emails

data/corpus/betz_rau.txt

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ making and drives public deliberation and debate.
 Unfortunately, we are not very good at getting practical arguments right. Intuitive
 practical reasoning risks to suffer from various shortcomings and fallacies as
 39
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 soon as a decision problem becomes a bit more complex – for example in terms of
 predictive uncertainties, the variety of outcomes to consider, the temporal structure
 of the decision problem, or the variety of values that bear on the decision (see
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ extension of – the programme of an argumentative turn, which was so far mainly
 perspectives of political science and empirical discourse analysis.
 2 For examples, see Singer (1988:157–9).
 40 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 guided by the goal of making the given argumentation as clear as possible and by
 standards for evaluating arguments: premises can be right/true or wrong, arguments
 can be valid or invalid, strong or weak.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ with reference to examples.
 3We freely draw on our earlier work, specifically Brun (2014), Brun and Hirsch Hadorn (2014),
 Betz (2013), and Betz (2010).
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 41
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 2.1 Tasks of Argument Analysis
 Argument analysis, understood in a wide sense, involves two basic activities:
 reconstruction and evaluation of argumentation and debates.
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ place of “multiple”. See Snoeck Henkemans (2001) a survey on terminology and
 of complex argumentation.
 6We use “inference” as a technical term for completely explicit and well-ordered arguments.
 42 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 requires taking decisions which need to be made with a perspective to the other
 reconstructive tasks. Another reason is that each subsequent step of reconstruction
 will identify additional structure, which may prompt us to revise or refine an
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ identify the structure of the argumentation
 Fig. 3.1 Interplay of reconstruction and evaluation in argument analysis (Adapted from Brun and
 Hirsch Hadorn 2014:209)
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 43
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 Let us now turn from reconstruction to evaluation. A comprehensive evaluation
 of arguments and complex argumentation involves assessing a whole range of
 qualities. The following may be distinguished:
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ author’s argumentation to argument analysis which seeks to find the best argum
 that can be constructed following more or less closely the line of reasoning in
 some given argumentative text.
 44 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 The exegetical aspect implies that reconstructions must answer to hermeneutic
 principles, especially accuracy (sometimes called “loyalty”7) and charity. “Accuracy”
 means that a reconstruction must be defensible with respect to the argumentative
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ position, resolve whether to accept a controversial claim, reach consensus on so
 the context of argument analysis see Reinmuth (2014).
 8 On various aspects of clarification see also Morscher (2009:1–58) and Hansson (2000).
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 45
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 issue, shake an opponent’s convictions or explore the consequences of adopting a
 certain position. Argument analysis by itself does not directly realize such aims,
 neither does it necessarily lead to better arguments. However, it may prove effective
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ interesting and well paid job in Chicago. But the catch is that, if you wanted t
 job, you would have to take a plane [. . .]. Therefore there would be a very small but
 positive probability that you might be killed in a plane accident. [. . .]
 46 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 [3.2] The maximin principle says that you must evaluate every policy available to you in
 terms of the worst possibility that can occur to you if you follow that particular policy. [. . .]
 [2.1] If you choose the New York job then the worst (and, indeed, the only) possible
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ whether some element of a text is part of an argument is functional. Being a
 premise or a conclusion is not a matter of the form or the content of a sentence,
 but a role a statement can play, just like being an answer. Identifying arguments in a
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 47
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 text therefore presupposes at least a rough understanding of the structure of the text.
 A well-tested strategy is to start by sketching the main argument(s) in a passage in
 one’s own words and as succinctly as possible. For [Harsanyi] that could be
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ needs to be resolved, for example, different readings of scope (“Transportatio
 and industry contribute 20 % to the US greenhouse gas emissions.”). Thirdly,
 context-dependent, for example, indexical (“I”, “this”, “here”, “now”, . . .) and
 48 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 anaphoric (“Harsanyi quotes Rawls before he criticizes him.”), expressions, must be
 replaced if there is a danger that their interpretation might not be clear in the
 resulting representation of the argument. In practice, the necessary reformulation
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ representation of inference
 experiment” and r to “we ought not to perform on the animal an experiment that would be
 considered outrageous if performed on one of us.”
