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+Analysing Practical Argumentation
+Georg Brun and Gregor Betz
+Abstract Argument analysis is a powerful tool for structuring policy deliberation
+and decision-making, especially when complexity and uncertainty loom large.
+Argument analysis seeks to determine which claims are justified or criticized by a
+given argumentation, how strong an argument is, on which implicit assumptions it
+rests, how it relates to other arguments in a controversy, and which standpoints one
+can reasonably adopt in view of a given state of debate. This chapter first gives an
+overview of the activities involved in argument analysis and discusses the various
+aims that guide argument analysis. It then introduces methods for reconstructing
+and evaluating individual arguments as well as complex argumentation and
+debates. In their application to decisions under great uncertainty, these methods
+help to identify coherent positions, to discern important points of (dis)agreement, as
+well as to avoid spurious consensus and oversimplification.
+Keywords Practical reasoning • Argument analysis • Reconstruction • Argument
+mapping • Uncertainty • Argumentation schemes
+1 Introduction
+When experts derive policy recommendations in a scientific report, they set forth
+arguments for or against normative claims; they engage in practical reasoning – and
+so do decision-makers who defend the choices they have made, NGOs who argue
+against proposed policy measures and citizens who question policy goals in a public
+consultation. Practical reasoning is an essential cognitive task that underlies policy
+making and drives public deliberation and debate.
+Unfortunately, we are not very good at getting practical arguments right. Intuitive
+practical reasoning risks to suffer from various shortcomings and fallacies as
+39
+
+soon as a decision problem becomes a bit more complex – for example in terms of
+predictive uncertainties, the variety of outcomes to consider, the temporal structure
+of the decision problem, or the variety of values that bear on the decision (see
+Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn 2016). Hence we need to analyse policy arguments and
+to make explicit which scientific findings and normative assumptions they presume,
+how the various arguments are related to each other and which standpoints the
+opponents in a debate may reasonably hold.
+Although argumentation does not provide an easy route to good decisions in the
+face of great uncertainty, the argumentative turn builds on the insight that substantial
+progress can be made with the help of argument analysis.1 Consider, for
+example, the following text which is listed as an argument against “nuclear energy”
+in Pros and Cons. A Debater’s Handbook:
+In the 1950s we were promised that nuclear energy would be so cheap that it would be
+uneconomic to meter electricity. Today, nuclear energy is still subsidised by the taxpayer.
+Old power stations require decommissioning that will take 100 years and cost billions.
+(Sather 1999:257)
+It is unclear which claim(s) this professed argument is supposed to attack or
+support, and maybe even more so, in which way it is supposed to do so. Analysis is
+needed to make the reasoning more specific and to reveal its hidden assumptions. In
+general, we expect that argument analysis can help us understand which aspects of a
+decision challenge are crucial, and in what respects and why we disagree. Does a
+disagreement concern the truth or the relevance of some premises? Or rather which
+conclusion they support or about how strong the argument is? Clarity in such
+matters is important, not least because there is always a danger that policy debates
+lead to a spurious consensus on an ill-defined position all parties interpret in favour
+of their own views.2
+If argument analysis should be of help in answering the questions mentioned and
+provide the desired clarity, it must provide reconstructions. It must start with the
+arguments that are put forward in a debate and try to represent them as clearly as
+possible in a form which allows for an effective evaluation. This is a task which
+differs not only from scientific research into the subject matter of the debate, but
+also from discourse analysis; that is, from empirical research which aims at
+describing and structuring the views and arguments different people put forward
+or subscribe to in a debate. As a reconstructive enterprise, argument analysis has
+both a descriptive goal, inasmuch as it deals with the arguments people actually use,
+and a normative perspective. This means that reconstructions of arguments are
+1 An “argumentative turn” in policy analysis and planning had first been proclaimed by Fisher and
+Forester (1993), who called for putting more emphasis on deliberative and communicative
+elements in decision making (see also Fischer and Gottweis 2012). We conceive of our chapter,
+and this book in general, as a genuinely normative, argumentation-theoretic contribution to – and
+extension of – the programme of an argumentative turn, which was so far mainly shaped by the
+perspectives of political science and empirical discourse analysis.
+2 For examples, see Singer (1988:157–9).
+40 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+guided by the goal of making the given argumentation as clear as possible and by
+standards for evaluating arguments: premises can be right/true or wrong, arguments
+can be valid or invalid, strong or weak.
+As a reconstructive enterprise, argument analysis is also not opposed to traditional
+decision theoretic reasoning. Quite the contrary, what has been said about
+argument analysis is true of applied decision theory as well: it is essentially a
+method for reconstructing and evaluating practical reasoning. But traditional decision
+theory is confined to problems which exhibit only a very limited range of
+uncertainty, namely unknown or not precisely known probabilities of outcomes (see
+Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn 2016). And it is restricted to a specific though important
+type of reasoning, so-called consequentialist arguments. Relying on traditional
+decision theory therefore also means systematically ignoring other kinds of practical
+arguments that may be set forth in order to justify policy conclusions. For this
+reason we suggest to conceive of argument analysis as the more general, more
+unbiased and hence more appropriate method for decision analysis, which incorporates
+the insights of traditional decision theory just as far as consequentialist
+arguments are concerned and the preconditions for its application are met.
+In Sect. 2, we start with a brief survey of the various tasks involved in argument
+analysis, the aims guiding argument analysis and the uses to which argument
+analysis may be put. Section 3 then introduces the basic techniques for analysing
+individual arguments and discusses the most common problems. On this basis, we
+sketch an approach to analysing complex argumentation and debates in Sect. 4,
+while Sect. 5 addresses strategies for dealing with the specific challenges of
+analysing reasoning involving practical decisions under uncertainty.
+Argument analysis is a lively field of research and the argumentative turn is no
+systematic, monolithic theory, but includes a plurality of approaches and methods.
+We therefore add the caveat that this chapter is neither a presentation of textbookmethods
+nor an overview of the available approaches, it is rather an opinionated
+introduction to analysing practical reasoning.3
+2 Tasks, Aims and Uses of Argument Analysis
+This section sets the stage for further discussion by giving a overview of argument
+analysis. We identify a range of tasks involved in argument analysis, give an
+account of the aims guiding argument analysis, and then briefly comment on the
+various uses which may be made of argument analysis. On the basis of this general
+overview, the subsequent sections discuss the individual tasks in more detail and
+with reference to examples.
+3We freely draw on our earlier work, specifically Brun (2014), Brun and Hirsch Hadorn (2014),
+Betz (2013), and Betz (2010).
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 41
+
+2.1 Tasks of Argument Analysis
+Argument analysis, understood in a wide sense, involves two basic activities:
+reconstruction and evaluation of argumentation and debates.
+Reconstruction of argumentation and debates comprises a range of tasks which
+take argumentative texts as inputs and return various representations as outputs.
+Roughly, one can distinguish the following activities of reconstruction:
+• Text analysis: extract debates and arguments from texts.
+• Debate Analysis: determine how the argumentation of different proponents
+relate to each other.4 For example, does A’s argument support or attack B’s
+argument or position?
+• Argument analysis in a narrow sense: break down complex argumentation into
+individual arguments and their relations. For example, identify attack and
+support relations between arguments, or distinguish “hierarchical” argumentation,
+in which one argument supports a premise of another argument, from
+“multiple” argumentation, in which several arguments support the same
+conclusion.5
+• Analyse individual arguments and recast them in standardized form as inferences
+6: determine which premises and which conclusion are given; reformulate
+unclear, incomplete and nonuniform sentences; supply missing elements.
+In this chapter, we discuss these tasks in reverse order and we take the analysis of
+debates and complex argumentation together since on a basic level debates and
+complex argumentation are analysed in the same way.
+Each of these tasks not only involves the identification of some argumentative
+structure but also its representation in a form which supports the goals of the
+reconstruction, especially the aim of enhancing clarity. For both, analysis and
+representation, a broad range of tools are available, ranging from informal guidelines
+to formal languages and software support (see the resources listed at the end of
+this chapter).
+It is important to note that the above list of reconstructive tasks is not to be read
+as implying that the activity of reconstructing has a simple sequential structure.
+Although the list can be used as a rough guide to reconstructing, the various tasks
+constitute neither a linear and nor a uniquely determined sequence of steps. They
+are rather (partly) interdependent, and backtracking and looping strategies will
+frequently be called for. One reason is that, in general, several competing reconstructions
+may be on offer in each and every step of analysis. This constantly
+4We use “debate” in a sense which does not necessarily involve more than one person. One can
+“internalize” proponents of various positions and explore how they can argue against each other.
+5 Sometimes “serial” or “subordinate” are used in place of “hierarchical”, and “convergent” in
+place of “multiple”. See Snoeck Henkemans (2001) a survey on terminology and basic structures
+of complex argumentation.
+6We use “inference” as a technical term for completely explicit and well-ordered arguments.
+42 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+requires taking decisions which need to be made with a perspective to the other
+reconstructive tasks. Another reason is that each subsequent step of reconstruction
+will identify additional structure, which may prompt us to revise or refine an
+“earlier” step. If, for example, the analysis of individual arguments uncovers
+ambiguities, this will often motivate exploring alternative reconstructions of the
+overarching complex argumentation. As we will shortly see, the reconstruction of
+an argumentation is also intertwined with its evaluation. The practical upshot is that
+reconstructing requires a strategy of trial and error, going back and forth between
+reconstruction and evaluation as well as between reconstructing individual arguments
+and more complex structures (see Fig. 3.1). Since all this requires creativity
+rather than following a predefined procedure, new ideas are always possible and
+consequently, the analysis of a realistically complex argumentation is an openended
+undertaking.
+Speaking of “reconstruction” should also help to avoid, right from the beginning,
+the misunderstanding that argument analysis is just a matter of uncovering a given
+but maybe hidden structure. As the discussions below will make clear, argument
+reconstruction is an activity based on and relative to some theoretical background, it
+involves creative and normative moves, and it aims at coming up with representations
+of arguments that meet certain standards the original texts typically fail to
+comply with, for example, full explicitness. This fits well with the term “reconstruction”,
+which refers to a construction guided by a pre-existing object or situation,
+in our case an argumentation.
+quality of the premises
+Evaluation
+validity or strength of the inferences
+contribution of the inference to the complex argumentation
+extract argumentation from text
+identify individual arguments
+recast arguments as inferences
+identify premises and conclusions
+reformulate unclear, incomplete and nonuniform statements
+deal with incomplete arguments
+represent complex argumentation as a map of inferences
+Reconstruction
+identify the structure of the argumentation
+Fig. 3.1 Interplay of reconstruction and evaluation in argument analysis (Adapted from Brun and
+Hirsch Hadorn 2014:209)
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 43
+
+Let us now turn from reconstruction to evaluation. A comprehensive evaluation
+of arguments and complex argumentation involves assessing a whole range of
+qualities. The following may be distinguished:
+• Truth and acceptability of the premises of individual arguments.
+• Validity or strength of individual arguments: does the truth of the premises
+guarantee or at least provide good reasons for the truth of the conclusion?
+Valid arguments with true premises are called “sound”.
+• Overall evaluation of a complex argumentation: is the argumentation valid or
+strong in view of the validity or strength of its component-arguments? Does the
+argumentation contain “gaps”?
+• Contribution of arguments to a complex argumentation, debate, discussion or
+inquiry (“dialectical relevance”).
+• Coherence of a position (as characterized by an argumentation).
+• Contribution of argumentation and debates to solve a problem, for example, a
+decision task.
+Not all of these aspects can be addressed by argument analysis alone. Most
+importantly, assessing the truth of the claims involved is subject to other kinds of
+research in, for example, empirical sciences or ethics.
+For some of these evaluations, extensive theoretical treatments are available.
+Logical theories, for example, make it possible to prove validity, the theory of
+dialectical structures can be used to effectively assess which position can be
+consistently adopted in a debate, and argumentation theory provides extensive
+treatments of fallacies; that is, of common patterns of invalid, weak, irrelevant,
+misleading or otherwise problematic arguments. Using some of these resources
+requires taking additional, non-trivial steps of reconstruction, such as formalizing
+inferences in order to prove their validity with the help of some logical
+theory.
+2.2 Aims and Guiding Perspectives
+Argument analysis may be done in the service of all kinds of practical or theoretical
+goals, but it always operates between two pulls. On the one hand, argument analysis
+is an interpretational undertaking dealing with some given argumentation, which it
+is therefore committed to take serious. On the other hand, argument analysis aims to
+represent the argumentation at hand as clearly as possible, evaluate it, and identify
+problems and potential for improvement. These two orientations open up a spectrum
+from exegetical to exploitative argument analysis (Rescher 2001:60), from
+argument analysis which aims at understanding as accurately as possible an
+author’s argumentation to argument analysis which seeks to find the best argumentation
+that can be constructed following more or less closely the line of reasoning in
+some given argumentative text.
+44 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+The exegetical aspect implies that reconstructions must answer to hermeneutic
+principles, especially accuracy (sometimes called “loyalty”7) and charity. “Accuracy”
+means that a reconstruction must be defensible with respect to the argumentative
+text, in particular its actual wording and the available information about its
+context. Charity calls for reconstructing an argumentation under the defeasible
+presumption that it performs well with respect to validity, soundness and the
+other evaluative dimensions mentioned above. In particular, charity is a “tiebreaker”
+if there are alternative, equally accurate interpretations. It requires, other
+things being equal, to select the most favourable interpretation. This makes sure
+that an unfavourable evaluation of an argument is not merely the result of interpretative
+mistakes of even malevolence. Charity is also a basic reason why reconstruction
+and evaluation are intertwined in argument analysis.
+However, reconstruction is also guided by the fundamental aim of clarification.
+This ideal comprises three core aspects: explicit, precise and transparent representation.
+Explicitness not only requires that the relation between individual arguments
+in a complex argumentation be represented explicitly, but also that the individual
+arguments are framed as inferences, which implies that all premises and the
+conclusion are made explicit and formulated as self-contained statements. “Precision”
+is not used in its numerical sense, but means that argument reconstruction
+needs to address ambiguity, context-dependence and vagueness in a way which
+makes sure that they do not lead to misevaluation of the arguments at hand.
+Transparency, finally, calls for representing debates, complex argumentations and
+individual arguments in a way that makes it easy to grasp their structure and get an
+overview.8
+In short, reconstruction means representing argumentation in a form which
+ensures that its structure is represented explicitly, precisely and transparently.
+Since these aspects of clarity as well as the hermeneutic principles of accuracy
+and charity may be partly antagonistic, trade-offs are often inevitable. And in such
+cases, deciding whether a proposed reconstruction is adequate requires judgement
+rather than applying a purely formal procedure. And in many cases more than one
+resolution of conflict, favouring different reconstructions, may be plausible.
+2.3 Uses of Argument Analysis
+The core function of arguing is to provide reasons for a claim, but arguments – even
+the same argument – may be put to very different uses. One may strive to identify
+supporting reasons as a means to, for example, support some statement, attack a
+position, resolve whether to accept a controversial claim, reach consensus on some
+7 See Walton (1996:211–6); for a more comprehensive discussion of hermeneutical principles in
+the context of argument analysis see Reinmuth (2014).
+8 On various aspects of clarification see also Morscher (2009:1–58) and Hansson (2000).
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 45
+
+issue, shake an opponent’s convictions or explore the consequences of adopting a
+certain position. Argument analysis by itself does not directly realize such aims,
+neither does it necessarily lead to better arguments. However, it may prove effective
+as a means to
+• reflect on one’s own reasoning and that of others; for example, by becoming
+more clearly aware of all the premises involved, of the exact relations between
+the constituents of a complex argumentation, or of the strengths and weaknesses
+of an argumentation;
+• identify promising revisions of a position; for example, eliminate problematic
+premises or strengthen an argument by resorting to a weaker conclusion or by
+adding supporting premises;
+• identify promising moves in a debate; for example, identify premises that could
+be used to support a position, finding arguments that may force an opponent to
+modify her position or identify arguments that can help to find a consensus.
+3 Analysing Individual Arguments
+In this section, we illustrate many aspects of argument analysis with the help of an
+argument from Singer’s Animal Liberation and a passage from Harsanyi, in which
+he criticizes John Rawls’s appeal to the maximin principle in A Theory of Justice
+(Rawls 1999). For the sake of exposition, we give comparatively meticulous
+reconstructions for these two untypically transparent examples (square brackets
+are used for cross-references and to indicate important changes to the original
+text):
+[Singer] So the researcher’s central dilemma exists in an especially acute form in psychology:
+either the animal is not like us, in which case there is no reason for performing the
+experiment; or else the animal is like us, in which case we ought not to perform on the
+animal an experiment that would be considered outrageous if performed on one of
+us. (Singer 2002:52)
+(1.1) Either the animal is not like us or else the animal is like us.
+(1.2) If the animal is not like us, there is no reason for performing the experiment.
+(1.3) If the animal is like us, we ought not to perform on the animal an experiment
+that would be considered outrageous if performed on one of us.
+(1.4) [There is no reason for performing the experiment or we ought not to perform
+on the animal an experiment that would be considered outrageous if
+performed on one of us.]
+[Harsanyi] Suppose you live in New York City and are offered two jobs at the same time.
+One is a tedious and badly paid job in New York City itself, while the other is a very
+interesting and well paid job in Chicago. But the catch is that, if you wanted the Chicago
+job, you would have to take a plane [. . .]. Therefore there would be a very small but
+positive probability that you might be killed in a plane accident. [. . .]
+46 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+[3.2] The maximin principle says that you must evaluate every policy available to you in
+terms of the worst possibility that can occur to you if you follow that particular policy. [. . .]
+[2.1] If you choose the New York job then the worst (and, indeed, the only) possible
+outcome will be that you will have a poor job but you will stay alive. [. . .] In contrast, [2.2]
+if you choose the Chicago job then the worst possible outcome will be that you may die in a
+plane accident. Thus, [2.4/3.1] the worst possible outcome in the first case would be much
+better than the worst possible outcome in the second case. Consequently, [3.3] if you want
+to follow the maximin principle then you must choose the New York job. [. . .]
+Clearly, this is a highly irrational conclusion. Surely, if you assign a low enough
+probability to a plane accident, and if you have a strong enough preference for the Chicago
+job, then by all means you should take your chances and choose the Chicago job. (Harsanyi
+1975:595)
+(2.1) The worst possible outcome of the option New York is having a poor job.
+(2.2) The worst possible outcome of the option Chicago is a dying in a plane
+accident.
+(2.3) [Having a poor job is much better than dying in a plane accident.]
+(2.4) The worst possible outcome of [the option New York] is much better than the
+worst possible outcome of [the option Chicago].
+(3.1) The worst possible outcome of the option New York is much better than the
+worst possible outcome of the option Chicago. [¼2.4]
+(3.2) [Given two options, the maximin principle says that you must choose the one
+the worst possible outcome of which is better than the worst possible outcome
+of the other.]
+(3.3) [The maximin principle says that] you must choose the option New York.
+3.1 Basics of Reconstruction
+A reconstruction of an individual argument takes an argumentative text as its input
+and aims at delivering an inference as its output. The guiding principles are the
+hermeneutic maxims of accuracy and charity as well as the ideal of clarity with its
+aspects of explicitness, precision, and transparency. In principle, the reconstruction
+proceeds by employing four basic types of operations: elements which do not
+contribute to the argument, for example, digressions and purely rhetoric embellishments,
+are deleted, unclear statements are reformulated, premises and conclusion
+are rearranged into a standard form, and missing elements, such as (parts of) a
+premise or the conclusion are added.
+The first task is to find argumentative elements in a text. In argumentative
+passages, one or more statements are treated as providing a reason for a further
+statement (and this in turn may be done in the service of any of the many uses to
+which arguments can be put; see Sect. 2). Hence, the criterion which decides
+whether some element of a text is part of an argument is functional. Being a
+premise or a conclusion is not a matter of the form or the content of a sentence,
+but a role a statement can play, just like being an answer. Identifying arguments in a
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 47
+
+text therefore presupposes at least a rough understanding of the structure of the text.
+A well-tested strategy is to start by sketching the main argument(s) in a passage in
+one’s own words and as succinctly as possible. For [Harsanyi] that could be
+(of course, many other formulations are equally plausible at this stage of analysis):
+(4) The worst possible outcome of the option Chicago (dying in a plane accident) is much
+worse than the worst possible outcome of the option New York (a poor job). Therefore,
+according to the maximin principle you must choose the option New York.
+One can then turn to the analysis of individual arguments, and tackle the problem
+of identifying the premises and the conclusion. In practice, this is not just a matter
+of applying formal techniques. “Indicator words” such as “therefore”, “thus”,
+“because” and many more are certainly worth paying attention to, but they cannot
+be used as simple and reliable guides to an argument’s structure. It is usually best to
+try to identify a conclusion (which may not be stated explicitly) and then actively
+search for premises, also with the help of hypotheses about what would make for a
+good argument. A functional perspective provides the guide for this search: what
+would fit what we already have found out or assumed about the argument at hand?
+What makes sense in light of the complex argumentation or the debate the argument
+is part of? (Betz 2010:§ 99; Sect. 4 below). In [Harsanyi], we know (from the
+context) that Harsanyi wants to attack Rawls’s use of the maximin principle and
+specifically the claim that one should take the New York job. Hence the conclusion
+of (4) is a good starting point.
+Once some premises or a conclusion are identified, they must typically be
+reformulated for the sake of clarity. Explicitness requires that all premises and
+the conclusion must be specified as a complete, independently comprehensible
+sentence. This is of special importance if more than one element of an argument
+are given in one sentence. In extracting individual premises or a conclusion from
+such sentences, the result must be spelled out as a full sentence, which usually
+means that some anaphoric expressions (expressions used in such a way that their
+interpretation depends on the interpretation of other expressions, e.g. relative pronouns,
+or “first case” and “second case” in 2.4) must be replaced by expressions
+which can be independently interpreted.
+A second aspect of clarity is precision. Eliminating ambiguity, contextdependence
+and vagueness altogether is neither realistic, nor necessary for the
+purposes of argument analysis. But certain problems call for reformulation.
+Concerning ambiguity and context-dependence, premises and conclusions must
+firstly be represented in a way which avoids equivocation; that is, the use of
+corresponding instances of the same expression with different meanings. In
+[Singer], for example, an equivocation would result if “is like us” did not refer to
+the same aspects of likeness in its two occurrences; reconstruction (1) assumes that
+this is not the case. Some of these problems can be tackled by employing, or if
+necessary introducing, a standardized terminology (e.g. restricting “risk” to known
+probabilities; see Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn 2016). Secondly, syntactical ambiguity
+needs to be resolved, for example, different readings of scope (“Transportation
+and industry contribute 20 % to the US greenhouse gas emissions.”). Thirdly,
+context-dependent, for example, indexical (“I”, “this”, “here”, “now”, . . .) and
+48 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+anaphoric (“Harsanyi quotes Rawls before he criticizes him.”), expressions, must be
+replaced if there is a danger that their interpretation might not be clear in the
+resulting representation of the argument. In practice, the necessary reformulation
+of premises and conclusion is often greatly facilitated by introducing notational aids
+such as brackets or subscripts (e.g. “risk1” for known probabilities of outcomes,
+“risk2” for unwanted outcomes).
+Argument analysis will also sometimes uncover vagueness; that is, expressions
+for which there are “borderline-cases” cases in which it is unclear whether the
+expression applies although the meaning of the expression is clear. Vagueness is a
+pervasive and to a large extent unproblematic feature of natural language expressions,
+but it can have the undesired effect that the truth of a sentence featuring a
+vague expression cannot be assessed. However, if reducing vagueness is necessary,
+this task cannot be handled with the resources of argumentation theory alone.
+Deciding in which way statements should be made more exact is rather a matter
+of considerations relating to the subject matter of the argument at hand.
+The goal of transparency, the third aspect of clarity, means that it should be easy
+to recognize the meaning of every sentence in an inference as well as its logical
+structure and, more generally, any structure relevant to argument evaluation with
+respect to, for example, the strength of individual arguments or the coherence of a
+position. Key factors of transparency are abbreviation, simplicity and uniformity of
+expression, easily graspable symbols and a direct correlation between features of
+the representation and features of the argument which are relevant to its evaluation.
+In practice, all this boils down to representing debates, argumentations, inferences
+and individual sentences in standardized forms which are easily grasped.
+Transparency is therefore to a considerable degree a matter of selecting appropriate
+tools for representing inferences. Examples range from the format premises –
+inference bar – conclusion (as in 1–3) and visualizations (e.g. Fig. 3.2) to logical
+languages (e.g. Øp _ p; Øp ! q; p ! r ) q _ r for (1)9). While the former are
+readily graspable, logical formulas become cognitively efficient only after some
+initial training.
+On an informal level, streamlining formulations is nearly always of pivotal
+importance. This includes eliminating superfluous elements (e.g. purely illustrative
+examples), simplifying needlessly complex phrasing, introducing informal abbreviations,
+introduce standard expressions for marking out logical structure
+1.4
+Fig. 3.2 Alternative 1.1 1.2 1.3
+representation of inference
+(1) reconstructed from
+[Singer]
+9 With p corresponding to “the animal is like us”, q to “there is no reason for performing the
+experiment” and r to “we ought not to perform on the animal an experiment that would be
+considered outrageous if performed on one of us.”
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 49
+
+(e.g. “and” instead of “but”, “not acceptable” instead of “inacceptable”) and
+especially eliminating stylistic variations, for example, by replacing expressions
+which are synonymous in the context at hand by one and the same. In the examples
+(1)–(3), the most extensive reformulation is (3.2), which replaces Harsanyi’s casual
+formulation of the maximin principle by a more precise one.
+3.2 Dealing with Incomplete Arguments
+A certain type of incomplete arguments, so called enthymemes, are responsible for
+notorious problems of argument reconstruction. Enthymemes are arguments which
+are weak in the form in which they have been put forward, but merely because a
+premise or the conclusion has been “left implicit”. Such arguments are extremely
+common because efficient transmission of information with the help of relatively
+few explicit expressions is a basic trait of natural language communication. This
+favours leaving unexpressed what can be assumed as easily understood anyway.
+Enthymemes are arguments which exploit this feature of natural language communication
+by not explicitly stating a premise or the conclusion.10 Accordingly, not all
+incomplete or otherwise weak arguments count as enthymemes, but only those
+which can more or less readily be completed in a way which can be assumed to go
+without saying in the context at hand.
+In what follows, we introduce the traditional approach to deal with incomplete
+arguments by supplying premises or a conclusion.11 This approach is motivated by
+the goal of explicitness and guided by the hermeneutic principles of accuracy and
+charity, which, however, are antagonistic in this context. Charity speaks in favour
+of reconstructing an inference that can be positively evaluated and accuracy in
+favour of respecting the actual wording of an argument. Adding a premise or a
+conclusion will therefore have a price in accuracy even if it is charitable.12
+Importantly, charity and accuracy come in degrees, can be traded off against each
+other, and often more than one candidate for completing an argument will remain
+10 Of course, reconstructing enthymemes does not rest on the highly dubious idea that all implicit
+information should be made explicit. Even complete arguments virtually always involve a great
+deal of presuppositions. That the premise “The 2-degree-target can no longer be achieved”, as well
+as its negation, imply “Reaching the 2-degree-target is not impossible at every point in time” does
+not mean that the latter sentence should be reconstructed as an additional premise.
+11 In fact, missing conclusions are often neglected in the literature.
+One alternative to the traditional approach relies on argument schemes and adds the elements
+needed to turn the argument at hand into an instance of such a scheme (Paglieri and Woods 2011).
+Another idea is to interpret arguments against the background of a belief-state ascribed to its
+author and deal with “incomplete” arguments by revising the ascribed belief state (Brun and Rott
+2013).
+12 This presupposes that charity is interpreted as a presumptive principle, not merely a tie-breaker.
+As Jacquette (1996) has pointed out, adding a premise is in some cases less charitable than
+strengthening a premise or weakening the conclusion.
+50 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+plausible. Exercising judgement rather than applying a formal procedure is needed
+for assessing the alternative suggestions and deciding which one to select.
+Both, the notion of an enthymeme and the appeal to charity are linked to the
+evaluation of arguments. Hence reconstruction and evaluation are intertwined in
+dealing with enthymemes. Considerations of deductive validity or non-deductive
+strength (to be discussed below) go into judging whether an argument counts as an
+enthymeme and in which ways it may be completed.
+When reconstructing enthymemes by adding a conclusion, the leading consideration
+is whether a sentence can be found which turns the given enthymeme into a
+strong argument and which suits the conclusion’s role in its dialectical context.
+Specifically, the argument resulting from adding a conclusion should fit into the
+complex argumentation, which it is part of according to the analysis in progress. If,
+for example, an argument is thought to constitute an attack on another argument, its
+conclusion may be expected to be incompatible with one of the latter’s premises; if
+it is thought to be part of a hierarchical complex argumentation, its conclusion is
+expected to be effective as a premise of another argument (e.g. 2.4 and 3.1). In the
+example [Singer], the context in Animal Liberation strongly suggests a conclusion
+which speaks against experimenting on animals. In practice, the search for prospective
+conclusions can be facilitated by checking out whether the given premises
+fit an argumentation scheme; that is, a commonly used pattern of arguing (see
+Walton et al. 2008). For example, the reconstruction (1) and specifically the added
+conclusion (1.4) are guided by the idea (suggested by Singer) that this argument can
+be reconstructed as instantiating one of the standard schemes of dilemmas. For
+practical arguments, the decision principles discussed in Sect. 5 can be used as a
+heuristic guide.
+For adding premises, the leading consideration is that one or more sentences
+need to be found which yield a strong argument and which can be defended as
+acceptable and more or less obvious relative to their dialectical context. The
+question is not whether the author of the argument or of the reconstruction actually
+finds the prospective premise acceptable or obvious, but whether it can be assumed
+to have these qualities in the context in which the argument at hand is supposed to
+provide a reason for its conclusion. This may well be a position an author is
+attacking or discussing, rather than endorsing herself. For example, since Harsanyi
+refers to Rawls’s position, the added premises (2.3) needs to be acceptable to
+Rawls in the described fictional situation, not to Harsanyi. As a practical strategy
+(see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004:3, 117), one may start with the “logical
+minimum” as a candidate for the additional premise. For deductive arguments, this
+is a sentence of the form “If [the given premises], then [the given conclusion]”.
+For non-deductive arguments, two strategies are available. One can either try to
+find a weakest13 premise which yields a non-deductively strong argument, or one
+can convert the argument at hand into an equivalent deductive one with a
+13 Sentence S is logically stronger than sentence T (and T is logically weaker than S) just in case S
+implies T but not vice versa.
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 51
+
+weakened premise and investigate which additional premises are needed for such a
+conversion. For both strategies, argumentation schemes may be used as a
+heuristic tool.
+Once a candidate for a reconstruction has been found, one has to decide
+whether the supplementary premises can plausibly be ascribed to a proponent of
+the relevant position. This may not be the case for two reasons. If the premise is
+inacceptable to the proponent because it is too strong, the argument cannot be
+dealt with as an enthymeme, but must be evaluated as weak. However, a premise
+can also be implausible because it is too weak. Typically this is due to problematic
+implicatures; that is, claims not implied but suggested by the prospective
+premise in virtue of communicative principles (van Eemeren and Grootendorst
+1992:ch. 6). In such cases, a stronger premise may yield a more adequate
+reconstruction. The logical minimum for (3) in [Harsanyi], for example, would
+be (3.2*), which is much less plausible than (3.2) as a premise expressing the
+maximin principle:
+(3.2*) If the worst possible outcome of the option New York is much better than the worst
+possible outcome of the option Chicago, then the maximin principle says that you
+must choose the option New York.
+Two important general points need be noted. The hypothesis that an argument is
+an enthymeme is, of course, defeasible. Hence, reconstructing incomplete arguments
+can take different routes. Either a complete inference can be reconstructed
+which can be defended in light of the hermeneutic principles and the specific
+considerations discussed, or else one may conclude that the argument presented is
+just weak, or even resolve that it is unclear what it is supposed to be an argument
+for. Secondly, there may be several ways in which an enthymeme can be
+reconstructed as a complete inference, each fitting into a different reconstruction
+of the complex argumentation at hand. Selecting a best reconstruction is than a
+matter of an overall judgement.
+3.3 Evaluation of Arguments
+Arguments can be evaluated in (at least) three respects: the quality of their premises,
+the strength of the relation between premises and conclusion, and the
+argument’s contribution to the complex argumentation which it is part of. In this
+section, we focus on the first two perspectives; the third is discussed in Sect. 4. All
+these evaluations address inferences, and therefore presuppose that at least a
+tentative reconstruction of the argument at hand has been carried out.
+With respect to the quality of the premises, the question whether they are true is
+obviously of central interest. In general, it cannot be answered by argument analysis
+but calls for investigation by, for example, perception, science or ethics. The main
+exceptions are inconsistencies that can be detected by logical or semantical analysis
+which shows that the logical form or the meaning of a set of premises guarantees
+52 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+that they cannot all be true.14 Inferences involving an inconsistent set of premises
+are negatively evaluated since they cannot perform the core functions of arguments;
+they provide no reason in favour of the conclusion. However, arguments with an
+inconsistent set of premises are relatively seldom found. Much more common are
+inconsistencies arising in the broader context of a complex argumentation, when a
+proponent endorses an inconsistent set of sentences (see Sect. 4). Plainly, truth and
+consistency must be distinguished from acceptability since we do not live in a world
+in which people accept all and only true sentences (in such a world, there would be
+little need for arguments). Premises must therefore also be evaluated with respect to
+whether they are acceptable in their dialectical context. If, for example, an argument
+is supposed to convert an opponent or to undercut15 its position (as in
+Harsanyi’s argumentation against Rawls), its premises must be acceptable to the
+opponent, irrespective of whether they are acceptable to the proponent or the author
+of the argument. Again, this is a matter that needs to be assessed in the course of
+analysing the broader argumentative context.
+The second perspective from which arguments are evaluated focuses on the
+relation between the premises and the conclusion. The leading perspective is that a
+good argument should lead from true premises to a true conclusion: does the truth of
+the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion or does it at least provide strong
+support? Two standards are commonly distinguished, deductive validity and
+non-deductive strength. If an inference is evaluated for deductive validity, the
+question is whether the conclusion must be true if the premises all are. If evaluated
+for non-deductive strength, the question is whether the premises provide a strong
+reason, if not an absolute guarantee, for the truth of the conclusion.16
+Deductive validity is conceived as a maximally strong link between premises
+and conclusion in the following sense: it guarantees (in a logical sense to be
+explained below) that the conclusion is true if the premises are. This leaves room
+for deductively valid inferences with premises or conclusions that are false; it only
+excludes the possibility that we could be confronted with true premises and a false
+conclusion. Hence a deductively valid inference can be put to two basic uses:
+showing that the conclusion is true, given that the premises are true; or showing
+that at least one premise is false, given that the conclusion is false (this is Harsanyi’s
+overall strategy of argumentation). Another important consequence is that for
+showing an inference to be deductively invalid, it suffices to point out one situation
+in which the premises are true but the conclusion false. Showing that an inference is
+14 Other inconsistencies, e.g. inconsistency of a premise with known facts of science, are just a
+reason for assessing the premise in question as false.
+15 In an undercut argument, the proponent (who puts forward the argument) uses premises which
+the opponent accepts to infer a conclusion which the opponent denies. See Betz (2013) for a
+typology of dialectical moves.
+16 The distinction between deductive and non-deductive primarily applies to standards of evaluation
+and only derivatively to arguments. An arguments can then be called “deductive” either
+because it is meant or taken to be evaluated by deductive standards, or because it performs well
+with respect to deductive standards. (Skyrms 2000:ch. II.4).
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 53
+
+deductively valid is more ambitious insofar as referring to just one case will not
+do. We rather need a general argument which shows that there cannot be a case in
+which the premises are true and the conclusion false.
+Such arguments can be given in basically two ways, which correspond to two
+varieties of deductive validity. The first is called “formal” validity17 and covers
+arguments which are valid in virtue of one of their logical forms. Logical forms are
+constituted by features of inferences which are relevant to their validity and “topic
+neutral” such as the way inferences can be analysed into constituents of logically
+relevant categories (e.g. sentences, predicates and singular terms) and logical
+expressions such as “and”, “all” and “if . . . then”. The core idea of formal validity
+is that some inferences are valid solely in virtue of such structural features and
+regardless of the meaning of the non-logical expressions they involve. The notion
+of logical form is relative to a logical theory (of, e.g. zero- or first order logic), and
+such a theory is also needed to actually show that an inference is formally valid. The
+basic structure of a proof of formal validity involves two steps. First, the inference
+at hand must be formalized. One of its logical forms must be represented by means
+of a formula; that is, a schematic expressions of the formal language which is part of
+the logical theory. Secondly, the logical theory can be used to prove that every
+inference which has a logical form represented by the scheme in question is valid.
+Well-known techniques for such proofs include truth tables and natural deduction.
+In this way, the validity of the example [Singer] can be shown by proving Øp _ p;
+Øp ! q; p ! r ) q _ r.
+The second form of deductively valid inferences are “materially” valid inferences
+(also called “semantically” or “analytically” valid), the validity of which is
+due to a logical form and the meaning of (some of) the non-logical expressions they
+contain (e.g. “Option New York is better than option Chicago. Therefore Chicago is
+worse than New York.”). One way of dealing with materially valid inferences
+employs a strategy of treating such inferences as enthymematic counterparts of
+formally valid inferences. If a premise expressing the conceptual relationship
+responsible for the materially valid inference is added to the original, a formally
+valid inference results. The inference at hand is then materially valid just in case the
+resulting inference is formally valid and the added premise expresses a conceptual
+truth. In reconstruction (2) of [Harsanyi], for example, one could add (2.5) as a
+premise and then get (2.6) as a conclusion (in line with 4):
+(2.5) x is much better than y just in case y is much worse than x.
+(2.6) The worst possible outcome of the option Chicago is much worse than the worst
+possible outcome of the option New York.
+Non-deductive strength is an attribute of inferences which are deductively
+invalid, but the premises of which nonetheless provide good reason for their
+conclusions. Three characteristics distinguish non-deductive strength from logical
+validity: non-deductive strength is compatible with the conclusion being false even
+17 In this chapter, we use “validity” simpliciter as an abbreviation for “deductive validity”; in the
+literature it often also abbreviates “formal validity”.
+54 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+if all the premises are true, it comes in degrees, and it is nonmonotonic; that is,
+adding premises can yield a stronger or weaker argument. An immediate consequence
+is that even if a strong non-deductive argument supports some conclusion,
+there can still be a counter-argument which shows that this conclusion is false.
+Evaluating the non-deductive strength of arguments is a much more heterogeneous
+business than assessing deductive validity. In the literature, a range of different
+types of non-deductive inferences are analysed. Examples include inferences based
+on probability (“inductive” inferences), analogies, inferences to the best explanation
+and inferences involving causal reasoning or appeal to the testimony of experts.
+It is debated how the various types of non-deductive inferences can best be
+analysed, whether they can be reduced to a few basic theoretical principles and
+whether they admit of a uniform and maybe even formal treatment. Some also
+defend a deductivist strategy of systematically correlating (some types of)
+non-deductively strong arguments to deductively valid ones with additional premises
+and a weaker conclusion. Again, argumentation schemes can be used as a
+heuristic tool for identifying candidates for additional premises.18 One particular
+idea is to include premises which express that there are no valid or strong counterarguments.
+We critically elaborate on this approach in Sect. 5, which also includes a
+range of examples.
+Invalid and non-deductively weak inferences pose a particular challenge to the
+analyst. If she fails to show that an inference is valid or strong, this may be her
+fault rather than a deficit of the inference. For invalidity, there is the simple case
+mentioned above, in which we find that an inference has true premises and a false
+conclusion in some possible situation. But unless we can refer to such a direct
+counter-example, showing formal invalidity amounts to showing that the inference
+has no valid logical form, and there is, strictly speaking, no general way of
+conclusively showing that we have investigated all the inference’s logical forms
+(see Cheyne 2012). All we can do, is making plausible that an inference has no
+valid form, and for this, we need to rely on the assumption that we have
+considered all formal features of the inference which may be relevant to its
+validity. So any verdict of invalidity is at most as plausible as this assumption.
+And similar considerations apply in case of material invalidity and non-deductive
+weakness. Still, verdicts of invalidity or non-deductive weakness can often be
+argued convincingly, for example, by pointing out a confusion about necessary
+and sufficient conditions.
+Many more defects of arguments are systematically studied under the label
+“fallacies”. In general, fallacies are arguments that are irrelevant or misleading,
+especially because they are presented as being valid or strong although they are in
+fact invalid or weak, or as performing a dialectical function they in fact do not
+perform. The first type, traditionally called non sequitur, has just been discussed.
+The second type is exemplified in problems of dialectical irrelevance such as
+18 Lumer (2011) explains how argumentation schemes can be exploited for deductivist
+reconstructions.
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 55
+
+arguments which do not support the thesis they are presented as supporting
+(ignoratio elenchi) or arguments which attack a position the opponent does not
+in fact defend (“straw-man”).19 In this way, Harsanyi’s undercut seems to miss
+the point because he includes assumptions about probabilities although Rawls
+intends maximin as a principle only for some situations which involve “choice
+under great uncertainty” (Rawls 1999:72); that is, choice situations, “in which a
+knowledge of likelihoods is impossible, or at best extremely insecure” (Rawls
+1999:134).20
+3.4 Practical Arguments
+So far, our discussion has not been specifically tailored to practical arguments. The
+basic characteristic of practical argumentation is that it leads to a “normative”
+conclusion. In this chapter, we focus on normative sentences which qualify an
+action with some deontic modality; that is a phrase such as “it is forbidden to . . .”,
+“. . . must not do . . .” or “. . . ought to . . .”.21 On the one hand, there are many more
+such expressions which are commonly used. On the other hand, not all normative
+premises and conclusions are normative sentences, because they can have a normative
+meaning in the context at hand even if they do not contain an explicitly
+normative expression (e.g. “Boys don’t cry.”). A first task of reconstruction is
+therefore formulating the normative premises and the normative conclusion explicitly
+as normative sentences. One possibility is to qualify directly acts (e.g. “Agent A
+ought to do X” etc.), another is to is to rely on standard qualifiers for sentences (“It
+is obligatory that Agent A does X”), which are studied in deontic logic (see
+McNamara 2010):
+As an example, we get the following standard formulation for the conclusion of
+inference 3:
+(3.3*) The maximin principle says that it is impermissible that you choose the option
+New York.
+Importantly, the relations depicted in Fig. 3.3 only hold if the various modalities
+relate to the same normative perspective. What is obligatory from a legal point of
+view is not merely optional from this point of view even if it is morally optional.
+Reconstructions therefore must make the normative perspective explicit unless all
+19 There is a rich literature on fallacies; see section Resources. For specific fallacies in argumentation
+about risk, see Hansson (2016).
+20 Harsanyi offers further considerations which may dispel the straw-man worry in the text that
+follows what we quoted as [Harsanyi].
+21 This is a restricted perspective since there are other types of non-descriptive sentences as well,
+for example those which include evaluative terms (“good”, “better”). For a more precise and
+sophisticated discussion (using a different terminology), see Morscher (2013).
+56 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+explicit normative phrases in an argumentation relate to the same normative
+perspective.
+A second challenge for reconstructing practical arguments arises in connection
+with the fact that there are no valid practical inferences without any normative
+premises.22 Practical arguments are frequently enthymematic in this respect, and
+normative premises must then be supplied in reconstruction. For the purpose of a
+systematic study of practical arguments, it will be convenient to rely on inferences
+with a certain standard form that can be expressed with the help of a decision
+principle. This is a sentence which claims that a certain option for acting has a
+certain deontic status under some descriptive and normative conditions. Such
+principles can then be used as a premise which joins further premises stating the
+mentioned conditions with a conclusion expressing the normative status of the
+relevant option. In Sect. 5, we will discuss a selection of examples of decision
+principles.
+Another cluster of problems which regularly arises in the analysis of practical
+arguments is the following. If an option or a decision problem can be assessed
+with reference to more than one action-guiding principle, one faces the question
+of how these principles relate to each other. Are they lexicographically ordered
+(e.g. moral considerations trump prudential ones)? Or can the principles be
+weighted against each other in some other way? And how can such information
+be accounted for in argument analysis? Furthermore, premises of practical arguments
+will often include so-called prima facie (or pro tanto, or defeasible) reasons
+or obligations (cf. Hansson 2013:99). These are normative claims which are stated
+without any restrictions, but may be overridden in specific cases of application
+nonetheless (e.g. “Lying is impermissible” may not apply to cases in which an
+insignificant lie can save the life of many). We suggest to deal with these
+challenges as problems of acquiring coherent positions in a complex argumentation
+(see Sect. 4.2).
+obligatory optional impermissible
+omissible
+Fig. 3.3 Deontic permissible
+modalities and their logical
+relations (e.g. everything
+optional is permissible)
+22 Strictly speaking, this is only true for practical arguments in which every premise and the
+conclusion either is entirely in the scope of a deontic modality or does not contain any deontic
+modality. The situation is much more complex if for practical arguments which include “mixed”
+sentences; that is, sentences only part of which are in the scope of a deontic modality. See
+Morscher (2013) for an accessible discussion.
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 57
+
+4 Analysing Complex Argumentation
+4.1 Reconstructing Complex Argumentation
+as Argument Maps
+We have so far studied methods for analysing individual arguments. Virtually
+every policy debate and practical deliberation contains however multiple, typically
+conflicting arguments (see, e.g. Schefczyk 2016 on the monetary policy
+debate). If the argumentative turn aspires to represent an alternative to traditional
+risk analysis, it has to solve the problem of aggregating and compounding
+opposing arguments; at least, it has to suggest methods for balancing conflicting
+reasons.
+Balancing reasons is a fundamental reasoning task we all perform regularly in a
+more or less systematic way. The basic tool we use to structure this task is a
+pro/con list. Still, such a pro/con list is insufficient for aggregating conflicting
+arguments. It may at best serve as a starting point for a more thorough analysis and
+should be seen as a mere heuristic one may use when nothing important is at stake
+(e.g. in many everyday decisions). The problem is that policy deliberation and
+analysis does frequently not go beyond giving a pro/con list. (And if it does, it uses
+highly questionable methods, e.g. cost benefit analysis.) There is a striking
+mismatch between the efforts our societies put into (a) getting the factual statements
+our policy analysis relies on right and (b) drawing the right conclusions
+from these factual statements in view of our complex normative beliefs. Put
+bluntly: where we find that a back-of-the-envelope-calculation is not good enough
+to establish the facts, we should not draw policy conclusions merely relying on
+pro/con lists, either.
+But why precisely is a pro/con list not enough? There are three major issues with
+such lists:
+1. Macro structure. It is unclear how exactly the different arguments relate to each
+other. Even worse, such lists wrongly suggest that all pro arguments (respectively
+con arguments) are related to the central thesis in a similar way.
+2. Micro structure. The internal structure of the individual arguments remains
+unclear.
+3. Aggregation. The plain juxtaposition of pros and cons suggests improper aggregation
+methods, such as simply counting (weighted) pros and cons.
+Let us illustrate these points with an example. Consider the thesis:
+[T] The global use of nuclear power should be extended.
+The following list of arguments is drawn from the 18th edition of Pros and Cons: A
+Debater’s Handbook (Sather 1999:255–7); the items have only been shortened
+(as indicated) and re-labelled. The fact that many of the descriptive claims made
+are false (as of today) does not prevent the example from being instructive.
+58 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+Pro Con
+[Pro1.1] The world faces an energy crisis. Oil
+will be exhausted within 50 years, and coal will
+last less than half that time. It is hard to see how
+‘alternative’ sources of energy will fulfil
+growing power needs. [Pro1.2] It is estimated,
+for example, that it would take a wind farm the
+size of Texas to provide for the power needs of
+Texas. [. . .]
+[Con1.1] The costs of nuclear power stations
+are enormous, especially considering the
+stringent safety regulations that must be
+installed to prevent disaster. [Con1.2] Alternative
+energy, however, is only prohibitively
+expensive because there is no economic
+imperative to develop it when oil and gas are
+so cheap. [. . .]
+[Pro2.1] The Chernobyl disaster, widely cited
+as the reason not to build nuclear power plants,
+happened in the Soviet Union where safety
+standards were notoriously lax, and often
+sacrificed for the sake of greater productivity.
+[. . .]
+[Con2.1] It is simply not worth the risk.
+Nuclear power stations are lethal time-bombs,
+polluting our atmosphere today and leaving a
+radioactive legacy that will outlive us for
+generations. [Con2.2] Chernobyl showed the
+potential for catastrophe [. . .]. [. . .]
+[Pro3.1] The problems of the nuclear energy
+programme have been a result of bureaucracy
+and obsessive secrecy resulting from nuclear
+energy’s roots in military research. These are
+problems of the past. [. . .]
+[Con3.1] In the 1950s, we were promised that
+nuclear energy would be so cheap that it
+would be uneconomic to meter electricity.
+Today, nuclear energy is still subsidised by the
+taxpayer. [. . .]
+Now consider:
+1. Macro structure. For example, does argument [Con3.1] back up [Con1.1], does
+it question [Pro1.1], or does it criticize the central claim [T]? – Maybe it even
+does all three things at the same time. That is just not transparent.
+2. Micro structure. None of the arguments is fully transparent in terms of assumptions
+and validity. It is for example unclear to which implicit premises the
+argument [Pro1.1] appeals in order to justify the central thesis [T].
+3. Aggregation. It is tempting to count how many pros and cons one accepts in
+order to balance the conflicting arguments. We will see that this would be
+irrational.
+So, how can we improve on this? As a first step, we have to get a better understanding
+of the structure of complex argumentation in general.
+Arguments exhibit an internal premise-conclusion structure. The logicosemantic
+relations between the statements arguments are composed of determine
+the “dialectic” relations between arguments, the relations of support and attack.23
+23 Pollock (1987:485) distinguishes two further dialectic relations. An argument rebuts another
+argument if the arguments possess contradictory (or at least contrary) conclusions; an argument
+undercuts another argument if it questions the validity or applicability of an inference scheme
+applied in the latter. (Note that this is another use of “undercut” than in footnote 15.) The undercut
+relation is, however, not directly relevant in the framework we propose here. Validity of the
+individual arguments is guaranteed qua charitable reconstruction. Rather than using controversial
+inference schemes for the reconstruction, we suggest to add corresponding general premises that
+can be criticized. Pollock’s undercut-relation hence effectively reduces to the attack relation.
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 59
+
+• An argument supports another argument if the conclusion of the supporting
+argument is identical with (or at least entails) a premise of the supported
+argument.
+• An argument attacks another argument if the conclusion of the attacking argument
+negates (or at least contradicts) a premise of the attacked argument.
+We can now state more precisely the shortcomings of pro/con lists. They suggest
+that all pro (con) arguments possess the same conclusion, which is identical with
+the central thesis (respectively its negation). Typically some pro arguments do
+however support other pro arguments, rather than the central thesis directly; or they
+attack con arguments. These exact dialectic relations remain obscure in mere
+pro/con lists.
+Attack- and support-relations between arguments can be visualized as a network,
+a so-called argument or debate map. (Note that “argument map” sometimes refers
+to the visualization of the internal structure of a single argument, too.) Argument
+maps visualize the dialectical structure of a complex argumentation. It is convenient
+to display central theses besides arguments in such a map. This allows one for
+example to visually express so-called rebuttals without introducing an extra relation
+in the argument map; argument A rebuts argument B in case A supports a thesis that
+B attacks.
+Conceptually, the micro-structure of arguments determines the macro-structure
+of a debate. Methodologically, i.e. in terms of reconstruction procedure, the reverse
+order of analysis has turned out to be practical. Accordingly, we suggest to sketch
+the dialectical structure first before reconstructing individual arguments in detail,
+which may (and typically does) lead to a revision of the original sketch. Sketching
+the dialectical structure essentially means to lay out the explicitly intended and
+intuitively hypothesized support- and attack-relations between arguments. The
+starting point of such a sketch may be a pro/con list.
+Figure 3.4 shows a sketch of the debate about nuclear power, based on the
+pro/con list given above (solid arrows represent support, dashed arrows attack
+Fig. 3.4 Argument map
+visualizing support (solid
+arrows) and attack (dotted
+arrows) relations between
+arguments and theses
+(boxes) in the illustrative
+debate about nuclear power
+60 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+relations between the arguments, and theses). The map is basically a hypothesis
+about the debate’s dialectical structure, which has to be probed through detailed
+reconstructions of the individual arguments. At the same time, this hypothesis
+may guide the further reconstruction process, namely through suggesting constraints
+for (i) adding premises and (ii) modifying premises and conclusions in
+arguments.
+We next present detailed reconstructions of two arguments mentioned in the
+illustrative pro/con list and the argument map above, the argument [Pro1.1] in
+favour of the global expansion of nuclear energy and the argument [Con2.1] against
+it.
+[Pro1.1]
+(1) If the global use of nuclear energy is not extended and the growing power
+need will be met nonetheless, then fossil fuels will fulfil growing power
+needs or ‘alternative’ sources of energy will do.
+(2) It is impossible that fossil fuels will fulfil growing power needs (because of
+limited resources).
+(3) It is impossible that ‘alternative’ sources of energy will fulfil growing power
+needs.
+(4) Thus (1–3): The global use of nuclear energy is extended or growing power
+needs will not be met.
+(5) The global energy crisis must be resolved, i.e. growing power needs must
+be met.
+(6) Practical-Syllogism-Principle [cf. below].
+(7) Thus (from 4–6): The global use of nuclear power should be extended. [T]
+[Con2.1]
+(1) The probability of accidents in nuclear power stations with catastrophic
+environmental and health impacts is non-negligible.
+(2) Nuclear power stations pollute our atmosphere and leave a radioactive
+legacy that will outlive us for generations.
+(3) If a technology exhibits a non-negligible likelihood of catastrophic accidents,
+pollutes the atmosphere and generates long-lasting, highly toxic
+waste, then its continued use – and a fortiori its expansion – poses severe
+environmental and health risks for current and future generations.
+(4) Thus (1-3): The continued use of nuclear energy – and a fortiori its expansion
+– poses severe environmental and health risks for current and future
+generations.
+(5) Any measure that poses severe environmental and health risks for current
+and future generations should not be implemented.
+(6) Thus (4,5): The global use of nuclear power should not be extended. [N.B.
+entails non-T!]
+These two reconstructions corroborate the dialectic relations as presumed in the
+preliminary argument map (cf. their conclusions).
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 61
+
+4.2 Argument Maps as Reasoning Tools
+Let us now suppose that all arguments have been reconstructed like [Pro1.1] and
+[Con2.1] above, and that the dialectic relations as visualized in Fig. 3.4 do really
+obtain, i.e. the debate’s macro-structure dovetails with the micro-structure of the
+arguments. In addition, we assume that all individual arguments have been
+reconstructed as deductively valid (and non-redundant).24 How can we evaluate
+such a debate?
+It is important to understand that the reconstruction itself is not prescriptive. It
+neither decides on who is right or wrong nor on who has the final say in a debate.
+Hence argument analysts do not teach scientists or policy-makers what they should
+believe or do, and for what reasons. Essentially the reconstruction itself entails only
+if-then claims: if certain statements are true, then certain other statements that occur
+in the debate must also be true. The argument map does not reveal which statements
+are true; it is thus neutral and open to different evaluations (depending on which
+statements one considers to be true, false or open). In other words, the argument
+map identifies the questions to be answered when adopting a position in the debate,
+and merely points out the implications of different answers to these questions.
+Because of this, a thesis that is supported by many arguments is not necessarily true.
+And, by the same token, a thesis that is attacked by many arguments is by no means
+bound to be false. This applies equally to arguments. An attack on an argument does
+not imply that the very argument is definitely refuted. (It may be, for example, that
+the attacking argument itself draws – from an evaluative perspective – on premises
+that can easily be criticized by adding further arguments).
+But then, again: how can we reason with argument maps? How do they help us to
+make up our mind?
+We suggest that argument maps are first and foremost a tool for determining
+positions proponents (including oneself) may adopt, and for checking whether these
+positions satisfy minimal standards of rationality, i.e. are “dialectically coherent.”
+While arguments constrain the set of positions proponents can reasonably adopt,
+there will in practice always be a plurality of different, opposing positions which
+remain permissible.25
+Such positions can be conceptualized and articulated on different levels of detail.
+24 The proper analysis and evaluation of non-deductive reasoning poses serious theoretical problems
+and goes beyond the scope of this chapter. For a comprehensive state-of-the-art presentation
+compare Spohn (2012).
+25A prominent rival approach to the one presented in this chapter are Dung-style evaluation
+methods for complex argumentation, which have been developed in Artificial Intelligence over the
+last two decades (see Bench-Capon and Dunne 2007; Dung 1995). Dung-style evaluation methods
+impose far-reaching rationality constraints; e.g. non-attacked arguments must be accepted, and
+undefended arguments must not be accepted. According to the approach championed in this
+chapter, in contrast, any argument can be reasonably accepted, as long as the proponent is willing
+to give up sufficiently many beliefs (and other arguments).
+62 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+• On the macro level, a complete (partial) position specifies for all (some) arguments
+in the debate whether it is accepted or refuted. To accept an argument
+means to consider all its premises as true. To refute an argument implies that at
+least one of its premises is denied (whereas such a coarse-grained position does
+not specify which premise).
+• On the micro level, a complete (partial) position consists in a truth-value
+assignment to all (some) statements (i.e. premises and conclusions) that occur
+in the debate’s arguments.
+There is no one-to-one mapping between coarse- and fine-grained positions. Different
+fine-grained formulations may yield one and the same coarse-grained articulation
+of a proponent’s position. Fine-grained positions are more informative than
+coarse-grained ones.
+These two types of articulating a position come along with coherence standards,
+i.e. minimal requirements a reasonably adoptable position must satisfy. The basic
+rationality criterion for a complete macro position is:
+• [No accepted attack] If an argument or thesis A is accepted, then no argument or
+thesis which attacks A is accepted.
+A partial macro position is dialectically coherent if it can be extended to a complete
+position which satisfies the above criterion.
+Consider for illustrative purposes the two macro positions (articulated on the
+background of the nuclear energy debate) which are shown in Fig. 3.5. The lefthand
+position is complete in the sense that it assigns a status to every argument in
+the map. Moreover, that position satisfies the basic rationality criterion. There is no
+attack relation such that both the attacking and the attacked item are accepted. The
+right-hand figure displays a partial macro position, which leaves some arguments
+without status assignment. That position violates constraint [No accepted attack]
+twice, as indicated through a flash of lightning.
+Complete micro positions must live up to a rationality criterion which is
+articulated in view of the inferential relations between statements (rather than the
+dialectic relations between arguments).
+• [No contradictions] Contradictory statements are assigned complementary truthvalues.
+• [Deductive constraints] There is no argument such that, according to the position,
+its premises are considered true while its conclusion is considered false.
+A partial micro position is dialectically coherent if it can be extended to a complete
+position which satisfies the above criteria.
+Consider for illustrative purposes the two arguments [Pro1.1] and [Con2.1] we
+have reconstructed formerly. A position which takes all premises of [Pro1.1] to be
+true but denies its conclusion, or which assents to the conclusions of both [Pro1.1]
+and [Con2.1] is obviously not dialectically coherent; it directly violates one of the
+above constraints. A partial position according to which all premises of [Pro1.1]
+and [Con2.1] are true is not dialectically coherent, either, because truth-values of
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 63
+
+the remaining statements (i.e. conclusions) cannot be fixed without violating one of
+the above constraints.
+A micro or macro position which is not dialectically coherent violates basic
+logical/inferential constraints that have been discovered and articulated in the debate.
+(Note that this standard of coherence is even weaker than the notion of logical
+consistency.) If a proponent’s position is not dialectically coherent, the proponent
+has not fully taken into account all the considerations that have been put forward so
+far. Either she has ignored some arguments, or she has not correctly adapted her
+position in regard of some arguments. As new arguments are introduced into a debate,
+previously coherent positions may become incoherent and in need of revision.
+Argument maps and the articulation of positions in view of such maps may
+hence help proponents to arrive at well-considered, reflective positions that do
+justice to all the considerations set forth in a deliberation. Suppose, for example,
+a stakeholder newly realizes that her position is attacked by an argument she
+considers prima facie plausible. That discovery may – indeed: should – lead her
+to modify her stance. But there are different, equally reasonable ways to revise her
+position: she may decide to refute the previously ignored argument despite its prima
+facie plausibility, or she concedes the criticism and gives up the argument that is
+attacked.
+Coherence checking is hence a proper way for balancing and aggregating
+conflicting normative arguments. Let us suppose that all descriptive premises in
+the arguments pro and con expanding nuclear energy were established and agreed
+upon. Whether a proponent assents to the central thesis [T] thus hinges only on her
+evaluation of the various normative premises, e.g. premise (5) in [Pro1.1] and
+[Con2.1], respectively. Typically, there will exist no dialectically coherent position
+according to which all ethical proscriptions, all decision principles, all evaluative
+statements and all claims to moral rights are simultaneously accepted. Only a subset
+of all normative statements that figure in a debate can be coherently adopted. And
+there are various such subsets. Coherence checking hence makes explicit the
+Fig. 3.5 Two macro positions, visualized against the background of the nuclear energy debate’s
+argument map. “Checked” arguments are accepted, “crossed” arguments are refuted, “flashes”
+indicate local violations of rationality criteria (see also text)
+64 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+precise normative trade-offs involved when aggregating conflicting practical
+arguments.26
+Over and above coherence checking, argument maps can be valuable tools for
+managing plurality and coping with conflicting positions. In terms of argument
+mapping, actual dissent between opponents can stem from two causes: (i) the
+proponents have overlooked arguments put forward by their respective opponent;
+(ii) some arguments and theses are evaluated differently. Re (i): If dissent arises,
+among other things, because one opponent has missed certain arguments, the
+opponents should first of all come to agree on, and possibly expand, the argument
+map, whereupon the positions held by the opponents will be re-evaluated. At best,
+dissent is dissolved right after that. Re (ii): If there is dissent in spite of agreement
+on the set of relevant arguments, one may proceed as follows. One firstly identifies
+the theses and arguments mutually agreed on by the opponents. Based on this
+common ground, one then tries to determine or develop consensual policies. For
+policy deliberations, this translates as follows: the argument maps can be used for
+developing robust policy proposals, i.e. policy measures that are compatible with
+many different positions and sets of basic moral assumptions.
+Plurality management may also allow one to identify promising argumentation
+strategies for reducing disagreement. The reconstruction may for instance reveal
+that there is a central argument which is simply not agreed upon because its
+empirical assumptions are still controversial. Consensus on the central normative
+thesis might then be reached by arguing about and clarifying the empirical assumption
+(which is sometimes easier than agreeing on basic normative evaluations). In
+addition, formal models of debate dynamics suggest, quite generally, that one
+should argue in an opponent-sensitive way (i.e. on the basis of one’s opponents’
+assumptions) in order to reduce mutual disagreement (see Betz 2013:12). The
+detailed analysis of a debate is certainly helpful in identifying such argumentative
+moves.
+The very basic point of plurality management is illustrated by Fig. 3.6. It shows
+two macro positions that disagree on most of the relevant issues (arguments in the
+debate) but agree on some core points: the central thesis should be refuted; it is
+attacked by an argument that should be accepted; and the sole justification of the
+central thesis should be rejected. This core agreement may suffice to agree on
+26 Sometimes one and the same (“prima facie”) normative principle, when applied to a complex
+decision situation, gives rise to conflicting implications. This is paradigmatically the case in
+dilemmatic situations, where one violates a given norm no matter what one does. In argumentmapping
+terms: given all descriptive premises are accepted, there is no coherent position according
+to which the “prima facie” principle is true. In regard of such cases, we suggest to systematize the
+aggregation and balancing process through specifying the normative principle in question such that
+the differences between alternative choices are made explicit. E.g. rather than arguing with the
+principle “You must not lie” in a situation where one inevitably either lies to a stranger or to one’s
+grandma, one should attempt to analyze the reasoning by means of the two principles “You must
+not lie to relatives” and “You must not lie to strangers”, which can then be balanced against each
+other.
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 65
+
+policy questions, further dissent concerning other arguments is then irrelevant
+(regarding policy consensus formation).
+Let us briefly return to our third criticism of pro/con lists: improper aggregation
+methods. It should be clear by now that numbers do not count. We should not
+simply add up accepted pros and cons. A single pro argument may override a dozen
+con arguments. The left-hand macro position in Fig. 3.6, which is dialectically
+coherent, accepts 3 out of 4 pro arguments and only 1 out of 5 con arguments, but
+denies the central thesis nonetheless.
+The process of specifying a dialectically coherent (macro or micro) position in
+view of an argument map can be modelled by means of a decision tree. To illustrate
+this process we shall consider a simplified dialectical structure that consists of three
+arguments A, B, C and a thesis T. We assume that A attacks T, B supports T, and C
+attacks B (Fig. 3.7).
+Each argument has but one premise whose truth-value is not fixed through
+background knowledge, labelled a, b, c respectively. In order to find a dialectically
+Fig. 3.6 Two macro
+positions, visualized against
+the background of the
+illustrative argument map
+Fig. 3.7 A simple, abstract
+argument map
+66 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+coherent micro position on this map and to determine whether one should accept the
+central thesis, one may execute the decision tree shown in Fig. 3.8.27
+We have started this section with the issue of aggregating conflicting reasons.
+Argument maps per se do not resolve this problem, they do not provide an
+algorithm for weighing conflicting reasons. They provide a detailed conceptual
+framework in which this task can be carried out. The resolution of normative
+conflicts will essentially depend on the acceptance/refutation of key premises in
+the arguments. These premises will also include conflicting decision principles. The
+map does not tell you how to do it, it only shows between which (sets of) normative
+statements one has to choose.
+4.3 An Illustrative Case Study
+This section illustrates the above methods by reporting how argument maps have
+been used as reasoning tools in climate policy advice.28 Climate engineering
+(CE) refers to large-scale technical interventions into the earth system that seek
+b?
+incoherent!
+yes not-T!
+no
+b?
+c?
+yes
+T or not-T!
+no
+T!
+a?
+yes no
+yes no
+Fig. 3.8 Decision tree for
+determining whether to
+accept the central thesis in
+the argument map depicted
+in Fig. 3.7
+27 “Yes” stands for statement accepted; “no” for statement not accepted. For the sake of simplicity,
+we do not distinguish between denying a statement and suspending judgement.
+28 This section is adapted from http://www.argunet.org/2013/05/13/mapping-the-climate-engineer
+ing-controversy-a-case-of-argument-analysis-driven-policy-advice/ [last accessed 16.03.2015].
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 67
+
+to offset the effects of anthropogenic GHG emissions. CE includes methods which
+shield the earth from incoming solar radiation (solar radiation management) and
+methods which take carbon out of the atmosphere (carbon dioxide removal).29
+In 2010, the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) commissioned
+six individual scoping studies on different aspects of CE. Eventually, these
+individual studies were to be integrated into a single, interdisciplinary assessment.
+Betz and Cacean compiled a report on ethical aspects (eventually translated and
+published as Betz and Cacean 2012).
+The overall aim in writing the study was to provide neutral policy advice on
+ethical issues of CE. To achieve this goal, Betz and Cacean (2012) decided to carry
+out an analysis of the various (ethical) arguments pro and con climate engineering
+methods. Splitting up the analysis into consecutive sub-tasks and including feedback
+rounds, they
+• compiled a comprehensive commented bibliography of the CE discourse with a
+focus on ethical arguments (including scientific articles, policy statements,
+media reports, popular science books, etc.),
+• sketched the overall dialectical structure and the individual arguments, which
+provided a first argument map,
+• presented the preliminary argument map at project workshops to get feedback,
+• and, finally, revised their interpretation of the debate and reconstructed the
+arguments in detail (as premise-conclusion structures).
+The immediate result of this procedure was a comprehensive argument map, which
+was then used in the BMBF project in order
+1. to compile the report “Ethical Aspects”;
+2. to assist policy makers in acquiring a coherent position (by evaluating alternative
+core positions proponents and policy makers may adopt);
+3. to merge the various disciplinary studies in a final assessment report.
+Re (1): The scoping study on ethical aspects of climate engineering contains a
+macro map of the debate that structures the entire report. Each chapter is devoted to
+a sub-debate of the controversy. The chapters in turn feature micro maps that
+display the internal structure of the sub-debates and visualize the individual arguments
+plus their dialectic relations. The arguments are then discussed in detail in the
+chapter texts. Central arguments are reconstructed as premise-conclusion
+structures.
+Re (2): Betz and Cacean also used the argument map to assist stakeholders in
+acquiring a coherent position.
+Thus, they have identified alternative core positions the ministry, or another
+stakeholder, may adopt. Such a core position might, for example, consist in saying
+that CE should be researched into so as to have these methods ready for deployment
+29 On the ethics of climate engineering and the benefits of argumentative analysis in this field
+compare Elliott (2016).
+68 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+in time. They have then visualized the core position in the argument map and
+calculated the logico-argumentative implications of the corresponding stance
+(cf. Fig. 3.9). The enhanced map shows, accordingly, which arguments one is
+required to refute and which theses one is compelled to accept if one adopts the
+corresponding core position. For example, proponents who think that ambitious
+climate targets will make some sort of climate engineering inescapable are required
+to deny religious objections against CE deployment. By spelling out such implications,
+Betz and Cacean tried to enable stakeholders to take all arguments into
+account and to develop a well-considered position.
+Re (3): The argument map also proved helpful in integrating the various
+discipline-specific studies into a single, interdisciplinary assessment report (Rickels
+et al. 2011). So, the assessment report, too, starts with a macro map, which depicts
+the overall structure of the discourse, and lists the pivotal arguments. Most
+Fig. 3.9 Illustrative core position (here: thumbs up) and its logico-argumentative implications
+(here: thumbs down) in a detailed reconstruction of the moral controversy about so-called climate
+engineering (Source: Betz and Cacean 2012:87)
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 69
+
+interestingly, though, all the empirical chapters of the assessment report
+(on physical and technical aspects, on sociological aspects, on governance aspects,
+etc.) consistently refer to the argument map and make explicit to which arguments
+the empirical discussion unfolded in the chapter is related. This allows one to trace
+back sophisticated empirical considerations to the general debate and hence to the
+key questions of the controversy.
+In sum, this case shows that argument mapping techniques can be very helpful in
+compiling assessment reports and providing scientific policy advice: they structure
+relevant empirical information and normative assumptions in such a way that
+decision makers are empowered to balance conflicting reasons in a well-informed
+and transparent way.
+5 Arguing Under Uncertainty
+5.1 General Requirements of Rational Deliberation
+and Sound Decision-Making
+There are two basic requirements of sound decision-making that apply in particular
+to practical reasoning. First of all, a specific course of action should be
+assessed relative to all conceived-of alternatives. Secondly, all (normatively relevant)
+consequences of each option should be taken into account; in particular,
+uncertainty about such consequences must not simply be ignored (e.g. by falsely
+pretending that the consequences are certain or by ignoring some consequences
+altogether).30
+There are two different ways in which these requirements can be applied to
+the argumentative turn, the argumentation-theoretic paradigm of practical reasoning.
+We have seen that every practical argument relies on a (frequently
+implicit) premise which states a more or less general decision principle
+(cf. Sect. 3.4). A decision principle licenses the inference from descriptive and
+normative statements to a normative conclusion. Now, the strong interpretation of
+the requirements demands that every individual decision principle (i.e. every
+individual practical argument) reasons for or against an action in view of all
+alternatives and all plausible outcomes. Arguments that fail to do so can accordingly
+be dismissed as defect. The alternative, weak interpretation of the requirements
+merely demands that all alternative options and all their plausible
+outcomes be considered in the entire debate, but not necessarily in each individual
+argument.
+30 Steele (2006) interprets the precautionary principle as a meta-principle for good decisionmaking
+which articulates essentially these two requirements.
+70 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+This choice boils down to the following question: should we allow for decision
+principles which individually do not satisfy standards of good decision-making? –
+Yes, we think so. The following simplified example is a case in point:
+Argument A
+(1) The 2-degree-target will only be reached if some CE technology is deployed.
+(2) The 2-degree-target should be reached.
+(3) Practical-Syllogism-Principle (see below).
+(4) Thus: Some CE technology should be deployed.
+Argument B
+(1) CE technologies are risk technologies without a safe exit option.
+(2) Risk technologies without a safe exit option must not be deployed.
+(3) Thus: No CE technology may be deployed [contrary to A.3 above].
+None of these arguments considers explicitly all options and all potential outcomes.
+(This is because the antecedent conditions of their decision principles, A.3
+and B.2, do not do so.) In combination, however, these two arguments allow for a
+nuanced trade-off between conflicting normative considerations. Risk-averse proponents
+may stick to argument B and hence give up the 2-degree-target (premise
+A.1) in order to reach a dialectically coherent position; others may prioritize the
+2-degree-target and accept potential negative side-effects, in particular through
+denying that these side-effects are a sufficient reason for refraining from CE
+(i.e. they deny premise B.2). In sum, practical reasoning and, in particular, coherence
+checking is performed against the entire argument map; as long as all
+normatively relevant aspects are adequately represented somewhere in the map,
+practical reasoning seems to satisfy the general requirement of sound-decision
+making. There is thus no need for explicitly considering all options and all potential
+outcomes in each and every single argument.
+5.2 Decision Principles for Reasoning Under Great
+Uncertainty
+In the remainder of this chapter, we will present some argument schemes (in the
+form of decision principles that can be added as a premise to an argument reconstruction)
+which may allow argument analysts to reconstruct very different types of
+normative arguments. Such argument schemes can facilitate the reconstruction
+process and are mainly of heuristic value. There are certainly good reconstructions
+which do not correspond to any of these schemes. And schemes might have to be
+adapted in order to take the original text or plausibility etc. into account. That is,
+schemes are rather prototypes that will frequently provide a first version of an
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 71
+
+argument reconstruction, which will be further improved in the reconstruction
+process.
+It is characteristic for practical arguments under uncertainty that their descriptive
+premises make explicit the uncertainty one faces. One way to arrive at (more or
+less) plausible decision principles for reasoning under uncertainty is hence to
+weaken their descriptive premises by introducing modal qualifications. The first
+six decision principles offer alternative qualifications of the descriptive premises
+(corresponding to apodictic, probabilistic and possibilistic versions). In general, the
+more far-reaching the qualification and the weaker the descriptive premises, the
+stronger and hence more questionable the corresponding decision principle.
+Just to be clear: we are not advocating any of these decision principles. Following
+the idea that argument maps are tools which support agents in balancing
+conflicting normative reasons, the principles stated below will figure as premises
+in different arguments and will have to be weighed against each other on a casespecific
+basis.
+The first principle states that any measure which is required to reach a goal
+should be taken – provided the goal should be attained.
+[Practical Syllogism Principle]
+If
+(1) It ought to be the case that S.
+(2) S [will not/is unlikely to/might not] be the case unless agent A does X.
+then
+(3) Agent A ought to do X.
+While the apodictic version of this principle is analytic, the possibilistic version
+is arguably very weak, we have merely mentioned it for reasons of systematic
+completeness. This observation implies the following for the aggregation of
+conflicting arguments: when coherence checking reveals that we face a choice,
+we are rather prepared to give up the possibilistic principle than the probabilistic or
+the apodictic version. Similar remarks apply to the principles below.
+Practical arguments frequently justify options not because they are necessary for
+attaining some goal but because they are optimal. Such arguments could be
+reconstructed with the following principle:
+[Optimal Choice Principle]
+If
+(1) It prima facie [i.e. without considering negative side-effects that are inevitable
+when bringing about S] ought to be the case that S.
+(2) S [will/is likely to/might] be the case if agent A does X.
+(3) There is no alternative to X for agent A that [will/is likely to/might] bring
+about S and is more suitable than X.
+72 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+(4) The certain, likely and possible side-effects of agent A doing X are collectively
+negligible as compared to the [certain/likely/possible] realization
+of S.
+then
+(5) Thus: Agent A ought to do X
+The underlying idea is that conditions (1) and (4) collectively guarantee that S
+ought to be the case all things considered and that (2) and (3) imply that X is [likely/
+possibly] the optimal means to reach S.
+Deontological reasons may be analysed along the following lines.
+[Prohibition Principle]
+If
+(1) Acts of type T are categorically impermissible.
+(2) Agent A doing X is [certainly/likely/possibly] an act of type T.
+then
+(3) Agent A must not do X.
+The apodictic version of this principle is, as in the case of the Practical Syllogism,
+analytic. As an alternative to modal qualifications, uncertainties may be made
+explicit in the characterization T of an act; e.g.: “an attempted murder”, that is an
+act (of a certain kind) that leads with some probability to some consequence. In
+such a case, premise (2) need not be qualified.
+Rights-based considerations pose no principle problems for argument analysis,
+either.
+[Principle of Absolute Rights Violation]
+If
+(1) Persons P possess the absolute right to be in state R.
+(2) Agent A doing X [certainly/likely/possibly] prevents persons P from being
+in or achieving state R.
+then
+(3) Agent A must not do X.
+The following principle speaks against some action based on the fact that the act
+violates prima facie rights that are not overridden (compare for example argument
+B in Betz (2016)).
+[Principle of Prima Facie Rights Violation]
+If
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 73
+
+(1) Persons P possess the prima facie right to be in state R.
+(2) Agent A doing X [certainly/likely/possibly] prevents persons P from being
+in or achieving state R.
+(3) There exist no collectively weightier rights (than someone being in state R)
+whose realization is [certainly/likely/possibly] jeopardized when not
+doing X.
+then
+(4) Agent A must not do X.
+Standard approaches in formal decision theory can be re-interpreted as decision
+principles, which in turn correspond to specific types of arguments (see also Betz
+(2016): Sect. 3). We illustrate this fact by means of two prominent examples. The
+following decision principle represents the criterion of expected utility maximization
+(e.g. Savage 1954).
+[Principle of Expected Utility Maximization]
+If
+(1) The option oþ has an expected utility of EUþ, according to probabilistic
+forecasts P and utility function U.
+(2) There is no alternative option to oþ which has an expected utility equal to or
+greater than EUþ, according to probabilistic forecasts P and utility
+function U.
+(3) The probabilistic forecasts P are reliable.
+(4) Utility function U adequately combines all normative dimensions that are
+relevant for the assessment of oþ (and its alternatives).
+Then
+(5) Option oþ ought to be carried out.
+Finally, consider a principle that grasps maximin reasoning under great uncertainty
+(see Gardiner 2006).
+[Worst Case Principle]
+If
+(1) Some available options may have catastrophic consequences.
+(2) There are no options whose potential gains would outweigh, if realized, the
+worst possible consequences that may come up. [Counterfactual comparison
+of potential best and worst case]
+(3) There are no reliable probabilistic forecasts of the available options’ consequences,
+especially not of their worst possible consequences.
+(4) There is no other available option whose worst possible consequence is
+(weakly) preferable to the worst possible consequence of option oþ.
+74 G. Brun and G. Betz
+
+then
+(5) Option oþ ought to be carried out.
+For various examples of worst case arguments compare Betz (2016:Sect. 3.1).
+6 Outlook
+In this chapter we surveyed methods of argumentation analysis, with a special focus
+on justifying and criticising decisions under great uncertainty. Our approach starts
+with a systematic account of the aims of argument analysis, including the various
+dimensions in which an argumentation may be evaluated and the various standards
+that guide the reconstruction of arguments. On this basis, we introduced and
+exemplified the basic procedures for identifying, reconstructing and evaluating
+individual arguments as well as complex argumentation and debates. We then
+explained how such reconstructions of complex controversies may serve as reasoning
+tools. Finally, we discussed a range of decision principles that figure prominently
+in practical arguments under great uncertainty.
+These methods have been developed as tools for clarifying and evaluating
+existing arguments and debates. The argumentative approach, however, has far
+greater potential. Concepts and techniques of argumentation analysis may be
+used to effectively improve practical reasoning in a variety of contexts. An
+argumentative approach enables experts and policy advisors to design scientific
+assessments and to provide decision-relevant scientific insights without being
+policy-prescriptive; it helps citizens and stakeholders to articulate their standpoints
+and to meaningfully contribute to intricate debates; it assists moderators in
+steering a controversy and managing a plurality of opinions; and it supports
+decision makers in balancing conflicting reasons in a transparent and wellinformed
+way. We are convinced that a focus on argumentation will improve
+the deliberative quality of policy debates. Argumentation and argument analysis
+ultimately serve an emancipatory agenda. All too often, citizens and stakeholders
+are intellectual captives of unchallenged assumptions. Argumentation analysis
+frees people who are lost in the communicative labyrinth of reasons – it
+empowers them to speak up, to argue their views, and to scrutinize positions,
+held by themselves or others.
+Resources Supporting Argument Analysis
+Bowell, Tracy, and Gary Kemp. 2015. Critical Thinking. A Concise Guide. 4th ed.
+London: Routledge.
+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 75
+
+Chapter 5 gives a very accessible yet reliable introduction to techniques of argument
+reconstruction focusing on the analysis of individual arguments and complex
+argumentation.
+Two online tutorials focusing on analysing complex argumentation are:
+• Course “Argument Diagramming” at Carnegie Mellon University: http://oli.
+cmu.edu/courses/free-open/argument-diagramming-course-details/.
+• Critical Thinking Web: http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/.
+A more extensive treatment of fallacies can be found in the Internet Encyclopedia
+of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/.
+Argunet is an argument mapping software designed to support the reconstruction
+of complex argumentation and debates: http://www.argunet.org/.
+Links were correct on 22.07.2015.
+References
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+Hadorn (Eds.), The argumentative turn in policy analysis. Reasoning about uncertainty
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+3 Analysing Practical Argumentation 77
+
+Chapter 6
+Accounting for Possibilities in Decision
+Making
+Gregor Betz
+Abstract Intended as a practical guide for decision analysts, this chapter provides
+an introduction to reasoning under great uncertainty. It seeks to incorporate standard
+methods of risk analysis in a broader argumentative framework by
+re-interpreting them as specific (consequentialist) arguments that may inform a
+policy debate—side by side along further (possibly non-consequentialist) arguments
+which standard economic analysis does not account for. The first part of
+the chapter reviews arguments that can be advanced in a policy debate despite deep
+uncertainty about policy outcomes, i.e. arguments which assume that uncertainties
+surrounding policy outcomes cannot be (probabilistically) quantified. The second
+part of the chapter discusses the epistemic challenge of reasoning under great
+uncertainty, which consists in identifying all possible outcomes of the alternative
+policy options. It is argued that our possibilistic foreknowledge should be cast in
+nuanced terms and that future surprises—triggered by major flaws in one’s
+possibilistic outlook—should be anticipated in policy deliberation.
+Keywords Possibility • Epistemic possibility • Real possibility • Modal
+epistemology • Ambiguity • Ignorance • Deep uncertainty • Knightian
+uncertainty • Probabilism • Expected utility • Worst case • Maximin •
+Precautinary principle • Robust decision analysis • Risk imposition • Surprise •
+Unknown unknowns
+1 Introduction
+A Hollywood studio contemplates to produce an experimental movie with a big
+budget. Its success: unpredictable. Long-serving staff says that past experience is no
+guide to assessing the likelihood that this movie flops. Should the management take
+the risk? (Some wonder: Could a flop even ruin the reputation of the studio and
+damage profits in the long run? Or is that too far-fetched a possibility?)
+Another example: A local authority considers to permit the construction of an
+industrial site near a natural habitat. There’s broad agreement that the habitat must
+be preserved, but it’s totally unclear how the ecosystem would react to a nearby
+industrial complex. Experts say that anything is possible (from no negative effects
+at all to the destruction of the ecosystem in the medium term).
+The objective of this chapter is to show how one can rationally argue for and
+against alternative options in situations like these. Intended as a practical guide for
+decision analysts, the chapter provides arguably an opinionated introduction to
+reasoning under “deep uncertainty.”1,2 It is not supposed to review the vast
+decision-theoretic or risk-ethical literature on this topic. Moreover, readers should
+be aware that what the chapter says departs from mainstream risk analysis, and that
+many scholars would disagree with its proposals.3 However, the argumentative turn
+does not simply dispose of standard decision-theoretic methods (or their application
+in risk analysis). Rather, it seeks to incorporate these methods in a broader argumentative
+framework by re-interpreting them as specific (consequentialist) arguments
+that may inform a policy debate—side by side along further (possibly
+non-consequentialist) arguments which standard risk analysis does not account for.4
+Brief outline. Reasons in favor of or against doing something can be analyzed as
+arguments in support of a normative statement—which, for example, characterizes
+the corresponding option as obligatory or impermissible (Sect. 2). Section 3 reviews
+such so-called practical arguments that can be advanced in a policy debate despite
+deep uncertainty about policy outcomes. These arguments, being partly inspired by
+the decision theoretic literature, presume characteristic decision principles, which
+in turn express different, genuinely normative risk attitudes. Reconstructing such
+arguments hence makes explicit the competing risk preferences—and basic
+choices—that underlie many policy debates. In the second part of the chapter,
+beginning with Sect. 4, we discuss the epistemic challenge of reasoning under
+deep uncertainty: identifying all possible outcomes of the alternative policy
+options. It is argued that our possibilistic foreknowledge should be described in
+nuanced terms (Sect. 4) and that drastic changes in one’s possibilistic outlook
+should be reckoned with (Sect. 5). Both the static and the dynamic features of
+possibilistic predictions compel us to refine and to augment the arsenal of practical
+arguments discussed in Sect. 3 (Sects. 6 and 7).
+1 Like for example Heal and Millner (2013), I use “deep uncertainty” to refer to decision situations
+where the outcomes of alternative options cannot be predicted probabilistically. Hansson and
+Hirsch Hadorn (2016) refer to situations where, among other things, predictive uncertainties
+cannot be quantified as “great uncertainty.” Compare Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn (2016) also
+for alternative terminologies and further terminological clarifications.
+2 This chapter complements Brun and Betz (2016) in this volume on argument analysis; for readers
+with no background in argumentation theory, it is certainly profitable to study both in conjunction.
+3 I try however to pinpoint substantial dissent in footnotes.
+4 For an up-to-date decision-theoretic review of decision making under deep uncertainty see Etner
+et al. (2012).
+136 G. Betz
+
+In the remainder of this introductory section, I will briefly comment on the limits
+of uncertainty quantification, the need for non-probabilistic decision methods and
+the concept of possibility.
+A preconceived idea frequently encountered in policy contexts states: no rational
+choice without (at least) probabilities. Let’s call this view “probabilism.”5
+According to probabilism, mere possibilities are uninformative and useless (for,
+in the end, anything is possible); in particular, it is allegedly impossible to justify
+policy measure based on possibilistic predictions.6 One aim of this chapter is to
+refute these notions, and to spell out how decision makers can rationally argue
+about options without probabilistic predictions.
+But why are non-probabilistic methods of rational choice important at all?
+Proponents of mainstream risk analysis might argue that decision makers always
+quantify uncertainty and that they, qua being rational, express uncertainty in terms
+of probabilities. We do not only need probabilities, they say, we always have them,
+too.7 Or so it seems. My outlook on rational decision and policy making departs
+from that view. Fundamentally, I assume that rational policy making should only
+take for granted what we know, what we have reason to assume. If there is for
+example no reason to believe that the movie will be a success, rational decision
+making should not rely on that prediction. Likewise, only justified probabilistic
+predictions should inform our policy decisions. Rather than building on probabilistic
+guesswork, we should acknowledge the full extent of our ignorance and the
+uncertainty we face. We should not simply make up the numbers. And we should
+refrain from wishful thinking.8
+At the same time, it would be equally irrational to discard or ignore relevant
+knowledge in decision processes. If we do know more (than mere possibilities),
+then we should make use of that knowledge. For example, if some local fisherman
+has strong evidence that an industrial complex would harm a key species in the
+ecosystem, then the policy making process should adequately account for this
+evidence. Generally, we should not only consider explicit knowledge but try to
+profit from tacit expert knowledge, too.9 In particular, whenever we have reliable
+5 Terminologically I follow Clarke (2006), who criticizes probabilism on the basis of extensive
+case studies. A succinct statement of probabilism is due to O’Hagan and Oakley (2004:239): “In
+principle, probability is uniquely appropriate for the representation and quantification of all forms
+of uncertainty; it is in this sense that we claim that ‘probability is perfect’.” The formal decision
+theory that inspires probabilism was developed by Savage (1954) and Jeffrey (1965).
+6 In the context of climate policy making, (Schneider 2001) is a prominent defence of this view;
+compare also Jenkins et al. (2009:23) for a more recent example. A (self-)critical review by
+someone who has been pioneering uncertainty quantification in climate science is (Morgan 2011).
+7 Morgan et al. (1990) spell out this view in detail (see for example p. 49 for a very clear
+statement).
+8 This view is echoed in various contributions to this book, e.g. Hansson (2016, esp. fallacies),
+Shrader-Frechette (2016 p. 12) and Doorn (2016, beginning). Compare Gilboa et al. (2009) as well
+as Heal and Millner (2013) for a decision-theoretic defence.
+9 See again Shrader-Frechette (2016).
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 137
+
+probabilistic information, it would be irresponsible not to make use of it in
+decision processes. In sum, this chapter construes reasoning about policy options
+as a tricky balancing act: it must rely on no more and on no less than what one
+actually knows.
+Because this point is both fundamental and controversial, I wish to illustrate it
+further.10 Assume that the outcome of some policy depends on whether a red or a
+blue ball is (randomly) drawn from an urn. If we know how many red and blue balls
+there are, we should consider the corresponding probabilistic knowledge in the
+decision process. However, if we don’t know, neither the policy advisor nor the
+decision maker should pretend to know.11 One might be tempted to argue that, in
+the absence of any specific information, we should consider both outcomes as
+equally likely. But then we’d describe the situation as if we knew that there are
+as many blue as red balls in the urn, which is simply not the case. No probabilistic
+description seems to capture adequately our ignorance in case we have no clue
+about the ratio of red and blue balls.
+Now, assume we don’t get reliable probabilistic forecasts; for practical purposes
+we have to content ourselves with knowledge about possible intended consequences
+and side-effects. Yet, what counts as a decision-relevant possibility?
+That is which possibilities, which “scenarios” should we consider when contemplating
+alternative options? E.g., is the potential bankruptcy of the Hollywood
+studio decision-relevant or is it just too far-fetched? That question will occupy us
+in the second part of this chapter. Here, I just want to make some preliminary
+remarks.
+A first type of possibility to consider are so-called conceptual possibilities.
+These are (descriptions of) states-of-affairs which are internally coherent. Conceptual
+possibilities can be consistently imagined (e.g., me walking on the moon). It
+seems clear that being a conceptual possibility is necessary but not sufficient for
+being decision-relevant.
+Real possibilities (at some point in time t) consist in all states-of-affairs whose
+realizations are objectively compatible with the states-of-the-world at time t. In a
+deterministic world, all real possibilities will sooner or later materialize.12 Epistemic
+possibilities, in contrast, characterize states-of-affairs according to their relative
+compatibility with current understanding. Epistemic possibilities hold relative
+10 The illustrative analogy is inspired by Ellsberg (1961), whose “Ellsberg Paradox” is an important
+argument against probabilism.
+11 It has been suggested that decision-makers can non-arbitrarily assume allegedly “un-informative”
+or “objective” probability distributions (e.g. a uniform distribution) in the absence of any
+relevant data. However, most Bayesian statisticians seem to concede that there are no
+non-subjective prior probabilities (e.g. Bernardo 1979:123). Van Fraassen (1989:293–317) thoroughly
+discusses the problems of assuming “objective priors.” Williamson (2010) is a recent
+defence of doing so.
+12 For a state-of-the-art explication of the concept of real possibility, using branching-space-time
+theory, see Mu¨ller (2012).
+138 G. Betz
+
+to a given body of knowledge13: a hypothesis is epistemically possible (relative to
+background knowledge K) if and only if it is consistent with K.14
+The following example may serve to illustrate the distinction. An expert team is
+supposed to defuse a WW2 bomb (i.e., a bomb from World War II). Its explosion is
+of course a conceptual possibility. The team has only limited knowledge of the
+bomb, it is in particular not clear whether the trigger mechanism is still intact.
+Against this limited knowledge, it is an epistemic possibility that the bomb detonates
+upon being moved. Now the trigger mechanism is in fact still intact, but the
+original explosives have undergone chemical interactions and were transformed
+into harmless substances over the decades. This means that the detonation of the
+bomb is not a real possibility.
+I assume that the decision-relevant notion of possibility is a purely epistemic
+concept. Quite generally, predictions used for practical purposes should reflect our
+current knowledge and understanding of the system in question. In the argumentative
+turn especially, we’re not interested in what is objectively, from a view from
+nowhere, the correct decision; we want to understand what’s the best thing-to-do
+given what we know—and what we don’t. For this task, we need not worry about
+whether some possibility is real or “just” epistemic.15 In the above example, one
+should consider the potential explosion as a decision-relevant possibility, as long as
+this scenario cannot robustly be ruled out. The rather metaphysical question
+whether it’s really possible that the bomb goes off (i.e., is the detonation
+pre-determined, or is the world objectively indeterministic such that not even an
+omniscient being would be in a position to predict whether the bomb would
+detonate?) seems of no direct practical relevance.
+Real possibilities are at best of indirect practical significance. Namely insofar as
+they bear on our expectations concerning the reducibility of (epistemic) uncertainty:
+ideally, the range of epistemic possibilities approaches the range of real
+possibilities as our understanding of a system advances; real possibilities represent
+lower bounds for the uncertainty we will face in the future, no matter how much we
+will learn about a system.
+Relativizing decision-relevant possibility to a body of background beliefs seems
+to raise the question: What’s the background knowledge? Whose background
+13 Or, more precisely, “knowledge claims.” In the remainder of this chapter, I will refer to fallible
+knowledge claims, relative to which hypotheses are assessed, as “(background) knowledge”
+simpliciter.
+14 There is a vast philosophical literature on whether this explication fully accommodates our
+linguistic intuitions (the “data”), cf. Egan and Weatherson (2009). Still, it’s unclear whether that
+philosophical controversy is also of decision-theoretic relevance.
+15 On top, that’s a question we cannot answer anyway: Every judgement about whether some stateof-
+affairs S is a real possibility is based on an assessment of S in terms of epistemic possibility. To
+assert that S is really possible is simply to say that S represents an epistemic possibility (relative to
+background knowledge K) and that K is in a specific way “complete”, i.e. includes everything that
+can be known about S. Likewise, to assert that S does not represent a real possibility means that S
+is no epistemic possibility (relative to background knowledge K) and that K is objectively correct.
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 139
+
+beliefs? First of all, note that this is a general issue in policy assessment, no matter
+whether we evaluate options in a possibilistic, probabilistic or deterministic mood.
+My reading of the argumentative turn is that we don’t need general rules which
+determine precisely what counts as background knowledge. If there is disagreement
+about this question, then make it explicit, analyze the different arguments that can
+be set forth from the different knowledge bases, identify the crucial items in the
+background beliefs which are responsible for the practical disagreement! The
+argumentative turn may accommodate dissent on background beliefs and allows
+for rational and constructive deliberation in spite of such disagreement.
+2 Practical Arguments, Preliminary Remarks
+In the argumentative turn, decision procedures, decision methods, and justifications
+of policy decisions are construed as arguments which warrant the corresponding
+policy measure.16 Such “practical” arguments have a normative—more precisely,
+prescriptive—conclusion: they warrant that certain policy options are obligatory
+(ought to be taken), permissible (may be taken) or prohibited (must not be taken).
+Valid arguments with prescriptive conclusions require normative and descriptive
+premisses. The descriptive premisses characterize the alternative options; often
+they identify consequences that will or may ensue if one such option is taken.
+The normative premisses value the alternative options in view of their descriptive
+characterization.
+Our first example of a practical argument (under certainty) is a simple, so-called
+consequentialist argument. It argues that China should reduce air pollution, despite
+negative side-effects, because this will curb pulmonary diseases, argument A:
+(1) The major effects of reducing air pollution in China, compared to status quo,
+would be (i) a significant reduction of pulmonary diseases and (ii) the acceleration
+of regional climate change.
+(2) Business as usual policy simply sustains status quo.
+(3) A significant reduction of pulmonary diseases and the acceleration of regional
+climate change are preferable to status quo.
+(4) If some option leads to a state of affairs that is preferable to the one that would be
+brought about by an alternative, the former should be taken rather than the latter.
+(5) Thus: China should reduce air pollution rather than continue business as usual.
+The conclusion (5) is a (comparative) prescriptive statement: It says that some
+action should be taken rather than another one. Premisses (1) and (2) are descriptive
+premisses: They forecast the main consequences of two policy options, reducing air
+pollution and business as usual. These different states-of-the-world, which are
+16 Brun and Betz (2016), this volume, which nicely complements this chapter, provides practical
+guidance for analyzing and evaluating argumentation.
+140 G. Betz
+
+predicted in (1) and (2), are then normatively evaluated in premiss (3). The
+normative evaluation of outcomes is based on, or partially expresses an underlying
+(frequently implicit) “value theory,” a so-called axiology. Premiss (4) states a
+(rather uncontroversial) decision rule: Of two options, choose the one with the
+better consequences! That is a normative statement, too.
+Practical arguments need not be consequentialist. The following simple rightsbased
+argument argues that new polling stations should be constructed, argument B:
+(1) Costly constructions of new polling stations are the only way to ensure that the
+citizens’ rights to vote are not infringed.
+(2) Such a measure does in turn not lead to violations of rights of similar or higher
+(normative) significance.
+(3) If a measure is required to avoid the violation of some rights and in turn does
+not bring about the violation of other rights (of similar or higher weight), then
+the measure ought to be taken.
+(4) Thus: New polling stations should be constructed.
+In this argument, premisses cannot be neatly separated into normative and
+descriptive ones. Premisses (1) and (2) characterize (in a descriptive mood) the
+policy measure in question (and indirectly—n.b. the “only” in (1)—the alternative
+options). Yet in referring to rights and their potential violation, these premisses
+have a normative content, too. Premiss (3) in turn is clearly a normative statement—
+and a substantial one, too: it implies that violations of rights can only be
+offset by violations of more important rights (not, e.g., by numerous violations of
+lesser rights or by diminution of wellbeing).
+The descriptive premisses in arguments A and B characterize unequivocally, by
+means of deterministic predictions, the alternative options. Even if there is uncertainty
+about the effects of measures to reduce air pollution or the construction of
+polling stations, these uncertainties are not articulated in arguments A and B. The
+whole point of decision analysis, broadly construed, is to make uncertainties
+(in descriptive or normative statements) explicit and to investigate how conclusions
+can be justified while acknowledging the uncertainty we face.
+In situations under deep uncertainty, we are not in a position to make deterministic
+predictions as in the arguments A and B. We can’t even provide reliable
+probabilistic forecasts (such as: “business as usual” policy is unlikely to lead to a
+reduction in pulmonary diseases; construction of polling stations will ensure with a
+probability of 90 % that voting rights are not infringed). The descriptive premisses
+merely state possible consequences of alternative actions, they characterize options
+in a possibilistic mood (like: moving the bomb possibly leads to its detonation). The
+normative premisses will then value the alternative options in view of their possible
+characteristics, e.g. in view of their possible outcomes. Crucially, reasoning under
+deep uncertainty relies on other decision principles than arguments under certainty
+or risk. As will become clear in the course of this chapter, these principles involve
+substantial normative commitments and reflect different risk attitudes (such as
+levels of risk aversion) one may adopt.
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 141
+
+Sound decision making under certainty requires one to consider all alternative
+options and all their consequences (to the extent that they are articulated and
+foreseen). Likewise, sound decision making under deep uncertainty requires one
+to consider all alternative options and all their possible consequences (under the
+same condition). In other words, practical reasoning under deep uncertainty must
+reflect one’s apprehension of the entire space of decision-relevant possibilities.17
+Arguments that derive policy recommendations in view of some possible consequences
+only, while deliberately ignoring other possibilities, are typically weak,
+i.e. rely on implausible decision principles and will be given up in the face of
+conflicting arguments.
+Let me flesh that out. The local authority which considers to permit the construction
+of the industrial site might reason like this: “The industrial complex may
+destroy our habitat. That would be disastrous. So we must stop the industrial
+project.” Now, this reasoning is faulty. The decision makers have not explicitly
+considered further possible consequences of constructing the industrial site (maybe
+this ensures that the company will not construct a factory at another place where an
+even more valuable ecosystem would be endangered; maybe the site will generate
+so much tax revenues that another reserve could be environmentally restored), and
+they have not considered the possible effects of not building the industrial complex
+(maybe the local authority will lack the financial resources to clean up a contaminated
+mine, which in turn might cause the medium-term destruction of the habitat,
+too). To be sure: The point here is not that the local authority cannot reasonably
+prohibit the construction because of potential ecological adverse effects. The point
+is only: in order to make this case, all (apprehended) possible consequences of the
+available options have to be considered and assessed.18
+Let me eventually comment on the relation between formal decision theory and
+the argumentative analysis of practical reasoning, picking up my brief remarks in
+the introduction. Decision theory provides a formal model of consequentialist
+decision making. All decision-theoretic methods can be recast and interpreted as
+practical arguments. And many important arguments in practical deliberation will
+be inspired by decision theory. There is however no reason to think that every
+legitimate argument can in turn be cast in decision-theoretic terminology. One
+major advantage of argumentative analysis over decision theory is its universality
+and hence superior flexibility; it can account for consequentialist as well as
+non-consequentialist reasoning side by side. Decision theory sometimes evokes
+the impression that there exists an algorithmic method for identifying the optimal
+17 On prerequisites of sound decision making under uncertainty see also Steele (2006).
+18 The symmetry arguments Hansson (2016) discusses are another case in point. Suppose a
+proponent argues that option A0 should be preferred to option A on the grounds that A possibly
+leads to the disastrous effect E. An opponent counters the argument by showing that A0 may lead to
+an equally disastrous effect E0. Now, both arguments only draw on some possible effects of A and
+A0 respectively. They are weak and preliminary in the sense that more elaborate considerations
+will make them obsolete. Maybe we can construe them as heuristic reasoning which serves the
+piecemeal construction of more complex and robust practical arguments.
+142 G. Betz
+
+choice. That is certainly how its methods are frequently presented and applied.19
+The argumentative turn is free from such hybris: Rational decision making
+according to the argumentative turn consists primarily in rational deliberation, in
+an argumentative exchange, in the process of giving and taking various reasons for
+and against alternative options.
+But haven’t decision theorists shown that someone who doesn’t maximize
+expected utility violates basic axioms of rationality? This seems to be a widespread
+misinterpretation of so-called decision-theoretic representation theorems.
+Granted: It can be shown that every agent whose preferences over
+alternative options satisfy certain criteria acts as if she were maximizing
+expected utility according to some hypothetical, personal utility and probability
+function. But this result entails nothing about how the agent has originally
+arrived at her preferences, or how she is making her choices. It may very well
+be that she adheres to a non-consequentialist ethical theory, which determines
+her choices and preferences. The existence of a hypothetical utility and probability
+function is then in a way a mere formal artefact, a theoretical epiphenomenon
+that has no practical bearing on the agent’s rational decision making
+process at all.20
+3 Arguing with Possibilities For and Against Options
+for Action
+This section reviews practical arguments that can be advanced in a policy debate
+despite deep uncertainty about policy outcomes. The worst case and robustness
+arguments developed in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, are inspired by the decision
+theoretic literature; Sect. 3.3 analyzes arguments from risk imposition, which are
+prominently discussed in risk ethics.
+3.1 Arguments from Best and Worst Cases
+Example (Local Authority) The local authority organizes a hearing on the planned
+industrial site. At this hearing, members of an environmental group argue along the
+following lines: The construction of the industrial complex may destroy the habitat.
+The worst thing that may happen if the community does not grant the construction
+permission is, however, that the local economy will miss a growth opportunity and
+will expand less quickly than otherwise. The latter case is clearly preferable to the
+19 Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) is a (influential) case in point.
+20 For a more detailed discussion of the implications of representation theorems see Briggs (2014:
+especially Sect. 2.2) and the references therein.
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 143
+
+first one. The local authority should err on the safe side and prohibit the
+construction.
+The environmentalists put forward a simple worst case argument, whose core can
+be analyzed as follows, argument C:
+(1) There is no available option whose worst possible consequences are preferable
+to the worst possible consequences of not permitting the construction.
+(2) If there is no available option whose worst possible consequences are [weakly]
+preferable to A’s worst possible consequences, then one is obliged to carry out
+option A.
+(3) Thus: The local authority should not permit the construction of the industrial
+complex.
+Premiss (2) represents the general decision principle which underlies the reasoning.
+It states that alternative options should be assessed according to their worst
+possible consequences. In decision theory, this worst case principle is called
+maximin criterion.21
+Premiss (1) has case-specific, normative and descriptive content. It typically
+takes three steps to justify a statement like premiss (1). First, one identifies, for each
+option, all possible consequences. Second, one locates those consequences in a
+‘normative landscape,’ and identifies, for each option, its worst possible consequences.
+Third, one compares the worst possible consequences of all options and
+identifies the option whose worst possible consequences are best.
+In line with our general remarks above, the simple worst case reasoning requires
+one to grasp the entire space of possibilities. Otherwise, one wouldn’t be able to
+correctly identify the options’ worst possible consequences.
+Example (Local Authority) The hearing continues and members of another environmental
+group object that without the new industrial project, we’re lacking
+necessary funds to clean up the contaminated mine, which threatens the habitat, too.
+This objection challenges premiss (1) in the above argument, in particular the
+claim that the worst case of not constructing the new industrial complex is preferable
+to the destruction of the habitat. In fact, the objection goes, not constructing the
+complex may have the same catastrophic consequences.
+Put more generally, all available options seem to possess equally bad worst
+cases. The antecedent conditions of the worst case principle (2) above don’t apply
+to any available option and the principle hence is of no use in warranting a choice.
+In view of such situations, the worst case principle is sometimes described as selfrefuting
+22; but that seems inadequate, the simple criterion does not give contradictory
+recommendations, it rather does not justify any prescription at all.
+21 Cf. Luce and Raiffa (1957:278), Resnik (1987:26).
+22 E.g. Elliott (2010).
+144 G. Betz
+
+Example (Local Authority) Charged by their colleagues, the opponents of the new
+complex refine their original argument. They concede that if the local authority
+fails to clean up the mine, the habitat may be destroyed, too. But they say: We
+may fail to clean up the mine no matter whether we build the new industrial
+complex or not. That’s because money is not even the main problem when
+de-contaminating the mine, we rather face technical and engineering problems.
+So, yes, a constantly contaminated mine with all its catastrophic ecological
+consequences, including the total destruction of the habitat, is clearly a worst
+case to reckon. But that worst case may materialize independently of the choice
+we discuss today. It’s just not relevant for the current decision. What is relevant,
+though, is the second worst case, i.e. the destruction of the habitat through the
+new industrial complex.
+The opponents of the industrial complex now argue with a refined decision
+principle.23 We can reconstruct their reasoning as follows, argument D:
+(1) The worst possible consequence of not permitting the construction is preferable
+to the worst possible consequence of permitting the construction—excluding all
+possible consequences both options have in common (such as failure to
+de-contaminate the mine).
+(2) An option A is to preferred to an option B, if—excluding all common possible
+consequences of A and B—A’s worst possible consequence is preferable to B’s
+worst possible consequence.
+(3) Thus: The local authority should not permit the construction of the industrial
+complex.
+This reasoning generalizes the original worst case argument C. I.e., every choice
+that is warranted by the original argument can also be justified with the refined
+principle.24
+Since the argument justifies a comparative prescription, it can be applied iteratively
+in order to exclude several options one after another.
+The decision principles which fuel the worst case argument express an attitude
+of extreme risk aversion. Any potential benefits (positive possible consequences)
+are simply ignored. We can easily think of decision situations where such an
+attitude seems to be inappropriate (a Hollywood studio that would base its
+management decisions on maximin would simply stop producing any films at
+all, since every film may flop). Following Rawls (1971), Stephen Gardiner suggests
+(sufficient) conditions under which such a precautionary attitude seems to be
+permissible, if not even morally required. These are: (i) some options may
+have truly catastrophic consequences, (ii) the potential gains that may result
+23 The lexicographically refined maximin criterion is called “leximin.”
+24 Moreover, the general premiss (2) can be understood as an implementation of Hansson’s
+symmetry tests (cf. Hansson 2016).
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 145
+
+from taking a risky option are negligible compared to the catastrophic effects that
+may ensue.25
+These prerequisites can be made explicit as antecedent conditions in the decision
+principle and, accordingly, as additional premisses in our worst case arguments,
+e.g., argument E:
+(1) Some of the local authority’s options may have truly catastrophic consequences.
+(2) The potential gains that may result from taking a risky option are negligible
+compared to the catastrophic effects that may ensue in the local authority’s
+decision to permit or prohibit the construction of the industrial complex.
+(3) There is no available option whose worst possible consequence is preferable to
+the worst possible consequence of not permitting the construction.
+(4) If (i) some options may have truly catastrophic consequences, (ii) the potential
+gains that may result from taking a risky option are negligible compared to the
+catastrophic effects that may ensue, and (iii) there is no available option whose
+worst possible consequence is [weakly] preferable to A’s worst possible consequence,
+then one is obliged to carry out option A.
+(5) Thus: The local authority should not permit the construction of the industrial
+complex.
+Gardiner (2006) suggests to consider the modified decision principle (4) as an
+interpretation and operationalization of the notoriously vague precautionary
+principle.
+In many situations it is not outright unreasonable to be highly risk averse—in
+some it may even be morally required. But what about other situations, and what
+about agents that are rather willing to take risks? How can they reason about their
+choices under deep uncertainty? One straightforward generalization of the maximin
+reasoning is to account for both worst and best possible consequences of each
+option.
+Example (Local Authority) The hearing is broadcast and citizens are invited to
+comment on the discussion online. One post argues: The worst case of constructing
+the industrial site is the destruction of the habitat. But what about the best case? Fact
+is: We’d attract a green tech company that builds highly innovative products. That
+does not only mean sustained growth but also that our small town will potentially
+attract further supplying industries, to the effect that a whole industrial cluster will
+emerge in the years to come. With the help of these industries, we might become,
+over the next two decades, the first community in this state that fully generates its
+energy demand in a CO2-neutral way.
+Unlike worst case reasoning, arguments of this sort assess alternative options in
+view of both their corresponding best and worst case. In order to do so, best and
+25 Gardiner (2006:47); see also Sunstein (2005), who argues for a weaker set of conditions. The
+general strategy to identify specific conditions under which the various decision principles may be
+applied is also favored by Resnik (1987:40).
+146 G. Betz
+
+worst cases have to be compounded for each option. Let’s refer to the joint
+normative assessment of a pair of possible consequences (best and worst case) as
+“beta-balance.”26 The relative weight which is given to the worst case in such a
+beta-balance is a measure of the underlying degree of risk aversion. A simple way
+to reconstruct the above reasoning would be, argument F:
+(1) There is no available option whose beta-balance (of best and worst possible
+consequences) is preferable to the beta-balance of permitting the construction.
+(2) If there is no available option whose beta-balance (of best and worst possible
+consequences) is preferable to A’s beta-balance, then one is obliged to carry out
+option A.
+(3) Thus: The local authority should permit the construction of the industrial
+complex.
+In order to justify a statement like premiss (1), one has to (i) identify all possible
+consequences of each available option; (ii) determine best and worst possible cases
+(for each option); (iii) balance and combine the best and worst case (for each
+option) in light of one’s risk attitude, so that one is finally able to identify the
+option with the best beta-balance. A proponent of the illustrative argument above
+would, in particular, have to compare a combination of destroying the habitat (worst
+case) and greening the local economy (best case) on the one side with a business as
+usual scenario on the other side (if we disregard uncertainty about the consequences
+of not building the industrial complex).
+Worst case reasoning is just a special case of this sort of argumentation, it merely
+consists in determining the beta-balance in an extreme way, namely by ignoring the
+best case and simply identifying the beta-balance with the worst case.
+The idea that options are assessed in view of their best and worst possible
+consequences allows us also to analyze the following line of reasoning.
+Example (Hollywood) It turns out that the Hollywood studio has lost a vital legal
+dispute and is virtually bankrupt anyway. Now the managers reason: There’s
+nothing to loose and it can’t really get worse. So we should go for the highly
+risky film—if it will turn out to be a blockbuster, then our studio will finally survive.
+To me, that sounds perfectly reasonable. Under one option, bankruptcy is nearly
+certain, and bankruptcy is as bad as it can get. Under the other option, there is at least
+a chance that the company survives. The general decision principle that can be used
+for reconstructing this argument is: If option A leads, in the worst possible case, to
+consequences X but may also bring about better consequences and if option B will
+26 In case the (dis)value of the best |case and worst case is quantifiable, their beta-balance is
+simply a weighted mean (where the parameter 0 ! β ! 1 determines the relative weight
+of best versus worst case in the argumentation): β " value-of-best-case þ ð1 $ βÞ" disvalue-of-worst-case. The corresponding decision principle is called “Hurwicz criterion”
+in decision theory (Resnik 1987: 32, Luce and Raiffa 1957:282). Hansson (2001:102–113)
+investigates the formal properties of “extremal” preferences which only take best and worst
+possible cases into account.
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 147
+
+surely bring about consequences X, then option A is preferred to option B.27 Now, we
+can also explain why the reasoning appears so plausible: Whatever the exact level of
+risk aversion, the beta-balance of option A is greater than that of option B and hence
+A is preferred to B according to best/worst case reasoning, in general.
+We’ve discussed the problem that sometimes all options may give rise to equally
+bad worst cases. Our solution was to compare 2nd (and if necessary 3rd, 4th, etc.)
+worst cases in order to evaluate the options. But what if all options essentially
+give rise to the same possible outcomes? In possibilistic terms, the options are then
+indistinguishable and any justification of a choice requires further (non-possibilistic)
+characterizations. Now, this characterization does not necessarily have to consist in
+precise probabilistic forecasts, as the following example illustrates.
+Example (WW2 Bomb) The team has decided to evacuate the borrow. Question is:
+What can be done to secure the historic Renaissance building nearby? The experts
+agree: There is no way to guarantee that the building will not be fully destroyed.
+Whatever the team does, that remains the worst possible case. In the same time, the
+probability of this happening cannot be assessed, too little is known about the inner
+life of this bomb and analogous cases are rare. Eventually, the team decides to erect
+a steel wall between the bomb and the building before trying to defuse it. It reasons:
+Whatever the specific circumstances (state of the trigger mechanism, degree of
+chemical transformation of the explosive, degree of corrosion, density of the
+underground, etc.), the (unknown) likelihood that the historic building will be
+destroyed is reduced through the erection of the steel wall.
+In this reasoning, the team relies on partial probabilistic knowledge. I suggest to
+analyze the argument as follows: The possible consequences of the alternative
+options are themselves described probabilistically. They can be seen as alternative
+probabilistic scenarios. The value theory which assesses the possible consequences
+does not only consider the physical effects but also their probability of occurrence;
+the normative assumptions of the reasoning assess the probabilistically described
+scenarios. More precisely, we assume that the negative value of a possible scenario
+(which may ensue) is roughly proportional to the (scenario-specific) likelihood that
+the historic building is fully destroyed. As a result, the alternative options may lead
+to different possible consequences which can be normatively assessed.28
+Following the overall direction of this section, we can reconstruct the argument
+as worst case reasoning, argument G:
+(1) The greatest possible probability that the historic building is fully destroyed is
+smaller in case a steel wall is erected (compared to not erecting a steel wall).
+27 This is a version of the dominance principle (Resnik 1987:9).
+28 In the context of climate policy making, an analogous line of reasoning, which focuses on the
+probability of attaining climate targets, is discussed under the title “cost risk analysis”; see the
+decision-theoretic analyzes by Schmidt et al. (2011) and Neubersch et al. (2014). Peterson (2006)
+shows that decision-making which seeks to minimize the probability of some harm runs into
+problems as soon as various harmful outcomes with different disvalue are distinguished.
+148 G. Betz
+
+(2) The value of a possible consequence of erecting or not erecting the steel wall is
+roughly proportional the corresponding likelihood that the historic building is
+not fully destroyed.
+(3) Thus: The worst possible consequence of erecting the steel wall is preferable to
+the worst possible consequence of not erecting the steel-wall.
+(4) An option A is to preferred to an option B, if—excluding all common possible
+consequences of A and B—A’s worst possible consequence is preferable to B’s
+worst possible consequence.
+(5) Thus: The team should erect the steel wall.
+3.2 Arguments from Robustness
+The best/worst case arguments discussed above presume that one can determine
+which of all possible outcomes is best, and which is worst. In this respect, such
+arguments side with traditional risk analysis, which allegedly identifies the “optimal”
+choice. Sometimes, however, we are not in a position to say which possible
+outcome is clearly best. (Maybe some values are incomparable, cf. Hansson (1997)
+and M€oller (2016)). As an alternative to optimization, we may seek options that
+bring about at least tolerable and acceptable (if not necessarily optimal) results.
+That’s the core idea of so-called satisficing approaches, such as implemented in the
+tolerable-windows approach (e.g. Toth 2003) or the guardrails approach (e.g. Graßl
+et al. 2003). As normative premisses, such reasons only require a very simple
+normative theory, namely a binary demarcation of all possible states into acceptable
+versus non-acceptable ones. Sometimes, this demarcation can be provided in terms
+of minimum or maximum (multi-dimensional) thresholds (e.g. technical safety
+thresholds, social poverty thresholds, or climate policy goals such as the
+2-degree-target).
+Satisficing approaches do not only address axiological uncertainty, they also
+provide a suitable starting point to handle predictive uncertainty. Thus, an option is
+permissible under deep uncertainty just in case all its potential outcomes are
+acceptable according to the underlying ‘normative landscape’ (i.e. satisfy certain
+normative criteria). Permissible options are robust vis-"a-vis all different possible
+states-of-affairs. Hence the notion of “robust decision analysis.” (Cf. Lempert
+et al. 2003)
+Like best/worst case reasoning, robust decision analysis requires one to have a
+full understanding of the alternative options’ possible consequences. Lempert
+et al. (2002) have, however, proposed heuristics which allow one to estimate
+which options are robust in light of an incomplete grasp of the space of possibilities.
+These heuristics involve the iterative construction of ever new possible scenarios in
+order to test whether preliminarily identified options are really robust.29
+29 Robust decision analysis "a la Lempert et al. is hence a systematic form of “hypothetical
+retrospection” (see Hansson 2016, Sect. 6).
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 149
+
+We will return to the epistemic challenge of deep uncertainty—namely the
+problem of fully grasping the space of possibilities—in the second part of this
+chapter. But deep uncertainty also poses a normative challenge for robust decision
+analysis: the greater the number of possible outcomes and scenarios, the greater the
+likelihood that no option will eventually satisfy a given set of minimum standards.
+Put more bluntly: No available option may guarantee that the corresponding outcome
+is acceptable. Robust decision analysis seems of no avail in situations like these.
+Still, I suggest that the diagnosis to the effect that no option is robust given some
+minimum standards may nonetheless give rise to a meaningful decision analysis.
+The following example illustrates the structure of the argumentation.
+Example (Local Authority) Besides permitting and prohibiting the construction of
+the industrial site, the local authority considers further measures that could supplement
+a decision to grant permission. These include additional restrictions on design
+and use of the industrial site; natural barriers (hills, woods); gradual extension of the
+habitat through artificial flooding of agricultural land; etc. So the authority has to
+choose amongst alternative policy portfolios. It is guided by two main criteria: an
+environmental (protect our unique ecosystems) and an economic one (increase
+growth and employment). The mayor has provisionally set the following targets:
+3 % growth p.a. over the next 10 years without any environmental degradation
+whatsoever. Experts say that, when taking all contingencies into account, there is no
+policy portfolio which will guarantee that these targets are met. There exist
+however robust options for weaker targets. So, the experts say, there are costly
+measures that will protect the ecological habitat (come what may) while
+constructing the new site, to the effect that long-term growth equals at least 2 %.
+The growth target of 3 % can be met while preserving the endangered habitat at the
+cost of putting another ecosystem at risk.
+So the mayor really faces a choice between different sets of normative minimum
+standards that are “satisfiable,” i.e. there exist robust policy options in view of these
+standards. Frequently, such a choice may involve normative trade-offs,
+e.g. lowering the ecological or the economic guardrail (tolerate more loss in
+biodiversity or slower GDP growth).
+The above example suggest that robust decision analysis should try to identify
+• The strictest, multi-dimensional sets of minimum standards such that there is at
+least one robust option relative to that set of guardrails.
+Each set of guardrails will produce a different argument in favor of a policy
+option. In the WW2 bomb example, the experts may face a trade-off between costs
+of the operation and protecting the neighbors. Different ways of striking the balance
+will result in different arguments.30 For example, argument H:
+30 These different arguments and the coherent position (cf. Brun and Betz 2016: Sect. 4.2) one
+adopts with regard to them can be understood as an operationalization of Hansson’s degrees of
+unacceptability (cf. Hansson 2013:69–70).
+150 G. Betz
+
+(1) A possible outcome is acceptable if and only if no person is killed and the
+operation has a total cost of less than 1 million €. [Normative guardrails]
+(2) There is no possible consequence of defusing the bomb according to which a
+person is killed or the operation has total cost greater than 1 million €.
+[Possibilistic prediction]
+(3) An option is permissible just in case all its potential outcomes are acceptable.
+[Principle of robust decision analysis]
+(4) Thus: It is permissible to defuse the bomb.
+An alternative set of minimum standards yields another argument, argument I:
+(1) A possible outcome is acceptable if and only if no person is seriously harmed and
+the operation has a total cost of less than 2 million €. [Normative guardrails]
+(2) There is no possible consequence of detonating the bomb according to which a
+person is seriously harmed or the operation has total cost greater than 2 million
+€. [Possibilistic prediction]
+(3) An option is permissible just in case all its potential outcomes are acceptable.
+[Principle of robust decision analysis]
+(4) Thus: It is permissible to detonate the bomb.
+3.3 Arguments from Risk Imposition
+Let’s stay with the WW2 bomb example. Assume the least expensive option (say
+detonating the bomb) risks to seriously harm people living and working in the
+neighborhood. When we deliberate about that option, it seems a relevant aspect
+whether the persons potentially affected have been informed and have given their
+consent. If not, this may provide a reason against choosing this option.31 A simple
+argument from risk imposition can thus be reconstructed as follows, argument J:
+(1) To detonate the bomb possibly causes serious harm (injuries) of persons living
+and working in the neighborhood.
+(2) The persons living and working in the neighborhood have not given their
+consent to being exposed to the possibility of serious harm as a result of the
+bomb’s disabling.
+(3) An option that involves risk imposition (i.e. which potentially negatively
+affects persons who have not given their consent to being exposed to such a
+risk) must not be taken.
+(4) Thus: The expert team must not detonate the bomb.
+Arguments like these face different sorts of problems and are probably in need of
+further refinement. Sometimes it is just physically impossible for those being
+affected by a measure to provide consent (e.g. future generations). The simple
+31 For a detailed discussion of risk imposition and the problems standard moral theories face in
+coping with risks see Hansson (2003).
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 151
+
+principle of risk imposition is hence too strict. It must be limited to cases where
+those potentially affected are in a position to provide consent, or it must state
+alternative necessary conditions for permissibility. Another problem is that the
+simple principle of risk imposition merely regards one specific aspect of the entire
+decision situation, it does, in particular, take into account neither all the alternative
+options nor all the possible outcomes of the different options. What if every
+available option involves risk imposition? What if the alternative options have
+clearly worse (certain or possible) consequences than merely imposing some risk of
+being injured without consent? Maybe the principle in premiss (3) is best seen as a
+prima facie principle.32
+4 The Statics of Possibilistic Knowledge: Four Classes
+of Possibilistic Hypotheses
+We’ve seen that practical reasoning under deep uncertainty requires grasp of the
+entire space of possibilities; justifications of policy recommendations presume that
+one correctly predicts all possible consequences for each available option. And the
+conclusions one arrives at depend sensitively on the outcomes one considers as
+possible.33 In the second part of this chapter, we will discuss the methodological
+challenge of identifying all possible outcomes of a given option, i.e. all conceptual
+possibilities whose realization, as a result of implementing the corresponding
+option, are consistent with the given background knowledge.
+It is sometimes straightforward to determine the decision-relevant possibilities.
+Example (Pendulum) Consider a well-engineered pendulum in a black box. We
+know that it was initially displaced by 10', but we don’t know when it was released
+(a minute ago, a second ago, just now). The task is to predict the pendulum’s
+position (deviation from equilibrium) in one minute. Given our ignorance about the
+time when the pendulum was released, any displacement between (10' is possible.
+That’s the space of possibilities. In other words, these are precisely the statements
+about the pendulum’s position which are consistent with our background
+knowledge.
+It seems that case is fairly obvious, but it’s nonetheless instructive to ask how
+exactly we arrive at the possibilistic prediction. So, on the one hand, every statement
+of the form “The pendulum is displaced by x degrees” with x taking a value
+between $10 and þ10' can be shown to be consistent with our background
+32 Brun and Betz (2016), this volume, discuss how such principles and the corresponding arguments
+can be analyzed. See also Hansson (2013:97–101).
+33 Thus, Hansson (1997) stresses that in decision-making under deep uncertainty the demarcation
+of the possible from the impossible involves as influential a choice as the selection of a decision
+principle.
+152 G. Betz
+
+knowledge. (In particular, for any such statementHjxj!10 there exists a time trel such
+that Hjxj!10 can be derived from the Newtonian model of the pendulum and the
+possibility that the pendulum has been released at trel.) On the other hand, every
+statement of the form “The pendulum is displaced by x degrees” with x taking an
+absolute value greater than 10' can be shown to be inconsistent with our background
+knowledge. (Any such statement implies that the total energy in the
+contained system has increased, in violation of the principle of energy conservation.)
+In sum, we have completely mapped the space of possibilities by considering
+every conceptual possibility and either showing that it is consistent with K or
+showing that it is inconsistent with K. Or, in other words, each conceptual possibility
+has been “verified” or “falsified.”34
+That’s in a way the ideal situation of possibilistic prediction.
+Mapping the space of possibilities requires us to verify or falsify each conceptual
+possibility. Both tasks are tricky. An argument to the effect that a statement is
+consistent with the background knowledge (possibilistic verification) has to account
+explicitly for one’s entire knowledge; if some item of information is left out, the
+argument fails to establish relative consistency (unless it is explicitly argued the
+item is irrelevant).35 The more diverse, heterogeneous and dappled our understanding
+of a system, the more challenging this task. (That is the reason why conceptual
+possibilities are sometimes only “partially” verified in the sense that they are shown
+to be consistent with a subset of our background knowledge; e.g., technical feasibility
+studies may ignore economic and societal constraints on technology deployment.)
+An argument to the effect that a statement is inconsistent with the
+background knowledge (possibilistic falsification) may in contrast be comparatively
+simple, it may suffice to find a single known fact that refutes the conceptual
+possibility. The challenge here rather consists in finding an item in our background
+knowledge that refutes the conceptual possibility.
+We have sketched the epistemic ideal of possibilistic prediction and identified
+potential challenges. But due to our cognitive limitations, we may fail to overcome
+these challenges. Our actual epistemic situation may depart from the ideal in
+different ways.
+i. There might be some conceptual possibilities which actually are consistent with
+the background knowledge, although we have not been able to show this (failure
+to verify).
+34 In speaking of “verified” and “falsified” conceptual possibilities, I follow a terminological
+suggestion by Betz (2010). To “verify” a conceptual possibility in this sense does not imply to
+show that the corresponding hypothesis is true, what is shown to be true (in possibilistic verification)
+is the claim that the hypothesis is consistent with background knowledge. However, to
+“falsify” a conceptual possibility involves showing that the corresponding hypothesis is false
+(given background knowledge).
+35 For this very reason, it is a non-trivial assumption that a dynamic model of a complex system
+(e.g. a climate model) is adequate for verifying possibilities about that system (cf. Betz 2015).
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 153
+
+ii. There might be some conceptual possibilities which actually are inconsistent
+with the background knowledge, although we have not been able to show this
+(failure to falsify).
+In other words: There may be some conceptual possibilities which are neither
+verified nor falsified. In addition, it is not always clear that we have fully grasped
+the space of conceptual possibilities in the first place, so
+iii. There might be some conceptual possibilities which we haven’t even considered
+so far (failure to articulate).
+That brings us to the following systematization of possibilities (see also Betz 2010):
+1. Non-articulated possibilities [Class 1]
+2. Articulated possibilities
+(a) Falsified possibilities (shown to be inconsistent with background knowledge)
+[Class 2]
+(b) Non-falsified possibilities
+i. Verified possibilities (shown to be consistent with background knowledge)
+[Class 3]
+ii. Merely articulated possibilities (neither verified nor falsified) [Class 4]
+For ideal agents, the dichotomy between conceptual possibilities that are consistent
+with background knowledge versus those that aren’t is perfectly fine and
+may serve to express their possibilistic knowledge. For non-ideal agents with
+limited cognitive capacities, like us, this dichotomy is often an unattainable ideal,
+and hence unsuitable to express our imperfect understanding of a domain. The
+conceptual distinctions above provide a more fine-grained framework for
+expressing our possibilistic knowledge at a given moment in time.
+Let me illustrate these distinctions with some examples.
+Class 1. Examples of non-articulated possibilities—aka “unknown unknowns”—
+can at best be given in retrospect. One of the most prominent instances is the
+hypothesis that HCFCs deplete the ozone layer, which was not even articulated
+in the first half of the twentieth century. Likewise, the possibility that an
+increased GHG concentration may cause the dry out of the Amazonian rainforest
+was not entertained in the time of Arrhenius. And that asbestos may cause lung
+cancer was not considered at all when asbestos mining began (more than
+4,000 years ago). Likewise, “Just underneath the bomb lies King John’s Treasure,
+a medieval fortune of immense financial but even infinitely greater historic
+value” is not even articulated by the bomb experts. While we can’t provide
+specific cases of possibilities we currently haven’t even thought about, we may
+have more or less strong reasons to suspect that such possibilities exist, e.g. when
+we deal with a complex system which we have only poorly understood so far.36
+36 See also the “epistemic defaults” discussed by Hansson (2016: Sect. 5).
+154 G. Betz
+
+Class 2. By summing up the maximum contribution of all potential sources of sea
+level rise, climate scientists are in a position to robustly refute the conceptual
+possibility that global mean sea level will rise by 10 m until 2,100 with business
+as usual emissions.37 In various safety reports, CERN scientists have argued that
+the generation of stable microscopic black holes in the large hadron collider is
+inconsistent with current background knowledge (specifically basic physical
+theory and cosmic observations).38 In our fictitious example, the expert team
+rules out—given its knowledge about the size of the bomb and the most powerful
+explosive used in WW2—that a detonation affects a cultural heritage site
+2 km away.
+Class 3. Following various detailed energy scenarios, it is consistent with our
+knowledge about the future of the energy system (which is mainly of technological
+nature) that Europe reduces its CO2 emissions by 80%in 2050 compared
+to 1990.39 Climatologists argue, by means of detailed models of ice shelf
+dynamics and global warming scenarios, or historic analogies, that a sea level
+rise of 2 m until 2,300 is consistent with current understanding of the climate
+system.40 That the US president in 10 years’ time will be a democrat is also
+known to be consistent with our current knowledge, essentially because we
+know nearly nothing about the specifics of the US political system in the
+medium-term. The bomb experts have verified the conceptual possibility that
+no single glass window breaks due to the detonation of the bomb by running
+computer simulations according to which the steel wall deflects, under favorable
+conditions, the pressure wave.
+Class 4. A run-away greenhouse effect on earth is a conceptual possibility sometimes
+articulated and seriously considered by climate scientists; yet it seems an
+open question whether that scenario is consistent with our knowledge about the
+climate system.41 Can the world achieve the 2-degree-target with current energy
+technologies, but without expanding nuclear energy and without substantial
+reductions in global economic growth? I suspect we have no proof that this
+conceptual possibility cannot unfold, but in the same time we haven’t shown that
+this scenario is consistent with our heterogeneous background knowledge,
+either. In our fictitious example, the policy makers wonder whether the ecosystem
+can essentially survive even if one species of fish is lost; but preliminary
+investigations by biologists are so far inconclusive. A schoolgirl asks the bomb
+experts whether the dust cloud of a bomb explosion may shut down the hospital’s
+air conditioning system; the experts concede that they have not checked this yet.
+37 For a discussion of narrower bounds for future sea level rise see Church et al. (2013:1185–6).
+38 See Ellis et al. (2008) and Blaizot et al. (2003).
+39 Compare the EU Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission 2011).
+40 Cf. Church et al. (2013:1186–9).
+41 Hansen et al. (2013) distinguish different “run-away greenhouse” scenarios and discuss whether
+they can be robustly ruled out—which, according to the authors, is the case for the most extreme
+ones (p. 24).
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 155
+
+5 The Dynamics of Possibilistic Knowledge
+Our possibilistic foreknowledge is highly fallible. That’s already true for the simple
+notion of serious possibility in the sense of relative consistency with the background
+knowledge. Changes in background knowledge trigger changes is serious
+possibilities. In particular, possibilistic predictions are fallible to the extent that
+background knowledge is fallible. Expansion and revision of background beliefs
+can necessitate a revision of one’s possibilistic knowledge. So can the recognition
+that the inferences drawn from background assumptions were incomplete or incorrect.
+And conceptual innovations that allow for the articulation of novel hypotheses
+may have the same effect.
+How do these changes affect a nuanced explication of one’s possibilistic knowledge
+in line with the previous section? We distinguish four cases: (a) The addition
+of novel items of evidence or inferences which do not affect previously held
+background beliefs (expansion); (b) the withdrawal of previously held background
+beliefs without acquiring novel ones (pure contraction); (c) the replacement of
+previously held background assumptions or inferences with novel ones (revision);
+(d) the modification of old or the creation of new terminology that allows for
+articulation of novel hypotheses (conceptual change).
+Re (a). Assume the background knowledge, or the set of inferences drawn from
+it, is expanded in a conservative way, i.e., without changing previous background
+knowledge or inferences. As a first point to note, any previously falsified possibility
+will remain falsified. But the status of formerly verified or merely articulated
+possibilities may change: All these hypotheses have to be re-assessed and the
+arguments which establish that a hypothesis is consistent with previous background
+knowledge don’t warrant that it is consistent with broader background knowledge—
+they don’t carry over, that is, to the novel situation. For some previously
+verified hypotheses, it may not be feasible to show that they are consistent with
+novel background knowledge; some of these may even be falsified on the basis of
+novel evidence. That may also happen with some formerly merely articulated
+hypotheses.
+In sum, conservative expansion tends to reduce the number of verified possibilities
+and to increase the number of falsified ones. And that’s how it should be, as
+increasing the content of one’s knowledge means to be able to exclude ever more
+conceptual possibilities.
+Let me illustrate these dynamics with the WW2 bomb example. Suppose the
+bomb experts get a call from a colleague, who has just discovered a document in a
+military archive from which it is plain that the particular bomb to-be-defused was
+produced before 1942. That novel evidence necessitates the re-assessment of
+non-falsified possibilities. The possibility that the trigger is intact, for instance,
+had been verified by reference to other WW2 bombs recently found, whose trigger
+was intact. But these bombs all dated from the last 2 years of the war. So the
+argument from analogy does not really warrant anymore that the trigger of the
+156 G. Betz
+
+bomb to-be-defused may be intact, too. For the time being, the possibility that the
+trigger is intact has to count as a merely articulated one. The experts had also
+considered whether the dust cloud of a potential detonation may damage the
+hospital’s air conditioning, without being able to verify or falsify that possibility.
+But based on the novel information that the bomb was produced in 1942, they can
+now exclude that possibility: the explosives used in that year degrade relatively
+quickly, which severely reduces the overall power of a potential explosion. The dust
+cloud would hence be too small to affect the hospital.
+Re (b). In terms of possibilistic dynamics, pure contraction is symmetric to
+conservative expansion of the background knowledge. If some background beliefs
+are given up, e.g. because the inferences that have been used to establish them are
+found to be fallacious, without acquiring novel beliefs, then every conceptual
+possibility that had been shown to be consistent with the background knowledge
+remains a verified possibility. Merely articulated possibilistic hypotheses are unaffected,
+too. But the allegedly falsified possibilities have to be re-examined: Some of
+these may become merely articulated or even verified possibilities relative to the
+contracted background belief system.
+Continuing the previous example, let’s assume the bomb experts realize that
+estimates of the degraded chemical substances’ explosive power are highly uncertain.
+In fact, it seems that a blunt statistical fallacy has been committed in the
+extrapolation from small-scale field tests to large-scale bombs, such as the one
+to-be-defused. So the bomb experts retract their belief that the power of a potential
+detonation can be narrowly confined—despite the bomb being produced in 1942.
+That in turn broadens the range of possibilities. Specifically, the hypothesis that a
+detonation will produce a large dust cloud which shuts down the hospital’s air
+conditioning system cannot be falsified anymore; it becomes a merely articulated
+possibility.
+Re (c). When the background knowledge or the inferences drawn are revised, all
+the conceptual possibilities have to be re-assessed. Previously falsified hypotheses
+may become merely articulated or verified ones. Formerly verified hypotheses may
+not be verifiable anymore, and may even be falsified. In short, anything goes. There
+is no stability, no accumulation of any kind of possibilistic prediction.
+Let’s illustrate this case, again, with the WW2 bomb example. Assume the
+bomb team realizes that it had committed, early in the mission, a fatal measurement
+error. They underestimated the length and hence the weight of the bomb by
+30 %! All the possibilities, all the scenarios considered have to be re-assessed. For
+instance, the team formerly argued, based on detailed computer simulation, that it
+is consistent with their understanding of the situation that no window breaks upon
+detonation thanks to a steel wall which deflects the pressure wave. But the
+simulations were based on an erroneous assumption about the bomb’s size, and
+hence don’t verify that specific scenario (given the correct assumption). The
+possibility that no window breaks becomes a merely articulated possibility (unless,
+e.g., an accordingly modified simulation re-affirms the original finding). Also, the
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 157
+
+team originally excluded the possibility that the cultural heritage site will be
+damaged. But the argument which rules out this scenario, too, relied on a false
+premiss. Given the novel estimate of the bomb’s size, that possibility cannot be
+robustly ruled out anymore. Even more so, analogies to similar cases, based on the
+correct size of the bomb, suggest that the detonation may very well damage the
+cultural heritage site. So this previously falsified scenario becomes a verified
+possibility. And so on.
+Re (d). Finally, let us briefly consider the case of conceptual change. New
+terminology is introduced or the meaning of old terminology is modified. Such
+conceptual change will typically go along with a revision or a re-statement of the
+background knowledge. So anything we’ve discussed under (c) is applicable here,
+as well. On top of that, the creation of a new terminology affects the set of
+conceptual possibilities and therefore the set of possibilistic hypotheses considered
+by the agents—some previously articulated hypotheses may not be conceptually
+possible anymore (like “that’s not consistent with the way we use the words now”),
+other possibilities might be newly articulated.
+We shall illustrate the effect of conceptual change against the background of
+the advancement of molecular biology and genetic theory in the twentieth
+century. The progress in these disciplines went along with the development of
+novel concepts, an entirely new language that allows one to describe a known
+phenomenon in a new way. For example, only against this novel conceptual
+framework could scientists articulate a hypothesis like: The exposition to this
+and this chemical substance affects the DNA of the offspring and alters the
+genetic pool in the medium term. Or: Radioactive radiation may damage the
+DNA in a cell.
+Non-monotonic changes in the stock of possibilistic predictions, such as
+discussed hitherto, correspond to potential surprises. Just assume that the bomb
+experts had not corrected their initial measurement error—they would have been
+surprised to see the cultural heritage site being nearly destroyed. Likewise, had the
+schoolgirl not brought up the possibility that the hospital’s air conditioning system
+will break down, the experts might have faced an outcome they hadn’t even
+thought of.
+Rational decision making under deep uncertainty requires one to map out, given
+current background knowledge, the possibilistic predictions in line with the previous
+section. I want to suggest that, on top of this, rational decision making should
+attempt to gauge the potential for surprise in a given decision situation—specifically
+the potential for surprise that is linked to the modification of the background
+knowledge and conceptual change.
+What I have in mind is a second order assessment of one’s background knowledge,
+the inferences drawn and one’s conceptual frame. The more stable these
+items, the smaller the potential for surprise. If there’s reason to think that one’s
+understanding of a system will change and improve quickly, however, one should
+also expect the overhaul of one’s possibilistic outlook.
+158 G. Betz
+
+Of course, it’s impossible to predict what we will newly come to know in the
+future.42 But it’s not impossible to estimate whether our knowledge will change,
+and how much. So, in 1799 Humboldt had reason to expect that he would soon
+know much more about the flora of South America; if NASA plans a further space
+mission to explore a comet, we have reason to expect that our understanding of that
+comet (and maybe comets in general) will change in the future. However, if, in spite
+of serious efforts, our understanding of a system has stagnated in the last decades
+and we even understand why it is difficult to acquire further knowledge about that
+system (i.e. because of its complexity, because of measurement problems that can’t
+be overcome with available technologies, etc.), we have a reason to expect our
+background knowledge (and hence our stock of possibilistic predictions) to be
+rather stable.43
+6 The Practical Arguments Revisited
+I’ve suggested that our possibilistic foreknowledge should be cast in terms of
+verified, merely articulated, and falsified possibilities; it should also comprise an
+estimate of the scope of currently non-articulated possibilities as well as an assessment
+of the stability of one’s background knowledge.
+What does this entail for practical reasoning under deep uncertainty?
+The decision principles and practical arguments we discussed in Sect. 3 assume
+that we have knowledge about plain possibilities, without taking further differentiations
+into account. When different kinds of possibilities are distinguished, these
+principles are in need of further specification before being applied. As a result, each
+decision principle discussed above corresponds to several principles, each referring
+to a different sort of possibility.
+Let’s explore these complications by means of our examples. We start with
+worst case reasoning.
+Example (Local Authority) The environmentalists cited the destruction of the
+ecosystem as a worst case in order to argue against the construction of the industrial
+site. Upon being pressed, they explain their possibilistic outlook: “Why do we think
+it’s possible that the ecosystem will be destroyed? Well, because no one has
+convincingly argued so far that this won’t happen.”
+This makes it clear that the environmentalists are concerned with non-falsified
+possibility. The original argument C can now be more precisely reconstructed as,
+argument K:
+42 See Betz (2011), especially the discussion of Popper’s argument against predicting scientific
+progress (pp. 650–651).
+43 See Rescher (1984, 2009) for a discussion of limits of science and their various (conceptual or
+empirical) reasons.
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 159
+
+(1) There is no available option whose worst non-falsified possible consequence is
+preferable to the worst non-falsified possible consequence of not permitting the
+construction.
+(2) If there is no available option whose worst non-falsified possible consequence is
+[weakly] preferable to A’s worst non-falsified possible consequence, then one is
+obliged to carry out option A.
+(3) Thus: The local authority should not permit the construction of the industrial
+complex.
+This clarification also shows that, in order to challenge the argument, it suffices
+to point out a non-falsified (not necessarily verified) possibility according to which
+not constructing the industrial complex will have consequences as bad as the
+destruction of the habitat.
+Other worst case arguments may consistently refer to verified possibilities. Next,
+consider best/worst case reasoning.
+Example (Local Authority) One argument in the hearing (argument F) compared
+the worst case of constructing the site with its best case, that is the attraction of a
+green industries cluster and CO2-free local energy generation in the medium term.
+What kind of possibilities are we facing here? Assuming the argument follows,
+on the one side, the outlook of the environmentalists, the worst case is a merely
+articulated possibility. What about the best case? That optimistic prediction is not
+shown to be consistent with the background knowledge, either (there exists for
+example no precise energy scenario that spells out that the respective conceptual
+possibility is consistent with local circumstances such as potentials for solar and
+wind energy, etc.). The possibilistic prediction is just set forth, it is a merely
+articulated possibility, too. So the argument really strikes a balance between best
+and worst non-falsified possible cases.
+Other best/worst case arguments may compare the best verified possible case
+with the worst verified possible case, or even the best verified possible case with the
+worst non-falsified possible case.
+Let’s turn to robust decision analysis. An option was said to be robust vis-"a-vis
+certain normative guardrails just in case every possible consequence satisfies these
+guardrails. We’ve designed the WW2 bomb example above such that no option is
+allegedly robust with respect to the minimum aims that no person should be harmed
+and that the costs of the operation should not exceed 1 million Euro. At least one of
+these guardrails had to be relaxed so that a robust option exists (cf. arguments H, I).
+At this point, a team member intervenes.
+Example (WW2 Bomb) “We haven’t been able to find a robust option that satisfies
+our original guardrails because we considered any possibility we just came up with.
+What if we restrict our deliberation to cases that we’re pretty sure may happen,
+because they happened before or because our simulations give rise to corresponding
+results? It seems to me that the detonation plus small-scale evacuation is robust
+vis-"a-vis our original minimum standards and relative to all such verified
+possibilities.”
+160 G. Betz
+
+So the team member explains that arguments H, I should be understood as
+referring to non-falsified possibilities. In addition, she sets up a further argument
+which only takes verified possibilities into account, argument L:
+(1) A possible outcome is acceptable if and only if no person is seriously harmed and
+the operation has a total cost of less than 1 million €. [Normative guardrails]
+(2) There is no verified possible consequence of detonating the bomb plus smallscale
+evacuation according to which a person is seriously harmed or the
+operation has total cost greater than 1 million Euro. [Possibilistic prediction]
+(3) An option is permissible just in case all its potential outcomes (verified possibilities)
+are acceptable. [Principle of robust decision analysis]
+(4) Thus: It is permissible to detonate the bomb after small-scale evacuation.
+A police officer has reservations about this argument, and objects:
+Example (WW2 Bomb) “But you can’t robustly rule out that some people in the
+neighborhood, which will not be evacuated, will be harmed, right. So we impose a
+serious risk on these people and we must not do so without their consent. Which in
+turn is difficult to get given that some of these persons are comatose.”
+This brings us to risk imposition. Here, the police officer challenges the conclusion
+of an argument from robustness (with respect to verified possibilities) with an
+argument from risk imposition (with respect to falsified possibilities).
+Of course, arguments from risk imposition may also be articulated in view of
+verified possibilities.
+Such are the differentiations we have to account for. We get, as a consequence of
+our more fine-grained framework for possibilistic prediction, a further proliferation
+of the already numerous decision criteria and argument patterns for decision
+making under deep uncertainty.
+Now, which of these criteria, which of these argument schemes should one use in
+order to justify one’s choice?—That is the wrong question! There is no exclusiveness.
+In a first step, one should consider different arguments, which rely on different
+decision criteria, side by side. We typically don’t have a single plausible argument
+that tells us what we should do, but we have a complex argumentation that consists
+in various, partially conflicting arguments. So the question is rather: Which of these
+arguments (underlying criteria) should we prefer? Or, even better: How should we
+balance the conflicting arguments?44
+The answer to this question seems to depend on at least two factors: (a) One’s
+level of risk aversion. Already the original decision criteria expressed different risk
+attitudes. That’s also true for their refined versions. Whether a catastrophic merelyarticulated
+possible consequence or only a catastrophic verified possible consequence
+represents a sufficient reason for some agent to refrain from some action is a
+matter of that agent’s risk aversion. Likewise, an agent who seeks robust options
+44 Brun and Betz (2016: especially Sect. 4.2) explain how argument analysis, and especially
+argument mapping techniques, help to balance conflicting normative reasons in general.
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 161
+
+with respect to non-falsified possibilities is more risk averse than an agent who is
+content with robustness with respect to verified possibilities. (b) The profile of
+possibilistic predictions on which the decision is based. If, for example, there is a
+wide range of non-falsified possibilities whereas only very few of these can be
+verified, then it seems unreasonable to base the deliberation on the verified possibilities
+only. Doing so would make much more sense, however, if nearly all
+non-falsified possibilities were actually verified. Balancing the different decision
+criteria may also depend on the ratio of verified, merely articulated and falsified
+possibilities (which reflects the breadth and depth of one’s understanding of a
+system).
+The distinction between different kinds of possibilities does not just make things
+more complicated, it may also help us to resolve dilemmas, especially dilemmas
+that pop up in worst case considerations. The idea is that verified-worst-casereasons
+trump—ceteris paribus—merely-articulated-worst-case-reasons.
+In one of our examples, the local authority faces a dilemma, which can be fleshed
+out as follows.
+Example (Local Authority) If the authority permits construction, then the new
+industrial site will affect, essentially through traffic noise, species living in the
+habitat, which may eventually cause its destruction. If the authority does not grant
+permission, then it won’t have the money to thoroughly decontaminate the mine,
+which may in turn intoxicate groundwater and destroy the ecosystem, too. In an
+attempt to resolve the dilemma, engineers point out the following asymmetry:
+“Both cases can’t be ruled out. But the intoxication scenario is really spelled out
+in detail and on the basis of extensive knowledge about the mine, its status, the
+effects of contamination on groundwater, the toxic effects on species living in the
+ecosystem, etc. This is all well understood and we know that it may happen. We
+have however no comparable knowledge about the precise effects of traffic noise.”
+The asymmetry consists in the fact that the worst case of one option is a merely
+articulated possibility whereas the worst case of the other option is even a verified
+possibility. This information could be used to resolve the dilemma in favor of the
+option with the merely-articulated worst case.
+7 Arguments from Surprise
+The fine-grained conceptual framework of possibilistic foreknowledge does not
+only induce a differentiation of existing decision criteria, it also allows us to
+formulate novel argument schemes for practical reasoning under deep uncertainty,
+which can not be represented in terms of traditional risk analysis.
+These novel argument schemes concern the various options’ potential of surprise.
+Given a possibilistic outlook, a surprise has occurred just in case something
+has happened which wasn’t considered possible (i.e. was not referred to in some
+non-falsified possibility). Surprises may happen for different reasons. We may in
+162 G. Betz
+
+particular distinguish two sorts of surprise, to which we already alluded above:
+(a) surprises that result from unknown unknowns; (b) surprises that result from the
+fallibility of and the occasional need to rectify one’s background knowledge.45
+We develop and explore arguments which refer to these kinds of surprise by
+means of example.
+7.1 Arguments from Unknown Unknowns
+Arguments from unknown unknowns set forth reasons to suspect that some relevant
+conceptual possibilities have not even been articulated, and claim that the available
+options are affected unevenly by this problem.
+Example (WW2 Bomb) A member of the expert team proposes to try a brand new
+method for disarming bombs, which he has only recently heard of and which
+involves ultra-deep freezing and nano-materials. Computer simulations have so
+far been promising (cheap and safe!), he lectures, but no field tests have been
+carried out yet. The other experts worry that they lack the time to thoroughly think
+through the potential effects. Without having a particular potential catastrophic
+consequence in mind, they argue that the team should rather go for one of the more
+costly options, so that they are at least pretty sure to oversee the space of possibilities
+and minimize the risk of unknown unknowns.
+Example (Local Authority) As a follow-up to the public hearing, some citizens
+raise, in a public letter, the concern that the endangered ecosystem is not isolated
+but linked, through multiple migratory species, with other ecosystems—both
+regionally and nation-wide. They argue that we really have no idea about what
+will be the broader consequences of the destruction of the habitat, not only
+ecologically, but also agriculturally and hence economically.
+Example (Geoengineering) The proposal to artificially cool the planet has sparked
+a public controversy (see also Elliott 2016; Brun and Betz 2016). One argument
+against doing so stresses that we know, from other technological interventions into
+complex systems, that things may happen which we haven’t even thought of. A
+similar worry, the argument continues, does not apply to alternative policies for
+limiting climate change. Emission reductions, for example, seek to reduce the
+extent of anthropogenic intervention into the climate system. Because of unknown
+unknowns, we should refrain from deploying geoengineering technologies.
+It seems that the above arguments are not outright unreasonable or implausible.
+The following decision principles could be used to reconstruct these arguments in
+detail:
+45 Basili and Zappia (2009) discuss the role of surprise in modern decision theory and its
+anticipation in the works of George L. S. Shackle.
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 163
+
+• If, considering all relevant aspects except their potential for surprise (i.e., the
+extent to which an option is associated with unknown unknowns), the options A
+and B are normatively equally good, and if A has a significantly greater potential
+for (undesirable) surprise than option B, then option B is normatively better than
+(should be preferred to) option A.
+• If option A has a significantly smaller potential for (undesirable) surprise (i.e., is
+associated with more unknown unknowns) than its alternatives and if carrying
+out option A doesn’t jeopardize a more significant value (than surprise aversion),
+then option A should be carried out.
+7.2 Arguments from Fallibility and Provisionality
+Arguments from fallibility and provisionality call for caution in the light of
+potential future modifications of our background knowledge and corresponding
+revisions of our possibilistic outlook.
+Example (WW2 Bomb) Physical scientists who have heard of the proposed
+method for disarming bombs have reservations about its application, too.
+They stress that the method relies on a novel theory (about nano-materials) in
+a science that is evolving quickly. The background knowledge against which the
+experts assess the brand new method is likely to change in the near future. That
+speaks against its deployment; in any case, the scientists argue, the experts
+should prepare for the eventuality that something unforeseen happens, i.e.,
+something they had articulated, but had originally not verified, or even
+ruled out.
+Example (Geoengineering) Another objection to geoengineering: Our detailed
+understanding of the climate system, its complex feedbacks, and its multi-scale
+interactions evolves quickly. Changes in this understanding will crucially affect our
+possibilistic assessment of the effectiveness and side-effects of geoengineering—
+much more than our assessment of adaptation and mitigation. Even if, under current
+possibilistic predictions, geoengineering deployment seems promising, we should
+refrain from it in light of its high potential for (catastrophic) surprise.
+These arguments, too, appear prima facie reasonable, and they could be
+reconstructed with decision principles similar to the ones used in arguments from
+unknown unknowns:
+• If, considering all relevant aspects except their potential for surprise (i.e., the
+extent to which relevant background knowledge is provisional and likely to be
+modified), the options A and B are normatively equally good, and if A has a
+significantly greater potential for (undesirable) surprise than option B, then
+option B is normatively better than (should be preferred to) option A.
+• If option A has a significantly smaller potential for (undesirable) surprise (i.e.,
+the relevant background knowledge is provisional and more likely to be
+164 G. Betz
+
+modified) than its alternatives and if carrying out option A doesn’t jeopardize a
+more significant value (than surprise aversion), then option A should be
+carried out.
+The available options’ potential for surprise may also be referred to in order to
+resolve dilemmas, as illustrated in the following case, which also provides an
+example for a positive potential surprise.
+Example (Local Authority) The local policy-makers commissioned a scientific
+study to identify and assess alternative locations for the industrial complex. The
+scientists have actually found a second location; at each site however, the report
+argues, a different ecosystem would be put at risk. The report details that the
+habitat near the original location has been monitored and studied in depth and
+over decades, it is moreover well documented from a handful of other places
+that traffic noise may cause the destruction of the highly sensitive habitat. The
+ecosystem near the novel location is very remote and has not been much
+studied, it is for example not even clear which mammal species exactly are
+living there. For both options (i.e., locations), the verified worst case is the
+destruction of the respective ecosystem. For the alternative location, this worst
+case is verified not because of sophisticated modeling studies, but simply
+because so little is known about the corresponding habitat. Further studies
+may revise the limited understanding of the poorly investigated ecosystem,
+and show that the system is not really put at risk by an industrial complex at
+all. The local policy-makers understand that its higher potential of surprise
+seems to speak for the alternative location: The second option has a higher
+potential for positive surprise.
+Such an argument from positive surprise may be reconstructed with the following
+decision principle:
+• If the options A and B have equally disastrous non-falsified worst cases and if A
+has a significantly greater potential for surprise than option B, and if no surprise
+associated with A implies that A’s worst case is even more catastrophic than
+originally thought, then A should be preferred to B.
+8 Summing Up
+This chapter discussed and illustrated a variety of arguments that may inform and
+bear on a decision under great uncertainty, where uncertainties cannot be quantified
+and decision makers have to content themselves with possibilistic forecasts. It
+developed, in addition, a differentiated conceptual framework that allows one to
+express one’s possibilistic foreknowledge in a nuanced way, in particular by
+recognizing the difference between conceptual possibilities that have been shown
+to be consistent with background knowledge and ones that merely have not been
+refuted. The conceptual framework also gives rise to a precise (possibilistic) notion
+6 Accounting for Possibilities in Decision Making 165
+
+of surprise (e.g. unknown unknowns) and triggers an expansion of the arsenal of
+standard argument patterns for reasoning under great uncertainty.
+One major purpose of this chapter has been to refute the widely held prejudice
+that rational decision making and practical reasoning requires at least probabilities.
+We have seen that this notion is simply untenable. But in view of the multitude of
+arguments that can be advanced in deliberation under great uncertainty, the problem
+seems to be that there will typically be too many (rather than too few)
+reasonable arguments, none of which however clearly trumps the others, none of
+which wins the debate by itself. All arguments that potentially justify decisions
+under great uncertainty seem more or less contestable, as they rely, in particular, on
+decision principles which express different levels of risk aversion. The real problem
+of practical reasoning is not to find any arguments at all, but to cope with the
+abundance of conflicting arguments and to aggregate diverse reasons in a
+meaningful way.
+How can that be achieved? Here, the fact that the argumentative turn in risk
+analysis is backed by argumentation theoretic models of rational controversy comes
+fully into play. Specifically, the methods of argument analysis and evaluation as
+introduced in Brun and Betz (2016) provide techniques for aggregating conflicting
+reasons. In a nutshell, I recommend, as a strategy for handling the variety of
+practical arguments under great uncertainty,
+1. To reconstruct all arguments that are (and can) be advanced pro and con the
+alternative options as well as further considerations that speak for or against
+those arguments;
+2. To identify agreed upon background beliefs (such as scientifically established
+facts), which fix truth-values of some premisses and conclusions in the debate;
+3. To identify coherent positions one may reasonably adopt in view of the arguments
+and the background beliefs, which in turn pinpoint the normative tradeoffs
+one faces when justifying a choice.46
+Individual decision makers may then resolve the normative trade-offs by opting
+for one such coherent position.
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+  Introduction and preview
+We are frequently confronted with arguments: these are attempts to
+persuade us -- to influence our beliefs and actions -- by giving us reasons
+to believe this or that, or to act in this way or that. This book will equip
+you with concepts and techniques used in the identification, analysis and
+assessment of arguments. The aim is to improve your ability to tell
+whether an argument is being given, exactly what the argument is, and
+whether you ought to be persuaded by it.
+Chapter 1 introduces the concept of argument as it should be understood
+for the purposes of critical thinking. Argument is distinguished from
+other linguistic means of getting people to do and to believe things. We
+introduce a method for laying out arguments so as to understand them
+more clearly, and we discuss various ways in which language can obscure
+an arguer's intended meaning.
+Chapter 2 introduces validity and soundness, the main concepts required
+for the analysis and assessment of deductive arguments. These
+are arguments whose premises, if true, guarantee the truth of the conclusion.
+We discuss the assessment of validity and soundness, and explain
+the meaning and use of the principle of charity.
+Chapter 3 continues our coverage of the concepts central to this book,
+this time for the analysis and assessment of inductive arguments: inductive
+force and inductive soundness. We also discuss inductive inferences
+and degrees of probability.
+Chapter 4 is a detailed discussion of rhetorical ploys and fallacies, two
+species of what we call 'sham-reasoning'. Common species of each are
+considered, and using the concepts and techniques covered in previous
+chapters, we provide a method for exposing fallacious reasoning and
+explaining what is fallacious about it.
+Chapter 5 covers in more detail the techniques required for reconstructing
+arguments and discusses specific issues that tend to arise in
+x
+practice. We demonstrate techniques for deciding which material is
+relevant to an argument; for dealing with ambiguous and vague language;
+for uncovering an argument's hidden premises; for adding connecting
+premises; for dealing with practical reasoning and for dealing with causal
+arguments.
+Chapter 6 is concerned with further concepts and techniques for
+argument assessment. We introduce the concept of rational persuasiveness,
+and introduce further techniques for assessing arguments and for
+refuting them. We also include a complete worked example, applying and
+illustrating the analytical techniques and concepts developed during the
+course of the book.
+Finally, in Chapter 7 we consider some of the philosophical issues
+underlying the concepts and techniques used here. We discuss truth and
+its relationship to belief and knowledge, and relate these issues to the
+concept of rational persuasiveness. We sketch some connections to philosophical
+questions in the theory of knowledge.
+Each chapter concludes with a chapter summary and exercises;
+answers to selected exercises are at the end of the text. Where appropriate,
+the reader is encouraged to look outside the book for further
+examples to serve as exercises.
+  
+Introduction and preview
+xi
+
+Chapter 1
+Why should we become
+critical thinkers?
+The focus of this book is written and spoken ways of persuading us to do
+things and to believe things. Every day we are bombarded with messages
+apparently telling us what to do or not to do, what to believe or not to
+believe: buy this soft drink; eat that breakfast cereal; vote for Mrs Bloggs;
+practise safe sex; don't drink and drive; don't use drugs; boycott goods
+from this country or that; vivisection is murder; abortion is murder; meat
+is murder; aliens have visited the earth; the economy is sound; capitalism
+is just; genetically modified crops are safe; etc. Some messages we just
+ignore, some we unreflectively obey and some we unreflectively reject.
+Others we might think about and question, asking 'why should I do, or
+refrain from doing that?', or 'why should I believe that, or not believe it?'.
+  
+1
+* Beginning to think critically 4
+* Aspects of meaning 9
+Rhetorical force * Implicature
+* Standard form 10
+* Identifying conclusions and premises 12
+Identifying conclusions * Several points make the identification
+of conclusions an easier task * Identifying premises
+* Arguments and explanations 18
+* Intermediate conclusions 20
+* Linguistic phenomena 22
+Ambiguity * Lexical ambiguity * Syntatic ambiguity * Vagueness
+* Primary and secondary connotation * Rhetorical questions *
+Irony * Implicitly relative sentences * Problems with quantifiers *
+Quantifiers and generalisations
+When we ask the question 'why?' we're asking for a reason for doing
+what we are being enjoined to do, or for believing what we are being
+enjoined to believe: Why should I vote for Mrs Bloggs, or eat this particular
+breakfast cereal? Why should I believe that meat is murder, or that
+the economy is sound? When we ask for a reason in this way we are
+asking for a justification for taking the action recommended or accepting
+the belief -- not just a reason, but a good reason -- that ought to motivate
+us to act or believe as we are recommended to do. We might be told, for
+example, that Wheetybites are a nutritious, sugar-free, low-fat breakfast
+cereal; if this is so, and we want to eat a healthy breakfast, then we've
+been given a good reason to eat Wheetybites. If, on the other hand, we
+are given only state-of-the-art marketing techniques -- for example,
+images of good-looking people happily eating Wheetybites with bright red
+strawberries out of fashionable crockery -- then, although an attempt has
+been made to persuade us to buy Wheetybites, it would not appear that
+any attempt has been made to provide good reasons for doing so.
+To attempt to persuade by giving good reasons is to give an argument.
+We encounter many different types of attempts to persuade.1
+Not all of these are arguments, and one of the things that we will concentrate
+on early in this book is how to distinguish attempts to persuade in
+which the speaker or writer intends to put forward an argument, from
+those in which their intention is to persuade us by some means other
+than argument. Critical thinkers should primarily be interested in arguments
+and whether they succeed in providing us with good reasons for
+acting or believing. But we also need to consider non-argumentative
+attempts to persuade, as we must be able to distinguish these from arguments.
+This is not always straightforward, particularly as many attempts
+to persuade involve a mixture of various argumentative and nonargumentative
+techniques to get readers and listeners to accept a point of
+view or take a certain course of action.
+You may find it surprising to think of an 'argument' as a term for
+giving someone a reason to do or believe something -- telling them
+why they should boycott certain products or disapprove of pornography
+for instance. Perhaps in your experience the word 'argument' means a
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+2
+1 Not all attempts to persuade use language, often they use images or combine images
+with language, most advertising, for instance, involves a combination of images and text
+or speech aimed to persuade us by non-argumentative means to buy stuff. Although the
+persuasive power of images is an interesting issue, here we are interested only in attempts
+to persuade that use written or spoken language. But images can also occur in argumentative
+attempts to persuade. We see on television, for example, a shot of dead fish in a
+dirty pond; a voice says, 'This is why we must strengthen the anti-pollution laws'. In this
+sort of case, we can think of the image as implicitly stating a premise, in the sense to be
+described below (pp. 15--18).
+disagreement -- shouting the odds, slamming doors, insults, sulking, etc.
+In fact in some of those situations the participants might actually be
+advancing what we mean by an argument, putting forward a well-argued
+case for washing up one's dishes for example, but in many cases, they
+will not be arguing in the sense that we have in mind here.
+The sort of argument we have in mind occurs frequently in ordinary,
+everyday situations. It is by no means restricted to the works of Plato,
+Descartes and other scholars famous for the arguments they put forward.
+You and your acquaintances give each other reasons for believing something
+or doing something all the time -- why we should expect our friend
+to be late for dinner, why we should walk rather than wait for the bus
+and so on. Open a newspaper, and you'll find arguments in the letters
+section, editorials and various other discussion pieces. In television and
+radio broadcasts (especially current affairs shows) and in internet discussions
+you'll find people arguing their case (though they may well also
+resort to other persuasive techniques as well). The same thing occurs in
+a more elevated form at university and college. Throughout your time as
+a student you will hear lecturers and other students arguing for a point
+of view, and in set readings you will encounter attempts to persuade you
+of various claims about all manner of issues. In the workplace you may
+find yourself having to argue for a particular course of action or argue
+on behalf of a client or associate.
+If you develop your ability to analyse people's attempts to persuade
+so that you can accurately interpret what they are saying or writing and
+evaluate whether or not they are giving a good argument -- whether, for
+example, they are providing you with a good reason to believe that
+pornography should be banned -- then you can begin to liberate yourself
+from accepting what others try to persuade you of without knowing
+whether you actually have a good reason to be persuaded.2
+But then, you may ask, why is it liberating to demand reasons before
+you are persuaded to adopt new beliefs? Isn't it less trouble to go through
+life unreflectively, doing more or less as you please and not worrying too
+much about whether you have good reason to do or believe something,
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+3
+2 Although this book emphasises the value of reason and the benefits of using techniques
+of persuasion that are rational, we should also bear in mind that what is claimed
+to be rational is not always rational, and certainly does not always have positive consequences.
+Historically, for example, those who wield power have often granted themselves
+authority over what counts as 'rational', condemning as 'irrational' what threatens the
+status quo. The correct response to that sort of rhetorical manoeuvre, however, is not to
+say 'so much the worse for rationality, then!'; the correct response is to question whether
+the charge of irrationality is justified, or whether the term is merely being abused or
+manipulated. Rationality in itself is a neutral force, independent of anyone's particular
+interests or beliefs.
+beyond whether or not you want to? Well, it may often be easier in the
+short run, but it might lead to a life dominated by bad decisions and
+discontentment. Socrates, the ancient Athenian philosopher famously
+argued that 'the unexamined life is not worth living'.3 While this may
+or may not be true, the only way to find out is to approach the issue in
+a critical and rational manner. Paying attention to arguments gets you,
+eventually, to the truth of a matter, thereby making the world and the
+people in it easier to comprehend and to deal with.
+Even if a desire to discover the truth does not seem a sufficiently
+strong reason for being concerned about having good reasons to justify
+your actions and beliefs, there are various life situations in which the
+ability to interpret and evaluate a person's case properly may be crucial
+to that person's well-being, or even to their remaining alive. For example,
+in a court trial the jury is instructed to convict an alleged murderer if the
+prosecution has proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The jury is
+being asked to consider the prosecution's case (which, ideally, is an argumentative
+attempt to persuade them of the guilt of the accused), and the
+evidence they offer at each step of making that case. It has to consider
+whether there is good reason to accept the argument or whether some
+faults in it mean that there must be some doubt about its truth. The skills
+of evaluation and interpretation involved in argument analysis are what
+we use (or ought to use) in determining the strength of the prosecution's
+case in such situations. In fact in any situation in which we have to make
+decisions, be they about our lives or the lives of others, there is no substitute
+for the ability to think logically and to detect errors in the thinking
+of others.
+It is a good reflection of the importance of the skills you are developing
+that those in power sometimes fear the effects of those who can
+think critically about moral, social, economic and political issues. The
+ability to think critically, then, is essential if one is to function properly
+in one's role as a citizen. It is not for nothing that Socrates, the most
+famous of critical thinkers, was sometimes referred to as 'the Gadfly'.
+Beginning to think critically: recognising arguments
+We do many things with language -- state a fact, ask a question, tell
+someone to do something, insult someone, praise someone, promise to
+do something, swear an oath, make a threat, tell a story, recite a poem,
+sing a song, say a character's lines in a play, cheer on a football team.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+4
+3 Plato, Apology , 38a (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 72.
+In this book we write about 'attempts to persuade' -- by argument
+and by other means. As we've mentioned, not all attempts to persuade
+(using language) are attempts to persuade by argument. Others are
+attempts to persuade by means of rhetorical devices. In Chapter 4 we
+discuss the most common of these devices in detail. For the time being
+we'll just make some remarks about rhetoric in general. For our purposes
+rhetoric is defined as follows:
+Rhetoric
+Any verbal or written attempt to persuade someone to believe, desire
+or do something that does not attempt to give good reasons for the
+belief, desire or action, but attempts to motivate that belief, desire or
+action solely through the power of the words used.
+The crucial thing to understand here is that an attempt to persuade
+by argument is an attempt to provide you with reasons for believing a
+claim, desiring something or doing something. Arguments appeal to your
+critical faculties, your reason. Rhetoric, on the other hand, tends to rely
+on the persuasive power of certain words and verbal techniques to influence
+your beliefs, desires and actions by appeal to your desires, fears and
+other feelings.
+Threats and bribes are special cases that may appear to count as rhetoric
+according to our definition. In fact they are closer to argument; for
+they work by announcing to the recipient that they have a good reason
+to act as suggested. For example, if Smith attempts to persuade Jones
+to lend him her car by threatening to inform the police that she uses a
+fake driver's licence, then he is implicitly giving her a reason to lend him
+her car -- if she doesn't do so, the police will find out about the driver's
+licence; since she doesn't want that to happen, she has a reason to lend
+him the car. Although threats and bribes may be immoral and may motivate
+partly by appeal to our fears and desires, among other feelings, they
+do motivate through force of reason and for that reason do not count as
+rhetoric.
+Rhetorical techniques can be manipulative and coercive; their use
+should generally be avoided by those who aspire to think critically and to
+persuade by reason. That is not to say that rhetoric is always undesirable.
+Often it is used to great effect for good causes. Consider this excerpt from
+Sir Winston Churchill's famous speech to Parliament during the Second
+World War in which he attempts to rein in a sense of celebration at the
+success of the evacuations of British troops from Dunkirk, and to remind
+parliamentarians, and the public generally, that there was still a long
+way to go in defeating the Nazis and their allies. Churchill uses some
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+5
+remarkably effective rhetoric for a good cause and he might well be
+admired as a talented rhetorician. But his speech does not amount to an
+attempt to persuade by argument:
+The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause
+and in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each
+other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength. Even though
+large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or
+may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi
+rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight
+in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with
+growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our
+Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall
+fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets,
+we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I
+do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated
+and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded
+by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until in God's good time,
+the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue
+and the liberation of the old.
+On the other hand, those who try to persuade you of not such good causes
+might also be effective, persuasive rhetoricians. European dictators of the
+last century -- Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Stalin -- provide good examples
+of this.
+Of attempts to persuade that are arguments, not all are good arguments.
+So when analysing attempts to persuade we have to perform three
+tasks:
+* The crucial first stage involves distinguishing whether an argument
+is being presented. We need to identify the issue being discussed,
+and determine whether or not the writer or speaker is attempting to
+persuade by means of argument.
+* Once we have established that the writer/speaker is presenting an
+argument, we can move to the task of reconstructing the argument
+so as to express it clearly, and so as to demonstrate clearly the steps
+and form of the argument's reasoning.
+* A clear reconstruction makes our third and final stage -- evaluating
+the argument, asking what's good about it and what's bad about it --
+much easier to perform and to justify.
+In subsequent chapters we explain in detail what we mean by reconstruction,
+and explain what makes an argument a good one. Our aim
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+6
+is not to help you acquire the basic comprehension skills that you need
+to work out what a passage or speech is about. We assume that you
+already have that skill, though working through this book might help
+you to hone it more finely. So we will begin with the first step, by considering
+how to distinguish arguments from other ways of putting forward
+opinions and persuading people to act.
+When we put forward an argument we are either advancing an
+opinion (a claim that we think is true) or recommending an action. In
+either case we give a number of claims intended to support the claim
+or the recommendation. However, these two types of arguments can be
+collapsed into one. For we can think of an argument that recommends an
+action as advancing a claim to the effect that the hearer or reader should,
+or ought to, do such-and-such. For example, an argument whose aim is
+to get you to buy Wheetybites can be understood as advancing the claim:
+'you ought to buy Wheetybites.'
+Thus all arguments can be understood as attempting to provide
+reasons for thinking that some claim is true. The nature of truth is a
+deep and controversial philosophical issue that we do not need to contemplate
+here. We are working with an ordinary, non-theoretical concept of
+truth -- one which says that to label a person's claim as true is to say that
+what it states is how things really are. For example, if a person makes
+the true claim 'Moscow is further from London than Paris', then according
+to our intuitive conception of truth, it is true just because Moscow is
+further from London than Paris. Our working definition of truth then,
+is as follows:
+To say that a claim is true is to say that what is claimed is how
+things actually are.
+A single claim, however, does not constitute an argument. An argument
+needs more than one claim: it needs the claim of which the arguer
+hopes to convince his or her audience, plus at least one claim offered in
+support of that claim. To illustrate the difference between arguments and
+claims, consider these unsupported claims:
+◗ It's going to rain later.
+◗ The Labour Party is making a better job of running the country
+than the Conservative Party ever did.
+◗ Philosophers are odd, unworldly people.
+◗ The world is facing environmental catastrophe.
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+7
+The following examples, by contrast, attempt to give some support for
+these claims. Whether they provide adequate support is something we
+will look at later. The important point is to see the difference between
+this set and the first set:
+◗ It's going to rain later; I know because I heard the weather
+forecast on the radio and it's usually reliable.
+◗ The Labour Party is making a better job of running the country
+than the Conservative Party ever did. Unemployment is down,
+prosperity is up and the Pound remains strong. These are the
+crucial signs that the country is doing well.
+◗ I've met a few philosophers in my time and they've always been
+strange people, heads in the clouds, not really in touch with
+the real world. Philosophers are odd, unworldly people.
+◗ Climate scientists predict that the world is facing environmental
+catastrophe, and they are the experts on these issues.
+There are special terms for the two parts of arguments: the primary
+claim, the one we are trying to get others to accept, is the conclusion.
+The supporting claims, the ones intended to give us reasons for accepting
+the conclusion, are the premises. As with the word 'argument', we are
+using the word 'premise' here in a restricted way, not necessarily corresponding
+to all the ways in which the word is ordinarily used. People
+might respond to an expression of opinion by saying, 'that's just your
+premise, but no one knows that for sure'; they do so to cast doubt on the
+truth of the claim being made. That is not the sense of the word 'premise'
+used in the discussion and analysis of arguments: for this purpose, a
+premise is simply any claim put forward as support for the conclusion of
+an argument, however certain or uncertain that claim may be.
+We can now give a working definition of argument:
+An argument
+A set of propositions of which one is a conclusion and the remainder
+are premises, intended as support for the conclusion.
+And what exactly do we mean by a proposition?
+A proposition
+The factual content expressed by a declarative sentence on a
+particular occasion. The same proposition may be expressed by
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+8
+different sentences. For example, on a given occasion, 'The
+Government has decided to hold a public enquiry into the affair'
+would express the same proposition as 'It was decided that the
+Government would hold a public enquiry into the affair'.
+One outcome of this is that different sets of sentences could express the
+same argument.
+Aspects of meaning
+Depending on how we use a sentence, it may express aspects of meaning
+additional to its factual, propositional content.
+Rhetorical force
+This is the rhetorical aspect of a sentence's meaning. It is not part of the
+propositional content that it expresses; rather, it is the emotive or otherwise
+suggestive window-dressing surrounding the proposition, which may
+be used to persuade us. The sentence in question can reasonably be taken
+to express this rhetorical message given the linguistic conventions according
+to which the words involved are normally used. The point is best
+grasped when we consider sentences that express the same proposition
+but have different rhetorical force. The sentence 'She is bringing up her
+children on her own' expresses the same proposition as the more rhetorically
+charged 'She's a single mum'. But while the former merely
+expresses a fact about the person's family arrangements, the second, by
+its use of the emotive and politically significant term 'single mum', might
+function not only to inform us of a fact, but also to manipulate our sympathies
+concerning the person in question (depending upon our beliefs
+and feelings about parenthood).
+Implicature
+Implicature is meaning, which is not stated, but which one can reasonably
+take to be intended, given the context in which the sentence is written
+or uttered (it is known more generally in linguistics as conversational
+implicature). Unlike rhetorical force, implicature cannot typically be interpreted
+according to conventions covering our ordinary use of the words
+in the sentence used. In order to recognise implicature, if there is any, we
+need to know the context in which a statement is made. Contextual factors
+  
+9
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+include who the speaker is, who she is addressing and the circumstances
+surrounding the particular use of the sentence. Suppose, for example, that
+a student's parent asks one of her lecturers how she is progressing in her
+studies and he replies: 'Well she hasn't been thrown out for missing
+classes.' The lecturer doesn't actually state 'she's not doing very well', but
+the implicature is that she's not. Implicature can serve as a source of rhetorical
+power when the unsaid, implied aspect of a sentence's meaning is
+employed to stimulate responses motivated by emotion or prejudice (we
+discuss this rhetorical ploy on page 124). It is also a way of communicating
+something without incurring the responsibility of having explicitly
+said it. Note that a statement cannot implicate something merely because
+the speaker intends to convey it. A statement implicates a given proposition
+only if a listener who is fully aware of the relevant context would
+reasonably take that proposition to have been intended. For the same
+reason, something can be implicated even when the speaker does not intend
+it. If a given proposition is indeed what a fully informed listener would
+reasonably take to have been implicitly intended by a statement, then that
+proposition is implicated even if the speaker did not intend it. Thus our
+responsibility for what we say -- our responsibility to choose the right
+words -- goes beyond what we explicitly state.
+Standard form
+An argument may be about any subject and have any number of premises,
+but it will always have only one final conclusion. This argument has just
+one premise:
+Bart has two sisters.
+Therefore, Bart is not an only child.
+This has two:
+Helping someone to commit suicide is the same as murder.
+Murder is wrong.
+Therefore, helping someone to commit suicide is wrong.
+And this one three:
+Car use is seriously damaging the environment.
+Reducing car journeys would reduce damage to the environment.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+10
+We should do what we can to protect the environment.
+Therefore, we should use cars less.
+As you can see, arguments for analysis are set out in a particular
+style with the premises listed in the order that they occur in the reasoning
+process and the conclusion appearing at the bottom. We can refine
+this style and further clarify the argument by numbering the premises
+P1, P2 and so on, and drawing a line between the last premise and the
+conclusion, which we mark with a 'C'. The line between premises and
+conclusion is called an inference bar, and its purpose is to distinguish
+steps in reasoning. The bar should be read as standing for 'therefore'.
+This style of setting out arguments is called standard form. The purpose
+of setting out arguments in this manner is to maximise clarity.
+Using this method helps us to see the stages of reasoning clearly and to
+make comparisons between arguments of similar form. When dealing
+with arguments as they are ordinarily presented, distinguishing the exact
+conclusion from the premises, the premises from each other, and the
+premises and conclusion from other, irrelevant, material can be difficult.
+Writing the argument in standard form provides us with the most
+comprehensive and clearest possible view of it, ensuring that while discussing
+the argument and attempting to evaluate it, we do not lose track
+of exactly what the argument is.
+A number of the exercises included in this book require you to
+set out arguments in standard form. To do this is to reconstruct the
+argument, and the end product -- the argument set out in standard
+form -- is called a reconstruction of the argument, or an argumentreconstruction.
+In reconstructing arguments you should follow the
+example below by taking these steps:
+◗ Identify the conclusion.
+◗ Identify the premises.
+◗ Number the premises and write them out in order.
+◗ Draw in the inference bar.
+◗ Write out the conclusion, placing C) in front of it.
+Thus the previous example looks thus in standard form:
+P1) Car use is seriously damaging the environment.
+P2) Reducing car journeys would reduce damage to the
+environment.
+P3) We should do what we can to protect the environment.
+C) We should use cars less.
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+11
+Identifying conclusions and premises
+The question of whether a passage or speech contains an argument is
+the question of whether the speaker or writer is attempting, by means of
+that passage or speech, to persuade his or her audience of some conclusion
+by offering premises in support of it. This is a question about the
+intentions of the writer or speaker -- 'What does this person intend to do
+with these words here?' -- that cannot always be answered unless we know
+something of the context -- the circumstances in which the passage or
+speech appeared or took place. But even when we've determined that an
+argument is being advanced, its premises and conclusion are often buried
+deep among the other elements of a speech or text, and there are no hard
+and fast rules for distinguishing the propositions that form an argument
+from those that perform some other function in a text or speech.
+Identifying arguments is largely a matter of determining what the author
+or speaker intends by interpreting her words (spoken or written), and this
+comes with practice. Often writers and speakers leave some of their
+premises unstated because they assume that readers or listeners will know
+what they have in mind. So in reconstructing arguments we often have
+to add premises to make their structure and content complete. Further,
+people do not always express their arguments in very clear language, so
+we have to clarify each proposition before we can command a clear view
+of the argument as a whole (we look at difficulties with linguistic meaning
+later in this chapter).
+Identifying conclusions
+Once you have determined that a text or speech contains an attempt to
+persuade by argument, it is easiest to proceed first by identifying its conclusion.
+Determining whether a passage contains an attempt to persuade
+by argument and identifying the conclusion of that argument do not
+always occur independently however. Sometimes you will identify the
+conclusion in the process of working out that a passage does indeed
+contain an argument. On other occasions you may have already worked
+out that a passage contains an argument by paying careful attention to
+the writing style and the context without yet having identified the
+conclusion. We will, in any case, treat these processes as independent steps
+in argument analysis.
+The conclusions of the following examples are probably clear from
+the first reading:
+Since Jo Bloggs is a politician and politicians are always corrupt,
+I guess Jo Bloggs is corrupt.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+12
+I'm anti-hunting because I believe that hunting foxes is wrong.
+After all, it's wrong to kill simply for pleasure and fox-hunting
+involves the killing of innocent animals for pleasure.
+Before moving on, make sure that you can identify the conclusions in
+each of these examples.
+Several points make the identification of conclusions
+an easier task
+1 Once you have decided that a passage or speech contains an attempt
+to persuade by argument, try to see what the main point of the passage
+or speech is. Ask what point the speaker or author is trying to establish;
+that point will be the conclusion. Once you come to re-construct an argument
+for analysis, paraphrasing the main point as one simple proposition
+will make the argument easier to handle. Bear in mind that a writer or
+speaker may make the same point in a number of different ways, so you
+may have to settle upon one particular way of expressing it.
+2 Any proposition on any topic can be a conclusion. It is possible to
+attempt to argue for any claim, from the highly theoretical to the most
+mundane. So the type of subject-matter of a proposition -- religion, morality,
+science, the weather, politics, sport -- is not in itself a guide to
+identifying whether or not that proposition is intended as the conclusion
+of a passage's argument. The premises and conclusions of arguments
+should ideally be expressed in declarative sentences, but in real-life arguments
+they may be expressed otherwise. When reconstructing arguments,
+we may need to rewrite premises and conclusions as declarative sentences
+in order to clarify the propositions expressed. For example, the apparent
+question, 'Aren't all socialists idealists?' might be used to express a
+premise that all socialists are idealists. The types of linguistic phenomena
+that need to be rewritten for clarity's sake are discussed in detail later in
+this chapter.
+3 A single text or speech may contain several arguments for several different
+but connected conclusions. Sometimes we argue for one point, then
+a second, and then use those conclusions as premises in an argument for
+a third and final conclusion. These chains of arguments are known as
+extended arguments and we look at them in more detail shortly.
+4 A helpful guide to recognising arguments are words that usually indicate
+that a writer or speaker is putting forward an argument. For example,
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+13
+if someone says, 'Given the facts that A, B and C, it follows that
+D', you can be sure that D is the conclusion of the intended argument
+(and that A, B and C are the premises). Other common conclusion
+indicators are:
+◗ Therefore . . .
+◗ Hence . . .
+◗ Thus . . .
+◗ It can be concluded that . . .
+◗ So . . .
+Usually (though not always) these words or phrases follow the sentences
+that express an argument's premises. Another way of expressing an argument
+is to include the premises and conclusion in a single sentence with
+an indicator word separating them. For example, in the sentence 'The
+fact that John Plunkett is a politician proves that he has a very big ego'
+the conclusion that Mr Plunkett has a very big ego is separated from the
+premise that states that he is a politician by the indicator 'proves'. Other
+words that serve the same function are:
+◗ . . . implies . . .
+◗ . . . establishes . . .
+◗ . . . shows . . .
+Commonly, a writer or speaker will state the conclusion of their argument
+before stating the premises. There are indicator words that are
+typically placed after the conclusion in these cases. For example, in the
+sentence 'Gordon Brown must be a very important man since he is Chancellor
+of the Exchequer', the conclusion that Mr Brown must be a very
+important man is separated from the premise stating that he is Chancellor
+of the Exchequer by the indicator word 'since'. Other words and phrases
+that serve the same function are:
+◗ . . . because . . .
+◗ . . . for . . .
+◗ . . . follows from the fact that . . .
+◗ . . . is established by . . .
+◗ . . . is implied by . . .
+These indicators are not foolproof and should not be treated as a substitute
+for careful identification and interpretation of attempts to persuade
+by argument. Not all arguers will help the critical thinker out by making
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+14
+use of indicator words. The fact that a text or speech does not include an
+indicator word is not a reliable reason for thinking that it does not express
+an argument. If a passage does not appear to have any conclusion indicators
+then an alternative way of identifying the conclusion is to try
+inserting conclusion indicators at appropriate places in sentences that
+appear to be good candidates for the conclusion. Then see if the passage
+or speech still reads or is heard smoothly and if its meaning is unchanged.
+There are no conclusion indicators in the following speech, but it is still
+an attempt to argue:
+I think that Dinnah should sue the local council. They have
+admitted that they were negligent in not mending the cracked
+pavement that she tripped over when she broke her ankle and
+that's sufficient grounds for compensation.
+Here if we try placing the conclusion indicator 'therefore' at the beginning
+of the second sentence ('They have admitted that they were negligent
+. . .'), it becomes clear that it is not the conclusion of the intended argument.
+Inserting 'because' between the first and second sentence (and thereby
+joining them to make one sentence), on the other hand, leaves the
+meaning intact and makes it clear that the conclusion -- the claim that the
+speaker wants us to accept -- appears at the beginning of the speech. Of
+course, when we write out the argument in standard form we change
+the order of the sentences and place the conclusion at the end preceded
+by the inference bar. Notice that the second sentence contains two premises
+so that in standard form the argument would be written thus:
+P1) The local council has admitted negligence.
+P2) An admission of negligence is sufficient grounds for
+compensating an injured party.
+C) The local council should compensate Dinnah.
+5 Indicator words are not parts of the propositions that the argument
+comprises; rather they introduce or frame the conclusion and premises.
+So when we write arguments in standard form so as to reconstruct them,
+we omit the conclusion indicator words from our reconstruction.
+6 So far we have only discussed explicit conclusions in which a
+writer or speaker expresses her conclusion directly and more or less
+clearly. However, conclusions sometimes remain unexpressed. These are
+implicit conclusions. They are only implied or suggested by the actual
+text or speech content, not explicitly expressed by it. This usually happens
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+15
+when the speaker or writer thinks that the context is sufficient to make
+the conclusion obvious so that it literally 'goes without saying'. This is
+often a bad idea as the conclusion is not always as obvious to those whom
+one is trying to persuade as it is to the persuader. It can also be a way
+of concealing one's uncertainty as to exactly what one is arguing for.
+In the name of clarity and explicitness, try to avoid implicit conclusions
+in your own writing and speech. It isn't clear, for example, what (if any)
+conclusion is implicit in the following:
+There's so much pornography available via the internet these days
+and young people are so easily influenced, it's bound to result in a
+social collapse into an orgy of rape, abuse and indecency.
+Identifying premises
+As you go through the process of identifying an argument's conclusion,
+it is likely that you will also spot some or all of its premises. Thus the
+stages of identification are not entirely separate in practice. The identification
+of an argument's premises is a search for reasons given by the writer
+or speaker to think that their conclusion is true. Like the identification of
+conclusions, much of the process of identifying premises amounts to close
+and charitable reading of what a writer or speaker says; but again there
+are some helpful guides:
+1 Ask yourself what the writer's or speaker's reasons for believing their
+conclusion are. What evidence does the writer or speaker give to think
+that the conclusion is true? The propositions that you come up with in
+response to these questions are likely to be the premises of the intended
+argument.
+2 Like conclusions, premises can have any subject-matter whatsoever.
+It does not matter whether a proposition is controversial or unanimously
+agreed, it can still be a premise.
+3 In most real examples of writing and speech arguments are embedded
+within other language that is not intended as part of the argument itself,
+although some of this language may be used in what we call shamreasoning
+in Chapter 4. Again, it helps to work out the overall structure
+of the passage when trying to identify the premises. Consider the following:
+I really think the Government should reconsider its policies on
+higher education. Education is such a complicated topic, and their
+policies are just more poll-driven nonsense; Blair and his cronies
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+16
+are so image-oriented with their expensive suits and so on, they
+invite pop stars to their parties and behave as if they too were
+pop stars, just out to sell themselves really.
+In this example the speaker gets side-tracked into commenting upon the
+Prime Minister's suits and party guest-lists, and fails, beyond the vague
+charge that the Government's policies are 'poll-driven nonsense', to offer
+a substantive criticism. Most of what is said is at best only obliquely relevant
+to the issue.
+4 As with conclusions, there are certain words that usually (but not
+always) indicate the presence of premises -- premise indicators. We
+have already seen some of these because they mark the speaker or writer's
+move from premises to conclusion or from conclusion to premises ('since',
+'because', 'is implied by' and so on.) There are other words and phrases
+that introduce sentences stating a premise or premises. A speaker or writer
+might state their conclusion and then begin the next proposition with
+such phrases as:
+◗ My reason is . . .
+◗ My evidence for this is . . .
+◗ This is so because . . .
+For example:
+I put it to you that Ms White killed Colonel Mustard in the
+ballroom with the candlestick. The reason I make this claim is that
+on the night of Colonel Mustard's death Lady Scarlet saw Ms
+White in the ballroom beating Colonel Mustard over the head with
+the very candlestick that was later found to have Ms White's
+fingerprints and Colonel Mustard's blood on it.
+Other premise indicators may occur at the beginning of a sentence
+containing both the premise and the conclusion. For example:
+On the basis of the fact that they have promised big tax cuts, I
+conclude that the Conservative Party will probably win the next
+general election.
+5 Again, when writing out the premises of an argument in standard
+form, take care not to include the indicator words as they are not part of
+the propositions that make up the argument. When indicator words such
+as 'since' and 'because' are not functioning to indicate premises or conclusions,
+however, but are used within an argument's propositions, then they
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+17
+should be included in the reconstruction. This is particularly important
+when 'because' is used in a proposition used to express an explanation.
+See the next section, discussing the distinction between arguments and
+explanations.
+6 Again, as with conclusions, a text or speech may not include specific
+premise indicators. Context is the best means of identifying premises
+in such cases. It may also help to try adding premise indicators to
+propositions to see if the passage or speech still runs smoothly.
+7 Ordinary language can make identifying arguments more difficult
+than it might otherwise be because people do not always express all of
+their premises explicitly. Thus many attempts to persuade by argument
+rely on implicit premises: these are propositions assumed or intended by
+the arguer as reasons in support of the conclusion, but which are not
+actually expressed by any sentence provided by the arguer. Sometimes
+this happens out of oversight; other times because the arguer assumes
+that, in the given context, the premise may already be taken for granted.
+In Chapter 5 we will discuss the interpretation of hidden premises and
+the reconstruction of arguments to include them.
+Arguments and explanations
+Words that function as indicator words can be used for other purposes.
+The sentence, 'Since 2004 I have been a student at the University of
+Anytown' contains the word 'since'; but in this case the word merely
+designates the beginning of a period of time, and does not indicate a
+premise of an argument.
+A trickier case is the use of words such as 'since' and 'because' -- especially
+'because' -- in explanations. The distinction between arguments
+and explanations is important, but not always easy to make because
+arguments and explanation often have a very similar structure. In some
+cases we have to think hard about the context in order to determine
+which is intended. We need to work out whether they are telling us
+that such-and-such event occurred as a result of some other event -- that
+is, whether they intend to assert a relation of cause and effect. For in
+that case, 'because' is being used to introduce an explanation, not an
+argument.
+The best way to appreciate the distinction between arguments and
+explanations is to consider an example. Consider this proposition:
+The tap is leaking.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+18
+Someone might advance an explanation for this by saying something like:
+The tap is leaking because it needs a new washer.
+On the other hand, we can imagine someone advancing an argument for
+that very same proposition, reasoning as follows:
+There is sound of dripping water coming from the bathroom.
+Therefore, the tap is leaking.
+What exactly is the difference? The difference is that when giving
+the explanation, the speaker assumes that his or her audience already
+accepts the proposition that the tap is leaking, or at least that the speaker
+has no need to persuade the audience of this fact. Given this fact, the
+speaker is asserting that the cause of that fact is the faulty or worn-out
+washer. By contrast, when giving an argument, the speaker does not
+assume that the audience accepts or will accept that the tap is leaking
+outright; the arguer intends to persuade the audience that this is so by
+giving the audience a good reason to believe it.
+This example of an explanation uses the word 'because' -- the word
+here indicates a causal relationship instead of a logical connection between
+premise and conclusion. As demonstrated by the following examples,
+'since', 'therefore', 'thus' and 'so' may also be used in explanations that
+are not intended to provide reasons for acting or believing something:4
+◗ Since we forgot to add yeast, the bread didn't rise.
+◗ We forgot to add yeast, therefore the bread didn't rise.
+◗ We forgot to add yeast, thus the bread didn't rise.
+◗ We forgot to add yeast, so the bread didn't rise.
+The distinction between arguments and explanations can be confusing
+where the explanation of actions is concerned (that is, things that people
+do). This confusion arises because in the case of actions, reasons are
+causes! That is, the explanation of an action normally involves specifying
+the reason for it: a person does something because he or she had a certain
+reason. Thus, in asking about reasons for actions -- asking 'Why are you
+doing that?' -- we are sometimes looking for a justification -- that is, we
+want the person to give us an argument for why the action is reasonable
+or acceptable -- and other times we simply want an explanation, in the
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+19
+4 While reading this book you may also have noticed a further use of 'thus'. 'Thus'
+can be used to mean 'in this way' and often proceeds an example or a quotation.
+sense of wanting to know the cause. Nevertheless, the distinction between
+arguments and explanations still holds.
+Suppose you are driving fast and your passenger asks, 'Why are you
+driving so fast?'. You assume your passenger is not in any way suggesting
+that you shouldn't drive so fast. You think they don't mind in the
+slightest. You assume they are merely curious as to why you're driving
+fast -- whether it's because you're late, being chased by the police or
+perhaps testing the limits of your new car. Your reply, however, is simply
+'Because I enjoy it'. This would be an explanation: you are telling your
+passenger why you're driving fast, not trying to persuade them of
+anything.
+But suppose, when your passenger asked 'Why are you driving so
+fast?', you think maybe they do mind. So you take the question as
+demanding a justification for your driving so fast. If you now say 'Because
+I enjoy it', then you would be arguing, roughly, that it is all right to drive
+at such a speed on the grounds that you have a right to do what you like.
+In that case 'Because I enjoy it' would be a premise of an argument, which
+might initially be expressed thus:
+It's OK for me to drive as fast as I like, because I like driving fast. I
+think we should be free to do anything that we enjoy.
+It might be rewritten thus in standard form:
+P1) I enjoy driving fast.
+P2) It is acceptable for me to do anything I enjoy.
+C) It is acceptable for me to drive fast.
+In such a case, your enjoying it might both a reason for driving fast and
+a cause of it.
+Intermediate conclusions
+The conclusion of one argument may serve as a premise of a subsequent
+argument. The conclusion of that argument may itself serve as a premise
+for another argument and so on. A simple illustration:
+Fido is a dog. All dogs are mammals, so Fido is a mammal. And
+since all mammals are warm-blooded, it follows that Fido is warmblooded.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+20
+In this argument, an intermediate conclusion -- that Fido is a mammal
+-- is used as a premise for a further argument, whose conclusion is that
+Fido is warm-blooded. We represent extended arguments of this kind
+like this:
+P1) Fido is a dog.
+P2) All dogs are mammals.
+C1) Fido is a mammal.
+P3) All mammals are warm-blooded.
+C2) Fido is warm-blooded.
+We give the two conclusions numbers: C1 is the conclusion of an argument
+whose premises are P1 and P2; C2 is the conclusion of an argument
+whose premises are C1 and P3. So C1 is both the conclusion of one
+argument and the premise of another.
+Normally, in such cases, the last conclusion reached (the one with
+the highest number) is the proposition that the arguer is most concerned
+to establish. It is the ultimate target. So we call this simply the conclusion
+of the argument, whereas any other conclusions, reached as steps
+along the way, are called intermediate conclusions.
+We sometimes want to concentrate for a moment on a particular part
+of an extended argument. In the above case, for example, we might be
+particularly interested either in the first part of the argument, or in the
+second. We will sometimes speak of the argument from P1 and P2 to C1,
+or of the argument from C1 and P3 to C2. We can also speak of the inference
+from P1 and P2 to C1, and the inference from C1 and P3 to C2.
+The use of the word 'inference' in logic and critical thinking is another
+case where a word is used in a somewhat restricted sense in comparison
+with ordinary language. All reasoning consists of inferences. In the logician's
+sense of the word each step of reasoning, each move from premise
+or premises to conclusion, is an inference. Contrary to the way the word
+is often ordinarily employed, there need be nothing doubtful about an
+inference. We sometimes say, 'but that's just an inference', meaning to
+cast doubt upon whether a given proposition should really be accepted on
+the basis of others. But in our sense of the word, an inference may be
+completely certain, not subject to doubt. For example, it is an inference,
+in our sense, to go from 'John is a classical musician' to 'John is a musician'
+-- despite the fact that there can be no doubt that if the first
+proposition is true, then so is the second (in the terminology to be introduced
+in Chapter 2, it is a valid inference).
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+21
+Linguistic phenomena
+As we've seen, once we've determined that a text or a speech contains an
+attempt to persuade by argument, the remainder of argument-reconstruction
+is largely a matter of interpreting the speech or text as accurately as possible.
+Here we are trying to work out what the speaker or writer intends
+readers or listeners to understand, and consequently do or believe, on hearing
+or reading their words. Phenomena in ordinary language sometimes
+make this task more difficult because they obscure speakers' and writers'
+intended meanings and therefore make it difficult to tell which proposition
+their sentences are supposed to convey. So aspirant critical thinkers need
+to be aware of the ways in which language can work to hide writers' and
+speakers' meanings and must practise spotting potentially problematic
+sentences. At this stage you should aim to be able to recognise these sentences
+and to be able to give the possible interpretations of them; that is,
+the propositions that they could be used to convey.
+Ambiguity
+A sentence is ambiguous in a given context when there is more than
+one possible way of interpreting it in that context -- that is, if there is
+more than one proposition it could plausibly be taken to express in that
+context. There are two types of ambiguity.
+Lexical ambiguity
+This is a property of individual words and phrases that occurs when the
+word or phrase has more than one meaning. The set or group of things
+to which an expression applies is called its extension (it helps to think
+of an extension as all the things over which the word or phase extends
+or spreads itself). Thus the extension of the word 'student' is the set of
+all students. An ambiguous word or phrase, then, has two or more separate
+and different extensions -- it picks out two or more different sets of
+things. Ambiguous words and phrases can bring their ambiguity into
+sentences, making those sentences capable of having more than one
+possible interpretation. The word 'match' is one such word. The sentence
+'He is looking for a match' could be intended to mean any of the following
+propositions:
+◗ He is looking for a small stick of wood with an inflammable tip.
+◗ He is looking for another one the same [as this one].
+◗ He is looking for [wants] a game of tennis (or some such).
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+22
+Words that are potentially lexically ambiguous are not necessarily ambiguous
+in every context. Suppose you know that the person 'looking for
+a match' in the example above is trying to light a fire, then there would
+be little reason to interpret him as looking for anything other than a small
+stick of wood with an inflammable tip. Notice that it is not only nouns
+that can be lexically ambiguous. Suppose you are going to meet someone
+for the first time and all you've been told about them is what a friend has
+told you -- 'She's a hard woman'. This could mean: She's a difficult person;
+She's an aggressive person; She has a very well-toned muscular body.
+Whichever interpretation you adopt will have an important effect on
+your expectations of the woman in question. When interpreting sentences
+that are lexically ambiguous, we have to focus on the context in which
+they are written or said and the consequent probability of each of the
+possible interpretations being the correct one. For instance the sentence
+'A visitor to the zoo was attacked by the penguins' is lexically ambiguous
+because the preposition 'by' has two possible meanings in this context.
+The sentence could express either of the following propositions:
+◗ The penguins attacked a visitor.
+◗ A visitor was attacked beside the penguins' enclosure.
+However, in the absence of any information about a vicious penguin,
+and given what we know about the usually non-aggressive behaviour
+of penguins towards zoo visitors, it would probably be reasonable to
+interpret the sentence as intended to express the second proposition.
+There are a few words that are not really ambiguous but may seem
+so when we hear them, though not when we see them written. This is
+because the words, though spelt differently, sound the same. For example,
+when heard, as opposed to read, the question 'Are you a mussel (muscle)
+man?' could be either an enquiry as to a person's taste in seafood or as
+to his physique. Of course, once we see the question written, we are in
+no doubt as to its meaning.
+The examples considered so far are relatively simple to understand
+because the alternative meanings of words such as 'match' and 'hard' are
+very different. However, instances of lexical ambiguity also occur when
+a word has alternative meanings that are much closer together. Such cases
+are much harder to interpret and we need to pay a lot of attention to the
+context in which the word is being used and to the probability of the
+speaker or writer's intending one interpretation rather than the other.
+Suppose someone reports that 'The average mortgage has doubled in
+six years'. The speaker or writer might mean to say that the average
+existing mortgage has doubled its value in the past six years, so people
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+23
+with mortgages owe twice as much now as they did six years ago, which
+would be a pretty worrying situation because so many people would have
+increased their debts in such a short space of time. On the other hand,
+the speaker or writer might have intended to claim that the average mortgage
+taken out now is twice as big as the average mortgage taken out six
+years ago, which would simply be a reflection of increasing property
+prices.
+Syntactic ambiguity
+This occurs when the arrangement of words in a sentence is such that
+the sentence could be understood in more than one way (as expressing
+more than one proposition). You will probably be familiar with examples
+of syntactic ambiguity as it is often the basis of jokes and newspaper headlines
+that appear odd. For example, '33-year old Mrs Jones admitted to
+dangerous driving in Leeds Crown Court yesterday' could mean either of
+the following:
+◗ In Leeds Crown Court yesterday Mrs Jones admitted to
+dangerous driving.
+◗ Yesterday Mrs Jones admitted to driving dangerously inside
+Leeds Crown Court itself.
+The sentence is syntactically ambiguous because it could, consistently with
+English grammar, be used to express either proposition. But since the second
+interpretation is extremely unlikely, it is unlikely that an actual use
+of this sentence would be ambiguous. But consider this case:
+US President Bush has cancelled a trip to Scotland to play golf.
+We can easily imagine a real context in which this sentence is ambiguous
+as to whether the purpose of the cancelled trip was to play golf or whether
+the trip was cancelled so that the president could play golf.
+Once we decide the most likely interpretation, we should always
+rewrite the ambiguous sentence so as to eliminate the ambiguity. For
+example, we might rewrite the above sentence thus:
+In order for him to play golf, US President Bush's trip to Scotland
+has been cancelled.
+Notice that in cases such as this we have to change the sentence quite
+radically to rid it of the syntactic ambiguity and clarify its meaning.
+Consider a further example:
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+24
+The Government will announce that the electricity supply is to be
+cut off tomorrow.
+The sentence leaves ambiguous the question of when the announcement
+will be made and when the electricity supply is to be cut off:
+◗ Tomorrow, the Government will announce that the electricity
+supply is to be cut off. (The announcement will be made
+tomorrow.)
+◗ The Government is going to announce that, tomorrow, the
+electricity supply will be cut off. (The announcement will be
+made now, the electricity will be cut off tomorrow.)
+Syntactic ambiguities are sometimes more difficult than lexical ones
+to interpret on the basis of context. Also, the possible interpretations of
+a sentence may be closely related so that there may not appear to be a
+very wide difference in meaning. Often we assume that one interpretation
+is intended without giving any consideration to alternatives. But such
+differences can be very significant indeed. Suppose someone were to claim:
+We should not tolerate those homeless people living on our streets.
+They might be saying that we should be intolerant of homeless people
+themselves. Or they might be saying that the people who do live on the
+streets should not be allowed to live on the street. On the other hand,
+the intended proposition might be that we should not tolerate the fact
+that there are homeless people living on our streets. That is to say, the
+view expressed might be critical of a society in which people are forced
+to live on the streets rather than critical of such people themselves.
+Vagueness
+Vagueness is a property of words and phrases. It is not the same as
+ambiguity, but it is often mistaken for it. For instance, when former US
+President Clinton famously said, 'I did not have sexual relations with
+that woman . . .' he was not (as alleged) hiding behind the ambiguity
+of the phrase 'sexual relations', but rather behind its vagueness. As we
+saw when considering lexical ambiguity, a word is ambiguous when it
+has two or more possible and different meanings -- thus two or more
+separate extensions. The particular meanings might themselves be perfectly
+clear and precise. The vagueness of a word, on the other hand, is
+really a feature of its meaning: the meaning of a word or expression is
+vague if it is indefinite or uncertain what is conveyed by the word. Thus
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+25
+a word may be ambiguous without being vague -- as in 'ball' (round plaything,
+formal dancing-party) -- or vague without being ambiguous, as in
+'sexual relations' (what exactly constitutes sexual relations?).
+Sometimes, someone aware of the weakness of their own position will
+deliberately leave their meaning vague in order to camouflage that weakness
+and to evoke strong feelings of approval or disapproval in their readers
+or listeners. Many highly charged words that wield rhetorical power
+in public discourse are used vaguely. Examples include: 'rights', 'liberal',
+'harassment', 'racism', 'sexism'. It is hard to discern one perfectly exact
+meaning for each of these words and it would be unrealistic to expect them
+to have such a meaning. Their extensions tend to include a cluster of objects,
+beliefs or actions that are not necessarily unified in any precise way. Take
+'liberal', for instance. This word conveys various characteristics including:
+◗ Belief in a permissive society.
+◗ Belief in freedom of speech, of association, of choice.
+◗ Belief that certain restrictive laws should be relaxed (e.g.
+against drugs).5
+◗ Belief that the state should interfere as little as possible in
+citizens' lives.
+◗ Belief in laissez-faire economic policies.
+◗ Supports the Liberal Democratic Party.
+◗ Not strict.
+◗ Politically left-wing.
+◗ Wishy-washy.
+◗ Soft on crime.
+One might be a liberal and not hold all of these beliefs or have all of
+these characteristics. Indeed, a person might have some or even many
+of them and not be a liberal.
+Here is a whole passage infected with vagueness of the kind we have
+in mind:
+Make no mistake, the researchers involved in the highly
+controversial project to map the human genome are involved in a
+radical project of unprecedented gravity and spiritual significance.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+26
+5 As you may have noticed the word 'drugs' is used vaguely in this claim. Although
+in the context of most arguments about legislation and criminality it means illegal drugs,
+it could also include alcohol, prescription medicines, pain-killers, nicotine and so on.
+Deliberately vague use of words in such a way constitutes either the rhetorical ploy of
+trading on an equivocation (see pp. 122--4) or the fallacy of equivocation (see pp. 154--5).
+Do they venture there with appropriate caution and humility? What
+they are doing is not even comparable to the research that made
+the atomic bomb possible, for it goes right to the essence of what
+we are as human beings. Like Dr Frankenstein, they are tinkering
+with life; they are travelling into unknown and sacred regions as no
+scientist previously has ever dared. The secret wellsprings of life,
+of our very being as homo sapiens, have ever remained shut up,
+concealed by aeons of either blind but cunning and ultimately
+unfathomable natural processes, or, as some continue to believe
+despite the showy displays of science and technology, concealed by
+the very hand of its Author, the Author of Nature Himself.
+What is the writer of this rather over-excited dose of hyperbole trying
+to argue? Clearly they think that there is something dangerous or otherwise
+ill-advised about the project to map the human genome. But they
+have not begun to make it clear what the danger is. The research is distinguished
+from atomic research by its concern specifically with life, but
+nothing is said as to why this is peculiarly dangerous beyond the use of
+extremely vague verbiage such as 'sacred', 'radical', 'gravity', 'spiritual
+significance' and so on. In a context such as this, with so much at stake,
+we need to have precise reasons why, despite the promise of medical
+benefits, the project is dangerous.
+Words can also be vague in another, more philosophically technical
+respect. Philosophers of language use the term 'vague' to apply to words
+that have a clear meaning, but which have an indefinitely demarcated
+extension. Obvious cases are colour-words like 'orange': there is no precise
+division between orange things and yellow things, for example. Things
+can often be precisely compared with respect to such attributes, however.
+For example, X may be more bald, or fatter, sleepier, taller or faster than
+Y, even if it is not definite whether or not X is bald, fat, sleepy, tall or
+fast. Borderline cases can also arise in the case of nouns. In fact vagueness
+occurs in many more cases than we might at first think. Take 'city':
+York is normally said to be a city, but is it really? Is it not merely a
+town? What about Doncaster? Lancaster? Harrogate? Carlisle?
+To a great extent, we take these sorts of vagueness in our stride,
+having become used to interpreting these phenomena unreflectively in
+ordinary language. But even the simplest cases can cause misunderstandings.
+Suppose your boss promises that you're going to receive a 'big
+pay rise' this year. When you receive the pay increase you discover that
+the rise is only 10p an hour. When you complain, your boss defends their
+promise by saying that the rise is bigger than last year's and therefore
+big in comparison (see the section on implicit relativity, pp. 30--1, for
+further discussion of such cases).
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+27
+Primary and secondary connotation
+The rich secondary connotation of some words provides a further source
+of vagueness. Every ordinary noun and every adjective -- 'elephant',
+'immoral', 'company', 'stupid' -- has a range of things to which it applies:
+the extension of the term. The set of all bananas constitutes the extension
+of 'banana'; the set of all square things constitutes the extension of
+'square'. A given thing falls within a word's extension if, and only if, it
+fits a certain rule associated with the use of that word. For example, the
+rule for the noun 'ram' is 'male sheep'. This rule is called the primary
+connotation of the term. This will be some set of characteristics, in this
+case being male and being a sheep which, by definition, everything to
+which the word applies must have. All of a term's primary connotation
+must apply to an object for that term to apply to it. The notion of a
+female ram, for example, is a logical impossibility, a contradiction.
+Thus when we are told that something is a B, for some general term
+B, we know that the thing must exemplify the primary connotation of the
+term; if we're told it's a ram, then we know it's a male sheep. However,
+when we are told that something is a ram, we tend to assume other things
+about that thing that are not included in the primary connotation: that it
+is woolly, has horns, lives on a mountainside or in a field, eats grass. . . .
+So if you know that something is a ram, it is reasonable to suppose that
+it has these additional characteristics. These further characteristics that the
+term 'ram' also conveys make up its secondary connotation. Things
+that fall under the term will generally exhibit these characteristics, but
+there is no logical contradiction in supposing there to be a thing that falls
+under the term but lacks a characteristic included under the secondary connotation.
+For instance, there is no logical contradiction in supposing that a
+thing might count as a ram -- that is, fulfil the demands of the primary
+connotation -- yet lack some or, indeed, all of these characteristics. It is not
+logically impossible that there could be a bald, hornless male sheep that
+lives in a barn and whose diet consists of potatoes.
+Why should critical thinkers be interested in the distinction between
+primary and secondary connotation? The most immediate relevance was
+demonstrated in our examination of vagueness. It is difficult to pin down
+the precise meaning of a word such as 'liberal' because, on the one hand,
+its primary connotation is very difficult to pin down, and on the other,
+its secondary connotation is so rich. In fact, in the case of vague words,
+the distinction between primary and secondary connotation tends to break
+down, or be difficult to draw. Take a look back at the list given earlier of
+characteristics conveyed by 'liberal': it is difficult to say which are part
+of its primary connotation, and which are only part of its secondary
+connotation.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+28
+A further reason for us to concern ourselves with this distinction is
+that it is the secondary connotation of many words that gives the sentences
+in which they occur their rhetorical force. Consider the noun
+'feminist'. Its primary connotation is difficult to pin down and it is full
+of secondary connotations that can be used to the rhetorical advantage of
+both those who support and those who oppose feminism. Here are just
+some of the characteristics our critical thinking students have come up
+with when asked what the word 'feminist' conveys to them:
+* Man-hating * Fighter
+* Lesbian * Staunch
+* Dungarees * Left-wing
+* Unshaven * Pro-abortion
+* Strong * Pro-women
+* Political
+When interpreting speakers and writers we should also be aware of
+the role of secondary connotation in metaphorical uses of language.
+Metaphors often function by bringing only the secondary connotation
+of a word into play. In most cases the primary connotation is in fact false
+of the object or person in question. When someone insults another person
+by calling them a 'pig', the claim is literally false, but they are attempting
+to ascribe some of the characteristics of the secondary connotation of 'pig'
+-- the way it eats, the way it smells, its penchant for mud, for instance.