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 49
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 (e.g. “and” instead of “but”, “not acceptable” instead of “inacceptable”) and
 especially eliminating stylistic variations, for example, by replacing expressions
 which are synonymous in the context at hand by one and the same. In the examples
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ author and deal with “incomplete” arguments by revising the ascribed belief
 As Jacquette (1996) has pointed out, adding a premise is in some cases less charitable than
 strengthening a premise or weakening the conclusion.
 50 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 plausible. Exercising judgement rather than applying a formal procedure is needed
 for assessing the alternative suggestions and deciding which one to select.
 Both, the notion of an enthymeme and the appeal to charity are linked to the
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ can convert the argument at hand into an equivalent deductive one with a
 13 Sentence S is logically stronger than sentence T (and T is logically weaker than S) just in case S
 implies T but not vice versa.
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 51
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 weakened premise and investigate which additional premises are needed for such a
 conversion. For both strategies, argumentation schemes may be used as a
 heuristic tool.
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ but calls for investigation by, for example, perception, science or ethics. The
 exceptions are inconsistencies that can be detected by logical or semantical analysis
 which shows that the logical form or the meaning of a set of premises guarantees
 52 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 that they cannot all be true.14 Inferences involving an inconsistent set of premises
 are negatively evaluated since they cannot perform the core functions of arguments;
 they provide no reason in favour of the conclusion. However, arguments with an
@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ and only derivatively to arguments. An arguments can then be called “deductive
 because it is meant or taken to be evaluated by deductive standards, or because it performs well
 with respect to deductive standards. (Skyrms 2000:ch. II.4).
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 53
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 deductively valid is more ambitious insofar as referring to just one case will not
 do. We rather need a general argument which shows that there cannot be a case in
 which the premises are true and the conclusion false.
@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ validity: non-deductive strength is compatible with the conclusion being false e
 17 In this chapter, we use “validity” simpliciter as an abbreviation for “deductive validity”; in the
 literature it often also abbreviates “formal validity”.
 54 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 if all the premises are true, it comes in degrees, and it is nonmonotonic; that is,
 adding premises can yield a stronger or weaker argument. An immediate consequence
 is that even if a strong non-deductive argument supports some conclusion,
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ The second type is exemplified in problems of dialectical irrelevance such as
 18 Lumer (2011) explains how argumentation schemes can be exploited for deductivist
 reconstructions.
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 55
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 arguments which do not support the thesis they are presented as supporting
 (ignoratio elenchi) or arguments which attack a position the opponent does not
 in fact defend (“straw-man”).19 In this way, Harsanyi’s undercut seems to miss
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ follows what we quoted as [Harsanyi].
 for example those which include evaluative terms (“good”, “better”). For a more precise and
 sophisticated discussion (using a different terminology), see Morscher (2013).
 56 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 explicit normative phrases in an argumentation relate to the same normative
 perspective.
 A second challenge for reconstructing practical arguments arises in connection
@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ modality. The situation is much more complex if for practical arguments which in
 sentences; that is, sentences only part of which are in the scope of a deontic modality. See
 Morscher (2013) for an accessible discussion.
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 57
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 4 Analysing Complex Argumentation
 4.1 Reconstructing Complex Argumentation
 as Argument Maps
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ Debater’s Handbook (Sather 1999:255–7); the items have only been shortened
 (as indicated) and re-labelled. The fact that many of the descriptive claims made
 are false (as of today) does not prevent the example from being instructive.
 58 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 Pro Con
 [Pro1.1] The world faces an energy crisis. Oil
 will be exhausted within 50 years, and coal will
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ individual arguments is guaranteed qua charitable reconstruction. Rather than us
 inference schemes for the reconstruction, we suggest to add corresponding general premises that
 can be criticized. Pollock’s undercut-relation hence effectively reduces to the attack relation.