+In the course of interpretation, we should take care not to treat metaphors
+as literal claims and not to confuse a metaphorical use of a word with an
+ambiguous one. When Shakespeare's Romeo attempts to express the
+beauty of his lover, Juliet, he says, 'My love is a rose'; this is intended
+as a metaphor that ascribes some of the characteristics of the secondary
+connotation of 'rose' to her -- its beauty, fragility and sweetness -- and is
+not ambiguous between literal and metaphorical meanings of 'rose'.
+Rhetorical questions
+Rhetorical questions take the form of a question but indirectly assert a
+proposition (like a declarative sentence does). That is, they are not really
+used to ask a question, but to make a point in an indirect way. Speakers
+and writers often use rhetorical questions when they're making a point
+they assume to be obvious, so the answer to the question 'goes without
+saying'. However, in many cases the point is neither obvious nor universally
+agreed. Rhetorical questions obfuscate speakers' and writers' intended
+meanings because they make it more difficult to interpret whether or not
+a speaker/writer really does support a given claim. Rhetorical questions are
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+29
+common in polemical newspaper articles and in readers' letters to editors.
+If you encounter rhetorical questions in texts and speech that you are analysing,
+try to rewrite the question as a declarative sentence. For instance,
+if someone were to write:
+Should my right to freedom of speech be limited just because you
+disagree with me?
+they probably wish to convey the proposition that their freedom should
+not be so curtailed, so they are not genuinely asking a question. They
+expect that the reader's response will be an automatic 'No, of course not'.
+To convey the proposition that seems to be intended, we could rewrite
+the rhetorical question as a declarative sentence:
+My right to freedom of speech should not be limited just because
+you disagree with me.
+You should resist the temptation to employ rhetorical questions in your
+own arguments.
+Irony
+Speakers and writers sometimes express their claims using irony. This
+takes the form of language that, taken literally, would convey the opposite
+of what they wish to convey, or something otherwise very different
+from it. Consider the following instance:
+It is pouring with rain, very windy and cold. Mr I. Ronic says, 'Mmm
+lovely weather today'.
+Mr Ronic is probably being ironic, and intends to comment that the
+weather is lousy.
+It is important to be aware of the possibility of irony. In order to
+ridicule a position they are opposed to, speakers and writers sometimes
+sarcastically pretend to espouse that position; but it isn't always obvious
+that they are doing so.
+Implicitly relative sentences
+Consider the following examples:
+◗ She earns an above average salary.
+◗ He is of average intelligence.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+30
+◗ Great Aunt Edie is a fast runner.
+◗ Taxes are high.
+◗ The rent on our flat is low.
+Sentences such as these represent another potential problem for the
+critical thinker striving to work out exactly what a speaker or writer
+intends to convey by their words. The sentences are implicitly relative.
+They make a comparison with some group of things, but that comparison
+is not explicitly mentioned. For instance, to understand what it is
+for a person to earn an 'above average salary', we need to know of what
+group the average to which it is compared is. Or consider the one
+about Aunt Edie? Does the speaker intend to convey that Great Aunt Edie
+is a fast runner such that she runs at world record pace or that she is a
+fast runner for a woman of her age? Or something in between, such
+as that she is faster than the average person? If such sentences are
+interpreted without the recognition of their implicit relativity, then there
+is the possibility that they will be interpreted as making a comparison
+with a group other than that intended by the writer or speaker. Great
+Aunt Edie is not a fast runner when compared with Paula Radcliffe
+and thus interpreted the claim would be false. But when compared with
+other ninety-four-year-olds, many of whom haven't broken into a run
+for many years, she is a fast runner and the claim is true. Once we recognise
+such claims as implicitly relative and interpret them accordingly, they
+are more likely to have a definite truth value. But not always. Implicit
+relativity is often compounded by other sources of vagueness. For
+example, even if we do know what comparison class is being invoked in
+the case of Aunt Edie, it is by no means clear just how much faster a
+person must be than the average person of that class in order to be fast
+relative to it.
+Problems with quantifiers
+Quantifiers are words that tell us how many/much of something there
+are/is, or how often something happens. As you will see, not all quantifiers
+specify an exact quantity of the thing, rather they provide a rough
+guide. In the following examples the quantifiers are underlined (this is
+not an exhaustive list of quantifiers):
+◗ All men drive too fast.
+◗ Members of Parliament are often self-serving.
+◗ Few doctors support the health reforms.
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+31
+◗ The lecturer awarded almost all the assignments an A grade.
+◗ Nearly all the students passed the course.
+◗ She likes hardly any of her fellow students.
+◗ No examiner should take bribes.
+◗ Lots of computers develop faults.
+◗ Nine hospitals will close at the end of this year.
+◗ She never closes the door behind her.
+◗ There are adequate computing facilities in fewer than half of
+the country's schools.
+◗ He always writes his own speeches.
+◗ Most women would choose to stay at home with their children
+if they could afford to.
+There are four potential problems with quantifiers:
+1 Speakers and writers don't always use quantifiers with sufficient precision,
+so that the proposition they intend to convey is unclear and open
+to misinterpretation and rhetorical abuse. Suppose your friend says:
+'Premiership footballers all earn massive payments from sponsorship
+deals.' You don't agree and you mention an exception -- Fergie Footballer
+receives only his footballer's salary, with no extra money from endorsing
+sports shoes or shirts. Suppose your friend defends her claim by saying
+that she didn't really mean that every single player in the Premiership
+earns big money from endorsements and sponsorship, but only that most
+or nearly all of them supplement their earnings in this way. Now that
+her claim is clear, you see that it is one with which you are more likely
+to agree.
+2 Some quantifier-words are themselves vague. Suppose, for instance,
+that someone claims:
+Some Members of Parliament support the decriminalisation of
+cannabis use.
+What does 'some' mean here? It could mean that only a handful hold
+the view described, it could mean that a larger minority of members hold
+that view. Without a more precise understanding of how many Members
+of Parliament are intended to be conveyed by 'some', it is difficult to
+know how to respond to the claim. Moreover, the claim is open to abuse
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+32
+from people who hold views on both sides of such a debate. Advocates of
+decriminalisation can use it in support of their cause; their opponents can
+use it to back up their anti-decriminalisation stance (the latter might say,
+'Only some Members of Parliament support. . .').
+3 Often people simply omit quantifiers. For instance, someone might
+protest:
+Lecturers don't give students a chance to complain.
+At face value this might appear to convey the proposition that:
+No lecturer (ever) gives a student a chance to complain.
+Yet it is likely that what the speaker really wants to say is something
+like:
+Most of the lecturers I've encountered haven't given students
+enough chance to complain.
+Notice that once the appropriate quantifier is made explicit, the claim
+applies to a much smaller group of lecturers than one might have supposed
+when the quantifier remained implicit.
+Consider another example:
+Today's students are dedicated to their studies.
+If we interpret this as expressing this proposition:
+All of today's students are dedicated to their studies.
+we are likely to want to challenge the claim as we will be able to cite
+exceptions to the generalisation. If, however, we interpret the claim as it
+is more likely to be intended, then the quantifier that we make explicit
+should be 'most' or 'almost all', thereby exposing the proposition really
+intended as:
+Most of today's students are dedicated to their studies.
+and this proposition has a greater likelihood of being true. Cases that we
+use to challenge the truth of a generalising claim are known as counterexamples.
+(The process discussed here should not be confused with that
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+33
+of refuting a complete argument by counterexample, which is dealt with
+in Chapter 6.)
+Quantifiers and generalisations
+It is a commonplace for people to say that you can never really generalise.
+However, this is certainly not true just as it stands. When someone
+says this they might be understood as claiming, 'all generalisations are
+false'. But this is itself a generalisation; so if the claim is true, the claim
+is false! So that can't be what it means. In any case, it is obvious that
+some generalisations are true (even if they are not very interesting ones).
+That is, there are counterexamples to the claim that all generalisations
+are false. For example, 'All cities in the UK have a bus service' is obviously
+true and no case could really be raised to undermine its truth.
+What exactly is a generalisation? In fact, the ordinary term 'generalisation'
+is a bit vague; it means, roughly, 'statement about a category
+of things'. A generalisation is not simply any statement that includes
+quantifiers, since 'there are five eggs in the refrigerator' contains the
+quantifier-phrase 'there are five', but is not a generalisation. But we need
+not be too precise about this. For our purposes we will reserve the term
+for 'categorical' statements involving quantifiers such as 'all', 'every',
+'always', 'no', 'never' and so on, but also 'most', 'usually' and the like.
+To get a better grasp of which types of generalisations may cause
+problems during the analysis and assessment of arguments, the main
+thing we need is to distinguish between hard and soft generalisations.
+Consider the following generalisations (note that few of them have
+explicit quantifiers):
+◗ Private schools attain better examination results than state
+schools.
+◗ Traffic congestion is bad in Glasgow.
+◗ Regular exercise benefits your health.
+◗ Labour voters support a ban on hunting with hounds.
+◗ People play less sport when they get older.
+No doubt the counterexample fanatic will be able to provide us with
+plenty of exceptions -- congestion-free short cuts across Glasgow; labour
+voters who are keen fox-hunters; the person who had a heart attack while
+doing their regular work-out at the gym. And they can cite this as a
+reason to accept the claim that all generalisations are false because one
+can always find an exception to them. However, to do so would be to
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+34
+misinterpret what people usually intend to convey when they say or write
+such things. It's rare for someone to mean that these sorts of generalisations
+are true without exception. The quantifier they intend to imply
+is probably one that is not synonymous with 'all' or 'every', but one such
+as 'in most cases', 'usually', or 'almost all'. These generalisations are soft
+generalisations. We use soft generalisations when we want to express
+the idea that such-and-such is true of certain things normally, typically,
+generally, usually, on average, for the most part.6 In the examples
+above, the speaker/writer could make her intended meaning much clearer
+by adding one of these words or phrases; for example:
+Private schools generally attain better examination results than
+state schools.
+On the other hand, someone using a hard generalisation does
+intend it to apply without exception. Such a generalisation is rightly
+conveyed by a quantifier such as 'all', 'every', 'no', 'always', 'never'.
+For example:
+◗ Every passenger must hold a valid passport.
+◗ No doctor who helps a patient to die should consider
+themselves to be above the law.
+If someone makes a claim that is intended as a hard generalisation and
+we can find a counterexample to it, then we have refuted their claim. But
+quantifier-free generalisations are not typically intended as hard generalisations.
+If the fanatical anti-generaliser does have a point, we believe,
+it is a point about rhetoric, not truth. What the anti-generaliser is justifiably
+worried about are generalisations about groups defined by race,
+ethnicity, nationality, gender, class and sexuality. Suppose that there are
+two social classes amongst Martians: the Zormons and the Ringons. And
+suppose the generalisation 'Ringons are more violent than Zormons'
+is true when taken as a soft generalisation, but false when taken as a
+hard generalisation. A Ringon anti-generaliser might object to someone's
+saying this. But we've seen that the point cannot be that the generalisation
+is not true, in spite of the fact that not every Ringon is more violent
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+35
+6 Care should be taken interpreting and using 'usually' to express soft generalisations
+because it is ambiguous in some contexts. For instance, the sentence, 'British universities
+usually have a mathematics department' could be intended to mean that most or almost
+all British universities have a mathematics department, or that they have them most or
+almost all of the time, but at some times they have no such department. If 'usually' could
+be ambiguous in a context, it is better to use 'typically' or 'generally' instead.
+than every Zormon. This generalisation is, it must be admitted, true when
+taken as a soft generalisation.
+However, it might be argued, it is rhetorically dangerous. There
+are two reasons. The first reason is that many people are not very clear
+about the possible ambiguities of such a statement. It might wrongly
+be taken as a hard generalisation, and furthermore it might wrongly be
+taken as asserting something about the innate or genetic qualities of
+Ringons. In itself, it does not do this. So unless these possible misinterpretations
+are deflected by making the exact intended meaning perfectly
+explicit, this generalisation will remain very provocative and a likely cause
+of ill-feeling. The second reason is the brute fact that, even if these
+ambiguities are resolved, generalisations (even soft ones) about groups of
+people do often cause people to take offence. There are times when people
+take offence at a generalisation about a group and are simply irrational
+in doing so; no amount of explaining the difference between a soft generalisation
+and a hard one, or the difference between a generalisation about
+actual facts and one about alleged genetic qualities will change this. Like
+many kinds of irrationality, this is a natural kind of irrationality that
+cannot easily be overcome. No matter how factually true a generalisation
+may be, it is natural to feel that there is something dehumanising about
+it. So we cannot reasonably expect that people will always be able to overcome
+that feeling. Morality requires us to consider the consequences of
+our actions, and, since speech and writing are types of action, natural
+(though irrational) responses to what we say and write must sometimes
+be taken into account in deciding what we ought to say. We should not
+say what is false, but that a proposition is true is not always enough to
+justify expressing it. This, we believe, is the grain of truth in the antigeneraliser's
+position.
+CHAPTER SUMMARY
+Critical thinking enables us to ensure that we have good reasons
+to believe or do that which people attempt to persuade us to do or
+to believe. Attempts to persuade may be argumentative or nonargumentative.
+Most of the latter count as rhetoric, which is any
+attempt to persuade that does not attempt to give good reasons for
+the belief, desire or action in question, but attempts to motivate that
+belief, desire or action solely through the power of the words used.
+The former, on the other hand, persuade us by giving reasons for
+us to accept a claim or take the action suggested. Not all arguments
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+Chapter summary 36
+are good arguments. Good arguments are those that provide us with
+good reasons to act or to accept a claim.
+An argument consists of a set of propositions. The proposition
+expressed by a statement is its factual content, and should
+insofar as possible be distinguished from the rhetorical force of the
+sentence. Propositions may implicated by an utterance without
+being explicitly stated: a proposition is implicated by an utterance
+when it would reasonably be taken to have been intended. Among
+the propositions that constitute an argument, one is its conclusion
+-- the proposition argued for -- and rest are its premises -- the
+reasons given to accept the conclusion. Once we have determined
+that a text or a speech contains an argument, we must work out
+which sentence is intended to express the argument's conclusion and
+which are intended to express its premises. Words that serve as
+conclusion indicators and premise indicators offer a helpful
+(but not foolproof) guide to doing so successfully. We should also
+pay close attention to the context of the text or speech. Setting out
+arguments in standard form is a five-stage process that enables us
+to see the form of arguments better and hence, to compare, analyse
+and assess them more easily. Arguments must be distinguished
+sharply from explanations: arguments attempt to provide reasons
+for believing a proposition whose truth is not assumed already to
+be accepted; explanations assume a certain proposition is already
+accepted as fact, and attempt to specify the cause.
+There are various linguistic phenomena that can make the
+task of identifying and interpreting arguments more difficult. In the
+case of ambiguity, vagueness, metaphor, rhetorical questions
+and irony, these can be problematic because they obscure speakers'
+and writers' intended meanings. In the case of implicitly relative
+sentences and sentences that use quantifiers inappropriately,
+they can be problematic because they fail to convey speakers' and
+writers' intended meanings in their entirety. Quantifying sentences
+can also cause problems for the interpretation of arguments when
+they are used inaccurately to express generalisations. There are
+two types of generalisation: hard and soft. Hard generalisations
+are true only if they are true without exception. To avoid misinterpretation
+they should be expressed in sentences that use
+quantifiers such as all, every, no, none, always, never. Soft
+generalisations are only true of the majority of the class that is
+the subject of the generalisation. They should be expressed in
+sentences that use quantifiers such as most, almost all, in most
+cases, generally, typically, usually. In all cases linguistic
+phenomena prevent the intended meaning from being explicit, we
+  
+Chapter summary
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+37
+should pay careful attention to context in order to render the
+most plausible interpretation of the attempt to persuade. Where
+appropriate we should rewrite sentences to make their meaning
+explicit.
+EXERCISES
+1 Decide whether each of the following cases contains an argument. If
+it does not, write 'N/A'. If it does, identify its premises and conclusion
+by underlining the appropriate propositions and writing 'C' under the
+conclusion and 'P' and the appropriate number under the premises.
+Remember that premise and conclusion indicators are not part of those
+propositions:
+Example
+Bob is a dog and all dogs are black. So Bob is black.
+✎ P1 P2 C
+Notice that we have not underlined the words that connect or introduce
+the propositions, only the propositions themselves:
+a It follows from the fact that all cats are pests that this cat is a pest.
+b I'll never get to work if this traffic keeps up.
+c Whenever a person drinks instant coffee they end up with stomach
+ache and Jack is going to have stomach ache since he just drank a cup
+of instant coffee.
+d There is going to be a frost in the morning because the temperature
+has fallen below zero.
+e The biscuit tin is empty because the children ate all the biscuits.
+f Christians take care of the needy. Tony Blair's social and economic
+policies discriminate against the needy. He can't be a Christian.
+g Since this animal is a fish, it can't be a mammal.
+h The American-led invasion of Iraq has set the cause of world peace
+back by centuries.
+i Leeds is north of Birmingham and Birmingham is north of Brighton.
+So Leeds is north of Brighton.
+j My ex-partner was always telling me to change my appearance, so I
+changed my partner.
+38
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+Exercises
+k If those chemicals are released into the river, thousands of fish will
+die.
+l Since inflation is increasing, the price of mortgages is sure to go up.
+m Everyone at the lecture is bored. No one who is bored is listening.
+Therefore no one at the lecture is listening.
+n He's been on crutches since he was injured in the accident.
+o On the basis of the fact that it includes scenes depicting drug abuse,
+the film should not be shown on prime-time television.
+p If we don't do something to control the level of car traffic now, air
+pollution will become so bad that our grandchildren will not be able
+to walk the streets for fear of asphyxiation.
+q The Government proposes to reform the benefits system. Whenever
+such reforms occur someone loses out, so the Government's proposals
+are unfair.
+r Something must be done to regulate the cultivation of genetically
+manipulated foodstuffs. Uncontrolled production of these crops will
+lead to a collapse of the ecosystem.
+s If we hit our children, they will learn that violence is acceptable, so
+we shouldn't physically discipline our children.
+t It is, therefore, an impractical solution to the problem of homelessness.
+2 Write out the following arguments in standard form. You need not
+supply missing premises or change the words used unless it is absolutely
+necessary to retain the sense of a sentence, but you should omit indicator
+words:
+Example
+The Government should ban fox-hunting. Fox-hunting causes
+suffering to animals and anything that causes suffering to
+animals should be banned.
+✎ P1) Fox-hunting causes suffering to animals.
+P2) Anything that causes suffering to animals should be
+banned.
+C) The Government should ban fox-hunting.
+a If Manchester Utd win against Arsenal, Chelsea will go to the top of
+the Premier League. Manchester Utd have beaten Arsenal so Chelsea
+will be top of the league.
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+39
+Exercises
+b Children should not watch television programmes that lack educational
+merit. Pokemon fails to promote linguistic and cognitive development
+and programmes only have educational merit in so far as they
+promote linguistic and cognitive development. Children should not
+watch Pokemon.
+c I put it to you that Ms White killed Colonel Mustard in the ballroom
+with the candlestick. The reason I say this is that on the night of
+Colonel Mustard's death Lady Scarlet saw Ms White in the ballroom
+beating Colonel Mustard over the head with a candlestick, which was
+later found to have Ms White's fingerprints and Colonel Mustard's
+blood on it.
+d The team manager should be sacked. Whenever the team manager is
+sacked, team spirit is revitalised and this team's spirit certainly needs
+revitalising.
+e Excessive consumption by consumers in the developed world causes
+poverty and disease in the developing world and that's simply unjust.
+So if we care about the rest of the world, we should curb our
+consumption.
+f History will show President Bush to have been a successful president
+after all. The reason is that he has managed to maintain the USA's
+reputation as a super-power and that's the most important criterion
+by which to judge a US president.
+3 Without looking back at the relevant section, write a paragraph
+explaining the difference between lexical and syntactic ambiguity, then
+give a plausible example of each and explain their possible interpretations.
+4 In the following sentences indicate the words or phrases that are lexically
+ambiguous and explain their possible meanings:
+a The last time I saw them they were sitting beside the bank.
+b Happiness is the end of life.
+c Archbishop of Canterbury praises organ donor for his humanity.
+d Museum visitor attacked by mummy.
+e Stolen car found by statue.
+f British left waffles on Ireland.
+g Iraqi head seeks arms.
+h An intense depression swept over the British Isles today.
+i Blair leans further to the right.
+j Chancellor wins on budget, but more lies ahead.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+40 Exercises
+5 The following sentences are syntactically ambiguous. Rewrite them
+so as to give the most plausible interpretation. If two or more interpretations
+are equally plausible, give them all. You may need to rearrange
+the word order and/or add words:
+Example
+A former professional dancer was accused of assaulting a
+33-year old woman with her daughter.
+✎ A former professional dancer and her daughter were
+accused of assaulting a 33-year old woman.
+a The two suspects fled the area before the officers' arrival in a red Ford
+Escort driven by a woman in black.
+b I was invited to go to the movies yesterday.
+c Mary left her friends depressed.
+d People who use cocaine often die early.
+e Smith had a pair of boots and a pair of slippers that he borrowed
+from Jones.
+f Wanted: A bay mare, suitable for a novice with white socks.
+g Jones left the company in a better state.
+h Glasgow's first commercial sperm bank opened last Friday with semen
+samples from twenty men frozen in a stainless steel tank.
+i They were exposed to someone who was infected with the virus a
+week ago.
+j The police would like to speak to two women and a van driver who
+fled the scene of the accident.
+6 Without looking back at the relevant sections, write a paragraph
+explaining the difference between vagueness and ambiguity. Give examples
+to illustrate your explanation.
+7 For each of the following identify the quantifier and say whether the
+generalisation is soft or hard:
+Example
+Almost all students have contemplated cheating in an
+examination.
+✎ Almost all
+Soft generalisation
+  
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+41
+Exercises
+a No one may leave the room until the culprit owns up.
+b Few of the applicants are sufficiently qualified for the job.
+c Most Members of Parliament are committed to their constituents.
+d A majority of our members are prepared to go out on strike in support
+of their pay claim.
+e All passengers must fasten their seatbelts for take-off and landing.
+f Generally birds can fly.
+g Almost all of the patients are ready to be discharged.
+h Hardly any of the people surveyed were in favour of the proposed
+law change.
+i Every doctor must abide by the Hippocratic Oath.
+j Almost none of the candidates have the charisma to succeed in politics.
+8 Each of the following sentences expresses a generalisation, but its
+quantifier is missing. For each sentence, if it is true as a hard generalisation,
+add an appropriate quantifier to make it a hard generalisation. If
+it could only be true as a soft generalisation, add an appropriate quantifier
+to make it a soft generalisation:
+Example
+Passengers must hold a valid ticket before boarding the train.
+✎ All passengers must hold a valid ticket before boarding the
+train.
+a Cats have tails.
+b Children like to eat ice cream.
+c Voters voted for Labour Party candidates at the last general election.
+d Owls are mammals.
+e Cars run on petrol or diesel.
+f Citizens of a democratic country should be free to come and go as
+they please.
+g Members of Parliament are male.
+h Universities in the UK have a vice chancellor.
+i People care enough about the environment to change their lifestyles.
+j British people can speak a foreign language.
+Why should we become critical thinkers?
+42 Exercises
+Chapter 2
+Logic: deductive validity
+Our attempts to engage in critical thinking are sometimes frustrating.
+Often, even when we feel certain that there is something wrong with an
+argument, we find it hard to explain exactly what it is that's wrong with
+it. Sometimes this is frustration with ourselves; but it can easily look like
+frustration with the person giving the argument (it can certainly be interpreted
+as such by that person!). One of the primary aims of training in
+critical thinking is to learn concepts and techniques that will help us to
+express clearly what is wrong with an argument, thereby dispelling that
+frustration. By helping us to assess arguments more efficiently, this helps
+us in the pursuit of truth. But also, by becoming more articulate in our
+criticisms, we become less frustrated, and thereby less bad-tempered. This
+can help to smooth out our relationships with other people (whereas you
+might have thought that improving your skill at critical thinking would
+make you into a disagreeable quibbler).
+This frustration derives from two sources: First, confronted with an
+argument, we find it hard to hold the whole thing clearly before our
+  
+43
+* The principle of charity 44
+* Truth 49
+* Deductive validity 51
+How to judge validity * Further examples
+* Conditional propositions 57
+* Deductive soundness 62
+* The connection to formal logic 65
+* Argument trees 67
+mind's eye, and find it hard to say exactly what the argument is. Second,
+even when we do succeed in laying the argument out before us clearly,
+we find it hard to describe or explain what is wrong with it:
+* The first issue is addressed by techniques and strategies for argumentreconstruction:
+the representation of arguments in standard form, so
+as to give us a clear and comprehensive view of them.
+* The second issue is addressed by techniques and concepts of argument
+assessment: the determination of whether or not arguments provide
+good reasons for accepting their conclusions.
+We discuss practical details of argument-reconstruction in Chapter 5.
+This chapter and the next are mostly concerned with argument assessment.
+Ordinarily, we speak of arguments as being good or bad, strong or
+weak, valid or invalid, sound or unsound, persuasive or unpersuasive,
+intelligent or stupid, without having a clear idea of what we mean by
+these terms, and without clearly distinguishing their meanings. So not
+only are we vague when we use one of these terms to criticise the argument;
+our attempts to explain ourselves by means of the others are still
+vague. Thus our primary task in this chapter and the next is to explain
+the basic logical concepts in terms of which assessment is carried out --
+validity, soundness and inductive force.
+You may be surprised that detailed discussion of argument assessment
+precedes the detailed discussion of argument-reconstruction in
+Chapter 5; surely you have to reconstruct an argument before you can
+assess it? In fact, it is slightly less straightforward than that: although
+the final assessment of an argument must await its reconstruction, good
+reconstruction-practice must be informed by a good grasp of the concepts
+used in assessment. The purpose of the next section is to explain this
+important point.
+The principle of charity
+An argument is a system of propositions: a set of premises advanced
+in support of a conclusion. People succeed in expressing the propositions
+they have in mind with varying degrees of clarity. In addition, an argument
+may depend upon premises that the arguer does not state at all, but
+which he or she is implicitly assuming.
+For example, if someone argues: 'Sally is taking drugs; therefore she
+is breaking the law,' the arguer is probably using the rather vague term
+'drugs' in the narrow sense of 'unlawful recreational drugs', or perhaps
+Logic: deductive validity
+44
+in the sense of 'narcotics'. In the wider sense of 'drugs' that includes
+medicinal drugs, this would obviously be a bad argument. Furthermore,
+the arguer is assuming, without explicitly stating, that it is illegal to take
+such drugs. So two sorts of thing are left implicit in this argument: first,
+the arguer assumes a more precise meaning than is explicitly expressed
+by the word 'drugs'; second, the arguer fails to make explicit all the facts
+from which he or she infers the conclusion. A premise is left implicit.
+Since the purpose of argument-reconstruction is to determine exactly
+what argument has been given, it follows that part of the task of
+argument-reconstruction is to clarify what the arguer actually said, and
+to supplement what the arguer actually said (to make explicit what was
+merely implicit in the arguer's statements). That is, we try to represent
+the argument in such a way as to create a perfect match between the
+propositions that actually constitute the argument and the sentences which
+represent the argument in standard form.
+Two important consequences follow from this:
+* The sentences we use in a reconstruction of the argument need not
+be the very same sentences used by the arguer in giving their argument.
+We may employ sentences that more clearly or precisely
+express the propositions that constitute the argument.
+* Our reconstructed version of the argument may contain premises that
+are not expressed by any of the sentences actually used by the arguer.
+Argument-reconstruction is essentially a task of interpretation.
+What we are trying to reconstruct, to represent as clearly as we can, is
+a certain train of thought, of reasoning -- however well or badly the arguer
+may have succeeded in expressing it. This cannot be an exact science. It
+cannot be mechanical or foolproof. It calls for judgement, a critical but
+sympathetic eye or ear and even a certain degree of intuition, of understanding
+of people -- of the ways people tend to think in given sets of
+circumstances, and of some typical ways in which people fail to express
+themselves clearly.
+Nevertheless, the process can be undertaken in a systematic way, and
+there are general guidelines to follow. One of the most general of these
+is what we call the principle of charity, which we now explain.
+We have just said that argument-reconstruction of is often a task of
+surmising what the arguer had in mind, and was trying to express. Our
+primary evidence for this, naturally, is the specific words actually used
+by the arguer. Beyond this, we look to various sorts of facts about the
+context or circumstances in which the person employed the words that
+he or she did. For example, consider this argument:
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+45
+But he is still in Paris! Therefore, he cannot possibly be in
+St Petersburg by tomorrow.
+Of course nowadays St Petersburg is only a few hours from Paris by
+aeroplane. In the context of today, a person's being in Paris today would
+not prevent their being in St Petersburg tomorrow. If someone were to
+give a similar argument regarding some presently living person -- the
+Russian president Vladimir Putin for example -- then we would be puzzled.
+Since everyone is aware of air travel, nobody thinks that it is impossible
+to get from Paris to St Petersburg in one day. So in the context of today,
+we would have to inquire further to discover what the arguer thinks is
+preventing Mr Putin's journey. But suppose these words were given by
+someone in 1807, referring to Napoleon. Then surely the arguer would
+be assuming that it is not possible to get from Paris to St Petersburg at
+such a speed. That assumption would obviously have been correct in
+Napoleon's day. Indeed it would have gone without saying, which is
+precisely why the arguer need not have expressed it explicitly. The fastest
+way to travel then was by horse.
+Such facts pertaining to the context in which the argument is
+given, together with the specific words used by the person, will constitute
+the total evidence you have for reconstructing the argument. In
+some cases, the context is known, and makes it obvious what the arguer
+was implicitly assuming. In other cases, we may have to learn more
+about the context; this happens especially when interpreting historical
+documents.
+In other cases, however, we may learn all the relevant contextual
+factors, yet it remains possible to represent the person's argument in more
+than one way. And it may happen that one reconstruction represents
+the argument as a good one, another as a bad one. In such a case, which
+reconstruction should you prefer? Which should you advance as the
+reconstruction of the argument?
+It depends upon your purpose. If you are hoping to convince others
+that the person is wrong, you are most likely to succeed if you represent
+it as a bad one. Indeed, this is a very common ploy. If your aim is to
+defeat your opponent -- or to make it seem as if you have defeated them
+-- then success is more likely if you attack a weakened form of your opponent's
+argument. In a context like that of a public debate, this is often a
+good strategy. For what you are trying to do is to appear, in the eyes of
+the audience, to get the upper hand. By representing your opponent's
+position as weaker than it really is, you are more likely to appear to be
+the victor. You also put your opponent on the defensive, forcing him to
+scramble, saying things like 'that's not what I meant'. If your aim is
+to persuade, or to appear to be the victor, then you may be well-advised
+Logic: deductive validity
+46
+to choose the weaker version, especially if your audience is not aware
+that a stronger version is available.
+However, if what matters to you is whether or not the conclusion
+of the person's argument is true, then you should choose the best
+representation of the argument.
+Why? Suppose you are wondering whether some particular proposition
+is true. You are wondering, for example, whether increasing taxes
+for the wealthy would lead to a rise in unemployment. Suppose further
+that you honestly have no idea whether or not this is true. Now suppose
+that someone attempts to persuade you that this proposition is true by
+giving you an argument for it. But you find that this argument admits
+of being reconstructed in either of two ways. On one reconstruction, the
+argument is good, that is, it provides a good reason for accepting the
+proposition as true. On the other reconstruction, however, it is no good
+at all; you find that the reasons you have represented the person as giving
+in favour of this proposition do not support it at all. Suppose you decide
+on this latter representation of the argument, the one which represents
+it as bad.
+Can you now conclude that the proposition is true, or that it is false?
+Since, reconstructed that way, the argument was no good, you certainly
+cannot conclude, on the basis of it, that the proposition is true. But nor
+can you conclude that the proposition is false. The fact that someone has
+given a bad argument for some proposition is not, in itself, a reason to
+reject the proposition as false. For example, someone might argue that
+since three is a lucky number, there will not be a third world war. That
+is a bad argument; it gives you no reason to believe that there will not
+be a third world war. But (fortunately!) its being a bad argument provides
+no reason to believe that there will be a third world war. In short, the
+fact that someone has given a bad argument for the proposition in question
+leaves you in precisely the same position as you were when you
+started. If you began with no evidence either for or against the proposition,
+then your position is unchanged -- you've no reason to accept the
+proposition as true, and none to reject it as false.
+Suppose, then, that you accept the first reconstruction of the argument.
+Since this constitutes a good argument, you are now in a different
+position; now you do have some indication as to whether or not the proposition
+is true. In particular, you have a reason for its being true. On this
+first reconstruction, then, you represent the person as having made a
+useful contribution to the debate. You now have reasons that you lacked
+before. Thus, insofar as we engage in critical thinking -- insofar as our
+interest is in discovering the truth of things, and not just in persuading
+or refuting people -- we are most interested to discover good arguments,
+not bad ones. So we should always choose the best reconstruction of a
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+47
+given argument. That way, we discover reasons for accepting or rejecting
+particular propositions, advancing the cause of knowledge. This is an
+application of the principle of charity.
+There is a further reason for observing the principle of charity, which
+has more to do with ethics than with logic. When you give an argument,
+you may or may not succeed in expressing yourself clearly, but
+you do want your listener to try to understand you. If your listener
+impatiently seizes upon your words in order to refute your argument
+as swiftly as possible without taking the trouble to understand you,
+naturally you feel ill-used, that the person is not being fair to you. You
+think it wrong, unjust to be treated that way. If so, then we ought to
+try to be equally receptive to others -- to try to understand them, rather
+than be too eager to refute them or discredit them. When people give
+arguments, they almost always have some reason or other for what they
+are saying (although, of course, sometimes people do try to persuade
+us of things -- especially to do things like buy Coke -- without actually
+trying to give us good reasons). People are very seldom completely
+illogical. But they are seldom very well-practised at expressing their
+reasons clearly either, and often they are not so interested in clarity
+as in persuasion or eloquence. Still, beneath it all, they will usually
+have genuine reasons of some sort in mind, so it seems only right and
+proper that we should try to bring them to light, to understand what the
+person is really trying to say. If we do not attempt this, then we are not
+really doing the person justice; we are not being as receptive to his or
+her attempts at communication, as we would surely wish others to be
+to ours.
+The principle of charity, however, has a certain limit, beyond which
+the nature of what we are doing changes somewhat: If our task is to
+reconstruct the argument actually intended by the person, then we must
+not go beyond what, based upon the evidence available to us, we may
+reasonably expect the arguer to have had in mind. Once we go beyond
+what we may reasonably assume the arguer to have had in mind, then
+we are no longer in the business of interpreting their argument. Instead,
+we have become the arguer.
+If our concern is with how well a particular person has argued,
+then we should not overstep this boundary. However, if our concern is
+simply with the truth of the matter in question, then to overstep this
+boundary is perfectly all right. It often happens that, in reconstructing
+an argument, we hit upon another, similar or related argument for the
+same conclusion which is better than the one we are reconstructing.
+If what concerns us is simply finding the best arguments on either side
+of an issue, then we will want to give a representation of this better
+argument.
+Logic: deductive validity
+48
+Truth
+If your aim is to give the best possible reconstruction of an argument,
+then you have to know something of what makes an argument good or
+bad. Fortunately, logic gives us some very clear answers as to what does
+make arguments good or bad.
+The fundamental concept of logic is the concept of truth.1 For one
+thing, the overarching concern of the critical thinker is typically with the
+truth (or lack of it) of the conclusions of arguments. Further, truth is the
+concept in terms of which the logician attempts to explain everything
+else. Thus, we begin our discussion of the concepts of logic by saying a
+little bit more about this uniquely important concept.
+Many people are put off by the word 'truth'. This is usually the
+symptom of a philosophical worry that one cannot speak simply of 'truth'.
+One might worry that perhaps there is no one truth: that what is true
+for one person or group need not be true for another person or group.
+Or one may worry that truth is in some way beyond us, unapproachable
+by mere fallible human beings. But for our purposes, we can leave aside
+those sorts of abstruse philosophical worries as irrelevant. As noted in
+Chapter 1, the way in which the logician uses the word 'truth' is really
+very simple and down-to-earth. Properly understood, the word should
+not invite those sorts of controversies.
+Consider the following proposition:
+(A) Fish live in water.
+This proposition is true. What does it mean to say that this proposition
+is true? It means, simply, that that is the way things are. To say that the
+proposition is true is to say nothing more than: yes, fish do live in water.
+Thus, consider the proposition that says that (A) is true:
+(B) It is true that fish live in water.
+(A) and (B) are equivalent in the sense that, necessarily, if (A) is true
+then so is (B), and if (B) is true then so is (A). In other words, to say
+that it is true that fish live in water comes to the same thing as saying
+that fish live in water. Used this way -- which is all that is needed for
+logic or critical thinking -- the word 'true' is no more mysterious than
+the words occurring in the sentence 'Fish live in water'. In this sense,
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+49
+1 The great German logician Gottlob Frege -- who is genuinely agreed to be the inventor
+of the modern science of logic -- said that the laws of logic are really the 'laws of truth',
+in something like the way that the laws of physics are the laws of the physical world.
+you cannot doubt that there is 'really' such a thing as truth, or that truth
+is knowable, any more than you can doubt that fish live in water, or that
+the sky is blue, or that the Earth is bigger than a grapefruit. For these
+are all known truths.
+Discomfort with the word 'true' is sometimes due to a failure to
+distinguish truth from belief. If John says 'Fish live in water', then he
+does, of course, show that he believes that fish live in water (presumably
+he knows that fish live in water). Likewise, if Mary now refers to what
+John said, and says 'That's true', then she also shows that she believes
+that fish live in water. Despite their having done so by different means,
+both John and Mary have asserted the proposition that fish live in water.
+Mary, unlike John, has used the word 'true'. But they have asserted the
+same proposition; they have expressed the same belief. Yet clearly the
+truth of this proposition has nothing to do with what Mary believes. That
+depends only on how things stand as regards fish, and what fish do does
+not depend upon what people think. So despite the fact that Mary has
+used the word 'true' to assert something, the truth of what she asserts
+does not depend on her beliefs in any way.
+Of course, what Mary believes depends on her, and it is possible that
+people could have different beliefs as regards fish. But that has no effect
+on fish (we will, however, return to this issue in the final chapter).
+The reverse side of this is that to say that a proposition is false is
+just to deny it -- in this case, for example, some misinformed person who
+thought that snakes are fish might say, 'That's false; not all fish live in
+water'. 'It is false that fish live in water' is equivalent to 'Fish do not live
+in water'.
+Sometimes we will speak of the truth-value of a proposition. This just
+means the truth of the proposition, if it is true, or its falsity, if it is false.
+There are two truth-values, true and false. For example, we can say that
+the truth-value of 'Fish live in water' is truth, that that of 'Fish live in
+the sky' is falsity, and that the truth-value of 'It is now Tuesday' must
+always differ from that of 'It is now Friday'. To ask 'what is the truthvalue
+of that proposition?' is the same as asking whether or not that
+proposition is true.
+A question might have occurred to you: If to say that a proposition
+is true is the same asserting it, then why do we have the terms 'is true'
+and 'is false'? What is their purpose? Why are they not just redundant,
+superfluous appendages? One reason is convenience; saying 'that's true'
+is quick and easy, like saying 'yes', or nodding one's head. But a more
+important reason is that we sometimes want to generalise about propositions
+in terms of truth and falsity. That is, we sometimes wish to
+speak about true or false propositions in general, without specifying
+Logic: deductive validity
+50
+any propositions in particular. This is crucial in the formal study of
+logic, but less technical examples are no less important. For example, we
+have characterised critical thinking as aiming at truth. This means that
+we undertake it because we want to know whether capitalism is the fairest
+economic system, whether so-and-so committed the crime, whether the
+danger of war is increasing or decreasing . . . and so on, for everything
+we might want to know. That critical thinking aims at truth is a
+generalisation that sums this up.
+Deductive validity
+In fact, we need this sort of generalisation in order to define the important
+concept of deductive validity, to which we now turn. For brevity, we
+will sometimes call it simply 'validity'. In studying it, you should forget
+whatever the word might mean to you ordinarily. We mean logical
+validity, the concept of validity that concerns logic, the study of reasoning.
+Consider the following arguments:
+A P1) The Prime Minister's dog is infested with fleas.
+P2) All fleas are bacteria.
+C) The Prime Minister's dog is infested with
+bacteria.
+B P1) Colette owned a dog.
+P2) All French Bulldogs are dogs.
+C) Colette owned a French Bulldog.
+Argument A speaks of 'The Prime Minister's dog', but it is not made
+clear who that is, for we are given no indication of when, or even in what
+country, this argument was given. So we have no idea what dog, if any,
+has been referred to. Furthermore, P2 of A would be false under any
+circumstances in which the argument might have been given -- fleas are
+insects, not bacteria. But scrutinise these arguments carefully. You can
+easily recognise that there is something right about A, and something
+wrong with B. The conclusion of A does follow from its premises, and
+the conclusion of B does not follow from its premises. What you are
+recognising is that A is valid, and that B is invalid.
+Now what does this mean? What, exactly, are you seeing when you
+see that A is valid and B is invalid? Consider A. When you recognise its
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+51
+validity, you do not need to know whether or not P1 or C of A is true
+or even precisely which dog of which Prime Minister of which country
+is intended; nor do you care about the fact that P2 of A is positively false.
+For what you are seeing is that if the premises of A were true, then the
+conclusion would have to be true as well. In short, it would be impossible
+for the premises to be true but the conclusion false. The truth of
+the premises, in any possible or imaginable situation, would guarantee
+the truth of the conclusion. If fleas were bacteria, and the dog being
+referred to were infested with fleas, then it would, in that case, be infested
+with bacteria.
+On the other hand, consider B. When you recognise that it is not a
+valid argument, what you are recognising is that even if the premises
+were true, it would still be possible for the conclusion to be false. The
+conclusion does not follow. Whether or not the premises are in fact true,
+it would be possible or conceivable for the premises to be true and the
+conclusion false. The truth of the premises would not guarantee the truth
+of the conclusion.
+Now as it happens, the premises of B are true. The French author
+Colette did have a dog, and of course French Bulldogs are dogs. Indeed,
+the conclusion of B is also true; Colette's dog was a French Bulldog. But
+that is beside the point, so far as validity is concerned. It may be true that
+Colette had a French Bulldog, but this does not follow merely from the
+fact that she had a dog (along with the fact that French Bulldogs are dogs).
+A person given only the premises of the argument, and lacking any further
+information about Colette, would be in no position to infer that Colette
+had a French Bulldog. If this point seems strange, remember that you saw
+that the argument is invalid before you knew the truth-values of its
+premises or of its conclusion. And that is as it should be. You can tell that
+an argument is valid or not without knowing the truth-values of the propositions
+it comprises, because the validity of an argument (or lack thereof),
+does not depend upon the actual truth-values of those propositions.
+To put it another way: the concept of validity pertains to the connection
+between the premises and conclusion of an argument, not their actual
+truth-values considered individually. This is indeed the crucial lesson
+about the concept of validity: it pertains to whole arguments (more
+exactly: it pertains to inferences; extended arguments may contain more
+than one inference, and each one is subject to being valid or invalid).
+Thus, it should be clear that it would be nonsense, to say of a single
+proposition, that it is valid. That would be like saying, of a single word,
+that it rhymes (a rhyme requires a relation between words). By the same
+token, it would be nonsense to say, of an argument, that it is true. That
+would be like saying, of an entire jigsaw-puzzle, that it doesn't fit (this
+could be said of some or even of every piece, but not of the puzzle itself).
+Logic: deductive validity
+52
+A single proposition can be true or false, but not valid or invalid; an
+argument can be valid or invalid, but not true or false.
+These two points should be borne in mind, as it is a common mistake
+to confuse the notions of truth and validity, applying them to the wrong
+sorts of things.
+Here then are two definitions of validity; they are equivalent (they
+come to the same thing), so you are free to make use of the one you find
+easiest to work with:
+To say that an argument is valid is to say: It would be impossible for
+all the premises of the argument to be true, but the conclusion
+false.2
+And the second one:
+To say that an argument is valid is to say: If the premises are
+(or were) true, the conclusion would also have to be true.
+If the condition specified by the definition does not hold, then the
+argument is invalid. A consequence of these definitions is that the
+following cases of valid arguments are all possible:
+1 The premises are all (actually) true, and the conclusion is
+(actually) true.
+2 The premises are all (actually) false, and the conclusion is
+(actually) false.
+3 The premises are all (actually) false, and the conclusion is
+(actually) true.
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+53
+2 This definition has the consequence that if any premise of an argument is a necessary
+falsehood, or if the conclusion is a necessary truth, then the argument is valid (a necessary
+falsehood is a proposition that could not possibly have been true; a necessary truth
+is a proposition that could not possibly have been false). In such cases the premises may
+be entirely irrelevant to the conclusion. For example, 'There is a married bachelor, therefore
+the moon is made of green cheese' is valid, as is 'The moon is made of green cheese,
+therefore there is no married bachelor'. Our definition, then, is quite useless as a guide to
+reasoning, where necessary truths and necessary falsehoods are concerned. We believe this
+a reasonable price to pay, for the alternative -- a definition of validity whereby an argument
+is valid by virtue of its form -- is too difficult, for our purposes, to apply profitably
+to ordinary language. Further, it is really very seldom that necessary truths or falsehoods
+figure as the conclusions or premises of arguments encountered ordinarily.
+4 Some of the premises are (actually) true, some (actually)
+false and the conclusion is (actually) true.
+5 Some of the premises are (actually) true, some (actually)
+false and the conclusion is (actually) false.
+The only case in which an argument cannot be valid is the case
+when the premises are all (actually) true, but the conclusion is
+(actually) false. For if that is so, then obviously there is a possible
+case in which the premises hold true when the conclusion is false --
+the actual case.
+This is easier to grasp by looking at some examples. The following
+are, respectively, examples of cases 1--5 given above; the 'T's and 'F's in
+parentheses to the right of each premise or conclusion indicates its actual
+truth or falsity, as the case may be:
+1 P1) Janet Baker is an opera singer. (T)
+P2) All opera singers are musicians. (T)
+C) Janet Baker is a musician. (T)
+2 P1) Janet Baker is a baritone. (F)
+P2) All baritones are Italians. (F)
+C) Janet Baker is an Italian. (F)
+3 P1) Janet Baker is a baritone. (F)
+P2) All baritones are English. (F)
+C) Janet Baker is English. (T)
+4 P1) Janet Baker is a soprano. (T)
+P2) All sopranos are English. (F)
+C) Janet Baker is English. (T)
+5 P1) Janet Baker is a soprano. (T)
+P2) All sopranos are Italians. (F)
+C) Janet Baker is an Italian. (F)
+And here are some invalid arguments (we will consider further common
+invalid argument-types in Chapter 4 in the section 'formal fallacies'):
+Logic: deductive validity
+54
+6 P1) Janet Baker is a soprano. (T)
+P2) Janet Baker is a musician. (T)
+C) Janet Baker is an Italian. (F)
+7 P1) Janet Baker is a woman. (T)
+P2) All baritones are women. (F)
+C) Janet Baker is a baritone. (F)
+8 P1) Janet Baker is a singer. (T)
+P2) All sopranos are singers. (T)
+C) Janet Baker is a soprano. (T)
+9 P1) Janet Baker is a baritone. (F)
+P2) All singers are baritones. (F)
+C) Janet Baker is a singer. (T)
+How to judge validity
+The way to determine whether or not an argument is valid is to ignore
+the actual truth-values of the premises and the actual truth-value of the
+conclusion (of course, if the conclusion is actually false, and the premises
+are all true, then the argument must be invalid. But normally when
+assessing arguments we do not know the truth-value of the conclusion,
+because the whole reason for considering the argument is that we want
+to find out the truth-value of the conclusion). The way to do it -- and this
+is what the definition of validity should lead you to expect -- is to reason
+as follows:
+Whether or not they are actually true, suppose or pretend that the
+premises were all true; then in that situation -- aside from how things
+actually are -- could the conclusion conceivably be false? If it could
+not be false, then the argument is valid. If it could be false, then the
+argument is invalid.
+The systematic study of validity is the concern of logic. Logicians
+are concerned to devise perfectly reliable procedures for detecting validity,
+or the lack of it, even in the case of extremely complex arguments such
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+55
+as those occurring in mathematical proofs. Since the validity of an argument
+is independent of the truth-values of its premises, logic has a unique
+status among the sciences; for other sciences are concerned to find out
+the truth-values of particular propositions about its characteristic subjectmatter.
+Ichthyology, for example, seeks to know which propositions about
+fish are true, and which false. The logician has no particular concern with
+fish, nor with the truth as regards anything else in particular. Logic has
+no concern with particular truths. The logician is concerned only with
+relations between propositions, not with their actual truth-values. These
+are the sorts of relations displayed between premises and conclusion in
+valid arguments such as 1--5.
+Further examples
+The examples so far of valid arguments have all been of the same
+type or form. Here are some further, still quite simple, types of valid
+arguments. The examples are all fictional. Their being fictional helps
+us to realise that the actual truth-values of premises and conclusions
+are usually irrelevant to determining whether or not arguments are
+valid:
+P1) No Zormons are ticklish.
+P2) Trozak is a Zormon.
+C) Trozak is not ticklish.
+P1) Either Trozak is on Mars, or he is on Venus.
+P2) Trozak is not on Mars.
+C) Trozak is on Venus.
+P1) It is not possible to visit Mars and Venus in the
+same day.
+C) If Trozak visited Mars today, then he did not visit Venus
+today.
+P1) If Ichnik is ticklish, then Zadon is ticklish.
+P2) If Trozak is ticklish, then Ichnik is ticklish.
+P3) Trozak is ticklish.
+C) Zadon is ticklish.
+Logic: deductive validity
+56
+P1) If Trozak is on Mars, he will visit Ichnik.
+P2) Trozak is on Mars.
+C) Trozak will visit Ichnik.
+P1) If Trozak ate all the biscuits, then the biscuit tin is empty.
+P2) The biscuit tin is not empty.
+C) Trozak did not eat all the biscuits.
+Conditional propositions
+This is a good point at which to distinguish arguments from a certain kind
+of statement, which both logicians and grammarians call the conditional.
+Conditionals are most characteristically expressed using the 'if--then' form
+of declarative sentence. For example:
+If it is raining, then it is cloudy.
+Another example is P1 of the last example of the preceding section
+of this chapter. Conditionals can also be expressed in other ways, however.
+In fact, all of the following statements express the very same proposition
+as the example just given; they represent exactly the same connection
+between rain and clouds:
+◗ It is raining only if it is cloudy.
+◗ Either it is cloudy, or it is not raining.
+◗ It is not raining unless it is cloudy.
+◗ If it is not cloudy, then it is not raining.
+◗ It is not raining if it is not cloudy.
+◗ It is cloudy if it is raining.
+◗ There is no rain without clouds.
+At first, it may not be obvious that each of these is equivalent to 'If
+it is raining, then it is cloudy'. So let us stop to consider the ones that
+people most often find puzzling.
+I. 'If not. . .then not. . .'. If it is raining then it is cloudy; there is no
+rain without clouds. Therefore, if it is not raining, then it is not cloudy.
+So if we have 'If P then Q', we also have 'If not-Q then not-P'. But we
+can also go the other way, from 'If not-Q then not-P' to 'If P then Q'.
+You can see this by thinking about the rain example, but take another.
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+57
+The detective says 'If there is no mud on Smith's shoes, then Smith
+is not the murderer'. The detective is not saying that if there is mud
+on Smith's shoes, then Smith is the murderer. What he is saying is that
+if Smith is the murderer, then there is mud on his shoes. So saying 'If
+not-Q then not-P' is equivalent to saying 'If P then Q'.
+II. 'Either--or'. Usually, when two statements are joined by 'either--or',
+or just by 'or', to form a compound statement, the compound is equivalent
+to a statement using 'if--then', and vice versa. But to pass from the
+version using 'or' to the version using 'if--then', or vice versa, we have
+to insert the word 'not'. For example, the following pairs of statements
+are equivalent:3
+Rangers will win the league or Celtic will win the league.
+If Rangers do not win the league then Celtic will win the league.
+Either Jane will practice diligently or she will fail her exam.
+If Jane does not practice diligently then she will fail her exam.
+III. 'Only if'. This one is trickier. It should be clear that the following
+are equivalent, in the sense that they state the same relationship between
+rain and clouds:
+◗ It is raining only if it is cloudy.
+◗ If it is raining then it is cloudy.
+In the first, the word 'if' precedes the bit about clouds rather than the bit
+about the rain. It says: 'It is raining only on condition that it is cloudy.'
+Thus if it is raining, then that condition must be fulfilled -- so it must be
+Logic: deductive validity
+58
+3 A complication is that the word 'or' is used in either of two ways, known as the 'inclusive'
+and 'exclusive' sense. In the inclusive sense, 'P or Q' means that either P is true, or
+Q is true, or they are both true; so the compound sentence is false only if both P and Q
+are false. This is the sense intended if one says something like 'Real Madrid will lose if
+either Beckham receives a red card or Carlos receives a red card'. In the exclusive sense,
+'P or Q' means that either P is true or Q is true, but not both. This is the sense normally
+intended if one says something like 'Either you go to bed now or I will not read you a
+story' (the child would rightly feel cheated if he or she goes to bed immediately but doesn't
+get a story). A conditional statement 'If P then Q' is equivalent only to 'Either not-P
+or Q' only in the inclusive sense of 'or'. Where it is clear that the exclusive sense is intended,
+the reconstructed argument should contain conditionals running in both directions.
+A sentence such as 'Either the murder took place here or there was an accident here',
+intended in the exclusive sense, would be represented as 'If no accident took place here
+then the murder took place here' and 'If an accident took place here then the murder did
+not take place here'.
+cloudy. Note that it would be false to put it the other way round; it would
+be false to say: 'It is cloudy only if it is raining.' For the very same reason,
+it would false to say: 'If it is cloudy, then it is raining.' What makes these
+false is that sometimes it is cloudy but not raining.
+Take another, more real-life sort of example. Someone says: 'Jane
+is coming to the party only if Joe is.' Suppose that's true. Then if Jane is
+coming to the party, then Joe is coming to the party also. Note further
+that someone who says 'Jane is coming to the party only if Joe is' is not
+committed to 'If Joe is coming to the party then Jane is coming to the
+party'. Perhaps Jane won't come to the party without Joe being there,
+but might not come even if Joe does.
+We can express this last point by saying that 'P only if Q' makes the
+same assertion as 'If P then Q', but does not logically commit one to
+'If Q then P'. What makes this difficult to appreciate is that in some cases
+'P only if Q' implicates 'If Q then P' in the sense explained in Chapter 1
+(pp. 9--10). For example, suppose a parent says: 'You'll get ice cream only
+if you finish your peas.' This tells the child that if he does not finish his
+peas he won't get ice cream. And unless the parent is being mean, the
+child rightly assumes that if he eats his peas, he will get ice cream. Still,
+the parent's announcement does not actually assert 'If you finish your
+peas, you'll get ice cream'. We know this because if it did, then we would
+have to say that to assert 'It is raining only if it is cloudy' is also to assert
+'If it is cloudy then it is raining', which it certainly is not. The reason that
+things seem otherwise in the ice-cream case is that the parent's announcement,
+though it does not assert that the child will get ice cream if he eats
+his peas, implicates it.
+Finally, care should be taken not to confuse 'only if' with another
+device, 'if and only if'. To say 'P if and only if Q' is to say 'P if Q' and
+'P only if Q'. 'P if Q' means the same as 'If Q then P'. According to what
+we have said about 'only if', 'P only if Q' means the same as 'If P then
+Q'. Therefore: 'P if and only if Q' means the same as 'If P then Q, and
+if Q then P'. It means 'Either both P and Q, or neither'. So, for example,
+'It is raining if and only if it is cloudy' is false. On the other hand, if we
+wanted to say that Jane will not come to the party without Joe, but will
+definitely come if he does come, we could say 'Jane will come to the party
+if and only if Joe comes to the party'.
+IV. 'Unless'. Begin with these, each of which, again, states the same relationship
+between rain and clouds:
+◗ It is not raining unless it is cloudy.
+◗ If it is raining then it is cloudy.
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+59
+'Unless' is confusing in many of the same ways that 'only if' is confusing.
+For example, someone says 'That plant will grow well unless it
+gets whitefly'. Are they saying 'If the plant doesn't get whitefly it will
+grow well', or 'If the plant gets whitefly it will not grow well'? Look again
+at the example about rain and clouds. What it tells us is that 'not-P unless
+Q' is equivalent to 'If P then Q'. The transition from the 'unless' form to
+the 'if--then' form can be represented as follows. Begin with 'unless':
+Not-P unless Q. (It is not raining unless it is cloudy.)
+Replace 'unless' with 'if not':
+Not-P if not-Q. (It is not raining if it is not cloudy.)
+This is clearly just another way of saying:
+If not-Q then not-P. (If it is not cloudy then it is not raining.)
+But according to what we said above (under I), this is equivalent to:
+If P then Q. (If it is raining then it is cloudy.)
+In other words, the trick for dealing with 'unless' is to think of it as
+meaning 'if not': 'P unless Q' means 'P if not Q', which is the same as
+'If not-Q then P'. Therefore, the statement 'That plant will grow well
+unless it gets whitefly' means 'If that plant doesn't get whitefly then it
+will grow well'. It does not mean 'If that plant gets whitefly then it will
+not grow well'. Similarly, 'You will fail unless you study' means 'If you
+don't study then you will fail', but not 'If you study, then you will not
+fail'. On the other hand, 'You will not fail unless you don't study' means
+'If you do study then you will not fail'.
+In general, a conditional is a compound proposition consisting of two
+parts, each of which is itself a proposition, where these two parts are
+joined by some connecting words (they are called 'logical connectives')
+such as 'if--then', 'either--or', 'unless', or 'only--if', or something similar.
+Sometimes the presence of two whole propositions is somewhat concealed,
+as in the last example about rain and clouds. However they are joined,
+what a conditional says is that the truth of one proposition ensures that
+of another. In formal logic this relation is represented by a single device,
+usually an arrow:
+It is raining → It is cloudy.
+P → Q.
+Logic: deductive validity
+60
+The one from which the arrow points is called the antecedent; the one
+to which the arrow points is called the consequent, for obvious reasons.
+We will use this terminology a lot, so you should memorise it.
+Now, here is a tricky and important point. In one way or another,
+the examples on p. 57 express the very same conditional proposition about
+rain and clouds. They express the same relation between rain and clouds.
+Thus the antecedent and consequent in all those examples is the same --
+in all of them, the logical antecedent is the proposition that it is raining,
+and the logical consequent is the proposition that it is cloudy. In this
+sense, the fact that one proposition is the antecedent and another the
+consequent of a conditional statement is a matter of the logic of the statements.
+It is not a matter of the grammar of the sentences. It does not
+matter in what order, in the whole sentence, the two smaller sentences
+occur; what matters is the logical relationship asserted by the sentence.
+You can see this from the fact that in the sentences in the box the bit
+about rain, sometimes occurs before and sometimes after the bit about
+clouds.
+Our example of a conditional is a true statement. Some conditionals
+are false, such as 'If it is cloudy, then it is raining' (since, sometimes, it
+is cloudy but it is not raining). A conditional is said to be true or false,
+rather than valid or invalid. For a conditional is not itself an argument.
+A conditional is one proposition that comprises two propositions as parts,
+joined by 'if--then' or a similar device. An argument cannot be just one
+proposition. It needs at least two.
+The following, however, would be an argument:
+It is raining. Therefore, it is cloudy.
+This is not a conditional, but an argument composed of two propositions.
+Moreover, this argument actually asserts that it is raining, and also that
+it is cloudy. A person giving it would actually be asserting those things.
+Not so for the corresponding conditional: to say 'If it is raining then it
+is cloudy' is not itself to assert that it is raining, or that it is cloudy.
+People sometimes make a mistake on this point; we sometimes witness
+conversations like this:
+Mary: If Edna gets drunk, then her graduation party will be a
+mess.
+Jane: Why do you say Edna's going to get drunk? You're always
+so unfair to her.
+Mary: I didn't say Edna is going to get drunk, I said if Edna gets
+drunk . . .
+Jane: Well, it's the same thing!
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+61
+Mary: No it isn't!
+Jane: Don't try to get out of it! You always think the worst of
+Edna, and you're always trying to take back what you say!
+What Jane seems not to understand is that a conditional does not
+assert either its antecedent or its consequent. An argument asserts its
+premises and its conclusion, but Mary is not arguing that the party
+is going to be a mess; she is only saying that it will be if Edna gets
+drunk (presumably because she thinks Edna misbehaves when she drinks
+too much). Strictly speaking, she is not even saying that Edna is likely
+to get drunk. Of course, she would not have brought the whole thing up
+if she did not think there was some danger of Edna's getting drunk.
+The grain of truth in Jane's reaction is that the assertion of a conditional
+often implicates that there is some probability that the antecedent of the
+conditional is or will be true (on conversational implicature see
+Chapter 1, pp. 9--10). Even so, Mary might well think this probability
+to be less than fifty--fifty, and she did not say that Edna's going to get
+drunk.
+Finally, it is important to recognise that many arguments have conditional
+conclusions -- that is, conclusions which are themselves conditionals.
+For example:
+P1) If Labour does not change its platform, it will not attract new
+supporters.
+P2) If Labour does not attract new supporters, it will lose the next
+election.
+C) If Labour does not change its platform, then it will lose
+the next election.
+Here both premises as well as the conclusion are conditionals. This particular
+pattern is very common, and is called a 'chain' argument. A chain
+of conditionals is set up, like a row of dominoes. What the argument is
+saying is that if the antecedent of P1 comes true, then the consequent of
+P2 is true. Chain arguments can have any number of links. One of the
+'further examples' earlier in this chapter (p. 56) involved a chain.
+Deductive soundness
+Normally, you assess an argument because you wonder whether or not
+the conclusion is true. You want to know whether the arguer has given
+you a reason for thinking that the conclusion is true. If you find that the
+Logic: deductive validity
+62
+argument is invalid, then you know that even if the premises are true,
+the conclusion could be false. Therefore, the reasons given by the arguer
+-- the premises -- do not suffice to establish the conclusion, even if they
+are true. But suppose you find that the argument is valid. Then there are
+two possibilities:
+(A) One or more of the premises are (actually) false.
+(B) All of the premises are (actually) true.
+Now, as illustrated by examples 2 and 5 on p. 54, knowing that the argument
+is valid is not enough to show you that the conclusion is true. In
+order to determine that, you need a further step: you must determine the
+truth-values of the premises. You might already know them. But if you
+don't, then of course, logic is no help. If one of the premises is that the
+octopus is a fish, then unless you know already, you have to consult a
+book or ask an ichthyologist. Suppose now that you have done this, and
+what you have is a case of (A), i.e. one (or more) of the premises is false.
+In that case, you can draw no conclusion as to the truth-value of the
+conclusion (as illustrated by arguments 4 and 5 on p. 54, a valid argument
+with one or more false premises may have either a true or a false
+conclusion). But now suppose you find the argument to be a case of (B)
+-- that is, you have found it to be a valid argument with true premises.
+Eureka! For according to the definition of validity, a valid argument with
+true premises cannot have a false conclusion. So the conclusion must be
+true. The argument has accomplished its purpose; it has demonstrated its
+conclusion to be true. We call this a deductively sound argument.
+Argument 1 above about Janet Baker, for example, is a deductively sound
+argument:
+To say that an argument is deductively sound is to say: The
+argument is valid, and all its premises are (actually) true.
+This reveals the importance of the concept of validity. Given the definition
+of validity, it follows from the definition of deductive soundness that
+the conclusion of a deductively sound argument must be true. There
+cannot be a deductively sound argument with a false conclusion.
+An argument that is not deductively sound -- one which has one or
+more false premises, or is invalid, or both -- is said to be deductively
+unsound. Deductive soundness, like validity, pertains to whole arguments,
+and not to single propositions.
+It is important to recognise what follows if you happen to know that
+the conclusion of an argument is not true. Suppose someone gives you
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+63
+an argument, the conclusion of which is that there are platypuses at the
+local zoo. And suppose you know that this is not true. You know that
+the local zoo has no platypuses. Therefore, you know that this argument
+is not deductively sound. You should make it clear to yourself why this
+is so; check the definitions again if this is not clear.
+If you do know that there are no platypuses at the zoo, then you
+know it is possible to give a deductively sound argument for that conclusion.
+But there cannot be deductively sound arguments on both sides
+of the issue. For deductively sound arguments have true conclusions. If
+there were deductively sound arguments on both sides of this issue,
+it would follow that there are platypuses at the zoo, and also that there
+are not, which is impossible. This is important to recognise, because
+frequently we do say that there can be 'good' arguments on both sides
+of a given issue (especially a controversial one); we say this, perhaps, out
+of a wish to show respect for different opinions, or simply to express our
+own indecision over the issue. But in saying this, we cannot mean that
+there are deductively sound arguments on both sides of an issue. Later,
+we will explain in exactly what sense there can be 'good' arguments on
+both sides of an issue (for, to be sure, there can be).
+If we know that the conclusion of an argument is false, then we
+know that the argument is deductively unsound. What follows from
+that? Look at the definition of deductive soundness. If the argument is
+deductively unsound, it follows that either the argument has (at least)
+one false premise, or the argument is invalid (or perhaps both -- perhaps
+it is invalid and it has one or more false premises). Suppose then that
+you determine the argument to be valid. Then you know that at least
+one premise must be false. On the other hand, suppose that you find
+that the argument is invalid. What can you conclude about the truthvalues
+of the premises? Nothing! For you know that an invalid argument
+with a false conclusion may have either true premises or false premises.
+Similarly, if you perhaps do not know (for you are not certain),
+but you do believe, or hope, that the conclusion of a given argument is
+false, then you must run through the same procedure. Suppose you
+merely hope that there are no platypuses at the zoo, because you fear
+they would not be happy there (this might be reasonable; platypuses
+are extremely shy, so being put on display might stress them out).
+Then you must hope that the argument is deductively unsound, in which
+case you must hope that either the argument is invalid, or it has a
+false premise. This is the sort of thing you might do if you were a courtroom
+barrister, hoping to refute the opposing side's arguments. You
+might want to show that the prosecution's argument for your client's
+guilt is unsound.
+Logic: deductive validity
+64
+The connection to formal logic
+Occasionally in discussing logical points we have used 'dummy' letters to
+stand in place of sentences. For example, we said that 'P unless Q' is equivalent
+to 'If not-Q, then P'. The letters 'P' and 'Q' were used to stand in
+place of arbitrary declarative sentences like 'It is raining' or 'The cat is on
+the mat'. We can do this because the point we wish to make does not
+depend on what particular sentences we put for 'P' and 'Q'. The point concerns
+only the meaning or logical properties of such expressions as 'unless'
+and 'if--then', and it would hold for any sentences put for 'P' and 'Q'.
+Look now at the set of valid arguments about Janet Baker on
+p. 54. As we noted, they are all of the same form. We can display this
+form in the following way:
+P1) x is an F.
+P2) All F are G.
+C) x is a G.
+This is one example of what is known as a valid argument-form, sometimes
+called a valid argument schema. This means that whatever name
+we put for 'x' -- whether 'Janet Baker', 'Mt. Fuji' or 'Vienna' -- and whatever
+general terms we put for 'F' and 'G' -- whether 'soprano', 'volcano'
+or 'capital city' -- the resulting argument will be valid (so long as we
+always put the same name or term for the same letter). The validity of
+the argument is independent of the particular meanings of 'Janet Baker',
+'soprano', and so on. More exactly, we say that for whatever grammatically
+suitable expressions are put for 'x', 'F' and 'G', and whatever those
+expressions are taken to mean, the result will never have true premises
+and a false conclusion. Interestingly, you can readily see that this is so:
+you can easily see that whatever 'x' is, and whatever is taken for 'F' and
+'G', the argument-form is valid. In advance of studying formal logic, we
+already have a good eye for formal validity.
+Here is another valid form:
+P1) If P then Q.
+P2) P.
+C) Q.
+An instance of this form is given on p. 56, the third example about Trozak:
+'If Trozak is on Mars, then he will visit Ichnik; Trozak is on Mars;
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+65
+therefore Trozak will visit Ichnik.' The difference between this and the
+previous example is that in this one, the letters 'P' and 'Q' are placeholders
+for whole sentences, not for names or general terms. Note that
+we used 'F' and 'G' for general terms, and 'P' and 'Q' for sentences (if
+more were needed, we would use 'H', 'I' and so on for general terms, 'R',
+'S' and so on for sentences). We used lower-case letters in place of names.
+This is the usual practice in logic, but there is no need for a strict rule in
+this context.
+This is typical of what is known as formal logic: claims about logical
+relationships are made most efficiently by abstracting from the particular
+subject-matter we talk about and concentrating on the logical forms of the
+arguments. However, logical forms are not completely without content or
+meaning. In the first example, what we are really focussing on is the
+meaning of the word 'All'; in the second, we are focussing on the meaning
+of the expression 'if--then'. We don't put in dummy letters for those.
+Accordingly, these words are often known as 'logical words' or 'logical
+particles', and formal logic may appropriately be said to concern itself
+with those. Other logical particles in English include 'or', 'and', 'unless',
+'not', 'every', 'some', 'each', 'there is' and 'there are', 'no' (in its use as
+a quantifier), and 'is' (in the sense of 'is the very same thing as').
+Representing the logical form of an argument by means of dummy
+letters can be very useful for showing that an argument is invalid. For
+an argument-form is invalid if it has what we call an 'instance' with true
+premises and a false conclusion. Thus consider invalid argument number
+7 on p. 55:
+P1) Janet Baker is a woman. (T)
+P2) All baritones are women. (F)
+C) Janet Baker is a baritone. (F)
+We can represent its logical form as the following schema:
+P1) x is an F.
+P2) All G are F.
+C) x is a G.
+Here is an instance of this schema -- that is, an argument with the
+same logical form -- that has true premises and a false conclusion, thereby
+proving that the logical form of the original argument is invalid, and
+therefore that the original argument is itself invalid. We put 'Luciano
+Pavarotti' for 'x', 'human' for 'F' and 'women' for 'G':
+Logic: deductive validity
+66
+P1) Luciano Pavarotti is human. (T)
+P2) All women are human. (T)
+C) Luciano Pavarotti is a woman. (F)
+This technique is called 'refutation by counterexample'; we will return to
+it in Chapter 6.
+There are sophisticated technical procedures for exploring formal logical
+relationships in a systematic, detailed way. For the most part, it is
+necessary to invent artificial languages for this purpose employing special
+symbols in place of the logical particles of English such as the '→' sign
+for the conditional 'if--then' we mentioned earlier. The reason is that
+logical relationships in a 'natural' language such as English tend to be too
+cumbersome and poorly defined to represent clearly and systematically
+(look at all the different ways of representing the conditional, when really
+only one way is needed!). The logical forms of arguments in English are
+not always as clear as they are in our examples. By contrast, the validity
+of arguments expressed in symbolic notation is determined by precise
+rules, and the forms of the arguments are always exactly determined.
+Courses on 'formal logic' -- otherwise known as 'mathematical logic' or
+'symbolic logic' -- are taught in Philosophy, Mathematics, Linguistics and
+Computer Science. In critical thinking we are doing what you might call
+'practical logic'. We want to learn to identify the reasoning in commonly
+encountered attempts to persuade us, and to assess it as good or bad. For
+this, we need the concept of validity, but we do not need artificial symbols
+or elaborate technical procedures for detecting validity. The reason is that
+the logic of the vast majority of arguments in everyday life is rarely of
+any great complexity. Once we know exactly what the argument is,
+whether or not it is valid can almost always be seen by applying the definition
+given above. Most of the work goes into the reconstruction. And
+as we have seen -- and will see in more detail later -- we cannot profitably
+reconstruct an argument without knowing what makes a good argument,
+hence not without grasping the concept of validity.
+Nevertheless, it will sometimes be useful to use 'dummy' letters as
+we have already done, to draw attention to the forms of arguments and
+statements where appropriate.
+Argument trees
+An argument tree is a device that can be used for representing arguments
+in the form of a diagram. They are helpful when we are reconstructing
+arguments, particularly complex ones, because they provide a means of
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+67
+showing the ways in which the different parts of an argument are related
+to each other. They show how the premises support the conclusion. Constructing
+argument trees is a very valuable tool and you will find it helpful
+to use them in your own analyses of complex real-world arguments.
+Note: the process of constructing an argument tree is especially useful
+before you have supplied missing premises, and before you have settled
+upon a reconstruction of the argument in standard form. In fact, it can
+be useful to construct an argument tree at almost any stage in the reconstruction,
+including when the reconstruction is complete, simply as way
+illustrating the structure of the argument, of making it clear to oneself
+and to others.
+To illustrate, we stick to arguments already in standard form.
+Consider the following simple arguments:
+A P1) Susan is a marathon runner.
+P2) Susan eats well and sleeps well.
+C) Susan is healthy.
+B P1) Willy is in the music club.
+P2) No member of the music club plays jazz.
+C) Willy does not play jazz.
+These arguments both infer a conclusion from two premises, but there is
+an important difference.
+In argument A, each premise supports the conclusion individually.
+That is, P1 is cited as a reason for C, and P2 is cited as another reason for
+C. One could argue from P1 alone to C; one could also argue from P2
+alone to C. By contrast, in argument B, neither premise supports C by
+itself. Neither P1 nor P2 would, by itself, be a reason to accept C. Rather,
+they work together to support C. This is always the case when one premise
+is a conditional and another is the antecedent of that same conditional.
+Argument A is represented as in Figure 2.1 and argument B is
+represented as in Figure 2.2.
+Now these examples are very simple. Argument trees are especially
+helpful when used to represent more complex arguments with intermediate
+conclusions. For example:
+P1) Consumption is increasing.
+P2) The Pound is weakening against other currencies.
+C1) Inflation will increase.
+Logic: deductive validity
+68
+P3) Whenever inflation increases, mortgage rates rise.
+C2) Mortgage rates will rise.
+P4) Whenever mortgage rates rise, the building trade suffers.
+C3) The building trade will suffer.
+The correct argument tree for this is shown in Figure 2.3 (see over). Note
+that the first sub-argument is not valid as it stands. P1 and P2 may be
+said to support C1, but only by virtue of a relation that is not explicitly
+stated between consumption rates, the relative strength of currencies and
+inflation. Thus the argument does not explicitly include what later in the
+book we will call its 'connecting' premise or premises. The most plausible
+connecting premise would be of the form, 'If P1 and P2, then C1'. We
+had the same sort of situation in the argument about Susan the marathon
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+69
+P1 P2
+C
+Figure 2.1 Two premises supporting a conclusion individually
+P1 P2
+C
+Figure 2.2 Two premises supporting a conclusion jointly
+Logic: deductive validity
+70
+P1 P2
+C1 P3
+C2
+C3
+P4
+Figure 2.3 Extended argument
+P1 P2 P3
+C
+Figure 2.4 Three premises supporting an conclusion jointly
+runner. The connecting premise was left implicit. A plausible connecting
+premise, in this case, might be something like:
+P3) No marathon runner who eats and sleeps well is not healthy.
+If we do it this way, then the three premises work together to support
+the conclusion; an instance of this generalisation would be: 'If P1 and P2,
+then Susan is healthy.' So the argument would be represented as shown
+in Figure 2.4.
+CHAPTER SUMMARY
+The aim of argument-reconstruction is to clarify, and make fully
+explicit, the argument intended by an arguer. We do this by putting
+the argument into standard form. If our main concern is whether
+or not the conclusion of the argument is true, then our reconstruction
+should be guided by the principle of charity: we should
+aim for the best possible reconstruction of the argument.
+In order to do this, we need precise concepts in terms of which
+to assess arguments. We need, to begin with, the concepts of truth,
+deductive validity, and deductive soundness. A deductively
+valid argument (a valid argument for short) is one whose premises
+could not possibly be true without the conclusion being true also.
+A deductively sound argument is a valid argument with true
+premises. It follows that a deductively sound argument must have
+a true conclusion.
+The conclusion of one argument may serve as a premise for
+another. We call such a conclusion an intermediate conclusion
+for an extended argument.
+Individual propositions can be true or false, but not valid or
+invalid. Arguments can be valid or invalid, but not true or false.
+Conditional propositions are not arguments, but single propositions:
+a conditional proposition is a single proposition made up of
+two propositions, the antecedent and consequent. Typically the
+antecedent and consequent of a conditional proposition are joined
+by 'if--then', but many other devices can do the same job. The crucial
+thing is the logical relationship between them.
+Arguments do stand in a certain relationship to conditional
+propositions. If the argument is valid, then this conditional proposition
+is true: if the argument's premises are true, then its conclusion
+is true.
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+71
+Chapter summary
+It is sometimes useful to employ 'dummy' letters in place of
+sentences, names or general terms in order to display the logical
+form of an argument; this is the first step towards the study of
+formal logic. From the formal point of view, the definition of validity
+is: an argument is valid if (and only if) its logical form is valid. A
+logical form is valid if (and only if) there is no instance of that form
+with true premises and a false conclusion (not even if we are allowed
+to change the meanings of the non-logical expressions contained in
+an instance). For our purposes the most useful implication of this
+is that if a given argument has the same form as another argument
+with the same form, the given argument is invalid. Showing
+invalidity in this way is called refutation by counterexample.
+EXERCISES
+1 Study the section that describes the principle of charity. Then,
+without looking at the section again, and in your own words, write a
+short essay of about 250 words that explains the principle, and why it
+should be observed.
+2 Suppose that someone says: 'The purpose of argument is to defeat the
+opponent.' Write a short essay (about 250 words) commenting on this.
+3 Again, without consulting the book, and in your own words, explain
+the purpose of argument-reconstruction. Try to invoke some of the concepts
+you have learned in this chapter, such as validity.
+4 Suppose that Mr Smith argues as follows:
+Mr Jones argues that the unemployment rate will rise this year.
+However, as we have explained, Mr Jones' argument is clearly
+invalid. Furthermore, we have shown that the premises of the
+argument are false. Therefore, Mr Jones is wrong. The
+unemployment rate will not rise this year.
+Criticise Mr Smith's argument.
+5 Suppose that Bob says:
+Sarah is so arrogant. She's entitled to her opinions, of course.
+I don't mind her saying that landlords have an ancient right to
+prevent walkers' access to their property. That's her opinion. But
+she has to say it's true. I hate that. She always thinks she's right.
+She always thinks her opinion is the truth.
+Logic: deductive validity
+72 Exercises
+Does Bob have a point, or is he confused? Explain your answer an essay
+of about 150 words.
+6 For each argument, decide whether or not it is deductively valid. If
+it is not valid, briefly explain why. If it seems useful, describe a possible
+situation in which the premises are true, but the conclusion false.
+Example
+P1) Every Roman emperor before Constantine was a pagan.
+P2) Julian was a Roman emperor.
+C) Julian was a pagan.
+✎ Invalid. P2 says that Julian was a Roman emperor, but not
+that he ruled before Constantine. It would be possible for
+the premises to be true but the conclusion false, then, if
+Julian were a non-pagan Roman emperor after Constantine.
+a P1) Either Jane is in the kitchen, or Mary is in the kitchen.
+P2) Jane is not in the kitchen.
+C) Mary is in the kitchen.
+b P1) Either inflation will increase, or personal debt will increase.
+P2) If the central bank does not increase interest rates, inflation
+will not increase.
+P3) The central bank will not increase interest rates.
+C) Personal debt will increase.
+c P1) If the guerrillas have left the area, then there is traffic on the
+roads.
+P2) There is no traffic on the roads.
+C) The guerrillas have not left the area.
+d P1) No member of the Green Party voted for the tax cut.
+P2) Mr Jacobs did not vote for the tax cut.
+C) Mr Jacobs is a member of the Green Party.
+e P1) No member of the Green Party voted for the tax cut.
+P2) Mr Jacobs voted for the tax cut.
+C) Mr Jacobs is not a member of the Green Party.
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+73
+Exercises
+f P1) Every member of the Conservative Party voted for the tax cut.
+P2) Mr Winterbottom voted for the tax cut.
+C) Mr Winterbottom is a member of the Conservative
+Party.
+g P1) Some members of the Liberal Party voted for the tax cut.
+P2) Some who voted for the tax cut voted for new defence
+spending.
+C) Some members of the Liberal Party voted for new
+defence spending.
+h P1) If abortion is morally permissible, then infanticide is morally
+permissible.
+C) Abortion is not morally permissible.
+i P1) If abortion is not murder, then infanticide is not murder.
+P2) If infanticide is not murder, then killing innocent children is not
+murder.
+P3) Killing innocent children is murder.
+C) Abortion is murder.
+j P1) If each person has the right to determine what happens to his
+or her own body, then suicide should be legal.
+P2) Suicide should not be legal.
+C) No person has the right to determine what happens to
+his or her own body.
+k P1) Every regime is either corrupt or inefficient.
+P2) The Soviet regime was inefficient.
+C) The Soviet regime was not corrupt.
+l P1) If there is no blown resistor, then there is failed connection.
+P2) There is a blown resistor.
+C) There is no failed connection.
+m P1) Constantine ruled Rome before Constantius.
+P2) Constantius ruled Rome before Julian.
+C) Constantine ruled Rome before Julian.
+Logic: deductive validity
+74 Exercises
+n P1) Only democracies are just political systems.
+P2) Rome's political system was unjust.
+C) Rome's political system was not a democracy.
+o P1) The only just political systems are democracies.
+P2) Rome's political system was unjust.
+C) Rome's political system was not a democracy.
+p P1) Unless some historians have told lies, there were miracles
+during the first century.
+P2) There were no miracles during the first century.
+C) Some historians have told lies.
+q P1) Analysis has shown that Mr Cleever's accident was caused by
+faulty brakes, not by drunk driving.
+P2) If Mr Cleever was not drunk at the time of the accident, then
+he should be acquitted of drunk driving.
+C) Mr Cleever should be acquitted of drunk driving.
+r P1) If Constantius' professed Christianity was genuine, then history
+has represented him unfairly.
+P2) There is no convincing evidence that Constantius' professed
+Christianity was not genuine.
+C) History has represented Constantius unfairly.
+s P1) If Germanicus had not died at the German front, he would
+have become emperor.
+P2) If Germanicus had become emperor, then Tiberius would not
+have become emperor.
+P3) If Tiberius had not become emperor, then Caligula would not
+have become emperor.
+P4) If Caligula had not become emperor, then he would not have
+been murdered.
+P5) If Caligula had not been murdered, then Claudius would not
+have become emperor.
+C) If Germanicus had not died at the German front, then
+Claudius would not have become emperor.
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+75
+Exercises
+t P1) If any Roman emperor was wise, then Marcus Aurelius was
+wise.
+P2) Augustus was a Roman emperor.
+P3) If Augustus was wise, then Marcus Aurelius was not wise.
+C) Marcus Aurelius was wise.
+u P1) If any Roman emperor was wise, then Marcus Aurelius was
+wise.
+P2) Augustus was a Roman emperor.
+P3) If Augustus was wise, then Marcus Aurelius was not wise.
+C) Augustus was not wise.
+v P1) If John or Susan are late, then Mary will be disappointed.
+P2) John is late.
+P3) Susan is late.
+C) Mary will be disappointed.
+w P1) If John and Susan are late, then Mary will be disappointed.
+P2) John is late.
+C) Mary will be disappointed.
+x P1) If John and Susan are late, then Mary will be disappointed.
+P2) John is late.
+P3) Susan is not late.
+C) Mary will not be disappointed.
+y P1) If John and Susan are married, then Mary will be disappointed.
+P2) John is married.
+P3) Susan is married.
+C) Mary will be disappointed.
+z P1) If the Prime Minister does what the opinion polls say the
+people want, then he is cowardly.
+P2) If the Prime Minister does not do what the opinion polls say
+the people want, then he is arrogant.
+C) If the Prime Minister is not arrogant, then he is
+cowardly.
+Logic: deductive validity
+76 Exercises
+7 Which of the following statements are true, and which false?
+a It is impossible for all the premises of a valid argument to be false.
+b It is possible for the conclusion of a valid argument to be false.
+c It is possible for a deductively sound argument to have a false conclusion.
+d A valid argument cannot have all true premises and a false conclusion.
+e A valid argument cannot have all false premises and a true conclusion.
+f It is impossible for all the premises of a valid argument to be true,
+if the conclusion is false.
+g A valid argument must have true premises.
+h If the conclusion of a valid argument is false, then all the premises
+must be false.
+i If an argument has more than one premise, then if one of the premises
+is true, then the others must also be true.
+j If a valid argument is sound, then one of its premises must be false.
+k A sound argument cannot have a false premise.
+l An argument cannot be both valid and sound.
+m If an argument has true premises and a true conclusion, then it is
+valid.
+n If an argument does not have all true premises and a false conclusion,
+then it is valid.
+o An argument may have all true premises and a false conclusion.
+p If a valid argument has a false conclusion, then all its premises
+must be false.
+q If a valid argument has a false conclusion, the at least one of its
+premises must be false.
+8 In Exercise 7, a--f, various scenarios are said to be possible or impossible.
+In cases where the thing is possible, give an example.
+9 Rewrite the following sentences using 'if--then' and 'not', in order to
+express the same relation between propositions. Sometimes you may
+have to remove, rather than insert, a 'not'.
+a Either Trajan was great or Hadrian was great.
+b Dogs are loyal to their masters unless they are mistreated.
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+77
+Exercises
+c Unless there were no benevolent emperors, Marcus Aurelius was a
+benevolent emperor.
+d You will not pass unless you study.
+e My dog will get the ball unless your dog gets the ball.
+f You will be admitted only if you are wearing a tie.
+g You will not be admitted if you are not wearing a tie.
+h My dog barks only if your dog barks.
+i You will pass only if you do not drink every night.
+j You will pass only if you study.
+k You will only pass if you study.
+l The champion will win only if he fights aggressively.
+m Either your dog will get the ball or mine will, unless the ball goes in
+the water.
+n Galerius and Maximin were not both admired in Rome.
+10 Can there be more than one deductively sound argument for the same
+conclusion? If so, give an example. If not, explain why not.
+11 Consider the following two sentences:
+Lee Harvey Oswald murdered John Kennedy.
+Lee Harvey Oswald did not murder John Kennedy.
+Suppose we have two arguments, one with the first as conclusion and the
+other with second as conclusion. Could both arguments be valid? Could
+both arguments be deductively sound? Why or why not?
+12 Using the 'dummy' letters 'P', 'Q', 'R' and so on to stand in for
+sentences such as 'Your dog barks' and 'Trajan was great', rewrite the
+sentences in Exercise 9. Then rewrite your answers in the same way,
+writing them next to the corresponding original sentence.
+Example
+a Either Trajan was great or Hadrian was great.
+✎ Either P or Q. If not-P, then Q.
+13 Using the 'dummy' letters 'P', 'Q' and 'R' and so on for whole
+sentences, 'F' and 'G' for general terms, and 'x' and 'y' for names, try to
+construct argument-forms corresponding to the following problems in
+Exercise 6: a, b, f--j, p--w.
+Logic: deductive validity
+78 Exercises
+Example
+P1) Only fools are drug-users.
+P2) Ross Lambeau is a drug-user.
+C) Ross Lambeau is a fool.
+✎ P1) Only F are G.
+P2) x is a G.
+C) x is an F.
+14 Draw tree-diagrams for the 'further examples', p. 56. Consider the
+diagrams for arguments with two premises. What do they have in
+common? Can you explain why?
+  
+Logic: deductive validity
+79
+Exercises
+Chapter 3
+Logic: inductive force
+Inductive force
+Consider this argument:
+P1) Fiona lives in Inverness.
+C) Fiona owns at least one item of woollen clothing.
+Is this argument valid? You might think so. Inverness is a pretty cold
+place. And wool is plentiful: Scotland has millions of sheep. So surely
+80
+* Inductive force 80
+Probability
+* 'All', 'most' and 'some' 90
+* Soft generalisations 91
+* Inductive soundness 92
+* Probability in the premises 92
+* Arguments with multiple probabilistic premises 93
+* Inductive force in extended arguments 96
+* Conditional probability in the conclusion 97
+* Evidence 98
+* Inductive inferences 101
+How representative is the sample?
+* A programme for assessment 105
+you may conclude that Fiona must have a woollen jumper or two. Nevertheless,
+the argument is clearly invalid: it would not be impossible for
+someone to live in Inverness, yet not have any woollen items of clothing.
+Indeed, there probably are people there without any (some people are
+allergic to wool, for example).
+We could make the argument valid by adding the premise, 'Everyone
+in Inverness owns at least one woollen item of clothing'. Thus:
+P1) Fiona lives in Inverness.
+P2) Everyone in Inverness owns at least one woollen item of
+clothing.
+C) Fiona owns at least one woollen item of clothing.
+But this argument, though valid, is probably not sound, since P2 is probably
+false. Yet the original argument is surely a good argument, in some
+sense. The truth of the premise would be a good reason for expecting the
+conclusion to be true; it would be surprising to find it was false. Certainly
+if you had to bet on whether or not the conclusion is true, then, given
+no relevant information except for P1, you would bet that it is true, not
+that it is false. It would be reasonable to infer the truth of C from P1,
+and unreasonable to infer its falsity.
+However, we must notice something very important about the inference
+from P1 to C. A logician would not be in a position to recognise the
+forcefulness of this argument as we have written it so far. For in order
+to recognise it, one has to know certain facts about Inverness -- the facts
+that make it different from, say, a hot place around which they grow
+cotton such as Cairo. Someone giving the argument is implicitly relying
+on a proposition that is similar to P2 in the argument given directly above,
+but that is much more likely to be true -- namely, that the vast majority
+of people in Inverness own some items of woollen clothing. Almost no
+one owns none. That is to say, the use of the quantifier 'everyone' would
+be inappropriate here, but use of the weaker quantifier 'almost everyone'
+is appropriate. Given what we know about Inverness, we can be almost
+completely certain that almost everyone in Inverness owns at least one
+woollen item of clothing. (Recall from Chapter 1 that expressions such
+as 'most', 'almost all' and 'few' are called 'quantifiers'.) We can represent
+the argument, then, as follows:
+P1) Fiona lives in Inverness.
+P2) Almost everyone in Inverness owns at least one item of
+woollen clothing.
+C) Fiona owns at least one woollen item of clothing.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+81
+This argument is still not deductively valid, since Fiona still might conceivably
+be one of those few who do not have any woollen clothing. Still,
+these premises, just by themselves, do provide a good reason for accepting
+the conclusion; the logician, knowing nothing about the matter except
+the truth of P1 and P2, could happily accept that if the premises are true,
+then, probably, so is C. We recognise this by calling such an argument
+inductively forceful (the word 'inductively' is meant to contrast with
+'deductively'), and inserting the word 'probably', in parentheses, before
+the conclusion:1
+P1) Fiona lives in Inverness.
+P2) Almost everyone in Inverness owns at least one item of
+woollen clothing.
+C) (Probably) Fiona owns at least one woollen item of
+clothing.
+The word 'probably', here, is not to be regarded as part of C. It is not,
+strictly speaking, part of the argument. What it is, rather, is an indication
+to the reader that the argument has been judged, by the person doing
+the reconstruction, to be inductively forceful. If we were to remove it
+from the above reconstruction, the inductive force of the argument, and
+its status as not being deductively valid, would be unaffected.
+Roughly, then, an inductively forceful argument is one that is not
+deductively valid -- the truth of the premises would not ensure the truth
+of the conclusion -- but whose premises provide good reason to expect the
+conclusion to be true rather than false. Before we characterise the concept
+of inductive force more accurately, however, it will be useful to look
+briefly at the more basic concept of probability.
+Probability
+We express the probability that a given proposition is true (or that a given
+event has occurred or will occur) on a numerical scale between 0 and 1,
+expressed either as a decimal or as a fraction. For example, the probability
+that a tossed coin will land heads up is 0.5 or 1/2. Perhaps surprisingly,
+Logic: inductive force
+82
+1 Inductive force is often called inductive strength, and sometimes inductive cogency
+or simply cogency. The term 'inductive validity' is used by some writers and might have
+been expected, but it is not usual. The reason is that if 'inductively valid' is used, then
+'valid' becomes ambiguous between the inductive and deductive variety, thus spoiling the
+entrenched and convenient practice of using 'valid' as short for 'deductively valid'.
+there are different ways in which to explain probability. We will briefly
+consider three: proportion, frequency and rational expectation.2
+First, proportion. Many arguments contain a premise that says
+something like 'Most X are Y' or '7/8 of Xs are Ys'. Such quantifiers as
+'most' and '7/8 of' indicate proportions, and are importantly related to
+probability. Suppose you want to know the probability that the card you
+have drawn from an ordinary, complete deck of playing cards is an ace.
+One way to do this would be to assume that this probability is equal to
+the proportion of aces in the deck to the total number of cards in the
+deck. Since this figure is 1/13 (there are four aces and fifty-two cards,
+and 4/52 = 1/13), you assume that probability that you'll draw an ace is
+1/13 (about 0.077).
+Now frequency. Suppose you want to know the probability that it is
+going to snow in December in London, when December is still several
+months away. One simple way to do this would be find out how frequently
+this has actually happened over the past, say, one hundred years. Suppose
+you find that, out of the past one hundred Decembers, it has snowed during
+fourteen of them. Then you might infer that the probability that it will
+snow in London this coming December is 14/100 (0.14).
+These strategies are extremely important in the general theory of
+probability and statistics, but they are not sufficiently general for our
+purposes. There seem to be cases for which neither proportion nor
+frequency will serve as a direct indicator of probability. For example,
+bookmakers sometimes give odds that a given politician will become the
+next leader of his or her party. Suppose they say that the odds of Mr X
+becoming the next leader of the Labour Party are 1:1 (i.e. the probability
+is 1/2). Estimates such as these are often perfectly reasonable. But clearly
+the bookmaker, in this case, is not basing the probability on the frequency
+with which Mr X has become leader of the Labour Party in the past; that
+frequency is zero! Probability-estimates of this kind are sometimes quite
+reasonable, but there is no immediate and simple recipe for basing them
+upon frequencies or proportions.3 In such cases, we cannot simply convert
+a proportion or a frequency into a probability.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+2 Another common basis for probability-estimates is the use of models. For example,
+if an engineer wants to estimate the probability that a new aeroplane design will be stable
+at very high speeds, he or she might build a real or computer model and test it under
+simulated conditions; if the model is stable under the simulated conditions, then the engineer
+might infer that the actual aeroplane is likely to be stable under actual conditions.
+3 This is not to say that such estimates cannot be based upon proportions or frequencies.
+In fact, they typically are: it is precisely the task of those whose profession is to
+estimate probabilities (in the insurance industry, for example) to base the estimates upon
+relevant proportions, frequencies and other data. More generally, to say that a degree of
+83
+Because of these complications, we shall take degree of rational
+expectation as our general concept of probability.4 A person's degree of
+rational expectation in a given proposition is the degree to which he or
+she is entitled to believe it, given the evidence he or she has. Besides the
+fact that this concept of probability is more widely applicable than others,
+it has the further advantage that it corresponds to the way that the word
+'probably' is typically used: when we say: 'That's probably true,' we typically
+mean that our total sum of evidence makes it reasonable to expect
+the proposition in question to be true.
+This can best be appreciated by thinking again of something like cards.
+Suppose George has a card face down on the table before him; he doesn't
+know what it is, but he has been correctly informed that it is red. Since
+George knows that clubs are black, he can be perfectly certain -- rationally
+completely certain -- that the card is not a club. So his degree of
+rational expectation that the card is not a club is 1 (equivalently: his degree
+of rational expectation that the card is a club is 0). Provided he knows
+that hearts and diamonds are the only red suits, his degree of rational
+expectation that the card is a heart is 1/2.
+Notice two things about this characterisation of probability in terms
+of rational expectation. First, it is clear that the basis for assigning degrees
+of rational expectation may consist in proportions. It is because George
+knows the relevant proportions that we can assign degrees of rational
+expectation in this case. In other cases, frequencies provide the basis for
+assigning degrees of rational expectation. In further cases, we may assign
+degrees of rational expectation without knowing either relevant proportions
+or relevant frequencies.
+Second, notice that when assigning degrees of rational expectation, we
+spoke of the degree to which one is entitled to believe something given suchand-
+such evidence. Since we are taking the degree of rational expectation
+as our concept of probability, what this means can be expressed by saying
+that our key concept is the concept of conditional probability. That is to
+say, what we are interested in is the probability that a proposition is true,
+Logic: inductive force
+84
+(Footnote 3 cont.) expectation is rational, it seems, is precisely to say that some such statistical
+facts are available in terms of which the expectation can be justified. However,
+such justifications often turn out to be extremely complex, and in many cases we seem to
+know that probability-estimates are well-founded even when we are unable to explain them
+adequately. Since degree of rational expectation is arguably the most inclusive or general
+characterisation of probability, our strategy here is to proceed without requiring that
+probability-claims always be justified in terms of statistics. The science of such justifications
+-- taught in courses in Statistics and Probability Theory -- is extremely interesting and of
+ever increasing importance.
+4 There are many terms in the existing literature for this; common ones include
+'epistemic probability' and 'rational credence'.
+given that, or on the assumption that, some given set of propositions is true.
+More exactly, this is the degree to which it would be reasonable to accept
+a certain proposition, given no other relevant information except that contained
+within a certain set of propositions. In George's case, his evidence is
+that the card is red (along with the fact that exactly half the red cards are
+hearts). So the conditional probability of the proposition the card is a heart,
+relative to the proposition the card is red, is 1/2.
+We can now say more precisely what an inductively forceful argument
+is:
+Let [P] stand for one or more premises, and let A stand for a
+conclusion. Suppose we have an argument:
+[P] . . .
+C) A
+To say that such an argument is inductively forceful is to say that
+the conditional probability of A relative to the set [P] is greater than
+one-half, but less than 1. (The degree of inductive force of an
+argument is the conditional probability of A relative to [P].)
+This is our 'official' explanation, but you may find it more helpful to
+think of inductive force along the lines of the following:
+To say that an argument is inductively forceful is to say: The
+argument is not deductively valid, but, if the premises are true (or
+were true), then, given no information about the subject-matter of the
+argument except that contained in the premises, it would be more
+reasonable to expect the conclusion to be true than it would
+to expect it to be false.
+Or we can say: relative to the information contained in the premises [P],
+the conclusion is more likely to be true than false. There are several
+further points to bear in mind as regards probability and inductive force.
+1 It is true that we do not always express probabilities as conditional
+probabilities. For example, if we simply pick a card at random from the
+deck, it seems we can say outright that the chance of its being an ace
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+85
+is 1/13. So, it seems we do ordinarily attribute probability to a single
+proposition without stopping to specify any further information. Usually,
+however, this is only because the relevant further information upon which
+the probability-claim is based is left implicit; it is sufficiently well known
+such that we don't have to mention it explicitly. In this case, the relevant
+information that one would normally take for granted is that the deck is
+standard and complete, in which case four of its fifty-two cards are aces.
+Thus, given the information that the deck is standard and complete, it
+would be reasonable for you to conclude that the card is probably not an
+ace. But, so long as it is kept in mind that there must be a relevant set of
+information or some premises in the picture, it is perfectly harmless to
+attribute probability to single propositions, and we will sometimes do so.
+2 Probability of the kind that we are speaking of is not an alternative
+to truth or falsity in the way that finishing in the middle of the league
+table is an alternative to finishing at the top or at the bottom. Nor is
+probability a kind of truth. To say that a proposition is probable, in this
+sense, is to say that it is most likely true. It is to express an expectation,
+which falls short of perfect certainty, that a proposition is correct. What
+one says is true, if the evidence upon which the claim is based really does
+make the expectation rational. The idea is not that there is some third
+thing between truth and falsity, namely probability. For example, if I
+know that Reggie has taken his driving test today, and I say 'Probably,
+Reggie failed his driving test', I am not saying 'It isn't true that Reggie
+failed his driving test, and it isn't false; it's probable that he failed it'.
+No: either it is true that Reggie failed his driving test or it is false. That
+is, there are two possible states of affairs: either he failed the test or he
+did not. There is no mysterious third state of affairs, i.e. that he probably
+failed it. Rather, the function of the word 'probably' is to indicate
+that the evidence makes it rational to believe, but does not make it certain,
+that the proposition is true.
+3 Unlike truth, probability is a matter of degree; different propositions
+may have various degrees of probability (relative to a given body of information).
+For example, given the information we have, it is very highly
+probable that in the year 863 BC, someone ate a rabbit. But there is a
+very tiny possibility that no one did. It is somewhat less probable, but
+still probable, that someone will swim the English Channel during the
+year 2046. It is possible, but improbable, that someone swam the English
+Channel in the year 863 BC. We do sometimes specify probabilities in
+terms of numerical values, but often the probability of something being
+the case cannot be estimated with enough precision to justify assigning
+an exact numerical value. Sometimes the most we can do is to rank
+Logic: inductive force
+86
+probabilities; for example, we can say with confidence that a certain man
+is more likely to eat a cucumber than he is to visit Japan during the
+coming year, but we cannot assign precise numerical probabilities to these
+propositions in the way that we can with the cards. And sometimes we
+cannot even rank them with confidence. Of single propositions, the most
+we can say in such cases is, 'that's probable', or 'that's very probable', or
+'that's improbable'. (By 'probable', remember, we mean the case in which
+the probability is greater than 1/2; by 'improbable' mean the case in which
+it is less than 1/2; something can be neither probable nor improbable, if
+its probability is exactly 1/2.)
+Because of this, inductive force, unlike deductive validity, is also a
+matter of degree. We cannot say that one argument is more valid than
+another, but we can say that one argument is more inductively forceful
+than another. Validity was defined in terms of impossibility, in which
+case the probability is zero (look at the definition of validity again).
+Validity is thus all-or-nothing. Indeed, one could define validity simply
+as the 'limiting case' of inductive force -- the case in which the conditional
+probability of the conclusion relative to the premises is 1. Thus we
+can think of arguments as being arranged on a scale of conditional probability,
+ranging from deductively valid to a complete lack of inductive
+force (see Figure 3.1).
+Because we defined inductive force in the way that we did, an argument
+may be inductively forceful but only to a very small degree. For
+example, if you know that fifteen of the twenty-nine children in the class
+are wearing white shoes, then you have an inductively forceful argument
+for the conclusion that the child who got the highest mark in spelling is
+wearing white shoes. But the probability of that conclusion, relative to
+the premise, is only slightly better than 1/2; so the argument is just barely
+inductively forceful. It is inductively forceful, but only to a low degree.
+4 As ordinarily used, the term 'probably' is somewhat vague. Usually,
+when we say something like 'David will probably win the match', we
+don't just mean the probability of his winning is greater than 1/2; we
+mean it is substantially higher than that. But exactly how much higher
+must it be, if it is to be appropriate to say 'probably'? Of course, there
+is no exact answer. The person saying this may be willing to give a more
+precise figure, but they needn't in order to be entitled to use the word
+'probably'. In fact, there is good reason to maintain that the use of “probably”
+is appropriate if, and only if, the intended probability exceeds 1/2.
+If you are asked 'Is David going to win?', and you think his chances are
+better than 50--50 but only just, it is appropriate to say 'probably' -- but
+in doing so, you would normally use a hesitating tone of voice to convey
+that you put the probability at only just over the 50--50 threshold.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+87
+What is very likely is that ordinary uses of 'probably' mean a probability
+of greater than 1/2, but typically carry a conversational implicature
+that the probability substantially exceeds that threshold (see Chapter 1,
+pp. 9--10 for discussion of conversational implicature). We can cancel the
+implicature through tone of voice.
+Exactly the same point goes for the quantifier 'most'. If someone
+were to make an accusation by saying 'Most students cheated on the exam',
+they would probably intend to convey that substantially more than half
+of them cheated, not just a bare majority. Nevertheless, if were to turn
+out that 15 of the 29 students in the class cheated, the accuser might be
+surprised, but would not thereby be found to have spoken literally falsely.
+The concept of conversational implicature captures this point perfectly.
+For these reasons we define inductive force as conditional probability
+of premises to conclusion greater than 1/2. Because of this, it is sometimes
+important to make sure we do not underestimate the inductive force
+of an argument; if an argument has a high degree of inductive force, we
+should say so, and not pronounce simply that the argument is inductively
+forceful. When assessing inductive arguments, it is usually important to
+specify, as accurately as we can, the degree of inductive force.
+5 Whether or not an argument is deductively valid does not depend on
+whether anyone thinks it is. Likewise, probability, in our sense, is the
+degree to which it is rational or reasonable to expect something to be
+true (given a certain set of premises), irrespective of how likely we
+actually think it to be. When we claim that an argument is inductively
+Logic: inductive force
+88
+Valid
+arguments
+Inductively
+forceful
+arguments
+Arguments that are
+neither valid nor
+inductively forceful
+1 0.5
+Conditional probability of conclusion relative to premises
+0
+Figure 3.1 Arguments on a scale of conditional probability
+forceful, we are not always correct. We may think that a set of premises
+(our evidence) makes it reasonable to accept a conclusion, when in fact it
+is not. Rational expectation concerns what is in fact reasonable, not what
+any particular person thinks is reasonable.
+We can reinforce this point by considering a case in which everyone
+will agree that rational expectation depends on proportion. Suppose that
+Fiona is asked to pick a card at random. Her chance of getting, say, a
+heart, is exactly one in four. Her chance of not getting a heart, then, is
+three in four, or 3/4. So she will probably not get a heart. If she is
+perfectly rational and well-informed, she will be 3/4 certain that she won't
+get a heart. Suppose, however, that Fiona is not perfectly rational. She
+thinks that since she has recently fallen in love, she probably will choose
+a heart. She might express her thinking so by saying, 'I'll probably choose
+a heart'. Nevertheless, the probability that she will not choose a heart is
+greater -- indeed three times as great -- as the probability that she will.
+Fiona's actual degree of expectation is higher than the degree of rational
+expectation. More generally, we can observe that different people, going
+on the same set of premises, can have different degrees of expectation
+that something is or will be true; but there is only one correct answer as
+to how reasonable it is to infer the conclusion from the premises.
+6 Like the validity or invalidity of an argument, the degree of inductive
+force of an argument is independent of the truth-values of the
+premises. This can be seen most easily in the case of a completely fictional
+example, in which the question of the truth-values of the premises cannot
+even arise:
+P1) Almost all Zormons play chess.
+P2) Trozak is a Zormon.
+C) (Probably) Trozak plays chess.
+Of course this is not even a real argument, since there are no such beings
+as Zormons, and no such being as Trozak. Nevertheless, if there were,
+then this certainly would be an inductively forceful argument: if there
+were a being named 'Trozak' who was a member of some class of
+beings called 'Zormons', and P1 were true, then it would be reasonable
+to infer C if P1 and P2 were all one had to go on. If you did not
+know whether or not these beings exist, you would still be right to say
+that if this did express a real argument, it would be inductively forceful.
+Whether or not there is such a being as Trozak or such beings as Zormons,
+and whether or not P1 is true, are thus irrelevant to the estimate of
+inductive force.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+89
+7 The same point goes for conclusions; estimates of inductive force
+should not be affected by information relevant to the truth-value of the
+conclusion, except for that given in the premises. Consider this argument:
+P1) Sweden is a Scandinavian country.
+P2) At least one Scandinavian country exports cars.
+C) Sweden exports cars.
+Almost everyone knows that Sweden -- home of Volvo and Saab -- exports
+cars. Furthermore, both premises of this argument are true. However, it
+is clearly not an inductively forceful argument. If the only propositions
+you knew relevant to the conclusion were P1 and P2, then you would be
+wrong to think that C is probably true.
+'All', 'most' and 'some'
+To say that all rodents have tails is the same as saying: 'Every rodent has
+a tail', or 'Any rodent has a tail', or 'No rodent has no tail'. To say that
+most rodents have tails is to say that more than half of all rodents have
+tails, or that there are more rodents with tails than there are without
+them. But what about 'Some rodents have tails'? What proportion of
+rodents must have tails for that to be true? In fact, that is a bad question.
+Such a statement does not tell you what proportion of rodents have
+tails. Consider this argument:
+P1) Some patients who have been treated with X have developed
+liver disease.
+C) If I am treated with X then I will develop liver disease.
+This argument is not inductively forceful. P1 could be true even if, say,
+three patients developed liver disease upon being treated with X, yet thousands
+were treated with X without developing liver disease.
+That much should be fairly obvious. But the word 'some', as ordinarily
+used, can be rather tricky. Often, when we actually say something
+of the form 'Some A are B' (such as P1), we say it when we believe that
+more than one A is B, but that not all A are B. Often when using the
+word this way, we say, 'Only some A are B'. Other times, we say it when
+we believe that more than one A is B, but do not know whether or not
+all A are B. For example, a medical researcher who discovers a few patients
+that have developed liver disease after being treated with X might use the
+Logic: inductive force
+90
+sentence P1 to announce the discovery -- but this would be to leave open
+the possibility that perhaps all patients treated with X develop liver
+disease. He would not be ruling it out.
+For the purpose of reconstructing arguments it is most convenient to
+assume the latter understanding of 'some', whereby 'some A are B' does
+not rule out that all A are B. It does not say 'Some, but not all, A are
+B'. In this sense, 'Some A are B' means 'Some, perhaps all, A are B'.
+Further, when using 'some' in our argument-reconstructions, we will
+take it to mean 'at least one'. That is: if only one A is B, then it will be
+true that some A are B. On this understanding of 'some', what 'Some
+rodents have tails' means is simply that it is not the case that no rodents
+have tails. Similarly, 'Some rodents do not have tails' means the same as
+'Not all rodents have tails'. This departs slightly from what ordinary
+language typically suggests, but it is much more convenient for our
+purposes. If, when reconstructing an argument, it is clear that by 'some'
+the arguer means 'at least two', then we can simply make this explicit in
+the reconstruction, writing 'at least two'.
+Soft generalisations: a reminder
+It is worth re-stressing a point introduced in Chapter 1 (pp. 34--5), namely
+that in reconstructing arguments with generalisations, we should always
+supply missing quantifiers. We often run across arguments like this:
+The Government's policy is based on the claim that violent
+offenders re-offend. I resent and refute this claim utterly. My
+nephew was imprisoned in his late teens on an armed robbery
+conviction but unlike a lot of these wasters he thoroughly sorted
+himself out; he's now been married with a steady job for many
+years and there is no way he's going to commit a crime again.
+The arguer seems to argue that the generalisation 'violent offenders reoffend'
+is refuted by the existence of a violent offender who has not
+re-offended. And of course this argument would be valid:
+P1) My nephew is violent offender who has not re-offended and
+will not.
+C) Not all violent offenders re-offend.
+But it's very unlikely that the Government asserted that all violent
+offenders re-offend. More likely, they asserted that most do, or that the
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+91
+frequency of violent offending among those who have already committed
+a violent crime is significantly higher than it is among those who have
+not, or some such thing. If so, then the single example of the arguer's
+nephew does little or nothing to undermine the Government's claim.
+Inductive soundness
+You can probably guess what this is, by analogy with the definition of
+deductive soundness:
+To say that an argument is inductively sound is to say: It is
+inductively forceful and its premises are (actually) true.
+The important thing to note here is that an inductively sound argument,
+unlike a deductively sound argument, may have a false conclusion. That
+possibility is precisely what is left open by the definition of inductive
+force -- an inductively forceful argument is the case where the truth of
+the premises makes the truth of the conclusion probable, but does not
+guarantee it. Look again at the last argument given concerning Fiona,
+who lives in Inverness. Suppose it is true that Fiona lives in Inverness,
+and that almost everyone there has some woollen garments. An argument
+with those two facts as premises, and that Fiona has at least one
+woollen garment as a conclusion, would be inductively sound -- even if,
+as it happens, Fiona has no woollen garments.
+Note that we have not said that one should always be convinced by
+inductively sound arguments. You could know that an argument is inductively
+sound, but also know, for independent reasons, that the conclusion
+is false (review the discussion of inductive soundness if this is surprising).
+We will return to this point in Chapter 6.
+Probability in the premises
+So far in this chapter we have mostly considered premises expressing
+proportions, such as 'Most Zormons plays chess'. Proportions are expressed
+using quantifiers such as 'most', '95 per cent of', and the like. But
+consider this case:
+P1) If Napoleon is not ill then the French will attack.
+P2) Probably, Napoleon is not ill.
+C1) (Probably) The French will attack.
+Logic: inductive force
+92
+This argument is inductively forceful, but it does not contain any quantifiers.
+The reason that the truth of the premises would not guarantee
+that the French will attack, of course, is the presence of the word 'probably'
+in P2; it is only said to be probable that Napoleon is not ill. (We
+would get the same result if in place of P2 we wrote 'Napoleon is probably
+not ill', or 'It is unlikely that Napoleon is ill', or some other sentence
+synonymous with P2 as written.)
+Note that words such as 'probably' can also occur in the antecedents
+and consequents of conditionals. For example:
+P1) If Napoleon is not ill then, probably, the French will attack.
+P2) Napoleon is not ill.
+C1) (Probably) The French will attack.
+This too is an inductively forceful argument.5
+Arguments with multiple probabilistic premises
+Sometimes, probabilistic elements can occur in more than one premise.
+Assessing such arguments can be tricky. For example, we may have the
+following sort of case:
+P1) Most people in Glasgow live in council housing.
+P2) Most council housing is substandard.
+C) Most people in Glasgow live in substandard housing.
+Note that the argument tree for this is as shown in Figure 3.2 (see over).
+This argument is not inductively forceful. Strictly speaking, 'most'
+guarantees only that the statement is true for more than half of the given
+group. The premises could well be true, then, in the following circumstances:
+slightly more than half the residents of Glasgow live in council
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+93
+5 Some readers may wonder why we enclose the word 'probably' in parentheses before
+the conclusion of an inductive argument, but do not enclose it in parentheses when it
+occurs in a premise or as the consequent of a conditional conclusion. The reason is somewhat
+complicated, but what it boils down to is that we want to preserve the simple and
+common-sense contrast between deductive and inductive arguments, according to which
+the inductive case is that where the premises provide good but not water-tight reasons
+to accept the conclusion. Thus when we write '(Probably) such-and-such' beneath the
+inference bar, the conclusion is 'such-and-such', not '(Probably) such-and-such'. If the
+probability-indicator were regarded as part of the conclusion, then the distinction between
+deductive and inductive arguments becomes more complicated, and less intuitive.
+housing; slightly more than half the council housing units in Glasgow
+are substandard, yet no other housing in Glasgow is substandard. If that
+were so, then the proportion of substandard housing in Glasgow would
+be slightly more than half of slightly more than half the total housing
+units in Glasgow. Since half of a half is 1/2   1/2 = 1/4, this means that,
+in these circumstances, the proportion of housing units in Glasgow that
+are substandard would be a little bit more than 1/4. Of course, if a much
+greater majority in Glasgow lived in council housing, and a sufficiently
+high proportion of it were substandard, then an inductively sound argument
+along these lines could be constructed.6 It is important, in such cases,
+to determine whether or not the proportions indicated by 'most' are
+sufficient for the purpose of the argument.
+The same sort of thing applies when a word such as 'probably' occurs
+more than once in the premises. Here is a somewhat more difficult case
+involving an explicitly conditional probability:
+P1) Edna will probably come to the party.
+P2) If Edna comes to the party, then probably she'll get drunk.
+C) Edna will get drunk.
+Is this argument inductively forceful? Not as written. All that is required
+for something to be probable is that its probability be greater than 1/2.
+Suppose, then, that the chance of Edna coming to the party is exactly
+Logic: inductive force
+94
+P1 P2
+C
+Figure 3.2
+6 Of course, these premises are not true.
+0.6 (6 in 10) and that if she were to come to the party, then the chance
+of her getting drunk would be 0.6. Then the premises of the above argument
+would be true. But the conclusion would not thereby be probable.
+It might be that if she does not come to the party then she certainly
+will not get drunk, in which case the probability of her getting drunk will
+be 6/10 of 6/10, thus 36/100 or 0.36. Of course, if the probability of
+Edna's coming to the party were higher, or the likelihood of her getting
+drunk if she did were higher, or both, then the probability of her
+getting drunk would be higher. And as we noted earlier, someone using
+the word 'probably' might well have a higher probability in mind. If we
+were to replace both occurences of 'probably' with something like 'It is
+highly likely that', then it would be reasonable to interpret the argument
+as inductively forceful, perhaps even as very inductively forceful.
+Some arguments contain a premise with a word like 'probably' and
+a premise with a quantifier such as 'most':
+P1) Probably, James will gain a science degree.
+P2) Most people with science degrees earn better-than-average
+salaries.
+C) James will earn a better-than-average salary.
+Once again, this argument is not inductively forceful. However, if the
+argument were changed so as to indicate a sufficiently high probability
+of James' gaining a science degree, and/or to indicate a sufficiently high
+proportion of science degree-earners earning better-than-average salaries,
+then the argument would be inductively forceful. Of course the argument
+becomes inductively forceful if the word 'probably' is simply deleted from
+P1. It would also be inductively forceful if the word 'most' in P2 were
+changed to 'all'; but it would not be inductively sound, since P2 would
+be false. Not everyone with a science degree earns a better-than-average
+salary.
+Another tricky situation that sometimes arises is illustrated by the
+following:
+P1) Nine out of ten Green Party members are vegetarians.
+P2) Only one in ten non-Green Party members are vegetarians.
+P3) Alastair is a vegetarian.
+C) Alastair is a Green Party member.
+It is tempting to think that this argument is inductively forceful; you
+might reason: very few outside the Green Party are vegetarians, and
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+95
+almost all Green Party members are vegetarians; so surely if Alastair is
+a vegetarian, then mostly likely he's a Green Party member. But this
+would be a mistake (the mistake is known as the 'base rate fallacy';
+see the discussion in Chapter 4, pp. 130--1). In fact, even if P1 said that
+all Green Party members are vegetarians, the inference would be
+mistaken. For suppose that only one out of every 101 people (in the UK,
+for example) is a member of the Green Party. If the remaining (non-
+Green) population is 10 per cent vegetarian, then, since every Green is
+vegetarian, eleven out of every 101 people are vegetarian. But only one
+of those eleven is a Green. Thus ten out of every 101 people are non-
+Green vegetarians, and the non-Green vegetarians outnumber the Green
+vegetarians by ten to one! So if you meet a vegetarian such as Alastair,
+then, unless you had other reasons to think he is a Green, the reasonable
+expectation would be that he is not a Green. Summing up, then, the
+premises do not give you a good reason to think that Alastair is a Green.
+The problem is that the premises seem to tell us that if someone is
+a vegetarian, then, probably, they are a Green. But they do not. Similarly:
+all plumbers own pipe wrenches, and few non-plumbers own them; but
+these facts do not entitle us to say that if someone owns a pipe wrench,
+then probably, they are a plumber. As a matter of fact, many DIYers own
+pipe wrenches. And there are a lot more DIYers than there are plumbers.
+So the number of non-plumbers owning pipe wrenches may well
+outnumber the plumbers.
+Inductive force in extended arguments
+The conclusion of an inductively forceful argument may serve as a
+premise for a further argument, which may itself be deductively valid,
+inductively forceful or neither. However, if any sub-argument of an
+extended argument is not deductively valid, then the argument as a whole
+is not deductively valid. At most, it is inductively forceful. Here is a
+hybrid extended argument that illustrates the point:
+P1) If Napoleon is not ill then the French will attack.
+P2) Probably, Napoleon is not ill.
+C1) (Probably) The French will attack.
+P3) If the French attack, then the Prussians will be routed.
+C2) (Probably) The Prussians will be routed.
+Logic: inductive force
+96
+If the first argument were valid, entitling us to assert C1 categorically --
+that is, without the qualifier 'probably' -- then since the argument from
+C1 and P2 to C2 is deductively valid, there would be no need to write
+'probably' beneath the second inference bar. As it stands, however, C2
+inherits the qualifier 'probably' from its ultimate source in P2. The
+simplest way to think of this is to think of C2 as a proposition inferred
+from three premises: P1, P2 and P3. If the word 'probably' were deleted
+from P2, then that argument would be deductively valid. As it stands,
+however, that argument is only inductively forceful.
+Note that in carrying out the inference from C1 and P3 to C2, we
+think of that sub-argument just as if it were presented like this:
+C1) Probably, the French will attack.
+P3) If the French attack, then the Prussians will be routed.
+C2) (Probably) The Prussians will be routed.
+That is, we think of it just as if there were no parentheses around the
+word 'probably' in C1. When the conclusion of an inductively forceful
+argument is regarded as a premise in a further argument, the parentheses
+should be ignored.
+Conditional probability in the conclusion
+Consider the following argument:
+If you start a new internet company, then probably it will fold, or
+get bought by another company within three years. Most new
+internet companies do.
+The conclusion of this argument is not 'Probably, your new internet
+company will fold or be bought by another company within three years'.
+It is, rather, 'If you start a new internet company, then, probably, it will
+fold or get bought by another company within three years'. Its conclusion,
+then, states a conditional probability. We can reconstruct it like this:
+P1) Most new internet companies either fold, or get bought by
+another company, within three years.
+C) If you start a new internet company, then, probably,
+it will either fold, or be bought by another company,
+within three years.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+97
+You can see that the inference is correct. But is this argument deductively
+valid, or only inductively forceful? The presence of the word
+'probably' might make it seem that the argument is only inductively
+forceful, but strictly speaking the argument is deductively valid. The
+conclusion, it seems, can be asserted on the basis of P1 with perfect confidence;
+there is no need to insert a 'probably' before the conditional
+conclusion as well as before its consequent.7 Note, however, that once the
+new internet company gets started, it would be appropriate to construct
+an inductively forceful argument from P1 to '(Probably) Your new
+internet company will fold or be bought by another company within three
+years'.
+Evidence
+Arguments presented as being inductively forceful may have several
+premises. Consider the following:
+The case against Dr X can be summed up as follows. Dr X, a
+medical doctor, has the knowledge, and had the opportunity, to
+carry out the type of gradual programme of strychnine poisoning
+that killed the victim. He had a strong motive for the murder.
+And finally, Miss Y, a reliable witness, has testified that Dr X
+expressed to her his wish that the victim were dead.
+Let us grant that the case against Dr X is compelling. Here are four facts
+that seem jointly to condemn Dr X as the murderer. The case does not
+take the form of a deductively valid argument; it would not be impossible
+for these facts to be as the arguer says, yet Dr X be innocent. But
+it is crucial to recognise that the case should not be reconstructed as four
+separate arguments, each presented as inductively forceful in its own
+right. The prosecutor's case is based on four premises:
+Logic: inductive force
+98
+7 Note that a conclusion of the form 'If P, then, probably, Q' is quite different from
+something of the form 'Probably, if P then Q'. In fact in ordinary speech, the latter form
+is quite unusual, and we never use it in this book. Even when we say, for example,
+'Probably if Ronaldo plays, he'll score' what we mean is 'If Ronaldo plays, then, probably,
+he will score'. It depends on exactly what the English 'if--then' is taken to mean, but at
+least on one orthodox reading of it, the probability that a conditional 'If P then Q' is true
+is much higher than the conditional probability of Q relative to P. Thus 'Probably (If P
+then Q)' can be true when 'If P, then, probably, Q' is false. For example, if the initial
+probability of P and Q are both very low, then the former can be true even though P and
+Q are completely independent, so the conditional probability is low (in which case the
+latter statement is false).
+P1) Dr X has the knowledge to carry out the type of gradual
+programme of strychnine poisoning that killed the victim.
+P2) Dr X had the opportunity to carry out the murder.
+P3) Dr X had a strong motive for the murder.
+P4) Miss Y, a reliable witness, has testified that Dr X expressed to
+her his wish that the victim were dead.
+These constitute the evidence against Dr X. But an argument for the conclusion
+that Dr X murdered the victim based on P1 alone, would not be
+inductively forceful. If it were, then the argument would point with equal
+force to the guilt of a great many other people with the requisite knowledge
+of strychnine. Nor would an argument similarly based only upon
+P2, P3 or P4. If the prosecutor were to advance any of these four separate
+arguments by itself, then the jury could only conclude that the
+prosecutor lacks a compelling case: none of the arguments would be inductively
+forceful. It is essential to the prosecutor's case that these four items
+of evidence point jointly to the defendant's guilt. We do not have four
+arguments like this:
+But a single argument like this:
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+99
+P1
+C
+P2
+C
+P3
+C
+P4
+C
+P1 P2 P3
+C
+P4
+Figure 3.3
+Figure 3.4
+The argument, then, should be constructed like this:
+P1) Dr X has the knowledge to carry out the type of gradual
+programme of strychnine poisoning that killed the victim.
+P2) Dr X had the opportunity to commit the murder.
+P3) Dr X had a strong motive for the murder.
+P4) Miss Y, a reliable witness, has testified that Dr X expressed to
+her his wish that the victim were dead.
+C) (It is highly probable that) Dr X murdered the victim.
+This is how it is with items of evidence: if both B and C are evidence for
+A, the conjunction of B and C is (typically) stronger evidence than B or
+C alone.8 Put in terms of arguments, the argument with B and C as
+Logic: inductive force
+100
+8 This holds so long as B and C are independent: whether or not B occurs has no bearing
+on whether or not C occurs, and vice versa. Otherwise the situation is more complicated.
+The exact meaning of the independence of two events is: B and C are independent if and
+only if the conditional probability of B given C is equal to the probability of B. When B
+and C are independent, then some simple, useful relationships hold. First, the probability
+that event A does not happen is always 1  A. Then the probability of the conjunction
+of B and C (i.e. both happen) is simply the probability of B multiplied by the probability
+of C. In symbols: Pr(B and C) = Pr(B)   Pr(C). Then since 'B or C' means the same as
+'Not both: not-B and not-C', it follows that the probability of the disjunction (B or C) is
+1 minus the probability of neither B nor C. In symbols: Pr(B or C) = 1  [Pr(not-B and
+not-C)]. The conditional probability of B given C is normally written Pr(B/C), and is
+defined as the probability of the conjunction (B and C) divided by the probability of C.
+In symbols:
+Pr(B and C)
+Pr(B/C) = --------------------
+Pr(C)
+A familiar example of a set of possible outcomes that are independent is the case of rolling
+a die; if the possible outcomes are specified as the six possibilities of rolling a one, a two
+and so on, then each outcome has no bearing, either logically or causally, on any other.
+So if you roll it n times, you have n independent outcomes. A familiar example of a set
+of possible outcomes that are not independent is the case of drawing cards. What are the
+chances that the first card you draw from a complete deck is a heart? One in four cards
+in the deck is a heart, so the chance 0.25. What is the chance that your next card is a
+heart? It depends, and it is not 0.25! If the first card you drew was a heart, then 12 of the
+remaining 51 cards are hearts, so the probability is about 0.235. If the first card was not
+a heart, then 13 of the remaining 51 are hearts, so the probability is about 0.255. The
+outcome of the second draw is not independent of the outcome of the first, and this shows
+up in the difference between the conditional probability of drawing a heart given that you
+first drew a heart, and that of drawing a heart given that you first drew a non-heart. This
+is only scratching the surface of the vast subject of probability and statistics. However,
+you can learn enough from the most basic textbooks on probability or statistics to equip
+you to be far more savvy and critical than most people in interpreting and evaluating the
+sorts of statistical claims made in the media and elsewhere. For example, when the results
+of polls and surveys are reported, what exactly does 'margin of error' mean, and how can
+they know what the margin of error is?
+premises is more forceful than either the argument with B as a premise
+or that with C as a premise.
+Note also that in this example we have a case where the estimate of
+inductive force does not appeal to a proportion or a frequency, and does
+not depend on the presence of a probabilistic premise. The basis for the
+inference from premises to conclusion is left inexplicit. This does not mean
+that we could not at least to some degree make it more explicit. For
+example, we might include the premise that very few people have the
+kind of knowledge described in P1. But it is not always appropriate to try
+to do so; for example, the exact ways in which P2--P4 contribute to the
+argument cannot easily, and probably not very usefully, be spelled out.
+Inductive inferences
+Consider the following argument:
+So far, every goldfish I've had has died when I fed it cat food.
+Therefore, if I feed my new goldfish cat food, it will die.
+This inference seems reasonable, but how do we reconstruct the
+argument? We might try:
+P1 (a) All goldfish die if fed cat food.
+C) My new goldfish will die if I feed it cat food.
+Or:
+P1 (b) Most goldfish die if fed cat food.
+C) (Probably) My new goldfish will die if I feed it cat
+food.
+The first argument is valid and the second inductively forceful, and
+perhaps both are sound. But there is a logical problem. The arguer has
+not asserted either version of P1. What he has asserted is that all the
+goldfish to which he has fed cat food have died. The sample of goldfish
+with which the arguer has had this experience is only a tiny fraction of
+the total number of goldfish in the universe. So the arguer has not said
+anything about all, or most, goldfish. Presumably the arguer does believe
+either P1(a) or P1(b), but if so, he does so on the basis of his previous
+experience with goldfish and cat food. Somehow, the arguer must get
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+101
+from the proposition 'Every goldfish I've had has died when I fed it cat
+food' to 'My new goldfish will die if fed cat food', or even 'Most (or all)
+goldfish die when fed cat food'. So far, in our discussions of arguments,
+we have said nothing to help us with this sort of inference.9
+However, this kind of inference is very common, both in science and
+in ordinary life. We call it an inductive inference. This is our name
+for the case when you extrapolate from a sample of a total population of
+things either to something outside the sample, or to a generalisation about
+the population as a whole (so far, we have always gone the other way,
+either from a generalisation about a whole population to a claim about
+some smaller sample, or from the whole population to a claim about a
+single member of it). In the above case, the arguer needs to extrapolate
+directly from the sample of goldfish they have experimented with to a
+proposition about the new goldfish:
+P1) Every observed goldfish has died when fed cat food.
+C1) My new goldfish will die if I feed it cat food.
+If we judge this inference to be inductively forceful -- let as assume that
+it is -- then, just as with any inductively forceful argument, we write
+'probably', in parentheses, before the conclusion:
+P1) Every observed goldfish has died when fed cat food.
+C1) (Probably) My new goldfish will die if I feed it cat food.
+Alternatively, the arguer could have obtained this conclusion by a slightly
+longer route. The arguer might have reached the conclusion by means of
+an extended argument, comprising an inductive inference to a generalisation
+about all goldfish, together with a second, deductively valid inference
+Logic: inductive force
+102
+9 As we pointed out, many probabilities can be based upon proportion. One of the tasks
+of statistical analysis is to show how this is so, even in cases that might initially seem to
+resist this strategy. Inductive inferences represent a class of cases where proportion
+certainly cannot be applied straightforwardly. If we know that, say, 74 per cent of the past
+956 cases of A have been cases of B, we cannot without further ado assume that the probability
+that the next case of A will be a case of B is 74 per cent. The next case of A is not
+among the set of cases for which that proportion is known to have held. So it is not like
+the case of a card face down on the table, which is drawn from set of cards for which the
+relevant proportion is known. In the inductive case we have to make the further assumption
+that probabilities taken from proportions of known cases can be transferred to
+unknown cases. Of course such inferences do often seem to be rationally justified; the
+question of why this is so -- the 'Problem of Induction' -- was first raised by David Hume
+in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739), and remains an open problem.
+from that generalisation to the conclusion concerning the arguer's new
+goldfish:
+P1) Every observed goldfish has died when fed cat food.
+C1) All goldfish die if fed cat food.
+C2) My new goldfish will die if I feed it cat food.
+However, assuming the truth of P1, one could not assert the conclusion
+here with quite as much confidence as in the first case. We may assert
+C2 with as much, but no more, confidence than that with which we may
+assert C1. But since C1 is a generalisation about all goldfish, it stands a
+greater chance of being false than C1 of the first goldfish-argument -- a
+statement about a single goldfish. The reason is that the second argument
+depends upon a more ambitious extrapolation than the first, one that is
+not needed for the desired conclusion. Yet, the inferences to C1 in either
+case are fundamentally of the same type. They are both extrapolations
+from observed cases to unobserved cases. Each can be thought of as an
+extrapolation from a sample to a larger population of which the sample
+is a part. In the first case we can think of the larger population referred
+to as comprising the sample (the observed goldfish) plus this one new
+goldfish. In the second case, obviously, the larger population is simply
+the total population of goldfish. Some inductive inferences are concerned
+to make a broad generalisation (all goldfish), others are concerned only
+to extend to a few new cases, or to a single new case (the new goldfish).
+But they are fundamentally the same type of inference. Thus we define:
+To say that an inference is an inductive inference is to say: (a) it is
+not deductively valid; (b) its premises include a generalisation about a
+sample of a given population, and (c) its conclusion either
+extrapolates the generalisation to the total population from which the
+sample is drawn, or extrapolates it to a single case outside the
+sample but within the total population.
+Requirement (a) is to avoid counting the following sort of inference as
+inductive: 'Some black cats have no tails; therefore not all cats have tails.'
+Inductive inferences frequently extrapolate from past to future. For
+example, if we infer, from Ireland's never having won the football World
+Cup, that probably it never will, our sample is all the World Cups that
+have so far been contested, and the total population is the set of all World
+Cups -- past, present and future.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+103
+Often the conclusion of an inductive inference is a statistical generalisation
+such as '37 per cent'. For example, when a pollster finds that
+37 per cent of a sample of the adult British population supports a given
+political party, the pollster might conclude that 37 per cent of the adult
+British population supports that party. In such a case, the sample is the
+sample polled, and the total population is the entire adult population of
+Great Britain. Instead of extrapolating 100 per cent ('all') from sample to
+total population, we extrapolate the figure 37. How probable this conclusion
+is, however, will depend on how representative the sample is.
+In other words, in order to guess how far the proportion of the total
+is likely to stray from the figure 37 per cent, we need to know the degree
+to which the sample typifies the attitudes of the total population. This
+point requires further attention.
+How representative is the sample?
+Suppose you live near the North Pole, and every bear you've ever seen
+is white. So you argue:
+P1) Every observed bear is white.
+C) All bears are white.
+Formally, this argument is just like the one about the goldfish. But,
+whereas the goldfish-inference seemed to be correct, this one seems not
+to be. Only a minority of bears are white (polar bears, and perhaps some
+albinos of other species). The difference is that, whereas the goldfisharguer
+can reasonably assume that the sample of observed goldfish was
+representative of the total population of goldfish, the bear-arguer
+cannot. That is, the goldfish-arguer can reasonably assume that the sample
+of goldfish was relevantly similar to the total population, but the beararguer
+cannot. Polar bears are only one of many species of bears, and if
+you know anything about zoology and adaptation, you know that a trait
+like colour, though somewhat likely to be similar across a single species,
+is not nearly so likely to be similar across different species, even within
+the same genus. Further, you can reasonably assume that mammals living
+in non-snowy regions are much less likely to be white than ones living
+in perpetual snow (it is advantageous to carnivores to blend visually into
+the background, so in snowy regions white bears will have a greater
+chance of survival and procreation, in which case the gene for white fur
+is more likely to get passed on). Being a different species, which lives in
+a completely different climate, is certainly a relevant difference when
+Logic: inductive force
+104
+drawing inductive inferences about colour with respect to classes of
+mammals, even if the species is a closely related one.
+How do you know whether a sample is representative of the total
+population, i.e. relevantly similar to it? There is no simple rule for this;
+our estimate of relevant similarity must be based upon our knowledge of
+the subject-matter in question. For example, we drew upon some basic
+evolutionary biology in criticising the bear-inference. Where such statistical
+inference as the one mentioned above are concerned, the question is
+much more complicated, calling for more specialised expertise. A pollster
+sampling the population for voting preferences must study the many ways
+in which voting behaviour correlates with factors such as income, geographical
+location, profession and so on, and then ensure the that polled
+sample reflects the distribution of these factors in the population as a whole.
+Nevertheless, in general, the larger and more representative the
+sample used for a given generalisation, the more inductively forceful, or
+the stronger the inductive inference. An inductive inference that is not
+forceful -- one whose premise does not really support its conclusion -- is
+a weak one. For example, suppose someone argues: 'My brother is a fool.
+Therefore, probably, all boys are fools.' That is a very weak inductive
+inference; it is totally unwarranted. The bear-arguer's inference is not
+quite as bad as that, but it is also very weak. Also, from a given sample,
+an inference to a generalisation about most of the totality is a stronger
+one than an inference to a generalisation about all of the totality, since
+obviously the latter is less certain.
+A programme for assessment
+We are now in a position to outline a basic procedure for the assessment
+of arguments represented in standard form. We first consider arguments
+that have only one inference (that is, ones that are not extended arguments).
+When you represent an argument in standard form, do not
+include the word 'probably', or any similar word, in the conclusion -- not
+yet. Put such words in the premises only. Once you have reconstructed
+the argument in this way, you should proceed as follows (and you should,
+looking back at the definitions given in this chapter, stop to see why the
+chart is arranged as it is):
+1 Is the argument deductively valid?
+If not, proceed to 2.
+If yes, are all the premises true?
+If yes, the argument is deductively sound. Stop.
+If not, the argument is valid but unsound. Stop.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+105
+2 Is the argument inductively forceful?
+If not, the argument is neither valid nor inductively forceful.
+Stop.
+If yes, how forceful is it? Write 'probably', or suitable variant,
+in the appropriate place in the conclusion. Are the premises true?
+If yes, the argument is inductively sound. Stop.
+If not, the argument is neither deductively nor inductively sound.
+Stop.
+In the case of extended arguments, this procedure is to be carried out first
+with respect to the sub-arguments whose conclusions are premises of the
+extended argument. For example, suppose we have an extended argument
+whose form is like this:
+P1) . . .
+P2) . . .
+C1) . . .
+P3) . . .
+C2) . . .
+In this case the argument whose conclusion is C1 is a sub-argument for
+an extended argument whose conclusion is C2. You would first assess the
+argument from P1 and P2 to C1; you would then assess the argument
+from C1 and P3 to C2. Finally, you would use these results to assess the
+total argument from P1, P2 and P3 to C2.
+Assessment is to be distinguished from reconstruction, which is
+discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Broadly speaking, assessment
+may be said to fall into two categories. The first we may call logical
+assessment, which is that whereby we make judgements of deductive
+validity and inductive force. The second we may call factual assessment;
+here is where we ask after the truth-values of premises, in
+determining the soundness of arguments already found to be deductively
+valid or inductively forceful. However, as noted, the evaluation of inductive
+inferences is not purely independent of matters of fact in the way
+that judgements of validity are. For example, the evaluation of inductive
+inferences depends on judgements about how representative a sample is,
+which requires knowledge of matters of fact.
+It is important to realise that if your verdict is that the argument, as
+you have reconstructed it, is not deductively sound, you might be able
+Logic: inductive force
+106
+to reconstruct it so as to make it inductively sound. Look again at the
+example involving Fiona and wool. An early attempt at reconstructing
+it used the premise 'Everyone in Inverness owns at least one article of
+woollen clothing'. So rendered, the argument was valid, but not sound.
+We then weakened the premise to 'Almost everyone in Inverness
+owns at least one article of woollen clothing'. The result was not deductively
+valid, but it was inductively forceful. In general, it is best to sacrifice
+validity to soundness when reconstructing; an inductively sound
+argument is more useful than a valid but unsound argument.
+Later, we will learn some techniques that aid logical assessment. There
+is, you will appreciate, no readily definable procedure for factual assessment;
+for this is simply the task of determining whether particular
+propositions are true -- e.g. whether there are whales in the Black Sea,
+whether inflation rose in 1993, and so on. For that we must look outside
+logic books!
+CHAPTER SUMMARY
+The conditional probability of a proposition relative to a set of
+a premises is the degree to which it would be rational to expect it
+to be true, given no information relevant to the conclusion except
+that given in the premises. Estimates of rational expectation are
+often based upon other measures of probability such as proportion
+and frequency, but need not be.
+A deductively valid argument enables us to be certain of the
+truth of its conclusion, if we are certain of the truth of its premises.
+An inductively forceful argument does not allow this, but it does
+allow us, in the absence of other information relevant to the truthvalue
+of the conclusion, to think its conclusion more likely to be
+true than not: an inductively forceful argument is one for which the
+conditional probability of the conclusion relative to the premises is
+greater than 0.5.
+Like deductive validity, both probability and inductive force are
+objective: the conditional probability of a conclusion relative to a
+given set of premises is independent of people's actual estimates of
+conditional probability. But unlike deductive validity, both probability
+and inductive force are a matter of degree. An argument may
+be inductively forceful but only just barely. It is important to estimate
+the degree of an argument's inductive force as accurately as
+the case allows.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+107
+Chapter summary
+Inductively sound arguments are inductively forceful arguments
+with true premises. Unlike deductively sound arguments,
+they may have false conclusions.
+Some arguments contain inductive inferences. An inductive
+inference is a deductively invalid inference whose premise is a generalisation
+about some sample of a given population, and whose
+conclusion is a generalisation about the population as a whole, or
+about a member of the population outside the sample. In general,
+the force of an inductive inference depends on the degree to which
+the sample is representative of the population.
+EXERCISES
+1 Each argument below contains at least one premise with a missing
+quantifier. (A) Reconstruct the argument, adding appropriate quantifiers.
+Use the strongest quantifiers you can, so long as the resulting premises
+are what someone giving the argument would have intended (that is,
+don't use 'most', if it seems that the arguer would have intended all or
+almost all, or some such). (B) If the resulting argument is deductively
+valid, say so. If the argument is inductively forceful, say so, and insert
+'probably' before the conclusion.
+a Sex crimes are committed by people who have themselves been
+victims of child abuse. The defendant has committed a sex crime.
+Therefore, the defendant was a victim of child abuse.
+b Children love the Harry Potter books. Therefore your child will love
+the Harry Potter books.
+c If doctors in this country are overworked, then the general health of
+the population will decline. Doctors in this country are overworked.
+Therefore, the general health of the population will decline.
+d Old people have poor eyesight. People with poor eyesight should not
+be allowed to drive. Therefore, old people should not be allowed to
+drive.
+e In countries colonised by Spain, there are many people of Spanish
+descent. There are very few people of Spanish descent in Laos.
+Therefore Laos was not colonised by Spain.
+Logic: inductive force
+108 Exercises
+2 Consider the following pair of arguments:
+P1) Most AIDS patients in California are homosexual.
+P2) Mr X is a California AIDS patient.
+C) Mr X is a homosexual.
+P1) Most residents of Orange County, California, are not
+homosexual.
+P2) Mr X is a resident of Orange County, California.
+C) Mr X is not homosexual.
+Assume that this is the same Mr X referred to in each argument. (A) Are
+these arguments inductively forceful? (B) Could both arguments be inductively
+sound? If not, explain why not. Otherwise, describe a scenario in
+which they would both be sound. (C) If we knew the premises of both
+arguments to be true, would we have reason to believe, or not to believe,
+that Mr X is homosexual?
+3 Statements are incompatible if it is impossible for both of them to be
+true (if they are incompatible, it may or may not be possible for both to
+be false). Which of the following pairs of statements are incompatible?
+a Some hamsters are black. All hamsters are white.
+b Some hamsters are black. Some hamsters are white.
+c Some hamsters are black. Most hamsters are not black.
+d Some hamsters are black. All hamsters are black.
+e Many hamsters are black. Many hamsters are white.
+f Every hamster is black. This hamster is white.
+g This hamster is black. Some hamsters are white.
+h No hamster is black. No hamster is not black.
+i No hamster is black. No hamster is white.
+j Few hamsters are black. Many black hamsters are small.
+k Most hamsters are black. Many hamsters are white.
+l Most hamsters are black. All my hamsters are white.
+m Most hamsters are black. Every English hamster is white.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+109
+Exercises
+4 Reconstruct the following as either three separate arguments or as
+one, depending on which strategy would amount to a more forceful case.
+Also draw a tree-diagram for it.
+Lewis is probably not going to win another gold medal in the 100
+metres. He is now older than any previous winner of the event. His
+form has been poor this year, and he has a hamstring injury.
+5 (A) Reconstruct the following arguments. (B) Say whether or not
+they are valid or inductively forceful. (C) If the argument is neither valid
+nor inductively forceful, change or add one premise, or change the conclusion,
+so that it becomes valid or inductively forceful. There may be more
+than one reasonable answer. (D) Add any further remarks that seem
+appropriate to evaluating the argument.
+a If alcohol advertising is banned, then, probably, drinking would decline.
+If drinking declines, then domestic violence would decline.
+Therefore, if alcohol advertising is banned, then, probably, domestic
+violence would decline.
+b If alcohol advertising is banned, then, probably, drinking would decline.
+If drinking declines, then, probably, domestic violence would
+decline. Therefore, if alcohol advertising is banned, then, probably,
+domestic violence would decline.
+c Most children who go without breakfast have trouble concentrating
+at school in the morning. Johnny concentrates well at school in the
+morning. Therefore, probably, he does not go without breakfast.
+d If this meat was grown in Scotland, then it is extremely unlikely that
+it is infected with BSE. And even if it is infected, then it is very
+unlikely that eating it will make you ill. Therefore, if this meat was
+grown is Scotland, eating this meat will not make you ill.
+e Brazil is more likely to win the World Cup than Argentina. Therefore,
+probably, Brazil will win the World Cup.
+f Scotland has never won the World Cup. Therefore, probably, Scotland
+will never win the World Cup.
+g Probably, English football fans will make trouble at the next World
+Cup. If English football fans do make trouble at the next World Cup,
+then England may be expelled from the European Cup. Therefore, it
+is likely that England will be expelled from the European Cup.
+h If the murderer passed through here, then, probably, there would be
+hairs from the victim on the rug. But there are no hairs from the
+victim on the rug. Therefore, the murderer did not pass through here.
+Logic: inductive force
+110 Exercises
+i Very few habitual cannabis users are violent. The murderer is clearly
+very violent. Mr X is a habitual cannabis user. Therefore, probably,
+Mr X is not the murderer.
+j UN intervention in local conflicts usually leads to a more stable political
+situation. A more stable political situation usually leads to
+economic growth. Therefore, probably, UN intervention in this local
+conflict will lead to economic growth.
+k Almost all successful athletes have trained long and hard to become
+successful. Therefore, if you train long and hard, you will become a
+successful athlete.
+l Many teachers at Lenman secondary school are known to smoke
+cannabis. Mr X is a teacher at Lenman secondary school. Therefore,
+probably, Mr X smokes cannabis.
+m Most vegetarians eat eggs. A great many people in Berkeley are vegetarians.
+Roger is from Berkeley. Therefore, probably, Roger eats eggs.
+n If Hansen is leaving early tomorrow, then, probably, he isn't in the
+bar. Hansen isn't in the bar. So he is probably leaving early tomorrow.
+6 The following passages contain inductive inferences. (A) Rewrite them
+as arguments in standard form. (You may have to supply a missing quantifier.)
+(B) Can you think of any reasons why the sample might not be
+representative? If so, list them.
+a The elimination of sweets and other junk food from school lunch
+menus has resulted in improved student performance in schools all
+over the country, and in every case in which it has been tried. If we
+do this at our school, then, we can look forward to improved performance.
+b No communist system can succeed. Since communist regimes began
+early in the twentieth century, every one has either collapsed, or is
+near collapse.
+c Surprisingly, musicians have a higher average IQ than either doctors
+or lawyers. A study of seventeen conductors of major orchestras found
+their average IQ to be 17 points higher than that of UK doctors, and
+18 points higher than that of UK lawyers.
+d Most teenagers who take illicit drugs have serious family problems.
+I know, because as a counsellor for teenagers I have found that most
+of those who have come to me and confessed to taking illicit drugs
+do have serious family problems.
+  
+Logic: inductive force
+111
+Exercises
+e Manchester United are an English team that have won the treble once,
+but they're not going to win it again. No English team has won it
+twice.
+f Studies have shown that people who regularly take vitamins live
+longer than average. Jenna takes vitamins regularly, so probably she'll
+live longer than average.
+Logic: inductive force
+112 Exercises
+Chapter 4
+Rhetorical ploys and
+fallacies
+Sometimes we are moved to accept or reject claims when we have been
+given no good grounds for doing so. Often this is because speakers or writers
+attempt to persuade us in ways that appear to provide good reasons but
+  
+113
+* Rhetorical ploys 115
+Appeals to specific feelings * Appeal to novelty * Appeal to
+popularity * Appeal to compassion, pity or guilt * Appeal to
+cuteness * Appeal to sexiness * Appeals to wealth, status, power,
+hipness, coolness, etc. * Appeal to fear (also known as scare
+tactics) * The direct attack and hard sell * Buzzwords * Scare
+quotes * Trading on an equivocation * Trading on implicature *
+Smokescreen (changing the subject)
+* Fallacies 125
+Formal fallacies * Affirming the consequent of a conditional *
+Denying the antecedent of a conditional * Fallacy of deriving
+'ought' from 'is' * The base rate fallacy * Substantive fallacies *
+The fallacy of majority belief * Common practice * Ad hominem
+* Ad hominem circumstantial * Tu quoque * Appeal to authority
+* The perfectionist fallacy * Conflation of morality with legality *
+Weak analogy * Causal fallacies * Post hoc ergo propter hoc *
+Fallacy of mistaking correlation for cause * Inversion of cause
+and effect * Epistemic fallacies * Appeal to ignorance *
+Epistemic fallacy
+* Further fallacies 153
+Equivocation * Red herring * Slippery slope * Straw man *
+Begging the question * False dilemma
+that do not really. We'll call these persuasive devices sham-reasons and
+the process of employing them sham-reasoning. As critical thinkers we
+should be alert to the possibility of sham-reasoning, take care to avoid being
+convinced by arguments that rely upon it, and avoid using sham-reasons
+in our own attempts to persuade others. We are interested in two types of
+sham-reasoning: rhetorical ploys and fallacies. This chapter aims to
+equip you to distinguish between rhetorical ploys and fallacies, to familiarise
+you with various common types of sham-reasoning and to develop
+strategies of reconstruction and evaluation that will enable you to deal with
+them when analysing, assessing and constructing attempts to persuade.
+Neither rhetorical ploys nor fallacies provide us with good reasons to
+accept the claim they are intended to support. Fallacies are argumentative
+sham-reasoning. That is, they are still arguments in the sense
+that fits our definition of a set of propositions, some of which are premises,
+one of which is a conclusion, the latter intended to follow from the former.
+But in one way or another, they are bad arguments. Rhetorical ploys,
+on the other hand, are non-argumentative sham-reasoning: some
+of these persuasive devices may pretend to provide reasons for accepting
+a claim, but their real persuasive capacity depends on something
+non-argumentative. Recall our earlier definition of rhetoric as:
+Rhetoric
+Any verbal or written attempt to persuade someone to believe, desire
+or do something that does not attempt to give good reasons for the
+belief, desire or action, but attempts to motivate that belief, desire or
+action solely through the power of the words used.
+The difference between fallacies and rhetorical ploys is understood
+most easily as a difference in the function of the language being employed.
+As we saw in Chapter 1, politicians, advertisers and newspaper columnists
+tend to be experts when it comes to using rhetorical ploys. Rhetorical ploys
+typically make a more or less direct appeal to feeling and emotion rather
+than to reason, which is the domain of argument. Fallacies, on the other
+hand, are simply defective attempts at argument (they may be defective in
+any of various different ways, as explained below). They may fool us into
+thinking they are not defective, but they are still presented as attempts at
+argument. Of course, many writers and speakers will use a mixture of rhetorical
+ploys, fallacies and genuine arguments when attempting to persuade
+us of the truth of their claim. In fact, it is possible for a given form of
+words, as advanced by a would-be persuader, to constitute a fallacy, yet,
+at the same time, function as a rhetorical ploy. For example, the following
+sort of advertisement is ubiquitous:
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+114
+More mothers use Namby-pambies for their babies than any other
+disposable nappy. Shouldn't you?
+As we will explain in more detail below, this is an example of the
+fallacy of majority belief; the advertisement wants mothers to accept
+the argument: X is used by more people than any other product of its
+kind, therefore X is the best such product. That argument is fallacious
+because its implicit premise -- that the most popular thing is the best,
+or most popular belief is true -- is unjustified. But the advertisement also
+exemplifies the rhetorical ploy of appeal to popularity: the mere fact
+that something is popular often causes us to desire it (possibly by
+awakening a fear of being left out). The point can be put this way: the
+detection of fallacies is an exercise in logical and factual assessment; it
+involves the assessment of reasons. The detection of rhetorical ploys, on
+the other hand, is an exercise of psychology: we consider ways in which
+our desires, fears, beliefs and actions could be non-rationally influenced
+by uses of language which are intended to persuade us to hold beliefs and
+perform actions.
+As critical thinkers, we aim to become adept at distinguishing and
+identifying these different types of sham-reasoning. We want to understand
+how they work, and how to avoid being taken in by them. In the
+next section, we consider specific types of rhetorical ploy and examples
+thereof. Later we turn to a comprehensive consideration of fallacies.
+Rhetorical ploys
+Appeals to specific feelings
+There is a range of rhetorical ploys that attempt to tap into specific feelings
+in order to influence our behaviour and opinions (especially our
+consumer behaviour). Here we discuss a number of the most common.
+Some of them are not strictly or specifically linguistic ploys, but this will
+not affect the points we need to make.
+Appeal to novelty
+Here someone attempts to persuade us to try or buy something because
+the item is new and, by implication, different from and better than existing
+related items. Often this ploy appeals to our desire not to miss out
+on a new trend, or arouses our fear of appearing outdated in our tastes.
+Sometimes it appeals to our (vain) sense of our selves as flexible and
+willing to try out new experiences. It may also persuade us that because
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+115
+the product is new, it must be an improved version of the existing product.
+Familiar examples of the appeal to novelty include the re-naming
+of the Labour Party as the New Labour Party; advertising that attempts
+to persuade us to upgrade to frequently newly released, but little-changed
+or improved computer software packages; and attempts to persuade us to
+switch to allegedly new and improved washing detergents. The appeal to
+novelty may also be employed to persuade us to adopt new ideas or
+beliefs. Again, this appeals to our desire not to appear inflexible or stickin-
+the-mud. Thus we might be enjoined to give up a belief in the value
+of trade union participation on the grounds that trade unionism is 'oldfashioned'
+and 'has no place in the workplace of the twenty-first century'.
+Notice that we have been given no reason to reject trade unionism, we
+are just told that it is 'old-fashioned' and thus, by implication, something
+undesirable that we wouldn't want to be involved with.
+Appeal to popularity
+Like the appeal to novelty, this ploy appeals to our desire to run with the
+crowd, not to appear different from the norm and not to miss out on
+what others have. Again, it is commonly used to persuade us to buy
+things, but also occurs frequently as a means to persuade us to adopt a
+belief or to follow a certain course of action. Consider the following
+attempt to persuade students to buy a computer software package:
+Get Hotstuff! -- the best-selling comprehensive software package
+among today's students -- and turn your assignments into hot
+stuff.
+Such an advertisement can work in various ways. It makes a straightforward
+appeal to our desire to have what others have and not to miss out
+on the benefits enjoyed by those who already use the package in question.
+But, in addition, it tends to lead us to make some unjustified
+assumptions about why the product is the most popular ('best-selling').
+If we take insufficient care, we are inclined to think that the most popular
+product must be the most effective, but its popularity might stem purely
+from its competitive price or the success of the marketing campaign. The
+fact that the software package is the best-selling does not give us a
+compelling reason either to buy the product or to conclude that it must
+be the most suitable software package for student-use.
+Like many rhetorical ploys, the appeal to popularity can sometimes be
+construed as presenting an argument -- in this case, as presenting a reason
+to buy something. As we can see from the following reconstruction, the
+reason given is not typically a good one (so the argument is fallacious):
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+116
+P1) The software package that sells best among students must be
+the best software package for students.
+P2) The software package that sells best among students is
+Hotstuff.
+C1) Hotstuff is the best software package for students.
+This argument would be valid but almost certainly not sound because the
+assumption made explicit in P1 is not plausible; it is not the case in general
+that the best-selling product of a given kind is the best of that kind (see
+the discussion of the fallacy of majority belief, below). Certainly if you
+were a student intending to invest in an expensive software package, you
+would want much stronger evidence that Hotstuff is the best (and furthermore,
+you might well think that since different students have different
+needs, the claim that a given software package is the best for students in
+general must be pretty vague, and without any direct implication for
+you, with your particular needs; we will discuss this kind of vagueness
+in more on pp. 122--3).
+Appeal to compassion, pity or guilt
+This common rhetorical ploy operates by attempting to move us to do
+something purely by evoking a feeling of compassion towards the recipients
+of the suggested act or belief, or a feeling of guilt about their plight.
+The feeling alone does not provide a good reason for us to perform the
+act in question. Examples of this ploy are myriad. Charity appeals and
+advertising provide plenty of instances. Pictures of hungry children, suffering
+animals and so forth, accompanied by simple slogans are designed
+to tweak our feelings of compassion, pity and guilt about the situation
+of the people or animals featured. Remember that the primary purpose of
+our examination of rhetorical ploys is a critical one; that is, we encourage
+critical thinkers not to be persuaded by rhetoric and to avoid rhetoric in
+their own attempts rationally to persuade others.
+As we pointed out in Chapter 1, however, rhetoric can play a useful
+role when put to good ends. In the case of the appeal to compassion, it
+serves a positive role by pricking our conscience and opening us up to
+rational argument regarding how we should act in the given situation.
+Feelings of compassion can prompt us to look for arguments that do
+provide good reasons for the course of action recommended by the
+rhetorical ploy. Suppose, for example, you read a charity advertisement
+that appeals to your sense of compassion toward hungry children. You
+may go on to reason that if one can do something to alleviate hardship,
+one should; and if you are in a position to do so then you should make a
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+117
+donation to the charity. Such an argument might look thus when reconstructed
+and rendered in standard form:
+P1) A donation to the Worldwide Fund for Children would
+probably help to alleviate the suffering of children from extreme
+hunger.
+P2) I should try to alleviate extreme suffering where it's possible
+for me to do so.
+P3) It is possible for me to make a donation to the WWFC.
+C) (Probably) I should make a donation to the WWFC.
+Notice that the argument is inductively forceful, its premises make
+it probable that I should act in the way prescribed. It is certainly not
+implausible to say that this argument is sound. Suppose then that you
+were moved to donate to the WWFC by a message simply stating
+that many children throughout the world suffer from extreme hunger,
+along with instructions on how to donate to the WWFC. The message
+certainly does not present the above argument, nor any other. But it
+might have moved you to act by causing you to think of the argument
+yourself.
+Appeal to cuteness
+This rhetorical technique supplements its words with images of children,
+animals or animated characters to deliver a message. The product that we
+are urged to buy or the action we are urged to take is made to seem
+attractive by its association with the cute character that urges us to buy
+it or take it. The appeal can also work by helping us to remember a product
+(what advertisers would call making us brand-aware) via its association
+with the cute figure delivering the sales pitch.
+Appeal to sexiness
+This is similar to the appeal to cuteness, except that it uses a different
+type of image. It also has a further dimension. To those who would desire
+the sexy person depicted in the advertisement, the product is made to
+seem desirable by its association with the sexy person. But it is also made
+to seem desirable to those who would like to think of themselves as sexy
+in the way that the sexy person is. The ad seeks to flatter us. It may even
+invite us to reason, fallaciously: all sexy people buy or do this; therefore
+if I buy or do this, I'm sexy. This would be the fallacy of affirming the
+consequent, discussed below.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+118
+Appeals to wealth, status, power, hipness, coolness, etc.
+You can easily work out what these are by analogy with the appeals to
+cuteness and sexiness.
+Appeal to fear (also known as scare tactics)
+This is the tactic of trying to elicit a fear in one's readers or listeners
+in order to influence their behaviour or attitudes. A frequent example of
+the appeal to fear occurs in discussions about immigration into countries
+such as the UK. Many politicians and other opinion-formers such as
+journalists use the tactic of eliciting citizens' fears of economic destitution
+and cultural demise by constructing deliberately exaggerated images
+of 'waves of immigrants'1 entering a country illegally and generally
+living a life better than that they deserve; taking jobs, education, health
+care and state benefits to which they have no rightful entitlement and
+thereby making Mr and Ms Average Citizen worse off. This familiar scare
+tactic (that almost certainly also makes appeal to some people's racist attitudes)
+is often used by politicians to persuade people to support draconian
+immigration policies and infringements of people's civil rights, and to
+demonstrate that support by voting for them at election time. But no
+reason has been given for the belief that disaster would result if such
+extreme policies were not enacted. Instead, it is hoped that describing
+these disastrous scenarios will alarm people so severely as to disturb their
+reason, prompting the confused supposition that the disastrousness of the
+worst possible scenario should be matched by the severity of the preventive
+measures taken.
+The appeal to fear should be distinguished from genuine warnings.
+In instances of the former, there is no warranted connection between the
+fear elicited and taking the suggested course of action or accepting the
+claim. Whereas in the case of a warning, we are given a good reason to
+act. This is usually because the circumstances of the warning are themselves
+such as to warrant the belief that the warning is well-founded. For
+example, the warning 'Don't touch the dog, it may look cute and friendly
+but it bites!' would normally be given only by someone who knows that
+the dog bites; since such warnings are very seldom given insincerely or
+with a deceitful motive, the fact that such a warning has been given is
+good reason to heed it. Such an inference, needless to say, would be much
+more doubtful in the realm of advertising or political discourse.
+These are the most common instances of rhetorical ploys intended to
+manipulate specific feelings and thereby to influence our attitudes and
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+119
+1 Notice the rhetorical power of the phrase 'waves of immigrants', connoting as it does
+a flood that will sweep people away.
+behaviour, but there are others that occur frequently. Try to think of
+some and find some examples of your own.
+The direct attack and hard sell
+The direct attack is the simplest of all rhetorical ploys. It occurs most
+frequently in advertising, though it also appears in political campaigning.
+It often takes the form of a very simple slogan. For instance, 'Say no to
+tuition fees!', 'Drink cola!' Notice that we are given no reason to say 'no'
+or to drink cola. The belief of those who employ the direct attack is that
+the more we hear or read these commands and internalise them, the more
+likely we are to do as they advocate, despite having been given no reason
+to do so. We often talk about 'giving someone the hard sell'. The hard
+sell is simply the direct attack repeated persistently. Children are notably
+effective with it. The persuader just keeps it up until the subject of their
+attack gives in and does as they want, the persuader thereby having influenced
+their target by verbal means without giving reasons for doing as
+they command.
+Buzzwords
+This is the technique of using fashionable or otherwise currently 'hot'
+words or phrases that are loaded with rhetorical power due to their rich
+secondary connotation. (If you don't feel familiar with the concept of
+secondary connotation, have another look at the relevant section of Chapter
+1.) Buzzwords can be enormously provocative and therefore hard to tame,
+and this makes them especially problematic for the critical thinker. If we
+want to make an objective analysis of a passage or speech act, we should
+rephrase what is said or written in such a way as to eliminate the buzzwords,
+and then embark on the analysis. Here is an example of a passage
+containing several buzzwords:
+The Prime Minister's solid stance against European Union
+bureaucrats' latest attempts to create yet more employment
+rights for European workers and yet more financial burdens for
+European employers sent a message to business that his
+Government would continue to stand tall in its commitment to
+the free market and to wealth creation.
+The writer uses the terms 'bureaucrats', 'business', 'free market' and
+'wealth creation' as buzzwords to manipulate readers' sympathies towards
+the Prime Minister's anti-European stance. In combination with the rhetorical
+import of some of the other words used in the passage, these
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+120
+buzzwords have the effect of showing the Prime Minister to be protecting
+these (allegedly) uncontroversially good things in the face of an unwarranted
+attack on them by the European Union, which the writer casts in
+a bad light by their use of the negative connotations of the buzzword
+'bureaucrats'.
+Scare quotes
+This tactic is a means of influencing opinion against a view that one
+opposes. The speaker/writer takes key words in terms of which their
+opponent expresses their views and attempts to discredit those views by
+making them appear ridiculous or suspicious through the use of scare
+quotes. No reason is given for rejecting the view, we are simply manipulated
+into rejecting it because it has been made to appear ridiculous or
+suspicious. Suppose someone makes the following claim about people
+trying to settle in the UK for reasons of political asylum:
+Almost all asylum seekers are economic migrants.
+Now consider the effect of using scare quotes around the term 'asylum
+seekers' so that the claim becomes:
+Almost all 'asylum seekers' are economic migrants.
+As you can see, the addition of scare quotes has the same rhetorical effect
+as putting the phrase 'so-called' before the crucial term or phrase. The
+claim becomes much more explicitly negative in respect of its questioning
+of the legitimacy of people's claims for asylum. Indeed, it has virtually
+the same effect as the rhetorically explosive phrase 'bogus asylum
+seekers'.
+This tactic can also be used more subtly but to similar effect. In such
+cases an opponent's opinion is made to seem dubious by placing scare
+quotes around words used to describe what would be perfectly normal,
+acceptable facts about them. This can turn a perfectly innocuous statement
+into one that casts doubt on someone's credibility. Compare:
+My opponent does of course have his reasons for what he believes
+to be right.
+with the scare-quoted:
+My opponent does of course have his 'reasons' for what he believes
+to be right.
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+121
+While the first sentence suggests disagreement with the opponent's view,
+the use of scare quotes in the second lends it increased rhetorical power,
+not only expressing disagreement with the opinion in question, but also
+casting doubt on the legitimacy of the justification provided for those
+views.
+Care should be taken not to confuse the rhetorical ploy of scare
+quoting with the legitimate use of quotation marks to demarcate a direct
+citation of what someone has said or written. Sometimes we use quotation
+marks in this way even if the view we are quoting is one with which
+we disagree. For instance, in responding to a letter one has read in a
+newspaper, one might write:
+Ms Long is simply mistaken when she claims that 'men are better
+critical thinkers than women'.
+Here the writer is simply using quotation marks to show that she is using
+the original writer's words verbatim. Sometimes we do use citations of
+what people actually say or write to rhetorical effect and we use quotation
+marks to demarcate their actual words, but this is not the same as
+the tactic of scare quoting. A good example of this latter technique is
+the use of someone else's words taken out of context in order to give
+rhetorical support to one's own opinions.
+Trading on an equivocation
+This ploy deliberately exploits the ambiguity, and in some cases the
+vagueness, of a word or phrase in the given context. Although nothing
+false is claimed, the speaker or writer manages to influence our actions or
+beliefs by misleading us. It is generally used when someone is attempting
+to persuade us of the benefits and virtues of their product or policy; hence
+it is common in advertising, particularly when an advertisement uses a
+superlative such as 'best', 'biggest', 'most successful' and so on. So imagine
+we come across the following advertisement:
+Britburgers: Britain's favourite hamburger restaurant!
+To equivocate is misleadingly to use the same word in more than one
+sense; the ploy is to get us to interpret a message in a way that favours
+the product or view being advanced, when it is only under another
+interpretation that the message is true or well-founded. In this case, the
+word 'favourite' is ambiguous, having at least two possible meanings: it
+could mean (i) that Britburgers is the hamburger restaurant that most
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+122
+British people prefer or like best, or (ii) that Britburgers is the hamburger
+restaurant with the most customers in Britain (or possibly that it's
+the one that sells the most hamburgers in Britain, or that has the
+most franchise outlets in Britain). Obviously the advertisers hope that we'll
+understand the message according to (i): this is much more favourable to
+the restaurant than merely having the most customers, since its market
+domination might be due to some factor other than actual customer
+preference.
+Now we might realise that Britburgers would risk prosecution if
+they made this claim knowing it wasn't true, and thus conclude that
+Britburgers really is actively preferred by more British hamburger-eaters.
+But there's the rub with equivocation: the slogan could be true without
+the proposition it expresses giving us a good reason to expect Britburgers'
+burgers to be any good, for the truth expressed by the slogan might not
+be the one we take it to be. The slogan might be true only under interpretation
+(ii), and not under interpretation (i). In that case the advertisers
+could not rightly be convicted of having said something false; they can
+always claim that (ii) is all that was intended.
+Another common instance of equivocation occurs when the ambiguity
+and vagueness of the phrase 'links to' is used rhetorically to imply that
+someone is involved in some kind of illegal or immoral activity (and is
+therefore a bad person). Suppose you read a newspaper article which
+reports that:
+Mr Smith, who is believed to have links to terrorist organisations,
+was seen boarding a flight at Heathrow Airport.
+you may well be inclined to think that Mr Smith is a terrorist. But all
+that you have been told is that someone believes he has 'links to' terrorist
+organisations. These 'links' could amount to nothing more than his having
+visited premises belonging to such organisations, or he may have attended
+a meeting, or bought propaganda material, or done business with members
+of such an organisation, or simply have a relation who is involved
+in such an organisation. The ploy is also commonly employed using the
+phrase 'associated with', as in 'Mr Smith is believed to be associated with
+El Bayda'.2
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+123
+2 Notice that the word 'terrorism' is itself vague in that the boundaries of what counts
+as terrorism are fluid and the meaning of the term remains contested. Public discourse
+about terrorism often involves trading on equivocation about the meaning of 'terrorism'.
+As the cliché goes, one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter.
+The ploy of equivocation also occurs when someone attempts to
+mislead with statistics by saying something that is true, but which they
+expect their audience to understand according to an interpretation that is
+false. The following example of attempting to mislead with statistics,
+which comes from a speech by George W. Bush, also includes an equivocation
+on the meaning of 'average':
+These tax reductions will bring real and immediate benefits to
+middle-income Americans. Ninety-two million Americans will keep
+an average of $1,083 more of their own money.
+This claim sounds like the average American will get a little over $1,000.
+But hang on. Ninety-two million is the number of Americans who pay
+income tax. One might understand Bush, as his speechwriters intend one
+to, as saying that the tax bill of the average American will reduce by $1,083.
+But if 'average American' means 'American with average income', then
+Bush's claim is false. What is true is that $1,083 is the average tax reduction
+under the new plan. But that's because the highest earners save hundreds
+of thousands (similarly, if Bill Gates is in the room along with ten
+call-centre workers, then the average net worth is still in the billions). The
+American with average income still only gets a few hundred dollars relief.
+Trading on implicature
+This is the tactic of using a statement's implicature to mislead the audience
+(if you are not clear on what implicature is, revisit the discussion in
+Chapter 1, pp. 9--10). Since the proposition implicated is not actually stated
+by the speaker, the speaker can hope to avoid responsibility for having
+misled the audience. This is common in political discussion. For instance,
+suppose an opposition politician says:
+If the Government increases the income tax, it will be a further
+burden on working families.
+Suppose the politician knows that the Government is not actually considering
+the tax increase. Still, the audience is led to believe that the Government
+is considering it -- for why else would the politician think it
+relevant to specify the negative consequence of a tax increase? In using
+implicature in his way, the speaker or writer intends their audience to
+interpret their words in this misleading way and to be emotionally moved
+as a result. Yet if accused of having misled the audience, the politician
+can say that he did not actually say anything false, since he did not assert
+that the Government is considering a tax increase.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+124
+Smokescreen (changing the subject)
+This is the tactic of avoiding discussion of an issue or acknowledgement
+of a point through diverting or distracting one's opponent from the issue
+at hand by addressing a different (possibly related) issue. The issue irrelevant
+to the discussion thereby acts like a smokescreen by obscuring our
+view of the real issue. The more subtle the smokescreen, the more effective
+at distracting the listener or reader it tends to be. Consider, for
+instance, a Government minister trying to defend her Government's
+proposed changes to immigration legislation. The proposals have come to
+light because a civil servant has leaked some classified documents. In
+defending the proposals, the minister responds to questions by launching
+into a speech about how the leak constitutes a dreadful dereliction of duty
+and breach of trust. Instead of addressing the issue at hand -- whether or
+not the proposed legislative changes are good ones -- the minister is
+attempting to distract attention from it by obscuring it in the rhetoric of
+her speech about duty, responsibility and trust, a speech that is rhetorically
+powerful because duty, responsibility and trust are the sorts of things
+that right-minded people are supposed to uphold and admire.
+The smokescreen tactic is very similar to the red herring fallacy,
+discussed in more detail below (p. 155). The crucial difference is that while
+the smokescreen works via its rhetorical power, the red herring is still an
+attempt to persuade by argument: it gives reasons for accepting a claim,
+just not good reasons. When we are trying to distinguish the smokescreen
+ploy from the red herring fallacy, we must first work out whether or not
+the writer or speaker is attempting to persuade by argument.
+Fallacies
+Strictly speaking, a fallacy is a mistake in reasoning. One commits a
+fallacy when the reasons advanced or accepted in support of a claim fail
+to justify its acceptance. A fallacy can be committed either when one is
+deciding whether to accept a claim on the basis of a fallacious argument
+with which one has been presented, or when one is presenting the fallacious
+argument oneself.
+A fallacious argument or inference is one in which there is an inappropriate
+connection between premises and conclusion. Almost all
+fallacies fall under one of the following two types:
+* Formal fallacies. Sometimes the inappropriate connections are failures
+of logical connection, for example, in the case of the fallacy
+(below) of affirming the consequent; here the argument or inference
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+125
+is neither deductively valid nor inductively forceful, even where
+all implicit premises have been made explicit. It is simply a logical
+mistake.
+* Substantive fallacies. Sometimes the inappropriate connections
+involve reliance on some very general unjustified assumptions or
+inferences. We need only make these premises explicit in order to
+see that they are false and unjustified. What distinguishes a fallacious
+argument of this kind from an ordinary unsound argument is that
+the implicit, false or dubious premise will be of a very general nature,
+having nothing specifically to do with the subject-matter of the
+argument. What this means will become apparent when we turn to
+examples.
+The vast majority of fallacies that we encounter in everyday texts
+and speech are substantive fallacies, but some are formal fallacies, and a
+few are neither formal nor substantive. Arguments embodying formal or
+substantive fallacies are necessarily unsound, but not all fallacious
+arguments are actually unsound. Since fallacies are many and various in
+this way, it would be tedious and distracting to formulate a precise definition.
+We will simply take fallacies to be mistakes in reasoning that arise
+because of inappropriate connections between premises and conclusions;
+we will identify the most commonly encountered fallacies, and we will
+demonstrate different strategies for dealing with them.
+It is important at the outset to note the general point, however, that
+a fallacious argument can have true or false premises: simply having false
+premises does not make an argument fallacious. Nor does having true
+premises guarantee that an argument is not fallacious.
+Furthermore, a proposition accepted on the basis of a fallacious argument
+may turn out to be true as a matter of actual fact. Suppose that
+someone reasons as follows:
+There is blood on the candelabra. And if Colonel Mustard killed the
+victim with the candelabra, then there would be. So Colonel
+Mustard must be the murderer.
+Laid out in standard form the argument is thus:
+P1) If Colonel Mustard killed the victim with the candelabra, then
+there is blood on the candelabra.
+P2) There is blood on the candelabra.
+C) Colonel Mustard killed the victim.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+126
+Now suppose that, in fact, the conclusion is true: Colonel Mustard is the
+murderer. Still, the reasoning that takes us to that conclusion is fallacious
+(the fallacy is the fallacy of affirming the consequent). It is not
+legitimate to infer on the basis of P1 and P2 that Colonel Mustard is
+the murderer. Even if both premises were true, it would be possible
+for the conclusion to be false: for example, someone else could have
+killed the victim with the candelabra. Knowledge of the truth of those
+premises, just by themselves, would not be sufficient to infer the conclusion,
+even if that conclusion were actually true. If you were to be fooled
+by such an argument, you would end up with a true belief, but for
+mistaken reasons.
+Like linguistic phenomena and rhetorical ploys, the best way to
+become acquainted with the different types of fallacies considered in this
+chapter is to practise identifying and analysing them. As they are attempts
+to persuade by argument, you need to reconstruct them in standard
+form and then use techniques of argument analysis and assessment to
+demonstrate the ways in which they are fallacious.
+And one last thing to bear in mind before we work through specific
+types of fallacies: as we have already mentioned, many types of fallacious
+argument are effective as rhetorical ploys. Someone might be aware
+that their argument commits a fallacy, but will use it to try to persuade
+us because they are aware of its rhetorical power: they are aware, that is,
+that it does tend to persuade people. Fallacies tend to be effective as
+attempts to persuade because the psychological effect of their rhetorical
+power means that we often find them persuasive even though we ought
+not to. Common examples include uses of ad hominem, majority belief
+and slippery slope fallacies to rhetorical effect.
+Formal fallacies
+The first group of fallacies we want to discuss here are strictly formal
+fallacies; these are patterns of argument whose reasoning makes purely
+logical mistakes. Each type of fallacy constitutes an invalid argument
+and once you are familiar with the patterns, the fallacies will be
+recognised by the presence of the particular invalid pattern.
+Affirming the consequent of a conditional
+Or 'affirming the consequent' for short. This occurs when we argue from
+the conditional premise that if P (the antecedent), then Q (the consequent)
+together with the premise that Q to the conclusion that P, as in
+the following example:
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+127
+If mortgage rates go up, then house prices fall. House prices have
+fallen. Therefore, mortgage rates have gone up.
+Reconstruction of the argument reveals its invalidity:
+P1) If mortgage rates go up (P), then house prices fall (Q).
+P2) House prices have fallen (Q).
+C) Mortgage rates have gone up (P).
+If the premises were true, the conclusion would not have to be true. There
+are a variety of circumstances other than a rise in mortgage rates under
+which house prices might fall. So the fact that they have fallen would be
+insufficient for us to draw the conclusion that mortgage rates had gone
+up. That the inference is fallacious is obvious if we consider a true conditional
+such as 'If it is raining, then there are clouds'; it certainly does not
+follow, from this and the premise 'there are clouds', that it is raining.
+Notice that affirming the antecedent of a conditional premise does
+not make for an invalid argument:
+P1) If mortgage rates go up (P), house prices will fall (Q).
+P2) Mortgage rates have gone up (P).
+C) House prices will fall (Q).
+This is of course valid because the conditional gives one condition under
+which house prices will fall and P2 asserts that the condition is met; so
+it is legitimate to conclude that house prices will fall.
+Denying the antecedent of a conditional
+Or 'denying the antecedent' for short. This is the fallacy that occurs when
+we argue from a conditional premise (if P then Q) together with the negation
+of its antecedent (not-P) for the conclusion that the consequent is
+also negated (not-Q). The invalidity of this pattern can be seen clearly
+using a version of the example above:
+P1) If mortgage rates go up (P), house prices will fall (Q).
+P2) Mortgage rates have not gone up (not P).
+C) House prices will not fall (not Q).
+The invalidity here has similar grounds to that of the fallacy of affirming
+the consequent. There are conditions other than mortgage rates going up
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+128
+that could precipitate a fall in house prices, so the fact that mortgage rates
+have stayed the same (or decreased) does not give us sufficient grounds
+for concluding that house prices will not fall; other factors may lead to
+their falling. Or again: from 'If it is raining then there are clouds' and
+'it is not raining', it does not follow that there are no clouds.
+Fallacy of deriving 'ought' from 'is'
+The Scottish philosopher, David Hume, famously argued that an 'ought'
+cannot be derived from an 'is'. The claim can be understood in two ways:
+first, as a claim about motivations to act or refrain from acting. The fact
+that something is thus-and-so, argued Hume, is insufficient as a reason
+for thinking that one ought to act in such-and-such a way. The fact that
+torturing animals causes them suffering is not, according to this argument,
+sufficient reason to refrain from torturing animals. An additional motivating
+force -- a desire to avoid harm to animals -- must also play a role in
+our motivation to act in such cases. Although an interesting and controversial
+thesis, this way of interpreting Hume's claim is not the one that
+interests us here.3 Rather, we are interested in Hume's claim understood
+as the claim that a prescriptive conclusion cannot be validly derived from
+purely descriptive premises, such an inference is fallacious. Thus the fallacy
+of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' occurs when a prescriptive conclusion
+-- a conclusion making a claim about something that should or ought
+to be done or avoided or believed or not believed -- is deduced solely on
+the basis of descriptive, fact-stating, premises. Inferences from descriptive
+to prescriptive propositions are considered fallacious because the fact
+that something happens to be the case, or happens not to be the case, is
+insufficient grounds for concluding that it ought or ought not to be the
+case. If we want to make a valid argument for a prescriptive conclusion,
+we must always do so from premises at least one of which is prescriptive.
+Thus the following commits the fallacy of deriving 'ought' from 'is':
+How can anyone claim that the monarchy should be abolished? The
+monarchy as we know it has been central to British life for nearly
+a thousand years, arguably longer.
+Although it is not expressed as such, the conclusion of this argument is
+really a prescriptive one -- that the British monarchy should be retained
+-- but the conclusion is arrived at purely on the basis of the premise that
+it exists, and has done so for a long time. As such, the argument is plainly
+invalid:
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+129
+3 For a detailed discussion of this debate see J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and
+Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
+P1) The British monarchy has existed for nearly a thousand years.
+C) The British monarchy should be retained.
+In this particular case we can make the argument valid by adding a
+prescriptive premise as follows:
+P1) The British monarchy has existed for nearly a thousand years.
+P2) Anything that has existed for nearly a thousand years should
+be retained.
+C) The British monarchy should be retained.
+But the argument is clearly deductively unsound: poverty has existed for
+at least a thousand years, but it is surely false to claim that it should be
+retained. Note that P2 does not become more plausible if we make it into
+a soft generalisation. Thus the argument cannot be saved by attempting
+to make it inductively forceful and inductively sound.
+The base rate fallacy
+This fallacy has already been mentioned in Chapter 3 (see pp. 95--6). It
+is committed when an argument takes the following form: the proportion
+of one group that has a certain feature is higher than the proportion
+of another group that has that feature. Therefore, some X that has that
+feature is more likely to be from the first group than the second. Suppose
+someone reasons, for example: Rex is either a rat or a cat, 75 per cent of
+cats are black whereas only 45 per cent of rats are black, Rex is black,
+therefore Rex is probably a cat. The inference is mistaken because the
+number of black rats may still be larger than the number of black cats.
+In fact it surely is: the overall number of rats in the world is far greater
+than the number of cats, so even if blackness is more common among
+cats than rats, the number of black rats can still be much higher than the
+number of black cats.
+The fallacy commonly occurs when arguers resort to gender or racial
+stereotypes to make a point. Suppose that Ringons are a minority group
+outnumbered by non-Ringons by ten to one and someone argues:
+P1) Most Ringons have a criminal record.
+P2) Few non-Ringons have a criminal record.
+P3) Apex has a criminal record.
+C) (Probably) Apex is a Ringon.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+130
+Even though there is a high incidence of criminality among Ringons, there
+are so many more non-Ringons than Ringons that someone with a criminal
+record is still more likely to be a non-Ringon than they are to be a
+Ringon. Since the argument tells you nothing about the total number of
+Ringons as compared with non-Ringons, the argument is not inductively
+forceful: P1--P3 do not give you a reason to infer the conclusion. In fact,
+if you did know that non-Ringons outnumber Ringons ten to one, then,
+given P1--P3 and asked to guess whether Apex is a Ringon or a non-
+Ringon, 'non-Ringon' would be the better guess.
+Substantive fallacies
+The first two substantive fallacies that we consider involve an illegitimate
+inference from the prevalence of a belief or an action to its acceptability.
+Like many, but not all, of the fallacies we'll discuss, we can expose
+the fallacy by making explicit the hidden assumption that generates the
+illegitimate inference.
+The fallacy of majority belief
+This is the fallacy of concluding, on the basis of the fact that the majority
+believe a certain proposition, that the proposition is true. The following
+reasoning commits it:
+Of course the Government must crack down on drug trafficking,
+after all that's what most reasonable, law-abiding people believe.
+The only reason the arguer gives for a government crack-down is that
+most people think such a crack-down would be a good thing. We can see
+this more clearly by laying out the argument in standard form:
+P1) Most reasonable, law-abiding people believe that the
+Government should crack down on drug trafficking.
+C) The Government should crack down on drug trafficking.
+So rendered, the argument is invalid. But we can make the cause of the
+faulty reasoning clearer by making the hidden assumption explicit thus:
+P1) Most reasonable, law-abiding people believe that the
+Government should crack down on drug trafficking.
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+131
+P2) Any belief shared by most reasonable, law-abiding people is
+true.
+C) The Government should crack down on drug trafficking.
+Once we add the implicit premise, the argument becomes valid; but
+we can now see that the assumption underlying the argument, expressed
+by the hard generalisation P2, is false and that the argument is therefore
+unsound. Even if a majority of people do believe a proposition and even
+if they are of sound character, etc. their believing it is not sufficient to
+make it true. Imagine, for example, if most reasonable, law-abiding people
+believed that the Earth was flat, that would not establish that it is! More
+controversially, if a majority of reasonable, law-abiding people believe
+that capital punishment should be restored as a sentence for murder, the
+fact that it is a majority belief is not sufficient to make it true.4 This is
+the principal strategy for dealing with substantive fallacies; by exposing
+the hidden assumption generating the fallacy, we reveal that the same (or
+a very similar) false proposition, usually a generalisation, figures in all
+instances of a particular fallacy.
+The fallacy of majority belief often places us in an apparent dilemma
+when we have to take decisions on behalf of others. Suppose you are a
+member of the jury in an important and high-profile trial that has received
+a great deal of pre-courtroom publicity. On that basis you know that
+most people believe that the defendant was the victim of a conspiracy on
+the part of the investigating police officers; nevertheless, the evidence
+presented in court gives you good reasons to believe that he is guilty.
+Thus you might be tempted into reasoning as follows:
+P1) Most people believe that the defendant was set up and is not
+guilty of the crime he is alleged to have committed.
+C) The defendant is innocent.
+Such reasoning would commit the fallacy of majority belief and should
+be avoided as a basis for a juror's decision. Again we can make the faulty
+reasoning clear by exposing the hidden false assumption, which will be a
+very similar generalisation to that which figured in the previous example,
+thus:
+P1) Most people believe that the defendant was set up and is not
+guilty.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+132
+4 We consider the relationship between truth and belief in more detail in Chapter 7.
+P2) Any belief held by the majority is true.
+C) The defendant is innocent.
+So the argument is valid but not sound.
+The fallacy of majority belief is similar to the rhetorical ploy of appeal
+to popularity, because both use the fact of something's popularity or
+commonality to attempt to persuade us to do or believe it. Sometimes,
+the very act of presenting an argument that commits the fallacy of
+majority belief is at the same time an example of the rhetorical ploy of
+appealing to popularity. Still these are distinct concepts: again, to call it
+a (substantive) fallacy is to say that the argument presented implicitly
+embodies a certain sort of unjustified assumption; to call it a rhetorical
+ploy is to say that it attempts causally to induce us to accept a certain
+belief by activating our social instincts, desires and fears. Some cases
+exemplify the fallacy without exemplifying the rhetorical ploy: someone
+might, for example, be quite sincere in thinking that if something is
+believed by the majority it must be true, and accept a conclusion on that
+basis. On the other hand, some cases exemplify the rhetorical ploy without
+exemplifying the fallacy: an advertisement, for example, that shows
+someone being humiliated because they are the only person not drinking
+a certain brand of cola is clearly trying to influence us by way of our
+social instincts and feelings, not by presenting an argument.
+Common practice
+This is the tactic of attempting to persuade someone to do something they
+shouldn't do by giving them the justification that 'everyone does it'. The
+implication of this sham-reasoning is if everyone does X, X must be acceptable.
+We often use this tactic to provide justification to ourselves for doing
+things we ought not to do. For example: 'It won't hurt to call in sick today,
+everyone does it once or twice a year.' Like the fallacy of majority belief,
+the common practice fallacy is driven by a false assumption concerning
+the connection between what is commonly believed or done and what it
+is morally, socially or rationally acceptable to believe or do. The following
+reasoning is an instance of the common practice fallacy:
+Of course it's OK to fiddle your expenses once in a while, everyone
+does.
+This standard form rendition of the argument shows it to be invalid
+because there is no appropriate connection between the premise and the
+conclusion:
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+133
+P1) Everyone fiddles their expenses occasionally.
+C) It is acceptable to fiddle one's expenses occasionally.
+Once again, exposing the false assumption produces the following argument,
+the unsoundness of which rests on the actual falsity of both P1
+and P2:
+P1) Everyone fiddles their expenses occasionally.
+P2) Any act that everyone occasionally performs is acceptable.
+C) Fiddling one's expenses is acceptable.
+Surely there are some people who have never cheated when making a
+claim for expenses from their employer; and we can think of actions --
+meting out violence to an innocent stranger, for example -- which, if
+performed occasionally by everyone would still be unacceptable. Even
+if the quantifier in P1 and P2 were qualified by 'almost', then although
+P1 might be true, it becomes even less plausible that P2 is true.
+The next group of fallacies involve using alleged facts about the
+person(s) putting forward an argument as the basis for inferring a conclusion
+that their argument should not be accepted. In each case the
+fact about the person is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not we
+should accept their argument. As critical thinkers we are only interested
+in the argument, not in the person giving it. It is also helpful to remember
+this if we feel uncomfortable criticising arguments put forward by
+people we like, respect, fear or want to impress. If the argument is a good
+one, it makes no difference by whom it was given, likewise if it is a
+bad one.
+Ad hominem
+This fallacy (from the Latin, meaning 'to the man') can be committed
+in two ways: either by responding to someone's argument by making
+an attack upon the person, rather than addressing the argument itself, or
+by rejecting a claim because of disapproval of or dislike for the person
+who makes it. The following reasoning commits the ad hominem fallacy
+by citing a claim about a minister's speaking style as a reason for rejecting
+the legislation they propose:
+I don't see why we should accept the new Criminal Justice Bill
+when the minister presented it to us in such an imperious way.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+134
+An initial reconstruction displays the argument as invalid:
+P1) The minister presented the Criminal Justice Bill in an imperious
+way.
+C) The Bill should be rejected.
+Our strategy of exposing the crucial underlying assumption results in the
+following argument, which is unsound because P2 is false:
+P1) The minister presented the Criminal Justice Bill in an imperious
+way.
+P2) Any legislation presented by a person with an imperious
+manner should be rejected.
+C) The Bill should be rejected.
+All instances of the ad hominem fallacy will depend upon similar underlying
+general assumptions referring to certain characteristics or beliefs of
+arguers.
+Ad hominem circumstantial
+This is a sub-species of the ad hominem fallacy and occurs when someone's
+argument in favour of doing or believing something is discounted
+on the grounds that they would allegedly benefit from our doing or believing
+it. Someone would be committing the ad hominem circumstantial
+fallacy if they were to argue:
+Of course academics argue in favour of the proposed expansion of
+university education: the more aspiring graduates there are, the
+more job opportunities there are for people like them.
+Notice that the conclusion of this argument is left implicit, but given the
+arguer's tone, it is reasonable to conclude that they do not agree with the
+expansion proposal. When reconstructing we need to add the conclusion
+for ourselves:
+P1) Academics argue in favour of the proposed expansion of
+university education.
+P2) They would benefit from such an expansion.
+C) We should reject academics' arguments in favour of the
+proposal to expand university education.
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+135
+The result, however, is an argument that is neither valid nor inductively
+forceful. Once again, we can see the true shape of the reasoning that
+constitutes this fallacy by exposing the hidden assumption thus:
+P1) Academics argue in favour of the proposed expansion of
+university education.
+P2) They would benefit from such an expansion.
+P3) Whenever someone would benefit from something, we should
+reject their arguments in favour of it.
+C) We should reject academics' arguments in favour of the
+proposal to expand university education.
+Note that P3 is really quite ludicrous: if it were true, then one could never
+hope to argue successfully for what one wants! Normally, that is exactly
+what we do, and there is nothing intrinsically illegitimate about it. So it
+is unreasonable to reject an argument because the arguer desires or would
+benefit from the truth of the conclusion. What matters is the strength of
+the reasons given for the claim, irrespective of the arguer's motives for
+making the claim. Reason places no strictures on arguing in favour of
+things from which one would benefit.
+However, this is not to say that the issue of a speaker's or a writer's
+character is entirely irrelevant in matters of argument analysis and evaluation.
+A person's character and actions are certainly relevant to their
+credibility: the degree to which someone's having said something constitutes
+a reason to think it true. We should, for example, be on our guard
+against believing the claims of people whom we know to be dishonest.
+Even those who are not habitually dishonest are more likely to attempt
+deception if they are arguing for something that is strongly in their own
+interest. There is certainly a higher probability that someone who is not
+disinterested will deliberately resort to techniques of sham-reasoning in
+their attempts to persuade us of the truth of their claims; for they have
+more to lose if their arguments are not accepted. This probability increases
+with the degree to which the person is unscrupulous. In such cases we
+should check the reasoning carefully, and we should not take their having
+advanced a premise as a reason, in itself, to think it true. This is not,
+however, to say that we should positively assume their reasoning to be
+faulty or their premises false. That would be committing the ad hominem
+fallacy. We should never lose sight of the need to assess the argument
+on its own account. If the argument is found to be valid or inductively
+forceful, or the premises true, the character of the arguer is irrelevant.
+There is one final observation to make concerning the relationship
+between people's characters and reputations and the strength of their
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+136
+arguments. This point does not directly concern a type of fallacious
+reasoning, but is relevant to considerations about the credibility of arguers
+and their arguments: sometimes we are tempted to ignore or reject criticism
+of a person's arguments because of the way in which they have
+been labelled or treated by the media. The sorts of cases we have in mind
+are those in which someone has received racist, sexist or homophobic
+treatment in the media and this has been given as a reason for avoiding
+criticism of or for accepting their views. An example was provided by
+arguments that it was acceptable to allow the convicted rapist and former
+heavyweight boxing champion Mike Tyson into the UK on the grounds
+that much of the media coverage of the case was racist. It may well be
+the case that a good deal of what was written and said about Mr Tyson
+was racist and also that there were good reasons to grant him entry. It
+is crucial to recognise, however, that the existence of the racist discourse
+was irrelevant to the strength or weakness of arguments that he should
+or shouldn't have been granted leave to enter the UK.
+Tu quoque
+In common with ad hominem fallacies, the tu quoque ('you too') fallacy
+occurs when we make unwarranted connections between a person's alleged
+lack of credibility and the strength of their argument. Here the alleged lack
+of credibility ensues specifically from their being hypocritical: an inconsistency
+between the arguer's actions and their claims. The fallacy is
+committed when we: reject a person's claim that a behaviour or proposal
+should be refrained from or discarded on the grounds that they themselves
+practise that behaviour; or when we reject a person's claim that a behaviour
+or proposal should be adopted on the grounds that they fail to follow
+it themselves. Consider the following argument:
+My Dad's always telling me not to talk on my mobile phone while
+I'm driving, but why should I take any notice of him? He's always
+taking calls when he's driving.
+An initial reconstruction yields an invalid argument:
+P1) My Dad says one shouldn't talk on the mobile phone while
+driving.
+P2) My Dad talks on his mobile phone while he's driving.
+C) It is OK to talk on the mobile phone while driving.
+Exposing the hidden false assumption demonstrates that the argument is
+unsound:
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+137
+P1) My Dad says one shouldn't talk on the mobile phone while
+driving.
+P2) My Dad talks on his mobile phone while he's driving.
+P3) Whenever someone's behaviour is inconsistent with their
+advice, that advice is false.
+C) It is OK to talk on the mobile phone while driving.
+The tu quoque fallacy occurs frequently in discussions of the gaps between
+politicians' policy and private decisions.
+Suppose someone were to argue the following:
+The Government's transport policy is a joke, how can we take them
+seriously when they tell us to leave the car at home and use public
+transport when Government ministers go everywhere in chauffeurdriven
+limousines?
+An initial reconstruction yields an invalid argument:
+P1) The Government tells the public to use public transport.
+P2) Government ministers use cars not public transport.
+C) We should not take the Government's transport policy
+seriously.
+Exposing the hidden false assumption demonstrates that the argument is
+unsound:
+P1) The Government tells the public to use public transport.
+P2) Government ministers use cars not public transport.
+P3) Whenever someone's behaviour is inconsistent with their
+policies, we should not take those policies seriously.
+C) We should not take Labour's transport policy seriously.
+The arguer has spotted the inconsistency between what the Government
+does and what it says, but that inconsistency does not render false the
+Government's views about public transport and it does not provide a
+reason to reject the policies in question. Whether it would be a good idea
+for more people to use public transport instead of private cars does not
+depend on whether or not the members of the Government use public
+transport themselves. When we commit this fallacy we are going against
+the old adage: 'Don't do as I do, do as I say.' We might well think that
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+138
+people ought to follow their own advice and principles, in fact in most
+cases it is irrational for them not to do so, but it is equally irrational of
+us to discount their arguments solely on the grounds that they themselves
+don't heed the conclusions of those arguments. Of course, the fact
+that someone in the public arena behaves inconsistently or hypocritically
+does undermine their credibility and may lead us to withdraw our trust
+and respect, but it is not in itself a reason to reject their arguments. What
+seems to happen in such cases is that someone gives advice or expounds
+a policy that they believe applies to their audience, but apparently not to
+themselves. We suspect they delude themselves into thinking that they
+represent an exception to the prescriptive claim that they are making. For
+instance, in the first case above, Dad might delude himself into thinking
+that he's such an experienced and safe driver that when he talks on his
+mobile phone while driving, he is not a danger to himself and to others
+and so need not desist from doing it.
+Appeal to authority
+This fallacy also involves mistaken assumptions about the people mentioned
+by an argument. It is committed when an argument makes an
+unjustified appeal to an alleged authority. This can occur either because
+the authority appealed to is not in fact authoritative on the matter in
+hand or because there is good reason to doubt that the claimed authority
+is adequately informed of the facts of the matter. For example, the fallacy
+is committed when someone in power such as the Prime Minister or
+another political leader is unjustifiably invoked as an expert. For instance:
+It is always better to drink white wine with fish. Tony Blair says so,
+he must know what he's talking about, he's the Prime Minister.
+An initial reconstruction shows the argument to be valid:
+P1) Tony Blair says that it is always better to drink white wine with
+fish.
+P2) Tony Blair is Prime Minister.
+P3) If someone is Prime Minster, then they must always be
+knowledgeable about all the subjects they talk about.
+C) It is always better to drink white wine with fish.
+It is unsound, however, because of the falsity of the conditional P3.
+Someone's being Prime Minister is not sufficient reason to think that
+they are knowledgeable about everything about which they express an
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+139
+opinion. That does not mean, of course, that all appeals to authority are
+fallacious; only those which are mistaken about someone's claim to be
+authoritative about the matter in hand. Prime ministers can claim authority
+on those matters on which they are best qualified to speak. If Tony
+Blair were to say that the best way to win an election is to make realistic
+promises, then one might accept that claim on the basis of his
+evident expertise in such matters.
+The appeal to authority can also function as a rhetorical ploy; the
+pull of the alleged authority being used to lure us into accepting the
+proposition argued for. A common example of this use of the appeal to
+authority is the use of celebrity endorsement to sell things. Although
+one might take Tiger Woods' endorsement of a brand of golf clubs as a
+good reason for buying that brand, one ought to be more wary about
+taking him to be an authority on makes of car, for example, whereas,
+Tommy Hakinnen's endorsement of a car would be authoritative but his
+recommendation of a particular brand of golf clubs would not.
+The perfectionist fallacy
+This fallacy occurs when we place excessive demands on an idea or a
+proposal and then reject it purely on the grounds that it will not
+completely solve a problem. Someone would commit the perfectionist
+fallacy if they were to argue or to accept the argument that:
+The Government should give up its plans to spend ten billion
+pounds on extra surgery in order to reduce hospital waiting lists.
+It's just not possible to get rid of waiting lists in that way.
+An initial reconstruction shows that the argument is invalid:
+P1) The Government's plan to spend ten billion pounds to reduce
+hospital waiting lists will not get rid of waiting lists completely.
+C) The Government's plan should be abandoned.
+The assumption driving this instance of the perfectionist fallacy is that
+governments should only pursue plans that completely solve the problems
+they are intended to solve; more generally, the perfectionist assumption
+is that no measure aimed at solving or reducing a problem is justified
+unless it solves or reduces it completely. This is really quite silly if you
+think about it. It is obvious that many measures are intended to reduce a
+problem, not completely eradicate it, and are justified if they do reduce
+the problem sufficiently. For example, fences are put around cow pastures
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+140
+to keep the cows in; once in a while a cow escapes, but no one would say
+that the occasional escape shows that the fences are unjustified.
+When we include the perfectionist premise in the argument, in this
+case expressed as a conditional, we see that it is deductively unsound
+because the perfectionist premise is false:
+P1) The Government's plan to spend ten billion pounds to reduce
+hospital waiting lists will not get rid of waiting lists completely.
+P2) If a government proposal will not completely solve the problem
+it is intended to solve, it should be abandoned.
+C) The Government's plan should be abandoned.
+Conflation of morality with legality
+This is the mistake of assuming that anything legal must be moral, or
+conversely, that anything illegal must be immoral. For something to be
+legal within the boundaries of a given political entity (nation, city, district,
+the United Nations) is to say that there is no law in the statutes of
+that entity that prohibits it. However, the fact that something is legal
+does not automatically make it morally acceptable. For example, it is
+not illegal to cheat on your lover, or to be rude to a shy person at a party
+just out of cruelty, but these things are immoral. More gravely, in some
+countries, slavery, though obviously immoral, was legal until the nineteenth
+century. In other countries, even today, people may legally be
+denied human and civil rights because of their race, ethnicity, gender or
+religious belief.
+In some cases the laws ought to be changed in order to reflect what
+is morally right. Indeed, it is tempting to argue that what is legal should
+include only what is moral. But to try to outlaw everything immoral
+would be unworkable, and indeed it would overstep what are generally
+considered to be the proper bounds of governmental authority. Some
+aspects of behaviour that we find morally unacceptable are not necessarily
+appropriate subjects for legislation -- conduct in personal relationships, for
+example: we would not want it to be against the law to tell a lie, break
+a promise, make fun of someone or fail to show up for a date. Conversely,
+the fact that something is illegal does not automatically make it immoral.
+In some countries, Australia for example, it is illegal not to cast a vote
+in elections, but it is not obvious that there is a moral issue at stake here.
+Similarly, you are breaking the law when you park on a double yellow
+line, but it is arguable whether or not you are doing anything immoral.
+And sometimes laws that are meant to legislate against immorality are
+mistaken; throughout the ages there have been laws against all manner
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+141
+of things, thought by the authorities of the time to be immoral, that in
+retrospect we think are not immoral, and that never were -- the worship
+or non-worship of certain gods, the education of women, the wearing of
+certain clothes. Indeed, to think that everything legal is moral is to nullify
+the possibility of criticising existing laws on moral grounds.
+Consider this example:
+I don't see why people are so hard on Donald Mirving. After all he's
+done nothing wrong, in this country there's no law against denying
+the Holocaust.
+The 'there's no law against it, so it's acceptable' argument is an extremely
+common instance of the fallacy of conflating legality and morality.
+The first reconstruction shows that the argument is invalid without the
+conflating assumption; the second shows that it is valid but unsound
+with it:
+P1) Donald Mirving has denied the extent and facts of the
+Holocaust.
+P2) It is not illegal to do this in the UK.
+C) Donald Mirving's denial of the Holocaust was not
+morally wrong.
+P1) Donald Mirving has denied the extent and facts of the
+Holocaust.
+P2) It is not illegal to do this in the UK.
+P3) Anything legal is moral.
+C) Donald Mirving's denial of the Holocaust was not
+morally wrong.
+So, pointing out that the act in question is not against the law does not
+show that it is not wrong. Of course, many of the questions surrounding
+whether or not an issue is a moral one are controversial (the examples
+given above are by no means clear cut); they may require reflection and
+argument in their own right.
+Weak analogy
+Analogies are often interesting and may be illustrative of points one
+wishes to make, but arguing on the basis of analogy is often unsuccessful
+and often turns out to be fallacious either because the analogy is too
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+142
+weak to sustain the argument or because the analogy itself has not been
+argued for. (This makes the argument question-begging. We discuss
+the fallacy of begging the question later in this chapter.) In the case of
+the fallacy of weak analogy, it will be helpful first to see the form that
+instances usually take, and then to consider an example. The fallacy of
+weak analogy usually argues on the basis of a proposition that because
+one thing is similar to another in one respect, that it is, therefore, similar
+in a further respect. This mistaken inference is based on the false assumption
+that if something is similar to another thing in one respect, it is
+similar in all respects. Hence we construct an argument of the following
+valid but unsound form:
+P1) An object X is similar to an object Y in respect of
+characteristic A.
+P2) Whenever an object X is similar to an object Y in one respect,
+it is similar in all respects.
+P3) Y has characteristic B.
+C) X has characteristic B.
+An instance of this fallacy occurs frequently in debates about legislation
+to control the ownership and use of firearms. So let's take such an instance
+as our example:
+I don't see what all the fuss is about guns. Of course gun
+ownership shouldn't be prohibited, you can kill someone with a
+cricket bat, but no one proposes to ban ownership of cricket bats.
+A reconstruction demonstrates that this argument takes the form characteristic
+of the fallacy of weak analogy except that to render the arguer's
+thinking fully, we have to add a further premise to the effect that things
+that are the same should always be treated the same:
+P1) Guns are like cricket bats in that both can be used to kill
+people.
+P2) Whenever an object X is similar to an object Y in one respect,
+it is similar in all respects.
+P3) Objects that are similar to each other in all respects should be
+treated identically.
+P4) We would not ban ownership of cricket bats.
+C) We should not ban ownership of guns.
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+143
+The argument is unsound because it is obviously false to assume that
+similarity in one respect implies similarity in all respects. While it is of
+course true that cricket bats and guns have some shared similarities, those
+similarities are not sufficient for the analogy to hold. The dissimilarities
+-- cricket bats have a different primary purpose; it is difficult to commit
+mass murder with a cricket bat, and so on -- outweigh the similarities
+(indeed, one can kill a person with just about any solid, heavy object,
+such as a television; no one would argue that since we don't ban those
+potential murder weapons, we shouldn't ban firearms!).
+The fact that arguments from analogy frequently turn out to be fallacious
+does not mean that they are universally unsuccessful. For an analogy
+to be effective in giving us a reason to accept a conclusion, an arguer
+must first present an argument for the claim that the objects that are
+allegedly analogous (cricket bats and guns in the case under consideration)
+are sufficiently similar in the relevant respect. Once established, this
+conclusion would become the first premise of a subsequent argument for
+the claim that gun ownership should not be banned.
+Causal fallacies
+These fallacies are committed when we make mistaken inferences about
+the cause(s) of something. Three types can be distinguished:
+* Post hoc ergo propter hoc (from the Latin meaning 'after that, this,
+therefore this because of that);
+* fallacy of mistaking correlation for cause; and
+* inversion of cause and effect.
+Post hoc ergo propter hoc
+This fallacy occurs when we mistakenly infer that an event X caused an
+event Y merely on the basis that Y occurred after X. In the following
+example, the fallacy is committed twice. We can tell that the argument
+includes a causal claim because the proposition expressed by the conclusion
+states that one event -- making a will -- makes another event happen
+-- living longer:
+Making a will makes you live longer. That's the conclusion reached
+by legacy specialists Live and Let Live, who compared the
+mortality figures of those who had made a will with those who
+hadn't. The average age of death for people who hadn't made a will
+was 72 years, 6 months. However, bequeath your personal
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+144
+possessions on paper and life expectancy shoots up to 80 years,
+5 months. Want to live even longer? Leave some cash to charity;
+generous donors lasted until the ripe old age of 83 years.
+As with previous cases, we can first represent causal fallacies as
+neither invalid nor inductively forceful arguments, then, to demonstrate
+that they are driven by a false assumption, make the argument valid or
+inductively forceful but unsound:
+P1) Generally, people who make a will live longer than those who
+don't.
+C) (Probably) Making a will causes people to live longer.
+Adding the implicit general assumption and making explicit a further
+implicit premise, needed to make the argument inductively forceful,
+gives the following, which is inductively forceful but unsound due to the
+falsity of P2:
+P1) Generally people who make a will live longer than those who
+don't.
+P2) Whenever one event (Y) occurs after another event (X), Y is
+caused by X.
+P3) Living longer (not dying) occurs after making a will.
+C) (Probably) Making a will causes people to live longer.
+The post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy is frequently committed in
+public discourse when arguers are attempting to persuade people of the
+merits of a policy or piece of legislation. Thus, tougher sentencing policies
+might be fallaciously inferred to be the cause of a drop in the crime
+rate, or a teachers' pay increase to be the cause of better examination
+marks in schools. Where the second event is alleged to be causally linked
+to the first, solely on the basis that it occurred after the first, the argument
+is almost definitely fallacious. This is not to say that tougher
+sentencing couldn't be a cause of a drop in the crime rate, it's just that
+we need to be given stronger reasons to accept the causal claim than
+simply the fact that one event occurred before the other.
+Fallacy of mistaking correlation for cause
+Whereas the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc occurs because the
+temporal priority of one event over another is taken as sufficient to
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+145
+establish a causal relationship between those events, this fallacy is
+committed when the fact that one type of event or state of affairs is always
+or usually found in conjunction with another type is mistakenly taken to
+be sufficient to establish that events or states of affairs of the one type
+cause the other. In a word, the fallacy is committed when a statistical
+correlation is assumed, without any further justification, to establish a
+causal relation. So, for instance, someone who argues:
+You only have to look at the statistics to see that poverty is the
+obvious cause of educational under-achievement. Eighty per cent
+of those who leave school with no qualifications come from homes
+whose income is at least 50 per cent below the average.
+commits the fallacy of mistaking correlation for cause. Our point here is
+not that it is completely mistaken to think that there is a link between
+poverty and under-achievement in school. Indeed, there is plenty of respectable
+research establishing a relationship between them. And certainly
+a statistical correlation is necessary for a causal relation: if there is no
+statistical correlation, then there cannot be a causal relation. What is
+crucial, though, is that we resist making the mistaken inferential leap
+from the fact of their statistical correlation to the alleged fact of a causal
+relationship between them. There may well be such a relationship, but
+correlation alone is not sufficient to conclude that the relationship is
+causal, as we see when we reconstruct the argument in standard form:
+P1) There is a statistical correlation between students' underachievement
+at school and poverty at home.
+C) Poverty at home causes students' under-achievement at
+school.
+Making explicit the hidden assumption, we derive the following valid but
+unsound argument:
+P1) There is a statistical correlation between students' underachievement
+at school and poverty at home.
+P2) Whenever two phenomena X and Y are correlated, X is the
+cause of Y.
+C) Poverty at home causes students' under-achievement at
+school.
+That P2 is false can be made obvious by considering certain counterexamples.
+Creatures that wear clothes, for example, tend to be more
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+146
+intelligent than those that do not. These things are correlated. But wearing
+clothes does not cause intelligence. In cases where there is correlation
+between two or more events or phenomena and they are in fact causally
+related it is often difficult to distinguish which is cause and which is effect.
+Poverty and ill health tend to go together, but which causes which? It is
+probable that in many cases they are mutually causally efficacious. We
+discuss the relation between correlation and cause in more detail in
+Chapter 5.
+Inversion of cause and effect
+Here one mistakenly infers that if X causes Y, an absence of X will
+prevent Y:
+Research carried out by a team of researchers shows that
+vitamin E may be the key to the secret of everlasting youth. The
+team believe that the vitamin may be at work normally in humans
+to prevent ageing. Experiments carried out on laboratory rats
+have enabled the scientists to discover that animals deprived of
+vitamin E seem to age faster and even become senile. Their
+spokesperson, Dr Young, said that although the ageing process
+remains mysterious, these experiments have demonstrated an
+'interesting causal relationship' between vitamin E and the ageing
+process.
+Even if we grant that it is generally warranted to make inferences about
+human physiology from that of rats, it is not warranted to infer from the
+fact that vitamin E deficiency seems to hasten ageing to the claim that
+vitamin E is the secret of everlasting youth. The proposition that a lack
+of something (vitamin E) causes X (hastened ageing) does not entail the
+proposition that the presence of that thing (vitamin E) causes the opposite
+of X (slowed ageing). We can use a reconstruction to expose the
+mistaken causal assumption driving this fallacy:
+P1) Vitamin E deprivation causes hastened ageing.
+P2) If a lack of something X is the cause of a phenomenon Y, the
+presence of X will cause of the opposite of Y.
+C) Vitamin E causes the ageing process to slow.
+One sometimes encounters the inversion fallacy and the fallacy of
+mistaking correlation for cause committed simultaneously. The following
+reasoning fallaciously infers a causal relation between eating certain foods
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+147
+and eating disorders from a correlation between those things (in this case
+the correlation is anecdotal rather than statistical), but also commits the
+inversion fallacy by mistakenly inverting that causal relationship:
+Contrary to what the healthy eating lobby dictates, traditional
+British cooking is good for you. Remember the good old days when
+we ate bacon, eggs, sausages, fried tomatoes, potatoes, toast
+and marmalade? And that was just for breakfast. Well in those
+days, people didn't succumb to anorexia or bulimia and the
+incidence of obesity was much lower. Seems the 'experts' have
+got it wrong again.
+This argument seems to conclude not only that eating traditional British
+cooking protects people from anorexia, bulimia and obesity, but that not
+eating it causes those things. To expose the fallacies, we can reconstruct
+the entire argument as an extended argument:
+P1) When we ate traditional foods (X) there was a significantly
+lower incidence of anorexia, bulimia and obesity (lack of Y).
+P2) Whenever two phenomena (X) and (Y) are correlated, X is the
+cause of Y.
+C1) Eating traditional foods (X) causes a low incidence of
+anorexia, etc. (lack of Y).
+P3) Now we don't eat those foods (lack of X) and the incidence of
+anorexia, etc. is much higher (Y).
+P4) Whenever X causes a lack of Y, a lack of X causes Y.
+C2) Not eating traditional foods (lack of X) causes a higher
+incidence of anorexia, bulimia and obesity (Y).
+The fallacy of mistaking correlation for cause is signalled by P2. The
+mistaken inversion is signalled by P4, which is false. Some causal relationships
+can be inverted, but it is certainly not true of causal relationships
+in general that they can be. For example, drinking milk causes us not to
+be thirsty. But it is not true that not drinking milk causes us to be
+thirsty!
+The next two fallacies that we consider are committed when we make
+unwarranted inferences from what is known, believed or proven.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+148
+Epistemic fallacies
+Appeal to ignorance
+This is the fallacy of concluding either that because a claim has not been
+proven it must be false (the negative form), or that because it has not
+been disproved it must be true (the positive form). It is often used when
+defending a belief in something that remains unproven such as astrology
+or the existence of a deity. The following commits the negative form
+of the fallacy:
+As no one has proven that UFOs exist, it's reasonable to assume
+that they don't.