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 59
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 • An argument supports another argument if the conclusion of the supporting
 argument is identical with (or at least entails) a premise of the supported
 argument.
@@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ arguments and theses
 (boxes) in the illustrative
 debate about nuclear power
 60 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 relations between the arguments, and theses). The map is basically a hypothesis
 about the debate’s dialectical structure, which has to be probed through detailed
 reconstructions of the individual arguments. At the same time, this hypothesis
@@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ entails non-T!]
 These two reconstructions corroborate the dialectic relations as presumed in the
 preliminary argument map (cf. their conclusions).
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 61
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 4.2 Argument Maps as Reasoning Tools
 Let us now suppose that all arguments have been reconstructed like [Pro1.1] and
 [Con2.1] above, and that the dialectic relations as visualized in Fig. 3.4 do really
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ undefended arguments must not be accepted. According to the approach championed
 chapter, in contrast, any argument can be reasonably accepted, as long as the proponent is willing
 to give up sufficiently many beliefs (and other arguments).
 62 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 • On the macro level, a complete (partial) position specifies for all (some) arguments
 in the debate whether it is accepted or refuted. To accept an argument
 means to consider all its premises as true. To refute an argument implies that at
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ and [Con2.1] is obviously not dialectically coherent; it directly violates one o
 above constraints. A partial position according to which all premises of [Pro1.1]
 and [Con2.1] are true is not dialectically coherent, either, because truth-values of
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 63
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 the remaining statements (i.e. conclusions) cannot be fixed without violating one of
 the above constraints.
 A micro or macro position which is not dialectically coherent violates basic
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ Fig. 3.5 Two macro positions, visualized against the background of the nuclear e
 argument map. “Checked” arguments are accepted, “crossed” arguments are refuted, “flashes”
 indicate local violations of rationality criteria (see also text)
 64 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 precise normative trade-offs involved when aggregating conflicting practical
 arguments.26
 Over and above coherence checking, argument maps can be valuable tools for
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ grandma, one should attempt to analyze the reasoning by means of the two princip
 not lie to relatives” and “You must not lie to strangers”, which can then be balanced against each
 other.
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 65
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 policy questions, further dissent concerning other arguments is then irrelevant
 (regarding policy consensus formation).
 Let us briefly return to our third criticism of pro/con lists: improper aggregation
@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ illustrative argument map
 Fig. 3.7 A simple, abstract
 argument map
 66 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 coherent micro position on this map and to determine whether one should accept the
 central thesis, one may execute the decision tree shown in Fig. 3.8.27
 We have started this section with the issue of aggregating conflicting reasons.
@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ we do not distinguish between denying a statement and suspending judgement.
 28 This section is adapted from http://www.argunet.org/2013/05/13/mapping-the-climate-engineer
 ing-controversy-a-case-of-argument-analysis-driven-policy-advice/ [last accessed 16.03.2015].
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 67
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 to offset the effects of anthropogenic GHG emissions. CE includes methods which
 shield the earth from incoming solar radiation (solar radiation management) and
 methods which take carbon out of the atmosphere (carbon dioxide removal).29
@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ that CE should be researched into so as to have these methods ready for deployme
 29 On the ethics of climate engineering and the benefits of argumentative analysis in this field
 compare Elliott (2016).
 68 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 in time. They have then visualized the core position in the argument map and
 calculated the logico-argumentative implications of the corresponding stance
 (cf. Fig. 3.9). The enhanced map shows, accordingly, which arguments one is
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ Fig. 3.9 Illustrative core position (here: thumbs up) and its logico-argumentati
 (here: thumbs down) in a detailed reconstruction of the moral controversy about so-called climate
 engineering (Source: Betz and Cacean 2012:87)
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 69
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 interestingly, though, all the empirical chapters of the assessment report
 (on physical and technical aspects, on sociological aspects, on governance aspects,
 etc.) consistently refer to the argument map and make explicit to which arguments
@@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ argument.