+whereas this equally fallacious argument commits the positive form:
+No one has managed to prove that UFO's don't exist, so we can
+reasonably conclude that they do.
+As we see when we reconstruct the arguments, each fallacious and unsound
+argument is driven either by the false assumption that absence of proof
+means a proposition is false or that absence of disproof means a proposition
+is true. Notice that in reconstructing this argument, we omit the
+indicator phrase 'it is reasonable to conclude that':
+P1) No one has proven that UFOs exist.
+P2) All unproven propositions are false.
+C) UFOs do not exist.
+P1) No one has proven that UFOs don't exist.
+P2) All propositions that have not been disproved are true.
+C) UFOs do exist.
+Of course, in cases where efforts to prove something have been sufficiently
+strenuous, it may be reasonable to infer the falsity of the proposition.
+For example, repeated efforts have been made, using sophisticated
+scientific equipment, to find the Loch Ness monster (to prove the proposition
+that Nessie exists); but to no avail. It is reasonable on that basis to
+conclude, alas, that Nessie doesn't exist. But that is because we know that
+if Nessie did exist, then she probably would have been detected by those
+efforts. The mere fact that a proposition hasn't been proven, just by itself,
+is no reason to think it false. Likewise, the mere fact that a proposition
+hasn't been disproved, just by itself, is no reason to think it true.
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+149
+'Proof' connotes certainty, and part of what is going on with this
+fallacy is that people sometimes think that if a claim is not certain, then
+it can reasonably be denied. But that is not how things are, as should be
+reasonably clear from Chapter 3. Where we know we have an inductively
+very forceful argument with true premises, then despite not having
+perfect certainty, it would be unreasonable to deny the conclusion (with
+certain exceptions, as explained in Chapter 6). Some claims and theories
+provide the most probable explanations of the phenomena they concern
+even though they remain neither proven nor disproved. The theory of
+natural selection is one such example. The arguments in favour of it have
+a great deal of inductive force, but as yet no one has managed to prove
+it.5 Reasons why it should be considered the most plausible explanation
+of the evolution of species ought to be incorporated into relevant arguments;
+whether or not it is proven is not essential to the question of
+whether we ought to believe it.
+Epistemic fallacy
+This fallacy (from the Greek episteme, meaning knowledge) arises because
+of the tricky nature of knowledge and belief, and the difficulty of discerning
+from the third-personal point of view what someone believes or
+knows. It is committed when we make a fallacious inference from the fact
+that someone believes that P that they must also believe that Q on the
+grounds that P and Q are about the same thing or person, even though
+the way in which they refer to that thing or person is different. The
+following provides a simple instance of the epistemic fallacy:
+Chris believes that Tony Blair enjoys skydiving. Tony Blair is the Prime
+Minister, so Chris believes that the Prime Minister likes skydiving.
+A reconstruction gives us:
+P1) Chris believes that Tony Blair enjoys skydiving.
+P2) Tony Blair is the Prime Minister.
+C) Chris believes that the Prime Minister enjoys skydiving.
+The inference is incorrect and the argument invalid because the arguer
+has assumed that, in addition to having beliefs about Tony Blair's pre-
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+150
+5 We should note that although a theory may be in principle provable it may remain
+neither proven nor unproven indefinitely because there is insufficient evidence to prove or
+disprove it conclusively.
+ferred leisure pursuits, Chris also knows that Tony Blair is the Prime
+Minister. But the arguer has given no grounds for this assumption. Chris
+may only have a belief about Tony Blair but not know that Tony Blair
+is the Prime Minister. If so, then C might be false. Another way of putting
+this is to say that Chris may not know that 'the Prime Minister' and
+'Tony Blair' refer to the same person. Thus, if Chris is indeed ignorant
+of Tony Blair's being Prime Minister, the following argument, though
+valid, would be unsound due to the falsity of P3 and of C:
+P1) Chris believes that Tony Blair enjoys skydiving.
+P2) Tony Blair is the Prime Minister.
+P3) Chris knows that Tony Blair is the Prime Minister.
+C) Chris believes that the Prime Minister enjoys skydiving.
+It is important to note that similar inferences made in different contexts
+are warranted and the arguments containing them valid. Consider the
+following:
+P1) The Prime Minister is a world champion darts player.
+P2) Tony Blair is Prime Minister.
+C) Tony Blair is a world champion darts player.
+Inferences such as this are sanctioned by an apparently indubitable
+logical principle known as Leibniz's Law (after the seventeenth century
+German philosopher and mathematician, Gottfried Leibniz). This law
+holds that if one thing is the same identical thing as another, then what
+is true of one must be true of the other. For example, if Superman has
+blond hair and Superman and Clark Kent are the same person, then Clark
+Kent must have blond hair. Sentences about people's beliefs or knowledge,
+such as our example about Tony Blair and skydiving, are exceptions
+to Leibniz's Law. If Chris believes that X is thus-and-so, even if X and
+Y are the same thing, it does not follow that Chris believes Y to be
+thus-and-so because we do not know whether or not Chris knows that X
+and Y are the same thing. The inference would only be warranted if the
+arguer knew that Chris knew this. How to make sense of these sorts of
+cases is a famous philosophical puzzle, but we need not let that worry
+us here.6
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+151
+6 The most famous discussion is 'On sense and reference', by Gottlob Frege, reprinted
+in Meaning and Reference, edited by A.W. Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
+The epistemic fallacy is often used knowingly to discredit someone's
+opinion. For example:
+Mr Smith believes that the cultivation and use of cannabis should
+remain a criminal offence in this country. But cannabis is the
+most effective anti-nausea drug for chemotherapy patients. So
+Mr Smith believes that it should remain a criminal offence to
+produce or use the most effective anti-nausea drug for
+chemotherapy patients.
+An initial reconstruction of the argument gives us the following valid
+argument:
+P1) Mr Smith believes that it should be a criminal offence to
+produce or to use cannabis.
+P2) Cannabis is the most effective anti-nausea drug for
+chemotherapy patients.
+C) Mr Smith believes that it should be a criminal offence
+to produce or to use the most effective anti-nausea
+drug for chemotherapy patients.
+If we add a hidden premise of the same form as P3 in the previous example,
+we see that we cannot conclude that the argument is sound unless we have
+some grounds for saying that P3 (and hence C) are true:
+P1) Mr Smith believes that it should be a criminal offence to
+produce or to use cannabis.
+P2) Cannabis is the most effective anti-nausea drug for
+chemotherapy patients.
+P3) Mr Smith knows that the most effective anti-nausea drug for
+chemotherapy patients is cannabis.
+C) Mr Smith believes that it should be a criminal offence
+to produce or to use the most effective anti-nausea
+drug for chemotherapy patients.
+We are unjustified in making this knowledge attribution if we don't
+know that Mr Smith is aware of the anti-nausea properties of cannabis.
+It is possible that Smith is unaware that cannabis is the best anti-nausea
+drug for chemotherapy patients. Indeed, it might well be that Smith
+believes that the best remedy for nausea ought to be made available to
+chemotherapy patients and so long as he is genuinely ignorant that
+cannabis is the best such remedy, he would not be inconsistent in making
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+152
+this claim. The danger of epistemic fallacies, then, is that they may
+attribute beliefs to persons that they do not really hold.
+Notice that the familiar if you're not with us you're against us type
+of argument is an instance of the epistemic fallacy. By claiming that a
+non-supporter takes an opposing position, the arguer makes an unwarranted
+assumption about the non-supporter's beliefs when, in fact, the
+non-supporter may hold a view that does not amount to an opposing one,
+or she may simply not have a view on the issue in question.7 Here's an
+example:
+The President has made it perfectly clear: we know who the
+terrorists are, and we are going to hunt them down. Now Senator
+Routman wants to set limits on the pursuit of these killers, by
+opposing covert overseas invasions by Special Forces. So he
+thinks we should simply let them go?
+Notice that these examples turn on verbs such as 'knows', 'believes' and
+'wants'. Philosophers and linguists call verbs such as these propositional
+attitude verbs. If we reflect upon how these verbs are used, we see that
+we say someone believes that . . ., where the blank is filled by the expression
+of some proposition or other. A propositional attitude, then, expresses
+the fact that someone holds some attitude towards a specific proposition.
+Smith believes that such-and-such is the case; Jones wants such-and-such
+to happen; Brown knows that such-and-such is the case. Other examples
+are 'desires', 'hopes', 'prays' and 'wishes'.
+Further fallacies
+We said early in our discussion of fallacies that almost all are either formal
+or substantive fallacies. All such fallacies make for unsound arguments;
+they are either irremediably invalid, or depend on some very general, but
+false, implicit assumption. We turn now, however, to a different group of
+fallacies. These are labelled as fallacies, but not every instance of them will
+be invalid, or inductively unforceful, or even unsound. However, they are
+all poor techniques at argument; they should be criticised when we
+analyse arguments, and avoided in our own attempts to persuade by argument.
+Many of them, however, are useful for non-rational persuasion:
+they are frequently used to avoid engagement with an opponent, or to
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+153
+7 The if you're not with us, you're against us argument can also be an instance of the
+false dilemma fallacy. The arguer implies that there are only two positions available on
+the issue in question -- their own and one that is in direct opposition to it.
+trump an opponent in the knowledge that their premises do not actually
+give good reason to accept their conclusions. In many cases they do have
+persuasive power.
+Although reconstruction will be helpful in analysing instances of these
+fallacies, they cannot be exposed by making explicit a false assumption
+that drives all instances of the fallacy in question. This is because there is
+no single false assumption (expressed as a generalisation or a conditional)
+that underlies all instances of each of these fallacies. So while we should,
+in order to expose their fallacious reasoning, continue the practice of reconstructing
+arguments that we suspect of committing these fallacies, it is not
+so easy to give a straightforward method for detecting these fallacies.
+Equivocation
+The rhetorical ploy of trading on an equivocation is the ploy whereby we
+deliberately use a word or form of words with the intention to confuse
+the audience; one hopes that the audience will conflate the two or more
+possible interpretations. A single unsupported claim, rather than an
+argument, may be the instrument of the ploy. To fall prey to the fallacy
+of equivocation, by contrast, is to fail to notice an ambiguity, thereby
+accepting the conclusion of an argument, when one should not have. Silly
+but clear examples are easy to come by; for example: 'In the Philosophy
+department, someone broke one of the chair's legs; therefore one of the
+Philosophy department's professors has a broken leg' (equivocation on
+the word 'chair'). Such a case is simple and amusing but no one would
+actually be taken in by it. In the more interesting cases, explaining the
+fallacy can be a subtle conceptual task. For example:
+Some conservatives claim moral universal truths; they claim that
+throughout history, in all times and places, people fundamentally
+have the same rights. This displays a lamentable ignorance of
+history, and -- characteristically of conservatives -- of other
+cultures. It is a plain fact that at other times in history, and in
+other parts of the world today, human beings do not have the
+same rights. In some countries, for example, a man has the right
+forcibly to confine his wife to the home if he sees fit; not so in our
+culture. The conservative claim of universal rights is plainly false.
+The arguer wishes to conclude that, contrary to certain conservatives
+who believe in universal moral truths, whether or not a human being
+possesses a given right depends on what culture they are in. Thus ignoring
+some irrelevant material, we may reconstruct it as a very simple argument:
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+154
+P1) In some countries, men have the right to confine their wives
+forcibly; in other countries they do not.
+C1) It is not the case that human beings have the same
+rights in all places and at all times.
+C2) The conservative claim -- that throughout history, in all
+times and places, people fundamentally have the same
+rights -- is false.
+The argument equivocates on the word 'right', however. Both senses
+are established items in our language, but they are close together in
+meaning. In one sense of the word, to possess a 'right' is be allowed, by
+the culture or other social environment one is in (often, but not always,
+this a system of laws), to perform a certain action. Call this the 'conventional'
+sense of the word. In the other sense, to possess a 'right' is to be
+such that one ought, whatever culture or other social environment one is
+in, to be allowed to perform a certain action -- even if one is not in fact
+allowed to. Call this the 'philosophical' sense of the word. Thus one may
+possess rights in the philosophical sense that are not rights in the conventional
+sense. The trouble with the argument is that it uses both senses: if
+we keep to the conventional sense of the word, P1 is true, C1 is true, and
+the inference from P1 to C1 is valid. The inference to C2 would be valid
+if the conservative claim were intended in the conventional sense. But the
+conservative claim, no doubt, was that rights are invariant in the philosophical
+sense of the word. In that case C2 cannot be inferred from C1;
+the inference would be no better than the silly one about the broken chair.
+Red herring
+So-named after the practice of dragging a smelly, salt-cured (and therefore
+reddish) herring across the trail of an animal tracked by dogs. The
+red herring fallacy is used as a technique to throw someone off the scent
+of one's argument by distracting them with an irrelevance. The rhetorical
+ploy of the smokescreen constitutes a similar tactic. However, where an
+irrelevant premise(s) is given as a reason for accepting the conclusion
+being advanced, the red herring fallacy is committed. For example:
+The judge should rule against the charge of false accounting
+against the President. The President is very popular, and presides
+over an extremely healthy economy.
+The arguer seems to advance the president's political success as a
+reason to rule against the charge of financial corruption. If we make the
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+155
+reasonable assumption that the judge should rule strictly on the basis of
+the president's guilt or innocence, then the president's political success is
+utterly irrelevant. Reconstructed, the argument looks like this:
+P1) The President is very popular, and presides over an extremely
+healthy economy.
+P2) If the president is very popular, and presides over an extremely
+healthy economy, then the judge should rule against the
+charge of false accounting.
+C) The court should rule against the plaintiff's charge of
+false accounting.
+In general, the red herring fallacy is that of inferring a conclusion
+from a premise that is strictly irrelevant to it, but in a way that has the
+potential to fool the audience into accepting the inference. Normally this
+is accomplished by a premise that tends to instil some sort of positive
+attitude towards the conclusion. In this case, the premise is intended to
+make the audience feel supportive towards the President, thus unreceptive
+to the idea that he should be convicted of misconduct.
+Note that, although red herring arguments can easily be represented
+as valid, red herring is not a substantive fallacy. P2 is obviously false, but
+our ability to recognise this depends on our knowledge of what is and
+what is not relevant to the establishment of guilt in a court of law. More
+generally, what is and what is not relevant to a conclusion will depend
+on the conclusion's particular subject-matter. So there is not going to be
+one characteristic premise that red herring fallacies assume, in the way
+that there is, for example, in the case of inverting cause and effect. So
+red herring, according to our categories, is not a substantive fallacy.
+It is worth re-emphasising, finally, that to say that someone has been
+taken in by a red herring fallacy is to say that they have been fooled.
+Unlike most other fallacies, the ability to recognise red herring varies
+depending on our knowledge of the subject-matter of the argument. But
+if X honestly believes, for example, that cancer is always caused by
+thinking morally bad thoughts, then, although having developed cancer
+is irrelevant to the question of the moral character of their thoughts, X
+does not commit red herring if X infers, from the fact Y has cancer, that
+Y must have been thinking bad thoughts. X is just badly informed. The
+point of distinguishing red herring as a fallacy of irrelevance is to single
+out the cases where one is fooled by an irrelevance, where one ought to
+have known better. Every minimally educated person knows, for example,
+that guilt or innocence in a court of law is properly established only by
+the preponderance of evidence; because of this, one who advances or
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+156
+accepts the argument given above has been fooled by an irrelevance, and
+has thus committed red herring.
+Slippery slope
+This fallacy occurs when an arguer wrongly assumes that to permit or
+forbid a course of action will inevitably lead to the occurrence of further
+related and undesirable events, without providing good reasons to suppose
+that the further events will indeed inevitably follow; and thus to allow
+the first is to tread on a slippery slope down which we will slide to the
+other events. Since its rhetorical power is derived from fear or dislike of
+the undesirable events, it is from a rhetorical point of view closely related
+to the appeal to fear. Slippery slope arguments are sometimes used to
+justify particularly harsh laws or penal sentences and occur frequently in
+debates about the liberalisation or toughening of laws or constraints on
+behaviour, as in the following example about the decriminalisation of
+cannabis use:
+The decriminalisation of cannabis would be just the start. It would
+lead to a downward spiral into widespread abuse of harder drugs
+like heroin and cocaine.
+The implicit conclusion is that cannabis should not be decriminalised. The
+only explicit premise is that if cannabis were decriminalised then the use
+of hard drugs would increase. So an initial reconstruction represents the
+argument as invalid:
+P1) If cannabis were to be decriminalised, the use of hard drugs
+would increase.
+C) Cannabis should not be decriminalised.
+Notice that as it stands the argument also commits the fallacy of deriving
+'ought' from 'is'. To correct this, we need to add a premise to make good
+the connection between the non-prescriptive premise and the prescriptive
+conclusion, thus ending up with the following argument:
+P1) If cannabis use were decriminalised, the use of hard drugs
+would increase.
+P2) Anything that leads to increased use of harder drugs should
+be avoided.
+C) Cannabis should not be decriminalised.
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+157
+The immediate problem is that we have not been given a reason to
+think that P1 is true; that is, no reason to think that decriminalisation of
+cannabis will unavoidably be the beginning of a slippery slope to an
+increase the use of hard drugs. Of course, some slopes really are slippery;
+even in this case, it might be possible to give such reasons and they might
+form part of an extended argument for the same conclusion. But as it
+stands the argument remains fallacious, because the arguer has not given
+a reason for supposing that it is inevitable that allowing the first event
+will precipitate a slide into even worse events. (This form of argument is
+sometimes called floodgates -- the arguer alleges without evidence that
+allowing X will inevitably open the floodgates to Y and Z.)
+Straw man
+This is the fallacy that occurs when an arguer ignores their opponent's
+real position on an issue and sets up a weaker version of that position by
+misrepresentation, exaggeration, distortion or simplification. This makes
+it easier to defeat; thereby creating the impression that the real argument
+has been refuted. The straw man argument, like the straw man himself,
+is easier to knock down than the real thing. Suppose that Jones is an
+advocate of the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia; that is Jones believes
+that terminally ill patients should have the legal right to choose to have
+their life ended if their suffering has greatly diminished their quality of
+life, and doctors agree that the patient's mental state is sufficiently sound
+to make the decision rationally. Smith, Jones' opponent, responds as
+follows:
+How can you support giving doctors the right to end a person's
+life just because they decide that the person's life is no longer
+worth living; no one should have that power over another person's
+life, and doctors should not kill patients.
+According to Smith, Jones advocates that doctors should unilaterally
+have the power to end a patient's life, if they think that the patient's life
+is not worth living. That would be a very controversial position. But it
+is not Jones' position. Jones' position is that patients should have the
+choice of euthanasia, so long as that choice is approved by doctors. Of
+course the doctor administers the lethal drug, but only at the behest of
+the patient, as Jones envisages things. Smith thus fails to engage with
+Jones' actual position and instead misrepresents it as a more extreme and
+therefore weaker position that (as far as we know) Jones does not advocate.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+158
+Begging the question
+An argument commits the fallacy of begging the question when the truth
+of its conclusion is assumed by one or more of its premises, and the
+truth of the premises depend for their justification on the truth of the
+conclusion. Thus the premises ask the audience to grant the conclusion
+even before the argument is given. Contrary to the way in which the
+phrase is sometimes used in ordinary discourse, 'begging the question'
+does not mean raising the question without offering an argument. By
+way of example, imagine the following scenario:
+Three thieves pull off a successful heist and steal four diamonds,
+but they can't decide how to divide their haul. Eventually the first
+thief says: 'I should get two diamonds, and you two should get one
+each, because I'm the leader.' The second thief says: 'Wait a
+minute, who says you're the leader?' The first thief replies: 'I must
+be the leader, I'm getting the largest share of the haul.'
+A reconstruction enables us to see clearly the way in which the first
+thief's reasoning begs the question. Initially thief number one appears to
+argue from the proposition that he's the leader together with the implicit
+premise that leaders should always get the biggest haul to the conclusion
+that he should get the biggest share:
+P1) I'm the leader of the gang.
+P2) Gang leaders should always get the biggest share of their
+gang's haul.
+C) I should get the biggest share of the haul.
+But when requested by thief number two to justify P1 he argues as
+follows:
+P1) I'm getting the biggest share of the haul.
+P2) Whoever gets the biggest share of the haul is the leader.
+C1) I must be the leader of the gang.
+Once we put the two steps of the argument together to form a
+complex argument, we see that it begs the question of who should get
+the biggest share:
+P1) I'm getting the biggest share of the haul.
+P2) Whomever receives the biggest share of the haul is the leader.
+C1) I must be the leader of the gang.
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+159
+P3) Gang leaders always receive the biggest share of their gang's
+haul.
+C2) I'm getting the biggest share of the haul.
+Thief number one is guilty of begging the question (in addition to armed
+robbery) because P1, which he uses to reach C2, expresses the same proposition
+as that expressed by C2. So the conclusion -- that thief number one
+gets the biggest share -- is already assumed by the premises. Notice that
+each inference stage passes our test for validity, if the premises were true,
+the conclusion would have to be true, but the argument is a clear instance
+of the fallacy of begging the question of who should get the biggest share
+of the proceeds of the robbery.
+An argument's premise(s) and conclusion need not express a proposition
+in precisely the same way (as they do in the previous example) in
+order for it to count as an instance of begging the question. It is sufficient
+that the premise be a version of, or rely upon, the claim made by the
+conclusion. If someone were to argue from the premise that newspaper
+editors claim that their publications are better than any other medium for
+finding out about events overseas, to the conclusion that newspapers are
+the best source of international news, their argument would commit the
+fallacy of begging the question. For obvious reasons, the fallacy of begging
+the question is often referred to as 'circular reasoning'.
+False dilemma
+This is the fallacy of limiting consideration of positions on an issue to
+fewer alternatives than there are that should be considered. Typically, the
+arguer pretends that there are only two options, when in fact there are
+more: the arguer sets up a dilemma where none really exists by misrepresenting
+the possible positions on an issue, so that there appears to be
+a straight choice between their own and its opposite. The fallacy is
+committed by a politician who argues as follows:
+There is a tough choice facing the Government and the nation:
+either we cut taxes and increase everyone's spending power,
+thereby providing much needed stimulation to the economy, or we
+increase spending on health and education. It is impossible to do
+both; and without a tax cut the economy will remain weak. So
+increased spending on health and education will have to wait.
+As a reconstruction shows, the argument is valid, but the fallacy is driven
+by the false assumption that cutting taxes and increasing public spending
+on health and education preclude each other.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+160
+P1) We should stimulate the economy.
+P2) The only way to stimulate the economy is by cutting taxes.
+C1) We should cut taxes.
+P3) We cannot both cut taxes and increase public spending on
+health and education.
+C2) We should not increase public spending on health and
+education.
+The assumption in P3 is not true because (a) if a tax cut does improve
+the economy, then even if the Government takes a smaller proportion of
+the Gross National Product it might take more in absolute terms (because
+the GNP will be larger); (b) expenditure on health and education might
+be increased by diverting Government funds from other areas such as
+defence; (c) the Government might be able to sustain a period of decreased
+tax revenues and increased overall expenditure by increasing its debt (or
+decreasing its surplus, as the case may be).
+The fallacy of false dilemma is often used to make the false assumption
+that if someone does not agree with X, they must be anti-X, whereas
+they may hold some intermediate position or be undecided. For example,
+suppose someone asks you if you are in favour of positive discrimination
+towards under-represented groups in the award of promotion to higher
+grades of a profession (affirmative action). You reply that you are not
+and, employing a fallacious inference, they accuse you of being against
+affirmative action, when in fact you may just be undecided, neither for
+nor against it. Or, worse, perhaps they retort that you support discrimination
+against under-represented groups, and therefore are racist, ageist
+and misogynist (among other things).
+CHAPTER SUMMARY
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies are both instances of shamreasoning.
+While rhetorical ploys seek to persuade by nonargumentative
+means, fallacies are argumentative attempts to
+persuade that embody some characteristic type of confusion or
+mistaken assumption. Many fallacious arguments may function at
+the very same time as an effective rhetorical ploy, thus causing the
+audience not to notice the fallacy. Insofar as we aim to be rational,
+and to appeal to the rationality of others, we should avoid using
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+161
+Chapter summary
+rhetorical ploys and fallacies in our own attempts to persuade and
+should take care not to be persuaded by others' rhetorical or fallacious
+attempts to persuade us to do and believe things. The best
+way of doing so is to familiarise ourselves with various common
+rhetorical ploys and fallacious forms of argument.
+Many rhetorical ploys are appeals to specific feelings or desires;
+these include the appeals to novelty, popularity, compassion,
+pity, guilt, fear, cuteness, sexiness, hipness, coolness,
+wealth, power and many others. Typically a position or consumer
+item is represented in association with some object of the specific
+feeling or desire, in order that the feeling or desire should be directed
+upon the position or consumer item. The direct attack involves
+the bold assertion of a position or command; the hard sell is the
+direct attack repeated. The use of buzzwords is the use of words
+with high emotive or otherwise rhetorical charge to manipulate the
+passions of an audience. Scare quotes are used mockingly to make
+an opponent's position or other phenomenon look ridiculous or
+dubious. Trading on an equivocation occurs when someone
+knowingly makes an ambiguous statement that may be true when
+interpreted in a certain way, but when interpreted in another way,
+may be false, but also more favourable to the position being
+advanced or to the product being advertised. Smokescreen occurs
+when one talks about some highly controversial, compelling or
+otherwise arresting issue or object, in an effort to divert the audience
+momentarily from the issue under discussion. A successful
+smokescreen causes the audience to overlook the fact that the issue
+has not been addressed.
+Fallacies can be grouped together according to certain shared
+features. Formal fallacies are simply mistaken inferences -- inferences
+of certain characteristic kinds that are often mistakenly
+thought to be valid or inductively forceful. These include: the
+fallacies of affirming the consequent (of a conditional proposition)
+and denying the antecedent (of a conditional proposition);
+the fallacy of deriving 'ought' from 'is', which is committed by
+any argument that attempts to move from solely descriptive
+premises to a prescriptive conclusion; and the base rate fallacy.
+Substantive fallacies are committed by arguments that tacitly
+assume some very general principle of a characteristic kind that it
+may be tempting to rely upon, but which is false, and which can
+easily be seen to be false the moment it is brought to light. The
+fallacies of majority belief and common practice make illegitimate
+inferences from the commonality of a belief or an action to its
+acceptability. The ad hominem fallacy and the tu quoque fallacy
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+162 Chapter summary
+use facts about the person(s) putting forward a position as grounds
+for rejecting it. The appeal to authority makes a mistaken appeal
+to the opinion of someone who is not qualified (or under-qualified)
+on the matter in hand. The perfectionist fallacy is committed
+when excessive demands are placed on an idea or proposal; the
+fallacy of conflating morality with legality occurs when we
+mistakenly assume that anything that is legal must also be moral
+or that anything that is illegal must be immoral. The fallacy of
+weak analogy arises when an argument employs an unsustainable
+or an unjustified analogy. Causal fallacies are committed when
+we make mistaken inferences about the cause of a phenomenon or
+an event. There are three types of causal fallacy: post hoc ergo
+propter hoc -- the fallacy of assuming that the temporal priority
+of X over Y makes X the cause of Y; fallacy of mistaking correlation
+for cause -- falsely assuming that the simultaneous
+occurrence of X and Y makes one the cause of the other; and the
+fallacy of causal inversion -- the mistaken inference that if X
+causes Y, an absence of X will prevent Y. Epistemic fallacies and
+the fallacy of appeal to ignorance occur because of unwarranted
+inferences from what is known, believed or proven to additional
+knowledge, beliefs or proof of which the arguer has no independent
+evidence.
+Substantive fallacies can be exposed by careful argumentreconstruction.
+An initial reconstruction will demonstrate that the
+argument, as stated, is either invalid or inductively unforceful. A
+second reconstruction can be used to reveal the false assumption that
+drives the fallacious reasoning, thereby demonstrating that the
+(amended) argument is unsound. For each substantive fallacy, all
+instances of the fallacy will be driven by the same or a very similar
+assumption.
+Some fallacies are neither formal nor substantive. Not all
+instances of the fallacies considered in the final grouping of this
+chapter are invalid, non-inductively forceful or unsound even when
+carefully reconstructed. A deductively sound, hence valid argument
+may beg the question, for example. While the method of exposing
+hidden assumptions will prove helpful for some instances, there is
+no single false assumption that underlies all instances of each of
+these types of fallacies.
+The red herring fallacy occurs when irrelevant premises are
+given as a reason for accepting a conclusion. A slippery slope
+fallacy is committed when an arguer assumes without justification
+that to permit or forbid a course of action will inevitably cause a
+chain of undesirable events. The straw man is deliberately set up
+  
+163
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+Chapter summary
+as a target that will be easier to defeat than an opponent's real argument.
+An argument commits the fallacy of begging the question
+when the truth of its conclusion is assumed by its premise(s). The
+fallacy of false dilemma is committed when an argument limits
+consideration of positions on an issue to two mutually exclusive
+ones, thereby setting up an apparent dilemma, when there are other
+positions that could be considered.
+EXERCISES
+1 Name the following rhetorical ploys:
+Example
+If we allow the development of genetically engineered foodstuffs,
+we are leaving our children and our children's children open to the
+threat of genetic mutation and environmental disaster.
+✎ Appeal to fear/scare tactics.
+a The 'relationships' of homosexuals cannot be compared to that of
+marriage: marriage is something that involves a man and a woman
+united through the word of God.
+b Take a look at the latest hatchback from Fraud: the new Ergo.
+c Successfully applied knowledge management is now impacting on
+organisations in terms of both direct competitive advantage, and in
+building a learning culture that identifies itself through a shared
+vision and common purpose.
+d More pet owners feed their puppies First Choice puppy food than any
+other. If you want to give the little fella a head start, shouldn't you,
+too?
+e These people say we have a moral duty to honour our United Nations
+commitments and provide refugees with a safe haven. I say to you:
+look at all these people arriving here and then claiming state benefits,
+they are sucking this country dry.
+f Fatbusters -- the most successful diet programme on the market today!
+g Imagine yourself, or worse, your daughter, alone beside your broken
+down car on a remote country road in the middle of the night. Few
+people pass by and no one stops to help. Don't get caught like that
+-- don't get caught without a Phonecom mobile phone.
+164
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+Exercises
+h By scheduling the broadcast at 1 a.m., the TV company is committing
+an act of censorship.
+i Hair unmanageable and dull? Try Goldie Glow from Bella. The latest
+in hair management technology.
+j Opposition MP: The proposed secrecy legislation is a threat to democracy
+and should be strenuously opposed. Government minister: It is
+scandalous that these matters have been put in the public arena via
+yet another document leaked by a civil servant. Such leaks are a
+breach of trust, a dereliction of duty.
+2 Without looking back at the relevant section, name the two types of
+sham-reasoning and write a paragraph explaining the difference between
+them giving an example of each to illustrate that difference.
+3 Name the fallacy committed by the following arguments. If no fallacy
+is committed, write 'N/F'.
+Example
+No one has ever been able to prove the existence of extrasensory
+perception. We must therefore conclude that extrasensory
+perception is a myth.
+✎ Appeal to ignorance.
+a Our employees have asked us to provide lounge areas where they
+can spend their breaks. This request will have to be refused. If we
+give them lounge areas, next they'll be asking for a swimming pool
+and sauna. Then it will be tennis courts, football pitches, fitness
+centres . . .
+b A few minutes after the minister made his speech to the City of
+London, a devastating explosion occurred. For the safety of the people
+who live and work in the city, it is imperative that the minister makes
+no more speeches here.
+c Publishing these vile criminals' names and addresses in our paper was
+definitely the right thing to do. We have been inundated with calls
+and faxes from readers who support our stance.
+d If she doesn't finish her assignment on time, she will fail the course.
+She has failed the course so obviously she didn't finish her assignment
+on time.
+e We have a simple choice between developing genetically manipulated
+crops or continuing to stand by while thousands of people in the
+developing world die of starvation and malnutrition.
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+165
+Exercises
+f As my client has pointed out, tax avoidance is not illegal, so she has
+done nothing immoral.
+g The Japanese diet is low in dairy products and certain cancers have a
+very low incidence in Japan. So if you want to avoid cancer, give up
+drinking milk and eating milk products.
+h Teachers say that their job is becoming harder and harder and that
+they deserve more pay. But the Government should ignore them,
+they're just a bunch of whingeing liberals.
+i It's all very well for the caring middle classes to say that we should
+provide more aid to the developing world, but remember that most
+of them are preaching at us from around their well-stocked dining
+tables.
+j Given the evidence that so many students are cheating in examinations,
+examinations should be abolished in favour of assessment by
+coursework.
+4 (i) Name the fallacy committed by each of the following arguments
+and (ii) reconstruct the argument to demonstrate its fallaciousness.
+Example
+Democracy is the best system of government. Most people in the
+world believe in the superiority of democratic systems.
+✎ (i) Fallacy of majority belief.
+(ii) P1) Most people believe in democratic systems.
+P2) Any belief held by the majority is true.
+C) Democracy is the best system of government.
+a Our lecturers are always extolling the virtues of critical thinking, but
+they would say that wouldn't they? They only keep their jobs if
+they've got students to teach.
+b It's not illegal for me to exaggerate skills on my curriculum vitae, so
+it can't be immoral either.
+c My doctor says that wearing high heels is bad for your knees, but
+she wears high heels, so I don't think they really are.
+d Smoking causes lung cancer so people who do not smoke will not
+suffer lung cancer.
+e Jo believes that Chancellor of the Exchequer is doing a poor job. Thus
+Jo believes that Gordon Brown is doing a poor job.
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+166 Exercises
+f Whenever the cherry trees blossom, the weather begins to get
+warmer. So cherry blossoms cause the weather to get warmer.
+g David Beckham is the best midfielder ever to play for England and
+he says that Britburgers are his favourite. They must be the best
+burgers.
+h We shouldn't allow children to watch Pokemon, because pretty soon
+they will be collecting farm animals and staging contests to see who
+has the strongest pig. It's only a short step from there to complete
+disrespect for animal life.
+i There's nothing wrong with getting drunk once in a while, everyone
+I know is partial to a few beers now and again.
+j There is no point in implementing harsh penalties for drunk drivers
+because there will always be some people who are going to drive
+drunk no matter what penalties are put in place.
+k If a car breaks down on the road, no one thinks that a passing
+mechanic is obligated to render emergency road service. So why
+expect doctors to render emergency medical assistance to all and
+sundry?
+5 Provide an example of each of the following fallacies. Try to make
+your example appreciably different from those already provided for you.
+Example
+Denying the antecedent
+✎ If he took all of his medication, he should be feeling better
+by now. He flushed half of his medication down the lavatory
+so he can't be feeling any better.
+a Begging the question
+b Red herring
+c Straw man
+d Mistaking correlation for cause
+e Perfectionist fallacy
+f Ad hominem
+g Deriving 'ought' from 'is'
+h Weak analogy
+i Base rate fallacy
+j Tu quoque
+  
+Rhetorical ploys and fallacies
+167
+Exercises
+Chapter 5
+The practice of argumentreconstruction
+The goal of argument-reconstruction is to produce a clear and completely
+explicit statement of the argument that the arguer had in mind. The
+desired clarity and explicitness is achieved by putting all of the argument,
+and nothing but the argument, into standard form: this displays the
+168
+* Extraneous material 169
+* Defusing the rhetoric 171
+* Logical streamlining 174
+* Implicit and explicit 176
+* Connecting premises 184
+* Covering generalisations 185
+* Relevance 188
+* Ambiguity and vagueness 191
+Ambiguity * Vagueness
+* More on generalisations 198
+The scope of a generalisation
+* Practical reasoning 201
+* Balancing costs, benefits and probabilities 205
+* Explanations as conclusions 207
+* Causal generalisations 210
+* A shortcut 213
+argument's premises, intermediate conclusions and conclusion, and indicates
+the inferences between them. The strength of the argument is understood
+in terms of the concepts discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 -- validity,
+inductive force, deductive and inductive soundness. In this chapter, we
+begin to see, in more detail, how the practice of reconstruction goes; in
+particular, we learn some ways of coping with commonly encountered
+difficulties.
+Extraneous material
+The first step in analysing and reconstructing an argument is to identify
+its conclusion, then its premises. But much of what people say or write,
+when advancing an argument, plays no argumentative role. Much is there
+for emphasis, or is rhetorical, or plays some other role than that of
+expressing the propositions that properly constitute the argument. When
+reconstructing arguments, then, we have to hive off this extraneous
+material. Here's an example; we've given each sentence a number in order
+to facilitate a detailed discussion of it:
+(1) Once again the problem of young people drinking in city centres
+and generally creating chaos rears its ugly head. (2) The recent
+trouble in York was some of the worst. (3) It happens over and over,
+so much that people just seem to shrug their shoulders, accepting
+it as a fact of life, or a law of nature. (4) So are we simply resigned
+to it? (5) Do we simply accept that our young people are going to
+waste the best years of their lives acting like hooligans? (or rather,
+being hooligans?) (6) Do we stand idly by? (7) I don't think so. (8)
+Not I, at any rate. (9) And there's a ready solution. (10) Let us turn
+to an old solution for a new problem: compulsory military service.
+(11) Because they would learn habits of discipline, and something
+about community spirit, it's pretty obvious that young people would
+be a lot less likely to cause trouble when finished.
+The arguer's conclusion here seems to be that Britain should introduce
+compulsory military service for its youth. The most important premise is
+the conditional statement that if compulsory military service were introduced,
+then the problem of drunkenness and hooliganism among British
+youth would be curtailed. Sentence 11 seems to be provided as a premise
+in a sub-argument for that claim. But there is a lot of other material:
+* The first two sentences function as stage-setting: they alert the reader
+to the problem being discussed, and perhaps serve to emphasise the
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+169
+immediacy and severity of the problem. Sentences 1--8, as a group,
+are intended to persuade the reader that the problem is serious enough
+that something ought to be done about it. That much is surely a
+premise of the main argument; but it should be evident that they do
+not provide an argument for that claim. They merely assert the claim
+in a rhetorically charged way.
+* The function of sentence 9 is simply to announce that the author is
+now going to turn from stressing the gravity of the problem to
+suggesting a solution -- in other words, that the author is now going
+to give the argument.
+* Sentence 10 asserts the conclusion. But it does not do so in the most
+economical or straightforward way. The bit about the 'old solution
+for a new problem' is a rhetorical flourish that should be omitted
+from the reconstruction. Also, it seems clear that the arguer is saying
+that compulsory military service should be introduced, not just that
+it would solve the problem. The conclusion, then, should be rewritten
+as 'Compulsory military service should be introduced' (there will be
+more on this type of 'practical' conclusion later in the chapter).
+* Sentence 11 includes the words 'it's pretty obvious that . . .'. Phrases
+of that kind -- phrases that merely serve to emphasise the claim being
+made -- should always be eliminated from reconstructed arguments.
+* Sentence 11 exemplifies a use of the word 'because' that should always
+be eliminated from reconstructed arguments. Often we use 'because'
+when speaking of cause and effect, as in 'The cake is dry because it
+was baked too long'. In sentence 11, however, the word does something
+else: it indicates a relation between premise and conclusion of
+a sub-argument to the main argument. In particular, the arguer is
+giving the following sub-argument:
+P1) If British youth were to acquire habits of discipline and
+community spirit, then the problem of drunkenness and
+hooliganism among them would be reduced.
+P2) If made to perform military service, British youth would acquire
+habits of discipline and community service.
+C1) If British youth were made to perform military service,
+the problem of drunkenness and hooliganism among
+them would be reduced.
+C1 serves as an intermediate conclusion in the arguer's overall argument.
+The word 'because', in this usage, is equivalent to the word 'since', which
+functions in the following way. If we say 'If there are no clouds, it isn't
+raining', then we have not asserted either that it isn't raining, nor that
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+170
+there aren't any clouds (review the section in Chapter 2 on conditionals
+if this is not clear). If we say, however, 'Since there are no clouds, it isn't
+raining', then we've asserted both. So what the word 'since' does is to
+transform a conditional statement into a statement that asserts both the
+conditional and the antecedent of that conditional, and thereby asserts its
+consequent. It provides a compact way of expressing simple arguments of
+the form: 'If P, then Q; P, therefore Q.' 'Because', in the usage we are
+discussing, does exactly the same thing. And since our aim in reconstructing
+arguments is to lay out the arguments explicitly and clearly, we
+should eliminate such uses of 'because' and 'since', and unpack the arguments
+they serve to indicate. (The causal use of 'because' is another
+matter, however; it will be discussed later in this chapter; see also the
+discussion of 'because' in Chapter 1, pp. 18--20.)
+Bearing in mind that the above argument laid out in standard form
+is a sub-argument for C1, a reconstruction of the remainder of the
+argument might go like this:
+C1) If British youth were made to perform military service, the
+problem of drunkenness and hooliganism among them would
+be reduced.
+P3) Something should be done to reduce the problem of
+drunkenness and hooliganism among British youth.
+C2) Britain should introduce compulsory military service for
+its youth.
+We will be in a better position later in the chapter to say whether or not
+such an argument is valid. The main lesson here is that the first step in
+reconstructing an argument is to make a list of the argument's premises
+and conclusion that leaves out extraneous material, and that expresses
+the premises and conclusion as concisely and clearly as possible. Note
+however, that making such a list is only the first step towards a complete
+reconstruction. A complete reconstruction also includes premises and
+conclusions that are only implicit in the original argument (and which
+therefore do not appear on the initial list). A complete reconstruction also
+displays the structure of an extended argument by displaying intermediate
+conclusions. It should be clear that the correct argument tree is
+as shown in Figure 5.1 (see over).
+Defusing the rhetoric
+Much of the task of reconstruction is the task of clarification. In Chapter 1,
+we discussed several linguistic phenomena that frequently impede clarity,
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+171
+including ambiguity, vagueness, the differing roles of primary and secondary
+connotation and conversational implicature, rhetorical questions,
+figures of speech, irony and implicit relativity. We will deal with the specific
+problems of ambiguity and vagueness later in this chapter. At this point
+we deal with some other impediments to clear reconstruction. Suppose
+Kemp has been caught stealing money from the company, and someone
+says:
+That damned Kemp's been caught with his hand in the cookie jar
+again. He's history.
+The arguer is reasoning is follows:
+P1) If Kemp has been caught stealing money from the company,
+then he is going to be fired.
+P2) Kemp has been caught stealing money from the company.
+C) Kemp is going to be fired.
+As you can see, in giving the reconstruction, we have eliminated the
+metaphor 'caught with his hand in the cookie jar', the expressive epithet
+'that damned Kemp', and the slang 'he's history'. Not as colourful, but
+much more amenable to logical analysis. When reconstructing, eliminate
+metaphors, expressive epithets and slang.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+172
+C1 P3
+C2
+P1 P2
+Figure 5.1
+What exactly are expressive epithets? These are terms used to
+refer to some person, group or other entity -- just like a proper name
+such as 'Gary Kemp' or 'Paris' -- but that characterise the entity referred
+to for rhetorical purposes (non-logically persuasive purposes, or nonpersuasive
+purposes such as humour). Let us look at a well-known real
+example that demonstrates how complex their use can be. In 2003, US
+and British forces along with smaller forces from some other countries
+invaded Iraq, for the purpose of removing the Government and military
+capabilities of its president Sadaam Hussein. His military capabilities, it
+was claimed, included the so-called 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' (note
+that this itself might be regarded as an expressive epithet). American
+Secretary of State Colin Powell had in March of that year announced a
+list of thirty countries that had agreed to be named as supporting the
+invasion, including, of course, those that would actually be contributing
+troops or other military assistance. He announced it as 'The Coalition of
+the Willing'. In the weeks before the invasion, however, leaders of France,
+Germany and Belgium had voiced vociferous opposition to the invasion,
+arguing that UN inspection teams should be given more time to verify
+whether or not Iraq possessed illegal weapons, which constituted the
+primary reason for the invasion. Here is a comment from a public debate
+held at the time:
+You think our coalition of the willing needs the Gang of Three?
+They can sit on the fence; let 'em.
+In the context, it was clear that the first sentence was a rhetorical
+question: the speaker's intention was to assert that the answer is no, the
+coalition of the willing does not need the Gang of Three. Rhetorical questions
+should always be rewritten as declarative sentences. Now as for the
+epithets. What the terms stand for, literally, are simply two groups of
+countries: one supporting the invasion, and one opposed. 'Coalition of the
+willing' has a rather positive 'spin' to it (for the others are made to sound
+'unwilling', hence complacent or perhaps cowardly), but 'Gang of Three'
+sounds distinctly negative, owing to the connotation of 'Gang of Four',
+which signified a notorious group within the Chinese communist government
+in the 1970's who were partly responsible for the disastrous 'cultural
+revolution' of Mao Tse-Tung's later years. But shorn of all this spin and
+rhetoric, these emotive associations, the factual content of the sentence is
+merely something like this:
+In order to undertake the invasion successfully, the invading
+countries and their supporters do not require approval or support
+from France, Germany and Belgium.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+173
+The phrase 'sit on the fence' is, in this context, another pejorative
+phrase; the sentence containing it seems to mean that approval and support
+from those countries is not needed. The intended argument, then, was
+probably this:
+P1) In order to undertake the invasion successfully, the invading
+countries and their supporters do not require approval or
+support from France, Germany and Belgium.
+P2) If, in order to undertake the invasion successfully, the invading
+countries and their supporters do not require approval or
+support from France, Germany and Belgium, then they should
+undertake the invasion without it.
+C) The invading countries should undertake the invasion
+without approval or support from France, Germany and
+Belgium.
+Logical streamlining
+In Chapter 2 we devoted a good deal of attention to certain expressions
+whose logical nature is comparatively easy to grasp. These include 'if--
+then', 'not', 'every', 'all' and 'or'. For example, one exercise asked you to
+translate sentences containing the comparatively difficult expressions
+'only if' and 'unless' into easier forms using 'if--then' and, where needed,
+'not'. So we learned that 'A unless B' means the same as 'If not-B, then
+A'. In general, when reconstructing arguments we should strive to display
+the logical relationships in an argument in the simplest, clearest and most
+familiar ways possible. An example will illustrate this:
+We read over and over that when all is said and done, what is best
+for the child is the family. But what would the elimination of the
+marriage tax-credit mean? Less incentive to marry. And what would
+that mean? Fewer couples getting married. And what would that
+mean? A reduction in the proportion of children living in families.
+It should be clear that after the first sentence that the arguer is
+expressing some conditionals: if the marriage tax-credit is eliminated, then
+there will be less incentive to get married. If there is less incentive to get
+married, then fewer couples will get married. If fewer couples get married
+then the proportion of children living in families will be reduced. But
+this, according to the arguer's first sentence, should be avoided. Thus the
+argument might be reconstructed like this:
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+174
+P1) If the marriage tax-credit is eliminated, then there will be less
+incentive to get married.
+P2) If there is less incentive to get married, then fewer couples will
+get married.
+P3) If fewer couples get married, then the proportion of children
+living in families will be reduced.
+P4) The proportion of children living in families should not be
+reduced.
+C) The marriage tax-credit should not be eliminated.
+This reconstruction, however, leaves two intermediate conclusions implicit.
+A completely explicit reconstruction represents it as an extended
+argument:
+P1) If the marriage tax-credit is eliminated, then there will be less
+incentive to get married.
+P2) If there is less incentive to get married, then fewer couples will
+get married.
+C1) If the marriage tax-credit is eliminated, then fewer
+couples will get married.
+P3) If fewer couples get married, then the proportion of children
+living in families will be reduced.
+C2) If the marriage tax-credit is eliminated, then the
+proportion of children living in families will be reduced.
+P4) The proportion of children living in families should not be
+reduced.
+C3) The marriage tax-credit should not be eliminated.
+The point we want to stress here is that we have replaced the language
+used by the arguer to express these conditional propositions with explicit
+if--then sentences. The language used by the arguer is not especially unclear,
+but it is awkward to deal with because it does not even take the
+form of proper sentences. Rewriting the material in terms of if--then
+sentences makes the argument easier to handle and its logic more obvious.
+This is just one example of what we mean by logical streamlining.
+There are many, many ways in which ordinary language can be awkward
+to reconstruct, and in which logical relationships can be concealed; so we
+cannot give anything like an exhaustive list of exact rules for logical
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+175
+streamlining. But here are some 'rules of thumb' that you should apply
+whenever you can do so in a way that remains faithful to the arguer's
+apparent meaning:
+1 Where appropriate, rewrite sentences as either conditional or disjunctive
+sentences of one of the following forms:
+If A then B. If not-A then not-B.
+If not-A then B. If A then not-B.
+A or B. A or not-B.
+Not-A or B. Not-A or not-B.
+2 Rewrite generalisations in one of the following forms, where the
+blank '__' is filled by a quantifier such as 'all', 'some', 'most', 'no',
+'almost all', etc.:
+__ F are G.
+__ are not-G.
+We will not stick to this religiously, as it is not always possible, and doing
+it will sometimes distract from other points we are trying to make. What
+we will do, rather, is continue to practise it on many occasions throughout
+the book. For example, in the section on rewriting for rhetorical neutrality
+we employed simple if--then sentences. If you pay attention, you should
+gradually develop a feel for logical streamlining.
+Implicit and explicit
+Not only do actual statements of arguments typically include a lot of
+material that is inessential to the argument, they often exclude some of
+what is essential to the argument: some essential propositions are left
+implicit. Our task in reconstruction is to make the argument fully
+explicit. To say that a proposition is implicit in an argument is to say
+that it is part of the argument intended by the arguer -- either as a premise
+or as the conclusion -- but that it has not actually been stated by the
+arguer. To make the proposition explicit is simply to state it -- in
+particular, to include it in our reconstruction of the argument. So a large
+part of argument-reconstruction is to make explicit what was merely
+implicit in the original statement of the argument.
+Consider a very simple case:
+Is Mr Jenkins well-educated? Well of course. Didn't you know that
+he's a successful politician?
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+176
+The arguer might be presumed to be arguing as follows:
+P1) Mr Jenkins is a successful politician.
+C) Mr Jenkins is well-educated.
+So rendered, the argument is invalid. Nor is it inductively forceful, since
+in order to know whether or not the premise makes the conclusion probable,
+you have to know something the argument's premise does not tell
+us -- namely whether or not successful politicians, at least usually, are
+well-educated. But it is clear that, in drawing this inference, the arguer
+is making the assumption that successful politicians are well-educated.
+We have to make this assumption explicit:
+P1) Mr Jenkins is a successful politician.
+P2) All successful politicians are well-educated.
+C) Mr Jenkins is well-educated.
+Or perhaps we should write 'almost all' rather than 'all'.
+Let us now consider a real and more complicated example. The moa
+was a very large, flightless bird, which was native to New Zealand but
+which is now believed to be extinct. The yeti is a large, white-furred ape,
+which is probably only mythical, but which some people believe actually
+inhabits the Himalayas. Here is the argument:
+The moa is thought to have been extinct for at least 100 years.
+So naturally a great deal of scepticism is met by Paddy Freaney's
+claim to have seen a moa in 1993. But as Freaney himself has
+pointed out, Freaney has climbed Mount Everest twice, and has
+not claimed to have seen a yeti. So we ought to believe Mr
+Freaney's claim.1
+The first task of argument-reconstruction should be to identify, and
+if necessary, to restate, the conclusion of the argument. Now in this case
+it might seem obvious that the conclusion of this argument is stated explicitly
+in the last sentence: 'we ought to believe Mr Freaney's claim.' But
+this is not the most straightforward and informative way to put it. Ask
+yourself: exactly what proposition is the ultimate concern of the arguer
+here? The arguer attempts to persuade us to accept a certain claim of
+Paddy Freaney's; but this does not really tell us the ultimate concern of
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+177
+1 Sunday Star-Times, Auckland, New Zealand, 10 December 1995, p. C5.
+the arguer until we specify what claim that is. Freaney's claim, the one
+that ultimately concerns the arguer, is the claim that he saw a moa. So
+what the arguer is really trying to persuade us of is that Paddy Freaney
+did see a moa. Here then is a case in which the conclusion is at least partly
+implicit; none of the sentences directly says that Paddy Freaney saw a moa.
+Indeed, it might plausibly be suggested that the conclusion ultimately
+at issue here is one that is inferred from the proposition that Freaney saw
+a moa, namely, that the moa is not extinct. In that case it would be even
+more obvious that the conclusion of the argument is only implicit in the
+original statement of the argument. But let us not push the matter quite
+as far as that. For simplicity we shall take the conclusion to be that Paddy
+Freaney saw a moa.
+Once we have identified the conclusion, we must identify the argument's
+premises. It is clear that the first two sentences in the example
+function as stage-setting, informing the reader of some of the relevant
+concerns surrounding the issue, and are not premises of the argument.
+The arguer is arguing that Paddy Freaney saw a moa; this proposition is
+certainly not supported by the fact that the moa is thought to be extinct,
+nor by the fact that many people doubt Freaney's claim to have seen one.
+If anything, those facts make it less credible that Freaney saw a moa. So,
+by the principle of charity, we should not take the arguer to be citing
+those facts in support of the conclusion that Freaney saw a moa. Rather,
+the function of these propositions is to acknowledge that there is reasonable
+resistance to Freaney's claim. This sort of thing is very common: very
+frequently, an arguer will begin by explaining why there is opposition to
+his or her conclusion.
+The only premise explicitly given is that Freaney has twice climbed
+Mount Everest, and has not claimed to see a yeti. So our first shot at a
+reconstruction might look like this:
+P1) Paddy Freaney climbed Mount Everest twice, and did not
+claim to see a yeti.
+C) Paddy Freaney saw a moa.
+Now this is a start, but clearly it does not do justice to the arguer's intentions.
+As it stands, the argument is neither deductively valid nor
+inductively forceful. To see this, suppose the only information you are
+given is that a certain person climbed Mount Everest twice, and that that
+person did not claim that he saw a yeti. Does that give you any reason
+to infer that that person saw a moa? Obviously not. P1 does not support
+the conclusion by itself.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+178
+Yet the argument as originally intended by the arguer surely does
+have at least some inductive force. Therefore, the arguer must be implicitly
+relying upon some further premise or premises, which we should
+try to make explicit. One proposition, which is surely relied upon by the
+argument, but which is not explicitly stated in the argument, is simply
+that Paddy Freaney claimed he saw a moa. The second sentence almost
+states this explicitly, but does not quite do so. So we should include this
+in our reconstruction:
+P1) Paddy Freaney has claimed he saw a moa.
+P2) Paddy Freaney climbed Mount Everest twice, and did not
+claim to see a yeti.
+C) Paddy Freaney saw a moa.
+This is better. We now have in the premises, it seems, a statement of all
+the particular facts about Paddy Freaney from which the arguer is inferring
+that Paddy Freaney saw a moa. But still we have not made everything
+explicit. In order to see this, ask yourself, why does P2 -- in view of the
+fact that Paddy Freaney claimed he saw a moa -- support the conclusion
+that he did see a moa? It is something like this: the arguer seems to be
+responding to the charge that Freaney is liar, that he wishes fraudulently
+to claim credit for a certain sort of zoological discovery. As against this,
+the arguer points out that Freaney climbed Everest twice without claiming
+a yeti-sighting. But surely, reasons the arguer, if a person were the sort
+to go around making false claims about seeing strange creatures, then if
+he has twice climbed Mount Everest, he would probably have claimed to
+see a yeti (for such a person, having visited Everest, surely would not be
+able to resist claiming to have seen the notorious yeti). But Freaney
+climbed Everest twice without making such a claim, so he must not be
+such a person. If he is not such a person, then he didn't lie about the
+moa. So, if he said he saw a moa, he did see a moa.
+What is missing from the preceding reconstruction, then, is an
+assumed generalisation: a person who has visited Mount Everest without
+claiming to see a yeti is not a person who would fabricate the sighting
+of a creature whose existence is disputed. This is a generalisation because
+it is not something said on the basis of knowledge about Paddy Freaney
+in particular. It is plausible to say, as a general fact about human nature,
+that a person who wishes to tell 'tall tales' about some particular kind of
+thing is unlikely to pass up a favourable opportunity to do so.
+The argument implicitly depends upon this generalisation as a
+premise; hence in our reconstruction we should make it explicit:
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+179
+P1) Paddy Freaney has claimed he saw a moa.
+P2) Paddy Freaney climbed Mount Everest twice, and did not
+claim to see a yeti.
+P3) A person who lies about sighting creatures whose existence is
+disputed would claim to see a yeti, if he or she were to climb
+Mount Everest.
+C) Paddy Freaney saw a moa.
+Note that, although we could have produced a valid argument by writing
+'everything Paddy Freaney says is true' (or an inductively forceful argument
+by writing 'most of what Paddy Freaney says is true'), doing so
+would have failed to take into account the relevance of P2. If we had
+written that premise in place of the actual P3, then the conclusion could
+have been inferred from that premise along with P1, and P2 would have
+played no role in the argument. This is important, because the arguer
+clearly means to give us a very specific reason to believe this particular
+claim of Freaney's; he or she is clearly not simply relying on Freaney's
+general honesty or trustworthiness.
+This reconstruction of the argument now seems to include the relevant
+facts about Paddy Freaney upon which the arguer is relying, and it
+includes the generalisation upon which the arguer is (implicitly) relying.
+We could make its structure a bit more explicit by making an intermediate
+conclusion explicit, and adding one further relevant point about the
+moa (note that we have had to change the numbering of the premises):
+P1) Paddy Freaney climbed Mount Everest twice, and did not
+claim to see a yeti.
+P2) A person who lies about sighting creatures whose existence is
+disputed would claim to see a yeti, if he or she were to climb
+Mount Everest.
+C1) Paddy Freaney does not lie about sighting creatures
+whose existence is disputed.
+P3) Paddy Freaney has claimed he saw a moa.
+P4) The moa is a creature whose existence is disputed.
+C2) Paddy Freaney saw a moa.
+The argument is not deductively valid. To see this, suppose that the
+premises P1--P4 of the argument are indeed true. In that case, Paddy
+Freaney was not lying, making up a story, in saying that he saw a moa.
+But it does not follow that Paddy Freaney did see a moa, for he could
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+180
+have been mistaken rather than lying. In that case, his claim to have seen
+one was not a lie, but nor was it true. Thus the inference from C1, P3
+and P4 to C2 is invalid. So the argument as a whole is invalid. In order
+to make this clear, we can represent the argument like this:
+P1) Paddy Freaney climbed Mount Everest twice, and did not
+claim to see a yeti.
+P2) A person who lies about sighting creatures whose existence is
+disputed would claim to see a yeti, if he or she were to climb
+Mount Everest.
+C1) Paddy Freaney does not lie about sighting creatures
+whose existence is disputed.
+P3) Paddy Freaney has claimed he saw a moa.
+P4) The moa is a creature whose existence is disputed.
+C2) Either Paddy Freaney saw a moa, or he was mistaken
+in believing he did.
+C3) Paddy Freaney saw a moa.
+This makes the argument's invalidity quite obvious: the inference from
+C2 to C3 is invalid. Might the argument be inductively forceful, then?
+What follows from the premises is that Freaney either saw a moa or was
+mistaken. In order to conclude that Freaney probably saw a moa we would
+thus need to know which of these alternatives is more likely. Since the
+argument does not give us any information relevant to this, we are not
+really in a position to judge the argument inductively forceful.
+Note finally that having begun with an argument whose structure
+was like this:
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+181
+P1
+C
+Figure 5.2
+We arrived at a much more complicated one like this:
+Let us now look at an example from down under (Australia this
+time), which shows how making a generalisation explicit can reveal the
+weakness of an argument:
+The suggestion that in order to protect children from sunburn,
+a rule should be instituted requiring all children at our school
+to wear a sun hat when they are outside after 11 a.m., is
+unacceptable. For clearly such a rule would be an infringement
+upon the freedom of the individual.
+The conclusion, obviously, is that a sun hat rule at school would be unacceptable.
+The only explicit premise is that given in the second sentence.
+So we may begin with:
+P1) A sun hat rule at school would infringe upon the freedom of
+the individual.
+C) A sun hat rule should not be instituted.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+182
+C1 P3 P4
+C2
+C3
+P1 P2
+Figure 5.3
+Obviously a generalisation is being implicitly assumed. A first shot at
+making it explicit, and which might well seem to capture what the arguer
+must have been thinking, might be this: that no rule that infringes upon
+the freedom of the individual is acceptable. So we write:
+P1) A sun hat rule at school would infringe upon the freedom of
+the individual.
+P2) No rule that infringes upon the freedom of the individual is
+acceptable.
+C) A sun hat rule at school is unacceptable.
+Here is a deductively valid argument. If the premises are true, then
+certainly the conclusion is true. However, this does not establish that the
+conclusion is true. For that, we have to ask whether the premises are true
+-- whether the argument is not only deductively valid but deductively
+sound.
+Surely P1 is true, in a sense: by definition, a rule of any kind restricts,
+hence infringes upon, the freedom of those to whom it applies -- in this
+case the children of the school in question. So let us grant that P1 is true.
+But look at P2. We often hear this sort of statement, and we are often
+so impressed by such a phrase as 'the freedom of the individual' that we
+accept the statement as true. We have the feeling that 'the freedom of
+the individual' is something important and valuable, therefore that
+anything which takes it away must be a bad thing. But, as stated here,
+this proposition is absurd. For as we just said, all rules 'infringe upon the
+freedom of the individual'. So what P2 amounts to is the absurd proposition
+that all rules are unacceptable. Unless you are a kind of radical
+anarchist, you have to conclude that this argument is not deductively
+sound.
+Now there may be some less sweeping generalisation that the argument
+might employ instead of P2, which would be more plausible, yet
+sufficient to obtain the desired conclusion. But the arguer has not given
+any hint as to what generalisation this might be. So we cannot credit the
+arguer with actually having supplied a helpful argument on the issue.
+They may have something more plausible in mind, but they have not
+conveyed it.
+This argument, by the way, is a good illustration of the importance
+of distinguishing between argument and rhetoric. It was by thinking carefully
+about the precise literal meanings of the words expressing the
+argument that we came to see that the argument is unsound. In order to
+do this, however, we had to have some courage: a phrase such as 'the
+freedom of the individual' is rhetorically powerful; nevertheless, it is just
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+183
+not literally true that every rule that 'infringes upon the freedom of the
+individual' is unacceptable; on the contrary, it is absurd to suggest it.
+Connecting premises
+Look back at the argument about successful politicians (p. 177). And now
+consider this argument:
+We can assume that inflation will increase, because we know that
+consumer confidence is increasing.
+Reconstructing, we might write:
+P1) Consumer confidence is increasing.
+C) Inflation will increase.
+As it stands, the argument is neither valid nor inductively forceful.
+But we can see that the arguer is implicitly assuming that if consumer
+confidence is increasing, then inflation will increase. So we write:
+P1) Consumer confidence is increasing.
+P2) If consumer confidence is increasing, then inflation will
+increase.
+C) Inflation will increase.
+In each case -- the inflation argument and the politician argument --
+the premise, which had to be made explicit in order to make the argument
+valid, is what we call a connecting premise. We have had to
+add connecting premises in many of the arguments we have so far considered.
+Usually, when people give arguments, the premises they give
+explicitly will be only those which pertain to the particular facts or
+subject-matter they are talking about. For example, someone might say
+'My cat won't have kittens; she's been spayed'. The arguer explicitly sets
+forth the relevant fact about her particular cat, but doesn't bother to state
+explicitly the generalisation she assumes, that spayed cats can't have
+kittens. Probably she assumes this to be common knowledge; if she did
+not, then she would have made the premise explicit. The point then is
+that arguers very often leave implicit the more general assumptions they
+make. That is what happened in the inflation case and the politician case
+discussed earlier.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+184
+We cannot assume, however, that whenever an argument, as explicitly
+given, is neither valid nor inductively forceful, the intended argument
+is valid or inductively forceful. It is not always the case that the arguer is
+implicitly relying on an appropriate connecting premise. Sometimes people
+just do give bad arguments, ones that are neither valid nor inductively
+forceful. That is what may have happened in the Paddy Freaney case.
+In further cases, the implicit connecting premise is just not true, in
+which case the argument is unsound. That's what happened in the sun
+hat case.
+Covering generalisations
+In the politician case, the connecting premise was a generalisation
+(review the discussion of generalisations in Chapter 1 if you are not clear
+about what a generalisation is). Connecting premises are usually generalisations.
+But in the inflation case the connecting premise we used was
+a conditional (see Chapter 2). This is also common. However, there is
+an important relationship between conditionals and generalisations that
+must be appreciated. Consider the following propositions:
+a If Betty is a Siamese cat, then she has blue eyes.
+b All Siamese cats have blues eyes.
+(a) is a conditional, (b) is a generalisation. The special relationship in
+which they stand is that (b) is a covering generalisation for (a). (We
+can also say that (a) is an instance of (b), as is common in logic.) Note
+that (a) may be inferred from (b); the argument from (b) to (a) would be
+valid. But covering generalisations need not be hard generalisations: 'If
+Jane's cat is Siamese then its eyes are blue' is an instance of 'All Siamese
+cats have blues eyes', but it is also an instance of 'Most Siamese cats have
+blues eyes'. In such a case the inference from generalisation to instance
+is inductive rather than deductive.
+There is one further aspect to the relationship between covering
+generalisations and their instances that should be appreciated. Another
+way to express the proposition expressed by the generalisation (b) is this:
+c If something is a Siamese cat, then it has blue eyes.
+Or we could say, 'Whatever X may be, if X is a Siamese cat, then X has
+blue eyes. This is exactly like (a), except we use the indefinite pronoun
+instead of the name 'Betty'; this makes the conditional statement into a
+generalisation. In other words, generalisations of the 'All A are B' sort
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+185
+are themselves conditionals, except they are generalised. (b) and (c) are
+generalised forms of (a). The same goes for generalisations of the form
+'No A are B', as in 'No ungulates are carnivores'. This says, in effect,
+that all ungulates are non-carnivores. So it could be expressed as 'If something
+is an ungulate, then it is not a carnivore'.
+Very often, when people assert conditionals, they do so on the basis
+of some covering generalisation. It is important to be aware of this when
+reconstructing arguments. Suppose you are given the inflation argument,
+but without a connecting premise:
+P1) Consumer confidence is increasing.
+C) Inflation will increase.
+Suppose you reply to the arguer by saying that you just have no idea
+whether or not P1 constitutes a reason to infer C, that inflation is going
+to increase. You point out that the argument, at any rate, is certainly not
+valid as it stands, and would not be inductively forceful. Suppose that the
+arguer now tries to satisfy you with:
+P1) Consumer confidence is increasing.
+P2) If consumer confidence is increasing, then inflation will
+increase.
+C) Inflation will increase.
+Does this really improve the argument? It does make it valid. But this
+doesn't really help you. All that P2 says is that if P1 is true then so is
+C. You have already said that you have no idea whether P1 constitutes
+a reason to infer C. The arguer is not going to convince you merely by
+asserting P2; to do so is merely to assert that P1 is a good reason to infer
+C. So the new version is not really an advance on the first version;
+although you cannot deny that the new version of the argument is valid,
+you can't really say whether the argument is sound, even if you grant
+that the arguer does know that P1 is true.
+Suppose, however, that you wished to find out whether or not to
+believe P2. Well P2 says that if consumer confidence is now increasing
+(which it is), then inflation will increase. So the only way to find out
+whether P2 is true would be to look into the future to see whether inflation
+does increase. But that you cannot do. So what do you do? What
+you need is to find out whether, in general, increases in consumer confidence
+bring about increases in inflation. And that you can find out, by
+doing some statistical research (consumer confidence is defined in terms
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+186
+of how much people buy, and how much they borrow in order to buy).
+So what you really need to know, and what it is possible to find out, is
+whether the following covering generalisation is true:
+Whenever consumer confidence increases, inflation increases.
+Probably it isn't, but the corresponding soft generalisation might well be
+true:
+Usually, when consumer confidence increases, inflation increases.
+This could be established by inductive inference from a survey of past
+cases in which consumer confidence increased.
+So, the arguer giving the inflation argument gives a conditional
+premise rather than a generalisation, but if the arguer believes the conditional,
+he or she probably does so on the basis of believing the corresponding
+covering generalisation. Since that is what the arguer is
+assuming at bottom, that is what should be included in the reconstruction
+of the argument. If we do not do this, then our analysis of a given
+argument may be superficial. Indeed, it is easy to reconstruct an argument
+as valid in a completely superficial way, if we do not take pains to
+discover what connecting premises an arguer is relying on at bottom. For
+example, the following argument might have been given on the evening
+of the 28 June 1914:
+P1) If the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand has been assassinated
+today, then a general war involving all the European powers
+will soon break out.
+P2) The Austrian Archduke Ferdinand has been assassinated
+today.
+C) A general war involving all the European powers will
+soon break out.
+Now in fact this argument would have been sound: the Archduke was
+assassinated that day, and that single event touched off what would
+become known as the Great War, later as the First World War. But
+someone not well-apprised of the political situation in Europe at the time
+would have needed a lot of explanation in order to see why they should
+accept P1. P1 is a connecting premise that ensures validity, but it hardly
+begins to tell us why the arguer thinks that a single assassination will
+lead to a general war involving several countries. In reconstructing, we
+should try to bring out as much of this as we can. Connecting premises
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+187
+are almost always necessary, but they can fail to be sufficient to bring
+out the real basis of an argument.
+Finally, you should take care to distinguish the relationship we have
+just been discussing between conditionals and generalisations from the
+following sorts of cases:
+If all men are mortal, then all women are mortal.
+If no men are mortal, then no women are mortal.
+If all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal.
+If Socrates is mortal, then all men are mortal.
+These are conditionals that have generalisations as antecedents, as consequents,
+or as both. They are quite common.
+Relevance
+This chapter began with a discussion of the necessity of eliminating extraneous
+material from argument-reconstructions. We turn now to some
+further aspects of this, and to some cases where the matter is more
+complex. Consider this argument:
+At Les Champignons they are usually fully booked (Professor
+Gilmour once took me to dine there). So we can safely expect Les
+Champignons to be fully booked tonight.
+Without bothering to reconstruct, you can see that this would be an
+inductively forceful argument (of course it isn't deductively valid). You
+might try reconstructing the argument like this:
+P1) Les Champignons is usually fully booked.
+P2) Professor Gilmour once took me to dine at Les Champignons.
+C) (Probably) Les Champignons will be fully booked
+tonight.
+But, if you think about it, there is no point in including P2 in the reconstruction
+of the argument. P1 alone is the basis for thinking that the
+restaurant will be fully booked; that the arguer once dined there with
+Professor Gilmour is irrelevant. When a proposition stated by the arguer
+is irrelevant to the reasoning that delivers the conclusion, that proposition
+should not be included in a reconstruction of the argument.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+188
+It might seem that the only reason not to include irrelevant material
+in an argument is that it would be distracting. But in fact it can affect
+our assessment of the argument in a more important way. For suppose
+P1 is true, but P2 is not; the arguer, wishing to boast of a greater intimacy
+with Professor Gilmour than they in fact enjoy, fibbed when telling
+us that they dined out with him. If we were to discover this, yet persist
+in the above reconstruction of the argument, we should have to pronounce
+the argument to be unsound. Indeed, upon discovering the lie and
+becoming annoyed with the arguer, we might well be eager to do just
+this. But this would be wrong, because P2 is irrelevant to the argument.
+The argument should be represented like this:
+P1) Les Champignons is usually fully booked.
+C) (Probably) Les Champignons will be fully booked
+tonight.
+Since P1 is true, and the inductive inference is reasonable, the argument
+is inductively sound.
+This is an obvious point, but some cases are more subtle. In such
+cases it is a point that is easy to lose sight of, especially when we wish
+to refute the argument. Consider this example:
+If the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently, it will
+collapse altogether, because tuna populations will vanish. The
+evidence is obvious: tuna catches have decreased significantly
+every year for the past nine years. Indeed, because of depleting
+stocks, the Mid-Pacific Tuna Company went out of business.
+Suppose we initially reconstruct the argument as follows:
+P1) Tuna catches have decreased significantly every year for the
+past nine years.
+P2) Last year, the Mid-Pacific Tuna Company went out of
+business.
+C) If the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently, it
+will collapse altogether.
+For the moment, we leave out connecting premises. Here the arguer is
+claiming that P1 supports the conclusion by itself. But the arguer also
+seems to regard P2 as providing some additional evidence, in the form of
+an inductive inference from one case to the general proposition that tuna
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+189
+stocks have declined sufficiently to cause difficulty for the tuna industry
+as a whole. So surely P2 is not completely irrelevant to the argument.
+Both P1 and P2 support the conclusion. Suppose now you discover that
+although P1 is true, P2 is false, because the Mid-Pacific Tuna Company
+did not go out of business; rather, it was taken over by the larger Pan-
+Pacific Tuna Company. You might then conclude that since P2 is false,
+the argument is unsound, end of story. You might, indeed, exploit this
+mistake in attempting to discredit the arguer. If you were a person who
+opposed greater regulation of tuna fishing, drawing attention to this
+factual error might be a good rhetorical strategy to use in persuading
+people not to listen to arguments for increased regulation. Nevertheless,
+it would be a mistake from the point of view of critical thinking. This is
+simply because P1, by itself, constitutes a good reason for accepting the
+conclusion. To fixate upon the falsity of P2 simply diverts attention from
+the arguer's having cited P1. According to the principle of charity, we
+should simply omit P2 in our final reconstruction of the argument. More
+exactly: both P1 and P2, quite independently of each other, would support
+the conclusion. So really we should regard the arguer as having given
+two arguments for the conclusion, one of which we know to be unsound.
+So according the principle of charity, we should now focus on the other
+argument, the one utilising P1. Adding the needed connecting premises
+and an intermediate conclusion, we get:2
+P1) Tuna catches have been decreasing significantly for the past
+nine years.
+P2) If tuna catches have been decreasing significantly for the past
+nine years, then, if the tuna industry is not regulated more
+stringently, the tuna population will vanish.
+C1) If the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently,
+the tuna population will vanish.
+P3) If the tuna population vanishes, the tuna industry will collapse
+altogether.
+C2) If the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently, it
+will collapse altogether.
+This reconstruction makes for a plausible argument as it stands. There
+are two comments that it may be useful to make.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+190
+2 It might be more plausible to reconstruct this argument as inductive rather than
+deductive, but we have ignored this in order to maintain the focus on the point about
+relevance.
+First, note that, as usual, we have deleted the phrase 'the evidence is
+obvious', which adds nothing to the substance of the argument. Second,
+note that we have applied our policy of logical streamlining fairly rigorously
+in this case. Most conspicuously, the argument contained a
+non-causal use of 'because', functioning in a way similar to 'since' (see
+pp. 170--1). We replaced it with a conditional and a statement of the
+antecedent of the conditional as a separate premise, thereby 'opening up'
+the logical texture of the argument.
+It is easy to see that the argument from C1 and P3 to C2 is valid.
+Suppose that the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently. Then
+according to C1, the tuna population will vanish. But if so, then according
+to P3, the tuna industry will collapse. So it follows from C1 and P3 that
+if the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently, then the tuna
+industry will collapse; which is exactly what C2 says. (This is an example
+of a 'chain argument', as discussed near the end of Chapter 2.)
+Returning now to the main theme of this section. The basic moral of
+this section is that the truth-values of the premises actually advanced by
+an arguer can be more or less relevant to the soundness of the argument.
+Sometimes it is highly relevant that a given premise is false, sometimes
+it is much less so. It depends upon the nature of the mistake, and upon
+the role played in the argument by the premise. The degree of relevance
+must therefore be taken into account in the process of reconstruction.
+Ambiguity and vagueness
+If our explanations of ambiguity and vagueness are not clear to you, then
+you should review the discussions of those concepts in Chapter 1. In this
+section, we explain how to cope with vagueness and ambiguity when you
+encounter it in arguments.
+Ambiguity
+In reconstructing arguments, we have to eliminate any ambiguities in the
+original statement of the argument. If the original statement contains an
+ambiguous sentence, we have to decide which of the possible interpretations
+was most likely intended by the arguer, and, in our reconstruction
+of the argument, rewrite the sentence, choosing a form of words that
+conveys the intended meaning unambiguously.
+Let us take an example. Suppose that Jane, a Londoner, decides to
+invest some money in the share market. She decides to look for an investment
+adviser, and finds an advertisement which runs as follows:
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+191
+Sharemasters: London's leading personal investment advice
+service!
+Suppose that this expresses a true proposition, and Jane accepts that what
+it says is true; she accepts that Sharemasters is London's leading personal
+investment service. Assuming that it would be fraudulent to publish such
+a claim if it were not true, Jane reasons as follows (for simplicity, we will
+ignore the reference to London in the advertised claim; this will not affect
+the point we are making):
+P1) Sharemasters is the leading personal investment service.
+P2) If I employ a personal investment service, then I should employ
+the leading personal investment service.
+C) If I employ a personal investment service, then I should
+employ Sharemasters.
+This looks to be a deductively valid argument. But this is not quite clear,
+because P1 is ambiguous. What does 'leading' mean, in this context? It
+could mean (and this is no doubt what the advertisers hope that people
+like Jane will think it means) that Sharemasters is the most effective
+personal investment service -- that it secures better returns for its clients
+than other personal investment services. But it could also mean that
+Sharemasters is the biggest such organisation -- in the sense of having
+the most clients (this is the sense in which McDonald's is the world's
+leading restaurant); it might even mean that Sharemasters is the most
+profitable personal investment service -- that is, that it makes the most
+profits for the owners of Sharemasters itself, not necessarily for its clients
+(after all, this organisation is a business, and profitability can plausibly
+be said to be the measure of who is the 'leader' in a certain field of business).
+Suppose now that you wish to evaluate Jane's argument. You are
+aware of the ambiguity, so you rephrase P1 in each of the three ways,
+yielding three arguments:
+A P1) (a) Sharemasters secures higher returns for its clients than
+any other personal investment service.
+P2) (a) If Jane employs a personal investment service, then she
+should employ the personal investment service that
+secures higher returns for its clients than any other
+personal investment service.
+C) If Jane employs a personal investment service, she
+should employ Sharemasters.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+192
+B P1) (b) Sharemasters is the most profitable personal investment
+service.
+P2) (b) If Jane employs a personal investment service, then she
+should employ the most profitable personal investment
+service.
+C) If Jane employs a personal investment service, she
+should employ Sharemasters.
+C P1) (c) Sharemasters is the biggest personal investment service.
+P2) (c) If Jane employs a personal investment service, then she
+should employ the biggest personal investment service.
+C) If Jane employs a personal investment service, she
+should employ Sharemasters.
+Now all three arguments are deductively valid. But are any of them
+sound? First of all consider arguments B and C. Even if we assume that
+P1(b) and P1(c) are true, it does not seem that these are sound arguments,
+because it does not seem that either P2(b) or P2(c) are true. Perhaps they
+have some plausibility -- since presumably if Sharemasters were highly
+unsuccessful at making money for its clients, then it would not have
+grown so big or become so profitable. But these would not be very reliable
+assumptions; to reason in the manner of C, for example, would be
+like concluding that since McDonald's is the biggest restaurant in the
+world, it has the best food.
+So you can conclude that Jane's argument has a good chance of being
+sound only if argument A is what she had in mind. Suppose you investigate,
+and find that it is true that Sharemasters is the biggest as well as
+the most profitable personal investment service in London. Suppose you
+find, however, that it is not the most effective personal investment service
+in London; its size and profitability are due to its high fees, its organisational
+efficiency, and effective advertising. Hence P1(b) and P1(c) are true,
+but P1(a) is false. You must therefore conclude that although it is valid,
+argument A is unsound. Since neither B nor C seems to be sound, you
+must conclude that Jane's original argument is unsound; in none of the
+three possible interpretations does it appear to be sound.
+Eliminating the ambiguity of the original argument was crucial in
+discovering this, for one could very easily think that the original argument
+was sound. Advertisements of this kind may be said to exploit this
+sort of ambiguity. If Sharemasters is indeed the largest personal investment
+service in London, but not the most effective, then the slogan does
+express something true; yet the advertisers might hope that readers will
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+193
+interpret the claim along the lines of argument A (or possibly along the
+lines of B, making the questionable assumption that the biggest service
+of a given sort is likely to be the most effective).
+Remember that a primary purpose of reconstruction is to represent
+the propositions that constitute an argument in the clearest possible way.
+Thus we should have no qualms about changing the language used to
+express those propositions; in changing it, we are only trying to gain a
+better grasp of what the arguer was thinking. There is no guarantee that
+we will not change or distort the arguer's thinking, but there is no point
+in allowing ambiguous language to remain unchanged. For we simply
+cannot evaluate an argument if we do not know exactly what argument
+we are evaluating. If we simply cannot decide between two interpretations
+of an ambiguity, then we must give both interpretations of the
+argument, and evaluate the two arguments independently.
+Vagueness
+As noted in Chapter 1, many words and phrases are vague in the way
+that 'bald' is vague. Examples include 'tall', 'orange', 'heap of sand' (i.e.
+we cannot draw a precise boundary between tall and not-tall, between
+orange and red, and cannot say exactly how many grains of sand you
+need to have a heap). Each such word pertains to a certain quality, such
+as height, region of the colour spectrum (which proceeds gradually from
+red through orange, yellow, green, blue and violet), or amount of sand,
+which has 'fuzzy' boundaries, but the meaning of the term is clear. The
+terms have vague extensions (range of things to which they apply) but
+the concepts or ideas they express are not vague.
+These sorts of words seldom present problems for actual argumentreconstruction
+and assessment.3 More important for critical reasoning
+are words whose actual meanings are vague. Indeed, many of the most
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+194
+3 But they do cause trouble for logic. Consider the term 'sand dune'. There is no exact
+rule for how much sand is needed to constitute a sand dune, but here is one proposition
+about sand dunes that seems undeniable: if X is a sand dune and one grain of sand is
+removed from X, then X is still a sand dune. But now suppose that X is a sand dune. If
+we remove one grain of sand from X, then X is still a sand dune. But then if we remove
+one grain of sand from this, we still have a sand dune. And so on. But then eventually
+we run out of sand, so we have no sand dune. So at some point, X was a sand dune
+consisting of n grains of sand for some number n, such that X ceased to be a sand dune,
+upon the removal of one grain of sand. But that seems absurd; we cannot imagine a sand
+dune such that removing one grain of sand destroys its status as a sand dune. So we seem
+to have a contradiction. This paradox -- Paradox of the Heap or Sorites paradox -- was
+puzzled over by the ancient Greeks, and there is still no consensus as to how to avoid the
+apparent contradiction.
+rhetorically powerful or emotionally provocative words in public (and
+private) discourse are vague in this way. Consider:
+* politics/political * radical
+* liberal * ideology
+* elitism * rights
+* racism * responsibility
+* conservative * love
+* sovereignty * weapons of mass destruction
+* terrorism * political correctness
+* freedom fighter
+As pointed out in Chapter 1, we often have the feeling that these things
+are bad, or that they are good, without any precise idea of what we mean
+by them. What they signify is typically a whole group or cluster of things
+that are not unified in any exact way.
+Let us take 'conservative' (in the political sense) as our example.
+There are various attributes often associated with someone's being
+'conservative':
+Conservative
+◗ Believes in minimum government.
+◗ Favours free market economics.
+◗ Favours privatisation of government industries and services.
+◗ Against the dole, welfare, etc.
+◗ Supports 'traditional' values -- pro-family, anti-gay, etc.
+◗ Against government help for minorities, women, etc.
+◗ Supports strong police, military, severe prison sentences.
+◗ Supports business as against labour, environmental groups.
+Someone could rightly be called 'conservative' without exhibiting all
+these attributes or tendencies. Exactly which attributes you must have,
+and which you must not have, to be a conservative, is simply not clear.
+So 'conservative' is vague.
+Now, in reconstructing arguments, the best thing to do with vague
+words is simply to eliminate them. This can be seen from the following
+example:
+MP Jeremy Price has made his conservative stance clear by
+favouring 'traditional values' and stronger sentencing for criminals.
+Therefore, we can certainly assume he will oppose any new laws
+protecting the environment.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+195
+It might occur to you to represent this as a two-stage argument, thus:
+P1) Jeremy Price favours 'traditional values' and stronger
+sentencing for criminals.
+C1) Jeremy Price is a conservative.
+C2) Jeremy Price will oppose new laws protecting the
+environment.
+The inferences from P1 to C1, and from C1 to C2, depend upon implicit
+generalisations, which, having learnt earlier lessons well, you know you
+would do well to make explicit:
+P1) Jeremy Price favours 'traditional values' and stronger
+sentencing for criminals.
+P2) All those who favour 'traditional values' and stronger
+sentencing for criminals are conservatives.
+C1) Jeremy Price is a conservative.
+P3) All conservatives oppose new laws protecting the environment.
+C2) Jeremy Price opposes new laws protecting the
+environment.
+The argument from C1 and P2 to C2 is deductively valid, but it might
+then occur to you that P3 is implausible. Surely not every conservative
+is so disdainful of environmental restriction. So you replace 'all' with
+'most':
+P1) Jeremy Price favours 'traditional values' and stronger
+sentencing for criminals.
+P2) All those who favour 'traditional values' and stronger
+sentencing for criminals are conservatives.
+C1) Jeremy Price is a conservative.
+P3) Most conservatives oppose new laws protecting the
+environment.
+C2) (Probably) Jeremy Price will oppose new laws
+protecting the environment.
+Now this argument might seem plausible to the average person; it
+might seem to be inductively sound. But the argument appears better
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+196
+than it is, because of the presence of the word 'conservative'. And in fact,
+all the actual logic of the original argument can be reproduced without
+making use of that word at all. It is simple: The actual evidence the arguer
+has for their conclusion that Jeremy Price will oppose new environmental
+laws is that Price favours traditional values and stronger sentencing for
+criminals. The arguer supplies no further evidence, and the word 'conservative'
+plays no role at all. Thus, adding the necessary generalisation, we
+might just as well represent the argument like this:
+P1) Jeremy Price favours traditional values and stronger sentencing
+for criminals.
+P2) Most people who favour traditional values and stronger
+sentences for criminals oppose new laws protecting the
+environment.
+C) (Probably) Jeremy Price opposes new laws protecting
+the environment.
+This remains inductively forceful, and it is no less inductively forceful
+than the previous version. But the inductive soundness of this argument
+is far from certain, because P2 is far from certain. This reconstruction
+thus makes the weakness of the original argument perfectly clear. It does
+so by removing the distraction created by the word 'conservative' (even
+if you do think that P2 is true, you have to admit that this reconstruction
+centres our attention on the real issue).
+Since many of the most rhetorically highly charged words in
+public discourse are also vague, eliminating them from our argumentreconstructions
+achieves two things: it clarifies the argument, and, by
+eliminating emotionally provocative words, enables us to focus without
+distraction upon the logic of the argument.
+The best thing to do with ambiguous or vague language, then, is
+simply to replace it with language that is not vague or ambiguous. The
+aim is to employ language that will express the intended propositions
+without ambiguity or vagueness. But this is not always possible. Where
+a sentence is ambiguous, we cannot always tell which of the different
+possible interpretations was intended by the arguer, even if we apply the
+principle of charity. In such a case we can assess each of the possible
+versions of the argument, but we may have to confess that we cannot
+tell which version the arguer intended. And -- especially where the language
+used by the arguer is vague rather than ambiguous -- we have to
+admit that the arguer's thinking may simply have been vague or confused,
+not just his or her language. Indeed, where vague words such as those
+listed above play a role in an argument, this is very often the case. In
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+197
+constructing your own arguments, such words are best simply avoided.
+They tend to obscure the issue rather than clarify it. However, not all
+vague language can be removed. We will return to this in the next chapter.
+More on generalisations
+As we noted in Chapter 1, only hard generalisations can rightly be
+conveyed by using a quantifier-word like 'all', 'no' or 'every'. Indeed, that
+is the usual function of those words -- to make it perfectly explicit that a
+hard generalisation is what is intended. For example, someone at a meeting
+of Parliament might say, 'Every single MP in this chamber takes bribes',
+rather than 'MPs in this chamber take bribes'. Soft generalisations, indeed,
+are very often expressed without any quantifier at all, as in 'Children like
+sweeties'. Other times, we add a quantifier such as 'most' or 'almost all'
+to a soft generalisation, in order to make it clear that a soft generalisation
+is what is intended, and also to make it clear just how soft (or how close
+to being hard) it is meant to be.
+Since there is often confusion over the difference between hard and
+soft generalisations, we should, when reconstructing arguments, always
+make it clear whether a generalisation is hard or soft (the one exception
+to this is the case of causal statements; this will be discussed near the end
+of this chapter). The confusion most often arises when the generalisation,
+as stated, lacks an explicit quantifier. The intended quantifier is merely
+implicit, so there is room for misinterpretation. A generalisation in which
+the quantifier is merely implicit is thus a kind of ambiguity. The way to
+eliminate the ambiguity is to add an explicit quantifier.
+The scope of a generalisation
+Consider the following hard generalisations:
+1 All cows are herbivores.
+2 All black cows are herbivores.
+The subjects of these generalisations -- what the generalisations are
+about -- are cows and black cows, respectively. Both generalisations are
+true, and they stand in a special relationship. There are two aspects of
+this relationship. First, they attribute the same feature to their subjects
+(that of being herbivores). Second, the subject of the second is a subset
+of the first (all black cows are cows, but not all cows are black). Thus we
+say that the scope of (1) is wider than that of (2) and conversely that
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+198
+the scope of (2) is narrower than that of (1). Note that we can compare
+generalisations in this way only when the subject of one is a subset of
+the subject of the other. We cannot, for example, say that the generalisation
+'All lions are carnivores' is narrower than, or wider than, either
+(1) or (2). Nor can we compare the scope of 'All sheep are herbivores' to
+that of either (1) or (2).
+Figure 5.4 represents the situation expressed by (1) and (2). It can
+sometimes be important to adjust the scope of a generalisation, making
+it either narrower or wider. Usually, in reconstructing arguments, we
+have to narrow them; hardly ever do we have to widen them. Suppose,
+for example, you are a fervent environmentalist, and believe that radical
+measures must be taken immediately to protect the environment from
+air pollution. In particular, you believe that our reliance upon petroleum
+products -- such as petrol for cars -- must be halted as soon as possible.
+So you argue:
+Private vehicles that emit carbon monoxide should not be allowed.
+We must ban automobiles.
+The reasoning here is pretty clear, but in reconstructing, some care
+must be taken with the generalisation implicit in it. The implicit generalisation,
+obviously, is that automobiles emit carbon monoxide. The
+argument might be reconstructed as follows:
+P1) We should ban all private vehicles that emit carbon monoxide.
+P2) All automobiles emit carbon monoxide.
+C) We should ban all automobiles.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+199
+Black
+Cows
+Cows
+Herbivores
+Figure 5.4 The scope of a generalisation
+Note that in writing P1, we added the quantifier 'all'. Usually when
+someone speaks of 'banning' something they don't add the word 'all' (or
+any equivalent word), but they do mean that none should be allowed.
+Still, as always, it is worthwhile when reconstructing to make the quantifier
+explicit. Now assume you really do believe P1. This argument is
+deductively valid. However, you must admit that it has a weak point. For
+P2, as written, is clearly untrue. Some automobiles, for example, are electric,
+and run on batteries. Since they do not burn petrol (or any other
+petroleum product), they do not emit carbon monoxide (indeed they do
+not pollute the air at all, at least not directly). So even if P1 is true, you
+have failed to give a sound argument.
+Now you could make the argument inductively sound by changing
+the word 'all' in P2 to 'most'. But you could do better, for two reasons:
+First, it could become false that most automobiles emit carbon
+monoxide, without any reduction at all in the number of petrol-driven
+cars, in which case the pollution (and other problems) caused by the
+burning of petrol might not have been curtailed at all. For it would be
+possible that so many electric cars or other alternatives to be produced
+over a few years' time that they outnumber petrol-driven cars without
+any reduction in the number of petrol-driven cars. In that case, P2 would
+be false but you would still want to argue against petrol-driven cars, since
+they would still be emitting the same amount of pollution.
+Second, changing 'all' to 'most', although it renders the argument
+sound, does not clarify the issue as much as another alternative.
+This other alternative is to change the scope of the generalisation
+expressed by P2 -- in particular, to reduce its scope. Instead of 'All automobiles
+emit carbon monoxide', we can more accurately write 'All petroldriven
+automobiles emit carbon monoxide', rewriting the argument thus:
+P1) We should ban all private vehicles that emit carbon monoxide.
+P2) All petrol-driven automobiles emit carbon monoxide.
+C) We should ban all petrol-driven automobiles.
+Assuming the truth of P1, this is a deductively sound argument. Even if
+you doubt P1, this is, at any rate, a much better argument than the earlier
+version; since the new P2 is a narrower generalisation than the old P2,
+its premises have a better chance of being true. Furthermore, by narrowing
+the generalisation, the issue is defined more exactly. We now have it
+explicitly before us that the point at issue is the use of petrol-driven
+automobiles, not automobiles in general.
+Thus, when reconstructing arguments, we should take care not to
+employ a hard generalisation that is wider in scope than we need, if there
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+200
+is anything doubtful about the wider one that could be eliminated by
+employing a narrower one. If a narrower (but hard) generalisation will
+suffice for constructing an argument for the desired conclusion, then we
+should employ the narrower one. This is not to say we should always
+choose narrower generalisations whenever possible. For example, it would
+not improve the argument to rewrite P2 as 'All green petrol-driven automobiles
+emit carbon monoxide'. For adding the word 'green', besides not
+making the generalisation any more likely to be true (or at least not
+appreciably so), renders the argument invalid. The point is that if one
+generalisation is narrower than another and more likely to be true, then,
+provided that it is sufficient for obtaining the desired conclusion, the
+narrower one should be employed.
+Note that in some cases there is no natural word or phrase for the
+class of cases we wish to generalise about. In such cases we have to reduce
+the scope of a generalisation by explicitly excepting a certain class of what
+would otherwise be counterexamples. For example, consider the inference
+'That is a mammal; therefore it doesn't fly'. The generalisation needed is
+'No mammals except bats fly', since 'No mammals fly' is false (and of
+course we would also need the premise that the creature in question
+is not a bat; we ignore flying squirrels).
+Practical reasoning
+The conclusion of the above argument about the automobile is one that
+has a practical conclusion: rather than saying that some proposition is
+true, it enjoins or commends a particular action. What the argument says,
+roughly, is that doing one thing (banning the petrol-driven automobile)
+is necessary if a certain desirable outcome or end (finding alternatives to
+vehicles that emit carbon monoxide) is to be achieved. Other arguments
+with practical conclusions are those that say that a certain action would
+be sufficient to bring about the desired end, and for that reason ought to
+be performed. Still others say that a certain action would lead to a certain
+undesirable outcome, and therefore ought not to be performed. Reasoning
+of this kind is often called practical reasoning, or means--end reasoning,
+and is normally based upon two sorts of considerations: First, an outcome
+is specified as being either desirable or undesirable (in this book we
+prefer to use 'must' or 'should' to specify the outcome, as illustrated
+below; normally, 'must' expresses a stronger demand or requirement
+than 'should'). Second, there is a proposition put forward that says either
+(1) that if such-and-such action is performed, the outcome will result;
+(2) that if the action is performed, the outcome will not result; (3) that
+if the action is not performed the outcome will not come about; or
+(4) that if the action is not performed then the outcome will come about.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+201
+This gives rise to eight different types of argument that concern a
+relation between action and outcome. Just for the purpose of illustration,
+then, suppose that the outcome is that the amount of chocolate in the
+world be increased, and the action in question is X. Then, using 'should',
+the eight types of practical reasoning can be sketched like this:
+1 P1) The amount of chocolate in the world should be
+increased.
+P2) If action X is performed, then the amount of chocolate in the
+world will be increased.
+C) Action X should be performed.
+2 P1) The amount of chocolate in the world should be
+increased.
+P2) If action X is not performed, then the amount of chocolate in
+the world will not be increased.
+C) Action X should be performed.
+3 P1) The amount of chocolate in the world should be
+increased.
+P2) If action X is not performed, then the amount of chocolate in
+the world will be increased.
+C) Action X should not be performed.
+4 P1) The amount of chocolate in the world should be
+increased.
+P2) If action X is performed, then the amount of chocolate in the
+world will be not be increased.
+C) Action X should not be performed.
+5 P1) The amount of chocolate in the world should not be increased.
+P2) If action X is performed, then the amount of chocolate in the
+world will be increased.
+C) Action X should not be performed.
+6 P1) The amount of chocolate in the world should not be increased.
+P2) If action X is not performed, then the amount of chocolate in
+the world will not be increased.
+C) Action X should not be performed.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+202
+7 P1) The amount of chocolate in the world should not be
+increased.
+P2) If action X is not performed, then the amount of chocolate
+in the world will be increased.
+C) Action X should be performed.
+8 P1) The amount of chocolate in the world should not be
+increased.
+P2) If action X is performed, then the amount of chocolate in the
+world will be not be increased.
+C) Action X should be performed.
+There is, however, an important complication that is most easily explained
+in connection with type 1. Suppose that we believe that increasing the
+number of doctors would improve the NHS. We might set out the argument
+like this:
+P1) The NHS should be improved.
+P2) If the number of doctors were increased, the NHS would
+improve.
+C) The number of doctors should be increased.
+This is a start, but as it stands it is really not adequate. For if you
+think about it, the argument is clearly not valid. It does not follow, from
+the fact that such-and-such would bring about some desirable result, that
+we should do such-and-such (also look again at the earlier argument about
+the sun hat rule). There are two reasons.
+First, we need to know that the cost of the proposed action does not
+outweigh the benefit of the outcome. For example, it would certainly
+improve the NHS if the Government were to increase its budget by tenfold.
+But that would not be a good idea, as the cost would be far too great.
+This sort of thing -- 'weighing the costs' -- is clearest where money is at
+stake, but it is not limited to monetary considerations. If you want
+stronger muscles, for example, then you have to weigh the desirability
+for you of stronger muscles against the 'cost' of exercising (the time
+expended, the pain, etc.). Indeed, even in the argument about the NHS,
+we are not assuming that the value of an improved NHS can be assessed
+in monetary terms.
+Second, we need to know that there is not some other means that
+would bring about the same benefit but at a lower cost. We need to know,
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+203
+that is, that the proposed action is the most efficient or economical way
+to bring about the desired outcome.
+In reconstructing practical reasoning, then, we have to incorporate
+both of these points as premises. The argument concerning the NHS,
+then, would go something like this:
+P1) The NHS should be improved.
+P2) If the number of doctors were increased, the NHS would
+improve.
+P3) The benefits of improving the NHS would outweigh the costs
+of increasing the number of doctors.
+P4) Increasing the number of doctors would be the most efficient
+means of improving the NHS.
+C) The number of doctors should be increased.
+This argument is valid.4 Strictly speaking, P1 and P2 are now redundant,
+since they can be inferred from P3 and P4; but it is harmless, and it makes
+it clearer, to leave them in. Of course, the argument is a bit vague: it
+does not say to what extent the NHS should be improved, nor by how
+many the number of doctors should be increased. Someone actually
+advancing this argument would want to fill in these details.
+In considering this issue we focused on an argument of type 1, but the
+weighing of costs and benefits may enter into four of the eight types of
+practical argument. Types 2, 4, 5 and 7 are valid as they stand, but types
+1, 3, 6 and 8 are invalid types, and must always be supplemented by
+premises outlining costs, benefits and efficiency. For example, consider
+type 3. It might be that the cost of not performing action X would be
+greater than the benefit of increasing the amount of chocolate (that is
+to say, it might be that the benefit of performing it is greater than the
+benefit of increasing the amount of chocolate).
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+204
+4 In endorsing this style of argument as valid we are assuming that all practical considerations
+can be subsumed under the categories 'cost' and 'benefit'. We do so for simplicity;
+but it should be acknowledged that many philosophers hold that rights and duties are practically
+relevant considerations that cannot be explained in terms of cost and benefit (cannot
+be explained, that is, from a utilitarian or consequentialist point of view). More generally,
+the relation of rule-theoretic concepts such as rights and duties to value-theoretic concepts
+such as cost and benefit is a central concern of the philosophical study of ethics. A way to
+accommodate this without complicating our argument-reconstructions is simply to think
+of rights and duties as entering into the calculation of cost and benefit in their own right,
+without any assumption that can be explained in terms of some independent conception
+of cost and benefit.
+Balancing costs, benefits and probabilities
+Someone giving the above argument about the NHS might concede that
+there is some possibility, even if the number of doctors were increased,
+that the NHS would not improve. Nevertheless, so long as he or she is
+reasonably certain that it would, it would be simplest to leave the conditional
+P2 as it is, rather than inserting 'probably' before its consequent,
+thereby making the argument inductive rather than deductive.
+In other cases, however, practical arguments are more plausibly
+reconstructed as inductive. For we sometimes have to balance costs and
+benefits in a more complicated way. For example, suppose you are
+repairing a window. Having removed it, you are invited to a party, which
+is taking place now. You know the party would be a lot of fun, but
+although you could very easily repair the window tomorrow, there is
+no time to replace the window before going to the party; either you
+leave the window off and go to the party, risking the possibility of rain
+getting in (assume the window is too high up for there to be a risk of
+burglary), or you continue working on the window and miss the party.
+What should you do? Obviously the benefit of going to the party is
+high, but so would be the cost of rain getting in. If we assume that
+these are roughly equal, then clearly your decision should rest on the
+probability of rain: if the probability of rain is less than 1/2, then you
+should go to the party; if it is higher than 1/2, then you should not.
+But suppose the cost of rain getting in would be much greater than the
+benefit of attending the party. In that case you should not risk going to
+the party even if the chance of rain is fairly low. We can represent this
+in a table:
+Here we are assuming that the unpleasantness of the rain, if you
+leave the window off, would be twice the pleasure of going to the party,
+and that not going to the party would be neither bad nor good (it does
+not matter that we used --10 and +5 to represent this relationship; we
+could just as well have used --4 and +2, or --2 and +1). In this situation,
+then, you should stay home, unless the probability of its raining is less
+than half the probability of its not raining. That is, you should stay home
+unless the probability of rain is less than one third.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+205
+Rain
+--10
+0
+Go to party
+Not go to party
++5
+0
+No rain
+What we are leading up to is the concept of expected value:
+Let o1, o2 . . . on be the possible outcomes of an action A; let V(o) be
+the value (cost or benefit) of each outcome o, and let P(o) be the
+probability of each outcome (given that action A was performed).
+Then the expected value of an action A is:
+[P(o1)   V(o1)]  [P(o2)   V(o2)]  . . . [P(on )   V(on)]
+That is, for each possible outcome of the action, you multiply the probability
+of the outcome by its value (its cost or benefit, as the case may be).
+Then you add these figures together to get the expected value of the action.
+The idea behind this is that, given a range of possible actions, one should
+do whatever maximises expected value. If one's possible actions are
+A1, A2, . . . An, and one of these -- say Ak -- has the highest expected value,
+then one should perform Ak. In the case of the window and the party, the
+possibilities are: stay and repair the window, or go to the party. If we
+assume that the probability of rain is 0.5, then the expected value of going
+to the party, according the values given in the chart above, would be:
+0.5   (--10)  0.5   5 = (--5)  2.5 = --2.5.
+The expected value of not going to the party is:
+0.5   0  0.5   0 = 0.
+Since the expected value of staying to repair the window (0) is greater
+than that of going to the party (--2.5), you should stay to repair the
+window.
+It is very helpful to have a firm grasp of the concept of expected value,
+because it is one of the areas in which people most frequently make
+mistakes in reasoning. For example, we sometimes see arguments like this:
+The bottom line is this: no matter how safe the Government says
+it is, they cannot rule out the possibility of a catastrophic
+accident. We should decommission all nuclear power plants as
+soon as possible.
+If the arguer is right, then the expected value of decommissioning all
+nuclear plants should be greater than that of not doing so. But, although
+this may be true, the arguer has given us no reason to believe it. In order
+to reach that conclusion, we would need to know the actual probability
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+206
+of an accident; we would also need to know how the cost of an accident
+would compare with the benefits and other costs of continuing to use
+nuclear power, as well as the benefits and costs of relying on other sources
+of energy. The arguer has provided none of this, and the mere fact that
+an accident is not impossible is not disputed by anyone. Nor does anyone
+dispute that a nuclear accident would be a very bad thing. But the mere
+fact that something bad -- no matter how bad -- is a possible outcome of
+some action certainly does not establish that the action should not be
+performed.
+It is somewhat controversial to suppose that the rationality of all action
+depends on its expected value. Suppose, for example, that there are ten
+people who will certainly die unless they are treated with a rare enzyme
+that happens to be present in your brain. It cannot be found anywhere
+else, and extracting it from your head will kill you. A doctor decides
+forcibly to extract it from your head -- thus killing you -- but justifies this
+on the grounds that since ten people will die if the enzyme is not extracted,
+and only one will die if it is, the expected value of the action is positive.
+(Assume that no other harm would result; e.g., the doctor would not be
+charged with murder or any thing like that.) It might be noble of you to
+volunteer for this, but it seems wrong to say that the doctor would be
+right or justified in extracting the enzyme from your brain. The reason is
+that his doing so would violate your rights. Alternatively, we might hold
+that there is an absolute moral rule, that (outside the context of war) it is
+always wrong to kill an innocent person, or to use a person's life against
+their will. Thus there is a certain limit to the application of expected value
+calculations: the expected value of a proposed action tells us whether or
+not it would be rational to do something, unless it is overridden by the
+existence of rights or moral rules. Normally, moral rules are invoked in
+a very straightforward way: x has property F; actions with property F
+must never be performed, therefore x must not be performed. The main
+difficulty faced by reasoning in terms of moral rules is that, at least on
+the surface, they sometimes come into conflict, as when one person's or
+group's rights seem to be incompatible with another's. Courses in ethics
+or moral philosophy are often concerned to find principled ways of
+resolving such dilemmas. Another central concern is the interplay between
+moral rules and expected value (or utility as it is often called), and the
+degree to which the former might be explained in terms of the latter.
+Explanations as conclusions
+In the first chapter, we took care to distinguish arguments from explanations.
+An argument supplies reasons why we should believe a certain
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+207
+proposition whose truth-value is in question. By contrast, an explanation
+tells us why it is that a certain proposition is the case, when the
+truth-value of that proposition is not in question. It is especially important
+to observe this distinction when dealing with arguments whose conclusions
+are themselves explanations. The aim of this sort of argument is to
+persuade the audience that such-and-such is the actual cause of a fact or
+event. Such arguments are very common. For example:
+We must not have fertilised that plant. It hasn't got a disease.
+We've watered it correctly, and it gets enough sun, but it still isn't
+growing well.
+This passage does involve an explanation; but it is, nevertheless, an argument.
+The conclusion is that the cause of the plant's poor growth is that
+it wasn't fertilised. So we might reconstruct it like this:
+P1) If a plant is not growing well, then either it has a disease, it is
+getting the wrong amount of water, it isn't getting enough sun
+or it has not got enough fertiliser.
+P2) This plant is not growing well.
+P3) This plant has not got a disease, it gets the right amount of
+water and it gets enough sun.
+C) This plant has not got enough fertiliser.
+This argument is valid. But it is not quite right, because the conclusion
+does not say that the plant's poor growth is caused by its not having
+enough fertiliser. It is a perfectly good argument, and indeed it is part of
+what the arguer is trying to establish; but it is not all of it. In order to
+display the full force of the argument, we need to use the word 'cause'
+in both the premises and the conclusion:
+P1) If a plant is not growing well, then the cause is either that it has
+a disease, that it is getting the wrong amount of water, that it
+isn't getting enough sun or that it has not got enough fertiliser.
+P2) This plant is not growing well.
+P3) This plant has not got a disease, it gets the right amount of
+water and it gets enough sun.
+C) The cause of this plant's not growing well is that it has
+not got enough fertiliser.
+Or, as we might more naturally put it, this plant is not growing well
+because it has not got enough fertiliser -- that would be the causal use of
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+208
+'because' that was discussed in the first section of this chapter. Note that
+in order to obtain the desired conclusion, it was necessary to include the
+word 'cause' (or the word 'because') in P1. If we had left P1 as it is in
+the first version, then the inference to the conclusion in the second version
+would have been invalid. For it is certainly not true that if A is true (the
+plant hasn't enough fertiliser), and B is true (the plant isn't growing well),
+then A is the cause of B (though of course if A is the cause of B, then
+A and B must both be true).
+In fact this is not quite the whole argument, but only a sub-argument.
+In order to get the final conclusion, 'This plant is not growing well because
+we did not fertilise it', we'd have to add another premise after the given
+conclusion: 'If we had fertilised this plant, then it would have had enough
+fertiliser.'
+Note that the correct reconstruction is not like this:
+P1) If a plant has got a disease, it is getting the wrong amount of
+water, it isn't getting enough sun, or it has not got enough
+fertiliser, then it doesn't grow well.
+P2) This plant is not getting enough fertiliser.
+C) This plant doesn't grow well.
+In the passage, the arguer assumes that the audience agrees that the plant
+isn't growing well. This fact is not in question. The aim of the argument is
+to persuade the audience as to the cause, that is, the explanation, of this fact.
+All such arguments begin with an accepted fact -- some proposition
+that the arguer expects his or her audience already accepts. The arguer's
+aim is to answer the question, 'what is the correct explanation of this fact?'
+by giving an argument. In the above example, the arguer recognises that
+there are several possible causes of the agreed fact, and, by eliminating all
+but one, advances the remaining one as the correct explanation. The pattern
+can be represented like this:
+P1) (The agreed fact).
+P2) (The agreed fact), was caused by either A or B (or C, or . . .).
+P3) B is not the case (nor is C, nor . . .).
+C) (The agreed fact) was caused by A.5
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+209
+5 A more complex kind of case is one where we know that the cause was A or B, and
+that A and B were both true, yet we still wish to determine which was the actual cause
+(e.g. we might know that the patient's death was caused by either heart disease or liver
+disease, and that both his heart and liver were diseased). But we shall not discuss these
+sorts of cases here.
+Normally P2 will be backed by a covering generalisation, of the form
+'Whenever such-and-such happens, it is caused by . . .'. But not always;
+sometimes we know what the possible causes of a given fact or event are,
+but are unable to articulate generalisations from which they may be
+inferred. In cases where we do know the appropriate generalisations, however,
+we should, as always, include them in the reconstruction. That is
+what we did in the plant example. Of course the list of possible causes
+listed in P2 may be of any length.6
+The generalisations appealed to in arguments of this kind are often
+soft rather than hard. For example, a sudden increase in the temperature
+of an automobile engine's cooling system is usually, but not always,
+caused either by a leak in the cooling system or a broken fan belt. In such
+cases, we must insert 'usually', or 'probably' or some suitable variant,
+into the appropriate place in P2. Likewise, we may not be able to rule out
+with certainty the possible explanations listed in P3. Again, in such cases
+we should have to insert 'probably', 'usually' or some suitable variant,
+into the appropriate place in P3 (or perhaps 'probably not', etc.). In these
+cases the arguments will be inductive rather than deductive. Such an
+argument might look like this:
+P1) The temperature of the engine's cooling system has suddenly
+increased.
+P2) Almost always, a sudden increase of the temperature of an
+engine's cooling system is caused by a broken fan belt, or a
+leak in the cooling system.
+P3) It is very unlikely that the fan belt has broken.
+C) (Probably) The increase of the temperature of the
+engine's cooling system was caused by a leak in the
+cooling system.
+In this case, P3 might be the conclusion of another argument; for example,
+it may have been inferred from the fact that the fan belt is new.
+Causal generalisations
+In the preceding examples we were concerned with causal relationships
+between particular events or states of affairs. We were concerned, for
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+210
+6 It may, indeed, contain only one item, in which case there is no need for P3. For
+example: smoke is always caused by fire; therefore if we see smoke, then since we know
+that it is always caused by fire, and never by anything else, we can conclude immediately
+that the smoke we see is caused by a fire. Such cases of course are not very interesting.
+example, with whether or not the particular event in a car's cooling
+system was caused by a particular fault. However causal statements
+often appear as generalisations about types of events or states of affairs,
+as in:
+Powerful electric shocks cause the muscles to contract.
+This sort of statement is relatively unproblematic. What it means,
+roughly, is that whenever powerful electric charges are applied to a living
+person's body, the muscles contract (unless there is something wrong
+with their nervous system). So it is a hard generalisation about events.
+However, the word 'cause' does not always, or even typically, indicate a
+hard generalisation of this kind. Consider:
+Smoking causes cancer.
+This is not a hard generalisation about events, persons or states of affairs.
+It does not mean, for example, that every act of smoking causes an outbreak
+of cancer, or that everyone who smokes gets cancer. It does not even
+mean that smoking usually causes cancer (since it is not true that most
+smokers develop cancer). The following argument, then, is not inductively
+forceful:
+P1) Smoking causes cancer.
+C) If you smoke, then, probably, you will get cancer.
+What, then, does 'Smoking causes cancer' mean? Roughly, what it
+means is that each person is more likely to develop cancer if they smoke,
+than that person would be if they did not smoke. Smoking raises the
+probability of getting cancer. So this argument is deductively valid:
+P1) Smoking causes cancer.
+C) If you smoke, you will be more likely to get cancer than
+if you don't.
+But note that the statement about smoking does not tell us to what
+degree smoking raises the probability of getting cancer. In that respect it
+is vague. A more precise causal generalisation would take the form:
+'Smoking raises the probability of cancer by such-and-such per cent.'
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+211
+This connects with another important issue regarding generalisations.
+Consider:
+A recent study of primary school children has discovered a strong
+correlation between diet and school performance: better diets
+were strongly linked to better test marks. One of the simplest
+things we can do to improve performance in primary schools, then,
+is simply to improve the foods on offer at school refectories.
+To discover a 'correlation' between X and Y is to discover that the
+proportion of things that exhibit the feature Y is higher among things that
+exhibit feature X than it is among things that do not exhibit feature X.
+The arguer here seems to infer a causal relationship from the correlation
+of better test marks with better diets. As noted in Chapter 4, this is the
+fallacy of confusing correlation with cause. The inference goes like this:
+P1) X is strongly correlated with Y.
+C) X causes Y.
+But this inference is no good. This can be seen easily by considering the
+following example of the same pattern:
+P1) High concentrations of bicycles are strongly correlated with air
+pollution.
+C) High concentrations of bicycles cause air pollution.
+P1 is actually true, since high concentrations of bicycles and high levels
+of air pollution are typically found in the same place, namely large cities.
+But obviously C is false. This argument-pattern is evidently not valid,
+and not inductively forceful either.
+Usually, when there is a correlation between X and Y without causation,
+what is going on is that some underlying factor causes both X and
+Y. In the case of bicycles and pollution, the common underlying cause is
+the presence of a large and concentrated population of human beings (the
+population density explains the presence of such sources of pollution as
+cars, which in turn cause the pollution). As for the case of children and
+test scores, it is certainly plausible to suppose that diet influences school
+performance, but there may be a common underlying cause in that case
+as well. For example, it might be that children from better-educated
+households tend to be more intelligent (if only because intelligent people
+are more likely to complete a university education), and that bettereducated
+households tend to eat better diets (perhaps because they tend
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+212
+to have more money, and hence can afford a better diet). Or it might be
+that children from poor households tend to eat poorer diets, and that poor
+households tend to suffer from other sorts of family problems that tend
+to impair school performance. Thus the correlation is not sufficient to
+establish the causal relationship.
+Under what circumstances, then, can we legitimately infer the presence
+of a causal relationship? The answer should be evident from the
+rough-and-ready definition of causation given above: in order to infer a
+causal relationship from a correlation between X and Y, we need to know
+that the correlation holds, or would hold, even when other possible causes
+of Y are absent or were absent. In other words, we need to know that Y
+exists more frequently when X exists than when it doesn't, regardless of
+the circumstances in which we find X. We need to rule out other possible
+causes. So what we would need to know in the case of the children, for
+example, is whether or not children from well-off households do worse
+at school if their diets are poor, and likewise for children from less welleducated
+households, and similarly for other alternative factors that might
+influence performance at school.
+It is important to be aware of these issues, and especially to be able
+to point it out when a causal relationship is wrongly inferred from a correlation.
+But it would take us too far into the subject to give a general recipe
+for validly inferring causal relationships from correlations. Probably the
+most important single lesson to take away is that a causal relationship
+entails a correlation, but a correlation does not entail a causal relationship.
+A shortcut
+Where an argument contains a conditional among its premises, we have,
+in order to infer the consequent of the conditional, to write down its
+antecedent as a separate premise. This means that we have to write a
+certain sentence down twice. This can be cumbersome, and it often makes
+the structure of an argument more difficult to see than it need be.
+Consider again the first sub-argument in the argument about the tuna
+industry:
+P1) Tuna catches have been decreasing significantly for the past
+nine years.
+P2) If tuna catches have been decreasing significantly for the past
+nine years, then, if the tuna industry is not regulated more
+stringently, the tuna population will vanish.
+C1) If the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently,
+the tuna population will vanish.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+213
+P2 is a conditional whose antecedent is P1. Instead of rewriting P1 out
+in full, we may abbreviate it simply as 'P1'. So we may rewrite the argument
+as follows:
+P1) Tuna catches have been decreasing significantly for the past
+nine years.
+P2) If (P1), then, if the tuna industry is not regulated more
+stringently, the tuna population will vanish.
+C1) If the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently,
+the tuna population will vanish.
+This is easier to read, and it saves you having to write things out unnecessarily.
+Henceforth, whenever an argument draws an inference from a
+conditional premise, feel free to abbreviate in this way.
+CHAPTER SUMMARY
+This chapter was concerned to address some of the main logical problems
+encountered in the reconstruction of arguments.
+General aspects of this include defusing the rhetoric
+(rewriting so as to improve clarity by eliminating rhetoric) and
+logical streamlining (clarifying logical connections by using
+logically clear expressions such as 'if--then' for conditional relationships).
+In many cases, one or more premises upon which a conclusion
+depends is left implicit by the arguer. A necessary part of reconstruction
+is to make such premises explicit. Implicit premises are
+usually, though not always, connecting premises: these are either
+conditionals or generalisations. Where an argument contains a
+conditional among its premises, the conditional is often regarded by
+the arguer as being supported by a covering generalisation. In
+reconstruction, we should take care to include a suitable covering
+generalisation where appropriate. Covering generalisations may be
+either hard or soft generalisations.
+Not everything explicitly stated by an arguer is relevant to
+the argument. A proposition asserted by an arguer may be completely
+irrelevant; that is, the arguer does not advance that proposition
+as support for the conclusion. Such propositions should
+not be included in the reconstruction. In other cases, a proposition
+explicitly stated does provide some independent support for the
+conclusion, but is such that if it were ignored, the arguer would still,
+by virtue of other propositions put forward, have given an argument
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+214 Chapter summary
+for the intended conclusion. In such a case, the proposition in question
+should be removed from the argument. If it is plausible to do
+so, it may be treated as a premise in a separate argument for the
+same conclusion.
+Where possible, ambiguity and vagueness should be coped
+with by removing them. If it is possible to do so, the ambiguous
+or vague language should be replaced by language that is not
+ambiguous or vague. If a word in a premise or conclusion is
+ambiguous (can be read as expressing either of two meanings), and
+it is not clear which meaning is intended, then two reconstructions
+of the argument should be given, each reflecting one of the two
+meanings.
+All generalisations in reconstructed arguments, whether hard
+or soft, should have explicit quantifiers. Where a premise is a generalisation,
+the scope of a generalisation should be as narrow as is
+needed to maximise its probability of being true, but not so narrow
+that the inference to the conclusion is no longer valid (or inductively
+forceful, as the case may be).
+Practical reasoning, or means--end reasoning, is embodied
+in arguments that specify an outcome as being either desirable
+or undesirable, along with an action said to be either necessary
+or sufficient for bringing about that outcome. Such arguments can
+take any of eight basic forms. In order to reconstruct such arguments
+as valid or inductively forceful, we often have to add a premise
+stating that the proposed action is the most efficient means of
+bringing about the outcome, and a premise stating that the benefit
+of the outcome outweighs the cost of the action (or, in the negative
+case, that the cost of an action would outweigh the benefit of the
+outcome). But sometimes the outcomes of actions are only probable.
+This may require us to calculate the expected value of an
+action. The conclusions of arguments based on expected value may
+be overridden by moral rules.
+Arguments are distinct from explanations, but many arguments
+have explanations as conclusions: such arguments attempt
+to establish which, of various possible causes of a given fact
+or event, is the actual cause. Arguments that attempt to establish
+causal generalisations present more difficulty. It is common to
+see causal generalisations fallaciously inferred from mere correlations.
+Causal generalisations are not as informative as one might
+be tempted to think: what they tell us is that one type of event or
+state of affairs increases the probability of another type of event
+or state of affairs.
+  
+215
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+Chapter summary
+EXERCISES
+1 As given, the arguments below are invalid. But each can plausibly be
+thought to contain either a generalisation or conditional as an implicit
+premise -- a proposition that the arguer is assuming but has not explicitly
+stated. The arguments can easily be made deductively valid by
+making the implicit premise explicit. (A) Identify the conclusion and
+explicit premises; then add the premise needed to make the argument
+valid. (B) Reconstruct the argument in standard form. Use a hard generalisation
+if you can think of one that is plausible; otherwise settle for a
+conditional. You should write all conditionals in the 'if--then' form.
+a Mr Bean is an idiot. You shouldn't marry him.
+b All men are idiots. You shouldn't marry one.
+c Johnny will like the Blandings Castle books; he likes the Jeeves books.
+d Pavarotti is going to sit in that chair! It's going to break!
+e Prices are not going to rise, because the savings rate is not decreasing.
+f Hakkinen won't win unless Schumacher's car breaks down. So
+Hakkinen won't win unless Schumacher's mechanic is inept.
+g Verdi was greater than Rossini, so obviously Verdi was greater than
+Puccini.
+h Since only democracies are just, no socialist countries are just.
+i If he doesn't accept the offer, then we will either withdraw the offer
+or raise it. If we raise it, then we incur financial risk. Therefore, if
+he doesn't accept the offer, then either we carry on with a secondrate
+manager, or we incur financial risk.
+j Unless John brought wine, there isn't any. John didn't bring wine.
+So we'll drink beer.
+k Cigarette advertisements don't encourage people to smoke? Ha. I
+think it safe to say that ads for chocolates encourage people to eat
+chocolates.
+2 Rewrite the following in such a way as to defuse the rhetoric.
+a The democratic candidate's policy on the issues is that he jumps on
+the winning bandwagon.
+b The invasion of Iraq: the mother of all miscalculations.
+c If they impose trade tariffs then we don't have a level playing field.
+d She's been raking it in since she switched to writing chick-lit.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+216 Exercises
+e They can peddle that same ideology all they want, but we're not
+buying.
+f The Bio-tech shares offered by Ramsay? Just another fool's gold.
+g Our crusade against the junk-food mongers will not cease until the
+last junk-food ad has disappeared from children's television.
+h Blundering doctors killed 40,000 patients this year.
+3 Logical streamlining: rewrite the following as single sentences using
+simple logical expressions such as 'if--then' and 'every'.
+a You threaten not to release prisoners? Then no cease-fire.
+b There is no way we're going to win the election without increasing
+our appeal to women.
+c There are places in which the most offensive speech is always deemed
+acceptable. They are called universities.
+d A leaf-blower is louder than a rake.
+e Embryo research is the thin end of the wedge towards human cloning.
+f He who laughs last laughs longest.
+4 Find appropriate covering generalisations for the following conditionals.
+Choose a hard or soft generalisation as seems appropriate.
+a If John is under 18, then he cannot legally purchase alcohol in the
+UK.
+b If that is a scorpion, then it is poisonous.
+c If that wine is not French, then it is probably not overpriced.
+d That picture is not likely to be an oil painting, unless it was painted
+after 1500 or is Dutch or Flemish.
+e He is probably good at analysing arguments, if he is a successful
+lawyer.
+f If the patient is now haemorrhaging, then his blood pressure is
+decreasing.
+5
+a Suppose you know that Doctor Bowes does not own or drive a Ferrari.
+Reconstruct the argument in accordance with the principle of charity.
+Doctor Bowes, the candidate, owns a majority share in a large
+and successful corporation. Furthermore, he drives a brand new
+Ferrari. Of course he is wealthy.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+217
+Exercises
+b The following passage includes the assertion that the defendant has
+been addicted to cocaine for two years. Suppose you know this assertion
+to be entirely false (the defendant has never used any illicit drug).
+Reconstruct the argument in accordance with the principle of charity.
+In order to reconstruct it, you will have to rephrase some of the
+sentences, ignore some material, and also to make implicit premises
+explicit. The conclusion is also implicit.
+The evidence is very compelling. The defendant has been addicted
+to cocaine for over two years. Her blood and fingerprints were
+found on the murder weapon. She was seen emerging from the
+victim's flat not more than half an hour after the murder took
+place. She boarded a flight for Greece only twelve hours after the
+murder. And finally, the victim had recently ended the sexual
+relationship between himself and the accused.
+6 We very frequently hear of claims or actions being criticised on the
+grounds that they are politically motivated. Sometimes this is put by
+saying that someone is 'playing politics', or using something as a 'political
+football'. What does this mean? Why is it a criticism? Find examples
+in the print media, and try to explain what the point is, in such cases in
+calling something 'political'.
+7 Reconstruct the following arguments, taking care to eliminate vague
+or ambiguous terms. You will have to rewrite sentences, ignore some
+material, and make implicit propositions explicit.
+a Ms Jones has demonstrated her commitment to feminism by supporting
+an across-the-board pay rise for female academics. So no
+doubt she'll support a reduction of the evidential standard for rape
+convictions.
+b Make no mistake: whatever their keepers say, these so-called 'domesticated'
+wolves are wild. Wild animals are too dangerous to be kept
+as pets.
+c Researchers have found that heroin use in teenagers is linked to
+parents with histories of depression. Parents under psychiatric care
+for depression should therefore be told the symptoms of heroin use.
+8 For this argument, reconstruct it twice: once retaining the vague term
+'political correctness', and once eliminating it.
+When the Bunbury Women's Group proposes that the City Council
+bar men from the 'Women's Safe House', we realise that we must not
+allow them to have influence on the Council. For this makes it obvious
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+218 Exercises
+that the virus of 'political correctness' has infected the women's group,
+and we know what 'political correctness' stands for -- they would
+promote such horrors as homosexuality being taught in schools and
+legal prohibitions against language deemed 'incorrect'.
+9 Reconstruct the following arguments, making implicit propositions
+explicit as needed. If the argument is not deductively valid, increase
+its inductive force by decreasing the scope of the generalisation. If the
+argument is deductively valid, increase its chances of being sound by
+decreasing the scope of the generalisation.
+a Of course your new horse can be trained without much difficulty.
+Most horses can be.
+b Most men marry. Therefore most men have, have had or will have
+a mother-in-law.
+c No primates can learn to talk. Bobo is a chimpanzee, hence a primate;
+therefore he cannot learn to talk.
+d All countries can be attacked by sea. Thus all countries require a naval
+defence.
+10 Reconstruct the argument about compulsory military service discussed
+at the beginning of this chapter (p. 169). Take into account the advice
+given in the section on practical reasoning (pp. 201--4).
+11 Look at argument-pattern (1) in the section on practical reasoning
+(p. 204). In order for such arguments to be valid, we need to add two
+premises: first, that the benefit of increasing the amount of chocolate
+outweighs the cost of performing action X; second, that action X is the
+most efficient way of increasing the amount of chocolate. What similar
+premises are needed to make argument-patterns (3), (6) and (8) valid?
+12 Reconstruct the argument below. Some guidance: you will need to
+remove some extraneous material and perhaps defuse some rhetoric. It is
+not easy to tell exactly what the conclusion is, and it may be implicit.
+Once you have decided, you may need to add implicit premises. You
+should also think about the role of the word 'deviant'; is it vague or
+ambiguous? Should it be avoided in the reconstruction of the argument?
+Why has marriage always meant man and woman? Because other
+sexual relationships are deviant. Obviously homosexual relationships
+are deviant; that's just biological fact. And that's what the legalisation
+of same-sex marriage would mean: the legal protection of deviant
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+219
+Exercises
+sexual relationships -- the legal protection of all sexual relationships,
+of whatever kind. Why not incest and bestiality too?
+13 The following argument contains a fair amount of rhetoric, stagesetting
+and explanation, but also a practical argument. Decide which of the
+eight patterns of practical reasoning the central argument of the passage
+fits, and reconstruct it. Don't worry too much about including every point
+that might be relevant; your main task should be to get the central argument
+laid out before you (then you can add sub-arguments, if you find
+any). Part of the first paragraph is concerned to reply to a point made by
+the correspondent referred to; think carefully about whether, and in what
+way, this contributes to the writer's intended argument.
+I despair of your correspondent who responded to the article on otters
+and mink (Letters, 9 July). Mink are certainly not playful and
+delightful animals. She must be confusing them with ferrets. While
+I agree it is no fault of their own that they are with us, it is not a
+question of survival. Mink are in paradise here in the wild: no harsh
+winter; no natural predators; a vast range of prey.
+In the Mustelid family they have found a niche halfway between
+otters and pine marten with the aquatic ability of the former and the
+natural aggression of the latter. Mink are consequently able to reach
+nesting colonies of ducks and seabirds, formerly secure from predation,
+wiping them out and rendering the island sanctuaries untenable by birds.
+I would invite your correspondent to come to Argyll and see for herself.
+Mink are a scourge on our environment and should be eliminated at
+every opportunity.7
+14 Another practical argument, this time giving you more practice identifying
+implicit premises and conclusion. Reconstruct as according to the
+instructions on practical reasoning. The letter is humorous, but contains
+a serious (though implicit) argument.
+Sir, having read your report on how the police plan to test drivers
+for drugs, I and both my children in their early twenties attempted
+the tests described, without having taken any illegal substances.
+We consistently failed the second test (on one leg, head tilted back,
+eyes closed, other leg off the ground, arms extended, touch nose with
+each index finger). Swaying and giggling helplessly at each other's
+attempts, we would have given every appearance of intoxication.
+We have therefore decided that, if we are stopped and invited to
+perform these tests at the roadside, we will first ask the officer for a
+demonstration.8
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+220
+7 Michael Murray, Independent, 16 July 2000.
+8 John Tayler, The Times, 4 August 2000.
+Exercises
+15 A friend offers you a wager: if you draw an ace out of a (normal)
+pack of playing cards, he'll give you £10. If you don't, you pay him
+£1. What is the expected value of accepting the wager? Should you
+do it?
+16 There is a sweepstakes draw: all you have to do is post a letter with
+your name and address to the address given, and your name will go into
+the draw. The lucky winner, drawn from a barrel containing 400,000
+names, will receive £100,000! Assuming that a second-class stamp costs
+26p, what is the expected (monetary) value of posting your letter, thereby
+entering the sweepstakes?
+17 Criticize the following argument: the purpose of the National Lottery
+is to earn money for the Government. Thus the amount collected from
+ticket sales exceeds the amount paid out in prizes. Therefore the expected
+value of buying a lottery ticket is negative. Therefore one should not buy
+lottery tickets.
+18 The following passage contains an argument that can reasonably be
+construed as balancing costs, benefits and probabilities. Try to reconstruct
+it accordingly.
+Elimination of global hunger, prevention of deficiency diseases and
+protection of the world's threatened environments are within reach
+as bio-tech and genetically modified food research improves.
+The debate over food production has swung in favour of new hightech
+methods. The benefits to consumers, producers and the environment
+from these new technologies are increasingly evident and vastly
+outweigh the risks. Every year millions of lives are lost to malnutrition.
+Thousands of hectares of precious habitat are sacrificed in the
+struggle to produce food using inefficient methods, namely conventional
+methods.
+For example, vitamin A deficiency is a serious worldwide problem.
+So it is hard to see the merit in eco-terrorists who destroy test crops
+of GM 'golden rice' -- which contains high levels of beta-carotene to
+help fight rampant vitamin A deficiency and resulting blindness in
+developing nations.
+Meanwhile, too many people drastically overestimate the risks
+because they don't understand that GM crops are not essentially
+anything new. Genetic improvement has a long and venerable history,
+and with the exception of wild game, wild berries and the like, virtually
+all the foods in our diet are obtained from organisms that have
+been genetically improved. Scientists worldwide agree that adding genes
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+221
+Exercises
+to plants does not make them less safe either to the environment or
+for humans to eat. Dozens of new plant varieties produced through
+hybridisation and other traditional methods of genetic improvement
+enter the marketplace each year without scientific review or scientific
+labelling. Many such products are plant varieties that do not and cannot
+exist in nature!
+The scientific consensus is unequivocal: gene-splicing is more
+precise, controllable and predictable than other, 'traditional' or conventional
+techniques. For example, new insect-resistant varieties of
+grain crafted with gene-splicing techniques have lower levels of contamination
+with toxic fungi and insect parts than conventional grains.
+Thus, gene-spliced grain is not only cheaper to produce but is a potential
+boon to human health. Moreover, by reducing the need for
+spraying chemical pesticides on crops, it is environmentally friendly.
+Florence Wambubu, and agronomist from Kenya, described how all
+farming there is 'organic' and has produced low yields and hungry
+people. She spent three years at Monsanto, in the United States developing
+a genetically modified sweet potato to help the farmers in her
+country, where the crop has been nearly destroyed by a virus. The
+engineered sweet potato is virus-resistant, and requires no pesticides.
+Wambugu is scornful of the environmental 'hooligans', whom she sees
+as trying to tear down many years of work on behalf of romantic
+notions and bad science.
+19 The following are not simply explanations, but rather arguments that
+have explanations as conclusions. Reconstruct them, eliminating extraneous
+material and making implicit material explicit as needed.
+a At your last visit I said that the pain in your abdomen is caused either
+by a kidney infection, a musculoskeletal injury or cancer in the
+pancreas or liver. But no indicators for a kidney infection showed up
+in the urinalysis, and if it were musculoskeletal, the pain would have
+subsided, not grown, by now. I'm afraid you have cancer.
+b The stress of modern life is not because we work more than our
+parents did -- we don't -- but because we no longer go to church.
+Instead, we shop: the world's most stressful activity.
+c Nietzsche's going irrevocably mad was caused either by his tortured
+intellectual life -- as romantically minded people would like to believe
+-- or by the syphilis he contracted as a young man. But if it were his
+intellectual proclivities, then we should expect a great many other
+notable intellectuals to have gone irrevocably mad. The truth -- again
+contrary to romantic fantasies -- is that very few have.
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+222 Exercises
+d We read with horror that the age of the onset of puberty in girls is
+getting younger. We don't believe this has to do with artificial
+hormones in the milk or anything like that -- surely in these more
+environmentally aware times, there are fewer artificial hormones and
+suchlike in our food than there were say, twenty years ago. The real
+reason is the unprecedented onslaught of sexualised images to which
+children are now subjected, especially on television.
+e Mr Jenkins blames the high unemployment rate on Britain's high
+interest rates: these strengthen the Pound, making British exports
+uncompetitive, which in turn forces British manufacturers to cut
+costs by means of redundancies. We blame it on the ease with which
+people out of work can go on the dole. Jenkins' argument assumes
+that the non-manufacturing sector of the economy is not growing as
+fast as the manufacturing side shrinks. Manifestly, it is.
+f The president says that greenhouse gasses are mostly produced by
+trees, not by industry. That makes sense. Global warming is on the
+rise, and we all see how, all over the world, people are busy planting
+trees and closing down factories, getting rid of their cars, and so on.
+The world of our pre-industrial ancestors must have been a real
+hothouse.
+20 Review the section on causal generalisations. Every example below is
+a case either of (1) assuming that a causal relation entails a hard generalisation
+or a generalisation of the 'most' type; or (2) too readily inferring
+a causal relationship from a statistical correlation. In a short paragraph,
+criticise the following arguments: say whether each argument is a case of
+either (1) or (2) and explain your answer.
+a It is just not true that prolonged exposure to the sun causes skin
+cancer. If it did, then everyone who has ever had a suntan or a
+sunburn would get skin cancer.
+b I am so tired of hearing that social and economic deprivation 'cause'
+teenage criminality. Plenty of teenagers suffer from social and economic
+deprivation without turning to crime.
+c Taking lots of vitamin C makes my colds go away. I always take
+vitamin C when I get a cold, and it always goes away.
+d A causal link between violent video games and juvenile violence has
+been demonstrated. A study has shown that the incidence of violence
+is much higher among teenage boys who play violent video games
+regularly than it is among those who do not.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+223
+Exercises
+e Oxbridge representatives claim that their admission procedures are
+not biased against students from poor backgrounds. How can they
+maintain this obvious falsehood, when their own figures show that
+the proportion of Oxbridge undergraduates from impoverished backgrounds
+is far lower than the proportion of applicants from impoverished
+backgrounds? Oxbridge continues to exclude the poor because
+they are poor.
+21 (A) Draw tree-diagrams for the following arguments as written. (B)
+Reconstruct them thoroughly, and draw tree-diagrams for the reconstructed
+versions. (C) Say whether they are valid, inductively forceful or
+neither.
+a The sharp increase in the death rate in ancient Antioch, in the year
+AD 364, has been ascribed to many factors: to famine, to an influx of
+disease brought by soldiers returning from the Persian campaign, and
+to problems with the city's water supply. It was probably the water
+supply: if it were food shortages, it is unlikely both that no contemporary
+historian mentions it, and that there should be no record of
+similar sufferings in the lesser towns of the area or the surrounding
+countryside. And if the soldiers had contracted disease in Mesopotamia,
+then, since they were seriously weakened by hunger and the
+strain of a long and arduous campaign, they would have died of
+disease in significant numbers. And then it is certain that Ammanius,
+an eyewitness, would have recorded those fatalities -- so cruel after
+the humiliations and losses they had endured in battle -- in his history.
+But he is silent on the point.
+b Jepsen's Neural Syndrome -- JNS -- seems to be caused in dolphins by
+an excessive intake of heavy metals. A genetic cause is ruled out,
+because if the cause were genetic, then the correlation discovered
+between JNS and the presence of abnormally high levels of heavy
+metals in dolphins would be extremely unlikely. True, the correlation
+between JNS and abnormally high levels of heavy metals is no greater
+than that of JNS with the consumption of large amounts of squid. But
+squid, as we know, tend to retain, over time, large concentrations of
+the trace heavy metals that pass through their bodies. Dolphins tend
+to eat the larger, therefore older squid. It is very probable that if squid
+did not retain heavy metals, then the correlation between JNS and squid
+consumption would not exist. Since there are no other significant correlations
+with JNS, the heavy metals diagnosis looks highly probable.
+c If alcoholic behaviour in parents -- as opposed to genetic predispositions
+to alcoholism -- caused alcoholism in children, then we would
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+224 Exercises
+find that children whose parents are not alcoholic, and who are
+adopted at a very early age by alcoholic parents, were significantly
+more likely to become alcoholics. But our study shows that they are
+not. Therefore mere heavy drinking in parents does not, despite the
+well-known correlation, cause children to grow up to be alcoholic.
+  
+The practice of argument-reconstruction
+225
+Exercises
+Chapter 6
+Issues in argument
+assessment
+Rational persuasiveness
+It is plain common sense that the role of an argument is to give us reasons
+for accepting its conclusion as true. The aim is to give an argument that
+the intended audience ought to be persuaded by. But we have not quite
+defined what it is, exactly, for an argument to do this. You might think
+that we have done this with the notions of deductive and inductive soundness,
+but that is not quite right. The reason is that even if we have
+reconstructed an argument perfectly, we cannot always tell whether or
+not the argument is sound. And that is because a sound argument must
+have true premises. A deductively sound argument is one that has true
+226
+* Rational persuasiveness 226
+* Some strategies for logical assessment 235
+Arguments with conditionals or generalisations as conclusions *
+Supposing the conclusion false
+* Refutation by counterexample 239
+* Avoiding the 'who is to say?' criticism 241
+* Don't merely label the position 243
+* Argument commentary 244
+* A complete example 247
+* Commentary on the commentary 253
+premises and which is deductively valid; an inductively sound argument
+is an inductively forceful argument with true premises. Since we do not
+always know which propositions are true and which false, we cannot
+always tell whether an argument is sound or not.
+What we want, rather, is to characterise the property of 'giving us
+good reasons to accept the conclusion' in such a way that when an argument
+has that property, we are always able to recognise it -- just by virtue
+of whatever knowledge we do possess, along with our ability to assess
+arguments logically. This property cannot be the property of validity or
+inductive force, since the fact that an argument is valid or forceful does
+not give us a reason to accept its conclusion unless we already have reason
+to accept the premises. But neither can this property be the property of
+soundness, since being able to recognise soundness normally requires that
+we have factual knowledge that goes beyond the ability to analyse or
+reconstruct arguments.
+Here is a very simple illustration. Suppose you are wondering whether
+or not you should expect that interest rates will increase in the next year,
+and someone presents you with the following argument:
+P1) Interest rates will neither decrease nor remain unchanged in
+the next year.
+C) Interest rates will increase in the next year.
+Clearly this argument is of no use to you. It is logically correct -- it is
+deductively valid -- but such an argument could not persuade anyone of
+the conclusion who did not already accept it. For if you did not know
+whether or not to expect interest rates to increase, then of course you
+didn't know whether to expect them to decrease, or to remain unchanged.
+If you had had some reason to accept P, then you could not have been
+wondering whether to accept C.
+Here is another illustration. Suppose Bert drops a coin into a cup of
+coffee, and it settles to the bottom 'heads up'. Neither Bert nor Barney
+can see it, so neither knows that it landed heads up. Neither has any idea
+which way the coin landed. Then Bert and Barney consider the following
+argument:
+P1) If the coin landed tails down, then it landed heads up.
+P2) The coin landed tails down.
+C) The coin landed heads up.
+In the envisaged situation, the argument would be deductively sound,
+since it is deductively valid and the premises are true. But, although P2
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+227
+is true, neither Bert nor Barney has any reason think so. So, although
+the argument is deductively sound, and Bert and Barney can see that it
+is deductively valid, it gets them no closer to knowing the truth-value of
+the conclusion.
+In such a situation, we say that the argument is rationally unpersuasive.
+More exactly we must say it is rationally unpersuasive for
+Barney, and also for Bert. Why we must put it this way -- why we must
+relativise the notion of the rational persuasiveness of an argument, can
+be seen from a variation of the story.
+Suppose that Barney, but not Bert, knows that the coin is weighted
+in such a way that it almost always ends up tails down. Then Barney,
+but not Bert, has a good reason to accept P2. Therefore Barney has a
+good reason to accept that the argument is sound, but Bert does not.
+Therefore the argument is rationally persuasive for Barney, but not for
+Bert.
+Now imagine a further variation on the story. Suppose that at a
+particular moment, Barney tells Bert about the weighting of the coin. If
+Bert had considered the argument before that moment, the argument
+would not have been rationally persuasive for him. But if he considers it
+after that moment, then it is rationally persuasive for him, because of
+Bert's acquisition of the relevant information. So rational persuasiveness
+is doubly relative: an argument is or is not rationally persuasive for a
+person at a particular time. Since different people are in different states
+of information at different times, an argument may be rationally persuasive
+for Barney but not for Bert, and it may be rationally persuasive for
+Bert at one time but fail to be at another time. In what follows, we will
+usually suppress this complication, but it is worth knowing that it can
+sometimes be relevant.
+Before we give our official definition of rational persuasiveness, there
+is one last complication to be discussed. Looking over the example just
+given, you might think that an argument is rationally persuasive (for a
+person at a time) if (i) it is inductively forceful or deductively valid and
+(ii) the person reasonably believes the premises (at the time). But this is
+not quite right.
+For consider now the following example:
+P1) Almost all residents of Inverness own at least one item of
+woollen clothing.
+P2) Jane is a resident of Inverness.
+C) (Probably) Jane owns at least one item of woollen
+clothing.
+Issues in argument assessment
+228
+This is an inductively forceful argument. Suppose in fact you have good
+reason to accept both P1 and P2. Indeed, suppose you know with certainty
+that they are both true. Does it follow that you should accept C? Can
+you imagine a situation in which you know that P1 and P2 are true, but
+in which you could reasonably reject C? Yes. For suppose that, in addition
+to your knowledge of P1 and P2, you know that Jane is violently
+allergic to wool. In that case, you could quite reasonably expect C to be
+false. Someone who knew the truth of P1 and P2, but nothing else about
+Jane, could reasonably expect C to be true, but not you. The argument
+would be rationally persuasive for them, but not for you.
+What we say, in such a case, is that the argument is defeated for
+you by other evidence that you have; in this case you have, in effect,
+two arguments: the argument as given, and also a more compelling
+argument for the falsity of the first argument's conclusion.
+In particular:
+To say that an inductively forceful argument is defeated for a person
+is to say: The person reasonably believes the premises, but,
+nevertheless, reasonably rejects the conclusion.
+An inductively forceful argument whose premises you have reason
+to accept is rationally persuasive only if your total evidence does not
+defeat the argument for you (we will say more about evidence in Chapter
+7). Note that the definition pertains only to inductive arguments. The
+reason for this will be clear in a moment. Thus our definition:
+To say that an argument is rationally persuasive for a person (at a
+time) is to say:
+(i) the argument is either deductively valid or inductively forceful;
+(ii) the person reasonably believes the argument's premises (at the
+time); and
+(iii) it is not an inductively forceful argument that is defeated for that
+person (at that time).
+There are six further points to bear in mind as regards rational
+persuasiveness.
+1 It is not possible for the conclusion of a deductively valid argument
+to be defeated by a person's total evidence -- this is only possible for
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+229
+inductively forceful arguments. Thus condition (iii) of the definition of
+rational persuasiveness only applies to inductively forceful arguments.
+The reasons for this are:
+a If you accept with good reason the premises of an argument that you
+recognise to be deductively valid, then you must accept the conclusion
+as well; for you know that if the premises are true, then the
+conclusion must be true as well. If a person has good reason to accept
+the premises of a deductively valid argument, then we may conclude
+that it is rationally persuasive for that person without further ado.
+Any further consideration that, for that person, casts doubt on the
+conclusion, must equally cast doubt on the premises.
+The reason for this comes from the definition of a valid argument:
+if its premises are true, then its conclusion must be true.
+Remember from Chapter 2: validity has nothing to do with the actual
+truth of the premises. Therefore, if the premises are true and the
+argument is valid -- the conclusion must necessarily (no exceptions)
+be true. So if you have reason to accept the premises then those very
+same reasons are equally strong reasons to accept the conclusion. The
+only way that a deductively valid argument can fail to be rationally
+persuasive is if a person is without reason to accept the truth of one
+or more of the premises (remember that since the argument is
+deductively valid, condition (i) has already been fulfilled).
+b The adverb 'probably' (or similar term) before the conclusion of an
+inductively forceful argument allows the possibility that the premises
+are true and the conclusion false. When you have an argument that
+is inductively forceful, the third condition of the definition of rational
+persuasiveness becomes relevant; for the evidence that defeats the
+conclusion is precisely the evidence that shifts the balance of probability.
+Because the claim that an argument is inductively forceful
+only claims that if the premises are true the conclusion is likely to
+be true, there is room for situations in which the conclusion is actually
+false.
+Condition three of the definition of rational persuasiveness means
+that there are two ways in which an inductively sound argument can
+fail to be rationally persuasive. The first is when the person has no
+good reason to accept one or more of the premises (i.e. it fails condition
+(ii)). The second is when the argument is defeated for the person:
+the person has evidence that prevents him or her from accepting the
+conclusion even though he or she recognises that the premises are
+true and the argument is inductively forceful.
+Issues in argument assessment
+230
+2 It is not part of the definition that the argument be sound (either
+deductively or inductively). The reason is simple: the notion of rational
+persuasiveness is intended to capture what it is about an argument that
+constitutes its rational claim on a person. It explains what it means to
+say: this person ought to accept the conclusion of this argument. It is the
+notion of an argument's giving a person good reason to accept its conclusion.
+Indeed, an argument can have a false premise, and hence be unsound
+(neither deductively nor inductively sound), yet be rationally persuasive
+for a person. To illustrate, go back to the second version of the weighted
+coin. Suppose that on this one rare occasion, the coin settles to the bottom
+of the cup heads down, so P2 is false. Still, in that case, Barney would
+still be quite reasonable in thinking that P2 is true (for he knows that
+the coin is weighted). So the argument would still be rationally persuasive
+for Barney, despite its having a false premise, and thereby being
+unsound. He would be quite right -- in the sense of being rationally justified
+-- to accept the conclusion of the argument, even though, in fact, it
+is false.
+This point about rational persuasiveness illustrates an important fact
+to which we will return later in more detail: a person may reasonably
+believe a proposition that is, as it happens, false. In other words, there is
+such a thing as a reasonable mistake. This is an elementary point, but it
+is an easy one to forget -- and hence, for example, you might inappropriately
+blame people when they make a mistake of this nature. Indeed,
+a useful way to put the point is to say that the word 'mistake' is
+ambiguous. To say that someone is 'mistaken' could mean either (i) that
+they have accepted a false conclusion, or (ii) that they have been persuaded
+by bad reasons -- by an argument which is not in fact rationally persuasive
+for them (or they have failed to be persuaded by good reasons -- by
+an argument that is rationally persuasive for them). Clearly we are
+responsible for our mistakes of type (ii); we ought to be persuaded by
+good reasons, and not by bad reasons. If we fail in this, then, typically,
+we are blameworthy. But it is much less clear that we are always responsible
+for mistakes of type (i). If someone believes a proposition on the
+basis of good reasons -- on the basis of arguments that are rationally
+persuasive for him or her -- then it might just be bad luck if the proposition
+turns out to be false. If so, then the person need not be to blame
+for having made a 'mistake'.
+Suppose, for example, that you are a doctor. Suppose there is a drug
+X that you know to have cured a certain dangerous disease every single
+time it has been used, in over a million cases; furthermore, you know that
+it has never had a negative side effect, and contains no substances known
+to be dangerous in any way. A patient has the disease and you prescribe
+X. Unfortunately, instead of being cured by X, the patient is made ill by
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+231
+it. Were you mistaken in believing that X would safely cure the disease?
+Not if by 'mistaken' we mean a mistake of type (ii), and hence not in the
+sense required if you are to be blameworthy. Indeed, you would have been
+open to criticism if you had decided not to prescribe the drug, since you
+would have been going against a massive body of evidence.
+3 It should be appreciated why we have named rational persuasiveness
+as we have. Remember that at the beginning, we said that there are
+various kinds of attempts at persuasion. This book is about trying to
+distinguish argumentative from non-argumentative -- especially rhetorical
+-- attempts at persuasion, and learning to evaluate them. An attempt at
+persuasion by argument is an attempt at rational persuasion, as opposed
+to other kinds of persuasion, which do not appeal to your reason (but
+rather to your emotions or prejudices). Directed at you, it is an attempt
+at providing you with a rationally persuasive argument. Note, again, that
+this does not mean that the argument must be a sound argument. The
+attempt depends upon what you reasonably believe regardless of whether
+or not those reasonable beliefs are in fact true.
+4 Rational persuasiveness is a matter of degree; it is not all-or-nothing.
+This is evident from the fact that inductive force is a matter of degree.
+5 'Rationally persuasive' does not mean merely 'persuasive' or 'convincing'.
+A rationally persuasive argument may fail to persuade anyone.
+Whether or not an argument is rationally persuasive for you does not
+depend upon whether you think it is. The crux of the matter is to understand
+this: an argument may be rationally persuasive for you even though
+you are not persuaded by it. This should not be regarded as paradoxical.
+All it means is that there are cases where you ought to be persuaded by
+an argument, but you are not. Likewise, there are cases where you are
+persuaded or convinced by an argument, but where you should not be,
+because the argument is not actually rationally persuasive for you. It is
+one task of rhetoric to cause people to overestimate the rational persuasiveness
+of an argument -- to convince or persuade people without actually
+giving them good reasons.
+To understand why this is so, examine Figure 6.1. You can see from
+this figure that when we examine the relationships between sound arguments,
+rationally persuasive arguments and the arguments that actually
+persuade people, it is possible for a given argument to be one, two or all
+three of them. The important point you need to note is that rational
+persuasiveness and soundness are properties that arguments can have
+independently of whether an individual or group actually finds them
+persuasive. Human beings are not always perfectly rational and part of
+Issues in argument assessment
+232
+the function of the concept of rational persuasiveness as we have defined
+it is to acknowledge this. If rational persuasiveness were defined so as to
+make all rationally persuasive arguments ones that actually persuaded
+people, we would have no way of accounting for the fact that sometimes
+people fail to be persuaded by arguments that they really should be
+persuaded by, and are sometimes persuaded by arguments that they
+should not be persuaded by.
+There are three ways in which one can be mistaken about the rational
+persuasiveness of an argument. Study them carefully, especially if the
+preceding paragraphs are mysterious to you.
+First, we can make mistakes concerning whether or not an argument
+is valid or inductively forceful. Especially in the case of a logically complex
+argument, we may, for example, think the argument deductively valid or
+inductively forceful when it is neither (for example, when the argument
+contains a fallacy that is also an effective rhetorical ploy; see Chapter 4).
+If so, then even if we accept the truth of the premises, and are perfectly
+justified or reasonable in doing so, we may think that the argument is
+rationally persuasive for us when it is not. Equally, if we think an argument
+invalid when it is valid, or think it inductively unforceful when it
+is inductively forceful, it is possible to think an argument rationally
+unpersuasive for us when in fact it is rationally persuasive for us.
+Second, we can think we have good reason to accept a premise when
+we don't, or vice versa. For example, consider the following argument:
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+233
+Rationally
+persuasive
+arguments
+Sound
+arguments
+Arguments that
+people are actually
+persuaded by
+Figure 6.1
+P1) Next summer will be a hot one.
+P2) Hot weather is good for Cabernet Sauvignon grapes.
+C) (Probably) Next year's Cabernet Sauvignon harvest will
+be good.
+This looks like an inductively forceful argument, and P2 is true. Now
+suppose Jane knows that P2 is true. She also thinks that P1 is true, but
+her reason is that she has the superstitious belief that whenever it rains
+on Winter solstice, the following summer will be hot (assume it really
+is unreasonable for her to accept P1; as we will see in more detail later,
+what are often called 'superstitious' beliefs are not always unreasonable).
+In that case, assuming she knows it did rain on Winter solstice, she
+may think her belief in P1 is reasonable or well-founded, but it is not.
+So in that case, having noticed its inductive forcefulness, she may well
+think that this argument is rationally persuasive for her, but she would
+be wrong. She may be persuaded, but she is not rationally persuaded.
+Third, you can be mistaken about whether or not an argument is
+defeated for you. On the one hand, you might accept an argument for a
+given conclusion -- thereby accepting the argument as rationally persuasive
+-- without realising that you have information sufficient to construct
+another argument that defeats the conclusion of the first argument.
+You might, for example, accept an argument for the conclusion that Mr
+Jones will attend the meeting, momentarily forgetting that Mr Jones
+had scheduled a holiday today. On the other hand, you might think that
+an argument is defeated for you when it isn't. You might, that is, mistakenly
+think you have good reasons to reject the conclusion of an argument
+that is inductively forceful and whose premises you accept.
+Obviously one can give arguments for various purposes, including
+deceitful ones. But the rational, non-deceitful motivation for giving an
+argument is surely this: it is to give a sound argument that is rationally
+persuasive for oneself, and for its intended audience. Different arguments
+may be required for different audiences. We cannot always know with
+certainty whether an argument is sound, but that is the human predicament.
+It is simply a consequence of the fact that we do not always know
+with certainty which propositions are true and which false. If we did, we
+would never need arguments.
+6 In saying that an argument is rationally persuasive for a person only
+if the person reasonably believes the premises, we are not requiring that
+the person have, at his or her disposal, further arguments with those
+premises as conclusions. What we are requiring is that the person be justified
+in accepting the premises. Justification is a wider concept than rational
+Issues in argument assessment
+234
+persuasiveness: if one has a rationally persuasive argument for a proposition
+then one is justified in accepting it, but one may be justified in
+accepting it by means other than argument. In particular, some beliefs,
+especially perceptual beliefs such as 'I see a dog in front of me', are
+often justified -- reasonable -- even though they are not inferred from
+other beliefs. We will return to this in the next chapter.
+Some strategies for logical assessment
+Once we have an argument represented in standard form, we have to
+pronounce whether or not the argument is valid, and if not, whether or
+not it is inductively forceful. To do this, the basic technique is simple:
+ask yourself, can I imagine or conceive of a situation in which the premises
+are true, but the conclusion false? If under no conceivable situation could
+that be, then the argument is valid.
+If you can think of ways in which the premises would be true but
+the conclusion false, then you must determine to what degree, if any, the
+argument is inductively forceful. What you do here is to imagine various
+situations in which all the premises are true. Of these situations, which
+are more likely, the ones in which the conclusion is true, or the ones in
+which it is false? If the situations in which the conclusion is true would
+be more likely than those in which it is false, then the argument is inductively
+forceful; if not, not. If it is forceful, it remains only to specify the
+degree to which it is so.
+Here is an illustrative example:
+P1) The diamond thief wore size five high heels.
+C) The diamond thief was a woman.
+This is not deductively valid, since it is not impossible that the thief was
+a man with very small feet wearing high heels, or even a child. This is
+readily conceivable. Is the argument inductively forceful? Not just as it
+stands, since the premises themselves do not tell us that children seldom
+steal diamonds and that men very seldom have such small feet. But these
+are items of general knowledge that we can add as premises, thus making
+the inductive force of the argument explicit:
+P1) The diamond thief wore size five high heels.
+P2) Very few men wear size five high heels.
+P3) Very few children steal diamonds.
+C1) (Probably) The diamond thief was a woman.
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+235
+Whenever we find that an argument is not valid, we should always ask
+whether there are premises that (1) the arguer could reasonably be expected
+to know, or which we know to be true, and (2) would make the
+argument inductively forceful, if added.
+Arguments with conditionals or generalisations as
+conclusions
+The process described above, where we ask ourselves whether there is a
+possible situation in which an argument's premises are true but its conclusion
+false, can be mentally taxing, where the argument's conclusion is a
+conditional or a generalisation. Recall the argument from Chapter 5 concerning
+the tuna industry, rewritten to eliminate the use of 'unless':
+P1) Tuna catches have been decreasing significantly for the past
+nine years.
+P2) If tuna catches have been decreasing significantly for the past
+nine years, then, if the tuna industry is not regulated more
+stringently, the tuna population will vanish.
+C1) If the tuna industry is regulated more stringently, then
+the tuna population will vanish.
+P3) If the tuna population vanishes, the tuna industry will collapse
+altogether.
+C2) If the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently, it
+will collapse altogether.
+Concentrate on the argument from C1 and P3 to C2. It might be a bit
+difficult to imagine C1 and P3 true, and then ask whether C2 could be
+false in such a situation. But in fact, when we considered this argument
+earlier, we used a method that makes it easier. We shall now make this
+more explicit, as it is important when considering arguments that have
+as much logical complexity as this argument (or more). Note that C2 is
+a conditional. What a conditional asserts, roughly, is a certain relation
+between the antecedent and consequent -- that if the antecedent is true
+then so is the consequent. So the question we want to answer is this:
+if the premises of the argument were true, then would this purported
+relationship hold? To answer this question we suppose, not only that
+the premises of the argument are true, but that the antecedent of the
+argument's conclusion is also true. And then what we want to know
+Issues in argument assessment
+236
+is whether, under all those suppositions, the consequent of the argument's
+conclusion would also have to be true. If that is so, then that conditional
+proposition does follow from the premises.
+We can illustrate the matter like this, using the arrow '→' to indicate
+'if--then' as we did in Chapter 2. Suppose we have an argument that
+looks like this, with capital letters standing in for sentences:
+P1) . . . .
+P2) . . . .
+C) P → Q
+Such an argument is valid only if the following is also valid, where P1
+and P2 are the same as before:
+P1) . . . .
+P2) . . . .
+P3) P
+C) Q
+That is to say, in order to determine whether P → Q follows from
+some premises, we ask whether Q follows from those premises together
+with P.
+So back to the tuna fishing argument. Suppose C1 and P3 are true,
+and that the tuna industry is not (going to be) regulated more stringently
+(this is the antecedent of C2). We can now reason as follows: we have
+assumed that the tuna industry is not regulated more stringently; therefore,
+according to C1, the tuna population will vanish. But in that case,
+according to P3, the tuna industry will collapse altogether. But that is
+precisely what the consequent of the C2 says. So we see that if C1 and
+P3 are true, then it does follow, from the antecedent of C2's being true,
+that the consequent of C2 is true also. So the argument is valid.
+The same sort of technique is useful where the conclusion of an
+argument is a generalisation. Consider this argument:
+P1) Every midfielder on the Italian national side is a good defender.
+P2) No one is a good defender who does not tackle well.
+C) Every midfielder on the Italian national side tackles
+well.
+Here, as before, we begin by supposing the premises true. But in this
+case the conclusion is a generalisation. Now recall from Chapter 5 that
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+237
+generalisations can typically be regarded as generalised conditionals. So
+the conclusion C can (somewhat awkwardly) be re-worded as: 'If someone
+is a midfielder on the Italian national side, then that person tackles well.'
+Thus suppose that P1 and P2 are true. What we do in this case is to
+suppose that someone is a midfielder on the Italian national side; that is,
+we consider any midfielder on the Italian national side. What we now
+want to know is whether P1 and P2 force us to conclude that that person
+tackles well. They do: according to P1 this person is a good defender; but
+then according to P2, this person must tackle well. But this was just any
+Italian midfielder, not any one in particular. So we can conclude that every
+Italian midfielder tackles well (if P1 and P2 are true). Now consider a
+slightly different argument:
+P1) Every midfielder on the Italian national side is a good defender.
+P2) Every player who tackles well is a good defender.
+C) Every midfielder on the Italian national side tackles
+well.
+If we imagine our Italian midfielder again, P1 entails that he is a good
+defender. But P2 does not entail that he tackles well. It says that every
+player who tackles well is a good defender, but it does not tell us that if
+he is a good defender, then he tackles well. So P1 and P2, in this argument,
+do not allow us to conclude that our Italian midfielder tackles well.
+The argument is invalid.
+Supposing the conclusion false
+Another way to assess the validity of an argument is suppose the premises
+are true but the conclusion false. If we can see that this is impossible, then,
+according to the definition of validity, the argument is valid; if we can see
+that this is possible, then we know that the argument is invalid. So consider
+the first argument about the Italian footballers. To suppose the conclusion
+false is to suppose that there is at least one Italian midfielder who does
+not tackle well. If he does not, then by P2 he is not a good defender. But
+then he is an Italian midfielder who is not a good defender, which contradicts
+P1. So if the conclusion is false, it is impossible for the premises to
+be true. So the argument is valid.
+Do the same with the second argument about the Italian footballers.
+We now imagine an Italian midfielder who does not tackle well. According
+to P1, he must be a good defender. But P2 does not force us, or enable
+us, to draw any further conclusion about this Italian midfielder. It tells
+Issues in argument assessment
+238
+us that if he tackles well, then he is a good defender, but it does not tell
+us anything about the case where he does not tackle well: it does not say
+that if he does not tackle well then he is not a good defender. So the
+falsity of the conclusion is perfectly consistent with the two premises
+being true. For all the premises say, our midfielder might be a good
+defender for other reasons -- he might be very quick and energetic, good
+at clearances and so on. So the argument is invalid.
+This method can be used on any argument, not just those whose
+conclusions are conditionals or generalisations. But it is especially helpful
+in those cases.
+Refutation by counterexample
+We move now to an important technique for showing that an argument
+is invalid or inductively unforceful. Normally, you would use this when
+you have already determined that the argument is not valid or inductively
+forceful, and, in an argument commentary, when you wish to
+explain why the argument is not valid or inductively forceful. It is grasped
+most easily by looking at an example. Consider this argument:
+P1) Almost all heroin addicts were marijuana smokers before
+becoming heroin addicts.
+C) Marijuana smokers tend to become heroin addicts.
+This argument is sometimes given as a reason not to legalise marijuana
+(or cannabis). But it is definitely a bad argument. This can be seen very
+readily by comparing it with this argument:
+P1) Almost all heroin addicts were milk drinkers before becoming
+heroin addicts.
+C) Milk drinkers tend to become heroin addicts.
+Obviously this argument would not give us a reason to outlaw the
+drinking of milk. Yet it has a true premise, just as the first argument,
+and more importantly, it embodies exactly the same reasoning as the first
+argument. In particular, both arguments assume that if almost everyone
+who does X did Y beforehand, then having done Y makes them more
+likely to do X (or, those who do Y tend to become people who do X). As
+the second argument above illustrates, that is clearly wrong.
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+239
+If you were given the first argument, you could show that it is a bad
+argument by presenting the second as an example of the same reasoning.
+That is what we mean by refuting an argument by means of a counterexample.
+The second example is a counterexample to the belief in this
+form of reasoning.
+Now in this case we have been able to lay bare the mistaken assumption
+upon which the mistaken reasoning rested. This can often be very
+useful, and according to our general policy of making everything explicit,
+we should make the assumption explicit, rendering the two arguments
+thus:
+P1) Almost all heroin addicts were marijuana smokers before
+becoming heroin addicts.
+P2) If almost everyone who does X did Y beforehand, then those
+who do Y tend to become people who do X.
+C) Marijuana smokers tend to become heroin addicts.
+And:
+P1) Almost all heroin addicts were milk drinkers before becoming
+heroin addicts.
+P2) If almost everyone who does X did Y beforehand, then those
+who do Y tend to become people who do X.
+C) Milk drinkers tend to become heroin addicts.
+In making this generalisation explicit, we make explicit exactly what
+is wrong with the original argument. For we have now represented the
+argument as a deductively valid one. But in this way we represent the
+argument as very obviously unsound, owing to the falsity of P2. The
+second argument shows this, because it is valid, yet P1 is true and C
+is false. According to the definition of validity, it follows that P2 is
+false.
+The technique just discussed is this: if an argument is unsound due
+to an implicitly assumed but false generalisation, first make explicit the
+assumed generalisation, in such a way that the argument becomes deductively
+valid (or inductively forceful). Then find a true premise and false
+conclusion that are suitably analogous to the premise and conclusion of
+the original argument, and substitute them (as we did with P1 and C of
+the above argument).
+Sometimes an arguer's assumed, faulty generalisation is perfectly
+obvious, but they seem not to notice that it is faulty. Here is an example:
+Issues in argument assessment
+240
+The continuing carnage on our roads must be stopped. Since it will
+certainly reduce the number of fatal road accidents, I propose
+that we immediately reduce all speed limits by 25%.
+We can reconstruct this, making the generalisation explicit, as follows:
+P1) Reducing speed all limits by 25% would reduce the number of
+fatal road accidents.
+P2) Anything which will reduce the number of fatal road accidents
+should be done immediately.
+C) All speed limits should immediately be reduced by 25%.
+This is deductively valid, but it can easily be refuted by counterexample:
+P1) Banning all motor vehicles would reduce the number of fatal
+road accidents.
+P2) Anything which will reduce the number of fatal road accidents
+should be done immediately.
+C) All motor vehicles should be banned immediately.
+Since P1 is true and C false, and the argument is valid, P2 must be
+false. So the original argument, since its P2 is the same, is unsound. Of
+course, this does not mean that nothing should be done to reduce road
+fatalities. It means only that the fact that a given remedy would reduce
+them is not sufficient for carrying it out. As explained in the Chapter 5
+section on practical arguments, we must, in such cases, show that the
+overall expected value of the envisaged remedy would be positive (i.e. that
+it would not cause other, worse problems), and also that no other remedy
+would have a higher expected value (no other would be more practical
+and effective).
+Engaging with the argument I: avoiding the 'who is to
+say?' criticism
+Sometimes an argument will contain a premise that no one would say
+can be known with certainty. Sometimes these will have to do with what
+a particular person was thinking, or with what motives people in certain
+circumstances are likely to have, or with the future, such as whether unemployment
+will increase or the Labour Party will win the next election.
+Consider this argument:
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+241
+If they close down the factory -- making over 500 workers
+redundant -- then unemployment in our town will immediately
+double, at the very least. This will surely lead to increases in family
+tensions, hence in domestic violence. Studies have found this
+happening in every case where there is such an abrupt and
+dramatic increase in unemployment.
+The conclusion is that if the factory closes, domestic violence will
+increase. Without bothering to reconstruct further, you can well imagine
+someone reacting to this argument with: 'Well, who is to say what will
+happen? You don't know that increased domestic violence would result;
+you can't just assume that the people in our town are as bad as that.' But
+this is an empty criticism of the argument. The critic has given no reason
+to suppose that the people of the town in question are different from
+other people. The critic is just ignoring the argument, not analysing it.
+Assuming the premises to be true, the evidence that an increase in
+domestic violence tends to follow large increases in unemployment is very
+strong. Perhaps this sort of thing cannot be absolutely certain until it
+happens, but that is the nature of inductive inferences. Where an argument
+is inductively forceful, the person who says 'who is to say' that the
+conclusion is true is either repeating what nobody doubts -- that the argument
+is not deductively valid -- or expressing a seemingly unreasonable
+scepticism, like a person who refuses to believe that past observation
+supports the hypothesis that Spring will follow Winter.
+Another variety of the 'who is to say?' response is illustrated in the
+following example:
+P1) Our finest works of art are irreplaceable cultural assets.
+P2) It is the Government's responsibility to protect our
+irreplaceable cultural assets.
+C) It is the Government's responsibility to protect our
+finest works of art.
+Now the phrase 'finest work of art' is a vague term; no doubt the boundary
+between the finest works and the not-so-fine works is not clear. It is also
+what is sometimes called a 'value-laden' term, since what makes something
+a fine work of art depends at least partly upon whether, in fact,
+people do value it (more generally, a value-laden term is one whose application
+to things depends in some way upon our attitudes towards those
+things; for example, the word 'weed' is value-laden, since whether or not
+something is a weed depends on whether we like or tolerate it in gardens
+or among crops). So now suppose some opponent of the conclusion
+Issues in argument assessment
+242
+responds to this argument with: 'Well, who is to say what are our finest
+works of art? It's a matter of opinion.' But this is not an effective criticism
+of the argument. It may well be that there is some difficulty in
+achieving unanimity on such a question. But in order effectively to criticise
+an argument -- in order to engage with it -- one must either (i) show
+that the argument is neither valid nor inductively forceful; or (ii) show or
+argue that one or more of the premises is false; or (iii) show, if it is an
+inductive argument, that it is defeated by some other argument. Merely
+pointing out that a term occurring in the argument is vague or valueladen
+is not sufficient. Certainly remarking the presence of vagueness is
+not sufficient. For example, 'bald' is a vague term, yet it is inductively
+forceful to argue 'Robin is female, therefore Robin is not bald'. Nor is
+remarking the presence of a value-laden term sufficient as a criticism.
+To make this vivid, consider this argument:
+P1) Killing innocent children is immoral.
+P2) One should not do what is immoral.
+C) One should not kill innocent children.
+This argument contains the words 'immoral', and 'innocent', which are
+certainly value-laden. It would certainly be possible for someone to say:
+'Who is to say what is immoral, or what is innocent?'. But the fact that
+these terms can present problems of application does not detract from the
+evident soundness of this argument.
+Of course, it might be that if the Government policy suggested by
+the argument about works of art were enacted, it would be very difficult
+to apply it, owing to the difficulty of identifying 'our finest' works of art.
+That might even constitute an argument against such a policy. But in
+order actually to engage with the argument, the critic must actually
+produce such arguments; merely to point out that an argument contains
+a problematic or vague term like 'fine work of art' is not enough, as shown
+by the murder example.
+Engaging with the argument II: don't merely
+label the position
+Here is a typical example of what we mean by this:
+Freiberg argues that rape victims are 'peculiarly vulnerable' to
+emotional distress and therefore should be given special
+protections when questioned by defence lawyers. This is the usual
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+243
+'politically correct' stance that gives every break to women or
+so-called 'minorities'. A man being prosecuted for rape should
+have the same rights as any other defendant, and that includes
+the opportunity to question the alleged victim.
+It should be clear that whatever Freiberg's argument was, the writer has
+not engaged with it. The writer has not given a reason to think that the
+argument is not sound: they have not criticised either its reasoning or its
+premises. What the writer has done, in calling Freiberg's position 'politically
+correct', is indulge in a certain kind of prejudicial labelling. Used in
+this way, the label invites the reader to think that Freiberg is merely biased
+in certain ways, subscribing unreflectively to a certain perceived orthodoxy.
+Similar things happen when positions or arguments are labelled
+'conservative', 'liberal' and the like.
+Argument commentary
+We have now completed our survey of our basic concepts and procedures
+of argument analysis. By 'argument analysis' we mean a two-stage
+process; comprising first the reconstruction, then the assessment of the
+argument. At this point, we need to say a bit more about the final product
+of this process. When the analysis of an argument is undertaken, you
+may sometimes want to produce a piece of written work that summarises
+the analysis you have made. This should consist of three parts:
+1 The argument (or arguments) as originally expressed.
+2 The argument(s) expressed in standard form.
+3 A commentary on the argument(s), written in ordinary prose.
+Generating 2 out of 1 is the stage of argument-reconstruction; most of
+what was said in Chapter 5 of this book is addressed to various sorts of
+difficulties commonly encountered in making that step. The concepts
+discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 also bear systematically upon the step from
+1 to 2, because, as explained earlier, the principle of charity enjoins us
+to reconstruct the argument in the most favourable way, and we need
+those concepts in order to determine exactly what that means.
+What we have not yet discussed explicitly is 3. What this comes to
+is simply a written piece of work that covers the following points (either
+all of them, or as many as seems relevant in the particular case):
+(i) A general discussion of the argument, explaining, as appropriate: (1)
+The context in which the argument is given, that is, whatever facts a reader
+Issues in argument assessment
+244
+would need to know in order to understand the point of the argument.
+Often this will include a description of what the arguer's opponents are
+saying or arguing, especially when the arguer's primary intention is to
+rebut those arguments. (2) If needed, some discussion of the structure of
+what the arguer has written or said. For example, if the arguer gives several
+arguments, or devotes a great deal of space to explanation or rhetoric rather
+than argument, then it may be useful to explain this.
+(ii) A discussion of how and why the standard-form reconstruction was
+derived as it was, focusing especially on any problems encountered in the
+process. If any implicit premises (or any implicit conclusions) have been
+added, it should be explained why. If the conclusion or any premises have
+been re-worded, it should be explained why (for example, it should be
+explained why an ambiguous sentence has been rewritten, why a vague
+or highly rhetorical term has been replaced, etc.). It may also be useful
+to explain meanings of important words that appear in the reconstruction.
+In general, this section should ideally include everything necessary
+to justify the given reconstruction. You have to explain why you have
+reconstructed the argument in the way that you have (but there is no
+need to state points which are simply obvious). Frequently, this will
+mention the likely intentions of the author of the original argument, and
+the context in which the argument was given.
+(iii) A discussion of the validity or degree of inductive force of the argument.
+You have first to pronounce whether or not the argument is
+deductively valid. If it is not, you should explain why it is not (here, for
+example, you might use the method of refutation by counterexample).
+And if it is not, you should pronounce and explain to what degree, if any,
+the argument is inductively forceful. If the argument commits a fallacy,
+then you may identify it at this point, especially if the fallacy is a formal
+one.
+(iv) If the argument is either valid or inductively forceful, a discussion
+and verdict concerning the truth-values of the premises. This will amount
+to a verdict regarding the soundness of the argument. It should be
+explained in detail which premises are most debatable, and why. Except
+where it is more or less obvious, these explanations must be substantive;
+actual reasons for accepting or doubting particular premises must be given.
+One should avoid the 'who is to say?' criticism, for example. If the argument
+commits a substantial fallacy, then you would explain this here.
+(v) In the case of an inductively sound argument, you should also say
+whether or not the argument is defeated for you. An argument's being
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+245
+defeated for you is a fact about your relation to the argument, not a fact
+directly about the argument itself. By contrast, an argument's validity or
+inductive force (or lack of it), and its soundness (or lack of it), are matters
+concerning which there is a single right answer, a fact about the argument
+which is independent of the state of knowledge of particular people.
+Nevertheless, when our ultimate concern is with the truth-value of the
+conclusion of an argument, it is obviously relevant, when the argument
+is defeated for you, to point this out in your argument commentary. In
+other cases, however, we may be interested, not so much in the truth of
+the conclusion, but in the merits of the argument as given by the arguer.
+For example, Napoleon may have advanced an inductively sound argument
+for the conclusion that his army would prevail at Waterloo. That
+argument would be defeated for us, since we know that his army did not
+win. But if our concern were to assess Napoleon's reasoning, then we
+would not fault it on the grounds that his argument is defeated for us.
+We might rest with showing that the argument was inductively
+sound. Still, this leaves open whether the argument was rationally persuasive
+for Napoleon. In order to find this out, we would need to know more
+about what Napoleon knew or might have known. As historians or military
+strategists, we might be interested in this question. And depending
+on the answer, we might find Napoleon open to criticism in either of two
+ways. First, even if the argument was inductively sound and rationally
+persuasive for Napoleon, its degree of inductive force may not have been
+sufficient to risk the battle. In other words, the expected value of fighting
+the battle may have been negative, or insufficient to justify the risk.
+Second, the argument may have been defeated for Napoleon, and hence
+not rationally persuasive for him despite being inductively sound. That
+is, the argument may have been defeated by some fact that he knew but
+failed to take into account.
+If an argument is defeated for you, you may be perfectly justified in
+saying: the conclusion is false. For if an argument for a conclusion is
+defeated for you by a more powerful argument against that conclusion,
+then you have a good reason for asserting that the conclusion is false. In
+that case, you can say something stronger than 'this argument is defeated
+for me'; you can say: 'the conclusion of this argument is false.'
+We cannot always reach a definite verdict concerning a valid or inductively
+forceful argument. In some cases your belief in the premises may
+not be strong enough for you to pronounce confidently that the argument
+is sound. In such a case you would say that you think that the
+argument is probably sound. In other cases we fail to have a belief either
+way with respect to an argument's premises. What we should do in such
+a case, rather than arbitrarily committing ourselves to a soundness verdict,
+is to say that we cannot determine it because we are too ignorant of the
+Issues in argument assessment
+246
+truth-values of the premises (note that one is in such a case showing that
+one finds the argument rationally unpersuasive). We should also explain,
+if we can, what we would need to find out in order to alleviate that
+ignorance.
+Ideally, it is helpful to keep the discussions (i)--(v) separate. However, this
+is not always practical. For example, we may justify a given reconstruction
+on the grounds that it is inductively more forceful than another
+possible reconstruction (following the principle of charity). So we would
+be jumping ahead to (iv) in the midst of (ii). That is all right. The main
+thing is to ensure that all three tasks are completed, with as much clarity
+as possible.
+A complete example
+What follows is a complete reconstruction with commentary of some
+arguments appearing in a London Times editorial piece by Mick Hume.
+Many members of the public, and some tabloid newspapers, had expressed
+outrage that a convicted rapist who had served 15 years of his sentence
+had won £7 million in the UK National Lottery, having purchased a ticket
+while out on weekend furlough (he was due to be released the following
+year). We have assigned letters to paragraphs and numbered sentences
+within in order to facilitate discussion, but this is not always necessary,
+provided that you can clearly indicate which parts of the argument as
+originally presented you are talking about.
+Part 1 The arguments as presented
+(A) ➀ LIFE, they say, is a lottery. ➁ But life has taught me that
+some things, other than death and taxes, are dead certainties. ➂ It
+seems a safe bet, for instance, that as soon as newspapers stir up
+public outrage over something, the Home Secretary will promise a
+law to ban it. ➃ When it comes to new legislation, David Blunkett's
+knee jerks so fast and often that his guide dog might need to wear
+a riot helmet.
+(B) ➀ Mr Blunkett's latest example of made-to-order law and order
+is a pledge to stop prisoners who win the National Lottery benefiting
+from their winnings in jail, and make them pay compensation
+to the official victims' fund. ➁ This comes after the public uproar
+over Iorworth Hoare, a convicted rapist serving a life sentence, who
+won £7 million while on release from an open prison.
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+247
+(C) ➀ The Home Secretary considers this so important that he has
+written an article in The Sun promising to 'find a way to stop this
+happening again'. ➁ Given that it has never happened before, there
+seems no reason to imagine that it ever will. ➂ Yet Mr Blunkett's
+article protests that 'this is not a knee-jerk reaction'.
+(D) ➀ Hoare is obviously a horrible specimen deserving of public
+contempt, and I could not care less about his 'human right' to buy
+a Lotto ticket. ➁ I am worried, however, about this irrational
+outburst of national outrage.
+(E) ➀ Everybody seems to be up in arms about such a bad man
+enjoying such good fortune. 'And he's not the only undeserving
+winner', moans one newspaper. ➁ Indeed he is not. ➂ I am also an
+undeserving lottery winner. ➃ And if, like me, you have picked up
+the occasional tenner, then you are one, too. ➄ As Clint Eastwood
+tells Gene Hackman in Unforgiven, 'Deserves got nothin' to do with
+it'. ➅ Life may or may not be a lottery, but Lotto definitely is. ➆
+To win it, nobody has to prove his moral worth, simply that he has
+the price of the ticket.
+(F) ➀ Some complain that they are outraged by Hoare's windfall
+because they play the lottery to give money to good causes. ➁ Come
+off it. ➂ When I buy a ticket it is no more an act of charity than
+when I bet on the dogs or football. ➃ It gives me (and my young
+daughters who pick the numbers) a quick frisson of excitement on
+a Saturday evening. ➄ But when we don't win, what difference can
+it make to us who does?
+(G) ➀ Now Mr Blunkett says that 'there's no justice' if Hoare can
+win the lottery while his victims suffer. ➁ Since when, Home
+Secretary, has criminal justice had anything to do with who wins a
+raffle? ➂ I always thought justice involved criminals paying their
+debt to society, not repaying their lottery winnings to the Home
+Office. ➃ That is why Hoare was sent to prison. ➄ No doubt there
+is an argument to be had about whether he should have been on
+release. ➅ But the widespread suggestion that his victims should
+start suing him for compensation is likely to make matters worse.
+➆ What price do you put on a rape that happened 20 years ago,
+anyway? ➇ It is entirely understandable that the women he attacked
+in the seventies and eighties should feel aggrieved at this turn of
+events. ➈ But exactly how are they supposed to benefit from seeing
+their past ordeals dragged across the national media today?
+(H) ➀ Lotto can be neither a force for good nor evil in society,
+whether that overblown raffle is won by a convicted rapist or a
+conviction politician. ➁ And there cannot be a new law to ban everything
+that we don't like in life.
+Issues in argument assessment
+248
+Part 2 The arguments reconstructed
+Argument 1
+P1) Something should not be banned if it is unlikely to happen.
+P2) It is unlikely that another imprisoned criminal will win the lottery.
+C) Imprisoned criminals should not be banned from
+winning the lottery.
+Argument 2
+P1) Very few lottery winners deserve their winnings.
+P2) Most lottery winners are entitled to collect their winnings.
+C1) Some lottery winners who do not deserve their
+winnings are entitled to their winnings.
+C2) In order to be entitled to lottery winnings, it is not
+necessary to deserve them.
+Argument 3
+P1) Most people, when playing the lottery, are not motivated
+primarily by the desire to support good causes.
+P2) Most lottery winners are entitled to collect their winnings.
+C1) Some lottery winners who are not motivated by the
+desire to support good causes are entitled to their
+winnings.
+C2) In order to be entitled to lottery winnings, it is not
+necessary that one's playing the lottery should be
+primarily motivated by the desire to support good
+causes.
+Argument 4
+P1) If a someone convicted of a crime has served the sentence
+prescribed for that crime, then, if the sentence was sufficient for
+the crime, the person has been sufficiently punished for the crime.
+P2) Mr Hoare has served the sentence prescribed for the crime for
+which he was convicted.
+C) Either Mr Hoare's sentence was not sufficient for the
+crime, or he has been sufficiently punished for it.
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+249
+Part 3 Commentary
+Iorworth Hoare, a convicted rapist, purchased a lottery ticket while
+on weekend furlough from prison. He has served 15 years and is
+due to be released shortly. The ticket was the winning ticket for
+a prize of £7 million. The author, Mick Hume, appears to be
+responding to claims that Hoare should not be given the money,
+which seem to be supported by arguments based on the following
+premises. First, that imprisoned criminals should be banned from
+winning the lottery. Second, that only people who 'deserve' to win
+the lottery are entitled to lottery winnings. Third, that only people
+who play the lottery with the intention to contribute to 'good
+causes' (the causes funded by lottery ticket sales) can be entitled
+to lottery winnings. Hoare is an imprisoned criminal, is not a
+'deserving' person, and presumably did not play with the intention
+of contributing to good causes. Thus if these premises are true, then
+we have three sound arguments for the conclusion that Hoare is not
+entitled to the £7 million. Hume provides separate arguments
+against each of these premises, and also provides a further argument
+whose relevance will be explained below.
+Argument 1 is derived from paragraph C. Paragraphs A and B
+are largely stage-setting and rhetoric. Hume also criticises Home
+Secretary1 David Blunkett for having reacted too quickly to newspaper-
+induced outcry over the issue by pledging to stop prisoners
+from receiving lottery winnings. He does not, however, support this
+claim, except possibly by claiming in paragraph A that Blunkett
+often reacts hastily to such public outcry. This ad hominem point
+about Blunkett would not be relevant to Hume's central question of
+whether or not prisoners should be allowed to win the lottery.
+Blunkett has, however, pledged to disallow it in the future, presumably
+by getting a law passed preventing it. Sentence 3 of paragraph
+C, then, seems to argue that no such law should be passed. P2 reiterates
+the statement made explicitly by that sentence; P1 is an
+implicit premise, and C the conclusion that Hume seems to invite
+us to draw.
+Paragraph D, sentence 1 makes it clear that Hume is not
+contesting that Hoare is a 'horrible specimen'. Sentence 2 expresses
+a vague worry about an 'irrational outburst of national outrage', but
+it is never made clear what this worry is.
+Issues in argument assessment
+250
+1 In the British system of government, the Home Secretary is a member of the Prime
+Minister's cabinet who is responsible for various domestic matters, especially law and order
+and immigration policy. Blunkett was Home Secretary in 2004 when this argument was
+given.
+Argument 2 is derived from paragraph E. Some people, Hume
+says, complain that Hoare is an 'undeserving' lottery winner, and
+therefore that he should not be entitled to collect the prize. However,
+Hume says that he too is an 'undeserving lottery winner'. By this,
+as sentences 4--5 make clear, he means to present himself as a typical
+case. The typical lottery winner does not 'deserve' the money they
+win; thus, as represented in the reconstruction, very few winners
+'deserve' the money. The word 'deserve' is important here. To
+deserve something does not simply mean that one is entitled to it.
+For example a person who merely finds money on the street does
+not thereby deserve it even though he or she is entitled to keep it.
+On the other hand a person who does appropriate labour may have
+earned the money and thereby deserve it. We also say, for example,
+that a man who has worked hard for several months in succession
+'deserves' a holiday. In general, 'deserves it' seems to mean 'is
+owed it', or 'has earned it, by virtue of work or other valuable
+actions'. So in this sense (P1) very few lottery winners deserve their
+winnings. Yet we do accept that most winners are entitled to them:
+typically, if your ticket is the winner, you have the right to collect.
+C1 of argument 2 thus follows. In fact, it is probably true and
+accepted by most people that all but a few winners are entitled to
+the prize, in which case it would follow that most lottery winners
+do not deserve their prize but are entitled to it. But all we need here
+is the weaker P2 as written. C2 follows from C1, which establishes
+Hume's point: one cannot argue that Hoare is not entitled to the
+lottery prize from the premise that he is undeserving. For the needed
+premise, that winners are entitled to the prize only if they deserve
+it, is false.
+Argument 3, derived from paragraph F, is similar to argument
+2. Again, some people claim that those who do not play the lottery
+with the intention of contributing to good causes by purchasing
+lottery tickets are not entitled to the prize. Since Hoare is a bad
+person, they reason, he cannot have had that intention, so he is
+not entitled to the prize. Hume contests the first premise of that
+argument. Hume points out that he and his daughters are not
+motivated in this way when they play, and again assumes that he
+and his daughters are typical in this respect. Hence P1. P2 is as in
+argument 2; from these follow C1, from which follows C2, contradicting
+the idea that only those who intend to support good causes
+by purchasing lottery tickets are entitled to collect winnings.
+Argument 4 is directed against the quoted claim by David
+Blunkett that 'there's no justice' if a criminal such as Hoare wins
+the lottery. Hume interprets this as meaning that if the criminal
+  
+251
+Issues in argument assessment
+wins the lottery, then the requirements of criminal justice will
+not have been satisfied. That is to say, it will not be the case that
+the criminal has received a legal punishment appropriate to the
+crime. As against this, Hume poses what is written in the reconstruction
+as P1, and which seems to be what is expressed by
+sentences 2--4. The condition 'if the sentence was sufficient for the
+crime' seems necessary. For suppose we wrote simply: 'if someone
+convicted of a crime has served the sentence prescribed for that
+crime, then the person has been sufficiently punished for the crime.'
+This is surely not true, since at least some prescribed sentences are
+too lenient. Hume's point seems to be that it is the purpose of penal
+sentences to satisfy the demands of criminal justice. Provided that
+the sentence fits the crime, a criminal who has served the prescribed
+sentence has satisfied the demands of criminal justice. Although
+Hume does not do so, it might be added that it is wrong to punish
+a criminal further, when the criminal has already satisfied the
+demands of criminal justice, and thus it would be inappropriate to
+deprive him of money (the lottery winnings) that would otherwise
+legally be his. Since Hume does not assert that Hoare's sentence
+was appropriate to the crime, and I do not know whether it was,
+I have stated Hume's conclusion (which is only implicit in his
+presentation of the argument) as a disjunction: 'Either Mr Hoare's
+sentence was not sufficient for the crime, or he has been sufficiently
+punished for it.'
+All four of the arguments are valid, and arguments 2--4 seem
+to me to be sound. Argument 1 does not seem to me to be sound
+because P1 seems to me to be false. If something is highly unlikely,
+then still it might be that it should be banned, especially if its
+consequences would be extremely bad. Also, it is not clear whether
+P2 is true. Perhaps it is not likely that another prisoner will win £7
+Million, but if it has happened once, it cannot be so unlikely that
+we can assume it won't happen again. Also, it is not so unlikely
+that prisoners will win smaller prizes, which would raise the same
+issue.
+Finally, some mention should be made of paragraph H. Hume's
+opponents think that something is morally wrong if bad people win
+the lottery. Hume's main point seems to be that it is the whole
+purpose of the lottery that the winner should be determined by pure
+luck -- not moral considerations or anything of that sort. So argument
+2 seems to be the most important one. Since it is sound, I
+conclude that Hume has been successful in his main task.
+252
+Issues in argument assessment
+Commentary on the commentary
+In work of this kind, there is always the question of how much detail to
+go into. In this case we have included quite a lot of detail, largely in order
+to be highly illustrative. Still, we could have gone into a lot more. In other
+cases -- especially where it seems important or interesting to do so -- even
+more detail may be appropriate; more likely, less detail may be appropriate.
+Also you should bear in mind that this case only illustrates a
+handful of the techniques and issues that have been raised in this book;
+no one case is going to illustrate very many of them, and every argument
+presents its own problems of interpretation and reconstruction. There is
+certainly no need to copy the style of the foregoing commentary slavishly
+-- what is important is that the reconstruction be explained and justified
+in a way that it is informative, clear, non-rhetorical and balanced (that is,
+you should aim to be judicious and disinterested, in the sense of being
+neutral or unbiased). Any technique, style or approach that serves these
+aims may be appropriate. Note also that although the ability to analyse
+arguments is a highly transferable skill -- that is, it can exercised on
+arguments on any subject, and does not typically require specialised knowledge
+of the subject -- knowledge of the subject is often helpful, especially
+for understanding the context in which the argument is given. This is
+often crucial, since so many key components of arguments are often only
+implicit.
+CHAPTER SUMMARY
+A rationally persuasive argument must be either deductively
+valid or inductively forceful. A deductively valid argument is rationally
+persuasive for you (at a time) if you have good reason to accept
+its premises (at that time). An inductively forceful argument is rationally
+persuasive for you (at a time) provided that you have good
+reason to accept the premises (at that time), and the argument is
+not defeated for you (at that time). An inductively forceful argument
+is defeated for you (at a time) if you have some other argument
+for rejecting the conclusion that is more rationally persuasive for
+you than the one in question.
+Unlike validity, inductive force and soundness, rational persuasiveness
+is not a feature of arguments in themselves. It is also a
+matter of a given person's relationship to an argument (at a time).
+An argument may be rationally persuasive for one person but not
+for another, and for a person at a given time but not for the same
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+253
+Chapter summary
+person at another time. An argument may be sound but not
+rationally persuasive for you, for the premises might be true even
+though you lack good reasons to accept them, or you may accept
+the premises of an argument that you recognise to be inductively
+sound, yet the argument is defeated for you. Moreover, an argument
+may be rationally persuasive for you but not sound. For you
+may have good reasons for accepting a set of premises, even when
+one of the premises is false. But the question of whether or not an
+argument is rationally persuasive for you is not simply the question
+of whether or not you find it persuasive, or whether you are
+in fact persuaded by it. For unlike the question of whether we are
+actually persuaded by an argument, we can be mistaken about
+rational persuasiveness: an argument may be rationally persuasive
+for you even when you think it isn't, and fail to be when you think
+it is. The importance of the concept of rational persuasiveness is that
+it captures what arguments are intended to do: the distinctive aim
+of persuasion by argument is to persuade people rationally, that is,
+by actually giving them good reasons to accept a given conclusion,
+and not just seeming to. The person ought to accept the conclusion,
+even if they do not.
+There are various informal methods of logical assessment,
+and of demonstrating that an argument is not valid or inductively
+forceful. The principal task is simply to apply the definitions of
+deductive validity and inductive force, but there are some strategies
+to facilitate this in more difficult cases. One strategy that is almost
+always pertinent is to suppose the conclusion of the argument to be
+false, and then to ask whether it would still be possible for all the
+premises to be true. Another strategy, where the conclusion of an
+argument is a conditional, is to suppose that the antecedent of that
+conditional is true, and then to determine whether the remaining
+premises force one to conclude that the consequent would also be
+true. If the conclusion of an argument is a generalisation, an analogous
+strategy is to suppose that the antecedent of an arbitrary
+instance of the generalisation is true. Finally, an effective way of
+demonstrating that an argument is invalid, or inductively unforceful,
+is the method of refutation by counterexample. This involves
+giving an argument that employs the same type of inference as the
+one in question, but which is obviously invalid or unforceful.
+It is important to avoid the 'who is to say?' criticism. One
+form this takes is to complain that the conclusion of an inductively
+forceful argument has not been 'proven', that it 'might' be false.
+Another is to object to an argument on the grounds that it contains
+a value-laden term. It should be clear that these are not genuine
+254
+Issues in argument assessment
+Chapter summary
+criticisms from a rational point of view. One must also avoid merely
+labelling an argument or position, for example, as 'politically
+correct', 'socialist' or whatever; the applicability of such a label does
+not in itself show why the argument or position should be rejected
+or accepted.
+EXERCISES
+1 For questions a--i, consider this argument:
+P1) If Rangers won the match then the pub will sell pints for £1
+tonight.
+P2) Whenever Rangers are ahead at halftime of a Scottish
+Premiership match, they almost always win the match.
+P3) Rangers were ahead at halftime, and this is a Scottish
+Premiership match.
+C) (Very probably) The pub will sell pints for £1 tonight.
+Suppose that the premises are true. Suppose that both Andrew and James
+know that the premises are true (they have both seen the sign in the pub
+window about the £1 pints, they both saw the halftime score of 1--0 in
+favour of Rangers announced on television, and both know that Rangers
+have won every Scottish Premiership match in the past three years when
+leading at halftime). Andrew has no other information relevant to the
+truth of the conclusion; but unlike Andrew, James saw on television that
+the opposing side scored twice in the second half to win the match 2--1.
+a Is the argument deductively valid?
+b Is the argument deductively sound?
+c Is the argument inductively forceful?
+d Is the argument inductively sound?
+e Is the argument rationally persuasive for Andrew?
+f Is the argument rationally persuasive for James?
+g Should Andrew be persuaded by the argument?
+h Should James be persuaded by the argument?
+i If the argument is not rationally persuasive for either Andrew or
+James, explain why.
+  
+255
+Issues in argument assessment
+Exercises
+2 Now consider this argument:
+P1) The majority of well-educated Germans speak English.
+P2) Jacob is a well-educated German.
+C) (Probably) Jacob speaks English.
+Assume this time that P1 is true and that the conclusion is true; but
+assume that P2 is false: Jacob is Austrian, and not very well educated
+either. Still, he did learn English quite well from his American mother.
+Assume that Catherine, Jane, Mary and Anna all know that P1 is true.
+Catherine believes P2 is true because her friend David told her it is; David
+is a reliable person who knows Jacob, and Catherine has no reason to
+doubt him. In fact David's mistake was quite reasonable: Jacob lied to
+him, telling him he completed a university degree in history; further, it
+was reasonable for David to infer, from Jacob's accent, that Jacob is
+German. For, although German is the national language of Austria, the
+vast majority of native German speakers are German. Catherine knows
+nothing else about Jacob, and accepts C. Jane also believes P2, but for
+different reasons: she fancies Jacob, having seen him, at a distance, at a
+party, and thinks he's well-educated because she saw Jacob wearing glasses
+and a tie. Jane also accepts C, but has no other information relevant to
+the truth of C. Mary believes both P1 and P2, for the same reasons as
+Catherine; but she does not accept C, because she heard Jacob speaking
+German to David at the party, and inferred, quite reasonably, that Jacob
+does not speak English. She has no other information relevant to the
+truth of C. Anna does not believe P2. She heard what David said to
+Catherine, and believes that David is always sincere and well-informed;
+but Jacob is athletic and handsome and she has a stupid irrational prejudice
+according to which athletic, handsome men are almost always stupid,
+and therefore not well-educated. She has no other information relevant
+to the truth of C.
+a Is the argument inductively forceful?
+b Is the argument inductively sound?
+c Is the argument rationally persuasive for Catherine? Why or why
+not?
+d Is the argument rationally persuasive for Jane? Why or why not?
+e Is the argument rationally persuasive for Mary? Why or why not?
+f Is the argument rationally persuasive for Anna? Why or why not?
+Issues in argument assessment
+256 Exercises
+3 Consider the following argument:
+George W. Bush's apparent obsession with Saddam Hussein may have
+the appearance of paranoid schizophrenia: the fear that someone is
+out to get us (paranoia) and the belief that only we can save the world
+(grandiosity). But Bush's beliefs wander into dangerous mental territory
+only if they're wrong. If he's right about the danger presented
+by Saddam and our role in ending that danger, then he's perfectly
+rational.
+Harry Sorenson, San Francisco Chronicle, 17 March 2003
+(i) The last two sentences embody a serious confusion. Explain this
+confusion in terms of the distinction between the rational persuasiveness
+of an argument and the truth of an argument's conclusion.
+(ii) What do you suppose is the intended conclusion of the argument?
+Reconstruct the argument. Is it sound? Why not?
+4 The conclusions of the following arguments are conditionals or generalisations.
+Reconstruct them. Then, using the technique discussed earlier
+of supposing the antecedent of a conditional conclusion to be true, explain
+why the argument is, or is not, valid. (In h the conclusion is a generalisation;
+trying supposing 'x is a Roman', whatever x may be.)
+Example
+This man is either a Russian spy or a criminal. No Russian spy
+wears a Rolex. Everyone who enters this repair shop wears a Rolex.
+Therefore, if this man enters this repair shop, then he is a criminal.
+✎ P1) No Russian spy wears a Rolex.
+P2) Everyone who enters this repair shop wears a Rolex.
+P3) If this man is not a Russian spy, then he is a criminal.
+C) If this man enters this repair shop, then he is a criminal.
+Suppose the man enters the repair shop. Then according to P2, he wears
+a Rolex. Then according to P1, he is not a Russian spy. Then according to
+P3, he is a criminal. So if he enters the repair shop, then he is a criminal.
+a If the Lena is polluted, then the Ob is polluted. But if the Ob is polluted,
+then the Dneiper is polluted. Therefore if the Lena is polluted,
+then so is the Dneiper.
+b The Lena is longer than the Ob. Therefore if the Danube is longer
+than the Lena, it is longer than the Ob.
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+257
+Exercises
+c Every Russian spy wears a Rolex. Everyone who enters this repair
+shop wears a Rolex. Therefore if this man enters this repair shop,
+then he is a Russian spy.
+d If this man is not a spy, then he is a detective. But all detectives wear
+trench coats, and he is not wearing one. If he is a spy, then either he
+is Russian or American. But no American spy knows how to order
+dessert wines, unless he is from New York. But all spies from New
+York wear trench coats. Therefore, if this man knows how to order
+dessert wine, then he is a Russian spy.
+e If the ancient Allemani were both vicious and loyal, then the
+Romans would have purchased their allegiance. If they had done so,
+then the Franks would never have challenged the Allemani. But they
+certainly did. Therefore, if the Allemani were vicious, they were
+not loyal.
+f All Roman citizens were literate. Therefore if some ancient Visigoths
+were literate, then some ancient Visigoths were Roman citizens.
+g All Roman citizens were literate. Therefore if some ancient Visigoths
+were Roman citizens, then some ancient Visigoths were literate
+h Every educated Roman knew Homer. But anyone who knows Homer
+knows the story of Achilles. Therefore all Romans knew the story of
+Achilles.
+i If God is unwilling to prevent evil, then God is not good. If God is
+unable to prevent evil, then God is not omnipotent. God exists only
+if God is both good and omnipotent. If God is willing and able to
+prevent evil, then evil does not exist. Therefore if evil exists, then
+God does not exist.
+j If God is unwilling to prevent evil, then God is not good. If God is
+unable to prevent evil, then God is not omnipotent. If God exists,
+then God is good and omnipotent. If God is willing and able to prevent
+evil, then evil does not exist. Therefore if evil does not exist, then
+God exists.
+5 The conclusions of the arguments in Exercise 3, a--e and i--j, are conditionals.
+Split them into two statements: antecedent and consequent. Now
+add the antecedent to the premises, regard the consequent as the conclusion
+of the argument, and rewrite the argument accordingly in standard
+form.
+Issues in argument assessment
+258 Exercises
+Example
+P1) All Roman citizens were literate.
+C) Therefore if some ancient Visigoths were Roman citizens, then
+some ancient Visigoths were literate.
+✎ P1) All Roman citizens were literate.
+P2) Some ancient Visigoths were Roman citizens.
+C) Some ancient Visigoths were literate.
+6 Reconstruct the following arguments, then refute them by counterexample
+-- that is, by giving arguments that embody the same pattern,
+but which have true premises and false conclusions. It may help to extract
+the logical form of the argument (as according to Chapter 2, pp. 65--7).
+a A significant increase in the rabbit population would bring about an
+increase in the number of foxes. And sure enough, the number of
+foxes has increased lately. This must, therefore, be due to an increase
+in the rabbit population.
+b If free will is impossible, then the concept of responsibility is
+nonsense. If so, then the existing justice system is legitimate.
+Therefore if free will is possible, then the existing justice system is
+legitimate.
+c Many people have tried to prove that Nessie does not exist. But they
+have failed. You should by now admit it: Nessie is real.
+d You admit that the Loch Ness monster has not been seen in recent
+years. If so, then it must be very secretive. But if it is secretive, then,
+obviously, it exists. Therefore you have admitted that Nessie exists.
+e Why don't we do what we know will stop these evils? We should
+give drug-dealers and paedophiles life prison sentences.
+7 For Exercise 3, a and c--j, extract the logical form. Use capital letters
+for sentences or general terms. (See Chapter 2, p. 65). Some are difficult!
+It may help to choose letters that remind you of what you're replacing
+them for. For example, in d, you could use S for 'spy', D for 'detective',
+T for 'trench coat wearer', R for 'Russian', A for 'American' and Y for
+'from New York'.
+8 Draw tree diagrams for the arguments in Exercise 3.
+  
+Issues in argument assessment
+259
+Exercises
+9 List the explicit premises and the conclusions of the arguments in
+Exercises 16, 18 and 19 of Chapter 5. Draw tree-diagrams for these, including
+only the explicit premises. Now add the needed implicit premises to
+the list, and draw new tree-diagrams for the complete arguments.
+10 Could one give an argument that (i) one knows to be sound (ii) is
+rationally persuasive for its audience, and (iii) is not rationally persuasive
+for oneself? If not, why not? If so, would that be deceitful, or otherwise
+naughty in any way? Why or why not? Make up an example.
+Issues in argument assessment
+260 Exercises
+Chapter 7
+Truth, knowledge and
+belief
+In this final chapter we will delve deeper into some philosophical issues
+underlying the principles of good critical thinking. We begin the chapter
+by extending the discussion of truth that appears in Chapters 1 and 2 and
+attempting to dispel what in our experience is a deep seated myth -- that
+what is true depends upon nothing more than personal opinion or taste.
+As we will explain, this is the myth that all truth is relative. Later we
+examine the relationship between believing that something is the case,
+being justified in believing that it is the case and knowing that it is the
+case. These relationships are important for critical thinking because they
+are concerned with the adequacy of evidence for beliefs. Thus they
+are at the root of our determinations of whether or not premises are true,
+whether or not the conclusion of an inductively forceful argument is
+  
+261
+* Truth and relativity 262
+* True for me, true for you 267
+* Truth, value and morality 271
+* Belief, justification and truth 273
+* Justification without arguments 276
+* Knowledge 276
+* Justification failure 277
+Insufficiency * Mistakes about justification
+* Knowledge and rational persuasiveness 280
+* Philosophical directions 282
+Foundationalism vs. coherentism * Internal vs. external justification
+* Probability and justification
+defeated for a person, and whether or not an argument is rationally
+persuasive for a person. Further, the concepts of truth, knowledge and
+evidence are such frequent sources of confusion in argumentative contexts
+that clarity about them is extremely valuable in its own right.
+Truth and relativity
+When we say something, claim something such as 'The kettle has boiled',
+we assert something; we express a belief. A belief is an attitude we take
+towards a proposition: to believe a proposition is to accept it as true.
+Assertion is a truth-claim, and belief is a truth-attitude. Assertion, belief
+and truth are internally related in this way. From the outset we have
+been working with an intuitive understanding of truth such that to say
+that a claim is true is simply to say that things are as the claim says
+they are: to assert that a proposition is true is equivalent to asserting
+that very same proposition. What this means is that a pair of sentences
+such as the following:
+◗ Maria Sharapova was the Wimbledon Women's Singles
+Champion in 2004.
+◗ It is true that Maria Sharapova was the Wimbledon Women's
+Singles Champion in 2004.
+must have the same truth value; if one of them is true, then so is the
+other. This necessary equivalence is the fundamental fact about the
+ordinary meaning of the word 'true'. Suppose, then, that Julie says that
+Maria Sharapova was the Wimbledon Women's Singles Champion in
+2004. To say that Julie's claim is true, at bottom, is just to say that Maria
+Sharapova did win the Women's Singles at Wimbledon in 2004. Thus,
+although truth is a feature of claims that people make (of some claims,
+of course, not of all of them), whether or not a claim is true has nothing
+at all to do with the person who makes it; nor with that person's beliefs,
+culture or language (except when the proposition is explicitly about those
+things). Whether or not Julie's claim about Maria Sharapova is true
+depends only on whether or not Maria Sharapova won the Women's
+Singles at Wimbledon in 2004, and does not depend in any way on
+anything about Julie. In particular, the mere fact that Julie believes, and
+has claimed, that Maria Sharapova won Wimbledon, has nothing to do
+with whether or not her belief or claim is true.
+Notice also the following consequence of the equivalence noted above.
+If John responds to Julie's claim by saying 'That's true', then what he
+does, in effect, is to assert the very same thing that Julie did. He agrees
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+262
+with her. Her claim is true if Maria Sharapova won Wimbledon and false
+otherwise; likewise with John's.
+These points are quite straightforward, but they can be easy to lose
+sight of in other contexts, and these contexts can create confusion about
+truth generally. In order to dispel the myth that truth is relative, we first
+explain the concepts of indexicals and implicit speaker-relativity.
+Consider the following sets of claims:
+1 ◗ Bill Clinton was the US President immediately before
+George W. Bush.
+◗ Water is H2O.
+◗ Neptune is larger than Venus.
+◗ La Paz is the capital of Bolivia.
+2 ◗ It's raining here.
+◗ She's 35 years old.
+◗ That book is too expensive for most students to afford.
+◗ The boss is visiting our office today.
+3 ◗ Algebra is hard.
+◗ Chocolate ice cream tastes better than vanilla ice cream.
+◗ George Clooney is more handsome than Brad Pitt.
+◗ Gone with the Wind is a highly entertaining film.
+◗ It is more fun to play Monopoly than it is to play
+football.
+The claims in each of the three sets are expressed using the same
+assertoric form. Assertoric form is generally used to express a belief
+that such-and-such is true (except when someone is lying or play-acting);
+but the fact that someone has made an assertion does not establish that
+the assertion is true, only that the speaker believes it to be so. Thus, if
+someone asserts 'Neptune is larger than Venus', they express their belief
+that one planet is larger than another, that it is fact that the one is larger
+than the other. But whether or not the assertion is true depends only on
+whether or not Neptune really is larger than Venus. Similarly with 'Bill
+Clinton was the US President immediately before George W. Bush' and
+'La Paz is the capital of Bolivia'. Note that although someone making one
+of these statements asserts their own belief, they are certainly not talking
+about themselves; someone who asserts that La Paz is the capital of Bolivia
+asserts one of their beliefs, but the statement, and their belief, is only
+about La Paz and Bolivia.
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+263
+Now look at the second set of claims, which, as we have noted already,
+are expressed in the same assertoric form. Each claim includes an indexical
+-- 'here', 'she', 'that' and 'today', respectively. An indexical is a word
+that picks out a particular thing (in philosophers' terms, it is a 'referring
+term'), but precisely which thing it picks out depends upon the context
+of utterance, and sometimes on the intention of the speaker. Thus what
+it picks out can change from utterance to utterance. This has the effect
+of making the truth-value of the sentence context-relative too. 'It's
+raining here' uttered in Glasgow might be true, whereas uttered in Madrid
+at the very same moment it might be false. So determining to what
+location 'here' refers to in a given context is crucial to determining the
+truth-value of the sentence in which it occurs. Similarly 'She's 35 years
+old' might be true if uttered about Jones, yet false when uttered about
+Smith; while it might be true that the boss is visiting today when 'today'
+refers to Tuesday, it might be false if 'today' is Friday; and if 'that book'
+is a 100-page paperback that costs £50, then it is indeed too expensive
+for most students, if, on the other hand, 'that book' refers to a 300-page
+edition at £5, then it is false to claim that it is beyond the means of most
+students.
+Sentences are often context-relative in a certain respect without explicitly
+containing an indexical that signifies it as such. Consider 'It's raining
+here' again. That might be true if uttered in Glasgow today, but false if
+uttered in Glasgow tomorrow (one can always hope). The sentence does
+not contain the indexical word 'now', but it is context-sensitive with
+respect to the time of utterance. It is exactly as if the sentence were 'It's
+raining here now'. That is how it is with many typical uses of presenttense
+verbs: if you say 'I'm hungry', or 'The car needs a wash', you are
+saying that these things are so now (similarly with past and future
+tenses -- 'She used to be married', etc.). Location is also a contextual
+feature that is often left tacit. For example, we usually say 'It's raining',
+reserving 'It's raining here' for the case where speaker and hearer are in
+different places, as on the telephone. So 'It's raining' involves two implicit
+indexicals: 'here' and 'now'.
+More generally, a sentence containing indexicality (explicit or
+implicit) expresses different propositions in different contexts of utterance.
+A context is simply a collection of factors relevant to determining
+what is said by a given utterance. This will include the identity of the
+speaker (who is speaking), the time and place of utterance, and other
+factors such as what a speaker happens to be pointing to. Thus if Groucho
+says 'I'm hungry' at 3:00 and Chico says 'I'm hungry' at 5:00, then they
+express different propositions -- Groucho says that Groucho is hungry at
+3:00, whereas Chico says that Chico is hungry at 5:00. If they both speak
+truly, they report different facts.
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+264
+Since what is expressed by a sentence involving indexicality depends
+on the context of utterance, its truth-value depends on context of utterance.
+But such sentences are still fact-stating: once we have determined
+the relevant features of the context, we have a complete proposition with
+a fixed truth-value. The truth-value of the proposition is not contextrelative:
+either Groucho was really hungry at 3:00 or he wasn't, end of
+story (ignoring the possible vagueness of 'hungry'). Other indexical terms
+include personal pronouns such as 'I', 'he', 'we', 'you' and 'they'; impersonal
+ones such as 'this' and 'there' (often accompanied by a pointing
+gesture or suchlike); expressions employing possessive pronouns such as
+'my house', 'your car', 'our dog', 'their holiday'; and temporal expressions
+such as 'tomorrow' and 'yesterday'.
+Turning to the third set of claims, if we consider the first claim:
+Algebra is hard.
+It appears to assert a fact about the difficulty of algebra. But imagine Jane
+-- who has had no end of tutoring and has certainly tried her best -- saying
+this to Mary; Mary replies, 'No it's not! It's easy!'. Must they really be
+disagreeing? It seems not. In such a case, it seems that what Jane might
+really be saying is that algebra is hard for her; Mary is saying that she,
+Mary, finds it easy (unless Mary is telling Jane that she's so dim she
+can't even do something that is in fact easy -- but let's assume she isn't!).
+Since the sentence expresses a different proposition depending on who
+utters it, the sentence is implicitly indexical and hence context-relative.
+In this kind of case, we say that the claim is implicitly relative. A claim
+is implicitly relative when it states a comparison or other relation to something
+it doesn't explicitly mention (see Chapter 1, pp. 30--1, for a review
+of this concept). For example, said of an adult man, 'John is tall' states a
+comparison, a relation, between John and other men; it really says that
+John is taller than the average man.1
+Furthermore, what Mary says about algebra is implicitly speakerrelative.