 30 Steele (2006) interprets the precautionary principle as a meta-principle for good decisionmaking
 which articulates essentially these two requirements.
 70 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 This choice boils down to the following question: should we allow for decision
 principles which individually do not satisfy standards of good decision-making? –
 Yes, we think so. The following simplified example is a case in point:
@@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ which do not correspond to any of these schemes. And schemes might have to be
 adapted in order to take the original text or plausibility etc. into account. That is,
 schemes are rather prototypes that will frequently provide a first version of an
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 71
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 argument reconstruction, which will be further improved in the reconstruction
 process.
 It is characteristic for practical arguments under uncertainty that their descriptive
@@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ when bringing about S] ought to be the case that S.
 (3) There is no alternative to X for agent A that [will/is likely to/might] bring
 about S and is more suitable than X.
 72 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 (4) The certain, likely and possible side-effects of agent A doing X are collectively
 negligible as compared to the [certain/likely/possible] realization
 of S.
@@ -1424,7 +1424,7 @@ B in Betz (2016)).
 [Principle of Prima Facie Rights Violation]
 If
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 73
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 (1) Persons P possess the prima facie right to be in state R.
 (2) Agent A doing X [certainly/likely/possibly] prevents persons P from being
 in or achieving state R.
@@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ especially not of their worst possible consequences.
 (4) There is no other available option whose worst possible consequence is
 (weakly) preferable to the worst possible consequence of option oþ.
 74 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 then
 (5) Option oþ ought to be carried out.
 For various examples of worst case arguments compare Betz (2016:Sect. 3.1).
@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ Resources Supporting Argument Analysis
 Bowell, Tracy, and Gary Kemp. 2015. Critical Thinking. A Concise Guide. 4th ed.
 London: Routledge.
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 75
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 Chapter 5 gives a very accessible yet reliable introduction to techniques of argument
 reconstruction focusing on the analysis of individual arguments and complex
 argumentation.
@@ -1548,7 +1548,7 @@ Hansson, S. O. (2016). Evaluating the uncertainties. In S. O. Hansson & G. Hirsc
 The argumentative turn in policy analysis. Reasoning about uncertainty (pp. 79–104). Cham:
 Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-30549-3_4.
 76 G. Brun and G. Betz
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 Hansson, S. O., & Hirsch Hadorn, G. (2016). Introducing the argumentative turn in policy analysis.
 In S. O. Hansson & G. Hirsch Hadorn (Eds.), The argumentative turn in policy analysis.
 Reasoning about uncertainty (pp. 11–35). Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-30549-3_2.
@@ -1603,7 +1603,7 @@ Press.
 Walton, D. N., Reed, C. A., & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press.
 3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 77
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 Chapter 6
 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision
 Making
@@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ with no background in argumentation theory, it is certainly profitable to study
 4 For an up-to-date decision-theoretic review of decision making under deep uncertainty see Etner
 et al. (2012).
 136 G. Betz
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 In the remainder of this introductory section, I will briefly comment on the limits
 of uncertainty quantification, the need for non-probabilistic decision methods and
 the concept of possibility.
@@ -1723,7 +1723,7 @@ Shrader-Frechette (2016 p. 12) and Doorn (2016, beginning). Compare Gilboa et al
 as Heal and Millner (2013) for a decision-theoretic defence.
 9 See again Shrader-Frechette (2016).
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 137
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 probabilistic information, it would be irresponsible not to make use of it in
 decision processes. In sum, this chapter construes reasoning about policy options
 as a tricky balancing act: it must rely on no more and on no less than what one
@@ -1768,7 +1768,7 @@ defence of doing so.
 12 For a state-of-the-art explication of the concept of real possibility, using branching-space-time
 theory, see Mu¨ller (2012).