+Unlike 'John is tall', the fact expressed is implicitly about the
+person making the assertion. Mary, we are assuming, is really expressing
+the proposition that Algebra is hard for Mary. Similarly, suppose that
+John has very fair skin, and says 'The sun is too strong' during a walk
+on a Mediterranean beach. He alludes to the danger of sunburn. Julie,
+whose darker skin is less sensitive to the sun, says 'No it isn't'. In such
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+265
+1 Of course there is no such thing as 'the average man', as if, in addition to Tom, Dick,
+Harry and the rest, there were another chap, the average man. To say that John is taller
+than the average man is to say that if you take the average (the mean) of the heights of
+all men, then John's height exceeds that figure.
+a case, John might only be saying that the sun is too strong for him, and
+Julie saying that it isn't too strong for her.
+Implicit speaker-relativity is most common in the expression of attitudes,
+preferences and the like, as illustrated by the remainder of the
+examples in the third set. If Julie says 'Chocolate ice cream tastes better
+than vanilla', then what she is really saying is that she prefers chocolate
+to vanilla. Similarly, if John asserts this very same sentence, then he is
+saying that chocolate ice cream tastes better to him than vanilla does. So
+Julie and John are saying different things, despite the fact that they use
+the same sentence to say it. These two speakers' assertions are statements
+of fact about their respective preferences, not statements of fact about the
+superiority of chocolate over vanilla ice cream independent of anyone's
+preference.
+To sum up the discussion of the third group: the sentence by means
+of which we express such a proposition -- 'Chocolate ice cream tastes better
+than vanilla' -- is an incomplete expression of the proposition we express
+by means of it. The statement actually expresses a fact about the person
+making it, but the sentence does not explicitly mention this; that is why
+the statement is implicitly speaker-relative.2
+The importance of these differences emerges when we consider what
+happens when people appear to disagree over claims that are implicitly
+speaker-relative in this way, and compare this with genuine factual
+disagreement. Suppose now that Julie and John disagree about the capital
+of Bolivia. Julie says:
+La Paz is the capital of Bolivia.
+But John denies it. He says: 'La Paz is not the capital of Bolivia' (perhaps
+he thinks it's the capital of Columbia). In this case, there is exactly one
+proposition -- that La Paz is the capital of Bolivia -- such that Julie asserts
+it and John denies it. That is what genuine factual disagreement is:
+genuine disagreement is when there is one proposition that is asserted by
+one person but denied by another. If Julie and John value the truth, they
+will want to know whose claim is true.
+Contrast with the case when Julie says 'I am wearing wool socks',
+and John says 'I am not wearing wool socks'. The sentence that John
+asserts is the negation of the sentence that Julie asserts, but obviously
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+266
+2 There is one slight complication, however: statements of this kind may mean that
+something is preferred or liked by most people. For example, this is plausibly what someone
+means who says: 'soured milk does not taste good.' Nevertheless, these statements are still
+implicitly relative, because they still depend for their truth on an implicit reference to
+people's preferences. In such a case, the statement is a generalisation about people's actual
+preferences rather than a statement of one person's preference.
+they are not disagreeing about anything. Due to the explicit contextrelativity
+introduced by the indexical 'I', the proposition asserted by Julie
+is not the proposition denied by John.
+But when context-relativity is implicit rather than explicit, there can
+appear to be genuine factual disagreement when there isn't. Suppose that
+Julie and John seemingly disagree about the relative merits of chocolate
+and vanilla ice cream: Julie contends that chocolate tastes better, while
+John is on the side of vanilla. As we have seen, in order to make her
+meaning perfectly explicit, Julie would have to say 'Chocolate ice cream
+tastes better than vanilla to me'; John would have to say the same in
+order to be explicit. So what Julie is really saying is that chocolate tastes
+better to her, John that vanilla tastes better to him.
+The proposition that Julie expresses can equally well be expressed as:
+(1) Chocolate ice cream tastes better than vanilla to Julie.
+Whereas John's proposition is:
+(2) Vanilla ice cream tastes better than chocolate to John.
+These are two different propositions. There is certainly no logical conflict
+between them: they could both be true. But in that case, Julie and John do
+not really disagree: there is not one proposition here that either Julie or
+John asserts, and that the other denies. They are not really disagreeing
+about the truth-value of the same proposition. That is, they do not dispute
+the facts of the matter; their claims are simply expressions of different
+preferences. To continue to dispute such an issue would be a waste of time.
+Indeed, notice that (1) and (2) are no longer implicitly speaker-relative;
+they are explicitly speaker-relative. So there should be no temptation to
+say that the truth of either (1) or (2) depends on who is making the claim.
+If you say 'Chocolate ice cream tastes better than vanilla', then you are
+implicitly talking about yourself, and the truth of what you say depends
+on facts about you (your preferences). If you assert (1), however, the truth
+of your assertion depends only on facts about Julie, not on facts about you.
+Having discussed the concepts of indexicals and implicit speakerrelativity,
+we are now in a position to confront the myth that truth is
+relative.
+True for me, true for you
+Often, people who have succumbed to the myth that 'the truth is always
+relative' respond to a disagreement about the facts by saying something
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+267
+like: 'Well, that may be true for you, but it's not true for me.' In doing
+so, they use a common ploy to avoid proper engagement with the argument.
+Unless the matter under discussion is one that is actually implicitly
+speaker-relative, as it is in the ice cream example, this is not a legitimate
+move to make within an attempt to persuade rationally. It is a refusal to
+argue any further.3 A similar refusal to engage in debate occurs when
+someone responds to others' claims by saying, 'that's just your opinion'
+as though expressing one's mere opinion is not an attempt to make a true
+claim about a matter but, rather, tantamount to expressing a preference
+for chocolate rather than vanilla ice cream. But when we express our
+opinion on a matter -- the best way of reducing crime rates, say -- we are
+expressing our beliefs about the truth of a matter. It is really a kind of
+self-deception not to face up to this: that when we express our opinion,
+we are making a claim to truth. So criticising someone's contribution to
+a conversation by saying, 'that's just a matter of opinion' is another
+attempt to hinder rational persuasion or debate, and unjustifiably denies
+that there is any such thing as disagreement.
+The 'true-for-me' phraseology, however, is not just a device for
+evading arguments. It is a characteristic way of expressing the relativitymyth
+(though the relativity-myth may itself be motivated by the wish
+to avoid the sometimes unpleasant reality of disagreement). Thus we shall
+try to dispel the myth by considering it in more detail. Consider again
+the sentence:
+Chocolate ice cream tastes better than vanilla.
+The implicit speaker-relativity of a sentence like this might be described
+by saying that the sentence is true for Julie, and not true for John. Upon
+hearing Julie assert this sentence, John might say: 'Well, that may be true
+for you, but it isn't true for me.' John might, in this case, simply be
+making the point about implicit speaker-relativity. If so, then that is all
+right; he is quite right to do so. However, phrases such as 'true for me'
+are sometimes used in what appear to be factual contexts where implicit
+speaker-relativity is not in play. For example, suppose that Julie believes
+in astrology, and says:
+Scorpios tend to be luckier than Libras.
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+268
+3 When you think about it, it is very hard to see exactly what this claim amounts to.
+It seems to say that truth is relative to persons; yet it is odd that the only way that this
+can be the case is for that statement itself to be true in just the way that the statement
+itself denies -- thus it seems that relativism about truth may be contradictory.
+John does not believe in astrology, and therefore does not believe that
+one's character depends on what the part of the year one is born. So he
+thinks this proposition is false. But John, wishing to avoid a painful
+disagreement, expresses himself by saying: 'Well, that may be true for
+you, but it isn't true for me.'
+As we have just seen, where implicit speaker-relativity is involved,
+the use of such phrases as 'true for you' is perfectly legitimate. But in
+the astrology case, the use of this phrase is misleading. Is this sentence
+implicitly speaker-relative? Is the sentence about a preference, belief or
+other attitude? It certainly does not seem to be. It is like the sentence
+about La Paz: it purports to state a fact about the respective fortunes
+of Scorpios and Libras. Someone asserting the sentence about La Paz
+expresses their belief concerning La Paz, but they are not talking about
+themselves, they are talking only about La Paz and Bolivia. This is shown
+by the fact that the truth of what they say depends only on how things
+are with La Paz and Bolivia, its truth does not depend in any way on the
+beliefs of the speaker. Likewise, someone asserting the astrology sentence
+expresses their own attitudes about Scorpios and Libras, but is not saying
+anything about their own attitudes towards Scorpios and Libras. So when
+John says, of the astrology sentence, that it might be true for Julie but
+not for him, he cannot be saying that the sentence is implicitly speakerrelative,
+and could therefore be true when Julie says it but false when
+he says it.
+What, then, could John reasonably mean by 'true for you' in this
+context? As we noted, when someone sincerely asserts a declarative
+sentence, they express a belief. By 'true for you', then, John could simply
+mean that according to Julie, the sentence is true. That is to say, he could
+mean simply that Julie believes the proposition expressed by the sentence:
+that she believes that Scorpios tend to be luckier than Libras. John, of
+course, denies this very same proposition. So this is a straightforward
+case of genuine disagreement over the same proposition. In suggesting
+that the sentence is true for Julie and not for himself, all that John is
+doing is pointing out the fact that he and Julie do disagree: Julie believes,
+and John disbelieves, the very same proposition. Unfortunately, by using
+the phrase 'true for you', he makes it sound as if it's a case of implicit
+speaker-relativity, in which case there is no actual disagreement. Since
+that is the sort of case where 'true for me' has a legitimate point to it,
+he makes it sound as if there is no actual disagreement, thus smoothing
+over his difference with Julie. This is perhaps polite of him, but it is really
+just an evasion.
+With these points in mind concerning 'true-for-me', we can now
+dispel the myth that all truth is relative. The myth is often expressed by
+saying that we cannot legitimately speak simply of what is true, but only
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+269
+of what is true for me, or true for you, or more generally true-for-X,
+where X is some person (or perhaps culture). If this is explained as the
+claim that all statements are really implicitly speaker-relative, then this
+is clearly not so, as we have seen: a statement like the one about La Paz
+just isn't speaker-relative. However, the claim that all truth is truth-for-
+X might also be understood in accordance with the way that John
+employed the phrase in his dispute with Julie about astrology. According
+to this interpretation of 'true-for-X', to say that a proposition is true for
+X is to say that X believes it. Could all truth really be truth-for-X, in
+that sense?
+Let us work out the implications of supposing that it is. Consider
+these two sentences:
+(3) Scorpios tend to be luckier than Libras.
+(4) It is true that Scorpios tend to be luckier than Libras.
+According to what we said about the word 'true' at the beginning of this
+chapter, (3) and (4) are necessarily equivalent: it is impossible for one of
+them to be true and the other false. That is why we can always register
+our agreement with a claim simply by saying, 'that's true'. And that, we
+might say, is the point of having the word 'true': that is how the word
+is used. However, according to the version of the myth we are considering,
+if Julie asserts (4), then she would be speaking more accurately if
+she were to say: 'It is true for me that Scorpios tend to be luckier than
+Libras.' Thus, as we ourselves would express it, what she says by means
+of (4), according to the myth, is really:
+(5) It is true for Julie that Scorpios tend to be luckier than
+Libras.
+And this, as we said, is more accurately expressed by:
+(6) Julie believes that Scorpios tend to be luckier than Libras.
+So according to this version of the relativity-myth, Julie's utterance of
+(4) is equivalent to (5), which is equivalent to (6). So according to the
+myth, (4) is equivalent to (6). But (6) is certainly not equivalent to (3).
+(3) Makes no reference to Julie; it would be possible for (3) to be true
+but (6) false, or the other way round (in fact, if (6) were true, then since
+presumably (3) is false, they would actually differ in truth-value). Thus,
+according to this version of the myth, we would have to say that (4) is
+not equivalent to (3). But that cannot be right, for that is simply not how
+the word 'true' is used. This version of the relativity-myth violates the
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+270
+actual, ordinary day-to-day meaning of the word 'true' according to which
+(3) and (4) are equivalent. According to that meaning, Julie is right when
+she says (3) if, and only if, she is right when she says (4). So (3) and (4),
+whoever utters them, cannot differ in truth-value. If so, then since (5)
+and (6) mean the same thing, (5) cannot be what is meant by (4), in which
+case 'true' cannot mean 'true-for-X'.
+There is no getting around it, then. There is no way to make satisfactory
+sense of the relativity-myth. So truth is not relative. It is objective,
+and the truth of a proposition is independent of our desiring or believing
+it to be true. Just as thinking or desiring cannot make the moon be made
+of green cheese, thinking or desiring cannot make it true that the moon
+is made of green cheese. To believe is to believe something to be true,
+but truth is not the same thing as belief. This means that truth is independent
+of all of us; it does not mean that one powerful person or being
+could hold the key to all that is true about the world. Thus in saying that
+truth is objective, we are certainly not taking any kind of political stance,
+saying that certain cultures or institutions have or might have a monopoly
+on truth. The aim of good reasoning and argument is to get at the truth,
+at the way the world is, irrespective of how people think or feel it to be.
+Rationality is a great leveller. In the pursuit of truth, we are all equally
+placed before the world, and no amount of political power can provide an
+advantage.
+Truth, value and morality
+So far we have been tackling the myth that all truth is relative. Many
+people are also tempted to think that values like those central to
+moral issues are relative to personal or cultural preferences. It is possible
+that people are tempted to think that truth is relative because they think
+that value is relative. In fact, however, the non-relativity of truth does
+not imply the non-relativity of value. The question of the relativity of
+value is a different sort of question, and it is important to see how and
+why. By way of example, we'll take the claim:
+Doctor-assisted suicide is immoral.
+According to the relativist view, when opponents of doctor-assisted suicide
+say it is morally unacceptable and their opponents contradict them and
+say that it is morally acceptable, there is no real disagreement; rather the
+two sides do not share the same moral preferences. Thus, for the relativist,
+value-statements are always speaker-relative, whether implicitly or
+explicitly. Thus the incoherence of relativism about all truth does not
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+271
+entail that value-statements are not relative in this way: the relativist can
+claim that all value-statements are speaker-relative without claiming that
+all statements are speaker-relative. An apparent disagreement over a value
+is in this respect like that between Julie and John concerning chocolate
+versus vanilla ice cream. One reason why this relativistic view of moral
+issues is so tempting is that we feel uncomfortable about being seen to
+dictate morals to other people because we (rightly) value tolerance of
+different opinions.4
+We cannot prove, and would not try to prove, that moral relativism
+is false. It is conceivable that all claims about values are implicitly speakerrelative,
+or perhaps implicitly relative in some other way. We will, however,
+try to explain why there is good reason to resist moral relativism.
+While moral issues are almost always complicated and can be difficult to
+agree upon, the problem with this simplistic relativist approach is that it
+leaves no room for genuine disagreement about moral issues. It enjoins
+us to say, 'You feel OK about doctors helping their patients to die, I don't,
+end of story' without attempting rationally to persuade one another of
+the truth of our beliefs. The poverty of such a view of morals is illustrated
+by the following case: suppose there emerged a terrible fascist
+regime that murdered millions of people on grounds of race, religion or
+political beliefs. Simplistic relativists who desire to remain consistent with
+their relativist commitment would be unable to hope that the fascists are
+wrong, and that, therefore, others could rationally be persuaded that the
+fascists are wrong; for the fascists' views about the moral status of their
+victims would be nothing more than preferences that just happen to be
+different from most other people's. In the same way that many people
+prefer ice cream to carrots, this regime prefers murdering people who are
+different from them to living tolerantly alongside them. This is a very
+extreme example, but the point is well made. To adopt naive relativism
+about moral matters, to deny there can be a truth of the matter; and to
+say that claims such as the claim that torture is wrong have a similar
+status to the claim that chocolate ice cream tastes best, is to deny ourselves
+the opportunity to attempt rationally to persuade others that their moral
+beliefs are false and to persuade them not to follow courses of action that
+would be harmful to others. It places fundamental moral issues outside
+of the ambit of critical thinking.
+Yet the critical thinker does not have to give up hope. While people
+may continue to believe that moral relativism is true, they must also be
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+272
+4 This repudiation of moral relativism is aimed only at the very naive type of relativism
+that holds that moral questions are simply a matter of personal or cultural preference
+and therefore not the subject of genuine disagreements. There are various more sophisticated
+versions of moral relativism. It is not our intention to repudiate such theories.
+consistent in their judgements. For example: it is irrational to hold that
+murderers are bad people, and at the same time, in full knowledge of his
+crimes, hold that Jack the Ripper was not a bad person. Thus, the critical
+thinker can at least demand logical consistency of the relativist: they can
+show that there is a valid argument from a premise accepted by the relativist
+to the conclusion that Jack the Ripper was bad. This means that it
+is possible to refute the relativist's moral views if it can be established
+that they are incoherent. In moral arguments a good way to do this is to
+find a general principle that the relativist accepts and go on to show how
+it is inconsistent with the belief that you wish to challenge. For example,
+if a relativist is pro-abortion and you discover that they are also against
+any form of killing, then you could force them to revise their beliefs if
+you could establish by argument that abortion was a type of killing.5
+Belief, justification and truth
+It is not the case that for any given proposition, we either believe it to
+be true (believe it), or believe it be false (disbelieve it). We may simply
+have no attitude towards it, either because it has never come to our attention,
+or because we choose not to consider the question. Or we may have
+an attitude that is midway between belief and disbelief: we may suspend
+judgement, because we find upon reflection that we lack sufficient evidence
+to make the judgement. This happens when we lack an argument either
+for or against the proposition that is rationally persuasive for us. The
+issue of the existence of a single deity who is said to have created the
+world provides a good example with which to illustrate the point. Consider
+the claim:
+The world was created by an omnipotent and omniscient being.
+Some people, let's call them 'theists', believe the proposition expressed
+here. Others, atheists, disbelieve it. Others, agnostics, are not sure
+whether or not to believe it so they have suspended judgement until such
+time as they acquire sufficient evidence (or faith) to support a belief either
+way. These three positions probably cover most adults in our society. But
+consider the position of most pre-school children. They do not believe
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+273
+5 See Louis Pojman's essay 'Ethical relativism versus ethical objectivism' in his Introduction
+to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Oxford University
+Press, 2004) for an excellent critical analysis of moral relativism and a convincing case
+for a version of moral objectivism. This very accessible paper is aimed at beginning
+Philosophy students.
+that a deity made the world. They do not believe that a deity didn't make
+the world. However, it would not be accurate to say that they have
+suspended judgement on the issue. For they have not considered the issue,
+indeed they are probably too young to understand the claim that is the
+subject of debate. Of course, when assessing an argument's soundness
+and rational persuasiveness, the stance of having no opinion about the
+truth of the premises is not an option for critical thinkers. Either we
+consider ourselves to have sufficient evidence to believe or disbelieve the
+proposition expressed by the premise(s) or we recognise that we lack such
+evidence, and suspend judgement until such evidence is available. And
+even if we believe the argument to be inductively sound, we may find
+that having accepted its premises, the argument is not rationally persuasive
+for us because its conclusion is defeated by some further evidence
+that we have.
+It is crucial to bear in mind that in saying that someone does not
+hold a certain belief, we are not saying or implying that they hold the
+opposite belief. If someone tells you that they don't believe that the Prime
+Minister is a bad person, they are not thereby saying or implying that
+they believe that the Prime Minister is not a bad person, let alone that
+the Prime Minister is a good person. They may not know the Prime
+Minister very well and may want to learn more about the Prime Minister
+before making a judgement, or they may simply not care and have no
+intention of ever forming a belief about the Prime Minister's moral
+standing. Or perhaps they have never even heard of the Prime Minister.
+As we saw in Chapter 4, an argument that assumes that someone who
+does not believe a proposition believes its negation commits a version of
+the epistemic fallacy.
+Of the four stances we can take towards a proposition -- believing
+it, not believing it, suspending judgement, not engaging with it
+-- two, believing and not believing, admit of degrees. Smith and Jones
+may both believe that the Conservative Party will form the Government
+after the next general election, but they may not hold the belief with the
+same degree of confidence. Smith may be nearly certain, while Jones, an
+arch-sceptic when it comes to predicting voting behaviour, still believes
+it but to a lesser degree. Similarly Jack and Jill may both disbelieve the
+proposition that the Conservative Party will form the next Government,
+but the strength of Jack's disbelief may be such that he'll bet two weeks'
+wages at odds of 20 to 1 on a Conservative defeat. Whereas Jill, normally
+a keen betting woman, would not risk nearly as much money (if offered
+the same odds).
+Given that someone holds a certain belief, we can ask whether or not
+the belief is justified, and whether or not it is true. Suppose Smith works
+for a national polling organisation and has seen the results of several
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+274
+methodologically sound top-secret polls that predict the Conservative
+Party will gain 80 per cent of the vote on election day. In the absence of
+any evidence that goes against that prediction, Smith is in possession of
+an argument that is highly rationally persuasive for him. He would thus
+be well-justified (other factors such as the reliability of the data notwithstanding)
+in believing the conclusion of the argument with a strong degree
+of certainty. As critical thinkers we may conclude that Smith's belief is
+reasonable or justified given what we know about the evidence available
+to them. Whenever someone's belief is backed by an argument that is
+rationally persuasive for them, it follows that they are justified in
+believing the conclusion, precisely to the extent that the argument is rationally
+persuasive for them.6
+However, the fact that Smith is perfectly rational and justified in
+holding this belief does not establish that the belief is true. That depends
+upon whether the Conservative Party do in fact form the next
+Government. A belief's being true is a matter of its fitting the facts, not
+of there being good reasons to think that such-and-such is the case.
+We see this clearly when we consider the possibility of being justified
+in holding a belief that is actually false. Suppose I form the belief that
+the Government has just been deposed in a military coup. I am led to
+form this belief because while writing this chapter, I have been distracted
+into reading electronic newspapers and I find the same story appearing
+on several previously reliable and reputable internet sites. I track down
+one or two colleagues, they look at their own favourite sites and sure
+enough, find the same story. Given the widespread coverage of the coup
+and the fact that the sources are reliable and reputable, I would be justified
+in believing that the Government had been deposed by a military
+coup. But in fact, despite my good reasons for having formed this belief,
+it turns out to be false. A clever computer hacker has managed to hack
+into several UK-based internet news services and post this false story. So
+I have a justified but false belief. I may be in possession of an argument
+that is rationally persuasive for me, but my belief in its conclusion still
+need not be true.
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+275
+6 This is not to say that a belief is justified only if one has a rationally persuasive argument
+for it. According to many theorists, some beliefs, especially those that arise in
+perception, are justified but not 'inferentially' -- not, that is, by means of arguments or
+reasoning. Others deny this, holding that even the justification of perceptual beliefs depends
+upon underlying premises or assumptions. Since this is a fundamental open question
+in the theory of knowledge (epistemology), we have avoided taking a stand on it here.
+See the concluding section of this chapter. For detailed discussion see Robert Audi,
+Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (2nd edition,
+Routledge, 2002).
+Justification without arguments
+In order to be justified in holding a certain belief, must one be in possession
+of a (rationally persuasive) argument for that belief? No -- or at least
+not in any ordinary sense. There are forms of justification that do not
+involve having reasons in the usual sense. The obvious case is that of
+perception. If you perceive, under normal circumstances, that the cat is
+on the mat, then you are normally justified in believing that the cat is on
+the mat. If you say 'The cat is on the mat', and someone asks 'How do
+you know?', it is a perfectly adequate answer to say 'Because I see it'. The
+question of exactly how perception is related to justification is a complicated
+philosophical problem, but for our purposes it is sufficiently straightforward
+that a normal person in normal circumstances who perceives that
+such-and-such is justified in believing it; put another way, perceiving
+something is good reason for believing it. That is why, in our discussion
+of rational persuasiveness in Chapter 6, we said that in order for an argument
+to be rationally persuasive for a person, they must be justified in
+accepting the premises -- having rationally persuasive arguments for those
+premises in turn is one way for that requirement to be satisfied, but it is
+not the only way.
+Other, less obvious non-argumentative forms of justification include
+introspection, or reports of one's own thoughts, feelings and emotions
+(though these might be regarded as 'perception' in a somewhat extended
+sense of the word). Thus if you report that you are hungry, happy or
+afraid of failing the exam, then, except in bizarre circumstances, your
+belief that you are hungry, happy or afraid of failing the exam is surely
+justified, and does not stand in need of an argument.
+Knowledge
+Truth and knowledge are intimately linked. Our desire to accumulate
+knowledge stems from a desire to get at the truth. And certainly if one
+knows something, then the proposition known must be true: one cannot
+rightly be said to know that the cat is on the mat if the cat is not on the
+mat. The truth of a belief is certainly one necessary condition of that
+belief's being knowledge. So it may seem reasonable to suppose that if
+Jones believes that the Government has been deposed in a military coup,
+and the Government has been deposed in a military coup, then Jones
+knows that the Government has been deposed in a military coup. This is
+to say that knowledge that such-and-such is the case is simply having a
+true belief that such-and-such is the case.
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+276
+However, this is not correct. Having a belief that is true is necessary,
+but not sufficient for knowledge. Suppose that Smith has been given
+LSD. He is hallucinating like mad, and his reason has gone completely
+haywire. The conviction suddenly impresses itself upon his unhinged
+mind that evil leprechauns have set fire to his mother's house in Sydney,
+15,000 miles away. So he believes that his mother's house is on fire. In
+fact, Smith takes LSD every day, and believes, every time, that his
+mother's house is on fire (though for a different reason each time). But
+this time, it just so happens that his mother's house is on fire. Just by
+chance, the belief, this time, was true. No one would say that Smith, in
+this situation, knows that his mother's house is on fire. It was true belief,
+but not knowledge. He is like a person who shoots at a target blindfolded,
+dozens of times, and finally hits it, despite not having had any idea where
+the target was.
+So knowledge cannot be identified simply with having a true belief.
+A further ingredient must be added to true belief, if it is to be knowledge.
+In particular, a true belief counts as knowledge only if we arrive at that
+true belief via the right route: we have knowledge only if we have good
+reasons for a holding belief that turns out to be true. We have to be justified;
+we need to have solid evidential support. We must, if you like,
+earn the right to be sure. Lucky true beliefs do not count as knowledge.
+This third requirement is incorporated into the traditional philosophical
+account of knowledge, which is called the tripartite account:
+For any subject (S) and any proposition (P), S knows that P if and
+only if:
+(i) S believes that P.
+(ii) P is true.
+(iii) S is justified in believing that P.
+According to this account, to know that P is to have a justified true belief
+that P. It amounts to saying, then, that knowledge is identical with justified
+true belief. If I have a justified true belief that Tony Blair is UK
+Prime Minister then I know that Tony Blair is UK Prime Minister.
+Justification failure
+There are two ways in which belief can lack the justification, the evidential
+support, required for knowledge: it can either be genuine but
+insufficient, or simply not genuine, that is, mistaken.
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+277
+Insufficiency
+Consider Mrs Green, the greengrocer, who discovers that a customer has
+left their shopping behind. She has served five customers so far that day
+-- Mr Red, Mrs Pink, Mr Orange, Mr Yellow and Mrs Blue. She has no
+reason to suppose that any one of them is any more forgetful than any
+of the others. None of them is in the habit of forgetting their shopping,
+for instance. Mrs Green concludes that one of the men left the shopping
+behind. She does have some justification for forming this belief: of the
+five customers three were male, so on the balance of probability the
+forgetful shopper is more likely to be a man. That is to say, she does
+have an argument for that conclusion which is somewhat rationally
+persuasive for her. But, intuitively, we may feel that this probability is
+somewhat slim justification for her belief. Even if it turns out that the
+shopping belongs to Mr Orange, we don't feel inclined to say that she
+arrived at her true belief via the right route; that is, that her true belief
+is really justified. So even if she's right, we don't feel that she knows that
+the forgetful shopper is a man. This is not to say that probability as a
+justification for true belief should be ruled out per se. The problem here
+is that the probability is not strong enough. If there had been four male
+shoppers and one woman, we would be more inclined to allow that Mrs
+Green's belief is justified. If there had been 99 men and 1 woman, we
+would certainly be so inclined.
+There are occasions when there is far more at stake in having the
+proper justification for forming a true belief than simply making sure
+that someone gets their groceries. An obvious case is where principles of
+justice are involved, where evidence is required to demonstrate beyond
+reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of an alleged crime. Suppose
+Jones is accused of the murder of Brown. In fact, Jones is guilty: he strangled
+Brown to death. Smith is called as a prosecution witness to Jones'
+crime. He is called as a witness because he has given a police statement
+in which he claims to have seen Jones emerging from Brown's house
+carrying a knife. If this is all the evidence the jury has, is it, by itself,
+sufficient reason for jury members to form the true belief that Jones is
+guilty of Brown's murder? Clearly not, even though Jones is in fact guilty
+of the murder. So although the jury members may have reached their
+true belief about Jones' guilt on the basis of Smith's evidence, they do
+not have a justified belief about Jones' guilt. If this is the only evidence
+they have for reaching their verdict, then they should not convict Jones
+of Brown's murder. Again, note that this holds even though Jones happens
+to be guilty.
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+278
+How strong must our evidential support be, if a belief is to be justified?
+How strong must it be if a true belief is to qualify as knowledge?
+Unfortunately, there is no precise answer to this question. The terms
+'justified' and 'knowledge', like 'bald', are somewhat vague: just as there
+is no exact quantity or proportion of cranial hairlessness required for baldness,
+there is no exact strength of evidence for a belief short of which it
+is not knowledge, and beyond which it is knowledge. But this should not
+trouble us too much. In practice, we are adept at recognising the cases
+where our degree of justification is borderline. This does not change the
+nature of our task as critical thinkers: we know that our task is to fashion
+sound arguments that are rationally persuasive for ourselves or for their
+intended audiences. By paying attention to the reasons why we are entitled
+to form true beliefs, we are able to achieve the firmest possible grasp
+upon what we can legitimately claim to know.
+Mistakes about justification
+Sometimes misevaluation of evidence leads us to form irrational beliefs,
+even in cases that are not so extreme as Smith and his hallucinations. In
+such cases we overestimate our evidential support, or we think that the
+evidence supports a belief when it doesn't. This is an error that people
+who attempt to persuade by devious means can often exploit to their
+advantage (indeed we noticed in Chapter 4 that some fallacies actually
+work well as rhetorical ploys). For instance they might describe one or
+two vivid examples of some alleged phenomenon with the aim of getting
+us to form generalisations for which the examples do not provide adequate
+support. An example that should be familiar to readers and observers of
+the UK tabloid press is that of a vivid description of a recipient of state
+benefit or of an asylum seeker, which apparently supports the claim that
+they enjoy an undeservedly luxurious lifestyle. Such examples are rolled
+out in an attempt to persuade readers to believe that the majority of
+benefit recipients and asylum seekers are undeserving cheats. Often, the
+details of such examples and the manner of their presentation are so rhetorically
+powerful that they cause us to misevaluate the significance of the
+evidence presented to us. In particular, we make an unjustified inductive
+inference (one with very low force). When we are led to make such
+mistakes and form irrational beliefs, we allow ourselves to be distracted
+by factors other than principles of good reasoning.
+There is another type of irrational belief. Sometimes we allow
+ourselves to accept a false belief because we believe that accepting it will
+benefit us in some way. In such cases we not only lack evidence for
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+279
+the belief, but we also seem not to care that we have none. For instance,
+someone might believe that the predictions of their astrologer will come
+true; they might believe in faith-healing; ESP; life after death; that everything
+in the Bible is literally true; that their terminally ill grandparent
+will make a recovery; that a certain alternative healing method will cure
+cancer. We often feel that it would be unfeeling to point out that such a
+person's beliefs are irrational. Indeed, we often admire their faith and
+sincerity. However, it would be a mistake to retreat into relativity and
+conclude that their belief is 'true for them'. The belief is false, that's that.
+Indeed, such people can sometimes paradoxically be described as believing
+that which they know to be false -- self-deceived.
+However, we should not be too cold-blooded. It's not usually the case
+that such people are intentionally deceiving themselves, but rather that
+they are trying to deal with their plight by having faith that their hopes
+(however unlikely) will be borne out.7 So it's rather unfair and unfeeling
+to accuse such people of being irrational, even though strictly speaking
+they are. While we should try to avoid irrationality, we must also accept
+that as human beings, it is sometimes psychologically better for us if our
+beliefs and behaviour fall short of rationality.
+Knowledge and rational persuasiveness
+Rational persuasiveness requires that you be justified in accepting the
+premises of an argument. If the argument is deductively valid, then if
+you are justified in accepting the premises, you are equally justified in
+accepting the conclusion. If the premises of such an argument are actually
+true, and you know that they are, then if you recognise that the
+argument is valid, you know the conclusion to be true.8
+However, there are two complications. First, a rationally persuasive
+argument can be unsound: rational persuasiveness does not itself require
+that the premises of the argument actually be true. It requires that one
+be justified in accepting the premises; but, we have seen, it is perfectly
+possible to have good reasons, to be justified, in holding a false belief. Thus
+one can be rationally persuaded by an argument but not know the argument's
+premises to be true. In such a case, one can be rationally persuaded
+by an argument without thereby acquiring knowledge. Knowledge that an
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+280
+7 There are, of course, cases where people are guilty of self-deception. A classic case is
+the person who knows (for their clothing has become too tight) that they have gained
+weight, but refuses to believe that their scales are functioning properly.
+8 In epistemology this is called the 'closure principle'. It might seem undeniable, but
+in more advanced philosophical treatments of these issues, it is called into question.
+argument is sound, on the other hand, makes a stronger demand on our
+epistemological relationship with its premises. To know that an argument
+is sound, we have to know that its premises are true. To know that an
+argument is sound, we need justified true beliefs in the premises. Whereas
+for rational persuasiveness, we need only the justification; the belief need
+not be true.
+Second, in the case of an inductively forceful argument that is not
+defeated, the degree of justification transmitted from known premises to
+the argument's conclusion may be insufficient to establish the conclusion
+as knowledge. For the degree of inductive force may be too weak. One
+might, for example, know with certainty that 51 of 100 stones in a bag
+are black; one would thus have an inductively sound argument that is
+rationally persuasive for the conclusion that the next stone drawn at
+random from the bag will be black. But the argument is only slightly
+rationally persuasive. Even if that conclusion turns out to be true, the
+belief in it would be insufficiently justified by the argument, and so would
+not count as knowledge. More generally, the degree of justification one
+has for the conclusion of an argument that is inductively forceful but not
+deductively sound will be smaller than the degree one has for the premises
+(unless one has some other source of justification for the conclusion).
+Finally, here is a case that displays what knowledge is, as opposed
+to what it isn't. The following scenario provides an example of the fulfilment
+of the requirements placed on knowledge claims:
+Tabitha Tabloid, a journalist, is at a restaurant one evening and
+sees a prominent politician at an adjacent table with a person she
+knows not to be their spouse. 'Perhaps there's a story in this', she
+thinks. Later, as she walks to her car, she notices a couple locked
+in a passionate embrace in a parked car that just happens to be
+parked under a street lamp. On discreet but close inspection she
+sees that the couple is the politician and their companion. She
+forms the belief (which happens to be true) that the politician is
+having an illicit affair with this person. In fact, she believes that
+the evidence for her belief is sufficiently strong that she
+persuades her editor that her story should be the next morning's
+front-page lead.
+Here we have the three components that are apparently required for
+legitimate knowledge claims: a true belief that the politician is having an
+affair and a rational justification for that belief based upon what Tabitha
+witnessed in the restaurant and subsequently in the parked car, that is,
+the criteria provided by the tripartite account of knowledge are all met
+and it is reasonable to say that Tabitha knows that the politician is having
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+281
+an intimate relationship (or at least a one-off passionate embrace) with
+the person in question.9
+Philosophical directions
+In this final section, we mention just a few questions that arise naturally
+out of some of the main topics of this chapter, answers to which require
+more detailed or strenuous philosophical analysis than would be appropriate
+here. This may help you to see why philosophical inquiries are not
+always 'irrelevant' to real life: they arise inevitably when we reason critically
+about things, or try to determine exactly what is involved in doing
+so. We will quickly sketch these issues and recommend some sources for
+further reading. They are all issues in epistemology and the theory or
+science of knowledge.10
+Foundationalism vs. coherentism
+We said that unlike other sorts of beliefs, we do not normally think of
+beliefs based on perception as standing in need of reasons, that is, arguments.
+We think of normal perceptual beliefs as justified just as they
+stand, just by virtue of being grounded in perception. So long as we think
+so, then it is natural to think of other beliefs as ultimately being based
+on perception. Scientific theories, for example, seem to be ultimately based
+upon observation, that is, perception. Thus for each non-perceptual belief
+P, it seems plausible that it is justified -- and hence potentially knowledge
+-- only if we can trace it back along a chain of reasons to some perceptual
+belief or set of beliefs. Since perceptual beliefs are self-justifying,
+they can transmit justification along the train of reasons back up to the
+belief P that was in question.
+This way of conceiving the structure of knowledge fits common sense
+very well, and is known as foundationalism. There is, however, a
+contrary point of view that -- strangely enough -- also appeals to common
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+282
+9 In a famous essay Edmund Gettier described cases that appear to be justified true
+belief but not knowledge, thus casting doubt on the intuitive theory that knowledge is
+justified true belief. If you'd like to learn more, see Robert Audi, Epistemology, A
+Contemporary Introduction (2nd edition; Routledge, 2002). Gettier's original paper, along
+with notable attempts to solve the problem, is reprinted in Michael Huemer, Epistemology:
+Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002).
+10 For further reading on these and other issues in epistemology see Robert Audi,
+Epistemology, A Contemporary Introduction (2nd edition, Routledge, 2002), and Michael
+Huemer, Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002).
+sense. As everybody knows, perception is not 100 per cent reliable. We
+are subject to visual illusions (the man outside the train seems to be
+moving -- no, it's the train beginning to move) and other less exotic
+perceptual mistakes (the referee honestly but mistakenly sees the player
+as offside). More dramatically, we dream and even hallucinate; aren't we
+then having false perceptions, or at least, experiences that are indistinguishable
+from true perceptions? Of course much or most of the time
+our perceptions are correct -- we are quite certain we're not dreaming or
+otherwise mistaken. But even so, aren't we implicitly assuming that
+the circumstances are favourable? Aren't we reasoning something like
+this: this is the experience I would have if I were really seeing the cat on
+the mat under favourable circumstances. Circumstances are favourable.
+Therefore I really am seeing the cat on the mat. If so, then the question
+arises: what are the premises of that little argument based upon? The
+anti-foundational position known as coherentism claims that if we
+always insist on a foundation in self-justifying perceptual beliefs, then
+we can never get it, and no belief is ever justified. Since that is absurd,
+the foundationalist demand must be misconceived. Instead, we should
+think of our whole network of beliefs as mutually supporting: each belief
+-- even if it is a perceptual belief -- is justified just insofar as it fits with
+or coheres with the network we already have. Perceptual beliefs typically
+do pass this test, but not always: it looks like the magician saws the
+woman in half, but that does not cohere with other things we already
+know, so we don't believe it. On the other hand, coherentism has its
+problems too. Most conspicuously, surely a whole set of beliefs could be
+mostly false (the person is deluded about almost everything!); if another
+belief coheres with that set, does that justify it? It seems not.
+Both theories have problems, but they are the only obvious options.
+Internal vs. external justification
+Exactly how is it that perceptual beliefs are justified? One answer is that
+perception is reliable. That is, in normal circumstances, when a perceptual
+belief arises in a normal, properly functioning human being, the belief
+is almost always correct. Perception is in this way truth-conducive. Thus
+we might suppose: if a person has a perceptual belief, then so long as the
+person is functioning normally and the perceptual circumstances are
+normal, the belief is justified; if not, then the belief is not justified.
+On the other hand, you might wonder: surely it is not enough for
+the circumstances to be favourable in that way; doesn't the person have
+to know that the circumstances are favourable? Otherwise, by what right
+would he or she accept the belief? This might seem like a reasonable
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+283
+demand, until you recognise how much it requires: for how are we
+supposed to know that the circumstances are favourable, except by perception?
+But if we need more perceptions in order to justify the first
+perception, don't we need yet more to justify these? And so on; we are
+off, it seems, on what philosophers call a vicious regress. It is vicious,
+because unless we can put a stop to it, it seems we are unable to justify
+any perceptual beliefs.
+Again, both sides have their advantages and disadvantages. The view
+that beliefs may be justified simply by having been acquired in the right
+way -- whether or not we know them to have been so acquired -- is called,
+for obvious reasons, externalism; the view that one must always be
+aware of the means of justification is internalism. The issue between
+them is by no means merely academic. For example, in 2002, British
+military forces participated the US-led invasion of Iraq at least partly on
+the grounds that Iraq was concealing so-called weapons of mass destruction.
+There turned out not be any. But the British Prime Minister Tony
+Blair defended the decision on the grounds that at the time of the invasion,
+the evidence available to him suggested that Iraq was concealing
+such weapons. Many people who granted Blair's sincerity on the issue
+were nonetheless unsatisfied. Plausibly, such critics were thinking that
+however Blair's decision may have been justified on internal grounds,
+it was not justified from an external point of view, because the means of
+justification was not in fact reliable.
+Probability and justification
+Where our reason for believing something is an argument with inductive
+force, is the question of justification simply the same thing as the
+degree to which the argument is rationally persuasive for us? In most
+cases, it is correct to assume so. But not, in seems, in all. Suppose that a
+few minutes ago you filled and switched on the electric kettle. So you
+know there's hot water in the kettle. Now compare this case. Your sister
+tells you she's got a lottery ticket. You happen to know that the chance
+that her ticket is a winner is one in ten million. As it happens, the draw
+has already taken place; neither of you know it, but her ticket is not a
+winner. In such a case, you naturally believe that your sister's ticket is
+a non-winner; this belief is true, and its probability of being true was
+very high. But do you know that her ticket is a non-winner? It seems
+wrong to say so. Yet the probability of this belief's being correct is
+much higher than that of your belief about the kettle! The failure rate
+of kettles is much higher than one in ten million. To repeat: both beliefs
+are true. The kettle-belief constitutes knowledge but the lottery-belief
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+284
+does not, despite the fact that the kettle-belief had a greater chance of
+being wrong.
+One could respond to this seeming paradox in different ways. At first,
+you might think maybe you do know that the lottery ticket is a loser.
+But that seems wrong: every purchaser of a lottery ticket is in exactly
+the same position, has exactly the same evidence as to whether or not
+they've won: everyone knows their chance is miniscule, namely one in
+ten million. So everyone would be equally justified in claiming to have
+lost. But one such person would be wrong to claim this, namely the
+winner. If we say that the losers knew they were losers, then knowledge
+seems to be a matter of mere luck, which seems wrong; it also makes it
+seem completely irrational to play the lottery -- why would you buy
+lottery tickets if you know that you're not going to win?
+Another response is to suppose that standards for what counts as justification
+-- criteria of justification -- shift depending on the subject-matter.
+So in some cases we demand a higher probability of being right than in
+others. Or perhaps probability can never suffice for justification: perhaps
+if the only reason for accepting a certain proposition is its probability of
+being true, then we cannot be justified in believing it, even if in point of
+fact it is true. But this seems to fly in the face of the notion of probability
+itself, which we explained as degree of rational expectation; probability
+just is a measure of the degree to which it is reasonable to believe something.
+Yet another tack is to suppose that only what is certain -- 100 per
+cent probable -- can properly be said to be known. The problem with that
+route is that it leads swiftly to philosophical scepticism, the view that
+nothing, or very little, can actually be known. It remains one the defining
+endeavours of philosophy to formulate a consistent theory of knowledge
+that does not result in scepticism.
+CHAPTER SUMMARY
+It is crucial for critical thinkers to recognise that truth is objective
+and not relative. Otherwise the critical thinker's objective of analysing
+and assessing arguments with the aim getting at the truth of
+a matter is deeply undermined. Some sentences that appear to be
+straightforward assertions are in fact implicitly relative expressions
+of subjective preferences and tastes: they are implicitly speakerrelative.
+In such cases there cannot be genuine disagreements about
+the facts of the matter, whereas when a non speaker-relative proposition
+is asserted, a genuine disagreement can occur because a truth
+is at stake. To deny this, to accept the myth that all truth is relative,
+is to accept something of which it seems impossible to make sense.
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+285
+Chapter summary
+In the case of moral beliefs, or beliefs about value, relativism may
+not be readily refutable, but (1) the consequences of denying that
+there is truth in this realm appear to be extremely pernicious and
+(2) relativism does not completely close the door to rational persuasion,
+because we may still demand consistency of the relativist.
+If our stance is not that of not considering it, or refusing to
+consider it, which one of the three remaining stances we choose to
+take towards a given proposition depends upon the evidence available
+to us. We require sufficient evidence for the truth or falsity of
+a proposition in order to justify believing or rejecting it. If such evidence
+is unavailable, we should suspend our judgement. It is perfectly
+possible to be justified in holding a false belief. The evidence available
+to us might make it rational for us to accept a proposition despite
+the fact that it turns out to be false.
+Some forms of justification do not involve arguments or
+reasoning. Perception is the obvious case. Merely having a true
+belief in a proposition is not sufficient to count as knowing the
+proposition, though it is necessary for knowledge of it. Traditionally,
+philosophers have concluded that knowledge requires a true belief
+arrived at via the right route; that is, via good reasoning based
+upon sufficient evidential support. This leads to the formulation of
+an account of knowledge known as the tripartite account according
+to which to know that P is to have a justified true belief that P.
+Knowledge is a stronger requirement than having a rationally
+persuasive argument. One may have a rationally persuasive argument
+for a proposition without thereby knowing it, if the degree of
+rationally persuasiveness of the argument is not sufficiently high.
+EXERCISES
+1 Without looking back at the relevant section of the book, write a paragraph
+explaining the difference between indexical sentences and implicitly
+speaker-relative sentences and then give an example of each.
+2 For each of the following sentences, say whether it is indexical, implicitly
+speaker-relative or neither. If it is implicitly speaker-relative, explain
+also whether it could be implicitly relative to the preferences of the person
+asserting it. Explain your answers. Note that in some cases, there is room
+for reasonable disagreement as to the correct answer. So don't worry if
+you are not sure of how to answer; the important thing is to try to explain
+the answer you do give.
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+286 Exercises
+a The maximum speed limit on UK roads is 70 miles per hour.
+b Yorkshire is nearby.
+c Maria Sharapova did not win the 2004 US Open Tennis Championship.
+d It's raining there.
+e Euthanasia is morally acceptable.
+f The climate in Southern Italy is too warm.
+g Haggis is delicious.
+h Bill Clinton was a great President.
+i I am in pain.
+j Drink-driving should be punished by a prison sentence.
+k The Government should cut the tax on petrol.
+l Bitter tastes better than lager.
+m I like bitter better than lager.
+n Robbie Williams has sold more records than Coldplay.
+o Robbie Williams' music is better than Coldplay's.
+p If you eat more fruit and vegetables you will be healthier.
+q It's going to snow tomorrow.
+r Tchaikovsky wrote the 1812 overture.
+s We all live in a yellow submarine.
+t That hurts!
+u France and Great Britain were Second World War allies.
+v 10 is the square root of 100.
+w All pop/rock music is pathetic cacophony and a waste of any
+intelligent person's time.
+x All triangles have three angles totalling 180 degrees.
+y Blood is thicker than water.
+z This one is better than that one.
+3 Without looking back at the relevant section of the book, write out
+the tripartite account of knowledge. Then, using your own example,
+explain why simply having a true belief that P is insufficient for
+knowledge that P.
+  
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+287
+Exercises
+4 Suppose you are justified in believing a proposition that is in fact
+false. Could there be an argument for that proposition which is rationally
+persuasive for you? Would the situation change if the proposition were
+actually true rather than false? Explain your answer, using examples --
+your own examples -- if you find it useful.
+5 It is sometimes held that testimony -- what people tell you -- is like
+perception, in that one is normally justified in accepting the proposition
+without having an argument for it. The alternative view would be that
+in accepting something on the basis of testimony, one is implicitly doing
+some reasoning, relying on an argument. What would the argument be?
+Truth, knowledge and belief
+288
+  Glossary
+Words written in bold indicate references to relevant further glossary
+entries.
+Ambiguity A sentence is ambiguous in a given context if there is more
+than one possible way to interpret it in that context. A word is ambiguous
+in a given context if there is more than one possible way to interpret
+in that context. See also lexical ambiguity, syntactic ambiguity.
+Compare vagueness.
+Antecedent A conditional statement asserts a relation between two
+propositions, the antecedent and the consequent. When the antecedent
+of a true conditional statement is true, the consequent must also be true.
+Thus the antecedent of 'If John wins then Mary will cry' is 'John wins';
+if one accepts both this conditional and its antecedent as true, then one
+must also accept that Mary will cry.
+Argument An argument is a system of propositions comprising one or
+more premises advanced by the arguer in support of a conclusion.
+Arguments may be evaluated as valid, inductively forceful, or neither,
+but not as true or false.
+Argument commentary An argument commentary is a short essay
+that discusses an argument-reconstruction, covering the following
+points: (i) how and why the argument was reconstructed as it was; (ii)
+the validity or degree of inductive force of the argument; (iii) the truthvalues
+of the premises; (vi) the degree of rational persuasiveness of
+the argument for relevant audiences, where this is not already addressed
+by (iii).
+  
+289
+Argument-reconstruction A presentation of an argument in standard
+form in which premises may be added, made explicit or clarified in
+order to make the argument either valid or inductively forceful.
+Argument trees A graphical representation of the structure of an
+argument. See pp. 67--71.
+Causal generalisation A causal generalisation is a generalisation
+to the effect that things of one kind tend to cause things of another kind.
+Such a generalisation is true if the presence of a thing of the first kind
+raises the probability of things of the second kind, even when other
+possible causes are absent.
+Conclusion An argument's conclusion is the proposition that its premises
+are intended to support. The distinctive aim of giving an argument
+is to persuade an audience rationally that the conclusion is true.
+Conclusion indicators These are words such as 'therefore', 'so' and
+'thus' that are often used to indicate the conclusion of an argument. Such
+words sometimes serve other purposes, however, such as indicating a
+causal relationship.
+Conditional A conditional proposition is single proposition that joins
+two propositions, the antecedent and consequent. Its usual function
+is to assert that if the antecedent is true, then so is the consequent. It is
+most characteristically expressed by means of 'if--then'. Conditionals,
+unlike arguments, may be evaluated as true or false.
+Conditional probability The conditional probability of a proposition
+P, given evidence (set of premises) A, is the probability, if A holds (that
+is, if all the premises in A are true), that P is true. Conditional probabilities
+are to be assessed ignoring any evidence not included in A that
+might be relevant to the truth-value of P.
+Connecting premises These are conditionals or generalisations,
+usually implicitly assumed by an arguer, that are needed in order to infer
+the argument's conclusion. For example, if the argument is 'Mary is a
+doctor, therefore Mary has a university degree', a suitable connecting
+premise is 'All doctors have university degrees'.
+Connotation, primary/secondary The primary connotation of a
+term is the condition that is necessary and sufficient for something's
+being a member of the extension of the term: it is the rule that
+Glossary
+290
+determines whether or not a given thing is or is not correctly designated
+by the term. The secondary connotation of a term is the range of further
+attributes that a thing is commonly assumed to possess if it is thought
+to be correctly designated by the term. The primary connotation of
+'mink coat', for example, is 'coat made from the furs of minks'; its
+secondary connotation might include 'expensive', 'posh', 'old-fashioned',
+'warm' and 'beautiful' or 'immoral', depending on opinion. Unlike a term's
+primary connotation, its secondary connotation can vary from person to
+person.
+Consequent See antecedent and conditional.
+Context The context of an argument is the set of circumstances in
+which an argument is actually advanced by an arguer. Context is significant
+because in order to reconstruct an argument we often have to fill
+in premises that are only implicitly assumed by the arguer. To determine
+what an arguer is likely to have assumed, we usually need to know
+the circumstances in which the argument is advanced. We also need to
+know the context in order to know the meaning of indexical (contextrelative)
+expressions used.
+Counterexample (i) A counterexample to a generalisation is particular
+statement -- a statement that is not a generalisation -- that is the
+negation of an instance of the generalisation. For example, 'Darcy
+Bussell is a great ballerina who is tall' is a counterexample to 'No great
+ballerinas are tall'. (ii) A counterexample to an argument is an argument
+of the same form or pattern as the first argument that is clearly invalid
+or inductively non-forceful. It is used as an illustration to make it clear
+that the first argument is invalid or inductively non-forceful.
+Covering generalisation Often, where a premise of an argument is
+a conditional proposition of the form 'If Mary is a doctor, then Mary has
+a university degree', it is implicitly inferred from a generalisation of
+which it is an instance -- in this case, 'All doctors have university
+degrees'. This relation is made more conspicuous if we express the generalisation
+in the form 'For any given person, if that person is a doctor,
+then that person has a university degree'.
+Credibility The degree to which someone's having said something
+constitutes a reason to think it true. While critical reasoning requires us
+to focus on an argument and not on the person putting it forward, a
+person's character and actions are certainly relevant to their credibility.
+  
+Glossary
+291
+Deductive validity Validity can be defined according to either of the
+following, equivalent formulations: (1) An argument is valid if and only
+if it would be impossible for its premises to be true but its conclusion
+false. (2) An argument is valid if and only if necessarily, if its premises
+are true, then its conclusion is true.
+Defeated argument An inductively forceful argument, whose premises
+a person reasonably believes, is defeated for that person if he or she
+has good reasons to think the conclusion false.
+Expected value The expected value of a given action depends on the
+values and probabilities of the possible outcomes. In particular, if o1, o2,
+. . . and so on are the possible outcomes of an action, V(o) is the value
+of a given outcome, and Pr(o) is the probability of a given outcome, then
+the expected value of the action is:
+V(o1)   Pr(o1) + V(o2)   Pr(o2) + . . .
+The value of each outcome must be assigned a number, but the purpose
+of the numbers is only to indicate the comparative values of the possible
+outcomes. For example, if one outcome is judged to be twice as good as
+a second, we could assign them any two numbers so long as the first is
+assigned a number that is twice that assigned to the second. Expected
+value is the central concept of cost/benefit analysis. The idea is that, given
+a range of possible actions, one should perform the action with the highest
+expected value.
+Explanations We give an argument for something when we seek to
+persuade an audience that that proposition is true. By contrast, when we
+give an explanation of something, we know, or assume, that the audience
+already accepts that the proposition to be explained is true. Our aim is not
+to give reasons for believing that proposition, but to specify, for example,
+the causes of the event that it mentions. Both arguments and explanations
+can be described as answering 'why' questions, but there is a crucial difference:
+whereas the question in the case of explanation is 'why is it so?', or
+'why did it happen?', the question in the case of argument is 'why should
+I believe it?'. Potentially confusing is that in order to establish that an
+explanation is the correct one -- e.g. that it specifies the actual cause of an
+event -- we often have to give reasons why it should be believed, i.e. an
+argument. That is, we sometimes have to argue for an explanation.
+Extended arguments An extended argument for a proposition is
+one containing more than one inference: a conclusion is used as a
+Glossary
+292
+premise for a further argument, the conclusion of which may be used
+as a premise for a further argument, and so on. Conclusions used as
+premises for further inferences in an extended argument are called intermediate
+conclusions.
+Extension The extension of a general term such as 'cat' or 'red car' is
+the set or group of things designated by the term.
+Factual assessment The stage in the assessment of an argument in
+which we determine whether or not the argument's premises are true. If
+the argument is either valid or inductively forceful, then the argument
+is sound if and only if all its premises are true.
+Fallacies The term 'fallacy' encompasses certain commonly encountered
+failures of argumentation; it is partly because they are often effective
+as rhetorical ploys that they are commonly encountered. Formal
+fallacies are simply logical mistakes; that is, arguments that fail to be
+valid or inductively forceful in certain characteristic ways. Substantive
+fallacies are arguments that implicitly assume some quite general premise
+of a kind which, when more closely and explicitly considered, can
+readily be seen to be false. Some other common defects in argumentation
+fit neither classification; but since they involve fooling the audience
+in the context of argument they can be appropriately classified as
+fallacies.
+Generalisations A generalisation is a proposition concerning a class
+of things, either explicitly or implicitly involving a quantifier such as
+'all', 'every', 'no', 'some', 'most', 'twelve', 'at least twelve' and so on. For
+example, whereas 'That dog is black' is not a generalisation, replacing
+'that dog' with 'every dog', 'no dog', 'at least one dog' and so on,
+yields a generalisation. Sometimes the verb must be changed to the plural
+form, and likewise the predicate if it involves a noun rather than an
+adjective.
+Gettier cases Gettier cases are cases in which someone satisfies the
+conditions for knowing a proposition that are set down by the tripartite
+account of knowledge, yet fails to know it. This is usually because the
+person is only accidentally justified in believing a true proposition.
+Good reasons For someone to have good reasons for believing a
+proposition is for that person to possess an argument for that proposition
+that is rationally persuasive for them.
+  
+Glossary
+293
+Hard generalisation A hard generalisation is one that is correctly
+conveyed by using a quantifier such as 'all', 'every', 'each' and 'no'. Unlike
+soft generalisations, such generalisations are true only if there are no
+counterexamples.
+Implicature (conversational implicature) A proposition is said to be
+implicated or conversationally implicated by a statement (asserted
+utterance of a declarative sentence) when the proposition (i) is not explicitly
+stated by the utterance and (ii) is such that a listener who knew
+the relevant facts about the context would reasonably take it to have
+been intended by the speaker. Example: a tailor asks whether you want
+your jacket made in this particular fabric; you say 'That's ugly'. The tailor
+reasonably takes you to be intending to convey that you don't want it
+made in that fabric.
+Implicit A premise is implicit in an argument if it has been assumed
+but not actually stated by the arguer. Conclusions may also be implicit,
+though this is less common. Whether or not, as a matter of psychological
+fact, a given premise has been assumed by an arguer is often beside
+the point. In general, implicit propositions are those not stated by the
+arguer that would be included in a reconstruction produced in accordance
+with the principle of charity.
+Implicit relativity A statement is implicitly relative when the type of
+fact it expresses involves a relation to something that is not explicitly
+mentioned in the statement. For example, 'John is tall' is implicitly relative
+because what it really means is 'John is taller than the average man'
+(if John is a man). The relation to the average man is not explicit in the
+original statement.
+Implicit speaker-relativity An implicitly speaker-relative statement is
+one that is implicitly relative, where the implicit term of the relation
+is the person making the statement. Thus the statement is speakerrelative,
+but only implicitly so. For example, 'Chocolate ice cream tastes
+better than strawberry ice cream' is implicitly speaker-relative because
+what it really means is 'Chocolate ice cream tastes better to me than
+strawberry ice cream does'. (Some might say that the implicit term here
+should not be 'me' but something like 'most people'.)
+Inductive force The inductive force of an argument is the conditional
+probability of its conclusion relative to its premises.
+Glossary
+294
+Inductive inference To draw an inductive inference is to conclude, on
+the basis that a certain proportion of a sample of a population possesses
+a certain feature, that the same proportion of the whole population
+possesses that feature. The inference is inductively forceful to the
+degree that the sample is representative of the population.
+Inductive soundness See soundness.
+Inference An inference is a step in reasoning from one or more
+premises to a conclusion. All arguments contain at least one inference.
+Inferences are evaluated not as true/false, but as valid/invalid and inductively
+forceful/inductively non-forceful.
+Inference bar In an argument-reconstruction, an inference bar is a
+line written between a premise and conclusion, indicating that the
+proposition expressed below the line has been inferred from one or
+more of the propositions above it. It can be read as 'therefore'. Every
+reconstructed argument contains at least one inference bar.
+Instance An instance of a generalisation is a proposition about an individual
+that is directly implied by the generalisation. Normally this will be
+a conditional. For example, 'If Socrates is a philosopher, then he is wise'
+is an instance of 'All philosophers are wise'. The inference from a hard
+generalisation to a corresponding instance is always deductively valid.
+That from a soft generalisation to an instance is inductively forceful.
+Intermediate conclusion In an extended argument, an intermediate
+conclusion is a conclusion inferred from some set of premises
+that is used, in the same argument, as a premise for a further inference.
+Invalid Synonymous with 'not deductively valid'. An argument may
+be invalid yet inductively forceful, or neither valid nor inductively
+forceful.
+Justification One's degree of rational justification for believing a proposition
+is the degree to which one is entitled to think it true. In many cases
+this will depend on whether or not one has good reasons -- arguments that
+are rationally persuasive -- for thinking so. In other cases -- especially
+beliefs acquired by perception -- one may be justified without being able
+to give further reasons. Rational justification can be distinguished from
+pragmatic justification, according to which one is justified in believing
+something if believing it has desirable consequences. Rational justification
+and pragmatic justification do not always coincide.
+  
+Glossary
+295
+Knowledge See tripartite account of knowledge.
+Lexical ambiguity An ambiguous sentence is lexically ambiguous if
+it contains an ambiguous word.
+Logic Logic is the systematic study of arguments, especially deductive
+validity and inductive force.
+Logical assessment Logical assessment is the stage of argument
+assessment at which it is determined whether the argument is valid or
+invalid, and at which the degree of inductive force of invalid arguments
+is determined. Except where inductive inferences are concerned,
+it is sharply to be distinguished from factual assessment.
+Practical reasoning Practical reasoning is the use of arguments whose
+conclusions recommend an action. See expected value.
+Premise A premise in an argument is advanced as a reason for inferring
+the argument's conclusion.
+Premise indicators These are expressions such as 'since, 'because'
+and 'for the reason that', which are often used to indicate a premise
+in an argument. As in the case of conclusion indicators, however,
+such words sometimes serve other purposes, such as indicating a causal
+relationship.
+Principle of charity According to this principle, if our aim is to
+discover the truth about a given issue, then we should reconstruct arguments
+so as to yield the maximum degree of rational persuasiveness for
+the relevant audience (which normally will include ourselves).
+Probability The probability of a proposition is the degree to which it
+is likely to be true, where this degree is expressed as fraction or decimal
+between 0 and 1. There are different ways of explaining this, such as
+proportion and frequency; but in this book the degree to which a proposition
+is likely to be true is taken to be the degree to which it would be
+perfectly rational to expect it to be true. Since this obviously depends on
+the evidence one has, the key concept is that of conditional probability:
+the degree to which it is rational to expect a proposition to be true given
+such-and-such evidence.
+Proposition A proposition is the factual content expressed by a declarative
+sentence on a particular occasion of using (writing or uttering)
+Glossary
+296
+the sentence. In particular, it is what is expressed that admits of being
+true or false. Different sentences can express the same proposition. For
+example, 'Antony kissed Cleopatra' expresses the same proposition as
+'Cleopatra was kissed by Antony'. Different propositions may be expressed
+by means of the same sentence. For example, if Antony and Cleopatra
+each utter the sentence 'I'm hungry', they express different propositions,
+since they talk about different people. A sentence's propositional content
+is independent of its rhetorical or emotive content.
+Quantifiers Quantifiers are expressions such as 'all', 'some', 'every',
+'many', 'twelve', 'not very many' and 'no', used in the explicit statement
+of generalisations. Often, where both hard and soft generalisations are
+concerned, they are left implicit.
+Rational persuasiveness This is the concept we use to characterise
+a person's having 'good reason' for accepting a conclusion. An argument
+is rationally persuasive for a person if, and only if: (i) the person
+accepts its premises, and is justified in doing so; (ii) the argument is
+either deductively valid or inductively forceful and (iii) if it is inductively
+forceful, the argument is not defeated for that person.
+Refutation by counterexample This is a method of criticising an argument.
+One fabricates an argument that embodies the same form or strategy
+as the argument one means to criticise, but which is clearly invalid,
+not inductively forceful, or fallacious. This shows that the strategy or
+form of the argument one means to criticise is defective in the same way.
+Relevance The falsity of a premise can be more or less relevant, where
+the aim is to discover reasons for or against the conclusion in question.
+Sometimes a false premise can simply be removed from an argument
+without destroying its validity or degree of inductive force; the
+resulting argument may thus be sound. Other times the false premise
+can be replaced by another, similar premise that is true, again without
+compromising validity or inductive force. For example, the scope of a
+generalisation may be reduced.
+Representative See samples.
+Rhetoric A verbal or written attempt to persuade someone to believe,
+desire or do something that does not attempt to give good reasons for
+the belief, desire or action, but attempts to motivate that belief, desire
+or action solely through the power of the words used is an instance of
+rhetoric.
+  
+Glossary
+297
+Rhetorical force Not part of the proposition that a sentence expresses,
+but the emotive or otherwise suggestive window-dressing that
+surrounds that proposition and is used to persuade us to believe or
+do something by appeal to our non-critical faculties.
+Rhetorical ploys Commonly encountered instances of rhetorical use of
+language, these include: appeal to novelty, appeal to popularity, appeal to
+compassion, pity or guilt, appeal to cuteness, appeal to sexiness, appeals
+to wealth, status, power, hipness, coolness, etc. appeal to fear (also known
+as scare tactics), the direct attack and hard sell, buzzwords, scare quotes,
+trading on an equivocation and smokescreen (changing the subject).
+Rhetorical question An interrogative sentence that is not really
+intended as a question, but as a statement, usually of a proposition with
+which the speaker or writer assumes the audience will agree.
+Samples An inductive inference is inductively forceful if, and only
+if, the sample cited in the premise of the inference is representative of the
+population cited in the conclusion of the inference. Suppose that n is the
+proportion of the sample known to bear a certain trait. We can reasonably
+conclude that the proportion of the population bearing that trait is n
+only if we have good reason to think that nothing has caused that proportion
+in the sample that does not equally affect the population as a whole.
+Scope To speak of the scope of a generalisation -- for example, one of
+the form 'All X are Y' -- is a way of discussing the size of the class X.
+For example, the scope of 'All dogs are friendly' is wider than that of 'All
+beagles are friendly'. See relevance.
+Sham-reasoning Attempts to persuade which appear to give reasons
+for accepting/rejecting a claim but in fact do not give us any reason for
+doing so are instances of sham-reasoning. Fallacies and rhetorical
+ploys are types of sham-reasoning, the former argumentative shamreasoning,
+the latter non-argumentative.
+Soft generalisation A soft generalisation such as 'Most dogs are
+friendly' is contrasted with a hard generalisation such as 'All dogs are
+friendly'. Unlike hard generalisations, soft generalisations cannot be
+refuted by a single counterexample. Soft generalisations are frequently
+expressed without an explicit quantifier, as in 'Siamese cats meow a lot'.
+Soundness An argument is sound if, but only if, its premises are all
+true, and it is either deductively valid or inductively forceful.
+Glossary
+298
+Speaker-relativity A kind of statement is speaker-relative if it expresses
+a different proposition depending on who makes the statement. For
+example, if John says 'I am left-handed' he says that he is left handed,
+whereas if Mary says 'I am left-handed' she says that she is lefthanded.
+The two propositions, then, could have different truth-values.
+Stances (towards a proposition) There are four possible stances that
+can be taken towards a proposition with which one is presented: believing
+it, not believing it, suspending judgement, not engaging with it.
+Believing and not believing a proposition admit of degrees dependent
+upon the evidence available to provide justification for belief in that
+proposition.
+Standard form This is a style of displaying an argument's premises,
+conclusion and inferences, in which each proposition is enumerated,
+and each inference indicated by an inference bar. For example:
+P1) If Mrs McFee were murdered, there would be signs of a
+struggle.
+P2) There are no signs of a struggle.
+C1) Mrs McFee was not murdered.
+P3) If Mrs McFee was not murdered, then Inspector Radcliffe
+ought to leave the premises.
+C2) Inspector Radcliffe ought to leave the premises.
+Syntactic ambiguity An ambiguous sentence is syntactically ambiguous
+when the arrangement of its words is such that the sentence
+could be understood in more than one way (as expressing more than one
+proposition.) See also lexical ambiguity.
+Tripartite account of knowledge According to this account of knowledge,
+someone counts as knowing a proposition if and only if (i) they
+believe it, (ii) it is true and (iii) they are justified in believing it. See also
+Gettier cases.
+Truth To say, of a proposition, that it is true, is to say that things
+are as the proposition says it is. For example, to say that it is true that
+snow is white is to say that snow is as that proposition says it is, namely
+white. Another way to put the point: to say that it is true that snow is
+white is equivalent to saying that snow is white. Unless a statement
+  
+Glossary
+299
+is speaker-relative, the proposition that it expresses cannot be true for
+one person but false for another.
+Truth-value Sometimes it is convenient to speak of the truth-value of
+a proposition (see, for example, speaker-relativity): the truth-value of
+a true proposition such as 'snow is white' is truth, and that of a false
+proposition such as 'snow is green' is falsity.
+Vagueness An expression is vague if (i) its extension is indefinitely
+bounded, e.g. 'bald', 'tall' or (ii) in a given context it is unclear what is
+meant by it. In the first case the meaning of the term may be clear, but
+the extension is 'fuzzy' because there is no clear point at which things
+arranged on a single dimension (e.g. degree of baldness) cease to have the
+quality denoted by the term. In the second case particular uses of a term
+such as 'political' are vague: it may not be clear exactly what is meant
+by calling something political in a given context. Because of this, a word
+such as 'political' may be vague in both senses: because its meaning is
+vague, so is its extension.
+Validity See deductive validity.
+Glossary
+300
+  Answers and hints to
+selected exercises
+Chapter 1
+1 (a) Argument. (b) N/A it's a conditional. (c) Argument. (d) Argument.
+(e) N/A it's an explanation. (f) Argument. (g) Argument. (h) N/A
+it's an unsupported claim. (i) Argument. (j) N/A it's a statement about
+something that happened. (k) N/A it's a conditional. (l) Argument (hint:
+if you insert a conclusion indicator such as 'therefore', you see more
+clearly that this is an argument of a similar structure to that in (d). (m)
+Argument. (n) N/A it's a statement. (o) Argument. (p) N/A it's a conditional
+(hint: don't be misled by the long consequent.) (q) Argument. (r)
+Argument (hint: the conclusion appears before the premise). (s) Argument
+(hint: compare with (b), (k) and (p). (t) N/A only the conclusion is given
+(hint: move 'therefore' to the front of the proposition and you can see
+this more easily).
+4 (a) 'Bank' could mean a financial institution or the area beside a river
+or lake. (b) 'End of life' could mean the final part of one's life or the
+goal/function of life. (c) 'Organ donor' could mean someone who donated
+a body part or someone who donated a musical instrument (hint: the term
+is ambiguous here because of the context -- the Archbishop of Canterbury
+praises the donor). (d) 'Mummy' could mean either someone's mother
+(probably the victim's) or an ancient Egyptian exhibit (hint: the context
+makes the term ambiguous -- the attack takes place in a museum). The
+phrase 'by mummy' could also be ambiguous: the sentence could mean
+either that someone's mother or a museum exhibit was responsible for
+the attack, or that the attack took place in the vicinity of either someone's
+mother or a museum exhibit. (e) 'by statue' could mean that the statue
+found the car or that the car was found beside the statue. (f ) 'British left
+waffles' could mean that British left-wing politicians talk meaninglessly
+  
+301
+Answers and hints
+about Ireland or it could mean that the British (military, maybe) left
+some square pancake-like pastries in Ireland. (g) 'Arms' could mean
+weapons or limbs. 'Head' could also be ambiguous here, meaning either
+a head of state or a body part, so there are four possible interpretations
+of the sentence, though not all of them are equally plausible. (h)
+'Depression' could mean a drop in the atmospheric pressure or a psychological
+condition. (i) 'The right' could mean that Blair is physically leaning
+further over to the right hand side or that he is shifting his political position
+rightwards. (j) 'More lies ahead' could mean that the Chancellor is
+facing further challenges or that the public can expect to be told more
+untruths.
+5 (a) Before the officers' arrival the two suspects fled the area in a red
+Ford Escort that was driven by a woman in black. (b) Yesterday I was
+invited to go to the movies. (c) When Mary left her friends she was
+feeling depressed or When Mary left, her friends were feeling depressed.
+(d) Often people who neglect their diet die early or People who often
+neglect their diet tend to die early. (e) Smith had five pairs of boots as
+well as a pair of slippers. He lent the slippers to Jones or Smith had five
+pairs of boots and a pair of slippers and he lent them all to Jones. (f )
+Wanted: a bay mare with white socks, suitable for a novice. (g) When
+Jones left the company, it was in a better state or when Jones left the
+company, he was in a better state. (h) Glasgow's first commercial sperm
+bank opened last Friday with twenty men's semen samples frozen in a
+stainless steel tank. (i) A week ago, they were exposed to someone who
+was infected with the virus or They were exposed to someone who had
+been exposed to the virus a week ago. (j) The police would like to speak
+to two women and a van driver who all fled the scene of the accident or
+the police would like to speak to two women and also to a van driver who
+fled the scene of the accident.
+7 (a) No one. Hard. (b) Few. Soft. (c) Most. Soft. (d) A majority of.
+Soft. (e) All. Hard. (f) Generally. Soft. (g) Almost all. Soft. (h) Hardly
+any. Soft. (i) Every. Hard. (j) Almost none. Soft.
+8 Only (d) is uncontroversially true as a hard generalisation and you
+need to use 'No owls'. (a), (b), (c), (e), ( f ), (g), (i) and (j) should all be
+soft. (h) may turn out to be true as a hard generalisaion, but it is unlikely
+that readers (and their lecturers) have sufficient information about UK
+universities' mathematics departments at their fingertips to determine this.
+Also, there may be some disagreement about what constitutes a 'department',
+hence a hard generalisation is unlikely to be uncontroversially true.
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+302 Answers and hints
+Chapter 2
+4 Hint: according to the definition of soundness, an unsound argument
+may have a true conclusion.
+5 Hint: review the remarks on pp. 49--50 on the concept of truth.
+6 (a) Valid. (b) Valid (hint: see what follows from P2 and P3; then see
+what follows from that proposition together with P1). (c) Valid. (d)
+Invalid. Even if no member of the Green Party voted for the tax cut, it
+could be that people outside the Green Party voted against it as well (or
+failed to vote for it). So Mr Jacobs could be one of those outside the Green
+Party who didn't vote for it. (e) Valid. (f) If every member of the
+Conservative Party voted for the tax cut, it could be that others outside
+that party voted for it as well. (g) P2 says that some of those who voted
+for the tax cut voted to increase defence spending, but it doesn't say that
+all who voted for the tax cut voted to increase defence spending. So it
+could be that some voted for the tax cut without voting for increased
+defence spending; if so, then that group could contain all the Liberal Party
+members who voted for the tax cut. (h) Invalid: to make the argument
+valid, we would have to add the premise 'Infanticide is not morally
+permissible'. That premise might be obviously true, but until it is actually
+added to the argument, the argument remains invalid. (i) Valid. ( j)
+Invalid (!): what follows from the premises is that the antecedent of the
+conditional P1 is false -- namely, that it is not the case that each person
+has the right to determine what happens to his or her own body. This
+means: not every person has that right. This leaves it open that some
+people might have that right, even if not everyone does. The conclusion,
+however, says that no people have that right. So the premises could be
+true and the conclusion false. As a further exercise, you might try to
+construct an argument similar to (j) but which is valid. (k) Invalid: P1
+allows that a regime might be both corrupt and inefficient. (l) Invalid: P1
+doesn't tell us that only one of those two things could have happened.
+Compare: if the car has no petrol (gasoline), then it will not start. If the
+car does have petrol, it doesn't follow that it will start -- it might have a
+dead battery, a faulty starter, etc. (m) Valid. (n) Invalid: P1 tells you that
+if a political system is just, then it is a democracy. It doesn't tell you
+anything about unjust political systems; it could be that although all just
+systems are democracies, not all democracies are just. (o) Invalid: the word
+'only' can be tricky. Actually P1 here says exactly the same thing as P1
+in the previous argument. Compare: 'Only boys are members of the club'
+and 'The only members of the club are boys' -- these say exactly the
+same thing, namely that every member of the club is a boy. (p) Valid. (q)
+  
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+303
+Answers and hints
+Invalid: Mr Cleever may have been drunk at the time of the accident,
+even though his drunkenness did not cause the accident. (r) Invalid: in
+order to infer the conclusion from the conditional P1, we need to know
+that Constantius' Christianity was genuine, but P2 only tells us that we
+do not know that it was not genuine; it doesn't tell us that it was. So
+perhaps Constantius' faith was a fraud, but no evidence of that fraudulence
+has survived. (s) Valid. (t) Invalid. If no Roman Emperors were wise,
+then it could be that Marcus Aurelius was not wise, and P1--P3 are all
+true. (u) Valid. (To see this, see what happens if we try to suppose the
+conclusion false but the premises true. Thus suppose C is false, i.e. that
+Augustus was wise. Then according to P3 Marcus Aurelius was not wise.
+Then according to P1, no Roman emperor is wise. But then Augustus, a
+Roman emperor according to P2, is wise! So it is impossible for the
+premises to be true but the conclusion false.) (v) Valid. (w) Invalid: P1
+says that Mary will be disappointed if both John and Susan are late; so
+perhaps she won't be disappointed if only John is late. (x) Invalid: perhaps
+P1--P3 are all true, but Mary is disappointed for some other reason;
+perhaps John's being late was enough to disappoint her (P1 doesn't say
+Mary will be disappointed only if both John and Mary are late). (y)
+Invalid: this is disputable, but it seems that P1 tells us that Mary will be
+disappointed if John and Susan are married to each other. Perhaps John
+and Susan are both married but not to each other, in which case the
+premises could all be true but the conclusion false. (z) Valid.
+7 (a) False. (b) True. (c) False. (d) True. (e) False. ( f) True. (g) False.
+(h) False. (i) False. ( j) False. (k) True. (l ) False. (m) False. (n) False. (o)
+True. (p) False. (q) True.
+9 Note that each of these admit of more than one correct answer; for
+example, 'If Hadrian was not great then Trajan was great' is equivalent
+to the answer given to (a), and would be equally correct. (a) If Trajan
+was not great then Hadrian was great. (b) If they are not mistreated, then
+dogs are loyal to their masters. (c) If there were any benevolent emperors,
+then Marcus Aurelius was a benevolent emperor. (d) If you do not study,
+then you will not pass. (e) If your dog does not get the ball, then my
+dog will get the ball. ( f) If you are not wearing a tie, then you will not
+be admitted. (g) If you are not wearing a tie, then you will not be
+admitted. (h) If my dog barks then your dog barks (or: if your dog does
+not bark, then my dog does not bark). (i) If you drink every night, then
+you will not pass. (j) If you do not study, then you will not pass. (k) If
+you do not study, then you will not pass. (l) If the champion does not
+fight aggressively then he will not win. (m) If the ball does not go in the
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+304 Answers and hints
+water, then either your dog will get the ball or mine will. (n) If Maximin
+was admired in Rome, then Galerius was not admired in Rome.
+Chapter 3
+1 (a) (A) P1) Most sex crimes are committed by victims of child abuse.
+P2) The defendant committed a sex crime.
+C) (Probably) The defendant was a victim of child
+abuse.
+(B) Inductively forceful.
+(d) (A) P1) Most old people have poor eyesight.
+P2) No one with poor eyesight should be allowed to drive.
+C) (Probably) Most old people should not be allowed
+to drive.
+(B) Inductively forceful.
+2 (A) Both are inductively forceful. (B) They could both be sound. If
+Mr X is a non-homosexual AIDS patient living in Orange County, then
+still the premises of both arguments could be true. (C) The four premises
+together do not give us a reason to conclude that Mr X is a homosexual,
+and do not gives us a reason to conclude that he is not.
+3 (a) Incompatible. (b) Compatible. (c) Compatible. (d) Compatible
+(according to our convention, 'some' means 'at least one'). (e) Compatible.
+( f ) Incompatible. (g) Compatible. (h) Incompatible. (i) Compatible. (j)
+Compatible. (k) Compatible. (l) Compatible. (m) Compatible.
+4 Reconstruct it as a single argument; its tree would have three
+premises pointing separately to the conclusion 'Probably, Lewis is not
+going to win another gold medal in the 100 metres'.
+5 (d ) (A) P1) If this meat was grown in Scotland, then it is extremely
+unlikely that it is infected with BSE.
+P2) If this meat is infected, then it is very unlikely that
+eating it will make you ill.
+C) If this meat was grown is Scotland, then eating
+this meat will not make you ill.
+  
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+305
+Answers and hints
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+306
+(B) Invalid. (C) But the argument can be made valid as follows:
+P1) If this meat was grown in Scotland, then it is extremely
+unlikely that it is infected with BSE.
+P2) If this meat is infected, then it is very unlikely that eating
+it will make you ill.
+C) If this meat was grown is Scotland, then, probably,
+eating this meat will not make you ill.
+(D) This assumes that the expressions 'extremely unlikely' and
+'very unlikely' in the premises are strong enough to justify
+the word 'probably' in the consequent of the conclusion.
+(e) (A) P1) Brazil is more likely to win the World Cup than
+Argentina.
+C) Brazil will win the World Cup.
+(B) Invalid, and not inductively forceful. (D) The arguer is probably
+thinking that Brazil is the team most likely to win the
+World Cup, but that could be true even if the probability
+of Brazil winning is less than one-half.
+(g) (A) P1) Probably, English football fans will make trouble at the
+World Cup.
+P2) If English football fans make trouble at the World Cup,
+then England may be expelled from the Euro tournament.
+C) England will be expelled from the Euro
+tournament.
+(B) Invalid, and not inductively forceful. (C) However, it could
+be made valid as follows:
+P1) English football fans will make trouble at the World Cup.
+P2) If English football fans make trouble at the World Cup,
+then England may be expelled from the Euro tournament.
+C) England may be expelled from the Euro
+tournament.
+Alternatively, it could be made inductively forceful:
+P1) Probably, English football fans will make trouble at the
+World Cup.
+Answers and hints
+P2) If English football fans make trouble at the World Cup,
+then England will be expelled from the Euro tournament.
+C) (Probably) England will be expelled from the Euro
+tournament.
+(h) (A) P1) If the murderer passed through here, then, probably,
+there would be hairs from the victim on the rug.
+P2) But there are no hairs from the victim on the rug.
+C) (Probably) The murderer did not pass through
+here.
+(B) Not valid, but it is inductively forceful.
+(l ) Hint: note that 'many' of a given population can be thus-and-so,
+when most are not. For example, many people have gym memberships,
+but most do not.
+6 (a) and (b) seem to be inductively forceful; (a) is very forceful because
+the sample looks to be representative; (b) seems to be less so, since it is
+possible that communist systems might succeed in other historical circumstances.
+Reconstructions should be obvious.
+(c) (A) This is a bit more tricky to reconstruct. One way is as follows:
+P1) The average IQ from among 17 conductors of major
+orchestras is 17 points higher than that of UK doctors,
+and 18 points higher than that of UK lawyers.
+C) (Probably) The average IQ of musicians is higher
+than that of either doctors or lawyers.
+(B) This argument is not inductively forceful because the sample
+is not representative. The relevant population mentioned in
+the conclusion is musicians, but the sample cited in the
+premise is only that of conductors of major orchestras. These
+are likely to be among the most intelligent musicians, so it
+is no wonder that they should be found to have high IQs.
+(d) (A) P1) Most of the teenagers who have come to me (a
+counsellor for teenagers) and confessed to taking illicit
+drugs have serious family problems.
+C) (Probably) Most teenagers who take illicit drugs
+have serious family problems.
+  
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+307
+Answers and hints
+(B) Not inductively forceful because the sample is not representative.
+It might be that most teenagers who take illicit
+drugs do not have serious family problems, and do not do
+seek the services of a counsellor. The counsellor sees only
+those teenagers who are sufficiently troubled to seek a
+counsellor.
+(e) (A) P1) No English club has won the treble twice.
+P2) Manchester United is an English club.
+C) (Probably) Manchester United is not going to win
+the treble again.
+(B) The argument is not inductively forceful. For all that the
+premises tell us, perhaps only one English club (United) has
+won the treble (FA Cup, League/Premiership, Champions
+League/European Cup). (In fact, that is true; only United has
+done it -- but you don't need to know this in order to see the
+weakness of the argument.) Thus, even if no English clubs
+have won it twice, it could be that given that a club has won
+the treble once, it is likely to win it again. That is, P1 could
+be true even though the conditional probability of an English
+club's winning the treble given that it has won it before is
+quite high. Note also: it is tempting to think we should add
+'Manchester United won the treble once' as a premise, but
+that statement does not support the conclusion, so it is not
+part of the argument.
+( f ) (A) P1) People who take vitamins regularly live longer than
+average.
+P2) Jenna takes vitamins regularly.
+C) (Probably) Jenna will live longer than average.
+(B) This is inductively forceful. If you think it isn't, it is probably
+because you are reasoning as follows: 'We cannot conclude
+from P1 that taking vitamins regularly causes people
+to live longer than average, because it might be that already
+healthy people are more likely to take vitamins (perhaps
+well-off people tend to take vitamins more, and are healthier
+because they are well-off, not because they take the
+vitamins); therefore we can't conclude that because Jenna
+takes vitamins regularly she's likely to live longer.' It is true
+that P1 doesn't tell us anything about a causal relationship.
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+308 Answers and hints
+But C doesn't tell us about a causal relationship either!
+Compare: 'Most people with sore throats get a runny nose.
+Jenna has a sore throat, therefore, probably, she'll get a
+runny nose.' The sore throat doesn't cause the runny nose,
+but still the argument is inductively forceful.
+Chapter 4
+1 (a) Scare quotes. (b) Appeal to novelty (c) Buzzwords ('knowledge
+management', 'competitive advantage', 'learning culture', 'shared vision',
+'common purpose'.) (d) Appeal to popularity. (e) Smokescreen (hint:
+avoids the question of our moral duty). (f) equivocation (over the vagueness
+of 'most successful'.) (g) Appeal to fear. (h) Buzzword ('censorship'.)
+(i) Appeal to novelty or appeal to vanity. 'Hair management technology'
+is a buzzword (phrase). (j) Smokescreen (hint: avoids the question of the
+alleged threat to democracy).
+3 (a) Slippery slope. (b) Post hoc ergo propter hoc. (c) Fallacy of majority
+belief. (d) Affirming the consequent. (e) False dilemma. (f) Conflation
+of morality with legality. (g) Mistaking correlation for cause. (h) Ad
+hominem. (i) Tu quoque (hint: it is implied that the well-fed middle classes
+do not follow their own prescription). (j) Perfectionist fallacy.
+4 General hint: remember that the crucial move when reconstructing
+substantial fallacies is that of adding the premise (which is usually hidden
+and operates in all instances of the fallacy) that exposes the fallacy.
+(a) Ad hominiem circumstantial:
+P1) Lecturers are always extolling the virtues of critical
+thinking.
+P2) Lecturers only have jobs if they have students to
+teach.
+P3) Whenever someone would benefit from something we
+should reject their arguments in favour of that thing.
+C) We should reject lecturers' arguments in favour of
+critical thinking.
+(b) Conflation of morality with legality:
+P1) It's not illegal for me to exaggerate my skills on my CV.
+P2) Anything which is not illegal is not immoral.
+C) It's morally acceptable for me to exaggerate my
+skills on my CV.
+  
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+309
+Answers and hints
+(c) Tu quoque:
+P1) The opposition criticises the Government for spending
+money on the arts.
+P2) When the opposition was in government it increased the
+arts budget by 200%.
+P3) Whenever someone's actions are inconsistent with their
+claims, we should not take those claims seriously.
+C) We should not take the opposition's criticism
+seriously.
+(d) Inversion of cause and effect:
+P1) Smoking causes lung cancer.
+P2) Whenever one thing X causes another Y, an absence of
+X will cause an absence of Y.
+C) People who do not smoke will not suffer lung
+cancer.
+(e) Epistemic fallacy:
+P1) Jo believes that the Chancellor is doing a poor job. (P)
+P2) Gordon Brown is the Chancellor. (Q)
+P3) If someone believes that P, they also believe that Q.
+C) Jo believes that Gordon Brown is doing a poor
+job.
+Chapter 5
+1 Except in the case of (k), we provide only the missing premises. (a)
+'You should not marry an idiot', where this is understood as a hard generalisation;
+or perhaps 'If someone is an idiot, then you should not marry
+him'. (b) Same. (c) 'Everyone who likes the Jeeves books likes the Blandings
+Castle books.' (d) 'If Pavarotti sits in that chair, then it will break.' Or
+possibly add two premises (though this is not specified as an option in the
+instructions: 'If a very heavy person sits on that chair, then it will break,'
+and 'Pavarotti is a very heavy person'. (e) Possibly a hard generalisation:
+'Prices rise only when the savings rate decreases,' or 'When the savings
+rate does not decrease, prices do not rise'; or a soft one, i.e. 'Usually, when
+the savings rate does not decrease, prices do not rise'. ( f ) 'If Schumacher's
+mechanic is not inept, then Schumacher's car will not break down.' It may
+help in this case to translate all the uses of 'unless' into sentences using
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+310 Answers and hints
+'not' and either 'if' or 'only if'. The first sentence would be 'Hakkinen will
+win only if Schumacher's car breaks down', or 'If Schumacher's car does
+not break down, then Hakkinen won't win'. (g) 'Rossini was greater than
+Puccini.' (h) 'No socialist country is a democracy.' (i) 'If we withdraw the
+offer, then we carry on with a second-rate manager.' ( j) 'If there isn't any
+wine, then we'll drink beer.' (k) The conclusion -- 'Cigarette advertisements
+encourage people to smoke more' -- is not quite explicit. One likely implicit
+premise is simply the conditional: 'If ads for chocolates encourage people
+to eat chocolates, then cigarette advertisements encourage people to
+smoke.' One might think the implicit premise is something like the
+covering generalisation: 'All ads for a given brand of consumable product
+encourage people to consume that product.' This generalisation would be
+too broad in scope, however; it doesn't seem true that ads for toothpaste
+or toilet paper encourage people to use more toothpaste or toilet paper.
+Yet the suggested conditional is surely motivated by a generalisation (why
+should there be a connection between chocolates and cigarettes?). A good
+exercise would be to find a plausible generalisation (or appropriate scope)
+that would serve the purpose of the argument.
+2 There are many ways in which these sentences might be reformulated;
+we offer one suggestion for each. (a) The democratic candidate adopts whatever
+position is most popular. (b) The invasion of Iraq was a huge (large,
+massive, etc.) miscalculation. (c) If they impose trade tariffs then trading
+agreements will not be fair. (d) Since beginning to write novels aimed at
+a young female adult audience, she has earned a great deal of money. (e)
+However long they attempt to persuade us of their position, we will not be
+persuaded. (f ) Although it is widely believed that shares in Ramsay represent
+good value, they do not. (g) We will continue our attempts to ban the
+advertisement on children's television of innutritious convenience foods
+until such advertisements have been completely eliminated. (h) Mis-takes
+by doctors contributed to the deaths of 40,000 patients last year. (One
+might use 'caused' instead of 'contributed to', but one would have to know
+more of the relevant facts in order to determine which is appropriate.)
+3 (a) If you do not release prisoners then there will be no cease-fire.
+(b) If we do not increase our appeal to women then we will not win the
+election. (c) All universities allow the most offensive forms of speech
+(conceivably, this means only that some universities allow such speech).
+(d) Every leaf-blower is louder than every rake. (e) If embryo research is
+allowed then human cloning will be allowed. (f ) Everyone who laughs
+last laughs longest. Alternatively: for every group of people, the one who
+laughs after everyone else in the group has laughed laughs longer than
+anyone else in the group.
+  
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+311
+Answers and hints
+4 As is often the case, each of these might be answered in either of
+several ways. (a) No one under the age of 18 can legally purchase alcohol
+in the UK. (b) All scorpions are poisonous. (c) Most non-French wines are
+not overpriced or Few non-French wines are overpriced. (d) Most oil paintings
+from before 1500 are either Dutch or Flemish or Except for Dutch
+and Flemish paintings, few paintings from before 1500 were painted in
+oil. (e) Most successful lawyers are good at analysing arguments. (f ) The
+blood pressure of any haemorrhaging patient will decrease.
+7 P1) Everyone who supports across-the-board pay rises for female academics
+supports a reduction in the evidential standard for rape
+convictions.
+P2) Mrs Jones supports across-the-board pay rises for female
+academics.
+C) Mrs. Jones will support a reduction in the evidential standard
+for rape convictions.
+9 (a) P1) Most healthy, young parrots can be trained to talk.
+P2) Your new parrot is healthy and young.
+C) (Probably) Your new parrot can be trained to talk.
+(b) P1) Most men marry.
+P2) Every married woman has, at the time of her wedding, a
+mother.
+C) Most men have, have had, or will have a mother-in-law.
+(c) Since human beings are primates, the scope of the generalisation
+must be reduced. The argument might be represented in different
+ways, but however it is done, some implicit premises will need
+to be made explicit.
+P1) All chimpanzees are primates.
+P2) No chimpanzee is human.
+P3) Bobo is a chimpanzee.
+C1) Bobo is a non-human primate.
+P4) No primates except humans can learn to talk.
+C2) Bobo cannot learn to talk.
+(d) Not all countries can be attacked by sea -- Paraguay, Laos and
+Switzerland, for example, are land-locked (assuming that 'attacked
+by sea' means 'attacked using ships or boats', and does not include
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+312 Answers and hints
+attacks by aeroplanes from aircraft carriers and the like). But most
+countries have a seacoast.
+P1) Most countries can be attacked by sea.
+P2) Any country that can be attacked by sea requires a naval
+defence.
+C) Most countries require a naval defence.
+P2 might well be disputed. Does, say, Equatorial Guinea require
+a naval defence?
+12 The conclusion is that same-sex marriage should not be legal. Note
+that the following reconstruction would be inadequate:
+P1) No deviant sexual relationship should be legally protected.
+P2) The legalisation of same-sex marriage would legally protect
+homosexual relationships.
+P3) Homosexual relationships are deviant sexual relationships.
+C) Same-sex marriage should not be legalised.
+First, this reconstruction leaves out of account the slippery slope appealed
+to in the last sentence. The point seems to be that the only reason that
+only heterosexual relationships (between mature persons not genetically
+closer than cousins) are entitled to legal protection is that others
+are deviant. Therefore, if homosexual relationships are entitled to legal
+protection, then since they are deviant, all deviant sexual relationships
+are entitled to it. Second, this reconstruction uses the word 'deviant'. But
+there are at least three possible meanings here, one of which is rhetorically
+charged: the word can mean simply 'deviating from the norm', which
+might mean 'not biologically typical', or 'not socially typical'. But it also
+carries an opprobrious connotation of sickness or unhealthy abnormality,
+as when we speak of 'social deviants'. The factual basis of the argument
+can be clarified by eliminating the term.
+15 There are just two relevant outcomes here: you draw an ace, or you
+do not draw an ace. A pack of playing cards contains 52 cards, of which
+four are aces. So the probability of drawing an ace is 4/52 = 1/13, and
+the probability of not drawing one is 12/13. So:
+EV = (1/13   10) + (12/13   1)
+= (0.77   10) + (0.92   1)
+= 0.77 + (0.92)
+= 0.15.
+The expected value is negative, so you shouldn't accept the wager.
+  
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+313
+Answers and hints
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+314
+17 The first two sentences are true, but only the second is relevant as
+a premise. Hints: the first conclusion is ambiguous. Interpreted one way,
+there is a sound argument for it using the second sentence as a premise,
+but it does not support the second conclusion. Interpreted the other way,
+it supports the second conclusion but is not supported by the second
+sentence.
+19 (b) The conclusion might be 'The stress of modern life is caused
+by the amount of shopping we do, combined with our not going to
+church', or something like 'Our lives are more stressful than our
+parents' lives were because we shop more and attend church less than
+they did'. Taking the latter as the conclusion, a simple reconstruction
+might be:
+P1) Our lives are more stressful than our parents' lives were either
+because we shop more and attend church less than they did,
+or because we work more than they did.
+P2) We do not work more than they did.
+C) Our lives are more stressful than our parents' lives were
+either because we shop more than they did, and they went
+to church whereas we do not.
+Note, however, that the argument hints at an argument for P1 itself.
+Since shopping is said to be a highly stressful activity, the arguer might
+also be assuming that attending church reduces stress.
+Chapter 6
+1 (a) No. (b) No. (c) Yes. (d) Yes. (e) Yes. (f ) No. (g) Yes. (h) No. (i)
+The argument is defeated for James because he has much stronger evidence
+that the conclusion is false (in fact, he knows that the conclusion is
+false).
+2 (a) Yes. (b) No. (c)--( f ) The argument is rationally persuasive for
+Catherine if we assume she was justified in accepting what David told
+her. It seems that she was. Jane's case is less clear, but it seems the argument
+is not rationally persuasive for her because her reason for accepting
+P2 is not good. The argument is defeated for Mary, hence not rationally
+persuasive for her. Though she does not accept the conclusion, it seems
+the argument is rationally persuasive for Anna: her reason for rejecting
+the conclusion is poor.
+Answers and hints
+3 (i) Hint: Remember that false beliefs can be reasonable, i.e. wellsupported
+and justified. The word 'wrong' is possibly ambiguous in this
+context; does it mean 'false' or 'unjustified'?
+4 (h) P1) Every educated Roman knew Homer.
+P2) Everyone who knows Homer knows the story of
+Achilles.
+C) Every Roman knew the story of Achilles.
+Suppose X is any Roman. According to P1, X knew Homer. Then according
+to P2, he knew the story of Achilles. So whatever Roman X
+is, X knew the story of Achilles. So, every Roman knew the story of
+Achilles.
+7 (a) P1) If P then Q.
+P2) If Q then R.
+C) If P then R.
+(d) P1) If a is not an S, then a is a D.
+P2) All Ds are T, and a is not T.
+P3) If a is an S, then either a is R or a is A.
+P4) Every W is either not-A or Y.
+P5) Everything that is S and Y is T.
+C) If a is W, then a is R and S.
+We can try checking for validity just using the logical form. We suppose
+a is W, and see whether the premises tell us that a must be R and S. We
+know from P2 that a is not T. Therefore from P2 a cannot be a D (if it
+were, then it would be T, which it is not). Then P1 tells us that a is an
+S. So we know that a is an S. It remains to show that a is R. P4 tells us
+that a is either not-A or Y. Let us see what follows on each alternative:
+first that a is Y, then that a is not-A.
+So suppose a is Y. Since we know that a is an S, P5 tells us that a is
+a T. But we know from P2 that a is not a T. So a can't be Y.
+So suppose a is not-A. Then P3 tells us that if a is S, a is R. According
+to P1, if a is not S, then a is D. So a is either D or R. But we know that
+a is not a D. So a is R.
+So if a is W, then a is both S and R, and the argument-form is
+valid.
+  
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+315
+Answers and hints
+Chapter 7
+2 (b), (d), (i), (m), (q), (s), (t) and (z) are indexical. (t) could also be
+implicitly speaker-relative if it means 'that hurts me', as could (z) if it
+means something like 'I think this one is better than that one', in which
+case it could also be implicitly relative to the preferences of the speaker
+(but need not be).
+(g), (h), (l ), (o) and (w) are implicitly speaker-relative and also
+implicitly relative to the preferences of the speaker with respect to food,
+presidents, beer and music, respectively.
+( f ) depends on context. It could be both implicitly speaker-relative and
+relative to the preferences (in respect of climate) of the speaker if she is
+explaining, for example, why she doesn't want to go to Southern Italy for
+a holiday. On the other hand, the speaker might be talking about, say, the
+suitability of the climate for growing a certain crop -- Riesling grapes, for
+instance -- in which case the sentence would be neither implicitly speakerrelative
+nor relative to the preferences of the speaker. Note that it would
+be implicitly speaker-relative in the sense dealt with in Chapter 1.
+(e), ( j) and (k) make prescriptive claims ((e) and (j) are specifically
+moral claims, (k) arguably so). These are tricky. If we take the philosophical
+view that moral values are relative to the preferences of an
+individual or to a group of individuals or a culture (the position called
+moral relativism, discussed in this chapter), then we should say that these
+sentences are both implicitly speaker-relative and implicitly relative to the
+preferences of the speaker(s) asserting them. If, on the other hand, we
+take the philosophical view that moral values are independent of individual
+or collective preferences (the position called moral objectivism),
+then we should say that the sentences are neither implicitly speakerrelative
+nor relative to the preferences of the speaker(s).
+4 A sample answer:
+Yes, if I were justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false, there
+could still be an argument for that proposition that is rationally persuasive
+for me. This is because rational persuasiveness only requires (a) that
+an argument be valid or inductively forceful, (b) that I have good reason
+to accept the premises and, if the argument is inductively forceful, (c)
+that the conclusion is not defeated for me. So providing these criteria are
+met, the fact that the conclusion is false does not undermine the argument's
+rational persuasiveness for me. The situation would not change if
+the proposition were actually true. Apart from (c), which is not relevant
+to this case, the criteria for rational persuasiveness do not make reference
+to the actual truth values of an argument's conclusion.
+Answers and hints to selected exercises
+316 Answers and hints
+Example
+P1) Jeremy is a nine-year-old boy.
+P2) Most nine-year-old boys like to play football.
+C) (Probably) Jeremy likes to play football.
+I have good reason to believe that Jeremy likes to play football because
+I frequently see him playing football, he has football posters in his
+bedroom, reads football comics, and so on. In fact, the proposition is false.
+He doesn't really like to play, he just goes along with it to please his
+father, a very keen football fan. The argument is inductively forceful
+and I have good reasons to accept P1 and P2 -- I know Jeremy and I have
+more than a passing acquaintance with the likes and dislikes of nine-yearold
+boys -- so criteria (a) and (b) are met. I have no evidence that should
+lead me to reject C); that is, I don't know that Jeremy's apparent football
+fervour is really a front to please his dad, so the argument is not
+defeated for me. Thus it is rationally persuasive for me. If it turned out
+to be true that Jeremy likes to play football, the argument would still be
+rationally persuasive for me.
\ No newline at end of file
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+++ b/data/brucebarbone_jta.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,12451 @@
+Introduction: Show Me
+the Arguments
+Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
+“ We are going to ruin undergraduate philosophy. ” That was what we told
+our friends and teachers when we pitched the idea of this book to them. It
+was our experience that for almost any given philosophy class that we took
+as undergraduates, there were only a handful of arguments, totaling no
+more than a few pages of carefully crafted notes, that we needed to know.
+We imagined a rolodex of arguments in front of us, which we could spin
+through with ease to fi nd the argument and move on. Midterm or fi nal
+examinations in one of these classes would be reduced to presenting a philosopher
+’ s argument, followed by a critique – usually another philosopher ’ s
+argument. The ability to state an argument clearly and concisely, in a term
+paper, for example, demonstrates that one succinctly understands the material.
+The following arguments can be viewed as answers to such test questions
+and also to some of life ’ s questions as well.
+“ Show me the argument ” is the battle cry for philosophers. Everyone
+has subjective personal experiences, sentiments, and opinions, so philosophy
+appeals to the common ground of reason to evaluate claims objectively.
+Logical reasoning is independent of political and religious commitments.
+Put simply, an argument is valid or it is not. (Whether or not it is convincing
+is another issue.) When one analyzes a position in terms of its argument,
+one responds with a certain level of rigor and attention. Uncompelling
+arguments can be dismissed out of hand as absurd and forgotten; however,
+arguments that evoke strong reactions, often due to the potential consequences
+of the argument, are countered by a restatement of the initial
+argument, explicitly displaying the inferences, assumptions, and justifi cations
+and why the conclusions do not follow. When things become serious,
+one wants just the arguments .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+2 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
+The time has long passed when it was possible for one to read the entire
+Western philosophical canon. Philosophy needs new didactic tools to
+address the fact that the quantity of infl uential arguments will increase while
+the number of hours that a student at any level has will remain relatively
+the same. Philosophy as a formal discipline will increasingly need to “ get
+smart ” about how it selects which arguments deserve more attention than
+others in the classroom and then how to teach them. Outside of the classroom,
+there are little - to - no resources that function as study guides. Detailed
+study guides are made for everything – the Bible, calculus, grammar, biology
+– except for philosophy. There are laminated sheets in bookstores that list
+all the standard mathematical equations, sheets that have common Spanish
+verbs, and even one on “ Golf for Women, ” but not one has arguments on
+the existence of God, free will, or moral responsibility. Many books present
+important philosophical arguments, but it is often the case that these books
+outline only a single argument or a string of related arguments. Encyclopedias
+of philosophy are great for limited descriptions of philosophers and concepts,
+but there is a need for reference tools that offer specifi c arguments.
+In the end, these secondary sources often bury the argument in commentary
+and analysis and do not lend themselves to concise and effi cient referencing.
+It can take just as long to fi nd an argument in the analysis as it would to
+go to the original text. This volume acts as a compact and accessible companion
+to both sources.
+It deserves to be underscored that this volume showcases 100 of the most
+important arguments and that this list is not exhaustive or uncontroversial.
+This is the fi rst project of its kind. There are not standardized accounts of
+arguments that are univocally accepted in the fi eld. Experts in every fi eld
+disagree – perhaps even more so in philosophy. Arguments that are valued
+now may not be considered to be as equally important in the future. Even
+when there is an agreement that an argument is important, it can be far
+from clear how the argument goes or what the correct conclusion is.
+Authors in this volume have selected representative quotations in support
+of their versions of the arguments. The following arguments are not ranked
+against each other as more or less important. Aquinas ’ Five Ways should
+not be considered more important than other arguments based on the fact
+that it comes fi rst. There are many more, important arguments that are not
+included here, and we hope to provide these in forthcoming installments.
+We have selected arguments that an undergraduate philosophy major
+would be likely to encounter, though many of the issues arise in general
+education classes outside of philosophy. A majority of the arguments employ
+intuitive logical inferences, allowing readers without formal training in logic
+to follow the argument. The inference rule used to draw each conclusion is
+named to enable the reader to see explicitly the argument ’ s valid structure.
+We provide an overview of the inferences in the appendices. There are a
+Introduction: Show Me the Arguments 3
+few arguments that require a more advanced understanding of logic, and
+readers will benefi t from the introduction and commentary that provide the
+general strategy.
+This volume is divided into six parts: philosophy of religion, metaphysics,
+epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophies of science
+and language. There are more branches of philosophy than there are sections
+in the volume, and there are other important arguments within the
+given domains than those presented here. It is common that arguments in
+one area are also important and infl uence arguments in another. Many
+arguments could have been included in multiple sections. These divisions
+are provisional, and arguments will reference related arguments in the book,
+signaled by “ # ” and then the number of the argument. The bibliographic
+information in each article will also be instructive for further reading. The
+following are introductions to the arguments in the form of the questions
+that they address. In other words, we provide the questions that would
+naturally lead one to the argument. For example, “ Is change real (#14)? ”
+directs readers to the article “ Parmenides ’ Refutation of Change, ” argument
+#14.
+Philosophy of Religion
+What were Aquinas ’ “ Five Ways ” to prove the existence of God (#1)? Must
+there be at least one self - existent being that explains why there is something
+rather than nothing (#2)? If something begins to exist, then does it have a
+cause (#3)? If God is something than which nothing greater can be thought,
+does that mean that God must exist in reality (#4)? What was Pascal ’ s
+Wager (#5)? Is it rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence
+(#6)? Does the existence of evil in the world disprove the existence of God
+(#7)? What if God permits evil so that humans have the greater good of
+free will (#8)? Does free will entail the power to sin (#9)? Is it justifi able
+to believe in a miracle on the basis of empirical evidence (#10)? Is what is
+holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it
+is holy (#11)? What did Nietzsche mean when he said “ God is dead ” and
+where does this leave truth (#12)? What is Ockham ’ s Razor (#13)?
+Metaphysics
+Is change real (#14)? If change is not real, then is time real (#15)? Are only
+things that are perceived real (#16)? How did Kant argue against this kind
+of idealism and skepticism (#17)? What is the relationship between necessity
+and possibility in terms of the past, present, and future (#18)? If things
+4 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
+could have been different in the past, does that mean that there are different
+possible worlds (#19)? What are “ persons ” and what makes a person
+maintain her numerical identity over time (#20)? Is there a decisive factor
+– for example, body mass, brain mass, or memories – for personal identity
+(#21)? In what way do things both persist over time and change (#22, 23)?
+Do humans have nonbodily immaterial parts called souls (#24)? Is it irrational
+to fear death (#25)? How do we know things if they are in constant
+fl ux (#26)? How did Aristotle argue against Plato ’ s Forms (#27)? Is the
+same logical theory to be applied in all domains, or do different domains
+require different logics (#28)? Can there be a totality of true propositions
+without running into paradoxes (#29)? What is the connection between free
+will and moral responsibility (#30)? Do I have free will only if I had the
+option to do otherwise (#31)? Are free will and determinism compatible
+(#32)? If everything is either going to happen or not, isn ’ t fatalism tenable
+(#33)? How does Sartre ’ s existentialism – “ Man is condemned to be free ”
+– enter into the conversation (#34)?
+Epistemology
+How do I know that I exist (#35)? Am I certain that I am not dreaming
+(#36)? Am I directly conscious of features of sensations or experiences
+(#37)? Does every belief need to be justifi ed by other beliefs and will that
+lead to an infi nite regress (#38)? Isn ’ t there a commonsense response to
+skepticism (#39)? If there can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively
+distinguishing among competing epistemic views, then are all accounts are
+epistemically equal (#40)? How does the traditional account of knowledge
+being a true justifi ed belief fail (#41)? Is something true solely because
+people agree that it is true (#42)? Is it possible to differentiate knowledge
+or experience between a conceptual component and an empirical component
+(#43)? Is there a sharp division between analytic truths and synthetic
+truths (#44)? Is there a rational justifi cation for inductive inferences and
+the foundation of modern science (#45)? If things are similar in certain
+observable or identifi ed cases, are they are also similar in some other unobservable
+or unidentifi ed cases (#46)? Should philosophy look to science to
+explain and justify our knowledge of the world (#47)? Are some cognitive
+states in direct contact with reality and form a fi rm foundation that supports
+the rest of our knowledge (#48, #49)? Are there limitations to what reasoning
+can accomplish (#50)?
+Ethics
+Does the just life bring happiness (#51)? Is the happy life one in accord with
+reason (#52)? Is the Good one thing or many (#53)? What is the best posIntroduction:
+Show Me the Arguments 5
+sible life that a person can lead (#54)? Did Kant have an argument for the
+categorical imperative (#55)? And why did he think that autonomy deserves
+respect (#56)? Should the Good be conceived of in terms of utility (#57)?
+Are humans just hedonists, who champion pleasure over everything else
+(#58)? Is all morality relative or are there objective principles across cultures
+(#59)? Can the good be defi ned (#60)? Should we accept the authority of
+the state (#61)? Is taxation forced labor (#62)? Do we have a moral duty to
+give to charity (#63)? Would it be better if, in the future, a greater rather
+than lesser number of people lived (#64)? Is a great loss to one person justifi
+ed by smaller benefi ts to a great many others (#65)? Is it better to bring
+everyone down to the same level than to accept an inequality (#66)? Does
+justice demand preserving a patterned distribution of property (#67)?
+What are the central arguments of liberal feminism (#68)? What is the
+moral status of marginal cases; that is, when is there not a clearly drawn
+line between human and nonhuman animals (#69)? What is the most robust
+argument in favor of vegetarianism (#70)? What does a famous violin player
+have to do with the most discussed argument in the abortion debate (#71)?
+Is abortion immoral due to the loss of future experiences, activities, projects,
+and enjoyments (#72)? Does something need to be able to desire or conceive
+of something in order to have the right to something; for example, life
+(#73)? Is there an ethical difference between active and passive euthanasia
+(#74)?
+Philosophy of Mind
+Is the mind a blank slate or are there innate ideas (#75)? What is Cartesian
+dualism and is the mind distinct from the body (#76)? What is the mind –
+body problem (#77)? What is property dualism and how is it different than
+substance dualism (#78)? Are mental events identical with physical events
+(#79, #80)? Is every mental property realized in exactly one physical way
+(#81)? How does the nonphysical mind move the physical body (#82)? Do
+I have privileged access to my mental states and can I know the mental
+states of others (#83)? Does physicalism capture all the essential facts of
+experience (#84, #85)? If a zombie world is metaphysically possible, how
+would that critique physicalism (#86)? Does the sensation of color reveal
+intrinsic features about color (#87)? If a computer had the right programs,
+would it have a mind; in other words, is true artifi cial intelligence possible
+(#88)?
+Science and Language
+How do we discern science from pseudo - science (#89)? Do scientifi c paradigms
+build from previous ones; that is, are they commensurable (#90)? Is
+6 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
+the shift from one paradigm to another a rational process (#90)? Is scientifi c
+realism the only way that makes progress in science and technology not
+miraculous (#91)? How did Galileo know that all objects fall at the same
+rate of speed regardless of their respective weights without experimenting
+(#92)? If a theory is fallible, should it be eliminated (#93)?
+Is there such a thing as a completely private language (#94)? Does learning
+a language require learning a rule (#95)? Does learning a rule require
+learning a language (#96)? When there is translation, is there also interpretation
+(#97, #98)? If there are true statements that contain abstract objects,
+does that mean those abstract objects exist (#99)? Is mathematical Platonism
+the best way to explain mathematical knowledge (#100)?
+How to Use This Book
+Block quotations are provided to show how the argument is presented in
+the text.
+P1. Premises are marked “ P. ”
+P2. A premise is a statement that is either true or false and is given as evidence
+or a reason for accepting the conclusion; a conclusion is the statement
+that is argued for and supported by the premises.
+C1. Conclusions, of which there may be many, are marked with “ C ”
+and are indented. Conclusion indicators – for example, “ therefore ”
+and “ hence ” – have been omitted. The rule of inference or replacement
+is listed after deductive conclusions.
+In the boxed area that precedes the arguments, you will fi nd a reference
+list of original and secondary sources.
+Part I
+Philosophy of Religion
+1
+Aquinas ’ Five Ways
+Timothy J. Pawl
+St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/5 – 74) offered his Five Ways, or fi ve proofs for
+the existence of God, near the beginning of his magnum opus , the Summa
+theologiae (Part 1, Question 2, Article 3, the response). The Summa (ST),
+as it is often called, was written as a textbook for men in their priestly
+formation. It is well over 2,500 pages in a standard English translation from
+the Latin, but the Five Ways take up only slightly more than one page.
+All quotations from Aquinas are taken from Alfred Freddoso ’ s translation of
+the Summa theologiae , available online at www.nd.edu/ ∼ afreddos/summa -
+translation/TOC - part1.htm
+Baisnee , Jules . “ St. Thomas Aquinas ’ s Proofs of the Existence of God
+Presented in Their Chronological Order , ” in Philosophical Studies in
+Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O.P. , edited by John K.
+Ryan , 29 – 64 . Westminster : The Newman Press , 1952 .
+Bochenski , Joseph M. “ The Five Ways , ” in The Rationality of Theism , edited
+by Adolfo Garc í a de la Sienra , 61 – 92 . Atlanta, GA : Rodopi , 2000 .
+Kenny , Anthony . The Five Ways: Saint Thomas Aquinas ’ Proofs of God ’ s
+Existence . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1969 .
+Pawl , Timothy . “ The Five Ways , ” in The Oxford Handbook of Thomas
+Aquinas , edited by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump . Oxford : Oxford
+University Press , 2011 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+10 Timothy J. Pawl
+Nevertheless, they are almost assuredly the most commented on section of
+the Summa and some of the most well - known arguments for the existence
+of God.
+One should note that while each Way concludes with some variation of
+“ and this we call God, ” Aquinas did not intend the Five Ways to be demonstrations
+of a uniquely Christian God. In fact, he warns against attempts
+to prove, for instance, that God is triune (three persons but one being, as
+Christians affi rm), since such arguments, he explains, will fall short and
+lead unbelievers to scoff (see his Summa contra gentiles , Book 1, Chapter
+9, paragraph 2). Furthermore, Aquinas did not take the Five Ways to show
+that this thing we call “ God ” is perfect, good, immutable, eternal, powerful,
+knowledgeable, or even that there is just one such thing. As a consequence,
+some common criticisms of the Ways – for instance, that they do not demonstrate
+an omnipotent being – clearly miss the mark. Aquinas goes on later
+to devote many pages to whether the thing we call “ God ” in the Five Ways
+is omnipotent. And the same is true for the other abovementioned attributes.
+Rather, Aquinas ’ intent in the Five Ways is to show that there is something -
+or - other that, for instance, causes things but is itself uncaused, or something
+that is necessary and does not have that necessary existence from another.
+In fact, he does not argue that the Five Ways conclude to the same thing
+– rather than fi ve different things – until later in the Summa (Part 1,
+Question 11, Article 3, the response).
+Finally, it is important to note that while the Five Ways are Aquinas ’
+most often cited arguments for the existence of God, they are not his most
+detailed or nuanced. The Summa , as said above, is a textbook of sorts, and
+written for an audience of common men in formation for the priesthood
+– not academics, scholars, atheists, or agnostics. To judge Aquinas ’ best and
+most powerful arguments for the existence of God, one would do better to
+look at the parallel passages from his other works rather than at his Summa
+(see Baisnee for a helpful list of these passages). That said, it is the arguments
+in the Summa that have received the most attention and have become,
+by any reasonable standard, some of the most important arguments in the
+Western intellectual tradition.
+The First Way – The Argument from Motion
+The First Way focuses on motion. By “ motion, ” Aquinas means the three
+sorts of accidental change that Aristotle differentiates: change of location
+(e.g., moving across the room), change in quality (e.g., heating up), and
+change in quantity (e.g., getting fatter). The general thrust of the argument
+is that anything changed in one of these ways is changed by something else.
+That something else, in changing the fi rst thing, either is itself changed or
+Aquinas’ Five Ways 11
+remains changeless. A series of changing changers cannot proceed infi nitely.
+So there must be some fi rst, unchanging being. That being we call “ God. ”
+The argument below uses ‘ F ’ as a variable governing end states of being
+correlated with the three sorts of motion mentioned above. For instance,
+one could substitute “ across the room, ” “ hot, ” or “ fat ” for F. Aquinas
+provides three detailed defenses of C3 in the Summa contra gentiles , Part
+1, Chapter 13. He considers the common objection that a thing can move
+itself (e.g., the runner moves himself when sprinting from the starting line)
+by saying that such cases are instances of a part moving a whole and not
+a thing moving itself. In P3, Aquinas says that the mover must be in a
+state of actuality relevant to F in order to make something F. The argument
+would be more forceful if Aquinas could say that the mover must
+be actually F, but he cannot say that, at least not with perfect generality.
+For Aquinas thinks that God can move things in many ways that God is
+not actually: God can fatten a man without himself being fat. In that case,
+God is said to be virtually F, where something is “ virtually F ” if it is not
+itself F but it has the power to make others F. One may say, then, that
+something is in a state of actuality relevant to F when it is either actually
+F or virtually F.
+It is certain, and obvious to the senses, that in this world some things are
+moved. But everything that is moved is moved by another. For nothing is
+moved except insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to that actuality
+toward which it is moved, whereas something effects motion insofar as it is
+in actuality in a relevant respect. After all, to effect motion is just to lead
+something from potentiality into actuality. But a thing cannot be led from
+potentiality into actuality except through some being that is in actuality in a
+relevant respect; for example, something that is hot in actuality – say, a fi re
+– makes a piece of wood, which is hot in potentiality, to be hot in actuality,
+and it thereby moves and alters the piece of wood. But it is impossible for
+something to be simultaneously in potentiality and in actuality with respect
+to same thing; rather, it can be in potentiality and in actuality only with
+respect to different things. For what is hot in actuality cannot simultaneously
+be hot in potentiality; rather, it is cold in potentiality. Therefore, it is impossible
+that something should be both mover and moved in the same way and
+with respect to the same thing, or, in other words, that something should
+move itself. Therefore, everything that is moved must be moved by another.
+If, then, that by which something is moved is itself moved, then it, too,
+must be moved by another, and that other by still another. But this does not
+go on to infi nity. For if it did, then there would not be any fi rst mover and,
+as a result, none of the others would effect motion, either. For secondary
+movers effect motion only because they are being moved by a fi rst mover, just
+as a stick does not effect motion except because it is being moved by a hand.
+Therefore, one has to arrive at some fi rst mover that is not being moved by
+anything. And this is what everyone takes to be God. (ST I, q2, a3, response)
+12 Timothy J. Pawl
+P1. Some things are moved.
+P2. If something is moved to being F, then it is potentially but not actually
+F.
+P3. If something moves a thing to be F, then it (the mover) is in a state of
+actuality relevant to F.
+C1. If something were to move itself to be F (e.g., be both moved and
+its own mover), then it would be both potentially but not actually F
+and also in a state of actuality relevant to F (conjunction, and modus
+ponens , P1, P2, P3).
+P4. But it is not possible for something to be both potentially but not actually
+F and also in a state of actuality relevant to F.
+C2. It is not possible for something to move itself to be F ( modus tollens,
+C1, P4).
+P5. If it is not possible for something to move itself to be F, then if something
+is moved, it is moved by something else.
+C3. If something is moved, it is moved by something else ( modus ponens ,
+C2, P5).
+P5. If B moves A and B is moved, then B must be moved by some other
+thing, C. And if C is moved, then C must be moved by still some other
+thing, D. And so on.
+P6. If the series of movers were to go on to infi nity, then there would be
+no fi rst mover.
+P7. If there were no fi rst mover, then there would be no motion.
+C4. There is a fi rst mover ( modus tollens , P1, P7).
+C5. That fi rst mover is the thing that everyone takes to be God
+(defi nition).
+The Second Way – The Argument from Causation
+Whereas the First Way focused on accidental changes, the Second Way
+focuses on ordered series of effi cient causation. An effi cient cause is that
+which produces something or an alteration in something. The composer is
+the effi cient cause of the sonata; the fi re is the effi cient cause of the heating
+of the kettle. An ordered series is a series in which the causal work of later
+members in the series depends on the simultaneous causal work of earlier
+members in the series. If the fi re heats the kettle and the kettle heats the
+water, it is an ordered series, since the kettle ’ s heating the water depends
+upon the causal activity of the earlier cause, the fi re. Likewise, a system of
+gears is an ordered causal series, since the causal action of one intermediate
+gear spinning another, later gear depends upon the causal activity of previous
+gears in the system. Aquinas argues in the Second Way, to continue
+with the gear image, that the system cannot be gears all the way back. An
+Aquinas’ Five Ways 13
+infi nite series of gears, without a fi rst cause of their spinning, would not be
+in motion.
+We fi nd that among sensible things there is an ordering of effi cient causes,
+and yet we do not fi nd – nor is it possible to fi nd – anything that is an effi cient
+cause of its own self. For if something were an effi cient cause of itself, then
+it would be prior to itself – which is impossible.
+But it is impossible to go on to infi nity among effi cient causes. For in every
+case of ordered effi cient causes, the fi rst is a cause of the intermediate and the
+intermediate is a cause of the last – and this regardless of whether the intermediate
+is constituted by many causes or by just one. But when a cause is
+removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if there were no fi rst among the
+effi cient causes, then neither would there be a last or an intermediate. But if
+the effi cient causes went on to infi nity, there would not be a fi rst effi cient
+cause, and so there would not be a last effect or any intermediate effi cient
+causes, either – which is obviously false. Therefore, one must posit some fi rst
+effi cient cause – which everyone calls God. (ST I, q2, a3, response)
+P1. There is an ordered series of effi cient causes.
+P2. Necessarily, if X is an effi cient cause of Y, then X is prior to Y.
+C1. Necessarily, if X is an effi cient cause of X, then X is prior to X
+(instantiation, P2).
+P3. It is not possible for X to be prior to X.
+C2. It is not possible for X to be an effi cient cause of itself ( modus tollens ,
+C1, P3).
+P4. If something is an ordered series of effi cient causes, then the fi rst cause
+causes the intermediate cause(s), and the intermediate cause(s) cause(s)
+the last effect.
+P5. If a cause is removed from an ordered series of effi cient causes, then
+the effects after that cause are removed as well.
+C3. If there were no fi rst cause, then there would be no subsequent effects
+(instantiation, P4, P5).
+P6. If an ordered series of effi cient causes could precede infi nitely, then there
+would be no fi rst cause.
+C4. If an ordered series of effi cient causes could precede infi nitely, then
+there would be no subsequent effects (hypothetical syllogism, C3, P6).
+P7. But there are subsequent effects.
+C5. An ordered series of effi cient causes cannot precede infi nitely ( modus
+tollens , C4, P7).
+P8. An ordered series of effi cient causes either precedes infi nitely, terminates
+in a cause that causes itself, or terminates in an uncaused cause.
+C6. An ordered series of effi cient causation terminates in an uncaused
+cause (disjunctive syllogism, C2, C5, P8).
+C7. We call that uncaused cause “ God ” (defi nition).
+14 Timothy J. Pawl
+The Third Way – The Argument from Possibility
+and Necessity
+Aquinas has a specifi c understanding of possibility and necessity in mind
+in the Third Way, and it is not the common understanding in today ’ s philosophical
+discussions. When Aquinas calls something “ necessary, ” in this
+argument, he means that it is not subject to generation or corruption. A
+necessary being exists, but it does not come into existence by composition,
+and it cannot cease existing by way of decomposition. Similarly, a possible
+being, in this context, exists, but it does or could have come into existence
+by way of composition, and it can cease to exist by way of decomposition.
+The most debated inference in this argument is the inference from P3 to
+C2. Most commentators who attempt to justify it do so by arguing that
+Aquinas had in mind an implicit premise which, together with P3, entails
+C2. As it stands, without the help of an implicit premise, the inference is
+invalid and commits the fallacy of composition.
+Certain of the things we fi nd in the world are able to exist and able not
+to exist; for some things are found to be generated and corrupted and, as a
+result, they are able to exist and able not to exist.
+But it is impossible that everything should be like this; for that which is
+able not to exist is such that at some time it does not exist. Therefore, if
+everything is such that it is able not to exist, then at some time nothing existed
+in the world. But if this were true, then nothing would exist even now. For
+what does not exist begins to exist only through something that does exist;
+therefore, if there were no beings, then it was impossible that anything should
+have begun to exist, and so nothing would exist now – which is obviously
+false. Therefore, not all beings are able to exist [and able not to exist]; rather,
+it must be that there is something necessary in the world.
+Now every necessary being either has a cause of its necessity from outside
+itself or it does not. But it is impossible to go on to infi nity among necessary
+beings that have a cause of their necessity – in the same way, as was proved
+above, that it is impossible to go on to infi nity among effi cient causes.
+Therefore, one must posit something that is necessary per se , which does not
+have a cause of its necessity from outside itself but is instead a cause of necessity
+for the other [necessary] things. But this everyone calls God. (ST I, q2,
+a3, response)
+P1. Some things are able to be generated or corrupted.
+P2. If some things are able to be generated or corrupted, then it is possible
+for those things either to exist or not to exist.
+C1. It is possible for some things to exist or not to exist ( modus ponens ,
+P1, P2).
+Aquinas’ Five Ways 15
+P3. If, for each thing, it is possible that it not exist, then at some time it
+does not exist.
+C2. If, for each thing, at some time it does not exist, then at some time
+nothing exists (universal generalization, P3).
+P4. If at some time nothing exists, then there would have been nothing to
+cause another thing to exist.
+P5. If there had been nothing to cause another being to exist, then nothing
+could have come into existence.
+P6. If nothing could have come into existence, then nothing would exist
+even now.
+P7. But something does exist now.
+C3. Something could have come into existence ( modus tollens , P6, P7).
+C4. There had to have been something to cause another thing to exist
+( modus tollens, P5, C3).
+C5. At no time did nothing exist ( modus tollens , P4, C4).
+C6. It is not true that, for each thing, at some time it does not exist
+( modus tollens , C2, C5).
+C7. There must be something that is not possible not to exist – that is,
+there must be a necessary being ( modus tollens , P3, C6).
+P8. A necessary being has a cause for its necessity from something else or
+it does not.
+P9. It is not possible for there to be an infi nite series of beings with their
+necessity from something else.
+C8. There must be some necessary being with its necessity not from
+something else (disjunctive syllogism, P8, P9).
+C9. We call that necessary being whose necessity comes from nothing
+else “ God ” (defi nition).
+The Fourth Way – The Argument from Gradation
+In the Fourth Way, Aquinas relies on two arguments from Aristotle, which
+he does not provide in the text, to justify two of his premises (P3 and P4).
+P1 is observably true. P2 requires a scope restriction. Aquinas seems to be
+saying that any comparative predications of a property entail that there
+exists something that is maximally that property. If this were true, then if
+Bob is fatter than Tom, then there must be something that is maximally fat.
+Worse still, from P4, it would follow that this fattest thing would be the
+cause of all other fat things. It seems better to restrict P2 to perfections and
+then take heat (his example) to be a form of perfection (note that this is
+just an example; one can grant his point while denying that heat is a perfection).
+C4 seems to commit the fallacy of composition. Even if it were proven
+16 Timothy J. Pawl
+that there is a thing that is most good, and a thing that is most noble, and
+a thing that is most true, it has yet to be shown why this must be the same
+thing. Aquinas perhaps had in mind a principle requiring the cause of a
+thing ’ s being also to be the cause of its other positive attributes or the cause
+of its perfections. If so, such a premise would need to be inserted into the
+argument before C4.
+In the world some things are found to be more and less good, more and
+less true, more and less noble, etc. But more and less are predicated of diverse
+things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a
+given respect. For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches
+that which is maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is maximally
+true, maximally good, and maximally noble, and, as a result, is a maximal
+being; for according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, things that are
+maximally true are maximally beings.
+But, as is claimed in the same book, that which is maximal in a given genus
+is a cause of all the things that belong to that genus; for instance, fi re, which
+is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something
+that is a cause for all beings of their esse , their goodness, and each of their
+perfections – and this we call God. (ST I, q2, a3, response)
+P1. There are some things that are more or less good, more or less true, or
+more or less noble.
+P2. If something is more or less F, then there is something maximally F.
+C1. There is something maximally good, something maximally true, and
+something maximally noble (substitution, and modus ponens , P1, P2).
+C2. There is something maximally true (simplifi cation, C1).
+P3. If something is maximally true, then it is maximally being.
+C3. Something is maximally being ( modus ponens , C2, P3).
+P4. If something is maximally F, then it is the cause of all things that are F.
+C4. There is something that is the cause for all beings, their goodness,
+and each of their perfections ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
+C5. We call that thing which is the cause of the being, goodness, and
+perfection of all other things “ God ” (defi nition).
+The Fifth Way – The Argument from the Governance
+Aquinas argues in the Fifth Way that if things always or for the most part
+act for a particular end, that is evidence of their being directed at that end
+by an intelligent agent. In nature, most natural things act always or for the
+most part for a particular end, and so nature is directed by an intelligent
+agent. Note that, for Aquinas, to act for the sake of an end does not require
+intentionality. In Aquinas ’ way of speaking, fi re acts for the sake of the end
+Aquinas’ Five Ways 17
+when it burns upwards and the stone acts for the sake of the end when
+falling down to the earth. One might think that evolutionary biology allows
+a way out of the design or chance dilemma, since, given evolutionary
+biology, something could always or for the most part act for the sake of an
+end but not due to either design or chance but rather natural selection.
+Aquinas ’ argument, however, is not aimed solely at biological entities. An
+electron, for instance, attracts positively charged particles always or for the
+most part, but it did not acquire this property via some evolutionary
+process. So even if natural selection narrows the scope of Aquinas ’ argument,
+it alone does not defeat the argument.
+We see that some things lacking cognition, viz., natural bodies, act for the
+sake of an end. This is apparent from the fact that they always or very frequently
+act in the same way in order to bring about that which is best, and
+from this it is clear that it is not by chance, but by design, that they attain
+the end.
+But things lacking cognition tend toward an end only if they are directed
+by something that has cognition and intelligence, in the way that an arrow is
+directed by an archer. Therefore, there is something intelligent by which all
+natural things are ordered to an end – and this we call God. (ST I, q2, a3,
+response)
+P1. If something always or for the most part acts in the same way in order
+to bring about that which is best, then it acts for the sake of an end.
+P2. Beings in nature always or for the most part act in the same way in
+order to bring about that which is best.
+C1. Beings in nature act for the sake of an end ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If beings in nature act for the sake of an end, then beings in nature are
+directed by something that has cognition and intelligence.
+C2. Beings in nature are directed by something that has cognition and
+intelligence ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+C3. We call that director of unthinking things “ God ” (defi nition).
+2
+The Contingency
+Cosmological Argument
+Mark T. Nelson
+The Contingency Argument is a version of the cosmological argument for
+the existence of God, proposed by Samuel Clarke (1675 – 1729) and rescued
+from obscurity by William Rowe (b. 1931). The cosmological argument is
+not, in fact, a single argument but a family of arguments that attempt to
+prove, or at least render plausible, the existence of God based on the existence
+of the cosmos. Typically, these arguments have two stages: the fi rst
+arguing from the existence of the cosmos to the existence of a necessary
+being or fi rst cause of this cosmos; the second arguing that this necessary
+being or fi rst cause is God. Regarding the fi rst stage of the argument, scholars
+sometimes distinguish between two versions: those based on the idea
+that infi nite causal regresses do not exist and those not based on this idea.
+The fi rst three of Thomas Aquinas ’ (1224/5 – 74) “ Five Ways ” (#1) are
+examples of the former; Clarke ’ s contingency argument is an example of
+the latter. Aquinas argues, for example, that an uncaused fi rst cause of
+Clarke , Samuel . A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and
+Other Writings , edited by Enzio Vailati . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
+University Press , 1998 .
+Rowe , William L. The Cosmological Argument . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
+University Press , 1975 .
+___. Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction . Belmont, CA : Wadsworth ,
+1978 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Contingency Cosmological Argument 19
+“ sensible beings with effi cient causes ” must exist, because, if it did not,
+there would be an infi nite regress of caused causes, but such infi nite causal
+regresses do not in fact exist. Many critics fi nd Aquinas ’ argument on this
+point unconvincing, so one advantage of Clarke ’ s argument is that it simply
+sidesteps this issue. According to Clarke, the problem with the idea of
+everything ’ s being just an infi nite regress of dependent beings caused by
+other dependent beings (equivalent to Aquinas ’ “ sensible beings with effi -
+cient causes ” ) is not that such regresses are impossible but that this would
+violate the Principle of Suffi cient Reason, an intuitive principle according
+to which (roughly) there is an explanation for every being and every fact.
+In such a case, there would be an explanation of the existence of every
+particular dependent being, and there would even be an explanation of the
+existence of that particular collection of dependent beings. There would
+not, however, be an explanation of the fact that there are any dependent
+beings at all, since no particular existing dependent being (or set of dependent
+beings) could explain this. That is, we would lack an explanation of the
+fact that there is something rather than nothing. Thus, there must be at
+least one self - existent being that explains why there is something rather
+than nothing. Elsewhere, Clarke undertakes to prove that this being has the
+other attributes that we normally associate with divinity.
+There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent
+being. For since something must needs have been from eternity, as has been
+already proved and is granted on all hands, either there has always existed
+some one unchangeable and independent being from which all other beings
+that are or ever were in the universe have received their original, or else there
+has been an infi nite succession of changeable and dependent beings produced
+one from another in an endless progression without any original cause at all.
+Now this latter supposition is so very absurd that, though all atheism must
+in its accounts of most things [ . . . ] terminate in it, yet I think very few atheists
+ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly
+impossible and contradictory to itself. I shall not argue against it from the
+supposed impossibility of infi nite succession, barely and absolutely considered
+in itself, for a reason which shall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we consider
+such an infi nite progression as one entire endless series of dependent beings,
+it is plain this whole series of beings can have no cause from without of its
+existence because in it are supposed to be included all things that are, or ever
+were, in the universe. And it is plain it can have no reason within itself for
+its existence because no one being in this infi nite succession is supposed to be
+self - existent or necessary (which is the only ground or reason of existence of
+anything that can be imagined within the thing itself [ . . . ]), but every one
+dependent on the foregoing. And where no part is necessary, it is manifest the
+whole cannot be necessary – absolute necessity of existence not being an
+extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination but an inward and essential
+property of the nature of the thing which so exists. (Clark, 10)
+20 Mark T. Nelson
+Rowe ’ s terminology:
+“ dependent being ” = “ a being whose existence is explained by the causal
+activity of other things ”
+“ self - existent being ” = “ a being whose existence is explained by itself,
+that is, by its own nature ”
+“ positive fact ” = “ a fact whose obtaining entails the existence of at least
+one contingent being ”
+“ contingent being ” = “ a being such that it is logically possible for that
+being to exist and it is logically possible for that being not to exist ”
+Principle of Suffi cient Reason (PSR):
+PSR1. For every being that exists or ever existed, there is an explanation
+of the existence of that being.
+PSR2. For every positive fact, there is an explanation of that fact.
+P1. Every being (that exists or ever existed) is either a dependent being or
+a self - existent being.
+P2. Not every being is a dependent being.
+C1. There exists a self - existent being (disjunctive syllogism, P1, P2).
+The argument is valid if it is interpreted as follows:
+P1 * . Every being is a dependent being or some being is a self - existent being.
+[Or: If no being is a self - existent being, then every being is a dependent
+being.]
+P2 * . It is not the case that every being is a dependent being.
+C1 * . Some being is a self - existent being (disjunctive syllogism, P1 * , P2 * ).
+The case for P1 * :
+P1 may appear to be a tautology, but it is not, because it rules out one type
+of case, namely, things whose existence is explained by nothing at all.
+Thus, it is equivalent to PSR1.
+The case for P2 * :
+P3. If every being is a dependent being, then if there is an explanation for
+the fact that any dependent beings exist (rather than nothing at all), this
+will be in terms of the existence of either the totality of dependent beings
+or some subset of that totality.
+P4. That any dependent beings exist at all (rather than nothing) is a positive
+fact (defi nitions of “ dependent being ” , “ positive fact ” ).
+The Contingency Cosmological Argument 21
+P5. There is an explanation of every positive fact (PSR2).
+C2. There is an explanation for the fact that any dependent beings exist
+at all (instantiation, P4, P5).
+C3. If every being is a dependent being, then there is an explanation for
+the fact that any dependent beings exist (rather than nothing at all),
+in terms of the existence of either the totality of dependent beings or
+some subset of that totality (instantiation, P3, C2).
+P6. It is not possible to explain the fact that any dependent beings exist at
+all (rather than nothing) simply in terms of the existence of either the
+totality of dependent beings or of some subset of that totality.
+C4. It is not the case that every being is a dependent being ( modus tollens ,
+C3, P6).
+Thus, P1 * depends on PSR1 and P2 * depends on PSR2, so, according
+to Rowe, the success of Clarke ’ s contingency argument turns on the truth
+or rational acceptability of the Principle of Suffi cient Reason itself.
+3
+The Kalam Argument for the
+Existence of God
+Harry Lesser
+One of the most interesting arguments for the existence of God was developed
+by the philosopher – theologians of the Kalam, the tradition of mediaeval
+Muslim theology, and has recently been revived by William Craig,
+among others. It is a version of the cosmological argument, being an argument
+from the mere existence of the universe to the existence of God, as
+opposed to arguing from the concept of God, as the ontological argument
+does, or from particular features of the universe, such as evidence of design.
+William Craig ’ s formulation of the argument is particularly concise, and
+runs as follows:
+Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
+The universe began to exist.
+Therefore, the universe has a cause. (63)
+This argument is clearly a valid modus ponens ; but how certain is the
+truth of the premises? The major premise seems unproven. It is not self -
+contradictory to assert that something could, or did, begin to exist without
+any cause. There is, of course, a powerful empirical inductive argument
+Craig , William L. The Kalam Cosmological Argument . London : Macmillan ,
+1979 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Kalam Argument for the Existence of God 23
+from the fact that there are billions upon billions of examples of something
+beginning to exist and having a cause of its existence, and not a single
+observed or recorded example of something coming to exist without a
+cause. But this is insuffi cient for proof for two reasons. First, no inductive
+argument gives us more than very good evidence that something is always
+the case: however many confi rming instances we fi nd, an exception is
+always a possibility, even if an unlikely one. Second, even if every individual
+entity in the universe that began to exist has a cause of its existence, it does
+not follow that this is true of the universe as a whole, since what is true
+even of every part is not necessarily true of the totality and vice versa.
+A third argument for the claim that whatever begins to exist has a cause
+would be that though it is not self - contradictory that something might come
+into existence without a cause, it is unimaginable. To this two replies might
+be made. One is that this might be a feature of our minds rather than a
+feature of how the world really is, that is, simply a limit on what we can
+conceive and not a limit on what can happen. Secondly, the universe as a
+whole is something totally beyond our experience: hence it might be said
+that we simply have no idea what might or might not be possible. Hence,
+the major premise of the argument cannot be proven by either logic or
+experience. Nevertheless, the notion that something could come into being
+from nothing, without a cause, seems close to incredible, so that the premise,
+though unproven, seems very plausible.
+On the other hand, the minor premise, that the universe has a beginning,
+for a long time looked very vulnerable: there seemed to be no reason to
+assert that the universe came into being rather than having always existed,
+as most of the Greeks, including Aristotle, thought. The Kalam philosophers
+themselves, and those who followed them, tried to argue that the notion of
+an infi nite series of events back in time, with no fi rst event, is incoherent
+or in some way impossible, but no convincing argument on these lines has
+been produced. It is true that the idea that time has no beginning creates
+problems for the mind, but there are equal problems in supposing that it
+does have a beginning, since one can always ask, “ What happened before
+that? ” What has reestablished the argument in a contemporary version, by
+no means confi ned to Muslims, is the increasing scientifi c evidence that the
+universe did have a beginning. This does not yet amount to proof: indeed,
+it is not clear what astronomical or other observations could absolutely
+prove the “ big bang ” theory of the beginning of the universe. But it makes
+the proposition, that the universe had a beginning, plausible, something for
+which there is evidence and which is believed by many who have studied
+the evidence. So the Kalam argument for the existence of God is a valid
+argument from two premises of which neither is proven nor certain, but
+both are plausible. The jury is still out, and much depends on how science
+develops and whether the minor premise looks increasingly plausible.
+24 Harry Lesser
+We should note, though, that the argument is incomplete. Even if the
+universe has a cause outside itself, further argument is needed to establish
+that the cause is an eternal and good being; in other words, that it is God.
+Some who accept the argument think that one also has to show that the
+cause is a personal being and have offered arguments for this. Certainly it
+could be argued that only an eternal being could precede the universe and
+therefore only an eternal being could cause it. It can also be argued that
+the only kind of cause that could operate on the universe from outside, as
+opposed to being part of it, would be the act of a personal being and only
+a good personal being would wish to create a universe. But it is fair to say,
+I think, that we have not yet got a full and rigorous working - out of this
+part of the argument, though the above indicates the lines it might take.
+Once again, we might say that it is plausible, but not proven, that the cause
+of the universe is a good personal Creator, just as it is plausible, but not
+proved, that the universe has a cause.
+P1. If something begins to exist, then it has a cause.
+P2. The universe began to exist.
+C1. The universe has a cause ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+4
+The Ontological Argument
+Sara L. Uckelman
+In philosophy of religion, arguments that attempt to prove the existence of
+God on the basis of God ’ s essence are called ontological arguments because
+they appeal only to the nature or essence of God ’ s being. The fi rst such
+argument was given by Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033 – 1109) in Chapter
+II of his Proslogion (written c .1077 – 8). Saint Anselm defi nes God as “ that
+than which nothing greater can be thought ” and seeks to derive from this
+defi nition a contradiction with the assumption that God does not exist.
+Some modern commentators have also found another similar argument in
+Proslogion III, which purportedly shows not only that God exists but that
+God ’ s existence is necessary. However, it is the argument in Proslogion II
+that is usually referred to simply as “ the ontological argument. ”
+Anselm of Canterbury . Proslogion, in S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi
+Opera Omnia , vol. 1 , edited by F. S. Schmitt , 93 – 104 . Seccovii : Abbatia ,
+1938 – 61 .
+Anselm of Canterbury . Proslogion, in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major
+Works , edited by B. Davies and G. R. Evans , translated by M. J.
+Charlesworth, 82 – 104 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1998 .
+Davies , Brian. “ Anselm and the Ontological Argument , ” in The Cambridge
+Companion to Anselm , edited by B. Davies and B. Leftow , 57 – 178 .
+Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2004 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+26 Sara L. Uckelman
+Many authors since Anselm have objected to the argument on the
+strength of its conclusion and have attempted to show that it is either invalid
+or unsound. During Anselm ’ s lifetime, Gaunilo, a monk from Marmoutier,
+criticized the argument by showing that an argument of the same structure
+could be used to demonstrate the existence of the best possible island, which
+conclusion is taken to be absurd. While this criticism does not point to a
+specifi c error in Anselm ’ s argument, it casts some doubt on its structure,
+since the same structure can be used to derive absurd conclusions. One
+famous counterargument is given by Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), who
+argues that Anselm mistakenly uses “ existence ” as a predicate, which it is
+not. However, there is no agreement as to the status of the validity of the
+argument or the soundness of its premises; even among those who believe
+the argument is problematic do not agree on what is the problem.
+Well then, Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may
+understand, as much as You see fi t, that You exist as we believe You to exist,
+and that You are what we believe You to be. Now we believe that You are
+something than which nothing greater can be thought. Or can it be that a
+thing of such a nature does not exist, since ‘ the Fool has said in his heart,
+there is no God ’ [Ps. 13: 1; 52: 1]? But surely, when this same Fool hears
+what I am speaking about, namely ‘ something - than - which - nothing - greater -
+can - be - thought ’ , he understands what he hears, and what he understands is
+in his mind, even if he does not understand that it actually exists. For it is
+one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to understand
+that an object actually exists. Thus, when a painter plans beforehand what
+he is going to execute, he has [the picture] in his mind, but he does not yet
+think that it actually exists because he has not yet executed it. However, when
+he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and understands
+that it exists because he has now made it. Even the Fool, then, is forced to
+agree that ‘ something - than - which - nothing - greater - can - be - thought exists in
+the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood
+is in the mind. And surely that - than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought
+cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind, it can be
+thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that - than - which -
+a - greater - cannot - be - thought exists in the mind alone, this same that -
+than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought is that - that - which - a - greater - can - be -
+thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no
+doubt that something - than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought exists both in
+the mind and in reality. (Anselm trans. Charlesworth, 87)
+P1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought
+(defi nition).
+P2. Existence in the understanding and existence in reality are two separate
+things.
+P3. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding.
+The Ontological Argument 27
+(P3a. Something existing in reality is greater than something that only exists
+in the understanding.)
+P4. Even the fool understands the concept of “ something than which none
+greater can be imagined. ”
+P5. If something is understood, then it exists in the understanding
+(defi nition).
+C1. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” exists in the
+understanding ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
+P6. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” can exist only
+in the understanding (assumption for reductio ).
+P7. It is greater for “ something than which none greater can be imagined ”
+to exist in reality than for it to just exist in the understanding.
+C2. There is something greater than “ something than which none greater
+can be imagined ” (instantiation, P6).
+C3. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” cannot exist
+only in the understanding. It must also exist in reality ( reductio ,
+P6 – C2).
+C4. God exists (substitution of defi niendum for defi niens , C3, P1).
+5
+Pascal ’ s Wager
+Leslie Burkholder
+Unlike some other arguments about God ’ s existence, Pascal ’ s Wager doesn ’ t
+try to prove that God exists. It is intended to show that you are better off
+believing that God exists and leading the life of a believer than not doing
+so. More particularly, it tries to show that it is worthwhile to believe in the
+existence of a Christian God and lead the life of a Christian believer.
+The following is a modern presentation of Pascal ’ s thinking. The Christian
+God either exists or does not. It is diffi cult to prove the existence of God
+by philosophical argument. Is it worthwhile for you to live a Christian life
+– acting as though you are a believer – in the hope of attaining eternal life
+and of becoming a believer in the process of living that life? If God exists
+and if you live the Christian life, you will be saved. This has nearly infi nite
+value to you. If God exists and if you do not lead the Christian life, you
+will be damned, a result whose negative utility is also large. If God does
+not exist and if you live the Christian life, you lose at most a little worldly
+Pascal , Blaise. Pens é es , translated by John Warrington. London : Dent , 1960 .
+Hacking, Ian . “ The Logic of Pascal ’ s Wager . ” American Philosophical
+Quarterly 9 ( 1972 ): 186 – 92 .
+McClennan , Edward F. “ Pascal ’ s Wager and Finite Decision Theory , ” in
+Gambling on God , edited by Jeff Jordan , 115 – 33 . London : Rowman &
+Littlefi eld , 1994 .
+Whyte , Jamie. Crimes against Logic . New York : McGraw - Hill , 2004 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Pascal’s Wager 29
+pleasure compared to what you would get if God did exist. Hence the
+expected gain from living the Christian life is higher than that of living
+otherwise, so long as the probability of God ’ s existence is greater than 0.
+It is foolish not to lead the Christian life.
+Parts of the wager argument – whether in Pascal ’ s own version or this
+modern one – are best presented using a device called a “ decision table ”
+(below). The words at the top of each column describe a possible state of
+the world or universe. There are just two, and each one has some chance
+or probability of being the truth. We can ’ t eliminate either, according to
+Pascal. Each box tells the result you get if the state named in the column
+is true and you make the choice in the row. So, for example, the result for
+you if the Christian God exists and you lead the Christian life and believe
+this God exists is a gain or benefi t of all – in Pascal ’ s words – or infi nite
+positive value – in the words of the modern argument – and a loss of either
+nothing – which seems to be what Pascal thinks – or something very small,
+some worldly pleasure – as the modern argument has it. Pascal doesn ’ t
+explicitly tell us what goes into some of the boxes. For example, he doesn ’ t
+say what the results for you are if the Christian God exists but you don ’ t
+believe this. The modern statement of the wager fi lls this in for us.
+The third and fourth premises of the argument below are implicit or
+hidden. This argument is certainly deductively valid once these hidden
+premises are added. Each simple step in the reasoning in the argument is
+truth - functionally valid. So any criticism of the argument must tell us that
+one or more of the premises are false. Here are some examples of
+criticisms:
+(a) The fi rst premise says that anyone who leads the Christian life and
+believes, no matter why he does this, gets the benefi t. That ’ s what is
+in Table 1 and the fi rst premise tells us that everything in the table is
+true. But it ’ s false. The Christian God would not reward someone who
+believes or leads the life of a believer solely in order to gain the benefi t
+of infi nite happiness.
+(b) According to the reasoning, the table completely describes the possible
+states of the world and says what will result in each of these states if
+you do believe and lead an appropriate life or you don ’ t believe and
+do not lead the Christian life. But is that correct? Suppose, when the
+Christian God doesn ’ t exist, it is also true that another type of god
+does. This god punishes severely those who believe in the Christian
+God or lead a Christian life. This is a possibility; it is not ruled out by
+logic any more than the existence of the Christian God is ruled in or
+out by logic. If that happens, then what is said in Table 1 down column
+2 aren ’ t certain results. They are merely one among many possible sets
+of results. These are the results that would happen when the Christian
+30 Leslie Burkholder
+God doesn ’ t exist and no other god does either. What is said about
+the state when the Christian God doesn ’ t exist also holds for when
+that God does exist. Other kinds of gods could possibly exist as well,
+even when the Christian God exists. The results listed in column 1 of
+the table are only the ones that happen when the Christian God exists
+and no other kind of god does. So either premise 1 is false because
+what the table states is that the results are really only one of indefi nitely
+many possible results, or premise 2 is false because the columns do
+not cover all the possibilities. They only really cover the case when the
+Christian God exists and no other does and the case when the Christian
+God does not exist and no other does either.
+(c) Suppose that there is no problem with either premise 1 or premise 2.
+Then there is a problem with the implicit or hidden premise 3.
+According to the table, the benefi t gained from believing in the case
+when the Christian God exists is infi nitely positive and the loss from
+not believing in this case is infi nitely negative. Using these facts and
+the rest in the table, we are supposed to be able to calculate that we
+are better off believing in the existence of the Christian God than not
+believing. But there is no way to make sound calculations involving
+infi nite gains and losses. So premise 3 may be false – or at least it is
+very uncertain that it is true.
+God is, or He is not. Reason can decide nothing here. [ . . . ] A game is
+being played at the extremity of this infi nite distance where heads or tails will
+turn up. [ . . . ] Which will you choose then? [ . . . ] Let us weigh the gain and
+the loss in wagering that God is. [ . . . ] If you gain, you gain all; if you lose,
+you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is. ( § 233)
+P1. The information in Table 1 is true.
+P2. The information in Table 1 is complete.
+C1. The information in Table 1 is true and the information in Table 1
+is complete (conjunction, P1, P2).
+Table 1
+Christian God exists
+(Prob > 0)
+Christian God doesn ’ t
+exist (Prob > 0)
+Lead Christian life
+and believe
+Christian God exists
+Gain = all, infi nite
+good; loss = small
+or nothing
+Gain = nothing;
+loss = small or nothing
+Don ’ t lead Christian
+life and believe
+Christian God exists
+Gain = nothing;
+loss = all, infi nite bad
+Gain = nothing;
+loss = nothing
+Pascal’s Wager 31
+P3. If the information in Table 1 is true and the information in Table 1 is
+complete, then you are better off having the life of a believer and believing
+in the Christian God than not doing so.
+C2. You are better off having the life of a believer and believing in the
+Christian God than not doing so ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. If you are better off having the life of a believer and believing in the
+Christian God than not doing so, then you logically should choose the
+Christian kind of life and believe in God.
+C3. You logically should choose the Christian kind of life and believe in
+God ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
+6
+James ’ Will to Believe Argument
+A. T. Fyfe
+William James (1842 – 1910), in his 1896 lecture, “ The Will to Believe, ”
+gave an argument for holding onto religious belief even in the face of insuffi
+cient evidence that is second in prominence only to Pascal ’ s Wager (#5).
+James ’ stated target in his lecture is W. K. Clifford (1845 – 79), a philosopher
+who had recently argued in his “ The Ethics of Belief ” that “ It is wrong
+always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything upon insuffi cient
+evidence. ” James ’ strategy in “ The Will to Believe ” is fi rst to identify what
+he thought would be a point of agreement with Clifford; specifi cally, that
+our two fundamental duties as believers are to believe truth and avoid falsehood.
+James then goes on to agree partially with Clifford that at least
+ordinarily, when someone believes upon insuffi cient evidence, he is irrational.
+This is because while believing upon insuffi cient evidence does con-
+James , William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy .
+New York : Dover , 1956 .
+Welchman , Jennifer. “ William James ’ s ‘ The Will to Believe ’ and the Ethics of
+Self - Experimentation . ” Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society 42 ,
+2 (Spring 2006 ): 229 – 41 .
+Wernham , James C. S. James ’ Will - to - Believe Doctrine: A Heretical View .
+Montreal : McGill - Queen ’ s University Press , 1987 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+James’ Will to Believe Argument 33
+tribute to the pursuit of true belief (since the belief might be true), when
+someone believes upon insuffi cient evidence, he is usually violating his duty
+to avoid false belief (since he didn ’ t wait for suffi cient evidence before
+believing).
+Where James disagrees with Clifford is on whether believing upon insuffi
+cient evidence always involves violating our duty to avoid false belief.
+Specifi cally, James argues that there exist beliefs for which the evidence of
+their truth (if they were true) would only become available after we believed
+them and, therefore, waiting to believe until we had suffi cient evidence
+would be a self - defeating wait. To illustrate with an example, suppose that
+you have just fi nished medical school and that you are trying to decide
+whether to join a research team working to discover a cure for cancer. Now,
+to make such a substantial commitment to the search for a cure, James
+would argue that you must believe that a cure exists to be found. That is,
+you ’ d be fooling yourself if you thought you could make such a momentous
+career choice while continuing to suspend belief about the existence of the
+cure you ’ re looking for. At the very least, most people would need such a
+belief to sustain them during the times in which their research was going
+poorly. That being said, suffi cient evidence that such a cure exists won ’ t be
+available until well into the search for one. Therefore, a belief in the existence
+of a cure for cancer is a belief for which the evidence of its truth (if it
+is true) only becomes available after we believe a cure exists.
+Similar to a cancer researcher ’ s belief in the existence of a cure, James
+holds that religious belief is required before evidence of its truth (if it is
+true) can become available. While this would seem to justify religious belief
+only for those who make a career of religious research, James argues that
+religious belief is justifi ed even for ordinary believers in virtue of the peculiar
+way its evidence depends upon their belief. In the preface to the published
+version of his “ The Will to Believe ” lecture, James fi lls in this last step of
+his argument:
+If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the active
+faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the
+experimental tests by which they are verifi ed, and the only means by which
+their truth or falsehood can be wrought out. The truest scientifi c hypothesis
+is that which, as we say, ‘ works ’ best; and it can be no otherwise with religious
+hypotheses. Religious history proves that one hypothesis after another has
+worked ill, has crumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world,
+and has lapsed from the minds of men. Some articles of faith, however, have
+maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more vitality
+to - day than ever before [ … ]. [T]he freest competition of the various faiths
+with one another, and their openest application to life by their several champions,
+are the most favorable conditions under which the survival of the fi ttest
+can proceed. (XII)
+34 A. T. Fyfe
+P1. It is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence if
+and only if having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our
+duty to avoid false belief.
+P2. Having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our duty to
+avoid false belief if and only if I could withhold religious belief for the
+purpose of waiting until I had suffi cient evidence.
+C1. If it is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence,
+then having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our
+duty to avoid false belief (equivalence, simplifi cation, P1).
+C2. If having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our duty
+to avoid false belief, then I could withhold religious belief for the
+purpose of waiting until I had suffi cient evidence (equivalence, simplifi
+cation, P2).
+C3. If it is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence,
+then I could withhold religious belief for the purpose of waiting until
+I had suffi cient evidence (hypothetical syllogism, C1, C2).
+P3. Access to the evidence for religious belief requires already having religious
+belief.
+P4. If access to the evidence for religious belief requires already having
+religious belief, then I cannot withhold belief for the purpose of waiting
+until I had suffi cient evidence.
+C4. I cannot withhold religious belief for the purpose of waiting until I
+had suffi cient evidence ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+C5. It is rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence
+( modus tollens , C3, C4).
+7
+The Problem of Evil
+Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
+In the philosophy of religion, the “ problem of evil ” (sometimes referred to
+as “ theodicy ” ) is one of the oldest and most interesting areas of study. There
+have been numerous reformulations and solutions proposed, most of which
+try to reconcile the existence of evil in the world with the concept of God
+as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (all powerful, all knowing,
+and all loving). Epicurus (341 – 270 bce ) is usually cited as the fi rst author
+to articulate this tension. Following Epicurus, we present a generic argument
+that more explicitly shows the inferences. Starting with the premise
+of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God, the argument
+shows only that the defi nition is incoherent by confl ict with the existence
+of evil and the relevant collective attributes of God. A common mistake in
+interpreting this argument is to suppose that it shows that “ God ” does not
+exist tout court ; what this argument in fact shows is that “ God ” as defi ned
+in a certain way is contradictory and therefore cannot exist as such.
+Inwood , Brad , and L. P. Gerson . Hellenistic Philosophy . Indianapolis :
+Hackett , 1988 .
+Hume , David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion . Indianapolis : Hackett ,
+1980 .
+Mackie , J. L. “ Evil and Omnipotence . ” Mind 64 ( 1955 ): 200 – 12 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+36 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
+God either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not
+want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants
+to and cannot, he is weak – and this does not apply to god. If he can, but
+does not want to, then he is spiteful – which is equally foreign to god ’ s nature.
+If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful and so not a god.
+If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fi tting for a god, where then
+do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them? (Epicurus as
+recounted by Lactantius, qtd. in Inwood and Gerson, 94)
+P1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
+P2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
+C1. God has the power to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If God is omniscient, then God knows evil exists.
+C2. God knows evil exists ( modus ponens , P1, P3).
+P4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
+C3. God has the desire to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , P1, P4).
+P5. Evil exists.
+P6. If evil exists, then either God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all
+evil or doesn ’ t know evil exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate
+all evil.
+C4. God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all evil or doesn ’ t know
+evil exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate all evil ( modus
+ponens , P5, P6).
+P7. If God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all evil or doesn ’ t know evil
+exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate all evil, then God does not
+exist.
+C5. God does not exist ( modus ponens , P7, C4).
+8
+The Free Will Defense to the
+Problem of Evil
+Grant Sterling
+The free will defense is a response to the problem of evil (#7). This defense
+is designed to show that there is no contradiction in supposing that God
+would allow evil to exist (even if God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly
+good), because even a perfectly good being might have reason to
+permit an evil to exist if there is some greater good that cannot be achieved
+without allowing it. The proponent of the free will defense thinks that free
+will is such a good – it is logically impossible for even God to give a creature
+free will and at the same time guarantee that it will always choose rightly,
+and yet free will is a very great good (or is necessary for the existence of
+great goods).
+Note that for many advocates of this argument, it is only necessary to
+show that such a story is coherent, not that it is true. That is, since the
+problem of evil claims that it is impossible for God and evil both to exist,
+to refute the argument, it is only necessary to show that the existence of
+both God and evil is a coherent possibility. On this understanding, a
+“ defense ” claims to lay out a coherent possibility, whereas a philosopher
+who undertakes a “ theodicy ” aims to show that this possibility is the actual
+reason God allows evil.
+van Inwagen , Peter. The Problem of Evil . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2006 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+38 Grant Sterling
+I grant that, in some sense of the word, the non - existence of evil must
+be what a perfectly good being wants. But we often don ’ t bring about states
+of affairs we can bring about and want to bring about. Suppose, for example,
+that Alice ’ s mother is dying in great pain and that Alice yearns desperately
+for her mother to die today and not next week or next month. And suppose
+it would be easy for Alice to arrange this – she is perhaps a doctor or a
+nurse and has easy access to pharmaceutical resources that would enable
+her to achieve this end. Does it follow that she will act on this ability that
+she has? It is obvious that it does not, for Alice might have reasons for not
+doing what she can do. Two obvious candidates for such reasons are: she
+thinks it would be morally wrong; she is afraid that her act would be discovered,
+and that she would be prosecuted for murder. And either of these
+reasons might be suffi cient, in her mind, to outweigh her desire for an
+immediate end to her mother ’ s sufferings. So it may be that someone has a
+very strong desire for something and is able to obtain this thing, but does
+not act on this desire – because he has reasons for not doing so that seem
+to him to outweigh the desirability of the thing. The conclusion that evil
+does not exist does not, therefore, follow logically from the premises that
+the non - existence of evil is what God wants and that he is able to bring
+about the object of his desire – since, for all logic can tell us, God might
+have reasons for allowing evil to exist that, in his mind, outweigh the desirability
+of the non - existence of evil. (van Inwagen, 64 – 5)
+God made the world and it was very good. An indispensable part of the
+goodness he chose was the existence of rational beings: self - aware beings
+capable of abstract thought and love and having the power of free choice
+between contemplated alternative courses of action. This last feature of
+rational beings, free choice or free will, is a good. But even an omnipotent
+being is unable to control the exercise of the power of free choice, for a choice
+that was controlled would ipso facto not be free. In other words, if I have a
+free choice between x and y , even God cannot ensure that I choose x . To ask
+God to give me a free choice between x and y and to see to it that I choose
+x instead of y is to ask God to bring about the intrinsically impossible; it is
+like asking him to create a round square, a material body that has no shape,
+or an invisible object that casts a shadow. Having this power of free choice,
+some or all human beings misused it and produced a certain amount of evil.
+But free will is a suffi ciently great good that its existence outweighs the evils
+that have resulted and will result from its abuse; and God foresaw this. (van
+Inwagen, 71 – 2)
+Problem of Evil, Conclusion 3: * C3 * . God has the desire to eliminate
+all evil.
+P1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
+P2. If God is morally perfect, then if it is impossible to secure a great good
+without permitting an evil, God will not desire to eliminate that evil.
+The Free Will Defense to the Problem of Evil 39
+P3. Free will in created beings is a great good (or is a necessary precondition
+for great goods).
+P4. It is impossible to secure the existence of free will in created beings
+without permitting evil to exist.
+C1. If it is impossible to secure a great good without permitting an evil,
+God will not desire to eliminate that evil ( modus ponens, P1, P2).
+C2. It is impossible to secure a great good (free will) without permitting
+an evil (semantic substitution, P3, P4).
+C3. God will not desire to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , C1, C2,
+with slight semantic variation).
+C4. * C3 * (Conclusion 3 of the Problem of Evil) is false (double negation,
+C3).
+C5. The Problem of Evil is unsound. (All arguments with a false premise
+are unsound by defi nition.)
+9
+St. Anselm on Free Choice and
+the Power to Sin
+Julia Hermann
+Anselm ’ s argument for the claim that freedom of choice does not entail the
+power to sin is still of great philosophical interest regarding the problem of
+free will. Interested in how free will bears on the human responsibility for
+sin and the need for grace, Anselm ’ s reasons for dealing with the issue differ
+from those of contemporary philosophers. Yet, we do not have to share his
+interests in order to see the force of his arguments.
+The argument presented here can be found at the beginning of Anselm ’ s
+dialogue “ On Freedom of Choice, ” which is the second of three “ treatises
+pertaining to the study of Holy Scripture ” (S I: 173; Dialogues , 1), all of
+which deal with closely related subject matters: truth and justice ( De
+Veritate ), freedom of choice ( De Libertate Arbitrii ), and the fall of the devil
+( De Casu Diaboli ). The speakers are the same in all three dialogues: a
+teacher asking questions and a student responding to them.
+At the beginning of the second dialogue, the teacher rejects the view put
+forward by the student that “ freedom of choice is ‘ the ability to sin and
+not to sin ’ ” (S 208; Dialogues , 32). He starts with a reductio ad absurdum :
+S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia . Edited by Franciscus
+Salesius Schmitt , 3 vols. Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt : Friedrich Fromann
+Verlag , 1968 . (S)
+Anselm . Three Philosophical Dialogues , translated by Thomas Williams.
+Indianapolis : Hackett , 2002 . ( Dialogues )
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+St. Anselm on Free Choice and the Power to Sin 41
+If freedom of choice was that ability, “ neither God nor the angels, who
+cannot sin, would have free choice – which it is impious to say ” (ibid.). He
+then provides a further argument for the claim that “ the power to sin is
+neither freedom nor a part of freedom, ” which will be reconstructed below
+(ibid.).
+Initially, the student believes that a will capable of both sinning and not
+sinning is freer than a will which lacks the former capacity. This reveals the
+assumption, prominent in recent debates about the compatibility of free
+will and determinism, that the capacity to do otherwise is a necessary condition
+for freedom of will ( “ Principle of Alternative Possibilities, ” #31).
+Anselm rejects this assumption, holding that freedom does not depend on
+the possibility to will both what is just and what is unjust but on the ability
+to initiate one ’ s own actions. It is a necessary condition for a person ’ s
+will to be free that his actions have their origin in him and not in any
+external power (S I: 209f; Dialogues , 33f.). Freedom of will (or choice) is
+only impeded by external compulsion, not by the lack of alternative possibilities.
+Today, we fi nd elaborated versions of this idea in accounts of
+“ agent - causality. ”
+Starting from the premise that “ if someone has what is fi tting and expedient
+in such a way that he cannot lose it, he is freer than someone who
+has it in such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting
+and harmful, ” Anselm argues that a will that lacks the ability to sin is freer
+than a will that has it. He then continues arguing that since something that
+diminishes the will ’ s freedom when added to the will cannot be freedom or
+a part of it, and since the power to sin diminishes freedom when added to
+the will, that power is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
+Initially, the fi rst premise of the argument seems controversial. It must
+be seen in the light of Anselm ’ s teleological conception of freedom. Later
+in the dialogue, freedom of choice is defi ned as “ the power to preserve
+rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself ” (S I: 212; Dialogues , 36).
+This defi nition, in turn, cannot be understood independently of Anselm ’ s
+discussion of truth in the fi rst dialogue. There he argues that truth consists
+in rectitude, or correctness ( rectitudo , S I: 177; Dialogues , 5). He speaks of
+truth not only in statements and opinions but also in actions, the will, the
+senses, and the essences of things. According to his teleological understanding
+of rectitude, a will has rectitude if it wills what it ought to will, that is,
+what God wants it to will (S I: 181f; Dialogues , 8f).
+Anselm then defi nes justice as “ rectitude of will preserved for its own
+sake ” (S I: 194; Dialogues , 24). Given that in the second dialogue freedom
+of choice is defi ned as “ the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake
+of rectitude itself, ” freedom of choice turns out to be identical with a capacity
+for justice. This illuminates why the ability to sin, when added to the
+will, diminishes its freedom. Also, we can now see clearly that, like his
+42 Julia Hermann
+understanding of truth, Anselm ’ s understanding of freedom is teleological.
+This distinguishes him from most contemporary philosophers.
+In the way in which Anselm presents his argument, it is incomplete. To
+be formally and semantically valid, it has to be supplemented by a number
+of premises that are merely implicit in the text. The original argument is
+contained in the following passage from “ On Free Will ” :
+T: Which will do you think is freer: one whose willing and whose ability
+not to sin are such that it cannot be turned away from the rectitude of
+not sinning, or one that in some way can be turned to sin?
+S: I don ’ t see why a will isn ’ t freer when it is capable of both.
+T: Do you not see that someone who has what is fi tting and expedient in
+such a way that he cannot lose it is freer than someone who has it in
+such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting
+and inexpedient?
+S: I don ’ t think anyone would doubt that.
+T: And you will say that it is no less indubitable that sinning is always unfi tting
+and harmful.
+S: No one in his right mind thinks otherwise.
+T: Then a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is
+freer than a will that can abandon that rectitude.
+S: I don ’ t think anything could be more reasonably asserted.
+T: Now if something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom
+if taken away, do you think that it is either freedom or a part of
+freedom?
+S: I cannot think so.
+T: Then the power to sin, which if added to the will diminishes its freedom
+and if taken away increases it, is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
+S: Nothing could be more logical. (S I: 208f; Dialogues , 32f)
+P1. If someone has what is fi tting and expedient in such a way that he
+cannot lose it, he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that
+he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting and harmful.
+P2. Rectitude is fi tting and expedient.
+C1. If someone has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it, then he is
+freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be
+seduced into what is unfi tting and harmful (substitution, P1, P2).
+P3. Sinning is always unfi tting and harmful.
+C2. If someone has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it, then
+he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it
+and be seduced into sinning (substitution, C1, P3).
+P4. Someone who has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it is
+someone who has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not
+sinning.
+St. Anselm on Free Choice and the Power to Sin 43
+P5. If someone has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not
+sinning, then he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he
+can lose it and be seduced into sinning (substitution, C2, P4).
+C3. Someone who has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of
+not sinning is freer than a will that has rectitude in such a way that
+he can lose it and be seduced into sinning ( modus ponens , P5, P4).
+P6. A will that can abandon rectitude is a will that has rectitude in such a
+way that it can lose it and be seduced into sinning.
+C4. A will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is freer
+than a will that can abandon rectitude (substitution, C3, P6).
+P7. The power to sin diminishes freedom if it is added to the will and
+increases freedom if it is taken away from it (implied by C2).
+P8. If something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom if
+taken away, then it is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
+C5. The power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom ( modus
+ponens , P7, P8).
+10
+Hume ’ s Argument against
+Miracles
+Tommaso Piazza
+Originally planned to appear in the earlier Treatise of Human Nature
+(1739 – 40), Hume ’ s argument against miracles fi rst went to press as Chapter
+X of An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding in 1748. Since then,
+mainly as a separate text, it has been granted continued attention. The
+argument is part of Hume ’ s philosophy of religion. In particular, it is
+inserted within a discussion about whether some religious belief could be
+Hume , David. An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
+Hackett , 1997 .
+Buckle , Stephen. Hume ’ s Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An
+Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding . Oxford : Oxford University
+Press , 2001 .
+Fogelin , Robert J. A Defense of Hume on Miracles . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
+University Press , 2003 .
+Levine , Michael P. Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution . Dordrecht :
+Kluwer , 1989 .
+___. “ Miracles . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005
+edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
+entries/miracles/#Hum
+Swinburne , Richard. The Existence of God . Oxford : Oxford University
+Press , 2004 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Hume’s Argument against Miracles 45
+established by revelation; the argument purports to vindicate a negative
+answer to this question, by showing that miracles – the very foundation of
+revealed religion – are not (could not be) credible. Importantly, it is independent
+of any metaphysical claim about whether a miracle is or is not
+possible, and it is just premised on Hume ’ s empiricist views in epistemology.
+Here is how Hume summarizes the argument:
+A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature [DEF - m]; and as a fi rm and
+unalterable experience has established these laws [DEF - l], the proof against
+a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from
+experience can possibly be imagined. (Hume, 76)
+It is scarcely controversial, although it has not remained unchallenged
+(see Swinburne), that Hume ’ s argument is to be read as addressing the
+question about whether we could be justifi ed in believing in a miracle on
+the basis of empirical evidence; in fact, he leaves to a different part of the
+Inquiry a discussion of whether we could have knowledge of God (and so,
+on its basis, indirectly of miracles) other than by revelation. It is a bit more
+controversial, though, whether Hume is trying to establish the conclusion
+that we could be justifi ed in believing in a miracle on the basis of no empirical
+evidence whatsoever – and so, in particular, not even if we had an
+experience of a miracle – or the considerably weaker conclusion that we
+could not be justifi ed in believing in a miracle on the basis of the testimony
+of others. In what follows, the argument will be presented as it is more
+customarily discussed, that is, as aimed to establish the weaker conclusion.
+It is also unclear whether Hume ’ s argument is meant to be a priori or a
+posteriori . This difference is worth taking into consideration for the following
+reason: while many philosophers think that a priori justifi cation is
+indefeasible by experience, it is quite uncontroversial that a posteriori justifi
+cation can be so defeated; since the conclusion of an argument cannot
+be justifi ed more fi rmly than its premises, this implies that Hume ’ s argument,
+depending on whether we read it as a priori or a posteriori , is aimed
+to establish a conclusion that cannot – respectively can – be overturned by
+further experiences. A possible irenic solution that will be adopted here is
+to divide Hume ’ s argument in two parts (corresponding to the parts into
+which Chapter X is divided), 1 and to read the fi rst of them as aimed to
+assess the question whether testimony (possibly) justifi es belief in a miracle
+(at least in part) in light of a priori considerations, and to read the second
+1 Buckle explains that both parts refl ect to some degree a division of probability arguments
+which was common in Hume ’ s time: that among “ internal ” and “ external ” evidences. The
+internal part of any such argument examines the internal credibility of a claim, the external
+part examines this claim in light of the evidence available.
+46 Tommaso Piazza
+as aimed to assess the very same question in light of additional considerations
+of a clearly a posteriori nature. As we will see, the (sub)conclusion of
+the fi rst part is logically weaker than the conclusion of the second. By the
+same token, the conclusion of the fi rst argument has appeared more resistible
+than the conclusion of the second. (For this reason, Fogelin contends
+that Hume just wanted to offer the second argument and not the fi rst.) The
+fi rst argument purports to show that no testimony could ever provide evidence
+that is strong enough to undermine our expectation that events that
+have always been experienced in conjunction with one another will not (and
+did not) appear in conjunction with one another; the second argument aims
+just to show that no testimony has provided such evidence. Finally, it is
+worth mentioning that some controversy surrounds the scope of the conclusion
+that (the fi rst part of) Hume ’ s argument, if successful, would actually
+establish. In particular, it has been suggested that the argument quickly (and
+undesirably) generalizes to the conclusion that it is always irrational to
+accept testimony of something which is very unlikely in light of past experience
+(such as water ’ s becoming ice, if you live in a very warm region).
+Hume ’ s insistence on the distinction among extraordinary (yet natural)
+events and miracles is often invoked to resist this objection (Levine): given
+its supernatural origin, a miracle cannot be judged to be analogous to any
+other event in experience; on the contrary, an extraordinary event can bear
+the relevant similarity to past experience and then become acceptable by
+analogy. Yet, it is controversial whether this strategy – since it implies that
+Hume ’ s argument should feature as a premise the claim that we could not
+have had an experience of a miraculous event – creates more problems for
+Hume ’ s argument than it helps to solve.
+P1. That A is the case provides evidence E for B ’ s being the case if and only
+if the number of times in which we have observed A, and then have
+observed B, is greater than the number of times in which we have
+observed that A was not followed by B.
+P2. The strength of E is proportional to the ratio among the number of
+times in which we have observed A, and then have observed B, and the
+number of times in which we have observed that A was not followed by
+B.
+P3. The existence of testimony of type K (henceforth K - testimony) to the
+effect that B was not the case provides evidence ET for the proposition
+that B was not the case only if the number of times in which we have
+received K - testimony for a proposition, and then have observed that the
+proposition was true, is greater than the number of times in which we
+have received K - testimony for a proposition and then have observed that
+the proposition was not true (instantiation, P1).
+Hume’s Argument against Miracles 47
+P4. The strength of ET is proportional to the ratio among the number of
+times in which we have received K - testimony for a proposition and then
+have observed that the proposition was true and the number of times in
+which we have received K - testimony for a proposition and then have
+observed that the proposition was not true (instantiation, P2).
+P5. Whenever one ’ s global evidence is constituted by E1 and E2, and E1 is
+evidence in favor of a given p, and E2 is evidence for non - p, it is rational
+to believe that p only if E1 is stronger than E2, it is rational to disbelieve
+that p only if E2 is stronger than E1, and it is rational to withhold belief
+as to whether p only if the strength of E1 is the same as the strength of
+E2.
+P6. There is K - testimony to the occurrence of a miracle M.
+P7. There is a law of nature L – say that every A is followed by B – and
+the K - testimony is to the effect that A was not followed by B
+(DEF – m).
+P8. It is rational to accept that M occurred (assumption for reductio ).
+P9. That A was the case provides evidence E * for the proposition that B
+was the case, which is weaker than the evidence ET, provided by the
+K - testimony, for the proposition that B was not the case.
+P10. If it is rational to accept that M occurred, then that A was the case
+provides evidence E * for the proposition that B was the case, which is
+weaker than the evidence ET, provided by the K - testimony, for the
+proposition that B was not the case (instantiation, P8, P9).
+P11. L has been established by a “ fi rm and unalterable experience ” of many
+instances of A ’ s that were followed by many instances of B ’ s without
+exception (DEF - 1).
+P12. That A was the case provides the strongest possible evidence E * for
+the proposition that B was the case (instantiation, P2, P11).
+P13. ET is stronger than the strongest possible evidence E * (conjunction
+P9, P12).
+C1. It is not the case that ET is stronger than E * .
+C2. It is not rational to accept that M occurred ( modus tollens , P10,
+C1).
+The (sub)conclusion above is derived without further specifying the
+nature of the K - testimony in favor of a miracle (namely, independently of
+the number, reliability, opportunity, etc. of the witnesses reporting M that
+identify the relevant K). So, at least to this extent, the argument is a priori .
+Importantly, the conclusion is still compatible with its being rational, on
+the basis of testimony, to withhold belief as to whether a miracle occurred.
+As already anticipated, however, in the second part of Chapter X of the
+Inquiry , Hume presents empirical considerations about the K - testimony
+48 Tommaso Piazza
+which is actually available that allow one to derive a logically stronger
+conclusion.
+There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a suffi cient
+number of men, of such unquestioned good - sense, education and learning as
+to secure us against all delusion. [ … ] The passion of surprise and wonder,
+arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency
+towards the belief of these events. (Hume, 78)
+Empirical observation of the nature of the witnesses who have testifi ed
+to a miracle and the general psychological remark that men are far too
+prone to believe in the marvelous suggest that the testimony for a miracle
+that is actually available is of a kind K that is unable to deliver evidence
+ET that is strong enough to equal to (not to say to outweigh) the evidence
+we have to expect nature to proceed along the course we have always
+experienced. So, it arguably enforces:
+C1. Evidence ET is weaker than E * .
+C2. It is (more) rational to believe that M did not occur ( modus ponens ,
+P5, C1).
+11
+The Euthyphro Dilemma
+David Baggett
+Antony Flew once said that the test of one ’ s aptitude in philosophy is one ’ s
+ability to grasp the force and point of the “ Euthyphro Dilemma, ” a traditional
+objection to theistic ethics traceable to an early Socratic dialogue.
+The dilemma has long been thought to be an effective refutation of the
+effort to locate the authority of morality in the will or commands of God
+(or the gods). In the original context, the dilemma referred to the Greek
+pantheon of gods and what they loved and hated, whereas in more recent
+times the formulation is typically in terms of God and God ’ s commands.
+The point of the dilemma is that God, even if God exists, does not function
+as the foundation of ethics. At most, God satisfi es a prudential or epistemic
+function when it comes to morality, but not an ontological one, if the argument
+goes through.
+About halfway into Plato ’ s Euthyphro , Socrates asks the young Euthyphro
+a question that has come to be known as the “ Euthyphro Dilemma. ”
+Expressed in contemporary and monotheistic terms, it can be put like this:
+Plato . The Collected Dialogues of Plato , edited by Edith Hamilton and
+Huntington Cairns . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press , 1961 .
+Adams , Robert . Finite and Infi nite Goods: A Framework for Ethics . Oxford :
+Oxford University Press , 2000 .
+Baggett , David , and Jerry L. Walls . Good God: The Theistic Foundations of
+Morality . New York : Oxford University Press , 2011 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+50 David Baggett
+Does God command something because it is moral, or is something moral
+because God commands it? In the original context, Euthyphro, a fi rm
+believer in the Greek pantheon of gods, argues that the essence of holiness
+is what the gods love. After Socrates elicits from Euthyphro the admission
+that the gods, according to legend, could disagree, Euthyphro ’ s view became
+that the holy is what all the gods loved and the unholy what all the gods
+hated. At this point, Socrates shifts gears and introduces the Dilemma, both
+horns of which are problematic for the theistic ethicist: for either God is
+merely reporting what ’ s moral apart from God or God can render as moral
+whatever God ’ s whim happens to choose.
+Many classical theists fi nd both horns of the dilemma unacceptable,
+because as moral realists they are unwilling to think of morality as infi nitely
+malleable, and as robust supernaturalists they resist the notion that God is
+essentially irrelevant to a matter so important as moral truth. One common
+effort at the solution is to disambiguate “ morality ” between its deontic and
+axiological dimensions, distinguishing between obligation and value, and
+rooting God ’ s commands only in the former. God ’ s commands thus provide
+a way to delimit among what ’ s good what ’ s also obligatory, since some
+such mechanism is necessary because not everything that ’ s morally good is
+also morally obligatory (otherwise there would no room for the category
+of supererogation, moral actions that go above and beyond the call of
+duty, a category that act utilitarians have a notoriously hard time
+accommodating).
+A principled affi rmation of divine impeccability (sinlessness) helps resolve
+arbitrariness and vacuity concerns, because if God is essentially good and
+loving, then God would never issue commands in irremediable tension with
+nonnegotiable moral intuitions.
+A series of six additional distinctions can also be useful in diffusing the
+Euthyphro Dilemma. A scope distinction between defi nition and analysis,
+a semantic distinction between univocation and equivocation, a modal
+distinction between conceivability and possibility, an epistemic distinction
+between diffi culty and impossibility, a metaethical distinction between
+knowing and being, and an ontological distinction between dependence and
+control collectively can enable the theistic ethicist to defend her view against
+the Euthyphro Dilemma. Therefore, God ’ s commands can provide the right
+analysis of moral obligations even if not a defi nition of “ moral obligation, ”
+which allows atheists to use deontic language meaningfully without believing
+in God. God would, moreover, retain moral prerogatives that human
+beings wouldn ’ t, so God ’ s behavior, though ultimately recognizable as
+moral, need not be exactly like human morality (contrary to John Stuart
+Mill ’ s claim to the contrary). Although God ’ s issuing irremediably evil commands
+is vaguely conceivable, it wouldn ’ t be genuinely possible; reconciling
+God ’ s commands with ineliminable moral intuitions may be diffi cult but
+The Euthyphro Dilemma 51
+can ’ t be impossible if it ’ s rational to believe in God ’ s moral perfection; and
+our grasp of necessary moral facts is an epistemic issue that would underdetermine
+the metaphysical foundations of morality. And fi nally, the dependence
+of morality on God does not entail God ’ s volitional control over the
+contents of morality to make it just anything at all; divine impeccability
+would rule some things out. Armed with such distinctions, the theistic ethicist
+and divine command theorist has not been shown to be irrational in
+light of the Euthyphro Dilemma.
+Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it
+because it is holy? (Plato, 10a)
+P1. What is moral is either moral because God commands it or it is not.
+P2. If what is moral is moral because God commands it, then morality is
+arbitrary and vacuous.
+P3. If what is moral is moral for reasons other than that God commands
+it, then God is superfl uous from the standpoint of morality.
+C1. Either morality is arbitrary and vacuous or God is superfl uous to
+morality (constructive dilemma, P1, P2, P3).
+12
+Nietzsche ’ s Death of God
+Tom Grimwood
+While Nietzsche resists easy logical formulation, the signifi cance of his
+critique of the ideas of truth and morality in Western philosophy makes
+him one of the most important thinkers in modern times. Perhaps no other
+philosopher has been defi ned through his legacy as has been Nietzsche: the
+assault on the metaphysical nature of truth in this argument not only lays
+foundations for existentialism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism, but
+it also provides moral philosophy with an emblematic fi gure of moral skepticism
+(in the work of MacIntyre or Williams, for example).
+For Nietzsche, the contemporary age (Northern Europe at the end of the
+nineteenth century) was witnessing a radical undermining of its philosophical
+foundations. On the one hand, the traditional beliefs in God were
+rendered unbelievable by developments in science. But on the other hand,
+the gap this left in existence had merely being fi lled by a substitute, science
+itself, which for Nietzsche maintained the same illusory suppositions over
+the sacred nature of “ truth. ” On the one hand, the rise of the middle classes
+in the industrial age was undermining traditional structures of society,
+revealing the importance and malleability of power to the development of
+humanity. On the other hand, Nietzsche saw that this great shift had produced
+not radical change but only apathy. The real problem, Nietzsche
+argued, was not that God had ceased to be believable, but – given the way
+Nietzsche , Friedrich . The Gay Science , translated by Josefi ne Nauckhoff.
+Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2001 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Nietzsche’s Death of God 53
+in which science seamlessly slotted into the same foundational space –
+nobody had really noticed the signifi cance of the event. Nietzsche is not a
+nihilist: for him, the death of God is the greatest event of recent times,
+enabling “ Free Spirits ” to throw off their metaphysical shackles and embrace
+a genuinely open future (although Nietzsche ’ s – necessary – ambiguity over
+the precise nature of this future has undeniably led to such diverse readings
+of his work).
+Hence, despite its subject matter, Nietzsche does not argue for the Death
+of God itself in his work in a way that would engage traditionally with the
+philosophy of religion – it is, rather, a proclamation of an event which is
+witnessed or reported (for example, in The Gay Science, § 125, § 343, and
+in the prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra ). He is more interested in how
+we, as humans, react to the event: whether we embrace its full signifi cance
+or continue to place a similar “ faith ” in concepts that remain dependent
+upon the same metaphysical assumptions, such as science and/or morality.
+Central to these assumptions is the affi rmation of “ another world, ” that of
+“ truth, ” which lies behind our immediate world of experience (for
+Christianity, this is “ heaven ” ; for morality, the abstract “ good ” ; for science,
+atomic structures; and so on). This “ beyond ” removes us from our own
+sensibilities and retains us in a quasi - religious state in reverence to the
+scientifi c and/or the moral. Given that such an ordering of the world infects
+both our language and practice, Nietzsche consequently views the importance
+of truth as metaphorical rather than rational: the sense we make of
+the world is always limited by our perspective (indeed, in his early work he
+argues that truth is itself a mixed metaphorical construction, a point much
+elaborated on by later poststructuralists), and as such images, fi gures, and
+motifs authorize this sense long before we construct a justifi catory logic for
+it. Nietzsche ’ s style of arguing is at once rigorously philological, tracing
+the historical development of concepts with intense academic skill, and
+at the same time almost hopelessly generalizing, aiming broad shots across
+the bows of our expectations of what a philosophical argument should be.
+This style must be borne in mind when approaching the logic of Nietzsche ’ s
+argument: his argument over the Death of God is far more a polemic than
+it is an exercise in close reasoning, and at least one of its aims is to open
+our eyes to a world without fi xed parameters of meaning and truth, and in
+its place, a raw fl ux of energy and power.
+The greatest recent event – that “ God is dead ” ; that the belief in the
+Christian God has become unbelievable – is already starting to cast its fi rst
+shadow over Europe. [ … ] But in the main one might say: for many people ’ s
+power of comprehension, the event is itself far too great, distant, and out of
+the way even for its tidings to be thought of as having arrived yet. Even less
+may one suppose many to know at all what this even really means – and,
+54 Tom Grimwood
+now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because
+it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown on it – for example, our
+entire European morality. ( § 343)
+Wouldn ’ t the cultivation of the scientifi c spirit begin when one permitted
+oneself no more convictions? That is probably the case; only we need still
+ask: in order that this cultivation begin , must there not be some prior conviction
+– and indeed one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifi ces all
+other convictions to itself? We see that science, too, rests on a faith; there is
+simply no “ presuppositionless ” science. The question whether truth is necessary
+must get an answer in advance, the answer “ yes ” , and moreover this
+answer must be so fi rm that it takes the form of the statement, the belief, the
+conviction: “ Nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything
+else has only secondary value. ” [ … ] But why not deceive? But why
+not allow oneself to be deceived? Note that the reasons for the former lie in
+a completely different area from those for the latter: one does not want to let
+oneself be deceived because one assumes it is harmful, dangerous, disastrous
+to be deceived; in this sense science would be a long - range prudence, caution,
+utility, and to this one could justifi ably object: How so? Is it really less
+harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived? [ … ]
+Precisely this conviction could never have originated if truth and untruth had
+constantly made it clear that they were both useful, as they are. So, the faith
+in science, which after all undeniably exists, cannot owe its origin to such a
+calculus of utility; rather it must have originated in spite of the fact that the
+disutility and dangerousness of the “ will to truth ” or “ truth at any price ” is
+proved to it constantly. [ … ] Consequently, “ will to truth ” does not mean “ I
+do not want to let myself be deceived ” but – there is no alternative – “ I will
+not deceive, not even myself ” ; and with that we stand on moral ground .
+( § 344)
+Thus the question “ Why science? ” leads back to the moral problem: Why
+morality at all , if life, nature, and history are “ immoral ” ? No doubt, those
+who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science
+presupposes thereby affi rm another world than that of life, nature, and
+history; [ … ] it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science
+rests – that even we knowers of today, we godless anti - metaphysicians, still
+take our fi re, too, from the fl ame lit by the thousand - year old faith, the
+Christian faith which was also Plato ’ s faith, that God is truth; that truth is
+divine [ … ] But what if this were to become more and more diffi cult to believe,
+if nothing more were to turn out to be divine except error, blindness, the lie
+– if God himself were to turn out to be our longest lie? ( § 344)
+The opening part of this reconstructed argument is not Nietzsche ’ s but
+rather a standard motif of modernity, which Nietzsche takes to task:
+P1. If we accept or commit to something as an organizing principle of our
+lives, then it should be rational, true, or believable.
+Nietzsche’s Death of God 55
+P2. God ’ s existence is not rational, true, or believable ( “ The belief in the
+Christian God has become unbelievable, ” § 343).
+C1. We should not accept and commit to God as an organizing principle
+of our lives ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+The majority of people are happy with this, Nietzsche thinks, because they
+substitute other, more believable principles – science, morality, and so on – in
+the place of ‘ God ’ s existence ’ . P2 then becomes an affi rmation rather than a
+negation – ‘ science is rational ’ , for example – albeit creating a fallacy of
+affi rming the consequent. It is these substitutions that Nietzsche sees as remnants
+of belief that are really challenged by the idea of the Death of God.
+Thus, Nietzsche is not interested in discussing the existence or nature of God
+(P2 or C1). His issue is rather with the claim made in P1: our desire to seek a
+“ truth ” in the world beyond our immediate sensations, or, as Nietzsche terms
+it, the Will to Truth, and why this conditions our lives in the way it does.
+P3. If science, morality, or religion contains assumptions, then these will
+affect the outcome of its inquiry.
+Again, here Nietzsche is using the principles of the Enlightenment (the
+“ scientifi c spirit ” ) that knowledge should be objective and without assumptions
+(or, in Nietzsche ’ s words, “ convictions ” ). “ Wouldn ’ t the cultivation
+of the scientifi c spirit begin when one permitted oneself no more convictions?
+” But Nietzsche probes this premise, “ we need still ask: in order that
+this cultivation begin , must there not be some prior conviction – and indeed
+one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifi ces all other convictions
+to itself? ” ( § 344).
+P4. Science, morality, and religion contain the same assumption: the Will
+to Truth (the unspoken assumption of science, for example, is that truth
+is worth discovering: the “ yes ” in advance); “ There is simply no ‘ presuppositionless
+’ science. ”
+C2. The Will to Truth affects the outcome of (moral, scientifi c, religious)
+inquiry ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+Nietzsche is noting here that our understanding is conditioned by the
+need to discover a “ truth ” beyond our immediate perception, which he
+considers most moral, scientifi c, and religious understanding to do (he
+writes more on this in the section of Beyond Good and Evil entitled “ On
+the prejudices of philosophers ” ).
+P5. If the Will to Truth is essential to our understanding (i.e., we can have
+no knowledge without it), then we will have a reason for following it.
+P6. But we do not have a moral or utilitarian reason for following it.
+56 Tom Grimwood
+When Nietzsche asks whether it is “ really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous
+not to want to let oneself be deceived? ” we can see that lying and
+deception can, in fact, be very useful (e.g., when raising children, absolute
+truth is unnecessary and sometimes unhelpful).
+C3. The Will to Truth is not essential to our understanding ( modus
+tollens , P5, P6).
+As Nietzsche refl ects, “ you only have to ask yourself carefully, ‘ Why do
+you not want to deceive? ’ especially if it should seem – and it does seem!
+– as if [ … ] life on the largest scale has actually always shown itself to be
+on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi . ” (201) “ Polytropoi ”
+means devious, cunning, deceptive. It comes from The Odyssey , where it is
+used to describe the hero who uses these traits to survive the wrath of the
+gods. In other words, Nietzsche is suggesting that “ life ” in general does not
+favor truth in the way that scientifi c or moral knowledge seems to.
+The argument then makes two interrelated points surrounding the status
+of “ truth ” itself:
+P7. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to
+Truth, our reasons must be other than these.
+“ Should both be necessary – a lot of trust as well as a lot of mistrust –
+then where might science get the unconditional belief or conviction one
+which it rests? ” (200 – 1).
+C4. Our reasons for following the Will to Truth are other than moral or
+utilitarian ( modus ponens , P7, P6).
+P8. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to
+Truth, then it cannot be rational, true, or believable
+C5. The Will to Truth cannot be rational, true, or believable ( modus
+ponens , P8, P6).
+In the place of “ rational ” justifi cation, which is but an aspect of the Will
+to Truth, Nietzsche suggests that “ truth ” is merely a guise for the expression
+of our power. It rests on a metaphysical faith which is no different, at heart,
+to the Christian belief in God. The Will to Truth is, thus, a means for limiting
+our expression of such power: this is symptomatic in the “ slave morality
+” of Christianity. With this connection established between science,
+morality, and faith, Nietzsche returns to the fi rst part of the argument. If
+God has become unbelievable, then our faith in the divinity of “ truth ” is
+also placed in question. The question that Nietzsche leaves us with suggests
+that this is what the death of God “ really means. ”
+13
+Ockham ’ s Razor
+Grant Sterling
+“ Ockham ’ s Razor ” is frequently cited as an argument and attributed to
+William of Ockham. It is typically rendered as “ Entities are not to be multiplied
+without necessity. ” It is sometimes understood to mean that when
+given a choice between two theories, one should choose the one that
+employs fewer entities (or, sometimes, fewer different types of entities). At
+other times, it is understood to state that if a given entity is not necessary
+to explain anything, then we should deny its existence. This common conception,
+however, is a misunderstanding in several ways.
+First, Ockham never said those words – the name “ Ockham ’ s Razor ”
+was invented in 1852, and the words attributed to Ockham do not appear
+in any of his known works. (The two statements above represent Ockham ’ s
+actual position.) Second, the idea that we shouldn ’ t believe in things without
+a good reason is by no means original to Ockham or distinctive of him.
+Third, the Razor is not really an argument but rather a premise or principle
+used to create arguments of a certain form. Finally, Ockham himself did
+not actually use the argument to deny the existence of any possible entities,
+only to doubt them. Ockham allowed for three sources of knowledge
+William of Ockham . Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae , translated
+by Michael J. Loux. Notre Dame, IN : University of Notre Dame
+Press , 1974 .
+___. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio) , Distinctiones
+XIX – XLVIII, in Opera Theologica , vol. IV , edited by Girard Etzkorn
+and Francis Kelly . St. Bonaventure, NY : St. Bonaventure University ,
+1979 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+58 Grant Sterling
+(self - evidence, empirical evidence, and biblical revelation), and held that if
+we cannot know that something exists through one of these three sources,
+we should not believe that the thing exists (which does not necessarily mean
+that we believe that it doesn ’ t exist – without positive evidence that the
+thing is not there, we should simply remain neutral).
+Plurality should not be postulated without necessity. ( Commentary on the
+Sentences of Peter Lombard , Part I, dist. 1, q. 1 and 2)
+For nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is known
+through itself or known by experience or proven by the authority of Sacred
+Scripture. ( Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard , Part I, dist. 30,
+q. 1)
+“ Ockham ’ s Razor ” as it is commonly employed:
+P1. Two theories, T1 and T2, explain the observed facts equally well (and
+better than all rival theories), and T1 requires us to postulate the existence
+of more entities (or more types of entities) than T2.
+P2. “ Ockham ’ s Razor ” : If two theories explain the observed facts equally
+well (and better than all rival theories), believe the theory that postulates
+fewer entities than a rival theory with no loss in explanatory force.
+C1. We ought to believe T2 and disbelieve T1 ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+Or
+P1. We do not need to postulate the existence of object X in order to explain
+any of the phenomena we are attempting to explain.
+P2. “ Ockham ’ s Razor ” : If we do not need to postulate the existence of any
+particular object in order to explain any of the phenomena we are
+attempting to explain, we should disbelieve the existence of any putative
+object not needed to explain phenomena.
+C1. Disbelieve the existence of X ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+Ockham ’ s Razor as Ockham himself would employ it:
+P1. The existence of object X is not self - evident, nor do we have empirical
+evidence for its existence, nor is it required by the Bible.
+P2. Ockham ’ s Razor: If the existence of object X is not self - evident, nor do
+we have empirical evidence for its existence, nor is it required by the
+Bible, then we should not believe in the existence of object X.
+C1. Do not believe in the existence of object X (though it is still possible
+that X does exist) ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+Part II
+Metaphysics
+14
+Parmenides ’ Refutation
+of Change
+Adrian Bardon
+Parmenides was a Greek scholar living in the Italian colony of Elea in the
+fi fth century bce . The Eleatic school that he championed was known for
+its claim that reality is a timeless unity. Change, along with the passage of
+time, is just an illusion or projection of the mind. Only fragments of
+Parmenides ’ work survive; they include his refutation of change, which may
+constitute the earliest surviving example of extended philosophical
+argumentation.
+The main fragment contains a series of connected points intended to
+show the impossibility of change. According to Parmenides, any change
+involves destruction or creation, in that it either involves an item going from
+being to not being (or vice versa) or a property going from being (instantiated)
+to not being (uninstantiated) (or vice versa). So any change involves
+something that both is and is not, which is an apparent contradiction. He
+anticipates the obvious proposed resolution to this claim: there is no contradiction
+in an item or property both being and not being, since it can,
+say, “ be ” in the present while “ not be ” in the future or past. He replies that
+this just relocates the contradiction inherent in change to the level of change
+Palmer , John . Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford
+University Press , 2009 .
+Hoy , Ronald . “ Parmenides ’ Complete Rejection of Time . ” Journal of
+Philosophy 91 ( 1994 ): 573 – 98 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+62 Adrian Bardon
+over time. Taking change seriously requires us to think in terms of past and
+future times as real; but the past and future are distinguished from the
+present in that the present “ is ” while the past and future “ are not. ” The
+only way to think of the past and future as real (Parmenides would claim)
+is to think of them as real now, which would make them present. So thinking
+about change requires us to think about the past and future as both
+present and not present, real and not real.
+Parmenides ’ resolution of the contradiction is to deny the reality both of
+change and of the passage of time. (Note this line of reasoning is a very
+close precursor to J. M. E. McTaggart ’ s (#15) early - twentieth - century argument
+to the same conclusion. Sense - perception is characterized by change,
+so sensation is fundamentally deceptive. The only way to know the truth
+about the world is by disregarding sensation and using reason and logic
+alone.
+Note that Parmenides does not consider rejecting P2 or P4 instead of P1;
+he does not, in other words, consider any defi nition of change that would
+be consistent with a static theory of time. The static theory denies dynamic
+nonrelational temporal properties (such as past/present/future) but allows
+static relational temporal properties (such as earlier/simultaneous/later).
+This is the same omission later made by McTaggart. This omission does
+not affect the validity of this argument when considered as an attack specifi -
+cally on the dynamic theory of time.
+As yet a single tale of a way
+remains, that it is; and along this path markers are there
+very many, that What Is is ungenerated and deathless,
+whole and uniform, and still and perfect;
+but not ever was it, nor yet will it be, since it is now together entire,
+single, continuous; for what birth will you seek of it?
+How, whence increased? From not being I shall not allow
+you to say or to think: for not to be said and not to be thought
+is it that it is not. And indeed what need could have aroused it
+later rather than before, beginning from nothing, to grow?
+Thus it must either be altogether or not at all.
+Nor ever from not being will the force of conviction allow
+something to come to be beyond it: on account of this neither to be born
+nor to die has Justice allowed it, having loosed its bonds,
+but she holds it fast. And the decision about these matters lies in this:
+it is or it is not; but it has in fact been decided, just as is necessary,
+to leave the one unthought and nameless (for no true
+way is it), and [it has been decided] that the one that it is indeed is genuine.
+And how could What Is be hereafter? And how might it have been?
+For if it was, it is not, nor if ever it is going to be:
+thus generation is extinguished and destruction unheard of.
+(Parmenides, qtd. in Palmer, 143)
+Parmenides’ Refutation of Change 63
+P1. Change is real (assumption for reductio ).
+P2. If change is real, then it involves either (a) an object ’ s coming into existence
+or beginning to have some property or (b) an object ’ s becoming
+nonexistent or ceasing to have some property.
+P3. If (P2), then there are different times, that is, past/present/future.
+C1. There are different times, that is, past/present/future (hypothetical
+syllogism, P1,P2, P3).
+P4. There are not different times – only the present exists.
+C2. There are different times and there are not different times (conjunction
+C1, P4).
+C3. Change is not real ( reductio , P1 – C2).
+15
+McTaggart ’ s Argument against the
+Reality of Time
+M. Joshua Mozersky
+McTaggart ’ s argument begins with the rather simple observation that there
+are two ways in which moments and events in time may be characterized.
+First, they may be past, present, or future, in which case they form what
+McTaggart calls the “ A - series ” (this is a series because these properties
+order events with respect to each other). Second, times or events may be
+earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than other times/events; McTaggart
+calls this ordering the “ B - series. ” These two series differ. A - series properties
+are transitory; an event might be future, but soon it will be present, then
+past. B - series relations are permanent. If, for example, it is true that X
+follows Y, then it is always true that X follows Y; there is never a time at
+which X precedes Y or at which X and Y are simultaneous. On the B - series,
+McTaggart concludes, there is no genuine change – no temporal variation
+in facts – since whatever is true is always true. McTaggart also claims,
+however, that time can only exist if change exists; hence, if time is real, then
+McTaggart , J. M. E. The Nature of Existence , vol. II . Cambridge, UK :
+Cambridge University Press , 1927 .
+Broad , C. D. An Examination of McTaggart ’ s Philosophy , vol. II . Cambridge,
+UK : Cambridge University Press , 1938 .
+Le Poidevin , Robin , and Murray MacBeath (eds.). The Philosophy of Time .
+Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+McTaggart’s Argument against the Reality of Time 65
+moments and events in time must be characterized by A - series properties.
+In short, any series that is ordered solely by B - series relations could not be
+temporal in nature.
+The problem, according to McTaggart, is that the assumption that anything
+exhibits A - series properties leads to a contradiction. On the one hand,
+these properties are mutually incompatible: if something is present, for
+example, it is neither past nor future. On the other hand, each event in time
+must possess all three A - series properties: anything present, for instance,
+was future and will be past. McTaggart notes that one may object that there
+is no diffi culty here, for surely it is not really a contradiction to suppose
+that an event is present, was future, and will be past. He responds as
+follows. Suppose that an event, M, is present, was future, and will be past.
+To say that M will be past is to say that at some future time, T, M is past.
+Nonetheless, since M is present, there is no moment of past time at which
+M is past. However, T itself will eventually be past, and when it is, M will
+then be past at a moment of past time. So it turns out that M is not past
+at a moment of past time but is past at a moment of past time, namely T,
+and this is a contradiction. Now, of course, one will want to reply that
+when T is fi nally past, then it is possible for M to be past at a moment of
+past time, so there is no contradiction even if now M cannot be past at any
+moment of past time. This move, replies McTaggart, simply reintroduces
+the contradiction, because if T itself will be past, then T must be past,
+present, and future, and to make that coherent we must suppose that it is
+past, present, and future at different times. But each of those times will be
+past, present, and future, which is a contradiction unless we suppose that
+they are past, present, and future at different times; and so on. Every
+attempt to eliminate the contradiction leads back to it.
+Accordingly, the A - series does not escape contradiction and, therefore,
+cannot characterize anything. But time is real only if moments and events
+are characterized by A - series properties. Hence, concludes McTaggart, time
+itself is unreal.
+McTaggart ’ s argument is valid, but there are three main sources of
+concern over its soundness. First, McTaggart presents the fi rst premise
+without substantial support. In fact, his defense is simply the following: “ It
+would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change [ … ]
+there could be no time if nothing changed ” (11). But even if this were universally
+admitted, perhaps universal opinion is wrong. It is, moreover, not
+universally admitted. Some philosophers have argued that it is possible for
+time to exist without change (see Le Poidevin and MacBeath 63 – 79).
+Additionally, the second premise has been questioned. McTaggart argues
+that if it is always true that, say, a fi replace poker is hot on Monday and
+cold on Tuesday, then nothing has changed because the sum total of truths
+remains unchanged. But it is beliefs, sentences, or propositions that are true;
+66 M. Joshua Mozersky
+in other words, truth, whatever it is, is a property of entities that represent
+something else. But couldn ’ t something have a property that our representation
+of it lacks? After all, we can represent a red fl ower with black and
+white words, so perhaps we can represent a changing world with a set of
+nonchanging, eternal truths. In other words, it seems that McTaggart is
+wrong to assume that the B - series is incompatible with real change, and as
+a result many philosophers have rejected the A - series without rejecting the
+existence of time. Such philosophers are typically called “ B - theorists. ”
+Finally, premise six is controversial. Many philosophers have wondered
+why we should follow McTaggart and analyze “ M will be past ” as “ M is
+past at a moment of future time, T ” (see Broad). Perhaps tense modifi ers
+such as ‘ was ’ and ‘ will be ’ have no need of further analysis and are easily
+understood as they are. In other words, if we allow for tensed descriptions
+of time such as ‘ M is present ’ , ‘ M was future ’ , and ‘ M will be past ’ to stand
+as basic and fundamental, then no contradiction arises that needs to be
+eliminated by McTaggart ’ s suggested analysis, because all such descriptions
+are mutually compatible. “ A - theorists ” agree with McTaggart that the
+B - series is inadequate as a description of time but reject his claim that there
+is a contradiction in the A - series.
+To this day, most philosophers who think about time are either A - theorists
+or B - theorists. Though few agree with the whole of McTaggart ’ s reasoning,
+almost every subsequent philosopher of time has been infl uenced by it.
+It truly stands as one of the most important arguments in Western
+philosophy.
+Past, present and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must
+be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. If I say that any event
+is past, that implies that it is neither present nor future, and so with the others.
+And this exclusiveness is essential to change, and therefore to time. For the
+only change we can get is from future to present, and from present to past.
+The characteristics are, therefore, incompatible. But every event has them all.
+If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be present
+and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. Thus all the three
+characteristics belong to each event [ … ]. The attribution of the characteristics
+past, present and future to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction,
+unless it is specifi ed that they have them successively. This means, as we have
+seen, that they have them in relation to terms specifi ed as past, present and
+future. These again, to avoid a like contradiction, must in turn be specifi ed
+as past, present and future. And, since this continues infi nitely, the fi rst set of
+terms never escapes from contradiction at all [ … ]. The reality of the A series,
+then, leads to a contradiction, and must be rejected. And, since we have seen
+that change and time require the A series, the reality of change and time must
+be rejected. And so must the reality of the B series, since that requires time.
+(McTaggart, 20 – 2)
+McTaggart’s Argument against the Reality of Time 67
+P1. If time is real, then change is real.
+P2. If change is real, then what is true at one time differs from what is true
+at other times.
+C1. If time is real, then what is true at one time differs from what is true
+at other times (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
+P3. If moments and events are characterized only by B - series relations, then
+it is not the case that what is true at one time differs from what is true
+at other times.
+C2. If it is not the case that what is true at one time differs from what
+is true at other times, then it is not the case that time is real (transposition,
+C1).
+C3. If moments and events are characterized only by B - series relations,
+then it is not the case that time is real (hypothetical syllogism, P3,
+C2).
+C4. If time is real, then it is not the case that moments and events are
+characterized only by B - series relations (transposition, C3).
+P4. If it is not the case that moments and events are characterized only by
+B - series relations, then moments and events have A - series properties.
+C5. If time is real, then moments and events have A - series properties
+(hypothetical syllogism, C4, P4).
+P5. A - series properties are mutually incompatible.
+P6. If A - series properties are mutually incompatible, then the attribution of
+A - series properties to moments and events entails a contradiction.
+C6. The attribution of A - series properties to moments and events entails
+a contradiction ( modus ponens , P5, P6).
+P7. If the attribution of A - series properties to moments and events entails
+a contradiction, then it is not the case that moments and events have
+A - series properties.
+C7. It is not the case that moments and events have A - series properties
+( modus ponens , C6, P7).
+C8. It is not the case that time is real ( modus tollens , C5, C7).
+16
+Berkeley ’ s Master Argument for
+Idealism
+John M. DePoe
+Much of the philosophical writings of George Berkeley (1685 – 1753) is
+dedicated to arguing for metaphysical idealism, the position that everything
+that exists is composed of thought, mind, or God. As Berkeley understood
+it, being composed of thought is contrary to being composed of matter, and
+therefore he aimed to show that believing in the existence of matter is
+unreasonable, if not unintelligible. Matter, according to Berkeley, exists
+independently of thought. He described matter as inert, senseless, and
+having what the British empiricists called “ primary qualities, ” roughly
+defi ned as properties that exist independently of a mind ’ s perception of them
+(e.g., mass, extension, motion, etc.).
+One of Berkeley ’ s most famous arguments against the existence of matter
+is commonly called “ the master argument ” because if it is successful, it
+refutes the existence of matter with a single masterstroke. The argument
+can be summed up with a challenge: can you imagine or conceive of a tree ’ s
+(or any material object ’ s) existing without its being perceived (or thought
+about)? While you might think you have succeeded in conceiving of a tree
+that is not being perceived, a little refl ection will reveal that you haven ’ t
+done so, because in the process of conceiving of the tree, you are perceiving
+Berkeley , George . Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues ,
+edited by R. S. Woolhouse . London : Penguin , 1988 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Berkeley’s Master Argument for Idealism 69
+it. So, it seems that it is impossible to conceive of something ’ s existing truly
+unperceived. But if it isn ’ t even possible to conceive of something existing
+unperceived, why should we think that matter can and does exist this way?
+Since it is impossible to conceive of matter ’ s unperceived existence, Berkeley
+concluded that the existence of matter is unreasonable.
+But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for
+instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive
+them. I answer, you may so, there is no diffi culty in it: but what is all this, I
+beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call
+books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one
+that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them
+all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have
+the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew
+that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist
+without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them
+existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When
+we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the
+while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of
+itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought
+of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or
+exist in it self. (Berkeley, 60)
+P1. If material objects exist, then material objects exist independently of
+any mind ’ s thinking of them.
+P2. If material objects exist independently of any mind ’ s thinking of them,
+then it is conceivable for material objects to exist without any mind
+thinking of them.
+P3. It is not the case that it is conceivable for material objects to exist
+without any mind thinking of them.
+C1. It is not the case that material objects exist independently of any
+mind ’ s thinking of them ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
+C2. It is not the case that material objects exist ( modus tollens , P1, C1).
+17
+Kant ’ s Refutation of Idealism
+Adrian Bardon
+In the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason , Kant offers a refutation
+of Cartesian epistemological skepticism that draws (albeit somewhat
+cryptically) on his insights regarding the necessary conditions of time -
+consciousness. While the details remain under dispute, the key claim seems
+to be that we would be unable to order all or some of our subjective experiences
+in time unless we were relating their sequence in some way to changes
+in objects external to the mind. The contents of our perceptual states do
+not come marked with the time of their occurrence; further, all experience
+is successive in form regardless of whether it represents sequences of events
+or static states of affairs. Thus we need some guide to reconstructing past
+events beyond the mere subjective contents of perception and memory. Only
+objective states of affairs and events – conceived of as part of a law -
+governed system – could function as a guide to this reconstruction by dictating
+one interpretation over another. Consequently, the fact that we are
+Kant , Immanuel . Critique of Pure Reason , translated by Paul Guyer and
+Allen Wood. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1998 .
+Dicker , Georges . “ Kant ’ s Refutation of Idealism , ” No û s 42 , 1 ( 2008 ):
+80 – 108 .
+Guyer , Paul . Kant . New York : Routledge , 2006 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Kant’s Refutation of Idealism 71
+able to assign a determinate order to our experiences shows that they are
+the result of contact with states of affairs and events independent of the
+mind.
+Kant ’ s refutation of idealism is a classic example of an argument form
+known as a “ transcendental argument. ” Transcendental arguments are
+usually aimed at some form of epistemological skepticism. They begin with
+some uncontroversial fact about our mental life – such as our having some
+knowledge, belief, or cognitive capacity – and add the claim that some fact
+about the extra - mental world questioned by the skeptic is a necessary condition
+of that indisputable fact about our subjective mental life.