 138 G. Betz
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 to a given body of knowledge13: a hypothesis is epistemically possible (relative to
 background knowledge K) if and only if it is consistent with K.14
 The following example may serve to illustrate the distinction. An expert team is
@@ -1814,7 +1814,7 @@ background knowledge K) and that K is in a specific way “complete”, i.e. inc
 can be known about S. Likewise, to assert that S does not represent a real possibility means that S
 is no epistemic possibility (relative to background knowledge K) and that K is objectively correct.
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 139
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 beliefs? First of all, note that this is a general issue in policy assessment, no matter
 whether we evaluate options in a possibilistic, probabilistic or deterministic mood.
 My reading of the argumentative turn is that we don’t need general rules which
@@ -1854,7 +1854,7 @@ pollution and business as usual. These different states-of-the-world, which are
 16 Brun and Betz (2016), this volume, which nicely complements this chapter, provides practical
 guidance for analyzing and evaluating argumentation.
 140 G. Betz
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 predicted in (1) and (2), are then normatively evaluated in premiss (3). The
 normative evaluation of outcomes is based on, or partially expresses an underlying
 (frequently implicit) “value theory,” a so-called axiology. Premiss (4) states a
@@ -1899,7 +1899,7 @@ or risk. As will become clear in the course of this chapter, these principles in
 substantial normative commitments and reflect different risk attitudes (such as
 levels of risk aversion) one may adopt.
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 141
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 Sound decision making under certainty requires one to consider all alternative
 options and all their consequences (to the extent that they are articulated and
 foreseen). Likewise, sound decision making under deep uncertainty requires one
@@ -1945,7 +1945,7 @@ A0 respectively. They are weak and preliminary in the sense that more elaborate
 will make them obsolete. Maybe we can construe them as heuristic reasoning which serves the
 piecemeal construction of more complex and robust practical arguments.
 142 G. Betz
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 choice. That is certainly how its methods are frequently presented and applied.19
 The argumentative turn is free from such hybris: Rational decision making
 according to the argumentative turn consists primarily in rational deliberation, in
@@ -1982,7 +1982,7 @@ will expand less quickly than otherwise. The latter case is clearly preferable t
 20 For a more detailed discussion of the implications of representation theorems see Briggs (2014:
 especially Sect. 2.2) and the references therein.
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 143
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 first one. The local authority should err on the safe side and prohibit the
 construction.
 The environmentalists put forward a simple worst case argument, whose core can
@@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ recommendations, it rather does not justify any prescription at all.
 21 Cf. Luce and Raiffa (1957:278), Resnik (1987:26).
 22 E.g. Elliott (2010).
 144 G. Betz
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 Example (Local Authority) Charged by their colleagues, the opponents of the new
 complex refine their original argument. They concede that if the local authority
 fails to clean up the mine, the habitat may be destroyed, too. But they say: We
@@ -2065,7 +2065,7 @@ have truly catastrophic consequences, (ii) the potential gains that may result
 24 Moreover, the general premiss (2) can be understood as an implementation of Hansson’s
 symmetry tests (cf. Hansson 2016).
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 145
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 from taking a risky option are negligible compared to the catastrophic effects that
 may ensue.25
 These prerequisites can be made explicit as antecedent conditions in the decision
@@ -2108,7 +2108,7 @@ view of both their corresponding best and worst case. In order to do so, best an
 general strategy to identify specific conditions under which the various decision principles may be
 applied is also favored by Resnik (1987:40).
 146 G. Betz
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 worst cases have to be compounded for each option. Let’s refer to the joint
 normative assessment of a pair of possible consequences (best and worst case) as
 “beta-balance.”26 The relative weight which is given to the worst case in such a
@@ -2151,7 +2151,7 @@ in decision theory (Resnik 1987: 32, Luce and Raiffa 1957:282). Hansson (2001:10
 investigates the formal properties of “extremal” preferences which only take best and worst
 possible cases into account.
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 147
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 surely bring about consequences X, then option A is preferred to option B.27 Now, we
 can also explain why the reasoning appears so plausible: Whatever the exact level of
 risk aversion, the beta-balance of option A is greater than that of option B and hence
@@ -2195,7 +2195,7 @@ decision-theoretic analyzes by Schmidt et al. (2011) and Neubersch et al. (2014)
 shows that decision-making which seeks to minimize the probability of some harm runs into
 problems as soon as various harmful outcomes with different disvalue are distinguished.
 148 G. Betz
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 (2) The value of a possible consequence of erecting or not erecting the steel wall is
 roughly proportional the corresponding likelihood that the historic building is
 not fully destroyed.
@@ -2237,7 +2237,7 @@ order to test whether preliminarily identified options are really robust.29
 29 Robust decision analysis "a la Lempert et al. is hence a systematic form of “hypothetical
 retrospection” (see Hansson 2016, Sect. 6).
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 149
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 We will return to the epistemic challenge of deep uncertainty—namely the
 problem of fully grasping the space of possibilities—in the second part of this
 chapter. But deep uncertainty also poses a normative challenge for robust decision
@@ -2280,7 +2280,7 @@ will result in different arguments.30 For example, argument H:
 adopts with regard to them can be understood as an operationalization of Hansson’s degrees of
 unacceptability (cf. Hansson 2013:69–70).
 150 G. Betz
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 (1) A possible outcome is acceptable if and only if no person is killed and the
 operation has a total cost of less than 1 million €. [Normative guardrails]
 (2) There is no possible consequence of defusing the bomb according to which a
@@ -2320,7 +2320,7 @@ affected by a measure to provide consent (e.g. future generations). The simple
 31 For a detailed discussion of risk imposition and the problems standard moral theories face in
 coping with risks see Hansson (2003).
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 151
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 principle of risk imposition is hence too strict. It must be limited to cases where
 those potentially affected are in a position to provide consent, or it must state
 alternative necessary conditions for permissibility. Another problem is that the
@@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ can be analyzed. See also Hansson (2013:97–101).
 of the possible from the impossible involves as influential a choice as the selection of a decision
 principle.
 152 G. Betz
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 knowledge. (In particular, for any such statementHjxj!10 there exists a time trel such
 that Hjxj!10 can be derived from the Newtonian model of the pendulum and the
 possibility that the pendulum has been released at trel.) On the other hand, every
@@ -2404,7 +2404,7 @@ is the claim that the hypothesis is consistent with background knowledge. Howeve
 35 For this very reason, it is a non-trivial assumption that a dynamic model of a complex system
 (e.g. a climate model) is adequate for verifying possibilities about that system (cf. Betz 2015).
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 153
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 ii. There might be some conceptual possibilities which actually are inconsistent
 with the background knowledge, although we have not been able to show this
 (failure to falsify).
@@ -2445,7 +2445,7 @@ have more or less strong reasons to suspect that such possibilities exist, e.g.
 we deal with a complex system which we have only poorly understood so far.36
 36 See also the “epistemic defaults” discussed by Hansson (2016: Sect. 5).
 154 G. Betz
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 Class 2. By summing up the maximum contribution of all potential sources of sea
 level rise, climate scientists are in a position to robustly refute the conceptual
 possibility that global mean sea level will rise by 10 m until 2,100 with business
@@ -2490,7 +2490,7 @@ air conditioning system; the experts concede that they have not checked this yet
 they can be robustly ruled out—which, according to the authors, is the case for the most extreme
 ones (p. 24).