+Many contemporary commentators think that transcendental arguments
+are not likely to be successful as proofs of any extra - mental fact since they
+characteristically involve an implausible leap from knowing how we must
+represent the world to knowing how the world must really be. However,
+some also think that more modest versions of similar arguments may hold
+promise. A “ modest ” transcendental argument attempts to show only that
+some conceptual framework is indispensable to experience as we know it,
+not that the world must actually conform to that framework. The most
+common contemporary objection to Kant ’ s reasoning in the refutation of
+idealism is that it establishes, at best, that we must conceive of our experiences
+as being related to external objects and events, not that those experiences
+are actually caused by external objects and events. Kant ’ s apparent
+lack of concern over the difference between these conclusions may be due
+to his “ transcendental idealism, ” according to which the distinction between
+how things are and how we must, constitutionally, represent them to be is
+intelligible on a certain level but inoperative from any experiential or practical
+standpoint.
+I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination
+of time presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent
+thing, however, cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination
+of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as
+such require something persistent that is distinct even from them, in relation
+to which their change, thus my existence in the time in which they change,
+can be determined. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible
+only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of
+a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time
+is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive
+outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the
+consciousness of the possibility of this time - determination. Therefore it is also
+necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition
+of time - determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at
+the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things
+outside me. (Kant, B276)
+72 Adrian Bardon
+P1. I am aware of myself as a subject of experiences with a determinate
+temporal order that represent a world of objects and events distinct from
+my mental states; that is, I have self - consciousness.
+P2. If (P1), then I make judgments about the temporal order of my own
+mental states.
+C1. I make judgments about the temporal order of my own mental states
+( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. There are no grounds for ordering my own mental states to be found
+either in the form or content of those states.
+P4. If (P3), then if I have self - consciousness, then there is something distinct
+from my mental states to which their changes can be referred and their
+order thereby determined.
+C2. If I have self - consciousness, then there is something distinct from my
+mental states to which their changes can be referred and their order
+thereby determined ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+C3. There is something distinct from my mental states to which their
+changes can be referred and their order thereby determined ( modus
+ponens , C2, P1).
+P5. If (C3), then objects of experience exist outside me.
+C4. Objects of experience exist outside me ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
+P6. If objects of experience exist outside me, they must exist in space.
+C5. Objects of experience exist in space ( modus ponens , P6, C4).
+18
+The Master Argument of Diodorus
+Cronus
+Ludger Jansen
+Aristotle . The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation ,
+edited by Jonathan Barnes , 2 vols. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
+Press , 1984 .
+Boethius . Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias , vols. I – II , edited
+by C. Meiser . Leipzig : Teubner , 1877 – 80 .
+Cicero . De Fato , translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA : Harvard
+University Press , 1982 .
+Epictetus . Discourses , in The Hellenistic Philosophers , edited and translated
+by A. Long and D. Sedley , vol. 1 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
+Press , 1987 .
+Gaskin , Richard . The Sea Battle and the Master Argument: Aristotle and
+Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future . Berlin : de Gruyter ,
+1995 .
+Psellos , Michael . Theologica , Vol. I., edited by P. Gautier. Leipzig: Teubner,
+1989 .
+Sedley , David . “ Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy . ” Proceedings
+of the Cambridge Philological Society 203 ( 1977 ) 74 – 120 .
+Vuillemin , Jules . Necessity or Contingency: The Master Argument . Stanford,
+CA : CSLI , 1996 .
+Weidemann , Hermann . “ Aristotle, the Megarics, and Diodorus Cronus on
+the Notion of Possibility . ” American Philosophical Quarterly 45 ( 2008 )
+131 – 48 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+74 Ludger Jansen
+The “ Master argument ” ( ho kurieu ô n logos ) is usually credited to Diodorus
+Cronus, a philosopher of the Dialectical school in the fourth century bce .
+Its name is probably derived from the stock example used but connotes also
+its sophistication: It was a masterly argument about a master (see Michael
+Psellus, Theologica , 3.129 – 35). Together with Aristotle ’ s sea - battle argument
+( De Interpretatione 9), it belongs to a series of arguments pertaining
+to the discussion of possibility and necessity and their bearing on the determination
+of the future. The master argument hinges on the alleged logical
+incompatibility of three intuitively valid conceptions:
+(1) The necessity of the past: What is past cannot be changed; thus truths
+about the past seem to be necessary.
+(2) The closure of the possible over entailment: A possible proposition
+does not entail any impossible propositions but only possible ones;
+this can be used as a test for checking whether something is indeed
+possible (cf., Aristotle, Metaphysics IX 3 – 4).
+(3) The existence of unrealized possibilities: There seem to be plenty of
+unrealized possibilities. For example, it seems both to be possible that
+I sit at noon and that I stand at noon, but at most one of these possibilities
+will be realized.
+Diodorus ’ aim is to disprove (3), that is, to show that it is inconsistent
+to assume that a statement such as “ You are a master ” may be possible,
+although it neither is nor will be true. On this basis, Diodorus was able to
+argue for his characterization of the possible in temporal terms as that
+which either is or will be (Cicero, On Fate 13; Boethius, On De
+Interpretatione 234.22). But it leads also to a form of “ logical determinism,
+” because if there are no unrealized possibilities, everything is necessary.
+His fellow Dialectician Panthoides and others, however, used (2) and (3) to
+reject (1), and the Stoic Chrysippus used (1) and (3) to reject (2). Anterior
+to this debate, Aristotle was able to hold all three ideas by distinguishing
+absolute necessity (of, e.g., logical truth) from time - relative necessity. For
+it is only now that singular past facts are unchangeable; when they were
+still in the future, they were contingent and thus nonnecessary, because they
+could have been changed. As we have no ancient sources about the structure
+of Diodorus ’ argument, its reconstruction is somewhat speculative, and
+several competing reconstructions have been suggested, using different
+modern logical systems such as tense logic or quantifi ed temporal logic with
+or without indexicals.
+These seem to be the sort of starting - points from which the Master
+Argument is posed. The following three propositions mutually confl ict: ‘ Every
+past truth is necessary ’ ; ‘ Something impossible does not follow from someThe
+Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus 75
+thing possible ’ ; and ‘ There is something possible which neither is nor will be
+true. ’ Diodorus saw this confl ict and exploited the convincingness of the fi rst
+two to establish the conclusion that ‘ Nothing which neither is nor will be true
+is possible. ’ (Epictetus, 38A)
+P1. If α is or has been the case, then it is necessary that α is or has been
+the case.
+C1. If α is or has at least once not been the case, then it is not possible
+that α is and has always been the case (contraposition, P12).
+P2. If α necessarily implies β , and α is possible, then β is possible.
+C2. If α necessarily implies β , and β is not possible, then α is not possible
+(contraposition, P2).
+P4. There is a proposition, p , that is possible but neither is nor will be the
+case (assumption for reductio ).
+C3. p is possible (simplifi cation, P4).
+C4. p neither is nor will be the case (simplifi cation, P4).
+P5. If p neither is nor will be the case, then it is or has at least once not
+been the case that p will be true (tense logic).
+C5. It is or has at least once not been the case that p will be true ( modus
+ponens , C4, P5).
+C6. It is not possible that it is and has always been the case that p will
+be true ( modus ponens , C1, C5).
+P6. p necessarily implies that it is now and has always been the case that
+p will be true (tense logic).
+C7. p is not possible ( modus ponens , conjunction, C2, P6, C6).
+C8. There is no proposition that is possible but neither is nor will be
+true ( reductio , P4 – C7).
+19
+Lewis ’ Argument for
+Possible Worlds
+David Vander Laan
+Lewis , David . Counterfactuals . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press ,
+1973 .
+___. On the Plurality of Worlds . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 1986 .
+van Inwagen , Peter . “ Two Concepts of Possible Worlds , ” in Ontology,
+Identity and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics . Cambridge, UK :
+Cambridge University Press , 2001 .
+Lycan , William . “ The Trouble with Possible Worlds , ” in The Possible and
+the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality , edited by Michael
+J. Loux , 274 – 316 . Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 1979 .
+In the middle of the twentieth century, the notion of possible worlds demonstrated
+its power by providing a semantics for modal logic, and the idea
+has since become standard equipment in the analytic philosopher ’ s toolbox.
+Naturally, the notion of possible worlds raises ontological questions. Are
+there really such things? If so, what kinds of things are they? David Lewis
+was one of the fi rst to take on these questions. In Counterfactuals , Lewis
+defended the ontological foundations of his possible worlds analysis of
+counterfactual conditionals. Later, in On the Plurality of Worlds , Lewis
+made a sustained case for possible worlds and more fully developed his
+“ modal realist ” account of what possible worlds are.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Lewis’ Argument for Possible Worlds 77
+Lewis ’ earlier argument for possible worlds is characteristically concise.
+Lewis notes that we already believe that there are many ways things could
+have been, takes this as an affi rmation that certain entities exist, and calls
+these entities “ possible worlds. ”
+One reason the argument has been controversial is that Lewis took the
+actual world to be what we ordinarily call “ the universe ” and took other
+possible worlds to differ from the universe “ not in kind but only in what
+goes on in them ” (Lewis Counterfactuals , 85). Worlds are thus concrete
+objects, and anything that could possibly happen really does happen in
+some world or another. The thought that Lewis ’ argument establishes such
+a view has seemed incredible to some philosophers. Peter van Inwagen, for
+one, writes, “ [T]o suppose that the existence of a plurality of universes or
+cosmoi could be established by so casual an application of Quine ’ s criterion
+of ontological commitment has been regarded by most of Lewis ’ s readers
+as very exceptionable indeed ” (87).
+Others have suggested that Lewis ’ argument is not even an argument,
+properly speaking, at all. For example, William Lycan calls it a “ brief paean
+to the hominess and familiarity of nonactual worlds ” and goes on to say
+that Lewis ’ “ ‘ natural as breathing ’ talk, like Meinong ’ s, thinly masks a
+formidable theoretical apparatus which must be evaluated on theoretical
+grounds ” (277 n.7).
+The argument Lewis later offered in On the Plurality of Worlds was an
+argument from utility: the notion of possible worlds is useful, and this is a
+reason to think that there are possible worlds. The earlier argument, as
+construed below, anticipates the later one in at least two ways. First, the
+earlier argument concludes not that there are possible worlds but rather
+that there is a presumption in favor of accepting the existence of possible
+worlds. Similarly, Lewis ’ argument from utility was not intended as a conclusive
+case for the existence of possible worlds (Lewis On the Plurality ,
+viii). Second, premise four of the below argument stands in clear need of
+further support. Much of On the Plurality of Worlds consists of a defense
+of modal realism and a critique of the alternatives and thus attempts to
+provide the support that premise four needs. Lewis ’ later argument might
+thus been seen as a development of his earlier one.
+I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to
+inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that
+things might have been otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that
+things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this mean?
+Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could
+have been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence
+is an existential quantifi cation. It says that there exist many entities of a
+certain description, to wit ‘ ways things could have been ’ . I believe that things
+could have been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases
+78 David Vander Laan
+of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe
+in the existence of certain entities that might be called ‘ ways things could have
+been ’ . I prefer to call them ‘ possible worlds ’ . (Lewis Counterfactuals , 84)
+P1. Things could have been different in many ways.
+P2. If things could have been different in many ways, then there are many
+ways things could have been besides the way they actually are.
+C1. There are many ways things could have been besides the way they
+actually are ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If (C1), then if it is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value
+is known to lead to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is
+known not to lead to trouble, then there is a presumption in favor of
+accepting (C1) at face value.
+C2. If it is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value is known
+to lead to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is known
+not to lead to trouble, then there is a presumption in favor of accepting
+(C1) at face value ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. It is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value is known to lead
+to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is known not to lead
+to trouble.
+C3. There is a presumption in favor of accepting (C1) at face value
+( modus ponens , C2, P4).
+P5. “ There exist many possible worlds ” expresses (C1) taken at face value.
+C4. There is a presumption in favor of accepting that there exist many
+possible worlds (substitution, C3, P5).
+20
+A Reductionist Account of
+Personal Identity 1
+Fauve Lybaert
+Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy . New York : Classic Books
+America , 2009 .
+Locke , John . An Essay concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
+Hackett , 1996 .
+Nagel , Thomas . The View from Nowhere . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
+1986 .
+Parfi t , Derek . “ Experiences, Subjects and Conceptual Schemes , ” Philosophical
+Topics 26 , 1/2 ( 1999 ): 217 – 70 .
+___. “ Is Personal Identity What Matters ? ” The Ammonius Foundation.
+http://www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/ammoniusfi nal.pdf
+(accessed December 31, 2007 ).
+___. Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
+___. “ The Unimportance of Identity , ” in Identity , edited by H. Harris ,
+13 – 46 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1995 .
+Quine , W. V. “ Identity and Individuation . ” The Journal of Philosophy 69
+( 1972 ): 488 – 97 .
+Shoemaker , Sydney . “ Persons and Their Pasts . ” American Philosophical
+Quarterly 7 ( 1970 ): 269 – 85 .
+Williams , Bernard . Problems of the Self . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
+University Press , 1973 .
+Wittgenstein , Ludwig . Zettel . Oxford : Blackwell , 1967 .
+1 The exposition of this account draws heavily on the work of Derek Parfi t. The exposition
+of the different kinds of reductionism is in large part inspired by Parfi t ’ s “ Experiences, Subjects
+and Conceptual Schemes ” as well as his “ Is Personal Identity What Matters? ” in which he
+slightly revises the argument which he makes about personal identity in Reasons and Persons .
+The formalized argument at the end of this chapter is an abbreviated version of the argument
+which Parfi t develops in his Reasons and Persons . Both the commentary and the formalized
+argument have benefi ted from the comments of Derek Parfi t, Cheryl Chen, Filip Buekens,
+Lorenz Demey, and Roger Vergauwen.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+80 Fauve Lybaert
+For ages, philosophers have argued over the nature of persons and what
+is involved in the numerical identity of persons over time. To understand
+the concept of numerical identity, consider this. The two chairs at my
+kitchen table, which look exactly alike and are made of the same material,
+may be qualitatively identical, but they are not numerically identical.
+Contrast this with the one chair in my room. If someone paints that chair
+while my eyes are closed, then the chair I see when I open my eyes will
+be qualitatively different from but numerically the same as the chair I saw
+before.
+Apply this to persons. When a relative tells you that you have changed
+over the years, he recognizes that you are still numerically the same person.
+He does not think that you have passed away. But he sees that you are
+qualitatively a bit different now.
+There is more debate over whether someone is still numerically the same
+person when complete loss of memory and radical change of character
+occur. Philosophers disagree over whether the resulting person is only qualitatively
+different or also numerically different than the person before having
+a brain hemorrhage. Philosophers, such as Derek Parfi t, who hold that we
+are only the same as long as there is psychological continuity, say that we
+would in such a case be confronted with a numerically different entity.
+Philosophers, such as Bernard Williams, who state that someone stays the
+same as long as there is bodily continuity, claim the opposite.
+How do we decide what determines the numerical identity of someone?
+We will fi rst have to agree on how the concept “ person ” gets its meaning.
+John Locke ( An Essay , 148 II.xxvii.26) stated that the concept ‘ person ’ is
+a forensic concept. “ Forensic ” is often equivocated with “ legal ” , but its
+meaning stretches further than this. The term is derived from the Latin term
+‘ forum ’ and means “ public ” . Locke refers to “ person ” as a public concept
+because he takes its meaning to be determined by how we use it – or, to be
+more precise, by how we ought to use it if we want our speaking to be in
+accordance with our common beliefs, attitudes, and practices. The meaning
+of the word ‘ person ’ in a legal context is one instance of this. It has, for
+example, been held that, in this context, someone cannot be found guilty
+of committing a crime unless he remembers committing it. One idea behind
+this is that it only makes sense to penalize someone for doing something if
+he can take responsibility for doing this. Remembering what you did is
+supposed to be a precondition for the latter.
+However, not all philosophers agree on whether the meaning of the
+concept “ person ” is determined by our common use of it. Derek Parfi t, for
+instance, contests this assumption. He warns that our use of this term may
+be wrongheaded and holds that philosophers are in a position to assess this.
+They can unveil inconsistencies in our use of this concept, examine whether
+there is a real entity in the world to which it refers, as well as determine
+A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 81
+whether this concept names what matters when we are concerned about
+our survival – as we usually think it does. 2
+This being said, philosophers will mostly start their examination of what
+the concept “ person ” refers to with an assessment of how we commonly
+use this concept. They will either describe our use of this concept as precisely
+as possible and let this description function as a determination of the
+meaning of this term, or they will explain why our application of this
+concept is not entirely accurate.
+This has led to two main philosophical approaches to the questions of
+what persons are and what makes a person maintain her numerical identity
+over time: the reductionist and the nonreductionist approach.
+There are different versions of reductionism. Constitutive reductionism 3
+is likely to be the most defensible version of reductionism with regard to
+persons. Constitutive reductionists admit that persons exist but argue that
+they are fully constituted by their physical and/or psychological continuity,
+and nothing over and above these continuities.
+To say that persons are fully constituted by their physical and/or psychological
+continuity is not to say that persons are nothing but this continuity.
+According to Sydney Shoemaker, the case is analogous to the relationship
+between a statue and the lump of clay of which it is made. The statue is
+constituted by the clay and has no separate existence apart from the clay.
+Yet it is not the same as the lump of clay. For, if this lump loses its shape,
+it will still be there, but the statue will not be. 4
+Constitutive reductionists are metaphysical reductionists, not conceptual
+reductionists. 5 They claim that persons are not separately existing entities
+over and above their physical and/or psychological continuity, even though
+we may not be able to get rid of the term “ person ” when we want to give
+a complete description of the world. It is possible that we ascribe experiences
+to subjects and that we should call these subjects “ persons ” not
+“ physical ” and/or “ psychological continuities. ”
+Another way to state what constitutive reductionists hold is this. They
+claim that what makes different experiences belong to one person is not the
+fact that they belong to a single separately existing entity. Rather, what
+makes experiences intrapersonal should be explained in terms of other facts,
+such as the fact that they are psychologically continuous with one another
+or the fact that they are associated with a single body.
+3 For the term ‘ constitutive reductionism, ’ see Parfi t “ Experiences ” and Parfi t “ Is Personal ” .
+2 This is why Parfi t calls for a revisionary metaphysics, rather than a descriptive metaphysics:
+he claims that we have to revise the use of certain of our concepts (see, e.g., Parfi t
+Reasons, ix).
+5 For a distinction between these two kinds of reductionism, see Parfi t “ Experiences ” (223).
+4 For this reference to Shoemaker, see Parfi t “ Experiences ” (268 n.9).
+82 Fauve Lybaert
+A metaphysical nonreductionist, on the other hand, claims that persons
+are separately existing entities over and above their physical and psychological
+continuity. An example of a metaphysical nonreductionist would be
+someone who identifi es persons in accordance with their soul and does not
+take this soul to be fully constituted by any combination of further entities.
+This metaphysical nonreductionist could believe in the transmigration of
+the soul: perhaps she believes that she is identical to some past person from
+whom her soul has migrated, even though that person ’ s body is not continuous
+with her current body, that person ’ s character is radically different, and
+she has no memory of that person ’ s experiences.
+Let ’ s return to reductionism. Within constitutive reductionism, there is
+still one big division to be made. Some reductionists, such as Bernard
+Williams and Thomas Nagel, argue that a person stays the same person as
+long as there is a certain degree of physical continuity. Other reductionists,
+such as Sydney Shoemaker and Parfi t, hold that a person stays the same as
+long as there is a certain degree of nonbranched psychological continuity.
+Below, we will look at Parfi t ’ s argument for his position. Parfi t argues
+for his view by stating that we should be either nonreductionists or reductionists,
+by advancing that there is no evidence for the nonreductionist view,
+and by demonstrating how we can describe psychological continuity in a
+way that does not presuppose personal identity.
+Even when Parfi t ’ s argument is considered formally valid, discussion
+about the truth of his premises and his method is possible.
+Two of the premises that could be questioned are premise 6 and premise
+7. Can quasi - memories really be called ‘ memories ’ , or are they only bits of
+information? If the latter is the case, could quasi - memory then still be said
+to be an instance of psychological continuity?
+As far as Parfi t ’ s method is concerned, one could question his appeal to a
+thought experiment. Parfi t imagines a world in which we could have memories
+of experiencing an event at which we were in fact not present. Philosophers
+develop thought experiments like these to become clear on our intuitions
+about a certain concept. They ask something like “ If x were the case, what
+would we then think about A? ” There is controversy over whether it is
+legitimate to appeal to thought experiments in philosophical arguments.
+Some philosophers, such as Quine ( “ Identity, ” 490) and Wittgenstein ( Zettel ,
+proposition 350), claim that doing so would mean that we attribute a power
+to words which they in fact do not have. They argue that, being in this world,
+we cannot really predict what our attitudes in another world would be. They
+also question what our attitudes in a world unlike ours could possibly say
+about our attitudes in the world in which we actually live.
+We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies,
+and various interrelated physical and mental events. Our existence just
+A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 83
+involves the existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of our deeds,
+and the thinking of our thoughts, and the occurrence of certain other physical
+and mental events. Our identity over time just involves (a) Relation R – psychological
+connectedness and/or psychological continuity – with the right
+kind of cause, provided (b) that this relation does not take a ‘ branching ’
+form, holding between one person and two different future people. (Parfi t
+Reasons , 216)
+Defi ning Premises
+P1. When we ask what persons are, and how they continue to exist, the
+fundamental choice is between two views: the nonreductionist view and
+the reductionist view (Parfi t Reasons , 273).
+P2. “ On the non - reductionist view, persons are separately existing entities,
+distinct from their brain and bodies and their experiences ” (ibid., 275).
+On this view, persons are entities whose existence must be all - or - nothing
+(cf., ibid., 273).
+P3. On the reductionist view, “ persons exist. And a person is distinct from
+his brain and body, and his experiences. But persons are not separately
+existing entities. The existence of a person, during any period, just consists
+in the existence of his brain and body, the thinking of his thoughts,
+the doing of his deeds, and the occurrence of many other physical and
+mental events ” (cf., ibid.).
+Arguments in Defense of the Reductionist View
+P4. The reductionist view is true (A) if the occurrence of psychological
+continuity does not presuppose that a person holds these psychological
+events together and (B) if we should reject the belief that persons are
+separately existing entities.
+A. The occurrence of psychological continuity does not presuppose that
+a person holds these psychological events together.
+P5. We could think of memories as instantiations of quasi - memories.
+P6. I would have an “ accurate quasi - memory of past experience if I seem
+to remember having an experience; someone did have this experience;
+and my apparent memory is causally dependent on that past experience ”
+(ibid., 220). An example of my quasi - memory of another person ’ s past
+experience could be this: this person experiences something; a memory
+of this experience is formed; this memory gets stored on some device and
+is then downloaded to my brain.
+84 Fauve Lybaert
+P7. The continuity of quasi - memory is an instantiation of psychological
+continuity. Or, in other words: if there is continuity of quasi - memory
+(P( x )), then there is an instantiation of psychological continuity (Q( x )).
+Formalized, this gives: ( ∀ x (P( x ) → Q( x )).
+P8. If we were aware that our quasi - memories may be of other people ’ s
+past experiences, as well as of ours, these quasi - memories would and
+should not be automatically combined with the belief that these memories
+are about our own experiences. In logical language, this means that
+the continuity of quasi - memory (P) is consistent with the idea that this
+continuity can be shared by different persons (R). This relationship of
+consistency can be formalized as: ∃ x (P( x ) & R( x )).
+C1. A certain continuity of quasi - memory can be shared by different
+persons. Or: P( a ) & R( a ) (elimination of the existential quantifi er, P8).
+C2. There is continuity of quasi - memory (P( a )) (simplifi cation, C1).
+C3. The occurrence of a certain continuity of quasi - memory implies the
+occurrence of a certain psychological continuity: P( a ) → Q( a ) (elimination
+of the universal quantifi er, P7).
+C4. There is an instantiation of psychological continuity (Q( a )) ( modus
+ponens , C2, C3).
+C5. Something has the property of being shared by different persons
+(R( a )) (simplifi cation, C1).
+C6. The property of being psychologically continuous is consistent with
+the property of being shared: Q( a ) & R( a ) (conjunction,C4, C5).
+C7. Psychological continuity is consistent with this continuity not being
+shared by different persons: ∃ x (Q( x ) & R( x )). Or, in other words: the
+occurrence of psychological continuity does not presuppose that one
+person holds these psychological events together) (introduction of the
+existential quantifi er, C6).
+B. We should reject the belief that persons are separately existing
+entities.
+P9. If we do not have evidence for the claim that persons exist as separately
+existing entities, then we should reject this belief (ibid., 224).
+P10. We do not have any awareness of the continued existence of a separately
+existing subject.
+P11. We do not have “ evidence for the fact that psychological continuity
+depends chiefl y, not on the continuity of the brain, but on the continuity
+of some other entity ” (ibid., 228).
+P12. We do not have good evidence for the belief in reincarnation (ibid.).
+Neither do we have evidence for the existence of Cartesian egos (i.e.,
+thinking nonmaterial substances); it seems like they are neither “ publicly
+observable ” nor “ privately introspectible facts ” (ibid.).
+A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 85
+P13. There are no other reasons than the ones in P10, P11, and P12 to
+believe in the existence of a separately existing subject of experiences.
+C5. We have no evidence for the claim that we are separately existing
+entities (P10, P11, P12, P13).
+C6. We should reject the belief that persons exist as separately existing
+entities ( modus ponens , P9, C5).
+C7. The reductionist view is true ( modus ponens , P4, C1, C6).
+21
+Split - Case Arguments about
+Personal Identity
+Ludger Jansen
+Parfi t , Derek . Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
+Shoemaker , Sydney , and Richard Swinburne . Personal Identity (Great
+Debates in Philosophy) . Oxford : Blackwell 1984 .
+In the empiricist tradition, it is a common move to account for the diachronic
+identity of a person in terms of shared mental properties or continuity
+of memories (e.g., Locke) or in terms of shared matter, especially of
+the brain. But all these criteria allow for “ split cases, ” that is, for two or
+more candidates fulfi lling the requirements, which cause trouble with the
+formal properties of the identity relation (i.e., refl exivity, symmetry, and
+transitivity). For example, a brain can be divided and both halves implanted
+in different bodies: which of these, if any, is the same person as the original
+one? Two individuals could even share most of their memories – but this
+does not make them the same person. Thus, none of these criteria can be
+the decisive factor for personal identity. Some philosophers, such as Richard
+Swinburne (#24), argue for dualism and conclude that there must be some
+immaterial factor, the soul, that accounts for personal identity. Others, such
+as Derek Parfi t, conclude that we should discard the concept of personal
+identity altogether and rather replace it with a nonsymmetric successor
+relation that allows for such split cases.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Split-Case Arguments about Personal Identity 87
+There are no logical diffi culties in supposing that we could transplant one
+of [a person] P 1 ’ s [brain] hemispheres into the skull from which a brain had
+been removed, and the other hemisphere into another such skull, and that
+both transplants should take, and it may well be practically possible to do
+so. [ … ] If these transplants took, clearly each of the resulting persons would
+behave to some extent like P 1 , and indeed both would probably have some
+of the apparent memories of P 1 . Each of the resulting persons would then be
+good candidates for being P 1 . After all, if one of P 1 ’ s hemispheres had been
+destroyed and the other remained intact and untransplanted, and the resulting
+person continued to behave and make memory claims somewhat like those
+of P 1 , we would have had little hesitation in declaring that person to be P 1 .
+The same applies, whichever hemisphere was preserved [ … ]. But if it is, that
+other person will be just as good a candidate for being P 1 . [ … ] But [ … ] that
+cannot be – since the two persons are not identical with each other. (Shoemaker
+and Swinburne, 15)
+P1. A 1 and A 2 are two distinct persons.
+P2. At t 2 > t 1 , A 1 and A 2 are such that each of A 1 and A 2 share exactly the
+same amount of the X that A had at t 1 .
+P3. X is the decisive factor for personal identity (e.g., body mass, brain
+mass, memories, character traces), that is, for any persons A 1 and A 2 and
+any times t 1 and t 2 , if A 2 has at t 2 most of the X that A 1 had at t 1 , then
+A 1 and A 2 are the same person (assumption for reductio ).
+C1. A 1 is the same person as A ( modus ponens , P3, P2).
+C2. A 2 is the same person as A ( modus ponens , P3, P2).
+P4. If X is the same person as Y, then Y is the same person as X (symmetry
+of identity).
+C3. A is the same person as A 2 ( modus ponens , P4, C2).
+P5. If A 1 is the same person as A and A is the same person as A 2 , then A
+is the same person as A 2 (transitivity, C1, C3).
+C4. A 1 is the same person as A 2 ( modus ponens , conjunction, P5, C1,
+C3).
+C5. No such X can be the decisive factor for personal identity ( reductio ,
+P1 – C4).
+22
+The Ship of Theseus
+Ludger Jansen
+Hobbes , Thomas . “ De corpore , ” in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes ,
+Vol. 1 , edited by Sir William Molesworth . London : John Bohn , 1839 .
+Plato . Phaedo , in Five Dialogues , 2nd edn. , translated by G. M. A. Grube,
+revised by J. M. Cooper, 93 – 154 . Indianapolis : Hackett , 2002 .
+Plutarch . “ Life of Theseus , ” in Lives , translated by Bernadotte Perrin, vol.
+I , 1 – 87 . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1967 .
+The “ Ship of Theseus ” is an intriguing puzzle about identity through time.
+It is based on the custom of the Athenians to send Theseus ’ ship each year
+on a sacred voyage to Delos, because it was believed that Apollo once saved
+the lives of Theseus and his fourteen fellow - travellers. The ritual was annually
+repeated for a long time, and hence the ship needed continual repair,
+new planks being substituted for the old ones. Plutarch relates to us that
+already the Athenian philosophers had discussed whether the ship is still
+the same ship although it consists, after a while, entirely of new planks
+(Plutarch, “ Life of Theseus ” § 22 – 3; cf., Plato, Phaedo 58a – c). Hobbes put
+a sophisticated twist to the story: Suppose, he said, that someone collected
+the old planks and put them together again in the end, thus restoring the
+old ship. The same ship, then, seems to exist twice, which is absurd. Hobbes
+used this argument to support his version of relative identity: the original
+ship T1 and the restored ship T2 share the same matter, whereas the original
+ship and the repaired ship T3 share the same form.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Ship of Theseus 89
+[I]f, for example, that ship of Theseus, concerning the difference whereof
+made by continual reparation in taking out the old planks and putting in new,
+the sophisters of Athens were wont to dispute, were, after all the planks were
+changed, the same numerical ship it was at the beginning; and if some man
+had kept the old planks as they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards
+together in the same order, had again made a ship of them, this, without
+doubt, had also been the same numerical ship with that which was at the
+beginning; and so there would have been two ships numerically the same,
+which is absurd. (Hobbes Chapter 11, 136)
+P1. T1 is identical with T2.
+P2. It is not the case that T2 is identical with T3.
+P3. T3 is identical with T1 (assumption for reductio ).
+C1. T3 is identical with T2 (transitivity of identity, P1, P3).
+C2. T2 is identical with T3 (symmetry of identity, C1).
+C3. It is not the case that T2 is identical with T3 and T2 is identical with
+T3 (conjunction, P2, C2).
+C4. It is not the case that T3 is identical with T1 (r eductio , P3 – C3).
+23
+The Problem of
+Temporary Intrinsics
+Montserrat Bordes
+Lewis , David . On the Plurality of Worlds . Oxford : Blackwell , 1986 .
+Lowe , E. J. “ The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis . ” Analysis
+48 ( 1988 ): 72 – 7 .
+Moore , G. E. Philosophical Studies . London : Oxford University Press , 1922 .
+Our pre - theoretic beliefs tell us that ordinary things such as trees, people,
+or chairs change their properties during their existence. We can say that
+ordinary things persist – they exist at different times – and change; that is,
+they persist and have complementary properties (P, not - P) at distinct times.
+What remains controversial, however, is the way in which ordinary things
+persist. We commonly distinguish between ordinary things and events.
+Some think that unlike football games, weddings, and smiles, ordinary
+things persist by having only spatial, not temporal parts; they appear to
+endure rather than perdure. Something endures if and only if it persists by
+being wholly present at different times; something perdures if and only if
+it persists by having distinct temporal parts at different times (Lewis).
+Opponents of endurantism think that ordinary things endure, whereas their
+histories, which are types of events, perdure (Lowe). Perdurantists hold that
+both events and ordinary things have not only three spatial dimensions but
+also a temporal one: they have (the worm view) or are (the stage view)
+temporal parts.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics 91
+Is there a rationale for preferring one theory of persistence to another?
+Lewis thought that the argument from temporary intrinsics (ATI) shows
+compellingly that endurantism is untenable. His reasoning can be presented
+as follows. Ordinary things undergo change of their temporary intrinsic
+properties; that is, they gain or lose (monadic) properties, that they have in
+virtue of the way they themselves are, not in virtue of their relations to
+other things. Put differently, A ’ s intrinsic properties are properties shared
+by every duplicate of A (Moore and Lewis).
+Endurantist and perdurantist explanations of change are incompatible.
+To illustrate this, let us suppose that A is P at time t and that A also
+existed at a past time t ’ when A was not - P. For a perdurantist, this amounts
+to A ’ s having a temporal part that is P at t and A ’ s having another part
+that is not - P at t ’ . For an endurantist, A itself (not a proper part of it) is
+P at t and not - P at t ’ . Supporters of endurantism, then, face a contradiction,
+that A itself is both P and not - P, that is also at odds with Leibniz ’
+Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals: given that A endures from t ’ to
+t , A must therefore be the same from t ’ to t (A at t ’ is diachronically
+identical to A at t ), and A should have the same properties at both
+times (A at t ’ should be indiscernible from A at t ). Lewis states that endurantism
+cannot account for the existence of temporary intrinsic properties
+demanded by ATI, since the efforts to solve the contradiction deny either
+the nonrelational nature of properties, their instrinsicality, or their
+temporality.
+P1. Ordinary things change their intrinsic properties (properties that ordinary
+things have in virtue of the way they themselves are, not in virtue
+of their relations to other things).
+P2. Properties can be either of two mutually exclusive types: extrinsic or
+intrinsic.
+P3. If ordinary things change their intrinsic properties, then ordinary things
+persist; that is, they exist at different times.
+C1. Ordinary things persist ( modus ponens , P1, P3).
+P4. If ordinary things persist, then they either endure (persist by being
+wholly present and numerically identical at more than one time) or
+perdure (persist by having temporal parts or being partially present at
+more than one time).
+C2. Ordinary things either endure or perdure ( modus ponens , P4, C1).
+P5. Indiscernibility (having the same intrinsic properties) is a necessary
+condition of numerical identity (the Law of Indiscernibility of Identicals
+implied by Leibniz ’ Law).
+P6. If ordinary things endure, then ordinary things cannot remain numerically
+identical if they have incompatible (like P and not - P) intrinsic
+properties (general instantiation, P5).
+92 Montserrat Bordes
+P7. If ordinary things cannot remain numerically identical if they have
+incompatible properties, then either intrinsic properties are either disguised
+relations to times or the only intrinsic properties of ordinary
+things are those they have in the present.
+C3. If ordinary things endure, then either intrinsic properties are either
+disguised relations to times or the only intrinsic properties of ordinary
+things are those they have in the present (hypothetical syllogism, P6,
+P7).
+P8. If ordinary things perdure, then their incompatible properties belong to
+different things (i.e., their different temporal parts).
+P9. If intrinsic properties are disguised relations to times, then all properties
+are extrinsic.
+C4. Intrinsic properties are not disguised relations to times ( modus
+tollens , P9, P2).
+P10. If intrinsic properties are those properties which ordinary things have
+in the present, then there is no other time than the present; that is, presentism
+is true.
+P11. If presentism is true, then ordinary things do not persist.
+C5. Presentism is false ( modus tollens , P11, C1).
+C6. Ordinary things do not endure ( modus tollens , P9, C4, C5).
+C7. Ordinary things perdure (disjunctive syllogism, C2, C6).
+C8. The incompatible properties of ordinary things belong to their different
+temporal parts ( modus ponens , P8, C8).
+24
+A Modern Modal Argument
+for the Soul
+Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
+Alston , W. P. , and T. W. Smythe . “ Swinburne ’ s Argument for Dualism . ” Faith
+and Philosophy 11 ( 1994 ): 127 – 33 .
+Hasker , W. “ Swinburne ’ s Modal Argument for Dualism: Epistemically
+Circular . ” Faith and Philosophy 15 ( 1998 ): 366 – 70 .
+Nagasawa , Y. 2005 . “ Critical Notice of Richard Swinburne ’ s ‘ The Evolution
+of the Soul (Revised Version) ’ . ” Available at www.infi dels.org/library/
+modern/yujin_nagasawa/soul.html (accessed 27 July, 2010).
+Reames , K. “ A Response to Swinburne ’ s Latest Defense of the Argument for
+Dualism . ” Faith and Philosophy 16 ( 1999 ): 90 – 7 .
+Stump , E. , and N. Kretzmann . “ An Objection to Swinburne ’ s Argument for
+Dualism . ” Faith and Philosophy 13 ( 1996 ): 405 – 12 .
+Swinburne , Richard . The Evolution of the Soul . Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
+1986 .
+___. “ Dualism Intact . ” Faith and Philosophy 13 ( 1996 ): 968 – 77 .
+Swinburne , Richard , and Sydney Shoemaker . Personal Identity . Oxford :
+Blackwell , 1984 .
+Urbaniak , R. , and A. Rostalska . “ Swinburne ’ s Modal Argument for the
+Existence of a Soul: Formalization and Criticism . ” Philo 12 ( 2009 ):
+73 – 87 .
+Zimmerman , D. W. “ Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the
+Soul . ” American Philosophical Quarterly 3 ( 1991 ): 217 – 26 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+94 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
+Richard Swinburne, one of the most prominent representatives of dualism
+in the twentieth century, formulated his modal argument for the existence
+of the soul as an improvement of Descartes ’ (#76) analogous argument.
+Roughly speaking, Swinburne argues that human beings currently alive
+have nonbodily immaterial parts called souls, using the assumption that it
+is logically possible that a human being survives the destruction of the body
+(and a few additional supposedly quite innocent premises). The modern
+twist to the argument that makes it technically interesting is that it employs
+a quantifi ed propositional modal logic. The argument raises also a general
+philosophical interest, like all seemingly simple and correct philosophical
+arguments for strong conclusions.
+The argument employs quantifi ed propositional modal logic T, a rather
+straightforward extension of classical propositional logic. We extend the
+language with two modal operators: ‘ ◊ ’ read as “ it is possible that, ” and
+‘ □ ’ read as “ it is necessary that ” and quantifiers binding propositional variables.
+On top of the classical rules of inference, one needs to add two axiom
+schemata (called traditionally K and T):
+(K) □ ( A → B ) → ( □ A → □ B )
+(T) □ A → A
+We also add two rules of inference: necessitation, which tells us that if
+something is a thesis of the system, it is necessary, and propositional universal
+quantifi er elimination, which works like universal quantifi er elimination
+in classical predicate logic, except that it applies to propositional
+variables and formulae. We ’ ll start with a brief presentation of the argument
+in its original formulation. Then, we ’ ll reconstruct the argument in more
+detail. Next, we ’ ll describe main known objections to the argument, describe
+how one of the objections (usually considered to be lethal) can be avoided,
+and fi nally, provide our own brief assessment of what we think the main
+weakness of the argument is.
+The argument was originally designed to prove that I [Swinburne] have a
+soul in 1984, and I leave it in that form. Updating is always possible for any
+year in which Premiss one is manifestly true. Likewise any name or other
+referring expression can be substituted for ‘ I ’ , so long as Premiss 1 remains
+manifestly true. [ … ] I defi ne:
+p = ‘ I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984 ’
+q = ‘ my body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984 ’
+r = ‘ I have a soul in 1984 ’
+s = ‘ I exist in 1985 ’
+x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with ( p & q ) and
+describing 1984 states of affairs.
+A Modern Modal Argument for the Soul 95
+‘ ( x ) ’ is to be read in the normal way as ‘ for all x ’ .
+The argument is then as follows:
+p (Premiss 1)
+( x ) ◊ ( p & q & x & s ) (Premiss 2)
+∼ ◊ ( p & q & ∼ r & s ) (Premiss 3)
+Premiss 2 says that it is possible that I survive into 1985, given that I am
+conscious in 1984, even if my body is totally destroyed and whatever else
+might be the case in 1984, compatible with these last two suppositions.
+Premiss 3 says that it is not possible that I who am conscious in 1984 survive
+into 1985 if my body is totally destroyed, unless there is a non - bodily part
+of me in 1984, namely, a soul. It follows from Premiss 2 and Premiss 3 that
+∼ r is not within the range of x . But since ∼ r describes a 1984 state of affairs
+it follows that it is not compatible with ( p & q ). Hence ( p & q ) entails r . But
+the addition to p of q , which describes what happens to my body at the end
+of 1984 can hardly affect whether or not p entails r . So I conclude that p by
+itself entails r . Hence, from Premiss 1, r . (Swinburne Evolution , 322 – 3)
+Once we point out tacit assumptions, the argument comes out valid in
+a rather modest modal logic T with universal propositional quantifi er elimination.
+First, a few abbreviations:
+C ⇔ Swinburne is a Conscious person and exists in 1984.
+D ⇔ Swinburne ’ s body is (completely) Destroyed in the last instant of
+1984.
+S ⇔ Swinburne has a Soul in 1984.
+E ⇔ Swinburne Exists in 1985.
+84 ( p ) ⇔ Sentence p is about 1984.
+Now, the premises are as follows:
+P1. C.
+P2. ∀ p[84(p) & ◊ (p & C & D) → ◊ (C & D & p & E)].
+P3. ∼ ◊ (C & D & ∼ S & E).
+P4. 84( ∼ S).
+P5. □ ((C & D) → S) → □ (C → S).
+The fi rst premise is straightforward. The second one now incorporates
+the restrictions that Swinburne put on quantifi cation in metalanguage (now
+we are able to substitute any proposition whatsoever for p ). (2) says that
+any proposition about 1984 compatible with the claim that Swinburne is
+conscious and his body is (afterwards) destroyed is compatible with his
+being conscious, his body being (afterwards) destroyed, and his having a
+soul in 1984. P3 says that it ’ s impossible for Swinburne to survive the
+complete destruction of his body if he doesn ’ t have a soul. P4 says that the
+96 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
+claim that he doesn ’ t have a soul in 1984 is a claim about year 1984. P5
+says that if his being conscious and his body ’ s being destroyed entail that
+he has a soul, his being conscious itself entails the same claim (thus capturing
+the intuition that whether his body is destroyed has no impact on
+whether he has a soul).
+P6. 84( ∼ S) & ◊ ( ∼ S & C & D) → ◊ (C & D & ∼ S & E) (universal quantifi er, P2).
+P7. ∼ (84( ∼ S) & ◊ ( ∼ S & C & D)) ( modus tollens , P3, P6).
+P8. ∼ 84( ∼ S) ∨ ∼ ◊ ( ∼ S & C & D) (De Morgan ’ s Law, P7).
+P9. ∼ ◊ ( ∼ S & C & D) (disjunctive syllogism, P8, P4).
+P10. □ ∼ ( ∼ S & C & D) (defi nition of □ , P9).
+P11. □ ((C & D) → S) (substitution of provable equivalents, P10).
+P12. □ (C → S) ( modus ponens , P5, P11).
+C1. S (schema T; i.e., □ A → A; modus ponens , P1, P12).
+The argument has been attacked from various angles. Swinburne and
+Shoemaker ( Personal Identity ) point out that P2 involves a de re possibility
+claim that cannot be justifi ed by bare thought experiments. They complain
+that no conclusion about the actual world can follow from mere possibility
+claims. Swinburne (1996) insists that not all premises are merely modal (P1
+isn ’ t). Swinburne also argues that the story in which he himself survives is
+consistent and that this is enough to support the de re claim.
+Hasker argues that Swinburne ’ s argument is epistemically circular.
+Swinburne (1996) attempted to defend against this sort of insinuation that
+someone may accept premise 2 without even understanding the conclusion
+or without accepting premise 3. The strength of this criticism is rather
+unclear because the notion of epistemic circularity is rather vague.
+Reames gives a parallel argument for the opposite conclusion, switching
+∼ S with S and E with ∼ E. Some space is still left for Swinburne, for he can
+argue that one of the premises is false on this reading.
+Nagasawa disagrees with the so - called “ quasi - Aristotelian premise, ”
+which says that there is no identity through time between two objects if
+they have no part in common (Swinburne used it to defend P3).
+Probably the best known objection, which is most often considered to
+be lethal, is the substitution objection formulated against the truth of P2
+(Zimmerman, Alston, Smythe, Stump, and Kretzmann). These authors
+point out that if we substitute for p a sentence that states ‘ Swinburne is
+purely material in 1984 ’ (let ’ s abbreviate it by M) or ‘ Swinburne is identical
+with his body or some part of it ’ , premise 2 comes out false, for (arguably)
+it is not possible that Swinburne is purely material and yet he survives the
+destruction of his body, even though it is possible that he is purely material
+and yet conscious.
+A Modern Modal Argument for the Soul 97
+Dealing with the substitution objection proceeds as follows. First of all,
+one cannot try to save P2 by insisting that the consequent of the problematic
+substitution instance is true, for on the assumption that being material
+entails not having a soul, this move would falsify P3.
+Swinburne himself tried a slightly different strategy. He insisted that no
+such p is compatible with C & D, for any such p amounts to the denial of
+his conclusion. This defense doesn ’ t seem too convincing. To say that it is
+possible that Swinburne is conscious and material (and his body is later
+destroyed) is not to state a philosophical thesis about the very issue in
+dispute. One can admit such a possibility without asserting that conscious
+beings actually are (purely) material. Another worry is that if you reject the
+compossibility of being material and conscious, you no longer even need
+Swinburne ’ s argument: from the mere claim that Swinburne is conscious,
+you ’ ll be able to conclude that he is not purely material.
+As it turns out, a slight modifi cation to one of the premises yields a valid
+argument that doesn ’ t fall prey to the substitution objection. Instead of
+‘ being about 1984 ’ , let ’ s use ‘ being true about 1984 ’ in P2 and let ’ s leave
+other premises intact. If we use 84(p) & p instead of 84(p) we get: P2 * . ∀
+p[84(p) & p & ◊ (p & C & D) → ◊ (C & D & p & E)], which says that no true sentence
+about 1984 compatible with C & D excludes C & D & E. The fi rst thing
+to observe is that we still can derive S (see Urbaniak and Rostalska for more
+details).
+The second thing to note is that P2 * , as a case of strengthening the
+antecedent, is properly weaker than P2. Last but not least, P2 * is not susceptible
+to the substitution objection. For to believe that substituting M for
+p will falsify P2 * , one has to believe that the antecedent of such an instance
+will be true:
+84(M) & M & ◊ (M & C & D).
+Does this move completely immunize the argument to criticism? Alas, it
+only shows that the main fault doesn ’ t lie where the substitution objection
+claimed it did. Clearly, the key premises here are P2 * and P3. The former
+says that no true sentence about 1984 excludes Swinburne ’ s survival in
+1985, and the latter says that such a survival is impossible if one doesn ’ t
+have a soul. If presented with those sentences separately, we might feel
+compelled to say, Sure, there is no (logical) reason why sentences purely
+about 1984 should exclude sentences about 1985! Sure, there is no way
+one could survive the complete and instantaneous destruction of one ’ s body
+if one didn ’ t have a soul! The key question here is whether the modalities
+underlying those intuitions are the same. It seems that the modality that
+motivates us to accept P3 is a rather strong metaphysical modality with
+quite a few metaphysical assumptions built in, whereas the one that compels
+98 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
+us to buy into P2 * looks defi nitely weaker (would a modality that makes
+it impossible to survive into 1985 if you didn ’ t have a soul in 1984 make
+you think that no true sentence about 1984 excludes your survival into
+1985?)
+Swinburne ( Evolution , 314) himself admits only one type of possibility
+and explicitly identifi es the metaphysical and the logical. The mere fact,
+however, that Swinburne didn ’ t want to accept such a distinction doesn ’ t
+mean that we ourselves should make no distinction between the kinds of
+modalities involved in the intuitive assessment of P2 * and P3. And in fact,
+if this distinction is made, we not only have an explanation of why the
+argument initially might seem compelling (we don ’ t notice that our intuitions
+employ two different modalities), but also the argument itself cannot
+be interpreted as a sound argument.
+25
+Two Arguments for the
+Harmlessness of Death
+Epicurus . “ Letter to Menoeceus , ” in Greek and Roman Philosophy after
+Aristotle , edited by Jason Saunders , 49 – 52 . New York : The Free Press ,
+1966 .
+Epicurus ’ Death is Nothing to Us Argument
+Steven Luper
+Epicurus (341 – 270 bce ) is most famous for arguing that death is nothing
+to us. His position is still discussed today, partly because it is not immediately
+clear where his argument fails and partly because the implications of
+his conclusion would be important. For example, it seems to follow that
+we have no reason to avoid death and also that if we save people from
+death, we are not doing them any good. If death is not bad for us, it seems,
+living is not good for us.
+Epicurus makes his argument in the course of defending a more substantial
+thesis, namely that anyone can achieve, and then maintain, ataraxia , or
+perfect equanimity. The achievement of complete equanimity requires so
+situating ourselves that nothing will harm us, so that we have nothing to
+dread. Since death appears to be harmful indeed, and hence something that
+a reasonable person will dread, Epicurus needed to explain why it is not.
+His argument can be found in the following passage, taken from his
+“ Letter to Menoeceus ” :
+Death [ … ], the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we
+are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. (50)
+Unfortunately, it is not clear that this argument accomplishes what
+Epicurus wanted it to do. The problem is that the term ‘ death ’ might mean
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+100 Steven Luper and Nicolas Bommarito
+at least two different things. First, it might signify an event: our ceasing to
+live. Call this “ dying. ” Second, it might signify a state of affairs: the state
+of affairs we are in as a result of our ceasing to live. Call this “ death. ” Both
+dying and death appear to harm us, and hence both threaten our equanimity.
+But Epicurus ’ argument shows, at best, that death is nothing to us.
+This argument is directed at death rather than dying, but it is possible
+to substitute ‘ dying ’ for ‘ death ’ .
+P1. We are not affected by an event or state of affairs before it happens.
+P2. Death is an event or state of affairs.
+C1. Death does not affect us before it happens (instantiation, P1, P2).
+P3. If death affects us while we are alive, it affects us before it happens.
+C2. Death does not affect us while we are alive ( modus tollens , P3, C1).
+P4. If death affects us while we are dead, it affects us when we do not exist.
+P5. We are not affected by anything when we do not exist.
+C3. We are not affected by death when we do not exist (instantiation,
+P5).
+C4. Death does not affect us while we are dead ( modus tollens , P4, C3).
+C5. It is not the case that death affects us while we are alive or while
+we are dead (conjunction, C2, C4).
+P6. If death affects us, it affects us while we are alive or while we are dead.
+C6. Death does not affect us ( modus tollens , P6, C5).
+P7. What does not affect us is nothing to us.
+C7. Death is nothing to us ( modus ponens , P7, C6).
+It is possible to substitute ‘ dying ’ for ‘ death ’ in this argument, but the
+resulting argument will clearly be unsound. The problem, of course, is P6,
+which can easily be challenged on the grounds that dying can affect us while
+we are dying.
+Lucretius ’ Symmetry Argument
+Luctretius . On the Nature of Things , translated by Martin Ferguson Smith.
+Indianapolis : Hackett , 2001 .
+Kaufman , Frederick . “ Death and Deprivation; or, Why Lucretius ’ Symmetry
+Argument Fails . ” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 , 2 ( 1996 ):
+305 – 12 .
+Nagel , Thomas . “ Death ” in Mortal Questions . Cambridge : Cambridge
+University Press , 1997 .
+Warren , James . Facing Death . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2004 .
+Nicolas Bommarito
+Two Arguments for the Harmlessness of Death 101
+Symmetry arguments attempt to show the fear of death to be irrational by
+appeal to similarities between time before our birth and the time after our
+death. This type of argument has its origin in the philosophy of Epicurus
+(341 – 270 bce ), but its most famous statement is in Lucretius ’ ( c .99 bce –
+c .55 bce ) philosophical epic De Rerum Natura ( On the Nature of Things ).
+The scope of the poem is wide, dealing with physics, metaphysics, psychology,
+and other fi elds. The clearest statement of the symmetry argument
+comes near the end of book III:
+Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed
+before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature
+shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it?
+Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not appear more peaceful than the
+deepest sleep? (Lucretius III, 972 – 75)
+The argument draws a similarity between pre - natal nonexistence and
+post - mortem nonexistence; they both are simply states in which we fail to
+exist. It then notes that we do not fear the time before our birth in which
+we did not exist, so the time after our death warrants a similar attitude. It
+is important to remember that the argument is about the fear of death (the
+state of nonexistence), not the fear of dying (the process of going out of
+existence).
+There are several criticisms of this kind of argument. Thomas Nagel
+suggests that post - mortem nonexistence is a deprivation in a way that pre -
+natal nonexistence is not; one who dies is robbed of life in a way that those
+yet to be conceived are not. Someone whose watch has just been stolen is
+not in the same state as someone who never owned a watch; they are both
+watch - less, but one of them has lost something. One might also think that
+fear itself has a temporal aspect and is essentially future - directed in the way
+it is natural to fear being fi red next week but not to fear having been fi red
+last week.
+Another response to the argument is to grant the symmetry, but use our
+fear of death as a premise rather than our lack of fear of the time before
+we existed. Another way to have similar attitudes toward both states is to
+fear both the time before we existed and the time after our death.
+P1. The pre - natal state is a kind of nonexistence.
+P2. The post - mortem state is a kind of nonexistence.
+C1. Pre - natal and post - mortem states are relevantly similar; both are
+states of nonexistence (conjunction, P1, P2).
+P3. If states are relevantly similar, then they warrant similar attitudes.
+C2. The pre - natal and post - mortem states warrant similar attitudes
+( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. The pre - natal state does not warrant fear.
+C3. Post - mortem nonexistence does not warrant fear (instantiation, C2,
+P4).
+26
+The Existence of Forms: Plato ’ s
+Argument from the Possibility
+of Knowledge
+Jurgis (George) Brakas
+Plato . The Collected Dialogues of Plato , edited by Edith Hamilton and
+Huntington Cairns . New York : Bollington Foundation , 1963 .
+Cornford , F. M. The Republic of Plato . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
+1941 .
+Ross , William David . Plato ’ s Theory of Ideas . Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
+1951 .
+The existence of Forms is at the heart of Plato ’ s philosophy. Take them
+away, and no philosophy that could reasonably be called Plato ’ s would
+remain. To the layman (not to mention many philosophers), they are strange
+creatures indeed. This demands that any discussion of them attempt not
+only to make clear what these Forms are supposed to be like but also why
+we should believe they exist at all. Plato gives us several arguments for their
+existence, but the most important one is arguably what may be called his
+“ argument from the possibility of knowledge. ” Its premises can be found
+in several of his dialogues. The argument, naturally enough, is the product
+of his own passionate convictions and the infl uence of his predecessors upon
+his thinking.
+Deeply infl uenced by Socrates, he took from him the love of wisdom,
+the love of genuine knowledge, with its corresponding withering contempt
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Existence of Forms 103
+for pretensions to it – including the relativism and subjectivism of many of
+his contemporary thinkers, the Sophists. He also realized that he had to
+come to grips with the views of two other major thinkers, Heraclitus and
+Parmenides – Heraclitus claiming that nothing is, only becoming, Parmenides
+(#14) claiming that change does not exist, only what does not change (a
+certain One). If – as Plato believed with Heraclitus – everything in this world
+is constantly changing in every way, constantly “ morphing, ” never, ever
+remaining what it is, how could it ever be possible for us to “ grasp ” anything,
+to know what any thing is? By the time you think you have grasped
+it, it has already slipped out of your hands.
+To know something must therefore be to know something that does not
+change, something that always remains what it is (something Parmenidean).
+Only such a thing can be known, and only such a thing – Plato agrees with
+Parmenides – is really real. Since such things do not exist in this world, they
+must exist in, and constitute, a nonspatial, nontemporal dimension. These
+are what Plato calls “ Forms. ” (Note that the structure of Plato ’ s argument
+is not that Forms exist because knowledge exists; it is, rather, that knowledge
+exists because Forms exist. Knowledge is not the source of the existence
+of Forms; the reverse is true: the existence of Forms makes the existence
+of knowledge possible. Plato ’ s argument, therefore, is not epistemic; it is
+ontological.) They are also perfect, eternal, the source of the existence of
+this world, and many other things as well, but Plato gives other reasons for
+their possession of these attributes.
+[Socrates asks Cratylus] Tell me whether there is or is not any absolute
+beauty or good, or any other absolute existence? Certainly, Socrates, I think
+there is. Then let us seek the true beauty, not asking whether a face is fair, or
+anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in fl ux, but let us ask
+whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. Certainly [ . . . ]. Then how
+can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? [ . . . ]. They cannot.
+Nor yet, can they be known by anyone; for at the moment that the observer
+approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you can
+no longer know their nature or state. [ . . . ]. Nor can we reasonably say [ . . . ]
+that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there
+is nothing abiding. For knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge
+unless continuing always to abide and to exist. But if the very nature
+of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be
+no knowledge, and if the transition is always going on, there will always
+be no knowledge. ( Cratylus , qtd. in Ross, 439C – 440C; Ross ’ s trans., slightly
+modifi ed using Jowett ’ s in The Collected Dialogues )
+In the Republic , Plato gives us the same argument in more explicit form
+– or, if you like, a different version of the same argument in more explicit
+form.
+104 Jurgis (George) Brakas
+[Addressing Glaucon, Socrates asks] [If] a man believes in the existence of
+beautiful things, but not of Beauty itself [ . . . ], is he not living in a dream?
+[ . . . ]. Contrast him with the man who holds that there is such a thing a Beauty
+itself and can discern that essence as well as the things that partake of its
+character, without ever confusing the one with the other – is he a dreamer or
+living in a waking state? He is very much awake. So we may say that he
+knows, while the other has only a belief in appearances; and might we call
+their states of mind knowledge and belief? Certainly. [ . . . ] When a man
+knows, must there not be something that he knows? [ . . . ] [T]here must.
+Something real or unreal? Something real. How could a thing that is unreal
+ever be known? [ . . . ]. So if the real is the object of knowledge, the object of
+belief must be something other than the real. Yes. Can it be the unreal? Or
+is that an impossible object even for belief? Consider: if a man has a belief,
+there must be something before his mind; he cannot be believing nothing, can
+he? No. [ . . . ]. So what he is believing cannot be real nor yet unreal. True.
+[ . . . ]. It seems, then, that what remains to be discovered is that object which
+can be said both to be and not to be and cannot properly be called either real
+or purely unreal. If that can be found, we may justly call it the object of belief
+[ . . . ]. (Plato Republic , 476C – 479A; Cornford ’ s trans.)
+Socrates then goes on to identify that object as the world in which we
+live, a world which he earlier implicitly referred to as a world of appearances.
+Although one of the basic operating premises here is not that all
+things in this world are in constant fl ux, but rather that they are neither
+fully real nor fully unreal, it is not a far stretch to argue that they are neither
+fully real nor fully unreal because they are in constant fl ux. If so, then the
+argument is fundamentally the same as the one given in the Cratylus ; if not,
+then it is another version of it. In the latter case, premise 4 would have
+to be modifi ed accordingly as well as the wording in all the lines relying
+on it.
+P1. Knowledge is possible.
+P2. Knowledge is knowledge of some object. That is, if a (putative) piece
+of knowledge does not have an object, then that (putative) piece of
+knowledge does not exist.
+P3. All knowledge (unlike opinion) is stable. That is, all pieces of knowledge
+are stable: they do not change, being one thing at one time, another at
+another.
+P4. If the object of knowledge could change (for example, if beauty, the
+object I know, could become something other than beauty), then the
+knowledge of that object would not be stable (my knowledge of beauty
+would not be stable).
+P5. All things in this world, as Heraclitus says, are in constant fl ux. That
+is, all things in this world are things that are always changing in every
+way, or, all things in this world are not things that are stable.
+The Existence of Forms 105
+P6. Some objects of knowledge exist among things in this world (assumption
+for reductio ).
+C1. Some objects of knowledge change; they are not stable (syllogism,
+P5, P6).
+C2. Some pieces of knowledge are not stable ( modus ponens , P4, C1).
+C3. All knowledge (unlike opinion) is stable and some pieces of knowledge
+are not stable (conjunction, P3, C2).
+C4. No objects of knowledge exist among things in this world ( reductio ,
+P6 – C3).
+P7. If objects of knowledge do not exist in this world and do not exist in
+another, then objects of knowledge do not exist.
+P8. Objects of knowledge do not exist in another world (assumption for
+indirect proof).
+C5. Objects of knowledge do not exist in this world, and objects of
+knowledge do not exist in another (conjunction, C4, P8).
+C6. Objects of knowledge do not exist ( modus ponens , P7, C5).
+C7. Knowledge is not possible ( modus ponens , P2, C6).
+C8. Knowledge is possible, and knowledge is not possible (conjunction,
+P1, C7).
+C9. Objects of knowledge – called “ Forms ” – do exist in another world
+( reductio , P6 – C8).
+27
+Plato, Aristotle, and the Third Man
+Argument
+Jurgis (George) Brakas
+Aristotle . Peri Ideon ( On Ideas ) , in Aristotle Fragmenta Selecta , edited by
+William D. Ross . Oxford , 1963 : 84.21 – 85.6 .
+Fine , Gail . “ Owen, Aristotle and the Third Man . ” Phronesis 27 ( 1982 ):
+13 – 33 .
+Lewis , Frank A. “ On Plato ’ s Third Man Argument and the ‘ Platonism ’ of
+Aristotle , ” in How Things Are , edited by J. Bogen and J. McQuire ,
+133 – 74 . Dordrecht : Reidel , 1985 .
+Plato . Plato: Parmenides , translated by R. E. Allen. New Haven, CT : Yale
+University Press , 1998 .
+Strang , Colin . “ Plato and the Third Man . ” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
+Society , vol. 1 ( 1963 ): 147 – 64 .
+Many scholars believe that the Third Man Argument (the TMA) is one of
+the most powerful arguments against the existence of Plato ’ s Forms, many
+going so far as to maintain that it is successful. It exists in two versions.
+One, preserved to us only in a commentary on Aristotle ’ s Metaphysics by
+Alexander of Aphrodisias, uses the Form Man as an example; the other –
+offered fi rst, to his great credit, by Plato himself – uses the Form Large. The
+difference between the versions is signifi cant, because the fi rst uses Forms
+of entities or substances as examples whereas the second uses attributes or
+properties.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Plato, Aristotle, and the Third Man Argument 107
+Both versions use just three major premises (in addition to fi ve that most
+people would fi nd uncontroversial) to generate a regress that is vicious. For
+any group of things to which the same “ name ” (word) may be truly applied,
+there exists a Form having the same “ name ” in virtue of which that “ name ”
+may be truly applied to them. (This may be called the “ Existence
+Assumption ” or “ One - over - many Assumption. ” ) This Form is not a member
+of the group of things of which it is the Form. (This is usually called the
+“ Non - identity Assumption. ” ) Finally, this Form may be predicated of itself.
+(This is usually called the “ Self - predication Assumption. ” It should be
+pointed out that both the formulation of this premise and its name are
+misleading. It is not the very same Form that is predicated of itself but
+rather another Form having the same name as the fi rst, with the same point
+applying as the regress proceeds.) Since an infi nite regress is impossible (at
+least, so both Plato and Aristotle agree), one or more of the three major
+premises must be false, if we take the additional fi ve to be uncontroversial.
+The problem is that it is extremely diffi cult, if not impossible, to see how
+Plato could give up any of those premises and be left with anything that
+resembles his philosophy.
+Controversy does surround both versions. Scholars interpret them differently,
+and, while some fi nd one or both to be successful, others do not
+(see Strang, Fine, and Lewis).
+The third man is proven also in the following way. If the thing predicated
+of some group of things also is another thing in addition to the things of
+which it is predicated, having been separated from them (for this [is what]
+those who posit the Forms think they prove; this is why, according to them,
+a certain man - itself exists – because the man being truly predicated of the
+many individual men also is other than the individual men) – if this is so,
+there will be a third man. For if the thing predicated is other than the things
+of which it is predicated, and exists on its own, and man is predicated both
+of the individual men and of the Form, there will be a third man in addition
+to both the individuals and the Form. In the same way, [there will be] also
+a fourth man, predicated of both this [man] – that is, the Form – and the
+individual [men], and in the same way also a fi fth, and so on to infi nity.
+(Aristotle, 84.21 – 85.6; author ’ s translation)
+P1. If a group of things exists (individual men, 1 for example) to each
+member of which the same name ( “ man ” ) may be truly applied, then a
+Form (Man or man - himself) exists in virtue of which that name may be
+truly applied to them (existence or one - over - many assumption).
+1 “ Men ” and “ man ” are used in a gender - neutral sense.
+108 Jurgis (George) Brakas
+P2. If a Form (Man) exists in virtue of which the same name may be truly
+applied to a group of things (individual men), then the Form in virtue
+of which the same name may be truly applied to that group is not
+included in it (nonidentity assumption).
+P3. If the same name ( “ man ” ) may be truly applied to each member of a
+group of things (individual men), then the name that may be truly applied
+to each member of that group may also be truly applied to the Form in
+virtue of which that name may be applied to each member of that group
+(self - predication assumption).
+P4. A group of things (e.g., men) exists to each member of which the name
+“ man ” may be truly applied.
+C1. A Form, Man, exists (in virtue of which “ man ” may be truly applied
+to each member of the group of individual men) ( modus ponens , P1,
+P4).
+C2. The Form Man is not included in the group of individual men
+( modus ponens , P2, C1).
+C3. The name “ man ” may be truly applied to the Form Man. That is,
+the Form Man is [a] 2 man ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+P5. The Form (Man) in virtue of which the same name ( “ man ” ) may be
+applied to a group of things (individual men) is added to that group.
+P6. If the Form (Man) in virtue of which the same name ( “ man ” ) may be
+applied to a group of things (individual men) is added to that group,
+then the Form and that group constitute a new, different group.
+C4. Man and the group of individual men constitute a new, different
+group ( modus ponens , P6, P5).
+C5. The name “ man ” may be truly applied to Man and each of the
+individual men. In other words, a group of things exist (Man and the
+individual men) to each member of which the same name ( “ man ” )
+may be truly applied (conjunction, C3, P4).
+C6. Another Man (The Third Man 3 ) exists (in virtue of which “ man ”
+may be truly applied to each member of this new group) ( modus
+ponens , P1, C5).
+P7. If a third Man exists, then also a fourth Man exists (by the same reasoning
+that the third Man exists: P1 – C6).
+C7. A fourth Man exists ( modus ponens , P7, C6).
+P8. If a fourth Man exists, then an infi nite number of such Forms exist.
+C8. An infi nite number of such Forms exist ( modus ponens , P8, C7).
+2 Brackets are placed around “ a ” because the indefi nite article does not exist in ancient
+Greek. Depending on the context, the Greek would therefore allow the same set of words to
+be translated as “ Man is a man ” or “ Man is man. ” Clearly, the argument will not go through
+if “ self - predication ” is understood along the lines of “ Man is man. ”
+3 Although this Form is not the third Form Man to appear, it is the third man to appear if
+we take any one of the individual men to be the fi rst man – as Aristotle does.
+Plato, Aristotle, and the Third Man Argument 109
+P9. If an infi nite number of Forms exist, then an infi nite regress is
+possible.
+C9. An infi nite regress is possible ( modus ponens , P9, C8).
+P10. An infi nite regress is not possible.
+C10. An infi nite regress is possible and an infi nite regress is not possible
+(conjunction, C9, P10).
+C11. One or more of P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, or P10 are false
+( reductio , P1 – C10).
+Plato presents what may be called the “ self - characterization ” version of
+the TMA in the Parmenides . Parmenides is questioning Socrates:
+“ [W]hen some plurality of things seem to you to be large, there perhaps
+seems to be some one characteristic that is the same when you look over them
+all, whence you believe that the large is one. ”
+“ True, ” he said.
+“ What about the large itself and the other larges? If with your mind you
+should look over them all in like manner, will not some large one again appear,
+by which they all appear to be large? ”
+“ It seems so. ”
+“ Therefore, another character of largeness will have made its appearance
+alongside largeness itself and the things that have a share of it; and over and
+above all those, again, a different one, by which they will all be large. And
+each of the characters will no longer be one for you, but unlimited in multitude.
+” (Plato, 132a – b; Allen ’ s translation)
+In reconstructing this argument, I have used beautiful things and their
+corresponding Forms instead of the “ larges ” and their Forms. This should
+make Plato ’ s argument more “ down to earth, ” without distorting it in any
+way.
+P1. If a group of things exists (individual beautiful things, for example) to
+each member of which the same name ( “ beautiful ” ) may be truly applied,
+then a Form (the beautiful itself or Beauty) exists in virtue of which that
+name may be truly applied to them (existence or one - over - many
+assumption).
+P2. If a Form (Beauty) exists in virtue of which the same name may be truly
+applied to a group of things (individual beautiful things), then the Form
+in virtue of which the same name may be truly applied to that group is
+not included in it (non - identity assumption).
+P3. If the same name ( “ beautiful ” ) may be truly applied to each member
+of a group of things (individual beautiful things), then the name that
+may be truly applied to each member of that group may also be truly
+110 Jurgis (George) Brakas
+applied to the Form in virtue of which that name may be applied to each
+member of that group ( “ self - predication ” assumption).
+P4. A group of things (individual beautiful things, for example) exists to
+each member of which the name ( “ beautiful ” ) may be truly applied.
+C1. A Form, Beauty, exists (in virtue of which “ beautiful ” may be truly
+applied to each member of the group of individual beautiful things)
+( modus ponens , 1, 4).
+C2. The Form Beauty is not included in the group of individual beautiful
+things ( modus ponens , P2, C1).
+C3. The name “ beautiful ” may be truly applied to the Form Beauty. That
+is, the Form Beauty is beautiful ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+P5. The Form (Beauty) in virtue of which the same name ( “ beautiful ” ) may
+be applied to a group of things (individual beautiful things) is added to
+that group.
+P6. If the Form (Beauty) in virtue of which the same name ( “ beautiful ” )
+may be applied to a group of things (individual beautiful things) is added
+to that group, then the Form and that group constitute a new, different
+group.
+C4. Beauty and the group of individual beautiful things constitute a new,
+different group ( modus ponens , P6, P5).
+C5. The name “ beautiful ” may be truly applied to Beauty and each of
+the individual beautiful things. In other words, a group of things exist
+(Beauty and the individual beautiful things) to each member of which
+the same name ( “ beautiful ” ) may be truly applied (conjunction, C3,
+P4).
+C6. Another Beauty (The Third Beauty) exists (in virtue of which “ beautiful
+” may be truly applied to each member of this new group) ( modus
+ponens , P1, C5).
+P7. If a third Beauty exists, then also a fourth Beauty exists (by the same
+reasoning that the third Beauty exists: P1 – C6).
+C7. A fourth Beauty exists ( modus ponens , P7, C6).
+P8. If a fourth Beauty exists, then an infi nite number of such Forms exist.
+C8. An infi nite number of such Forms exist ( modus ponens , P8, C7).
+P9. If an infi nite number of Forms exist, then an infi nite regress is
+possible.
+C9. An infi nite regress is possible ( modus ponens , C8, P7).
+P10. An infi nite regress is not possible.
+C10. An infi nite regress is possible and an infi nite regress is not possible
+(conjunction, C9, P10).
+C11. One or more of P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, or P10 are false
+( reductio , P1 – C10).
+28
+Logical Monism
+Luis Estrada - Gonz á lez 1
+Beall , J. C. , and Greg Restall . Logical Pluralism . Oxford : Oxford University
+Press , 2006 .
+Haack , Susan . Philosophy of Logics . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
+Press , 1978 .
+Priest , Graham . Doubt Truth to Be a Liar . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
+2006 .
+Read , Stephen . “ Monism: The One True Logic , ” in A Logical Approach to
+Philosophy , edited by David DeVidi and Tim Kenyon , 193 – 209 .
+Dordrecht : Springer , 2006 .
+Logical monism is the view that there is only one correct logic or, alternatively,
+the view that there is only one genuine consequence relation, only
+one right answer to the question on whether and why a given argument is
+valid, only one collection of valid inferences (or of logical truths), or only
+one right way of reasoning. Logic is at the center of philosophy and many
+theoretical and practical pursuits, for they proceed by the way of argument,
+inference, and their evaluation. Thus, the problem of knowing whether
+there is only one correct logic is central in philosophy and of crucial importance
+to philosophy and other activities.
+There is a simple argument for logical monism, put forward, among
+others, by Graham Priest and purported to follow from the pre - theoretical
+notion of validity – an inference is valid if and only if whenever its premises
+1 Thanks to Axel Barcel ó , John Corcoran, Claudia Olmedo - Garc í a, Agust í n Rayo, and
+Stephen Read for valuable comments on earlier versions of this text. Needless to say, those
+mistakes that remain are mine alone.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+112 Luis Estrada-González
+are true, so is the conclusion. He works with a broad notion of logic in the
+sense that he is ready to accept that inferential tools for certain particular
+cases or domains augmented with principles specifi c to those domains count
+as logics, but he says that there is nonetheless one true logic, a logic whose
+inferences are valid in all domains and that lacks principles depending on
+specifi c domains.
+Some logical pluralists try to wriggle out of this monist argument by
+claiming that the quantifi cation “ all cases (domains) ” is not absolute but
+should be read “ all cases (domains) of a kind. ” For example, classical
+predicate logic would stem from taking cases to be the consistent and complete
+worlds, whereas constructive logic would be given when cases are
+taken to be possibly incomplete bodies of information or warrants or constructions,
+and relevance logic would be given when cases are taken to be
+possibly incomplete or inconsistent (or both) ways the world might or might
+not be. Thus, there could be different collections of inferences valid in all
+cases, for they could be valid in all cases but of different kinds.
+This pluralist reply seems not to be a good one, for then ‘ all the cases ’
+does not mean “ all the cases ” and makes logic dependent on the content
+or particularities of the case under consideration, which goes against the
+generality and topic - neutrality expected from logic. Moreover, the inferences
+valid in all the (different kinds of) cases would be regarded as the real
+valid inferences, for they are indeed valid in all cases, do not vary from case
+to case, and hence hold independently of the particularities of each case.
+Another pluralist option, not very well developed yet, is to bite the bullet,
+to take the pre - theoretical notion of validity at face value and then try to
+show that it might be inapplicable. The logical monist assumes that the
+collection of valid inferences, defi ned as inferences holding in all cases, is
+not empty. We have seen in the preceding paragraph that a logical monist
+might insist on the existence of one true logic, claiming that the inferences
+valid across all the cases of every kind are the real valid inferences. This
+move rests on the third premise below. But what if it were false; that is,
+what if there were no inferences valid in all cases (of all kinds)? Would there
+be no logic at all? Some arguments by trivialists and possibilists seem to
+imply that there are no inferences holding in all cases. However, this hardly
+entails the inexistence of any logic at all. Even though there were no inferences
+valid in all of them, cases might need special inferences as inferential
+patterns ruling right reasoning in them. To complicate things, premise 3
+requires further an “ enough ” number of valid inferences, for even though
+if the collection of valid inferences were not empty – if it consisted of, say,
+only one or just few inferences – it would be vacuous in practice to call
+“ logic ” to such a small number of valid inferences. However, the greater
+the collection of inferences, the more likely that they could not hold together
+in all cases.
+Logical Monism 113
+It seems, then, that logic should be better characterized as an inferential
+device and the universal quantifi er on the notion of validity should be
+explicitly restricted:
+An inference X => Y is k - valid if and only if it holds in all k - cases. As it
+is, this notion of validity is compatible with both the existence of one
+true logic (since it does not prevent the nonemptiness of the case of all
+cases) and the idea that logics may be inferential devices for specifi c
+domains.
+Priest rejects the idea that, in practice, every principle of inference – or
+at least a large amount of them so as to make speaking of a logic vacuous
+– fails in some situation. His argument for this, premise 3, is that to the
+extent that the meanings of connectives are fi xed, there are some principles
+that cannot fail. The discussion of this reply would lead us quite far from
+our present concern, though, for it introduces the problem of the meaning
+of logical connectives.
+The pluralist replies considered hitherto tried to provide a special account
+of the phrase ‘ all cases (or domains) ’ or attempted to give reasons to reject
+premise 3. There is an additional way of challenging logical monism, not
+necessarily incompatible with the former and just recently being taken into
+account in the specialized literature. It consists of challenging premises 1
+and 2, that is, challenging at least the uniqueness of the pre - theoretical
+notions of holding in a case and validity. For example, the following characterizations
+of validity turn out to be equivalent in classical logic, which
+has just two, sharply separable truth values (true and false), but in general
+they are not:
+V1. An inference X => Y is valid if and only if in all cases in which X is
+true then Y is true too.
+V2. An inference X => Y is valid if and only if in all cases in which X is
+not false then Y is true.
+V3. An inference X => Y is valid if and only if in all cases in which X is
+true then Y is not false.
+These different notions of validity may give rise to different collections
+of valid inferences and hence to a plurality of logics with very different
+properties. This last pluralist strategy surely has its shortcomings, but in
+order to discuss it in detail, it is necessary to introduce further and more
+technical remarks on truth values and the ways the collections of truth
+values can be partitioned. However, I hope this brief note is helpful for
+anyone looking to enter the fascinating problem of whether there is only
+one correct logic.
+114 Luis Estrada-González
+Priest expresses his logical monism in the following terms:
+Is the same logical theory to be applied in all domains, or do different
+domains require different logics? [ … ] Even if modes of legitimate inference do
+vary from domain to domain, there must be a common core determined by the
+syntactic intersection of all these. In virtue of the tradition of logic as being
+domain - neutral, this has good reason to be called the correct logic. But if this
+claim is rejected, even the localist must recognise the signifi cance of this core.
+Despite the fact that there are relatively independent domains about which we
+reason, given any two domains, it is always possible that we may be required
+to reason across domains. (Priest, 174f; emphasis in the original)
+I hereby present a version of the argument using valid inferences, but it
+can be easily turned into an argument about logical truths. ‘ X => Y ’ is read
+“ Y is inferred from X. ” I use also the word ‘ case ’ , but you can read ‘ domain ’
+if you prefer.
+P1. An inference X => Y holds in a case if and only if, in that case if X is true,
+then Y is true (the pre - theoretical notion of holding in a case).
+P2. An inference X => Y is valid if and only if it holds in all cases (the pre -
+theoretical notion of validity.)
+P2 ′ . X => Y is not valid if and only if it does not hold in all cases (contraposition,
+P2).
+P3. There is at least one collection of (enough) inferences holding in all
+cases (existence of a logic).
+P4. If two collections of all inferences holding in all cases are different, then
+there is at least one inference X => Y such that it belongs to a collection
+but not to the other (extensionality of collections).
+P5. There are at least two different collections of all inferences holding in
+all cases (logical pluralism, hypothesis to be reduced).
+C1. Since they are different collections of valid inferences, there is an
+inference X => Y belonging to one of the collections but not to the other
+( modus ponens , P4, P5).
+C2. If X => Y is a valid inference, then it holds in all cases (equivalence,
+simplifi cation, P2).
+C3. If X => Y is not a valid inference, then it does not hold in all cases
+(equivalence, simplifi cation, P2 ′ ).
+C4. X => Y holds in all cases ( modus ponens , C1, C2).
+C5. X => Y does not hold in all cases ( modus ponens , C1, C3).
+C6. X => Y holds in all cases and X => Y does not hold in all cases (conjunction,
+C4, C5).
+C7. There are not even two collections of inferences that are different
+and hold in all cases ( reductio , P5 – C6).
+C8. There is exactly one collection of inferences holding in all cases
+(disjunctive syllogism, P3, C7).
+29
+The Maximality Paradox
+Nicola Ciprotti
+Adams , Robert . “ Theories of Actuality , ” No û s 8 ( 1974 ): 211 – 31 . Reprinted
+in The Possible and the Actual. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality ,
+edited by Michael Loux , 190 – 209 . Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press ,
+1979 . (All subsequent references are to this edition.)
+Chihara , Charles . The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics
+of Modal Logic . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1998 .
+Davies , Martin . Meaning, Quantifi cation, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical
+Logic . London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1981 .
+Divers , John . Possible Worlds . London : Routledge , 2002 .
+Grim , Patrick . The Incomplete Universe. Totality, Knowledge, and Truth .
+Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1991 .
+The suggested label for the argument to follow, the “ maximality paradox, ”
+is tentative. As a matter of fact, there currently is no consensus as to what
+the most appropriate label might be; what ’ s more, there is not even consensus
+as to who fi rst formulated it. Robert Adams is credited with having
+been the fi rst to touch on it in print, while the fi rst detailed formulation is
+due to Martin Davies.
+Such uncertainties about name and origin have possibly to do with the
+fact that the maximality paradox is actually a family of closely related, yet
+distinct, arguments. For, while each argument relies on a common body of
+tenets, namely, well - established facts of standard set theory, it nevertheless
+is the case that the salient targets of maximality paradox can, and do, differ.
+What is common to each argument, and so what the maximality paradox
+essentially consists in, is that a reductio of the hypothesis that a set A exists
+of a given sort, namely a totality - set, is arrived at. Different maximality
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+116 Nicola Ciprotti
+paradox - style arguments can be wielded, however, against the existence of
+distinct set - theoretic (or set - like) totalities, such as, for example, the set of
+all possible worlds, the set of all truths, or the set of all states of affairs
+(whether or not the maximality paradox also threatens the existence of the
+members of such sets, not only the sets themselves, is an issue we shall
+briefl y address in closing).
+In what follows, we shall focus on Adams ’ original outline of maximality
+paradox as subsequently given rigorous shape by John Divers. This version
+of the maximality paradox is specifi cally concerned with a particular conception
+of possible worlds as world - stories, namely, peculiar sets of propositions.
+After due modifi cations, however, the argument can be conferred
+wider in scope so as to apply to set - like totalities including elements that
+are different from possible worlds.
+According to a good deal of philosophers (#99), abstract entities of
+various sorts exist. Among them are sets, numbers, states of affairs, propositions,
+and properties, to name the ones referred to most often. The majority
+of philosophers who believe in abstract objects also include possible worlds
+among them. In particular, the suggestion is that possible worlds can be
+analyzed as world - stories, that is, sets of propositions that are both (i)
+consistent and (ii) maximal collections thereof.
+Generally speaking, a set A is consistent if and only if it is possible for
+its members to be jointly true (or jointly obtain); a set A is maximal if and
+only if, for every proposition p , either A includes p or A includes the contradiction
+of p . Such two conditions seem constitutive of the notion of a
+possible world: a possible world ought to be possible, that is, a contradiction -
+free entity; a possible world ought to be maximal, that is, a complete
+alternative way things might be, or have been – one fi lled in up to the
+minutest detail.
+According to this conception, then, the explicit defi nition of “ possible
+world ” is as follows:
+(DF) w is a possible world = df w is a set A of propositions such that: (i)
+for every proposition p , either p is an element A or p is not an element
+A (maximality condition); (ii) the conjunction of the members of A is
+consistent (consistency condition).
+The main asset of (DF) is that, through it, the existence of possible worlds
+is made compatible with an ontology that eschews quantifi cation over
+nonactual objects, generally regarded as entia non grata . Qua sets of propositions,
+in fact, it is alleged that no more than actually existing abstract
+objects – indeed, sets and propositions – is needed for accommodating possible
+worlds within a respectable actualist ontology; that is, one free of mere
+possibilia . (DF), though, gives rise to the maximality paradox.
+The Maximality Paradox 117
+Notoriously, the development of a satisfactory logic theory of propositions
+[ . . . ] is also beset by formal problems and threats of paradox. One such threat
+particularly concerns the [ . . . ] theory [of possible worlds as maximal sets of
+propositions]. The theory seems to imply that there are consistent sets composed
+of one member of every pair of mutually contradictory propositions.
+Furthermore, it follows from the theory, with the assumption that every possible
+world is actual in itself, that every world - story, s , has among its members
+the proposition that all the members of s are true. Here we are teetering on
+the brink of paradox [ . . . ]. This may give rise to a suspicion that the [ . . . ]
+theory could not be precisely formulated without engendering some analogue
+of the semantical paradoxes. (Adams, 207 – 8)
+Adams ’ point is as follows. If w is a possible world, namely, a maximal
+consistent set of propositions (call it ‘ S ’ ), then qua set S must have a size
+– in set - theoretic jargon, a cardinality. What is the cardinality of S? We
+know from standard set theory that the power set of S – that is, the set
+whose members are all of the subsets of S – has a cardinality that is greater
+than S ’ s. It follows that for each member B of the power set, there is the
+proposition that B is a set (in fact, it is true that B is a set). Accordingly,
+there is a consistent set of propositions that has a cardinality greater than
+S, which was supposed to be a maximal consistent set – reductio . Thus, we
+have started from the supposition that w was a maximally comprehensive
+object, one “ than which nothing greater can be conceived, ” and we have
+ended up with an object greater than w. (Taking the union of S and B as
+the real maximal consistent set won ’ t do, of course, since by standard set
+theory again, there is a set whose cardinality is greater than the union of S
+and B.) This is the maximality paradox.
+As already hinted at, the maximality paradox has possibly more bite;
+while the case below is only concerned with possible worlds as maximal
+consistent sets of propositions, structurally identical arguments can be
+constructed to question the existence of other set - like totalities. As soon as
+some given totality is construed set - theoretically, in fact, there follows by
+Cantor ’ s Theorem that such a totality cannot exist. Thus, parallel arguments
+have been mounted for proving, for example, that: (i) there is no set
+of all truths (Grim); and (ii) there is no set of all possible states of affairs
+(Chihara).
+Notice that, strictly speaking, maximality paradox - style arguments do not
+rule out the (possibility of the) existence of the members involved. As regards,
+for example, possible worlds as maximal consistent sets of propositions, their
+nonexistence actually follows from the maximality paradox only if the further
+premise is taken aboard that, for every possible world, there necessarily is a
+corresponding maximal consistent set of propositions. In other words, the
+stronger conclusion – that is, the nonexistence of the worlds themselves –
+would follow only if the further principle is assumed that, for every domain
+118 Nicola Ciprotti
+of discourse, the objects in that domain necessarily make up a set or some
+set - like object. Unless this is assumed, a possible way out of the maximality
+paradox is to treat possible worlds not as sets but proper classes, that is, such
+that they cannot in turn be members of a more inclusive collection. Maximality
+paradox - style arguments cannot exclude by themselves the (possibility of
+the) existence of all - inclusive domains of discourse of a given sort (e.g., the
+domain of all possible worlds, the domain of all existent objects, the domain
+of all truths, etc.), provided that such domains be (treated as) nonsets. What
+maximality paradox - style arguments do rule out is the existence of a set (or
+set - like entity) of which all objects of the domain of discourse at stake are
+members. Notice fi nally though that regarding possible worlds, the suggested
+way out is not trouble free because it seems to undermine a basic tenet of
+possible - worlds semantics, that is, that a set W of possible worlds is both
+mathematically well defi ned and manageable. This strategy would then
+require us to revise robustly our views on what constitutes an acceptable
+applied semantical system, like possible - worlds semantics.
+The power set of A, symbolized as ℘ (A), is the set of all subsets of a set
+A. Thus, ℘ (A) is short for {B |B ⊆ A}. ℘ (A) has 2 n members if A has n
+members.
+(Example: suppose that A = {1, 2, 3}. Hence, ℘ (A) = {A, {1, 2}, {1, 3},
+{2, 3}, {1}, {2}, {3}, Ø }.)
+Theorem (so - called “ Cantor ’ s Theorem, ” CT): For any set A, every
+subset of A is smaller than ℘ (A). (Emphasis on “ every ” because every
+set A is a subset of itself.)
+The Proposition Assumption, PA: For each set A i that is a member of
+℘ (A), a proposition p exists that is about that set, namely, the proposition
+that A i is a set; if A i ≠ A j , then the proposition that A i is a set and
+the proposition that A j is a set are different propositions.
+P1. There is a maximal consistent set S of propositions (assumption for
+reductio ).
+P2. For each set S i that is a member of ℘ (S), there is the proposition p that
+S i is a set (Proposition Assumption).
+P3. For each such p , either p is an element of S or p is not an element of S
+(defi nition of maximality condition).
+P4. S includes at least as many propositions as there are elements in ℘ (S)
+(P2, P3).
+P5. S is a subset of S (standard set theory).
+P6. S has a subset that is at least as large as ℘ (S) (P4, P5).
+P7. S has no subset as large as ℘ (S) [CT].
+C1. There is no maximal consistent set S of propositions ( reductio ,
+P1 – P7).
+30
+An Argument for Free Will
+Gerald Harrison
+Clarke , Randolph . “ Toward a Credible Agent - Causal Account of Free Will . ”
+No û s 27 ( 1993 ): 191 – 203 .
+van Inwagen , Peter . An Essay on Free Will . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
+1983 .
+___. “ How to Think about the Problem of Free Will . ” Journal of Ethics 12
+( 2008 ): 327 – 41 .
+Reid , Thomas . Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind . Cambridge,
+MA : The MIT Press , 1969 .
+Strawson , Peter F. “ Freedom and Resentment . ” Proceedings of the British
+Academy 48 ( 1962 ): 1 – 25 .
+Some philosophers think that our decisions are free only if uncaused, others
+that causation is needed to prevent our decisions being uncontrolled; some
+think that the causation needs to be indeterministic, others that it needs to
+be deterministic, and others that it does not matter either way.
+Nevertheless, there is near unanimous agreement that free will is needed
+to ground moral responsibility. That is to say, free will is required if we are
+to deserve praise, blame, reward, or punishment for our deeds, and if a host
+of so - called “ reactive attitudes ” such as resentment, guilt, and forgiveness
+are appropriate.
+This common ground among disputants provides the basis for a positive
+argument for free will. Versions of this argument (which has no specifi c
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+120 Gerald Harrison
+name) have been presented by Thomas Reid, Randolph Clarke, Peter van
+Inwagen ( Essay ), and Peter Strawson, among others.
+Just as it is widely agreed that moral responsibility requires free will, it
+is also widely agreed that we are morally responsible for at least some of
+what we do some of the time. For Reid, it was a fi rst principle “ that some
+aspects of human conduct deserve praise, others blame ” (361). According
+to Peter Strawson, our commitment to moral responsibility is so deeply
+rooted that it is simply inconceivable that we could give it up, and thus the
+reality of moral responsibility sets a boundary condition for where rational
+argument can lead.
+If our moral responsibility is beyond reasonable doubt, then it must be
+beyond reasonable doubt that we possess free will, as the former presupposes
+the latter. Thus, we get our positive argument for free will.
+Not everyone accepts this argument. A signifi cant minority of philosophers
+deny that we are morally responsible. There are, after all, powerful
+arguments both for thinking that free will is incompatible with determinism
+and for thinking that it is incompatible with indeterminism. Such arguments
+can be used to raise doubts about whether we have free will, and so to raise
+doubts about moral responsibility.
+For most, however, the belief that we are morally responsible has greater
+initial plausibility than any of the premises of an argument leading to the
+denial of free will. Moral responsibility therefore provides the best positive
+argument for thinking that we do have free will.
+There are, moreover, seemingly unanswerable arguments that, if they are
+correct, demonstrate that the existence of moral responsibility entails the
+existence of free will, and, therefore, if free will does not exist, moral responsibility
+does not exist either. It is, however, evident that moral responsibility
+does exist: if there were no such thing as moral responsibility nothing would
+be anyone ’ s fault, and it is evident that there are states of affairs to which one
+can point and say, correctly, to certain people: That ’ s your fault. (van Inwagen
+“ How to Think ” )
+P1. If we are morally responsible then we have free will.
+P2. We are morally responsible.
+C1. We have free will ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+31
+Frankfurt ’ s Refutation of
+the Principle of Alternative
+Possibilities
+Gerald Harrison
+Frankfurt , Harry . “ Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility . ” Journal
+of Philosophy 45 ( 1969 ): 829 – 39 .
+Fischer , John M. “ Frankfurt - Style Compatibilism , ” in Free Will , edited by
+Gary Watson , 190 – 211 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2003 .
+Widerker , David , and Michael McKenna , (eds.). Moral Responsibility and
+Alternative Possibilities . Farnham, UK : Ashgate , 2006 .
+Endorsed by Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and many others the “ Principle of
+Alternative Possibilities ” (PAP for short) states:
+PAP: A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she
+could have done otherwise.
+Historically, PAP has been one of the most popular routes to “ incompatibilism
+” about moral responsibility (incompatibilism is the view that
+moral responsibility and causal determinism – the thesis that there is only
+one future compatible with the past and the laws of nature – are incompatible).
+After all, if determinism is true, there ’ s a sense in which no one could
+ever have acted differently. “ Compatibilists ” (those who believe determinism
+and moral responsibility to be compatible) resisted this argument by
+arguing that PAP should be given a controversial “ conditional ” interpretation
+according to which an agent could have done otherwise if he would
+have done so had he desired.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+122 Gerald Harrison
+But in 1969, the philosopher Harry Frankfurt devised an argument to
+refute PAP. Frankfurt argued that it is possible for circumstances to arise
+in which it is clear that a person could not have done otherwise yet also
+clear that he is morally responsible for his deed. The defi ning feature of
+what has now become known as a “ Frankfurt - style case ” is that an intervention
+device does not intervene in a process leading to an action but
+would have intervened if the agent had been about to decide differently.
+The presence of the intervention mechanism rules out the possibility of the
+agent ’ s deciding differently, yet because the intervention mechanism plays
+no role in the agent ’ s deliberations and subsequent action, it seems clear
+that the agent is fully morally responsible for his action; hence PAP is
+refuted.
+By refuting PAP, Frankfurt ’ s argument closes off one of the major routes
+to incompatibilism and allows compatibilists to bypass the debate over the
+correct interpretation of PAP.
+Frankfurt ’ s argument remains the focus of considerable debate, with
+detractors arguing that it is impossible to construct a Frankfurt - style case
+in which all relevant alternative possibilities have been expunged.
+Suppose someone, Black, let us say wants Jones to perform a certain
+action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he
+prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is
+about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear
+to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide
+to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear
+that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps
+to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him
+to do. Whatever Jones ’ s initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will
+have his way [ … ].
+Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for
+reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black
+wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely
+the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if
+Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. (Frankfurt,
+835 – 6)
+P1. An agent is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could
+have done otherwise (PAP).
+P2. If PAP is true, then a Frankfurt - style case will absolve its subject from
+moral responsibility.
+P3. Frankfurt - style cases do not absolve their subjects from moral
+responsibility.
+C1. PAP is false ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
+32
+Van Inwagen ’ s Consequence
+Argument against Compatibilism
+Grant Sterling
+van Inwagen , Peter . An Essay on Free Will . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1983 .
+One of the most famous recent arguments in the free will and determinism
+debate is Peter van Inwagen ’ s consequence argument, which aims to show
+that compatibilism is false. Compatibilism is the view that all our actions
+could be fully determined by the laws of physics and yet at the same time
+we could have free will in the sense necessary for moral responsibility. Van
+Inwagen introduces the essence of this argument near the beginning of his
+book on free will and then goes on to gives three detailed technical versions
+of the argument. Included here is the simple version and the fi rst technical
+formalization (which aims to show that under determinism we could never
+act in any way other than the way in which we do act).
+If determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of nature
+and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were
+born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences
+of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (16)
+Consider any act that (logically) someone might have performed. If it
+should turn out that this act was incompatible with the state of the world
+before that person ’ s birth taken together with the laws of nature, then it
+follows that that person could not have performed that act. Moreover, if
+determinism is true, then just any deviation from the actual course of events
+would be incompatible with any past state of the world taken together with
+the laws of nature. Therefore, if determinism is true, it never has been within
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+124 Grant Sterling
+my power to deviate from the actual course of events that has constituted my
+history. (75)
+P1. If determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of
+nature and events in the remote past.
+P2. The laws of nature and events in the remote past are not up to us.
+P3. If something is not up to us, then its consequences are not up to us.
+C1. If the laws of nature and events in the remote past are not up to us,
+then their consequences are not up to us (substitution, P2, P3).
+C2. Consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past
+are not up to us ( modus ponens , P2, C1).
+C3. If determinism is true, then our acts are not up to us (in our control,
+within our ability) (substitution, C2, P1).
+P4. If our acts are not up to us, then we ’ re not responsible for them.
+C4. If determinism is true, we ’ re not responsible for any of our acts
+(hypothetical syllogism, C3, P4).
+Van Inwagen ’ s First Formalization
+Defi nitions:
+Let ‘ U ’ be a complete description of the state of the universe right now.
+Let ‘ U – 1 ’ be a complete description of the state of the universe the day
+before some person ‘ X ’ was born.
+Let ‘ A ’ be some action that X did not perform.
+Let ‘ L ’ be the laws of nature.
+P1. X cannot change U – 1 (no one can change the past state of the universe
+at a time before she was even born).
+P2. X cannot change L (no one can change the laws of nature).
+P3. If determinism is true, then {(U – 1 plus L), entails U} (follows from the
+concept of determinism).
+P4. If X had done A, then not - U (A is an action that didn ’ t occur, so if it
+had occurred the universe wouldn ’ t be exactly the same as it is now).
+C1. If X could have done A, X could have made U false (follows semantically
+from P4).
+C2. If X could have made U false, then X could have made (U – 1 plus
+L) false (transposition, P3).
+C3. If X could have made (U – 1 plus L) false, then X could have made
+L false (De Morgan ’ s, C2, P1, and disjunctive syllogism).
+C4. X could not have made L false (P2).
+C5. X could not do A ( modus tollens , C3, C4, and a series of implicit
+hypothetical syllogisms).
+33
+Fatalism
+Fernando Migura and Agustin Arrieta
+Aquinas , Thomas . Summa Theologiae , translated by Fathers of the English
+Dominican Province, The Summa Theologiae , 2nd rev. edn., 22 vols.
+London : Burns, Oates & Washbourne , 1912 – 36. Reprinted in 5 vols.,
+Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981 . E - text in HTML available at
+www.newadvent.org/summa
+Aristotle . Aristotle Categories and De Interpretatione , translated with notes
+and glossary by J. L. Ackrill. Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1961 .
+Augustine , Saint . On Free Choice of the Will , translated, with introduction
+by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis : Hackett , 1993 .
+Rice , Hugh . “ Fatalism . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( Fall
+2009 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta , available at http://
+plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/fatalism
+According to the philosophical doctrine called “ fatalism, ” everything that
+happens does so inevitably. Suppose that something is going to happen
+tomorrow; let ’ s say that it is going to rain. If it is true now that tomorrow
+it is going to rain, then it can ’ t be true that it won ’ t rain tomorrow, so it is
+necessary to rain tomorrow. On the other hand, if it is false now that tomorrow
+it is going to rain, then it can ’ t be true that it will rain tomorrow, so
+it is impossible to rain tomorrow; that is, it is necessary that it won ’ t rain
+tomorrow. Since the same reasoning can be applied to every event, everything
+that happens does so necessarily and inevitably.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+126 Fernando Migura and Agustin Arrieta
+Let us see the structure of the argument from which fatalism is concluded.
+Let p be: “ It is going to rain tomorrow ” (or whatever declarative
+sentence that describes an event that you think that can happen tomorrow).
+Then the argument has the following structure:
+P1. If it is true now that p , then necessarily p .
+P2. If it is true now that not p , then necessarily not p .
+P3. It is true now that p or it is true now that not p .
+C1. Necessarily p or necessarily not p (constructive dilemma, P1, P2,
+P3).
+This argument is unsound because it is clear that the conclusion is false,
+but it is not so clear where it goes wrong. The classical solution has to do
+with a known ambiguity (amphiboly) associated with conditional sentences
+of the form: “ If X, then, necessarily Y. ” This can be interpreted as (a) “ It
+is a necessary truth that if X, then Y ” or as (b) “ If X, then it is a necessary
+truth that Y. ” On the one hand, if premises 1 and 2 are read as (a), they
+are clearly true but, then, the conclusion doesn ’ t follow from premises. On
+the other hand, if premises 1 and 2 are interpreted as (b), the conclusion
+does follow from them, but they presuppose fatalism. So, either the argument
+is not logically valid or it begs the question.
+The fi rst and best known argumentative version of fatalism can be found
+in the sea - battle argument formulated by Aristotle in Chapter IX of On
+Interpretation ( Peri Hermeneias , also De Interpretatione ):
+For if every affi rmation or negation is true or false it is necessary for everything
+either to be the case or not to be the case. For if one person says that
+something will be and another denies this same thing, it is clearly necessary
+for one of them to be saying what is true – if every affi rmation is true or false;
+for both will not be the case together under such circumstances. [ … ] It follows
+that nothing either is or is not happening, or will be or will not be, by chance
+or as chance has it, but everything of necessity and not as chance has it (since
+either he who says or he who denies is saying what it is true).
+I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea - battle
+tomorrow, but it is not necessary for a sea - battle to take place tomorrow, not
+for one not to take place – though it is necessary for one to take place or not
+to take place. (Aristotle On Interpretation , IX 18a34, 19a23)
+But there are also other known formulations due to St. Augustine and
+Thomas Aquinas relating to the associated problem of free will. St. Augustine
+in On Free Choice of the Will (Book Three), considers an argument that
+could be paraphrased as follows:
+If God foreknows that Pope Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow, then necessarily
+Pope Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow. God foreknows that Pope
+Fatalism 127
+Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow. So necessarily Pope Benedict XVI will sin
+tomorrow.
+Another example of this is Thomas Aquinas ’ discussion of the argument
+that God ’ s Providence ( Summa Theologiae , First Part, Question 22) implies
+fatalism. The argument is built from a supposition like this: During the
+Creation, God foresaw everything, including, for example, Pope Benedict
+XVI sinning tomorrow. So, necessarily Pope Benedict XVI will sin
+tomorrow.
+Assuming that what God foreknows or sees is always true, these versions
+of fatalist arguments are essentially analyzed in the same way. Both arguments
+count as modus ponens : “ If X, then, necessarily Y, and X, so, necessarily
+Y. ” In both cases, the key issue has to do with the correct interpretation
+of conditional sentence properly understood as “ It is necessarily true that
+X, then Y. ”
+Let us consider a more familiar example:
+(e) “ If I know George Clooney is a bachelor, then necessarily George
+Clooney is unmarried. ”
+Given that I know George Clooney remains Hollywood ’ s most famous
+bachelor today (September 1, 2010), if I don ’ t interpret correctly the conditional,
+I can conclude by modus ponens , “ Necessarily, George Clooney
+is unmarried. ” But this conclusion would be equivalent to saying, “ There
+are no possible circumstances in which George Clooney is married, ” and
+so a strong conclusion is not justifi ed by the premises. Obviously the correct
+interpretation of (e) is, “ Necessarily, if I know George Clooney is a bachelor,
+then George Clooney is unmarried. ”
+One of the most known practical consequences of fatalism has to do
+with the uselessness of decision - making. If someone assumes fatalism, why
+should she bother making decisions if the outcome is already fi xed? This
+direct consequence of fatalism is clearly illustrated in the famous “ lazy
+argument. ” For instance, if you feel sick now, it is true now that you will
+either recover or it is now true that you will die. In any case, by direct
+application of the fatalist argument, necessarily you recover from your
+illness or necessarily you die because of it. So, why should you call the
+doctor or do anything at all? (As is easy to see, this argument has the form
+of a dilemma too.)
+Aristotle was entirely aware of this consequence of fatalism when he said
+that if everything is and happens of necessity, there would be no need to
+deliberate or to take trouble thinking that if we do this, this will happen,
+but if we do not, it will not (see On Interpretation , IX 18b26).
+34
+Sartre ’ s Argument for Freedom
+Jeffrey Gordon
+Sartre , Jean - Paul . Being and Nothingness , translated by Hazel Barnes. New
+York : Philosophical Library , 1956 .
+Sartre ’ s argument for freedom is unique in the history of philosophy because
+it treats freedom as the essential characteristic of human consciousness as
+opposed to a property or capacity of consciousness or mind. In one of
+Sartre ’ s famous formulations, “ Man is freedom, ” the idea is that consciousness
+has no properties at all, that it is nothing more than a relation to real
+existent things, and it relates to those things by defi ning their signifi cance.
+The conscious person must interpret the signifi cance of the existent thing;
+he must construct a coherent world from what is given. The given has no
+meaning in itself; whatever meaning it will have derives from the agent ’ s
+interpretation. For a given state of affairs to function as a cause of my
+conduct, I must fi rst confer upon that state of affairs a certain meaning,
+which in turn informs that situation with its power to cause. I, then, am
+the source of its causal effi cacy. But determinism requires that the nature
+and compelling power of the cause exist in themselves, quite independently
+of any characteristic of the entity undergoing the cause – effect process. Since
+this necessary condition of determinism is never met by consciousness,
+determinism is inapplicable to human experience. Experience cannot be
+caused. To experience is to appropriate, to interiorize the given, to make it
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Sartre’s Argument for Freedom 129
+one ’ s own. In virtue of the relationship between consciousness and the
+given, my freedom to choose is inescapable. Sartre therefore concludes,
+“ Man is condemned to be free ” (439).
+Suppose that a boy is born into poverty; that is, the socioeconomic condition
+of his family is much lower than the average. (The idea of poverty,
+fraught with connotations of disvalue, already presupposes an interpretation.)
+Trying to explain his later extraordinary drive, we might well cite this
+early circumstance as formative – indeed, as determinative. But Sartre
+would insist that such an explanation is quite misleading. The poverty could
+not have had this effect had the young boy not understood the condition
+as shameful. Had he thought of it instead as the source of the strong mutual
+dependency in his family and their consequent bonds of solidarity, the drive
+for wealth might very well have seemed to him an empty pursuit. Sartre ’ s
+point would be that a given socioeconomic circumstance must await the
+interpretation of consciousness before it could function as a cause. Life
+circumstances cannot impel an effect without the assent of consciousness.
+Always to have to interpret the given, to have to forge of the given a motive
+and cause, is the inescapable condition of consciousness. The uncaused
+source of its own actions, the human being is irremediably free.
+No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure
+of society, the psychological “ state, ” etc.) is capable by itself of motivating
+any act whatsoever. For an act is the projection of [consciousness] toward
+what it is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not.
+[ . . . ] This implies for consciousness the permanent possibility of effecting a
+rupture with its own past, of wrenching itself away from its past so as to be
+able to consider it in the light of a non - being and so as to be able to confer
+on it the meaning which it has in terms of the project of a meaning it does
+not have . Under no circumstances can the past in any way by itself produce
+an act [ . . . ]. In fact as soon as one attributes to consciousness this negative
+power with respect to the world and itself [ . . . ] we must recognize that the
+indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the
+acting being. (436)
+P1. In order for a given state of affairs deterministically to cause a human
+action, the causal effi cacy of that state of affairs would have to derive
+exclusively from characteristics of that state of affairs.
+P2. A given state of affairs has no meaning in itself.
+P3. If a given state of affairs has no meaning in itself, then its meaning must
+be conferred upon it by the person experiencing it.
+C1. The meaning of a given state of affairs must be conferred upon it
+by the person experiencing it ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
+P4. The meaning of the state of affairs is the source of its power to motivate
+(or cause) the action.
+130 Jeffrey Gordon
+P5. If the meaning of the state of affairs is the source of its power to motivate
+(or cause) the action, then in the case of human action, the causal
+effi cacy of the state of affairs does not derive exclusively from characteristics
+of that state of affairs.
+C2. In the case of human action, the causal effi cacy of the state of affairs
+does not derive exclusively from characteristics of that state of affairs
+( modus ponens , P4, P5).
+C3. No given state of affairs can deterministically cause a human action
+( modus tollens , P1, C3).
+P6. If no given state of affairs can deterministically cause a human action,
+then one ’ s actions are free.
+C4. Human beings are inescapably free ( modus ponens , C3, P6).
+Part III
+Epistemology
+35
+The Cogito Arguments of Descartes
+and Augustine
+Descartes , Ren é . Meditations , edited by David B. Manley and Charles S.
+Taylor , translated by John Veitch, available at www.wright.edu/cola/
+descartes/index.html (accessed June 2010).
+Descartes ’ Cogito
+Joyce Lazier
+Since Descartes ’ argument, “ I think therefore I am, ” presented in Meditation
+II, is often taken as the foundation of idealism and also the source of the
+mind – body problem, it is a core philosophical argument. The Meditations
+are presented as a stream - of - consciousness style of writing, and the arguments
+are diffi cult to follow when just reading it straight through. When
+put in premise and conclusion form, it is easier to see both the argument
+as well as some of its fl aws. After Descartes discards God as the cause of
+his thoughts in the fi rst argument, the assumption of the “ evil deceiver ” in
+the fi fth argument is the most obvious fl aw, since it contradicts the logic
+given in the fi rst argument. If we believe the fi rst argument, that Descartes
+is capable of producing thoughts himself so he needn ’ t presume a God, then
+we could also think Descartes is capable of producing his own deceit so he
+needn ’ t presume a deceiver. So, either the evil demon could be discarded as
+the cause of Descartes ’ deceit along with God as the cause of his thoughts,
+or God could be presumed to exist along with the deceiver. Furthermore,
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+134 Joyce Lazier and Brett Gaul
+besides deceit, which we could cause ourselves, we have no evidence for the
+evil deceiver and therefore good reason to doubt (by Descartes ’ own standard
+of knowledge) and throw out such an assumption. Another fl aw that
+stands out after the reconstruction is an equivocation with “ exist ” as well
+as with “ I. ” Most interestingly, this formulation shows that the typical “ I
+think therefore I am ” interpretation of Descartes ’ argument is too broad in
+two senses. First, as the argument shows, he claims to know he exists when
+he is thinking, which allows for the possibility of his not knowing he exists
+when he is not thinking. Second, the “ I am ” in “ I think, therefore, I am ”
+suggests existence of the “ I ” independent of thought. But Descartes ’ argument
+does not prove this “ I ” ; it just proves thought. At most, his argument
+proves “ thought exists. ”
+But how do I know that there is not something different altogether from
+the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is impossible to entertain the
+slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being, by whatever name I may
+designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind? But why
+suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them?
+Am I, then, at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses
+or a body; I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent
+on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the
+persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no
+sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same
+time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I
+was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once
+of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing
+all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived;
+and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am
+nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must,
+in fi ne, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that
+this proposition [ pronunciatum ] I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it
+is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.
+P1. Either God or I cause thoughts to arise in my mind.
+P2. If I can produce the thoughts myself, I needn ’ t suppose such a God.
+P3. I can produce the thoughts myself.
+C1. I needn ’ t suppose God ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
+P4. If I can produce thoughts myself, then I am something.
+P5. I can produce thoughts myself.
+C2. I am something ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
+P6. I was persuaded that there was nothing in the world.
+P7. If I am persuaded, then I existed.
+P8. I was persuaded.
+C3. I existed ( modus ponens , P7, P8).
+The Cogito Arguments of Descartes and Augustine 135
+P9. There is an evil demon who is constantly deceiving me that I ’ m
+something.
+P10. If I am deceived, then I am conscious that I am something.
+P11. I am deceived.
+C4. I am conscious that I am something ( modus ponens , P10, P11).
+P12. If I am conscious that I ’ m something, then I cannot be nothing.
+P13. I am conscious that I ’ m something.
+C5. I am not nothing ( modus ponens , P12, P13).
+P14. If I am not nothing, then I exist.
+P15. I am not nothing.
+C6. I exist ( modus ponens , P14, P15).
+Augustine ’ s “ Si fallor, sum ” Argument (If I Am Mistaken,
+I Exist)
+Augustine . The City of God against the Pagans , edited and translated by R.
+W. Dyson . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1998 .
+Descartes , Ren é . The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , translated by John
+Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, UK :
+Cambridge University Press , 1999 .
+Menn , Stephen . Descartes and Augustine . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
+University Press , 1998 .
+Brett Gaul
+Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) occupies an interesting place in the
+history of philosophy. A bishop in the Roman Catholic Church, Augustine
+is one of the main fi gures responsible for incorporating elements of Greek
+and Roman philosophy into Christianity, and his ideas still exert a powerful
+infl uence in Christian philosophy even today. In The City of God , his
+longest and arguably his most important and infl uential work, Augustine
+defends Christianity against the criticisms of unbelievers and displays his
+considerable knowledge of classical thought. One of the many classical
+views Augustine addresses is skepticism – the belief that no genuine knowledge
+is possible. Augustine defends the possibility of genuine knowledge by
+arguing that he cannot be mistaken about his own existence ( “ Si fallor,
+sum ” ). The argument is signifi cant because it predates by about 1,200 years
+Descartes ’ more famous French “ Je pense, donc je suis ” and Latin “ Cogito,
+ergo sum ” ( “ I think, therefore I am ” ) arguments from the Discourse on
+Method and Principles of Philosophy , respectively. Although it is unclear
+136 Joyce Lazier and Brett Gaul
+whether Descartes bases his versions of the argument on Augustine ’ s, we
+know from Descartes ’ own correspondence that he did read Augustine.
+It is, however, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms
+that I am wholly certain that I exist, and that I know this fact and love it. So
+far as these truths are concerned, I do not at all fear the arguments of the
+Academics when they say, What if you are mistaken? For if I am mistaken, I
+exist. He who does not exist clearly cannot be mistaken; and so, if I am
+mistaken, then, by the same token, I exist. And since, if I am mistaken, it is
+certain that I exist, how can I be mistaken in supposing that I exist? Since,
+therefore, I would have to exist even if I were mistaken, it is beyond doubt
+that I am not mistaken in knowing that I exist. (Augustine, 484)
+P1. If I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence,
+then I know that I exist because the ability to consider something is a
+suffi cient condition for existence.
+P2. I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence.
+C1. I know that I exist ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+Alternatively:
+P1. If I do not exist, then I cannot consider whether I might be mistaken
+about my own existence because existence is a necessary condition for
+the ability to consider anything.
+P2. I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence.
+C1. I exist ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+36
+The Cartesian Dreaming Argument
+for External - World
+Skepticism
+Stephen Hetherington
+Descartes , Ren é . “ Meditation I , ” in Meditations on First Philosophy , in The
+Philosophical Works of Descartes , vol. I , edited and translated by E. S.
+Haldane and G. R. T. Ross . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
+Press , 1911 .
+___. Discourse on the Method , in The Philosophical Works of Descartes ,
+vol. I , edited and translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross .
+Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1911 .
+Sosa , Ernst . A Virtue Epistemology . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2009 .
+Stroud , Barry. The Signifi cance of Philosophical Scepticism . Oxford :
+Clarendon Press , 1984 .
+Wilson , M. D. Descartes . London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1978 .
+Descartes ’ was not the fi rst worried philosophical reference to dreaming as
+an epistemological issue. But he made the worry especially famous. It has
+since developed into an argument – usually deemed Cartesian, at least in
+spirit – which many epistemologists regard as needing to be defeated if
+external - world knowledge is to be possible. (Descartes ’ use of the worry
+helped even to defi ne the category of external - world knowledge in the fi rst
+place. Such knowledge amounts, in his treatment of it, to knowledge of the
+physical world.) Even if not always in the suggestive but elliptical way used
+by Descartes, the skeptical argument is routinely taught in introductory
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+138 Stephen Hetherington
+philosophy courses – general ones, as well as metaphysics and epistemology
+ones.
+This argument is epistemological, skeptically so. It challenges the thesis
+– one which, for most of us, is an unquestioned presumption – that people
+are able to have even some knowledge of a physical world, including of
+their own physical aspects. The argument is generally called “ Cartesian ” in
+honor of Ren é Descartes (1596 – 1650), even though a much earlier version
+of the argument was advanced by Socrates in Plato ’ s dialogue Theaetetus
+(at 158a – e). Descartes ’ version has been the historically infl uential one.
+Most famously presented in his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy
+( “ Meditation I ” ), it was a dramatic moment within philosophy ’ s most celebrated
+expression and exploration of sustained doubt. These skeptical
+thoughts by Descartes – followed immediately within the Meditations by
+his attempts to resolve them – were pivotal in the formation of modern
+philosophy, let alone modern epistemology.
+The argument has since been formulated more fully within contemporary
+epistemology, along the way acquiring the status of a paradigm form of
+skeptical challenge. Whenever contemporary epistemologists seek to defuse
+skeptical reasoning, this particular piece of skeptical reasoning – the
+Cartesian dreaming argument for external - world skepticism – often serves
+as their representative target. This is partly because knowledge of the physical
+world is something that people seem so manifestly and so often to have
+and to use.
+The importance of the Cartesian argument is also due partly to its apparent
+metaphysical ramifi cations. It has either refl ected or suggested the possibility
+of people living only as thinking things – within their “ inner ” worlds
+of thoughts and apparent sensations, not knowing if there is any “ outer ”
+world beyond these.
+Descartes ’ argument reaches that stage by seizing upon the possibility of
+something – dreaming – that can strike us as being a vivid yet deceitful sort
+of experience. We believe we can be deceived, when dreaming, into thinking
+that we are really experiencing the physical world as it is. The skeptical
+argument challenges us to know that this is not happening whenever we
+think we are really experiencing the physical world. If we do not know that
+this is not happening, do we know that the world is at all as it seems to us
+to be? The skeptical conclusion is that we do not, even when everything
+seems normal to us.
+That argument has inspired many attempted refutations because most
+epistemologists are not skeptics. Many, even so, treat it as an important
+way of challenging us, not to prove that we have knowledge of the physical
+world, but to explain how we have such knowledge. We seem to rely just
+on our sensory experiences. How could these be adequate, though, if they
+can be mimicked in dreaming?
+Cartesian Dreaming and External-World Skepticism 139
+At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently
+I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the
+same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are
+insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in
+the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place, that I was
+dressed and seated near the fi re, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed!
+At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I
+am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is
+deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what
+happens in sleep does not appear so clear and distinct as does all this. But in
+thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep
+been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this refl ection
+I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may
+clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And
+my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now
+dream. (Descartes Meditation I, 145 – 6)
+Technical terms used in the ensuing argument:
+Experience: an occurrence within someone ’ s awareness or consciousness.
+Sensory experience: an experience resulting from the use of one or more
+of the person ’ s senses (sight, hearing, etc.)
+Content (of an experience): the details of what (according to the experience)
+reality is like in some respect; how, in some respect, the experience
+portrays the world as being.
+Conclusive: rationally conclusive: ruling out all possible rational doubts
+about the accuracy of the content at hand.
+Certainty: rational certainty: having ruled out all possible rational doubts
+about the accuracy of the content at hand.
+P1. Consider at random any actual or possible experience (call it E) that
+does or would feel like a sensory experience of the physical world.
+P2. Any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a sensory
+experience of the physical world has a content to the effect that the
+physical world is thus - and - so in some more or less specifi c respect.
+C1. E has a content to the effect that the physical world is thus - and - so
+in some more or less specifi c respect (instantiation, P2).
+P3. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world, if it has a content to the effect
+that the physical world is thus - and - so in some more or less specifi c
+respect, then it includes no further content.
+C2. If E has a content to the effect that the physical world is thus - and - so
+in some more or less specifi c respect, then E includes no further
+content (instantiation, P3).
+140 Stephen Hetherington
+C3. E includes no further content ( modus ponens , C1, C2).
+P4. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world, if it includes no further content,
+then in particular it includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
+of not being an instance of dreaming.
+C4. If E includes no further content, then in particular E includes no
+further and conclusive mark or indication of not being an instance of
+dreaming (instantiation, P4).
+C5. In particular, E includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
+of not being an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C3, C4).
+P5. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world, if in particular it includes no
+further and conclusive mark or indication of not being an instance of
+dreaming, then it is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an
+instance of dreaming.
+C6. If, in particular, E includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
+of not being an instance of dreaming, then E is not providing
+conclusive evidence of not being an instance of dreaming (instantiation,
+P5).
+C7. E is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an instance of
+dreaming ( modus ponens , C5, C6).
+P6. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world, if it is not providing conclusive
+evidence of not being an instance of dreaming, then the person who is
+or would be having the experience does not know with certainty that it
+is not an instance of dreaming.
+C8. If E is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an instance of
+dreaming, then the person who is or would be having E does not know
+with certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming (instantiation,
+P6).
+C8. The person who is or would be having E does not know with
+certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C7,
+C8).
+P7. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
+be having it does not know with certainty that it is not an instance of
+dreaming, then she does not know at all that it is not an instance of
+dreaming.
+C9. If the person who is or would be having E does not know with
+certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming, then she does not
+know at all that E is not an instance of dreaming (instantiation, P7).
+C10. The person who is or would be having E does not know at all that
+it is not an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C8, C9).
+Cartesian Dreaming and External-World Skepticism 141
+P8. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
+be having it does not know at all that it is not an instance of dreaming,
+then he does not know at all that it is a sensory experience of the physical
+world.
+C11. If the person who is or would be having E does not know at all
+that it is not an instance of dreaming, then he does not know at all
+that E is a sensory experience of the physical world (instantiation, P8).
+C12. The person who is or would be having E does not know at all that
+it is a sensory experience of the physical world ( modus ponens , C10.
+C11).
+P9. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
+be having the experience does not know at all that it is a sensory experience
+of the physical world, then it is not providing her with any knowledge
+of the physical world.
+C13. If the person who is or would be having experience E does not
+know at all that it is a sensory experience of the physical world, then
+E is not providing her with any knowledge of the physical world
+(instantiation, P9).
+C14. E is not providing any knowledge of the physical world to the
+person who is or would be having experience E ( modus ponens , C12,
+C13).
+C15. Any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world is not providing any knowledge
+of the physical world to the person who is or would be having
+the experience (universal generalization, P1, C14).
+C16. No actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world is providing knowledge of
+the physical world to the person who is or would be having the experience
+(quantifi er - negation, C15).
+P10. If no actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
+sensory experience of the physical world is providing knowledge of the
+physical world to the person who is or would be having the experience,
+then knowledge of the physical world is impossible.
+C17. Knowledge of the physical world is impossible ( modus ponens ,
+C16, P10).
+37
+The Transparency of Experience
+Argument
+Carlos M. Mu ñ oz - Su á rez
+Block , Ned . “ Mental Paint and Mental Latex , ” in Philosophical Issues 7,
+Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 19 – 49 . Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview ,
+1996 .
+Dretske , Fred . Naturalizing the Mind . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,
+1995 .
+Harman , Gilbert. “ The Intrinsic Quality of Experience , ” in Philosophical
+Perspectives 4 , Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind , edited by J.
+Tomberlin , 53 – 79 . Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1990 .
+___. “ Explaining Objective Color in Terms of Subjective Reactions , ” in
+Philosophical Issues 7 , Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 1 – 17 .
+Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1996 .
+Kind , Amy . “ What ’ s so Transparent about Transparency? ” Philosophical
+Studies no. 115 ( 2003 ): 225 – 44 .
+Moore , G. E. “ The Refutation of Idealism . ” Mind , New Series 12 , 48 ( 1903 ):
+433 – 53 .
+Robinson , Howard . Perception . London : Routledge , 1994 .
+Russell , Bertrand . The Problems of Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University
+Press , 1980 .
+Shoemaker , Sydney . “ Color, Subjective Relations and Qualia , ” in Philosophical
+Issues 7 , Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 55 – 66 . Atascadero, CA :
+Ridgeview , 1996 .
+Tye , Michael . Ten Problems of Consciousness . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
+Press , 1995 .
+___. Consciousness, Color and Content . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,
+2000 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Transparency of Experience Argument 143
+This is one of the main arguments in the philosophy of perception and
+epistemology. It was canonically presented by G. E. Moore. This argument
+challenges the thesis that by having sensations we are directly conscious of
+features of sensations or experiences. It makes explicit a commonsense
+intuition on what appears to be diaphanous by having sensations, that is,
+sensory awareness relations – in the words of Moore: “ in respect of which
+all sensations are alike ” (444). In general, the argument is about what it is
+epistemically available by having sensations.
+In principle, this is an epistemic argument, but it has metaphysical conclusions
+depending on the theoretical framework. In general, the transparency
+of experience argument (henceforth, TEA) is often understood as going
+against the reduction of the contents of sensations (say, colors) to a kind
+of “ veil of perception ” or “ mental paint ” (Harman, “ Intrinsic Quality ” and
+“ Explaining ” ) – in other words, in Berkeley ’ s empiricism, something constituting
+the external world itself. Other philosophers have criticized such
+a conclusion (see Block).
+The intuition framing the TEA was sketched by Moore as follows: when
+“ we try to fi x our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly,
+it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness.
+When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue:
+the other element is as if it were diaphanous ” (Moore 450). This quote is
+often used to uphold the following: (a) An epistemological inference: by
+merely having sensations, we are never able to introspect sensory awareness
+relations; therefore, we are directly aware of what our sensations are about,
+for example, the color green (Tye Ten Problems , 30). (b) A metaphysical
+inference: by merely having sensations, we are never able to introspect
+sensory awareness relations or features of sensations themselves; therefore,
+there are no perceptual intermediaries. The consequent of (a) is not necessarily
+the consequent of (b), despite the antecedent being the same. To
+clarify the relations between such antecedent and such consequents is the
+core issue in the debate (see Dretske, Harman “ Explaining, ” Block, and
+Shoemaker). The antecedent was not defended by Moore. I shall return to
+this issue below.
+The abstract structure of the reasoning behind the TEA is as follows:
+P1. [Content Premise:] If a subject, S, has a sensation, v , v is a sensation of
+x .
+P2. [Transparency Premise:] By having v , S only has direct knowledge of y .
+C1. [Epistemological conclusion] S is directly aware of y .
+C2. [Metaphysical conclusion]
+(If v = y or ( y = P and Pv )) There are y - like entities between S and x .
+(If v ≠ y or ( y = P and 􀀝 Pv )) There are no y - like entities between S and x .
+144 Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez
+The TEA is not an argument concluding that transparency is true but
+takes it as a premise. The argument has ab initio two plausible interpretations
+depending on the metaphysical character and role ascribed to that
+what sensation are about: (i) The strong content version: what fi gures as
+the content of a sensation is a subject - independent particular and its properties.
+(ii) The weak content version: what fi gures as the content of a sensation
+is a subject - dependent entity (e.g., sensory properties, qualia , and so on).
+Philosophers endorsing (i) appeal to TEA to justify objective (physical)
+relations between sensations and external mind - independent physical entities
+(Harman “ Intrinsic, ” Dretske, and Tye Consciousness ]. Accordingly,
+philosophers endorsing (ii) appeal to TEA to justify (mental) relations
+between sensations and mind - dependent entities (Robinson IX § 3). Further
+on, “ transparency ” has ab initio two plausible interpretations depending
+on the epistemic role ascribed to sensations (see Kind): (i * ) Strong transparency:
+by having a sensation, V, one cannot introspect features of v , but just
+what v is about. (ii * ) Weak transparency: by having a sensation, V, one
+could introspect some feature of V. The latter was the version endorsed by
+Moore and the former is the antecedent of the epistemological inference
+and the metaphysical inference.
+(i) and (i * ) can be coupled, and we obtain a version of TEA motivating
+direct realism. Call this version strong TEA: by having a sensation, V, one
+cannot introspect features of V but just the subject - independent entity that
+v is about (Tye Consciousness and Harman “ Intrinsic, ” 39). It might be
+synthesized as follows:
+P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then, V is a sensation of a subject -
+independent entity, X (strong content version).
+P2. By having V, S cannot introspect features of V but just what V is about
+(strong transparency).
+C1. There are no perceptual intermediaries between S and X (metaphysical
+inference * ).
+Accordingly, (ii) and (ii * ) can be coupled, and we obtain a version of
+TEA motivating idealism. Weak TEA holds that by having a sensation, V,
+one is sensory aware of a mind - dependent entity and one could introspect
+features of V. The argument would be as follows:
+P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then V is a sensation of a subject -
+dependent entity, Z (weak content version).
+P2. By having V, S cannot introspect features of V, but just what V is about,
+that is, Z (strong transparency).
+C1. There are no perceptual intermediaries between S and Z (metaphysical
+inference * * ).
+The Transparency of Experience Argument 145
+There is another version about content; this is a version of the weak
+content version. Call this the “ property - content ” version (iii): what fi gures
+as the content of a sensation are subject - dependent properties (say, colors)
+which look like being instantiated in subject - independent particulars (say,
+tables). This version can be coupled with weak transparency. We obtain a
+third version of TEA: call this “ sense - data ” TEA.
+P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then V is a sensation of a subject -
+dependent property, Q, looking like instantiated on a mind - independent
+particular X (property - content version).
+P2. By having a sensation, V, S could introspect Q (Weak Transparency).
+C1. There are perceptual intermediaries between S and X.
+Sense - data TEA differs from weak TEA since the former specifi es that
+perceptual intermediaries can only be sensory properties, say qualia , and
+cannot be concrete physical particulars (see Russell). The debate about
+transparency and the right comprehension of the content of sensations is
+far from being solved; however, there are many detailed theories trying to
+do it.
+38
+The Regress Argument for
+Skepticism
+Scott Aikin
+Sextus Empiricus . Outlines of Scepticism . Translated by Julia Annas and
+Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2000 .
+Oakley , I. T. “ An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justifi ed Beliefs . ”
+American Philosophical Quarterly , 13 , 3 ( 1976 ): 221 – 8 .
+Cling , Andrew . “ Reasons, Regresses and Tragedy . ” American Philosophical
+Quarterly , 46 , 2 ( 2009 ): 333 – 46 .
+The basic thought behind the regress argument is familiar to anyone who
+has spoken with an inquisitive child, “ Why? ” is always a good question.
+Since the question can be asked of any answer, a recursive pattern very
+quickly emerges. For example, “ Eat your vegetables. ” “ Why? ” “ Because
+they are good for you. ” “ Why? ” “ Because you want to he healthy. ” “ Why? ”
+And then we are off to the races. Translated to an epistemological context,
+the regress problem arises because of the simple requirement that if you are
+to hold reasonably a belief, you must be able to answer satisfactorily a
+“ why ” question with another reasonably held belief or group of beliefs.
+This, of course, invites another “ why ” question, which requires another
+satisfactory and justifi ably held answer. And then the regress ensues (#49).
+It seems that the demand that we go on to infi nity is excessive, that answers
+that go in a circle are vicious, and that anytime someone says she does not
+need to give further answers, she is acting unreasonably. Skepticism seems
+to follow – if we cannot give the adequate backing for our claims, we do
+not know those claims to be true.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Regress Argument for Skepticism 147
+Sextus Empiricus classically framed the regress problem in his Outlines
+of Pyrrhonism as the coordination of fi ve “ modes, ” or strategies, of skeptical
+argument. Two of these modes, sometimes called the “ material modes, ”
+are those to challenge someone who believes something to defend it. These
+are the modes of relativity and dispute. Once a believer starts to defend the
+belief, there are only three options for the argument to proceed: either in
+(i) a vicious regress, which Sextus calls “ ad infi nitum , ” (ii) a question -
+begging circle, which Sextus calls “ reciprocality, ” or (iii) unsupported dogmatic
+assertion, which Sextus calls “ hypothesis. ” These three fi nal modes
+for argument are called the “ formal modes ” or “ the trilemma. ”
+According to the mode deriving from dispute, we fi nd that undecidable
+dissension about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life
+and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to choose or
+to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgment. In the mode
+of deriving from infi nite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a
+source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs another source,
+which itself needs another, and so ad infi nitum, so that we have no point from
+which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgment follows. In
+the mode deriving from relativity, [ … ] the existing object appears to be such -
+and - such relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together
+with it, but we suspend judgment on what it is like in its nature. We have the
+mode from hypothesis from the Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infi nitum,
+begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply
+and without proof in virtue of a concession. The reciprocal mode occurs when
+what ought to be confi rmatory of the object under investigation needs to be
+made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being unable to take
+either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both.
+(Empiricus PH I.165 – 9)
+Given the structural problems that come with knowing, we are forced
+to suspend judgment about our beliefs generally because they are not justifi
+ed. Justifi cation is structurally vexed, and as a consequence, something we
+cannot possess. General skepticism about knowledge, then, follows. The
+argument ’ s premises are all inherently plausible. The principle of inferential
+justifi cation is something that comes with being a responsible believer – if
+you believe something, then you should be able to explain why you do so;
+that is, you should be able to give a reason that counts in favor of the truth
+of your belief. This is simply what it is to be accountable for and in charge
+of your beliefs. The responsibility iterates, because the reasons we give must,
+themselves, pass this test. And so these chains of reasons are just part of
+what it is to be a rational being – we give justifying stories for what we do,
+what we say, and what we believe. Without those stories, it is hard to see
+ourselves as responsible, reasonable, or rational.
+148 Scott Aikin
+The principle of noncircular justifi cation comes from the informal argumentative
+thought that arguments that have their conclusions function in
+their premises fail because they beg the question. Reasoning should be a
+kind of progress, where we get somewhere, increase our knowledge, resolve
+disagreements, and answer questions. If we assume our conclusions at the
+beginning and tell our justifying stories for them in light of them, we have
+at most been consistent, but that is about as much as we can say in favor
+of the reasoning.
+The principle of fi nite justifi cation is simply that infi nite series of reasons
+are not completable by fi nite creatures such as us. We do not have infi nite
+time, nor do we have infi nite reasons for our beliefs – our minds are limited
+only to the things we ’ ve experienced, thought about, and learned. The
+requirement that knowledge be more than that is absurd. Further, it seems,
+as Sextus notes above, even were there an infi nite chain of reasons, we are
+unsure how reasoning on such a chain of reasons could either ever get
+started or ever fi nish.
+The corollaries of no unjustifi ed justifi ers and no unjustifi ed chain - enders
+are contrapositives of the principle of inferential justifi cation and the corollary
+of recursive justifi cation. The requirement of inferential justifi cation is
+that (in epistemology lingo) if S has a justifi ed belief that p, S has a justifi ed
+belief that q that justifi es p. The corollary is that without a justifi ed belief
+that q that justifi es p, S does not have a justifi ed belief that p. There are no
+unjustifi ed justifi ers.
+The trilemma is that once chains of reasons begin to be extended, there
+are only three options: they either (a) stop with some belief or other, without
+further support, (b) circle back on themselves, or (c) go on to infi nity. So
+long as we think that reasons must come in recursive chains, these are the
+only three options.
+Despite the fact that all the premises of the argument are each individually
+appealing, they together entail an unappealing conclusion, namely, that
+we have no justifi cation for any of our beliefs. This unacceptable conclusion
+has forced many to return to the premises of the argument with a more
+critical eye. One of the premises, if we do in fact know things, must be
+false. The project of anti - skepticism, in light of the regress problem, is that
+of making the case for the falsity of at least one of these premises.
+The oldest and most widely favored anti - skeptical strategy is called
+“ foundationalism. ” The foundationalist holds that premise 1 is false, or at
+least, that there are notable exceptions. There are some beliefs that stand
+on their own, and they can then serve as a foundation for further beliefs.
+Call these beliefs with autonomous justifi cation “ basic beliefs. ” The foundationalist
+accepts that reasons come in chains, but if the reasons are justifying,
+those chains of reasons all end with beliefs that are justifi ed
+independently of other reasons. Take three examples, your beliefs: (i) that
+The Regress Argument for Skepticism 149
+you exist, (ii) that you have a book in front of you, and (iii) that 2 + 2 = 4.
+Each of these beliefs is justifi ed because you just see that they it is true.
+You, in believing (i), furnish the reason for its truth (it can ’ t be false if you
+believe it). Your visual experiences of this book in front of you give you a
+reason to believe (ii), and you don ’ t need more reasons for that. Your concepts
+of addition, equality, two, and four give you the understanding to
+make it so that you don ’ t need any more reason to believe (iii) than just
+that you understand it. Beliefs such as these are regress - enders.
+The “ coherentist ” accepts the principle of inferential justifi cation and
+holds that only justifi ed beliefs can justify beliefs. However, the coherentist
+denies the principle of the noncircularity of justifi cation. Justifying stories
+come as packages, in that we reasonably believe things when they fi t well
+enough with other things that we believe. And once these systems of belief
+are up and running, the beliefs in them are mutually supporting. For
+example, you believe that there are physical forces, such as gravity. You
+also believe that a bowling ball falling down on a fragile porcelain mouse
+will crush it. You also believe that the last time you dropped your keys,
+they fell on the ground. These beliefs all hang together, and they function,
+with many others, as a system for you to make sense of your past experiences
+and make predictions about future ones. Justifi cation emerges from
+these interdependent and mutually supporting systems of beliefs.
+The “ contextualist, ” like the foundationalist, holds that there are exceptions
+to the principle of inferential justifi cation. However, the beliefs that
+need no further reasons are dependent on what kinds of questions our
+justifi cations are out to answer. For example, if you ’ re trying to decide
+whether to go to Las Vegas for your holiday, it may be reasonable to doubt
+that your year - old information about hotel prices is accurate. So you may
+go to a recent source. But you ’ re not going to worry about whether they
+accept American dollars or whether you can expect that you can get service
+in English. But if you were thinking about going to Monte Carlo (in
+Monaco), instead, you ’ d not only want to get better information about
+hotel prices, but you ’ d also want to check into what kind of currency you ’ ll
+need and whether you ’ ll need to take a crash course in French. Depending
+on what ’ s at issue, some questions aren ’ t worth asking, because their
+answers are reasonably assumed in the context. But in others they are worth
+asking, because you cannot reasonably assume their answers.
+“ Infi nitism ” is a recent development in epistemology, as for the over
+2,000 years folks have been thinking about the regress problem, it wasn ’ t
+until the last 10 years that anyone ’ s tried to work this view out in any detail.
+The infi nitist denies the principle of fi nite justifi cation. And so the infi nitist
+holds that only an infi nite series of reasons can yield justifi ed belief. The
+basic thought is that the person who really knows something can answer
+“ why ” questions until there just aren ’ t any more. And, in principle, there
+150 Scott Aikin
+is no reason why such questions must end. This is certainly a heavy task,
+and it seems troublesome, because it is clear that we don ’ t ever actually give
+those very long arguments. But the infi nitist holds that one may not have
+to give those arguments but only be able to give them as far as they are
+needed by critical questioners. Persistent questioners are troublesome, but
+they are useful to us in that they allow us to plumb the depths of our
+reasons. They may break certain rules of context in questioning things we
+don ’ t normally question, but that is how we really know – we can answer
+questions that otherwise we ’ d just say we ’ d assumed.
+The success of the regress argument for skepticism hinges on whether
+these four anti - skeptical programs are correct in denying or modifying the
+argument ’ s premises. If these anti - skeptical programs are right, they must
+be able to answer some simple questions. The question for the foundationalist
+is whether, in arguing that there are regress - ending basic beliefs, the
+foundationalist has actually continued the regress. This is sometimes called
+the “ meta - regress problem ” for foundationalism. The question for the
+contextualist is whether these systems of mutually supporting beliefs have
+anything to do with the truth, as it seems that systems of crazy beliefs (e.g.,
+conspiracy theories) are coherent and function similarly but are terribly
+wrong. This is called the “ alternate systems problem ” for coherentism. The
+question for the contextualists is whether contextually appropriate assumption
+amounts to justifi cation – surely some contexts are defi ned by the fact
+that people make assumptions in them, but that doesn ’ t mean they have
+knowledge. This is called the “ problem of credulity ” for contextualists. The
+question for the infi nitist is whether infi nitism is simply another form of
+skepticism, as it seems that no one ever actually has an infi nite series of
+justifying reasons and so no one actually knows anything. This is called the
+problem of “ crypto - skepticism ” for infi nitists. The regress skeptic is, for
+lack of a better term, skeptical as to whether there are adequate answers
+to these challenges.
+P1. If any believer is reasonably (or justifi ably) to hold a belief, then that
+believer must do so on the justifying basis of another justifi ed belief.
+P2. If a believer reasonably holds a belief, then that believer must reasonably
+hold another belief to justify that fi rst belief, and a third belief to
+hold that second one, and a further fourth belief to hold that third one,
+and so on. Call this a “ chain of reasons. ”
+C1. If a believer reasonably holds a belief, that believer must have a
+justifying chain of reasons (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
+P3. If any believer is reasonably to hold a belief, it cannot be on the basis
+of a circular chain of reasons.
+P4. If any believer is reasonably to hold a belief, it cannot be on the basis
+of an infi nite chain of reasons.
+The Regress Argument for Skepticism 151
+P5. If any believer holds a belief on the basis of a belief without justifi cation,
+that believer does not reasonably hold the fi rst belief.
+C2. No believers with chains of reasons with unjustifi ed beliefs at their
+ends are justifi ed (universal generalization, P2, P5).
+P6. Chains of reasons either (a) are circular, (b) end with unjustifi ed beliefs,
+or (c) are infi nite.
+C3. For any believer ’ s chain of reasons, it either (a) goes in a circle, (b)
+ends with an unjustifi ed commitment, or (c) goes on to infi nity (instantiation,
+P6).
+C4. There are no beliefs for which believers are justifi ed in holding them
+(destructive trilemma, P3, P4, P6).
+39
+Moore ’ s Anti - Skeptical
+Arguments
+Matthew Frise
+Moore , G. E. “ Four Forms of Scepticism, ” and “ Proof of an External
+World, ” in Epistemology: An Anthology , edited by Ernest Sosa , Jaegwon
+Kim , and Matthew McGrath , 24 – 8 . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 2000 .
+Reid , Thomas . Philosophical Works . Hildesheim : Olms , 1983 .
+External - world skepticism – the view that we do not know that anything
+outside our minds exists – has always been a central issue in epistemology.
+G. E. Moore, one of the most infl uential analytic philosophers of the twentieth
+century, popularized two types of arguments against skepticism that
+make reference to commonsense claims, claims such as “ I know this is a
+pencil ” and “ Here is a hand. ” The strategy of the fi rst type of argument is
+to point out that commonsense claims are more certain than the skeptic ’ s
+assumptions (at least some of them). The conclusion is not that commonsense
+knowledge disproves skepticism, but that our commonsense knowledge
+is in no danger of being undermined by skepticism. The strategy of
+the second type of argument is to cite things in the external world that we
+clearly know to exist, thereby demonstrating knowledge that the external
+world itself exists. An argument of this type is formally valid, but many
+think it fails to disprove skepticism because it “ begs the question ” ; knowledge
+of its premises allegedly presupposes knowledge of its conclusion.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Arguments 153
+Below, we give the skeleton of both types of arguments, making the reasoning
+and conclusion of each explicit.
+What I want, however, fi nally to emphasize is this: Russell ’ s view that I do
+not know for certain that this is a pencil or that you are conscious rests, if I
+am right, on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I don ’ t know
+these things immediately; (2) That they don ’ t follow logically from any thing
+or things that I do know immediately; (3) That if (1) and (2) are true, my
+belief in or knowledge of them must be ‘ based on an analogical or inductive
+argument ’ ; and (4) That what is so based cannot be certain knowledge . And
+what I can ’ t help asking myself is this: Is it, in fact, as certain that all these
+four assumptions are true, as that I do know that this is a pencil and that you
+are conscious? I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that I do
+know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious, than that any single
+one of these four assumptions is true, let alone all four. That is to say, though,
+as I have said, I agree with Russell that (1), (2), and (3) are true; yet of no
+one even of these three do I feel as certain as that I do know for certain that
+this is a pencil. Nay more: I do not think it is rational to be as certain of any
+one of these four propositions as of the proposition that I do know that this
+is a pencil. (Moore, 28)
+P1. The skeptic ’ s assumptions imply that propositions such as “ I know this
+is a pencil ” are false.
+P2. If proposition A is more certain than proposition B, B cannot falsify A.
+P3. “ I know this is a pencil ” is more certain than any of the skeptic ’ s
+assumptions.
+C1. The skeptic ’ s assumptions cannot falsify that “ I know this is a
+pencil ” ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
+I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By
+holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the
+right hand, ‘ Here is one hand ’ , and adding, as I make a certain gesture with
+the left, ‘ and here is another ’ . (Moore, 24)
+P1. Here is a hand, here is another.
+P2. If hands exist, then external objects exist.
+C1. External objects exist ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+40
+The Bias Paradox
+Deborah Heikes
+Antony , Louise . “ Quine as Feminist , ” in A Mind of One ’ s Own , edited by
+Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt , 110 – 53 . Boulder, CO : Westview ,
+2002 .
+Heikes , Deborah . “ The Bias Paradox: Why It ’ s Not Just for Feminists
+Anymore . ” Synthese 138 , 3 ( 2004 ): 315 – 35 .
+The bias paradox arises from arguments that reject or decisively revise
+standard Cartesian conceptions of pure objectivity and impartiality. Such
+conceptions require that we move beyond particularity and contingency in
+order to acquire knowledge that is free from bias. Feminist philosophers
+are generally concerned with rejecting notions of objectivity that require
+this complete elimination of subjectivity. As a rule, feminists believe that
+subjectivity can never be entirely eliminated. However, this rejection of a
+notion of pure (nonsubjective) neutrality has led the dilemma that Louise
+Antony calls the “ bias paradox. ”
+For feminists, two fundamental commitments give rise to a dilemma that
+seems to require a commitment either to objectivism or relativism. The fi rst
+of these commitments is the explicit rejection of the concept of impartial
+objectivity, and the second one is the desire to assert the reality and injustice
+of women ’ s oppression. The problem is that in the absence of impartiality
+(at least as an ideal), there appears to be a lack of principled, normative
+criteria for evaluating beliefs across differing epistemic perspectives. At the
+same time, feminist philosophers almost unanimously reject the possibility
+of impartiality. The dilemma, as Antony presents it, is this: either we
+endorse the ideal of objectivity so that we can provide a ground for evaluating
+bias or we cease criticizing bias (i.e., we cease distinguishing between
+“ good ” biases and “ bad ” biases), since there can be no standard for evaluating
+competing biases.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Bias Paradox 155
+While this tension is dealt with most straightforwardly in discussions of
+naturalized feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy of science, the
+bias paradox is not merely a problem for feminists. Any view that rejects
+the Cartesian ideals of pure objectivity and value - neutrality will ultimately
+be forced to confront the dilemma that seemingly results from the paradox,
+namely, either to endorse pure impartiality or to accept an “ anything goes ”
+relativism. The problem, of course, is that most philosophical views deny
+that pure impartiality can be achieved, and many argue that it is not even
+useful as an ideal. However, the alternative view is that just about every
+claim to knowledge is as good as any other claim, and almost no one wishes
+to adopt this view. Hence, we encounter the bias paradox.
+According to many feminist philosophers, the fl aw in the ideal of impartiality
+is supposed to be that the ideal itself is biased: Critics charge either that
+the concept of ‘ objectivity ’ serves to articulate a masculine or patriarchal
+viewpoint [ … ], or that it has the ideological function of protecting the rights
+of those in power, especially men. But how is it possible to criticize the partiality
+of the concept of objectivity without presupposing the very value under
+attack? Put baldly: If we don ’ t think it ’ s good to be impartial, then how can
+we object to men ’ s being partial ? (Antony, 114)
+P1. Impartiality is untenable as an ideal of epistemic practice.
+P2. If impartiality is untenable as an ideal of epistemic practice, then all
+epistemic practices are biased.
+C1. All epistemic practices are biased ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If all epistemic practices are biased, there can be no impartial criteria
+for evaluating the epistemic worth of biases.
+C2. There can be no impartial criteria for evaluating the epistemic worth
+of biases ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. If there are no impartial criteria for evaluating the epistemic worth of
+biases, then all biases are equal.
+C3. All biases are equal ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
+Generic bias paradox:
+P1. The ideal of impartiality should be rejected.
+P2. If we reject the ideal of impartiality, there can be no justifi ed procedure
+for normatively distinguishing among competing epistemic views.
+C1. There can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively distinguishing
+among competing epistemic views ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If there can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively distinguishing
+among competing epistemic views, then all accounts are epistemically
+equal.
+C2. All accounts are epistemically equal ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+41
+Gettier ’ s Argument against
+the Traditional Account
+of Knowledge
+John M. DePoe 1
+Gettier , Edmund . “ Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge? ” Analysis 23 ( 1963 ):
+121 – 3 .
+The Gettier problem has drawn the attention of epistemologists since
+Edmund Gettier (1927 – ) published his three - page article in 1963. The point
+of Gettier ’ s argument is to show that the concept of knowledge cannot be
+defi ned as justifi ed true belief, and Gettier set out to disprove the traditional
+account of knowledge by showing that there are counterexamples to it. If
+the traditional account of knowledge is correct, then it is not possible for
+a person to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t knowledge (P1). Since the
+account maintains that all instances of knowledge are justifi ed true beliefs
+and vice versa, in order to refute the traditional account, Gettier needed to
+provide an example of a justifi ed true belief that no one would think is an
+example of knowledge.
+In order to understand Gettier ’ s counterexample, it is fi rst important to
+see how advocates of the traditional account understood justifi ed belief.
+The correct analysis of justifi cation is a matter of great controversy, but
+as a preliminary attempt it may be helpful to think of a person ’ s having a
+justifi ed belief as that person ’ s having some evidence or good reasons to
+think that the belief is true or likely to be true. Importantly, to have a justi-
+1 The author wishes to thank Michael O ’ Rouke (University of Idaho).
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Gettier and the Traditional Account of Knowledge 157
+fi ed belief, one ’ s good reasons do not necessarily need to guarantee that the
+belief is true. For example, one may be justifi ed in believing that one is
+seeing a zebra based on the evidence of a black - and - white - striped - equine
+sensory experience, and one would still be justifi ed, in believing one is seeing
+a zebra, even if the animal were not a zebra but a cleverly painted mule
+instead. Consequently, for a belief to be justifi ed, it is not necessary for the
+belief to be true. As (P2) states, it is possible for one to be justifi ed in believing
+a false proposition.
+The next part of Gettier ’ s counterexample follows from the principle
+expressed by (P3): if one is justifi ed in believing some proposition, then one
+is justifi ed (at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that
+one competently deduces from the original one. Since when deductive reasoning
+is performed competently it preserves truth infallibly, one ’ s justifi cation
+does not diminish across deductive inference. Perhaps this is best
+illustrated by a variation from one of Gettier ’ s examples. Imagine a case
+where a trustworthy friend, Mr. Nogot, provides suffi ciently strong evidence
+to his friend Jackson for being justifi ed in believing that he (Nogot) owns
+a Ford. For example, imagine that in addition to his typically trustworthy
+testimony, Mr. Nogot shows Jackson his registration papers, he takes
+Jackson for a ride in the Ford, and Jackson has no reason to doubt his
+testimony or any of the additional evidence that he has to support the
+proposition that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford. Now, Mr. Nogot does not own
+a Ford (unbeknownst to Jackson), but this does not prevent Jackson from
+being justifi ed in believing that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford, since according to
+(P2) it is possible for a person to be justifi ed in believing a false proposition.
+And now to the part relevant to (P3) – suppose that as Jackson is pondering
+his justifi ed belief (that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford) with Mr. Nogot in the
+room, he deductively reasons that if Mr. Nogot owns a Ford, then someone
+in the room owns a Ford; therefore, Jackson concludes, someone in the
+room owns a Ford. On the basis of (P3), Jackson is at least as justifi ed in
+believing that someone in the room owns a Ford as he is for the proposition
+that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford since he deduced the former from the latter,
+which is stated in (C1).
+The fi nal claim needed to underwrite Gettier ’ s counterexample is stated
+in (P4): If a person is justifi ed in believing a proposition that is true by
+accident or luck, then her justifi ed true belief is not knowledge. It has
+already been stipulated that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. Now let ’ s
+suppose that at the time that Jackson deductively reasons from the proposition
+that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford to the proposition that someone in the
+room owns a Ford, Mr. Havit happens to be the room. Mr. Havit – a person
+Jackson has never met or has any justifi cation for believing what kind of
+car he owns – is sitting quietly in the corner of the room, and he happens
+to own a Ford. So, it turns out that Jackson ’ s belief that someone in the
+158 John M. DePoe
+room owns a Ford is both justifi ed and true. Recall that it is justifi ed because
+he deduced it from a proposition that he is justifi ed in believing. The belief
+is true since Mr. Havit owns a Ford and he is in the room. But since Jackson
+has no beliefs whatsoever about Mr. Havit, the truth of his justifi ed belief
+appears to be accidental or lucky. After all, Jackson would have still believed
+that someone in the room owns a Ford even if Mr. Havit wasn ’ t in the
+room. Thus, it seems that Jackson ’ s justifi ed belief is true by luck or accident.
+In other words, the belief ’ s being true has nothing to do with the
+justifi cation Jackson has for holding the belief. For this reason, it would be
+wrong to accept that Jackson ’ s justifi ed true belief (that someone in the
+room owns a Ford) counts as knowledge.
+Since Jackson ’ s belief that someone in the room owns a Ford is a justifi ed
+true belief (C2), and it is plainly wrong to think that it counts as knowledge,
+Gettier ’ s argument is widely accepted as demonstrating why knowledge
+cannot be defi ned as justifi ed true belief (C3).
+These [ . . . ] examples show that defi nition (a) [knowledge is justifi ed true
+belief] does not state a suffi cient condition for someone ’ s knowing a given
+proposition. (Gettier, 123)
+P1. If knowledge is justifi ed true belief, then it is not possible for a person
+to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t knowledge.
+P2. A person can be justifi ed in believing a false proposition.
+P3. If a person is justifi ed in believing some proposition, then she is justifi ed
+(at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that she competently
+deduces from the original.
+C1. A person is justifi ed (at least to the same degree) in believing any
+proposition that she competently deduces from the original ( modus
+ponens , P2, P3).
+P4. If a person is justifi ed in believing a proposition that is true by accident
+or luck, then his justifi ed true belief is not knowledge.
+P5. Jackson is justifi ed in believing that someone in the room owns a Ford,
+which is true by accident or luck.
+C2. It is possible for a person to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t
+knowledge ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
+C3. It is not the case that knowledge is justifi ed true belief ( modus tollens ,
+P1, C2).
+42
+Putnam ’ s Argument against
+Cultural Imperialism
+Maria Caama ñ o
+Putnam , Hilary . “ Why Reason Can ’ t Be Naturalized , ” in Epistemology: An
+Anthology , edited by Ernest Sosa , Jaegwon Kim , and Mathew McGrath ,
+314 – 24 . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 1999 .
+Putnam introduces this argument in the context of criticizing the different
+attempts to naturalize reason by reducing it to those standards accepted by
+a culture. According to Putnam, reason always results from a balance
+between immanence to culture and traditions and transcendence to them.
+The fi rst would be manifest in the inherited cultural background in which
+any reasoning always takes place; the second would become obvious in our
+ability to criticize such cultural background. Both cultural relativism and
+cultural imperialism would break the above balance as a result of their
+emphasis on immanence. However, facts related to the transcendent side of
+reason are precisely the ones that would show the self - refutability of both
+views. Cultural relativism would need to make, inconsistently, a transcendent
+assumption regarding the symmetry of the epistemic situation between
+different cultures. Cultural imperialism, on the other hand, would require
+us to assume an immanent agreement that is contradicted by experience.
+So while the argument for cultural relativism turns out to be analytically
+fl awed, the one to support cultural imperialism proves empirically faulty.
+In this context, Putnam formulates his argument against cultural imperialism
+and continues by pointing out two of its important features: fi rst, its
+contingent character, since the goodness of the argument depends on the
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+160 Maria Caamaño
+contingent fact that people disagree about something – that is, about truth ’ s
+dependency on cultural standards (P2 below); and second, its extensibility
+to all theories which equate truth or right assertability with what people
+(would) agree. The importance of the argument, therefore, does not only
+lie on its rebuttal of cultural imperialism but also on its more general refutation
+of any defi nition of truth in terms of (possible) agreement among
+people. The argument follows a reductio ad absurdum strategy, by refl exively
+applying the requirement established in the principle of cultural imperialisms
+to that very principle and thereby showing that the assumption
+violates the very requirement that it establishes. Finally, a more general aim
+of Putnam ’ s argument consists in supporting the view that modern European
+and American culture does not have “ norms ” that decide philosophical
+questions, as would happen in totalitarian or theocratic cultures.
+A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according to
+the norms of modern European and American culture is itself neither assertable
+nor refutable in a way that requires assent by everyone who does not
+deviate from the norms of modern European and American culture. So, if this
+statement is true, it follows that it is not true QED. (Putnam, 319)
+P1. A statement P is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
+to the norms of modern European and American culture (assumption for
+reductio ).
+C1. If “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable
+according to the norms of modern European and American culture ”
+is true (rightly assertable), then it is assertable according to the norms
+of modern European and American culture (substitution of ‘ P ’ with
+“ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
+to the norms of modern European and American culture ” in P1).
+P2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
+to the norms of modern European and American culture ” is not assertable
+according to the norms of modern European and American culture.
+C2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
+to the norms of modern European and American culture ” is not
+true, that is, rightly assertable ( modus tollens , C1, P2).
+C3. A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
+to the norms of modern European and American culture and it is
+not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is
+assertable according to the norms of modern European and American
+culture (conjunction, P1, C2).
+C4. It is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
+it is assertable according to the norms of modern European and
+American culture ( reductio , P1 – C3).
+Putnam’s Argument against Cultural Imperialism 161
+Extension of Putnam ’ s Argument
+In order to bring Putnam ’ s discussion of his own argument to completion,
+it may be interesting to show how it naturally extends to arguments equating
+truth with what people (would) agree. Let us see how the refutation
+would work in that case:
+P1. A statement P is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
+it (assumption for reductio ).
+C1. If “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees
+with it ” is true (rightly assertable), then everybody agrees with it
+(Substitution of ‘ P ’ by “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
+everybody agrees with it ” in P1).
+P2. Not everybody agrees that “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only
+if everybody agrees with it. ”
+C2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
+it ” is not true, that is, rightly assertable ( modus tollens , C1, P2).
+C3. A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
+it and it is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable)
+only if everybody agrees with it (conjunction, P1, C2).
+C4. It is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
+everybody agrees with it ( reductio , P1 – C3).
+43
+Davidson on the Very Idea of a
+Conceptual Scheme
+George Wrisley
+Davidson , Donald . “ On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . ” Proceedings
+and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 ( 1974 ):
+5 – 20 ; reprinted in Davidson (2001).
+Davidson , Donald . Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation , 2nd edn. Oxford :
+Clarendon Press , 2001 .
+Case , Jennifer . “ On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . ” Southern
+Journal of Philosophy 35 ( 1997 ): 1 – 18 .
+Malpas , Jeff . “ Donald Davidson . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
+(Fall 2009 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta , available at http://
+plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/Davidson
+One of Immanuel Kant ’ s (1724 – 1804) central philosophical concerns was
+the relationship between mind and world. He famously inverted the idea
+that in knowing the world the mind attempts to mirror a “ mind - independent ”
+world, claiming instead that the world we experience necessarily conforms
+to certain categories of the mind. While such categories were essentially
+universal for Kant, later philosophers replaced the idea of the world ’ s conforming
+to the categories of the mind with the idea of the world ’ s conforming
+to linguistic or conceptual categories. This change allowed for the idea
+of a very strong conceptual/linguistic relativism whereby either the content
+of experience or the world itself is relativized to conceptual frameworks or
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 163
+schemes – the central idea of which is that different conceptual schemes
+result in different worlds.
+Donald Davidson (1917 – 2003) argues that conceptual relativism is incoherent
+because the very idea of a conceptual scheme is incoherent. Davidson
+reaches these conclusions by arguing that the idea of a conceptual scheme
+depends on the notion of failure of translation between differing schemes.
+According to Davidson, sense cannot be made of either complete or partial
+failure of translation, and so it does not make sense to speak of different
+conceptual schemes. Since it does not make sense to speak of different
+conceptual schemes, he claims that it does not make sense to speak of
+there being only one conceptual scheme.
+Davidson ’ s argument against the intelligibility of the idea of a conceptual
+scheme, and thus the possibility of conceptual relativism, is important given
+its implications for the way that we know the world, the relationship
+between us and the world, and the relationship between language and
+world. For if he is right, then there is not a dualism of conceptual scheme
+and content (world/experience), and it becomes even more diffi cult to make
+sense of the idea that radically different accounts of what exists and how
+the world is could all be true, and those forms of skepticism that depend
+on a dualism of scheme and content are also called into question.
+We may accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having
+a conceptual scheme. The relation may be supposed to be this: where conceptual
+schemes differ, so do languages. But speakers of different languages
+may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way of translating one
+language into the other. Studying the criteria of translation is therefore a way
+of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes. [ . . . ]
+I consider two kinds of cases that might be expected to arise: complete,
+and partial, failures of translatability. There would be complete failure if
+no signifi cant range of sentences in one language could be translated into
+the other; there would be partial failure if some range could be translated
+and some range could not. [ . . . ] My strategy will be to argue that we cannot
+make sense of total failure, and then to examine more briefl y cases of partial
+failure.[ . . . ]
+[Regarding partial failure], when others think differently from us, no
+general principle, or appeal to evidence, can force us to decide that the difference
+lies in our beliefs rather than our concepts.
+We must conclude, I think, that the attempt to give a solid meaning to the
+idea of conceptual relativism, and hence to the idea of a conceptual scheme,
+fares no better when based on partial failure of translation than when based
+on total failure. (Davidson Inquiries , 197)
+Both the shorter version (Part I) and longer version (Part II) consist of
+three arguments: (1) an argument against the idea of complete failure
+of translation; (2) an argument against partial failure of translation; and
+164 George Wrisley
+(3) a capstone argument drawing on (1) and (2) for the conclusion that the
+very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible rather than its being false
+that there is only one conceptual scheme or that there could be different
+conceptual schemes.
+Part I : Shorter Version (Leaves Key Premises Unsupported)
+P1. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is intelligible, then we can
+make sense of a difference in conceptual schemes consisting in complete
+failure of translation between schemes, or If the idea of different conceptual
+schemes is intelligible, then we can make sense of a difference in
+conceptual schemes consisting in partial failure of translation between
+schemes.
+P2. If the idea of complete failure of translation as a way to individuate
+conceptual schemes makes sense, then we can make sense of the idea of
+the scheme organizing the content, or If the idea of complete failure of
+translation as a way to individuate conceptual schemes makes sense, then
+we can make sense of the idea of the scheme fi tting the content.
+P3. We can neither make sense of the idea of the scheme organizing the
+content, nor the idea of the idea of the scheme fi tting the content.
+C1. We cannot make sense of the idea of complete failure of translation
+as a way to individuate conceptual schemes (destructive dilemma,
+P2, P3).
+P4. If the idea of partial failure of translation as a way to individuate conceptual
+schemes makes sense, then there is either a general principle or
+evidence that could determine whether our disagreement with those
+operating with a purportedly different scheme about the truth of sentences
+X, Y, Z is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief.
+P5. There is neither a general principle nor evidence that could determine
+whether our disagreement with those operating with a purportedly different
+scheme about the truth of sentences X, Y, Z is a difference in
+scheme or a difference in belief.
+C2. We cannot make sense of the idea of partial failure of translation as
+a way to individuate conceptual schemes ( modus tollens , P4, P5).
+C3. The idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible (destructive
+dilemma P1, C1, C2).
+P6. If there is only one conceptual scheme, then it is false that there are
+different conceptual schemes.
+P7. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible, then it is
+not false that there are different conceptual schemes.
+P8. It is not false that there are different conceptual schemes ( modus ponens ,
+C3, P7).
+Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 165
+P9. There is not only one conceptual scheme ( modus ponens , P6, P8).
+P10. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible and there
+is not only one conceptual scheme, then the very idea of a conceptual
+scheme is unintelligible.
+C4. Therefore, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible
+( modus ponens , P10, C3, P9).
+Part II : Detailed Version
+P1. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is intelligible, then we can
+make sense of a difference in conceptual schemes consisting in complete
+failure of translation between schemes, or If the idea of different conceptual
+schemes is intelligible, then we can make sense of a difference in
+conceptual schemes consisting in partial failure of translation between
+schemes.
+Complete Failure of Translation
+P2. Let us consider the possibility of complete failure of translation between
+languages.
+P3. A conceptual scheme implies a dualism of scheme and (uninterpreted)
+content. The scheme is the conceptual apparatus of a language, where a
+language consists of sentences held to be true. The content is either the
+world/reality or experience/evidence understood as uninterpreted, that
+is, a neutral something to which the scheme stands in a relation.
+P4. If the idea of complete failure of translation as a way to individuate
+conceptual schemes makes sense, then we can make sense of the idea of
+the scheme ’ s organizing the content, or If the idea of complete failure of
+translation as a way to individuate conceptual schemes makes sense, then
+we can make sense of the idea of the scheme ’ s fi tting the content.
+P5. If sense can be made of the scheme ’ s organizing the content, then
+the content is a nonindividuated object, or if the scheme organizes the
+content, then the content consists of parts.
+P6. A nonindividuated object cannot be organized.
+P7. The content cannot consist of parts prior to being organized by the
+scheme, since it is supposed to be the scheme that organizes the content
+into parts.
+C1. We cannot make sense of the idea that a scheme organizes the
+content (destructive dilemma, P5, P6, P7).
+P8. Consider the possibility of the scheme ’ s fi tting the content. Saying that
+a scheme fi ts the content just means that it is borne out by the evidence,
+166 George Wrisley
+which simply means that the scheme is true (or largely true to allow for
+error).
+P9. From P8, this means that a scheme X will be different from, for
+example, that of the English language if and only if X is (largely) true
+but untranslatable into English.
+P10. However, we cannot separate the concepts of truth and translation in
+this way. Here is why, according to Davidson:
+P11a. Following Alfred Tarski ’ s work on the concept of truth (and
+Tarski ’ s work gives us the best understanding of truth), the true sentences
+of a language must conform to Tarski ’ s Convention T, which
+says that for every sentence s of (the language) L, a theorem can be
+given of the form ‘ s is true if and only if p ’ where ‘ s ’ is replaced by a
+description of s and ‘ p ’ by s itself if L is English, and by a translation
+of s into English if L is not English. An example using English and
+German: “ ‘ Es schneit ’ is true if and only if it is snowing. ” All true
+sentences of a language conforming to Convention T constitute a
+“ theory of truth ” for that language.
+P11b. In the case we are considering, X is a conceptual scheme different
+from English, which means (a) X is true, but untranslatable. But (b)
+if X is true, then a theory of truth for X can be given. And (c) if a
+theory of truth for X can be given, then, by Convention T, translations
+of sentences of X into English can be given. However, by the supposition
+that X is a different conceptual scheme from English, its sentences
+are untranslatable into English.
+P11c. We cannot make sense of the claim that X is true (two instances
+of modus tollens from 11b, beginning with (c) and (a), and then the
+negation of the antecedent of (c) together with (b)).
+P12. We cannot make sense of the idea that a scheme fi ts the content, for
+if the scheme fi ts the content, then it is true and untranslatable into
+another language. But, by P11c, we cannot make sense of a true and
+untranslatable language.
+C2. We cannot make sense of the idea of complete failure of translation
+as a way to individuate conceptual schemes (destructive dilemma P4,
+C1, P12).
+Partial Failure of Translation
+P13. Let us consider the possibility of partial failure of translation between
+languages. Two languages that have partial failure of translation will
+embody different schemes to the extent that they have parts that are not
+intertranslatable.
+Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 167
+P14. The proper way to approach the translation of an unknown language
+into a known language is by interpreting the utterances of the speakers
+of the unknown language from the perspective of speakers of the known
+language. Such interpretation will consist in forming hypotheses as to
+what the speakers ’ utterances mean.
+P15. The formation of such hypotheses requires attributions of both
+meaning and belief. As a matter of interpretation, we know what a person
+’ s utterances mean in relation to knowing what he believes in a given
+context. For example, if a speaker utters “ Hartchep ” right after a thunderclap,
+our hypothesizing that “ Hartchep ” means thunder consists in
+attributing the belief that the sound that occurred was thunder to the
+speaker. If we thought the speaker believed the sound to have been an
+explosion (even though we knew it had been thunder), we would likely
+not hypothesize that “ Hartchep ” means thunder.
+P16. Assume that even when we cannot know what a speaker believes or
+means, we can know whether a speaker holds a particular utterance to
+be true.
+P17. To facilitate the possibility of interpretation, we should employ the
+principle of charity and assume that the beliefs of the people we are
+interpreting are by and large true (by our lights).
+P18. If it is a reasonable assumption that there will be sentences uttered by
+speakers of language X that those speakers reject as truths, and we are
+to interpret those rejected sentences, then depending on the evidence
+available, we will either translate them into sentences that we accept or
+sentences that we reject.
+P19. If the evidence available for interpreting those rejected sentences of X
+leads us to translate them into sentences that we accept as true, then this
+can be taken to mean either that our schemes differ at this point or that
+our beliefs differ.
+P20. If we are in a position in which we can either take our schemes to
+differ or our beliefs to differ at a particular point, then there is neither
+a general principle nor evidence that could possibly determine whether
+it is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief.
+P21. If there is neither a general principle nor evidence that could possibly
+determine whether it is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief,
+then we could never be in a position to judge whether speakers of X
+have concepts or beliefs radically different from our own.
+P22. If we could never be in a position to judge whether speakers of X have
+concepts or beliefs radically different from our own, then we cannot
+make sense of the idea of there being partial failure of translation.
+P23. It is a reasonable assumption that there will be sentences uttered by
+speakers of language X that those speakers reject as truths, and we are
+to interpret those rejected sentences.
+168 George Wrisley
+C3. We cannot make sense of the idea of partial failure of translation
+(hypothetical syllogism of P18 – P22, and modus ponens , P22, P23).
+The Unintelligibility of the Very Idea of a
+Conceptual Scheme
+C4. The idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible (destructive
+dilemma, P1, C2, C4).
+P24. If there is only one conceptual scheme, then it is false that there are
+different conceptual schemes.
+P25. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible, then it is
+not false that there are different conceptual schemes.
+P26. It is not false that there are different conceptual schemes ( modus
+ponens , C4, P25).
+P27. There is not only one conceptual scheme ( modus tollens , P24, P26).
+P28. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible and there
+is not only one conceptual scheme, then the very idea of a conceptual
+scheme is unintelligible.
+P29. The idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible and there
+is not only one conceptual scheme (conjunction, P27, C4).
+C4. The very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible ( modus ponens ,
+P28, P29).
+44
+Quine ’ s Two Dogmas of
+Empiricism
+Robert Sinclair
+Quine , W. V. “ Two Dogmas of Empiricism , ” in From a Logical Point of
+View , 20 – 46 . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1981 .
+Originally published in Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20 – 43.
+Hylton , Peter . Quine . New York : Routledge , 2007 .
+Kemp , Gary . Quine: A Guide for the Perplexed . New York : Continuum ,
+2006 .
+Russell , Gillian . “ The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction . ” Philosophy Compass
+2 ( 2007 ): 712 – 29 .
+There appears to be an intuitive difference between these two claims:
+(1) All bachelors are unmarried.
+(2) All bachelors are less than 15 feet tall.
+While both of these statements are true, the way in which they are taken
+to be true highlights what many philosophers have seen as a signifi cant
+difference. The fi rst is an “ analytic ” truth, whose truth is determined solely
+through the meanings of the terms involved and independently of any
+empirical fact. The second “ synthetic ” truth is true because of empirical
+facts about the world. In his famous and widely read article, “ Two Dogmas
+of Empiricism, ” W. V. Quine declared that the use of this distinction in
+modern empiricism was an unsupported dogma, and he further argued that
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+170 Robert Sinclair
+what he calls “ reductionism, ” roughly, the view that theoretical statements
+can be logically reduced to statements about experience, is a second dogma
+that should also be rejected. These criticisms target the views of Rudolf
+Carnap, C. I. Lewis, and others who used analyticity to make sense of the
+a priori elements of human knowledge and, more specifi cally, advocated its
+importance in clarifying and understanding the language of science.
+In “ Two Dogmas, ” Quine ’ s main concern is with clearly explicating the
+distinction in question, and he argues that there is no such sharp division
+between analytic truths and synthetic truths. His argument has been usefully
+described as analogous to the kind one might fi nd offered in the physical
+sciences (Kemp, 19 – 20). A scientist might reject a type of physical phenomena
+because it cannot be explained in ways that do not already assume its
+existence. It might be further argued that the evidence cited in support of
+such phenomena can be accounted for in other ways without them. In
+general, it is this type of attitude that informs the structure of Quine ’ s
+overall argument, where he begins by surveying a number of attempts to
+explain the concept of analyticity and fi nds them all uninformative. Here,
+he appeals to what has been called the “ circularity argument, ” where analyticity
+is defi ned in terms of sameness of meaning or synonymy (Russell,
+718).
+Two expressions are synonymous when sentences containing them
+remain true when one is substituted for the other, what is here described as
+interchangebility salva veritate . When applied to necessity statements in
+English, this view seems to work, since the sentence ‘ Necessarily, every
+unmarried man is unmarried ’ and ‘ Necessarily, every bachelor is unmarried ’
+is a case where truth is preserved when we switch ‘ unmarried man ’ for
+‘ bachelor, ’ and these terms are also synonyms. The problem is that such
+sentences are understood as true in virtue of being analytic. The attempt to
+explain analyticity by an appeal to synonymy is then circular.
+Quine criticizes the second dogma of reductionism by claiming that theoretical
+sentences have connections to experience only as a collective body
+and not when isolated from each other. This then prevents the type of
+phenomenalist reduction of science to experience advocated by the logical
+empiricists and further prevents us from defi ning synthetic statements as
+true when confi rmed by sets of experience and analytic truths as those
+confi rmed by any experience whatsoever. With each of these attempts to
+clarify analytic truth found wanting, Quine claims that the reasonable thing
+to conclude is that the distinction itself is an unempirical dogma. In the last
+section of his paper, he outlines his alternative view of empiricism, often
+described as “ epistemological holism, ” which is further developed in his
+later work. Here, he indicates how the alleged a priori necessity of mathematics
+and logic can be explained by its deep entrenchment within our
+overarching system of theoretical commitments rather than by an appeal to
+Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 171
+analyticity. This deep entrenchment is what further explains our reluctance
+to revise such truths. Quine would come to emphasize that the main issue
+surrounding the analytic – synthetic distinction turns less on the availability
+of its sharp delineation (he later suggests and endorses his own way of
+marking the difference), but rather with its general epistemological signifi -
+cance. Here he claims that no such distinction is of any real import in
+helping us to understand the structure of human knowledge (Hylton,
+68 – 80).
+Many philosophers infl uenced by logical empiricism and its specifi c conception
+of scientifi c philosophy viewed some form of the analytic – synthetic
+distinction as central for making sense of a priori truth. After Quine ’ s
+famous criticisms, it became increasingly diffi cult simply to assume that
+some form of this distinction was viable. This also led to a fundamental
+change in conceptions of philosophy and philosophical practice. Carnap ’ s
+use of the analytic – synthetic distinction supported his view of philosophy
+as concerned with the logical structure of scientifi c language and as distinct
+from empirical science. Quine ’ s criticisms of analyticity further challenged
+this view of philosophy by rejecting any sharp difference between philosophy
+and empirical science. The result was Quine ’ s infl uential naturalistic
+view of philosophy, which conceives of philosophical pursuits as continuous
+with those found in the empirical sciences.
+There have been many critical responses to Quine ’ s circularity argument
+against analyticity, and there are various ongoing attempts to resurrect
+alternative conceptions of analyticity. It has been recently suggested that
+new innovations in the theory of meaning offer support for an account of
+analytic truth in terms of meaning (Russell, 712 – 29).
+In formal and informal work alike, thus, we fi nd that defi nition [ . . . ]
+hinges on prior relations of synonymy. Recognizing then that the notion of
+defi nition does not hold the key to synonymy and analyticity, let us look
+further into synonymy and say no more of defi nition [ . . . ] we must recognize
+that interchangeability salva veritate , if construed in relation to an extensional
+language, is not a suffi cient condition of cognitive synonymy in the sense
+needed for deriving analyticity. [ . . . ] If a language contains an intensional
+adverb ‘ necessarily ’ [ . . . ] then interchangeability salva veritate in such a
+language does afford a suffi cient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such
+a language is intelligible only in so far as the notion of analyticity is already
+understood in advance [ . . . ]. The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated
+form, is intimately connected with the other dogma – that there is a
+cleavage between the analytic and synthetic [ . . . ] the one dogma clearly supports
+the other in this way: as long as it is taken to be signifi cant in general
+to speak of the confi rmation and information of a statement, it seems signifi -
+cant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confi
+rmed, ipso facto , come what may; and such a statement is analytic [ . . . ].
+172 Robert Sinclair
+My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense,
+to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of
+any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence
+upon language and experience; but this duality is not signifi cantly traceable
+into the statements of science taken one by one. (Quine 27, 31, 41 – 2)
+P1. Analytic truths are defi ned as true in virtue of the meaning of their
+terms and independently of empirical fact.
+P2. Meaning is not to be confused with reference (e.g., ‘ creature with a
+heart ’ and ‘ creature with kidneys ’ refers to the same class of objects, but
+the expressions differ in meaning).
+P3. There is no need to appeal to a special set of things called “ meanings ”
+to explain this difference, since the concept of meaning can be shown to
+be theoretically adequate if we focus on cases of sameness of meaning
+or synonymy (where we say that x and y are alike in meaning). If we
+proceed to use the concept of “ meaning ” to defi ne analyticity, we should
+then appeal to synonymy between terms.
+C1. We can now defi ne analytic truths as logical truths achieved by
+substituting synonyms for synonyms ( ‘ No bachelor is married ’ becomes
+the logical truth ‘ No unmarried man is married ’ if we substitute
+‘ unmarried man ’ for ‘ bachelor ’ ) ( modus ponens , P1, P3).
+P4. If truth - by - sameness of meaning (C1) relies on our understanding of
+truth - by - meaning, which in turn rests on a prior understanding of
+‘ meaning ’ , then this explanation of analyticity by use of synonymy is no
+clearer than our starting point.
+C2. This explanation of analyticity by use of synonymy is no clearer than
+our starting point ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
+P5. What if we understand synonymy as involving the defi nition of terms?
+P6. If we understand synonymy as involving the defi nition of terms, then
+this only provides a report of which terms mean the same as others, but
+no further indication of what synonymy or sameness of meaning consists
+in.
+C3. Synonymy defi ned as defi nition is then no help in clarifying analyticity
+( modus ponens , P5, P6).
+P7. What if we take two phrases or expressions as synonymous when sentences
+containing them remain true when one is substituted for the other?
+P8. If we take two phrases or expressions as synonymous when sentences
+containing them remain true when one is substituted for the other, then
+in extensional languages, where substituting co - extensive expressions
+preserves truth - value, the interchangeability does not give us sameness
+of meaning (e.g., substituting ‘ creature with a heart ’ with ‘ creature with
+kidneys ’ preserves truth - value, but we would not claim that these expressions
+have the same meaning).
+Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 173
+C4. In extensional languages, interchangeability does not give us sameness
+of meaning and is no help in understanding analyticity ( modus
+ponens , P7, P8).
+P9. However, English is not extensional and in such nonextensional
+languages, interchangeability salva veritate is the right criterion for
+synonymy; that is, it preserves sameness of meaning (e.g., ‘ Necessarily,
+every unmarried man is unmarried ’ and ‘ Necessarily, every bachelor is
+unmarried ’ is a case where truth value is preserved when we switch
+‘ unmarried man ’ for ‘ bachelor ’ , and they are also synonyms).
+P10. But necessity statements of this kind are thought to be true precisely
+because the statement in question ( ‘ every unmarried man is unmarried ’ )
+is already taken to be analytic. In this way, interchangeability salva veritate
+provides the right account of synonymy, but only by already relying
+on the intelligibility of analyticity. This is circular, and so analytic truth
+is still not clarifi ed.
+P11. If English is not extensional (P9), and necessity statements are taken
+to be analytic (P10), then this view of synonymy does not then explain
+analyticity.
+C5. This view of synonymy does not then explain analyticity ( modus
+ponens , P11, conjunction, P9, P10).
+P11. Reductionism claims that any signifi cant nonanalytic statement is
+equivalent to a statement about sensory experience. The meaning of a
+statement is then directly tied to a set of sensory experiences.
+P12. Given this view, we can defi ne analytic truths as those statements
+confi rmed by every experience or, in other words, as statements that
+contain no empirical content or information.
+P13. However, the reductionism project cannot be completed because of
+holistic considerations that prevent a simple reduction of theoretical
+sentences to specifi c sensory experiences.
+P14. But if reductionism is untenable, then we cannot assign specifi c empirical
+content to individual sentences or then specify when a sentence is
+analytic in the sense of being confi rmed by any experience whatsoever.
+C6. There is then no way to use reductionism to clarify those statements
+which depend on sensory experience for their confi rmation and those
+that do not, that is, analytic truths. Reductionism then fails to clarify
+the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements ( modus
+ponens , P13, P14).
+C7. A consideration of these various proposals for clarifying analytic
+truths has shown them all to be wanting. We have no reason to hold
+such a fi rm distinction or the form of reductionism often used to
+support it. Both are dogmas of modern empiricism that should be
+rejected (conjunction, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6).
+45
+Hume and the Problem
+of Induction
+Hume , David . An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
+Hackett , 1993 .
+Editors ’ note: We have included two versions of Hume ’ s argument concerning
+induction in order to highlight different approaches to the seminal issue.
+Hume ’ s Problem of Induction
+James E. Taylor
+Hume ’ s argument for skepticism about induction presupposes his distinction
+between “ relations of ideas, ” which are intuitively or demonstratively
+certain because their denials are contradictory (e.g., “ All bachelors are
+unmarried ” ) and “ matters of fact and existence, ” which are not certain
+because their denials are possibly true (e.g., “ The sun will rise tomorrow ” ).
+Hume holds that all of our beliefs about matters of fact and existence are
+based on either the present testimony of our senses, our memories of what
+we have experienced on the basis of our senses, or reasoning about relations
+of cause and effect on the basis of our senses and memory beliefs. For
+instance, we infer that a friend of ours is in a distant place on the grounds
+that a letter we are currently looking at indicates that it was sent by our
+friend from that place; so we infer a currently unobserved cause from a
+currently observed effect of that cause. We also infer more generally from
+cause - and - effect relationships we have observed in the past that similar
+causes will have similar effects in the future. Thus, according to Hume,
+the foundation of all our reasoning about matters of fact and existence is
+experience. But Hume argues that these sorts of inferences from experience
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Hume and the Problem of Induction 175
+are not based on any further reasoning. The way this claim is typically put
+today is that there is no rational justifi cation for inductive inferences. If this
+claim is true, then no one can be rationally justifi ed in believing anything
+that goes beyond what one is currently observing, and if that is the case,
+then there is no rational justifi cation for any theory of empirical science.
+Since Hume was the fi rst philosopher to make this claim and argue for it,
+the problem facing philosophers who deny it is called “ Hume ’ s Problem of
+Induction. ” Though many attempts have been made to solve this problem,
+none of these attempts is widely believed to be successful. Consequently,
+Hume ’ s problem of induction continues to be a central topic of philosophical
+conversation.
+All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative
+reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that
+concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative
+arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the
+course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which
+we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May
+I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and
+which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling
+of fi re? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affi rm, that all the
+trees will fl ourish in December and January, and decay in May and June?
+Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no
+contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument
+or abstract reasoning a priori .
+If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience,
+and make it the standard of our future judgement, these arguments must be
+probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence, according
+to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind,
+must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as
+solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence
+are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that
+relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental
+conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable
+to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by
+probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently
+going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.
+(IV.ii)
+An example of an inductive inference employed by Hume (which can
+represent all inductive inferences) is the inference from (a) “ All the bread
+I have eaten has nourished me ” to (b) “ The bread I am about to eat
+will nourish me. ” I will refer to this example in my reconstruction of
+Hume ’ s argument for his claim that no such inferences have a rational
+foundation.
+176 James E. Taylor and Stefanie Rocknak
+P1. If the (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) has a rational foundation,
+then it must be based on intuition, reasoning that is based on intuition
+( “ demonstrative ” or deductive reasoning) or reasoning that is based on
+direct observation ( “ experimental ” or inductive reasoning).
+P2. The (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) is not based on intuition, reasoning
+that is based on intuition, or reasoning that is based on direct
+observation.
+C1. The (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) does not have a rational
+foundation ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+Argument for P2:
+P3. The connection between (a) and (b) of the example inference is not
+intuitive (i.e., it isn ’ t self - evident that if (a) is true, then (b) is true).
+P4. The inference from (a) to (b) is not based on demonstrative reasoning
+(since demonstrative reasoning can only establish claims that are not
+possibly false and the claim that if (a) is true, then (b) is true is possibly
+false).
+P5. The inference from (a) to (b) is not based on experimental reasoning
+(because all experimental reasoning presupposes that similar causes have
+similar effects and the inference in question is an instance of this very
+presupposition, so an experimental (inductive) argument for that inference
+would be circular).
+C2. P2 is true: the (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) is not based on
+intuition, reasoning that is based on intuition, or reasoning that is
+based on direct observation (conjunction, P3, P4, P5; De Morgan ’ s).
+Hume ’ s Negative Argument concerning Induction
+Hume , David . A Treatise of Human Nature , edited by D. F. and M. J. Norton.
+Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2002 .
+Arnold , N. Scott . “ Hume ’ s Skepticism about Inductive Inferences . ” Journal
+of the History of Philosophy 21 , 1 ( 1983 ): 31 – 55 .
+Baier , Annette . A Progress of Sentiments . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University
+Press , 1991 .
+Beauchamp , Tom , and Alexander Rosenberg . Hume and the Problem of
+Causation . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1981 .
+Broughton , J. “ Hume ’ s Skepticism about Causal Inferences . ” Pacifi c
+Philosophical Quarterly 64 ( 1983 ): 3 – 18 .
+Stefanie Rocknak
+Hume and the Problem of Induction 177
+Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come
+from? “ Why [do] we conclude that [ … ] particular causes must necessarily
+have such particular effects? ” (Hume, 1.3.2.15) In 1.3.6 of the Treatise ,
+Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason.
+However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists
+of Hume ’ s “ negative ” argument concerning induction. This argument
+has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention.
+How could causal inferences be justifi ed if they are not justifi ed by reason?
+If we believe that p causes q , isn ’ t it reason that allows us to conclude with
+some assurance – that is, with some necessity – that q whenever we see p ?
+The responses to these questions are many, but they may be parsed into
+four groups. (1) Some argue that Hume ’ s negative argument shows that he
+thought that inductive inferences are worthless. Hume was actually a closet
+“ deductivist, ” where he meant to show that any method that does not rely
+on a priori principles is useless (e.g., Stove). (2) Others have alleged that
+Hume ’ s negative argument only meant to show that we cannot use demonstrative
+reason to justify inductive inferences, but we can, apparently, justify
+them with probable reason (e.g., Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Arnold,
+Broughton, and Baier). (3) Still others argue that Hume ’ s notion of justifi cation
+(in regard to beliefs in general, including beliefs in causal inferences)
+should be understood in two stages in Book I of the Treatise . In the fi rst,
+Hume does lay out a theory of justifi cation. In the second (particularly in
+1.4.7), he retracts it (e.g., Passmore, Immerwahr, Schmitt, and Loeb). (4)
+Finally, there are those who claim that no “ justifi cation ” is needed for
+causal inferences. In fact, asking for it amounts to a misplaced demand for
+Garrett , Don . Cognition and Commitment in Hume ’ s Philosophy . Oxford :
+Oxford University Press , 1997 .
+Immerwahr , John . “ The Failure of Hume ’ s Treatise . ” Hume Studies 3 , 2
+( 1977 ): 57 – 71 .
+Loeb , L. E. Stability and Justifi cation in Hume ’ s Treatise . Oxford : Oxford
+University Press , 2002 .
+Owen , David . Hume ’ s Reason . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1999 .
+Passmore , John . Hume ’ s Intentions . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
+Press , 1952/1968 .
+Schmitt , F. E. Knowledge and Belief . London : Routledge , 1992 .
+Smith , Norman K. The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its
+Origins and Central Doctrines . New York : Macmillan , 1941 .
+Stove , D. C. Probability and Hume ’ s Inductive Skepticism . Oxford : Oxford
+University Press , 1973 .
+Strawson , P. F. Introduction to Logical Theory . London : Methuen , 1952 .
+178 James E. Taylor and Stefanie Rocknak
+epistemic explanation; to some degree, this is what the negative argument
+shows us. What we must do instead is give a descriptive psychological
+explanation where this explanation consists of Hume ’ s “ positive ” account
+of induction; see, for instance, Treatise 1.3.14, “ of the idea of necessary
+connexion ” (e.g., Strawson, Garrett, and Owen).
+In the arguments that rule out demonstrative and probable reasoning,
+Hume assumes that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by, respectively,
+demonstrative reason and probable reason, and then he respectively shows
+why these assumptions are incorrect. In the concluding argument, he
+shows that this means that the principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by
+reason, nor is the necessity that obtains of our causal inferences a function
+of reason. To do so, he draws on the premises established in his introduction
+and the conclusions established in the arguments that rule out demonstrative
+and probable reason.
+[We must now] discover the nature of that necessary connexion, which
+makes so essential a part of [the relation of cause and effect] [ . . . ]. Since it
+appears, that the transition from an impression present to the memory or
+senses to the idea of an object, we call cause and effect, is founded on past
+experience, and our resemblance of their constant conjunction, the next question
+is, whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding
+or of the imagination; whether we are determin ’ d by reason to make the
+transition, or by a certain association of perceptions. If reason determin ’ d us,
+it wou ’ d proceed upon that principle, that instances, of which we have had
+no experience must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and
+that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. In order
+therefore to clear up this matter, let us consider all the arguments, upon which
+such a proposition may suppos ’ d to be founded ’ and as these must be deriv ’ d
+either from knowledge or probability, let us cast our eye on each of these
+degrees of evidence, and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this
+nature. (Hume, 1.3.6.3, 1.3.6.4)
+P1. When the mind makes what appears to be a necessary transition from
+a present impression, or a memory of an impression, to a given idea, we
+call that transition “ cause and effect. ” The question is, on what is this
+seemingly necessary transition founded? Of what is it a function: understanding
+(i.e., reason) or the imagination?
+P2. If reason does determine us to make these causal transitions, then this
+reasoning must proceed upon the principle that instances (e.g., particular
+associations of any two objects) that occurred in the past will continue
+to occur as such in the future (the principle of uniformity).
+P3. If causal necessity is a function of reason, where that reason is based
+on the principle of uniformity, then the principle of uniformity must,
+in some fashion or other, be justifi ed ; it too must be “ founded ” on
+Hume and the Problem of Induction 179
+reason. In symbolic form, this reads (N ⊃ P) ⊃ J, where ‘ N ’ stands for
+causal necessity is a function of reason, ‘ P ’ stands for a principle of
+uniformity, and ‘ J ’ stands for “ the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by
+reason. ”
+P4. There are only two kinds of reason that may justify a principle, including
+the principle of uniformity: (a) “ knowledge ” (demonstrative reasoning)
+or (b) “ probable ” reasoning.
+P5. Assume that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by demonstrative
+reasoning.
+P6. If the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by demonstrative reasoning – in
+other words, it is an instance of demonstrative reasoning – then the
+principle of uniformity cannot be imagined otherwise.
+P7. We can imagine that nature will not continue uniformly in the future,
+while simultaneously imagining that nature has always continued the
+same in the past, without contradicting ourselves.
+C1. The principle of uniformity is not proved; that is, justifi ed by demonstrative
+reasoning ( modus tollens , P6, P7).
+P8. The principle of uniformity is justifi ed by probable reasoning (assumption
+for reductio ).
+P9. Probable reasoning is actually causal reasoning, since both are cases
+where we are automatically led to think of an idea in virtue of experiencing
+an impression or remembering an impression.
+P10. If the reasoning at hand is an instance of causal reasoning, then such
+reasoning is justifi ed by the principle of uniformity.
+C2. Probable reasoning is justifi ed by the principle of uniformity ( modus
+ponens , P9, P10).
+C3. The principle of uniformity is justifi ed by probable reasoning (i.e.,
+causal reasoning) and justifi es probable reasoning (i.e., causal reasoning)
+(conjunction, P7, C2).
+C4. The principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by probable reason
+( reductio , P7 – C3).
+C5. The principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by either demonstrative
+or probable reasoning (conjunction C1, C4).
+P11. If the principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by either demonstrative
+or probable reasoning, then we must reject the claim that the principle
+of uniformity is justifi ed by reason.
+C6. We must reject the claim that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed
+by reason ( modus ponens , C5, P11).
+P12. If we must reject the claim that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed
+by reason, then we must reject the claim that the necessity that seems to
+accompany causal relations is a function of reason.
+C7. We must reject the claim that the necessity that seems to accompany
+causal relations is a function of reason ( modus ponens , P12, C6).
+46
+Argument by Analogy in Thales
+and Anaximenes
+Giannis Stamatellos
+Aristotle . On the Heavens , translated by W. K. C. Guthrie. Cambridge, MA :
+Harvard University Press , 1939 .
+Barnes , Jonathan . The Presocratic Philosophers . London : Routledge , 1979 .
+Diels , Hermann . Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker , 6th edn. , revised with
+additions and index by W. Kranz . Berlin : Weidmann , 1951 – 52 . (DK)
+Kirk , Geoffrey Stephen , John Earl Raven , and Malcolm Schofi eld . The
+Presocratic Philosophers . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,
+1983 .
+Lloyd , Geoffrey Ernest Richard . Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of
+Argumentation in Early Greek Thought . Bristol : Bristol Classical Press ,
+1992 .
+Pachenko , Dmitri . “ Thales and the Origin of Theoretical Reasoning . ”
+Confi gurations 3 ( 1993 ): 387 – 484 .
+Wright , M. R . The Presocratics . Bristol : Bristol Classical Press , 1985 .
+If x is P and Q , and y is P , we infer that y is also Q .
+An argument by analogy relies on inductive inference. Arguing by analogy
+is arguing that since things are similar or alike in certain respects, they are
+similar or alike in others. An analogical argument is based on hypothetical
+similarities between distinct cases: in other words, since things are similar
+in certain observable or identifi ed cases, they are also similar in some other
+unobservable or unidentifi ed cases.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Argument by Analogy in Thales and Anaximenes 181
+An argument by analogy is not deductively valid. It is considered as a
+weak form of argumentation due to the arbitrary presupposition of similarities
+between things. However, analogy is not only used in literal cases but
+also in cases of metaphor and explanatory purposes. Moreover, an argument
+by analogy is considered as an indispensable accompaniment of scientifi
+c thought as far as induction forms the basic scientifi c method.
+In early Greek philosophy, analogy is a pattern of thought that underlies
+the fi rst attempts for an explanation of the cosmos. This is initially found
+in the Milesians thinkers Thales ( fl . c. 585 bce ) and Anaximenes ( fl . c. 546
+bce ). Thales argued that “ as a piece of wood fl oats on a pond, so the whole
+earth fl oats on water ” (DK 11A14; cf., DK 11A12). According to Aristotle:
+Others say that the earth rests on water. For this is the most ancient
+account we have received, which they say was given by Thales the Milesian,
+that it stays in place through fl oating like a log or some other such thing (for
+none of these rests by nature on air, but on water) – as though the same argument
+did not apply to the water supporting the earth as to the earth itself.
+(Aristotle B13, 294a28)
+Thales ’ inductive reasoning refl ects an argument by analogy: if two
+things have certain properties in common on a small scale, then they have
+the same properties in common on a cosmic scale:
+Small scale: a piece of wood fl oats on a pond.
+Large scale: the Earth fl oats on Okeanos.
+Likewise, Anaximenes claims an analogy between human soul and the
+cosmos:
+As our soul, which is air, maintain us, so breath and air surround the whole
+world. (DK, 13B2)
+Anaximenes offers an argument by analogy:
+Small scale: the human soul (human breath) maintains the single individual
+organism (microcosm).
+Large scale: the soul of the cosmos (universal breath) surrounds and
+maintains the whole universe.
+Analogy as a pattern of thought seems to underlie Anaximenes ’ inductive
+thinking used for rhetorical, metaphoric, and explanatory purposes. This is
+evident in some of his extant fragments and testimonies ( Die Fragmente der
+Vorsokratiker ):
+182 Giannis Stamatellos
+The stars move around the earth, just as turban winds round our head.
+[A7]
+The universe whirls like a mill - stone. [A12]
+The stars are fi xed in the crystalline in the manner of nails. [A14]
+The sun is fl at like a leaf. [A15]
+In the above examples, analogy is used by Anaximenes to explain macrocosm
+through common observation. Thales ’ and Anaximenes ’ arguments
+by analogy are considered as one of the fi rst incidences of inductive reasoning.
+The relationship between microcosm (small scale) and macrocosm
+(cosmic scale) refl ects Thales ’ hylozoism and mathematical expertise
+(e.g., measurement of the pyramids and predictions of the eclipses) and
+Anaximenes ’ natural philosophy and cosmological discoveries. Early Greek
+philosophical argumentation by analogy, as a form of induction, marks the
+beginning of scientifi c explanation and thought.
+47
+Quine ’ s Epistemology
+Naturalized
+Robert Sinclair
+Quine , W. V. “ Epistemology Naturalized , ” in Ontological Relativity and
+Other Essays , 69 – 90 . New York : Columbia University Press , 1969 .
+Gregory , Paul . Quine ’ s Naturalism: Language, Theory and the Knowing
+Subject . New York : Continuum , 2008 .
+Roth , Paul . “ The Epistemology of ‘ Epistemology Naturalized ’ . ” Dialectica
+53 ( 1999 ): 87 – 109 .
+In his highly infl uential article “ Epistemology Naturalized, ” W. V. Quine
+argued that the problems found in the history of modern empiricism should
+lead us to rethink the overall aims of contemporary epistemology. More
+specifi cally, he offered a historical reconstruction of post - Humean empiricism,
+highlighting where attempts to support or to justify our knowledge
+of the world through sensory experience fell into insurmountable problems
+and suggesting further the need to locate the grounds of knowledge within
+science itself. On his view, epistemology should then be “ naturalized ” in
+the sense that it becomes a scientifi c project where philosophers must use
+the resources of science to explain, to describe, and to justify our knowledge
+of the world.
+His basic argument appeals to an analogy between studies in the foundations
+of mathematical knowledge and the empiricist attempt to provide a
+sensory foundation for scientifi c knowledge. The project in the philosophy
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+184 Robert Sinclair
+of mathematics that is Quine ’ s focus is known as “ logicism, ” which held
+that mathematical truths could be defi ned in terms of a more basic logical
+language. Here, on what Quine calls the “ conceptual ” side, mathematical
+concepts could be rewritten and, in that sense, reduced to what was thought
+to be a more certain and obviously true logical vocabulary. This would also
+help deal with a further “ doctrinal ” concern over the justifi cation of mathematical
+truths, since they could be restated as basic logical truths with a
+similar degree of logical certainty. Unfortunately, this project cannot be
+completed, since the proposed reduction of mathematical concepts requires
+set theory, which contains its own logical paradoxes and does not then have
+the same obviousness or certainty assumed to be had within logic. Moreover,
+G ö del ’ s famous incompleteness theorems undermine the doctrinal aim,
+since they demonstrate that no logical rendering of all the truths of mathematics
+is possible.
+With this as background, Quine proceeds to develop further his analogy
+between logicism and empiricism. Like logicism, the empiricist attempt to
+validate scientifi c truths within sensory experience contains a conceptual
+side focused on defi ning concepts in sensory terms and a doctrinal side that
+seeks to justify truths of nature through sensory experience. However, these
+two aims cannot be met. The conceptual side falters because of “ holism, ”
+the view that terms and sentences have implications for experience only
+through their interconnections and never by themselves in isolation. What
+this suggests is that, in general, no concept or theoretical claim has its own
+consequences for experience, and thus no single concept or statement could
+then be assigned to or reduced to its own specifi c element of experience.
+The doctrinal aim fails because of what Quine calls “ Hume ’ s problem, ”
+where even simple general claims based on our experience of things claim
+much more than any empirical evidence we could have to justify them. So,
+empiricism suffers from incompleteness in an analogous way to logicism in
+the philosophy of mathematics, but, importantly, Quine suggests that the
+epistemology of empirical knowledge is no worse off than mathematical
+knowledge (see Roth, 96). Studies in mathematics lowered its epistemic
+standards in fruitful ways, and given this analogy, empiricism can follow
+suit. This requires moving from the attempt to reconstruct science logically
+from experience, something which Quine accepts would be more epistemologically
+adequate, and instead seeking a validation for scientifi c knowledge
+from within the methods of science.
+Quine ’ s argument is then an invitation for us to reconsider what empiricist
+epistemology looks like once we adopt a holistic view of human knowledge
+and accept the way this undermines an empiricist reduction of
+knowledge to experience, while further viewing science as providing the
+best remaining resources for addressing justifi catory issues in epistemology
+(see Roth, 96 – 100). Within such constraints, he stresses the importance of
+Quine’s Epistemology Naturalized 185
+using the methods of science to justify scientifi c truths and to develop
+explanatory accounts of the causal mechanisms responsible for the creation
+of scientifi c theories.
+The infl uence of this argument can be measured in terms of two contrasting
+responses, one positive, the other critical. With regard to the fi rst,
+Quine ’ s suggested reconstruction of epistemology has spawned numerous
+attempts to offer more empirically informed accounts of human knowledge.
+Such views appeal to a variety of different sciences such as evolutionary
+biology, psychology, and neuroscience, and in the fi eld of philosophy of
+science further use has been made of history and sociology. More generally,
+Quine ’ s philosophical naturalism, where philosophy is to be conceived as
+part of empirical science, has further infl uenced the development of work
+in the philosophy of mind, language, ethics, and elsewhere. The second
+more critical response has claimed that Quine ’ s suggested naturalization of
+epistemology results in a curt dismissal of the central aims of epistemology.
+Here, much of the attention has focused on Quine ’ s apparent rejection of
+the normative aims of justifi cation leading to what many have viewed as a
+radical changing of the subject. The result is the so - called “ replacement
+interpretation, ” where Quine is taken as advocating the replacement of
+normative epistemology, which seeks to assess critically and rationally the
+evidential basis of our beliefs, with a psychological description of the causal
+processes of belief acquisition (Gregory, 85 – 121).
+Recent scholarship has suggested that this critical reading is mistaken
+and has further emphasized that, in general, Quine ’ s proposal does not seek
+to eliminate such normative concerns but, rather, explains how epistemology
+can still remain normative in light of empiricism ’ s failures and the
+ongoing progress of science.
+[T]here remains a helpful thought, regarding epistemology generally, in
+that duality of structure which was especially conspicuous in the foundations
+of mathematics. I refer to the bifurcation into a theory of concepts, or
+meaning, and a theory of doctrine, or truth; for this applies to the epistemology
+of natural knowledge no less than to the foundations of mathematics.
+The parallel is as follows. Just as mathematics is to be reduced to logic, or
+logic and set theory, so natural knowledge is to be based somehow on sense
+experience. This means explaining the notion of body in sensory terms; here
+is the conceptual side. And it means justifying our knowledge of truths of
+nature in sensory terms; here is the doctrinal side of the bifurcation. [ . . . ]
+Philosophers have rightly despaired of translating everything into observational
+and logico - mathematical terms. They have despaired of this even when
+they have not recognized, as the reason for this irreducibility, that the statements
+largely do not have their private bundles of empirical consequences.
+And some philosophers have seen in this irreducibility the bankruptcy of
+epistemology [ . . . ] But I think at this point it maybe more useful to say rather
+186 Robert Sinclair
+that epistemology still goes on, through in a new setting and a clarifi ed status.
+Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of
+psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon,
+viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain
+experimentally controlled input – certain patterns of irradiation in assorted
+frequencies, for instance – and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as
+output a description of the three dimensional external world and its history.
+The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation
+that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always
+prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence related to
+theory, and in what ways one ’ s theory of nature transcends any available
+evidence. (Quine 71, 82 – 3)
+P1. There are important parallels between studies in the foundations of
+natural science and studies in the foundations of mathematics that can
+help illuminate the epistemology of empirical knowledge.
+P2. The logicist project of constructing logical procedures for the codifi cation
+of mathematical truths contained two elements: a conceptual one
+that defi ned mathematical notions in terms of logic, and a doctrinal
+component that derived mathematical truths using logical techniques.
+C1. The empiricist attempt to provide an evaluation or derivation of
+scientifi c truths on the basis of sensory experience contains the same
+general features: a conceptual side concerned with the defi nition of
+concepts in sensory terms, and a doctrinal side focusing on the justifi
+cation of truths of nature in sensory terms (analogy, P1, P2).
+P3. If the empiricist program is to be successful, it then needs to address:
+(A) The conceptual requirement of showing how theoretical concepts
+(e.g., body) can be defi ned in terms of sensory experience.
+(B) The doctrinal requirement of showing how scientifi c laws or generalizations
+can be derived from sense experience.
+P4. (A) cannot be achieved because concepts and sentences have experiential
+consequences only as a collective body, and not in isolation from each
+other (holism). (B) cannot be achieved because even the simplest generalizations
+based on experience outrun the empirical evidence (Hume ’ s
+problem).
+C2. No independent philosophical foundation for science is then available
+within empiricism ( modus tollens , P3, P4).
+P5. There are no better standards of justifi cation available between formal
+derivation and the standards of empirical science itself (Quine ’ s scalar
+hypothesis; see Roth 98).
+P6. If empiricism cannot successfully implement its foundationalist project
+and there is no better justifi catory standards than those found in science,
+then epistemology should appeal to science in justifying scientifi c results
+and practices.
+Quine’s Epistemology Naturalized 187
+P7. No independent philosophical foundation for science is then available
+within empiricism, and there are no better standards of justifi cation
+available between formal derivation and the standards of empirical
+science itself (conjunction, C2, P5).
+C3. Epistemology becomes science self - applied where we use the methods
+of science to justify scientifi c truths and develop an explanatory
+account of the causal mechanisms responsible for the development of
+scientifi c theories. In sum, epistemology should be naturalized ( modus
+ponens , P6, P7).
+48
+Sellars and the Myth of
+the Given
+Willem A. deVries
+Sellars , Wilfrid . “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind , ” in Minnesota
+Studies in the Philosophy of Science , vol. I , edited by Herbert Feigl and
+Michael Scriven , 253 – 329 . Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press ,
+1956 . (EPM) Reprinted with additional footnotes in Science, Perception
+and Reality . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963; reissued by
+Ridgeview Publishing Company in 1991. (SPR) Published separately as
+Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: With an Introduction by
+Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom , edited by Robert
+Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Also
+reprinted in W. deVries and T. Triplett, Knowledge, Mind, and the
+Given: A Reading of Sellars ’ “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. ”
+Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2000. (KMG)
+Alston , William P. “ What ’ s Wrong With Immediate Knowledge? ” Synthese
+55 ( 1983 ): 73 – 96 . Reprinted in Epistemic Justifi cation: Essays in the
+Theory of Knowledge . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.
+___. “ Sellars and the ‘ Myth of the Given ’ , ” 1998 . http://www.ditext.com/
+alston/alston2.html (accessed July 27, 2010).
+Meyers , R. G. “ Sellars ’ Rejection of Foundations . ” Philosophical Studies 39
+( 1981 ): 61 – 78 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Sellars and the Myth of the Given 189
+Knowledge has a structure: there are relations of dependency among a
+person ’ s (and a community ’ s) cognitive states. Skeptical challenges easily
+arise; for example, if every piece of knowledge is dependent on others,
+how could we acquire our fi rst piece of knowledge (#38)? Many philosophers
+have held that knowledge has a hierarchical structure not unlike
+that of a well - built house. There must be some cognitive states that are
+in direct contact with reality, and that form a fi rm foundation that supports
+the rest of our knowledge. For obvious reasons, this has been called
+the “ foundationalist picture ” of knowledge ’ s structure. Philosophers cash
+this metaphor out via two requirements on knowledge, as follows. (1)
+There must be cognitive states that are basic in the sense that they possess
+some positive epistemic status independently of their epistemic relations
+to any other cognitive states. Call this the Epistemic Independence
+Requirement [EIR]. Positive epistemic statuses include being an instance
+of knowledge, being justifi ed or warranted, or (more weakly) having some
+presumption in its favor. (Many have claimed that basic cognitions must
+possess an unassailable epistemic warrant – certainty, incorrigibility, or
+even infallibility.) Epistemic relations include deductive and inductive
+implication. (2) Every nonbasic cognitive state with positive epistemic
+status possesses that status only because of the epistemic relations it bears,
+directly or indirectly, to basic cognitive states. Thus the basic states provide
+the ultimate support for the rest of our knowledge. Call this the Epistemic
+Effi cacy Requirement [EER]. Call such basic – that is, independent
+and effi cacious – cognitive states the “ given. ” Many philosophers have
+believed that there has to be such a given if there is to be any knowledge
+at all.
+The EIR and the EER together put constraints on what could play the
+role of basic knowledge. Traditionally, philosophers required that basic
+knowledge have an unassailable warrant. Although Sellars was a fallibilist
+and believed that any cognitive state could be challenged, his argument
+against the given, contrary to some interpretations, does not worry about
+this issue. If there are no foundations, we need not worry about the strength
+of foundational warrant.
+A foundationalist structure has been attributed to logical and mathematical
+knowledge, which is formal and a priori , as well as to empirical knowledge.
+For millennia, Euclidean geometry, which starts with defi nitions and
+axioms and derives numerous theorems by long chains of reasoning, has
+provided a paradigmatic foundationalist structure. But no axioms – self -
+evident general truths – seem adequate to provide the basis for empirical
+knowledge. Rather, the common assumption is that particular truths can
+be known through direct experience and provide the basis for all empirical
+knowledge. Thus, experience supposedly provides us with epistemically
+independent and effi cacious cognitive states that form the foundation of
+190 Willem A. deVries
+empirical knowledge. Empiricism claims that all substantive knowledge
+rests on experience.
+Sellars ’ argument against the given denies not only that there must be a
+given but that there can be a given in the sense defi ned. It is thus an attack
+on the foundationalist picture of knowledge, especially its empiricist version.
+The argument claims that nothing can satisfy both EIR and EER. To satisfy
+EER, a basic cognition must be capable of participating in inferential relations
+with other cognitions; it must possess propositional form and be
+truth - evaluable. To meet EIR, such a propositionally structured cognition
+must possess its epistemic status independently of inferential connections
+to other cognitions. No cognitive states satisfy both requirements.
+Many philosophers have believed in self - evident cognitive states that are
+epistemically independent. Mathematical axioms were traditionally called
+self - evident, but is any empirical proposition self - evident? According to
+Sellars, the standard candidates for basic empirical knowledge (knowledge
+of sense - data, knowledge of appearances, etc.) all presuppose other knowledge
+on the part of the knower and thus fail EIR. He argues that such
+states count as cognitive states only because of their epistemic relations to
+other cognitive states. Because he argues by cases, it is unclear whether
+some other candidates might pass EIR. For instance, some claim that externalism
+evades his critique because then the epistemic status of basic cognitive
+states is determined solely by their causal status and they pass EIR (see
+Meyers). Just assuming that there are (much less must be) Epistemically
+Independent cognitive states, however, begs the question against his argument.
+A fi nal resolution of this dispute requires a positive theory of the
+suffi cient conditions for possessing a positive epistemic status (see Alston).
+Sellars offers one, but this reaches beyond the critique of the given. At very
+least, Sellars ’ critique of the given shifts the burden of proof onto those who
+believe in epistemically independent cognitive states. They owe us a good
+theory of such states and why they have their epistemic status.
+Some foundationalists believe that basic cognitive states are not propositionally
+structured but are cases of direct knowledge of an object – what
+Russell called “ knowledge by acquaintance. ” Such states violate EER: How
+could such knowledge justify further knowledge? If John knows O, for some
+object O, no proposition seems to be warranted for John solely on that
+basis.
+If Sellars ’ argument works, knowledge cannot be acquired incrementally
+from initial encounters with the world in experience that are already full -
+fl edged cognitive states. The epistemic status of our perceptions and introspections
+belongs to them because they belong in a complex system of
+mutually supporting cognitive states that mediate our practical engagement
+with the world around us – though Sellars also rejects standard coherentism
+as well. The argument is not a conclusive, once - and - for - all refutation of the
+Sellars and the Myth of the Given 191
+foundationalist picture of knowledge, but it is a signifi cant challenge to that
+picture. Sellars ’ argument, in combination with arguments by Quine and
+Davidson, among others, have put foundationalism on the defensive since,
+roughly, the mid - point of the twentieth century.
+Sellars ’ argument has infl uenced a wide range of late - twentieth - century
+philosophers, including Richard Rorty, Paul and Patricia Churchland,
+Laurence Bonjour, David Rosenthal, Jay Rosenberg, John McDowell, and
+Robert Brandom.
+If I reject the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I want
+to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation. For to put it this way is
+to suggest that it is really “ empirical knowledge so - called, ” and to put it in
+a box with rumors and hoaxes. There is clearly some point to the picture of
+human knowledge as resting on a level of propositions – observation reports
+– which do not rest on other propositions in the same way as other propositions
+rest on them. On the other hand, I do wish to insist that the metaphor
+of “ foundation ” is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is
+a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation
+reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the
+former.
+Above all, the picture is misleading because of its static character. One
+seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a
+tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian
+serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither
+will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is
+rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self - correcting
+enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once. (EPM
+VIII, § 38, in SPR, 170; in KMG, 250)
+The doctrine of the given requires that for any empirical knowledge P,
+some epistemically independent knowledge G is epistemically effi cacious
+with respect to P.
+P1. If X cannot serve as a reason for Y, then X cannot be epistemically
+effi cacious with respect to Y.
+P2. If X cannot serve as a premise in an argument for Y, then X cannot
+serve as a reason for Y.
+P3. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot serve as a premise in an
+argument.
+P4. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot serve as a reason for Y (hypothetical
+syllogism, P3, P2).
+C1. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot be epistemically effi cacious
+with respect to Y (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P4).
+P5. If X cannot be epistemically effi cacious with respect to Y, then the
+nonpropositional cannot serve as the given.
+192 Willem A. deVries
+C2. The nonpropositional cannot serve as the given ( modus ponens , C1,
+P5).
+P6. No inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental state is
+epistemically independent.
+P7. The epistemic status of noninferentially acquired, propositionally structured
+cognitive states presupposes the possession by the knowing subject
+of other empirical knowledge, both of particulars and of general empirical
+truths.
+P8. If noninferentially acquired empirical knowledge presupposes the possession
+by the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge, then noninferentially
+acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states are not
+epistemically independent.
+C3. Noninferentially acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states
+are not epistemically independent ( modus ponens , P7, P8).
+P8. Any empirical, propositional cognition is acquired either inferentially
+or noninferentially.
+C4. Propositionally structured cognitions, whether inferentially or noninferentially
+acquired, are never epistemically independent and cannot
+serve as the given (conjunction, P6, C3).
+P9. Every cognition is either propositionally structured or not.
+C5. Neither propositional or nonpropostitional cognitions can serve as
+the given (conjunction, C2, C4).
+P10. If neither propositional nor nonpropostitional cognitions can serve as
+the given, then it is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical
+knowledge can serve the function of a given.
+C6. It is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical knowledge can
+serve the function of a given ( modus ponens , C5, P10).
+49
+Sellars ’ “ Rylean Myth ”
+Willem A. deVries
+Sellars , Wilfrid . “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind , ” in Minnesota
+Studies in the Philosophy of Science , vol. I , edited by Herbert Feigl and
+Michael Scriven , 253 – 329 . Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press ,
+1956 . (EPM) Reprinted with additional footnotes in Science, Perception
+and Reality . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963; reissued by
+Ridgeview Publishing Company in 1991. (SPR) Published separately as
+Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: With an Introduction by
+Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom , edited by Robert
+Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Also
+reprinted in W. deVries and T. Triplett, Knowledge, Mind, and the
+Given: A Reading of Sellars ’ “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. ”
+Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2000. (KMG)
+___. “ Intentionality and the Mental , ” a correspondence with Roderick
+Chisholm, in Minnesota Studies in The Philosophy of Science , vol. II ,
+edited by Herbert Feigl , Michael Scriven , and Grover Maxwell , 507 – 39 .
+Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press , 1957 . Reprinted in
+Intentionality, Mind and Language , edited by Ausonio Marras. Chicago:
+University of Illinois Press, 1972.
+Marras , Ausonio . “ On Sellars ’ Linguistic Theory of Conceptual Activity . ”
+Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 ( 1973 ): 471 – 83 .
+___. “ Reply to Sellars . ” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 ( 1973 ):
+495 – 501 .
+___. “ Sellars on Thought and Language . ” Nous 7 ( 1973 ): 152 – 63 .
+___. “ Sellars ’ Behaviourism: A Reply to Fred Wilson . ” Philosophical Studies
+30 ( 1976 ): 413 – 18 .
+___. “ The Behaviourist Foundation of Sellars ’ Semantics . ” Dialogue
+(Canada) 16 ( 1977 ): 664 – 75 .
+Perner , Josef . Understanding the Representational Mind . Cambridge, MA :
+The MIT Press , 1991 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+194 Willem A. deVries
+The Cartesian tradition teaches that people have direct, privileged knowledge
+of their own mental states and that such knowledge possesses the
+highest epistemic warrant. For example, Descartes ’ wax example argument
+in the Second Meditation concludes that he knows his own mental states
+“ fi rst and best. ” The concepts employed in such knowledge are usually
+assumed to be either innate or derived by abstraction from the occurrence
+of those mental states. This is crucial to theories that make our knowledge
+of our own subjective mental states basic , for the foundation of our knowledge
+must be independent of all other knowledge. Thus, according to such
+foundationalist theories, both our knowledge of particular mental states
+and our knowledge of the concepts employed in the knowledge of particular
+mental states are “ givens. ” [See the argument that the given is a myth
+(#48).]
+Early in “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, ” Sellars attacked the
+idea that there could be a given in the sense that the Cartesian tradition
+demands, but that critique could not be very convincing without an alternative
+explanation of how we acquire concepts of the mental and why knowledge
+of our own mental states is immediate and privileged. So Sellars needs
+to establish that there is a coherent alternative to the traditional view that
+mentalistic concepts are given, either innately or abstracted directly from
+particular mental states. This is the point of the Rylean Myth. The Rylean
+Myth and the critique of the Myth of the Given reinforce each other,
+strengthening the conclusion that not even knowledge of subjective mental
+states is given.
+Concepts of the mental, therefore, are not fundamentally different in
+kind or mode of acquisition and application from other empirical concepts.
+Early - twentieth - century psychology (#93) sought to legitimate the empirical
+investigation of mind by construing psychology as the science of behavior
+and eschewing the need to talk of inner, subjective states. But by the time
+of Sellars ’ essay, it was increasingly acknowledged that a narrowly behavioristic
+approach to mind, both in philosophy and in psychology, was
+inadequate. Sellars ’ Rylean Myth shows how intersubjective, empirical concepts
+of subjective states are possible, arguing that they are like theoretical
+Triplett , Timm , and Willem deVries . “ Is Sellars ’ s Rylean Hypothesis Plausible?
+A Dialogue , ” in The Self - Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid
+Sellars , Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the
+Humanities, vol. 9 , edited by Michael P. Wolf , 85 – 114 . New York :
+Rodopi , 2006 .
+Wellman , Henry M. The Child ’ s Theory of Mind . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
+Press , 1990 .
+Sellars’ “Rylean Myth” 195
+concepts. If so, the mental is as open to intersubjective empirical investigation
+as any other realm within the empirical world. Furthermore, if our
+concepts of the mental are empirical concepts acquired via theory postulation,
+like the concepts of unobservable micro - objects postulated in the
+natural sciences, then there is little reason to think that they apply to objects
+of an entirely different kind from other natural objects. This removes a
+motivation for Cartesian dualism.
+Sellars ’ approach to mentalistic concepts has been important for cognitive
+science, for it legitimates a naturalistic approach to the mind that
+nonetheless respects the internality of mental states. Indeed, it inspired the
+“ theory theory ” approach to folk psychology, a research program in cognitive
+science that develops the idea that in early childhood people acquire
+and learn to apply a theory - like conceptual structure that enables them to
+interpret the behavior of other people (see Perner and Wellman).
+Sellars ’ argument takes the form of a thought experiment. He asks us to
+imagine a community that lacks concepts of inner psychological states,
+although it possesses a complex language for describing and explaining
+objects and events in the world. This community also possesses a behaviorist
+’ s ability to describe and to explain human behavior, as well as metalinguistic
+abilities to describe and to prescribe linguistic behavior. Such a
+community, Sellars then argues, can reasonably increase its explanatory
+resources by extending its language/conceptual system by postulating unobservable
+states internal to each person. Further, there is a motive to postulate
+two different kinds of internal states: one kind – thoughts – has properties
+modeled on the semantic properties of overt linguistic events, while the
+other – sense impressions – has properties modeled on the properties of
+perceptible objects. If Sellars ’ story is coherent, then the traditional view
+that our concepts and knowledge of the mental is simply given is not
+compulsory.
+The principal objections to Sellars ’ Rylean Myth have been that the situation
+described in his thought experiment is either incoherent (Marras) or
+so empirically implausible as to be unworthy of serious consideration
+(Chisholm, Triplett). Could there really be people who have a rich physical
+language as well as a metalanguage yet lack all conception of internal psychological
+states, thoughts, and sense impressions?
+We [can] characterize the original Rylean language in which they described
+themselves and their fellows as not only a behavioristic language, but a behavioristic
+language which is restricted to the non - theoretical vocabulary of a
+behavioristic psychology. Suppose, now, that in the attempt to account for
+the fact that his fellow men behave intelligently not only when their conduct
+is threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes – that is to say, as we would
+put it when they “ think out loud ” – but also when no detectable verbal output
+is present, Jones develops a theory according to which overt utterances are
+196 Willem A. deVries
+but the culmination of a process which begins with certain inner episodes.
+And let us suppose that his model for these episodes which initiate the events
+which culminate in overt verbal behavior is that of overt verbal behavior itself.
+In other words, using the language of the model, the theory is to the effect
+that overt verbal behavior is the culmination of a process which begins with
+“ inner speech. ” (EPM § 56, in SPR, 186; in KMG, 266 – 67)
+P1. Concepts of mental states can be acquired only innately or by direct
+and privileged access to and abstraction from immediate experience of
+mental states, which are given by direct intuition (assumption for
+reductio ).
+P2. Consider a community of behaviorists with an intersubjectively available
+language that contains, besides object - level concepts, semantic ( ergo
+metalinguistic) concepts as well. Such a community would possess no
+concepts of the psychological.
+P3. Such a community would have available to it only the resources of
+narrow behaviorism to explain human behavior.
+P4. The resources of narrow behaviorism are not suffi cient to explain all
+human behavior.
+P5. If such a community would have available to it only the resources of
+narrow behaviorism to explain human behavior, then such a community
+would, therefore, face substantial puzzles about numerous forms of
+human behavior.
+C1. Such a community would, therefore, face substantial puzzles about
+numerous forms of human behavior ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
+P6. Such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by utilizing
+postulational scientifi c methodology.
+P7. If such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by utilizing
+postulational scientifi c methodology, then using utterances as a model,
+this technique could give rise to concepts of inner, speech - like episodes
+that cause some of the puzzling forms of behavior, and, indeed, cause as
+well the overt linguistic episodes they are modeled on.
+C2. Using utterances as a model, this technique could give rise to concepts
+of inner, speech - like episodes that cause some of the puzzling
+forms of behavior, and, indeed, cause as well the overt linguistic episodes
+they are modeled on ( modus ponens , P6, P7).
+P8. If other puzzling behaviors need to be explained, then the application
+of normal postulational scientifi c methodology, using perceptible objects
+as a model, could give rise to concepts of inner, qualitative states that
+are normally present when one perceives the perceptible object that is its
+model but can be present in one when the external object is absent.
+P9. If (P6) such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by
+utilizing postulational scientifi c methodology, and using utterances as a
+model, this technique could give rise to concepts of inner, (C2) speech -
+Sellars’ “Rylean Myth” 197
+like episodes that cause some of the puzzling forms of behavior, and,
+indeed, cause as well the overt linguistic episodes they are modeled on,
+and (P8) the application of normal postulational scientifi c methodology
+can explain other puzzling behaviors, then it is possible (and not in the
+sense of bare logical possibility, but in the sense that there is a coherent
+story with some empirical plausibility) that our concepts of the psychological
+are acquired in perfectly normal, intersubjectively available,
+empirical ways.
+C3. It is possible (and not in the sense of bare logical possibility, but in
+the sense that there is a coherent story with some empirical plausibility)
+that our concepts of the psychological are acquired in perfectly
+normal, intersubjectively available, empirical ways ( modus ponens ,
+P9, conjunction, P6, C2, P8).
+P10. It is not the case that concepts of mental states can be acquired only
+innately or by direct and privileged access to and abstraction from immediate
+experience of mental states which are given by direct intuition
+( reductio , P1 – P9).
+50
+Aristotle and the Argument to End
+All Arguments
+Toni Vogel Carey
+Aristotle . Metaphysics , translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
+1908 .
+Friedman , Milton . Essays in Positive Economics . Chicago : University of
+Chicago Press , 1953 .
+Mill , John Stuart . A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive , in Collected
+Works of John Stuart Mill , vols. VII and VIII , edited by J. Robson .
+Toronto : Toronto University Press , 1973 .
+Parsons , Charles . “ Reason and Intuition , ” Synthese 125 ( 2000 ): 299 – 315 .
+This argument, which comes down from Aristotle, is one of the most fundamental
+in the history of thought. It is also one of the most abbreviated,
+however, which makes it easy to overlook. In the Metaphysics , Aristotle
+merely says:
+It is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything;
+[for then] there would be an infi nite regress, so that there would still
+be no demonstration. (1006a, 8 – 10)
+Here is an abridged version of Aristotle ’ s implicit reductio ad infi nitum
+argument:
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Aristotle and the Argument to End All Arguments 199
+P1. For any p , if p is a proposition, then reasons can be given for/
+against p .
+P2. p is a proposition.
+C1. Reasons can be given for/against P ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. q and r are reasons for/against p .
+P4. If q and r are propositions, then reasons can be given for/against q
+and r .
+P5. q is a proposition.
+C2. Reasons can be given for/against q ( modus ponens , P1, P5).
+P6. s and t are reasons for/against q .
+P7. If s and t are propositions, then reasons can be given for/against s
+and t .
+P8. s is a proposition.
+C3. Reasons can be given for/against s ( modus ponens P1, P8).
+P9. u and v are reasons for/against s .
+P10. If u and v are propositions, then reasons can be given for/against u
+and v .
+P11. u is a proposition.
+C4. Reasons can be given for/against u ( modus ponens , P1, 11).
+And so on, ad infi nitum (omitting r , t , and v for the sake of brevity).
+If we demand reasons for/against every proposition, in other words, we
+will be stuck in an endless process of justifi cation, unable to assert anything
+at all. As the philosopher of logic and mathematics Charles Parsons put it,
+“ The buck has to stop somewhere. ”
+This argument does not, of course, prevent us from giving reasons for
+many, indeed most, propositions. And even where we cannot give reasons
+for a proposition, it does not follow that we are therefore unjustifi ed in
+believing it. Some propositions may be self - evident – known intuitively, as
+“ evident without proof or reasoning, ” to quote Webster ’ s Ninth . That is
+how Aristotle viewed the logical law of noncontradiction and how others
+have treated moral rules like promise keeping. The American Declaration
+of Independence famously begins: “ We hold these truths to be
+self - evident. ”
+Then, too, while the buck has to stop somewhere, it need not always
+stop in the same place. We can assume the truth of a proposition merely
+conditionally, for the sake of argument. We can even assume that p is true
+for one argument and false for another. As the economic theorist Milton
+Friedman notes in his Essays in Positive Economics , “ there is no inconsistency
+in regarding the same fi rm as if it were a perfect competitor for one
+problem, and a monopolist for another, just as there is none in regarding
+the same chalk mark as a Euclidean line for one problem, a Euclidean
+surface for a second, and a Euclidean solid for a third ” (36).
+200 Toni Vogel Carey
+It is important, though, to know what proposition(s) one is taking as
+given. People are often unaware of their underlying premises or think them
+too obvious to mention. But marriages, friendships, and political alliances
+can come to a bad end simply because of unarticulated disagreements about
+where the buck stops.
+We hold some truths to be more self - evident than others, not only for
+the sake of argument, but without qualifi cation. Scientists operate on the
+assumption that whatever laws hold for the universe today will continue to
+hold tomorrow. And that the buck has to stop somewhere is even more
+foundational than this principle of induction. Philosophers have traditionally
+supposed there are some necessary truths; that is, propositions that
+could not, in any possible world, be false. If so, the Aristotelian argument
+we are considering is one of these.
+On the other hand, in “ Two Dogmas of Empiricism, ” the philosopher
+W. V. Quine put forward the idea that so - called necessary truths are merely
+those propositions we would be most reluctant to give up (#44). For many,
+the existence and benevolence of God is a belief to keep when all else fails.
+For Quine, though, no statement, not even a law of logic, is “ immune to
+revision. ”
+The argument we are considering is important because it shows that
+there are limitations to what reasoning can accomplish, which goes against
+our cherished belief that the exercise of reason can, in principle, settle all
+disputes. If the buck has to stop somewhere, then even in logic the ultimate
+appeal is not to reason, deductive or inductive, but to something closer to
+intuition. Aristotle had no trouble accepting this; nor, for that matter, did
+Einstein. But John Stuart Mill and others have made ‘ intuition ’ a term of
+ill repute – notwithstanding Mill ’ s assertion in A System of Logic that
+“ truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others
+are inferred ” ( § 4).
+The trouble with intuition is that people are often loath to brook any
+challenge, however well taken, to their entrenched intuitive beliefs, making
+further discussion pointless, if not impossible; and this can lead to toxic
+forms of fanaticism. That one bases a belief on intuition does nothing to
+guarantee its truth. But fallible, and even dangerous, as intuitive beliefs can
+be, it does not follow that intuition should simply be discredited. As George
+Bealer notes in his entry on “ Intuition ” in the Supplement to the Encyclopedia
+of Philosophy , perception too is fallible (even dangerous at times), but no
+one thinks we should therefore discount it. On the contrary, it is a truism
+that “ seeing is believing. ”
+Valid logical inference is safe, while the appeal to intuition carries some
+risk. But what Aristotle ’ s argument shows is that valid logical inference
+itself rests on propositions (axioms) whose truth we accept intuitively; that
+is perforce where the buck stops.
+Part IV
+Ethics
+51
+Justice Brings Happiness in
+Plato ’ s Republic
+Joshua I. Weinstein
+Plato . Republic , translated by G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C. Reeve.
+Indianapolis : Hackett , 1992 .
+Cooper , John . “ Plato ’ s Theory of Human Motivation . ” History of Philosophy
+Quarterly 1 ( 1984 ): 3 – 21 .
+Korsgaard , Christine. “ Self - Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant . ”
+Journal of Ethics no. 3 ( 1999 ): 1 – 29 .
+Sachs , David. “ A Fallacy in Plato ’ s Republic . Philosophical Review 72 ( 1963 ):
+141 – 58 .
+Santas , Gerasimos . Understanding Plato ’ s Republic . Oxford : Wiley - Blackwell ,
+2010 .
+In its 300 - plus pages, Plato ’ s Republic addresses nearly every topic under
+the sun: tyranny and democracy, feminism and abortion, Homer and carpentry,
+musical scales and solid geometry, immortality and the afterlife, and
+why we hate ourselves for screwing up. But all these issues come up in the
+context of answering one big question: How should one live? What is the
+best kind of life to lead? In particular, why should one live a life of justice
+if the wicked seem to be better off?
+The main claim in the dialogue is that justice is an excellence or virtue
+( aret ê ) that brings eudaimonia , some integration of happiness, success, and
+contentment; one lives well if and only if one is a just person. Justice, on
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+204 Joshua I. Weinstein
+Plato ’ s account, is founded on how a person ’ s soul or psyche holds together,
+since only a person whose priorities are all straight can be counted on to
+behave properly. Also, only such a person can really live life to its fullest.
+The signifi cance of this argument extends beyond the fact that the
+Republic has been one of the most infl uential texts in the history of philosophy.
+Arguments of this general kind become more important as one becomes
+less confi dent that God rewards the virtuous and punishes the wicked. This
+argument had many successors in the ancient world and has been taken up
+in various ways in contemporary thought. (For a fuller introduction to the
+Republic and its main argument, see Santas. For a contemporary use of the
+Republic ’ s strategy, see Korsgaard.)
+The basic sketch of the argument is presented by Socrates at the end of
+Book 1, where he introduces the concept of ergon , the activity, work or
+function that typifi es a thing:
+And could eyes perform their function ( ergon ) well if they lacked their
+peculiar virtue ( aret ê ) and had the vice instead?
+How could they, for don ’ t you mean if they had blindness instead of
+sight? [ … ]
+So ears, too, deprived of their own virtue perform their function badly?
+That ’ s right. [ … ]
+Come, then, and let ’ s consider this: Is there some function of a soul that
+you couldn ’ t perform with anything else, for example, taking care of things,
+ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to
+which you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar
+function?
+No, none of them.
+What of living? Isn ’ t that a function of the soul?
+It certainly is.
+And don ’ t we also say that there is a virtue of the soul?
+We do.
+Then, will a soul ever perform its function well, Thrasymachus, if it is
+deprived of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?
+It ’ s impossible.
+Doesn ’ t it follow, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things
+badly and that good soul does all these things well?
+It does.
+Now we agreed that justice is a soul ’ s virtue, and injustice its vice?
+We did.
+Then, it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an
+unjust one badly.
+Apparently so, according to your argument.
+And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy ( eudaim ô n ), and
+anyone who doesn ’ t is the opposite.
+Of course.
+Justice Brings Happiness in Plato’s Republic 205
+Therefore, a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched.
+So be it.
+It profi ts no one to be wretched but to be happy.
+Of course.
+And so, Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profi table than justice.
+(Plato, 353b – 354a)
+P1. Every thing performs its activity or function ( ergon ) well if and only if
+it has its virtue or excellence ( aret ê ).
+P2. The activity of the soul is to live; that is, one lives by the soul.
+C1. One lives well if and only if one has the virtue of the soul (instantiation,
+P1).
+P3. Justice is the virtue of the soul.
+C2. One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P3 into C1).
+P4. One who lives well is happy; one who lives poorly is miserable.
+C3. The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,
+P4 into C2).
+This sketch leads into the main body of the dialogue, which elaborates,
+clarifi es, and defends these premises and conclusions (among many other
+things!) Even the seemingly innocuous P4 comes in for examination (578a –
+592b). Though one might also wonder about P2 (does one really live only
+by the soul and not at all by the body?), the main diffi culty in this argument
+is clearly P3: how is justice the specifi c virtue of the soul? Much of the
+Republic is devoted to explaining and defending this premise.
+The defense of P3 is based on an analysis of the human psyche or soul.
+In particular, a human being is shown to be full of confl icting impulses and
+abilities so that only by ordering and integrating them can a person be “ at
+one. ” Thus, for example, one can both feel a bodily thirst and simultaneously
+know (say, from a medical expert) that it would be bad to drink
+(439a – d). Confl icts such as this need to be resolved by the principle that
+each part of oneself does what it should and does not meddle in the business
+of the other parts. Deciding is the job of reason, not of thirst. This
+principle makes possible self - unifi cation and psychic health, and when it is
+identifi ed as justice, P3 begins to look somewhat better:
+Even if one has every kind of food and drink, lots of money, and every
+sort of power to rule, life is thought to be not worth living when the body ’ s
+nature is ruined. So even if someone can do whatever he wishes [ … ] how can
+it be worth living when his soul – the very thing by which he lives – is ruined
+and in turmoil? (Plato, 445a)
+The fuller version of the argument, as it appears in Book 4 (434d – 445b),
+can be analyzed like this:
+206 Joshua I. Weinstein
+P1 ′ . The activity of the soul is to live.
+P2 ′ . Living consists of potentially contradictory sub - activities.
+C1 ′ . The soul performs potentially contradictory activities (substitution,
+P2 ′ into P1 ′ ).
+P3 ′ . Everything that performs potentially contradictory activities consists
+of parts.
+C2 ′ . The soul is composed of parts (instantiation, P3 ′ ).
+P4 ′ . Everything that is composed of parts performs its activity well if and
+only if each of its parts performs, and only performs, its own
+activities.
+C3 ′ . The soul performs its activity well if and only if each of its parts
+performs, and only performs, its own activity (instantiation, P4 ′ ).
+P5 ′ . Justice is doing what is one ’ s own, and not doing what is not one ’ s
+own.
+C4 ′ . The soul performs its activity well if and only if it is just (substitution,
+P5 ′ into C3 ′ ).
+C5 ′ . One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P1 ′ into C4 ′ ).
+P6 ′ . One who lives well is happy, one who lives poorly is miserable.
+C6 ′ . The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,
+P6 ′ into C5 ′ ).
+This version of the argument is far more muscular and compelling than
+the original. The range of impulses it claims to integrate includes everything
+from the desire for sweet pastries and attractive partners, through the competitive
+urge to succeed and be respected (especially according to one ’ s
+parents ’ expectations), and on to the desire to overcome perplexity, escape
+one ’ s own ignorance, and contemplate eternity.
+But this version also has problems which remain hotly contested to this
+day. P3 ′ and the inference to C2 ′ are defended in a complex and controversial
+argument based on the principle that no one thing can do or undergo
+both one thing and its opposite at the same time in the same sense and
+respect (436b – 441c). This sub - argument is notable for probably being the
+fi rst recorded use of the principle of noncontradiction. Plato also argues
+here that the number of activities – and hence parts of the soul – is exactly
+three : sustenance by the appetites; control and stability by the spirited part;
+and guidance through deliberation and reason. (Cooper is a good place to
+begin examining this tripartition of the soul.) C4 ′ has also drawn much fi re,
+since it seems to depend on an equivocation on the meaning of a soul ’ s
+being “ just. ” Can one be just because all of one ’ s psychic parts work properly
+and together, even as one goes out to rob, cheat, and steal? Or is
+Socrates right in asserting that this is impossible? (See Sacks.)
+Do living well and treating others properly both depend on “ justice in
+the soul ” ; that is, minimizing internal discord and being “ in tune ” with
+Justice Brings Happiness in Plato’s Republic 207
+oneself? Freudian psychoanalysis and Eastern schools of yoga or meditation
+derive much of their appeal from similar arguments: “ You can ’ t live well
+without being an authentic, honest, person. ” “ A thief never sleeps well at
+night. ” “ You must fi nd inner peace and be at one. ” Plato ’ s version is not
+only older and more deeply rooted in Western culture, but the Republic
+also includes a detailed explication of how philosophy, politics, and pleasure
+all fi t into the one whole thing which is “ living one ’ s life well through
+achieving psychic harmony ” – that is, justice.
+52
+Aristotle ’ s Function Argument
+Sean McAleer 1
+Aristotle . Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Terence Irwin.
+Indianapolis : Hackett , 1999 .
+The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (384 – 322 bce ) remains infl uential
+today, especially among advocates of virtue ethics (roughly, the view that
+moral philosophy should focus primarily the virtues rather than on duties
+or rights or good consequences). The Function Argument – so - called because
+it relies on the notion of a thing ’ s function or characteristic activity – is the
+centerpiece of the fi rst of the Nicomachean Ethics ’ ten books; Aristotle
+spends the remaining nine books elaborating on its conclusion by investigating
+its key terms (soul, virtue, etc.). The Function Argument concerns the
+nature of happiness ( eudaimonia ), which for Aristotle means not a momentary
+psychological state or mood but a life of fl ourishing or well - being. We
+all want to be happy, Aristotle thinks; happiness is the fi nal good or end
+that we seek, the ultimate reason we choose other things and which we
+don ’ t choose for the sake of anything else. But these formal features of
+happiness don ’ t give us a clear target to aim at in leading our lives. The
+task of the Function Argument, an ambitious and infl uential attempt to
+1 Work on this chapter was supported by the University of Wisconsin – Eau Claire Faculty
+Sabbatical Leave Program, for which the author is most grateful.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Aristotle’s Function Argument 209
+arrive at moral truths by considering human nature, is to provide such a
+target; it boldly concludes that human beings can ’ t be happy without being
+virtuous.
+Some more conceptual background might be helpful. For Aristotle, the
+essence of a thing isn ’ t what it ’ s made of, or its DNA or chemical structure,
+but what activities it characteristically performs and ends it characteristically
+pursues: in other words, its function ( ergon ). This organ is a heart
+because its function is to pump blood, while that organ is a kidney because
+its function is to clean blood. Once you know a thing ’ s function, you have
+a standard by which to evaluate it: something is good when it performs its
+function well – when it achieves the good it characteristically seeks. For
+example, a knife ’ s function is to cut, so a good knife cuts well. A virtue or
+excellence ( aret ê ) is the condition or state that enables a thing to perform
+its function well. Thus the virtue of a knife is sharpness, since being sharp
+is what enables a knife to cut well. Aristotle takes these insights about the
+functions of artifacts and organs and applies them to human beings. He
+argues that human beings have a distinctive function, “ activity of the soul
+in accord with reasons ” – what we ’ ll simply call “ rationality, ” remembering
+that it has both theoretical and practical (action - oriented) aspects. Since the
+good for human beings is happiness, and the human function is rationality,
+Aristotle concludes that happiness is rationality in accord with virtue –
+though he concedes that external factors beyond our control can affect
+whether we fl ourish.
+Aristotle ’ s claim that rationality is the human function is controversial.
+Some philosophers think that human beings are too complex to have a
+single, distinctive function; others doubt that the function is rationality.
+Readers will also want to be sensitive to the various senses ‘ good ’ can
+have: a teleological sense, in which a good is an end or goal pursued or
+desired; a benefi cial sense, in which a thing is good for someone; an evaluative
+sense, in which a thing is good when it performs its function well; a
+moral sense, which goes beyond mere functional effi ciency.
+But presumably the remark that the best good is happiness is apparently
+something generally agreed, and we still need a clearer statement of what the
+best good is. Perhaps, then, we shall fi nd this if we fi rst grasp the function of
+a human being. For just as the good, i.e., doing well, for a fl autist, a sculptor,
+and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and characteristic
+action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true
+for a human being, if a human being has some function [ … ].
+Now we say that the function of a kind of thing – of a harpist, for instance
+– is the same in kind as the function of an excellent individual of the kind
+– of an excellent harpist, for instance. And the same is true without qualifi cation
+in every case, if we add to the function the superior achievement in accord
+with the virtue; for the function of a harpist is to play the harp, and the
+210 Sean McAleer
+function of a good harpist is to play it well. Moreover, we take the
+human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be activity
+and actions of the soul that involve reason; hence the function of the excellent
+man is to do this well and fi nely.
+Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord
+with the virtue proper to that kind of thing. And so the human good proves
+to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best
+and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one. (I.7:
+1097b23 – 1098a18)
+P1. The good for members of a kind is to perform well the function distinctive
+of their kind.
+P2. To perform well the function distinctive of one ’ s kind is to perform it
+in accord with the relevant virtue(s).
+C1. The good for members of any kind is to perform their distinctive
+function in accord with the relevant virtue(s) (transitivity of identity,
+P1, P2).
+P3. The function distinctive of humans is rationality.
+C2. The good for humans is rationality in accord with virtue (substitution,
+C1, P3).
+P4. Happiness is the good for humans.
+C3. Happiness is rationality in accord with virtue (transitivity of identity,
+C2, P4).
+53
+Aristotle ’ s Argument that Goods
+Are Irreducible
+Jurgis (George) Brakas
+Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by W. D. Ross, revised by J. O.
+Urmson, and edited by Jonathan Barnes . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
+University Press , 1984 .
+Brakas , Jurgis . Philosophiegeschicte und logische Analyse/Logical Analysis
+and History of Philosophy , VI ( 2003 ): 23 – 74 .
+For most philosophers seeking to discover the nature of the good, the
+assumption underlying their quest is that the good is one thing – certainly
+when they are seeking the good for human beings, if not the good in general.
+This is a very natural assumption to make. If you say “ health is a good (or
+a value), ” “ wealth is a good, ” and “ my life is a good, ” it is reasonable to
+think that “ a good ” (or “ a value ” ) means the same thing when you make
+such claims. Aristotle, however, disagrees. While discussing the good for
+humanity in the Nicomachean Ethics , he suddenly shifts to a discussion of
+the good in general and argues that it cannot be one thing. In other words,
+for Aristotle, the senses of the good – or “ value ” – are irreducible (#60).
+His target here is not just his teacher, Plato, who did believe that the good
+is one thing (the Form of the good), but, more broadly, anyone who believes
+that the good is one thing (whatever that may be). Many would say that
+this is a very undesirable outcome, since it would mean that goods by nature
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+212 Jurgis (George) Brakas
+are “ fragmented, ” not capable of being placed in a hierarchy consistently
+derived from one fundamental good.
+Aristotle ’ s basic strategy is to argue that goods fall into every one of his
+categories of being – that is, into substance (or “ the what ” ), quality, quantity,
+and the rest because “ the good ” signifi es things in all of them. If they
+really do fall into all the categories, then they cannot be reduced to one
+thing, since they do not have anything in common. For example, although
+human being and ox can be reduced to animal (a substance) and blue and
+yellow to color (a quality), human being and blue cannot be reduced to one
+thing because they have no genus in common. There is just one problem
+here: why does Aristotle believe that goods exist in all the categories if “ the
+good ” signifi es things in all of them? You can make any word signify whatever
+you please, but that does not mean that what it signifi es exists – in the
+categories or anywhere else. However, a good case can be made that “ the
+good ” signifying things in all the categories that Aristotle has in mind here
+is the one signifying real, not apparent, goods – doing so by using his
+method of endoxa (interpreted in a certain way), a method which allows
+him to separate opinion from knowledge and the apparent from the real.
+The interpretation offered here of the passage where Aristotle makes this
+argument is new. The passage has been remarkably resistant to satisfactory
+interpretation, defying the efforts of scholars for about a century (see
+Brakas).
+[S]ince “ the good ” is uttered signifying something in as many ways as
+“ being ” [is] {for it is uttered signifying things in [the category of] the “ what ”
+(for example, god – that is, mind) and in [the category of] quality (the virtues)
+and in [the category of] quantity (the moderate[ - amount]) and in [the category
+of] the relative (the useful) and in [the category of] time ([the] opportune - time)
+and in [the category of] place ([an] abode) and other things such as these}, it
+is clear that it cannot be some common universal – that is, one thing; for
+[then] it would not be uttered signifying things in all the categories but in one
+only. (Aristotle A6: 1096a23 – 9; author ’ s translation)
+In fairness to Aristotle, I must add that he does not remain content
+with this negative conclusion. After having fi elded fi ve or six arguments to
+prove that the good cannot be one thing, he goes on in the same chapter
+to ask:
+But what, then, does [ “ the good ” ] signify? 1 It certainly is not like the things
+bearing the same name by chance. But then do absolutely all goods belong
+to one class at least by being [derived] from one thing or [by being] relative
+to one thing? Or [do they belong to one class] rather by analogy (for as sight
+1 Literally: “ But how, then, is it uttered signifying something? ”
+Aristotle’s Argument that Goods Are Irreducible 213
+is in the body, so reason is in the soul, and so on in other cases)? (Aristotle,
+1096b26 – 9; author ’ s translation)
+He dismisses such questions “ for now, ” since exact statements about
+them “ would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy ”
+(Aristotle, 1096b30 – 1). His promise, unfortunately is not fulfi lled – at least
+not in the extant works. Even so, I believe a plausible reconstruction of his
+answers to these questions can be given. However, no such reconstruction
+is in print yet.
+P1. “ The good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being.
+P2. If “ the good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being, then goods
+exist in all the categories of being.
+C1. Goods exist in all the categories of being ( modus ponens , P2, P1).
+P3. If goods exist in all the categories of being, then goods cannot be
+reduced to some universal common to all goods.
+C2. Goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods
+( modus ponens , P3, C1).
+P4. If goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods,
+then the good is not one thing.
+C3. The good is not one thing ( modus ponens , P4, C2).
+54
+Aristotle ’ s Argument for
+Perfectionism
+Eric J. Silverman
+Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Martin Ostwald. Upper Saddle
+River, NJ : Prentice Hall , 1999 .
+Anscombe , G. E. M. “ Modern Moral Philosophy . ” Philosophy 33 , 24 ( 1958 ):
+1 – 19 .
+Aquinas , Thomas . Treatise on Happiness , translated by John A. Oesterle.
+South Bend, IN : University of Notre Dame Press , 1983 .
+Broadie , Sarah . Ethics with Aristotle . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
+Cahn , Steven M. , and Christine Vitrano . Happiness: Classic and Contemporary
+Readings in Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2008 .
+One long - disputed issue in ethics concerns the nature of the supreme good
+for humanity. In other words, what is the best possible life that a person
+can lead? This supreme good is commonly referred to as “ happiness ” or
+“ the happy life. ” Several of the ancient Greek philosophers held a view
+called “ perfectionism, ” which claims that the ongoing exercise of moral
+and intellectual virtue constitutes the best possible life for humanity.
+Aristotle ’ s Nicomachean Ethics offers the most infl uential of the ancient
+arguments for viewing the life of virtue rather than the life of pleasure,
+wealth, honor, or amusement as humanity ’ s supreme good. Aristotle ’ s perfectionistic
+views infl uenced the ethics of medieval theists such as Thomas
+Aquinas and Moses Maimonides. While his views were less infl uential
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Aristotle’s Argument for Perfectionism 215
+during the modern era, some of them were reintroduced when G. E. M.
+Anscombe ’ s “ Modern Moral Philosophy ” inaugurated the contemporary
+virtue ethics movement.
+Aristotle ’ s argument for perfectionism is grounded in a controversial
+account of human nature. Since he holds a teleological view of the universe,
+he claims that all things – including human beings – have an ultimate function
+or purpose for which they exist. Aristotelian terminology refers to this
+ultimate purpose as a “ fi nal cause. ” Therefore, he claims that the supreme
+good for humanity is to achieve this ultimate purpose. He establishes two
+criteria for recognizing the supreme good for humanity: it must be desired
+as an end in itself rather than as a means to some further good, and it must
+be suffi cient in itself for making life good. Finally, he claims that the virtuous
+life fulfi lls humanity ’ s ultimate purpose by actualizing the intellectual
+and moral potentials distinctive of our species. Accordingly, he argues that
+the virtuous life better fi ts the criteria for happiness than other lifestyles.
+Since there are evidently several ends, and since we choose some of these
+– e.g., wealth, fl utes, and instruments generally – as a means to something
+else, it is obvious that not all ends are fi nal. The highest good, on the other
+hand, must be something fi nal. Thus, if there is only one fi nal end, this will
+be the good we are seeking; if there are several, it will be the most fi nal and
+perfect of them. We call that which is pursued as an end in itself more fi nal
+than an end which is pursued for the sake of something else; and what is
+never chosen as a means to something else we call more fi nal than that which
+is chosen both as an end in itself and as a means to something else. What is
+always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is
+called fi nal in an unqualifi ed sense. This description seems to apply to happiness
+above all else: for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and
+never for the sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all
+virtue we choose partly for themselves – for we would choose each of them
+even if no further advantage would accrue from them – but we also choose
+them partly for the sake of happiness, because we assume that it is through
+them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness
+for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means to anything
+at all.
+We arrive at the same conclusion if we approach the question from the
+standpoint of self - suffi ciency. For the fi nal and perfect good seems to be self -
+suffi cient. (Aristotle, 1097a26 – 1097b8)
+P1. There is a supreme good for humanity, commonly referred to as
+happiness.
+P2. If a good is desired as an end in itself and is suffi cient for making life
+good, then that good constitutes happiness.
+P3. The virtuous life fulfi lls a human being ’ s function by actualizing that
+person ’ s full potential.
+216 Eric J. Silverman
+P4. If some good fulfi lls a human being ’ s function by actualizing that person
+’ s full potential, then that good is desired as an end in itself.
+C1. The virtuous life is desired by human beings as an end in itself
+( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+P5. If some good fulfi lls a human being ’ s function, then it is suffi cient for
+making that being ’ s life good.
+C2. The virtuous life is suffi cient for making a human being ’ s life good
+( modus ponens , P3, P5).
+C3. The virtuous life is desired as an end in itself and is suffi cient for
+making life good (conjunction, C1, C2).
+C4. The virtuous life constitutes happiness, the supreme good for humanity
+( modus ponens , P2, C3).
+55
+Categorical Imperative as the
+Source for Morality
+Joyce Lazier
+Kant , Immanuel . The Metaphysics of Morals , translated by Mary Gregor.
+New York : Cambridge University Press , 1991 .
+Kant ’ s deontological ethical theory relies on two assumptions used to
+deduce the categorical imperative. The fi rst is that morality is for all, or
+what is wrong for one to do is wrong for everyone to do. The second is
+that morality is grounded on reason and not experience. Combining these
+two assumptions, Kant arrives at the categorical imperative. The following
+reconstruction of Kant ’ s arguments for the categorical imperative brings to
+the forefront two major problems. First, the use of disjunction opens up
+Kant ’ s argument to the fallacy of the excluded middle, and second, the
+reconstruction also makes more apparent Kant ’ s reliance on teleology. Not
+many thinkers today believe that everything has a specifi c, defi ned end that
+belongs only to it. The arguments are taken from The Metaphysics of
+Morals, parts 216, 222, and 225.
+But it is different with the teachings of morality. They command for everyone,
+without taking account of his inclinations, merely because and insofar
+as he is free and has practical reason. He does not derive instruction in its
+laws from observing himself and his animal nature or from perceiving the
+ways of the world what happens and how men behave (although the German
+word Sitten , like the Latin mores , means only manners and customs). Instead,
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+218 Joyce Lazier
+reason commands how men are to act even though no example of this could
+be found and it takes no account of the advantages we can thereby gain,
+which only experience could teach us. For although reason allows us to seek
+our advantage in every way possible to us and can even promise us, on the
+testimony of experience, that it will probably be more to our advantage on
+the whole to obey its commands than to transgress them especially if obedience
+is accompanied with prudence, still the authority of its precepts as commands
+is not based on these considerations. Instead it uses them (as counsels)
+only as a counterweight against inducements to the contrary, to offset in
+advance the error of biased scales in practical appraisal, and only then to
+ensure that the weight of a pure practical reason ’ s a priori grounds will turn
+the scales in favor of the authority of its precepts. (216)
+An imperative is a practical rule by which an action in itself contingent is
+made necessary. An imperative differs from a practical law in that a law
+indeed represents an action as necessary but takes no account of whether this
+action already inheres by an inner necessity in the acting subject (as in a holy
+being) or whether it is contingent (as in man); for where the former is the
+case there is no imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule the representation
+of which makes necessary an action that is subjectively contingent and thus
+represents the subject as one that must be constrained (necessitated) to
+conform with the rule. A categorical (unconditional) imperative is one that
+represents an action as objectively necessary and makes it necessary not indirectly
+through the representation of some end that can be attained by the
+action but through the mere representation of this action itself (its form), and
+hence directly. No other practical doctrine can furnish instances of such
+imperatives than that which prescribes obligation (the doctrine of morals).
+All other imperative are technical and are, one and all, conditional. The
+ground of the possibility of categorical imperative is this: that they refer to
+no other property of choice (by which some purpose can be ascribed to it)
+than simply to its freedom. (222)
+The categorical imperative, which as such only affi rms what obligation is,
+is: Act upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal law. You must therefore
+fi rst consider your actions in terms of their subjective principles; but you can
+know whether this principle also holds objectively only in this way: That
+when your reason subjects it to the test of conceiving yourself as also giving
+universal law through it, it qualifi es for such a giving of universal law. (225)
+P1. A human is free and has practical reason.
+P2. Either practical reason or experience uses perceptions of the ways of
+the world and actions of humans as sources of its laws.
+P3. Practical reason does not use the ways of the world and actions of
+humans as sources of its laws.
+C1. Experience uses perceptions of the ways of the world and actions of
+humans as sources of its laws (disjunctive syllogism, P2, P3).
+Categorical Imperative as the Source for Morality 219
+P4. Either practical reason or experience teaches us how to act given the
+advantages we can gain.
+P5. Practical reason does not teach us how to act given the advantages we
+can gain.
+C2. Experience teaches us how to act given the advantages we can gain
+(disjunctive syllogism, P4, P5).
+P6. Either practical reason or experience bases the authority of its precepts
+on how much advantages we can gain.
+P7. Practical reason does not use perceived advantages as the basis of the
+authority of its commands.
+C3. Experience does use perceived advantages as the basis of the authority
+of its commands (disjunctive syllogism, P6, P10).
+P8. Either experience or a priori grounds are the source of practical reason ’ s
+authority.
+P9. Experience is not the source of practical reason ’ s authority.
+C4. A priori grounds are the source of practical reason ’ s authority (disjunctive
+syllogism, P8, P9).
+P10. If practical reason ’ s source of authority is a priori , then it commands
+for everyone without taking into account one ’ s inclinations.
+P11. Practical reason ’ s source of authority is a priori (C4).
+C5. Practical reason commands for everyone without taking into account
+one ’ s inclinations ( modus ponens , P10, P11).
+P12. Either morality comes from experience or it comes from practical
+reason.
+P13.The teachings of morality do not stem from experience.
+C6. The teachings of morality stem from practical reason (disjunctive
+syllogism, P12, P13).
+P14. If practical reason is the source of morality ’ s commands, then morality
+commands for everyone without taking into account one ’ s inclinations.
+P15. Practical reason is the source of morality ’ s commands.
+C7. The teachings of morality command for everyone without taking
+into account one ’ s inclinations ( modus ponens , P14, P15).
+P16. If a law represents an action as necessary, then it is not a practical law.
+P17. Imperatives are laws that represent an action as necessary
+C8. Imperatives are not practical laws ( modus ponens , P16, P17).
+P18. If something is an imperative, then it necessitates an action.
+P19. If something necessitates an action, then it must constrain the subject
+to conform to that rule.
+C9. If something is an imperative, then it is a rule that necessitates an
+action through constraint of the subject to conform to that rule (hypothetical
+syllogism, P18, P19).
+P20. If an imperative is categorical, then it represents an action as objectively
+necessary.
+220 Joyce Lazier
+P21. If an action is represented as objectively necessary, then it is not
+because of some end that can be attained.
+C10. If an imperative is categorical, then it is not because of some end
+that can be attained (hypothetical syllogism, P20, P21).
+P22. If an imperative is categorical, then it makes an action necessary
+directly through representation of the action itself (its form).
+P23. If an action is made necessary directly through representation of the
+action itself (its form), then it is grounded in freedom of choice (and not
+a subjective end).
+C11. If an imperative is categorical, then it is grounded in freedom of
+choice (and not a subjective end) (hypothetical syllogism, P22, P23).
+P24. If an imperative is grounded in freedom of choice (and not some subjective
+end), then reason subjects the maxim of action as conceiving itself
+as a universal law.
+P25. If the maxim of action can be conceived as a universal law, then it
+holds objectively.
+C12. If an imperative is grounded in freedom of choice, then it holds
+objectively (hypothetical syllogism, P24, P25).
+P26. A categorical imperative is grounded in freedom of choice.
+C13. A categorical imperative holds objectively ( modus ponens , C12,
+P26).
+P27. If the categorical imperative holds objectively, then it is the source of
+morality.
+C14. A categorical imperative is the source of morality ( modus ponens ,
+P27, C13).
+56
+Kant on Why Autonomy
+Deserves Respect
+Mark Piper
+Guyer , Paul . “ Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy , ” in Autonomy ,
+edited by Ellen Frankel Paul , Fred D. Miller , Jr. , and Jeffrey Paul , 70 – 98 .
+Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2003 .
+Kant , Immanuel . Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , translated and
+edited by Mary Gregor . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,
+1998 .
+According to a widespread view, there is something important about autonomy
+in virtue of which it deserves special respect. More often than not, the
+claim that autonomy deserves respect comes into play in relation to particular
+autonomous choices or acts of will. An autonomous choice is not a
+thoughtless or offhand choice; rather, it is a choice that expresses a person ’ s
+nature, freedom, preferences, or values – a person ’ s “ deep self ” – in a powerful
+and signifi cant way. As such, it is a choice that seems, according to
+many philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, to generate special demands
+of respect on others. This notion of the special respect owed to autonomy
+is pervasive throughout popular culture and philosophical discourse. It has
+application in debates concerning the ground of human dignity, the ground
+of human rights (including the defense of specifi c rights such as the right
+to free speech), the limits of intersubjective interference, medical ethics
+debates (including debates surrounding euthanasia and the physician –
+patient relationship), the justifi cation of liberal education, the justifi cation
+of liberal government, and the justifi cation of the wrongness of paternalism.
+The classic source for the view that autonomy deserves special respect is
+Immanuel Kant, and the following is a reconstruction of the core aspects
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+222 Mark Piper
+of Kant ’ s argument for this claim. It should be noted that the reconstruction
+of this argument is, given Kant ’ s dense and sometimes labyrinthine writing
+style, a diffi cult task, sometimes requiring reading between the lines or supplying
+premises that Kant does not provide explicitly. The key to the argument
+is Kant ’ s insistence that the only acts of will that deserve respect are
+those acts of will that are truly free (according to Kant ’ s understanding of
+“ freedom ” ). It should quickly be added that Kant understood the concept
+of “ respect ” in a very robust way: according to Kant, to say that something
+deserves respect is to say that it is an object of true and proper esteem.
+Moreover, it is important to note that for Kant, what it means for a person
+to be free is for that person not to be dominated by his or her inclinations
+or desires but rather to will and to act in accordance with universal laws
+of reason. Lastly, it should be noted that a number of philosophers have
+agreed with Kant that autonomy deserves respect but have disagreed with
+Kant about what autonomy fundamentally is. More specifi cally, some philosophers
+have claimed that it is possible for autonomous acts of will to
+contain, or to be based on, inclinations.
+For an object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have inclination
+but never respect, just because it is merely an effect and not an activity
+of the will. In the same way I cannot have respect for inclination as such,
+whether it is mine or that of another; I can at most in the fi rst case approve
+it and in the second sometimes even love it, that is, regard it as favorable to
+my advantage. Only what it connected with my will solely as ground and
+never as effect, what does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or at least
+excludes it altogether from calculations in making a choice – hence the mere
+law for itself – can be an object of respect and so a command. (Kant AK
+4:400)
+P1. If an act of will is free, then it deserves respect.
+P2. If an act of will is not free, then it does not deserve respect.
+P3. If an act of will is dependent on an object of desire, then it is not a free
+act of will.
+P4. If an act of will is in no way infl uenced by any object of desire but is
+rather exercised in accordance with its own law, then it is a free act of
+will.
+P5. An inclination is dependent on objects of desire.
+C1. Inclinations are not free acts of will ( modus ponens , P3, P5)
+C2. Inclinations do not deserve respect ( modus ponens , P2, C1).
+P6. An autonomous act of will is in no way infl uenced by any object of
+desire but is rather exercised in accordance with its own law.
+C3. Autonomous acts of will are free acts of will ( modus ponens , P4,
+P6).
+C4. Autonomous acts of will deserve respect ( modus ponens , P1, C3).
+57
+Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism
+A. T. Fyfe
+Mill , John Stuart . “ Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility Is
+Susceptible , ” in Utilitarianism . London : Parker, Son, and Bourn , 1863 .
+___. “ Excerpt from a Letter to Henry Jones , ” in The Classical Utilitarians:
+Bentham and Mill , edited by John Troyer . Indianapolis : Hackett , 2003 .
+Millgram , Elijah . “ Mill ’ s Proof of the Principle of Utility . ” Ethics 110 ( 2000 ):
+282 – 310 .
+Sayre - McCord , Geoffrey . “ Mill ’ s ‘ Proof ’ of the Principle of Utility: A More
+than Half - Hearted Defense . ” Social Philosophy & Policy 18 , 2 ( 2001 ):
+330 – 60 .
+Utilitarianism, as summarized by one of its chief proponents, John Stuart
+Mill (1806 – 73), is the moral theory that “ actions are right in proportion
+as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
+reverse of happiness. ” Therefore, viewing matters as Mill would, Robin
+Hood is not immoral for stealing from the rich to give to the poor, because
+in doing so he is able to produce more happiness in the world than would
+have otherwise existed. Likewise, if I possess excess wealth, it would be
+immoral of me to withhold that wealth from others for whom it would do
+more good. If, for example, I am considering new shoes when my present
+pair is fully functional, I should instead donate that excess wealth to famine
+relief. In both instances, Mill would have the agent in question perform
+whichever available action would best reduce unhappiness and promote
+happiness in the world.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+224 A. T. Fyfe
+Utilitarianism is generally understood to be the combination of two
+separate moral theories. First, utilitarianism is a form of “ consequentialism,
+” since it holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends
+solely upon the goodness or badness of that action ’ s consequences. Second,
+utilitarianism is a form of “ welfarism, ” since it holds that the goodness or
+badness of an action ’ s consequences depends solely upon the amount of
+happiness and unhappiness brought about by that action (i.e., the action ’ s
+effect on people ’ s welfare). Therefore, any argument for utilitarianism must
+aim to prove not one but two separate claims: a consequentialist “ theory
+of the right ” (i.e., what is right and wrong) and a welfarist “ theory of the
+good ” (i.e., what is good and bad).
+Examining J. S. Mill ’ s famous argument for utilitarianism, it is clear that
+Mill simply takes for granted a consequentialist theory of the right rather
+than providing an argument for it. As a result, even if Mill ’ s argument for
+utilitarianism succeeds, it will only prove half of what utilitarianism consists
+in, a welfarist theory of value. Taking what Mill says at face value, his
+argument begins with the claim that the only way we come to know that
+something is visible or audible is through seeing or hearing it. Mill then
+concludes, by analogy, that the only way to prove that something is desirable
+(i.e., worth desiring; good) is by appealing to what we actually do
+desire. After using this analogy with audibility and visibility to establish the
+only method for proving that something is desirable, Mill argues that happiness
+is the only intrinsic good in existence since (1) people do desire it,
+and (2) it is the only thing that people desire for its own sake. With this
+result in hand, Mill then concludes his argument for utilitarianism – or at
+least utilitarianism ’ s welfarist aspect – by inferring that since an increase in
+a person ’ s happiness is good for that person, an increase in all persons ’
+happiness is good for all persons.
+This is a notoriously bad argument. If this straightforward reading accurately
+refl ects the argument Mill means to give, then he has committed a
+number of elementary logical mistakes. In the fi rst part of his argument,
+Mill states that because people desire happiness, it follows that happiness
+must be “ desirable. ” However, “ desirable ” has two possible meanings, and
+Mill seems to be equivocating between them. Since “ audible ” just means
+“ possible to hear ” and “ visible ” just means “ possible to see, ” in order for
+his analogy to work, Mill must mean “ possible to desire ” when he talks of
+something as being “ desirable. ” However, to prove that what we desire is
+good, by “ desirable ” Mill must mean “ worthy of desire ” or “ good. ” While
+it is possible that Mill is not confused and not equivocating between these
+two senses of “ desirable, ” this would only mean that he is instead guilty of
+committing the “ naturalistic fallacy ” ; that is, the fallacy of either inferring
+how things should be merely from how things actually are (in this case,
+what we should desire from what we do desire) or trying to defi ne a moral
+Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 225
+concept with a nonmoral concept (in this case, Mill would be defi ning
+“ worthy of desire ” and “ good ” as just amounting to “ desired ” ).
+Mill ’ s apparent logical errors continue when, at the tail end of his argument,
+Mill seems to commit the “ fallacy of composition. ” One commits
+this fallacy whenever one tries to infer something about a whole simply
+because it is true of the whole ’ s parts. For example, I would be guilty of
+the fallacy of composition if I were to infer that tables were invisible to the
+naked eye just because tables are made of atoms, and atoms are invisible
+to the naked eye. Mill seems to be committing this fallacy when he infers
+that the general happiness is good for the group of all persons simply from
+the fact that he has proven that personal happiness is good for an individual
+person.
+Is this straightforward reading of Mill ’ s argument for utilitarianism
+correct? Did Mill really put forth an argument for half of utilitarianism that
+is itself riddled with the simplest of logical mistakes? This is unlikely. As a
+result, philosophers have developed a number of more charitable alternative
+interpretations in an attempt to uncover what Mill actually intended. One
+possible way in which philosophers have thought to alter our interpretation
+of Mill ’ s argument for the better is by taking his analogy to be an attempt
+to show that desire functions as an “ indicator ” or “ evidence ” of goodness.
+For example, when someone thinks she hears something and there is no
+reason to think that she is mistaken, then it plausible for us to conclude
+that there actually is a sound present. On this reading of Mill ’ s argument,
+desire similarly serves as an indicator of something worthy of desire actually
+being present. Such an interpretation would avoid equivocating between
+the two senses of “ desirable ” and would also prevent Mill from falling prey
+to the naturalistic fallacy. This more charitable interpretation also has the
+advantage of fi tting in well with Mill ’ s empiricist philosophical attitude.
+Another way in which we might alter our interpretation of Mill ’ s argument
+for the better is by reinterpreting his apparent commitment of the
+fallacy of composition to instead be an argument concerning how the value
+of happiness for an individual must depend on its intrinsic value. Specifi cally,
+Mill could be interpreted as arguing that if happiness is good for an individual
+to possess, then happiness itself must be good. But if happiness itself
+is good and if we are to judge the moral rightness of our actions by how
+much good they produce, then the rightness of my actions would depend
+not only on how much of my happiness they result in, but also on how my
+actions affect the happiness of others.
+However, this does not exhaust the numerous alternative interpretations
+of Mill ’ s argument. In fact, Mill ’ s remarks about the impossibility of providing
+a proof of utilitarianism have led some philosophers to conclude
+that Mill never meant to be giving an argument for utilitarianism in the
+fi rst place. Of course, no matter how successful Mill ’ s argument for
+226 A. T. Fyfe
+utilitarianism might be under some particular interpretation (if we interpret
+him to be giving one at all), Mill is still only arguing for utilitarianism ’ s
+welfarist aspect. As we noted at the outset, Mill ’ s argument fails to address
+consequentialism entirely. Mill simply takes for granted that it is “ the doctrine
+of rational persons of all schools ” that “ the morality of actions
+depends on the consequences which they tend to produce. ” This has become
+increasingly regrettable, since much of the controversy surrounding utilitarianism
+has come to concern precisely its consequentialist aspect, something
+that Mill found so uncontroversial that he didn ’ t even provide an
+argument for it.
+The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that
+people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people
+hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend,
+the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is
+that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine
+proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an
+end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can
+be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so
+far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however,
+being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all
+which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person ’ s
+happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a
+good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one
+of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality. (Mill
+“ Of What Sort of Proof, ” 61)
+As to the sentence [ . . . ] when I said the general happiness is a good to the
+aggregate of all persons I did not mean that every human being ’ s happiness
+is a good to every other human being, [ . . . ] I merely meant in this particular
+sentence to argue that since A ’ s happiness is a good, B ’ s a good, C ’ s a good,
+etc., the sum of all these goods must be a good. (Mill “ Excerpt from a Letter, ”
+270)
+Generic Argument for Traditional Utilitarianism
+P1. Consequentialist Theory of the Right. An action is right for someone
+to perform if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that
+would maximize total net good over bad in existence – otherwise, the
+action is wrong.
+P2. Welfarist Theory of the Good. The only intrinsic good is someone ’ s
+happiness while the only intrinsic bad is someone ’ s unhappiness.
+C1. Traditional Utilitarianism. An action is right for someone to perform
+if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that would
+Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 227
+maximize total net happiness over unhappiness in existence – otherwise,
+the action is wrong (substitution, P1, P2).
+Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Straightforward Interpretation)
+P1. The only proof that an object is visible is that people actually see it.
+P2. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people actually hear it.
+C1. The only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
+it (analogical inference, P1, P2).
+P3. If the only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
+it and each person actually desires happiness for herself, then each person
+’ s happiness is desirable for herself.
+P4. Each person actually desires happiness for herself.
+C2. The only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
+it and each person actually desires happiness for herself (conjunction,
+C1, P4).
+C3. Each person ’ s happiness is desirable for herself ( modus ponens , P3,
+C2).
+C4. The general happiness is desirable for the aggregate of all persons
+(fallacy of composition, C3).
+Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (One Alternative Interpretation)
+P1. The only proof that a visible thing exists is that people actually see it
+and there is no reason to think they are mistaken.
+P2. The only proof that an audible sound exists is that people actually hear
+it and there is no reason to think they are mistaken.
+C1. The only proof that a desirable thing exists is that people actually
+desire it and there is no reason to think they are mistaken (analogical
+inference, P1, P2).
+P3. Each person actually desires happiness for himself and there is no reason
+to think he is mistaken.
+C2. Each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself (semantic consequence,
+C1, P3).
+P4. If each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself, then happiness is a
+desirable thing itself.
+P5. If happiness is a desirable thing itself, then the general happiness is
+desirable.
+C3. If each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself, then the general
+happiness is desirable (hypothetical syllogism, P4, P5).
+C4. The general happiness is desirable ( modus ponens , C2, C3).
+228 A. T. Fyfe
+Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Another Alternative
+Interpretation)
+P1. If everyone desires happiness for herself, then everyone thinks of happiness
+itself as good and everyone selfi shly wants happiness for herself.
+P2. Everyone desires happiness for herself.
+C1. Everyone thinks of happiness itself as good and everyone selfi shly
+wants happiness for herself ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+C2. Everyone thinks of happiness itself as good (simplifi cation, C1).
+P3. If everyone thinks of happiness itself as good, then everyone should
+think of the happiness of herself and others as good.
+C3. Everyone should think of the happiness of herself and others as good
+( modus ponens , C2, P3).
+P4. No one desires anything other than happiness for herself and/or happiness
+for others.
+P5. If no one desires anything other than happiness for herself and/or happiness
+for others, then no one should think of anything other than the
+happiness of herself or others as good.
+C4. No one should think of anything other than the happiness of herself
+or others as good ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
+C5. Everyone should think of the happiness of herself and others as good,
+and no one should think of anything other than the happiness of
+herself or others as good (conjunction, C3, C4).
+58
+The Experience Machine
+Objection to Hedonism
+Dan Weijers
+Nozick , Robert . Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .
+De Brigard , Filipe . “ If You Like It, Does It Matter if It ’ s Real? ” Philosophical
+Psychology 23 , 1 ( 2010 ): 43 – 57 .
+Kymlicka , Will . Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction . New
+York : Oxford University Press , 1990 .
+Sobel , David . “ Varieties of Hedonism . ” Journal of Social Philosophy 33 , 2
+( 2002 ): 240 – 56 .
+Robert Nozick ’ s Experience Machine thought experiment describes a fantastic
+machine that can simulate any kind of experience for anyone who
+plugs herself into it. A life attached to an Experience Machine could be full
+of immensely pleasurable experiences; however (as Nozick correctly notes),
+the thought of actually living such a life is one that nearly everyone fi nds
+unappealing.
+Although Nozick originally devised the Experience Machine thought
+experiment to make a point about how animals should be treated, it was
+quickly adopted by anyone who wanted to argue for the falsity of hedonism
+as a theory of the good. The Experience Machine thought experiment is
+equally effective against any kind of theory that posits the internal aspects
+of our experiences as the only valuable things in a life, but hedonism is
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+230 Dan Weijers
+often singled out because it is the most widely discussed exemplar of this
+type of theory. The adoption of the Experience Machine thought experiment
+for the purpose of discrediting hedonism has been extremely successful.
+Indeed, virtually everyone who has written about hedonism since the
+mid - 1970s cites the Experience Machine thought experiment as a (and often
+the) decisive objection against it. Hedonism comes in many guises, but all
+hedonistic theories share the foundational claims that pleasure is the only
+thing of intrinsic value in a life and that pain is the only thing of intrinsic
+disvalue. The reason why the Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism
+was (and still is) considered to be decisive is because the widespread judgment
+that a life plugged into an Experience Machine is not appealing is
+thought to give overwhelming reason to reject this central claim.
+As with many other arguments in ethics, the Experience Machine
+Objection to Hedonism presents a thought experiment and relies on the
+readers ’ agreeing with the author ’ s judgment about it. The Experience
+Machine Objection to Hedonism garners near - complete agreement on the
+judgment that a life plugged into an Experience Machine is not something
+that we would choose for ourselves. It should be noted that this widespread
+judgment arises despite Nozick ’ s attempts to rule out some of the possible
+reasons that we might not want to plug in, such as allowing those who
+depend on us to plug in too. Even in modern reproductions of the Experience
+Machine Objection to Hedonism, which tend to place more emphasis than
+Nozick did on that fact that the experiences available in an Experience
+Machine would be far more pleasurable and less painful than those of a
+real life, hardly anyone admits to wanting to plug in to an Experience
+Machine.
+Despite the nearly unanimous judgment that plugging into an Experience
+Machine for life would be a mistake, substantial disagreement remains on
+the question of why we think that our current life would be better for us
+than a life in an Experience Machine. Many philosophers have offered different
+suggestions as to why we do not, and should not, choose a life in an
+Experience Machine. Nozick ’ s rationale is that plugging in would deprive
+us the chance really to do and be certain things (as opposed merely to having
+the internal experiences of doing and being them). Some (e.g., De Brigard)
+have suggested that the feelings we experience in response to the thought
+of the Experience Machine are based on an subconscious fear of change,
+as shown by reversing the thought experiment (imagine that you have actually
+been living an Experience Machine life all along). Until the disagreement
+about why nearly all of us judge a life plugged into an Experience
+Machine to be so ghastly is resolved, we cannot be confi dent that premise
+3 of the argument (below) is correct or be sure that the Experience Machine
+Objection to Hedonism should really be considered as decisive as it generally
+is.
+The Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism 231
+Suppose that there were an experience machine that would give you any
+experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your
+brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or
+making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time, you would be
+fl oating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug
+into this machine for life, preprogramming your life ’ s experiences? If you are
+worried about missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that
+business enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You
+can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of such experiences,
+selecting your life ’ s experiences for, say, the next two years. After two
+years have passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to
+select the experiences of your next two years. Of course, while in the tank
+you won ’ t know that you ’ re there; you ’ ll think it ’ s all actually happening.
+Others can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there ’ s no need
+to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will service
+the machines if everyone plugs in.) Would you plug in? What else can matter
+to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside? Nor should you refrain
+because of the few moments of distress between the moment you ’ ve decided
+and the moment you ’ re plugged. What ’ s a few moments of distress compared
+to a lifetime of bliss (if that ’ s what you choose), and why feel any distress at
+all if your decision is the best one? (Nozick, 42 – 3)
+P1. Plugging into an Experience Machine would make the rest of your life
+dramatically more pleasurable and less painful than it would otherwise
+have been (stipulated in thought experiment).
+P2. Given the choice to plug into an Experience Machine for the rest of
+your life, ignoring any responsibilities you might have to others, you
+would decline (appeal to readers ’ judgment).
+P3. If, ignoring any responsibilities you might have to others, you would
+decline the chance to plug into an Experience Machine for the rest of
+your life, then pleasure and pain are not the only things of intrinsic value
+(or disvalue) in a life.
+C1. Pleasure and pain are not the only things of intrinsic value (or disvalue)
+in a life ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
+P4. If hedonism is true, then pleasure and pain are the only things of intrinsic
+value (or disvalue) in a life.
+C2. Hedonism is false ( modus tollens , C1, P4).
+59
+The Error Theory Argument
+Robert L. Muhlnickel
+Mackie , John . “ A Refutation of Morals . ” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
+24 ( 1946 ): 77 – 90 . Reprinted in Twentieth Century Ethical Theory ,
+edited by Steven Cahn , Jeram Haber , and Joram Haber , 145 – 52 . Upper
+Saddle River, NJ : Prentice - Hall , 1995 .
+___. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong . Harmondsworth : Penguin , 1977 .
+Metaethics is the philosophical inquiry into the nature and status of morality.
+A basic question about the nature and status of morality is whether
+expressions of moral approval and disapproval are objective. Moral objectivism,
+generally and simply stated, is the view that moral expressions (in
+speech, writing, or thought) are cognitive judgments, which are true or false
+because of their relations to moral facts. Moral skepticism is the view that
+there are no such moral facts. Many philosophers think that commonsense
+morality presumes moral objectivism, and many philosophers defend versions
+of moral objectivism. Defending moral skepticism requires showing
+that the belief that moral facts exist is in error, even though our ordinary
+language presumes they do exist. The aim of showing this belief as erroneous
+gives the argument its name. The error theory argument is a “ destructive
+” argument; it aims to show that moral objectivism is false. J. L. Mackie
+defends the error theory argument and claims it shows that moral skepticism
+is more reasonable than moral objectivism.
+The error theory argument fi rst derives C1 by modus ponens that commonsense
+morality assumes and many moral philosophers defend moral
+objectivism. That C1 is the presumptive belief forestalls the objection that
+the error theory argument attacks a straw man. The error theory argument ’ s
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Error Theory Argument 233
+destructive aim is advanced by two component arguments: the argument
+from relativity and the argument from queerness.
+The argument from relativity extends from P3 to C2. P3 states the unimpeachable
+fact of moral relativity: moral judgments observed in behavior,
+described in records of deliberation, and stated in authoritative moral codes
+of different societies and historical eras are different and often incompatible
+with one another. Moral skeptics and moral objectivists offer different
+explanations of the relativity of morals. Moral skeptics argue that moral
+relativity is best explained by the fact that there are no objective moral principles;
+rather, people assert moral codes based on their familiarity with the
+moral codes they learn in their societies (P4 (i)). Moral objectivists argue
+that factual differences in the circumstances of various societies result in
+different applications of objective moral principles. Such different applications
+yield distinct moral codes despite agreement on objective moral principles
+(P4 (ii)).
+Mackie supports explanation (i) by appealing to a sentimentalist theory
+of the origins of moral expressions. Although Mackie does not call his
+argument an Inference to the Best Explanation, the reasoning here involves
+a comparative claim that the skeptical explanation accounts for the observed
+phenomena of moral expression better than the objectivist one. Inference
+to the Best Explanation arguments are comparisons of two or more explanations
+of observed phenomena and evaluations of each explanation on
+common standards. Commonly cited standards for comparing explanations
+are greater simplicity, greater explanatory power, and more coherence with
+other hypotheses and phenomena. Philosophers dispute what Inference to
+the Best Explanation argument implies, so the argument below includes P6
+and C2 and P6 * and C2 * for comparison. P6 and C2 make a stronger
+claim, that explanation (i) shows that the belief in the existence of objective
+moral facts is unjustifi ed, rather than merely not as well justifi ed as disbelief
+in the existence of objective moral facts.
+The objection to the argument from relativity on behalf of moral objectivism,
+though unsuccessful according to Mackie, leaves moral skepticism
+in need of further argument. The argument from queerness claims there are
+two necessary conditions of the existence of objective moral facts. The fi rst
+condition is a claim about the ontology of moral facts. Putative moral facts
+would consist of a different kind of entity or relation than those known
+by scientifi c observation and hypothesizing, ordinary perception, and quasi -
+scientifi c methods. The second condition claims that mental ability humans
+would have to possess in order to have knowledge of moral facts would be
+something specifi cally moral. Such ability would be different in kind from
+other human mental abilities. Since neither necessary condition of the
+existence of objective moral facts is true, the antecedent of the conditional
+in P7 is false by modus tollens .
+234 Robert L. Muhlnickel
+The error theory argument concludes in C4 by conjoining C3, that objective
+values no not exist, and C2, the belief that objective moral facts is not
+justifi ed. The conjunction (C4) is put in the antecedent of a conditional (P9)
+to argue that the presumptive belief in the existence of object moral facts
+is erroneous. The presumptive belief is the target of the error theory argument,
+and the combined argument from relativity and argument from
+queerness presented here, form a valid argument that the presumptive belief
+is erroneous.
+Mackie fi rst presented the error theory argument in 1946 in “ A Refutation
+of Morals. ” He expanded the argument in Ethics: Inventing Right
+and Wrong (30 – 42). The selections below are from the latter work.
+Mackie states that an error theory argument is required against moral
+objectivism:
+[T]he traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man as well as the main
+line of western philosophers are concepts of objective value. But it is precisely
+for this reason that linguistic and conceptual analysis are not enough. The
+claim to objectivity, however engrained in out language and thought, is not
+self - validating. But the denial of objective values will have to be put forward
+not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an ‘ error theory, ’ a theory
+that although most people in making moral judgments implicitly claim,
+among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these
+claims are all false. ( Ethics , 35)
+The argument from relativity follows:
+The argument from relativity has as its premiss the well - known variation
+in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another,
+and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes
+within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of
+descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither fi rst order
+nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order
+subjectivism: radical differences between fi rst order moral apprehensions
+make it diffi cult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths.
+But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity
+of values. [ … ] Disagreement about moral codes seems to refl ect people ’ s
+adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection
+seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy
+because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they
+participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy.
+( Ethics , 36)
+Defenders of moral objectivism claim that moral relativity is explained
+by the application of objective moral principles to specifi c conditions rather
+than the nonexistence of objective moral principles. “ It is easy to show, ”
+The Error Theory Argument 235
+Mackie writes, “ that such general principles, married with differing concrete
+circumstances, different existing social patterns, or different preferences,
+will beget different specifi c moral rules ” ( Ethics , 37). This argument
+fails, Mackie writes:
+[P]eople judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or
+wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some
+general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed,
+but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately
+in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different
+responses in others. ( Ethics , 37)
+The argument from queerness:
+If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or
+relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the
+universe. Correspondingly, if we are aware of them, it would have to be by
+some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from
+our ordinary ways of knowing anything else. [ … ] When we ask the awkward
+question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth
+of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively
+ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception
+or introspection or the framing and confi rming of explanatory hypotheses
+or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination
+of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘ a special sort of intuition ’
+is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clear - headed objectivist is
+compelled to resort. ( Ethics , 38)
+P1. If ordinary language, commonsense morality, and philosophical theories
+indicate belief in objective moral facts, then there is a presumptive belief
+that objective moral facts exist.
+P2. Ordinary language, commonsense morality, and philosophical theories
+indicate belief that objective moral facts exist.
+C1. There is a presumptive belief that objective moral facts exist ( modus
+ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. There is moral relativity among different societies and historical eras.
+P4. Moral relativity is explained by either but not both of explanations (i)
+or (ii):
+(i) People participate in different ways of life that lead them to believe
+that distinct moral rules are correct.
+(ii) People apply objective moral principles to different circumstances.
+P5. Explanation (i) is a better explanation of moral relativity than explanation
+(ii).
+236 Robert L. Muhlnickel
+P6. If (i) explains moral relativity better than (ii), then the belief that objective
+moral facts exist is not justifi ed.
+C2. The belief that objective moral facts exist is not justifi ed ( modus
+ponens , P5, P6).
+P7. If there are objective moral values, then they are specifi cally moral entities
+or relations and we know of their existence by a specifi cally moral
+cognitive ability.
+P8. There are no specifi cally moral entities or relations, and we have no
+specifi cally moral cognitive ability.
+C3. There are no objective moral values ( modus tollens , P7, P8).
+C4. There are no objective moral values and the belief that objective
+moral facts exist is not justifi ed (conjunction, C3, C2).
+P9. If there are no objective values and the belief that objective moral facts
+exist is not justifi ed, then the presumptive belief that objective moral
+facts exist is in error.
+C5. The presumptive belief that objective moral facts exist is in error
+( modus ponens , C4, P9).
+P6 * . If (i) explains moral disagreement better than (ii), then disbelief that
+objective moral facts exist is better justifi ed than belief that moral facts
+exist.
+C2 * . Disbelief that objective moral facts exist is better justifi ed than
+belief that moral facts exist ( modus ponens , C2, P5).
+60
+Moore ’ s Open Question
+Argument
+Bruno Verbeek
+Moore , George E. Principia Ethica . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
+Press , 1903 .
+Frankena , W. K. “ The Naturalistic Fallacy . ” Mind 48 , 192 ( 1939 ): 464 – 77 .
+Miller , Alexander . An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics . Cambridge,
+UK : Polity Press , 2003 .
+The Open Question Argument was fi rst formulated by G. E. Moore in his
+Principia Ethica (1903). It marks the beginning of a branch of ethical theory
+now referred to as metaethics. One of the central problems in metaethics
+– or indeed the central problem for this sub - discipline – is an analysis of
+the central concepts and terms in ethics, such as ‘ ought ’ and ‘ good ’ . Moore
+argued that the property of goodness is an undefi nable property. The
+reason, according to Moore, is that goodness is a simple, unanalyzable
+property. So - called “ real defi nitions ” of ‘ good ’ , which attempt to defi ne
+‘ good ’ in terms of a kind with specifi c characteristics, will fail. Anyone who
+claims to give a defi nition of ‘ goodness ’ is attributing goodness to something
+rather than identifying what goodness is. Moral naturalists – that is, those
+philosophers who believe that moral properties exist and can be studied by
+the sciences – are particularly guilty of this fallacy: hence the name “ naturalistic
+fallacy. ” As a result, the argument is typically invoked to reject
+moral naturalism. However, Moore was quick to point out that theists who
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+238 Bruno Verbeek
+claim that good is what God commands are prone to the same fallacy. (Note
+that a common misunderstanding is to think that the naturalistic fallacy is
+the invalid inference of an “ ought ” statement from factual [ “ is ” ] premises.)
+The test that Moore proposed to determine whether an attempt at defi ning
+‘ good ’ is correct and not an attribution in disguise is the so - called “ Open
+Question Argument. ” The basic idea is that a correct defi nition of a term
+cannot be rephrased as a question without betraying conceptual incompetence.
+For example, the defi nition of a ‘ bachelor ’ is “ unmarried man of the
+marriageable age. ” If I rephrase this defi nition as an open question ( ‘ Is a
+bachelor an unmarried man of the marriageable age? ’ ), it shows that I don ’ t
+know what a bachelor is (or ‘ man ’ or ‘ married ’ , etc.). However, suppose
+somebody offers the following defi nition of ‘ good ’ : “ the property we refer
+to as ‘ good ’ is the property of being pleasurable, ” or “ good is pleasurable ”
+for short. If you rephrase this as an open question: “ Is good pleasurable? ”
+this does not indicate that I don ’ t know what ‘ good ’ or what ‘ pleasurable ’
+is. I am asking a meaningful question. This demonstrates, according to
+Moore, that the proposed defi nition is (at best) in fact an attribution of
+goodness to all pleasurable things.
+My point is that ‘ good ’ is a simple notion, just as ‘ yellow ’ is a simple
+notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one
+who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what
+good is. Defi nitions of the kind that I was asking for, defi nitions which
+describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and
+which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible
+when the object or notion in question is something complex. (Moore, 7)
+When a man confuses two natural objects with one another, defi ning the
+one by the other, if for instance, he confuses himself, who is one natural
+object, with ‘ pleased ’ or with ‘ pleasure ’ which are others, then there is no
+reason to call the fallacy naturalistic. But if he confuses ‘ good, ’ which is not
+in the same sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever, then
+there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made with
+regard to ‘ good ’ marks it as something quite specifi c, and this specifi c mistake
+deserves a name because it is so common. (Moore, 13)
+The general form of the Open Question Argument is the following:
+P1. Suppose that the predicate ‘ good ’ is synonymous with some other
+predicate N (e.g., ‘ pleasurable ’ ).
+P2. ‘ X has the property N ’ will mean ‘ X is good ’ .
+C1. Anybody who would ask whether an X with property N is good,
+would ipso facto betray conceptual confusion. She is unaware what
+‘ good ’ means (symmetry of identity, P2).
+Moore’s Open Question Argument 239
+P3. However, for every N it is always an open question whether an X with
+property N is good. It is a meaningful question that does not demonstrate
+conceptual confusion.
+P4. If for every N it is always an open question whether an X with property
+N is good, then ‘ N ’ cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ .
+C2. ‘ N ’ cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+P5. If N cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ , then only ‘ good ’ can be synonymous
+with ‘ good ’ ; therefore, good is a simple (primitive) concept and
+cannot be defi ned.
+C3. Only ‘ good ’ can be synonymous with ‘ good ’ ; therefore, good is a
+simple (primitive) concept and cannot be defi ned ( modus ponens , C2,
+P5).
+The Open Question Argument is a very infl uential argument. It has
+motivated very diverse metaethical theories, such as noncognitivism, intuitionism,
+and anti - realist theories. It still fi gures prominently in virtually all
+textbooks on metaethics. However, the general opinion by now is that the
+argument does not work against naturalism. First, this is because it insuffi
+ciently distinguishes between conceptual or semantic naturalism (where
+“ good ” is defi ned in natural terms) and metaphysical naturalism
+(where “ good ” is analyzed as a natural kind, much as “ water ” is analyzed
+as H 2 O).
+The Open Question Argument works perhaps against the fi rst kind of
+naturalism but not the second kind of naturalism, and this is the kind
+of naturalism that most moral naturalists defend. Second, it is by no means
+obvious that somebody who rephrases a defi nition as a question is conceptually
+confused. Some correct defi nitions are extremely complex; for
+example, ‘ knowledge is justifi ed true belief ’ . Suppose this were correct; it
+still is not dead obvious to any competent speaker of English (Miller). Third,
+the argument in a deep sense begs the question against the naturalist
+(Frankena).
+61
+Wolff ’ s Argument for the
+Rejection of State Authority
+Ben Saunders
+Wolff , Robert Paul. In Defense of Anarchism . New York : Harper & Row ,
+1970 .
+Graham , Gordon. The Case against the Democratic State: An Essay in
+Cultural Criticism . Thorverton : Imprint Academic , 2002 .
+Reiman , Jeffrey H. In Defense of Political Philosophy: A Reply to Robert
+Paul Wolff ’ s In Defense of Anarchism . New York : Harper & Row , 1972 .
+Anarchism is traditionally associated with statelessness or resistance to
+coercive laws. Robert Paul Wolff defends what is sometimes known as
+“ philosophical anarchism. ” This is not a view about political arrangements
+as such but, rather, an argument about the duties of the individual. Wolff,
+drawing on a Kantian idea of self - legislation, argues that each individual
+has a duty to be autonomous (#55). From this, it follows that no one ought
+to accept the authority of others, including that of the state.
+This does not mean that one must disobey all laws – indeed, one may
+well conform to all laws – but one must never comply. (To conform is
+merely to do what the law says, for any reason, whereas to comply is to
+do so because that is what the law says.) That is, one must not unquestioningly
+obey the law because it is law but must always decide what to do for
+oneself. A just state ’ s laws may well accord with what one ought to do
+anyway, for reasons of morality or prudence, while the threat of punishment
+will give one further reasons to do what the law requires. There is, however,
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Wolff’s Argument for the Rejection of State Authority 241
+no fundamental difference between being told not to steal by the state and
+being told that by a friend – neither actually gives you the reason in
+question.
+The argument appears valid, but there are some problems with the
+premises; in particular, specifying exactly what Wolff means by autonomy.
+It is not easy to fi nd a consistent interpretation that explains both why it
+is so important as to be the individual ’ s primary obligation and incompatible
+with accepting authority. Even if something is in our interests, we do
+not ordinarily suppose it to be a duty for us.
+The defi ning mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary
+obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. [ … ] Insofar as a man
+fulfi ls his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist
+the state ’ s claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will deny that
+he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws.
+(Wolff, 18)
+P1. We have a higher - order interest in autonomy.
+P2. If something promotes our higher - order interests, we have a duty to
+do it.
+C1. We have a duty to be autonomous ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If we have a duty to be autonomous, then autonomy requires that we
+decide what to do for ourselves.
+C2. We should decide what to do for ourselves ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. If we accept the authority of others, then we are not autonomous.
+C3. We should not accept the authority of others ( modus tollens , C1,
+P4).
+P5. If we accept the authority of the law, then we accept the authority of
+others.
+C4. We should not accept the authority of the law ( modus tollens, C3,
+P5).
+62
+Nozick ’ s Taxation Is Forced
+Labor Argument
+Jason Waller
+Nozick , Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .
+One of the most contentious issues in contemporary debates about distributive
+justice concerns the redistribution of wealth. Should the state tax richer
+citizens in order to provide various benefi ts (schools, medical care, job
+training, cash payments, housing subsidies, etc.) to poorer citizens? The
+traditional distinction between the political “ right ” and “ left ” turns largely
+(although, not exclusively) on this question. One of the most infl uential
+libertarian arguments concerning the redistribution of wealth is offered by
+Robert Nozick, who argues that all forms of redistribution are morally
+wrong. His general strategy is to show that taxation is a kind of forced
+labor (i.e., slavery). The argument has been infl uential because it seems to
+turn on an uncontroversial defi nition of forced labor and the seemingly
+undeniable claim that all forms of forced labor are immoral. Nozick concludes
+that when the state redistributes wealth from the rich to the poor,
+the poor are in fact unjustly enslaving the rich. This form of slavery is, of
+course, quite mild by comparison to past forms, but (at least according to
+Nozick) it is immoral just the same.
+Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. Some
+persons fi nd this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of n hours of labor
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Nozick’s Taxation Is Forced Labor Argument 243
+is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n
+hours for another ’ s purpose. Others fi nd the claim absurd. But even these, if
+they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work
+for the benefi t of the needy. And they would also object to forcing each person
+to work fi ve extra hours each week for the benefi t of the needy. (Nozick, 169)
+P1. Forced labor (i.e., slavery) occurs anytime one (i) must perform some
+labor under threat of severe punishment (pain, prison, death, etc.) and
+yet (ii) the benefi ts of one ’ s labor go to someone else.
+P2. All forms of forced labor are immoral.
+P3. The state requires all working citizens to pay certain taxes in order to
+benefi t the needy or face severe punishment (i.e., prison time).
+P4. A is a working citizen.
+C1. If citizen A does not pay taxes, then the citizen will receive severe
+punishment; that is, she will go to prison (material implication, P3).
+P5. If citizen A does not work extra hours, then the citizen will not be able
+to pay her taxes.
+C2. If citizen A does not work extra hours at her job, then she will receive
+severe punishment; that is, she will go to prison (hypothetical syllogism,
+C1, P5).
+P6. Citizen A receives no benefi ts for the extra hours spent earning the
+money to pay her taxes because this money goes to the needy.
+C3. During the time when citizen A is earning the money needed to pay
+her taxes, the citizen is (i) performing some labor under threat of
+severe punishment [by C2] and (ii) the benefi ts of her labor go to
+someone else, namely, the needy (conjunction, C2, P6).
+C4. During the time when citizen A is earning the money needed to pay
+her taxes, she is undergoing forced labor; that is, slavery ( modus
+ponens , P1, C3).
+C5. Taxing citizen A to help the needy is immoral (instantiation, P2, C4).
+P7. This same argument can be made for each taxpayer.
+C6. All instances of taxation are immoral (instantiation, C5, P7).
+63
+Charity is Obligatory
+Joakim Sandberg
+Singer , Peter. “ Famine, Affl uence, and Morality . ” Philosophy and Public
+Affairs 1 ( 1972 ): 229 – 43 .
+___. Practical Ethics , 2nd edn . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,
+1993 .
+Sidgwick , Henry. The Methods of Ethics . Indianapolis : Hackett , 1981 .
+Unger , Peter. Living High & Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence . New
+York : Oxford University Press , 1996 .
+Most people think that it is good or charitable to give money to humanitarian
+aid agencies that provide food or shelter to people in need, and hence
+such agencies are referred to as charities. But couldn ’ t it actually be a moral
+duty to give money to such agencies; that is, morally wrong not to do so?
+According to the present argument, most famously formulated by Peter
+Singer, relatively affl uent people of developed countries are indeed under a
+moral duty to give a signifi cant amount of their money to humanitarian aid
+agencies.
+The argument turns on the seemingly uncontroversial principle (which
+can be found already in Sidgwick, 253) that it is wrong not to help others
+when helping is easy and cheap. Singer sometimes defends this principle by
+way of an example: Wouldn ’ t it be wrong to refuse to save a child from
+drowning in a pond, say, simply because one is hesitant to get one ’ s clothes
+dirty? The argument can be taken to exemplify philosophical reasoning in
+its most interesting form: going from seemingly uncontroversial premises
+to a largely controversial or unexpected conclusion. The conclusion is controversial
+because it basically requires us to – instead of spending our money
+on things for ourselves that we don ’ t really need (nice clothes, coffee, beer,
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Charity is Obligatory 245
+CDs) – give most of it away to people in remote parts of the world. And
+we are not even allowed to feel good about doing so – what we normally
+perceive as charitable (and thus beyond the call of duty) is really just
+morally obligatory. A number of slightly different formulations of the argument
+can be found in the literature, but we present it in its original form.
+All of the premises below have been scrutinized by critics in attempts to
+defuse the argument.
+I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food,
+shelter, and medical care are bad. I think most people will agree about this,
+although one may reach the same view by different routes. [ . . . ] My next
+point is this: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,
+without thereby sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance, we
+ought, morally, to do it. By “ without sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral
+importance ” I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen,
+or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral
+good, comparable in signifi cance to the bad thing that we can prevent. This
+principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one [ . . . but . . . ] The
+uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were
+acted upon [ . . . ] our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally
+changed. [ . . . ] The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot
+be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. [ . . . ] When we
+buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look “ well - dressed ” we
+are not providing for any important need. We would not be sacrifi cing anything
+signifi cant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the
+money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person
+from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give
+money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep
+us warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act
+which philosophers and theologians have called “ supererogatory ” – an act
+which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we
+ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so. (Singer “ Famine, ”
+231 – 5)
+P1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are
+bad.
+P2. If it is in one ’ s power to prevent something bad from happening, without
+thereby sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance, one ought,
+morally, to do it.
+C1. If it is in one ’ s power to prevent suffering and death from lack of
+food, shelter, and medical care, without thereby sacrifi cing anything
+of comparable moral importance, one ought, morally, to do it (instantiation
+& modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. By giving money to humanitarian aid agencies, one can prevent suffering
+and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care.
+246 Joakim Sandberg
+C2. If one can give money to humanitarian aid agencies without thereby
+sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance (to suffering and
+death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care) one ought, morally,
+to do it (instantiation and modus ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. We can give a substantial amount of our money away by simply giving
+up buying things that we do not really need; that is, without sacrifi cing
+anything of moral importance comparable to suffering and death from
+lack of food, shelter, and medical care.
+C3. We ought, morally, to give a substantial amount of our money to
+humanitarian aid agencies ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
+64
+The Repugnant Conclusion
+Joakim Sandberg
+Parfi t , Derek. Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1984 .
+Ryberg , Jesper , and Torbj ö rn T ä nnsj ö (eds.). The Repugnant Conclusion:
+Essays on Population Ethics . Dordrecht : Kluwer , 2004 .
+When philosophers think about future generations and what sort of world
+we should try to create, they sometimes ponder issues in so - called population
+ethics. For example, “ Would it be better if, in the future, a greater
+rather than fewer number of people lived? ” and “ Does the answer to this
+question depend further on who these people are and/or their quality of
+life? ” The seminal work in this fi eld is Derek Parfi t ’ s Reasons and Persons ,
+and the present argument is its undisputed highlight. The argument addresses
+the issue of what the relative values are of the quantity of lives lived versus
+the quality of these lives and a seemingly straightforward position on this
+issue – the position that classical utilitarians take – is that quantity and
+quality should be given equal value.
+Utilitarians typically compound these two factors into a measure of the
+overall utility, or “ quantity of whatever makes life worth living, ” in a population.
+Parfi t ’ s argument against this view, however, takes the form of a
+reductio ad absurdum : If any loss in the quality of lives can be compensated
+for by a suffi cient increase in the quantity of lives lived, then the best
+outcome could well be one in which an enormous amount of people lived
+lives that are barely worth living. This is what Parfi t calls the “ Repugnant
+Conclusion. ” Many ways of trying to get around the conclusion can be
+found in the literature. However, it may be noted that it has been surprisingly
+diffi cult to develop a theory that avoids this conclusion and at the
+same time doesn ’ t imply equally counterintuitive conclusions. The fi eld of
+population ethics thus continues to be challenging.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+248 Joakim Sandberg
+In B there are twice as many people living as in A, and these people are
+all worse off than everyone in A. But the lives of those in B, compared with
+those in A, are more than half as much worth living. [ . . . ] Which would be
+the better outcome? [ . . . ] I can now state the [ . . . ] Impersonal Total Principle:
+If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would
+be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. [ . . . ] Z is some
+enormous population whose members have lives that are not much above the
+level where life ceases to be worth living. [ . . . ] In each of these lives there is
+very little happiness. But, if the numbers are large enough, this is the outcome
+with the greatest total sum of happiness. [ . . . ] The Impersonal Total Principle
+then implies The Repugnant Conclusion: For any possible population of at
+least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some
+much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal,
+would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth
+living. As my choice of name suggests, I fi nd this conclusion very hard to
+accept. [ . . . ] If we are convinced that Z is worse than A, we have strong
+grounds for resisting principles which imply that Z is better. We have strong
+grounds for resisting the Impersonal Total Principle. (Parfi t, 385 – 90)
+P1. The “ quantity of whatever makes life worth living ” in a given population
+is a function of the quantity of its members and their quality of life.
+P2. One can increase the quantity of whatever makes life worth living in a
+given population by simply adding people whose lives are worth living.
+P3. If in one of two outcomes the quality of lives in a population is lower,
+the quantity of whatever makes life worth living can still be higher if
+suffi ciently many people are added whose lives are worth living.
+C1. If A is a population of at least ten billion people with a very high
+quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population,
+Z, where the quantity of whatever makes life worth living would be
+greater even though its members have lives that are barely worth living
+(instantiation, P3).
+P4. If, other things being equal, the best outcome would be the one in which
+there is the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living, one
+outcome is better than another if the quantity of whatever makes life
+worth living is greater.
+C2. If, other things being equal, the best outcome would be the one in
+which there is the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth
+living, Z would be better than A ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
+P5. Z is worse than A.
+C3. It is not the case that, other things being equal, the best outcome
+would be the one in which there is the greatest quantity of whatever
+makes life worth living ( modus tollens , C2, P5).
+65
+Taurek on Numbers Don ’ t Count
+Ben Saunders
+Taurek , John. “ Should the Numbers Count? ” Philosophy and Public Affairs
+6 ( 1977 ): 293 – 316 .
+Parfi t , Derek. “ Innumerate Ethics . ” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 ( 1978 ):
+285 – 301 .
+Sidgwick , Henry. The Methods of Ethics . Indianapolis : Hackett , 1981 .
+Wasserman , David , and Alan Strudler . “ Can a Nonconsequentialist Count
+Lives? ” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 ( 2003 ): 71 – 94 .
+Consequentialists think that we have a moral duty to bring about the best
+outcomes possible. The idea of the overall best outcome, however, typically
+involves summing good and bad effects distributed over different individuals.
+It is therefore frequently objected that consequentialism is indifferent
+to the separateness of persons, ignoring the distribution of good and bad
+consequences and implying that a great loss to one person could be justifi ed
+by smaller benefi ts to a great many others.
+Nonconsequentialists have often argued that we should not engage in
+this interpersonal aggregation – that it makes no sense to speak of what ’ s
+good or bad from “ the point of the view of the universe ” (Sidgwick, 382).
+Sometimes, however, rejecting consequentialism leads to positions that confl
+ict with common sense. In this much discussed article, Taurek rejects the
+idea that we have any obligation to save fi ve people rather than one other,
+whom he calls “ David. ” He argues that since there is no impersonal
+perspective from which we can judge either outcome better than the other,
+we are permitted to choose to bring about whichever outcome we prefer
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+250 Ben Saunders
+– though if we want to show equal concern to all involved, he suggests that
+we toss a coin so everyone has a 50 percent chance of survival.
+Not all aspects of Taurek ’ s argument are entirely clear. For example,
+interpreters differ as to whether he denies any notion of impersonal “ betterness
+” (even so - called Pareto improvements; i.e., those that are better for
+someone and worse for no one) or only denies the intelligibility of impersonal
+claims where there is a confl ict of interests between two parties.
+Nonetheless, much ink has been spilled attempting to show that nonconsequentialists
+can resist his conclusion and justify saving a larger group of
+people without engaging in morally suspect aggregation.
+The claim that one ought to save the many instead of the few was made
+to rest on the claim that, other things being equal, it is a worse thing that
+these fi ve persons should die than that this one should. It is this evaluative
+judgement that I cannot accept. I do not wish to say in this situation that it
+is a worse thing were these fi ve persons to die and David to live than it is or
+would be were David to die and these fi ve to continue living. I do not wish
+to say this unless I am prepared to qualify it by explaining to whom or for
+whom or relative to what purpose it is or would be a worse thing. (Taurek,
+303 – 4)
+P1. If we call one state of affairs (impersonally) better than another, then
+one ought (morally) to prefer it.
+P2. It is not the case that David ought (morally) to prefer that he die so
+fi ve others can be saved than the reverse (they die so he can be saved).
+C1. It is not the case that David ’ s dying so fi ve others can be saved is
+(impersonally) better than the reverse (they die so he can be saved)
+( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+P3. If one state of affairs is not better than another, one is not required to
+bring it about.
+C2. David is not required to bring it about that he dies so fi ve others
+can be saved ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. If it is permissible for David to choose to save himself, it is also permissible
+for a third party to save David.
+C3. It is permissible for a third party to save David ( modus ponens , C2,
+P4).
+P5. If it is permissible to save one rather than fi ve, there cannot be any
+general obligation to save the greater number (in confl ict cases).
+C4. There is no general obligation to save the greater number (in confl ict
+cases) ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
+66
+Parfi t ’ s Leveling Down Argument
+against Egalitarianism
+Ben Saunders
+Parfi t , Derek. “ Equality or Priority? ” Ratio 10 ( 1997 ): 202 – 21 . Originally
+published separately as “ The 1991 Lindley Lecture. ” Lawrence:
+Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995. Reprinted in The
+Ideal of Equality , edited by M. Clayton and A. Williams . London :
+Palgrave Macmillan , 2002 .
+Frankfurt , Harry. “ Equality as a Moral Ideal ” Ethics 98 ( 1987 ): 21 – 42 .
+Jerome , Jerome K. “ The New Utopia , ” in Cultural Notes no. 14. London :
+Libertarian Alliance , 1987 .
+Temkin , Larry . Inequality . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
+Almost everyone these days affi rms the moral equality of persons.
+Egalitarians hold that this has implications for distributive justice – that
+people ’ s material conditions should be equalized, at least insofar as they are
+not themselves responsible for being better or worse off than others. Many
+philosophers have explored how best to interpret these egalitarian commitments;
+for instance, over what goods ought to be equalized and whether
+people ought to be made equal in outcomes or merely opportunities. Some,
+however, have rejected the idea that equality per se is of any moral signifi -
+cance. Harry Frankfurt, for instance, has argued that all that matters is that
+everyone has enough, citing the fact that we don ’ t feel the need to redistribute
+from billionaires to millionaires. He claims that our concern is not
+really with inequality, but only with poverty.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+252 Ben Saunders
+Frankfurt shows that we do indeed care about suffi ciency, maybe more
+than about equality, but not that we do not care about equality as well.
+Derek Parfi t, however, has advanced a famous argument to show that a
+commitment to equality has perverse consequences and ought to be rejected.
+He argues that anyone committed to equality must think that it is – at least
+in this one respect – better to bring everyone down to the same level (something
+he calls “ leveling down ” ) than to accept an inequality. This, however,
+seems perverse if no one is made better off as a result.
+Suppose we think it unjust that some people are born with two healthy
+eyes and others with only one or none. In the absence of the technology
+required to perform eye transplants, there is nothing that we can do to make
+the blind better off. Thus, the only way to achieve equality between the
+blind and the sighted would be to blind those who can presently see (see
+Jerome ’ s short story, “ The New Utopia, ” which describes a dystopian future
+where such practices are carried out). Represented numerically, we could
+say that egalitarians think there is something better about a world where
+everyone has four units of good than a world where some have fi ve and
+some have seven since, although everyone is better off in the latter world,
+it is unequal.
+Note that Parfi t is not saying that egalitarians are committed to this
+course of action all things considered, since most subscribe to values other
+than equality and think it is better for people to be able to see than not.
+What he is saying, however, is that qua egalitarians they are committed to
+accepting that this would be in one way good – there is some reason to do
+it – and he fi nds even this absurd. How could it be in any way good if it
+is, by hypothesis, worse for some people and better for none? (Temkin calls
+this premise, numbered P5 below, that the world cannot be better or worse
+without being better or worse for any individual, “ the Slogan ” and argues
+powerfully against it.)
+While there are some who are completely untroubled by material inequalities
+between persons, no matter how large, Parfi t ’ s own positive view
+– which he calls the “ Priority View ” or prioritarianism, effectively a form
+of weighted utilitarianism – would be regarded by many as broadly egalitarian.
+Parfi t thinks that it is morally more important to benefi t someone the
+worse off he is. This view does not, however, require us to make comparisons
+between different people or posit that equality in itself has value, even
+if it will tend to have equalizing consequences in practice (because, where
+we can benefi t one of two people, we ought to benefi t the worse off until
+she becomes better off than the other).
+For true Egalitarians, equality has intrinsic value. [ . . . ] On the widest
+version of this view, any inequality is bad. It is bad, for example, that some
+people are sighted and others are blind. We would therefore have a reason,
+Parfi t’s Argument against Egalitarianism 253
+if we could, to take single eyes from some of the sighted and give them to the
+blind [ . . . ]. Suppose that those who are better off suffer some misfortune, so
+that they become as badly off as everyone else. Since these events would
+remove the inequality, they must be in one way welcome [ . . . ] even though
+they would be worse for some people, and better for no one. This implication
+seems to many to be quite absurd. I call this the Levelling Down Objection.
+(Parfi t Idea , 86, 97, 98)
+P1. Egalitarianism implies that it is pro tanto (in one way) good to eliminate
+inequality.
+P2. Inequality can be eliminated by bringing the worse - off up, and inequality
+can be eliminated by bringing the better - off down.
+C1. Egalitarianism implies that it is pro tanto good to bring the worse -
+off up and that it is pro tanto good to bring the better - off down
+(conjunction, P1, P2).
+C2. Egalitarianism implies that it is pro tanto good to bring the better - off
+down (simplifi cation, C1).
+P3. Simply bringing the better - off down does not make anyone better off.
+P4. If no one is made better off, one state of affairs cannot be pro tanto
+better than another.
+C3. Simply bringing the better - off down cannot be pro tanto better
+( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+P5. If Egalitarianism is true, then it is pro tanto good to bring the better - off
+down.
+C4. Egalitarianism is false ( modus tollens, P5, C3).
+67
+Nozick ’ s Wilt
+Chamberlain Argument
+Fabian Wendt 1
+Nozick , Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .
+Cohen , Gerald. “ Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns
+Preserve Liberty , ” in Self - Ownership, Freedom, and Equality . Cambridge,
+UK : Cambridge University Press , 1995 .
+Feser , Edward . On Nozick . Belmont, CA : Wadsworth , 2003 .
+Kymlicka , Will . Contemporary Political Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford
+University Press , 1990 / 2001 .
+Wolff , Jonathan. Robert Nozick: Property, Justice, and the Minimal State .
+Cambridge, UK : Polity Press , 1991 .
+Robert Nozick ’ s Wilt Chamberlain Argument is notorious. It is very simple,
+and its premises sound fairly reasonable, but its conclusion is perplexing:
+Egalitarian (and other patterned) theories of justice are supposedly not
+acceptable. Many philosophers are convinced that there is something wrong
+with the argument, but it is not so easy to fi nd a fl aw in it. Nozick presents
+the argument in Anarchy, State, and Utopia after having introduced his own
+theory of justice, the entitlement theory. According to this theory, every
+1 I would like to thank Ali Behboud and Thomas Schramme for helpful comments on earlier
+versions of this text.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument 255
+distribution of property that arose from voluntary, free transfers of justly
+acquired property is just. The entitlement theory is, in Nozick ’ s terminology,
+unpatterned; for a distribution of property to be just, it does not have to
+fi t any particular pattern. The entitlement theory leads to a libertarian position
+in political philosophy, condemning redistributive welfare states as
+unjust. In contrast, egalitarians hold that a just state has to redistribute
+property in order to achieve an egalitarian distributional pattern in society.
+The egalitarian pattern can take many different forms. An egalitarian theory
+of justice may, for example, aim for equality of opportunity for welfare or,
+as in John Rawls ’ theory of justice, aim for equality of resources except
+when inequalities are to the benefi t of the least advantaged.
+The Wilt Chamberlain Argument is designed to show that all patterned
+theories of justice, including egalitarian theories as the most prominent
+subclass, are intuitively not acceptable. The basic outline of the argument
+is as follows. Intuitively, it is morally unproblematic freely to transfer property
+to other persons, for example, to pay Wilt Chamberlain for watching
+him play basketball. But free transfers of property will inevitably upset any
+distributional pattern. Liberty upsets patterns, as the title of the corresponding
+chapter in Anarchy, State, and Utopia says. If this is right, how could
+justice demand preserving a patterned distribution of property?
+If patterned theories of justice are indeed not acceptable, then Nozick ’ s
+unpatterned entitlement theory of justice would constitute the obvious
+alternative. But maybe this is too hasty. It seems to me that the Wilt
+Chamberlain Argument is most appealing when directed against egalitarian
+theories only, not against any form of patterned theories. In particular,
+premise P2 in the formalized version below is less convincing if D 1 in
+premise P1 is not specifi ed as an egalitarian distributional pattern but as,
+for example, a distributional pattern prescribing that nobody should fall
+below a certain baseline of welfare. Nevertheless, a refutation of egalitarian
+theories of justice alone would still be a provocative result. Egalitarian
+critics of the argument will then probably have to reject either premise P3
+or P4. If one wants a less limited version of the argument, one can simply
+substitute “ egalitarian ” by “ patterned ” in P1 and call it “ patterned principle
+” instead of “ equality principle. ”
+It is not clear how those holding alternative conceptions of distributive
+justice can reject the entitlement conception of justice in holdings. For suppose
+a distribution favored by one of these non - entitlement conceptions is realized.
+Let us suppose it is your favorite one and let us call this distribution D 1 ;
+perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares vary in accordance with
+some dimension you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly
+in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also suppose
+contracts run for a year, with players being free agents.) He signs the following
+sort of contract with a team: In each home game, twenty - fi ve cents from the
+256 Fabian Wendt
+price of each ticket of admission goes to him. (We ignore the question of
+whether he is “ gouging ” the owners, letting them look for themselves.) The
+season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team ’ s games; they buy their
+tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty - fi ve cents of their admission
+price into a special box with Chamberlain ’ s name on it. They are excited
+about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us
+suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and
+Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the
+average income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this
+income? Is this new distribution D 2 unjust? If so, why? [ … ] If D 1 was a just
+distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D 2 , transferring parts
+of their shares they were given under D 1 (what was it for if not to do something
+with?), isn ’ t D 2 also just? (Nozick, 160 – 1)
+P1. A society is just if and only if the distribution of property in the society
+has a certain egalitarian distributional structure D 1 (Equality Principle
+assumption).
+P2. When people freely transfer their property to other persons, they change
+the distributional structure D 1 into a new distributional structure.
+P3. It is not unjust for people freely to transfer their property to other
+persons (Liberty Principle).
+P4. Whatever distributional structure results from a just distributional
+structure by not - unjust steps is itself just (Preservation Principle).
+C1. It is not unjust for people freely to transfer their property to other
+persons and whatever distributional structure results from a just distributional
+structure by not - unjust steps is itself just (conjunction, P3,
+P4).
+P5. If P2 is true, then the following concretion of P2 is true as well: If people
+start from a just distributional structure like, presumably, D 1 and then
+freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the distributional
+structure in the society will have changed to a new distributional structure
+D 2 .
+C2. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
+D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
+the distributional structure in the society will have changed to a new
+distributional structure D 2 ( modus ponens , P2, P5).
+P6. If C1 is true, then the following conditional is true as well: If people
+start from a just distributional structure like, presumably, D 1 and then
+freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the resulting
+distributional structure will be just.
+C3. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
+D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
+the resulting distributional structure will be just ( modus ponens ,
+C1, P6).
+Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument 257
+C4. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
+D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
+the distributional structure in the society will have changed to a new
+distributional structure D 2 and if people start from a just distributional
+structure like, presumably, D 1 and then freely transfer their
+property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the resulting distributional structure
+will be just (conjunction, C2, C3).
+P7. If C4 is true, then D 2 is just.
+C5. D 2 is just ( modus ponens , C4, P7).
+P8. If P1 is true, then D 2 is not just.
+C6. D 2 is not just ( modus ponens , P1, P8).
+C7. D 2 is just and D 2 is not just (conjunction, C5, C6).
+C8. P1 (the Equality Principle) is false ( reductio , P1 – C7).
+68
+Liberal Feminism
+Julinna C. Oxley
+Okin , Susan Moller. Justice, Gender, and the Family . New York : Basic Books ,
+1989 .
+Mill , John Stuart. The Subjection of Women , edited by Susan M . Okin,
+Indianapolis : Hackett , 1869/1988 .
+Wollstonecraft , Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman . London :
+Joseph Johnson , 1792 / London : Penguin , 2004 .
+First articulated in the late eighteenth century, liberal feminism is a political
+philosophy whose express aim is to free women from oppressive gender
+roles and achieve sexual equality (also called gender justice). Although
+women ’ s social situation changes from one generation to the next – due in
+large part to the infl uence of liberal feminists – the message of liberal feminism
+remains the same: women, as rational human beings, are deserving of
+the same social and political rights as men, and gender justice is best
+achieved by modifying existing social institutions and political systems. The
+political agenda of liberal feminism addresses present - day inequalities: early
+liberal feminists sought to gain the right to vote and equal access to education,
+while contemporary liberal feminists aim to secure equal social, political,
+and economic opportunities, equal civil liberties, and sexual freedoms.
+Perhaps the most controversial aspect of feminism is its claim that
+women are socially oppressed, especially since Western women in the
+twenty - fi rst century do not appear to be oppressed. Yet contemporary
+liberal feminists contend that society is structured in ways that favor men.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Liberal Feminism 259
+Many liberal feminists (such as Mill in the nineteenth century and Okin in
+the twentieth) argue that the primary source of woman ’ s subordination is
+her social role in the family, not just her biological role in reproduction or
+the male tendency to sexual violence (other oft - cited explanations for why
+women are the “ weaker ” sex). Since liberal feminism is the oldest version
+of feminism, it is the target of much criticism, especially by other feminists
+who argue that liberal feminists overlook differences of race, socioeconomic
+status, and sexual orientation relevant to an accurate assessment of women ’ s
+situation.
+While liberal feminism is an active political movement with a variety of
+participants, all feminists agree that the aims of liberal feminism remain
+unfulfi lled worldwide. For this reason, liberal feminism will continue to
+attract zealous adherents as well as vocal detractors.
+Marriage continues the cycle of inequality set in motion by the anticipation
+of marriage and the related sex segregation of the workplace. Partly because
+of society ’ s assumptions about gender, but also because women, on entering
+marriage, tend already to be disadvantaged members of the work force,
+married women are likely to start out with less leverage in the relationship
+than their husbands [ . . . ] In many marriages, partly because of discrimination
+at work and the wage gap between the sexes, wives (despite initial personal
+ambitions and even when they are full - time wage workers) come to perceive
+themselves as benefi ting from giving priority to their husbands ’ careers. Hence
+they have little incentive to question the traditional division of labor in the
+household. This in turn limits their own commitment to wage work and their
+incentive and leverage to challenge the gender structure of the workplace.
+Experiencing frustration and lack of control at work, those who thus turn
+toward domesticity, while often resenting the lack of respect our society gives
+to full - time mothers, may see the benefi ts of domestic life as greater than the
+costs.
+Thus, the inequalities between the sexes in the workplace and at home
+reinforce and exacerbate each other. It is not necessary to choose between
+two alternative, competing explanations of the inequalities between men and
+women in the workplace [ . . . ]. When the pivotal importance of gender -
+structured marriage and the expectation of it are acknowledged, these explanations
+can be seen, rather, as complementary reasons for women ’ s inequality.
+A cycle of power relations and decisions pervades both family and workplace,
+and the inequalities of each reinforce those that already exist in the other.
+Only with the recognition of this truth will we be able to begin to confront
+the changes that need to occur if women are to have a real opportunity to be
+equal participants in either sphere [ . . . ].
+The family is the linchpin of gender, reproducing it from one generation
+to the next [ . . . ] family life as typically practiced in our society is not just,
+either to women or to children. Moreover, it is not conducive to the rearing
+of citizens with a strong sense of justice. In spite of all the rhetoric about
+260 Julinna C. Oxley
+equality between the sexes, the traditional or quasi - traditional division of
+family labor still prevails [ . . . ]. Any just and fair solution to the urgent
+problem of women ’ s and children ’ s vulnerability must encourage and facilitate
+the equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive
+and reproductive labor [ . . . ]. A just future would be one without gender.
+(Okin, 146 – 71)
+P1. If a society is just and fair to women, then men and women will have
+equal social, political, and economic rights, liberties, and
+opportunities.
+P2. But in many Western societies, men and women do not have equal
+social, political, and economic rights, liberties, and opportunities.
+C1. Many Western societies are not just and fair to women ( modus
+tollens , P1, P2).
+P3. If a society is to be just and fair to women, then it ought not promote
+or engage in practices that contribute to women ’ s oppression.
+P4. If a society does not promote or engage in practices that contribute to
+women ’ s oppression, then its social, political, and legal institutions
+should be modifi ed so as to eradicate features that contribute to women ’ s
+oppression.
+C2. If a society is to be just and fair to women, then [Western] societies
+that seek gender justice should modify social, political, and legal
+institutions and eradicate features that contribute to women ’ s disadvantage
+(hypothetical syllogism, P3, P4).
+The Nature of Women ’ s Disadvantage and Oppression
+P1. If men and women do not spend the same amount of time performing
+domestic duties or doing unpaid labor in the home (including cooking,
+cleaning, raising children, etc.), then there will be an unequal distribution
+of labor in the family.
+P2. In a traditional family, men and women do not spend the same amount
+of time performing unpaid labor in the home – women perform most of
+the domestic duties.
+C1. There is an unequal distribution of unpaid labor in the traditional
+family ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If there is an unequal distribution of unpaid labor in the family, then
+this situation is unjust to women because the work is assigned in virtue
+of individual innate characteristics, and has long - term repercussions that
+make the woman vulnerable.
+C2. The traditional family is unjust to women because the work is
+assigned in virtue of individual innate characteristics, and has long -
+Liberal Feminism 261
+term repercussions that make the woman vulnerable ( modus ponens ,
+P3, C1).
+The Source of Women ’ s Disadvantage and Oppression
+P2. (repeated): In a traditional family, men and women do not spend the
+same amount of time performing domestic duties – women perform most
+of the domestic duties.
+P5. Women perform the majority of domestic duties because men expect
+women to do most of the work in the home and are reluctant to contribute
+to household labor. These expectations inform the “ gendered
+structure ” of the family (causal reasoning for P2).
+P6. If women spend more time working in the home than men, then they
+have less time to take advantage of opportunities to advance in the
+workplace than men do.
+C3. Women have less time and thus fewer opportunities to advance in
+the workplace ( modus ponens , P6, P2).
+P7. If women have less time and thus fewer opportunities to advance in the
+workplace as men, they do not have equality of opportunity in social
+and political life.
+C4. Women do not have equality of opportunity in social and political
+life ( modus ponens , P7, C3).
+P8. Women will have equality of opportunity in social and political life only
+if they do not perform the majority of the unpaid labor in the home
+(implied by P5 – C4).
+P9. For women not to perform a majority of the unpaid labor in the home,
+then men will have to be responsible for at least half of domestic duties
+(by defi nition).
+C5. If domestic duties are defi ned by the “ gendered structure ” of the
+family, then men are not responsible for at least half of domestic duties
+(substitution, P5, P9).
+C6. When men are not responsible for at least half of the domestic duties
+(the “ gendered structure ” of the traditional family), then women
+cannot achieve equality of opportunity in social and political life
+( modus ponens , P5, C5).
+Achieving Gender Justice
+P10. Gender roles, including norms and expectations regarding men ’ s and
+women ’ s roles in the family and in society, are learned in the family.
+262 Julinna C. Oxley
+P11. If children are raised in traditional “ gender - structured ” families where
+women lack power and independence, then the children learn that inequalities
+between men and women are the norm and that they can be
+expected in social life (follows from P10).
+P12. Many children are now raised in traditional “ gender - structured ” families
+where women are vulnerable because they lack power and
+independence.
+C7. Many children will learn that inequalities between men and women
+are the norm, and that they can be expected in social life ( modus
+ponens , P11, P12).
+P13. If many children will learn that inequalities between men and women
+are the norm and that they can be expected in social life, then when they
+grow up and start their own families, many people will perpetuate the
+idea that inequalities between men and women are the norm and that
+this can be expected in social life (i.e., the cycle of inequality).
+C8. When they grow up and start their own families, many people will
+perpetuate the idea that inequalities between men and women are the
+norm and that this can be expected in social life (i.e., the cycle of
+inequality) ( modus ponens , P13, C7).
+P14. A just and fair society seeks to eradicate inequality in its existing
+institutions, especially ones that perpetuate inequality.
+P15. If the family is a social institution, then it should be an egalitarian
+structure.
+P16. If the family is to be an egalitarian structure, then men and women
+will share equally the paid and unpaid work, productive and reproductive
+labor.
+C9. If the family is a social institution, then men and women in the family
+will share equally the paid and unpaid work, productive and reproductive
+labor (hypothetical syllogism, P15, P16).
+P17. The family is a social institution.
+C10. A just society will encourage and facilitate the equal sharing by
+men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and reproductive
+labor ( modus ponens , C9, P17).
+P18. If a just society encourages and facilitates the equal sharing by men
+and women of paid and unpaid work, and of productive and reproductive
+labor, then it will do so by eliminating traditional gender roles and
+their corresponding expectations regarding work and family life.
+C11. A just society will eliminate traditional gender roles and their corresponding
+expectations regarding work and family life; for example,
+by passing social policies that facilitate equally shared parenting,
+reorganizing work life to make parenting a priority, and educating
+children regarding the problems with gender stereotyping ( modus
+ponens , P18, C10).
+69
+Moral Status of Animals from
+Marginal Cases
+Julia Tanner
+Bernstein , Mark . “ Marginal Cases and Moral Relevance . ” Journal of Social
+Philosophy 33 , 4 ( 2002 ): 523 – 39 .
+Narveson , Jan. “ Animal Rights . ” Canadian Journal of Philosophy VII
+( 1977 ): 161 – 78 .
+Porphyry . On Abstinence from Animal Food , translated by Thomas Taylor.
+London : Centaur Press , 1965 .
+Singer , Peter . Animal Liberation . London : Pimlico , 1995 .
+It matters a great deal whether animals have moral status. If animals have
+moral status, it may be wrong for us to use them as we currently do –
+hunting, farming, eating, and experimenting on them. The argument from
+marginal cases provides us with a reason to think that some animals have
+moral status that is equal to that of “ marginal ” humans.
+Many of those who deny that animals have moral status argue that moral
+status depends on rational agency or the ability to use language or some
+other capacity/capacities that only humans have. There are many such
+capacities, so I shall use capacity X to stand in for them all.
+But pinning moral status on X (rational agency or any capacity that is
+typical of normal adult humans) is problematic. Not all humans will have
+X (not all humans are normal adult humans). There are some humans,
+known as marginal humans, who do not possess, or do not fully possess,
+X. The reason that such humans are called “ marginal cases ” is that they
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+264 Julia Tanner
+are atypical insofar as they do not possess the all - important capacity X.
+There are, broadly speaking, three types of marginal humans: pre - X – they
+have yet to acquire X, such as children; post - X – they have permanently
+lost X due to illness, accident, or old age; and non - X – they do not, never
+have had, and never will have X.
+Those who argue that moral status depends on X are, therefore, faced
+with a dilemma. Either, they must admit that marginal humans lack moral
+status because they lack X, or they must concede that moral status depends
+on something other than X (I will call this “ Z ” ). But some animals will also
+have Z. Thus, it must be conceded that those animals (with Z) have moral
+status too. This is the argument from marginal cases.
+The argument from marginal cases has roots in ancient Greece. Porphyry
+was the fi rst to make it (III. 19). But the term “ argument from marginal
+cases ” was coined more recently by Narveson (an opponent of the argument)
+(164). Peter Singer gives one of the earliest contemporary formulations
+(see below). Following Singer ’ s version is a generic version of the
+argument.
+[H]uman beings are not equal [ . . . ] if we seek some characteristic that all
+of them possess [ . . . it] must be a kind of lowest common denominator,
+pitched so low that no human being lacks it. The catch is that any such
+characteristic [ . . . ] possessed by all human beings will not be possessed only
+by human beings. (Singer, 237)
+P1. If there is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and
+some nonhuman animals, then if marginal humans have moral status, so
+do some nonhuman animals.
+P2. There is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and
+some nonhuman animals.
+C1. If marginal humans have moral status, then so do some nonhuman
+animals ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. Marginal humans have moral status.
+C2. Some nonhuman animals have moral status ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+70
+The Ethical Vegetarianism
+Argument
+Robert L. Muhlnickel
+Bentham , Jeremy. The Classical Utilitarians , edited by J. Troyer . Indianapolis :
+Hackett , 2003 .
+DeGrazia , David . Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status .
+Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1996 .
+Rachels , James . “ The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism , ” in The Legacy of
+Socrates , edited by S. Rachels , 3 – 15 . New York : Columbia University
+Press , 2007 .
+Singer , Peter. “ All Animals Are Equal . ” Philosophical Exchange 1 , 5 ( 1974 ):
+103 – 16 . Reprinted in Unsanctifying Human Life , edited by H. Kuhse .
+Oxford : Blackwell , 2002 .
+___. Animal Liberation . New York : Harper Perennial , 2009 .
+The ethics of relations between human and nonhuman animals is a minor
+topic in the history of Western moral philosophy. Philosophers have given
+it more attention since the 1970s, when Peter Singer ’ s work prompted much
+thinking about the interests of nonhuman animals. Singer ’ s signature claim
+is that the same interests of nonhuman animals and humans deserve the
+same degree of moral consideration. At the time, he pressed the analogy
+with contemporary liberation movements, saying that nonhuman animals
+were unfairly denied moral status just as women and people of color had
+been unfairly denied moral status. However, Singer ’ s judgments of social
+status and claims of oppression contribute less to its philosophical merit
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+266 Robert L. Muhlnickel
+than the impetus he gave to re - thinking the criteria of basic moral status.
+The argument presented here makes claims about moral status explicit.
+This argument has had more infl uence among nonphilosophers than any
+philosophical argument of the past fi fty years, with the possible exceptions
+of John Rawls ’ A Theory of Justice and Thomas Kuhn ’ s The Structure of
+Scientifi c Revolutions (#90). Although the argument concludes that vegetarianism
+is morally required, the considerations adduced in its premises
+can be extended to moral judgments about using nonhuman animals in
+research, manufacturing, entertainment, and companionship.
+The argument for ethical vegetarianism starts by asserting that the ability
+to suffer is the ground of basic moral consideration. A being deserves basic
+moral consideration if it deserves consideration for its own sake. In contrast,
+something deserves derivative moral consideration if it deserves consideration
+for the sake of something else. The Ethical Vegetarianism
+Argument aims to show that nonhuman animals deserve basic moral
+consideration.
+A being deserves basic moral consideration just in case we are morally
+required to take its interests into account when deliberating about what to
+do. The ability to suffer is roughly co - extensive with sentience, the capacity
+to experience pain, pleasure, and frustration and satisfaction of desires.
+Anything that deserves basic moral consideration is said to have interests.
+If so, then any being that can suffer has an interest in avoiding suffering.
+Things that cannot suffer might merit derivative moral consideration even
+when they do not merit consideration for their own sakes.
+Knowing that a being deserves moral consideration is necessary but not
+suffi cient for moral judgment. In addition, we need to know how various
+beings ’ interests stand in relation to one another. The Equal Consideration
+of Interests Principle is an independent premise telling us that interests
+themselves are equal, regardless of the kind of being that has the interests.
+Thus, the Equal Consideration of Interests Principle asserts that the criterion
+of moral consideration, the ability to suffer, applies to both nonhuman
+and human animals. Thus, the same suffering ought to have the same weight
+in judging the rightness or wrongness of our actions, whether a human
+nonhuman animal experiences that suffering.
+The argument derives C3 from P4 and P5, concluding that causing a
+being to suffer without adequate justifi cation is morally wrong. P6 and P7
+apply the Equal Consideration of Interests Principle, stated in P3, and C3
+to eating meat, concluding that doing so is morally wrong. The premises
+introduce the factual claims that industrial production of meat involves
+confi ning, killing, and causing animals to experience pain and that by eating
+meat one participates in confi ning, killing, and causing pain.
+Singer ’ s earliest statement of the argument is his “ All Animals Are
+Equal, ” published in 1974 in Philosophical Exchange . The journal is not
+The Ethical Vegetarianism Argument 267
+widely available, but the article is frequently anthologized. The quotation
+below is from Singer ’ s Unsanctifying Human Life.
+If a being suffers, there can be no moral justifi cation for refusing to take
+that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the
+principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the
+like suffering – insofar as rough comparisons can be made – of any other
+being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or
+happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of
+sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand
+for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only
+defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this
+boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to
+mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like
+skin color?
+The racist violates the principles of equality by giving greater weight to
+the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their
+interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly, the speciesist
+allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of
+members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case. Most humans
+are speciesists. I shall now briefl y describe some of the practices that show
+this.
+For the great majority of human beings, especially in urban, industrialized
+societies, the most direct form of contact with members of other species is at
+mealtimes: we eat them. In doing so we treat them purely as means to our
+ends. We regard their life and well - being as subordinate to our taste for a
+particular kind of dish. I say “ taste ” deliberately – this is purely a matter of
+pleasing our palate. There can be no defense of eating fl esh in terms of satisfying
+nutritional needs, since it has been established beyond doubt that we could
+satisfy our need for protein and other essential nutrients far more effi ciently
+with a diet that replaced animal fl esh by soy beans, or products derived from
+soy beans, and other high - protein vegetable products.
+It is not merely the act of killing that indicates what we are ready to do
+to other species in order to gratify our tastes. The suffering we infl ict on the
+animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer indication of our speciesism
+than the fact that we are prepared to kill them. (84 – 5)
+P1. If a being can suffer, then that being ’ s interests merit moral
+consideration.
+P2. If a being cannot suffer, then that being ’ s interests do not merit moral
+consideration.
+C1. If a being ’ s interests merit moral consideration, then that being can
+suffer (transposition, P2).
+C2. A being ’ s interests merit moral consideration if and only if that being
+can suffer (material equivalence, P1, C1).
+268 Robert L. Muhlnickel
+P3. The same interests merit the same moral consideration, regardless of
+what kind of being is the interest - bearer (equal consideration of interests
+principle).
+P4. If one causes a being to suffer without adequate justifi cation, then one
+violates that being ’ s interests.
+P5. If one violates a being ’ s interests, then one does what is morally wrong.
+C3. If one causes a being to suffer without adequate justifi cation, then
+one does what is morally wrong (hypothetical syllogism, P4, P5).
+P6. If P3, then if one kills, confi nes, or causes nonhuman animals to experience
+pain in order to use them as food, then one causes them to suffer
+without adequate justifi cation.
+P7. If one eats meat, then one participates in killing, confi ning, and causing
+nonhuman animals to experience pain in order to use them as food.
+C4. If one eats meat, then one causes nonhuman animals to suffer
+without adequate justifi cation (hypothetical syllogism, P6, P7).
+C5. If one eats meat, the one does what is morally wrong (hypothetical
+syllogism, C3, C4).
+71
+Thomson and the Famous
+Violinist
+Leslie Burkholder
+Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defense of Abortion . ” Philosophy and Public
+Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
+“ A Defense of Abortion . ” Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_
+Defense_of_Abortion (accessed April 20, 2011 )
+There are many sources of opposition to abortion. Sometimes this opposition
+is based on thinking like the following: abortion results in the death
+of the fetus. But a fetus is a human being or person and all human beings,
+no matter what their age, have a moral right to continued life. So an abortion
+infringes on the right to continued life of a person, a human being. Of
+course the mother has rights too. She has a right to control what is done
+with and to her own body. Her having an abortion would be an exercise
+of this right. But the right to continued life is surely more important than
+anyone ’ s right to control what is done to his body. So, even though the
+mother has this right, its exercise or use to have an abortion wrongfully
+violates another person ’ s – the fetus ’ – right to continued life. This means
+that an abortion may not be done. It is ethically impermissible.
+According to Judith Thomson, if this argument is deductively sound – if
+it is deductively valid with all true premises – then in the following imaginary
+case it would be morally impermissible to detach yourself from the
+famous violinist.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+270 Leslie Burkholder
+You wake up in the morning and fi nd yourself back to back in bed with
+an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found
+to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed
+all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right
+blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the
+violinist ’ s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can
+be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director
+of the hospital now tells you, “ Look, we ’ re sorry the Society of Music Lovers
+did this to you – we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still,
+they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would
+be to kill him. But never mind, it ’ s only for nine months. By then he will have
+recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you. ” Is it
+morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be
+very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to
+it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if
+the director of the hospital says, “ Tough luck. I agree, but now you ’ ve got to
+stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life.
+Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are
+persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your
+body, but a person ’ s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens
+in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him. ” I imagine
+you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is
+wrong with that plausible - sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago.
+(Thomson, 48)
+Thomson further says that you obviously have no moral obligation to
+stay attached to the violinist. The violinist is a human, and so she has a
+right to continued life, just as the fetus does. But that is not enough to prove
+that you may not have yourself detached. You can volunteer to stay attached
+and save the life of the violinist, but you are not ethically required to do
+this.
+P1. All abortions are acts resulting in the death of some fetus.
+P2. All acts resulting in the death of some fetus result in the death of some
+human being, person.
+P3. Any act resulting in the death of some human being, person, is an
+infringement of the right to continued life of some person, human being.
+C1. If A is an abortion, then A results in the death of some fetus (universal
+instantiation, P1).
+C2. If A results in the death of some fetus, then A results in the death
+of some human being, a person (universal instantiation, P2).
+C3. If A results in the death of some human being, person, then A is an
+infringement of the right to continued life of some person, human
+being (universal instantiation, P3).
+Thomson and the Famous Violinist 271
+C4. If A is an abortion, then A results in the death of some human being,
+a person (hypothetical syllogism, C1, C2).
+C5. If A is an abortion, then A is an infringement of the right to continued
+life of some person, human being (hypothetical syllogism, C3,
+C4).
+C6. All abortions are infringement of the right to continued life of some
+person, human being (universal generalization, C5).
+P4. All abortions are exercises of the mother ’ s right to control of her own
+body.
+P5. All exercises of the mother ’ s right to control of her own body are exercises
+of some person ’ s right to control of her own body.
+C7. If A is an abortion, then A is an infringement of the right to continued
+life of some person, human being (universal instantiation, C6).
+C8. If A is an abortion, then A is an exercise of the mother ’ s right to
+control of her own body (universal instantiation, P4).
+C9. If A is an exercise of the mother ’ s right to control of her own body,
+then A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to control of her own
+body (universal instantiation, P5).
+C10. If A is an abortion, then A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to
+control of her own body (hypothetical syllogism, C8, C9).
+C11. Not A is an abortion or A is an infringement of the right to continued
+life of some person, human being (implication, C7).
+C12. Not A is an abortion or A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to
+control of her own body (material implication, C10).
+C13. Both not A is an abortion or A is an infringement of the right to
+continued life of some person, and not A is an abortion or A is an
+exercise of some person ’ s right to control of her own body (conjunction,
+C12, C11).
+C14. Not A is an abortion or both A is an infringement of the right to
+continued life of some person, human being and A is an exercise of
+some person ’ s right to control of her own body (distribution, C13).
+C15. If A is an abortion, then both A is an infringement of the right to
+continued life of some person, human being, and A is an exercise of some
+person ’ s right to control of her own body (material implication, C14)
+P6. All acts that are an infringement of the right to continued life of some
+person, human being, and exercise of some person ’ s right to control of
+her own body are wrongful infringements of the right to continued life
+of some person, human being, and may not be done.
+C16. If A is an infringement of the right to continued life of some person,
+human being, and A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to control
+of her own body, then A is wrongful infringement of the right to
+continued life of some person, human being, and may not be done
+(universal instantiation, P6).
+272 Leslie Burkholder
+C17. If A is an abortion, then A is wrongful infringement of the right to
+continued life of some person, human being, and may not be done
+(hypothetical syllogism, C15, C16).
+C18. No abortion may not be done. All abortions are ethically impermissible
+(universal generalization, C17).
+Thomson ’ s argument against the argument above is deductively valid. So
+if its premises are both true, then its conclusion must be true. That would
+mean that the reasoning against abortion – the reasoning that says abortion
+is immoral and may not be done – would be unsound. But that reasoning
+is deductively valid. So if both the premises in Thomson ’ s reasoning are
+true, at least one of the premises in the argument opposing abortion is false.
+It is pretty easy to see which one or ones that must be. It is premise P6.
+The fact that you may detach yourself in the imaginary case of the famous
+violinist shows that the rule stated in premise P6 is not true – someone else ’ s
+right to life does not always outweigh the right to control what is done to
+your own body.
+Not everyone accepts that the premises in Thomson ’ s argument are both
+true. Some writers think you cannot detach yourself. In that case, premise
+P2 in Thomson ’ s own argument would be false. Some others say that the
+conditional in premise P1 in her reasoning is false. The reasoning against
+abortion is sound, and yet you may detach yourself from the violinist. This
+is because there is some morally important difference between the case of
+a mother ’ s aborting a fetus inside her and your detaching the violinist.
+P1. If the reasoning opposing abortion is deductively sound, then you may
+not detach yourself from the famous violinist.
+P2. You are allowed to detach yourself from the violinist. You are not ethically
+required to stay attached.
+C. The reasoning opposing abortion is not deductively sound ( modus
+tollens , P1, P2).
+72
+Marquis and the Immorality
+of Abortion
+Leslie Burkholder
+Marquis , Don . “ Why Abortion Is Immoral . ” The Journal of Philosophy 86
+( 1989 ): 183 – 202 .
+Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defense of Abortion . ” Philosophy and Public
+Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
+According to Don Marquis, abortions are impermissible because of the
+following line of reasoning. Surely, sometimes killing a particular adult or
+child is wrong, seriously wrong. Probably, for example, killing you or me
+or your little brother right now would be wrong. What makes the killing
+so wrong, what explains its wrongness, is that it causes the loss of all the
+future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would be had
+by you or me or your little brother, and this loss is one of the greatest losses
+that can be suffered. But if that explanation is correct, then anything that
+causes the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
+is seriously wrong. Abortions of a healthy fetus cause just this loss. They
+cause the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
+the fetus would have were it not aborted. So abortions are not just ethically
+wrong but seriously wrong.
+Marquis ’ argument is deductively valid. This means that if anything is
+wrong with the reasoning, one or more of its premises must be false. If they
+are all true, the conclusion would also have to be true. One premise that
+seems to be false is premise 3. It is a conditional. For it to be false, all that
+would need to happen is that the antecedent be true and the consequent be
+false. The antecedent in premise 3 is the consequent in premise 2. So it is
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+274 Leslie Burkholder
+easy to work out that it should be true. What about the consequent of
+premise 3? Look at the chapter in this volume examining Judy Thomson ’ s
+famous violinist imaginary case (#71). Detaching yourself from the violinist
+would end all that individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and
+enjoyments. But would it be wrong for you to detach yourself? If not, then
+the consequent of premise 3 is false.
+What makes it wrong? Here ’ s one central thing: killing us deprives us of
+the value of our future. It deprives us not only of what we value now and
+would have, given our current predilections, valued later, but also of what we
+would have come to value. (190)
+P1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
+wrong.
+P2. What makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this individual ’ s
+future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments, and this loss is
+one of the greatest losses that can be suffered.
+C1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
+wrong, and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all
+this individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments,
+and this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered
+(conjunction, P1, P2).
+P3. If killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
+wrong and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this
+individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments and
+this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered, then anything
+that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences, activities,
+projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong.
+C2. Anything that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences,
+activities, projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong ( modus
+ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. All aborting of any healthy fetus would cause the loss to that individual
+of all its future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments.
+C3. If A causes to individual F the loss of all future experiences, activities,
+projects, and enjoyments, then A is seriously wrong (particular
+instantiation, C2).
+C4. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A causes to individual F
+the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
+(particular instantiation, P4).
+C5. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A is seriously wrong
+(hypothetical syllogism, C3, C4).
+C6. All aborting of any healthy fetus is seriously wrong (universal generalization,
+C5).
+73
+Tooley on Abortion
+and Infanticide
+Ben Saunders
+Tooley , Michael . “ Abortion and Infanticide . ” Philosophy & Public Affairs 2
+( 1972 ): 37 – 65 .
+___. Abortion and Infanticide . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1983 .
+Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defence of Abortion . ” Philosophy & Public
+Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
+Abortion is understandably one of the more controversial ethical questions
+facing philosophers. Most refuse to take a stance on whether the fetus is a
+person. Thompson, for example, grants to her opponent that the fetus is
+indeed a person, but argues that abortion is nonetheless permissible, since
+one shouldn ’ t be required to suffer great hardship for nine months in order
+to keep someone else alive.
+Tooley argues that the fetus is not a person and nor in fact is a young
+infant. The argument depends on distinguishing between “ human being ”
+(which is a merely descriptive biological category) and “ person ” (which
+depends on self - awareness and implies a right to life). It is possible that not
+all persons are human – for instance, chimpanzees or dolphins may have
+the right to life – and that not all humans are persons; for instance, those
+in a persistent vegetative state. While the fetus or infant is undeniably
+human, Tooley argues that it does not acquire a right to life until it becomes
+self - aware. Before this point, it is permissible to kill the infant, even after
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+276 Ben Saunders
+it is born. Tooley rejects the ideas that species membership or the mere fact
+of being born make any difference to an entity ’ s rights, and he also argues
+that the mere potentiality of personhood is not suffi cient to ground rights,
+since it would be permissible to kill a kitten that was going to become a
+person provided that one did so before it actually became a person.
+The argument is important because it has implications not only for abortion
+but other areas such as our treatment of animals. The conclusion is
+obviously controversial, but that makes it all the more interesting if it can
+be established from the premises. It is unclear that it can, however, since it
+could be questioned whether the capacity to desire an object is, as Tooley
+suggests, a necessary condition for having a right to that object. If not, then
+he only succeeds in showing that fetuses and young infants do not satisfy
+certain suffi cient conditions for a right to life (they are not persons and their
+mere potential for personhood is not itself suffi cient to ground a right to
+life), but not that fetuses and young infants cannot have a right to life for
+other reasons.
+An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept
+of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and
+believes that it is itself such a continuing entity [ … ] [A] newborn baby does
+not possess the concept of a continuing self, any more than a newborn kitten
+possess such a concept. If so, infanticide during the time interval shortly after
+birth must be morally acceptable. (Tooley “ Abortion, ” 62 – 3)
+P1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to want X.
+P2. If A is able to want X, then A must be able to conceive of X.
+C1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to conceive
+of X (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
+P3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot conceive of their continuing
+as subjects of mental states.
+C2. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot want their continuing as
+subjects of mental states ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
+C3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals do not have morally serious
+rights to continue as subjects of mental states ( modus tollens , P1, C2).
+P4. If something does not have a morally serious right to life, then it is not
+wrong to kill it painlessly.
+C4. It is not wrong to kill fetuses, young infants, and animals painlessly
+( modus ponens , C3, P4).
+74
+Rachels on Euthanasia
+Leslie Burkholder
+Rachels , James . “ Active and Passive Euthanasia , ” New England Journal of
+Medicine 292 ( 1975 ): 78 – 80 .
+Beauchamp , Tom L. “ A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia , ”
+in Medical Responsibility , edited by Wade L. Robison and Michael S.
+Pritchard , 182 – 94 . Clifton, NJ : The Humana Press , 1979 .
+Foot , Philippa . “ Killing and Letting Die , ” in Abortion: Moral and Legal
+Perspectives , edited by James L. Garfi eld and Paul Hennessey , 177 – 85 .
+Amherst, MA : University of Massachusetts Press , 1984 .
+Perrett , Roy W. “ Killing, Letting Die, and the Bare Difference Argument , ”
+Bioethics 10 ( 1996 ): 131 – 9 .
+Active euthanasia happens when a medical professional or another kind of
+person deliberately does something that causes a person to die. Passive
+euthanasia, on the other hand, occurs when someone dies because medical
+professionals or others don ’ t do something needed to keep the patient alive.
+This might include not starting a treatment that would prevent the person ’ s
+death or not continuing with a procedure or treatment that is keeping a
+person or animal alive.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+278 Leslie Burkholder
+Many medical professionals and others think that active euthanasia, even
+when it is done at the request of the person who dies, is morally wrong.
+They also think that passive euthanasia is morally right, at least when it is
+done following the wishes of the person who dies. This idea that the two
+are ethically different is refl ected in the law in many countries. The law
+makes it a crime to commit active euthanasia but not a crime to perform
+passive euthanasia when the person who dies doesn ’ t want to be kept alive.
+Is this idea about the ethical difference between active and passive euthanasia
+sound? According to Rachels ’ argument, it isn ’ t.
+One reason why so many people think that there is an important moral
+difference between active and passive euthanasia is that they think killing
+someone is morally worse than letting someone die. But is it? Is killing, in
+itself, worse than letting die? To investigate this issue, two cases may be considered
+that are exactly alike except that one involves killing whereas the other
+involves letting someone die. Then, it can be asked whether this difference
+makes any difference to the moral assessments. It is important that the cases
+be exactly alike, except for this one difference, since otherwise one cannot be
+confi dent that it is this difference and not some other that accounts for any
+variation in the assessments of the two cases. So, let us consider this pair of
+cases:
+In the fi rst, Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should
+happen to his six - year - old cousin. One evening while the child is taking his
+bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child, and then arranges
+things so that it will look like an accident.
+In the second, Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen to his
+six - year - old cousin. Like Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to drown the child
+in his bath. However, just as he enters the bathroom Jones sees the child slip
+and hit his head, and fall face down in the water. Jones is delighted; he stands
+by, ready to push the child ’ s head back under if it is necessary, but it is not
+necessary. With only a little thrashing about, the child drowns all by himself,
+“ accidentally, ” as Jones watches and does nothing.
+Now Smith killed the child, whereas Jones “ merely ” let the child die. That
+is the only difference between them. Did either man behave better, from a
+moral point of view? If the difference between killing and letting die were in
+itself a morally important matter, one should say that Jones ’ s behavior was
+less reprehensible than Smith ’ s. But does one really want to say that? I think
+not. In the fi rst place, both men acted from the same motive, personal gain,
+and both had exactly the same end in view when they acted. It may be inferred
+from Smith ’ s conduct that he is a bad man, although that judgment may be
+withdrawn or modifi ed if certain further facts are learned about him – for
+example, that he is mentally deranged. But would not the very same thing be
+inferred about Jones from his conduct? And would not the same further
+considerations also be relevant to any, modifi cation of this judgment?
+Moreover, suppose Jones pleaded, in his own defense, “ After all, I didn ’ t do
+anything except just stand there and watch the child drown. I didn ’ t kill him;
+Rachels on Euthanasia 279
+I only let him die. ” Again, if letting die were in itself less bad than killing,
+this defense should have at least some weight. But it does not. Such a
+“ defense ” can only be regarded as a grotesque perversion of moral reasoning.
+Morally speaking, it is no defense at all. [ … ] I have argued that killing is not
+in itself any worse than letting die; if my contention is right, it follows that
+active euthanasia is not any worse than passive euthanasia. (Rachels,
+78 – 80)
+P1. Smith ’ s killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ s letting the child die except
+that Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die.
+P2. What Smith did is morally as bad as what Jones did.
+P3. If killing in itself is morally worse than letting die and Smith ’ s killing
+the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child die except that Smith kills
+someone and Jones allows someone to die, then Smith ’ s behavior should
+be more reprehensible than Jones ’ .
+C1. Not both killing in itself is morally worse than letting die and Smith ’ s
+killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child die except that
+Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die ( modus tollens ,
+P2, P3).
+C2. Not killing in itself is morally worse than letting die or not Smith ’ s
+killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ s letting the child die except that
+Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die (De Morgan ’ s,
+C1).
+C3. Not not Smith ’ s killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child
+die except that Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die
+(double negation, P1).
+C4. Killing is not in itself morally worse than letting die (disjunctive
+syllogism, C2, C3).
+P4. If there is an important moral difference between active and passive
+euthanasia, then killing someone is morally worse than letting someone
+die.
+C5. Active euthanasia is not any worse – ethically speaking – than passive
+euthanasia ( modus tollens , P4, C4).
+There is some ambiguity in the way some parts of the argument are
+stated. Formalizing the statements in a language for quantifi ed fi rst - order
+logic would bring out these ambiguities. For example, the fi nal conclusion
+could mean that active euthanasia is never ethically worse than passive
+euthanasia, or it could mean that active euthanasia is not always ethically
+worse than passive euthanasia. It is pretty clear that Rachels has in the mind
+the second of these two. Again, the intermediate conclusion C1 might mean
+that killing is never ethically worse than otherwise identical instances of
+letting die. But Rachels does not intend this. All that he means is that killing
+is not always worse, morally speaking, than similar cases of letting die.
+280 Leslie Burkholder
+So long as these ambiguities are removed in a consistent way, this argument
+is deductively valid. So if there is anything wrong with the reasoning,
+it must be that one or more of the premises are false. If the ambiguities are
+not cleared up in the same way, then the argument will turn out to be
+invalid.
+Part V
+Philosophy of Mind
+75
+Leibniz ’ Argument for
+Innate Ideas
+Byron Kaldis
+Leibniz , G. W. Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays , edited and
+translated by Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew. Indianapolis : Hackett ,
+1991 .
+___. New Essays on Human Understanding , edited and translated by Peter
+Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
+Press , 1996 .
+___. Philosophical Papers and Letters , edited and translated by L.E. Loemker,
+2nd edn . Kluwer : Dordrecht , 1969 .
+The importance of ideas, the cardinal building block in modern philosophy
+’ s theory of knowledge, can hardly be exaggerated. Equally important
+and vehement was the seventeenth - century debate over the status of certain
+principal ideas and special truths as either innate or not. Innatists and their
+opponents crisscross the dichotomy of rationalists/empiricists. A mental
+item can be innate in the sense of not acquired from extra - mental sources
+but also in the sense of discovered as stored in the mind since birth; obviously
+these two are not necessarily equivalent defi nitions. Nativists have
+standardly been distinguished between those who claim that the mind is
+actually aware of innate ideas and the more sophisticated ones, so - called
+dispositional innatists, such as Leibniz, who hold that the mind has the
+disposition or tendency to excavate certain ideas or principles it employs
+unconsciously or contains potentially.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+284 Byron Kaldis
+Leibniz, even more than Descartes before him, redrafts the issue of
+innateness by removing it from its ancient preoccupation with psychological
+origins only and redirects its emphasis mainly on the question of what the
+mind must be furnished with, seen that it, and not the senses, can access
+with remarkable epistemic success the modal status of necessary and universal
+truths.
+Though not the only or the fi rst champion of innate ideas in particular
+or of innate knowledge in general, Leibniz is the most intriguing and most
+vociferous defender of nativism (or innatism), both on the basis of his deep
+metaphysics as well as in terms of an argumentative strategy containing
+syllogisms designed specifi cally at rebutting Locke ’ s well - known attack on
+nativism and the latter ’ s attempt to reinstate the doctrine of the mind as a
+tabula rasa . The former, the metaphysical theses, are primarily found in
+Leibniz ’ Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and other early metaphysical
+writings, while the latter, the syllogisms, are found in his celebrated
+Nouveaux essais [ NE ] in dialogue format (published posthumously in 1765
+but composed around 1704 – 5), having Locke personally as their target and
+imaginary interlocutor. Leibniz ’ overall rationalist position aims at establishing
+that the validity of necessary truths in pure mathematics, metaphysics,
+logic, and even ethics, natural theology, and natural jurisprudence,
+cannot be proven in any other way but a priori or by means of reasoning
+only; that is, by what he calls the “ natural light. ” In fact, the latter, innate
+natural reason that distinguishes humans from beasts is equivalent to the
+power of the understanding innate to us, or what comes to the same thing,
+of the “ self. ” Hence, we have Leibniz ’ famed modifi cation of the classic
+scholastic motto, “ nihil est in intellectu quod prius fuerit in sensu , ” into
+“ There is nothing in the understanding which has not come from the senses,
+except the understanding itself, or the one who understands ” ( Philosophical
+Papers , 549; emphasis added). This rich sense of “ self ” structured as containing
+fundamental notions, the so - called “ intellectual ideas, ” of being,
+substance, unity, possibility, change, action, and so on, is deployed repeatedly
+by Leibniz in order to yield the innateness of these notions, being, after
+all, the ingredients of our self (hence “ we are innate to ourselves ” in this
+sense, too). So the possession of certain privileged intellectual ideas together
+with our epistemic access to the modal status of necessary truths, both
+unavailable by means of sense perception or induction, license belief in their
+innateness.
+In his purely metaphysical mood where Leibniz goes as far as to maintain
+that, strictly, all ideas must be innate, his principal aim is to safeguard the
+immateriality of the mind and its cognitive autonomy or self - suffi ciency.
+The mind, being a monad without any windows, cannot thereby receive
+any ideas from the outside by means of the senses. Infl ux of any sort is
+proscribed throughout Leibnizean metaphysics or physics, properly named
+Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 285
+“ dynamics ” ; in a strict metaphysical sense, no created substance has any
+real infl uence upon any other. Although in the case of material things,
+mechanistic explanations in terms of transmission of infl uence (causation)
+may be acceptable since the things involved in such a causal contact are not
+real substantial unities; metaphysically speaking, this cannot be admissible,
+for genuine substances are real (i.e., self - enclosed) unities. At the same time,
+metaphysical theses such as the one just presented or that all substance
+whatsoever that is a genuine unity is essentially characterized by an inherent
+primary force or entelechy constantly operating – that is, it is perpetually
+acting or never without originating activity or “ endeavor ” (and therefore
+never comes into existence by generation nor goes out of extinction completely)
+– all such theses are constantly at the background or foreground in
+Leibniz ’ argumentative tactics in the Nouveaux essais. It must therefore be
+underlined that the earlier strictly metaphysical theses are never deactivated
+in the later Nouveaux essais , even when Leibniz is advancing arguments
+only in an epistemic or psychological vein.
+Crucial to understanding Leibniz ’ nativism, avoiding making him sound
+unpalatable, is the particular manner in which he conceives of “ thinking, ”
+“ idea, ” and the unconscious in dispositional terms. For him, to learn something
+does not preclude it from being innate: Leibniz resists as invalid the
+entailment from “ something is learned ” to “ it is not innate. ” Following
+Descartes but going one step further, Leibniz is prepared to bite the bullet
+and answer charges against the triviality or emptiness of any explanation
+that takes recourse to potentialities or dispositions. First, Leibniz never
+admits scholastic “ bare faculties ” – that is, mere potentiality or possibility
+– dismissing them as fi ctions. By contrast, active force or entelechy, inherent
+in substance, contains in itself a certain effort, “ conatus, ” or “ endeavor, ”
+striving toward actualization. In the particular case of the activity of the
+mind, this generic thesis is translated into the specifi c one whereby there is
+always a mental tendency to actualize the awareness of innate notions. In
+other words, the mind is never idle in the sense of having a mere “ faculty ”
+or potentiality that could remain unactualized. It never fails to activate its
+tendency; that is, the dedicated effort to unearth, or be aware of, innate
+notions and truths contained in it. Such a Leibnizian force ( “ endeavor ” ) is
+predetermined never to fail to produce some actual activity, given the right
+conditions. By dint of attention or sense - probing, it acquires awareness of
+its otherwise unconscious innate mental contents. Second, and related to
+this, Leibniz never fails to emphasize well before the Nouveaux essais that
+by “ idea ” he does not understand an actualized occurrence or act of thought
+but a disposition to think in a certain way: “ an idea consists not in some
+act, but in the faculty of thinking, and we are said to have an idea of a
+thing even if we do not think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can
+think of it ” ( Philosophical Papers , 207). Given all this, third, for Leibniz,
+286 Byron Kaldis
+thinking does not amount to a constantly conscious series of occurrent
+mental acts with clarity and distinctness, since the soul ’ s always being
+active qua substance can be said to still be active even during “ confused ”
+(i.e., less that fully clear) states, either as potentially striving toward such
+conscious attentive thinking episodes or as being most of the time at a
+steady - state attenuated potentiality only. But what safeguards such an attenuated
+state from being empty, thus threatening to undermine Leibniz ’ whole
+position, is that it contains one of his most innovative elements, what he
+famously called “ petites perceptions ” : innumerable minute imperceptible
+sensations, each one of which escapes our awareness yet contributes to the
+aggregate impression of which we are aware. The Leibnizean conception of
+the unconscious is used against Descartes ’ doctrine of constant or permanent
+thinking while at the same time avoiding on the other side Locke ’ s
+doctrine that the mind can be, at periods, blank or inactive. That the
+“ petites perceptions ” turn out to be the capital pillar of Leibniz ’ defence of
+innateness in the Nouveaux essais becomes quickly apparent as he puts his
+invention to work in almost the whole range of his philosophy.
+In the Preface to the Nouveaux essais , Leibniz advances three arguments
+corresponding to the following theses (suitably reconstructed in an organized
+form): (1) only innate principles ground our knowledge with demonstrative
+certainty of the modal status of specifi c truths as necessary and
+universally valid; (2) in self - refl ection we become aware of possessing
+certain intellectual ideas (see above) being (a) immediately related to, and
+(b) always present to, the understanding, although we do not normally pay
+constant attention to these, since our everyday distractions and needs
+prevent our always being aware of them; and (3) as in a block of marble
+its veins predetermine the shape it may take, similarly our soul contains in
+an unconscious state innate items which it has the predetermined potentiality,
+tendency, or disposition to unearth, that is, become aware of – in
+support of this, the thesis of petites perceptions is employed. All these can
+be seen to be replies directed at the three prongs of Locke ’ s attack on
+innatism: (1) together with (3) answer Locke ’ s contention that necessary
+truths do not receive universal assent as they ought to if they were truly
+innate to all mankind; (2) together with (3) answer Locke ’ s contention that
+our mind cannot possess something of which it is unaware; and (3) together
+with Leibniz ’ metaphysical theses about the nature of the mind (see above)
+answer Locke ’ s contention that since the mind does not think all the time,
+it is possible for the mind to be empty. In the fi rst chapter of Book I of the
+Nouveaux essais , Leibniz adds a new aspect to potentiality, this time regarding
+not just ideas but also our knowledge of truths and use of inferences:
+their enthymemic character.
+The signifi cance of Leibniz ’ argumentation cannot be overstated given
+the importance of the notion of the unconscious – something he did not
+Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 287
+invent but formulated in a novel and plausible manner, his infl uence on
+subsequent developments in German idealism, and, perhaps more importantly,
+its unnoticed relevance to recent discussions in the philosophy of
+mind and evolutionary psychology regarding nativism and concept - innatism,
+or current research in neurophysiology. It is worth pointing out that current
+neurobiological fi ndings regarding motor cognition corroborate his view of
+the unconscious petites perceptions as neural activity falling below a
+minimum level or duration required to emerge into awareness. Similarly, in
+“ subconcious pre - processing ” during sense perception, it has been shown
+that we are not aware, for example, of the hairs of our inner ear that actually
+hear sounds but of the resultant aggregate acoustic sensation.
+(1) [N]ecessary truths, such as we fi nd in pure mathematics [ . . . ] must
+have principles whose proof does not depend on instances nor [ . . . ] on the
+testimony of the senses, even though without the senses it would never occur
+to us to think of them [ . . . ]. [S]o the proof of them can only come from inner
+principles described as innate. It would indeed be wrong to think that we can
+easily read these eternal laws of reason in the soul, as the Praetor ’ s edict can
+be read on his notice - board, without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that
+they can be discovered within us by dint of attention [ . . . ] what shows the
+existence of inner sources of necessary truths is also what distinguishes man
+from beast. (2) [I]deas which do not originate in sensation come from refl ection.
+But refl ection is nothing but attention to what is within us, and the senses
+do not give us what we carry with us already [ . . . ] can it be denied that there
+is a great deal that is innate in our minds since we are innate to ourselves
+[ . . . ] and since we include Being, Unity, Substance [ . . . ] and hosts of other
+objects of our intellectual ideas? [ . . . ] (3) I have also used the analogy of the
+veined block of marble, as opposed to an entirely homogeneous block of
+marble, or to a blank tablet [ . . . ] if there were veins in the block which
+marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, then the block
+would be more determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate to it
+[ . . . ] even though labour would be required to expose the veins and to polish
+them to clarity, removing everything that prevents them from being seen. This
+is how ideas and truths are innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies,
+or natural potentialities and not as action; although these potentialities
+are always accompanied by certain actions, often insensible ones, which correspond
+to them. (5) [ . . . A]t every moment there is in us an infi nity of
+perceptions unaccompanied by awareness or refl ection; that is alterations in
+the soul itself, of which we are unaware because these impressions are either
+too minute and too numerous or else too unvarying [ . . . ]. But when they are
+combined with others they do nevertheless have their effect and make themselves
+felt. (6) [A] special affi nity which the human mind has with [necessary
+truths . . . ] is what makes us call them innate. So it is not a bare faculty [ . . . ]
+a mere possibility of understanding those truths; it is rather a disposition [ . . . ]
+a preformation which determines our souls and brings it about that they are
+derivable from it. (7) [A] “ consideration of the nature of things ” is nothing
+288 Byron Kaldis
+but the knowledge of the nature of our mind and of those innate ideas, and
+there is no need to look for them outside oneself. ( New Essays , 50 – 84)
+Three Arguments
+P1. The mind knows both truths of matter of fact and truths of reason.
+P2. The mind knows truths of reason (simplifi cation, P1).
+P3. The truths of reason are necessary, universally valid (true in all possible
+words), and absolutely certain.
+C1. The mind knows necessary, universal, and absolutely certain truths
+(substitution, P2, P3).
+P4. Necessity, universality, and certainty can either be established by means
+of induction from external sensory data, or they may originate from the
+mind itself.
+P5. Induction is inadequate in yielding necessity, universal validity, and
+certainty.
+C2. Necessity, universal validity, and certainty of truths of reason can be
+original with the mind itself (disjunctive syllogism, C1, P4, P5).
+P6. If necessity and certainty are original with the mind, then they are
+contained within it.
+C3. The mind contains these originally in itself ( modus ponens , P6, C2).
+P7. If the mind contains originally an item of knowledge, then the mind is
+not empty ever.
+C4. The mind is not empty ever ( modus ponens , C3, P7).
+P1. The mind has ideas by means of refl ection.
+P2. Ideas of refl ection manifest the capacity of the mind to know itself.
+P3. The mind can know itself inwardly either by relying on the senses for
+assistance or it is itself endowed with this capacity.
+P4. The senses can deliver knowledge (ideas) regarding only the external
+world.
+C1. The mind ’ s capacity for refl ecting on itself is an endowed capacity
+(disjunctive syllogism, P3, P4).
+P5. If the mind possesses an endowed capacity, then it contains it in itself
+without having it acquired.
+C2. The mind contains an endowed capacity without acquiring the
+refl ecting capacity ( modus ponens , C1, P5).
+P6. If a mental item is contained in the mind without being acquired, then
+it is innate.
+C3. The mind ’ s refl ecting capacity is innate ( modus ponens , C2, P6).
+P7. If the mind has an innate item, then it cannot be empty at its
+inception.
+Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 289
+P8. If the mind contains something innately (from its inception), then it
+contains it continuously.
+C4. The mind is not empty ever (hypothetical syllogism, P7, P8).
+P1. Either a mental faculty is a bare faculty or it is a predetermined, dedicated,
+capacity to search for specifi c objects [truths] in the mind.
+P2. An epistemic faculty is a “ bare faculty ” if and only if it is merely an
+indeterminate disposition to receive truths (by defi nition).
+C1. A mental faculty is either an indeterminate disposition to receive
+truths or a predetermined, dedicated, capacity to search for specifi c
+truths in the mind (substitution, P1, P2).
+P3. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a mental faculty.
+C2. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is either a bare
+faculty or a predetermined dedicated capacity to search for specifi c
+such truths (substitution, C1, P3).
+P4. If the epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a bare faculty
+of receiving, then it is not the source of such truths.
+P5. The mind is the source of the validity (proof) of necessary truths (as
+per above: fi rst argument).
+C3. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is not a bare
+faculty ( modus tollens , P4, P5).
+C4. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a predetermined
+dedicated capacity to search for specifi c objects in the mind
+(disjunctive syllogism, P1, C3).
+76
+Descartes ’ Arguments for the
+Mind – Body Distinction
+Dale Jacquette
+Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy , in The Philosophical
+Works of Descartes , translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T.
+Ross. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1931 .
+Almog , Joseph . What Am I? Descartes and the Mind – Body Problem . Oxford :
+Oxford University Press , 2001 .
+Beck , L. J. The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations .
+Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1965 .
+Clarke , D. M. Descartes ’ s Theory of Mind . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
+2003 .
+Emmet , Dorothy . “ Descartes on Body and Mind: After 300 Years . ” Cambridge
+Journal 4 ( 1950 ): 67 – 82 .
+Long , Douglas C. “ Descartes ’ Argument for Mind – Body Dualism . ” The
+Philosophical Forum 1 ( 1969 ): 259 – 73 .
+Rozemond , Marleen . Descartes ’ s Dualism . Cambridge, MA : Harvard
+University Press , 2002 .
+Ryle , Gilbert . The Concept of Mind . London : Hutchinson , 1949 .
+Ren é Descartes ’ fi rst argument in support of mind – body ontic nonidentity
+or substance dualism theory appears in Meditation 2 of his 1641 Meditations
+on First Philosophy . The argument is historically signifi cant, if not obviously
+incorrect, and has earned its place as a focus of philosophical controversy
+for almost four centuries. If Descartes ’ reasoning is sound, then it
+answers the long - standing problem of understanding the relation between
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 291
+mind and body. Descartes believes that he has solved the mind – body
+problem in metaphysics that he revived from the time of the ancient Greeks,
+in keeping with certain religious beliefs about the soul ’ s independence from
+material things, and especially from the physical human animal body it
+happens to inhabit.
+Descartes applies the equivalent of Leibniz ’ Law – in particular, that half
+of the equivalence that is the conditional principle now often referred to as
+the “ indiscernibility of identicals ” – in a widely imitated general strategy
+for demonstrating the nonidentity of two distinct things by arguing for a
+difference in their properties. What is ahistorically called “ Leibniz ’ indiscernibility
+of identicals principle ” holds that for any A and B, if A = B, then
+A and B have all of their properties in common. Certainly Descartes would
+not have known the principle by either of these names but takes it for
+granted that distinctions between objects are drawn on the basis of a distinction
+among their properties. Descartes has the same intuitive grasp of
+the idea that identicals must have identical properties, and that any discrepancy
+among the properties of distinctly designated objects implies that the
+objects themselves are not identical. In order to prove that mind ≠ body in
+Meditation 2, Descartes claims to have found a difference in the properties
+of his mind and body, a property that his mind has but his body does not
+have, or conversely.
+Descartes singles out the property that he argues distinguishes his body
+from his mind in two ways. He speaks of his mind as being “ better knowable
+” or “ more easily knowable ” than his body and of his body as being
+such that its existence can be rationally doubted under the assumptions of
+a methodological skepticism while his mind is such that its existence cannot
+be rationally doubted, since entertaining doubt is a conscious state and in
+some cases an act of mind. The conclusion that Descartes can rationally
+doubt the existence of his body but not of his mind is supported, in turn,
+by Descartes ’ consideration that there might be an evil demon who systematically
+deceives him concerning the reality of any of his sense impressions
+that appear to reveal the existence and nature of an external world outside
+of, but correctly representing, the contents of his thoughts (the evil demon
+hypothesis). Descartes on pain of contradiction cannot consistently doubt
+the existence of his mind, since the actual entertainment of doubt would
+necessarily be an event actually occurring in and hence presupposing the
+existence of his mind ( Cogito, sum , in Latin; or “ When I think [including
+when I doubt], I exist ” ) (#35, #36).
+Descartes motivates his discussion of mind – body nonidentity in
+Meditation 2 by considering the sensible properties of a piece of wax that
+he invites the reader to imagine him describing as he holds and observes it
+in his hand. Descartes believes that the wax is better known to the intellect
+than by the senses because when the sensible properties of the wax all
+292 Dale Jacquette
+undergo change as the wax is gradually introduced to the heat of a fl ame,
+the senses alone do not tell us that it was the same wax that has undergone
+changes to its shape, size, color, smell, and other empirically perceivable
+properties. From this, Descartes draws the general conclusion that things
+known by the mind, including the mind itself, are better knowable than
+things, such as the body, known primarily or only with the aid of the senses.
+Descartes ’ proposition that his body but not his mind has the property of
+being such that its existence can be rationally doubted by his mind reinforces
+the argument ’ s assumption that Descartes ’ mind is better knowable
+than his body, in the sense that he must infer the existence of his body from
+the evidence of the senses, while the existence of mind upon refl ection is
+immediately known to itself and knows itself self - refl ectively and introspectively,
+directly and without the intermediary of logical or inductive
+inference.
+Descartes ’ fi rst or Meditations 2 ’ s mind ≠ body argument has nevertheless
+been criticized as subject to a fatal dilemma. The kind of property
+Descartes maintains his mind has but his body does not have (better or
+easier knowability) or that his body has but his mind does not have (such
+that its existence is capable of being rationally doubted by his own mind)
+seems to involve a mistaken, excessively general, application of what with
+appropriate qualifi cations we shall continue to call “ Leibniz ’ principle of
+the indiscernibility of identicals. ” Descartes ’ fi rst or Meditation 2 ’ s argument
+for mind ≠ body depends on what is sometimes called a “ converse
+intentional property, ” a property that belongs to an object by virtue of the
+intentional attitude that a thinking subject adopts or might adopt toward
+it. If I love Lisbon, then I have the intentional property of loving Lisbon,
+and Lisbon has the converse intentional property of being loved by me. If
+I doubt the existence of my body, then I have the intentional property of
+doubting the existence of my body, and my body has the converse intentional
+property of being such that its existence is doubted by me. Entities
+are distinguished when they can be shown not to share all of their properties.
+If it is a property of Lisbon that it is loved by me, and if I do not
+equally love London, then, if converse intentional properties are included
+among the shared properties of identical objects prescribed by Leibniz ’ Law,
+it should follow in this case that Lisbon ≠ London. If I equally loved
+London and Lisbon, then fortunately there would still remain many differences
+between them by which their nonidentity could be established as a
+consequence of Leibniz ’ Law. Lisbon and London have many things in
+common despite being different cities, so why shouldn ’ t they have my equal
+love for each of them in common?
+Descartes ’ fi rst mind ≠ body (Meditation 2) argument makes a philosophically
+more unfortunate use of converse intentional properties in applying
+the indiscernibility of identicals principle. His argument is sometimes
+Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 293
+said to commit an “ intensional fallacy. ” The objection is that by defi nition
+converse intentional properties do not belong intrinsically to objects but
+only as a consequence of the extrinsic circumstance of being thought of
+in a certain way by certain thinking subjects. Changes in object A ’ s and
+object B ’ s converse intentional properties as a result would seem to leave
+the object itself completely untouched as to the satisfaction or not of its
+intrinsic identity conditions. We know that 1 + 1 = 2, for example, even
+though someone might doubt that 1 + 1 is a prime number despite not
+doubting that 2 is a prime number. We know that Mark Twain = Samuel
+Clemens, regardless of whether or not someone happens to believe that
+Mark Twain wrote Tom Sawyer while doubting that Samuel Clemens wrote
+Tom Sawyer . Converse intentional properties invalidate Leibniz ’ Law as a
+universal identity principle, which means that extrinsic converse intentional
+properties should be barred from its applications. Unfortunately, Descartes ’
+fi rst (Meditation 2) mind ≠ body argument commits precisely the “ intensional
+fallacy ” of deducing the nonidentity of body and mind on the basis
+of their failure to share certain converse intentional properties; in particular,
+the property of being better or more easily knowable, or of the mind ’ s but
+not the body ’ s being such that its existence cannot be rationally doubted
+by the same mind.
+The dilemma for Descartes ’ fi rst or Meditation 2 mind ≠ body argument
+is that it either relies on a false, unrestricted, or excessively general version
+of Leibniz ’ principle of the indiscernibility of identicals that allows nonidentity
+determinations on the basis of converse intentional properties, in
+which case the argument is unsound; or, in case a correct formulation of
+Leibniz ’ Law is imposed, excluding converse intentional properties from
+permitted applications of the indiscernibility of identicals, the argument is
+deductively invalid, in the sense that the truth of its conclusion that
+mind ≠ body is not guaranteed by the truth of the argument ’ s corrected
+assumptions containing the properly restricted form of Leibniz ’ Law that
+excludes converse intentional properties from its permissible applications,
+just as we must in the case where 1 + 1 = 2 and Mark Twain = Samuel
+Clemens.
+Descartes ’ argument, conspicuous weaknesses notwithstanding, represents
+a highly instructive effort to mark an essential difference between the
+properties of body and mind and to answer the mind – body problem in such
+a way as to hold out the prospect of contra - causal freedom of will and the
+soul ’ s immortality. Descartes ’ fascinating project of replacing Aristotle ’ s
+metaphysics in the Scholastic synthesis of Aristotle and Holy Scripture,
+refi ned during the medieval period especially by Thomas Aquinas, with a
+new metaphysics or “ fi rst philosophy ” of his own, remains a heroic episode
+in the history of early modern philosophy, with a more general moral concerning
+the attractions and limitations of rationalist attempts to argue
+294 Dale Jacquette
+philosophically for signifi cant metaphysical truths to whatever extent possible
+exclusively from phenomenology and the resources of ingenious pure
+reason.
+I know that I exist, and I inquire what I am, I whom know to exist [ . . . ].
+But I already know for certain that I am, and that it may be that all these
+images, and, speaking generally, all things that relate to the nature of body
+are nothing but dreams [and chimeras]. [ . . . ] For if I judge that the wax is
+or exists from the fact that I see it, it certainly follows much more clearly that
+I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it. For it may be that what
+I see is not really wax, it may also be that I do not possess eyes with which
+to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or [ . . . ] when I think I see,
+that I myself who think am nought. (Descartes, 152 – 6)
+P1. My body has the property of being such that its existence can rationally
+be doubted by me (evil demon hypothesis).
+P2. My mind does not have the property of being such that its existence
+can rationally be doubted by me ( cogito sum ).
+P3. For any objects A and B, if A = B, then A and B have all of their properties
+in common and there is no difference in their properties (Leibniz ’
+Law [na ï ve form] or principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals [na ï ve
+form]).
+C1. My body has a property that my mind does not have, namely, the
+property of being such that its existence can be rationally doubted by
+me (conjunction, P1, P2).
+C2. My body ≠ my mind ( modus tollens , P3, C1).
+(Premises (P1) and (P2) can be reformulated alternatively to the same
+effect in terms of the mind ’ s having the (converse intentional) property of
+being “ better knowable ” or “ more easily known ” than the body or the
+body ’ s existence, unlike the mind ’ s, being known only inferentially from the
+evidence of sensation or external empirical perception rather than immediately
+in consciousness by refl ection on the occurrence of consciousness.)
+In Meditation 6, Descartes returns to the mind – body problem and offers
+another argument for the distinction, different in substance while identical
+in basic logical structure to the fi rst argument of Meditation 2. Here, signifi
+cantly, Descartes, deliberately or not, avoids the “ intensional fallacy ” of
+his Meditation 2 proof. In Meditation 6, Descartes no longer attempts to
+apply Leibniz ’ Law of the indiscernibility of identicals by singling out a
+converse intentional property possessed by the body but not the mind, or
+the reverse, but instead fi xes on an evidently nonconverse intentional property.
+He invokes the property of the body ’ s divisibility and the mind ’ s
+indivisibility. He argues that the body, unlike the mind, can be separated
+into distinct parts that will still be bodies in the sense of continuing to be
+Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 295
+spatially extended though now scattered material things. The mind,
+Descartes claims, cannot be so divided, but in the relevant sense is indivisible,
+possessing an essential unity. It is implicit in Descartes ’ second argument,
+moreover, that the soul is immortal, on the grounds that only
+something capable of being broken down into component or parts can be
+destroyed. Descartes may believe that in this way he secures a new Cartesian
+rather than Aristotelian metaphysical foundation for religious belief in the
+soul ’ s survival of death and the body ’ s destruction.
+“ Nature, ” Descartes says, teaches him these things about extended
+bodies. It is noteworthy that Descartes believes after Meditation 3 that he
+has dispelled the systematic doubt by which he had previously motivated
+his project to tear down the old Aristotelian edifi ce of knowledge and
+rebuild natural philosophy or science in a more contemporary sense on the
+foundations of his demonstration that a perfectly good and therefore veracious
+God exists, who would not allow us to be deceived even by an evil
+demon when we clearly and distinctly perceive the properties of what we
+take to be the external world. The Meditation 6 proof of mind – body nonidentity
+based on the divisibility of body and indivisibility of mind into like
+parts could therefore not have been presented in Meditation 2, prior to
+Descartes ’ vouchsafi ng the certainty of clear and distinct perceptions with
+the insights into the natural properties of such things as the human body
+that the later argument requires.
+Descartes ’ thesis of the mind ’ s indivisibility is as interesting as it is controversial.
+The mind can of course be divided into such faculties as memory,
+imagination, calculation, emotion, and will, or into distinct thoughts.
+However, this is not the division of the mind into smaller component self -
+subsistent minds as its continuing scattered parts. If Descartes is right, then
+there is an essential difference in the way that the body is supposed to be
+capable of being divided into smaller component bodies, limbs, organs,
+cells, and so on, all of which are bodies in the sense of being potentially
+simultaneously existing spatiotemporally extended things belonging to the
+same metaphysical category – in this case, of material entities. Where psychological
+entities are concerned, Descartes is emphatic that the mind
+cannot be similarly divided. As to the problem of split personalities, or
+multiple personal disorder (MPD), Descartes, as we should expect, has
+nothing to say. He could presumably argue that in such circumstances there
+must be distinct independent minds occupying the same body, perhaps at
+different times, each of which, again, unlike the body, remains indivisible
+into independently existent minds as self - subsistent continuing minds,
+rather than being unifi ed distinct components of one and the same mind.
+In order to begin this examination, then, I here say, in the fi rst place, that
+there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by
+296 Dale Jacquette
+nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter
+of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only
+a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend
+myself to be clearly one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to
+be united to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is
+separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from
+my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be
+properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which
+employs itself in willing and in feeling and understanding. But it is quite
+otherwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these
+imaginable by me which my mind cannot divide into parts, and which consequently
+I do not recognise as being divisible; this would be suffi cient to
+teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if
+I had not already learned it from other sources. (Descartes, 196)
+P1. My body has the property of being such that it is divisible, capable of
+being divided into like self - subsistent parts that are also component
+physical bodies (bodily divisibility).
+P2. My mind does not have the property of being such that it is divisible
+in the comparable sense as that above into self - subsistent parts that are
+also component minds (mental indivisibility).
+C1. My mind ≠ my body (Leibniz ’ Law, P1, P2).
+P3. Only entities constituted by like parts are capable of being destroyed
+(concept of destructibility).
+C2. My mind, unlike my body, is indestructible; from which it further
+follows that the mind or soul, unlike the body, as religion teaches as
+an article of faith, is immortal (P2, C1, P3).
+77
+Princess Elisabeth and the
+Mind – Body Problem
+Jen McWeeny
+Atherton , Margaret (ed.). “ Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia , ” in Women
+Philosophers of the Early Modern Period , 9 – 21 . Indianapolis : Hackett ,
+1994 .
+Descartes , Ren é . The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , 3 vols., translated
+by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch.
+Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1984 – 91 .
+Descartes , Ren é . Oeuvres de Descartes , 5 vols., edited by Charles Adams and
+Paul Tannery . Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin , 1971 – 74 .
+Descartes , Ren é and Princess Elisabeth . “ Correspondence , ” in Descartes: His
+Moral Philosophy and Psychology , translated by John J. Blom, 105 – 17 .
+New York : New York University Press , 1978 .
+Gassendi , Pierre . “ Fifth Set of Objections , ” in The Philosophical Writings of
+Descartes , vol. 2 , translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and
+Dugald Murdoch, 179 – 240 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
+Press , 1984 .
+Kim , Jaegwon . Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind – Body
+Problem and Mental Causation . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1998 .
+McGinn , Colin . “ Can We Solve the Mind – Body Problem? ” Mind 98 ( 1989 ):
+349 – 66 .
+Montero , Barbara . “ Post - Physicalism . ” The Journal of Consciousness Studies
+8 , 2 ( 2001 ): 61 – 80 .
+Tollefson , Deborah . “ Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind – Body
+Interaction . ” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 14 , 3 ( 1999 ):
+59 – 77 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+298 Jen McWeeny
+The mind – body problem exposes the inconsistencies that arise when mind
+and body are conceived as ontologically distinct entities. Human experience
+clearly shows that our minds interact with our bodies. When we will to
+walk, our legs usually move in the intended direction; when we become ill,
+the sharpness of our cognitive capacities is often compromised; when we
+are sad, we are frequently moved to tears; and so on. Philosophers who
+reject the identity of mind and body or mind and brain face the task of
+explaining these relations by illuminating the precise manner in which the
+mind moves the body and the body affects the mind. It is unsurprising,
+then, that the mind – body problem was fi rst articulated as a response to
+Ren é Descartes ’ dualistic philosophy. For Descartes, mind 1 is res cogitans ,
+a nonextended, immaterial substance whose essential nature is to think, and
+body is its conceptual opposite – res extensa , a material substance with a
+particular shape that is extended and located in space. In its Cartesian form,
+the mind – body problem asks how an immaterial thing can move a material
+thing.
+Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618 – 80), also known as “ The Princess
+Palatine, ” was the fi rst philosopher to articulate the mind – body problem
+in the form of an argument and the fi rst to elicit Descartes ’ serious attention
+to the matter, although the mind – body problem is rarely attributed to her.
+Princess Elisabeth lived most of her life in Holland, after her father had lost
+the throne of Bohemia and her family was exiled from their Palatinate lands
+and residence in Heidelberg during the Thirty Years ’ War. She was renowned
+for her knowledge of classical languages and her intellectual precision. As
+Descartes writes in his dedication to Princess Elisabeth at the beginning of
+The Principles of Philosophy , “ You are the only person I have found so far
+who has completely understood all my previously published works ”
+(Descartes Philosophical Writings , 2: 192). For the last years of her life,
+Princess Elisabeth served as abbess at a convent in Herford, Westphalia,
+and had wide jurisdiction over the surrounding territories.
+A few scholars – most notably Pierre Gassendi – expressed their doubts
+about the possibility of mind – body interaction to Descartes shortly before
+Princess Elisabeth did (Gassendi, 1: 238). However, Gassendi ’ s criticism was
+raised through a series of questions rather than an argument, and Descartes
+did not think that these questions were enough to produce a true “ objection
+” to his philosophy (Descartes Philosophical Writings , 1: 266). Princess
+Elisabeth formulates the mind – body problem in her very fi rst letter to
+Descartes, which is dated May 16, 1643. The general strategy that she
+employs is to use Descartes ’ understanding of motion as expressed in his
+Optics to show the impossibility of the mind ’ s moving the body as long as
+1 In his discussion of the mind – body relation, Descartes makes no conceptual distinction
+between “ mind ” (French l ’ esprit , Latin mens ) and “ soul ” (French l ’ â me , Latin anima ).
+Princess Elisabeth and the Mind–Body Problem 299
+the mind is conceived of as nonextended and immaterial. 2 In response,
+Descartes admits that Princess Elisabeth ’ s criticism is justifi ed in light of his
+previous writings because he has said “ nearly nothing ” of the union between
+body and soul that enables the two to act and to suffer together (Descartes
+and Princess Elisabeth, 107). He thus sets about this task in his ensuing
+correspondence with her and even devotes his fi nal work, The Passions of
+the Soul , to devising a solution to Princess Elisabeth ’ s query. All three of
+his “ solutions ” – the question has been improperly posed, the union of the
+mind and body cannot be known by the intellect, and “ the seat of the soul ”
+is the brain ’ s pineal gland – have been deemed largely unsatisfying by the
+majority of commentators, including Princess Elisabeth.
+That Descartes himself was unable to produce a viable solution to the
+mind – body problem is indicative of its signifi cance to his own thinking and
+to that of those philosophers who would follow him. Indeed, many of
+modern philosophy ’ s innovations after Descartes, such as Spinoza ’ s monism,
+Malebranche ’ s occasionalism, Leibniz ’ monads, and Hume ’ s skepticism, can
+be read as responses to this seemingly intractable problem generated by the
+Cartesian system. Moreover, the persistence of the mind – body problem has
+given rise to the area of contemporary analytic philosophy known as “ philosophy
+of mind. ” Today, philosophers of mind most often frame the mind –
+body problem in terms of fi nding a physical explanation for mental
+phenomena, although some have preferred the term “ nonmental ” to “ physical,
+” because current physics makes it diffi cult to specify adequately what
+we mean by “ physical ” (see Kim and Montero). Still others have conceded
+that the problem cannot be solved (see McGinn). Whereas most contemporary
+philosophers of mind answer the mind – body problem by ascribing to
+some form of physicalism, they disagree as to what mental states actually
+are. In recent years, lively debates have developed as to whether mental
+states consist in behavioral dispositions, functional processes, neural states,
+or something else besides. Such disputes indicate that Princess Elisabeth ’ s
+call for an explication of the manner in which the mind moves the body is
+far from answered. The mind – body problem therefore remains one of the
+most infl uential and long - standing arguments in the history of Western
+philosophy.
+I beseech you tell me how the soul of man (since it is but a thinking substance)
+can determine the spirits of the body to produce voluntary actions.
+For it seems every determination of movement happens from an impulsion of
+2 Since Princess Elisabeth only refers to Descartes ’ Meditations in this early correspondence,
+there is some question as to whether she was indeed familiar with his physics when she wrote
+this letter. See Tollefson for an interpretation that indicates that Princess Elisabeth was referencing
+a passage in the Optics .
+300 Jen McWeeny
+the thing moved, according to the manner in which it is pushed by that which
+moves it, or else, depends on the qualifi cation and fi gure of the superfi cies of
+the latter. Contact is required for the fi rst two conditions, and extension for
+the third. You entirely exclude extension from your notion of the soul, and
+contact seems to me incompatible with an immaterial thing. That is why I
+ask of you a defi nition of the soul more particular than in your Metaphysic
+– that is to say, for a defi nition of the substance separate from its action,
+thought. (Elisabeth, qtd. in Blom, 106)
+P1. If movement of a thing occurs, it must have been caused by one of the
+following: (a) self - impulsion, (b) being pushed by something else, or (c)
+the quality and shape of its surface (e.g., a marble).
+P2. Descartes defi nes the soul as nonextended and immaterial.
+P3. If movement of a thing occurs and that movement is caused by self -
+impulsion or being pushed by something else, then contact is required.
+P4. Nonextended and immaterial things (souls) cannot make contact with
+other things.
+C1. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by
+self - impulsion and cannot move a thing by pushing it ( modus tollens ,
+P3, P4).
+P5. If movement of a thing occurs by the quality and shape of its surface,
+then extension is required.
+P6. Nonextended and immaterial things (souls) do not have extension.
+C2. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by the
+quality and shape of their surface ( modus tollens , P5, P6).
+P7. If (C1) and (C2), then the soul (as it is defi ned by Descartes) cannot
+cause the body to move.
+C3. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by
+self - impulsion and the quality and shape of their surface and cannot
+move a thing by pushing it (conjunction, C1, C2).
+C4. The soul (as it is defi ned by Descartes) cannot cause the body to
+move ( modus ponens , P7, C3).
+Implication: If the soul does cause the body to move, then Descartes ’
+defi nition of the soul is incorrect.
+78
+Kripke ’ s Argument for
+Mind – Body Property Dualism
+Dale Jacquette
+Kripke , Saul . Naming and Necessity . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University
+Press , 1980 .
+Ahmed , Arif . Saul Kripke . New York : Continuum , 2007 .
+Bayne , Steven R. “ Kripke ’ s Cartesian Argument . ” Philosophia 18 ( 1988 ):
+265 – 9 .
+Feldman , Fred . “ Kripke on the Identity Theory . ” The Journal of Philosophy
+7 ( 1974 ): 665 – 76 .
+Fitch , G. W. Saul Kripke . London : Acumen , 2004 .
+Hughes , Christopher . Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity . Oxford :
+Oxford University Press , 2004 .
+Jacquette , Dale . Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness .
+New York : Continuum , 2010 .
+Preti , Consuelo . On Kripke . Cincinnati, OH : Wadsworth , 2002 .
+Saul A. Kripke offers a much - discussed argument against mind – body identity
+theory, supporting some type of property dualism, in his 1970 Princeton
+University lectures on Naming and Necessity . The argument purports to
+explain the relation between mind and body, solving the mind – body problem
+at a comparatively high level of abstraction within the context of a comprehensive
+philosophical treatment of the nature of transworld identity
+conditions and the theory of reference in logic, semantics, and philosophy
+of language. Kripke fashions an interesting argumentive methodology with
+important metaphysical conclusions based on independently defensible
+distinctions in modal logic and referential semantics. As such, Kripke ’ s
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+302 Dale Jacquette
+argument demonstrates unexpected connections between traditionally unrelated
+areas of inquiry in philosophy of language and the metaphysics of
+mind.
+Kripke introduces the concepts and explores some of the applications of
+a distinction between rigid versus nonrigid designation. A rigid designator
+designates the same object in every logically possible world in which the
+object exists. According to Kripke, proper names such as ‘ Plato ’ and ‘ Barack
+Obama ’ are rigid designators in this sense. Nonrigid designators, in contrast,
+potentially designate different individuals in different logically possible
+worlds. Defi nite descriptions, whose content may apply to different
+objects in different worlds, in contrast with rigidly designative proper
+names, are generally nonrigid designators under Kripke ’ s distinction. These
+standardly include such referring terms as ‘ The teacher of Aristotle ’ or ‘ The
+President of the United States in 2011 ’ , which could in principle refer to
+entirely different persons depending on with whom Aristotle happens to
+study or the logically contingent American election results as the election
+occurs in different logically possible worlds.
+Kripke maintains that questions of transworld identity, of identifying
+precisely the same individual from one logically possible world to another,
+cannot be made with high - powered telescopes and cannot be justifi ed on the
+basis of such superfi cial properties as external appearance, since these factors
+can differ radically across different logically possible worlds, obscuring the
+usual tests for identity and nonidentity that might be conducted in the actual
+world. Kripke proposes that transworld identity is a matter of stipulation,
+which is to say of decision rather than discovery. We do not look at alternative
+logically possible worlds and try to learn from our observations whether
+Aristotle exists in another logically possible world and what properties he
+might have there. We simply declare, laying it down as a kind of choice we
+have made, that there is a logically possible world in which Aristotle exists
+and has the following accidental properties different from those he possesses
+in the actual world. We must proceed by stipulation in order to make sense
+of transworld identities, according to Kripke, and we can only do so in
+thought and language by means of rigid designators.
+The appeal to rigid designators further enables Kripke to mount an argument
+in support of mind – body dualism. The core of the argument is to say
+that, since we can consider without internal contradiction that the
+mind ≠ body, at least in the sense that corpses presumably exist without
+minds, and we can imagine the mind existing without being associated with
+a body, it is logically possible that mind ≠ body. If we rigidly designate an
+individual body and mind or type of brain and psychological entity or event,
+then, since in that case there is at least one logically possible world in which
+(rigidly designated) mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body, it must be true that
+(rigidly designated) mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body in every logically posKripke’s
+Argument for Mind–Body Property Dualism 303
+sible world. It follows, then, that mind and body are distinct entities universally
+in every logically possible world. It is logically necessary, and
+therefore a fortiori actually the case, that mind ≠ body. The least objectionable
+mind – body dualism to be accepted as a result of Kripke ’ s argument is
+property dualism rather than substance or ontic (Cartesian) dualism, the
+latter of which has the additional burden of explaining causal interactions
+between the material body and the immaterial mind.
+Kripke ’ s argument delivers a powerful implication, supported by the
+general considerations that undergird his solution to the problem of understanding
+transworld identity and the considerable general utility of the
+distinction between rigid and nonrigid designation. Kripke ’ s attitude toward
+the argument appears somewhat ambivalent, as in footnote 17 he seems to
+step away from the conclusiveness of his own inference when he adds these
+qualifi cations: “ rejection of the [mind – body] identity thesis does not imply
+acceptance of Cartesian dualism [ . . . ] Descartes ’ notion seems to have been
+rendered dubious ever since [David] Hume ’ s critique of the notion of a
+Cartesian self. I regard the mind – body problem as wide open and extremely
+confusing ” (155).
+Descartes, and others following him, argued that a person or mind is
+distinct from his body, since the mind could exist without the body. He might
+equally well have argued the same conclusion from the premise that the body
+could have existed without the mind. Now the one response which I regard
+as plainly inadmissible is the response which cheerfully accepts the Cartesian
+premise while denying the Cartesian conclusion. Let ‘ Descartes ’ be a name,
+or rigid designator, of a certain person, and let ‘ B ’ be a rigid designator of his
+body. Then if Descartes were indeed identical to B, the supposed identity,
+being an identity between two rigid designators, would be necessary, and
+Descartes could not exist without B and B could not exist without Descartes.
+(Kripke, 144 – 5)
+P1. Mind – body dualism is logically possible.
+P2. If mind – body dualism is logically possible, then there is at least one
+logically possible world in which the mind is not identical to any material
+body, and mental events are not identical to any purely physical events.
+P3. The concept of rigid designation implies that rigidly designated
+bodies and minds or mental and physical events, if nonidentical in
+any logically possible world, are necessarily distinct or nonidentical in
+every logically possible world in which they exist, and therefore a fortiori
+actually distinct or nonidentical in the actual world.
+C1. Reductive mind – body physicalism or mind – body identity theory is
+therefore false, and some form of mind – body nonidentity, probably
+some type of property dualism, in particular, is true; (rigidly designated)
+mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+79
+The Argument from Mental
+Causation for Physicalism
+Amir Horowitz
+Armstrong , David . A Materialist Theory of the Mind . London : Routledge &
+Kegan Paul , 1963 .
+Lewis , David . “ An Argument for the Identity Theory . ” Journal of Philosophy
+66 ( 1966 ): 17 – 25 .
+Kim , Jaegwon . Mind in a Physical World . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,
+1998 .
+Rey , Georges . Contemporary Philosophy of Mind . Oxford : Blackwell , 1997 .
+Attempts to establish mind – body physicalism – the view that mental events
+are identical with physical events – often appeal to considerations pertaining
+to mental causation. The basic idea underlying the argument from mental
+causation in favor of physicalism (hereafter, “ the argument from mental
+causation ” ) is that physicalism is the only plausible explanation for the
+existence of mental causation. The expression “ physical events ” as it is
+employed here refers to events whose all properties are such that their
+instantiations are logically determined by instantiations of physical
+properties.
+A similar idea served opponents of dualism ever since this thesis was
+offi cially launched by Descartes. These opponents of dualism argued that
+the interactions between nonphysical events and physical events cannot
+occur (due, e.g., to a confl ict with the law of momentum, or the law of the
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Argument from Mental Causation for Physicalism 305
+conservation of mass and energy, or the alleged causal closure of the physical
+world). Since mental events are supposed by the dualist to be nonphysical,
+and since mental – physical interactions cannot be denied, dualism
+must be rejected. Put slightly differently, since physical events can only
+interact with physical events, the fact that mental events causally interact
+with physical events can only be accounted for by assuming that mental
+events are themselves physical events. The contemporary argument from
+mental causation employs this reasoning. In its simplest form, it asserts
+that mental events cause our actions and that brain events cause our actions;
+therefore, it is argued, mental events are in fact physical events. But such a
+version of the argument cannot do, for there are options in logical space in
+which nonphysical mental events as well as physical events cause actions
+(the same actions) without being identical. Thus, for the argument to go
+through, these options have to be ruled out. Various versions of the argument
+indeed rule such options out.
+The argument has several versions. Some of them (e.g., Armstrong ’ s)
+replace premise P2 with the premise that the concepts of mental events are
+concepts of specifi c causal roles, and they adjust premise P1 accordingly.
+Defenders of the argument also differ with respect to the way they rule out
+the options specifi ed in (P3). Thus, option (3c) is sometimes ruled out by
+employing assumptions concerning the nature of the physical world (such
+as the causal closure principle), and sometimes by employing specifi c
+assumptions about our physiology. I believe that that sub - version of the
+version presented here that rules out option (3c) by employing specifi c
+assumptions about our physiology is superior to all alternatives. It employs
+neither controversial assumptions about the nature of mental concepts nor
+assumptions that are arguably biased concerning the nature of the physical
+world.
+Let us say a few words about the argument ’ s premises. P1 is a well -
+established scientifi c claim, one which no contemporary educated person
+would deny. P2 is a highly plausible claim, which everybody seems to know
+from personal experience: it is hard to deny (although there have been
+philosophers who do deny) that our actions are caused by our desires and
+our beliefs (regarding what would satisfy our desires). Now P1 and P2
+together clearly entail C1. Assuming that P3 takes into account all options
+in which both mental events and physical events in the brain can be causes
+of our actions without being identical, the argument is formally valid. Of
+course, in order to persuade us, a convincing case should also be made in
+favor of its premises and in particular – since this is what is mainly at stake
+– in favor of ruling out those options mentioned in P3.
+These options should be explained. In option (3a) – causal over -
+determination – actions are independently caused by both nonphysical
+mental events and by physical events; that is, they would have been caused
+306 Amir Horowitz
+by either. In option (3b) – “ mental – physical causal cooperation ” – nonphysical
+mental events and physical events cooperate to cause actions by
+means of two separate causal chains – a nonphysical mental one and a
+physical one; that is, in the absence of either, the actions would not have
+been caused. In option (3c) – “ mixed mental – physical causal chains ” –
+nonphysical mental events and physical events are links in the same chains
+of events which bring about actions. We shall immediately illustrate this
+option.
+So as said, all these options should be eliminated. Against option (3a)
+– that of causal over - determinism – it has been argued that nowhere in
+nature do we encounter such a phenomenon or that its occurrence is
+implausible from an evolutionary perspective. Option (3b) – that of mental –
+physical causal cooperation – is usually not taken seriously and is ignored.
+It is generally assumed that the question that lies at the heart of the argument
+from mental causation concerns the status of option (3c), that of
+mixed mental – physical causal chains. Armstrong describes this option thus,
+“ Let us now consider the situation where a physical stimulus of some sort,
+say the sounds of a human voice, brings about certain mental events, say
+perceptions and thoughts, which then issue in further physical action. On
+the ‘ way up ’ there must be a last physical event in the brain before the
+mental events ensue. The mental events must then bring about a fi rst physical
+event in the brain on the ‘ way down ’ ” (62). In this case, mental causes
+intervene in the physiological chain of events.
+The most promising way to rule this option out is along the following
+lines. First, it is argued that the idea that there is a mental intervention in
+the chain that leads to the action means that “ a physical break ” is involved
+in this chain. It means, that is, that the transition from the last brain event
+on the “ way up ” to the fi rst brain event on the “ way down ” is not dictated
+by the laws of physics. Second, it is argued that the obtaining of such a
+physical break in the chain which leads to the action is empirically
+implausible.
+[I]t seems to be a striking fact about people and animals that all of their
+non - tendentiously described behavior could be explained in principle by reference
+to physical properties alone. All the motions of their bodies [ . . . ] could
+be perfectly well explained by reference to the electrical impulses along nerve
+fi bers that precede them. These fi rings in turn could be explained by earlier
+neurological events, which in turn could be explained by earlier events. [ . . . ]
+We have absolutely no reason to believe that there is any break in the physical
+explanation of their motion. (Rey, 71)
+According to this line of thought, since many physiological processes can
+be fully accounted for in physical terms and are completely dictated by
+physical laws, we seem to have good reasons to assume that no physical
+The Argument from Mental Causation for Physicalism 307
+break obtains in the causal chains that lead to our actions. Both the way
+up (beginning with an external stimulus and ending with a mental event)
+and the way down (beginning with a mental event and ending with an
+action) are – it is hard to deny – purely physical. Is it plausible to assume
+that only in that short segment, which connects the last brain event on the
+way up and the fi rst brain event on the way down, there is nonphysical
+intervention? Wouldn ’ t it be plausible to infer from the complete control of
+physics over all other transitions that are involved in those processes that
+it controls this segment as well?
+Opponents of the argument from mental causation might insist that,
+appearance to the contrary notwithstanding, the inference from the complete
+control of physics over all other transitions that are involved in physiological
+processes to its control over that segment is illegitimate since that
+segment is signifi cantly different. It is signifi cantly different precisely in that
+it involves a mental event, and the unique character of mental events – in
+virtue of their phenomenality and/or intentionality, and/or various epistemic
+characteristics, and so on – is granted even by physicalists (physicalists
+standardly maintain that mental phenomena are special physical phenomena).
+Once the uniqueness of mental events is admitted, there is no good
+reason to resist ascribing further uniqueness to the causal chains that
+include them, and assuming that these causal chains involve nonphysical
+links (namely, that those unique mental events that are included in those
+chains are unique also in being nonphysical). We shall leave it to the reader
+to estimate the strength of this objection to the argument from mental
+causation.
+P1. Actions are caused by physical events in the brain.
+P2. Actions are caused by mental events.
+C1. Either mental events are identical with physical events in the brain,
+or actions are caused both by mental events and physical events in
+the brain (conjunction, P1, P2).
+P3. All of the options in which actions are caused both by mental events
+and by physical events in the brain while the mental events are not identical
+with brain events should be rejected:
+(a) causal over - determination;
+(b) “ mental – physical causal cooperation ” ;
+(c) “ mixed mental – physical causal chains. ”
+C2. Mental events are identical with physical events in the brain (disjunctive
+syllogism, C1, P3).
+80
+Davidson ’ s Argument for
+Anomalous Monism
+Amir Horowitz
+Davidson , Donald . “ Mental Events , ” in Essays on Actions and Events ,
+207 – 24 . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1980 .
+How should one argue for a specifi c physicalist view of mentality such as
+token - physicalism – the view that mental events are physical events but
+what determines the mental type of a mental event (e.g., its being pain) is
+not its physical type? 1 The natural way for one to go, it seems, is fi rst to
+establish physicalism and then show that, given the truth of this general
+view, the specifi c version in question is the most plausible one. But Davidson ’ s
+argument for anomalous monism beautifully attempts to achieve both purposes
+in one stroke: his argument for physicalism assumes a rejection of
+strict mental – physical correlations, and thus the resulting physicalism is
+token - physicalism, or more specifi cally, Davidson ’ s specifi c version of it,
+anomalous monism.
+The general physicalist view that Davidson aims to establish (he refers
+to it as “ the identity of the mental and the physical ” ) is the view that mental
+events are identical with physical events. 2 A physical event, according to
+him, is an event that essentially has a physical description. Davidson avoids
+the jargon of properties, but it seems natural to take this characterization
+2 To be more precise, Davidson confi nes his argument to those mental events that interact
+with physical events. Of course, if all mental events interact with physical events, this doesn ’ t
+matter. In presenting Davidson ’ s argument, I will ignore this point.
+1 There is another use of “ token - physicalism, ” in which it refers to the thesis that takes
+mental events to be identical with physical events but is neutral with respect to the question
+of mental types.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Davidson’s Argument for Anomalous Monism 309
+to imply that a physical event is an event that has a physical property. An
+event that essentially has a physical description might also satisfy nonphysical
+descriptions, but Davidson certainly does not allow for such an event
+to have properties that are instantiated apart from physical space (this might
+explain his characterization of a physical event as an event that has only
+one physical description). He thus takes the thesis he argues to be a robust
+physicalist thesis that excludes not only Cartesian substance dualism but
+also property dualism.
+One instructive way that Davidson presents the rationale of the argument
+concerns the reconciliation of the following three principles, all of which
+he takes to be true:
+(a) (At least some) mental events interact causally with physical events.
+(b) Causation is nomological: events related as cause and effect fall under
+strict deterministic laws.
+(c) The mental is anomalous: there are no strict deterministic laws on the
+basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. And in
+particular, there are no strict deterministic laws that connect events
+under their physical descriptions with events under their mental
+descriptions.
+Principles (a) and (b) entail the obtaining of laws that connect mental
+events and physical events, but this seems to clash with (c), which seems to
+forbid mental – physical laws. How can this tension be resolved? Here is
+Davidson ’ s brief presentation of his reasoning:
+Suppose m , a mental event, caused p , a physical event; then, under some
+description m and p instantiate a strict law. This law can only be physical
+[ . . . ]. But if m falls under a physical law, it has a physical description; which
+is to say it is a physical event. (224)
+The basic idea is that there can be laws connecting mental events and
+physical events that do not mention the mental events as mental but rather
+as physical. We may call or refuse to call such laws “ mental – physical laws ” ;
+the point is that the possibility of such laws ensures the consistency of
+principles a – c.
+P1 and P2 (which express the above principles (a) and principle (b),
+respectively) straightforwardly entail C1, namely the claim that there must
+be strict deterministic laws that connect mental events with physical events.
+The crucial step of the argument comes next. P3 expresses principle (c) but
+also involves a generalization of it, namely the idea that all strict laws are
+physical laws – laws that employ physical descriptions of the events that
+they connect. So those laws that connect mental events with physical events
+310 Amir Horowitz
+also connect those events – the physical events as well as the mental events
+– under physical descriptions, and there are such laws (C2); a fortiori , these
+events have physical descriptions (C3) and so (if P5 is accepted) are physical.
+In short, it is the causal role of the mental that reveals its physical
+nature, for only the physical satisfi es the nomological requirement for
+causality.
+The argument ’ s offi cial conclusion is the physicalist thesis that mental
+events are physical events, but in fact the argument shows more. For the
+way to this conclusion goes through the assumption that the mental is
+anomalous – that it resists being predicted and explained by means of strict
+laws. Thus, according to this argument, the mental is both physical and
+anomalous, so the resulting view of the mental is anomalous physicalism,
+or as Davidson puts it, anomalous monism. Now, further, one aspect of the
+anomalous nature of the mental is that there can be no lawful connections
+between mental events with physical events. So anomalous monism excludes
+type - physicalism, which is committed to such lawful connections (it identifi
+es mental types with physical types), and is a form of token - physicalism.
+Since, as we saw, the conclusion of Davidson ’ s argument follows from
+the premises and the argument is a formally valid one, the only direct way
+to attack it is to attack its premises. Indeed, attacks against the argument ’ s
+premises have been launched, mainly against P2 and P3. The argument has
+also been attacked indirectly, by claiming that it has an arguably implausible
+implication, namely the “ type - epiphenomenalist ” view that the causal effi -
+cacy of mental events cannot be attributed to their mental properties.
+Whether or not this implication is to count as a reductio ad absurdum of
+the argument is a matter of dispute.
+P1. Mental events bear causal relations to physical events.
+P2. If there is a causal relation between events, then there is an implied
+existence of a strict deterministic law that connects those events.
+C1. There are strict laws that connect mental events with physical events
+( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. Strict laws only connect events under physical descriptions with events
+under physical descriptions.
+C2. There are strict laws that connect mental events under their (nonmental)
+physical descriptions with physical events (instantiation, P3,
+C1).
+P4. If there are strict laws that connect mental events under their (nonmental)
+physical descriptions with physical events, then mental events have
+physical descriptions.
+C3. Mental events have physical descriptions ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
+P5. If a mental event has a physical description, then it is a physical event.
+C4. Mental events are physical events ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
+81
+Putnam ’ s Multiple Realization
+Argument against
+Type - Physicalism
+Amir Horowitz
+Putnam , Hilary. “ The Nature of Mental States , ” in Hilary Putnam, Mind,
+Language, Reality: Philosophical Papers , vol. II , 429 – 40 . Cambridge,
+UK : Cambridge University Press , 1975 .
+Fodor , Jerry . Psychological Explanations . New York : Random House , 1968 .
+Hilary Putnam ’ s multiple realization argument aims to undermine the view
+nowadays known as “ type - physicalism. ” According to type - physicalism,
+mental properties are physical properties; put differently, mental types are
+physical types, and what makes a mental state of a certain type belong to
+its type (e.g., its being a pain state) is its physical – chemical makeup. Putnam
+took this view, which he labeled “ the brain state theory, ” to be the (then)
+standard physicalist view of mentality.
+The argument is simple in structure. P1 exposes the real meaning of
+type - physicalism. This theory is committed to the claim that all pains share
+physical – chemical nature, one which only they have – this is what makes
+them states of pain; similarly all states of hunger share physical – chemical
+nature that only they have – this is what makes them states of hunger, and
+so on for other mental states. We may say that according to P1, type -
+physicalism is committed to the thesis of the single realization of mental
+properties. One might think that exposing this commitment of type -
+physicalism isn ’ t exciting, but we should bear in mind that at the time
+Putnam ’ s argument was fi rst published there was no offi cial statement of
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+312 Amir Horowitz
+this theory, and Putnam elicited this commitment from what the champions
+of the prevalent physicalist view asserted (thus, in fact, exposing that they
+are type - physicalists).
+According to P2, there are empirical reasons to doubt this hypothesis.
+P2 expresses the multiple realization thesis: it asserts that most likely mental
+properties such as being pain are multiply realizable, so that pain states do
+not share a unique physical nature. It is possible that my pain and the pain
+of another creature do not exclusively share any physical property whatsoever:
+mine is realized by the instantiation of one physical property; the other
+creature ’ s by a different physical property. Now if type - physicalism is committed
+to the single realizability of mental properties but mental properties
+are (most probably) multiply realizable, then type - physicalism is (most
+probably) false. That is, C seems straightforwardly to follow from P1 and
+P2. The argument is valid. The validity of the argument is not affected by
+the fact that the multiple realization thesis is assumed to be only highly
+plausible – indeed, it is suggested as an empirical hypothesis, and not simply
+true, because the conclusion also claims for no more than high plausibility.
+Putnam strengthens his case against type - physicalism by comparing this
+theory to the thesis that mental properties are functional properties and
+showing the superiority – in terms of empirical likelihood – of the latter.
+Due to length, it will not be discussed here.
+It is important to note that the multiple realization argument undermines
+only one (important as it is) physicalist thesis and does not undermine
+physicalist ontology. Its soundness is compatible with the idea that mental
+properties are realized physically, although they may be realized in different
+physical ways. Indeed, given the truth of physicalist ontology, the argument
+may be taken to establish that some nonreductive form of physicalism, such
+that endorses physicalist ontology but denies that mental types are – or are
+reducible to – physical types, is probably true. In fact, for many philosophers,
+this is the important import of the multiple realization argument.
+Some philosophers have tried to downplay the argument ’ s conclusion by
+saying that although Putnam ’ s examples (such as that of octopus) suggest
+that not all pains exclusively share physical nature, it is still plausible that
+all human pains do. These philosophers thus endorsed a weak version of
+type - physicalism – species - specifi c - type - physicalism. According to species -
+specifi c - type - physicalism, all pains of members of the same species exclusively
+share physical natures, and the same holds for all the other mental
+states, of course. This view, however, has been challenged by the empirical
+fi nding that some areas of the brains of people who have suffered from
+some brain damage managed to “ learn ” to perform mental functions that
+were previously performed by other, physically different, areas of the brain.
+If so, it seems, the multiple realizability of mental properties penetrates also
+at the intra - species level.
+Putnam’s Argument against Type-Physicalism 313
+In addition to undermining type - physicalism, Putnam ’ s argument paved
+the way for the functionalist view of the mind. According to functionalism,
+mental properties are functional properties of organisms, the relevant functions
+being ones that connect perceptual inputs, behavioral outputs, and
+mental states. In fact, Putnam attempts to show not only that type -
+physicalism is not a very plausible theory but also that functionalism is
+more plausible and has to be preferred. Many philosophers were persuaded
+by Putnam ’ s considerations, and as a result functionalism has acquired the
+status of the dominant theory of mind.
+Putnam refers in the following passages to “ brain states ” and “ mental
+states ” rather than to properties, but the text clearly indicates that he takes
+the hypothesis he wishes to reject (namely the hypothesis that “ every psychological
+state is a brain state ” ) to be the one according to which what
+makes a psychological state belong to its mental type (e.g., its being a pain
+state) is the type of brain state that it is. So he is indeed discussing – and
+aims at undermining – type - physicalism.
+Consider what the brain - state theorist has to do to make good his claims.
+He has to specify a physical – chemical state such that any organism (not just
+a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses brain of suitable physical –
+chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical – chemical state [ . . . ].
+At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of any
+physically possible creature that cannot feel pain [ . . . ]. It is not altogether
+impossible that such a state will be found [ . . . ]. Thus it is at least possible
+that parallel evolution, all over the universe, might always lead to one and
+the same physical “ correlate ” of pain. But this is certainly an ambitious
+hypothesis.
+Finally, the hypothesis becomes still more ambitious when we realize that
+the brain state theorist is not just saying that pain is a brain state; he is, of
+course, maintained to concern that every psychological state is a brain state.
+Thus, if we can fi nd even one psychological predicate which can clearly be
+applied to both a mammal and an octopus (say, “ hungry ” ), but whose
+physical – chemical “ correlate ” is different in the two cases, the brain state
+theory has collapsed. It seems to me overwhelmingly probable that we can
+do this. (Putnam, 436)
+P1. If type - physicalism is true, then every mental property can be realized
+in exactly one physical way.
+P2. It is empirically highly plausible that mental properties are capable of
+multiple realizations.
+C1. It is (empirically) highly plausible that the view of type - physicalism
+is false ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+82
+The Supervenience Argument
+against Non - Reductive Physicalism
+Andrew Russo
+Kim , Jaegwon . “ Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion . ”
+Philosophical Perspectives 3 ( 1989 ): 77 – 108 .
+___. Mind in a Physical World . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1998 .
+___. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
+University Press , 2005 .
+Davidson , Donald . “ Mental Events ” in his Essays on Actions and Events ,
+207 – 25 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1980 .
+Putnam , Hilary . “ The Nature of Mental States , ” in Philosophy of Mind:
+Classical and Contemporary Readings , edited by David Chalmers , 73 – 9 .
+Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2002 .
+“ Mental Causation . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . (Summer
+2008 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta, available at http://
+plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental - causation/
+How it is possible for the mind to be causally relevant to events in the
+physical world has been recognized as a serious philosophical problem at
+least since Descartes defended his unique form of substance dualism.
+Nevertheless, it has become ironically clear that the problem of mental
+causation is sticking around as a diffi cult problem in contemporary metaphysics
+of mind despite both Cartesian and non - Cartesian forms of substance
+dualism fi nding diminished proponents amongst most philosophical
+circles. “ Physicalism, ” the thesis that somehow or other everything is
+dependent on the physical (and not the other way around), is motivated in
+large part due to the inadequate explanations (or lack thereof) substance
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Supervenience and Non-Reductive Physicalism 315
+dualists offer for how the mind could be causally relevant in the physical
+world. It is thought that if the mind just were something physical, then the
+problem of mental causation would simply be dissolved.
+Various reasons against reductive versions of physicalism have led many
+to accept some form of “ nonreductive physicalism, ” the view that despite
+everything somehow or other being dependent on the physical, it is not the
+case that mental properties are identical to physical properties (see Putnam
+and Davidson). The two most infl uential forms of nonreductive physicalism
+have been anomalous monism and functionalism. The importance of the
+supervenience argument lies in its conclusion that fi nding a place for the
+mind amidst the causal workings of the physical world is not possible
+simply by embracing one or the other version of nonreductive physicalism.
+In other words, the problem of mental causation remains a problem for the
+nonreductive physicalist.
+If reductive physicalism no longer remains an option, then why not
+accept that the mind simply has no place amidst the causal workings of the
+physical world? One should admit this position is even more diffi cult to
+defend than reductive physicalism. Mental causation is crucial in our self -
+understanding as free, rational, morally responsible agents, and epistemically
+evaluable cognizers. So, if mental causation is not possible, then much
+of the picture of ourselves isn ’ t possible either. The supervenience argument,
+then, poses a dilemma for the physicalist: embrace some form of reductionism
+or concede that the scientifi c conception of the world really does
+threaten the distinctiveness we take ourselves to have. This dilemma reveals
+an important point: it would be a mistake to think that the supervenience
+argument is an argument against mental causation tout court . Instead, the
+argument should be understood as calling into question how the mind could
+be causally relevant in the physical world supposing the truth of nonreductive
+physicalist.
+P is a cause of P * , with M and M * supervening respectively on P and P * .
+There is a single underlying causal process in this picture, and this process
+connects two physical properties, P and P * . The correlations between M and
+M * and between M and P * are by no means accidental or coincidental; they
+are lawful and counterfactual - sustaining regularities arising out of M ’ s and
+M * ’ s supervenience in the causally linked P and P * . These observed correlations
+give us an impression of causation; however, that is only an appearance,
+and there is no more causation here than between two successive shadows
+cast by a moving car, or two successive symptoms of a developing pathology.
+This is a simple and elegant picture, metaphysically speaking, but it will
+prompt howls of protest from those who think that it has given away something
+very special and precious, namely the causally effi cacy of our minds.
+Thus is born the problem of mental causation. (Kim Mind in a Physical
+World , 21)
+316 Andrew Russo
+Kim presents his supervenience argument as a reductio ad absurdum of
+the assumption:
+(CR) Mental properties are causally relevant properties. 1 More specifi cally,
+it is the assumption that some mental property M causes some physical
+property P * . 2 The following are the further assumptions he uses along
+the way to justify his premises:
+(SS) The mental strongly supervenes on the physical; that is, for any object
+O and any time T, if O has a mental property M at T, then necessarily
+O has a physical property P at T and necessarily anything having P at T
+has M at T.
+(NR) Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties in a sense
+of ‘ reduction ’ such that mental properties cannot be identifi ed with
+physical properties.
+(CE) Except for cases of genuine causal over - determination, no single property
+can have more than one suffi cient cause at any given time (see Kim
+“ Mechanism ” ).
+(CC) If a physical property has a cause at T, then its cause at T is a physical
+property. 3
+P1. M causes P * (CR = assumption for reductio ).
+P2. M has a supervenient base, call it P (SS).
+C1. P causes P * (P1, P2). 4
+C2. M and P cause P * (conjunction, P1, C1).
+4 One might question the move from P1 and P2 to C1. In other words, why think that just
+because P is the supervenient base of M and M causes P * that P deserves to be considered a
+cause of P * ? Kim ’ s answer is twofold. First, if you take causation to be grounded in nomological
+suffi ciency, then P does deserve to be considered a cause of P * , since (a) any supervenient
+base is nomologically suffi cient for what supervenes on it, (b) M is nomologically suffi cient
+for P * by being a cause of P * , and (c) the relation of nomological suffi ciency is transitive.
+Second, if you take causation to be grounded in counterfactuals then, again, P deserves to be
+considered a cause of P * , since (d) if the supervenient base had not occurred, then what
+supervenes on it would not have occurred, (e) if M had not occurred, then P * would not have
+occurred in virtue of M ’ s causing P * , and (f) these particular counterfactuals are transitive.
+Either way you choose to ground causation results in P ’ s deserving to be considered a cause
+of P * (see Kim Mind in a Physical World , 43).
+3 Take note that CC by itself does not rule out mental causation, since it allows the possibility
+of some physical property being causally overdetermined by another physical property and
+some mental property.