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 155
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 5 The Dynamics of Possibilistic Knowledge
 Our possibilistic foreknowledge is highly fallible. That’s already true for the simple
 notion of serious possibility in the sense of relative consistency with the background
@@ -2534,7 +2534,7 @@ had been verified by reference to other WW2 bombs recently found, whose trigger
 was intact. But these bombs all dated from the last 2 years of the war. So the
 argument from analogy does not really warrant anymore that the trigger of the
 156 G. Betz
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 bomb to-be-defused may be intact, too. For the time being, the possibility that the
 trigger is intact has to count as a merely articulated one. The experts had also
 considered whether the dust cloud of a potential detonation may damage the
@@ -2579,7 +2579,7 @@ hence don’t verify that specific scenario (given the correct assumption). The
 possibility that no window breaks becomes a merely articulated possibility (unless,
 e.g., an accordingly modified simulation re-affirms the original finding). Also, the
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 157
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 team originally excluded the possibility that the cultural heritage site will be
 damaged. But the argument which rules out this scenario, too, relied on a false
 premiss. Given the novel estimate of the bomb’s size, that possibility cannot be
@@ -2624,7 +2624,7 @@ items, the smaller the potential for surprise. If there’s reason to think that
 understanding of a system will change and improve quickly, however, one should
 also expect the overhaul of one’s possibilistic outlook.
 158 G. Betz
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 Of course, it’s impossible to predict what we will newly come to know in the
 future.42 But it’s not impossible to estimate whether our knowledge will change,
 and how much. So, in 1799 Humboldt had reason to expect that he would soon
@@ -2664,7 +2664,7 @@ progress (pp. 650–651).
 43 See Rescher (1984, 2009) for a discussion of limits of science and their various (conceptual or
 empirical) reasons.
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 159
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 (1) There is no available option whose worst non-falsified possible consequence is
 preferable to the worst non-falsified possible consequence of not permitting the
 construction.
@@ -2709,7 +2709,7 @@ results? It seems to me that the detonation plus small-scale evacuation is robus
 vis-"a-vis our original minimum standards and relative to all such verified
 possibilities.”
 160 G. Betz
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 So the team member explains that arguments H, I should be understood as
 referring to non-falsified possibilities. In addition, she sets up a further argument
 which only takes verified possibilities into account, argument L:
@@ -2752,7 +2752,7 @@ matter of that agent’s risk aversion. Likewise, an agent who seeks robust opti
 44 Brun and Betz (2016: especially Sect. 4.2) explain how argument analysis, and especially
 argument mapping techniques, help to balance conflicting normative reasons in general.
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 161
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 with respect to non-falsified possibilities is more risk averse than an agent who is
 content with robustness with respect to verified possibilities. (b) The profile of
 possibilistic predictions on which the decision is based. If, for example, there is a
@@ -2794,7 +2794,7 @@ Given a possibilistic outlook, a surprise has occurred just in case something
 has happened which wasn’t considered possible (i.e. was not referred to in some
 non-falsified possibility). Surprises may happen for different reasons. We may in
 162 G. Betz
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 particular distinguish two sorts of surprise, to which we already alluded above:
 (a) surprises that result from unknown unknowns; (b) surprises that result from the
 fallibility of and the occasional need to rectify one’s background knowledge.45
@@ -2833,7 +2833,7 @@ detail:
 45 Basili and Zappia (2009) discuss the role of surprise in modern decision theory and its
 anticipation in the works of George L. S. Shackle.
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 • If, considering all relevant aspects except their potential for surprise (i.e., the
 extent to which an option is associated with unknown unknowns), the options A
 and B are normatively equally good, and if A has a significantly greater potential
@@ -2874,7 +2874,7 @@ option B is normatively better than (should be preferred to) option A.
 • If option A has a significantly smaller potential for (undesirable) surprise (i.e.,
 the relevant background knowledge is provisional and more likely to be
 164 G. Betz
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 modified) than its alternatives and if carrying out option A doesn’t jeopardize a
 more significant value (than surprise aversion), then option A should be
 carried out.
@@ -2915,7 +2915,7 @@ recognizing the difference between conceptual possibilities that have been shown
 to be consistent with background knowledge and ones that merely have not been
 refuted. The conceptual framework also gives rise to a precise (possibilistic) notion
 6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 165
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 of surprise (e.g. unknown unknowns) and triggers an expansion of the arsenal of
 standard argument patterns for reasoning under great uncertainty.
 One major purpose of this chapter has been to refute the widely held prejudice