+2 Nothing hangs on the fact that the assumption is a mental property causing a physical
+property . Kim ’ s argument can be given (with minimal changes) if we were to begin with the
+assumption that a mental property causes another mental property.
+1 For the sake of clarity, I shall speak of properties causing other properties (alternatively,
+we can talk of states causing other states). But, according to Kim, it is more accurate to say
+that it is the instantiation of a property that causes the instantiation of another property. This
+is, of course, skirting over important issues in the metaphysics of causation.
+Supervenience and Non-Reductive Physicalism 317
+P3. If M and P cause P * , then either (i) M and P are the same property or
+(ii) P * has more than one suffi cient cause (plausibly true).
+P4. M and P are not the same property (NR).
+P5. P * does not have more than one suffi cient cause, or P * is a genuine case
+of overdetermination (CE).
+P6. P * is not a genuine case of overdetermination (stipulation).
+C3. P * does not have more than one suffi cient cause (disjunctive syllogism,
+P5, P6).
+C4. M and P are not the same property and P * does not have more than
+one suffi cient cause (conjunction P4, C3).
+C5. It is not the case that either (i) M and P are the same property or
+(ii) P * has more than one suffi cient cause (DeMorgan ’ s, C4).
+C6. It is not the case that both M and P cause P * ( modus tollens , P3,
+C5).
+C7. M does not cause P * or P does not cause P * (DeMorgan ’ s, C6).
+P7. P does cause P * (CC and given that P * is caused).
+C8. M does not cause P * (disjunctive syllogism, C7, P7).
+C9. M does and does not cause P * (conjunction, P1, C8).
+C10. M does not cause P * ( reductio , P1 – C9).
+Another way to understand Kim ’ s supervenient argument is that the set
+of assumptions above is inconsistent; that is, (CR), (SS), (NR), (CE), and
+(CC) cannot all be true. In order to resolve the inconsistency, one must
+abandon one of the above assumptions. Many philosophers are committed
+to the truth of (CR) and at least some thesis on the dependence of the mind
+on the physical, for example, (SS). Presumably, no physicalist should fi nd
+a problem with (CC), and (CE) has independent support (see note 4).
+Therefore, Kim urges that the best way of resolving the inconsistency is by
+rejecting (NR); that is, in some sense of ‘ reduction ’ we must accept the
+thesis that mental properties are reducible to physical properties.
+83
+Ryle ’ s Argument against
+Cartesian Internalism
+Agustin Arrieta and Fernando Migura
+Ryle , Gilbert. The Concept of Mind . Chicago : University of Chicago Press ,
+2002 .
+Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy , translated by John
+Cottingham . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1996 .
+Descartes put forward a conception of mind that has been sometimes
+described as “ internalist. ” Actually, Descartes ’ conception of mind is dualist,
+and internalism is just an aspect of it. Internalism ’ s main thesis claims that
+mental states are inner states. And, in Descartes ’ view, it goes on to claim
+that you alone have privileged access to your mental states: you are the only
+one who has authority about them.
+Internalism has been criticized from different points of view. Logical
+behaviorism has been one of them. Not without controversy, Ludwig
+Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle can be considered as fathers of logical behaviorism.
+Ryle ’ s criticism, in a nutshell, is that Cartesianism implies that there
+is an abyss between knowledge of my mind and knowledge of other minds.
+In other words, concerning knowledge of mind, the only authentic knowledge
+is self - knowledge. The problem is that, in Ryle ’ s view, this conclusion
+is false; hence, Cartesian internalism is false.
+Since the argument is valid, if someone wants to defend Cartesian internalism,
+he or she must reject some of the premises. It seems very diffi cult
+to regard as false the second and the third premises because they are just
+direct (or analytic) consequences of the defi nitions of the concepts we are
+using in such premises: privileged access, fi rst - person introspection. In
+defense of Cartesian internalism, one can reject the fourth premise and
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Ryle’s Argument against Cartesian Internalism 319
+assert that we do not have knowledge of the mental state of the others. As
+a Cartesian, one may defend the idea that (certain) knowledge is only possible
+concerning my own mental states (arguing in this way, one assumes a
+concept of knowledge linked to certainty). One accesses others ’ mental
+states just by analogy (or induction). But, actually, it seems diffi cult to
+accept as knowledge something which is justifi ed upon induction from one
+unique case (induction from one ’ s own case). In any case, Ryle defends the
+idea that that there is no such asymmetry between other minds and one ’ s
+own mind.
+It is important to distinguish between internalism and Cartesian internalism.
+The argument above does not apply to non - Cartesian internalism: the
+fi rst premise is (can be) false if Cartesian internalism is substituted for
+internalism. For instance, let us suppose that mental states are (internal)
+brain states. If so, one does not have privileged access to these states.
+Presumably, a brain - expert would have access to such states. In that case,
+fi rst - person privileges disappear.
+[Self - knowledge] is not attained by consciousness or introspection, as these
+supposed Privileged Accesses are normally described. [ . . . ] The sorts of things
+that I can fi nd out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can
+fi nd out about other people, and the methods of fi nding them out are much
+the same. A residual difference in degree between what I can know about
+myself and what I can know about you, but these differences are not all in
+favour of self - knowledge. In certain quite important respects it is easier for
+me to fi nd out what I want to know about you than it is for me to fi nd out
+the same sorts of things about myself. (Ryle, 155 – 6)
+P1. If Cartesian internalism is true, then one has privileged access to one ’ s
+mental states.
+P2. That each one has privileged access to one ’ s mental states means that
+fi rst - person introspection is the only way to know what a person ’ s mental
+states are. First - person introspection is the method to research the mind.
+P3. If fi rst - person introspection is the only way to know what a person ’ s
+mental states are, then we cannot know the mental states of others (or
+in other words, there is a strong qualitative difference between knowledge
+of one ’ s mind and knowledge of other minds).
+P4. One has knowledge of the mental states of others (or in other words,
+there is, at most, a residual difference in degree between knowledge of
+other minds and self - knowledge).
+P5. First - person introspection is not the only way to know what a person ’ s
+mental states are ( modus tollens , P3, P4).
+P6. One does not privileged access to one ’ s mental states ( modus tollens ,
+P2, P5).
+C1. Cartesian internalism is false ( modus tollens , P1, P6).
+84
+Jackson ’ s Knowledge Argument
+Amir Horowitz
+Jackson , Frank “ Epiphenomenal Qualia , ” Philosophical Quarterly 32
+( 1982 ): 127 – 36 .
+___. “ What Mary Didn ’ t Know , ” Journal of Philosophy 83 ( 1986 ):
+291 – 5 .
+Horgan , Terence. “ Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia , ”
+Philosophical Quarterly 34 ( 1084 ): 147 – 52 .
+Stoljar , D. and Y. Nagasawa (eds.). There is Something about Mary: Essays
+on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson ’ s Knowledge
+Argument . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 2004 .
+Frank Jackson ’ s Knowledge Argument (sometimes referred to simply as
+“ the knowledge argument ” ) aims at refuting physicalism and establishing
+mind – body dualism. Roughly, physicalism is the thesis that everything in
+the concrete world is physical and possesses only physical properties. Mind –
+body dualism denies physicalism: according to all its versions, mental states
+have nonphysical properties. The knowledge argument attempts to show
+that conscious experiences have nonphysical properties, thus vindicating
+dualism. (The argument deals with visual experiences but its reasoning can
+be applied to experiences of other kinds; e.g., audible experiences, bodily
+sensations such as pain, etc.).
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Jackson’s Knowledge Argument 321
+The knowledge argument belongs to a family of epistemological arguments.
+Epistemological arguments purport to derive ontological conclusions
+(conclusions about what there is) from epistemological premises (premises
+about knowledge). Other important arguments that belong to this family
+are the “ zombie argument ” (#85) and the explanatory gap argument that
+also seek to establish mind – body dualism. Moving from epistemological
+premises to ontological conclusion is no mean feat, and ingenuity is necessary
+in order to perform such a move without committing a fallacy. As we
+shall see, the knowledge argument is indeed ingenious. Nevertheless, some
+critics have argued that it rests on a fallacy.
+The argument is based on a thought experiment: an (arguably) logically
+possible scenario is described in which a certain person knows everything
+there is to know about the physical properties of an experience yet lacks
+knowledge of another property of this experience. So experiences, it is
+inferred, have nonphysical properties.
+Let us briefl y review the steps of the argument. The assumption that
+upon her release, Mary acquires new information (P2) means that this
+information was not included in the information she had before her release.
+But since before her release she had all physical information (P1), it follows
+that she gains information that isn ’ t physical. So C1 follows from P1 and
+P2. Now, the expression “ physical information, ” as it is used in Jackson ’ s
+argument, refers to information about physical properties (indeed, P1 means
+that Mary had information about all physical properties of the experience
+in question); and similarly, “ nonphysical information ” refers to nonphysical
+properties. So the claim (C1) that Mary acquired nonphysical information
+about the experience in question entails (in fact, means) that Mary acquired
+information about a nonphysical property of this experience. C2 thus seems
+to be warranted by the argument ’ s premises. And if Mary acquires information
+about a nonphysical property of this experience, then a fortiori this
+experience has such a property, as C3 states. That, in turn, means that
+physicalism is false and dualism is true. As we see, the knowledge argument
+appears to be a formally valid argument.
+According to one prominent objection, this argument is only valid if P2
+is construed in a way in which it cannot be defended. This is the objection
+from the intentionality of knowledge and information (mainly due to
+Horgan). The intentionality of information consists in the fact that one can
+have the information that something has a property X without having the
+information that is has property Y even though (unbeknownst to one) X is
+identical with Y. For example, one can have the information that Superman
+can fl y without having the information that Clark Kent can fl y; this can
+happen when the property in question is presented via different modes of
+presentation (e.g., different concepts). Thus, it is possible that Mary ’ s “ new ”
+information is new in a limited sense – it is about a property she knew all
+322 Amir Horowitz
+along from her scientifi c study of vision; it is just that before her release
+this property was presented in her knowledge by a physical concept, and
+after her release it is also presented in her knowledge by a mental (phenomenal)
+concept. How does this possibility affect the argument? According to
+this objection, P2 should be understood so as to concern “ new ” information
+in this limited sense only, and then P1 and P2 do not entail C1; for if the
+new information may be about the same property as the old information,
+then it may be about a physical property and thus not be nonphysical
+information.
+It may be instructive to note that Mary ’ s newly gained information may
+be said to be nonphysical in some sense, in the sense that it involves concepts
+that do not belong to physical theory – phenomenal concepts. But if “ nonphysical
+information ” in C1 is defi ned in this way, then, of course, C2 does
+not follow. Indeed, we can understand the intentionality objection as claiming
+that the knowledge argument illegitimately moves from an epistemological
+claim – a claim regarding the way in which information is given – to
+an ontological claim – a claim regarding what this information is about. Is
+it plausible to maintain that upon having for the fi rst time the experience
+of seeing red (and shouting “ Oh, this is what it is like to see red ” ) Mary
+didn ’ t learn about a new property? I will leave it to the reader to answer
+this question and thus to assess the strength of this objection.
+Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate
+the world from a black and white room via a black and white television
+monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us
+suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on
+when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘ red ’ , ‘ blue ’ , and
+so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from
+the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central
+nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from
+the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘ The sky is blue ’ . [ . . . ]
+What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or
+is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems
+just obvious that she will earn something about the world and our visual
+experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was
+incomplete. But she had all physical knowledge. Ergo there is more to have
+than that, and physicalism is false. (Jackson “ Epiphenomenal Qualia, ” 130)
+P1. Before her release from the black and white room, Mary had all physical
+information about the experience of seeing red.
+C1. If Mary acquired new information outside the room, then that information
+would be nonphysical (by defi nition of P1).
+P2. When released from the black and white room and having for the fi rst
+time the visual experience of seeing red, Mary acquired new information
+Jackson’s Knowledge Argument 323
+about such experiences – she acquired information about the ( “ phenomenal
+” ) property of what it is like to see red.
+C2. The information which Mary acquired about the experience of
+seeing red when released from the black and white room was nonphysical
+information ( modus ponens , C1, P2).
+P4. If Mary acquired nonphysical information, then that information is
+information about a nonphysical property of this experience.
+C3. The information which Mary acquired about the experience of
+seeing red when released from the black and white room is information
+about a nonphysical property of this experience; that is, the
+experience of seeing red has a property that is not physical ( modus
+ponens , C2, P4).
+P5. If the experience of seeing red has a property that is not physical, then
+physicalism is false and dualism is true.
+C4. Physicalism is false and dualism is true ( modus ponens , P5, C3).
+85
+Nagel ’ s “ What Is It Like
+to Be a Bat ” Argument
+against Physicalism
+Amy Kind
+Nagel , Thomas . “ What Is It Like to Be a Bat ? ” Philosophical Review 83
+( 1974 ): 435 – 50 .
+___. The View from Nowhere . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1986 .
+Physicalism – the claim that everything is physical – has been the dominant
+position in philosophy of mind since at least the middle of the twentieth
+century. Nonetheless, physicalism has long been accused of being unable to
+account satisfactorily for the qualitative or subjective aspect of experience,
+for example, the reddishness of one ’ s visual experience of a ripe tomato or
+the painfulness of one ’ s tactile experience of a sharp object. Many have
+charged that it is diffi cult to see how these aspects of experience could be
+accounted for in solely physical terms. Focusing specifi cally on the experience
+that a bat has when using its sonar, Thomas Nagel formulated this
+charge in a particularly powerful way. His argument is designed to show
+that subjective facts about experience, which are essential to it, cannot be
+captured in the objective language of physicalism. Although most philosophers
+assume that the argument, if successful, would show that physicalism
+is false, Nagel himself is careful to claim only that we currently lack the
+conceptual resources to see how physicalism could be true.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Nagel’s “Bat” Argument against Physicalism 325
+I assume we all believe that bats have experience. After all, they are
+mammals, and there is no more doubt that they have experience than that
+mice or pigeons have experience. [ . . . ]
+[T]he essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something
+it is like to be a bat. Now we know that most bats (the microchiroptera,
+to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation,
+detecting the refl ections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly
+modulated, high frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the
+outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus
+acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape,
+motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar,
+though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any
+sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively
+like anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create diffi culties
+for the notion of what it is like to be a bat. [ . . . ]
+Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human
+being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular
+point of view. [ . . . ]
+This bears directly on the mind – body problem. For if the facts of experience
+– facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism – are accessible
+only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of
+experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. The
+latter is a domain of objective facts par excellence – the kind that can be
+observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with
+differing perceptual systems. (Nagel “ What Is It, ” 438, 441, 442)
+P1. Humans cannot experience anything like what it is like for a bat when
+it is using its sonar.
+P2. Humans cannot imagine anything like what it is like for a bat when it
+is using its sonar.
+P3. If P1 and P2, then what it is like to be a bat is fundamentally a subjective
+phenomenon, understood only from a single point a view (namely,
+the bat ’ s).
+P4. Humans cannot experience anything like what it is like for a bat when
+it is using its sonar and humans cannot imagine anything like what it is
+like for a bat when it is using its sonar (conjunction, P1, P2).
+C1. What it is like to be a bat is fundamentally a subjective phenomenon,
+understood only from a single point of view ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
+P5. Physicalism takes the objective point of view.
+P6. If physicalism takes the objective point of view, and what it is like to
+be a bat is a subjective phenomenon understood from only a single point
+of view, then physicalism cannot capture what it is like to be a bat.
+P7. Physicalism takes the objective point of view and what it is like to be
+a bat is fundamentally a subjective phenomenon, understood only from
+a single point of view (conjunction, C1, P5).
+326 Amy Kind
+C2. Physicalism cannot capture what it is like to be a bat ( modus ponens ,
+P6, P7).
+P8. The fact that experience is subjective is an essential fact about
+experience.
+C3. The subjectivity of what it is like to be a bat is an essential fact about
+it (semantic entailment, P8).
+C4. Physicalism cannot capture what it is like to be a bat, and the subjectivity
+of what it is like to be a bat is an essential fact about it
+(conjunction, C2, C3).
+P10. If physicalism cannot capture what it is like to be a bat, and that is
+an essential fact about it, then physicalism cannot capture all the essential
+facts about experiences.
+C5. Physicalism cannot capture all the essential facts about experiences
+( modus ponens , C4, P10).
+86
+Chalmers ’ Zombie Argument
+Amy Kind
+Chalmers , David. The Conscious Mind . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
+1996 .
+___. “ Consciousness and Its Place in Nature , ” in Philosophy of Mind:
+Classical and Contemporary Readings , edited by David Chalmers , 247 –
+72 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2002 .
+Kirk , Robert . “ Zombies versus Materialists . ” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
+Society , Supplement 66 ( 1974 ): 135 – 52 .
+In the late twentieth century, zombies began to play an important role in
+philosophical discussions about consciousness. But unlike the zombies of
+Hollywood, philosophical zombies are very much alive – or at least, they
+would be were they to exist. As philosophers use the term, a zombie is a
+creature that is microphysically identical to a human being – and thus
+produces behavior that is indistinguishable from that of a normal human
+being – but lacks any sort of consciousness in the phenomenal sense.
+Zombies behave as if they are in pain when you stick them with a pin, and
+they will report that they are in pain, but they don ’ t experience any painful
+sensations.
+Many philosophers have recently claimed that we can coherently imagine
+the existence of zombies. This claim is taken to imply the possibility of
+zombies, a claim that in turn is taken to imply the falsity of physicalism.
+The zombies, after all, are by defi nition exactly like us physically. But if
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+328 Amy Kind
+two creatures alike physically can differ with respect to consciousness, then
+it seems to show that consciousness is something over and above the physical.
+The zombie argument is one of a class of arguments in philosophy of
+mind often referred to as “ conceivability arguments. ” Such arguments start
+by claiming that some scenario is conceivable. The conceivability of the
+scenario is taken to imply that it is possible, and this is then supposed to
+show something about the actual nature of the mind. With respect to conceivability
+arguments in general, each of these moves is controversial, and
+the zombie argument is no exception. Some philosophers have questioned
+whether zombies are really conceivable. Others grant that zombies are
+conceivable but deny that it is appropriate to move from a claim about their
+conceivability to a claim about their possibility. Yet others grant that
+zombies are possible creatures but deny that this shows anything about
+physicalism.
+[I]t is conceivable that there be a system that is physically identical to a
+conscious being, but that lacks at least some of that being ’ s conscious states.
+Such a system might be a zombie : a system that is physically identical to a
+conscious being but that lacks consciousness entirely. It might also be an
+invert , with some of the original being ’ s experiences replaced by different
+experiences, or a partial zombie , with some experiences absent, or a combination
+thereof. These systems will look identical to a normal conscious being
+from the third - person perspective: in particular, their brain processes will be
+molecule - for - molecule identical with the original, and their behavior will be
+indistinguishable. But things will be different from the fi rst - person point of
+view. What it is like to be an invert or a partial zombie will differ from what
+it is like to be the original being. And there is nothing it is like to be a zombie.
+There is little reason to believe that zombies exist in the actual world. But
+many hold that they are at least conceivable: we can coherently imagine
+zombies, and there is no contradiction in the idea that reveals itself even on
+refl ection. As an extension of the idea, many hold that the same goes for a
+zombie world : a universe physically identical to ours, but in which there is
+no consciousness. Something similar applies to inverts and other duplicates.
+From the conceivability of zombies, proponents of the argument infer their
+metaphysical possibility . Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they
+probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature. But the argument
+holds that zombies could have existed, perhaps in a very different sort of
+universe. For example, it is sometimes suggested that God could have created
+a zombie world, if he had so chosen. From here, it is inferred that consciousness
+must be nonphysical. If there is a metaphysically possible universe that
+is physically identical to ours but that lacks consciousness, then consciousness
+must be a further, nonphysical component of our universe. If God could have
+created a zombie world, then (as Kripke puts it) after creating the physical
+processes in our world, he had to do more work to ensure that it contained
+consciousness. (Chalmers “ Nature, ” 249)
+Chalmers’ Zombie Argument 329
+P1. I can conceive of zombies; that is, creatures that are microphysically
+identical to conscious beings but that lack consciousness entirely.
+P2. If zombies are conceivable, then they are metaphysically possible.
+C1. Zombies are metaphysically possible ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If zombies are metaphysically possible, then consciousness is
+nonphysical.
+C2. Consciousness is nonphysical ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+Alternatively:
+P1. I can conceive of a zombie world; that is, a world physically identical
+to ours but in which there is no consciousness.
+P2. If a zombie world is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible.
+C1. A zombie world is metaphysically possible ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. If a zombie world is metaphysically possible, then facts about consciousness
+are facts over and above the physical facts.
+C2. Facts about consciousness are facts over and above the physical facts
+( modus ponens , C1, P3).
+P4. If physicalism is true, then there are no facts about consciousness over
+and above the physical facts.
+C3. Physicalism is false ( modus tollens , C2, P4).
+87
+The Argument from Revelation
+Carlos Mario Mu ñ oz - Su á rez
+Byrne , Alex and David Hilbert . “ Color Primitivism , ” Erkenntnis 66 ( 2007 ):
+73 – 105 .
+Campbell , John. “ A Simple View of Colour , ” in Reality, Representation and
+Projection , edited by John Haldane and Crispin Wright , 257 – 68 . Oxford :
+Oxford University Press , 1993 . Reprinted in Readings on Color : vol. 1,
+The Philosophy of Color , edited by Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert,
+177 – 90. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997.
+___. “ Transparency vs. Revelation in Color Perception , ” Philosophical
+Topics 105 ( 2005 ): 105 – 15 .
+Harman , Gilbert. “ The Intrinsic Quality of Experience , ” in Action Theory
+and Philosophy of Mind , edited by James Tomberlin , 53 – 79 . Philosophical
+Perspectives, vol. 4. Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1990 .
+Johnston , Mark. “ How to Speak of the Colors , ” Philosophical Studies 68
+( 1992 ): 221 – 63 . Reprinted in Readings on Color , vol. 1: The Philosophy
+of Color , edited by Alex Byrne and David Hilbert, 137 – 72. Cambridge,
+MA: The MIT Press, 1997.
+Loar , Brian. “ Phenomenal States (Revised Version) , ” in The Nature of
+Consciousness: Philosophical Debates , edited by Ned Joel Block , Owen
+J. Flanagan , and G ü ven G ü zeldere , 597 – 616 . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
+Press , 1997 .
+Russell , Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy . London : Oxford University
+Press , 1912 .
+Strawson , Gallen . “ Red and ‘ Red ’ , ” Synth è se 78 ( 1989 ): 193 – 232 .
+Tye , Michael. Consciousness, Color and Content . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
+Press , 2000 .
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+The Argument from Revelation 331
+The argument from revelation is one of the most controversial arguments
+in the contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The terminology
+is due to Mark Johnston, in the context of the so - called “ philosophy of
+color. ” The argument tries to make explicit a basic conviction concerning
+our epistemic position with respect to what is known by having sensations,
+and it represents an effort to asking what knowledge our visual sensations
+of color provide us. Despite its apparent clarity, it is far from being an
+obviously sound argument with noncontroversial implications.
+According to Johnston, Strawson describes the idea behind the argument
+as follows: “ [C]olor words are words for properties which are of such a
+kind that their whole and essential nature as properties can be and is fully
+revealed in sensory - quality experience given only the qualitative character
+that that experience has ” (224). An earlier version of the argument was
+sketched by Russell (47). The Argument from Revelation (henceforth AR)
+is not an argument concluding that revelation is true but takes this as a
+premise. According to Johnston, revelation is often understood as a “ core
+belief ” of our conception of colors: “ [W]ere such beliefs to turn out not to
+be true we would then have trouble saying what they were false of, i.e., we
+would be deprived of a subject matter rather than having our views changed
+about a given subject matter ” (137).
+The AR is, in principle, an epistemological argument: it shows that the
+essential nature of that what sensations are about of is revealed to subjects
+merely by having such sensations. Hence, revelation concerns the relation
+between sensations and knowledge.
+[T]he nature of canary yellow is supposed to be fully revealed by visual
+experience so that once one has seen canary yellow there is no more to know
+about the way canary yellow is. Further investigation and experience simply
+tells us what further things have the property and how that property might
+be contingently related to other properties. (Johnston, 139 – 40)
+Thus, for example, subjects having visual sensations of colors are epistemically
+related to the essential features of those colors and, generalizing
+this, to have sensations suffi ces to know what they are about in themselves
+without acquiring any theoretical knowledge. The argument might be synthesized
+as follows:
+P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, and V is a sensation as of X, then
+(by revelation) S will know the essential features of X.
+P2. S has such a sensation.
+C1. S will know the essential features of X ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+This argument can also be applied to sensations other than merely visual
+– for example, to sensations of itches and pains – for revelation is not
+332 Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez
+thought to be a property of what sensations are about but a feature of the
+epistemic role of sensations.
+The AR has been defended against “ Type - type Physicalism ” (henceforth
+TP): the metaphysical thesis that mental entities of some type (say, sensations)
+are necessarily identical to physical entities of some type (say, neurobiological).
+TP is a version of ontological monism; that is, the thesis that
+reality is objectively constituted only by physical entities (say, events, states
+of affairs, processes, properties, and so on). Accordingly, some philosophers
+claim that if TP is true, then by knowing the latter (e.g., neurobiological
+states) we will know a priori the former (e.g., visual sensations). If we accept
+such inference, we will obtain a priori physicalism (AP), the epistemological
+thesis that by knowing physical entities of some type (say, neurobiological),
+we will know a priori mental entities of some type (say, visual sensations).
+In this sense, we can derive the AR against Type - type a priori physicalism
+(henceforth ARP).
+ARP simpliciter does not conclude that TP fails but that AP does. Thus,
+if someone defends a sort of TP dependent on the inference TP → AP, then
+this sort of physicalism will be denied by ARP. The AR is independent from
+ARP, for someone might accept TP to refute AP (Loar) or, for example, by
+accepting the thesis that the essential features of colors are a posteriori
+known as physical (Tye). The ARP might be synthesized as follows:
+P1. If sensations of certain type, V, are (necessarily metaphysically) identical
+to physical entities of certain type, N, then knowing N a priori entails
+knowing V; that is, TP → AP.
+P2. By merely knowing N, subjects will not know the essential features of
+V [Revelation].
+C1. TP is false ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+The AR is often viewed as framing Realist Primitivism (RP) (Byrne and
+Hilbert § 2.2); that is, the thesis that properties – or example, colors – are
+sui generis external properties. RP agrees that “ objects often do have the
+colors we take them to, and colors of objects often fi gure in causal explanations,
+in particular, that they fi gure in causal explanations of why things
+look to have the colors they do ” (Campbell 178).
+The main problem with revelation lies on the meaning of “ essential
+features. ” This expression has, at least, two senses: (i) essential features of
+what sensations are about of and (ii) essential features of sensations as
+mental states. Sense (ii) should not be confused with sense (i) (Harman). In
+other words, essential features of contents of sensations cannot be confused
+with essential features of sensations as mental states. If one adopts the
+former, then AR favors a sort of infallibility of sensations in relation to
+properties appearing to be external ones (e.g., colors). Further on, if one
+The Argument from Revelation 333
+accepts the latter, then sensations are self - revelatory. “ Essential features ”
+can also be understood as phenomenal or perspectival features that cannot
+be reduced to physical entities. So, if one accepts, for example, TP, then one
+will accept that essential features, either of sensations or of contents of
+sensations, are physical themselves. In principle, in talking about revelation
+we are talking about features in a phenomenal sense or features essentially
+phenomenal.
+There is a version of the AR with the following conclusion: “ S will know
+the complete set of truths about X ” – call this version “ ART. ” ART implies
+that the complete set of linguistic knowledge about, for example, colors is
+revealed to subjects merely by having sensations. Some philosophers have
+criticized ART (Campbell ibid.). The main difference between the AR and
+ART is that the former is an argument from revelation of essential features
+as qualitative ones, and the latter is an argument from revelation of true
+propositions about essential features.
+88
+Searle and the Chinese
+Room Argument
+Leslie Burkholder
+Searle , John. “ Minds and Brains without Programs , ” in Mindwaves , edited
+by C. Blakemore and S. Greenfi eld , 209 – 33 . Oxford : Blackwell , 1988 .
+___. “ Minds, Brains, and Programs . ” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3
+( 1980 ): 417 – 57 .
+Copeland , Jack . Artifi cial Intelligence . Oxford : Blackwell , 1993 .
+Is it possible to make a computer intelligent or give one a thinking mind
+just by having it run the right computer program? Strong AI believes that
+by designing the right programs with the right inputs and outputs, minds
+can be created in computers. John Searle ’ s famous Chinese Room argument
+is intended to prove that this answer is wrong. Here are Searle ’ s own words:
+Suppose that I ’ m locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese
+writing. I know no Chinese, either written or spoken. Now suppose further
+that after this fi rst batch of Chinese writing I am given a second batch of
+Chinese script together with a set of rules for correlating the second batch
+with the fi rst batch. The rules are in English, and I understand these rules.
+They enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of
+formal symbols, and all that “ formal ” means here is that I can identify the
+symbols entirely by their shapes. Unknown to me, the people who are giving
+me all of these symbols call the call the [fi rst] batch “ questions. ” Furthermore,
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Searle and the Chinese Room Argument 335
+they call the symbols I give them back in response to the [fi rst] batch “ answers
+to the questions, ” and the set of rules in English that they gave me, they call
+“ the program. ” Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the
+instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get
+so good at writing the programs that from the external points of view – that
+is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room in which I am locked
+– my answers to the questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of
+native Chinese speakers. As regards the [claims of strong AI], it seems to me
+quite obvious in the example that I do not understand a word of Chinese. I
+have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the native
+Chinese speaker, and I can have any formal program you like, but I still
+understand nothing. (Searle, 417 – 18)
+Searle continues by saying that if he doesn ’ t understand Chinese solely
+on the basis of running the right rules, then neither does a computer solely on
+the basis of running the right program. And what goes for Chinese goes
+for other forms of cognition as well. Just manipulating symbols according
+to a program is not enough by itself to guarantee cognition, perception,
+understanding, thinking, and so forth. So strong AI is decisively proved
+wrong.
+P1. All things or people who have a rule book or computer program that
+allows them to respond to questions and comments in Chinese in a way
+that can ’ t be distinguished from responses by someone who does understand
+Chinese satisfy the Turing test for having that ability.
+P2. Searle has a rule book that allows him to respond to questions and
+comments in Chinese in a way that can ’ t be distinguished from responses
+by someone who does understand Chinese.
+C1. If Searle has a rule book that allows him to respond to questions
+and comments in Chinese in a way that can ’ t be distinguished from
+responses by someone who does understand Chinese, then Searle satisfi
+es the Turing test for understanding Chinese (instantiation, P1).
+C2. Searle satisfi es the Turing test for understanding Chinese ( modus
+ponens , P2, C1).
+P3. All things or people that satisfy the Turing test for understanding
+Chinese are following the right rules or program for understanding
+Chinese.
+C3. If Searle satisfi es the Turing test for understanding Chinese, then
+Searle is following the right rules or program for understanding
+Chinese (instantiation, P3).
+C4. Searle is following the right rules or program for understanding
+Chinese ( modus ponens , C2, C3).
+P4. Searle doesn ’ t understand Chinese. Nothing about the situation changes
+this.
+336 Leslie Burkholder
+C5. Searle is following the right rules or program for understanding
+Chinese and not Searle does understands Chinese (conjunction, C4,
+P4).
+C6. Not either not Searle is following the right rules or program for
+understanding Chinese or Searle understands Chinese (De Morgan ’ s,
+C5).
+C7. It is not the case that if Searle is following the right rules or computer
+program for understanding Chinese then Searle understands Chinese
+(material implication, C6).
+P5. If Searle doesn ’ t understand Chinese solely on the basis of running the
+right rules, then neither does a computer solely on the basis of running
+the right program.
+C8. A computer doesn ’ t understand Chinese solely on the basis of running
+the right program ( modus tollens , C7, P4).
+P6. If no computer can understand Chinese solely on the basis of executing
+the right symbol - manipulating program or following the right symbol -
+manipulating rules, then no computer has any cognitive abilities just in
+virtue of executing the right program or following the right rules.
+C9. Just manipulating symbols according to a program is not enough by
+itself to guarantee cognition, perception, understanding, thinking, and
+so forth; that is, the creation of minds ( modus ponens , C8, P6).
+P7. If strong AI is true, then if there are the right programs with the right
+inputs and outputs, then there is creation of minds.
+C10. Strong AI is false. Strong AI is refuted ( modus tollens , C9, P7).
+Part VI
+Science and Language
+89
+Sir Karl Popper ’ s
+Demarcation Argument
+Liz Stillwaggon Swan
+Popper , Karl, R. “ Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report , ” in British
+Philosophy in Mid - Century , edited by C. A. Mace , 104 – 30 . London :
+George Allen & Unwin , 1957 .
+___. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientifi c Knowledge .
+New York : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1963 .
+Karl Popper (1902 – 94) is considered one of the most infl uential philosophers
+of science of the twentieth century. He is perhaps best known for his
+criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo - science. Troubled by
+the presumed scientifi c status of some theories popular in his time – most
+notably, Marx ’ s theory of history, Freudian psychoanalysis, and Alfred
+Adler ’ s individual psychology – Popper was determined to identify some
+criterion by which to distinguish scientifi c theories from pseudo - scientifi c
+theories. This criterion, known as falsifi ability, was for Popper the mark of
+a scientifi c theory. According to Popper, a theory is scientifi c only if it makes
+predictions that can be tested and potentially shown to be false. If a theory
+is not falsifi able in this way and can only be confi rmed with cumulative
+supporting evidence, then it is pseudo - scientifi c. For example, Einstein ’ s
+theory of general relativity predicts that light rays from distant stars will
+be defl ected by the sun ’ s gravitational fi eld. During a solar eclipse in 1919,
+astrophysicists confi rmed that starlight was in fact defl ected by the sun, and
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+340 Liz Stillwaggon Swan
+by almost precisely the amount predicted by Einstein. Einstein ’ s theory of
+general relativity is a scientifi c theory, according to Popper ’ s criterion,
+because it made a falsifi able prediction (that in fact was not falsifi ed).
+The problem which troubled me at the time was neither, “ When is a theory
+true? ” nor, “ When is a theory acceptable? ” My problem was different. I
+wished to distinguish between science and pseudo - science ; knowing very well
+that science often errs, and that pseudo - science may happen to stumble on
+the truth. ( Conjectures , 44)
+As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in
+1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian,
+but which he found no diffi culty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority
+feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I
+asked him how he could be so sure. “ Because of my thousandfold experience,
+” he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: “ And with this new
+case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand - and - one - fold. ”
+( Conjectures , 368)
+The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a history of
+irresponsible dreams, of obstinacy, and of error. But science is one of the very
+few human activities – perhaps the only one – in which errors are systematically
+criticized and fairly often, in time, corrected. This is why we can say
+that, in science, we often learn from our mistakes, and why we can speak
+clearly and sensibly about making progress there. ( Conjectures , 293)
+P1. If a theory is scientifi c, then it makes claims or predictions that could
+be shown to be false.
+P2. A theory that warrants only confi rmation (and ignores falsifying evidence)
+cannot be shown to be false.
+C1. A theory that can only be confi rmed and not falsifi ed is not scientifi c
+but pseudo - scientifi c ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+90
+Kuhn ’ s Incommensurability
+Arguments
+Liz Stillwaggon Swan and Michael Bruce
+Kuhn , Thomas S. The Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions . Chicago : The
+University of Chicago Press , 1963 .
+___. “ Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice , ” in The Essential
+Tension , 320 – 39 . Chicago : The University of Chicago Press , 1977 .
+___. The Road since Structure . Chicago : The University of Chicago Press ,
+2000 .
+Thomas Kuhn (1922 – 96) was trained as a historian of science, but is best
+known for his contributions to the philosophy and sociology of science. His
+Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions was one of the most important and most
+controversial books of twentieth - century philosophy of science, mainly
+because it so compellingly questioned the objectivity of science, which had
+previously been taken for granted especially in the foregoing philosophical
+tradition of logical positivism. Among Kuhn ’ s many contributions to the
+philosophy of science, three of the most important are: (1) an analysis of
+scientifi c revolutions wherein a paradigm shift occurs that enables scientists
+to see the world in a new light; (2) the notion that science is not cumulative,
+as generally assumed, since newer paradigms are incommensurable with the
+old, and the methods employed in making observations and uncovering
+“ truth ” are relative to the reigning scientifi c paradigm; and (3) the insight
+that science is best understood as a socially and historically contextualized
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+342 Liz Stillwaggon Swan and Michael Bruce
+endeavor, which was in sharp contrast to the earlier positivist philosophy
+of science that saw science as divorced from the human narrative.
+Rationality and Paradigm Shifts
+[T]he choice [between paradigms] is not and cannot be determined merely
+by evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in
+part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. ( Structure ,
+88)
+The competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be
+resolved by proofs. ( Structure , 148)
+There must also be a basis, though it need be neither rational nor ultimately
+correct, for faith in the particular candidate chosen. Something must
+make at least a few scientists feel that the new proposal is on the right track,
+and sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations
+that can do that. ( Structure , 158)
+P1. If an emerging paradigm becomes the dominant one not by scientifi c
+proof but by majority acceptance or intuitive appeal, then the transition
+from one paradigm to another is not rationally decided.
+P2. An emerging paradigm becomes dominant by majority acceptance or
+intuitive appeal.
+C1. The transition from one paradigm to another is not rationally
+decided ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+Incommensurable Paradigms and Holism
+The physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts are by no means identical
+with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. (Newtonian
+mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. Only at low relative
+velocities may the two be measured in the same way, and even then they must
+not be conceived to be the same). ( Structure , 102)
+Though subtler than the changes from geocentrism to heliocentrism, from
+phlogiston to oxygen, or from corpuscles to waves [as an account of the
+nature of light], the resulting conceptual transformation is no less decisively
+destructive of the preciously established paradigm. ( Structure , 94)
+Lavoisier [ … ] saw oxygen where Priestley had seen dephlogisticated air
+and others had seen nothing at all. ( Structure , 118)
+Kuhn’s Incommensurability Arguments 343
+P1. Scientifi c terms refer to things and have meaning through a network of
+meaning.
+P2. If paradigms were commensurable, then terms would still refer to the
+same things in new paradigms; for example, “ mass ” in Newton ’ s theories
+would be equivalent to “ mass ” in Einstein ’ s theories.
+P4. Terms do not refer to the same things in new paradigms; for example,
+“ mass ” is not equivalent in Newton ’ s and Einstein ’ s theories (and neither
+is a special case of the other), and some things (e.g., phlogiston) are
+eliminated outright.
+C1. Paradigms are incommensurable ( modus tollens , P2, P4).
+P5. If paradigms are incommensurable, then science does not more closely
+approximate the truth over time.
+C2. Science does not more closely approximate the truth over time
+( modus ponens , P5, C1).
+91
+Putnam ’ s No Miracles Argument
+Liz Stillwaggon Swan
+Putnam , Hilary . Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers ,
+vol. 1 . London : Cambridge University Press , 1975 .
+Boyd , Richard N. “ The Current Status of the Issue of Scientifi c Realism , ” in
+Erkenntnis 19 , 1 – 3 (May 1983 ): 45 – 90.
+Worrall , J. “ Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds ? ” Dialectica 43
+( 1989 ): 99 – 124 .
+Hilary Putnam (1926 – ) is a philosopher of language, mind, and science,
+who proposed the No Miracles argument in support of a realist understanding
+of the success of science. Realism holds that our best scientifi c practices
+and theories give us genuine knowledge about the world, and, in some cases,
+that the entities quantifi ed over in scientifi c theories, such as electrons, sub -
+particle strings, anti - matter, and mathematical laws, really do exist – or else
+our science would not be successful in teaching us about the world. The
+crux of the No Miracles argument is that the best explanation for the predictive
+and manipulative success of our scientifi c theories is that they are
+(at least approximately) true. (The opposing view – that of the anti - realist
+– is that the entities quantifi ed over in our scientifi c and mathematical theories
+need not exist for the theories to be useful; or, in other words, that our
+theories are useful but not necessarily empirically accurate.)
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Putnam’s No Miracles Argument 345
+The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that
+does not make the success of science a miracle. (Putnam, 73)
+It would be a miracle, a coincidence on a near cosmic scale, if a theory
+made as many correct empirical predictions as, say, the general theory of relativity
+or the photon theory of light without what that theory says about the
+fundamental structure of the universe being correct or “ essentially ” or “ basically
+” correct. But we shouldn ’ t accept miracles, not at any rate if there is a
+non - miraculous alternative. If what these theories say is going on “ behind ”
+the phenomena is indeed true or “ approximately true ” then it is no wonder
+that they get the phenomena right. So it is plausible to conclude that presently
+accepted theories are indeed “ essentially ” correct. (Worrall, 101)
+P1. If a scientifi c theory yields accurate observational predictions, then it
+must be (at least approximately) true.
+P2. Many of our scientifi c theories yield accurate observational
+predictions.
+C1. Many of our scientifi c theories must be (at least approximately) true;
+otherwise, the success of science would be miraculous ( modus ponens ,
+P1, P2).
+92
+Galileo ’ s Falling Bodies
+Liz Stillwaggon Swan
+Galileo . Discorsi e Dimostrazioni Matematiche, Intorno à Due Nuove
+Scienze 213, Leida, Appresso gli Elsevirii . Leiden: Louis Elsevier, 1638,
+or Mathematical Discourses and Demonstrations, Relating to Two New
+Sciences , translated by Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio. New York :
+Dover , 1914 .
+___. Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems , translated from
+the Dialogo by S. Drake, 2nd rev. edn. Berkeley, CA : University of
+California Press , 1967 .
+Brown , James R. The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the
+Natural Sciences . New York : Routledge , 1991 .
+Galileo ’ s (1564 – 1642) famous thought experiment concerning falling bodies
+appeared in his fi nal work, Discorsi, which he wrote during his time under
+house arrest. It is generally considered to be one of the most compelling
+thought experiments from the natural sciences and exemplifi es a rarity in
+the history of science in that it doubles as a reductio ad absurdum argument.
+Relying on nothing but logical reasoning, Galileo demonstrated that
+Aristotle ’ s long - standing theory that heavy objects fall more quickly than
+light objects leads to a contradiction, so he supplanted it with his own
+theory that all objects fall at the same rate of speed regardless of their
+respective weights. Now demonstrable in the laboratory with vacuum tubes,
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Galileo’s Falling Bodies 347
+Galileo ’ s thought experimental insight is remarkable in that he used only
+logic to arrive at the correct solution hundreds of years before empirical
+proof was possible. Interesting to note is that in his time, Galileo was criticized
+for being overly confi dent in his a priori conclusion; yet, had he in
+fact carried out the experiments described in his Falling Bodies thought
+experiment, he would have confi rmed Aristotle ’ s, and not his own, insight,
+due to the natural effects of air resistance.
+S alviati : If we take two bodies whose natural speeds are different, it is
+clear that on uniting the two, the more rapid one will be partly
+retarded by the slower, and the slower will be somewhat
+hastened by the swifter. Do you not agree with me in this
+opinion?
+S implicio : You are unquestionably right.
+S alviati : But if this is true, and if a large stone moves with a speed of,
+say, eight, while a smaller stone moves with a speed of four,
+then when they are united, the system will move with a speed
+of less than eight. Yet the two stones tied together make a
+stone larger than that which before moved with a speed of
+eight: hence the heavier body now moves with less speed than
+the lighter, an effect which is contrary to your supposition.
+Thus you see how, from the assumption that the heavier body
+moves faster than the lighter one, I can infer that the heavier
+body moves more slowly. [ … ]
+And so, Simplicio, we must conclude therefore that large and small bodies
+move with the same speed, provided only that they are of the same specifi c
+gravity.
+(Galileo Dialogue , 108)
+P1. If the light ball falls more slowly than the heavy ball, then it acts as a
+drag on the combined system, causing it to fall more slowly than the
+heavy ball alone.
+P2. But the combined system is itself a new, even heavier object that falls
+more quickly than the heavy ball alone.
+C1. The light ball does not fall more slowly ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
+P3. If the light ball does not fall more slowly, then all objects fall at the
+same rate of speed regardless of their respective weights.
+C2. Galileo concludes that the only logical solution is for all objects to
+fall at the same rate of speed regardless of their respective weights
+( modus ponens , P3, C1).
+93
+Eliminative Materialism
+Charlotte Blease
+Churchland , Paul M. “ Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
+Attitudes . ” Journal of Philosophy 78 , 2 ( 1981 ): 67 – 90 .
+___. “ Evaluating Our Self - Conception . ” Mind and Language 8 , 2 ( 1993 ):
+211 – 22 .
+Feyerabend , Paul. “ Materialism and the Mind – Body Problem . ” Journal of
+Metaphysics 17 ( 1963 ): 49 – 66 .
+In the philosophy of mind, “ eliminative materialism ” is perhaps the most
+radical thesis that has ever been proposed by philosophers. It is the provocative
+claim that our “ folk psychology ” – that is, our commonsense understanding
+of our own and other people ’ s behavior – is not only a theory but
+it is a false theory and will one day be eliminated in favor of a future,
+neuroscientifi c theory of the mind. The most recent and most vociferous
+eliminative materialist is Paul Churchland. Churchland argues that we need
+to overhaul our self - conception and eliminate such mental concepts as
+“ beliefs, ” “ desires, ” “ wishes, ” and so on. The thesis therefore has grave
+consequences for ethics and the social sciences (psychology, sociology,
+history, economics, and anthropology) and their applications (psychiatry,
+law, politics, etc.), since these fi elds employ such commonsense mental
+terms in their explanations. Eliminative materialism has been challenged on
+the grounds that it is self - refuting: the eliminative materialist, it is argued,
+cannot believe that “ beliefs ” are not true. Churchland argues that it merely
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Eliminative Materialism 349
+shows how deeply entrenched such terms as “ belief ” are in our self -
+understanding. Other objections to eliminative materialism include rejecting
+the claim that folk psychology is a theory or rejecting the view that it is
+false theory. In any case, successfully challenging or grappling with eliminative
+materialism can fundamentally change the way we think about
+ourselves.
+Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our commonsense conception of
+psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so
+defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually
+be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced to a completed neuroscience.
+Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted
+within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory
+we may expect to be more powerful by far than the commonsense psychology
+which it displaces, and more substantially integrated within physical science
+generally. (Churchland “ Eliminative Materialism, ” 67)
+P1. Folk psychology is a theory.
+P2. If folk psychology is a theory, then folk psychology is fallible; that is,
+eliminable.
+C1. Folk psychology is fallible; that is, eliminable ( modus ponens , P1,
+P2).
+P3. There are good grounds for believing that folk psychology is false.
+P4. If (C1) and (P3), then folk psychology should be rejected as a false
+theory.
+P5. (C1) and (P3) (conjunction).
+C2. Folk psychology should be rejected as a false theory (and thereby
+eliminated) ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
+94
+Wittgenstein ’ s Private
+Language Argument
+George Wrisley
+Wittgenstein , Ludwig . Philosophical Investigations , translated by G. E. M.
+Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, edited by P. M. S.
+Hacker and Joachim Schulte , rev. 4th edn. in German and English.
+Oxford : Wiley - Blackwell , 2009 .
+Candlish , Stewart , and George Wrisley . “ Private Language . ” The Stanford
+Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 edn.), edited by Edward N.
+Zalta , available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/
+private - language/
+Mulhall , Stephen . Wittgenstein ’ s Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense,
+and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations . Oxford : Clarendon
+Press , 2007 .
+Stern , David G. Wittgenstein ’ s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction .
+Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2004 .
+In section 243 of his Philosophical Investigations , Ludwig Wittgenstein
+(1889 – 1951) introduces the idea of a private language, a language that is
+supposed to refer to one ’ s own immediate, private sensations in such a way
+that no one else could understand the language. Such a language would not
+be private in the weak sense of a secret code, since a secret code could be
+shared. The idea that concerns Wittgenstein is whether a necessarily private
+language, one that could never be shared, is possible or even conceivable.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument 351
+Often, section 258 is seen as a key remark in what is often called “ the
+private language argument. ” However, the variety and complexity of issues
+discussed in the remarks from sections 243 – 315 suggest that there is not
+one single argument that could be labeled “ the private language argument. ”
+Those remarks approach related issues from different directions rather than
+form a sustained critique of a single issue. Nevertheless, the argument contained
+in sections 256 – 258 is central to the overall consideration of the
+possibility of a private language, and it can be reconstructed.
+The general strategy of sections 256 – 258 is to show: (1) how different
+a private language of sensations would have to be from our ordinary public
+language since it would require disconnecting our sensations from their
+natural expressions – for example, the expression of pain through crying,
+joy through smiling, and so on; and (2) that the conditions needed to establish
+a private language are not possible, or that the very notion of a “ private
+language, ” one consisting of mere association of sign and private object,
+cannot be given meaning.
+The philosophical implications of the arguments in the private language
+sections of Philosophical Investigations , particularly of those in sections
+256 – 258, are many and varied, but two important ones concern:
+Epistemology: Wittgenstein criticizes the idea that there is a sharp epistemological
+divide between knowledge of one ’ s own “ inner ” states and
+knowledge of other ’ s “ inner ” states. Descartes held that even if all he
+believed about the world external to his mind might be false, he could
+nevertheless not fail to know that he had certain sensations and thoughts
+and that he was consciousness. This implies that while I can know that I
+am in pain, I cannot know for certain of another person that she is in pain.
+Much of what Wittgenstein says on privacy seeks to undermine such a
+position. He questions whether it ’ s not the other way around, namely, that
+we do very well know when others are in pain and it is questionable in
+what sense I can be said to know that I am in pain. His reasons for questioning
+knowledge claims about one ’ s own pain are not easily summarized.
+However, they stem, in part, from observations about the differences in
+context and use between such claims as “ I know my car is running; I just
+turned the key ” and “ I know my tooth hurts; I feel it. ”
+Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Language: Wittgenstein has a general
+criticism of what might seem like a commonsensical view of the relationship
+between language and world; that is, he challenges the view that the
+world divides naturally into objects to which we then simply attach labels
+(names). One consequence of his consideration of ostensive defi nitions
+(defi ning/explaining a word by pointing to what it refers) is that referring
+to the world is only possible when a language is in place to fi x the reference.
+Thus the foundation of a language cannot simply be a matter of
+352 George Wrisley
+looking around to see what there is and then attaching names to self -
+identifying objects.
+In considering our sensation language, Wittgenstein similarly criticizes
+the idea that sensations are “ self - identifying, ” providing their own criteria
+of identity, so that all that is required to talk about them meaningfully is
+to associate a name with a sensation. Because of how intimate we are with
+our sensations, we may believe that all it takes for the word pain to be
+meaningful is for us to associate the sign ‘ pain ’ with the sensation. The
+sensation is unique and self - identifying, so that the meaning of ‘ pain ’ is
+determined by the sensation. However, if Wittgenstein is right about naming
+and the way names and words refer, then objects and sensations do not
+pick themselves out as the objects and sensation that they are. Their identity
+is determinate only in relation to a language that can be used determinately
+to refer to them as conceived by the language. Sensation words are not
+meaningful because they refer to self - identifying, private sensations; rather,
+it is the public observable behavior that is the foundation for the use and
+meaning of sensation language.
+256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences
+and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to signify my
+sensations? – As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied
+up with my natural expressions of sensation? In that case my language is not
+a “ private ” one. Someone else might understand it as well as I. – But suppose
+I didn ’ t have any natural expression of sensation, but only had sensations?
+And now I simply associate names with sensations, and use these names in
+descriptions. –
+257. [ . . . ] When one says “ He gave a name to his sensation ” one forgets
+that much must be prepared in the language for mere naming to make sense.
+And if we speak of someone ’ s giving a name to a pain, the grammar of the
+word “ pain ” is what has been prepared here; it indicates the post where the
+new word is stationed.
+258. Let ’ s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the
+recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “ S ”
+and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.
+— I fi rst want to observe that a defi nition of the sign cannot be formulated.
+– But all the same, I can give one to myself as a kind of ostensive defi nition!
+– How? Can I point to the sensation? – Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak,
+or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on
+the sensation – and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. – But what is this
+ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A defi nition serves to lay down
+the meaning of a sign, doesn ’ t it? – Well, that is done precisely by concentratWittgenstein’s
+Private Language Argument 353
+ing my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection between
+the sign and the sensation. – But “ I commit it to memory ” can only mean:
+this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the
+future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would
+like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only
+means that here we can ’ t talk about ‘ correct ’ . (Wittgenstein)
+P1. If a sensation is to be necessarily private, then it must not have a natural
+expression; for example, as pain is expressed through groans, screams,
+crying, and so on.
+P2. Suppose that one were to want to begin a private language and did so
+by making a sign, “ S, ” in a diary every time a particular sensation
+occurred.
+P3. If “ S ” is to be given a meaning and if there is to be a criterion of correctness
+for the correct application of “ S ” in the future, then a defi nition of
+“ S ” must be formulatable, or If “ S ” is to be given a meaning and if there
+is to be a criterion of correctness for the correct application of “ S ” in the
+future, then “ S ” must be given an ostensive defi nition (i.e., a defi nition
+through pointing to the thing named while saying/writing its name).
+P4. No defi nition for “ S ” can be formulated, for to do so would require
+the use of a public language, which would invalidate the language ’ s
+privacy.
+P5. Would it not be possible, nevertheless, ostensively to defi ne “ S ” by
+concentrating one ’ s attention on the sensation while writing the sign in
+the diary? No! Because:
+5a. As mentioned in section 257, and defended in sections 27 – 37 of
+Philosophical Investigations , if an ostensive defi nition is to function,
+then a conceptual – linguistic context to determine the “ object ” of the
+pointing, or in this case, the concentration of one ’ s attention, must
+exist.
+5ai. Ostensive defi nitions cannot be used to ground meaning but,
+rather, act as a fi nal step in making the already established meaning
+of a sign explicit.
+5aii. Without a conceptual – linguistic context with which to determine
+the “ object ” of concentration, there is no determinate “ pointing ”
+to the sensation. Is it the sensation that is concentrated on, its duration,
+its intensity, the body minus the sensation, and so on?
+C1. No ostensive defi nition is possible in the context of the private
+diarist ( modus tollens , P5, 5a – 5aii).
+5b. In the context of the private diarist, there is no existing conceptual –
+linguistic context.
+C2. The concentration of one ’ s attention on a sensation while writing
+a sign does not establish a meaning, private or otherwise, for the
+sign ( modus tollens 5a, 5b).
+354 George Wrisley
+There is controversy among Wittgenstein scholars regarding whether the
+above line of reasoning (together with other things Wittgenstein writes) is
+meant to show that the idea of establishing a private language by private
+ostension is false or nonsense. In order to refl ect that controversy, two different
+versions of this conclusion are given below.
+C3. No meaning has been given to “ S ” and there is no criterion for
+the correct application of “ S ” in the future (destructive dilemma,
+P3, P4, P5).
+P6. If (C3), then nothing meaningful will result.
+C4. Nothing meaningful will result from the mere association of a sign
+with a sensation ( modus ponens , C3, P6).
+C5. Since we do speak meaningfully about sensations, sensation talk does
+not get its meaningfulness from the mere association of sign with
+sensations (instantiation, C4).
+P7. Languages, even private ones, must be meaningful.
+C6 - Version 1 It is false that a private language consisting of mere association
+of sign and private object is possible (substitution, C5, P7).
+C6 - Version 2 Since we have failed to give any meaning to the notion of
+a necessarily private language, one consisting of mere association of
+sign and private object, it is not false that a private language consisting
+of mere association of sign and private object is possible; rather, it is
+not clear exactly what possibility is being ruled out. A necessarily
+private language is in effect nonsense (substitution, C5, P7).
+95
+Fodor ’ s Argument for
+Linguistic Nativism
+Majid Amini
+Fodor , Jerry . The Language of Thought . Hassocks, Sussex, UK : Harvester
+Press , 1976 .
+Chomsky , Noam. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use . New
+York : Praeger , 1986 .
+Gopnik , Myran (ed.). The Inheritance and Innateness of Grammars . Oxford :
+Oxford University Press , 1997 .
+Bertrand Russell, one of the most infl uential philosophers of the twentieth
+century, is reputed to have remarked, “ How comes it that human beings,
+whose contacts with the world are brief and personal and limited, are nevertheless
+able to know as much as they do know? ” (qtd. in Chomsky xxv).
+This is what Noam Chomsky has canonized as “ Plato ’ s Problem, ” “ How
+we can know so much given that we have such limited evidence ” (Chomsky
+xxv). In a similar Russellian spirit, Myran Gopnik offers the following
+observation about language: “ One of the puzzles about language is the fact
+that children do not speak when they are born, but by the time they are
+two they are using language and by four they are fl uent speakers. How do
+they accomplish this amazing feat? ” (Gopnik 3).
+Historically speaking, the acquisition of language by human beings has
+been explained in terms of two contrasting and competing analogies. On
+the one hand, John Locke, in his classic work An Essay concerning Human
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+356 Majid Amini
+Understanding (1689), contends that the mind of a child is like a tabula
+rasa or “ blank slate, ” which passively receives the impressions of experience
+to form linguistic competence and performance. Basically, at birth, the mind
+is bereft of any understanding, and, subsequently, senses and experience
+inscribe linguistic marks on the empty tablet. Yet, on the other hand,
+Gottfried Leibniz, in his New Essays concerning Human Understanding
+(1703), explicitly inveighs against the Lockean blank slate analogy of language
+acquisition and argues that the mind of an infant is like a “ veined
+block of marble ” with its ingrained structure, whereby experience can only
+carve at certain pre - specifi ed forms and patterns (see #75). On the Leibnizian
+account, the conceptual wherewithal of the mind is innate and pre - confi gured
+and the senses and experience only provide the occasion for the knowledge
+of language to arise.
+Jerry Fodor has been one of the most prominent contemporary philosophers
+at the forefront of defending the innateness of language through a
+number of infl uential arguments that are rather less empirical in nature and
+more abstract in orientation. He attempts to argue for the existence of
+innate knowledge not only of the syntactic categories and structure of language
+but also of internal words in the following way:
+Learning a language (including, of course, a fi rst language) involves learning
+what the predicates of the language mean. Learning what the predicates
+of a language mean involves learning a determination of the extension of these
+predicates. Learning a determination of the extension of the predicates involving
+learning that they fall under certain rules (i.e. truth rules). But one cannot
+learn that P falls under R unless one has a language in which P and R can be
+represented. So one cannot learn a language unless one has a language. (Fodor,
+63 – 4)
+The fi rst premise lends itself to two readings, since there is an ambiguity
+in the premise.
+A sentence is considered ambiguous when it can be read in at least two
+different ways. In the case of Fodor ’ s argument, his fi rst premise could be
+rendered either strongly or weakly, and accordingly the two different readings
+can be presented as follows:
+(1) Strong Reading: There is a rule R such that one learns language L only
+if one learns R.
+(2) Weak Reading: One learns language L only if there is a rule R such
+that one learns R.
+The different readings of the fi rst premise could be represented schematically
+by using the symbol for existential quantifi er in modern logic – that
+is, ∃ R – in the following manner:
+Fodor’s Argument for Linguistic Nativism 357
+(1) ∃ R (one learns L only if one learns R).
+(2) One learns L only if ∃ R (one learns R).
+But, what is important to observe is that Fodor needs the strong version
+for sustaining his argument for nativism. What is required for the weak
+version is just to construe knowledge of language only as an ability to use
+language, that is, an ability to conform to some rules, which is not suffi cient
+to support a nativist conception of language. Therefore, a weak reading of
+the fi rst premise renders the argument invalid, unless one can show that an
+ability conception of language is untenable.
+The second premise is also susceptible to various interpretations. For one
+thing, in characterizing a behavioral pattern, one has to distinguish between
+(i) being guided by a rule and (ii) fi tting a rule. For instance, although a
+plant exhibits a regular behavior, it does not represent a rule. That is, a
+tree ’ s behavior fi ts a rule but is not guided by the rule. Therefore, in the
+case of language, it may be claimed that although a child ’ s speech pattern
+fi ts a certain rule, it does not follow that it is guided by it. The latter needs
+further justifi cation.
+However, what might be more damaging to the argument is an ambiguity
+in the premise. Again, there are two possible ways of reading the
+premise:
+(A) Strong Reading: Coming to know a rule requires a prior ability to
+represent it.
+(B) Weak Reading: If one has come to know a rule, one has to be able to
+represent it.
+The problem is that although the weak version appears plausible, it does
+not entail the strong one. In other words, one may hold the weak version
+without subscribing to the other one, and the premise required for the
+nativist argument has to be in the strong sense. Again, if Fodor intends to
+insist on the strong reading of the premise, he needs to offer some further
+argument to rule out the weak reading of his second premise.
+This premise is also in need of clarifi cation, specifi cally about the notion
+of language invoked. For, if the notion of language is broadly interpreted,
+then the claim verges on banality in the sense that it would be general
+enough such as no one would object to it. But, in that case, it will not have
+suffi cient strength to sustain innateness of language. However, Fodor ’ s
+invocation of language is more substantial, and he has a highly detailed and
+complex understanding of it. Consequently, in support of his third premise,
+Fodor resorts to a number of other arguments, including the controversial
+idea of impossibility of learning, to defend his claim about linguistic
+nativism.
+358 Majid Amini
+P1. If one is learning a language, then one is required to learn a rule.
+P2. If one is learning a rule, then one is required to represent a rule.
+P3. If one is learning a language, then one is required to represent a rule
+(hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
+P4. If one is required to represent a rule, then one is required to already
+know a language.
+C1. If one is learning a language, then one is required to already know
+a language (hypothetical syllogism, P3, P4).
+96
+Fodor and the Impossibility
+of Learning
+Majid Amini
+Fodor , Jerry . “ On the Impossibility of Acquiring ‘ More Powerful ’ Structures , ”
+in Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam
+Chomsky , edited by Massimo Piattelli - Palmarini, 142 – 62 . London :
+Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1980 .
+Piatteli - Palmarini , Massimo . “ Ever since Language and Learning:
+Afterthoughts on Piaget – Chomsky Debate , ” in Cognition on Cognition ,
+edited by Jacques Mehler and Susana Franck , 376 – 78 . Cambridge, MA :
+The MIT Press , 1995 .
+Since the middle of the twentieth century, there has been a steady stream
+of empirical research purporting to support the idea that much of our cognitive
+abilities rely on the existence of innate theories of some specifi c
+domain of knowledge (#75, #95). For example, it seems that children
+possess an innate basis of information about other minds whose disruption
+can ensue in states such as autism. Innate beliefs have also been invoked in
+the explanation of other domains of cognitive competence, such as our
+knowledge of basic properties of physical objects and of kinds of stuff:
+children ’ s ability at exploiting limited information about numbers, set, and
+basic algebraic operations; adults ’ conception of numbers; music perception;
+na ï ve conceptions of the physical world; certain facial expressions of
+emotions; deductive inferences and our reasoning concerning actions and
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+360 Majid Amini
+their practical consequences. Thus, without denying or diminishing the role
+of experience as input and environmental trigger, the picture presented by
+these empirical investigations is that much of our cognitive competencies is
+the result of native capacities rather than learning and acquisition.
+Jerry Fodor, as one of the leading contemporary proponents of cognitive
+nativism, has been arguing that the cause of nativism is further strengthened
+when one realizes that, strictly speaking, learning is impossible. The argument
+revolves around the impossibility of changes in the representational
+system of an organism. Fodor argues that a stronger representational system
+cannot arise from a weaker one by means of general learning. In fact, the
+argument is applicable to any theory of learning couched in terms of conceptual
+enrichment. Fodor contends that nothing new could be acquired
+during cognitive development. Basically, the insight is that theories purporting
+to explain such new acquisition can offer explanation on pain of presupposing
+the availability of the very concepts involved in the new
+acquisition. However, the Achilles heel of Fodor ’ s reasoning seems to be the
+argument ’ s major assumption that knowledge and learning involve representations
+– a doctrine known as the representational theory of mind. One
+can talk about the process of learning involving changes in the representational
+system, as the fi rst premise does, only if one has already assumed
+that learning cannot take place without representation. But, if one believes
+that knowledge and learning can happen without representations, then the
+fi rst premise of the argument becomes untenable and thereby the argument
+collapses. Yet, the doctrine of representationalism is a presumption that is
+widely shared by a signifi cant number of cognitive science practitioners and
+philosophers.
+Suppose we have a hypothetical organism for which, at the fi rst stage, the
+form of logic instantiated is propositional logic. Suppose that at stage 2 the
+form of logic instantiated is fi rst - order quantifi cation logic. [ . . . ] clearly a
+case of a weaker system at stage 1 followed by a stronger system at stage 2.
+And, of course, every theorem of a propositional logic is a theorem of fi rst -
+order quantifi cational logic, but not vice versa. Now we are going to get from
+stage 1 to stage 2 by a process of learning, that is, by a process of hypothesis
+formation and confi rmation. Patently, it can ’ t be done. Why? Because to learn
+quantifi cational logic we are going to have to learn the truth conditions on
+such expressions as “ ( X ) Fx . ” And, to learn those truth conditions, we are
+going to have to formulate, with the conceptual apparatus available at stage
+1, some such hypothesis as “ ( X ) Fx ” is true if and only if [ . . . ]. But of course,
+such a hypothesis can ’ t be formulated with the conceptual apparatus available
+at stage 1; that is precisely the respect in which propositional logic is weaker
+than quantifi cational logic. Since there isn ’ t any way of giving truth conditions
+on formulas such as all “ ( X ) Fx ” in propositional logic, all you can do is say:
+they include Fa and Fb and Fc , and so on. (Fodor, 148)
+Fodor and the Impossibility of Learning 361
+P1. If learning is possible, then it involves changes in the representational
+system of an organism.
+P2. If there are changes in the representational system of an organism, then
+the representational system already has the required conceptual apparatus
+for the change.
+P3. The representational system does not already have the required conceptual
+apparatus for the change.
+C1. There are not changes in the representational system of an organism
+( modus tollens , P3, P2).
+C2. Learning is impossible ( modus tollens , C1, P1).
+97
+Quine on the Indeterminacy
+of Translation
+Robert Sinclair
+Quine , W. V. Word and Object . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1960 .
+Hylton , Peter . Quine . New York : Routledge , 2007 .
+Kemp , Gary . Quine: A Guide for the Perplexed . New York : Continuum ,
+2006 .
+In Chapter 2 of his magnum opus Word and Object , W. V. Quine famously
+attacked the scientifi c credentials of the concept “ meaning ” with his controversial
+argument for the indeterminacy of translation. The argument is
+set up in what Quine takes to be scientifi cally and empirically adequate
+terms, where the evidence for the assignment of meaning is viewed as objective
+and public, which is then captured in terms of dispositions to respond
+overtly to socially observable stimulations. He further emphasizes that the
+criteria available for isolating meanings, which are used to distinguish one
+meaning clearly from another, should also to be evaluated in terms of this
+public conception of empirical evidence. With this as background, Quine ’ s
+critical argument against the empirical viability of “ meaning ” proceeds with
+his introduction of the thought experiment he calls “ radical translation. ”
+In this idealized scenario, a fi eld linguist seeks to translate an unknown
+language without the help of dictionaries or bilingual guides of any sort. It
+is within such a hypothetical situation, Quine suggests, that one can better
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Quine on the Indeterminacy of Translation 363
+focus on the raw empirical data available for the assignment of meanings
+to the language in question. He concludes that the available data can only
+take the linguist so far, and that the completion of the translation requires
+the linguist to use his own subjective preferences or intuitions concerning
+how to understand the language. As a result, the unscientifi c nature of the
+enterprise is fully exposed, since the assignment of meaning largely involves
+matters of practical convenience and preference rather than scientifi c matters
+of fact. Translation is then indeterminate for Quine; a consideration of the
+evidence and methods available leaves translation unfi nished, requiring the
+further introduction of the linguist ’ s own preferences for its completion. He
+more dramatically makes this point by claiming that two rival translation
+manuals could be constructed that do justice to all the evidence yet offer
+inconsistent translations, and there is no further “ fact of the matter ” to
+decide between them. Many have missed or misunderstood the ontological
+upshot of this conclusion. By showing that “ meaning ” is unfi t for philosophical
+and scientifi c purposes, Quine thinks he has given us reason to
+reject the idea that meanings are entities that somehow underlie the practice
+of translation and communication. This is because translation aims at
+establishing synonymy or sameness of meaning relationships between languages,
+which for Quine would provide us with criteria for the separate
+identifi cation of meanings. Given the indeterminacy found within radical
+translation, there remains no adequate empirical clarifi cation of this synonymy
+relation, so we lack identity criteria for meanings and then have no
+reason to suppose that “ meanings ” exist. Since some philosophers have
+claimed that meanings should be construed as propositions, Quine sometimes
+presents indeterminacy of translation as undermining this claim that
+meanings are propositions.
+Given his interest in addressing semantical issues from a critical, scientifi c
+perspective and his specifi c view of the relevant evidence, Quine introduces
+several technical terms within his argument. The “ stimulus meaning ” of a
+sentence is the ordered set of sensory stimulations that would cause the
+acceptance or rejection of a sentence by a speaker. Importantly, stimulus
+meaning serves as the objective evidence from which the linguist proceeds
+to develop a translation manual. An “ observation sentence ” is an utterance
+that all speakers of the language would assent to when stimulated by the
+same situations or circumstances. Further, two sentences are said to be
+“ stimulus - synonymous ” when they are assented to under the same circumstances.
+A sentence is “ stimulus - analytic ” for a speaker if she would assent
+to that sentence in any situation whatsoever. Lastly, “ analytical hypotheses ”
+consist of the linguist ’ s guesses concerning the meaning of elements of the
+native language and their correlation to English words and phrases. Quine ’ s
+introduction of these terms indicates the type of empirical clarity he wished
+to inject into the philosophical (i.e., scientifi c) study of semantics or meaning.
+364 Robert Sinclair
+For him, clarity is only achieved if our hypotheses, even the more abstract
+ones of philosophy, are described in terms of overt behavior and dispositions
+to such behavior. He takes the use of these terms as providing greater
+scientifi c and empirical clarity on these issues than mentalist approaches to
+mind and meaning, which he ultimately rejects as unexplanatory. Moreover,
+these terms help further to clarify the steps taken to complete the translation
+and to highlight in more explicit terms the exact ways in which the procedure
+falls short.
+Of the many critical responses to this argument, perhaps the most
+obvious would stress that Quine ignores relevant empirical facts that may
+help to rule out competing translations, perhaps even determining just one.
+So, for example, one might argue that relevant features of human brains,
+such as the innate genetic endowment central for language acquisition, help
+to determine translation. However, if one accepts that the data to be
+explained with regards to meaning is public and empirical in the way
+emphasized by Quine, then it remains unclear how an appeal to such neurological
+features of the brain will help with the detection of meaning or
+with language translation. Quine himself thought that the indeterminacy
+thesis was plausible. Few have agreed. While some have taken the indeterminacy
+thesis as central to Quine ’ s overall philosophy, at least one noted
+commentator questions this view. Even if translation was shown to be
+determinate along lines suggested by Quine, the notion of meaning that
+would emerge would be inadequate for the philosophical purposes usually
+assigned to propositions and meanings such as understanding a language.
+On this reading, Quine ’ s refl ections on indeterminacy would, at most, show
+the concepts of “ meaning ” and “ proposition ” as not empirically well
+grounded, but this by itself would have little impact on a view of propositions
+as nonempirical, abstract entities. For Quine ’ s criticism of this use of
+proposition, one has to look elsewhere in his philosophy, specifi cally at his
+genetic view of language learning and how this account reveals no need for
+an appeal to this philosophical conception of meaning (Hylton, 225 – 30).
+Quine ’ s recent rather agnostic description of indeterminacy as a conjecture
+would appear to offer some support for this interpretation.
+Known languages are known through unique systems of analytical hypotheses
+established in tradition or painfully arrived at by unique skilled linguists.
+To devise a contrasting system would require an entire duplicate enterprise
+of translation, unaided even by usual hints from interpreters. Yet one has only
+to refl ect on the nature of possible data and methods to appreciate the indeterminacy.
+Sentences translatable outright, translatable by independent evidence
+of stimulatory occasions, are sparse and must woefully under - determine
+the analytical hypotheses on which the translation of all further sentences
+depends. To project such hypotheses beyond the independently translatable
+sentences at all is in effect to impute our sense of linguistic analogy unverifi -
+Quine on the Indeterminacy of Translation 365
+ably to the native mind. Nor would the dictates even of our own sense of
+analogy tend to any intrinsic uniqueness; using what fi rst comes to mind
+engenders an air of determinacy though freedom reign. There can be no doubt
+that rival systems of analytical hypotheses can fi t the totality of speech behavior
+to perfection, and can fi t the totality of dispositions to speech behavior as
+well, and still specify mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences
+insusceptible of independent control. (Quine, 72)
+P1. Language is a social art. Acquiring it depends on intersubjective observable
+cues concerning what to say and when to say it; that is, it is here
+that we fi nd empirical evidence relevant for the determination of meaning.
+P2. If language is social in this specifi c sense, then understanding how
+“ meaning ” is acquired can only be clarifi ed by an appeal to dispositions
+to respond overtly to socially observable stimulations; that is, verbal
+dispositions to overt behavior.
+C1. The type of empirical evidence relevant for clarifying the determination
+of meaning consists of verbal dispositions to overt behavior
+( modus ponens , P1, P2).
+P3. To isolate better this data and the possible empirical limits of a scientifi c
+account of meaning, we can consider an account of translation called
+“ radical translation ” (RT), an idealized situation where we confront an
+unknown language and have no help from bilinguals or dictionaries. We
+then examine how far the evidence (i.e., verbal dispositions) preserves
+sameness of meaning across languages.
+P4. Using the stimulus meanings of native utterances, the fi eld linguist
+translates native utterances by observing interactions with the local environment.
+This method yields translations of observation sentences and
+logical connections between utterances. Even more generally, the linguist
+can judge whether two sentences are stimulus - synonymous – that is,
+when they share stimulus meanings – or stimulus - analytic; that is, when
+assented to following any stimulus.
+C2. At this point, translation can be more or less objectively determined,
+with most of the language in question still remaining untranslated.
+Further steps need to be taken to complete the translation (P4, detailed
+description of the steps in RT).
+P5. If translation is to proceed beyond this stage, then the linguist must
+break down sentences further into words and assign independent signifi -
+cance to them, thereby developing a system of analytical hypotheses; that
+is, provide a translation manual.
+C3. The linguist completes a manual of translation using these analytical
+hypotheses ( modus ponens , C2, P5).
+P6. These hypotheses go beyond the available evidence (i.e., stimulus
+meaning) and are not then directly answerable to this evidence.
+366 Robert Sinclair
+P7. If analytical hypotheses are not directly answerable to the data, then it
+is possible to construct rival systems of analytical hypotheses that are
+equally good translations of the language in question.
+C4. The result is translational indeterminacy: rival systems of analytical
+hypotheses are possible, each of which provides a translation manual
+that is equally successful in facilitating effective communication. There
+remains no further “ fact of the matter ” to distinguish one as the single
+best translation manual of the language. Synonymy or sameness of
+meaning across languages has not been empirically clarifi ed ( modus
+ponens , P6, P7).
+P8. If we have translational indeterminacy and unclear standards of synonymy,
+then there is no good scientifi c or philosophical reason to posit
+the existence of meanings or propositions underlying the practice of
+translation and communication.
+C5. There are then no propositions or sentence meanings ( modus ponens ,
+C4, P8).
+98
+Davidson ’ s Argument for the
+Principle of Charity
+Maria Caama ñ o
+Davidson , Donald . “ Radical Interpretation , ” in Inquiries into Truth and
+Interpretation , 125 – 39 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
+___. “ On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme , ” in Inquiries into Truth
+and Interpretation , 183 – 98 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
+Hahn , Ludwig E. (ed.). The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, The Library
+of Living Philosophers , vol. XXVII . Chicago and La Salle : Open Court ,
+1999 .
+McGinn , Colin . “ Charity, Interpretation and Belief . ” Journal of Philosophy
+74 ( 1977 ): 521 – 35 .
+Ramberg , Bjorn . Donald Davidson ’ s Philosophy of Language . Oxford :
+Blackwell , 1989 .
+Stich , Stephen . The Fragmentation of Reason . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
+Press , 1990 .
+Wilson , N. L. “ Substance without Substrata . ” Review of Metaphysics 12
+( 1959 ): 521 – 39 .
+Davidson develops his argument for the Principle of Charity as a way to
+avoid appealing to intentional entities in his semantic theory while, at the
+same time, ruling out also the Quinean problem regarding the indeterminacy
+of translation (#97). The six premises formulated below correspond
+to six Davidsonian theses. The fi rst establishes what evidence is available
+for interpreting. The second states that such evidence is insuffi cient, whereas
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+368 Maria Caamaño
+P3 points out a fi rst requirement for interpreting, namely, the attribution
+of beliefs. The fourth and fi fth premises point to a twofold problem arisen
+from the latter requirement, that is, the interdependence between belief and
+meaning and the inaccessibility of beliefs. In P6, a second condition is laid
+down in order to solve that problem: the application of the Principle of
+Charity. The conclusion makes reference to the consequence that follows
+from the fulfi llment of the second condition: the translatability between the
+interpreter ’ s language and the language of the person being interpreted. The
+dependence between the fulfi llment of the fi rst and the second requirements,
+being stated within Davidson ’ s philosophical framework, is what determines
+the dependence of interpretation on translation. The argument
+follows a syllogistic strategy hinging on three main assumptions: one concerning
+the need of belief attribution for interpretation to be possible, one
+related to the inaccessibility of other agents ’ beliefs, and another regarding
+the interdependence between beliefs and meanings. It must be pointed out
+that Davidson drastically changed the original formulation of the Principle
+of Charity by N. L. Wilson: “ We select as designatum [of a name] that
+individual which will make the largest possible number of [the speaker ’ s]
+statements true ” (532). Davidson introduces the Principle of Charity not
+only as a semantic rule to determine the referents of the nouns in the
+speaker ’ s language but also as a necessary condition for recognizing a linguistic
+agent as such, that is, for recognizing any intentional behavior. Three
+main kinds of objections have being raised to Davidson ’ s use of such principle:
+(1) the a priori character of the Principle of Charity, which lacks any
+empirical justifi cation (Ramberg); (2) the high probability that the necessary
+agreement to interpret be much less than Davidson thinks (Stich); and (3)
+the existence of different patterns of rational behavior that can evolve along
+history, and even a certain degree of irrationality also obeying certain patterns
+that are amenable to evolution (McGinn).
+If we cannot fi nd a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of
+a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own
+standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having
+beliefs, or as saying anything. (Davidson “ Radical Interpretation, ” 137)
+The fi rst part has to do with coherence. Thoughts with a propositional
+content have logical properties; they entail and are entailed by other thoughts.
+Our actual reasonings or fi xed attitudes don ’ t always refl ect these logical
+relations. But since it is the logical relations of a thought that partly identify
+it as the thought it is, thoughts can ’ t be totally incoherent [ . . . ]. The principle
+of charity expresses this by saying: unless there is some coherence in a mind,
+there are no thoughts [ . . . ]. The second part of the argument has to do with
+the empirical content of perceptions, and of the observation sentences that
+express them. We learn how to apply our earliest observation sentences from
+Davidson’s Argument for the Principle of Charity 369
+others in the conspicuous (to us) presence of mutually sensed objects, events,
+and features of the world. It is this that anchors language and belief to the
+world, and guarantees that what we mean in using these sentences is usually
+true. [ . . . ] The principle of charity recognizes the way in which we must learn
+perceptual sentences. (Davidson, qtd. in Hahn, 343)
+P1. If something is evidence available for interpreting, then that is the
+agent ’ s behavior in publicly observable circumstances.
+P2. The only evidence available for interpreting is insuffi cient.
+P3. If there is interpretation, then there is attribution of beliefs to the agents
+being interpreted.
+P4. Belief and meaning are interdependent.
+P5. Beliefs are not agent ’ s behavior in publicly observable circumstances.
+C1. Beliefs are not evidence available for interpreting ( modus tollens , P1,
+P5).
+P6. If there is attribution of beliefs, then there is a maximization of the
+agreement between the interpreter ’ s beliefs and the beliefs of the agents
+being interpreted.
+C2. If there is interpretation, then there is a maximization of the agreement
+between the interpreter ’ s beliefs and the beliefs of the agents
+being interpreted (hypothetical syllogism, P3, P6).
+P7. There is a maximization of the agreement between the interpreter ’ s
+beliefs and the beliefs of the agents being interpreted (assumption).
+C3. There is maximization of agreement between the meaning of the
+interpreter ’ s language and the meaning of language used by the agents
+being interpreted (substitution, P4, P7).
+C4. If there is maximization of the agreement between the beliefs, then
+there is maximization of agreement between meanings, that is, translation
+(substitution P7, C3).
+C5. (Principle of Charity): If there is interpretation, then there is translation.
+(hypothetical syllogism, C2, C4).
+99
+Frege ’ s Argument for Platonism
+Ivan Kasa
+Frege , Gottlob . Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische
+Untersuchung ü ber den Begriff der Zahl . Breslau : W. Koebner , 1884 .
+___. Begriffsschrift. Eine der arithmetischen Nachgebildete Formelsprache
+des reinen Denkens . Halle : Louis Nebert , 1879 .
+___. The Foundations of Arithmetic , translated by J. L. Austin. Evanston,
+IL : Northwestern University Press , 1994 .
+Hale , Bob , and Crispin Wright . The Reason ’ s Proper Study . Oxford : Oxford
+University Press , 2000 .
+Wright , Crispin. “ Field and Fregean Platonism , ” in Physicalism in
+Mathematics , edited by A. Irvine , 73 – 94 . Dordrecht : Kluwer , 1990 .
+Commonly, many mathematical statements are considered to be true. We
+learn to distinguish early on, for example, true arithmetical statements, such
+as “ 2 + 3 = 5, ” from false ones, such as “ 2 + 3 = 4. ” On a higher level of
+mathematical sophistication, but to a similar effect, professional mathematicians
+strongly appear to be in the business of articulating mathematical
+conjectures and proving their truth.
+On the other hand, on any account of informal reasoning it holds that,
+in order for it to be the case that something is so - and - so, the thing so characterized
+has to exist. In formal theories of logical consequence, this is
+captured by rules of existential generalization. Expressible in quantifi ed
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Frege’s Argument for Platonism 371
+predicate logic, existential generalization says that every formula of the
+form ∃ xP ( x ) (for P a predicate) is the logical consequence of any formula
+of the form Pa , where a is a constant term.
+Interestingly, these elementary and uncontroversial contentions constitute
+premises for an argument that has a very controversial effect. To ask
+whether abstract objects, such as numbers, sets, or properties, exist means
+stepping into a traditional battleground of Western philosophy that is still
+vigorously contested. At the same time, the claim that there is something
+that is a number can be inferred from any trivial truth of arithmetic.
+The following refi nement of this short but important argument makes
+explicit some of the central assumptions commonly associated with the
+concepts involved. These are assumptions about how language is structured
+and how it relates to the world that can be invoked to justify the rules of
+inference mentioned above and are refl ected in standard formal accounts
+of meaning. The development of such accounts began with Frege ’ s analysis
+of elementary predication in function - argument form, whereby singular
+terms constitute a syntactically determinable category of expressions the
+members of which have the function to refer to entities in the world (see
+Frege ’ s Begriffsschrift ).
+It is natural to suppose that reference is not successful if the entity purportedly
+referred to does not exist. Abstract singular terms are singular
+terms that purport to refer to abstract entities, that is, roughly entities that
+lack spatio - temporal location. On the traditional Fregean conception,
+objects are by defi nition precisely those entities we can refer to, that aspect
+of the world responsive to the syntactically characterizable category of
+singular terms. (Note that this makes the class of objects somewhat broad,
+including, for example, people ’ s whereabouts.) In particular, Frege has
+argued that numerals are singular terms and numbers therefore are abstract
+objects (see Frege ’ s Grundlagen ).
+In arithmetic we are not concerned with objects which we come to know
+as something alien from without through the medium of the senses, but with
+objects given directly to our reason and, as its nearest kin, utterly transparent
+to it. (Frege Foundations , § 105)
+Frege ’ s belief that numbers are objects [ . . . ] is the product of a deceptively
+simple train of thought. Objects are what singular terms, in their most basic
+use, are apt to stand for. And they succeed in doing so when, so used, they
+feature in true statements. Certain sorts of expression, for instance the standard
+decimal numerals, and expressions formed by applying the numerical
+operator ‘ the number of . . . ’ , to a predicate, are used as singular terms in
+the pure and applied arithmetical statements of identity and predication in
+which they feature. Many such statements are true. So such terms do have
+reference, and their reference is to objects. (Wright, 154)
+372 Ivan Kasa
+P1. If a sentence is true, all of its syntactic constituents have successfully
+discharged their semantic function.
+P2. The semantic function of (abstract) singular terms is to refer to (abstract)
+objects.
+C1. If a sentence is true, all of its singular terms (if there are any) successfully
+refer to objects (substitution, P1, P2).
+P3. If a singular term successfully refers, there is an object that it refers to.
+C2. If a sentence partly constituted by singular terms is true, there are
+objects that its singular terms refer to (hypothetical syllogism, C1, P3).
+P4. There are true sentences partly constituted by abstract singular terms.
+C3. There are abstract objects ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
+100
+Mathematical Platonism
+Nicolas Pain
+Benacerraf , Paul . “ Mathematical Truth , ” Journal of Philosophy 70 ( 1973 ):
+661 – 80 .
+Balaguer , Mark . Platonism and Antiplatonism in Mathematics . Oxford :
+Oxford University Press , 1998 .
+G ö del , Kurt . “ What is Cantor ’ s Continuum Hypothesis? ” in Kurt G ö del:
+Collected Works. Publications 1938 – 1974 , edited by Solomon Ferferman ,
+John W. Dawson Jr. , Stephen C. Kleene , Gregory H. Moore , Robert M.
+Soloway , and Jean van Heijenoort , vol. 2 , 254 – 70 . Oxford : Oxford
+University Press , 1995 . Originally published in Philosophy of
+Mathematics: Selected Readings , edited by Paul Benacerraf and Hilary
+Putnam. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice - Hall/Oxford: Blackwell, 1964.
+Parsons , Charles . “ Mathematical Intuition , ” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
+Society 80 ( 1979 – 80): 145 – 68 .
+Mathematical Platonism ’ s (MP) purpose is to justify mathematical knowledge
+and to explain why certain mathematical propositions are true and
+meaningful. It is the metaphysical and the epistemological claim: (1) that
+abstract objects exist, that is, objects that are neither spatio - temporal nor
+causal; (2) that true and meaningful mathematical propositions of high -
+order theory stand for or refer to abstract objects; (3) that we know when
+these propositions are true and meaningful because we have an access to
+abstract objects. Reference to abstract objects seems to appear in second - or
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+374 Nicolas Pain
+higher - order logical and mathematical theories, that is, in theories that do
+not quantify over individuals (e.g., “ If there is an x such that x ≥ y , then
+x + z ≥ y + z ” ), but over properties of logical and mathematical items (e.g.,
+in “ Any natural number that has only two distinct natural number divisors,
+1 and itself, is a prime, ” we quantify over the property ‘ to be a natural
+number ’ ), or properties of properties. Because of mathematical evidence
+(the fact that we know for sure that certain mathematical propositions of
+second or higher order, e.g., “ 3 is a prime, ” are true), MP argues that we
+can infer from the intuition of these propositions being true, fi rst, that we
+have an intuition that there are abstract objects that give them meaning,
+and, second, that we have, similarly to the perception of empirical objects,
+a specifi c cognitive faculty to perceive abstract objects, without which no
+intuition would be, cognitively speaking, likely to be possible (see G ö del
+and Parsons).
+Whereas the metaphysical argument (see Benacerraf) against MP
+addresses statement (1), the skeptical argument against MP addresses statements
+(2) and (3). The key point of the epistemological argument against
+MP is the causal theory of knowledge (Benacerraf), whose purpose is to
+deny, fi rst, the validity of the inference that goes from the intuition of to
+the intuition that , and, second, the existence of a specifi c cognitive faculty
+to perceive abstract objects. A human being X knows P (a proposition) if
+and only if X is, in an appropriate way, causally related to the fact that p .
+And from that premise, we infer, fi rst, that human beings cannot obtain the
+knowledge of abstract objects, and, second, that human beings cannot
+obtain knowledge of mathematical propositions of second - or higher - order
+theory grounded on abstract objects. Therefore, MP is not true. And since
+we know for sure that certain propositions of second or higher order are
+true, even if we suppose that we do not know abstract objects, MP fails to
+explain mathematical evidence. Therefore, MP is not the best way to explain
+mathematical knowledge.
+[If X knows that p , it] must be possible to establish an appropriate sort
+of connection between the truth conditions of p ( . . . ) and the grounds on
+which p is said to be known, at least for propositions that one must come to
+know – that are not innate. In the absence of this no connection has been
+established between having those grounds and believing a proposition which
+is true. [ . . . ] This second condition on an account of mathematical truth will
+not be satisfi ed, because we have no account of how we know that the truth
+conditions for mathematical propositions obtain. (Benacerraf, 667)
+P1. If Mathematical Platonism is true, then, if for any human being there
+is knowledge of mathematical propositions of second - or higher - order
+theory, then this knowledge is grounded on abstract objects.
+Mathematical Platonism 375
+P2. If S knows P (a proposition), then S ’ s grounds for P are relevantly connected
+to the fact that p .
+P3. For any X, if X is a spatio - temporal being, and for any Q (a proposition
+that describes a fact q about an abstract object), then X is not relevantly
+connected to the fact that q and, therefore, X does not know Q .
+P4. Human beings are spatio - temporal beings.
+C1. Human beings are not relevantly connected to abstract objects and
+do not have any knowledge of abstract objects ( modus ponens , P3,
+P4).
+C2. Human beings do not know any proposition grounded on abstract
+objects ( modus tollens , P2, C1).
+P5. If human beings have knowledge of mathematical propositions of
+second - or higher - order theory grounded on abstract objects, then human
+beings possess knowledge of abstract objects.
+C3. Human beings do not have any knowledge of mathematical propositions
+of second - or higher - order theory grounded on abstract objects
+( modus tollens , P5, C2).
+C4. Mathematical Platonism is not true ( modus tollens , P1, C3).
+Appendix A: Learning the
+Logical Lingo
+A statement or proposition is a sentence that can either be true or false.
+A conditional statement is a sentence that can be either true or false and
+has two parts: the antecedent and the consequent. A conditional statement
+generally has the form of an “ If . . . , then . . . ” statement.
+An argument is a set of statements with at least one premise and one
+conclusion. The premises provide reasons or evidence for the truth of the
+conclusion.
+A deductive argument has premises that guarantee the truth of the conclusion.
+An inductive argument is an argument where the premises provide
+reasons that the conclusion is probably true.
+An argument is a deductively valid argument if and only if it is impossible
+for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. An argument is
+called “ sound ” when it is deductively valid and the premises are in fact
+true. An unsound argument is either invalid, or valid with at least one false
+premise.
+A strong argument is an inductive argument where the premises suffi -
+ciently support that the conclusion is probably true. The strength of an
+inductive argument is a matter of degree, and describing an argument as
+such does not imply that the premises are true.
+Inductive arguments that are not strong, having unlikely conclusions
+given the premises, are therefore called “ weak ” arguments.
+A cogent argument is a strong argument in which all the premises are in
+fact true. An uncogent argument is either weak or strong, with at least one
+false premise.
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Appendix B: Rules of Inference
+and Replacement
+Modus ponens p ⊃ q
+p
+=> q
+Modus tollens p ⊃ q
+∼ q
+=> ∼ p
+Hypothetical syllogism p ⊃ q
+q ⊃ r
+=> p ⊃ r
+Disjunctive syllogism p v q
+∼ p
+=> q
+Constructive dilemma ( p ⊃ q ) · ( r ⊃ s )
+p v r
+=> q v s
+Destructive dilemma ( p ⊃ q ) · ( r ⊃ s )
+∼ q v ∼ s
+=> ∼ p v ∼ r
+Absorption p ⊃ q
+=> p ⊃ ( p · q )
+Simplifi cation p · q
+=> p
+Conjunction p
+q
+=> p · q
+Addition p
+=> p v q
+Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
+First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
+© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
+Rules of Inference and Replacement 379
+Any of the following logically equivalent expressions can replace each
+other:
+De Morgan ’ s Theorem ∼ ( p · q ) ≡ ( ∼ p v ∼ q )
+∼ ( p v q ) ≡ ( ∼ p · ∼ q )
+Commutation ( p v q ) ≡ ( q v p )
+( p · q ) ≡ ( q · p )
+Association [ p v ( q v r )] ≡ [( p v q ) v r ]
+[ p · ( q · r )] ≡ [( p · q ) · r ]
+Distribution [ p · ( q v r )] ≡ [( p · q ) v ( p · r )]
+[ p v ( q · r )] ≡ [( p v q ) · ( p v r )]
+Double negation p ≡ ∼ ∼ p
+Transposition ( p ⊃ q ) ≡ ( ∼ q ⊃ ∼ p )
+Material implication ( p ⊃ q ) ≡ ( ∼ p v q )
+Material equivalence ( p ≡ q ) ≡ [( p ⊃ q ) · ( q ⊃ p )]
+( p ≡ q ) ≡ [( p · q ) v ( ∼ p · ∼ q )]
+Exportation [( p · q ) ⊃ r ] ≡ [ p ⊃ ( q ⊃ r )]
+Tautology p ≡ ( p v p )
+p ≡ ( p · p )
+Symmetry of identity: If a = b , then b = a (e.g., #21).
+Transitivity of identity: If a = b and b = c , then a = c.
+Substitution: If a = b , then a can replace b (e.g., #9).
+“ Instantiation ” reasons from the general to the particular: from “ All men
+are mortal ” to “ Mike is mortal, ” where “ Mike ” is an instance of “ men. ”
+Reductio ad absurdum is an indirect strategy of proving a proposition
+to be true by assuming its contradiction (opposite) and then showing that
+this leads to a conclusion that is false, contradictory, or absurd, and thereby
+justifying the original proposition. Note that, for any proposition, either
+that proposition is true, or its negation is true.
\ No newline at end of file
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+**Critical thinking is the ability to think clearly and rationally about what
+to do or what to believe.** It includes the ability to engage in reflective
+and independent thinking. Someone with critical thinking skills is able to do
+the following :
+
+  * understand the logical connections between ideas
+  * identify, construct and evaluate arguments
+  * detect inconsistencies and common mistakes in reasoning
+  * solve problems systematically
+  * identify the relevance and importance of ideas
+  * reflect on the justification of one's own beliefs and values
+
+Critical thinking is not a matter of accumulating information. A person with a
+good memory and who knows a lot of facts is not necessarily good at critical
+thinking. A critical thinker is able to deduce consequences from what he
+knows, and he knows how to make use of information to solve problems, and to
+seek relevant sources of information to inform himself.
+
+Critical thinking should not be confused with being argumentative or being
+critical of other people. Although critical thinking skills can be used in
+exposing fallacies and bad reasoning, critical thinking can also play an
+important role in cooperative reasoning and constructive tasks. Critical
+thinking can help us acquire knowledge, improve our theories, and strengthen
+arguments. We can use critical thinking to enhance work processes and improve
+social institutions.
+
+Some people believe that critical thinking hinders creativity because it
+requires following the rules of logic and rationality, but creativity might
+require breaking rules. This is a misconception. Critical thinking is quite
+compatible with thinking "out-of-the-box", challenging consensus and pursuing
+less popular approaches. If anything, critical thinking is an essential part
+of creativity because we need critical thinking to evaluate and improve our
+creative ideas.
+
+* * *
+
+## §1. The importance of critical thinking
+
+**Critical thinking is a domain-general thinking skill**. The ability to think
+clearly and rationally is important whatever we choose to do. If you work in
+education, research, finance, management or the legal profession, then
+critical thinking is obviously important. But critical thinking skills are not
+restricted to a particular subject area. Being able to think well and solve
+problems systematically is an asset for any career.
+
+**Critical thinking is very important in the new knowledge economy.** The
+global knowledge economy is driven by information and technology. One has to
+be able to deal with changes quickly and effectively. The new economy places
+increasing demands on flexible intellectual skills, and the ability to analyse
+information and integrate diverse sources of knowledge in solving problems.
+Good critical thinking promotes such thinking skills, and is very important in
+the fast-changing workplace.
+
+**Critical thinking enhances language and presentation skills**. Thinking
+clearly and systematically can improve the way we express our ideas. In
+learning how to analyse the logical structure of texts, critical thinking also
+improves comprehension abilities.
+
+**Critical thinking promotes creativity**. To come up with a creative solution
+to a problem involves not just having new ideas. It must also be the case that
+the new ideas being generated are useful and relevant to the task at hand.
+Critical thinking plays a crucial role in evaluating new ideas, selecting the
+best ones and modifying them if necessary
+
+**Critical thinking is crucial for self-reflection**. In order to live a
+meaningful life and to structure our lives accordingly, we need to justify and
+reflect on our values and decisions. Critical thinking provides the tools for
+this process of self-evaluation.
+
+**Good critical thinking is the foundation of science and democracy**. Science
+requires the critical use of reason in experimentation and theory
+confirmation. The proper functioning of a liberal democracy requires citizens
+who can think critically about social issues to inform their judgments about
+proper governance and to overcome biases and prejudice.
+
+## §2. The future of critical thinking
+
+In January 2016, the World Economic Forum issued a report "The Future of
+Jobs". It says:
+
+> The Fourth Industrial Revolution, which includes developments in previously
+> disjointed fields such as artificial intelligence and machine-learning,
+> robotics, nanotechnology, 3-D printing, and genetics and biotechnology, will
+> cause widespread disruption not only to business models but also to labour
+> markets over the next five years, with enormous change predicted in the
+> skill sets needed to thrive in the new landscape.
+
+The top three skills that supposed to be most relevant are thinking skills
+related to critical thinking, creativity, and their practical application.
+These are the cognitive skills that our website focuses on.
+
+## §3. For teachers
+
+  * The ideas on this page were discussed in a blog post on edutopia. The author uses the critical thinking framework here to apply to K-12 education. Very relevant to school teachers!
+
+__next tutorial
+
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+_Literal meaning_ is a property of linguistic expressions. Roughly speaking,
+the literal meaning of a complex sequence of words is determined by its
+grammatical properties and the meanings that are conventionally assigned to
+those words. The literal meaning of a statement should be distinguished from
+its _conversational implicature_ \- the information that is implicitly
+conveyed in a particular conversational context, distinct from the literal
+meaning of the statement.
+
+For example, suppose we ask Lily whether she wants to go to the cinema and she
+replies, "I am very tired." Naturally we would infer that Lily does not want
+to go to the cinema. But this is not part of the literal meaning of what is
+said. Rather, the information that she does not want to go is conveyed in an
+implicit manner. Similarly, suppose we hear Lala says, "Po likes books". We
+might perhaps take Lala to be saying that Po likes to read. But this is only
+the conversational implicature, and not part of the literal meaning of what is
+being said. It might turn out that Po hates reading and she likes books only
+because she regards them as good investment. But even if this is the case,
+Lala's assertion is still true.
+
+One important point illustrated by this example is that when we want to find
+out whether a statement is true, it is its literal meaning that we should
+consider, and not its conversational implicature. This is particularly
+important in the legal context. The content of a contract is typically given
+by the literal meaning of the terms of the contract, and if there is a dispute
+about the contract ultimately it is normally settled by looking at the literal
+meaning of the terms, and not by what one or the other party thinks was
+implied implicitly.
+
+Consider the following reference letter written for a student. Go through each
+of the sentence and explain why it is not part of its literal meaning that the
+student is a good student or a hardworking one.
+
+> Edward's abilities must be seen to be believed. The amount of material he
+> knows will surprise you. It would be very hard to find someone as capable as
+> he is. He has left a deep impression on all the teachers in the department.
+> You will be fortunate if you can get him to work for you.
+
+When we want to distinguish between the literal meaning of two statements, one
+method is to think of situations where one statement is true, and the other
+one is false, or to think of the different implcations that they might have.
+Apply this method to each of these pairs of sentences.
+
+  1. I shall try to come.   
+I shall come.
+
+  2. This is the oldest building on campus.  
+This is one of the oldest buildings on campus.
+
+  3. Amy convinced Betty to go to the party.  
+Amy encouraged Betty to go to the party.
+
+  4. Superman will die very soon.  
+Superman might die very soon.
+
+  5. It can be proved to be true.  
+It cannot be proved to be false.
+
+  6. Honesty is Tim's biggest virtue.  
+Loyalty is Tim's biggest virtue.
+
+Consider these two clauses which might appear as part of a rental agreement.
+How would you explain their differences in literal meaning? Think about their
+different implications with regard to your rights and duties.
+
+  1. You may terminate the contract after 12 months by giving 2 months notice.
+  2. After 12 months, you can give 2 months notice and terminate the contract.
+
+answer
+
+__The second statement says that notice to terminate the contract can be given
+only after 12 months. So in effect the minimum duration of the contract is 14
+months. This is different with the first statement, which says that the
+contract can be terminated after 12 months, provided that 2 months notice has
+been given. There is no requirement that the notice has to be given only after
+12 months, so the minimum duration of the contract is 12 months, provided that
+notice is given after 10 months (or earlier in common practice). This is
+something to watch out for when you sign a rental contract in the future!
+
+ __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. Controlled trials
+
+As we saw in the previous section, the fact that two things are correlated
+does not by itself show that one causes the other. To establish causal claims,
+statisticians use a method called the _controlled trial_. For example, suppose
+you wish to know whether a particular medicine is effective at curing
+baldness. What you wish to know is whether taking the medicine causes hair to
+grow. To establish this, you divide your test subjects into two groups, chosen
+at random (to avoid bias). Half the subjects (the treatment group) are given
+the medicine. The other half (the control group) are given a _placebo_ , which
+looks just like the medicine but contains no active ingredients. You can then
+measure the hair growth in the two groups and compare the results. If the
+medicine is effective, then the difference between the two groups should be
+large enough that you can reject the null hypothesis that the medicine works
+no better than the placebo, at your chosen significance level.
+
+The important point here is the _random_ assignment of patients to the two
+groups. The only factor that differs between the groups in a _systematic_ (as
+opposed to random) way is the treatment, so if there is a difference in hair
+growth, then either the medicine caused it, or it was the result of pure
+chance (sampling error). As long as the probability that the result was due to
+chance is small enough (smaller than the chosen significance level), we can
+conclude that the medicine was the cause.
+
+Controlled trials are difficult to perform in many areas. For example, one
+cannot perform a controlled trial to test whether smoking causes cancer in
+humans, because one cannot take two groups at random and force one group to
+smoke for twenty years! Instead, the groups that are studied are self-selected
+--some people choose to smoke and some choose not to. There is always the
+possibility that those people who choose to smoke have some other factor in
+common that causes cancer. This makes it much more difficult to establish
+causation in this area. However, controlled trials on animals can be used, and
+these strongly support a causal link.
+
+  1. The trial for the baldness treatment described above is a _blind_ trial. This means that the patients do not know whether they are in the treatment group or the control group--this is why the patients in the control group are given a placebo. Blind trials are used wherever possible. Why might this be important? answer
+
+__The importance of blind trials is to make sure that no factor varies
+systematically between the treatment group and the control group other than
+the treatment itself. If the patients know which group they are in, then this
+knowledge itself constitutes a systematic difference between the two groups.
+This might not seem like an important difference, but in fact simply believing
+that you are being treated can have a measurable effect for a wide range of
+medical conditions. Patients who are given a placebo to take often show a
+measurable improvement compared to patients who are given nothing at all. This
+is called the _placebo effect_.
+
+  2. A _double blind_ trial is one in which neither the patient nor the doctor knows whether the patient is in the treatment group or the control group. The doctor doesn't know whether the tablets they give to the patient are genuine or placebos. Why might this be important? answer
+
+__Again, the importance here is to rule out any factors which might vary
+systematically between the treatment group and the control group. It has been
+shown that if the doctor knows whether the patient is in the treatment group
+or the control group, this knowledge can unconsciously alter their behaviour
+towards the patient and their perception of the patient's condition. In this
+case, if the doctor knows which group the patient is in, this might
+unconsciously influence their perception of slight changes in hair growth or
+of the severity of side effects. This makes the data provided by the doctor
+less reliable.
+
+  3. Reread the excerpt from the _South China Morning Post_ in the previous question set. Would it be possible to conduct a controlled trial to determine whether superstitious beliefs cause neurosis, depression and low IQ? answer
+
+__No, a controlled trial is unlikely to be possible in this case. We can't
+assign people randomly to two groups and make one group believe in
+superstitions. Hence the two groups (superstitious and non-superstitious) are
+self-selecting, and this introduces the possibility of bias. It may be that
+people with a predisposition to neurosis, depression or low IQ are more likely
+to end up in the superstitious group than in the non-superstitious group. This
+is why the correlation reported in the newspaper article does not establish a
+causal link.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+One very interesting aspect of statistics is the use of probability in
+explaining scientific methodology. In particular, the _Bayesian approach_
+provides a powerful framework to explain confirmation and many other aspects
+of scientific reasoning.
+
+On the Bayesian approach, probability is used to measure _degrees of belief_.
+Belief does not come in an all-or-nothing manner. If it has been raining
+heavily the past week, and the clouds have not cleared, you might believe it
+is going to rain today as well. But you might not be certain that your belief
+is true, as it is possible that today turns out to be a sunny day. Still, you
+might decide to bring an umbrealla when you leave home, since you think it is
+more likely to rain than not. The Bayesian framework is a theory about how we
+should adjust our degrees of belief in a rational manner. In this theory, the
+probability of a statement, P(S), indicates the _degree of belief_ an agent
+has in the truth of the statement S. If you are certain that S is true, then
+P(S)=1. If you are certain that it is false, then P(S)=0. If you think S is
+just as likely to be false as it is to be true, then P(S)=0.5.
+
+One important aspect of the theory is that rational degrees of belief should
+obey the laws of probability theory. For example, one law of probability is
+that P(S) = 1 - P(not-S). In other words, if you are absolutely certain that S
+is true, then P(S) should be 1 and P(not-S)=0. It can be shown that if your
+system of degree of belief deviates from the laws of probability, and you are
+willing bet according to your beliefs, then you will be willing to enter into
+bets where you will lose money no matter what.
+
+What is interesting, in the present context, is that
+
+Here, P(H) measures your degree of belief in a hypothesis when you do not know
+the evidence E, and the conditional probability P(H|E) measures your degree of
+belief in H when E is known. We might then adopt these definitions :
+
+  1. E _confirms_ or supports H when **P(H|E) > P(H)**.
+  2. E _disconfirms_ H when **P(H|E) < P(H)**.
+  3. 3\. E is _neutral_ with respect to H when **P(H|E) = P(H)**.
+
+As an illustration, consider definition #1. Suppose you are asked whether Mary
+is married or not. Not knowing her very well, you don't really know. So if H
+is the statement "Mary is married", then P(H) is around 0.5. Now suppose you
+observe that she has got kids and has a ring on her finger, and living with a
+man. This would provide evidence supporting H, even though it does not prove
+that H is true. The evidence increases your confidence in H, so indeed P(H|E)
+> P(H). On the other hand, knowing that Mary likes ice-cream probably does not
+make a difference to your degree of belief in H. So P(H|E) is just the same as
+P(H), as in definition #3.
+
+One possible measure of the amount of confirmation is the value of
+P(H|E)-P(H). The higher the value, the bigger the confirmation. The famous
+Bayes theorem says :
+
+P(H|E) = P(E|H)xP(H)/P(E)
+
+So, using Bayes theorem, the amount of confirmation of hypothesis H by
+evidence E
+
+= P(H|E) - P(H)  
+= P(E|H) x P(H)/P(E) - P(H)  
+= P(H) { P(E|H) / P(E) - 1 }
+
+Notice that all else being equal, the degree of confirmation increases when
+P(E) decreases. In other words, if the evidence is rather unlikely to happen,
+this provides a higher amount of confirmation. This accords with the intuition
+that surprising predictions provide more confirmation than commonplace
+predictions. So this intuition can actually be justified within the Bayesian
+framework. Bayesianism is the project of trying to make sense of scientific
+reasoning and confirmation using the Bayesian framework. This approach holds a
+lot of promise, but this is not to say that it is uncontroversial.
+
+If you want to read more on this topic, here are some advanced readings:
+
+  * Howson and Urbach. _Scientific Reasoning : The Bayesian Approach_. 
+  * Entry on "Bayesian Epistemology" in _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_.
+
+__previous tutorial
+
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+Values are standards or ideals with which we evaluate actions, people, things,
+or situations. Beauty, honesty, justice, peace, generosity are all examples of
+values that many people endorse. In thinking about values it is useful to
+distinguish them into three kinds:
+
+  * **Personal values** : values endorsed by an individual. For example, some people regard family as their most important values, and structure their lives so that they can spend more time with their family. Other people might value success instead, and give less time to their families in order to achieve their goals.
+  * **Moral values** : values that help determine what is morally right or wrong, e.g. freedom, fairness, equality, etc, well-being. Those which are used to evaluate social institutions are sometimes also known as **political values**.
+  * **Aesthetic values** : values associated with the evaluation of artwork or beauty.
+
+__next tutorial
+
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+In reasoning about value, the distinction between _instrumental and intrinsic
+value_ is of fundamental importance. But first we need to understand the
+distinction between _means and ends_.
+
+## §1. Means and ends
+
+Ends are goals. Means are ways, methods, instruments, or tools to achieve
+goals. If you desire (or want) something, then that which you desire is an end
+(or a goal) of yours. Ends of yours are just that which you desire. Suppose
+you desire owning a dog. Then, owning a dog is an end of yours. Note that one
+and the same thing can be an end as well as a means to promote something else.
+For instance, you might want to own a dog because you want a companion. Then
+owning a dog is not only an end of yours. It is also a means to achieve a
+further end, namely having a companion.
+
+  1. What ends do you have? 
+  2. Do you have some ends which are also means to promote your other ends? 
+  3. Mary wants a dollar coin for using a public phone to call John's home phone in order to wake him up in the middle of the night. (i) What ends does Mary have? (ii) What corresponding means does she have for those ends of hers? 
+
+## §2. Desiring something as a means vs. desiring something as an end-in-
+itself
+
+As we have seen, you may desire X (which is an end of yours) because you
+believe that X is a means to promote some other ends of yours. In that case,
+we say that you desire X as a means to promote some other ends. But you may
+desire X regardless of whether you believe that X is a means to promote your
+any other ends - i.e., you simply desire X for its own sake. In that case, we
+say that you desire X as an end-in-itself. Note that a person may desire one
+and the same thing as a means and also as an end-in-itself. For instance, you
+may desire freedom as a means (e.g., to promote happiness) but at the same
+time you may also desire freedom as an end-in-itself, regardless of whether it
+promotes your any other ends. Finally, you may desire X as a means to promote
+Y because you desire Y and believe that X is a means to promote Y. But in
+reality, X may not be a means (or an effective means) to promote Y. In that
+case, we say that your desire of X is based on a false belief about it.
+
+  1. Is there anything which you desire as an end-in-itself? 
+  2. Is there anything which you desire as an end-in-itself and also desire as a means to promote some other ends?
+
+Read the passage and answer the questions below:
+
+> John wants to visit Mary because he wants to borrow her car for the weekend
+> and he believes that he will have the car for the weekend if he visits her
+> and asks. Unfortunately, Mary's car is staying at the garage over the
+> weekend to be repaired and John does not know that. But even if he knew
+> that, he would still want to visit Mary. For he also thinks that if he
+> visits her, then he can play with her dog, which is something he wants to
+> do. But Mary's dog died last week. When John finds that out, he will be very
+> upset because he really likes Mary's dog. The company of Mary's dog is one
+> of the few things that he wants for their own sake.
+
+(a) What ends does John have? (b) Among John's various ends, which one(s) does
+John desire as a means to promote some other ends? (c) Among John's various
+ends, which one(s) does John desire as an end-in-itself? (d) Which desire(s)
+of John's is based on a false belief?
+
+## §3. Having value as a means vs. having value as an end-in-itself
+
+Just as there are two ways in which someone may desire something, there are
+also two ways in which something may have value (or may be valuable). If X has
+value because it is a means to promote some end Y, then we say that X has
+value (or is valuable) as a means to promote Y. But if X has value regardless
+of whether it is a means to promote anything else, then we say that it has
+value (or is valuable) as an end-in-itself.
+
+Now, we are ready to define two different kinds of value. Their definitions
+are as follows:
+
+  * Something has _instrumental value_ if and only if it has value as a means to promote some ends. 
+  * Something has _intrinsic value_ (or non-instrumental value) if and only if it has value regardless of whether it is also useful as a means to promote some other ends. 
+
+Note that one and the same thing something may have instrumental value as well
+as intrinsic value. The two very different notions can be true of the same
+object.
+
+Some examples:
+
+  * Money has instrumental value. It has value as a means to deliver something else, such as food, clothing, shelter, and education. But it is quite clear that money does not have intrinsic (i.e., non-instrumental) value. For it has no value once it ceases to be a means of getting us something else. 
+  * Certain fruits, for another example, have instrumental value for bats who feed on them. They are means of brings nutrition (and perhaps also pleasure of taste) to the bats who feed on them. But it is not widely agreed that fruits have intrinsic value. It is unlikely that they have value as ends-in-themselves - i.e., value regardless of whether they are means for achieving something else. 
+  * We can likewise think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to acquire knowledge. But in addition to any such value, it is a common view in modern moral philosophy that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value - i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects for serving other ends. The intrinsic value of persons is often taken as the moral foundation of basic human rights regardless of occupation, economic status, social class, nationality, race, gender, etc. 
+  * The notions "instrumental value" and "intrinsic value" may also apply to objects of environmental concern. For example, wild plants of a certain species may have instrumental value because they provide the ingredients for some medicine or serve as aesthetic objects for human observers. But if the plants also have some value in themselves independently of their prospects for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then the plants also have intrinsic value.
+
+  1. What things do you think are instrumentally valuable? And why do you think that?
+  2. What things do you think are intrinsically valuable? 
+  3. For each of the following things, say whether you think it is instrumentally valuable, intrinsically valuable, both, or neither: (a) friendship, (b) health, (c) wealth, (d) youth, (e) fame, (f) beauty, (g) romantic love, (h) knowledge, (i) wisdom, (j) physical pleasure, and (k) power. 
+  4. Is there anything which you desire as an end-in-itself (see Q4 above) but do not think of it as intrinsically valuable (i.e., valuable as an end-in-itself)?
+
+## §4. A few more points
+
+Finally, there are a few more points to make about intrinsic value and
+instrumental value.
+
+  * As the intrinsically valuable is that which is valuable as an end in itself, it is commonly agreed in moral philosophy that something's possession of intrinsic value generates some moral duty (or moral obligation) on the part of moral agents (i.e., those who are capable of moral reflection and choice) to protect it or at least to refrain from damaging it. For this reason, intrinsic value is also often called "moral value". 
+  * The notion "value" is often used as a close synonym of "good" (or "goodness") which is another basic notion in ethics. For instance, when people say that happiness is an intrinsic value (or intrinsically valuable), they may as well say that happiness is intrinsically good. Since the notion "goodness" is just as fundamental as "value", if someone does not know what the term "value" means, it is very likely that he or she does not know what the term "good' means. Hence, it is not very informing to define value as that which is good. For your information, there is actually a huge philosophical literature in the 20th century devoted to the analysis and the study of the meaning of the notion "value" (or "good"). But we will not discuss them here. It suffices to know that it is not an easy thing to define "value". 
+
+(Written by Norva Lo)
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+The following are descriptive statements. they purport to describe facts :
+
+>   * This is a sharp knife.
+>   * Sam lied.
+>   * Mozart and Beethoven are composers.
+>   * Tom is dying painfully.
+>   * Ann believes that freedom of speech is important.
+>
+
+These, however, are statements about values :
+
+>   * This knife is a very useful kitchen tool.
+>   * It was wrong for Sam to lie.
+>   * Mozart is a greater composer than Beethoven.
+>   * It is better for Tom to die than to be alive.
+>   * Freedom of speech should be protected.
+>
+
+Philosophers usually distinguish between two kinds of values : _instrumental
+values_ and _intrinsic values_. Instrumental values are sometimes also called
+" _extrinsic values_ ". Something is supposed to have instrumental value when
+it is not valued for its own sake, but because it contributes to some further
+purpose, or because it helps bring about something else of value. So a
+particular kitchen knife might be said to be very valuable in this
+instrumental sense - it is valued not for its own sake but because it can be
+used to satisfy certain culinary purposes that we treasure.
+
+For further discussion on the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic
+values, you can read these two articles :
+
+>   * A less technical article on our web site.
+>   * The entry on "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value" in The Stanford
+> Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
+>
+
+## §1. Morality is normative and not purely descriptive
+
+Here are some examples of moral claims :
+
+>   * There is nothing wrong with torture.
+>   * A democratic society should not enact unjust laws.
+>   * Abortion is permissible under certain situations.
+>   * We should not discriminate against homosexuals.
+>   * It was wrong for the police to play music to drown out the protest.
+>
+
+When we think about values, very often we are thinking about morality. What is
+distinctive about moral claims is that they are normative and not purely
+descriptive. They talk about right or wrong actions, what should or should not
+happen. However, although a moral claim is not _purely_ descriptive, it can
+include some descriptive elements. For example, the last moral claim above
+implies the factual claim that the police did play music to drown out a
+protest. This is the descriptive element, and the normative component lies in
+the additional value judgement on what has been done.
+
+Notice also that descriptive claims about moral beliefs in themselves are not
+normative. A few years back a survey in Hong Kong drew the conclusion that
+many young people think there is nothing wrong with corruption. This
+conclusion is a statement about the a moral belief shared by many young
+people. But the conclusion is a purely descriptive statement that does not
+evaluate the shared belief.
+
+## §2. The fact-value gap
+
+Corresponding to the normative vs. descriptive distinction is the "is-ought"
+gap. What this means is that what is the case need not be what should be the
+case. Just because something is a matter of fact, it does not follow that it
+is something that is right, something that ought to happen. More precisely, it
+is a mistake to infer any moral claim purely on the basis of certain
+descriptive claims.1 Because this mistake is not uncommon, there is actually a
+name for it. It is called the _naturalistic fallacy_. Here are some examples :
+
+>   * There is nothing wrong being selfish. Everybody is selfish.
+>   * Homosexuality (or cloning, etc.) is wrong because it is unnatural.
+>   * Woman should stay at home and look after children because this is the
+> tradition.
+>   * Animals eat each other in the wild. So we can eat them too.
+>   * In nature, only the fittest survive. Simiarly, in human society only the
+> strongest will survive and this is the way it should be.
+>
+
+Many things can be said in response to these arguments. Just because many
+people are selfish does not mean that they are right. Many people used to
+think that slavery is acceptable, but we now think they were wrong. Plenty of
+things that are unnatural are not regarded as wrong, such as contraception or
+cosmetic surgery. Animals might eat their young or their old, but it does not
+mean that we should do the same to each other. Finally, some people end up in
+unfortunate circumstances through no fault of their own. Animals might not
+care about this, but it does not follow that human beings should act the way
+many animals do. In all these cases, we note that there are missing gaps in
+the original arguments : you need to assume that unnatural things are wrong,
+or that certain things which occur in nature or are widely accepted are
+morally correct. The purely factual premises are not sufficient to establish
+the normative conclusions, these additional bridging assumptions are needed.
+
+This is not to say that facts are not needed to draw conclusions about right
+or wrong. To show that someone should be convicted of murder, you need to at
+least show that the accused did cause the death of the victim. But causing the
+death of a victim in itself does not show that something wrong has been done.
+Similarly, empirical facts relating to the effect of alcohol are needed in
+order to support the prohibition of drink driving. For example, you might
+introduce a version of the "harm principle", which says that something should
+be prohibited when it is likely to cause harm to innocent people. Harming
+innocent people is very likley if we allow driving under the influence of
+alcohol, so according to the principle it should be prohibited. In general
+then, if you want to argue that something is right or wrong, you need not just
+descriptive statements about facts but also additional moral principles.
+
+Footnote:
+
+1\. For purported exceptions, see the discussion of Prior and Geach in Karmo
+(1988) "Some Valid (but no sound) Arguments Trivially Span the 'Is'-'Ought'
+Gap" in _Mind_ Vol. XCVII, pp.252-257.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. Does morality depend on God?
+
+It is not uncommon to think that morality depends on the existence of God. For
+example, some people suggest that there is no right or wrong without God, or
+that atheists who do not believe in God can have no objective basis for their
+values, and that their lives are entirely meaningless. Some people even think
+that the existence of a moral conscience supports the existence of God.
+
+It is not clear how these claims are to be substantiated. One reason why
+someone might think that morality depends on God is that he or she accepts,
+explicitly or implicitly, _the divine command theory of morality_. This theory
+says that right or wrong, and good or bad, are given by the commands of God.
+The rules of morality, on this view, are simply the rules that God requires us
+to follow. So if there is no God to command us, there is no morality.
+
+## §2. The Euthyphro problem
+
+However, there is a powerful objection to the divine command theory. This
+objection derives from a discussion of Socrates in one of Plato's dialogues.
+
+The objection runs as follows. Suppose we have an action X that is morally
+right. We can then ask, is it the case that X is right because God commands
+it, or is it the case that God commands X because X is right?
+
+If it is the latter, then morality does not depend on God. So someone who
+subscribes to the divine command theory would probably say that the former
+explanation is the correct explanation of why X is right, that X is right
+because this is what God requires. The problem with this answer is that
+morality then becomes dependent on the arbitrary will of God. So if God says
+that we should torture innocent babies for fun, that becomes right and that is
+what we should do. If God says that we should be dishonest then again this is
+what we should do. But morality presumably is not this arbitrary.
+
+Of course, someone might reply that God is good and morally perfect and so he
+would not command such a thing. But if morality does depend on God, there is
+no reason why God cannot issue such commands, since there are no additional
+moral constraints on what he should command. The only reason why God will does
+not require us to torture innocent babies is that there are independent
+reasons why those things are wrong, and God knows this. But then morality does
+not depend on God's commands after all.
+
+## §3. God and the meaning of life
+
+The Euthyphro problem is often presented as an argument against the divince
+command theory of morality. However, a similar argument can be given to show
+that other values, including the values that make life meaningful, cannot be
+solely based on God's commands.
+
+If the meaning of life depends again on God's commands only, this would have
+the consequence that if God says that doing X constitutes a meaningful life,
+then this is what we should do. For example, perhaps God says that a
+meaningful life is to watch TV commercials for 24 hours a day for everyday of
+our life. Then this is how we should live our lives. But of course we would
+think it is absurd that a meaningful life can be achieved in such a manner. So
+again we have to conclude that what makes a life meaningful cannot be solely
+determined by God's commands.
+
+## §4. Comments
+
+It is important to note that these arguments are not arguments against the
+existence of God. All they show is that even if God exists, meaning and
+morality cannot be entirely constituted by God's commands. More generally,
+these arguments tell us that the basis of moral values and meaning are not
+determined by any authority. We have to exercise our own rational judgment to
+determine how we should live our lives and what values to adopt. There is no
+way to find out what is meaningful and what is moral without using our own
+critical reflection.
+
+Evaluate the follow response to the Euthyphro problem:
+
+> "If God asks us to torture innocent babies or to watch TV commercials all
+> day long, there must be some hidden purpose which perhaps we cannot
+> understand. So even if God were to command these things, we should not infer
+> that such commands are wrong."
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. What is moral relativism?
+
+Moral relativism says that (1) there are no objective normative facts, and (2)
+what is right or wrong is relative to particular societies or persons, or
+moral frameworks or perspectives. For example, clitoridectomy, the mutilation
+of the sexual organ of a young female, is practiced in certain communities in
+Africa and the Middle East. It causes a lot of pain and often has long term
+psychological and health consequences. Should such a practice be banned? A
+relativist will say that clitoridectomy is only wrong when see from a Western
+liberal perspective. But it is quite alright relative to certain African or
+Middle Eastern traditional belief systems. There is no objective answer as to
+whether it is right or wrong, whether it should or should not be banned.
+Before continuing, you might want to try out this test :
+
+  * Are you moral beliefs consistent?
+
+## §2. Non-interventionist moral relativism is inconsistent
+
+Some people are attracted to moral relativism because they think it represents
+toleration and liberal thinking. A moral relativist might think that we should
+not interfere with other people's lives or moral values. He might think that
+if there is no objective fact to determine whether abortion is acceptable,
+then we should not interfere with a woman's request to have an abortion.
+
+This is actually an inconsistent position. If there are really no objective
+moral truths, then there is no objective answer as to whether something should
+or should not be allowed. It is inconsistent to say that there are no
+objective facts that determine whether something ought to be done or not, and
+at the same time claim that abortion ought to be allowed, since to make the
+latter claim is to claim that something indeed ought to be allowed.
+
+When this inconsistency is pointed out, some moral relativists might say that
+they are only affirming non-interference from their own perspective. But the
+problem is that from other perspectives, interference might not be undesirable
+and might even be necessary, and the relativist would then have no way to
+engage the other party in a rational discussion as to what the right thing to
+do is. For example, someone might think that abortion is wrong relative to his
+moral theory, and that all violent means are justified in order to prevent
+women from having abortions, including the killing of doctors and nurses who
+might participate in such matters. For a moral relativist, such a position is
+just as valid as thinking that abortion should be protected, and so no reason
+can be given to stop any such violent campaign against abortion. The obvious
+conclusion is that it would be a big mistake to think that moral relativism
+supports any kind of liberal moral outlook. Under relativism, any non-liberal
+or absurd position is just as valid as any other.
+
+## §3. Do not confuse moral contextualism with relativism
+
+Notice that moral relativism should not be confused with the claim that what
+is right or wrong depends on the context. For example, a moral realist might
+refuse to judge whether abortion is right or wrong because she thinks that
+abortion is permissible under certain situations (e.g. rape) but not
+permissible under other situations, say when a woman is 8 months pregnant out
+of her own freewill. But this is not relativism, for it is supposed to be an
+objective fact that abortion is permissible in cases of rape. A moral
+relativist will however insist that it is still a relative matter whether
+abortion is permissible in such a situation.
+
+Contextualism urges us to be cautious with regard to moral claims. Is lying
+wrong? That depends on the situation. Lying to young children is sometimes of
+no big consequence. Is killing always wrong? Perhaps not when you have to kill
+somone attacking you out of self-defense. Generalizations about morality
+should take into account special situations. But being cautious about general
+moral claims is not the same thing as accepting moral relativism.
+
+Can you think of any exceptions to these claims?
+
+  1. If someone has committed a murder, then that person should be given a fair trial.
+  2. Students should study hard and get a good grade.
+  3. We should never toture any innocent babies just for fun and for no other reason.
+
+## §4. What is moral absolutism?
+
+_Moral absolutism_ is the view that some actions are morally required or
+morally prohibited regardless of the situation and the potential consequences.
+
+For example, the famous philosopher Kant is a moral absolutist with regard to
+telling the truth. He seems to think that lying is always wrong, no matter the
+consequences. In the essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie", Kant says that we
+should not lie, even if there is a murderer at the door asking you whether the
+innocent victim is in your house. The moral absolutist might say that perhaps
+one should also call the police or to warn the victim, but the bottom line is
+that one should never lie.
+
+Understandably, many people find Kant's position bizarre, and there are
+probably very few people who are moral absolutists with regard to lying. But
+moral absolutism with regard to other actions are not difficult to find. For
+example, many people would think that incest is wrong, even if the parties
+involved genuinely love each other. Others might also hold some form of moral
+absolutism with regard to abortion and homosexuality, believing (perhaps for
+religious reasons) that they are never justified.
+
+Consider also the 1987 _United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
+Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment_. The second paragraph of
+Article 2 says,
+
+> "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat
+> of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
+> invoked as a justification of torture."
+
+Notice that this rule explicitly says that torture is never justified. A moral
+absolutist with regard to torture will agree with this rule. The absolutist
+would say that even in a situation when a terrorist has planted a bomb that is
+about to explode and kill many innocent people, it is still not permissible to
+torture the terrorist in order to extract information as to where the bomb is.
+
+## §5. What is moral contextualism?
+
+The opposite of moral absolutism is _moral contextualism_. This is the view
+that the very same action can be right in one situation (context), but wrong
+in a different situation.
+
+Obviously, moral contextualism with regard to an action X is inconsistent with
+moral absolutism with regard to X. Unlike Kant, most of us would probably
+think that when a murderer wants to find out where a person is in order to
+kill him, we should lie if it would save that person's life. But we might also
+think it is wrong for government officials to lie to its citizens, e.g. about
+corruption. This would be to reject moral absolutism with regard to lying.
+
+Sometimes people say that morality is not black and white, and it is possible
+that moral contextualism is what some of them might have in mind. For certain
+actions described generally, it might be impossible to say whether they are
+right or wrong, and that it all depends on the details of the particular
+situation.
+
+Notice that both moral absolutism and contextualism agree that morality is
+objective. They both agree that there are cases where certain actions are
+objectively right or objectively wrong. _Moral relativism_ would deny this.
+
+The author Shickle wrote in a paper "On a supposed right to lie [to the
+public] from benevolent motives: communicating health risks to the public."
+the following passage:
+
+> There are three main categories of rationale for withholding information or
+> telling lies: if overwhelming harm can only be averted through deceit;
+> complete triviality such that it is irrelevant whether the truth is told; a
+> duty to protect the interests of others.
+
+Come up with your own examples for illustrating these three types of
+situations.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. Consistency in morality
+
+Consistency plays an extremely important role in moral reasoning. Whatever the
+basis of morality is supposed to be, presumably we should ensure that our
+moral beliefs are consistent. For example, consistency is an important
+requirement of justice and fairness. One of the most important principles in
+the rule of law is that we should treat like cases alike. If someone goes to
+prison for stealing, it would be inconsistent and wrong for us to let another
+thief walks free, if the two cases are alike in all relevant respects.
+Similarly, if we treat someone better than another person without
+justification, we might be criticized for being discriminatory.
+
+## §2. The method of Reflective Equilibrium
+
+The famous political philosopher John Rawls describes a method known as "
+_reflective equilibrium_ " for striving towards consistency in our moral
+beliefs.
+
+We might depict the method with this diagram here :
+
+Some terminology :
+
+A _moral intuition_ is some particular belief or feeling that we might have as
+to whether a certain action is right or wrong in some situation. For example,
+if we find out that a baby has been murdered, we might think that this is
+terrible and feel quite bad about it.
+
+Given a moral intuition, the method of reflective equilibrium says that we
+should try to generalize and come up with a general _moral principle_ that
+explains this intuition. This requires the formulation of a rule that explains
+why we think it is wrong for someone to kill the baby. In this particular
+case, perhaps we might propose this rule:
+
+We should never kill any innocent people.
+
+This rule explains our intuition because we also believe that babies are
+innocent, and together with the moral principle they explain our intuition.
+
+According to the method of reflective equilibrium, we should try to ensure
+that our whole system of moral thinking is consistent, by coming up with many
+such moral principles, and checking that these principles are compatible with
+each other and consistent with the other intuitions we have. If they come into
+conflict then we should think carefully to see how they should be revised.
+
+As an illustration, consider the moral principle above that we should never
+kill any innocent people. Is this principle always true? Suppose a group of
+terrorists has hijacked a plane and is about the crash the plane into a
+building where there are a few thousand people. These people in the building
+are most likely going to die because there is not enough time to evaculate
+them. The only way to avoid this consequence is to shoot down the plane. But
+the plane includes a few innocent people and we would kill them as well when
+we destroy the plane. So what is the right thing to do in this situation?
+
+Mot people would probably agree that we should shoot down the plane if it is
+the only option available. It is of course terrible to have to kill the
+innocent victims on the plane, but this would be the right thing to do given
+the terrible situation. So we now have another moral intuition, but this time
+it is inconsistent with the principle that we should never kill the innocent.
+This tells us that the original principle would have to be modified. Perhaps a
+better formulation is as follows:
+
+We should never kill any innocent people, unless it is necessary to save a
+much larger number of innocent people, and there are no other alternatives
+available.
+
+Note that in this particular example we have choosen to revise the principle
+in order to keep our moral intuitions, but sometimes we might opt the other
+way and accept a principle and revise our intuitions instead. Many of our
+intuitions are a product of culture and upbringing, and many of them are
+perhaps unjustified. This process of reflective equilibrium can continue on
+and on. The point is not just to maximize consistency in our moral beliefs. It
+also helps us gain a deeper insight into our own moral thinking and come up
+with better reasons for our actions.
+
+  1. Continue the process of reflective equilibrium. Consider the principle just presented: 
+
+We should never kill any innocent people, unless it is necessary to save a
+much larger number of innocent people, and there are no other alternatives
+available.
+
+Can you think of a situation where it might conflict with our moral intuition?
+In other words, can you think of a case where it might be wrong to follow such
+a principle?
+
+  2. Consider the plane hijack example again. Suppose someone thinks it is indeed wrong to shoot down the plane, and that we should maintain the first principle that we should never kill any innocent people. Think about how you might try to convince this person to change his mind. If you do agree with this person, what other consequences should you be ready to accept? 
+
+### Readings
+
+  * An article on reflective equilibrium from the _Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_ \- a difficult philosophical article.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Do you know what your views on morality are? Do you think morality is
+relative? Whatever your views are, you should at least be consistent. Test the
+consistency of your beliefs by indicating whether you agree with the
+statements below :
+
+1\. Everyone has the right to do what they want, as long as they do not harm
+other people.
+
+Agree Disagree
+
+2\. What is morally right or wrong is relative to a perspective.
+
+Agree Disagree
+
+3\. We should always respect other people's point of view.
+
+Agree Disagree
+
+4\. An action can be right in some situations but wrong in other situations.
+
+Agree Disagree
+
+5\. It is wrong to torture innocent babies just for fun.
+
+Agree Disagree
+
+Submit Restart
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Everyone of us holds many beliefs. By and large, we hope that our beliefs are
+not irrational or unreasonable. And the more strongly we hold a set of
+beliefs, the stronger we hope that they are not irrational. Consistency is the
+minimum requirement of rationality. If we have a set of beliefs which are at
+odds with each other, rationality demands us to revise them so that the whole
+set becomes internally consistent. Most of us hold some beliefs on
+moral/ethical issues (e.g., such as whether suicide is morally wrong, or
+whether someone should be denied of the opportunity of education just because
+of his/her sex or skin color). Consistency plays one of the most important
+roles in moral reasoning (indeed reasoning of any kind). So if we do hold some
+moral beliefs, we should at least make sure that those beliefs are consistent
+with each other (putting aside for the moment the further question whether
+those beliefs are also true).
+
+Analogical arguments are very often used in moral reasoning (i.e., reasoning
+about moral issues), and they often help us think about the consistency of our
+moral outlook (i.e., the set of moral beliefs we hold). The basic idea of
+analogical arguments in moral reasoning is: treat similar case similarly. For
+example, suppose we are already convinced that action X (e.g., slapping a
+human baby for fun) is morally wrong. Also suppose we are convinced that
+action Y (e.g., lashing a dog for fun) is similar to X in many aspects
+relevant to deciding whether or not the action is morally wrong (e.g., both
+actions are infliction of pain on innocent beings, both are voluntary, and
+both are motivated by trivial self-interests, namely fun). Then, to be
+consistent, we should also think that Y is morally wrong to a similar extent
+to which X is wrong.
+
+In short, an analogical argument in ethics employs a presumably
+uncontroversial case X, to which we are supposed to agree to give a certain
+verdict, and a controversial case Y, to which we disagree about what verdict
+to give. The purpose of an analogical argument is to settle the controversy of
+Y, by comparing it with Y (which may be either a real case or a fictional
+case). What an analogical argument does is (1) to show that X and Y are
+analogous to each other (i.e., similar in many relevant aspects), and then (2)
+to point out that for the sake of consistency, the controversial case Y should
+receive a verdict similar to the one given to the uncontroversial case X.
+Analogical arguments in ethics often take the following basic form:
+
+> P1. Action X is morally wrong/permissible/unblamable/right/virtuous/etc..
+> [Presumably uncontroversial verdict for X]
+>
+> P2. Actions X and Y are analogous to each other. [Analogy between X and Y]
+>
+> C. Action Y is morally wrong/permissible/unblamable/right/virtuous/etc..
+> [From P1 & P2]
+>
+> Or
+>
+> P1. State-of-affairs X is morally good/bad/neutral. [Presumably
+> uncontroversial verdict for X]
+>
+> P2. States-of-affairs X and Y are analogous to each other. [Analogy between
+> X and Y]
+>
+> C. State-of-affairs Y is morally good/bad/neutral. [From P1 & P2]
+>
+> Or
+>
+> P1. Object X has/lacks intrinsic (i.e., non-instrumental) value/disvalue.
+> [Presumably uncontroversial verdict for X]
+>
+> P2. Objects X and Y are analogous to each other. [Analogy between X and Y]
+>
+> C. Object Y has/lacks intrinsic value/disvalue. [From P1 & P2]
+
+We may call P1 the evaluative premise because it employs evaluative terms,
+such as "morally wrong/permissible/unblamable/right/virtuous", "morally
+good/bad", and "intrinsic value/disvalue". We may call P2 the analogy-stating
+premise because it states an analogy without trying to evaluative what are
+being compared by the analogy. Finally, C is the evaluative conclusion of the
+analogical argument.
+
+Analogical arguments are often complex arguments, in which there are sub-
+arguments for P1 and P2. So in order to evaluate a complex analogical
+arguments, we will need to evaluate all its sub-arguments. Before looking at
+some concrete examples, we should bear in mind that there are at least two
+ways in which an analogical argument can be challenged.
+
+(1) An analogical argument can be challenged most directly by questioning the
+analogy-stating premise P2 - i.e., questioning whether the analogy drawn
+between X and Y is a good one. If P2 is unacceptable, then the argument fails
+to give good reasons for accepting conclusion C. The criteria for assessing an
+analogy includes (a) whether the aspects of the two cases being compared are
+relevant to the questions being asked about them (e.g., whether they are
+morally wrong), (b) whether the number of relevant similarities between the
+two cases are enough so that the conclusion drawn for the one case should be
+similar to that for the other case, and (c) whether there are relevant
+differences between the two cases which outweigh the relevant similarities
+between them so that the conclusion drawn for the one case should be different
+from that for the other.
+
+(2) Even if premise P2 is acceptable, the argument can still be challenged by
+questioning the evaluative premise P1 - i.e., questioning the evaluative
+verdict for the presumably uncontroversial case. If it could be shown that P1
+is actually doubtful, then the C is also doubtful.
+
+## §1. An example
+
+Let us now look at a concrete example of an analogical argument in ethics (in
+this case, animal ethics).
+
+Consider the follows passage:
+
+> The relationship between small children and their parents is just like the
+> relationship between dogs and their owners. When a dog, and likewise a small
+> child, wants something badly and does not get it, he or she will repeatedly
+> make demands in ways that often irritate those who take care of them. For
+> instance, when a dog wants a walk but the owner is busy doing something
+> else, the dog will bark and bark and bark nonstop so that the owner gets the
+> message and the dog eventually gets a walk. Likewise, when a small child
+> wants a toy but the parent refuses to buy, the child will repeat his of her
+> demands nonstop by whinging, crying and yelling so the parent gets the
+> message and the child eventually gets the toy. The worse thing in both cases
+> is that dogs, and likewise small children, are not creatures that adults can
+> reason with: they simply don't listen or understand. That is why dog owners
+> are often irritated by and get angry with their dogs in just the same way
+> that parents are often irritated by and get angry with their small children.
+> Furthermore, dogs and likewise small children cannot really tell what is
+> right from what is wrong. It is dog owners and parents who are morally (as
+> well as legally) responsible for the bad behaviour of their dogs and small
+> children, respectively, if that causes damage to the interests of other
+> people. Finally, the worst thing that could happen to a dog, and likewise a
+> small child, is for it to be ignored: it is better to be cruel to it than to
+> be totally indifferent to it as if it doesn't exist. For the reasons given
+> above, it is morally permissible for dog owners to beat their dogs if that
+> is necessary for disciplining them. Therefore, likewise, it is morally
+> permissible for parents to beat their small children if that is necessary
+> for disciplining them.
+
+The above is a complex analogical argument, the basic structure of which is as
+follows.
+
+> P1. It is morally permissible for dog owners to beat their dogs if that is
+> necessary for disciplining them. [Evaluative premise, presumably acceptable]
+>
+> P2. The relationship between dogs and their owners is just like the
+> relationship between small children and their parents. [Analogy-stating
+> premise]
+>
+> C. It is morally permissible for parents to beat their small children if
+> that is necessary for disciplining them. [From P1 & P2]
+
+Is the above analogical argument good? You need to do at least two things in
+order to answer the question.
+
+(a) Decide whether the evaluative premise P1 is acceptable. In order to do
+that, it will be help to write out and evaluate the sub-argument for P1.
+
+(b) Do the same with the analogy-stating premise P2.
+
+Important Reflections : The demand of consistency tells us nothing about which
+ones of our inconsistent beliefs should be rid of. So an analogy (e.g., P2)
+can be used to argue for a claim (e.g., C) as well as for the opposite claim
+(e.g., not-C). For example, someone, who disapprove of parents beating their
+small children, can actually employ the same analogy to condemn dog owners
+beating their dogs in the following way:
+
+> P1*. It is morally impermissible (i.e., morally wrong) for parents to beat
+> their small children even if that is necessary for disciplining them.
+> [Evaluative premise, not-C]
+>
+> P2*. The relationship between dogs and their owners is just like the
+> relationship between small children and their parents. [Analogy-stating
+> premise, P2]
+>
+> C*. It is morally impermissible for dog owners to beat their dogs even if
+> that is necessary for disciplining them. [not-P1, from P1* & P2*]
+
+Suppose the analogy (i.e., P2 or P2*) is correct. Consistency only demands us
+to hold either (a) that beating a small child is morally as permissible as
+beating a dog or, on the other side of the same coin, (b) that beating a dog
+is morally as impermissible as beating a small child.
+
+In other words, we should hold either both P1 and C on the one hand or both
+P1* ( not-C) and C* ( not-P1) on the other hand. But the demand of consistency
+does not tell us which option to take. So what do we do? Answer: we compare
+the acceptability of evaluative premise P1 and the acceptability of evaluative
+premise P1* - i.e., we write out and evaluate the sub-arguments for P1 and P1*
+respectively. If P1 is more acceptable than P1*, then so is conclusion C more
+acceptable than conclusion C*, and vice versa.
+
+In the light of the above considerations of the logic of analogical arguments
+in ethics, one useful tip is as follows:
+
+If you want to construct a good analogical argument, then you need to (1) give
+a good sub-argument for your analogy-stating premise, and (2) make sure that
+your evaluative premise is more acceptable than the negation of your
+(evaluative) conclusion - otherwise, your opponents would have good reasons to
+reject your conclusion, which, by virtue of consistent, will further lead to
+the rejection of your evaluative premise.
+
+In short, an analogy can be used to settle a controversial case in ethics,
+but, on the other side of the same coin, it can also be used to unsettle a
+case which is originally thought to be uncontroversial. Considerations
+independent of the analogy (e.g., sub-arguments for P1 and not-C,
+respectively) are needed in deciding whether the analogy helps to settle or
+unsettles.
+
+  1. (a) State all the sub-arguments that you can think of for P1 and P1* respectively in the above two analogical arguments. 
+  2. (b) Do you think the analogy-stating premise P2 (or P2*) above is true? Give reasons for your answer. 
+  3. (c) Do you think it is morally permissible for dog owners to beat their dogs if that is necessary for disciplining them? Give reasons for your answer. 
+  4. You (after consulting your tutor) may choose any of the following analogical arguments in ethics for tutorial discussion. In is important that you read the chosen arguments and get yourself familiarized with them before the tutorial so that you can have a more efficient tutorial discussion. 
+
+## §2. Racism/Sexism & Speciesism (An Argument for Animal Liberation)
+
+Consider the following passage:
+
+> Racism is the view that the interests (e.g., health, pleasure,
+> desire/preference-satisfaction) of members of one race (e.g., white people)
+> are morally more significant than the interests of members of other races
+> (e.g., colour people) just because the former are the interests of people
+> belonging to a particular racial group whereas the latter are not, so that
+> it is morally justified to promoted/protected the former in expense of the
+> latter whenever the two are in conflict each other. An example of racism is
+> that white babies receive better medical treatments than black babies from
+> government hospitals simply because the former belong to, but the latter do
+> not belong to, the white race. Sexism is the view that the interests members
+> of one sex (e.g., male human beings) are morally more significant than the
+> interests of members of another sex (e.g., female human beings) just because
+> the former are the interests of people belonging to a particular sex whereas
+> the latter are not, so that it is morally justified to promoted/protected
+> the former in expense of the latter whenever the two are in conflict each
+> other. An example of sexism is that boys receive, but girls do not receive,
+> school education simply because the former are male whereas the latter are
+> not. Speciesism, which has the same structure as racism and sexism, is the
+> view that the interests of members of one species (e.g., Homo sapiens or, in
+> other words, human beings) are morally more significant than the interests
+> of members of other species (e.g., non-human beings) just because the former
+> are the interests of beings belonging to a particular species whereas the
+> latter are not, so that it is morally justified to promoted/protected the
+> former in expense of the latter whenever the two are in conflict each other.
+> An example is speciesism is that nonhuman animals (e.g., mice, rabbits,
+> dogs, chimpanzees, ...etc.) are used in medical experiments (which cause
+> them immense suffering) but human beings (e.g., human infants) are not used
+> in such experiments simply because the former are do not, whereas the latter
+> do, belong to the species of Homo sapiens. Now, racism and sexism are both
+> morally unjustified. For how important an interest is (e.g., the interest in
+> receiving medical treatment) does not depend on the skin-colour or the sex
+> of the person to whom the interest belong. Black babies have just the same
+> interest in receiving good medical treatment as white babies. Girls have
+> just the same interest in receiving education as boys. Likewise, a dog has
+> just the same interest in avoiding pain (of same intensity and duration) as
+> a human infant. Pain is pain no matter whose pain it is. So the interest in
+> avoiding pain is same for everyone who is capable of suffering pain. In
+> short, species-membership is just as arbitrary a discriminating factor as
+> skin colour and sex in deciding how important an interest is. Hence, (to be
+> consistent, we should conclusion that) speciesism is as morally unjustified
+> as racism and sexism.
+
+The above is a complex analogical argument, the basic structure of which is as
+follows.
+
+> P1. Racism (or sexism) is morally unjustified. [Evaluative premise,
+> presumably acceptable]
+>
+> P2. Speciesism is analogous to racism (or sexism). [Analogy-stating premise]
+>
+> C. Speciesism is morally unjustified. [From P1 & P2]
+
+  1. Is the above analogical argument good? You need to do at least two things in order to answer the question. 
+  2. (a) Decide whether the evaluative premise P1 is acceptable. In order to do that, it will be help to write out and evaluate the sub-argument for P1.
+  3. (b) Do the same with the analogy-stating premise P2. Please do that now!
+  4. Now, someone who maintains that speciesism is morally justified (don't we all think that human interests are morally more important than nonhuman ones!) can actually employ the same analogy to justify racism or sexism in the following way: 
+
+> P1*. Speciesism is morally justified. [Evaluative premise, not-C]
+>
+> P2*. Speciesism is analogous to racism (or sexism). [Analogy-stating
+> premise, P2]
+>
+> C*. Racism (or sexism) is morally justified. [not-P1, from P1* & P2*]
+
+Suppose the analogy (between speciesism on the one hand and racism/sexism on
+the other hand, i.e., P2 or P2*) is correct, consistency only demands us to
+hold either (a) that speciesism is morally as unjustified as racism/sexism or,
+on the other side of the same coin, (b) that speciesism is morally as
+justified as racism/sexism. In other words, we hold either both P1 and C on
+the one hand or both P1* ( not-C) and C* ( not-P1) on the other hand. But the
+demand of consistency does not tell us which option to take.
+
+(a) State all the sub-arguments that you can think of for P1 and P1*
+respectively in the above two analogical arguments.
+
+(b) Do you think the analogy-stating premise P2 (or P2*) above is true? Give
+reasons for your answer.
+
+(c) Do you think speciesism is morally unjustified? Give reasons for your
+answer.
+
+## §3. The Violinist & The Fetus (An Argument Defending Abortion)
+
+Consider the follows passage:
+
+> We grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception. How does
+> the argument [against abortion] go from here? Something like this, I take
+> it. Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No
+> doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body;
+> everyone would grant that. But surely a person's right to life is stronger
+> and more stringent than the mother's right to decide what happens in and to
+> her body , and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; and abortion
+> may not be performed.
+>
+> But now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and find
+> yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious famous violinist. He has
+> been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers
+> has [...] kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system
+> was plugged into yours so that your kidneys could be used to extract poisons
+> from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells
+> you: "Look, we're sorry the Society of Lovers Lovers did this to you - we
+> would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it and
+> the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him.
+> But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered
+> from his ailment and can safely be unplugged from you." Is it morally
+> incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice
+> of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? [...
+> The story continues:] There you are, in bed with the violinist, and the
+> director of the hospital says to you: "It's all most distressing, and I
+> deeply sympathize, but you see this is putting an additional strain on your
+> kidneys, and you'll be dead within the month. But you have to stay where you
+> are all the same, because unplugging you would be directly killing an
+> innocent violinist, and that's murder, and that's impermissible." If
+> anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit murder, you do
+> not do what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and unplug
+> yourself from that violinist to save your life.
+>
+> (From J. J. Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion", Philosophy and Public Affairs
+> 1, no. 1 (1971)).
+
+The above analogical argument has the following form:
+
+> P1. It is morally permissible for agent A to perform action X under
+> circumstances C.
+>
+> P2. Agent B performing action Y under circumstances D is analogous to agent
+> A performing action X under circumstances C.
+>
+> C. It is morally permissible for agent B to perform action Y under
+> circumstances D. [From P1 & P2]
+
+In the above analogical argument: Action X is unplugging the person (who has
+been plugged to the violinist) from the violinist. Agent A is the person who
+has been plugged to the violinist. Circumstances C is (1) that the person did
+not volunteer to be plugged to the violinist - he or she was kidnapped, and
+(2) the person will die unless he or she is unplugged from the violinist.
+
+Answer the following questions:
+
+  * What are action Y, agent B, and circumstances D?
+  * Rewrite the argument according to your answers to (b).
+  * Do you think premise P1 is true? Give reasons for your answer.
+  * Do you think premise P2 is true? Give reasons for your answer.
+  * Do you think conclusion C is true? Give reasons for your answer.
+
+Imagine the following situation: Some tapeworms are intelligent creatures
+having individual personalities just like you and me (i.e., they are persons),
+and raw fish (sashimi) is well know as a carrier of the eggs of those
+intelligent tapeworms. You have eaten some raw fish carrying those tapeworm
+eggs, which will develop into huge intelligent tapeworms inside your body in
+several month. There is a drug which, if you take it, can kill the eggs so
+that they will not develop in your body.
+
+(a) Do you think it is morally permissible for you to take the drug? Give
+reasons for your answer.
+
+(b) If your answers for (a) is yes, then do you also think that the use of the
+morning-after pill is morally permissible? Give reasons for your answer.
+
+(c) Use the fictional case above to formulate an analogical argument
+supporting the use of morning-after pill.
+
+## §4. Animal Sexual Behaviour & Human Sexual Behaviour (An Argument Defending
+Human Sexual Infidelity)
+
+Consider the follows passage: We cannot blame men or women for sexual
+infidelity. Recent research has shown that animals cheat sexually all the
+time. Why should the situation be any different with humans? Female animals
+look for males who show signs of biological fitness, and will mate with such a
+male even if they are already bonded with another male. The same is also true
+of male animals. Just so it is with humans. As we should not blame animals for
+sexual infidelity, neither should we blame human beings for sexual infidelity.
+
+(a) Rewrite the above argument so that it contains an evaluative premise, an
+analogy-stating premise, and an evaluative conclusion.
+
+(b) Do you think the analogy-stating premise is true? Give reasons for your
+answer.
+
+(c) Do you think the evaluative premise is true? Give reasons for your answer.
+
+(d) Do you think the evaluative conclusion is acceptable? Give reasons for
+your answer.
+
+(e) If you find any fault in the above argument other than those that you have
+pointed out in your answers to (b), (c), and (d), please say what it is.
+
+## §5. An argument from Aristotle
+
+Consider the follows passage from Aristotle:
+
+> It is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the
+> rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the
+> equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. the same
+> holds good for animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better
+> nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by
+> man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and
+> the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this
+> principle of necessity extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a
+> difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as is
+> the case of those business it is to use their body, and who can do nothing
+> better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as
+> for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who
+> can be, and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational
+> principle enough to apprehend, but not to have such a principle, is a slave
+> by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend such a principle;
+> they obey their instinct. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame
+> animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the
+> needs of life. [...] It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free and
+> others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and
+> right.
+>
+> (Aristotle, Politics, book 1, chapters 4-5 (emphases added))
+
+The above passage from Aristotle actually contains three analogical arguments
+for three conclusions, namely (C1) it is morally justified for human beings
+(especially the male ones) to dominate nonhuman animals, (C2) it is morally
+justified for men to dominate women, and (C3) it is morally justified for
+those who are more rational to be masters and those who are less rational to
+be slaves.
+
+If C3 is true and if there is a standard and a corresponding test for
+rationality, then people who fail the test should all be the slaves of those
+who pass the test. Next, if C2 is true, then no woman should be allowed to
+hold a position (e.g., in business institutes, in the government, or whatever)
+which is more senior than some position held by a man. Finally, if C1 is true,
+then is nothing wrong human beings to use nonhuman animals in ways that are
+conducive to human interests (e.g., confining them in zoos, doing experiments
+on them, or hunting them for recreation).
+
+(a). Which group of beings in the world do you think is most benefited by
+Aristotle's three conclusions taken together?
+
+(b) Rewrite Aristotle's argument for C3 so that it contains an evaluative
+premise, an analogy-stating premise, and C3 as the evaluative conclusion.
+
+(c) Rewrite Aristotle's argument for C2 so that it contains an evaluative
+premise, an analogy-stating premise, and C2 as the evaluative conclusion.
+
+(d) Rewrite Aristotle's argument for C1 so that it contains an evaluative
+premise, an analogy-stating premise, and C1 as the evaluative conclusion Do
+you think the analogy-stating premise is true? Give reasons for your answer.
+
+(e) Evaluate the rewritten argument in (b).
+
+(f) Evaluate the rewritten argument in (c).
+
+(g) Evaluate the rewritten argument in (d).
+
+## §6. Artifacts & Restored Natural Entities (An Argument Devaluing Restored
+Natural Entities)
+
+A natural area (e.g., a rainforest) may be damaged by human activity or
+natural disaster (e.g., open-pit mining or natural fire). A damaged natural
+area may be repaired or restored (e.g., by reintroducing to the area plant and
+animal species which were original there) so that it appears quite similar to
+how it looks like before the damage. We call this resulting area a "restored
+natural area". Now, consider the following passage:
+
+> When humans modify a natural area they create an artifact, a product of
+> human labour and human design. This restored natural area might resemble a
+> wild and unmodified natural system, but it is, in actuality, a product of
+> human thought [i.e., human intention], the result of human desire and
+> interests.
+>
+> The ethical importance of the distinction between artifacts and natural
+> entities is thus derived from the anthropocentric nature of artifacts, their
+> ontological reliance on human interests, plans and projects. In contrast to
+> natural entities, artifacts, as human instruments, are always a means to the
+> furtherance of some human end. [...] If the categorical imperative is
+> applied to a treatment of artifacts and natural entities, we find a crucial
+> difference: artifacts must be treated as means, for their existence and
+> value only exist in a dependent relationship with human aims and goals; but
+> natural entities, existing apart from human projects, can be considered as
+> ends-in-themselves.
+>
+> (From E. Katz, Nature As Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community,
+> Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield.)
+
+The analogical argument above can be reformulated as follows.
+
+> P1. Artifact have instrumental value but lack intrinsic value.
+>
+> P2. Restored natural areas analogous to artifacts.
+>
+> C. Restored natural areas have instrumental value but lack intrinsic value.
+
+(a) Do you think the evaluative premise P1 is acceptable? Give reasons for
+your answer.
+
+(b) Do you think the analogy-stating premise P2 is acceptable? Give reasons
+for your answer.
+
+(c) Do you think the evaluative conclusion is acceptable? Give reasons for
+your answer.
+
+Hint: You may consult: Yeuk-Sze Lo, "Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature
+as Subjects", Environmental Ethics 21(1999): 247-66.
+
+Written by Norva Lo
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Lack of clarity in meaning can hinder good reasoning and obstruct effective
+communication. One way to make meaning clearer is to use definitions. A
+definition is made up of two parts - a _definiendum_ and a _definien_. The
+definiendum is the term that is to be defined, whereas the definien is the
+group of words or concepts used in the definition that is supposed to have the
+same meaning as the definiendum. For example, in defining "bachelor" to mean
+"an unmarried man", the word "bachelor" is the definiendum, and "an unmarried
+man" is the definien.
+
+We might divide definitions into four kinds. Let us look at them one by one.
+
+## §1. Reportive definition
+
+A _reportive definition_ is sometimes also known as a lexical definition. It
+reports the existing meaning of a term. This includes the "bachelor" example
+above, or the definition of "prime number" as referring to _any integer
+divisible only by 1 and itself_. A reportive definition should capture the
+correct usage of the term that is defined.
+
+But how do we know what the correct meaning of a term is? Many people think
+that a dictionary is an authoritative guide to reportive definitions. This is
+actually a misconception, for various reasons.
+
+First, many words in the language are difficult, if not impossible to define.
+This includes for example color words which we learn from examples. A
+dictionary might explain "red" as the color of ripe tomatoes, but obviously
+this is not what "red" means. "Red" does not mean blue even if all tomatoes
+suddenly were to become blue when they ripe. Explaining 'red' as 'a certain
+shade of colour' is of course not enough to distinguish the colour red from
+other different colours.
+
+Also, the main aim of a general dictionary is often to give enough indication
+of the main usage of a word so that a speaker can use the word adequately in
+everyday life. Because of the limitation of space the definitions might not
+capture adequately the exact meanings of words. For example, the _Pocket
+Oxford Dictionary of Current English_ defines "religion" as "belief in a
+superhuman controlling power." Suppose a scientist discovers that there are
+evil but superhuman aliens on Mars who created us and control our destiny. The
+scientist would then believe in the existence of a superhuman controlling
+power. But if this scientist does not worship or submit to these beings,
+surely this does not mean she has a religion in the usual sense of the term.
+
+Finally, many technical words, such as "microwave", "hyper-inflation", and "a
+priori" are used in rather specialized ways. The entries in a general language
+dictionary might not be accurate enough when it comes to such terms. In such
+cases you should consult a special dictionary for the particular discipline in
+question.
+
+As an exercise, evaluate the following entries from _The Pocket Oxford
+Dictionary of Current English_ as reportive definitions.
+
+  * Cat : Small soft-furred four-legged domesticated animal.
+  * Magazine : Illustrated periodical publication containing articles, stories, etc. hint
+  * Impress : Affect or influence deeply.
+  * Cloud : Visible mass of condensed watery vapour floating high above the ground.
+  * Swim : Propel the body through water with limbs, fins, or tail. hint
+
+What about this entry from the _Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary_?
+
+  * SUGAR : A sweet crystallizable material that consists wholly or essentially of sucrose, is colorless or white when pure tending to brown when less refined, is obtained commercially from sugarcane or sugar beet and less extensively from sorghum, maples, and palms, and is important as a source of dietary carbohydrate and as a sweetener and preservative of other foods. 
+
+## §2. Stipulative definition
+
+A _stipulative definition_ is not used to explain the existing meaning of a
+term. It is used to assign a new meaning to a term, whether or not the term
+has already got a meaning. If the stipulative definition is accepted, then the
+term is used in the new way that is prescribed. For example, suppose a
+stipulative definition is proposed to define "MBA" to mean _married but
+available_. Accepting such a definition, we can then go about describing other
+people as MBAs.
+
+## §3. Precising definition
+
+A _precising definition_ might be regarded as a combination of reportive and
+stipulative definition. The aim of a precising definition is to make the
+meaning of a term more precise for some purpose. For example, a bus company
+might want to give discounts to old people. But simply declaring that old
+people can get discounts will lead to many disputes since it is not clear how
+old should one be in order to be an old person. So one might define "old
+person" to mean _any person of age 65 or above_. This is of course one among
+many possible definitions of "old".
+
+Or consider a situation where two people are arguing whether animals such as
+birds or apes possess language. To resolve this dispute, we need to be more
+precise as to what is meant by "language". If by "language" we refer to any
+system of communication, then obviously birds and other animals do make use of
+languages. On the other hand, "language" might be used in a different sense,
+requiring a combinatorial syntax and semantics, allowing a user of the
+language to communicate information about non-existent objects or situations
+remote in time and space from the location of discourse. Used in such a way,
+the communication system of some animals might not qualify as a language. This
+example illustrates the use of precising definitions to resolve disputes that
+involve some key concepts whose meanings might not be clear enough.
+
+## §4. Persuasive definition
+
+A _persuasive definition_ is any definition that attaches an emotive, positive
+or derogatory meaning to a term where it has none. For example, someone
+against abortion might offer the definition of "abortion" as the murder of an
+innocent person during pregnancy. This definition carries a negative
+connotation, as the term "murder" suggests that abortion is wrongful killing,
+and it also assumes that the aborted fetus is already a person. Such a
+definition is surely not appropriate in a fair debate on the moral legitimacy
+of abortion, even though it might be useful as a rhetorical tool.
+
+Evaluate these reportive definitions.
+
+  1. A square is a closed region with four straight sides of equal length. 
+  2. To tell a lie is to say something that is false. 
+  3. A gun is any device that shoots a projectile. 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Utility, rights and virtues are the three main factors to consider in
+determining the morality of action. Different moral theories have different
+conceptions of how they are related. Here we focus on some of the more basic
+points.
+
+## §1. Utility
+
+_Utility_ is a measure of the consequences of an action. A certain action
+might lead to a certain amount of happiness and a certain amount of suffering.
+The difference between the two - the net difference between the happiness and
+the suffering - is the utility of the action.
+
+  * The utility of an action X depends on the happiness and suffering of _every person_ (and creature) affected by X.
+  * When a person performs an action X, the utility of X depends only on its consequences and not the intention of the person.
+  * An action X can have a higher utility than another action Y even if X produces no happiness. This would be the case if X brings about a lot less suffering than Y, even though Y does bring about some amount of happiness.
+
+Utility is obviously an important consideration in morality. When a government
+evaluates a certain policy, it would have to consider both the good and bad
+consequences of the policy. The utility to consider would include not just
+short-term utility but long-term utility. Rapid economic development might
+lead to a lot of happiness for the present generation, but in the long term a
+lot of suffering might result due to environmental pollution or valuable
+traditions being destroyed by market forces.
+
+The moral theory known as "utilitarianism" says that in any situation, the
+morally right thing to do is to act in such a way to maximize utility.
+However, many philosophers argue that maximizing utility might not always be
+right, and might lead to rights being violated. Discriminatory policies
+against homosexuals might create a lot of happiness for the conservative
+majority of a population, but if those policies cannot be morally justified,
+then perhaps they should not be implemented even if they bring about more
+utility.
+
+## §2. Rights
+
+Rights then, function as utility trumps. They serve to protect certain
+interests which we deem to be so important that, all else being equal, they
+cannot be violated in the name of bringing about more utility. Here are a few
+points to note about rights:
+
+  * Some rights are supposed to be absolute and others are not. Freedom of thought is supposed to be an absolute right, in the sense that there should be absolutely no limitation on what people should think and believe. Most other rights are however not absolute and can come into conflict with each other. Having the right to free speech does not mean we have the right to talk loudly in a library or the cinema. Similarly, the right to life does not entail that our lives should be protected at all costs, even when we are harming other people.
+  * Just because I have a right to X, it does not immediately follow that other people or the government should provide me with X. I have the right to leave the country if I want to, but it does not mean the Government should provide me with an air ticket to leave the country if I have no money.
+  * It is generally thought that some rights are basic and common to all human beings. The UN declaration of human rights says that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person". But the existence of many of our rights depend on social conventions and the legal system. Independent of government regulations, there is no objective standard to decide whether we should have a right to 6 years, 9 years, or some other number of years of free education.
+  * Rights in general can be divided into four kinds: claim right, liberty, power, and immunity. See the next tutorial for further discussion.
+
+## §3. Virtues
+
+Morality goes beyond simply the protection of rights. We have the duty of not
+violating other people's rights, but morality also recognizes that there are
+things we ought to do even if we are not required to do them. Virtuous actions
+belong to this category.
+
+Virtues are morally valuable character traits like courage, integrity,
+honesty, fairness, generosity, etc. We are not required to be nice or helpful,
+and failure to do so need not violate anybody's rights. If an old lady is
+carrying a heavy bag, it might be argued that I have no duty to help her. Even
+if I don't help her, I have not violated any of her rights. But if there is
+nobody around to help out, it would reflect very badly on my character if I
+don't help her. So being a virtuous person often involves doing more than what
+is required of us.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. Hohfeld
+
+We talk a lot about rights in ordinary life and in politics and current
+affairs. We say that other people have violated our rights or that certain
+rights should be given more adequate protection. But what exactly do we mean
+by "right"? If we do not clarify this important concept, it is likely there
+will be confusion and misunderstanding.
+
+Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879-1918) was the author of a few seminal essays on
+the analysis of rights. Hohfeld was writing mainly about legal rights, the
+rights that are prescribed by the legislation. However, his insightful
+analysis can be applied to rights in general. He published his theory in the
+groundbreaking article "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
+Judicial Reasoning" in the Yale Law Journal in 1913. He died 5 years later in
+1918 at the age of 38.
+
+## §2. Four types of rights
+
+Hohfeld proposed that rights can be classified into four categories. In the
+explanations below, A and B are persons and X is a situation:
+
+1\. **Claim-rights** \- A has a claim-right against B with regard to X just in
+case B has a **duty** to A to bring about X.
+
+Example: B borrowed $100 from A. So A has a claim right against B that B
+returned $100 to A.
+
+2\. **Privileges (liberties)** \- A has a privilege against B to X just in
+case B has **no claim right** against A not to X.
+
+Example: If A the right (against the Japanese Government) to stay in Japan,
+then this is a privilege. It means that the Japanese Government has no claim-
+right against A that he leaves the country. Or in other words, A has no duty
+to the Japanese Government that he leaves Japan.
+
+3\. **Powers (authority rights)** \- A has a power over B with respect to X
+just in case he can change B's rights with regard to X.
+
+Example: The librarian has the power over a student with regard to the use of
+the library. Normally a student has the right to use the library. But if a
+student is noisy then the libarian has the power to take away that right and
+stop the student from using the library.
+
+4\. **Immunities** \- A has an immunity against B with respect to X just in
+case B has no power over A's rights with respect to X.
+
+Example: Diplomats are supposed to have diplomatic immunity. If they have
+committed a crime in their host country, they are immune against arrests and
+legal prosecution. In other words, the police would have no power over them.
+(They can still be expelled though.)
+
+Notice that these four kinds of rights are related to each other, at least in
+the following ways:
+
+  * **A claim-right corresponds to the absence of a privilege** \- Suppose A has a claim-right against B that B performs some action K. Then B does not have the privilege of not doing K. For example, if A lends $10 to B, then A has a claim-right against B that B gives $10 back to A. This implies that B does not have the privilege of not giving $10 to B.
+  * **A power corresponds to the absence of an immunity** \- Suppose A has power over B with respect to a certain right of B. Then B lacks immunity against A with respect to that right. An example is that an employer has power over its employees with respect to their rights to enter the company building. The right to enter the building is granted by the employer, and can be taken away as the employer sees fit. This means that the employee lacks immunity against the employer with respect to such a right.
+
+## §3. Bundles of rights
+
+In ordinary discussion we tend to think of all rights as having the same
+nature. The right to privacy, the right to freedom of religion, and property
+rights, are all taken to be rights of the same kind.
+
+Hohfeld's analysis is an important contribution because first of all, we see
+that there are four very different kinds of things within the category of
+rights. Second, his analysis enables us to see that the commonly accepted
+rights are actually bundles of different rights. To understand "the right to
+X" is to analyze this right as being composed of one or more of these four
+basic kinds of rights.
+
+Consider for example the right to a certain piece of property, which turns out
+to be a package of different rights. Ownership of a piece of land involves at
+least these rights:
+
+  * Since the land is mine, I have certain privileges as to what to do with it, e.g. grow vegetables. In other words, I have no duty no to use it for growing vegetables.
+  * I also have claim-rights against other people that they do not enter without permission, and that they do not interfere with the exercise of my privileges, etc.
+  * Ownership also implies that I have a range of powers - the power to give someone else the privilege of using my land, and the power to transfer ownership by selling the land.
+
+## §4. Further reading
+
+  * A philosophical article on rights from _The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy_. See especially section 2.1.
+  * There is a very detailed discussion of Hohfeld's analysis in the book _The Realm of Rights_ by Judith Jarvis Thomson.
+
+Consider the following four sentences. Which type of right is being mentioned
+in each case?
+
+  1. If you signed a contract with a company to sing in a concert, the company has a right to your performance of the contract.
+  2. I have the right to use foul language.
+  3. Since I am a Korean citizen, the Korean Government has the right to determine whether I have the duty to pay tax.
+
+Many companies issue coupons for customers to redeem certain special offers.
+For example, a coupon might enable the coupon holder to get a free meal at a
+restaurant. In such a situation, which of the four kinds of rights does the
+coupon provide to the customer against the restaurant?
+
+Also, very often such coupons contain clauses such as the following:
+
+> This company reserves the final right of decision on all matters concerning
+> the use of this coupon.
+
+Given such a clause, the company can suddenly decide and announce that the
+coupon is no longer valid. Which of Hohfeld's rights does this "final right"
+most closely resemble? answer
+
+In the UK Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, it is stated that:
+
+> [E]very worker shall have the right not to be - (a) excluded from membership
+> (b) expelled from membership, of a trade union ... by way of arbitrary
+> discrimination.
+
+What kind of rights are these according to Hohfeld's framework? Spell them out
+more fully, making explicit to whom these rights are directed _against_.
+
+Answer the following questions:
+
+  1. Peter does not have the privilege against the hotel to check out after 10am. What can we deduce about the claim-right of the hotel?
+  2. "Whenever I have the privilege of doing X, it follows logically that other people have the duty not to interfere with my action." Is this true? (Hint: think about the rules of soccer.)
+  3. Boy to girl: "I have the liberty of seeing other girls. So you do not have the right to ask me not to see other girls." What's wrong with this argument?
+  4. "The government agrees that I have the freedom of religion. But in order to become a full believer of the Dada religion, I have to travel to Iceland and worship the Strokkur geyser. So the government should buy me an air-ticket to Iceland." What is wrong with this argument?
+  5. Many rights have exceptions. The right of liberty and personal safety does not protect you from being attacked when you are threatening somebody else. Can you think of any right or liberty which does not have any exception?
+
+__previous tutorial
+
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+Strategic thinking is a wide-raning subject. Here are a few important topics
+to think about. Naturally these topics overlap with each other.
+
+  1. General problem-solving skills - How do we go about analyzing a complex problem and break it into manageble parts? What is a good decision? How to improve our decision-making process? How do we become more creative and effective in solving problems?
+  2. Self-development - What kind of attitude or personality will help us come up with better strategies? What kind of thinking system or working habits would be useful?
+  3. Organizational strategies - How should organizations and businesses develop new stratgies? How should these strategies be developed and implmented? How do we make them more productive and more responsive to challenges and new opportunities? 
+  4. Tactical thinking - How should we deal with challenges and competitions? What are the ways to maximize our impact? How do we protect ourselves and find new allies, and resist our enemies when facing confrontations?
+
+It is very important to think about whether we have good skills in these four
+areas. In this module we will discuss some of these issues. There is a
+separate module on creativity.
+
+__next tutorial
+
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+Solving problems require good critical and creative thinking. We need to be
+able to define the problem, analyse the nature of the problem, and come up
+with effective solutions. The ability to solve problems is a very important
+skill in the workplace.
+
+## §1. Defining the problem
+
+When we are faced with a difficult problem, how should we go about solving it
+in an efficient and effective manner? An important starting point is knowing
+what the problem is. In school students are usually solving problems that are
+already well-formulated. Most problem sets and exam questions are like that.
+However, in everyday life and in the workplace, most of the time we have to
+identify the problem and formulate it correctly. In defining a problem there
+are these points to consider :
+
+  * The formulation of a problem can indirectly influence us in the directions that we take in seeking solutions. So sometimes it might be useful to come up with alternative formulations of the problem, and consider how to best formulate a problem. For example, faced with an unhappy relationship on the verge of breakup, one might think of the problem as "why is she leaving me?", and focus on the faults and reasons of the other person. But thinking of the problem in terms of "what have I been doing wrong" might lead one to focus more on oneself and think about what one might do to rescue the relationship. Similarly, instead of focusing on how a business competitor is taking away business from one's own company, the real problem to focus on might be why one's own company is not doing enough to adapt to the new market.
+  * If the problem concerns how a goal or target might be achieved, it is important to avoid vagueness and try to be more specific. If we are thinking about how to improve a company's profit, it would be useful to say more precisely how much of an increase we are looking for, in order to know whether the goal is realistic or not.
+  * It is also important to think about whether the problem so-defined is real or not. What data is available to show that there is a real problem to be solved? For example a university might be concerned that student standards are dropping. It would be useful to have information available confirming that this is not a subjective judgment but an actual declining trend. Gathering more data about the problem can also help us understand how serious it is and which are the most important factors to consider in dealing with it.
+
+## §2. Problem classification
+
+Having defined the problem, the next thing to do is to know what type of
+problem it is. Generally, a problem might be posed in the form of a question,
+and we might classify these questions into three kinds :
+
+  * Empirical questions
+  * Conceptual questions
+  * Evaluative questions
+
+Empirical questions are questions concerning empirical facts, particular
+events or causal processes in the world. Here are some examples :
+
+  * Who is the current president of the United States?
+  * Did Germany participated in the First World War?
+  * Can AIDS be transmitted through kissing?
+  * Is the universe expanding?
+
+To answer an empirical question, we need observations or experiments, or
+solicit the help of experts in the relevant field, such as physics, biology,
+psychology, economics, history, etc. Very often these questions cannot be
+answered by sitting in the armchair. For example, consider the question of
+whether human beings evolved from other forms of animals. This is an empirical
+question to be answered by careful scientific study. We might have certain
+convictions or intuitions about the answer, and be inclined to believe one way
+or another. But these prior beliefs should be evaluated according to empirical
+data. Pure thinking is not going to help find the answer.
+
+On the other hand, pure thinking can help us answer conceptual questions. Here
+are some examples of conceptual questions :
+
+  * Is rule of law sufficient for democracy?
+  * Can a woman sexually harass a man?
+  * Are there any married bachelors?
+  * Is 981567 divisible by 3?
+
+To answer these questions, we appeal to logic and the meaning of words and
+concepts to arrive at the answers without engaging in experiments or
+observations. In other words, mere thinking is enough to answer these
+questions. Here, "mere thinking" refers to conceptual analysis and reasoning.
+For example, in answering the first question, we note that "rule of law" means
+the consistent use of due procedure and legal processes in a society where the
+legal principles are not arbitrarily applied or withheld. But we might note
+that the laws in a society where this is the case might nonetheless
+discriminate against certain social groups and provide them with inadequate
+political representation in the government. As long as these rules are not
+abused and are consistently applied, there is rule of law but no democracy.
+Using pure reasoning and our understanding of the concepts of "rule of law"
+and "democracy", we conclude that rule of law is not sufficient for democracy.
+
+Similarly, the other conceptual questions are questions which can be answered
+without empirical observations or scientific study.
+
+Finally, let us consider evaluative questions. Evaluative questions are
+questions which explicitly or implicitly invoke values and norms. These
+questions relate to value judgments about moral correctness or aesthetic
+values. Here are some examples :
+
+  * Is abortion immoral?
+  * Is Beethoven a more profound composer than Mozart?
+  * Should the amount of unemployment benefits be raised?
+
+To answer this type of questions, we need to understand the distinction
+between intrinsic and instrumental values. Very briefly, intrinsic value is
+value that exists on its own. The intrinsic value of an object does not depend
+on its being used to satisfy some further end. But if something has value only
+because and in so far as it can be used to satisfy a further end, and would
+cease to have value if it fails to do so, then the value involved is
+instrumental value. (See here for further discussion.)
+
+## §3. Mixed questions
+
+Conceptual questions might be regarded as the most basic kind of question
+among the three categories. This is because factual and evaluative questions
+can only be answered if we understand the relevant concepts invoked by the
+questions. For example, if we do not know what a black hole is, we cannot
+answer the question "Can light escape from a black hole?" Similarly, we need
+to know what abortion is if we want to find out whether abortion is immoral.
+
+Empirical questions are generally independent of evaluative questions. We do
+not have to consider any evaluative judgements if we want to answer an
+empirical question. However, the reverse is not true. To answer many
+evaluative questions, we need to know quite a few empirical facts. For
+example, to evaluate whether an action is morally right or wrong, we usually
+have to consider the consequences of the action, or the motives behind the
+action. Once we know these empirical facts, we can then apply the correct
+moral standards to judge whether the action is good or bad. Suppose we want to
+find out whether it was right for the US to drop two atomic bombs onto Japan.
+We have to consider empirical facts such as Japanese atrocities during the
+Second World War, the extent of the destruction caused by the atomic bombs,
+the number of innocent civilians killed as a result, and whether there are
+other alternative ways of ending the war. These are all empirical matters
+which are important to consider in answering the questions.
+
+Many disputes and controversies persist because of bad thinking, and bad
+thinking techniques might take the form of failure to understand the nature
+and type of the questions that have to be answered. The distinction between
+three types of questions discussed here is a simple and crucial part of the
+methodology in problem-solving.
+
+  1. Suppose "sexual harassment" is defined as any unwelcome sexual behavior or conduct which is offensive, humiliating or intimidating. How would you answer the question of whether telling sexual jokes constitutes sexual harassment?
+  2. Describe how you might answer the question of whether animals have languages.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Polya's 1971 book _How to solve it_ is a classic text on problem solving.
+According to Polya, most problem-solving strategies can be classified under
+four general principles:
+
+  * Understand the nature of the problem.
+  * Draw up a plan to solve the problem.
+  * Try out the plan.
+  * Monitor the outcome of the plan.
+
+Let us highlight some important points to consider when we have to apply these
+four principles:
+
+### 1\. Understand the nature of the problem
+
+  * Is the problem well-defined? Can the problem be analysed into smaller sub-problems?
+  * What type of problem is it? (See the last tutorial on classifying problems.)
+  * What information can we gather about the problem?
+  * Have I / other people solve this problem before? What lessons might their experiences offer?
+  * What are the constraints (time, money, resources, etc) in solving the problem?
+
+### 2\. Draw up a plan
+
+  * Determine the time and resources needed.
+  * Carry out necessary preparations, e.g. research, coordination, etc.
+  * For solving problems that require a complex plan, write down the plan in a systematic manner.
+
+### 3\. Try out the plan
+
+  * Monitor progress to make sure that things go according to plan.
+  * Record errors or special considerations for future review.
+
+### 4\. Monitor the outcome of the plan
+
+  * This is the part of problem-solving that most people tend to ignore. One way for us to improve is to review past experiences and understand why we succeed or fail. So it is important to monitor our own performance review the whole exercise in order that we can do even better in the future.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_115.txt b/data/crtw_115.txt
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+Many problems involve complex systems or processes. We might be asked to
+explain how they work, or perhaps acquire a better understanding of them so
+that we know how they can be improved. In this module we discuss analytical
+methods that help us understanding complex systems and processes.
+
+The basic and simple idea behind is simply to understand the function and
+behavior of a complex object in terms of its components and their interaction.
+
+## §1. Analysing a complex input-output process
+
+In the commercial or industiral environment, process analysis is a basic part
+of quality management and strategic development. Here, a process is seen as a
+procedure composing of many steps which convert one or more inputs into one or
+more outputs. In a factory production line, the inputs might be raw materials
+or electronic components, and the output might be a particular product such as
+a computer.
+
+To carry out a process analysis, we identify the different parts of the
+process, and draw a diagram showing how one part of the process leads to
+another part of the process. To begin the analysis, we might divide the whole
+process into its major parts, and then we can carry out further analysis on
+the larger parts and show how they are composed for different activities and
+tasks. This process of decomposition allows us to see how the process is
+organized :
+
+One way to draw a systematic diagram of a complex process is to use
+_flowcharts_. You can refer to these notes to find out more about flowcharts.
+
+## §2. Analysing a complex system
+
+The same decomposition method can be used in understanding a complex system.
+For example, a computer is composed of different part, including memory,
+processor, display, and interface components such as keyboard and mouse. To
+understand how a computer works, we identify the functions of different
+components, and see how they interact with each other.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Charts and diagrams play an extremely important role in displaying information
+and assisting reasoning. They help us visualize complex processes, or make
+explicit the structure of problems and tasks. On this page we introduce some
+common visual tools.
+
+## §1. Flowcharts
+
+A flowchart is a diagram constructed from connected shapes representing a
+process or a plan. Here is an example of a simple flowchart illustrating the
+process of going to school.
+
+Flowcharts have two main functions. First, a flowchart can be used to analyse
+a complex process, by breaking down the process into individual steps or
+components. The diagram can then be used :
+
+  * as a basis for further discussion of the process
+  * to identify points where data can be collected and analysed
+  * to identify bottlenecks and inefficiencies
+  * to explain the process to other people
+
+A flowchart can also be used to define a process or project to be implemented.
+Such a diagram is useful because :
+
+  * it spells out clearly the steps that have to be implemented
+  * it provides the basis for identifying potential problems
+  * responsibilities for different parts of the process can be clearly defined
+
+The modern flowchart originated in computer science as a tool for representing
+algorithms and computer programs, but the use of flowcharts has extended to
+the representation of all other kinds of processes.
+
+### Notation
+
+In a standard flowchart, different shapes have different conventional
+meanings. The meanings of some of the more common shapes are as follows:
+
+|  The terminator symbol represents the starting or ending point of the
+system.  
+---|---  
+|  A box indicates some particular operation.  
+|  This represents a printout, such as a document or a report.  
+|  A diamond represents a decision or branching point. Lines coming out from
+the diamond indicates different possible situations, leading to different sub-
+processes.  
+|  It represents material or information entering or leaving the system. An
+input might be an order from a customer. An output can be a product to be
+delievered.  
+|  This symbol would contain a letter inside. It indicates that the flow
+continues on a matching symbol containing the same letter somewhere else on
+the same page.  
+|  As above, except that the flow continues at the matching symbol on a
+different page.  
+|  Identifies a delay or a bottleneck.  
+|  Lines represent the sequence and direction of a process.  
+  
+For further information about standard notation, please refer to :
+
+  * International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), ISO 5807 _Information processing -- Documentation symbols and conventions; program and system flowcharts_.
+  * American National Standard, ANSI X3.6-1970, _Flowchart Symbols and their Usage in Information Processing_.
+
+### Deployment flowcharts
+
+One type of flowchart which is quite useful in project planning is _deployment
+flowchart_. A deployment flowchart is just a flowchart drawn inside a table
+with different columns, e.g.
+
+The table is divided into columns representing the parties responsible for
+implementing the process. Different parts of the process are placed in the
+column for which the relevant party is in charge. The diagram reveals clearly
+how responsibilities for the sub-processes are distributed.
+
+### Hints for drawing flowcharts
+
+  * Write down the title of the flowchart. Identify the process that is shown.
+  * Make sure that the starting and ending points of the process can be easily located.
+  * Avoid crossing flow-lines if possible.
+  * Use informative labels in your diagram.
+  * The amount of details in a flowchart depends on the level of analysis required.
+
+### Analysing flowcharts
+
+In a management context the following considerations should be taken into
+account in reviewing a flowchart:
+
+  * Where are the labor intensive processes?
+  * Where would possible delays and hiccups most likely occur?
+  * Are there places particularly suited for quality control?
+  * Are there duplicated or redundant processes?
+  * Is it possible to streamline any process or reduce the number of operations?
+  * Has any process been omitted?
+
+## §2. Decision trees
+
+A decision tree diagram is a diagram that represents the possible consequences
+of a series of decisions in some situation. Here is a simple example :
+
+More sophisticated decision tree diagrams can represent the probabilities of
+different possible outcomes. Special methods can then be employed to calculate
+the overall probabilities of possible final outcomes, to help estimate risks
+and assist decision making.
+
+A decision tree diagram functions not just as a map for making decisions. It
+is also very useful in laying out the different positions on some complicated
+theoretical issue. Depending on how one might answer certain crucial
+questions, a decision tree diagram can help the user identify the theoretical
+consequences of the assumptions that he or she accepts. For example, here we
+have a very simple tree diagram on the topic of consciousness.
+
+## §3. Cause and effect diagrams
+
+There are two main types of cause and effect diagrams - Bayesian causal nets,
+and fishbone diagrams. Bayesian causal nets are rather similar to decision
+tree diagrams. For more details, please visit this page.
+
+* * *
+
+It is hard to describe systematically the art of using diagrams to present
+relevant information accurately and succintly. But here are a few simple
+reminders on interpreting and presenting charts containing statistical
+information:
+
+  * Misleading diagrams
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+(Image from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis)
+
+SWOT is an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.
+These four factors are used to analyze an individual, product, or
+organization. Strengths and weaknesses correspond to the good and bad aspects
+that are relatively internal to the entity in question. Opportunities and
+threats correspond to the positive features and potential problems in the
+external environment.
+
+To carry out a SWOT analysis is to draw a table like the one above, and list
+the relevant points in the appropriate boxes.
+
+The SWOT framework offers a systematic approach for assessing an organization,
+especially when formulating future plans. When a company is deciding how to
+expand its business or face off competitors, it might start with a SWOT
+analysis. It is perhaps one of the most popular and practical strategic
+thinking tools in business and management. But what is also noteworthy is that
+the tool is equally applicable to individuals. Many people live a busy life
+with little time for reflection. SWOT is a useful tool we can use now and then
+to step back and look at the bigger picture, to review where we are in life
+and where we want to go.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_118.txt b/data/crtw_118.txt
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+The McKinsey 7S Framework is a management tool invented by business
+consultants Robert Waterman, Jr. and Tom Peters. It is a useful tool for
+analyzing a company. We have included this tool here because we think it can
+also be quite useful for planning some perersonal project.
+
+The diagram above provides a list of issues we need to consider in order to
+achieve our goals:
+
+  1. Strategy: What is the plan and timeline? What do we need to do or achieve at different stages?
+  2. Structure: This is more about the organizational structure of the company, such as how employees should be grouped together to achieve the goals. So if you have a team of people, this is about who is in charge and who is responsible for what. 
+  3. Systems: What kind of resources do you need? Money? Hardware? What kind of working habits should you adopt? Which tools would improve your productivity when you work on this project?
+  4. Staff: Is there anyone who can help you? Who has done this before and can give you some advice?
+  5. Style: If you will end up with a product that you hope other people will use, e.g. a book, a new design, etc, how are you going to promote it? What about the presentation and publicity efforts? How do you maximize the impact of your ideas?
+  6. Skills: Do you have the knowledge required to achieve your goals? What else do you need to learn? Is there a weak spot and do you need to do something about it?
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_119.txt b/data/crtw_119.txt
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+Making good decisions is crucial if we want to be successful in our projects.
+According to many CEOs, decision-making is the top management skill. But what
+makes a good decision? Many people think a good decision if one that has a
+good outcome. But of course, you can get a good outcome just because you are
+lucky, and you might not be so lucky next time.
+
+So it is quite important to focus on the _process_ of making a decision.
+Improving the quality of the decision-making process itself can make good
+outcomes more likely in the long run.
+
+So what kind of decision-making process is more reliable? Some people say you
+should "trust your gut" and not think too much when you make decisions. On the
+other hand, many writers have also argued that you should not let your
+emotions take over your brain, and that we should make decisions rationally
+and in a cool-headed way, and avoid being biased by our emotions. So who is
+right and who is wrong?
+
+The truth, of course, is likely to be complicated. First of all, there are all
+types of decisions being made by different people under different situations
+about different things. Furthermore, reasoning and emotions interact in
+complex ways. Think of the pros and cons method of making decisions, where we
+decide by listing the good and bad points of a course of action. Careful
+reasoning is needed to come up with these points, but what makes them good or
+bad for us very often depends on our emotions. For example, someone might be
+trying to decide whether to go to the museum and he lists as one of the cons
+that it will be boring. But what makes it boring for him surely has something
+to do with his feelings and emotions. In other words, we often do appeal to
+our emotions in determining the pros and cons.
+
+The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio made an interesting discovery a while back
+about emotions and decision-making. He found out that some patients with brain
+damage in the areas involved in processing emotions ended up not being able to
+make even simple decisions. These patients don't seem to feel emotions but can
+reason well and can describe the pros and cons on both sides of a decision.
+Yet they would think and think and not being able to make up their mind, even
+on a simple task such as deciding what to eat. It would appear that emotions
+are crucial in helping us come to a decision.
+
+This is not the same as saying that we should make decisions blindly based on
+our gut feelings. Acting impulsively is dangerous, and we can easily regret
+our decisions. Scientists also tell us that gut feelings are often not very
+reliable. If they are reliable, it is more because they are the products of
+years of training and experience in some domain where there are learnable
+regularities. In other words, unless you are an expert, following your gut
+without thinking is usually not a good decision-making strategy.
+
+However, we do need to listen to our feelings because we often have to live
+with the decisions that we have made. Some of our deep-seated emotional
+reactions might come from those aspects of our personality that we are not
+able to change. For example, perhaps for some reason we just hate somebody's
+voice. If we cannot overcome this feeling, it might be unwise to develop a
+romantic relationship with this person, even if he or she might be perfect in
+all other respects. As the philosopher and scientist Blaise Pascal has said,
+"the heart has its reasons which reason does not know."
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_12.txt b/data/crtw_12.txt
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+The criteria for evaluating definitions depends on the kind of definition we
+are considering. With reportive definition, it is important that the
+definition provided correctly captures the usage of the term that is defined.
+In particular, this means that the definition should be neither too wide (or
+too broad) nor too narrow.
+
+  * A definition is too wide if the definiens applies to things that the definiendum does not apply to. In other words, the definition includes things that it should not. For example, defining a chair as a piece of furniture for sitting is too wide because a bench is not a chair but it satisfies the definition.
+  * A definition is too narrow if the definiens fails to include things to which the definiendum applies. In other words, the definition fails to include things that it should. Consider the definition of religion as any belief system that includes worshiping a god who created the universe. This definition is too narrow since it excludes religions that do not postulate a creator, such as Jainism and certain versions of Buddhism and Daoism.
+  * it is important to note that a definition can be both too wide and too narrow, e.g. chair = a piece of furniture for sitting which has four legs.
+
+In giving a stipulative definition, since we are introducing a new meaning,
+the question of whether the definition is too broad or too narrow does not
+arise. But it is important that the definien should avoid circularity,
+inconsistency and obscurity.
+
+  * An example of a circular definition: temperature is the physical quantitiy that is measured by a thermometer. This definition might help someone understand what the word "temperature" means in English, but it is circular as a definition. This is because there is no way to explain what a thermometer is without using the concept of temperature.
+
+Title 22, Chapter 38, section 2656f(d) of the United States Code contains this
+definition of terrorism:
+
+> the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence
+> perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
+> clandestine agents;
+
+Discuss some of the inadequacies of this definition as a general definition of
+terrorism. hints
+
+Discuss the adequacies of these definitions.
+
+  1. Chemistry is the academic discipline that studies chemical processes. 
+  2. Humans are rational animals. 
+  3. A religion is any system of belief that accepts an almighty and perfect God. 
+  4. Time is the quantity that is measured by clocks. 
+
+Some more definitions for you to think about. These are a bit more difficult.
+
+  1. Sports is any activity whose primary purpose is the exercise of physical skills. (Philosopher David Papineau) 
+  2. Art is the expression or application of human creative skill and imagination, typically in a visual form such as painting or sculpture, producing works to be appreciated primarily for their beauty or emotional power. 
+  3. Playing a game is the "voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles". (Bernard Suits) 
+
+See the explanations of "biscuits" and "cookies" below. If we take them as
+providing definitions, there is something seriously wrong. What is it? hint
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_120.txt b/data/crtw_120.txt
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+One very practically useful method of making decisions is to use a pros and
+cons list. "Pros" are the good reasons or good consequences that are in favor
+of the decision. "Cons" are the opposite, i.e. the disadvantages or bad points
+about the decision.
+
+When you have to decide whether to carry out a course of action, get a piece
+of paper and write down in two columns the pros and cons of the decision. Try
+to be comprehensive so you will end up with a clear picture of what is at
+stake. The general idea is that if there are more pros than cons, then you go
+ahead and carry out the proposed action. If there are more cons than pros,
+then you refrain from doing it. If it is a tie, then you can proceed either
+way.
+
+Benjamin Franklin was a very famous American politician, scientist, and
+author. He invented the lightning rod, bifocal lens, used a kite to conduct
+electricity from clouds, helped set up the University of Pennsylvania,
+contributed to the US Declaration of Independence, and accomplished lots of
+other things. You would expect that such a amazing person must have been very
+good at making decisions. The British scientist Joseph Priestley, who
+discovered oxygen, actually asked Franklin for advice about making decisions,
+and Franklin wrote this letter in replying providing the first ever
+description of the pros and cons method:
+
+To Joseph Priestley  
+London, September 19, 1772
+
+Dear Sir,
+
+In the Affair of so much Importance to you, wherein you ask my Advice, I
+cannot for want of sufficient Premises, advise you what to determine, but if
+you please I will tell you how.
+
+When these difficult Cases occur, they are difficult chiefly because while we
+have them under Consideration all the Reasons pro and con are not present to
+the Mind at the same time; but sometimes one Set present themselves, and at
+other times another, the first being out of Sight. Hence the various Purposes
+or Inclinations that alternately prevail, and the Uncertainty that perplexes
+us.
+
+To get over this, my Way is, to divide half a Sheet of Paper by a Line into
+two Columns, writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then during
+three or four Days Consideration I put down under the different Heads short
+Hints of the different Motives that at different Times occur to me for or
+against the Measure. When I have thus got them all together in one View, I
+endeavour to estimate their respective Weights; and where I find two, one on
+each side, that seem equal, I strike them both out: If I find a Reason pro
+equal to some two Reasons con, I strike out the three. If I judge some two
+Reasons con equal to some three Reasons pro, I strike out the five; and thus
+proceeding I find at length where the Ballance lies; and if after a Day or two
+of farther Consideration nothing new that is of Importance occurs on either
+side, I come to a Determination accordingly.
+
+And tho' the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic
+Quantities, yet when each is thus considered separately and comparatively, and
+the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less likely to
+take a rash Step; and in fact I have found great Advantage from this kind of
+Equation, in what may be called Moral or Prudential Algebra.
+
+Wishing sincerely that you may determine for the best, I am ever, my dear
+Friend,
+
+Yours most affectionately
+
+B. Franklin
+
+Source: Mr. Franklin: A Selection from His Personal Letters. Contributors:
+Whitfield J. Bell Jr., editor, Franklin, author, Leonard W. Labaree, editor.
+Publisher: Yale University Press: New Haven, CT 1956.
+
+There are a few noteworthy points in this letter:
+
+  1. The whole exercise is carried out within a few days. Of course, sometimes we need to decide quickly. But often it is useful to spend more time thinking carefully about a difficult and important decision. It gives our mind a better understanding of the situation, and helps us come up with a more comprehensive list of pros and cons. In addition, this avoids acting impulsively in a rush. 
+  2. Franklin realized that some reasons are more weightly than others and this should be taken into account. Just because an action has 5 pros and 3 cons does not mean that we must go ahead. Perhaps some of the cons are very serious. This should be taken into account.
+  3. Franklin also admitted that this is not a precise mathmatical method. But having every relevant consideration in front of us can be very helpful nonetheless. It might also be a good idea to keep the pieces of paper that we used to make such decisions. We can then review our track record periodically to see if we are prone to biases and can try to correct our mistakes and do better in the future. 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Formal decision theory might be considerd to be a branch of mathematics. It
+provides a more precise and systematic study of the formal or abstract
+properties of decision-making scenarios. Game theory concerns situations where
+the decisions of more than two parties are involved. Decision theory considers
+only the decisions of a single individual. Here we discuss only some very
+basic aspects of decision theory.
+
+The decision situations we consider are cases where a decision maker has to
+choose between a list of mutually exclusive decisions. In other words, from
+among the alternatives, one and only one choice can be made. Each of these
+choices might have one or more possible consequences that are beyond the
+control of the decision maker, which again are mutually exclusive.
+
+Consider an artificial example where someone, say Linda, is thinking of
+investing in the stock market. Suppose she is considering four alternatives :
+investing $8000, investing $4000, investing $2000, or not investing at all.
+These are the four choices that are within her control. The consequences of
+her investment, in terms of her profit or loses, are dependent on the market
+and beyond her control. We might draw up a _payoff table_ as follows :
+
+Choices | Profit  
+---|---  
+| Strong market | Fair market | Poor market  
+invest $8000 | $800 | $200 | -$400  
+invest $4000 | $400 | $100 | -$200  
+invest $2000 | $200 | $50 | -$100  
+invest $1000 | $100 | $25 | -$50  
+  
+Although the possible returns of the investment are beyond the control of the
+decision maker, the decision maker might or might not be able or willing to
+assign probabilities to them. If no probabilities are assigned to the possible
+consequences, then the decision situation is called " _decision under
+uncertainty_ ". If probabilities are assigned then the situation is called "
+_decision under risk_ ". This is a basic distinction in decision theory, and
+different analyses are in order.
+
+## §1. Decision under uncertainty
+
+### Maximin
+
+The Maximin decision rule is used by a pessimistic decision maker who wants to
+make a conservative decision. Basically, the decision rule is to consider the
+worst consequence of each possible course of action and chooses the one thast
+has the least worst consequence.
+
+Applying this rule to the payoff table above, the maximin rule implies that
+Linda should choose the last course of action, namely not to invest anything.
+
+Choices | Profit  
+---|---  
+| Strong market | Fair market | Poor market  
+invest $8000 | $800 | $200 | -$400  
+invest $4000 | $400 | $100 | -$200  
+invest $2000 | $200 | $50 | -$100  
+invest $1000 | $100 | $25 | -$50  
+  
+Maximin tells Linda to consider the worst possible consequence of her possible
+choices. These are indicated by the orange boxes here. Among the worst
+consequences of the four choices, the last one is the best of the worst. So
+that would be choice to make.
+
+### Maximax
+
+Choices | Profit  
+---|---  
+| Strong market | Fair market | Poor market  
+invest $8000 | $800 | $200 | -$400  
+invest $4000 | $400 | $100 | -$200  
+invest $2000 | $200 | $50 | -$100  
+invest $1000 | $100 | $25 | -$50  
+  
+Whereas minimax is the rule for the pessimist, maximax is the rule for the
+optimist. A slogan for maximax might be "best of the best" - a decision maker
+considers the best possible outcome for each course of action, and chooses the
+course of action that corresponds to the best of the best possible outcomes.
+So in Linda's case if she employs this rule she would look at the first column
+and picks the fist course of action and invest $8000 since it gives her the
+largest possible return.
+
+### Minimax regret
+
+This rule is for minimizing regrets. Regret here is understood as proportional
+to the difference between what we actually get, and the better position that
+we could have got if a different course of action had been chosen. Regret is
+sometimes also called "opportunity loss".
+
+Choices | Regret  
+---|---  
+| Strong market | Fair market | Poor market  
+invest $8000 | 0 | 0 | 350  
+invest $4000 | 400 | 100 | 150  
+invest $2000 | 600 | 150 | 50  
+invest $1000 | 700 | 175 | 0  
+  
+In applying this decision rule, we list the maximum amount of regret for each
+possible course of action, and select the course of action that corresponds to
+the minimum of the list. In the example we have been considering, the maximum
+regret for each course of action is coloured orange, and the minimum of all
+the selected values is 350. So applying the minimax regret rule Linda should
+invest $8000.
+
+## §2. Decision Making Under Risk
+
+When we are dealing with a decision where the possible outcomes are given
+specific probabilities, we say that this a case of decision making under risk.
+In such situations the _principle of expected value_ is used. We calculate the
+expected value associated with each possible course of action, and select the
+course of action that has the higest expected value. To calculate the expected
+value for a course of action, we multiple each possible payoff associated with
+that course of action with its probability, and sum up all the products for
+that course of action.
+
+Choices | Profit | expected value  
+---|---|---  
+| Strong market  
+(probability = 0.1) | Fair market  
+(probability = 0.5) | Poor market  
+(probability = 0.4) |  
+invest $8000 | $800 | $200 | -$400 | $800x0.1+$200x0.5+(-$400)x0.4  
+= **$20**  
+invest $4000 | $400 | $100 | -$200 | $400x0.1+$100x0.5+(-$200)x0.4  
+= **$10**  
+invest $2000 | $200 | $50 | -$100 | $200x0.1+$50x0.5+(-$100)x0.4  
+= **$5**  
+invest $1000 | $100 | $25 | -$50 | $100x0.1+$25x0.5+(-$50)x0.4  
+= **$2.5**  
+  
+Since the first course of action has the highest expected value, the principle
+of utility implies that Linda should invest $8000. For further discussion
+about expected value, see the corresponding section in statistical reasoning.
+
+In the example here, it is assumed that the probabilities assigned to
+different market conditions are independent of Linda's decisions. Is this a
+reasonable assumption to make? answer
+
+__previous tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_122.txt b/data/crtw_122.txt
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+Fallacies are mistakes of reasoning, as opposed to making mistakes that are of
+a factual nature. If I counted twenty people in the room when there were in
+fact twenty-one, then I made a factual mistake. On the other hand, if I
+believe that there are round squares, I am believing something that is
+inconsistent. This is a mistake of reasoning, and a fallacy, since I should
+not have believed something inconsistent if my reasoning is good.
+
+In some discussion, a fallacy is taken to be an undesirable kind of argument
+or inference. For example, a certain textbook explains "fallacy" as "an
+unreliable inference". In our view, this definition of fallacy is rather
+narrow, since we might want to count certain mistakes of reasoning as
+fallacious even though they are not presented as arguments. For example,
+making a contradictory claim seems to be a case of fallacy, but a single claim
+is not an argument. Similarly, putting forward a question with an
+inappropriate presupposition might also be regarded as a fallacy, but a
+question is also not an argument. In both of these situations though, the
+person is making a mistake of reasoning since he is doing something that goes
+against one or more principles of correct reasoning. This is why we would like
+to define fallacies more broadly as violations of the principles of critical
+thinking, whether or not the mistakes take the form of an argument.
+
+The study of fallacies is an application of the principles of critical
+thinking. Being familiar with typical fallacies can help us avoid them. We
+would also be in a position to explain other people's mistakes. There are
+different ways of classifying fallacies. Broadly speaking, we might divide
+fallacies into four kinds.
+
+>   * Fallacies of inconsistency: cases where something inconsistent or self-
+> defeating has been proposed or accepted.
+>   * Fallacies of inappropriate presumption: cases where we have an
+> assumption or a question presupposing something that is not reasonable to
+> accept in the relevant conversational context.
+>   * Fallacies of relevance: cases where irrelevant reasons are being invoked
+> or relevant reasons being ignored.
+>   * Fallacies of insufficiency: cases where the evidence supporting a
+> conclusion is insufficient or weak.
+>
+
+We shall discuss these fallacies in the next few tutorials.
+
+__next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_123.txt b/data/crtw_123.txt
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+Fallacies of inconsistency are cases where something inconsistent, self-
+contradictory or self-defeating is presented.
+
+## §1. Inconsistency
+
+Here are some examples:
+
+  * "One thing that we know for certain is that nothing is ever true or false." - If there is something we know for certain, then there is at least one truth that we know. So it can't be the case that nothing is true or false.
+  * "Morality is relative and it is just a matter of opinion, and so it is always wrong to impose our opinions on other people." - But if morality is relative, it is also a relative matter whether we should impose our opinions on other people. If we should not do that, there is at least one thing that is objectively wrong.
+  * "All general claims have exceptions." - This claim itself is a general claim, and so if it is true, it must also have an exception itself. This implies that not all general claims have exceptions. So the claim itself is inconsistent.
+
+## §2. Self-defeating claims
+
+A self-defeating statement is a statement that strictly speaking is not
+logically inconsistent, but is near enough in that it is obviously false when
+being asserted. Consider these examples:
+
+  * Very young children are fond of saying "I am not here" when they are playing hide-and-seek. The statement itself is not logically inconsistent, since it is logically possible for the child not to be where she is. What is impossible is to _utter the sentence as a true sentence_ (unless it is used for example in a telephone recorded message.)
+  * Someone who says, "I cannot speak any English."
+  * Here is an actual example. A TV programme in Hong Kong was critical of the Government. When the Hong Kong Chief Executive Mr. Tung was asked about it, he replied , "I shall not comment on such distasteful programs." Mr. Tung's remark was not logically inconsistent, because what it describes is a possible state of affairs. But it is nonetheless self-defeating because calling the program "distasteful" is to pass a comment!
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_124.txt b/data/crtw_124.txt
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+Fallacies of relevance are of two kinds:
+
+## §1. Taking irrelevant considerations into account
+
+This includes defending a conclusion by appealing to irrelevant reasons, e.g.
+inappropriate appeal to pity, popular opinion, tradition, authority, etc. An
+example would be when a student failed a course and asked the teacher to give
+him a pass instead, because "his parents will be upset". Since grades should
+be given on the basis of performance, the reason being given is quite
+irrelevant.
+
+Similarly, suppose somone criticizes the Democratic Party's call for direct
+elections in Hong Kong as follows : "These arguments supporting direct
+elections have no merit because they are advanced by Democrats who naturally
+stand to gain from it." This is again fallacious because whether the person
+advancing the argument has something to gain from direct elections is a
+completely different issue from whether there ought to be direct elections.
+
+## §2. Failing to take relevant considerations into account
+
+For example, it is not unusual for us to ignore or downplay criticisms because
+we do not like them, even when those criticisms are justified. Or sometimes we
+might be tempted into making snappy decisions thinking that our decisions are
+the best when in fact we should be investigating the situation more carefully
+and doing more research.
+
+Of course, if we fail to consider a relevant fact simply because we are
+ignorant of it, then this lack of knowledge does not constitute a fallacy.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_125.txt b/data/crtw_125.txt
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+Fallacies of insufficiency are cases where insufficient evidence is provided
+in support of a claim. Probably most common fallacies fall within this
+category. Here are a few popular types:
+
+## Limited sampling
+
+  * Momofuku Ando, the inventor of instant noodles, died at the age of 96. He said he ate instant noodles everyday. So instant noodles cannot be bad for your health. 
+  * A black cat crossed my path this morning, and I got into a traffic accident this afternoon. Black cats are really unlucky. 
+
+In both cases the observations are relevant to the conclusion, but a lot more
+data is needed to support the conclusion, e.g. Studies show that many other
+people who eat instant noodles live longer, and those who encounter black cats
+are more likely to suffer from accidents.
+
+## Appeal to ignorance
+
+  * We have no evidence showing that he is innocent. So he must be guilty. 
+
+If someone is guilty, it would indeed be hard to find evidence showing that he
+is innocent. But perhaps there is no evidence to point either way, so lack of
+evidence is not enough to prove guilt.
+
+## Naturalistic fallacy
+
+  * Many children enjoy playing video games, so we should not stop them from playing. 
+
+Many naturalistic fallacies are examples of fallacy of insufficiency.
+Empirical facts by themselves are not sufficient for normative conclusions,
+even if they are relevant.
+
+There are many other kinds of fallacy of insufficiency. See if you can
+identify some of them.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_126.txt b/data/crtw_126.txt
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+Fallacies of inappropriate presumption are cases where we have explicitly or
+implicitly made an assumption that is not reasonable to accept in the relevant
+context. Some examples:
+
+  * Many people like to ask whether human nature is good or evil. This presupposes that there is such a thing as human nature and that it must be either good or bad. But why should these assumptions be accepted and are they the only options available? What if human nature is neither good nor bad? Or what if good or bad nature applies only to individual human beings?
+  * Consider the question "Have you stopped being an idiot?" Whether you answer "yes" or "no", you admit that you are, or have been, an idiot. Presumably you do not want to make any such admission. We can point out that this question has a false assumption.
+  * "Same-sex marriage should not be allowed because by definition a marriage should be between a man and a woman." This argument assumes that only a heterosexual conception of marriage is correct. But this begs the question against those who defend same-sex marriages and is not an appropriate assumption to make when debating this issue.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_127.txt b/data/crtw_127.txt
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+Here are some examples of common fallacies:
+
+### _ad hominem_
+
+A theory is discarded not because of any evidence against it or lack of
+evidence for it, but because of the person who argues for it. Example:
+
+A: The Government should enact minimum-wage legislation so that workers are
+not exploited.  
+B: Nonsense. You say that only because you cannot find a good job.
+
+### _ad ignorantiam (appeal to ignorance)_
+
+The truth of a claim is established only on the basis of lack of evidence
+against it. A simple obvious example of such fallacy is to argue that unicorns
+exist because there is no evidence against such a claim. At first sight it
+seems that many theories that we describe as scientific involve such a
+fallacy. E.g. the first law of thermodynamics holds because so far there has
+not been any negative instance that would serve as evidence against it. But
+notice, as in cases like this, there is evidence for the law, namely positive
+instances. Notice also that this fallacy does not apply to situations where
+there are only two rival claims and one has already been falsified, then we
+may justly establish the truth of the other even if we cannot find evidence
+for or against it.
+
+### _ad misericordiam (appeal to pity)_
+
+In offering an argument, pity is appealed to. Usually this happens when people
+argue for special treatment on the basis of their need. E.g. a student argues
+that the teacher should let him/her pass the examination because he/she needs
+it in order to graduate. Of course, pity might be a relevant consideration in
+certain conditions, as in contexts involving charity.
+
+### _ad populum (appeal to popularity)_
+
+The truth of a claim is established only on the basis of its popularity and
+familiarity. This is the fallacy committed by many commercials. Surely you
+have heard of commercials implying that we should buy a certain product
+because it has made to the top of a sales rank, or because the brand is the
+city's "favourite".
+
+### Affirming the consequent
+
+Inferring that P is true solely because Q is true and it is also true that if
+P is true, Q is true.
+
+The problem with this type of reasoning is that it ignores the possibility
+that there are other conditions apart from P that might lead to Q. For
+example, if there is a traffic jam, a colleague may be late for work. But if
+we argue from his being late to there being a traffic jam, we are guilty of
+this fallacy - the colleague may be late due to a faulty alarm clock.
+
+Of course, if we have evidence showing that P is the only or most likely
+condition that leads to Q, then we can infer that P is likely to be true
+without committing a fallacy.
+
+### Begging the question ( _petito principii_ )
+
+In arguing for a claim, the claim itself is already assumed in the premise.
+Example: "God exists because this is what the Bible says, and the Bible is
+reliable because it is the word of God."
+
+### Complex question or loaded question
+
+A question is posed in such a way that a person, no matter what answer he/she
+gives to the question, will inevitably commit him/herself to some other claim,
+which should not be presupposed in the context in question.
+
+A common tactic is to ask a yes-no question that tricks people to agree to
+something they never intended to say. For example, if you are asked "Are you
+still as self-centred as you used to be?", then no matter you answer "yes" or
+"no", you are bound to admit that you were self-centred in the past. Of
+course, the same question would not count as a fallacy if the presupposition
+of the question is indeed accepted in the conversational context.
+
+### Composition (opposite of division)
+
+The whole is assumed to have the same properties as its parts. Anne might be
+humorous and fun-loving and an excellent person to invite to the party. The
+same might be true of Ben, Chris and David considered individually. But it
+does not follow that it will be a good idea to invite all of them to the
+party. Perhaps they hate each other and the party will be ruined.
+
+### Denying the antecedent
+
+Inferring that Q is false just because if P is true, Q is also true, but P is
+false.
+
+This fallacy is similar to the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Again the
+problem is that some alternative explanation or cause might be overlooked.
+Although P is false, some other condition might be sufficient to make Q true.
+
+Example: If there is a traffic jam, a colleague may be late for work. But it
+is not right to argue in the light of a smooth traffic that the colleague will
+not be late. Again, his alarm clock may have stopped working.
+
+### Division (opposite of composition)
+
+The parts of a whole is assumed to have the same properties of the whole. It
+is possible that, on a whole, a company is very effective, while some of its
+departments are not. It would be inappropriate to assume they all are.
+
+### Equivocation
+
+Putting forward an argument where a word changes meaning without having it
+pointed out. For example, some philosophers argue that all acts are selfish.
+Even if you strive to serve others, you are still acting selfishly because
+your act is just to satisfy your desire to serve others. But surely the word
+"selfish" means differently in the premise and the conclusion - when we say a
+person is selfish we usually mean that he does not strive to serve others. To
+say that a person is selfish because he is doing something he wants, even when
+what he wants is to help others, is to use the term "selfish" with a different
+meaning.
+
+### False dilemma
+
+Presenting a limited set of alternatives when there are others that are worth
+considering in the context. Example: "Every person is either my enemy or my
+friend. If he/she is my enemy I should hate him/her. If he/she is my friend I
+should love him/her. So I should either love him/her or hate him/her."
+Obviously, the conclusion is too extreme because most people are neither your
+enemy nor your friend.
+
+### Gambler's fallacy
+
+Assumption is made to take some independent statistics as dependent. The
+untrained mind tends to think that, e.g. if a fair coin is tossed five times
+and the results are all heads, then the next toss will more likely be a tail.
+It will not be, however. If the coin is fair, the result for each toss is
+completely independent of the others. Notice the fallacy hinges on the fact
+that the final result is not known. Had the final result been known already,
+the statistics would have been dependent.
+
+### Genetic fallacy
+
+Thinking that because X dervies from Y, and Y has a certain property, X must
+have the same property also. Example: "His father is a criminal, so he must
+also be up to no good."
+
+### _Non sequitur_
+
+A conclusion is drawn which does not follow from the premise. This is not a
+specific fallacy but a very general term for a bad argument. So a lot of the
+examples above and below can be said to be non sequitur.
+
+### _Petito principii_
+
+Latin word for question begging.
+
+### _Post hoc, ergo propter hoc_ (literally, "after this, therefore because of
+this")
+
+Inferring that X must be the cause of Y just because X is followed by Y.
+
+For example, having visited a graveyard, I fell ill and infer that graveyards
+are spooky places that cause illnesses. Of course, this inference is not
+warranted since this might just be a coincidence. However, a lot of
+superstituous beliefs commit this fallacy.
+
+### Red herring
+
+Within an argument some irrelevant issue is raised which diverts attention
+from the main subject. The function of the red herring is sometimes to help
+express a strong, biased opinion. The red herring (the irrelevant issue)
+serves to increase the force of the argument in a very misleading manner.
+
+For example, in a debate as to whether God exists, someone might argue that
+believing in God gives peace and meaning to many people's lives. This would be
+an example of a red herring since whether religions can have a positive effect
+on people is irrelevant to the question of the existence of God. The good
+psychological effect of a belief is not a reason for thinking that the belief
+is true.
+
+### Slippery slope
+
+Arguing that if an opponent were to accept some claim C1, then he or she has
+to accept some other closely related claim C2, which in turn commits the
+opponent to a still further claim C3, eventually leading to the conclusion
+that the opponent is committed to something absurd or obviously unacceptable.
+
+This style of argumentation constitutes a fallacy only when it is
+inappropriate to think if one were to accept the initial claim, one must
+accept all the other claims.
+
+An example: "The government should not prohibit drugs. Otherwise the
+government should also ban alcohol or cigarettes. And then fatty food and junk
+food would have to be regulated too. The next thing you know, the government
+would force us to brush our teeth and do exercises everyday."
+
+### Straw man
+
+Attacking an opponent by attributing to him/her an implausible position that
+is easily defeated when this is not actually the opponent's position.
+
+Example: When many people argue for more democracy in Hong Kong, a typical
+reply is to say that this is not warranted because it is wrong to think that
+democracy is the solution to all of Hong Kong's problems, or to say that one
+should not blindly accept democracy. But those who support democracy never
+suggest that democracy can solve _all_ problems (e.g. pollution), and they
+might also agree that _blindly_ accepting something is rarely correct, whether
+it is democracy or not. Those criticisms attack implausible "strawman"
+positions and do not address the real arguments for democracy.
+
+### Suppressed evidence
+
+Where there is contradicting evidence, only confirming evidence is presented.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_128.txt b/data/crtw_128.txt
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+##### Answer
+
+×
+
+Modal body text goes here.
+
+Identify any fallacy in each of these passages. If no fallacy is committed,
+select "no fallacy involved".
+
+* * *
+
+[Q1] Mr. Lee's views on Japanese culture are wrong. This is because his
+parents were killed by the Japanese army during World War II and that made him
+anti-Japanese all his life.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q2] Every ingredient of this soup is tasty. So this must be a very tasty
+soup.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q3] Smoking causes cancer because my father was a smoker and he died of lung
+cancer.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q4] Professor Lewis, the world authority on logic, claims that all wives cook
+for their husbands. But the fact is that his own wife does not cook for him.
+Therefore, his claim is false.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q5] If Catholicism is right, then no women should be allowed to be priests.
+Catholicism is wrong. Therefore, some women should be allowed to be priests.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q6] God does not exist because every argument for the existence of God has
+been shown to be unsound.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q7] The last three times I have had a cold I took large doses of vitamin C.
+On each occasion, the cold cleared up within a few days. So vitamin C helped
+me recover from colds.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q8] The union's case for more funding for higher education can be ignored.
+For it is put forward by the very people - university staff - who would
+benefit from the increased money.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q9] Children become able to solve complex problems and think of physical
+objects objectively at the same time that they learn language. Therefore,
+these abilities are caused by learning a language.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+* * *
+
+[Q10] If cheap things are no good then this cheap watch is no good. But this
+watch is actually quite good. So some good things are cheap.
+
+Choose answer No fallacy involved Division Amphiboly Composition Equivocation
+Strawman False dilemma Complex question Appeal to ignorance Begging the
+question Denying the antecedent Affirming the consequent Ad hominem argument
+Appeal to the people Appeal to unreliable authority False cause / Hasty
+generalization
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Please answer this question first before proceeding
+
+Namibia is a country in Africa. Do you know how big is Namibia's population?
+Is it above or below 100 million? Before you continue any further, write down
+your estimate of the population.
+
+* * *
+
+In this tutorial we will discuss cognitive biases. These are certain pervasive
+thinking habits which are likely to threaten objectivity or to lead to errors
+in reasoning. They are, however, often very common and difficult to get rid of
+them. Psychologists are interested in cognitive biases because they might tell
+us about human nature and how our brain is organised. Cognitive biases are
+obviously also relevant to many other areas, such as economics, management,
+advertising, education, and politics.
+
+Back to the question about Namibia. Here is the answer:
+
+answer
+
+__The population of Namibia population was around 2.5M in 2017. However, many
+people would probably give an estimate that is much higher. In fact, these
+estimates are likely to be of the same order of magnitude as the 100 million
+figure mentioned in the question. But the question of course does not assume
+that the correct answer has to be close to that figure. You can try asking
+your friends the same question, but change the 100 million figure to a smaller
+number, e.g. 5 million. You will probably find that the average estimate will
+become smaller as well. This phenomenon is known as the anchoring effect,
+where a piece of information act as an anchor around which people make
+decisions by making minor adjustments to the anchoring information. The
+anchoring effect can be very important in bargaining or advertising.
+
+Notice that a cognitive bias need not be a fallacy. The anchoring phenomenon
+just discussed does not seem to be a case where we have made an erroneous
+deduction. It is just that somehow our attempt to make a guess has been
+unconsciously influenced.
+
+Cognitive biases are certain pervasive thinking habits which are likely to
+lead to errors in reasoning, but which seem to be a very common part of human
+psychology. The study of cognitive biases is a very important part of
+cognitive science and psychology, and relevant to many other areas, such as
+economics, management and education.
+
+## §1. Some examples of cognitive biases
+
+  * _Confirmation bias_ : The tendency to look for information that confirms our existing preconceptions, making it more likely to ignore or neglect data that disconfirms our beliefs. For example, when we compare ourselves with others we are more likely to remember other people's mistakes and less likely to think of our own.
+  * _Framing bias_ : The tendency to be influenced by the way in which a problem is formulated even though it should not affect the solution. Example: Whether a patient decides to go ahead with a surgery can be affected by whether the surgery is described in terms of success rate or rate of failure, even though both numbers provide the same information.
+  * _Overconfidence effect_ (the above-average effect): Many people tend to over-estimate their abilities. Surveys across most areas of expertise indicate that more than half of the people think that they are better than the other half with respect to that expertise. For example, more than 50% of the population might think that they have above-average intelligence, but they cannot all be right. So many people tend to over-estimate their abilities and lack insight into their real performance.
+
+## §2. Biases relating to probability
+
+Many cognitive biases are related to judgments and reasoning about probability
+and statistics. Here are some examples:
+
+  * _Clustering illusion_ : The tendency to attribute patterns and underlying causes to random events when there are none.
+  * _Gambler's fallacy_ : The error of thinking that a random event can be influenced by past random events. Example: Thinking that because a certain number has just come up in a lottery, it is less likely (or more likely) to come up in the next round.
+
+## §3. Other resourecs
+
+  * Here is a nice poster about some common cognitive biases: http://www.businessinsider.com.au/cognitive-biases-that-affect-decisions-2015-8
+
+Here is a YouTube video about cognitive biases. There are many others in the
+channel:
+
+__previous tutorial
+
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+Definitions are very important in formulating contracts, rules and legal
+documents. Here are some interesting real legal disputes about definitions.
+
+## §1. A definition worth US$3.5 billion
+
+> NEW YORK - An overflow crowd gathered at the normally sleepy Second Circuit
+> Court of Appeals to hear an extended argument on the meaning of the word
+> "occurrence." Interest in the question was intensified by the fact that $3.5
+> billion could be riding on the answer.
+>
+> The three-judge court sitting in Manhattan was hearing arguments in the
+> World Trade Center insurance litigation in which Larry Silverstein, who
+> holds a 99-year lease for the buildings that were destroyed in the Sept. 11,
+> 2001, terror attacks, is claiming that he is entitled to recover $7.1
+> billion from the 22 insurers of the properties, twice the ostensible policy
+> limit, on the ground that the attack of the center was two occurrences, not
+> one. Otherwise, he would be stuck with the $3.55 face value of the policies.
+> - 23 July 2003
+>
+> [From Forbes, 07.23.03]
+>
+> NEW YORK - A federal appeals court in a ruling issued today, substantially
+> affirmed the position taken by the insurance industry that Silverstein
+> Properties, the leaseholder to the devastated World Trade Center, likely can
+> claim no more than the $3.5 billion insurance policy limit.
+>
+> While the appeals court did allow for a jury trial concerning the
+> interpretation of certain terms in the contracts with 22 insurers, the court
+> largely upheld the insurers' claim that Silverstein itself advocated a
+> definition that would preclude its theory that the attack on the buildings
+> should be considered two "occurrences" allowing for two separate insurance
+> claims. The decision leaves in doubt Silverstein's financial ability to
+> rebuild the Ground Zero site. - 26 Sept 2003.
+
+## §2. Judge: Fetuses do not count in carpool lanes
+
+> 11 Jan 2006 PHOENIX (AP) - Fetuses do not count as passengers when it comes
+> to determining who may drive in the carpool lane, a judge ruled. Candace
+> Dickinson was fined $367 for improper use of a carpool lane, but contended
+> the fetus inside her womb allowed her to use the lane. Motorists who use the
+> lanes normally must carry at least one passenger during weekday rush hours.
+> Municipal Judge Dennis Freeman rejected Dickinson's argument Tuesday,
+> applying a "common sense" definition in which an individual is someone who
+> occupies a "separate and distinct" space in a vehicle. "The law is meant to
+> fill empty space in a vehicle," the judge said. Sgt. Dave Norton stopped
+> Dickinson's car Nov. 8. When asked how many people were in the car,
+> Dickinson said two, pointing to "her obvious pregnancy," the officer said. -
+> ©The Associated Press
+
+## §3. Definition: The Clinton Affair [Not for children!]
+
+THIS SECTION IS NOT SUITABLE FOR CHILDREN!
+
+When Bill Clinton was US President, he was accused of lying under oath about
+his affair with Monica Lewinsky. In particular he was accused of lying about
+the fact that he had sexual relations with Monica when he received oral sex in
+the White House office.
+
+According to Clinton, when he denied that he has engaged in sexual relations,
+this is the definition of "sexual relations" that he uses. The definition is
+actually taken from a particular court case :
+
+> A person engages in 'sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages in
+> or causes contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
+> buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire
+> of any person.
+
+Here is Clinton's explanation why he did not engage in sexual relations :
+
+> If the deponent [the person who is testifying] is the person who has oral
+> sex performed on him, then the contact is with -- not with anything on that
+> list, but with the lips of another person. It seems to be self-evident that
+> that's what it is. . . . Let me remind you, sir, I read this carefully. ...
+> any person, reasonable person would recognize that oral sex performed on the
+> deponent falls outside the definition.
+
+Suppose we accept the above definition of sexual relations. Should we then
+accept Clinton's argument that he did not engage in sexual relations when he
+received oral sex? Or should we say that receiving oral sex also counts as
+engaging in sexual relations? If you are a lawyer trying to argue for the
+second position, how would you go about defending your position?
+
+## §4. Is a hot dog a sandwich?
+
+This doesn't actually involve a court case, but the British Sandwich
+Association has said that a hot dog is not a sandwich.
+
+The US Merriam-Webster dictionary says it is: “Given that the definition of
+sandwich is ‘two or more slices of bread or a split roll having a filling in
+between’, there is no sensible way around it,”
+
+So who is right? What is a sandwich? Read more at:
+https://inews.co.uk/distractions/offbeat/hot-dog-not-sandwich-says-british-
+sandwich-body
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+For many people, creativity is something reserved for scientists or artists.
+But this is to ignore the fact that we are faced with countless problems in
+our daily life, and it is precisely creative thinking that helps us come up
+with solutions to these problems. We need to make use of our creativity
+whether we are thinking about how to earn more money or how to make our our
+loved ones happier.
+
+Many people also seem to think that creativity is a matter of waiting for
+inspirations. How inspiring ideas come about is however regarded as a rather
+mysterious process, and it is just a fact that some people are more creative
+than others. But it would be a mistake to think that creativity is a passive
+state of mind. While it is true that there is no special algorithm for
+creativity, there are thinking skills that can be taught and things one can do
+to enhance one's creativity. But to begin with, we need to understand these
+three basic principles that underlie creativity.
+
+## Principle one : New ideas are composed of old elements
+
+Critical thinking is mainly about correct thinking. Creativity is mainly about
+alternative possibilities - how to come up with new and useful ideas. A new
+idea might be a new theory, a new product, a new solution to a problem, or a
+conception for a piece of art.
+
+To come up with something new is to produce something that is distinctive and
+special. The practical implication here is that in order to be creative we
+must be ready to deviate from the ordinary and the traditional. Many people
+have the habit of following instructions and are afraid of challenging the
+status quo or exploring anything new. This implies a certain courageous
+exploratory attitude and curiosity in one's character.
+
+But where do new ideas come from? The simple answer is that new ideas are
+actually old ones rearranged in a new way. So there is a sense in which it is
+true that "there is nothing new under the sun." This applies not just to the
+creation of concepts or theories but also the launching of new fashion or
+cultural trends.
+
+How do we generate new ideas from old ones? Roughly speaking, ideas are
+usually composed of diffrent elements, and we look for new combination of
+ideas by joining different ideas together, deleting some elements, or
+replacing some elements by other ones. Consider the idea of a mobile phone.
+This idea is of course the combination of the idea of wireless information
+transmission and the idea of a telephone.
+
+The first principle also has a practical implication - the ingredients for
+creativity depends on the store of ideas that are available for recombination.
+If you have a limited domain of knowledge, you will have fewer resources to
+draw from in forming new ideas. This is why intellectual curiosity and a wide
+knowledge base can significantly enhance one's creativity - one has in one's
+possession more concepts, theories and experience to choose from. This is also
+why it can be useful to try to solve a problem by consulting other people with
+different expertise.
+
+So creativity does not come from a vacuum or sheer determination. We have to
+start by absorbing lots and lots of ideas before we can come up with one
+ourselves. As the famous comedian John Cleese says:
+
+> You say, "I'm going to write something completely new and original and very
+> funny." You can't do it. It's like trying to fly a plane without having any
+> lessons. You've got to start somewhere and the best way to start is by
+> copying something that is really good.  John Cleese, comedian
+
+## Principle two : Not all new ideas are on a par
+
+Creativity is not simply a matter of coming up with new ideas. The kind of
+creativity that is valued is the ability to come up with new and _useful_
+ideas, ideas that serve an important need or creates a new trend that makes an
+impact.
+
+Creativity might be divided into _cognitive_ and _artistic_ creativity.
+Artistic creativity consists in the creation of artwork and expressing one's
+ideas and emotions through various forms of art. Critical thinking as such is
+not opposed to artistic creativity, but the enhancement of critical thinking
+skills obviously might not improve one's artistic creativity. However,
+critical thinking is a necessary condition for cognitive creativity. Cognitive
+creativity is a matter of coming up with solutions to practical or theoretical
+problems. This includes for example creating a new scientific theory, or
+lauching a new commercial product.
+
+Cognitive creativity has two parts - the generation of new ideas, and the
+evaluation and modification of new ideas. When we need new ideas to solve a
+problem, critical thinking is necessary to help determine the relevance and
+effectiveness of the idea. To build a rocket that flies to the moon, one
+should not violate logic or the laws of physics. The evaluation of any
+proposal to solve a problem must involve good critical thinking.
+
+It is sometimes suggested that creativity often requires going against the
+usual conventions, and that new and important ideas might be lost if one is
+too critical. But good critical thinking does not mean that one must always be
+critical. If experience tells us that it is useful to brainstorm, that
+sometimes it might be productive to suspend one's critical judgment and list
+out new ideas before evaluating them, then it is of course rational to do so.
+This is certainly not inconsistent with the principles of critical thinking.
+It is thus a serious misconception to regard critical thinking and cognitive
+creativity as opposed to each other.
+
+## Principle three : Creativity is enhanced by the ability to detect
+connections between ideas
+
+Our store of ideas provides the ingredients to generate new ones, but it is
+important to remember that useful ideas might come from unexpected sources. A
+successful marketing campaign might appeal to certain psychological studies
+and relate to particular trends in the society. This involves seeing a
+connection between the subject matter one is interested in (the marketing
+exercise) and other subjects (sociology and psychology) which might seem
+somewhat remote.
+
+As a concrete example, consider the so-called "fastskin" swimsuits that was
+introduced by the company Speedo around 1996. One of the key consideration in
+designing a swimsuit for athletes is to reduce the total amount of drag over
+the surface of the swimsuit. The company's researchers noticed that sharks are
+able to move very fast in water in part because of V-shaped ridges.
+Researchers designed swimwear fabric emulating sharkskin that produced less
+drag and turbulence. At the Sydney Olympics in 2000, 28 of 33 Olympic Gold
+Medal winners wore this type of swimsuit, testifying to its success.
+
+So if we want to be creative, we must be ready to explore connections between
+different areas. First, this means we should have a wide knowledge base.
+Creative people are usually people who read widely, who have a great sense of
+curiosity, and are often willing to explore topics which do not bring about
+immediate benefits. Second, we should ensure that our learning processes
+should aim at a deep understanding of the connections between key concepts.
+Studying is not simply remembering bits and pieces of unrelated information.
+We should make sure that we look at the information we have from different
+angles, reformulate them systematically in a way to achieve better
+understanding.
+
+Here is a nice quote from Steve Jobs, co-founder of Apple Computers:
+
+> Creativity is just connecting things. When you ask creative people how they
+> did something, they feel a little guilty because they didn't really do it,
+> they just saw something. It seemed obvious to them after a while. That's
+> because they were able to connect experiences they've had and synthesize new
+> things. And the reason they were able to do that was that they've had more
+> experiences or they have thought more about their experiences than other
+> people. From "Steve Jobs: The Next Insanely Great Thing" WIRED
+> (http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.02/jobs_pr.html)
+
+Famous scientist and author Isaac Asimov also talks about the importance of
+detecting connections between ideas. He wrote a special report about
+creativity where he says:
+
+> The history of human thought would make it seem that there is difficulty in
+> thinking of an idea even when all the facts are on the table. Making the
+> cross-connection requires a certain daring. It must, for any cross-
+> connection that does not require daring is performed at once by many and
+> develops not as a “new idea,” but as a mere “corollary of an old idea.”
+>
+> It is only afterward that a new idea seems reasonable. To begin with, it
+> usually seems unreasonable. It seems the height of unreason to suppose the
+> earth was round instead of flat, or that it moved instead of the sun, or
+> that objects required a force to stop them when in motion, instead of a
+> force to keep them moving, and so on.
+>
+> A person willing to fly in the face of reason, authority, and common sense
+> must be a person of considerable self-assurance. Since he occurs only
+> rarely, he must seem eccentric (in at least that respect) to the rest of us.
+> A person eccentric in one respect is often eccentric in others.
+>
+> Consequently, the person who is most likely to get new ideas is a person of
+> good background in the field of interest and one who is unconventional in
+> his habits. (To be a crackpot is not, however, enough in itself.) From
+> https://www.technologyreview.com/s/531911/isaac-asimov-asks-how-do-people-
+> get-new-ideas/
+
+__next tutorial
+
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+There is of course no precise procedure that would guarantee creativity. But
+the following informal procedure is quite useful, and lots of people have
+working routines which are very similar. It might look very simple, but
+success does not come from one single application but a repetition of the
+procedure again and again over a long period of time.
+
+### Step 1 - Research
+
+A Hong Kong student once asked the Nobel laureate John Nash for advice on
+getting ideas for his thesis, and the reply was, "Have you done your reading?"
+
+When we need to come up with an idea to solve a problem, it would be helpful
+to do some research to see what other people have thought about the topic. If
+there are already good solutions that can be used, then we don't have to waste
+our time to reinvent the wheel. But even if the problem has not been solved,
+we need to find out more about existing approaches and what their limitations
+are. When you are starting your research, collect as much information as you
+can, without worrying too much about their relevance.
+
+Some useful things to do:
+
+  * Obtain relevant information from the scientific literature or experts.
+  * Study the history of the problem.
+  * Do case studies of people who have dealt with similar problems.
+  * Think about analogous situations.
+  * Talk to the people who are involved.
+
+### Step 2 - Explore the connections between ideas
+
+When you are gathering your data you are doing some preliminary study to learn
+more about the problem you have to solve. While you are doing this, or after
+you have collected a lot of material, you need to examine and reflect on what
+you have, in order to rank the importance of the different pieces of
+information that you have, and to investigate whether there are special
+connections between the ideas. Creativity often takes the form of using some
+idea from one field and apply it to another one.
+
+### Step 3 - Relax and wait
+
+Very likely we have had experiences where an idea suddenly pops up while we
+are taking the shower, or after a good night's sleep. When we are sorting out
+the connections between ideas it is important that we are persistent and spend
+an extended period of time in order that we keep lots of different ideas in
+the mind, some of which remain in the background and some of which might enter
+into unconscious thinking processes. After a period of hardwork it is
+sometimes necessary to pull back and relax, to do something relaxing and
+different to stimulate the mind. Or it might perhaps be a case of allowing
+ourselves to forget about the less important ideas so that the more relevant
+ones float to the top. But whatever the mechanisms are, it does seem to be
+important to allow time for ideas to gestate. If we still can't think of
+anything, then we might have to do more research and think about connections
+further.
+
+### Step 4 - Apply, review and followup
+
+Once we have obtained some ideas that seem to work, we need to examine them
+carefully to check that they indeed can help solve our problem. We have to
+think about whether they can be improved further and we need to see how they
+are to be implemented. Even when they have proved to be successful, we should
+review the whole process to see how we can do better next time.
+
+## §1. An example
+
+Andrew Wiles is famous for proving Fermat's Last Theorem. In this TV interview
+he talks about his research routine which echoes what has been said in this
+tutorial:
+
+> NOVA: On a day-to-day basis, how did you go about constructing your proof?
+>
+> Wiles: I used to come up to my study, and start trying to find patterns. I
+> tried doing calculations which explain some little piece of mathematics. I
+> tried to fit it in with some previous broad conceptual understanding of some
+> part of mathematics that would clarify the particular problem I was thinking
+> about. Sometimes that would involve going and looking it up in a book to see
+> how it's done there. Sometimes it was a question of modifying things a bit,
+> doing a little extra calculation. And sometimes I realized that nothing that
+> had ever been done before was any use at all. Then I just had to find
+> something completely new; it's a mystery where that comes from. I carried
+> this problem around in my head basically the whole time. I would wake up
+> with it first thing in the morning, I would be thinking about it all day,
+> and I would be thinking about it when I went to sleep. Without distraction,
+> I would have the same thing going round and round in my mind. The only way I
+> could relax was when I was with my children. Young children simply aren't
+> interested in Fermat. They just want to hear a story and they're not going
+> to let you do anything else.
+>
+> NOVA: Usually people work in groups and use each other for support. What did
+> you do when you hit a brick wall?
+>
+> Wiles: When I got stuck and I didn't know what to do next, I would go out
+> for a walk. I'd often walk down by the lake. Walking has a very good effect
+> in that you're in this state of relaxation, but at the same time you're
+> allowing the sub-conscious to work on you. And often if you have one
+> particular thing buzzing in your mind then you don't need anything to write
+> with or any desk. I'd always have a pencil and paper ready and, if I really
+> had an idea, I'd sit down at a bench and I'd start scribbling away.
+>
+> From  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/proof/wiles.html (Nov 2000)
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+The recipe in the last tutorial is a very general outline of what we can do to
+come up with new ideas. But more specifically, if creativity involves
+manipulating ideas, what are the different methods available which would help
+us come up with ideas to be tested? Here we present some heuristics that might
+be helpful.
+
+## Feature list
+
+A feature list for an object or process is simply a list of its main features.
+Having obtained such a list, one can examine the features one by one and
+consider how it might be changed. For instance, a typical table has a fixed
+round or rectangular flat top that rests on one or more supporting pole. An
+exotic designer table might instead have movable multi-level worktops of
+irregular shapes supported by a wired frame.
+
+## Analogy
+
+The use of analogies might help us imagine new features. By comparing X with Y
+we can consider whether special features of Y might have analogues in X.
+Thinking of an airplane as a bird leads us to see whether the evolutionary
+solutions for aviation in birds might be applied to the building of aircrafts.
+Similarly, a new kind of swiming suit designed to reduce drag for swimming
+competitors was actually inspired by shark skins.
+
+## Search
+
+Sometimes solving a problem is a matter of searching through a long list of
+possible solutions. It then becomes important to find a systematic search
+method. When Edison was designing the electric light bulb, a crucial task was
+the search of a suitable filament which conducts electricity well enough to
+give off light, but which will not burn up or melt as a result. It became very
+important for him to classify the different types of material (e.g. ceramic or
+metallic) that was being tested in order to narrow down the search. When we
+have a large search space we should divide the space into portions to that the
+search can be done systematically, and device tests of represenative samples
+from different regions to eliminate unlikely candidates.
+
+## Perspective shift
+
+When dealing with a problem that involves people, one might consider the
+problem from the different perspectives of the parties involved. Suppose we
+are trying to improve the effiency of a company, we can imagine how we might
+deal with the problem from the CEO's point of view, or from the perspective of
+the sales department. Taking different perspectives in turn might help us
+appreciate difficulties or opportunities which we have not thought of before.
+
+Perspective shift involves also thinking about different ways of formulating a
+problem. Sometimes when we are dealing with a difficulty we might be fixated
+on one particular aspect. Trying to formulate the problem differently can help
+us discover new approaches. For example, a developer working on a site might
+be faced with the difficulty of having to clear and remove a significant
+amount of topsoil from the site. Instead of seeing this as a source of
+expenses, the developer might try to see the problem from a different
+perspective. He might discover for example that the quality of the soil is
+actually quite suitable for farming purposes, and so someone might actually be
+willing to pay some money to purchase the soil. So sometimes we do need to
+leave aside our preconceptions for the time being and explore alternative ways
+of looking at a situation. As Einstein said when he was asked what single
+event was most helpful in developing his theory of relativity, he replied:
+"Figuring out how to think about the problem."
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Many books and courses on creativity are about teaching individuals to become
+more creative. But in modern society, we often do not work alone but have to
+cooperate with other people in solving complex problems. Most big companies
+organise projects around teams of people with special expertise. Research in
+science and technology is increasingly done by teams of people. Science papers
+with multiple authors are cited more often than papers with single authors.
+This is also a growing trend in humanities research as well.
+
+Brainstorming is perhaps the most well-known creative thinking technique for
+groups. The term was made popular by advertising executive Alex Osborn in his
+1953 book _Applied Imagination_. The basic idea is for a group of people to
+meet together and try to come up with as many new ideas as possible. The most
+important requirement is to encourage the production of ideas by withholding
+criticisms or negative feedback.
+
+However, the usefulness of brainstorming is often exaggerated because it does
+not always work:
+
+  * If the objectives of the exercise are unclear, or the discussion is not very structured, the ideas produced might be too diffused and not practically useful. 
+  * Some people might be reluctant to present their ideas because they are worried about how others might judge them, even if they are not criticized. 
+  * A group might fixate on the first perceived solution and spends less effort to explore other alternatives. 
+  * It has been suggested that because it takes time to discuss ideas one by one, sometimes people forget their new ideas or give up talking about them. 
+  * There is the danger that group discussion will be dominated by more vocal individuals. 
+
+Because of the above problems, it is quite possible for a brainstorming group
+to produce fewer ideas than what the individuals would produce on their own.
+The effectiveness of brainstorming depends crucially on how it is implemented.
+A better way would be for give individuals some time to write their ideas down
+first, or to break up a group into smaller sub-groups for a preliminary
+discussion. Ideas can then be collected and discussed openly and perhaps
+anonymously, giving more emphasis on how to make them work rather than why
+they are mistaken.
+
+Another well-known potential pitfall with group creativity is that of
+groupthink. This is the danger that a close-knit group with a uniform culture
+is unlikely to challenge its own ideas and is very set in its ways. Innovative
+breakthroughs become more difficult. A special effort to bring in new people
+or rotate group membership might be necessary. Asking team members to take up
+opposite roles to debate with each other might also help.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Creativity is a high-valued trait. Education is supposed to help students
+become more creative and better at solving problems. Businesses are willing to
+pay a high premium to hire creative individuals. But is there a dark side to
+creativity?
+
+Empirical research indicates that there are statisical links between
+creativity and personality traits such as introversion, emotional sensitivity,
+openness to new experience, and impulsivity. In more extreme cases, creativity
+is often present together with emotional disorders, especially in the area of
+creative arts. (See Akinola and Mendes (2008) "The Dark Side of Creativity:
+Biological Vulnerability and Negative Emotions Lead to Greater Artistic
+Creativity” _Pers Soc Psychol Bull_ 34(12):1677-1686.)
+
+Along a similar theme, in his famous book _Creating Minds_ , Harvard
+psychologist Howard Gardner reviewed the lives of famous creative people such
+as Einstein, Freud, and Picasso. He claimed that a commonality among his
+subjects is that they all seem to be involved in some kind of a Faustian
+bargain, having to make a big sacrifice in some area in order to engage in
+their creative pursuits:
+
+> …the creators became embedded in some kind of a bargain, deal, or Faustian
+> arrangement, executed as a means of ensuring the preservation of his or her
+> unusual gifts. In general, the creators were so caught up in the pursuit of
+> their work mission that they sacrificed all, especially the possibility of a
+> rounded personal existence… unless this bargain has been compulsively
+> adhered to, the talent may be compromised or even irretrievably lost. And,
+> indeed, at times when the bargain is relaxed, there may well be negative
+> consequences for the individual’s creative output.
+
+More recently, Professor of business administration Francesca Gino and
+behavioral economist Dan Ariely have done experiments linking creativity with
+dishonesty. It was found that people with creative personalities tend to be
+more dishonest and more willing to cheat. In fact, in one experiment
+creativity turns out to be a better predictor of unethical behaviour than
+intelligence! (Gino and Ariely (2012) "The dark side of creativity: original
+thinkers can be more dishonest". _J Pers Soc Psychol_ 102(3):445-59.)
+
+Creativity that leads to success is often achieved as a result of very focused
+work over a long period of time. This would usually imply making significant
+sacrifices in other areas. In addition, perhaps it takes a certain kind of
+personality to be able to sustain that level of intense devotion to a project.
+Stubbornness and grit enable us to persist through failures and stick to our
+goals, and a willingness to break existing rules and be different underlies
+the courage to explore new territories. There is a lot more research that can
+be done on the connections between creativity, personality, and other
+psychological factors. But it should be clear that becoming a creative person
+is not just a matter of learning some rules of thinking. There are lots of
+other psychological factors involved.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+If you read more about the stories of people famous for their creativity, you
+will come across some common themes. There is no special shortcut or magic
+formula to follow. It is often a matter of focusing on a task, and having the
+discipline and persistence to become really good at it over a long period of
+time. This is a short and fun 3-minute video about creativity and success:
+
+* * *
+
+* * *
+
+A talk by the famous comedian John Cleese:
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+These are quotes on creativity from famous people which illustrate many of the
+principles discussed in our tutorials. You might be able to find some
+recurrent themes being mentioned. Hope you will find them interesting and
+inspiring.
+
+> People are wrong who think my art comes easily to me. I assure you, nobody
+> has devoted so much time and thought to composition as I. There is not a
+> famous master whose music I have not studied over and over.
+>
+> Mozart
+
+> The best way to have a good idea is to have lots of ideas.
+>
+> Linus Pauling, physicist
+
+> It is worth mentioning, for future reference, that the creative power which
+> bubbles so pleasantly in beginning a new book quiets down after a time, and
+> one goes on more steadily. Doubts creep in. Then one becomes resigned.
+> Determination not to give in, and the sense of an impending shape keep one
+> at it more than anything.
+>
+> Virginia Woolf, writer
+
+> It is better to have enough ideas for some of them to be wrong, than to be
+> always right by having no ideas at all.
+>
+> Edward de Bono, writer
+
+> Genius was 1 percent inspiration and 99 percent perspiration.
+>
+> Thomas Edison, inventor
+
+> The secret to creativity is knowing how to hide your sources.
+>
+> Albert Einstein, physicist
+
+> The first draft of anything is shit.
+>
+> Ernest Hemingway
+
+> Richard Feynman was fond of giving the following advice on how to be a
+> genius. You have to keep a dozen of your favorite problems constantly
+> present in your mind, although by and large they will lay in a dormant
+> state. Every time you hear or read a new trick or a new result, test it
+> against each of your twelve problems to see whether it helps. Every once in
+> a while there will be a hit, and people will say, "How did he do it? He must
+> be a genius!"
+>
+> Gian-Carlo Rota, Indiscrete Thoughts
+
+> After so many years, I've learned that being creative is a full-time job
+> with its own daily patterns. That's why writers, for example, like to
+> establish routines for themselves. The most productive ones get started
+> early in the morning, when the world is quiet, the phones aren't ringing,
+> and their minds are rested, alert, and not yet polluted by other people's
+> words. They might set a goal for themselves -- write fifteen hundred words,
+> or stay at their desk until noon -- but the real secret is that they do this
+> every day. In other words, they are disciplined. Over time, as the daily
+> routines become second nature, discipline morphs into habit.
+>
+> It's the same for any creative individual, whether it's a painter finding
+> his way each morning to the easel, or a medical researcher returning daily
+> to the laboratory. The routine is as much a part of the creative process as
+> the lightning bolt of inspiration, maybe more. And this routine is available
+> to everyone.
+>
+> Creativity is a habit, and the best creativity is a result of good work
+> habits.
+>
+> Twyla Tharp, choreographer and dancer The Creative Habit
+
+> This is the extraordinary thing about creativity: If just you keep your mind
+> resting against the subject in a friendly but persistent way, sooner or
+> later you will get a reward from your unconscious.
+>
+> John Cleese, comedian
+
+__previous tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_14.txt b/data/crtw_14.txt
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+Consider the following dialogue:
+
+Teacher A: Cindy is the best student in class.  
+Teacher B: No, she is not. Betty is better because Betty has more A grades.  
+Teacher A: No. Cindy is the best because her average grade is higher than
+Betty's.  
+Teacher B: You are wrong. Betty is the best!  
+Teacher A: YOU are wrong! Cindy is the best!
+
+So who is right and who is wrong? In a way, both teachers are correct because
+they seem to be operating with two different definitions of 'the best
+students'. For teacher A, the best student is the one with the highest average
+grade. For teacher B, the best student is someone who has the highest number
+of A grades. Obviously, the student who satisfies the first definition need
+not be the same as the student who satisfies the second definition. This is an
+example of what we might call a purely _verbal dispute_ , where the apparent
+disagreement is not due to disagreement with regard to the facts, but it has
+to do with the different understanding of the meaning of a key term or
+concept.
+
+Verbal disputes are often contrasted with _factual disputes_ , where
+disagreements have to do with different opinions about facts and not meaning.
+If someone thinks Sydney is the capital of Australia and others disagree, then
+the disagreement is a factual one.
+
+There are two main ways to resolve a purely verbal dispute once the different
+meanings of a key term is pointed out. First, the different parties might
+agree to disagree with regard to the usage of the term. Thus, teachers A and B
+might agree that they have provided two different precising definitions of
+'the best student', and that both are legitimate, and they can agree that
+Cindy is the best student under one interpretation, and that Betty is the best
+student under a different interpretation.
+
+However, there are situations in which the parties involved have to pick one
+particular interpretation. For example, perhaps there is just one prize to be
+given to the best student, and so there is a need to choose between the two
+definitions in order to decide whether Cindy or Betty should get the prize. So
+this is the second way in which a verbal dispute involving two definitions
+might be resolved - we choose to adopt a particular definition by considering
+very carefully the function that it is supposed to serve. In the example under
+discussion, if you have to choose between the definitions offered by teachers
+A and B, whose definition will you pick and why?
+
+Can you give your own examples of factual and verbal disputes?
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+The concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions help us understand and
+explain the different kinds of connections between concepts, and how different
+states of affairs are related to each other.
+
+## §1. Necessary conditions
+
+To say that X is a _necessary condition_ for Y is to say that **it is
+impossible to have Y without X**. In other words, the absence of X guarantees
+the absence of Y. A necessary condition is sometimes also called "an essential
+condition". Some examples :
+
+  * Having four sides is necessary for being a square.
+  * Being brave is a necessary condition for being a good soldier.
+  * Not being divisible by four is essential for being a prime number.
+
+To show that X is not a necessary condition for Y, we simply find **a
+situation where Y is present but X is not**. Examples :
+
+  * Being rich is not necessary for being happy, since a poor person can be happy too.
+  * Being Chinese is not necessary for being a Hong Kong permanent resident, since a non-Chinese can becoming a permanent resident if he or she has lived in Hong Kong for seven years.
+
+Additional remarks about necessary conditions :
+
+  * We invoke the notion of a necessary condition very often in our daily life, even though we might be using different terms. For example, when we say things like "life requires oxygen", this is equivalent to saying that the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for the existence of life.
+  * A certain state of affairs might have more than one necessary condition. For example, to be a good concert pianist, having good finger techniques is a necessary condition. But this is not enough. Another necessary condition is being good at interpreting piano pieces.
+
+## §2. Sufficient conditions
+
+To say that X is a _sufficient condition_ for Y is to say that **the presence
+of X guarantees the presence of Y**. In other words, it is impossible to have
+X without Y. If X is present, then Y must also be present. Again, some
+examples :
+
+  * Being a square is sufficient for having four sides.
+  * Being divisible by 4 is sufficient for being an even number.
+
+To show that X is not sufficient for Y, we come up with cases where X is
+present but Y is not. Examples :
+
+  * Loving someone is not sufficient for being loved. A person who loves someone might not be loved by anyone perhaps because she is a very nasty person.
+  * Loyalty is not sufficient for honesty because one might have to lie in order to protect the person one is loyal to.
+
+Additional remarks about sufficient conditions :
+
+  * Expressions such as "If X then Y", or "X is enough for Y", can also be understood as saying that X is a sufficient condition for Y.
+  * Some state of affairs can have more than one sufficient condition. Being blue is sufficient for being colored, but of course being green, being red are also sufficient for being coloured.
+
+## §3. Four possibilities
+
+Given two conditions X and Y, there are four ways in which they might be
+related to each other:
+
+  1. X is necessary but not sufficient for Y.
+  2. X is sufficient but not necessary for Y.
+  3. X is both necessary and sufficient for Y. (or "jointly necessary and sufficient")
+  4. X is neither necessary nor sufficient for Y.
+
+This classification is very useful in when we want to clarify how two concepts
+are related to each other. Here are some examples :
+
+  * Having four sides is necessary but not sufficient for being a square (since a rectangle has four sides but it is not a square).
+  * Having a son is sufficient but not necessary for being a parent (a parent can have only one daughter).
+  * Being an unmarried man is both necessary and sufficient for being a bachelor.
+  * Being a tall person is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a successful person.
+
+Rewrite these claims in terms of necessary and / or sufficient conditions :
+
+  1. You must pay if you want to enter. answer
+  2. A cloud chamber is needed to observe subatomic particles. answer
+  3. If something is an electron it is a charged particle. answer
+  4. I will pay for lunch if and only if you pay for dinner. answer
+
+Suppose Tom is a tall but unsuccessful person. Does it show that (a) being
+tall is not sufficient for being successful, or (b) being tall is not
+necessary for being successful? answer
+
+Discuss how these conditions are related to each other and explain your
+answers :
+
+  1. not being poor, being rich answer
+  2. being an even number, being divisible by 2 answer
+  3. being an intelligent student, being the most intelligent student answer
+  4. having ten dollars, having more than five dollars answer
+  5. the presence of the rule of law, being a just society answer
+  6. giving money to another person in exchange for a favour, corruption 
+  7. taking place on a weekday, not being held on Saturday 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_16.txt b/data/crtw_16.txt
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+The concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions relate to the concept of
+possibility. To say that X is necessary for Y is to say that it is not
+possible for Y to occur without X. To say that X is sufficient for Y is to say
+that it is not possible for X to occur without Y. There are, however,
+different senses of "possibility", and corresponding to these different
+meanings there are different kinds of necessary and sufficient conditions.
+
+Consider these statements :
+
+  * It is impossible to be a tall man without being tall.
+  * It is impossible to dissolve gold in pure water.
+  * It is impossible to travel from Hong Kong to New York in less than ten minutes.
+  * It is impossible to visit the army barracks without a permit.
+
+The word "impossible" has different meanings in each of these statements. In
+the first statement, what is being referred to is _logical impossibility_.
+Something is logically impossible if it is contradictory, or against the laws
+of logic. Thus a round square is a logical impossibility, and it is logically
+impossible to be a tall man without being tall.
+
+But it is not logically impossible to dissolve gold in water. The laws of
+logic do not tell us that this cannot happen. Rather, the impossibility is due
+to the laws of physics and chemistry which happen to hold in our universe. If
+our universe had contained different laws, then perhaps it is possible to
+dissolve gold in water. Dissolving gold in water is not logically impossible
+but _empirically impossible_. Sometimes this is also known as _causal_ or
+_nomologically impossibility_.
+
+The sense in which the third statement is true is again different. The laws of
+physics probably do not prohibit us from travelling from Hong Kong to New York
+under ten minutes. What is true is that we have no means to achieve this using
+current technology. Such a trip is therefore _technologically impossible_ ,
+even though it is both logically and empirically possible. Of course, if the
+technological obstacles can be overcome then such a trip will then become
+possible.
+
+Finally, visiting the army barracks without a permit is logically, empirically
+and technologically possible. After all, one might be able to dig a tunnel to
+enter the barracks without permission. The sense in which entering without a
+permit is impossible is in the legal sense. What is meant is that it is
+illegal or against the relevant regulations to enter the barracks without a
+permit. Here we are talking about _legal impossibility_.
+
+## §1. Different types of necessity and sufficiency
+
+Corresponding to these different notions of possiblity we have different
+concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions. For example :
+
+  * Having four sides is logically necessary for being a square.
+  * Being a father is logically sufficient for being a parent.
+  * The presence of oxygen is causally necessary for the proper functioning of the brain.
+  * Passing current through a resistor is causally sufficient for the generation of heat.
+  * Being an adult of over 18 years old is legally sufficient for having the right to vote.
+  * The presence of a witness is legally necessary for a valid marriage.
+
+Note that there might be other types of necessity and possibility as well. For
+example, a father might advise his son that he must treat his sister well. The
+sense of "must" here is not legal necessity, as the law does not require us to
+treat our siblings well. Rather, the sense of necessity might have to do with
+moral conduct. On the other hand, if the son is told that he must treat his
+boss well, what is meant might be that being nice to one's boss is required
+not so much by morality but by rules of prudence.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Language can be used to mislead and confuse, or to make certain ideas seem
+more profound than they really are. One main task of critical thinking is to
+identify these linguistic pitfalls. Let us start with the first major pitfall
+- obscurity.
+
+"Obscurity" here refers to unclear meaning. A concept or a linguistic
+expression can be unclear for various reasons. One reason is that it might be
+_ambiguous_ , i.e. having more than one meaning. The other reason is that it
+might be _vague_. A term is said to be vague if there are borderline cases
+where it is indeterminate as to whether it applies or not. Finally, a term
+might also have an unclear meaning in that its meaning is _incomplete_. Let us
+look at these cases one by one.
+
+## §1. Ambiguity
+
+There are actually different kinds of ambiguity:
+
+### Lexical ambiguity
+
+This is a single word or term having more than one meaning in the language.
+For example, the word "deep" can mean profoundity ("What you have said is very
+deep."), or it can be used to describe physical depth ("This hole is very
+deep"). Similarly for words like "young" (inexperienced or young of age),
+"bank" (river bank or financial institution), etc.
+
+### Referential ambiguity
+
+It is not clear which thing or group is being referred to. This often arises
+when the context does not make it clear what a pronoun or quantifier is
+referring to.
+
+  * "Ally hit Georgia and then she started bleeding." Who is hurt? Ally or Georgia?
+  * "Everybody is coming to the party." Certainly "everybody" does not refer to every human being in the whole world. But then which group of people are we talking about? Of course in normal situations the speaker usually has some specific group of people in mind.
+  * Many people like to make very general statements, such as "All politicians are corrupt". Literally, this statement implies that there is no politician who is not corrupted. But of course we can think of many counterexamples to such a claim. So the person who makes the statement might say "I don't really mean each and every politician." But then who exactly are the people referred to?
+
+### Syntactic ambiguity
+
+This means having more than one meaning because there is more than one way to
+interpret the grammatical structure. This can happen even when it is clear
+what the meanings of the individual words are.
+
+  * "We shall be discussing violence on TV." - It might mean the discussion will be conducted during a television programme, or it might mean _violence on TV_ is the topic to be discussed. 
+
+When dealing with ambiguous language the thing to do is of course to clarify
+the meaning of the expression, for example by listing out all the different
+possible interpretations. This process of removing ambiguity is call
+"disambiguation".
+
+## §2. Vagueness
+
+An term is _vague_ if it has an imprecise boundary. This means that there are
+cases where it is indeterminate whether the term applies or not. For example,
+a small but closed room with no windows or doors and no light inside is
+certainly dark. If we switch on a 100W lightbulb inside it will become bright.
+But we turn on the dimmer for the light and dim the light slowly until it goes
+out, then the room will gradually change from a bright room to a dark one. But
+there is no precise point at which the room suddenly ceases to be bright.
+Similarly, there is no precise point at which the room suddenly becomes dark.
+The terms "dark" and "bright" do not have clear boundaries of applications in
+this situation, and we say that these terms are vague.
+
+The term "a tall person" is also vague in that there are certain cases where
+it is hard to say whether a person is tall or not, but this indecision is not
+due to lack of knowledge about that person's height. You might know exactly
+how tall that person is, but still you don't know whether he is tall or not.
+This is because the meaning of the term is not precise enough. Other examples
+of vague terms : "heavy", "dark", "mountain", "clever", "cheap".
+
+Notice that **we should make a distinction between vagueness and ambiguity**.
+A word can be vague even though it is not ambiguous, and an ambiguous term
+having more than one meaning would not be said to be vague if the different
+meanings it has are very precise.
+
+**Vague terms can be useful in everyday life** because often we do not have to
+be too precise. How precise we should be depends of course on the context.
+
+Here is a form of bad argument about vagueness which we often encounter. The
+argument's conclusion is that there is really no difference between X and Y,
+and the reason is that there is no sharp difference between them.
+
+  * Example : "There is really no such thing as objective truth or falsity. Whether something is true or false is often hard to say."
+
+This is a bad argument because even though a distinction might have borderline
+cases, it does not follow that the distinction is not real. For example, it
+might sometimes be unclear whether a room is dark or bright. But (a) there is
+still a real distinction between dark and bright rooms, and (b) there can be
+clear cases where we have one but not the other.
+
+Vagueness should be avoided when we want to speak precisely, as vagueness
+decreases the informational content of a claim. For example, compare these
+sentences :
+
+  * He is quite old, actually exactly eighty years old. 
+  * He is quite old, actually about eighty years old. 
+  * He is quite old. 
+
+Many students often like to ask questions such as :
+
+  * Is there going to be a lot of homework for this course?"
+"Is the final exam going to be difficult?"
+
+But of course words like "difficult" and "a lot" are vague.
+
+Vague terms can make a claim vague and impossible to confirm or disprove.
+
+  * Horoscope predictions for example : "Be prepared for a change of direction this week as something crops up." - SCMP Sunday Post Magazine.
+  * "This piece of news is going to affect the market somewhat."
+
+But of course one might try to use vagueness to one's advantage in order to be
+non-committal or imprecise.
+
+  * "As a minister I agree that to some extent I am responsible."
+  * "The government will deal with this problem in an appropriate manner when the right time comes."
+
+## §3. Incomplete Meaning
+
+A term has an _incomplete meaning_ if the property or relation it expresses
+depends on some further parameter to be specified by the context, either
+explicitly or implicitly. This includes terms such as "useful", "important",
+"similar" and "better". Practically all objects are useful and important only
+in some respects but not others. For example, is love more important than
+money? Well, it depends. If you are starving to death, then money is more
+important. But if you are trying to determine which of the two contributes
+more to a happy and fulfilling life, then the answer might be different.
+
+So just saying that something is useful or important is empty unless it is
+made clear in what way it is so. This is also necessary if we want to evaluate
+whether what is said is true or not.
+
+  * "The education director shall visit Scotland to study their educational system because it is similar to the one in Hong Kong."
+  * "Will this year's final exam be similar to the one last year?"
+  * "It is better to be beautiful than to be good. But . . . it is better to be good than to be ugly." Oscar Wilde (1854 - 1900)
+  * "Art never improves, but . . . the material of art is never quite the same." T. S. Eliot (1888 - 1965)
+
+See if you can identify the ways in which these examples are ambiguous.
+
+  1. For sale - an antique table suitable for lady with thick legs.
+  2. For sale - ten puppies from an Australian terrier and a Boston terrier.
+  3. He left the bomb fifty yards to the right of the car in front of the house.
+  4. Mary loves Peter and Paul and Susan loves him too.
+  5. It is not advisable to take aspirin and alcohol after a meal.
+  6. I saw her duck.
+  7. The teacher hit the student with a stick.
+  8. Tiffany worries about annoying taxi drivers.
+  9. The old men and women sat at the front of the hall.
+  10. The CEO about his biggest fears, global warming and bitcoins. answer
+
+How would you improve the precision or clarity of these claims?
+
+  1. It's going to take a really long time to complete this project.
+  2. We predict that a lot of people will come to the party.
+
+* * *
+
+## §4. Bullshit
+
+There is a lot of pseudo-aphorisms which seem to be profound, but close to
+being nonsensical. They have little content because of their obscurity, but
+are not quite nonsensical because they are grammatical and contain a lot of
+buzzwords. Here are some examples:
+
+  * Intuition requires exploration. Intuition is the knowledge of life-force, and of us. 
+  * You can go to that ultimate ground of creation and introduce an intention, and just by introducing the intention, you activate the field of infinite correlation. 
+  * Synchronicity requires exploration. 
+  * Truth is the consciousness that wants to know. 
+  * This life is nothing short of a refining rebirth of holistic rejuvenation. 
+  * We are being called to explore the nexus itself as an interface between spacetime and self-actualization. 
+
+Some of these quotes were actually randomly generated by a computer (see
+http://sebpearce.com/bullshit/). Two are actual quotes from a popular new-age
+guru Deepak Chopra. Can you tell them apart?
+
+Some scientists have found that people who are more receptive to this kind of
+statements are less analytical and reflective. See Pennycook et al. (2015) On
+the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit. Judgment and Decision
+Making, Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 549–563.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Generally speaking, _distortion_ is a matter of using words in such a way that
+deviates from its standard meaning in an inappropriate manner.
+
+One example of distortion is the use of inappropriate emotive connotations.
+Many expressions in the language are not purely descriptive but carries
+positive or negative connotations. When using such terms, it is important to
+check whether the connotations are appropriate. Here are some examples :
+
+  * Defining "religion" as a _superstitious_ belief in the existence of God.
+  * Calling abortion "murder" in a debate about the morality of abortion.
+  * Describe something as a "valuable learning opportunity" when in fact "mistake" is more appropriate.
+
+In scientific theorizing, one should of course try to describe and explain
+phenomena using factual language that is value-neutral as far as possible. For
+example, terms such as "blackhole", "ethanol", "DNA" have no positive or
+negative connotation. In other contexts, such as news reporting, it is also
+important to distinguish between a factual description of a state of affairs
+from one's value judgments. It is of course not entirely easy to completely
+avoid using terms that carry connotations of one kind or another. Whether you
+describe a person as "independent" or "uncooperative" reflects your very
+different judgement of the person. But at the very least, we should be alert
+to the connotations of the words that we use.
+
+The use of _weasel words_ is also an example of distortion. These are cases
+where the ordinary meaning of a word is changed inappropriately in the middle
+of a discussion, usually in response to some counterexample or an objection.
+See the following exchange :
+
+Teacher : You did not get an "A" in the course because you were not
+hardworking.  
+Student : But I was studying all the time and slept for only 5 hours a day!  
+Teacher : No. If you were **_really_** hardworking, you would have got an "A".
+
+Here, "hardworking" is the weasel word. The teacher is suggesting that to be
+hardworking one must be able to get an "A". But this not only distorts the
+ordinary meaning of the term. It also makes his first statement empty. This is
+because what the teacher means by "hardworking" is "a person who could get an
+A." So in effect, his first statement is equivalent to: "You did not get an
+"A" in the course because you were not a person who could get an A."
+
+## §1. Reification
+
+The word "reify" came from the Latin word "res", which means thing.
+_Reification_ is treating an abstract idea or property as if it were a
+concrete physical object.
+
+For example, one slogan on a popular TV programme says "The truth is out
+there." This treats truth as if it were a physical object that can either be
+in here or out there somewhere. But truth is an abstract property of claims
+and theories and is not located anywhere. So this is an example of
+reification. Of course, we know roughly what the intended meaning is. What is
+meant is probably something like "the truth about a certain issue is something
+that we can discover if we try hard enough." For a different example, consider
+the popular claim that "History is just." A person or a system of rules or
+laws can be just or unjust, but justice is not really a property of history,
+taken as a body of facts about what has happened in the past. But again we can
+guess what the speaker might have in mind when the statement is made. Perhaps
+the intended meaning is something like "in time people will make the correct
+and fair opinion on the matter under discussion."
+
+The two examples here show that reification in itself need not be
+objectionable. It increases dramatic impact and is often used in poetry and
+metaphors. However, if our purpose is to convey information clearly and
+simply, then reification should perhaps be avoided. If a claim that involves
+reification constitutes a meaningful and informative claim, then it can be
+expressed more clearly in simpler language without using reification. When it
+is difficult if not impossible to carry out this translation, this is a good
+sign that the original statement does not actually have a clear meaning. So,
+in general, unless you want dramatic impact, avoid using reification. But if
+you have to, make sure you know what you really intend to say.
+
+## §2. Category mistakes
+
+Inappropriate uses of reification is an example of _category mistakes_. This
+is the mistake of ascribing to something of one category a feature that only
+applies to another, or more generally, misrepresenting the category to which
+something belongs. Consider the famous sentence "colourless green ideas sleep
+furiously". Although grammatical, this sentence contains a number of category
+mistakes, since green ideas cannot be said to be colorless, and ideas are not
+the kind of things that can sleep.
+
+Here is perhaps a less obvious example that has found its way into a journal
+article:
+
+> What we see at any given moment is in general a fully elaborated
+> representation of a visual scene.
+>
+> Churchland, Ramachandran, and Sejnowski (1994) "A critique of pure vision"
+> in _Large-Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain_ , edited by Christof Koch
+> and Joel Davis, MIT Press.
+
+Think for a moment and see if you can identify the category mistake in this
+sentence. answer
+
+__What we actually see are objects in the external world and not their
+representations. It might be true that the brain constructs representations
+when we see a tree, but it is the tree we see and not the representations in
+our head!
+
+## §3. Philosophical arguments and distortion of meaning
+
+Many bad philosophical arguments gain their plausibility through distortion.
+For example, the following argument is not uncommon : "Everyone is selfish,
+including people who help others. This is because everyone does what he or she
+wants to do.." In this argument it is implicitly assumed that a selfish person
+is to be defined as someone who does what he or she wants. But this is a
+distortion of the ordinary meaning of "a selfish person", which is more like
+"someone who wants to do only those things that are to his or her advantage."
+A person might want to do something in order to help other people, not because
+it is to his or her advantage.
+
+Here is a real example of bad philosophy that relies on distorting meaning:
+
+> Language is legislation, speech is its code. We do not see the power which
+> is in speech because we forget that all speech is a classification, and that
+> all classifications are oppressive.
+>
+> Roland Barthes (1915-80), famous French social and literary critic. Quote
+> take from his inauguration lecture of the Chair of Literary Semiology,
+> College de France.
+
+Here "legislation" is presumably used to describe language because language is
+governed by rules. But this is not what is ordinarily meant by "legislation".
+Furthermore, the fact that an activity is governed by rules does not make it
+oppressive. For example, it would be silly to say that football is an
+oppressive activity because there are rules in the game. Without rules there
+cannot be games! Incidentally, we might observe that to label language as
+legislation is presumably an act of classification, since he is saying that
+language belongs to the class of legislations rather than the class of things
+that are not legislations. Likewise, to say that classifications are
+oppressive is also an act of classification. To be consistent then, Barthes
+should conclude that his very assertion is also an oppressive act! If this is
+supposed to be true one can only conclude that Barthes is simply distorting
+the meaning of "oppression".
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+An _empty_ statement is any statement that is purported to provide
+information, but in reality it provides no information at all in the relevant
+conversational context.
+
+In ordinary situations, _tautologies_ or tautological statements are all
+empty. A tautology is a statement that is true in virtue of the meaning of the
+logical connectives present in the statement. These connectives are
+connectives like "not", "and", "or", "if ... then ...", "there is", "every",
+"none" and the like.
+
+For example, suppose Helen asks whether Francine will come to the party, and
+Francine replies, "If I come, I will come." This is a tautology as it is
+necessarily true given the meaning of "if then". But the statement provides no
+information as to whether Francine will attend the party. So it is indeed an
+empty statement.
+
+Similarly, the statement that "either it will rain tomorrow, or it will not"
+is also a tautology. Obviously, if we want to communicate information, we
+should avoid using tautologies as they provide no useful information about the
+world. This is not to say that they are completely useless. Tautologies can be
+useful in logic, and sometimes they serve as reminders about available courses
+of actions (e.g. "Either we get married, or we don't").
+
+A tautology is a special case of what we might call _analytic_ statements.
+These are statements that are true solely in virtue of their meaning. Here are
+some examples:
+
+  * A bachelor is an unmarried man.
+  * Anything that is large is not small.
+  * Nothing that is running is still.
+
+If a statement is analytic, then its truth depends solely on its meaning and
+not on any other empirical fact. Note that all tautologies are analytic
+truths, but not vice versa. A tautolgical sentence is a sentence that is true
+in virtue of the meaning of the _logical words_ in the sentence. An analytic
+sentence is a sentence that is true in virtue of the meaning of the words in
+the sentence. The three examples above are analytic truths but not
+tautologies. Why? Take the first example, it is true because "bachelor" has
+the same meaning as "unmarried man", but the word "bachelor" is not a logical
+word. Unlike words like "and", "or", "if then", "not", it does not describe
+any logical connections.
+
+If a competent English speaker asks whether Tom is a bachelor, and you answer,
+"a bachelor is an unmarried man", then your statement can be regarded as an
+empty statement. Although your statement is necessarily true, it offers no
+information relevant to the enquiry. On the other hand, if a student is
+learning English and is wondering what a bachelor is, then your answer does
+provide some useful information, so in such a case we should not say that the
+answer is empty.
+
+If we want to communicate information clearly and precisely, then of course we
+should avoid empty statements. On the other hand, there might be occasions
+where we want to be evasive and non-commital. In such situations, empty
+statements might be very useful indeed.
+
+__previous tutorial
+
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+Critical thinking is a **metacognitive skill**. What this means is that it is
+a higher-level cognitive skill that involves thinking about thinking. We have
+to be aware of the good principles of reasoning, and be reflective about our
+own reasoning. In addition, we often need to make a conscious effort to
+improve ourselves, avoid biases, and maintain objectivity. This is notoriously
+hard to do. We are all able to think but to think well often requires a long
+period of training. The mastery of critical thinking is similar to the mastery
+of many other skills. There are three important components: theory, practice,
+and attitude.
+
+### Theory
+
+If we want to think correctly, we need to follow the correct rules of
+reasoning. Knowledge of theory includes knowledge of these rules. These are
+the basic principles of critical thinking, such as the laws of logic, and the
+methods of scientific reasoning, etc.
+
+Also, it would be useful to know something about _what not to do_ if we want
+to reason correctly. This means we should have some basic knowledge of the
+mistakes that people make. First, this requires some knowledge of typical
+fallacies. Second, psychologists have discovered persistent biases and
+limitations in human reasoning. An awareness of these empirical findings will
+alert us to potential problems.
+
+### Practice
+
+However, merely knowing the principles that distinguish good and bad reasoning
+is not enough. We might study in the classroom about how to swim, and learn
+about the basic theory, such as the fact that one should not breathe under
+water. But unless we can apply such theoretical knowledge through constant
+practice, we might not actually be able to swim.
+
+Similarly, to be good at critical thinking skills it is necessary to
+internalize the theoretical principles so that we can actually apply them in
+daily life. There are at least two ways. One is to do lots of good-quality
+exercises. Exercises include not just exercises in classrooms and tutorials.
+They also include exercises in the form of discussion and debates with other
+people in our daily life. The other method is to think more deeply about the
+principles that we have acquired. In the human mind, memory and understanding
+are acquired through making connections between ideas.
+
+### Attitudes
+
+Good critical thinking skills require not just knowledge and practice.
+Persistent practice can bring about improvements only if one has the right
+kind of motivation and attitude. The following attitudes are not uncommon, but
+they are obstacles to critical thinking:
+
+  * I prefer being given the correct answers rather than figuring them out myself.
+  * I don't like to think a lot about my decisions as I rely only on gut feelings.
+  * I don't usually review the mistakes I have made.
+  * I don't like to be criticized.
+
+To improve our thinking we have to recognize that the importance of reflecting
+on the reasons for belief and action. We should also be willing to engage in
+debate, break old habits, and deal with linguistic complexities and abstract
+concepts.
+
+The _California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory_ is a psychological
+test that is used to measure whether people are disposed to think critically.
+It measures seven different thinking habits listed below, and it is useful to
+ask ourselves to what extent they describe the way we think:
+
+  1. Truth-seeking - Do you try to understand how things really are? Are you interested in finding out the truth?
+  2. Open-mindedness - How receptive are you to new ideas, even though intuitively they do not agree with you? Do you give them a fair hearing?
+  3. Analyticity - Do you try to understand the reasons behind things? Do you act impulsively or do you evaluate the pros and cons of your decisions?
+  4. Systematicity - Are you systematic in your thinking? Do you break down a complex problem into parts?
+  5. Confidence in Reasoning - Do you always defer to other people? How confident are you in your own judgment? Do you have reasons for your confidence? Do you have a way to evaluate your own thinking?
+  6. Inquisitiveness
+  7. Maturity of Judgment - Do you jump to conclusions? Do you try to see things from different perspectives? Do you take other people's experiences into account?
+
+Finally, as mentioned earlier, psychologists have discovered over the years
+that human reasoning can be easily affected by all kinds of cognitive biases.
+For example, people tend to be over-confident of their abilities, and focus
+too much on evidence that supports their pre-existing opinions. We should be
+alert to these biases in our attitudes towards our own thinking.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+A crucial part of critical thinking is to identify, construct, and evaluate
+_arguments_.
+
+In everyday life, people often use "argument" to mean a quarrel between
+people. But in logic and critical thinking, an argument is a list of
+statements, one of which is the _conclusion_ and the others are the _premises_
+or _assumptions_ of the argument.
+
+Before proceeding, read this page about statements.
+
+To give an argument is to provide a set of premises as reasons for accepting
+the conclusion. To give an argument is not necessarily to attack or criticize
+someone. Arguments can also be used to support other people's viewpoints.
+
+Here is an example of an argument:
+
+If you want to find a good job, you should work hard. You do want to find a
+good job. So you should work hard.
+
+The first two sentences here are the premises of the argument, and the last
+sentence is the conclusion. To give this argument is to offer the premises as
+reasons for accepting the conclusion.
+
+A few points to note:
+
+  * Dogmatic people tend to make assertions without giving reasons. When they are criticized they often fail to give arguments to defend their own opinions.
+  * To improve our critical thinking skills, we should develop the habit of giving good arguments to support our opinions.
+  * To defend an opinion, think about whether you can give more than one argument to support it. Also, think about potential objections to your opinion, e.g. arguments against your opinion. A good thinker will consider the arguments on both sides of an issue.
+
+See if you can give arguments to support some of your beliefs.
+
+  1. For example, do you think the economy is going to improve or worsen in the next six months? Why or why not? What arguments can you give to support your position? 
+  2. Or think about something different, do you think computers can have emotions? Again, what arguments can you give to support your viewpoint? Make sure that your arguments are composed of statements.
+
+## §1. How to look for arguments
+
+How do we identify arguments in real life? There are no easy mechanical rules,
+and we usually have to rely on the context in order to determine which are the
+premises and the conclusions. But sometimes the job can be made easier by the
+presence of certain premise or conclusion indicators. For example, if a person
+makes a statement, and then adds "this is because ...", then it is quite
+likely that the first statement is presented as a conclusion, supported by the
+statements that come afterwards. Other words in English that might be used to
+indicate the premises to follow include :
+
+  * since
+  * firstly, secondly, ...
+  * for, as, after all,
+  * assuming that, in view of the fact that
+  * follows from, as shown / indicated by
+  * may be inferred / deduced / derived from
+
+Of course whether such words are used to indicate premises or not depends on
+the context. For example, "since" has a very different function in a statement
+like "I have been here since noon", unlike "X is an even number since X is
+divisible by 4".
+
+Conclusions, on the other hand, are often preceded by words like:
+
+  * therefore, so, it follows that
+  * hence, consequently
+  * suggests / proves / demonstrates that
+  * entails, implies
+
+Here are some examples of passages that do not contain arguments.
+
+When people sweat a lot they tend to drink more water. [Just a single
+statement, not enough to make an argument.]
+
+Once upon a time there was a prince and a princess. They lived happily
+together and one day they decided to have a baby. But the baby grew up to be a
+nasty and cruel person and they regret it very much. [A chronological
+description of facts composed of statements but no premise or conclusion.]
+
+Can you come to the meeting tomorrow? [A question that does not contain an
+argument.]
+
+Do these passages contain arguments? If so, what are their conclusions?
+
+  1. Cutting the interest rate will have no effect on the stock market this time round as people have been expecting a rate cut all along. This factor has already been reflected in the market. answer
+  2. So it is raining heavily and this building might collapse. But I don't really care. answer
+  3. Virgin would then dominate the rail system. Is that something the government should worry about? Not necessarily. The industry is regulated, and one powerful company might at least offer a more coherent schedule of services than the present arrangement has produced. The reason the industry was broken up into more than 100 companies at privatisation was not operational, but political: the Conservative government thought it would thus be harder to renationalise. _The Economist_ 16.12.2000 answer
+  4. Bill will pay the ransom. After all, he loves his wife and children and would do everything to save them. answer
+  5. All of Russia's problems of human rights and democracy come back to three things: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. None works as well as it should. Parliament passes laws in a hurry, and has neither the ability nor the will to call high officials to account. State officials abuse human rights (either on their own, or on orders from on high) and work with remarkable slowness and disorganisation. The courts almost completely fail in their role as the ultimate safeguard of freedom and order. _The Economist_ 25.11.2000 answer
+  6. Most mornings, Park Chang Woo arrives at a train station in central Seoul, South Korea's capital. But he is not commuter. He is unemployed and goes there to kill time. Around him, dozens of jobless people pass their days drinking soju, a local version of vodka. For the moment, middle-aged Mr Park would rather read a newspaper. He used to be a brick layer for a small construction company in Pusan, a southern port city. But three years ago the country's financial crisis cost him that job, so he came to Seoul, leaving his wife and two children behind. Still looking for work, he has little hope of going home any time soon. _The Economist_ 25 .11.2000 answer
+  7. For a long time, astronomers suspected that Europa, one of Jupiter's many moons, might harbour a watery ocean beneath its ice-covered surface. They were right. Now the technique used earlier this year to demonstrate the existence of the Europan ocean has been employed to detect an ocean on another Jovian satellite, Ganymede, according to work announced at the recent American Geo-physical Union meeting in San Francisco. _The Economist_ 16.12.2000 answer
+  8. There are no hard numbers, but the evidence from Asia's expatriate community is unequivocal. Three years after its handover from Britain to China, Hong Kong is unlearning English. The city's gweilos (Cantonese for "ghost men") must go to ever greater lengths to catch the oldest taxi driver available to maximize their chances of comprehension. Hotel managers are complaining that they can no longer find enough English- speakers to act as receptionists. Departing tourists, polled at the airport, voice growing frustration at not being understood. _The Economist_ 20.1.2001 answer
+
+__next tutorial
+
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+## §1. Presenting arguments in the standard format
+
+When it comes to the analysis and evaluation of an argument, it is often
+useful to label the premises and the conclusion, and display them on separate
+lines with the conclusion at the bottom :
+
+(Premise 1) If you want to find a good job, you should work hard.  
+(Premise 2) You do want to find a good job.  
+(Conclusion) So you should work hard.
+
+Let us call this style of presenting an argument a presentation in _the
+standard format_. Here we rewrite two more arguments using the standard
+format:
+
+We should not inflict unnecessary pain on cows and pigs. After all, we should
+not inflict unnecessary pain on any animal with consciousness, and cows and
+pigs are animals with consciousness.
+
+(Premise 1) We should not inflict unnecessary pain on any animal with
+consciousness.  
+(Premise 2) Cows and pigs are animals with consciousness.  
+(Conclusion) We should not inflict unnecessary pain on cows and pigs.
+
+If this liquid is acidic, the litmus paper would have turned red. But it
+hasn't, so the liquid is not acidic.
+
+(Premise 1) If the liquid is acidic, the litmus paper would have turned red.  
+(Premise 2) The litmus paper has not turned red.  
+(Conclusion) The liquid is not acidic.
+
+In presenting an argument in the standard format the premises and the
+conclusion are clearly identified. Sometimes we also rewrite some of the
+sentences to make their meaning clearer, as in the second premise of the
+second example. Notice also that a conclusion need not always come at the end
+of a passage containing an argument, as in the first example. In fact,
+sometimes the conclusion of an argument might not be explicitly written out.
+For example it might be expressed by a rhetorical question:
+
+How can you believe that corruption is acceptable? It is neither fair nor
+legal!
+
+In presenting an argument in the standard format, we have to rewrite the
+argument more explicitly as follows:
+
+(Premise) Corruption is not fair and it is not legal.  
+(Conclusion) Corruption is not acceptable.
+
+  * If you want to improve your reading and comprehension skills, you should practise reconstructing the arguments that you come across by rewriting them carefully in the standard format. 
+  * Presenting arguments is not just a way to defend your own opinion. It helps us understand other people as well.
+
+Rewrite these arguments in the standard format.
+
+  1. He is either in Hong Kong or Macau. John says that he is not in Hong Kong. So he must be in Macau. 
+  2. If the Government wants to build an incinerator here they should compensate those who live in the area. Incinerators are known to cause health problems to people living nearby. These people did not choose to live there in the first place. 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. Definition of validity
+
+One desirable feature of arguments is that the conclusion should follow from
+the premises. But what does it mean? Consider these two arguments :
+
+  * Argument #1 : Barbie is over 90 years old. So Barbie is over 20 years old.
+
+  * Argument #2 :Barbie is over 20 years old. So Barbie is over 90 years old.
+
+Intuitively, the conclusion of the first argument follows from the premise,
+whereas the conclusion of the second argument does not follow from its
+premise. But how should we explain the difference between the two arguments
+more precisely? Here is a thought : In the first argument, if the premise is
+indeed true, then the conclusion cannot be false. On the other hand, even if
+the premise in the second argument is true, there is no guarantee that the
+conclusion must also be true. For example, Barbie could be 30 years old.
+
+So we shall make use of this idea to define the notion of a _deductively valid
+argument_ , or _valid argument_ , as follows:
+
+An argument is valid if and only if there is no logically possible situation
+where all the premises are true and the conclusion is false at the same time.
+
+The idea of validity provides a more precise explication of what it is for a
+conclusion to follow from the premises. Applying this definition, we can see
+that the first argument above is valid, since there is no possible situation
+where Barbie can be over 90 but not over 20. The second argument is not valid
+because there are plenty of possible situations where the premise is true but
+the conclusion is false. Consider a situation where Barbie is 25, or one where
+she is 85. The fact that these situations are possible is enough to show that
+the argument is not valid, or _invalid_.
+
+## §2. Validity and truth
+
+What if we have an argument with more than one premise? Here is an example :
+
+All pigs can fly. Anything that can fly can swim. So all pigs can swim.
+
+Although the two premises of this argument are false, this is actually a valid
+argument. To evaluate its validity, ask yourself whether it is possible to
+come up with a situation where all the premises are true and the conclusion is
+false. (We are not asking whether there is a situation where the premises and
+the conclusion are all true.) Of course, the answer is 'no'. If pigs can
+indeed fly, and if anything that can fly can also swim, then it must be the
+case that all pigs can swim.
+
+So this example tells us something :
+
+The premises and the conclusion of a valid argument can all be false.
+
+Hopefully you will now realize that validity is not about the actual truth or
+falsity of the premises or the conclusion. Validity is about the **logical
+connection** between the premises and the conclusion. A valid argument is one
+where the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion, but
+validity does not guarantee that the premises are in fact true. All that
+validity tells us is that **if the premises are true, the conclusion must also
+be true**.
+
+## §3. Showing that an argument is invalid
+
+Now consider this argument :
+
+Adam loves Beth. Beth loves Cathy. So Adam loves Cathy.
+
+This argument is not valid, for it is possible that the premises are true and
+yet the conclusion is false. Perhaps Adam loves Beth but does not want Beth to
+love anyone else. So Adam actually hates Cathy. The mere possibility of such a
+situation is enough to show that the argument is not valid. Let us call these
+situations _invalidating counterexamples_ to the argument. Basically, we are
+defining a valid argument as an argument with no possible invalidating
+counterexamples. To sharpen your skills in evaluating arguments, it is
+therefore important that you are able to discover and construct such examples.
+
+Notice that a counterexample need not be real in the sense of being an actual
+situation. It might turn out that in fact that Adam, Beth and Cathy are
+members of the same family and they love each other. But the above argument is
+still invalid since the counterexample constructed is a possible situation,
+even if it is not actually real. All that is required of a counterexample is
+that the situation is a coherent one in which all the premises of the argument
+are true and the conclusion is false. So we should remember this :
+
+An argument can be invalid even if the conclusion and the premises are all
+actually true.
+
+To give you another example, here is another invalid argument with a true
+premise and a true conclusion : "Paris is the capital of France. So Rome is
+the capital of Italy." . It is not valid because it is possible for Italy to
+change its capital (say to Milan), while Paris remains the capital of France.
+
+Another point to remember is that **it is possible for a valid argument to
+have a true conclusion even when all its premises are false**. Here is an
+example :
+
+All pigs are purple in colour. Anything that is purple is an animal. So all
+pigs are animals.
+
+Before proceeding any further, please make sure you understand why these
+claims are true and can give examples of such cases.
+
+  1. The premises and the conclusion of an invalid argument can all be true.
+  2. A valid argument should not be defined as an argument with true premises and a true conclusion.
+  3. The premises and the conclusion of a valid argument can all be false.
+  4. A valid argument with false premises can still have a true conclusion.
+
+## §4. A reminder
+
+The concept of validity provides a more precise explication of what it is for
+a conclusion to follow from the premises. Since this is one of the most
+important concepts in this course, you should make sure you fully understand
+the definition. In giving our definition we are making a distinction between
+truth and validity. In ordinary usage "valid" is often used interchangeably
+with "true" (similarly with "false" and "not valid"). But here validity is
+restricted to only arguments and not statements, and truth is a property of
+statements but not arguments. So never say things like "this statement is
+valid" or "that argument is true"!
+
+Are these arguments valid?
+
+  1. Someone is sick.  
+Someone is unhappy.  
+So someone is unhappy and sick. answer
+
+  2. If he loves me then he gives me flowers.  
+He gives me flowers.  
+So he loves me. answer
+
+  3. Beckham is famous.   
+Beckham is a football player.  
+Therefore, Beckham is a famous football player. answer
+
+  4. If it rains, the streets will be wet.  
+If the streets are wet, accidents will happen.  
+Therefore, accidents will happen if it rains. answer
+
+  5. John was in Britain when Mary died in Hong Kong.   
+So Mary could not have been killed by John. answer
+
+  6. If there is life on Pluto then Pluto contains water.  
+But there is no life on Pluto.  
+Therefore Pluto does not contain water. answer
+
+  7. There were only two rabbits in the room last week.  
+No rabbit has left the room since then.  
+Therefore there are only two rabbits in the room now. answer
+
+  8. All whales have wings.   
+Moby does not have wings.  
+So Moby is not a whale. answer
+
+Are these arguments valid?
+
+  1. John shot himself in the head. So John is dead. answer
+  2. John shot himself in the head. So John shot himself in the head. answer
+
+__Valid. This is a circular argument since the conclusion is also a premise.
+But it is nonetheless valid since it is impossible for the premises to be true
+while the conclusion is false.
+
+  3. All management consultants are bald. Peter is bald. So Peter is a management consultant. answer
+  4. If time travel is possible, we would now have lots of time-travel visitors from the future. But we have no such visitors. So time travel is not possible. answer
+  5. Jen is either in San Diego or in Tokyo. Since she is not in Tokyo, she is in San Diego. answer
+  6. Some people are nice. Some people are rich. So some people are rich and nice. answer
+  7. If I drink then I will be happy. If I am happy then I will dance. So if I drink then I will dance. answer
+  8. Every red fish is a fish. answer
+  9. The services of mobile phone companies are getting worse as there has been an increasing number of complaints against mobile phone companies by consumers. answer
+  10. All capitalists exploit the weak and the poor. Property developers exploit the weak and the poor. So property developers are capitalists. answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_23.txt b/data/crtw_23.txt
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+It should be obvious by now that validity is about the logical connection
+between the premises and the conclusion. When we are told that an argument is
+valid, this is not enough to tell us anything about the actual truth or
+falsity of the premises or the conclusion. All we know is that there is a
+logical connection between them, that the premises entail the conclusion.
+
+So even if we are given a valid argument, we still need to be careful before
+accepting the conclusion, since a valid argument might contain a false
+conclusion. What we need to check further is of course whether the premises
+are true. If an argument is valid, and all the premises are true, then it is
+called a _sound_ argument. Of course, it follows from such a definition that a
+sound argument must also have a true conclusion. In a valid argument, if the
+premises are true, then the conclusion cannot be false, since by definition it
+is impossible for a valid argument to have true premises and a false
+conclusion in the same situation. So given that a sound argument is valid and
+has true premises, its conclusion must also be true. So if you have determined
+that an argument is indeed sound, you can certainly accept the conclusion.
+
+An argument that is not sound is an _unsound_ argument. If an argument is
+unsound, it might be that it is invalid, or maybe it has at least one false
+premise, or both.
+
+Is it possible to have arguments of the following kinds? If so, provide an
+example. If not, explain why. It is particularly important to note the
+highlighted cases.
+
+| True conclusion  
+true premises | True conclusion  
+false premises | False conclusion  
+true premises | False conclusion  
+false premises  
+---|---|---|---|---  
+Valid & sound | answer| answer| answer| answer  
+Valid & unsound | answer| answer| answer | answer  
+Invalid & sound | answer| answer| answer| answer  
+Invalid & unsound | answer|  answer |  answer |  answer  
+  
+Are the following statements true or false? Why?
+
+  1. All invalid arguments are unsound. answer
+  2. All true statements are valid. answer
+  3. To show that an argument is unsound, we must at least show that some of its premises are actually false. answer
+  4. An invalid argument must have a false conclusion. answer
+  5. If all the premises of a valid argument are false, then the conclusion must also be false. answer
+  6. If all the premises and the conclusion of an argument are true, then the argument is valid. answer
+  7. All sound arguments are true. answer
+  8. Any valid argument with a true conclusion is sound. answer
+
+Here are some common questions from students about validity and soundness and
+their answers. See if you know how to answer them yourself.
+
+  1. An argument is valid, if when all the premises are true the conclusion is true. What if the premises are inconsistent? What if it is impossible for all the premises to be true at the same time? Is the argument still valid? answer
+
+__Yes. An argument with inconsistent premises is valid, regardless of what the
+conclusion is. If an argument has inconsistent premises, then it is impossible
+for all the premises to be true at the same time; hence it is impossible for
+all the premises to be true while the conclusion is false.
+
+  2. If the conclusion of an argument is tautological, does that means that the argument is valid? answer
+
+__Yes. An argument with a tautological conclusion is valid, regardless of what
+the premises are. If the conclusion is a tautology, then there is no possible
+situation where the conclusion is false. Hence there is no possible situation
+where the premises are true while the conclusion is false.
+
+  3. If every argument with a tautological conclusion is valid, then shouldn't this argument be valid rather than invalid?
+
+(Premise) All cows are mammals.  
+(Conclusion) Therefore, the sun is larger than the moon.
+
+Isn’t the conclusion a tautology?
+
+answer
+
+__This argument is invalid since there is a possible situation where all cows
+are mammals, but the sun not to be larger than the moon. The conclusion is
+true, but the conclusion is not a tautology; it is logically possible for the
+sun to be smaller than the moon.
+
+  4. "It is raining. Therefore 1+1=2." Why is this a valid argument as the premise and the conclusion are talking about completely different things? answer
+
+__
+
+An argument is valid if there is no possible situation where the premises are
+true and the conclusion is false. Since it is necessarily true that 1+1=2,
+there is no possible situation where the conclusion is false. So there is not
+possible situation where the premises are true and the conclusion is false.
+Thus, the argument is valid.
+
+You might think that this is strange, and indeed it is. Some philosophers and
+logicians have argued that we need a better definition of validity. But it
+turns out that this is not an easy task, and other definitions have their
+problems too. Here we will stick to the simpler definition.
+
+  5. I know that all sound arguments must have true conclusions because such arguments are by definition valid with all true premises. On the other hand, if an argument is valid and has a true conclusion, does it follow that it is sound? answer
+
+__No. A valid argument may have a true conclusion even if not all its premises
+are true. For instance:
+
+(Premise) All cats are flying creatures.  
+(Premise) All flying creatures are mammals.  
+(Conclusion) Therefore, all cats are mammals.
+
+  6. "All arguments are either valid or unsound." Is this statement true? answer
+
+__Yes. All arguments are either valid or invalid. All invalid arguments are
+unsound. So all arguments are either valid or unsound.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_24.txt b/data/crtw_24.txt
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+With valid arguments, it is impossible to have a false conclusion if the
+premises are all true. Obviously valid arguments play a very important role in
+reasoning, because if we start with true assumptions, and use only valid
+arguments to establish new conclusions, then our conclusions must also be
+true. But which are the rules we should use to decide whether an argument is
+valid or not? This is where formal logic comes in. By using special symbols we
+can describe patterns of valid argument, and formulate rules for evaluating
+the validity of an argument.
+
+## §1. Modus ponens
+
+Consider the following arguments :
+
+  * If this object is made of copper, it will conduct electricity. This object is made of copper, so it will conduct electricity. 
+  * If there is no largest prime number, then 510511 is not the largest prime number. There is no largest prime number. Therefore 510511 is not the largest prime number. 
+  * If Lam is a Buddhist then he should not eat pork. Lam is a Buddhist. Therefore Lam should not eat pork.
+
+These three arguments are of course valid. Furthermore you probably notice
+that they are very similar to each other. What is common between them is that
+they have the same _structure_ or _form_ :
+
+**Modus ponens** \- **If _P_ then _Q_. _P_. Therefore, _Q_.**
+
+Here, the letters _P_ and _Q_ are called _sentence letters_. They are used to
+translate or represent statements. By replacing _P_ and _Q_ with appropriate
+sentences, we can generate the original three valid arguments. This shows that
+the three arguments have a common form. It is also in virtue of this form that
+the arguments are valid, for we can see that any argument of the same form is
+a valid argument. Because this particular pattern of argument is quite common,
+it has been given a name. It is known as _modus ponens_.
+
+However, don't confuse modus ponens with the following form of argument, which
+is not valid!
+
+**Affirming the consequent** \- **If _P_ then _Q_. _Q_. Therefore, _P_.**
+
+Giving arguments of this form is a _fallacy_ \- making a mistake of reasoning.
+This particular mistake is known as _affirming the consequent_.
+
+If Jane lives in Beijing, then Jane lives in China. Jane lives in China.
+Therefore Jane lives in Beijing. (Not valid. Perhaps Jane lives in Shanghai.)
+
+There are of course many other patterns of valid argument. Now we shall
+introduce a few more patterns which are often used in reasoning.
+
+## §2. Modus tollens
+
+**Modus tollens** \- **If _P_ then _Q_. Not- _Q_. Therefore, not- _P_.**
+
+Here, "not- _Q"_ simply means the denial of _Q_. So if _Q_ means "Today is
+hot.", then "not- _Q_ " can be used to translate "It is not the case that
+today is hot", or "Today is not hot."
+
+If Betty is on the plane, she will be in the A1 seat. But Betty is not in the
+A1 seat. So she is not on the plane.
+
+But do distinguish _modus tollens_ from the following fallacious pattern of
+argument :
+
+**Denying the antecedent** \- **If _P_ then _Q_ , not- _P_. Therefore, not-
+_Q_.**
+
+If Elsie is competent, she will get an important job. But Elsie is not
+competent. So she will not get an important job. Not valid. Perhaps Elsie is
+not very competent, but her boss couldn't find anyone else to do the job.
+
+## §3. Hypothetical syllogism
+
+**Hypothetical syllogism - If _P_ then _Q_ , If _Q_ then _R_. Therefore, if
+_P_ then _R_.**
+
+If God created the universe then the universe will be perfect. If the universe
+is perfect then there will be no evil. So if God created the universe there
+will be no evil.
+
+## §4. Disjunctive syllogism
+
+**_P_ or _Q_. Not- _P_. Therefore, _Q_. ; _P_ or _Q_. Not- _Q_. Therefore,
+_P_.**
+
+Either the government brings about more sensible educational reforms, or the
+only good schools left will be private ones for rich kids. The government is
+not going to carry out sensible educational reforms. So the only good schools
+left will be private ones for rich kids.
+
+## §5. Dilemma
+
+**_P_ or _Q_. If _P_ then _R_. If _Q_ then _S_. Therefore, _R_ or _S_.**
+
+When _R_ is the same as _S_ , we have a simpler form :
+
+**_P_ or _Q_. If _P_ then _R_. If _Q_ then _R_. Therefore, _R_.**
+
+Example:
+
+Either we increase the tax rate or we don't. If we do, the people will be
+unhappy. If we don't, the people will also be unhappy. (Because the government
+will not have enough money to provide for public services.) So the people are
+going to be unhappy anyway.
+
+## §6. Arguing by _Reductio ad Absurdum_
+
+The Latin name here simply means "reduced to absurdity". Here is the method of
+argument if you want to prove that a certain statement S is false:
+
+  1. First assume that _S_ is true.
+  2. From the assumption that it is true, prove that it would lead to a contradiction or some other claim that is false or absurd. 
+  3. Conclude that _S_ must be false.
+
+Those of you who can spot connections quickly might notice that this is none
+other than an application of _modus tollens_. A famous application of this
+pattern of argument is Euclid's proof that there is no largest prime number. A
+prime number is any positive integer greater than 1 that is wholly divisible
+only by 1 and by itself, e.g. 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, etc.
+
+  1. Assume that there are only n prime numbers, where n is a finite number : P1 < P2 < ... < Pn.
+  2. Define a number Q that is 1 plus the product of all primes, i.e. Q = 1 + ( P1 x P2 x ... x Pn).
+  3. Q is of course larger than Pn.
+  4. But Q has to be a prime number also, because (a) when it is divided by any prime number it always leave a remainder of 1, and (b) if it is not divisible by an prime number it cannot be divisible by any non-prime numbers either. 
+  5. So Q is a prime number larger than the largest prime number.
+  6. But this is a contradiction, so the original assumption that there is a finite number of prime numbers must be wrong.
+  7. So there must be infinitely many primes.
+
+Let us look at two more examples of _reductio_ :
+
+  * Suppose someone were to claim that nothing is true or false. We can show that this must be false as follows : If this person's claim is indeed correct, then there is at least one thing that is true, namely the claim that the person is making. So it can't be that nothing is true or false. So his statement must be false.
+  * One theory of how the universe came about is that it developed from a vacuum state in the infinite past. Stephen Hawking thinks that this is false. Here is his argument : in order for the universe to develop from a vacuum state, the vacuum state must have been unstable. (If the vacuum state were a stable one, nothing would come out of it.) But if it was unstable, it would not be a vacuum state, and it would not have lasted an infinite time before becoming unstable. 
+
+## §7. Other Patterns
+
+There are of course many other patterns of deductively valid arguments. One
+way to construct more patterns is to combine the ones that we have looked at
+earlier. For example, we can combine two cases of hypothetical syllogism to
+obtain the following argument:
+
+**If _P_ then _Q_. If _Q_ then _R_. If _R_ then _S_. Therefore if _P_ then
+_S_.**
+
+There are also a few other simple but also valid patterns which we have not
+mentioned:
+
+  * **_P_ and _Q_. Therefore _Q_.**
+  * **_P_. Therefore _P_.**
+
+Some of you might be surprised to find out that " _P_. Therefore _P_." is
+valid. But think about it carefully - if the conclusion is also a premise,
+then the conclusion obviously follows from the premise! Of course, this tells
+us that not all valid arguments are good arguments. How these two concepts are
+connected is a topic we shall discuss later on.
+
+We shall look at a few more complicated patterns of valid arguments in another
+tutorial. It is understandable that you might not remember all the names of
+these patterns. But what is important is that you can recognize these argument
+patterns when you come across them in everyday life, and would not confuse
+them with patterns of invalid arguments that look similar.
+
+Consider the following arguments. Identify the forms of all valid arguments.
+Here are your choices: modus ponens, modus tollens, hypothetical syllogism,
+disjunctive syllogism, dilemma, reductio ad absurdum, valid but not one of the
+above patterns, invalid.
+
+  1. If Jesus loves me, then I love Jesus. I do not love Jesus. Therefore, Jesus does not love me. answer
+  2. Either Jimmy is walking the dog or Cathy is feeding the cat (or both). Cathy is feeding the cat. Therefore Jimmy is not walking the dog. answer
+  3. Either Jimmy is walking the dog or Cathy is feeding the cat. Cathy is not feeding the cat. Therefore Jimmy is walking the dog. answer
+  4. If X is a man, then X is a human being. If X is a human being, then X is an animal. Therefore, if X is a man, then X is an animal. answer
+  5. If I do not have Yellow Tail sashimi, then I will have scallop sushi instead. Now, I am having Yellow Tail sashimi. So I will not have scallop sushi. answer
+  6. If some sheep are black, then some ducks are pink. It is not true that some ducks are pink. Therefore, it is not true that some sheep are black. answer
+  7. Either she is right or she is wrong. If she is right, then he is wrong. If she is wrong, then he is also wrong. Therefore, he is wrong either way. answer
+  8. Paul is a bachelor. Paul is poor. So at least one bachelor is poor. answer
+  9. Either she is in Beijing or she is in Europe. If she is in Beijing, then she is eating lunch. If she is in Europe, then she is sleeping. Hence, either she is eating lunch or she is sleeping. answer
+
+Identify the conclusions that can be drawn from these assumptions. Which basic
+patterns of valid arguments should be used to derive the conclusion?
+
+  1. If God is perfect, then God knows what people intend to do in the future. If God knows what people intend to do in the future, then God can stop people from bringing about evil. answer
+  2. If he is dead, then there will be no pulse. If there is no pulse, then the red light will turn on. There is no red light. answer
+  3. Either Krypto is hot or Pluto is hot. If Krypto is hot, then there is no ice on its surface. But there is. answer
+  4. Either you speak justly or unjustly. If you speak justly then men will hate you. But if you speak unjustly the gods will hate you. answer
+  5. Johannes is either in Hong Kong or in Thailand. He is not at home. If he is in Thailand he is staying at the Peninsula. If he is in Hong Kong he is at home. answer
+
+If the following statements are all true, who killed Pam and where was Jones
+in 1997? Which piece of information is not needed? answer
+
+  1. Jones was either in HK or in London in 1997.
+  2. If Jones did not kill Pam, then Peter did.
+  3. If Pam died of suffocation, then either Jones killed her, or Pam committed suicide.
+  4. If Jones was in HK in 1997, then Jones did not kill Pam.
+  5. Pam died of suffocation but she did not kill herself.
+
+Is "P or Q, P, Therefore not-Q" a valid argument form?
+
+answer
+
+__If "P or Q" means "either P or Q, but not both", then the argument is indeed
+valid. But if "P or Q" means "either P or Q (or both)", then it is not. The
+former interpretation of "or" is known as "exclusive or", the latter
+"inclusive or". Unless otherwise stated, in general we will adopt the
+inclusive interpretation here.
+
+Suppose someone thinks that there is only a finite number of integers. How
+would he criticize the proof that there are infinitely many primes? Which step
+would he reject? answer
+
+Here is a very nice example taken from the philosopher James Pryor :
+
+A computer scientist announces that he's constructed a computer program that
+can play the perfect game of chess: he claims that this program is guaranteed
+to win every game it plays, whether it plays black or white, with never a loss
+or a draw, and against any opponent whatsoever. The computer scientist claims
+to have a mathematical proof that his program will always win, but the proof
+runs to 500 pages of dense mathematical symbols, and no one has yet been able
+to verify it. Still, the program has just played 20 games against Gary
+Kasparov and it won every game, 10 as white and 10 as black. Should you
+believe the computer scientist's claim that the program is so designed that it
+will always win against every opponent?
+
+How would you use the _reductio_ method to argue against the computer
+scientist? hint
+
+This is a more difficult question: When we say that _denying the antecedent_
+and _affiirming the consequent_ are not valid patterns of argument, what is
+meant is that not every argument of those patterns is valid. This is different
+from saying that every argument of those patterns are invalid. See if you can
+figure out the reason.
+
+Are arguments of the form "denying the antecedent” (or "affirming the
+consequent") necessarily invalid?
+
+answer
+
+__No. For instance, the following argument is valid and sound, even though it
+has the form of denying the antecedent: (Premise) If x is a positive integer
+that is only divisible by itself and 1, then x is a prime number. (Premise) 4
+is not a positive integer divisible only by itself and 1. (Conclusion)
+Therefore 4 is not a prime number.”
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_25.txt b/data/crtw_25.txt
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+Warning: This tutorial talks about some puzzling features in the definition of
+validity. This is more for those who are interested in logic, and you need not
+worry too much about this for the purpose of learning critical thinking. So
+feel free to skip this part if you want.
+
+Recall our definition of validity:
+
+An argument is valid if and only if there is no logically possible situation
+where all the premises are true and the conclusion is false at the same time.
+
+This definition is supposed to capture what is meant by one thing following
+from another. However, there are some consequences which might seem
+counterintuitive.
+
+## §1. Circularity
+
+The first puzzling feature is that all circular arguments are actually valid.
+Here, we might take a circular argument as an argument where the conclusion
+also appears as a premise. Here are two examples:
+
+God exists.  
+Therefore, God exists.
+
+The moon is made of cheese.  
+The sun is made of tofu.  
+Therefore, the moon is made of cheese.
+
+These arguments are valid because it is simply not possible for the premises
+to be true and the conclusion to be false at the same time. If all the
+premises are true in some situation, then the conclusion will also be true in
+the same situation since it is one of the premises!
+
+This might seem weird, but if we think about this, perhaps this is acceptable.
+We can argue that given any statement, if it is true, then obviously it does
+follow that it is true. So we should accept that every statement follows from
+itself. We just need to remember that valid arguments need not be good
+arguments.
+
+## §2. Necessarily true conclusions
+
+A more counterintuitive consequence of our definition of validity is that any
+argument with a necessarily true conclusion is valid, and it does not matter
+what the premises are and whether they are true or false:
+
+The moon is made of cheese.  
+Therefore, either it is raining in Tokyo now or it is not.
+
+1+1=3.  
+Therefore, if God exists, then God exists.
+
+These examples seem weird because the premises have nothing to do with the
+consequences. They talk about completely different things. So how can these
+arguments be valid?
+
+But note that their conclusions are all necessarily true. The first conclusion
+is true whether or not it is raining in Tokyo, and the second conclusion is
+true whether or not God exists. They are logical truths and it is impossible
+for them to be false. But this means in both cases, it is not possible for the
+premises of the argument to be true and the conclusion to be false at the same
+time. So they are valid!
+
+This might seem a bit strange to you. You might even think there is something
+wrong with the definition of validity. Some philosophers and logicians have
+indeed argued we need a better definition of validity that can ensure that the
+conclusion is _relevant_ to the premises. But this is quite controversial and
+very complicated, so we will stick with our simpler definition here. If you
+are interested you can read about how relevance logic is supposed to deal with
+this problem.
+
+## §3. Necessarily false premises
+
+A related feature about the definition of validity is that any argument with
+inconsistent premises will be valid, regardless of the conclusion:
+
+The moon is made of cheese.  
+The moon is not made of cheese.  
+Therefore, I am the most intelligent person in the universe.
+
+The number 1 is not the number 1.  
+Therefore, Paris is the capital of France.
+
+It is easy to easy why these arguments are valid. It is not possible for the
+premises to be true at the same time. So of course it is also not possible for
+the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false at the same time!
+
+For the purpose of critical thinking in everyday life, we do not need to be
+too concerned about these cases since we seldom have to seriously deal with
+such arguments. But thinking about these cases is important in the development
+and study of logic and philosophy. We discussed these cases not in order to
+confuse you, but to show that even very simple concepts, like the idea of one
+thing following from another, can raise unexpected issues when we think about
+them more deeply.
+
+Are these arguments valid?
+
+  1. John loves Mary. So John loves Mary. answer
+  2. John loves Mary. So Mary is loved by John. answer
+  3. 1>2\. So 2>1\. answer
+  4. All triangles have three sides. So all pigs have four legs. answer
+  5. All pigs have four legs. So all triangles have three sides. answer
+  6. All squares have three sides. So pigs have four legs. answer
+  7. All squares have four sides. So all triangles have three sides. answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+When people give arguments sometimes certain assumptions are left implicit.
+Example :
+
+Cloning human beings is wrong because it is unnatural.
+
+This argument as it stands is not valid. Someone who gives such an argument
+presumably has in mind the hidden assumption that whatever that is unnatural
+is wrong. When this assumption is added, the argument does become valid.
+
+But once this is pointed out, we can ask what this assumption really means and
+whether it is justified. There are plenty of things that are presumably
+"unnatural" but are not usually regarded as wrong, such as wearing sunglasses
+or having surgery. So anyone who accepts the argument above will have to
+either give up the argument, or come up with a different hidden premise. So
+trying to identify the hidden assumption in an argument can help us think more
+deeply.
+
+In everyday life, the arguments we normally encounter are often arguments
+where important assumptions are not made explicit. It is an important part of
+critical thinking that we should be able to identify such _hidden assumptions_
+or _implicit assumptions_.
+
+So how should we go about identifying hidden assumptions? There are two main
+steps involved. First, determine whether the argument is valid or not. If the
+argument is valid, the conclusion does indeed follow from the premises, and so
+the premises have shown explicitly the assumptions needed to derive the
+conclusion. There are then no hidden assumptions involved. But if the argument
+is not valid, you should check carefully what additional premises should be
+added to the argument that would make it valid. Those would be the hidden
+assumptions. You can then ask questions such as : (a) what do these
+assumptions mean? (b) Why would the proponent of the argument accept such
+assumptions? (c) Should these assumptions be accepted?
+
+This technique of revealing hidden assumptions is also useful in identifying
+hidden or neglected factors in causal explanations of empirical phenomena.
+Suppose someone lights a match and there was an explosion. The lighting of the
+match is an essential part in explaining why there was an explosion, but it is
+not a causally sufficient condition for the explosion since there are plenty
+of situations where someone lights a match and there is no explosion. To come
+up with a more complete explanation, we need to identify factors which
+together are sufficient for the occurrence of the explosion, or at least show
+that it has a high probability of happening. This might include factors such
+as the presence of a high level of oxygen in the environment.
+
+Identify the likely hidden assumptions in these arguments:
+
+  1. We should reduce the penalty for drunken driving, as a milder penalty would mean more convictions. answer
+  2. Moby Dick is a whale. So Moby Dick is a mammal. answer
+  3. Giving students a fail grade will damage their self-confidence. Therefore, we should not fail students. answer
+  4. It should not be illegal for adults to smoke pot. After all, it does not harm anyone. answer
+  5. There is nothing wrong talking on a mobile phone during lectures. Other students do it all the time. answer
+  6. Killing an innocent person is wrong. Therefore, abortion is wrong. answer
+  7. Traces of ammonia have been found in Mars' atmosphere. So there must be life on Mars. answer
+  8. There cannot be more than one God. Otherwise, there would be two Gods equally powerful, or one is more powerful than the other. answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_27.txt b/data/crtw_27.txt
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+## §1. What is induction?
+
+Consider the following argument :
+
+> Dipsy bought one ticket in a fair lottery with 10000 tickets.  
+>  So, Dipsy is not going to win the lottery.
+
+This argument is of course not valid, since Dipsy might be so lucky that he
+wins the lottery. But this is quite unlikely to happen if the lottery is
+indeed a fair one. In other words, the conclusion can be false even when the
+premise is true. However, even though the argument is not valid, if you
+believe that the premise is true, you probably will accept the conclusion as
+well on that basis. In other words, the conclusion is highly likely to be true
+**given that the premise is true**.
+
+Here is another example :
+
+> Dylan is a man.  
+>  He is 99 years old and is in a coma.  
+>  Therefore, Dylan will not win the Boston marathon tomorrow.
+
+Again, it is not logically impossible for Dylan to recover from his coma and
+join the Boston marathon and win, but this is unlikely to happen. Again, given
+that the premise is true, the conclusion is likely to be true also.
+
+Although the two arguments above are not valid, we would normally still regard
+them as good arguments. What is special about them is that they are
+**inductively strong** arguments : the conclusion is highly likely to be true
+given that the premises are true. With an inductively strong argument,
+although the premises do not logically entail the conclusion, they provide
+**strong inductive support** for it.
+
+There are at least three main differences between an inductively strong
+argument and a valid argument :
+
+  1. As already noted, in a valid argument, the conclusion follows logically from the premises, but this is not the case in an inductively strong argument. It is logically possible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false. 
+  2. Deductive validity is not a matter of degree. An argument is either deductively valid, or it is not. But inductive support is a matter of degree, depending on the probability of the conclusion being true given the premises. 
+
+For example, consider this slightly modified argument :
+
+> Dipsy bought X tickets in a fair lottery with 10000 tickets.  
+>  So Dipsy is going to win the lottery.
+
+If we replace X by a very small number, say, 5, then the argument is obviously
+not at all convincing, since it is most unlikely that Dipsy can win by buying
+so few tickets. If X is 6000, then the conclusion is more likely to be true
+then false, but the argument is still rather weak. But if X is 9999, then the
+argument is extremely strong, since it is now most likely that Dipsy will win.
+So you can see that inductive strength is not an all-or-nothing matter.
+
+  3. A related point is that inductive strength is defeasible, whereas validity is not. To say that validity is not defeasible is to say that if you have a valid argument, adding new premises will not make it invalid. If it is indeed true that three people have died, then it follows that at least two people died, and this will remain the consequence whatever new information you acquire. 
+
+However, new information can be added to an inductively strong argument to
+make it weak. Consider the second lottery argument again, and suppose we add
+the new premise that Dipsy bought 9999 lottery tickets, but gave all but one
+of them to Tinky-winky. Obviously this new argument will no longer be a strong
+argument.
+
+Inductive reasoning is very important in ordinary life and science. We believe
+lots of things on the basis of limited evidence. The evidence might not
+logically gaurantee that the belief is correct, but the belief can still be
+reasonable. For example, we see dark clouds in the sky and think it is likely
+to rain so we bring an umbrella. We see mould on our bread and think we will
+be sick if we eat it.
+
+Further reading : Chapter 2 "Probability and Inductive Logic" in Brain Skyrms
+(2000) _Choice and Chance : An Introduction to Inductive Logic_ Wadsworth.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_28.txt b/data/crtw_28.txt
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+## §1. What is a good argument?
+
+In this tutorial we shall discuss what a good argument is. The concept of a
+good argument is of course quite vague. So what we are trying to do here is to
+give it a somewhat more precise definition. To begin with, make sure that you
+know what a sound argument is.
+
+#### Criterion #1 : A good argument must have true premises
+
+This means that if we have an argument with one or more false premises, then
+it is not a good argument. The reason for this condition is that we want a
+good argument to be one that can convince us to accept the conclusion. Unless
+the premises of an argument are all true, we would have no reason to accept to
+accept its conclusion.
+
+#### Criterion #2 : A good argument must be either valid or strong
+
+Is validity a necessary condition for a good argument? Certainly many good
+arguments are valid. Example:
+
+> All whales are mammals.  
+>  All mammals are warm-blooded.  
+>  So all whales are warm-blooded.
+
+But it is not true that good arguments must be valid. We often accept
+arguments as good, even though they are not valid. Example:
+
+> No baby in the past has ever been able to understand quantum physics.  
+>  Kitty is going to have a baby soon.  
+>  So Kitty's baby is not going to be able to understand quantum physics.
+
+This is surely a good argument, but it is not valid. It is true that no baby
+in the past has ever been able to understand quantum physics. But it does not
+follow logically that Kitty's baby will not be able to do so. To see that the
+argument is not valid, note that it is not logically impossible for Kitty's
+baby to have exceptional brain development so that the baby can talk and learn
+and understand quantum physics while still being a baby. Extremely unlikely to
+be sure, but not logically impossible, and this is enough to show that the
+argument is not valid. But because such possibilities are rather unlikely, we
+still think that the true premises strongly support the conclusion and so we
+still think that the argument is a good one.
+
+In other words, a good argument need not be valid. But presumably if it is not
+valid it must be inductively strong. If an argument is inductively weak, then
+it cannot be a good argument since the premises do not provide good reasons
+for accepting the conclusion.
+
+For more information about inductive strength, see the previous tutorial.
+
+#### Criterion #3 : The premises of a good argument must not beg the question
+
+Notice that criteria #1 and #2 are not sufficient for a good argument. First
+of all, we certainly don't want to say that circular arguments are good
+arguments, even if they happen to be sound. Suppose someone offers the
+following argument:
+
+> It is going to rain tomorrow. Therefore, it is going to rain tomorrow.
+
+So far we think that a good argument must (1) have true premises, and (2) be
+valid or inductively strong. Are these conditions sufficient? The answer is
+no. Consider this example:
+
+> Smoking is bad for your health.  
+>  Therefore smoking is bad for your health.
+
+This argument is actually sound. The premise is true, and the argument is
+valid, because the conclusion does follow from the premise! But as an argument
+surely it is a terrible argument. This is a _circular argument_ where the
+conclusion also appears as a premise. It is of course not a good argument,
+because it does not provide independent reasons for supporting the conclusion.
+So we say that it _begs the question_.
+
+Here is another example of an argument that begs the question :
+
+> Since Mary would not lie to her best friend, and Mary told me that I am
+> indeed her best friend, I must really be Mary's best friend.
+
+Whether this argument is circular depends on your definition of a "circular
+argument". Some people might not consider this a circular argument in that the
+conclusion does not appear explicitly as a premise. However, the argument
+still begs the question and so is not a good argument.
+
+#### Criterion #4 : The premises of a good argument must be plausible and
+relevant to the conclusion
+
+Here, plausibility is a matter of having good reasons for believing that the
+premises are true. As for relevance, this is the requirement that the the
+subject matter of the premises must be related to that of the conclusion. Why
+do we need this additional criterion? The reason is that claims and theories
+can happen to be true even though nobody has got any evidence that they are
+true. If the premises of an argument happen to be true but there is no
+evidence indicating that they are, the argument is not going to be pursuasive
+in convincing people that the conclusion is correct. A good argument, on the
+other hand, is an argument that a rational person should accept, so a good
+argument should satisfy the additional criterion mentioned.
+
+## §2. Summary
+
+So, here is our final definition of a good argument :
+
+> A good argument is an argument that is either valid or strong, and with
+> plausible premises that are true, do not beg the question, and are relevant
+> to the conclusion.
+
+Now that you know what a good argument is, you should be able to explain why
+these claims are mistaken. Many people who are not good at critical thinking
+often make these mistakes :
+
+>   * "The conclusion of this argument is true, so some or all the premises
+> are true."
+>   * "One or more premises of this argument are false, so the conclusion is
+> false."
+>   * "Since the conclusion of the argument is false, all its premises are
+> false."
+>   * "The conclusion of this argument does not follow from the premises. So
+> it must be false."
+>
+
+Answer the following questions.
+
+  1. Does a good argument have to be sound? answer
+  2. Can a good argument be inductively weak? answer
+
+These are some arguments (or just premises) that students have given to
+support the idea that there is nothing morally wrong with eating meat. Discuss
+and evaluate these arguments carefully. Think about whether the premises are
+true, and whether they support the conclusion that it is morally acceptable to
+eat meat.
+
+  1. Human beings are part of the food cycle of nature.
+  2. Human beings are able to digest meat.
+  3. It is ok to eat meat because meat is just a kind of food and we need food to survive.
+  4. It is ok to eat meat because lots of people eat meat; because everyone around me eat meat.
+  5. It is ok to eat meat because the government does not stop people from eating meat.
+  6. Many other people eat meat.
+  7. Meat contains protein, and we need protein to survive.
+  8. We are animals, and it is ok for animals to eat animals.
+  9. It is ok to eat meat because I started eating meat when I was a child.
+  10. Meat is more tasty than vegetables.
+  11. It is ok to eat meat because nobody told me that this is wrong.
+  12. I love eating meat.
+  13. It is ok to eat meat because set meals in restaurants have very little vegetables.
+  14. Animals kill each other.
+  15. Maintain the balance of nature - there will be too many animals otherwise.
+  16. We are more powerful than animals.
+  17. I was taught that I should eat meat.
+  18. Human beings are at the top of the food chain.
+  19. Eating meat can help me avoid certain diseases.
+  20. We have special teeth for eating meat.
+
+## §3. A technical discussion
+
+This section is a more abstract and difficult. You can skip this if you want.
+
+One interesting but somewhat difficult issue about the definition of a good
+argument concerns the first requirement that a good argument must have true
+premises. One might argue that this requirement is too stringent, because we
+seem to accept many arguments as good arguments, even if we are not completely
+certain that the premises are true. Or perhaps we had good reasons for the
+premises, even if it turns out later that we were wrong.
+
+As an example, suppose your friend told you that she is going camping for the
+whole weekend. She is a trustworthy friend and you have no reason to doubt
+her. So you accept the following argument as a good argument:
+
+> Amie will be camping this weekend. So she will not be able to come to my
+> party.
+
+But suppose the camping trip got cancelled at the last minute, and so Amie
+came to the party after all. What then should we say about the argument here?
+Was it a good argument? Surely you were justified in believing the premise,
+and so someone might argue that it is wrong to require that a good argument
+must have true premises. It is enough if the premises are _highly justified_
+(of course the other conditions must be satisfied as well.)
+
+If we take this position, this implies that when we discover that the camping
+trip has been cancelled, we are no longer justified in believing the premise,
+and so at that point the argument ceases to be a good argument.
+
+Here we prefer a different way of describing the situation. We want to say
+that although in the beginning we had good reasons to think that the argument
+is a good one, later on we discover that it wasn't a good argument to begin
+with. In other words, the argument doesn't change from being a good argument
+to a bad argument. It is just that we change our mind about whether the
+argument is a good one in light of new information. We think there are are
+reasons for preferring this way of describing the situation, and it is quite a
+natural way of speaking.
+
+So there are actually two ways to use the term "good argument". We have
+adopted one usage here and it is fine if you want to use it differently. We
+think the ordinary meaning of the term is not precise enough to dictate a
+particular usage. What is important is to know very clearly how _you_ are
+using it and what the consequences are as a result.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_29.txt b/data/crtw_29.txt
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+An (simple) argument is a set of one or more premise with a conclusion. A
+_complex argument_ is a set of arguments with either overlapping premises or
+conclusions (or both). Complex arguments are very common because many issues
+and debates are complicated and involve extended reasoning. To understand
+complex arguments, we need to analyze the logical structure of the reasoning
+involved. Drawing a diagram can be very helpful.
+
+## §1. Argument maps
+
+An _argument map_ is a diagram that captures the logical structure of a simple
+or complex argument. In the simplest possible case, we have a single premise
+supporting a single conclusion. Consider this argument :
+
+Death is inevitable. So life is meaningless.
+
+This can be represented in an argument map as follows:
+
+Life is meaningless Death is inevitable
+
+We can also use numbers to label the premises and conclusion. (1) = Life is
+meaningless, (2) = Death is inevitable:
+
+Let us now look at another example:
+
+(1) Paris is in France, and (2) France is in Europe. So obviously (3) Paris is
+in Europe.
+
+Here is the corresponding argument map:
+
+Note that the two premises are connected together before linking to the
+conclusion. This merging of the links indicate that the two premises are _co-
+premises_ which work together in a single argument to support the conclusion.
+In other words, they do not provide _independent reasons_ for accepting the
+conclusion. Without one of the premises, the other premise would fail to
+support the conclusion.
+
+This should be contrasted with the following example where the premises are
+not co-premises. They provide independent reasons for supporting the
+conclusion:
+
+[1] Smoking is unhealthy, since [2] it can cause cancer. Furthermore, [3] it
+also increases the chance of heart attacks and strokes.
+
+Instead of writing the premises and the conclusion in full in the argument
+map, we can label them and write down their numbers instead:
+
+This diagram tells us that [2] and [3] are **independent** reasons supporting
+[1]. In other words, without [2], [3] would still support [1], and without
+[3], [2] would still support [1]. (Although the argument is stronger with both
+premises.)
+
+Finally, it is also possible to have a single reason giving rise to multiple
+conclusions :
+
+[1] Gold is a metal. [2] So it conducts electricity. [3] It also conducts
+heat.
+
+3 2 1
+
+## §2. More complicated examples
+
+Now that we know the basics of argument maps, we can combine the templates we
+learn above to represent more complicated arguments, by following this
+proceudre:
+
+  1. Identify the most important or main conclusion(s) of the argument.
+  2. Identify the premises used to support the conclusion(s). These are the premises of the main argument.
+  3. If additional arguments have been given to support any of these premises, identify the premises of these additional arguments as well, and repeat this procedure.
+  4. Label the premises and conclusions using numerals or letters.
+  5. Write down the labels in a tree structure and draw arrows leading from sets of premises to the conclusions they support.
+
+Let us try this out on this argument:
+
+Po cannot come to the party because her scooter is broken. Dipsy also cannot
+come because he has to pick up his new hat. I did not invite the other
+teletubbies, so no teletubby will come up to the party.
+
+We now label and refomulate the premises and the conclusions:
+
+  1. Po cannot come to the party.
+  2. Po's scooter is broken.
+  3. Dipsy cannot come to the party.
+  4. Dipsy has to pick up his new hat.
+  5. I did not invite the other teletubbies.
+  6. [Conclusion] No teletubby will come up to the party.
+
+We can then draw the argument map like this:
+
+This is an example of what we might call a _multi-layered_ complex argument,
+where an intermediate conclusion is used as a premise in another argument. So
+[1] and [3] are the intermediate conclusions, which together with [5] lead to
+the main conclusion [6]. This complex argument is therefore made up of three
+overlapping simple arguments in total. Of course, in this particular case you
+can understand the argument perfectly well without using this diagram. But
+with more complicated arguments, a picture can be an indispensable aid.
+
+Draw argument maps for the following arguments:
+
+  1. [1] This computer can think. So [2] it is conscious. Since [3] we should not kill any conscious beings, [4] we should not switch it off.  
+
+answer
+
+  2. [1. Many people think that having a dark tan is attractive.] [2. But the fact is that too much exposure to the sun is very unhealthy.] [3. It has been shown that sunlight can cause premature aging of the skin.] [4. Ultraviolent rays in the sun might also trigger off skin cancer.]  
+
+answer
+
+  3. [1. If Lala is here, then Po should be here as well.] [2. It follows that if Po is not here, Lala is also absent,] and indeed [3. Po is not here.] So most likely [4. Lala is not around.]  
+
+answer
+
+  4. [1. Marriage is becoming unfashionable.] [2. Divorce rate is at an all time high], and [3. cohabitation is increasingly presented in a positive manner in the media]. [4. Movies are full of characters who live together and unwilling to commit to a lifelong partnership]. [5. Even newspaper columnists recommend people to live together for an extended period before marriage in order to test their compatibility.]  
+
+answer
+
+  5. [1. All university students should study critical thinking.] After all, [2. critical thinking is necessary for surviving in the new economy] as [3. we need to adapt to rapid changes, and make critical use of information in making decisions.] Also, [4. critical thinking can help us reflect on our values and purposes in life.] Finally, [5. critical thinking helps us improve our study skills.]  
+
+answer
+
+## §3. More tutorials
+
+If you are interested to learn more about drawing argument maps, you can visit
+the Australian company _Austhink_ for a set of detailed online tutorials on
+argument mapping. An earlier version of these tutorials was commissioned by
+the University of Hong Kong:
+
+  * Online argument mapping tutorials
+
+## §4. Software for drawing argument maps
+
+  * Rationale \- Commercial software for drawing argument maps and there is both an online and off-line (windows) version. 
+  * Argunet \- Free argument map editor that runs on Java. 
+  * The Wikipedia page on argument mapping includes a list of argument mapping software. 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_3.txt b/data/crtw_3.txt
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+There are many different definitions of critical thinking. Here we list some
+of the well-known ones. It can be seen that they all emphasize the importance
+of clarity and rationality. Here we will look at some well-known definitions
+in chronological order.
+
+Many people traced the importance of critical thinking in education to Dewey.
+But Dewey did not make very extensive use of the term "critical thinking".
+Instead, in his book _How We Think_ , he argued for the importance of what he
+called "reflective thinking":
+
+> ... [when] the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its
+> adequacy to support the belief examined. This process is called reflective
+> thought; it alone is truly educative in value ...
+
+> Active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form
+> of knowledge in light of the grounds that support it, and the further
+> conclusions to which it tends, constitutes reflective thought.
+
+There is however one passage where Dewey explicitly uses the term "critical
+thinking":
+
+> The essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment; and the essence of
+> this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature of the problem before
+> proceeding to attempts at its solution. This, more than any other thing,
+> transforms mere inference into tested inference, suggested conclusions into
+> proof. Dewey (1910) _How We Think_ , p74.
+
+* * *
+
+The _Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal_ (1980) is a well-known
+psychological test of critical thinking ability. The authors of this test
+define critical thinking as :
+
+> ... a composite of attitudes, knowledge and skills. This composite includes:
+> (1) attitudes of inquiry that involve an ability to recognize the existence
+> of problems and an acceptance of the general need for evidence in support of
+> what is asserted to be true; (2) knowledge of the nature of valid
+> inferences, abstractions, and generalizations in which the weight or
+> accuracy of different kinds of evidence are logically determined; and (3)
+> skills in employing and applying the above attitudes and knowledge.
+
+* * *
+
+A very well-known and influential definition of critical thinking is from
+Robert Ennis (1987):
+
+> Critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on
+> deciding what to believe or do. Ennis (1987) A taxonomy of critical thinking
+> dispositions and abilities. In Baron and Sternberg (Eds.) _Teaching thinking
+> skills: Theory and practice_. NY: W.H. Freeman, pp. 9-26.
+
+* * *
+
+This definition comes from a statement written in 1987 by Michael Scriven and
+Richard Paul,  National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking, an
+organization promoting critical thinking in the US.
+
+> Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and
+> skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or
+> evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation,
+> experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief
+> and action. In its exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual
+> values that transcend subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy,
+> precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, depth,
+> breadth, and fairness. It entails the examination of those structures or
+> elements of thought implicit in all reasoning: purpose, problem, or
+> question-at-issue, assumptions, concepts, empirical grounding; reasoning
+> leading to conclusions, implications and consequences, objections from
+> alternative viewpoints, and frame of reference.
+
+* * *
+
+The following excerpt comes from Peter A. Facione (1990) "Critical Thinking: A
+Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of Educational Assessment and
+Instruction", a report for the American Philosophical Association.
+
+> "We understand critical thinking to be purposeful, self-regulatory judgment
+> which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as
+> well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological,
+> criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is
+> based. CT is essential as a tool of inquiry. As such, CT is a liberating
+> force in education and a powerful resource in one's personal and civic life.
+> While not synonymous with good thinking, CT is a pervasive and self-
+> rectifying human phenomenon. The ideal critical thinker is habitually
+> inquisitive, well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible,
+> fairminded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in
+> making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in
+> complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the
+> selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking results
+> which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit.
+> Thus, educating good critical thinkers means working toward this ideal. It
+> combines developing CT skills with nurturing those dispositions which
+> consistently yield useful insights and which are the basis of a rational and
+> democratic society."
+
+If you are interested in some further discussion about the definition of
+critical thinking, you can read this sample chapter from Alec Fisher's book on
+critical thinking here:
+http://assets.cambridge.org/052100/9847/sample/0521009847ws.pdf
+
+* * *
+
+Here are some other people trying to explain critical thinking. Evaluate their
+claims in light of what you have read above.
+
+  1. In this _Wall Street Journal_ article, someone defined critical thinking as "forming your own opinion from a variety of different sources." hint
+
+__Surely it is possible to think critically without consulting other sources?
+It is also possible to think uncritically by reacting in a biased way to the
+sources that you come across!
+
+  2. "Actually, the essence of critical thinking lies in asking questions and to keep asking them until you are satisfied with the answer." Ho Lok-sang, Director of the Centre for Public Policy Studies at Lingnan University. China Daily, Tuesday, December 30, 2014
+  3. From Diane F. Halpern - "Critical thinking is the use of those cognitive skills or strategies that increase the probability of a positive outcome." 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+To give an analogy is to claim that two distinct things are alike or similar
+in some respect. Here are two examples :
+
+  * Capitalists are like vampires.
+  * Like the Earth, Europa has an atmosphere containing oxygen.
+
+The analogies above are not arguments. But analogies are often used in
+arguments. To argue by analogy is to argue that because two things are
+similar, what is true of one is also true of the other. Such arguments are
+called " _analogical arguments_ " or " _arguments by analogy_ ". Here are some
+examples :
+
+  * There might be life on Europa because it has an atmosphere that contains oxygen just like the Earth.
+  * This novel is supposed to have a similar plot like the other one we have read, so probably it is also very boring.
+  * The universe is a complex system like a watch. We wouldn't think that a watch can come about by accident. Something so complicated must have been created by someone. The universe is a lot more complicated, so it must have been created by a being who is a lot more intelligent.
+
+Analogical arguments rely on analogies, and the first point to note about
+analogies is that any two objects are bound to be similar in some ways and not
+others. A sparrow is very different from a car, but they are still similar in
+that they can both move. A washing machine is very different from a society,
+but they both contain parts and produce waste. So in general, when we make use
+of analogical arguments, it is important to make clear in what ways are two
+things supposed to be similar. We can then proceed to determine whether the
+two things are indeed similar in the relevant respects, and whether those
+aspetcs of similarity supports the conclusion.
+
+So if we present an analogical argument explicitly, it should take the
+following form :
+
+(Premise 1) Object X and object Y are similar in having properties Q1 ... Qn.  
+(Premise 2) Object X has property P.  
+(Conclusion) Object Y also has property P.
+
+Before continuing, see if you can rewrite the analogical arguments above in
+this explicit form.
+
+## §1. Analogical arguments and induction
+
+It is sometimes suggested that all analogical arguments make use of inductive
+reasoning. This is not correct. Consider the explicit form of analogical
+arguments above. If having property P is a logical consequence of having
+properties Q1 ... Qn, then the analogical argument will be deductively valid.
+Here is an example :
+
+(Premise 1) X and Y are similar in that they are both isosceles triangles (an
+isosceles triangle is a triangle with two equal sides).  
+(Premise 2) X has two equal internal angles.  
+(Conclusion) Y has two equal internal angles.
+
+Of course, in such a situation we could have argued for the same conclusion
+more directly :
+
+(Premise 1) Y is an isosceles triangles.  
+(Premise 2) Every isosceles triangle has two equal internal angles.  
+(Conclusion) Y has two equal internal angles.
+
+What this shows is that :
+
+  * Some good analogical arguments are deductively valid.
+  * Sometimes we can argue for a conclusion more directly without making use of analogies. This might reveal more clearly the reasons that support the conclusion.
+
+Of course, analogical arguments can also be employed in inductive reasoning.
+Consider this argument :
+
+  * This novel is supposed to have a similar plot like the other one we have read, so probably it is also very boring. 
+
+This argument is of course not deductively valid. Just because the plot of
+novel X is similar to the plot of a boring novel Y, it does not follow
+logically that X is also boring. Perhaps novel X is a good read despite an
+unimpressive plot because its pace is a lot faster and the story telling is
+more gripping and graphic. But if no such information is available, and all we
+know about novel X is that its plot is like the plot of Y, which is not very
+interesting, then we would be justified in thinking that it is more likely for
+X to be boring than to be interesting.
+
+## §2. Evaluating analogical arguments
+
+So how should we evaluate the strength of an analogical argument that is not
+deductively valid? Here are some relevant considerations :
+
+  * **Truth** : First of all we need to check that the two objects being compared are indeed similar in the way assumed. For example, in the argument we just looked at, if the two novels actually have completely different plots, one being an office romance and the other is a horror story, then the argument is obviously unacceptable. 
+  * **Relevance** : Even if two objects are similar, we also need to make sure that those aspects in which they are similar are actually relevant to the conclusion. For example, suppose two books are alike in that their covers are both green. Just because one of them is boring does not mean that the other one is also boring, since the color of a book's cover is completely irelevant to its contents. In other words, in terms of the explicit form of an analogical argument presented above, we need to ensure that having properties Q1, ... Qn increases the probability of an object having property P. 
+  * **Number** : If we discover a lot of shared properties between two objects, and they are all relevant to the conclusion, then the analogical argument is stronger than when we can only identify one or a few shared properties. Suppose we find out that novel X is not just similar to another boring novel Y with a similar plot. We discover that the two novels are written by the same author, and that very few of both novels have been sold. Then we can justifiably be more confident in concluding that X is likely to be boring novel. 
+  * **Diversity** : Here the issue is whether the shared properties are of the same kind or of different types. Suppose we have two Italian restaurants A and B, and A is very good. We then find out that restaurant B uses the same olive oil in cooking as A, and buys meat and vegetables of the same quality from the same supplier. Such information of course increases the probability that B also serves good food. But the information we have so far are all of the same kind having to do with the quality of the raw cooking ingredients. If we are further told that A and B use the same brand of pasta, this will increase our confidence in B further still, but not by much. But if we are told that both restaurants have lots of customers, and that both restaurants have obtained Michelin star awards, then these different aspects of similarities are going to increase our confidence in the conclusion a lot more. 
+  * **Disanalogy** : Even if two objects X and Y are similar in lots of relevant respects, we should also consider whether there are dissimilarities between X and Y which might cast doubt on the conclusion. For example, returning to the restaurant example, if we find out that restaurant B now has a new owner who has just hired a team of very bad cooks, we would think that the food is probably not going to be good anymore despite being the same as A in many other ways. 
+
+## §3. Analogical arguments in morality
+
+Analogical arguments occur very frequently in discussions in law, ethics and
+politics. In a very famous article, "A Defense of Abortion", written in 1971,
+philosopher Judith Thomson argues for a woman's right to have an abortion in
+the case of unwanted pregnancy using an analogy where someone woke up one
+morning only to find that an unconscious violinist being attached to her body
+in order to keep the violinist alive. Thomson argues that the victim has the
+right to detach the violinist even if this would bring about the violinist's
+death, and this also means that a woman has the right to abort an unwanted
+baby in certain cases. For further discussion on the role of analogy in moral
+reasoning, see this article.
+
+Evaluate these arguments from analogy. See if you can identify any aspects in
+which the two things being compared are not relevantly similar :
+
+  1. We should not blame the media for deteriorating moral standards. Newspapers and TV are like weather reporters who report the facts. We do not blame weather reports for telling us that the weather is bad. answer
+  2. Democracy does not work in a family. Parents should have the ultimate say because they are wiser and their children do not know what is best for themselves. Similarly the best form of government for a society is not a democractic one but one where the leaders are more like parents. answer
+
+__There are many relevant ways in which a family is different from a society.
+First, the government officials need not be wiser than the citizens. Also,
+many parents might care for their children out of love and affection but
+government officials might not always have the interests of the people at
+heart.
+
+  3. "Wives, submit yourselves to your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church." - St. Paul, _Ephesians_ 5:22. answer
+  4. In the early 17th century, astronomer Francesco Sizi argued that there are only seven planets: "There are seven windows in the head, two nostrils, two ears, two eyes and a mouth; so in the heavens there are two favorable stars, two unpropitious, two luminaries, and Mercury alone undecided and indifferent. From which and many similar phenomena of nature such as the seven metals, etc., which it were tedious to enumerate, we gather that the number of planets is necessarily seven." answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+In our earlier discussion of valid patterns of arguments, we focus on patterns
+which can be described using letter symbols that stand for individual
+statements. Here is _modus ponens_ again:
+
+If P then Q.  
+P.  
+Therefore, Q.
+
+As you may recall, the letters _P_ and _Q_ stand for statements. The patterns
+of valid arguments below are somewhat different though, because the patterns
+involve breaking down statements into their individual components. We hope the
+examples given make it easy to understand what the patterns are.
+
+Every F is G.  
+x is F.  
+So x is G.
+
+Example: Every whale is a mammal. Moby Dick is a whale. So Moby Dick is a
+mammal.
+
+Every F is G.  
+Every G is H.  
+So every F is H.
+
+Example: Every whale is a mammal. Every mammal is an animal. So every whale is
+an animal.
+
+Every F is G.  
+x is not G.  
+So x is not F.
+
+Example: Every whale is a mammal. Nemo is not a mammal. So Nemo is not a
+whale.
+
+No F is G.  
+x is F.  
+So x is not G.
+
+Example: No whale is an insect. Moby Dick is a whale. So Moby Dick is not an
+insect.
+
+Every F is either G or H.  
+x is F.  
+So x is either G or H.
+
+Example: Every human being is either alive or dead. Einstein is a human being.
+So Einstein is either alive or dead.
+
+Obviously there are lots of such valid patterns of arguments. See if you can
+construct some more of your own. There are also patterns of arguments that
+look similar but which are not valid patterns, e.g.
+
+No F is G.  
+No G is H.  
+So no F is H.
+
+Example: No whale is a spider. No spider is warm-blooded. So no whale is warm-
+blooded.
+
+As you can see, this argument is not valid. If you are interested, you can
+read the tutorials on Venn diagrams, since they are useful tools for
+evaluating the validity of such arguments. In formal logic, predicate logic is
+used to formalize and study such arguments more systematically.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+One reason to learn about arguments is of course to be able to convince other
+people, to point out their mistakes and to change their minds.
+
+So when you disagree, it is important to explain your reasons very clearly. Do
+you disagree with the definitions? Do you think some of the assumptions are
+false? Or do you reject the reasoning?
+
+We also ought to remember that when people disagree with each other, things
+can get emotional and hostile. It is important to remain calm to find out who
+is right and who is wrong. It is of course quite possible for us to discover
+that we ourselves have made a mistake. How to conduct a constructive dialogue
+is an art that requires not just an understanding of logic, but also empathy,
+self-control, and a good grasp of human psychology.
+
+The philosopher Daniel Dennett has this advice which is quite useful:
+
+> Serious argument depends on mutual respect, and this is often hard to
+> engender when disagreements turn vehement. The social psychologist and game
+> theorist Anatol Rapoport (creator of the winning Tit-for-Tat strategy in
+> Robert Axelrod’s legendary prisoner’s dilemma tournament) once promulgated a
+> list of rules for how to write a successful critical commentary on an
+> opponent’s work.
+>
+> First, he said, you must attempt to re-express your opponent’s position so
+> clearly, vividly and fairly that your opponent says “Thanks, I wish I’d
+> thought of putting it that way.”
+>
+> Then, you should list any points of agreement (especially if they are not
+> matters of general or widespread agreement), and
+>
+> third, you should mention anything you have learned from your opponent.
+>
+> Only then are you permitted to say so much as a word of rebuttal or
+> criticism.
+>
+> I have found this a salutary discipline to follow – or, since it is
+> challenging, to attempt to follow.
+
+(From Dennett's review of Richard Dawkins, _The God Delusion_ )
+
+__previous tutorial
+
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+The term "logic" came from the Greek word _logos_ , which is sometimes
+translated as "sentence", "discourse", "reason", "rule", and "ratio". Of
+course, these translations are not enough to help us understand the more
+specialized meaning of "logic" as it is used today.
+
+So what is logic? Briefly speaking, we might define logic as _the study of the
+principles of correct reasoning_. This is a rough definition, because how
+logic should be properly defined is actually quite a controversial matter.
+However, for the purpose of this tour, we thought it would be useful to give
+you at least some rough idea as to the subject matter that you will be
+studying. So this is what we shall try to do on this page.
+
+## §1. Logic is not the psychology of reasoning
+
+One thing you should note about this definition is that logic is concerned
+with the principles of _correct_ reasoning. Studying the correct principles of
+reasoning is not the same as studying the _psychology_ of reasoning. Logic is
+the former discipline, and it tells us how we _ought_ to reason if we want to
+reason correctly. Whether people actually follow these rules of correct
+reasoning is an empirical matter, something that is not the concern of logic.
+
+The psychology of reasoning, on the other hand, is an empirical science. It
+tells us about the actual reasoning habits of people, including their
+mistakes. A psychologist studying reasoning might be interested in how
+people's ability to reason varies with age. But such empirical facts are of no
+concern to the logician.
+
+## §2. The principles of logic
+
+So what are these principles of reasoning that are part of logic? There are
+many such principles, but the main (not the only) thing that we study in logic
+are _principles governing the validity of arguments_ \- whether certain
+conclusions follow from some given assumptions. For example, consider the
+following three arguments :
+
+If Tom is a philosopher, then Tom is poor.  
+Tom is a philosopher.  
+Therefore, Tom is poor.
+
+If K>10, then K>2.  
+K>10.  
+Therefore, K>2\.
+
+If Tarragona is in Europe, then Tarragona is not in China.  
+Tarragona is in Europe.  
+Therefore, Tarragona is not in China.
+
+These three arguments here are obviously good arguments in the sense that
+their conclusions follow from the assumptions. If the assumptions of the
+argument are true, the conclusion of the argument must also be true. A
+logician will tell us that they are all cases of a particular form of argument
+known as " _modus ponens_ " :
+
+If P, then Q. P. Therefore, Q.
+
+We shall be discussing validity again later on. It should be pointed out that
+logic is not just concerned with the validity of arguments. Logic also studies
+consistency, and logical truths, and properties of logical systems such as
+completeness and soundness. But we shall see that these other concepts are
+also very much related to the concept of validity.
+
+## §3. Topic neutrality
+
+_Modus ponens_ might be used to illustrate two features about the rules of
+reasoing in logic. The first feature is its topic-neutrality. As the four
+examples suggest, _modus ponens_ can be used in reasoning about diverse
+topics. This is true of all the principles of reasoning in logic. The laws of
+biology might be true only of living creatures, and the laws of economics are
+only applicable to collections of agents that enagage in financial
+transactions. But the principles of logic are universal principles which are
+more general than biology and economics. This is in part what is implied in
+the following definitions of logic by two very famous logicians :
+
+> [Logic is] ... the name of a discipline which analyzes the meaning of the
+> concepts common to all the sciences, and establishes the general laws
+> governing the concepts. Alfred Tarski (1901-1983). From his _Introduction to
+> logic and to the methodology of deductive sciences_ , Dover, page xi.
+
+> To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern
+> the laws of truth. ... I assign to logic the task of discovering the laws of
+> truth, not of assertion or thought. Gottlob Frege (1848-1925). From his 1956
+> paper "The Thought : A Logical Inquiry" in _Mind_ Vol. 65.
+
+## §4. Necessity in logic
+
+A second feature of the principles of logic is that they are non-contingent,
+in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of
+the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the
+world actually is. Physicists might tell us that no signal can travel faster
+than the speed of light, but if the laws of physics have been different, then
+perhaps this would not have been true. Similarly, biologists might study how
+dolphins communicate with each other, but if the course of evolution had been
+different, then perhaps dolphins might not have existed. So the theories in
+the empirical sciences are contingent in the sense that they could have been
+otherwise. The principles of logic, on the other hand, are derived using
+reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features
+of the world.
+
+For example, logic tells us that any statement of the form "If _P_ then _P_."
+is necessarily true. This is a principle of the second kind that logician
+study. This principle tells us that a statement such as "if it is raining,
+then it is raining" must be true. We can easily see that this is indeed the
+case, whether or not it is actually raining. Furthermore, even if the laws of
+physics or weather patterns were to change, this statement will remain true.
+Thus we say that scientific truths (mathematics aside) are _contingent_
+whereas logical truths are _necessary_. Again this shows how logic is
+different from the empirical sciences like physics, chemistry or biology.
+
+## §5. Formal and informal logic
+
+Sometimes a distinction is made between _informal logic_ and _formal logic_.
+The term "informal logic" is often used to mean the same thing as critical
+thinking. Sometimes it is used to refer to the study of reasoning and
+fallacies in the context of everyday life. "Formal logic" is mainly concerned
+with formal systems of logic. These are specially constructed systems for
+carrying out proofs, where the languages and rules of reasoning are precisely
+and carefully defined. _Sentential logic_ (also known as "Propositional
+logic") and _Predicate Logic_ are both examples of formal systems of logic.
+
+There are many reasons for studying formal logic. One is that formal logic
+helps us identify patterns of good reasoning and patterns of bad reasoning, so
+we know which to follow and which to avoid. This is why studying basic formal
+logic can help improve critical thinking. Formal systems of logic are also
+used by linguists to study natural languages. Computer scientists also employ
+formal systems of logic in research relating to Aritificial Intelligence.
+Finally, many philosophers also like to use formal logic when dealing with
+complicated philosophical problems, in order to make their reasoning more
+explicit and precise.
+
+## §6. Further readings
+
+  * Entries on logic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These are difficult articles on the philosophy of logic. 
+
+  * Suppose we find out that people reason better when they are not under stress. Should this be counted as a principle of logic? answer
+  * How is science different from logic? answer
+
+__Science does involve logic, since we need logic to test our theories and
+check whether they are consistent. But for a theory to be a scientific one, it
+must either describe actual empirical facts about the world or the laws of
+nature in our universe. This is not the case with logic.
+
+  * How is mathematics different from logic? answer
+
+__The relatonship between mathematics and logic is rather complicated
+philosophical issue. To give a very short answer, the content of mathematics
+is restricted to abstract objects like numbers, functions, triangles, etc. But
+the principles and laws of logic are very general and are not restricted to
+such concepts.
+
+__next tutorial
+
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+In logic we often talk about the logical properties of _statements_ and how
+one statement is related to another. So what is a statement?
+
+There are three main sentence types in English:
+
+  * _Declarative_ sentences are used for assertions, e.g. "He is here."
+  * _Interrogative_ sentences are used to ask questions, e.g. "Is he here?"
+  * _Imperative_ sentences are used for making requests or issuing commands, e.g. "Come here!"
+
+For present purposes, we shall take a statement to be any _declarative
+sentence_. A declarative sentence is a complete and grammatical sentence that
+makes a claim. So here are some examples of statements in English :
+
+  * Snow is white.
+  * The moon is made of green cheese.
+  * Everyone is here.
+  * Whatever will be, will be.
+  * The data and information provided on this web page is for informational purposes only, and is not intended for trading or commercial purposes, unless written prior permission is obtained by the user from the author, though the author will not be liable for any errors or delays in the content, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon.
+
+As you can see, statements can be true or false, and they can be simple or
+complex. But they must be grammatical and complete sentences. So these are not
+statements :
+
+  * The United Nations [ A proper name, but not a sentence ]
+  * Bridge over troubled waters. [ Not a complete sentence ]
+  * Come here right now! [ A command that is not a complete sentence making a claim ]
+  * Will you be available on tuesday or wednesday? [ A question ]
+  * HJGAS&*^@#JHGKJAS*&^*!@GJHGAA*&S [ Ungrammatical ]
+
+There is an easy test to decide whether something is a statement in English.
+Suppose you have a sentence φ and you add "it is true that" to the front. If
+the resulting expression is grammatical, then φ is a statement. Otherwise it
+is not.
+
+So for example, φ might be "bridge over troubled waters". We append "it is
+true that" to the front, and end up with "it is true that bridge over troubled
+waters." But this expression is not grammatical. So "bridge over troubled
+waters" is not a statement. However, "I am like a bridge over troubled waters"
+is a statement, because "it is true that I am like a bridge over troubled
+waters" is grammatical.
+
+Which of the following are statements?
+
+  1. One plus one equals three. answer
+  2. Can you come to the party please? answer
+  3. AJH$%^#@! answer
+  4. If it rains then the street will be wet. answer
+  5. We all feel very sorry for you. answer
+  6. Come here! answer
+  7. A chicken is a song that weighs ten tons. answer
+  8. All statements are true. answer
+  9. It is true that it is raining. answer
+  10. I am ordering you to stop talking in class. answer
+
+__Yes. It is actually both a statement and a command at the same time. The
+statement makes a claim about the command that is being issued at the same
+time the statement is made. This example tells us that some imperative
+sentences are also declarative.
+
+Rewrite these utterances or headlines as statements using complete sentences.
+
+  1. Inflation rising. answer
+  2. Kidnapper : no ransom, boy dies answer
+  3. Scientists : coffee good for health answer
+  4. Paintings stolen from Presidential Palace. answer
+  5. No money, I no work. answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Here are a few basic concepts in logic that you ought to be familar with,
+whether you are studying symbolic logic or not.
+
+## §1. Negation
+
+The _negation_ of a statement α is a statement whose truth-value is
+necessarily opposite to that of α. So for example, for any English sentence α,
+you can form its negation by appending "it is not the case that" to α to form
+the longer statement **"it is not the case that α"**.
+
+In formal logic, the negation of α can be written as "not-α", "~α" or "¬α".
+
+Here are some concrete examples:
+
+Statement (α) | Negation (¬α)  
+---|---  
+It is raining| It is not the case that it is raining (i.e. It is not raining.)  
+1+1=2| It is not the case that 1+1=2 (i.e. 1+1 is not 2.)  
+Spiderman loves Mary| It is not the case that Spiderman loves Mary.  
+  
+There are two points about negation which should be obvious to you:
+
+  * A statement and its negation can never be true together. They are logically inconsistent with each other.
+  * A statement and its negation exhaust all logical possibilities - in any situation, one and only one of them must be true. 
+
+  * What is the negation of "God exists"? answer
+  * Is "I must not leave" the negation of "I must leave"? answer
+
+__No! It should be "It is not the case that I must leave." This includes the
+possibility that it does not matter whether I should leave or not. Note that
+these two statements do not exhaust all possibilities.
+
+  * Is "Tom is very happy" the negation of "Tom is very depressed"? answer
+
+__These statements are inconsistent but they are not negations of each other.
+The negation of the first is "It is not the case that Tom is very happy." This
+includes situations where Tom is neither happy nor depressed, or where Tom is
+a little depressed but not very depressed. Remember that a statement and its
+negation must exhaust all logical possibilities.
+
+## §2. Disjunction
+
+A disjunction is a kind of complex sentence typically expressed in English by
+the word "or", such as:
+
+Either we meet tonight, or we do not meet at all.
+
+The sentence has the structure of "either P or Q", where P and Q are
+statements
+
+In logic, we often make a distinction between _exclusive disjunction_ and
+_inclusive disjunction_.
+
+According to the exclusive interpretation, "P or Q" is true when P is true, or
+when Q is true, false when P and Q are both true, and also false when P and Q
+are false. Many people take the exclusive interpretation to be what is
+intended in for example "You can have tea or you can have coffee", where it is
+supposed to be implied that you can only have one or the other but not both.
+
+On the inclusive interpretation, "P or Q" is false when P and Q are both
+false, and it is true in all other situations, including when both P and Q are
+true.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_36.txt b/data/crtw_36.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e034ce147f3cd439433b315a9b3f609f94218812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_36.txt
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+## §1. Consistency
+
+Suppose S is a set that contains one or more statement. S is _consistent_ when
+it is logically possible for all of the statments in the set to be true at the
+same time. Otherwise S is _inconsistent_. Some examples:
+
+  * Consistent: Peter is three years old. Jane is four years old.
+  * Consistent: Peter is three years old. Peter is a fat rabbit.
+  * Inconsistent: Peter is three years old. Peter is a fat rabbit. Peter is five years old. 
+  * Inconsistent: Peter is three years old. It is not the case that Peter is three years old.
+  * Inconsistent: Peter is a rabbit. All rabbits are three years old. Peter is one year old.
+  * Inconsistent: Peter is a completely white rabbit that is completely black.
+
+Here are a few important points about consistency:
+
+  * If you have two statements that are both true, they are certainly consistent with each other.
+  * If you have two statements that are both false, they might or might not be consistent with each other. See if you can give your own examples.
+  * In the last example above, we have just one single inconsistent statement. An inconsistent statement must be false. But if you have a set of statements { P, Q, R, S }, the whole set is said to be inconsistent even if R and S are both true, and inconsistency is only due to inconsistency between P and Q.
+  * Although statements that are inconsistent with each other cannot all be true at the same time, it might be possible for them to be false at the same time. 
+  * Every statement is inconsistent with its negation.
+
+### Inconsistency and self-defeating statements
+
+Notice that there is a difference between making self-defeating statements and
+inconsistent statements. Suppose a tourist from a non-English speaking country
+says: "I cannot speak any English." Since what is being spoken is an English
+sentence, the tourist is obviously saying something false. However, strictly
+speaking the sentence is not logically inconsistent because it actually
+describes a logically possible situation. It is quite possible for the speaker
+not to be able to speak any English. What is impossible is to **say** the
+sentence truly. In these situations, it is more appropriate to say that the
+utterance is _self-defeating_ rather than inconsistent.
+
+Here are some funny actual examples of self-defeating / inconsistent
+statements:
+
+1\. An error message when installing Microsoft Wireless Optical Desktop for
+Bluetooth:
+
+Keyboard Error or No Keyboard Present  
+Press `F1` to continue, `DEL` to enter setup
+
+2\. A webpage shown to a user opting out from a mailing list:
+
+(Strictly speaking, these two sentences are not logically inconsistent. Why? )
+answer
+
+Which of the following sets of statements are consistent? Why?
+
+  1. Vegetables are good for your health. Vegetables are bad for your health. answer
+  2. Joseph likes steak. Sharifa does not like steak. answer
+  3. I knew I would pass the final exam. It is just bad luck that I didn't. answer
+  4. Marilyn has never played basketball. But if she were to play basketball today, she will become the world's best basketball player tomorrow. answer
+  5. World War II actually did not happen. It is a lie cooked up by historians and politicians. People who said they remember what happened are actually part of the whole conspiracy. answer
+  6. No matter what is going to happen in the future, I shall still love you. answer
+  7. Tom can only fly very slowly. No human being can fly. answer
+
+__Consistent, since it is not claimed that Tom is a human being. Maybe Tom is
+a bird. Notice that it is wrong to say that the sentences are consistent if
+Tom is not a human, but inconsistent if he is a human. Whether or not they are
+consistent depends only on what the sentences mean, and the sentence "Tom can
+fly in the sky without assistance" means the same thing whether Tom is human
+or something else. This is because the meaning of the name "Tom" does not tell
+you whether Tom is a human or something else.
+
+  8. Ah Kee is the best restaurant in Hong Kong. There are no good restaurants in Hong Kong. answer
+  9. If God exists then God loves human beings. If God loves human beings then he would not want them to suffer at all. Many human beings experience a lot of suffering. God exists. answer
+
+__The sentences are consistent. The sentences entail that people suffer, and
+God does not want people to suffer -- but that is not a contradiction. The
+sentences would only be inconsistent if you added the premise, "If God does
+not want human beings to suffer, then human beings do not suffer". Without
+that premise, it is easy to imagine that people suffer even though God exists
+and does not want us to suffer. Perhaps God does not have the power to prevent
+suffering, or maybe he has other desires that he can satisfy only if people
+suffer (for example, he might want us to have free will).
+
+Are these statements true or false?
+
+  1. If A is inconsistent with B, then if B is false, A must be true. answer
+
+__False, since they might both be false. Example : "There is only one book on
+the table" is inconsistent with "There are only two books on the table". Both
+are false when there is no book on the table.
+
+  2. If statement A is inconsistent with statement B, and statement A is also inconsistent with statement C, then B is inconsistent with C. answer
+
+## §2. Truth
+
+> Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a
+> perspective, not the truth.Marcus Aurelius
+
+It is not uncommon for people to make very grand and general claims about
+truth, only for these claims to turn out to be inconsistbut or self-defeating.
+
+For example, some people might say that nothing is true and it is all a matter
+of opinion. But if that is the case, then the claim is also not true. In other
+words, it is not true that nothing is true! So why should we believe it?
+
+Or consider the relativist claim that everything is relative and there is no
+objective truth. Is the claim itself relative or not? If not, then the claim
+is false since there is something that is not relative. But if the claim is
+indeed relative, then why should we accept it as opposed to the opposite claim
+that not everything is relative?
+
+## §3. Entailment
+
+A sentence X _entails_ Y if Y follows logically from X. In other words, if X
+is true then Y must also be true, e.g. "30 people have died in the riots"
+entails "more than 20 people died in the riots", but not vice-versa.
+
+  1. If X entails Y and we find out that Y is false, then we should conclude that X is also false. But of course, if X entails Y and we find out that X is false, it does not follow that Y is also false.
+  2. If X entails Y but Y does not entail X, then we say that X is a _stronger claim_ than Y (or "Y is weaker than X"). For example, "all birds can fly" is stronger than "most birds can fly", which is still stronger than "some birds can fly". 
+
+A stronger claim is of course more likely to be wrong. To use a typical
+example, suppose we want to praise X but are not sure whether X is the best or
+not, we might use the weaker claim "X is one of the best" rather than the
+stronger "X is the best". So we need not be accused of speaking falsely even
+if it turns out that X is not the best.
+
+  1. If a statement A entails a statement B, does it follow that B entails A? answer
+  2. If a statement A entails a statement B, and B entails another statement C, does A entail C? answer
+  3. Suppose a statement A entails a statement B, and B is false. Can we tell whether A is true or false? answer
+  4. Consider these two statements : "Peter loves Beth or Peter loves April.", "If Peter loves Beth then Peter loves April." Do they entail that Peter loves Beth? Do they entail that Peter loves April? answer
+
+What do these statements entail which they do not entail on their own?
+
+  * Either it is raining or it is cloudy. It is not raining. answer
+  * If Peter is upstairs, then someone is in the basement. Nobody is in the basement. answer
+
+## §4. Logical Equivalence
+
+If we have two statements that entail each other then they are _logically
+equivalent_. For example, "everyone is happy" is equivalent to "nobody is not
+happy", and "the glass is half full" is equivalent to "the glass is half
+empty".
+
+  * If two statements are logically equivalent, then they **must** always have the same truth value.
+
+  1. Is the statement "good things are not cheap" logically equivalent to the statement "cheap things are not good"? answer
+  2. See if you can form a different statement that also starts with "some" that is logically equivalent to "some animals are birds". answer
+  3. Which of these statements are logically equivalent? (a) It is not true that there is no life on Mars. (b) There may be life on Mars. (c) It is rather unlikely that there is life on Mars. (d) There is life on Mars. (e) There may not be life on Mars. (f) It is the case that there is life on Mars. (g) There is no life on Mars. answer
+  4. Which of these statements are logically equivalent? (a) It is not true that I have money. (b) It is false that I have no money. (c) I have lots and lots of money. (d) I have no money. answer
+  5. What about the statements in this photo?
+answer
+
+__previous tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_37.txt b/data/crtw_37.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7d47c41061327e2d61dcabc0ce4cc21aa37ef006
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+++ b/data/crtw_37.txt
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+## §1. A class is defined by its members
+
+Let us start with the concept of a class. A _class_ or a _set_ is simply a
+collection of objects. These objects are called _members_ of the set. A class
+is defined by its members. So for example, we might define a class C as the
+class of black hats. In that case, every black hat in the world is a member of
+C, and anything that is not a black hat is not a member of C. If something is
+not a member of a class, we can also say that the object is _outside the
+class_.
+
+Note that a class can be empty. The class of men over 5 meters tall is
+presumably empty since nobody is that tall. The class of plane figures that
+are both round and square is also empty since nothing can be both round and
+square. A class can also be infinite, containing an infinite number of
+objects. The class of even number is an example. It has infinitely many
+members, including 2, 4, 6, 8, and so on.
+
+## §2. Classes are represented by circles
+
+C
+
+  * As you can see in the diagram above, the class of black hats, C, is represented by a circle. We normally use circles to represent classes in Venn diagrams, though sometimes we also use bounded regions with different shapes, such as ovals.
+  * We can write the name of the class, e.g. "C", or "Class C", next to the circle to indicate which class it is.
+  * The area inside the circle represents those things which are members of the class.
+  * The area outside the circle represents those things which are _not_ members of the class, e.g. green hats, keys, cakes, etc.
+  * A Venn diagram is usually enclosed by a rectangular box that represents everything in the world.
+
+## §3. Use shading to indicate an empty class
+
+Let us now consider what shading means:
+
+A
+
+To indicate that a class is empty, we shade the circle representing that
+class. So the diagram above means that class A is empty.
+
+A
+
+In general, shading an area means that the class represented by the area is
+empty. So the second diagram above represents a situation where there isn't
+anything which is not a member of class A.
+
+However, even though shading indicates emptiness, a region that is not shaded
+does not necessarily indicate a non-empty class. As we shall see in the next
+tutorial, we use a tick to indicate existence. So in the second diagram above,
+the circle marked A is not shaded. This does not imply that there are things
+which exist which are members of A. If the area is blank, this means that _we
+do not have any information as to whether there is anything there_.
+
+__next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_38.txt b/data/crtw_38.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..79861d6e7265d9caf4d34bf5d3d58e3b4ec36f77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_38.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+## §1. Intersecting circles
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+Now let us consider a slightly more complicated diagram where we have two
+_intersecting_ circles. The left circle represents class A. The right one
+represents class B.
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+Let us label the different bounded regions:
+
+  * Region 1 represents objects which belong to class A but not to B.
+  * Region 2 represents objects which belong to both A and B.
+  * Region 3 represents objects which belong to B but not A.
+  * Region 4, the area outside the two circles, represents objects that belong to neither A nor B. 
+
+So for example, suppose A is the class of apples, and B is the class of sweet
+things. In that case what does region 2 represent? answer
+
+Furthermore, which region represents the class that contains sour lemons that
+are not sweet? answer
+
+## §2. Everything and nothing
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+Continuing with our diagram, suppose we now shade region 1. This means that
+the class of things which belong to A but not B is empty. Or more simply,
+**every A is a B**. ( It might be useful to note that this is equivalent to
+saying that if anything is an A, it is also a B. ) This is an important point
+to remember. Whenever you want to represent "every A is B", shade the area
+within the A circle that is outside the B circle.
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+What if we shade the middle region where A and B overlaps? This is the region
+representing things which are both A and B. So shading indicates that
+**nothing is both A and B**. If you think about it carefully, you will see
+that "Nothing is both A and B" says the same thing as "No A is a B" and "No B
+is an A". Make sure that you understand why these claims are logically
+equivalent!
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+Incidentally, we could have represented the same information by using two non-
+overlapping circles instead.
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+What about the diagram on the left? What do you think it represents? answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_39.txt b/data/crtw_39.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7f8411faf636eccfeae8ef0137d591ce1aae3223
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_39.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+See if you can explain what each diagram represents.
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+* * *
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+NO SVG support!!
+
+answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_4.txt b/data/crtw_4.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8a9f4f1a38487ed09e15a2dae5b1de57d5959e2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_4.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+In a survey conducted by the UCLA Higher Education Research Institute, 99.6%
+of university teachers agreed that critical thinking is an "very important" or
+"essential" goal for undergraduate education. (HERI (2009) _The American
+College Teacher: National Norms for 2007–2008_. Higher Education Research
+Institute, University of California.)
+
+But how should critical thinking be taught? There are lots of different issues
+to be investigated, such as:
+
+  * Should critical thinking be taught as a separate subject on its own, or should it be taught in combination with other specific subjects that the students are studying? 
+  * Which are the topics that are most crucial? How useful are lessons in formal logic or Venn diagrams? How should we go about designing a curriculum?
+
+Research from education psychology and cognitive science are very much
+relevant when designing an effective pedagogy for teaching critical thinking.
+Here is a research article on this topic commissioned by our website:
+
+**Tim van Gelder (2004) "Teaching Critical thinking: Lessons from cognitive
+science"**
+
+A later version is published as van Gelder, T. J. (2005). Teaching critical
+thinking: some lessons from cognitive science. _College Teaching_ , 53, 41-6.
+
+Abstract: This article draws six key lessons from cognitive science for
+teachers of critical thinking. The lessons are: acquiring expertise in
+critical thinking is hard; practice in critical thinking skills themselves
+enhances skills; the transfer of skills must be practiced; some theoretical
+knowledge is required; diagramming arguments ("argument mapping") promotes
+skill; and students are prone to belief preservation. The article provides
+some guidelines for teaching practice in light of these lessons.
+
+__Download PDF article
+
+* * *
+
+Some researchers have suggested that studying argument mapping is a good way
+to improve critical thinking, and sometimes more effective than traditional
+lectures. You can find some of the research articles from google scholars
+here:
+https://scholar.google.com.hk/scholar?q=argument+mapping+critical+thinking.
+
+* * *
+
+Also, see our next tutoral on the importance of metacognition.
+
+If you are interested in issues related to critical thinking in higher
+education, the following volume might be useful:
+
+**Martin Davies and Ronald Barnett (2015) _The Palgrave Handbook of Critical
+Thinking in Higher Education_ Palgrave. **
+
+__Link to amazon product page
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_40.txt b/data/crtw_40.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..391a7a1a71ff052bde6b8c34582e999bc1de655d
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+++ b/data/crtw_40.txt
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+So far we have been looking at Venn diagrams with two circles. We now turn to
+Venn diagrams with three circles. The interpretation of these diagrams is the
+same as before, with each circle representing a class of objects, and the
+overlapping area between the circles representing the class of objects that
+belong to all the classes.
+
+As you can see from the diagram below, with three circles we can have eight
+different regions, the eighth being the region outside the circles. The top
+circle represents the class of As, whereas the circles on the left and the
+right below it represent the class of Bs and Cs respectively. The area outside
+all the circles represents those objects which are not members of any of these
+three classes.
+
+You can click the different parts of the circles to see what they represent,
+and see if you understand why:
+
+**The green region represents:**
+
+## §1. Shading
+
+Now that you know what each of the region represents, you should know how to
+use shading to represent situations where "Every X is Y", or "No X is Y". As
+before, shading an area indicates that nothing exists in the class that is
+represented by the shaded region.
+
+Look at the sentences in the diagram below. Ask yourself which region should
+be shaded to represent the situation described by the sentence. Then click
+that sentence and check the answer.
+
+Every A is B Every B is A Every B is C Every C is B Every C is A Every A is C
+
+No A is B No B is A No B is C No C is B No C is A No A is C
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_41.txt b/data/crtw_41.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3b29b8acec136a71402105c222cf2be1e8ee5752
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_41.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+a. Is the statement "Every B is a C" true according to this diagram? answer
+
+b. Is the statement "No A is a B" true according to this diagram? answer
+
+c. Is the diagram consistent with the statement "Something is A"? answer
+
+d. "Something is A and it is either B or C." Is this statement true according
+to this diagram? answer
+
+e. Is the diagram consistent with the statement "Something is A or B"? answer
+
+f. This diagram is about different types of mathematical functions. But there
+is something wrong with it. What is it? answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_42.txt b/data/crtw_42.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e41f701279ce2902e4f30afb21d627544798a365
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_42.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+We have seen how to use shading to indicate that there is nothing in the class
+represented by the shaded region. We now see how to use ticks to indicate
+existence. The basic idea is that when a tick is present in a region, it
+indicates that there is something in the class represented by the region. So
+for example, in the diagram below, we have a tick outside the circles. Since
+the area outside the circle represents the class of things that are neither A,
+nor B, nor C, the diagram is saying that something exists that is neither A
+nor B nor C :
+
+There are two impotant points to remember :
+
+  1. A tick in a region says that _there is something_ in the class represented by the region. It does not say _how many_ things there are in that class. There might be just one, or perhaps there are many.
+  2. A region without a tick _does not_ represent an empty class. Without a tick, a blank region provides no information as to whether anything exists in the class it represents. Only when a region is shaded can we say that it represents an empty class.
+
+What about the following diagram? What does it represent?
+
+The diagram above does NOT say "something is A". Actually it says something
+more specific, namely that "something is A but is not B and not C". If you
+have given the wrong answer, you might be thinking that the tick indicates
+that there is something in the class represented by the A circle. But here we
+use a tick to indicate existence in the class represented by _the smallest
+bounded region that encloses the tick_. In the top diagram of this page the
+smallest bounded area that encloses the tick is the area outside the three
+circles. In the diagram above, although circle A does enclose the tick, it is
+not the _smallest_ bounded area that does that. That smallest region is the
+colored one in this diagram :
+
+* * *
+
+Now see if you can determine what what these diagrams indicate.
+
+answer
+
+answer
+
+answer
+
+answer
+
+Notice in the last diagram above, the two ticks indicate that there are two
+different things. What if you just want to say "Something is C but not A"? The
+way to do this is to put a tick across two bounded regions, as follows:
+
+The interpretation of this digram employs the same rule as before. What the
+tick indicates is that there is something in the smallest closed region (the
+colored area) that encloses the tick. Of course, the bigger C circle also
+completely encloses the tick, but it is not the _smallest_ bounded region that
+does that. So the tick does not mean that "something is C".
+
+Notice that the tick does not tell us whether there is anything that is B,
+because it is not completely enclosed by the B circle.
+
+See if you can explain what these diagrams represent:
+
+answer
+
+answer
+
+answer
+
+answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_43.txt b/data/crtw_43.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1913399760ca112f02c9b22547cd0e164c00292d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_43.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+So far we have used ticks to cut across only two bounded regions. But of
+course there are other possibilities:
+
+What do you think this means? Applying the same rule of interpretation as
+before, we see that the smallest closed region that encloses the big tick
+would have to be the combined three regions which the tick spreads across.
+This combined region represents things which are either B or C (or both), but
+which are not A. So what the diagram says is that there is something of this
+kind.
+
+So what if we just want to represent the fact that something is A? Here is one
+way to draw the diagram:
+
+Notice that the tick cuts across all the different regions within the A
+circle, and is completely enclosed by it.
+
+We can now combine what we have learnt about ticks and shading together.
+Suppose we start with the information that something is both A and C. We
+therefore draw the following diagram :
+
+Now suppose we are also told that every C is a B. So we add the additional
+information by shading the appropriate area, and end up with this diagram :
+
+How should this be interpreted and what should we conclude? Half of the green
+tick is in a shaded region. What does that mean? Give yourself a minute to
+think about it before you read on ...
+
+The answer is actually quite simple. The tick indicates that something is both
+A and C, and it occupies two separate regions. The left hand side region
+represents things that are A, B and C. The right hand side region represents
+things that are A and C but not B. Since the tick crosses these two regions,
+it indicates that there is something either in the class represented by the
+left region or in the class represented by the right region (or both of
+course). Shading tells us that there is nothing in the class represented by
+the right region. So whatever that exists according to the tick must be in the
+class represented by the left region. In other words, we can conclude that
+something is A, B, and C. In effect then, shading "moves" the tick into the
+left region since it tells us that there is nothing on the right. The above
+diagram is therefore equivalent to the following one :
+
+So here is a general principle you should remember:
+
+> A truncated tick within a region R counts as a complete tick in R if part of
+> the tick is in R and all other parts not in R are in shaded regions.
+
+a. Is the statement "something is either B or C" true according to the
+diagram? answer
+
+b. Is the diagram consistent with the statement "Everything is B or not C, or
+both"? answer
+
+c. Is the diagram consistent with the statement "Something is B and not A"?
+answer
+
+d. Is the diagram consistent with the statement "Everything is A or C"? answer
+
+e. What does the diagram tell us? answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_44.txt b/data/crtw_44.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8596d70a61b40964ff4e8aed99c10bd3eac1deef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_44.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+We now see how Venn diagrams can be used to evaluate certain arguments. There
+are many arguments that cannot be analysed using Venn diagrams. So we shall
+restrict our attention only to arguments with these properties:
+
+  1. The argument has two premises and a conclusion.
+  2. The argument mentions at most three classes of objects.
+  3. The premises and the conclusion include only statements of the following form: Every X is Y, Some X is Y, No X is Y.
+
+Here are two examples :
+
+(Premise #1) Every whale is a mammal.  
+(Premise #2) Every mammal is warm-blooded.  
+(Conclusion) Every whale is warm-blooded.
+
+(Premise #1) Some fish is sick.  
+(Premise #2) No chicken is a fish.  
+(Conclusion) No chicken is sick.
+
+These arguments are sometimes known as _syllogisms_. What we want to determine
+is whether they are _valid_. In other words, we want to find out whether the
+conclusions of these arguments follow logically from the premises. To evaluate
+validity, we want to check whether the conclusion is true in a diagram where
+the premises are true. Here is the procedure to follow:
+
+  1. Draw a Venn diagram with 3 circles.
+  2. Represent the information in the two premises.
+  3. Draw an appropriate outline for the conclusion. Fill in the blank in "If the conclusion is true according to the diagram, the outlined region should ________."
+  4. See whether the condition that is written down is satisfied. If so, the argument is valid. Otherwise not.
+
+## §1. Example #1
+
+Let us apply this method to the first argument on this page :
+
+**Step 1** : We use the A circle to represent the class of whales, the B
+circle to represent the class of mammals, and the C circle to represent the
+class of warm-blooded animals.
+
+**Step 2a** : We now represent the information in the first premise. (Every
+whale is a mammal.)
+
+**Step 2b** : We now represent the information in the second premise. (Every
+mammal is warm-blooded.)
+
+**Step 3** : We now draw an outline for the area that should be shaded to
+represent the conclusion. (Every whale is warm-blooded.) This is the red
+outlined region. We write: "If the conclusion is true according to the
+diagram, the outlined region _should be shaded_."
+
+**Step 4** : Since this is indeed the case, this means that whenever the
+premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. So the argument is valid.
+
+## §2. Example #2
+
+Let's go through another example:
+
+Every A is B.  
+Some B is C.  
+Therefore, some A is C.
+
+We now draw a Venn diagram to represent the two premises:
+
+In the diagram above, we have already drawn a Venn diagram for the three
+classes and encode the information in the first two premises. To carry out the
+third step, we need to draw an outline for the conclusion. Do you know where
+the outline should be drawn? Show outline If the argument is valid, there
+should be a complete tick inside the outlined region. But there isn't (there
+is only part of a tick). So this tells us that the argument is not valid.
+
+## §3. Example #3
+
+Some A is B.  
+Every B is C.  
+Therefore, some A is C.
+
+**Step 1** : Representing the first premise.
+
+**Step 2** : Representing the second premise.
+
+**Step 3** : Add outline for conclusion.
+
+Show outline
+
+**Step 4** : If the argument is valid, there should be a complete tick inside
+the outlined region. And indeed there is. Although part of the tick is outside
+the outlined region, that part of the tick appears only in a shaded area. So
+in effect we have a complete tick within the red outlined region. This shows
+that the argument is valid.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_45.txt b/data/crtw_45.txt
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+This page generates a random list of 10 syllogisms. See if you can determine
+whether they are valid or not.
+
+No C is an A.  
+No A is a B.  
+Therefore, no C is a B. answer
+
+* * *
+
+Every C is a B.  
+No C is an A.  
+Therefore, no B is an A. answer
+
+* * *
+
+No C is an A.  
+Every B is a C.  
+Therefore, no B is an A. answer
+
+* * *
+
+No A is a B.  
+No C is an A.  
+Therefore, no C is a B. answer
+
+* * *
+
+Every A is a C.  
+No B is a C.  
+Therefore, no B is an A. answer
+
+* * *
+
+No B is a C.  
+Every C is an A.  
+Therefore, no A is a B. answer
+
+* * *
+
+Every B is an A.  
+No B is a C.  
+Therefore, every A is a B. answer
+
+* * *
+
+No C is a B.  
+Every C is an A.  
+Therefore, every B is an A. answer
+
+* * *
+
+No B is a C.  
+Every A is a C.  
+Therefore, every C is an A. answer
+
+* * *
+
+Every A is a C.  
+No C is a B.  
+Therefore, no A is a B. answer
+
+* * *
+
+Want more? You can reload this page to generate another list.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_46.txt b/data/crtw_46.txt
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+Although Venn diagrams can help us reason about classes of objects, they also
+have many limitations. First of all, the diagrams can become too complicated
+to deal with if we are reasoning about many classes of objects. So far in our
+tutorials we have considered Venn diagrams with at most three circles. It is
+possible to add more bounded regions if we are dealing with more than three
+classes, but then the resulting diagrams will become rather difficult to
+handle and interpret. It is very easy to make mistakes when we encode
+information in such diagrams.
+
+The other problem with Venn diagrams is that they have limited _expressive
+power_. What this means is that there are many pieces of information that
+cannot be accurately represented. For example, our system of notation allows
+us to talk about classes of objects, but not particular individual objects.
+For example, to say that _a_ and _b_ are cats and _c_ and _d_ are not, we
+might have to introduce new symbols, using dots to represent individuals, as
+in the diagram below:
+
+However, even with this new notation, there are still other pieces of
+information that cannot be represented, such as :
+
+  * Either Felix is a cat or it is a dog. 
+  * If Peter is taller than Mary then Peter is older than Mary. 
+
+Perhaps it might be possible to introduce additional new symbols to represent
+such ideas. But then the system of Venn diagrams will get really complicated
+and difficult to use. So now that we know the limitations of Venn diagrams, we
+should be in a better position to know when they are useful and when they are
+not.
+
+a. Is this a suitable Venn diagram for showing the relationships between four
+sets of objects? answer
+
+b. In the second diagram, there are four overlapping rectangles. Which area
+corresponds to those items which are A, B and D, but not C? answer
+
+  1. See if you can invent a new notation for representing a sentence such as "Felix is either a cat or a dog.". answer
+  2. This is a difficult question. How would you draw a Venn diagram to represent the relationships between five sets of objects? One possible answer can be found on Wikipedia here. 
+
+__previous tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_47.txt b/data/crtw_47.txt
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+## §1. Formal systems of logic
+
+_Sentential logic_ (SL) is a _formal system of logic_. It is a very simple
+system of logic. When people study formal logic this is usually the first
+thing that they would study. Other more complicated systems include for
+example _predicate logic_ (PL), and _modal logic_.
+
+So what is a system of logic? Basically, it is a set of rules that tell us how
+to make use of special symbols to construct sentences and do proofs. To define
+a particular system of logic, we need to specify :
+
+  1. The _formal language_ of the system
+  2. The _semantic rules_ for the formal language
+  3. The _rules of proof_ for the language
+
+A formal language in a system of logic is a language with precisely specified
+rules that tell us how to construct grammatical sentences. Such rules are
+called _syntactic rules_. They are equivalent to the rules of grammar you find
+in English or Cantonese.
+
+The semantic rules are rules for interpreting the sentences in the language.
+They tell us what the sentences mean and the conditions under which the
+sentences are true or false.
+
+The rules of proof are rules that specify how logical proofs are to be
+constucted. They tell us what conclusions can be derived given certain initial
+assumptions.
+
+## §2. Why study formal systems of logic?
+
+There are many reasons for creating and studying such formal systems of logic:
+
+  * Systems of logic can be used to _formalize_ arguments in _natural languages_. A natural language is a language that is used for normal everyday communication in a human society. So languages such as Japanese, Irish, and French are all natural languages. By _formalization_ we refer to the process of translating arguments or sentences in natural languages into the notations of formal logic. The reason for carrying out formalization is that very often they can help us understand the logical structure of arguments better, by identifying patterns of valid arguments. Also, the rules of proof in a formal system of logic are precisely specified. By formalizing an argument we can use the rules of proof to check whether the argument can indeed be proved to be valid.
+  * Because the rules of formal systems of logic are defined very clearly, we can program them into a computer and get a computer to construct and evaluate proofs quickly and automatically. This is particularly important in areas such as _Artificial Intelligence_ , where many researchers teach computers to use formal logic in reasoning.
+  * Linguists are scientists who study natural languages. Many linguists also study formal languages and use them to compare and contrast with natural languages.
+  * Many philosophers are also interested in formal systems of logic. One reason is that natural languages are sometimes not precise enough to express certain ideas clearly. So sometimes they turn to formal systems of logic instead.
+  * Formal systems of logic are also interesting in their own right. Logicians and mathematicians are interested in finding out what they can or cannot prove, and also their many other logical properties. Formal systems of logic also play an important role in understanding the foundations of set theory and mathematics.
+
+__next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_48.txt b/data/crtw_48.txt
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+## §1. The language of SL
+
+To define the language of SL, we need to specify the _symbols_ or the
+_vocabulary_ of SL. These are the basic building blocks out of which more
+complicated expressions are to be constructed. There are three kinds of
+symbols in SL :
+
+1\. _Sentence letters_ : A, B, C, etc. These capital letters are used to
+translate sentences. If we run out of sentence letters we can always add
+subscripts to them to make new ones, e.g. A1 , B274, etc..
+
+2\. Five _sentential connectives_ :
+
+~ (tilde, or the negation sign)  
+& (ampersand, or the conjunction sign)  
+∨ (the wedge, or the disjunction sign)  
+→ (the arrow)  
+↔ (the double-arrow)
+
+3\. _Open and close brackets_ : ( )
+
+## §2. Construction of WFFs
+
+The set of sentence letters, connectives, and brackets constitutes the set of
+_symbols of SL_. An _expression of SL_ is simply any string of one or more
+symbols of SL:
+
+  1. ABCDF&&&&(())))→ABCB12356A
+  2. P
+  3. (P&Q) 
+  4. ~~(P&Q)) 
+
+Now we come to syntax, the rules that tell us which of the expressions of SL
+are grammatical, and which are not. A grammatical expression is called a
+_well-formed formula_ (WFF). A WFF of SL is any expression of SL that can be
+constructed according to these _rules of formation_ :
+
+**Rules of formation for SL**
+
+  1. All sentence letters are WFFs.
+  2. If φ is a WFF, then ~φ is a WFF.
+  3. If φ and ψ are WFFs, then (φ&ψ), (φvψ), (φ→ψ), (φ↔ψ) are also WFFs.
+  4. Nothing else is a WFF.
+
+Some comments on these rules :
+
+  * The first rule tells us that symbols such as "A", "B", "C" are all WFFs.
+  * "φ" in rule 2 is a Greek symbol, which nowadays is pronounced by many English speakers as "phi" (as in "Hifi"). (Note: this is probably not the correct ancient Greek pronuciation!) It is a _variable_ that stands for any arbitrary thing. What rule 2 tells us is that whatever φ is, if it is a WFF, then when you add "~" to the front of φ you will end up with a new and longer WFF. So from rule 1, we know that "A" is a WFF. Then we can apply rule 2 to "A" to infer that "~A" is also a WFF. If we apply rule 2 again, then we can see that "~~A" is also a WFF.
+  * "ψ" in rule 3 is a Greek symbol pronounced as "psi" (as in "psychology"). It is also a variable. Consider the formula "(P&~P)". This is a WFF because "P" is a WFF according to rule 1, so "~P" is also a WFF. Combining them according to rule 3 then, "(P&~P)" is also a WFF.
+  * However, even though "~P" is a WFF, "(~P)" is not, because as we can see from rule 3, any WFF that contains a pair of brackets must have at least one of the four other connectives inside.
+  * As you can see, the negation sign always connect to one single WFF to make a longer WFF, and is called a _one-place connective_. Whereas all other connectives connect two WFFs to make a new one and are called _binary_ or _2-place connectives_. Notice that all these connectives combine with WFFs to make new WFFs. A WFF is like a sentence which is why these connectives are called “sentential connectives”.
+
+Are these expressions WFF?
+
+  1. P answer
+  2. ~~~~~~~~~~(P&Q) answer
+  3. (P∨Q∨R) answer
+  4. (~(P&S)) answer
+  5. (~P) answer
+  6. ((P↔Q)) answer
+  7. ~(~G&~(~P&~Q)) answer
+
+  1. Suppose a WFF contains only three symbols. How many sentence letters would there be in this WFF? Is it possible for the WFF to contain the connective "&"? answer
+  2. How many symbols are there in the longest WFF in SL? answer
+  3. How many occurrences of binary and 1-place connectives are there in "~(~~(~P&Q)∨S)"? answer
+
+## §3. Grammatical categories
+
+Here are some useful terms for talking about WFFs and their parts. If φ and ψ
+are WFFs, then :
+
+  * (φ&ψ) is a _conjunction_ where φ and ψ are the first and second _conjunct_ respectively.
+  * (φvψ) is a _disjunction_ where φ and ψ are the two _disjuncts_.
+  * (φ→ψ) is a _conditional_ sentence where φ is the _antecedent_ and ψ the _consequent_. Note that it is a mistake to say that ψ is the conclusion as this conditional sentence need not be an argument.
+  * (φ↔ψ) is a _biconditional_ sentence.
+  * ~φ is the _negation_ of φ.
+
+So for example :
+
+  * "(P&Q)" is a conjunction.
+  * "((P&Q)∨(R↔Q))" is a disjunction.
+  * "~(P→(Q∨S))" is the negation of "(P→(Q∨S))".
+  * "~(P&Q)" is the antecedent of "(~(P&Q)→((P&S)↔Q))".
+
+## §4. Scope
+
+By the _scope_ of a connective α in a WFF φ we mean the shortest WFF in φ that
+contains α. Examples :
+
+  1. The scope of “&” in “~(P **&** Q)” is “(P&Q)”. “&” is of course contained in the whole WFF, but it is not the shortest WFF that contains it. “&Q” is a shorter expression that contains “&” but it is not a WFF.
+  2. The scope of “&” in “(~(~P **&** Q)→P)” is “(~P **&** Q)”.
+
+## §5. Main connective
+
+The _main connective_ in a WFF φ is the connective that has the widest scope.
+Here are some examples where the main connectives are highlighted in red:
+
+  1. **~** (P&Q) 
+  2. **~** ~~(P&Q) 
+  3. **~** (~P&(P&Q)) 
+  4. (~(~P&Q) **→** P)
+  5. **~** (~(~P&Q)↔P)
+  6. ((~M&N) **&** R) 
+  7. (~(~M&N) **&** R) 
+
+You will probably realize that we can use the main connective of a WFF to
+define whether it is a negation, a biconditional or a conditional, a
+disjunction or a conjunction.
+
+Answer the following questions :
+
+  1. Which is the first conjunct of "((P&Q)&R)"? answer
+  2. Which is the second disjunct of "((P∨Q)&R)"? answer
+  3. Which is the second disjunct of the first conjunct of "((P∨Q)&R)"? answer
+  4. Suppose the antecedent of a conditional is a disjunction where both disjuncts are "P", and the consequent is the negation of the antecedent. What does this conditional look like? answer
+  5. Give an example of a conjunctive WFF where the first conjunct is the negation of the second conjunct. answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_49.txt b/data/crtw_49.txt
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+## §1. What is a truth-table?
+
+We start with _truth-tables_ for the sentential connectives in SL. A truth-
+table shows how the _truth-value_ of a complex WFF depends on the truth-values
+of its component WFFs. So what are truth-values?
+
+In SL there are only two truth-values : T and F, which stands for _truth_ and
+_falsity_. To say that a statement has truth-value T is just to say that it is
+true. To say that its truth-value is F is to say that it is false. Notice that
+in SL we assume the principle of _bivalence_ : a WFF either has truth-value T
+or F. Some systems of logic, such as fuzzy logic, reject the principle of
+bivalence. Notice also that some logic or engineering textbooks use "1" and
+"0" in place of "T" and "F".
+
+Let us now look at the truth-table of each of the sentential connectives.
+
+## §2. Negation
+
+Consider the statement "whales are mammals." Let us use the sentence-letter
+"P" to translate this statement. (We can of course use any sentence letter we
+want.) This just means we are now taking the symbol "P" to have the same
+meaning as "whales are mammals." But suppose you disagree with the statement.
+Then you might express your disagreement by saying things like :
+
+  * Whales are not mammals.
+  * It is not true that whales are mammals.
+  * It is not the case that whales are mammals.
+
+In sentential logic, these three different sentences are all translated as
+"~P". Obviously, "P" and "~P" have opposite truth-values - if one is true then
+the other one must be false, and vice versa. The truth-table displayed here is
+the truth-table for the negation sign. It shows that when you have a WFF and
+you add the negation sign in front of it to make a new WFF, you end up with a
+WFF that has the opposite truth-value.
+
+Notice that we use the Greek symbol "φ" in the table to stand for any WFF. So
+the table tells us that when "P" is true, "~P" is F, and when "(Q&~R)" is F,
+"~(Q&~R)" is T, etc.
+
+## §3. Conjunction
+
+Now consider these two statements : "it is raining" and "it is hot". Each of
+them can be either true or false independently of the other, so in terms of
+their truth-values there are four different possibilities :
+
+  1. It is raining. It is also hot.
+  2. It is raining. But it is not hot.
+  3. It is not raining. But it is hot.
+  4. It is not raining. It is also not hot.
+
+Now what about the truth-value of the complex statement "it is raining and it
+is hot"? What would be its truth-value in each of the four situations? This
+question is easy to answer because we know that this statement is true only in
+the first situation, and false in the other three.
+
+In sentential logic we can translate this complex conjunction using "&" to
+conjoin the two conjuncts. The truth-table on the left shows how the truth-
+value of a conjucntion depends on the truth-values of the conjuncts, just as
+in the example we have looked at. The first row of truth-values tells us that
+when the first and second conjuncts are true, the whole WFF is true. The other
+three rows tell us that the conjunction is false in all other situations.
+
+## §4. Disjunction
+
+The disjunction symbol "∨" is usually used to translate "or". The truth-table
+on the left tells us that a disjunction is false when both disjuncts are
+false. Otherwise it is always true.
+
+Notice that the first row tells us that the disjunction is true when both
+disjuncts are true. In other words, if "(P∨Q)" is used to translate "Either
+Peter will leave, or Amie will leave.", and it turns out that they both leave,
+then the whole complex statement is still true.
+
+There are two things to be said if you think this is counter-intuitive. First,
+one might say that a better translation of "(P∨Q)" is "Either P or Q (or
+both)." Second, it is arguable that there are certain uses in ordinary
+language where "either ___ or ___" is considered to be false even when the
+disjuncts are considered to be true. For example, when ordering from a set
+menu in a restaurant you might be told that you can either have the salad or
+you can have the soup, but presumably it is understood that you cannot have
+both! Here the statement is better understood as "either P or Q (but not
+both)." These two senses of "or" are called _inclusive-or_ and _exclusive-or_
+respectively. The disjunctive sign "∨" in SL should always be understood in
+the inclusive sense. To express "P or Q" in the exclusive sense one might use
+the WFF "((P∨Q)&~(P&Q))" instead. This is an example of how formal logic can
+actually help us understand better the linguistic usages of natural languages.
+
+**In this web site, you should take "or" to mean inclusive-or, unless
+otherwise indicated.**
+
+## §5. Biconditional
+
+Suppose you are at a party, and you are wondering if your friend, Jane, is
+around. You asked another friend, and he replies, "Jane is at the party if and
+only if Matthew is at the party." If you accept this statement as true, what
+can you conclude from it? Of course this statement on its own does not tell
+you whether Jane is here or not. But it does tell you that if she is here,
+then Matthew is also here, and if one of them is not at the party, then the
+other person is absent as well. This sense of "if and only if" (or "iff") is
+captured in the truth-table on the left.
+
+## §6. The Material Conditional
+
+The arrow sign is often translated as "If ... then ...". Its truth-table is
+probably the most difficult one to understand among the ones you have seen so
+far. Perhaps it will be easier to remember the truth-table the following way.
+Suppose you make a conditional statement such as "If I have lots of money then
+I shall be happy." Under what condition will this statement be false?
+Obviously, your statement is false if you have a lot of money but still you
+are not happy. In other words, when the antecedent is true and the consequent
+is false, the whole conditional statement is false. This is exactly what the
+second row of the truth-table says. Just remember that the conditional is true
+in all other situations.
+
+This explanation is not quite the full and correct account of why the truth-
+table of "→" should look the way it does. We shall provide the full
+explanation in a separate tutorial in a different section.
+
+Are these statements true or false? answer
+
+  1. If "(P∨Q)" is true, either "P" is false or "Q" is false.
+  2. If "(P&Q)" is false, then "P" is false and "Q" is also false.
+  3. Whenever "(P∨Q)" is true, "(Q→P)" is also true.
+  4. In order for "(P→Q)" to be true, "Q" must be true. 
+
+We can actually use circuit diagrams to represent truth-tables. Look at the
+following diagram. Try clicking the switches to see how you might turn the
+light on.
+
+Suppose "P" means **the switch on the left is down** , and "Q" means **the
+switch on the right is down**. What WFF would you use to describe the switch
+settings that would turn on the light? answer
+
+Assuming the same meaning for "P" and "Q", what WFF would you use to describe
+the switch settings that would turn on the light in this second circuit?
+answer
+
+Now suppose "P" means **the switch on the left is UP** , and "Q" means **the
+switch on the right is UP**. Which is the right WFF to use? answer
+
+Consider this diagram :
+
+______________
+
+Now determine whether the following statements are true of the diagram, using
+the appropriate truth-tables to interpret the connectives :
+
+  1. All squares are red if and only if all squares are green. answer
+  2. If there is no red square, then there is a triangle. answer
+  3. Either there is a green circle, or there are no orange squares. answer
+
+Look at this animation for a few seconds (you should see them changing colors
+if your browser is working properly with Javascript enabled):
+
+____
+
+Suppose we use "P" to mean _the circle is orange_ , and "Q" to mean _the star
+is orange_. Which of the following WFF is **always true** of the animation?
+Click the button next to your answer.
+
+  1. (P&Q) answer
+  2. (PvQ) answer
+  3. (P→Q) answer
+
+How about this one? Which WFF is always true? answer
+
+____
+
+  1. (P↔Q)
+  2. ~P
+  3. (PvQ)
+
+How about this one? Which WFF is always true? answer
+
+____
+
+  1. (P↔Q)
+  2. (P→Q)
+  3. (P&Q)
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Most people would agree that the promotion of critical thinking is a central
+educational aim. But there are other complementary thinking skills which
+should not be neglected.
+
+One example is creativity. In our personal and professional life, we are
+always faced with problems which we need to resolve. We need creative thinking
+to come up with solutions, and we need critical thinking to evaluate and
+improve these solutions. In our website we have a learning module which is
+specifically about creativity.
+
+But there is another aspect of thinking that also deserves our attention, and
+that is metacognition, or “thinking about thinking”. Metacognition is about
+knowing more about our own thinking processes and being able to monitor and
+control them. Critical thinking must involve some amount of metacognition,
+because we need to become aware of our own reasoning, and find ways to improve
+them.
+
+Becoming a good and effective thinker is not just a matter of learning logic
+or other principles of reasoning. It also requires insight into our own minds,
+understanding our strengths and weaknesses. It is also important to obtain
+some understanding of human psychology, such as the typical cognitive biases
+that might influence our decisions. In addition, the successful application of
+theoretical knowledge also requires the right kind of personality and
+attitude. For example, persistence in problem-solving and a strong desire for
+self-improvement are both valuable traits that can enhance our thinking skills
+in the long run.
+
+What this means is that a disciplined and reflective mindset is very important
+for improving thinking. The development of this kind of metacognitive thinking
+is very often given very little emphasis in the teaching and learning of
+critical thinking. We suggest that the study of critical thinking should be
+understood as one aspect of the enhancement of metacognition. If you are
+interested to learn more about the connections between critical thinking and
+metacognition, we have made available a research paper on this topic below:
+
+**Joe Lau (2015) "Metacognitive Education: Going beyond critical thinking" In
+Davies and Barnett (eds.) (2015) _The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Thinking
+in Higher Education_. Palgrave.**
+
+Abstract: Metacognition is a matter of having knowledge about cognitive
+processes and being able to monitor and control these processes. This paper
+argues that the teaching of critical thinking should be expanded and re-
+conceptualized as part of a broader program for enhancing metacognition,
+especially at the university level. Metacognitive competence is necessary for
+coping with rapid changes in the modern world, and provides the foundation for
+improving thinking and learning. It is proposed that metacognitive competence
+includes four components: meta-conceptions, general knowledge about cognitive
+processes, meta self-knowledge, and self-regulation. The paper examines recent
+research to show how these components contribute to improvements in thinking
+and learning.
+
+__Download PDF preprint
+
+__Amazon book page for the edited volume
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. What are we doing?
+
+In this tutorial you will learn how to draw _full (or complete)_ truth-tables
+for more complex WFFs. What we want to do is to use a truth-table to tell us
+when a WFF is true and when it is false. Here is an analogy to help you
+understand what it is that we want to do.
+
+Suppose we have two arrows and they can only point either up or down. Then
+there are only four different possible ways they can be aligned:
+
+____ |  ____ |  ____ |  ____  
+---|---|---|---  
+  
+Now consider the sentence "the left arrow is pointing up and the right arrow
+is pointing up". Obviously, the sentence is true in the first situation, and
+false in the other three situations. If we consider a different sentence, such
+as "the right arrow is pointing down", then it is true in the second and
+fourth situation. Finally, what about a sentence such as "the left arrow is
+pointing up and the left arrow is pointing down"? This is an inconsistent
+statement, and clearly it is false in all four situations.
+
+Similarly, when we draw a truth-table for a WFF in SL, we are trying to list a
+set of possible situations to determine when the WFF is true (if ever) and
+when it is false (if ever).
+
+## §2. Drawing a truth-table
+
+To draw a truth-table for a WFF, follow the following procedure. First,
+remember that there are four regions in a full truth-table:
+
+Region #1 |  Region #2  
+---|---  
+  
+Region #3
+
+|
+
+Region #4  
+  
+To complete the truth-table for a WFF, you need to fill in the four regions
+according to this procedure:
+
+### Step 1
+
+Write down the WFF in region #2.
+
+### Step 2
+
+Identify the sentence letters that appear in the WFF, and write them down one
+after the other on a single row in region #1. You only need to write down a
+sentence letter once even if it has more than one occurrences in the WFF.
+
+So for example, given the WFF "(P→(PvQ))", the truth-table would look like
+this after the first two steps:
+
+P Q  |  (P→(PvQ))  
+---|---  
+  
+Region #3
+
+|
+
+Region #4  
+  
+### Step 3
+
+Region 3 is a list of all possible combination of truth-values that the
+sentence letters in region #1 can take. Each row in region #3 specifies a
+combination, and each combination is called an _assignment_ of truth-values.
+These assignments correspond to the different possible situations in the arrow
+example at the top.
+
+If there are _n_ sentence letters in region #1, each of which can have the
+truth-value T or F, then we know that there are 2 _n_ possible assignments of
+truth-values (21=2, 22=4, 23=8, 24=16, etc.). So in the truth-table above,
+there should be four assignments. We write them down one on each row in region
+#3:
+
+P Q  |  (P→(PvQ))  
+---|---  
+T T  
+T F  
+F T  
+F F  |  Region #4  
+  
+On each row, we write down under each sentence letter a truth-value which is
+the truth-value that the sentence letter receives under that assignment. So "T
+F" on the second row indicates an assignment where "P" is T and "Q" is F, and
+"F T" on the third row indicates an assignment where "P" is F and "Q" is T.
+
+In writing down the assignments it is important to use a systematic method to
+list all of them. Without such a method it is easy to miss some of them if
+there are many rows in the truth-table. When you compare the truth-tables of
+two or more WFFs, it is important to use the same method to list the truth-
+value assignments in the same order.
+
+The standard method is as follows: Start with the rightmost sentence letter in
+region #1. Write "T" down under the letter on the first row of region #3, and
+then "F" on the second row, alternating for every row until the last row. Then
+move on to the second sentence letter, and again start with "T". But this time
+alternate the truth-value only every _two_ rows. If there is a third sentence
+letter, alternate between "T"s and "F"s every _four_ rows. In general then,
+for the _n_ th sentence letter (starting from the right hand side), alternate
+between "T"s and "F"s every 2 _n_ -1 row.
+
+### Step 4
+
+The remaining task in completing the truth-table is to fill in region #4 by
+calculating the truth-value of the WFF under each assignment.
+
+First, let us define the _length_ of a WFF as the number of symbols of SL it
+contains. Each occurrence of a connective or sentence letter counts as a
+single symbol, and the open and close brackets are different symbols. So "P"
+has length 1, "~~Q" has length 3, and "((P&Q)→R)" has length 9 (not 10).
+
+We then apply this procedure. First, write down beneath each sentence letter
+of the WFF the truth-value it has under each assignment:
+
+P Q  |  (P→(PvQ))  
+---|---  
+T T  
+T F  
+F T  
+F F  |  T T T  
+T T F  
+F F T  
+F F F  
+  
+  
+Sentence letters are of course WFFs of length 1. We then look for the next
+shortest WFFs which are part of the whole WFF, and calculate their truth-
+values under each assignment. The next shortest WFFs should be of length 2,
+such as "~Q", but since there are no such WFFs, the next shortest WFF is
+"(PvQ)" of length 5. We write down its truth-value for each assignment under
+its _main operator_. Remember that the main operator of a WFF is the
+occurrence of a connective that has the widest scope.
+
+P Q  |  (P→(PvQ))  
+---|---  
+T T  
+T F  
+F T  
+F F  |  T TTT  
+T TTF  
+F FTT  
+F FFF  
+  
+  
+We then repeat this procedure with the next shortest WFF until we are finished
+with the whole WFF:
+
+P Q  |  (P→(PvQ))  
+---|---  
+T T  
+T F  
+F T  
+F F  |  T T TTT  
+T T TTF  
+F T FTT  
+F T FFF  
+  
+  
+The last column of truth-value we write down indicates the truth-values of the
+whole WFF under each of the assignments. This particular truth-table we have
+completed shows that the WFF is true under all the four possible assignments.
+
+If you can mentally carry out calculations of truth-values quickly, you can
+leave out writing the truth-values of the parts of WFF and just write down the
+truth-value of the whole WFF under each assignment. Then you will end up with
+this truth-table.
+
+P Q  |  (P→(PvQ))  
+---|---  
+T T  
+T F  
+F T  
+F F  |  T  
+T  
+T  
+T  
+  
+  
+Draw the following full truth-tables, and then click the WFFs to check if you
+have done it correctly.
+
+  1. (P&~Q)
+  2. ((P&Q)→R)
+  3. (~(P∨Q)→R)
+  4. ~(~(P↔(~P∨Q))→~R)
+  5. ~(S↔(~(P&Q)→R))
+
+## §3. Brackets
+
+Now that you know how to construct complex truth-tables, you can see why
+brackets are necessary. For example, “(A&B→C)” is ambiguous as between
+“((A&B)→C)” and “(A&(B→C))”. The truth-tables of the two WFFs are very
+different though :
+
+A| B| C| ((A&B)→C)  
+---|---|---|---  
+T| T| T| T  
+T| T| F| F  
+T| F| T| T  
+T| F| F| T  
+F| T| T| T  
+F| T| F| T  
+F| F| T| T  
+F| F| F| T  
+  
+A| B| C| (A&(B→C))  
+---|---|---|---  
+T| T| T| T  
+T| T| F| F  
+T| F| T| T  
+T| F| F| T  
+F| T| T| F  
+F| T| F| F  
+F| F| T| F  
+F| F| F| F  
+  
+Of course there are cases where the brackets do not matter. For example, it
+should be obvious that with “P&Q&R&S”, no matter where you place the brackets
+to turn it into a WFF, the resulting truth-table is always the same.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_51.txt b/data/crtw_51.txt
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+## §1. Logical properties
+
+Armed with truth-tables we can now use them to classify WFFs in SL according
+to their different logical status :
+
+### Tautology
+
+A _tautology_ is any WFF in SL that is true under all assignments of truth-
+values to its sentence letters. Examples:
+
+### Inconsistency
+
+An _inconsistent_ WFF is any WFF in SL that is false under all assignments of
+truth-values to its sentences letters:
+
+If a WFF is not inconsistent, then it is _consistent_. In other words, there
+is always at least one assignment where the WFF is true.
+
+### Contingency
+
+A _contingent_ WFF is any WFF in SL that is not inconsistent and not a
+tautology. In other words, there is at least one assignment under which it is
+true, and at least another assignment under which it is false. All single
+sentence letters are of course contingent. These WFFs are also contingent :
+(P&Q), (P∨Q), ~(P→~Q).
+
+True or false?
+
+  1. ~P is consistent. answer
+  2. Every tautology is consistent? answer
+  3. If a WFF is not a tautology, and is not inconsistent, then it is contingent? answer
+  4. All consistent WFFs are contingent. answer
+  5. All contingent WFFs are consistent. answer
+
+Determine whether these WFFs are tautological, contingent, or inconsistent:
+
+  1. P answer
+  2. ((P&~P)∨Q) answer
+  3. (~R∨(P→((Q→R)&(~S∨R)))) answer
+  4. (~Q→Q) answer
+  5. ((~P&~Q)↔(P∨Q)) answer
+  6. ((P&~P)&Q) answer
+
+## §2. Consistency
+
+Apart from talking about the properties of individual WFFs, we can also use
+truth-tables to identify logical relations between WFFs in SL.
+
+Earlier we talk about a single WFF being consistent or inconsistent. Actually
+we can also talk about consistency as the property of a set of one or more
+WFFs. A set of WFF is said to be _consistent_ (with each other) when there is
+at least one assignment of truth-value under which all the WFFs in the set are
+true. Otherwise the set of WFFs is inconsistent - there is not even one single
+assignment of truth-values that would make all the WFFs true.
+
+  1. If a set of WFFs is inconsistent, would the set become consistent by adding more WFFs to it? answer
+  2. If you have a set containing only tautologies, is the set consistent? answer
+  3. If A is consistent with B, and B is consistent with C, does it follow that A must be consistent with C? answer
+  4. If A is inconsistent with B, and B is consistent with C, does it follow that A must be inconsistent with C? answer
+  5. If X, Y and Z form an inconsistent set of WFFs, then X and Y are inconsistent with each other. answer
+  6. If X is an inconsistent WFF, and Y is an inconsistent WFF, then X is inconsistent with Y. answer
+
+## §3. Entailment
+
+Suppose we have a WFF φ and a set of (one or more) WFF ψ1...ψn. We define
+_entailment_ as follows :
+
+ψ1...ψn _entail_ φ if and only if **there is no assignment of truth-value
+under which ψ 1...ψn are true and φ is false**.
+
+So for example, ~P entails ~~~P. To show this we draw their truth-tables
+together :
+
+When P is true, ~P is false, and so is ~~~P. When P is F, ~P is true, and so
+is ~~~P. Since there is no assignment where ~P is true and ~~~P is false, the
+first entails the second.
+
+Another example :
+
+This tells us that (P↔Q), ~P entail ~Q. Note that under the second assignment,
+(P↔Q) and ~P are both F and ~Q is T. This does not show that there is no
+entailment. To prove entailment in this example, you need to ensure that when
+the first two WFFs are true, the third WFF must also be true. So the last
+assignment is the one to check.
+
+You should be able to work out for yourself that these claims are true :
+
+  * P, Q entail (P&Q)
+  * (P→Q), P entail Q
+  * (P∨Q), ~P entail Q
+
+In symbolic notation, we indicate entailment and failure of entailment as
+follows :
+
+Entailment : ψ1...ψn &models; φ No Entailment : ψ1...ψn ⊭ φ
+
+Equivalently we might also say :
+
+  * φ _follows from_ ψ1...ψn. 
+  * φ _is a logical consequence of_ ψ1...ψn. 
+  * ψ1...ψn _imply_ φ. 
+
+You might perhaps realize by now that entailment provides a more precise
+definition of validity in SL. An argument is valid when and only when it is
+impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false at the
+same time. What this means when the argument is an argument in SL is that the
+premises entail the conclusion in the way just defined.
+
+Notice that an argument in a formal system of logic is often called a
+_sequent_. So a valid argument in SL is called a "valid sequent", and an
+invalid argument in SL is called an "invalid sequent".
+
+Now that we know what entailment is, we can easily prove these two theorems :
+
+Theorem 1 : For any WFF φ, φ &models; φ.
+
+Proof : Since φ is identical to itself, there cannot be any assignment where φ
+is true and φ is false. So φ entails φ.
+
+Theorem 2 : For any WFFs φ1 ... φn and any tautology ψ, φ1 ... φn &models; ψ.
+
+In other words, a tautology is entailed by any set of WFFs. Proof : Given that
+ψ is a tautology, it is true under all assignments. So there is no assignment
+where ψ is false and φ1 ... φn are true. It does not matter what φ1 ... φn
+are.
+
+## §4. Logical equivalence
+
+_Logical equivalence_ can be defined in terms of entailment as follows :
+
+For any WFFs φ and ψ, φ is logically equivalent to ψ if and only if φ &models;
+ψ and ψ &models; φ.
+
+We might use this symbol "≡" to express logical equivalence :
+
+φ is logically equivalent to ψ : φ ≡ ψ
+
+Obviously, these claims are all true :
+
+  * For every WFF φ, φ is logically equivalent to itself.
+  * For every WFF φ, φ is logically equivalent to ~~φ.
+  * (P&Q) ≡ (Q&P) 
+  * (P∨Q) ≡ (Q∨P) 
+  * ~(P&Q) ≡ (~P∨~Q) 
+  * ~(P∨Q) ≡ (~P&~Q) 
+  * (P↔Q) ≡ (~Q↔~P) 
+
+## §5. Inter-definability of connectives
+
+We can show that some connectives can be defined in terms of others, e.g.
+
+(P→Q) ≡ (~P∨Q)  
+(P&Q) ≡ ~(~P∨~Q)  
+(P∨Q) ≡ ~(~P&~Q)  
+(P↔Q) ≡ ((P→Q)&(Q→P))
+
+## §6. Inconsistent WFFs entail everything
+
+You would probably find it surprising that given our definition of entailment,
+inconsistent WFFs entail every WFF. So for example, the following sequent is
+valid :
+
+P, ~P &models; Q
+
+This sequent is valid because there is no assignment under which P, ~P are
+true and Q is false. There is no such assignment simply because P, ~P cannot
+be true! By the same reasoning, the sequent will still be valid whatever WFF
+you replace Q with.
+
+No doubt you might find it hard to accept that from an inconsistent sentence,
+everything follows. Here is a way of understanding why we might want to live
+with a definition of entailment that has such a consequence. First of all,
+presumably we want the following sequent to be valid :
+
+The earth is round &models; Either the earth is round, or pigs can fly.
+
+On the other hand, we also want this sequent to be valid :
+
+Either the earth is round, or pigs can fly. The earth is not round. &models;
+Pigs can fly.
+
+If these two sequents are valid, then surely we should also have a valid
+sequent when we put the two together :
+
+The earth is round. The earth is not round. &models; Pigs can fly.
+
+Of course, you can replace "pigs can fly" with any statement you want. This
+shows that as long as we accept that (1) from any statement "P" we can
+conclude "(PvQ)", and (2) from "(PvQ)" and "~P" we can conclude "Q", then we
+would have to accept that "P" & "~P" entail all statements!
+
+If you still find it strange that from an inconsistent sentence, everything
+follows, you might be interested in this (supposedly true) story about the
+famous philosopher / logician Bertrand Russell. He was asked the question,
+“You mean from the statement 2+2=5 it follows that you are the Pope? Can you
+prove it?” Russell said “yes” and then came up with this proof on the spot:
+
+  1. Suppose 2+2=5.
+  2. Subtracting 2 from both sides we get 2=3.
+  3. Transposing, we have 3=2.
+  4. Subtracting 1 from both sides, we get 2=1.
+
+“Now”, Russell continues, “the Pope and I are two. Since two equals one, then
+the Pope and I are one. Hence I am the Pope.”
+
+Are these statements true or false?
+
+  1. If a contingent WFF X entails another WFF Y, then Y is also contingent. answer
+  2. If a contingent WFF X entails another WFF Y, then Y cannot be inconsistent. answer
+  3. If a tautology X entails a WFF Y, then Y is also a tautology. answer
+  4. If the conclusion of a sequent is inconsistent, then the sequent must be valid. answer
+  5. If A is inconsistent with B, and C entails B, does it follow that A must be inconsistent with C? Why? answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. An example
+
+Consider this particular argument :
+
+[Premise 1] The pollution index is high.  
+[Premise 2] If the pollution index is high, we should stay indoors.  
+[Conclusion] We should stay indoors.
+
+This argument is of course valid, as it is an instance of _modus ponens_. To
+use the methods of SL to show that it is indeed valid, we need to translate it
+from English into the language of SL. This process of translation is called
+_formalization_.
+
+First of all we need to find sentence letters to translate the different parts
+of the argument. Let us use the following _translation scheme_. A translation
+scheme in SL is simply a pairing of sentence letters of SL with statements in
+natural language. In carrying out formalization you should always write down
+the translation scheme first.
+
+Translation scheme :  
+P : The pollution index is high.  
+Q : We should stay indoors.
+
+Remember that “→” is used to translate “if ... then ___”. So using the above
+translation scheme we can formalize the argument as follows :
+
+Premise #1 : P  
+Premise #2 : (P→Q)  
+Conclusion : Q
+
+In SL we can rewrite this argument as a one line sequent, with the premises
+separated by comma :
+
+P, (P→Q) &models; Q
+
+## §2. Things to bear in mind
+
+There are a few things to bear in mind regarding formalization. First, we
+usually try to discern as much structure as we need in the original sentences.
+For example, consider this argument :
+
+Lychees are sweet and lemons are sour. Lychees are sweet.
+
+To show that the argument is valid, we need to formalize the premise as
+“(L&W)” rather than just “L”. Whereas we can just use “L” to formalize both
+the premise and the conclusion in the following argument :
+
+Lychees are sweet and lemons are sour. So, lychees are sweet and lemons are
+sour.
+
+Another point to remember is that in formalization we are in effect
+translating from a natural language into an artificial language. It is often
+not possible to find a translation that has exactly the same meaning as the
+original sentence. In such a case we should aim to find a wff that is closest
+in meaning, or which is logically equivalent. Take this valid argument for
+instance :
+
+Cinta will grow up whatever her parents think. But when Cinta grows up she
+will argue with her parents. So Cinta will argue with her parents.
+
+This argument can be formalized as a modus ponens argument :
+
+Translation scheme :  
+C : Cinta will grow up.  
+A : Cinta will argue with her parents.
+
+C, (C→A) &models; A
+
+However, notice the following features about our translation :
+
+  1. We are ignoring the phrase “whatever her parents think”. This is legitimate as the shorter version should be equivalent to the original one. 
+  2. We are ignoring the word “but” in the second premise. The word adds contrast and emphasis in natural language, but it is irrelevant to the validity of the argument. 
+  3. We are ignoring the difference in tense in ”Cinta will grow up” in the first premise, and “Cinta grows up” in the second premise. There are no symbols in SL to indicate tense, but here ignoring tense is acceptable because it does not affect the assessment of validity. But sometimes tense cannot be ignored. 
+
+This argument is valid : “If there is a stock market crash tomorrow Paul will
+be poor. There is a stock market crash tomorrow. So Paul will be poor.” But if
+we change the conclusion to “Paul is poor” it will no longer be valid, and it
+would be a mistake to use the same sentence letter to translate both “Paul is
+poor” and “Paul will be poor”.
+
+## §3. Translating natural language connectives
+
+So far we have said that the connectives can be used to translate their
+natural language counterparts :
+
+~| It is not the case that  
+---|---  
+→| if ... then ___  
+↔| if and only if  
+&| and  
+∨| or  
+  
+But in fact many other locutions can be translated using these five sentential
+connectives :
+
+### Negation
+
+Suppose “P” translates the sentence “Santa exists”. Then “~P” can be used to
+translate these sentences :
+
+  * Santa does not exist.
+  * It is not the case that Santa exists.
+  * It is false that Santa exists.
+
+### Conjunction
+
+(P&Q) can be used to translate:
+
+  * P and Q. 
+  * P but Q. 
+  * Although P, Q. 
+  * P, also Q. 
+  * P as well as Q. 
+
+### Disjunction
+
+(P ∨ Q)
+
+  * P or Q. 
+  * Either P or Q. 
+  * P unless Q. [Comments] 
+  * Unless Q, P.
+
+### Conditional
+
+(P→Q)
+
+  * If P then Q. 
+  * P only if Q. [Comments] 
+  * Q if P. 
+  * Whenever P, Q. 
+  * Q provided that P. 
+  * P is sufficient for Q. 
+  * Q is necessary for P. 
+
+### Biconditional
+
+(P↔Q)
+
+  * P if and only if Q. 
+  * P iff (if and only if) Q. 
+  * P when and only when Q. 
+  * P is equivalent to Q. 
+  * P is both necessary and sufficient for Q. 
+
+Translate these sentences into SL, preserving as much structure as possible.
+Provide the translation scheme in each case. Use the negation sign wherever
+appropriate.
+
+  1. The school has collapsed, but it is not true that five students died. answer
+  2. This footprint comes from a man or a woman. answer
+  3. It is not the case that May is in Oxford or Hong Kong. answer
+  4. If you want to go, then I shall go with you if it is sunny. answer
+  5. If the weather is bad or I am sick, then I will not go with you. answer
+  6. Whether Peter is coming or not, Mary is not going to come. answer
+
+__P : Peter is coming.  
+M : Mary is going to come.
+
+You can formalize the sentence as either ((P→~M)&(~P→~M)) or simply ~M.
+
+[But why not ((P→~M)∨(~P→~M))?]
+
+  7. Unless you try to improve yourself, and unless you improve your attitude, you are not going to succeed. answer
+  8. I will go to the concert only if Christina and Ricky do not sing together. answer
+  9. A man and a woman ate the whole cake. answer
+
+__Use a single sentence letter to formalize the whole statement. Note that the
+statement is NOT equivalent to "A man ate the whole cake and a woman ate the
+whole cake. " Why?
+
+  10. Jane and Matthew are fond of each other. answer
+
+Formalize these two statements in sentential logic and use truth-tables to
+check whether they are logically equivalent:
+
+  * If there are intelligent aliens, then either they are already here, or the earth is not an interesting place to visit. 
+  * If the earth is an interesting place to visit, then intelligent aliens are already here if they exist. 
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+Translation scheme:
+
+A : Intelligent aliens exist.  
+E : Intelligent aliens are already on the earth.  
+I : The earth is an interesting place to visit.
+
+The statements can then be formalized as (A→(Ev~I)) and (I→(A→E))
+respectively. Their truth-tables will show that they are logically equivalent.
+
+For more exercises, please go through Exercise 1.3 at
+http://logic.tamu.edu/cgi-bin/quizmaster
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_53.txt b/data/crtw_53.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..980ab4bffbba31160d117715aa5227ba0e1cfd11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_53.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+## §1. The full truth-table method
+
+In this tutorial we study how to make use of _full truth-table method_ to
+check the validity of a sequent in SL. Consider this valid sequent:
+
+P, (P→Q) &models; Q
+
+To prove that it is valid, we draw a table where the top row contains all the
+different sentence letters in the argument, followed by the premises, and then
+the conclusion. Then, using the same method as in drawing complex truth-
+tables, we list all the possible assignments of truth-values to the sentence
+letters on the left. In our particular example, since there are only two
+sentence letters, there should be 4 assignments :
+
+P| Q| | | P| | | (| P| →| Q| )| | | Q  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+T| T| | | | | | | | | | | | |  
+T| F| | | | | | | | | | | | |  
+F| T| | | | | | | | | | | | |  
+F| F| | | | | | | | | | | | |  
+  
+The next step is to draw the truth-table for all the premises and also the
+conclusion:
+
+In the completed truth-table, the first two cells in each row give us the
+assignment of truth-values, and the next three cells tell us the truth-values
+of the premises and the conclusion under each of the assignment. If an
+argument is valid, then every assignment where the premises are all true is
+also an assignment where the conclusion is true. It so happens that there is
+only one assignment (the first row) where both premises are true. We can see
+from the last cell of the row that the conclusion is also true under such an
+assignment. So this argument has been shown to be valid.
+
+In general, to determine validity, go through every row of the truth-table to
+find a row where ALL the premises are true AND the conclusion is false. Can
+you find such a row? If not, the argument is valid. If there is one or more
+rows, then the argument is not valid.
+
+Note that in the table above the conclusion is false in the second and the
+forth row. Why don't they show that the argument is invalid? answer
+
+## §2. More examples
+
+Remember that “(P→Q), ~P, therefore ~Q” is invalid. Look at the truth-table,
+and determine which line is supposed to show that? answer
+
+To show that a sequent is invalid, we find one or more assignment where all
+the premises are true and the conclusion is false. Such an assignment is known
+as an _invalidating assignment_ (a counterexample) for the sequent.
+
+Let's look at a slightly more complex sequent and draw the truth-table:
+
+(~P∨Q), ~(Q→P) &models; (Q↔~P)
+
+Again we draw a truth-table for the premises and the conclusion :
+
+To help us calculate the truth-values of the WFFs under each assignment, we
+use the full truth-table method to write down the truth-values of the sentence
+letters first, and then work out the truth-values of the whole WFFs step by
+step. The truth-values of the complete WFFs under each assignment is written
+beneath the main operator of the WFFs. As you can see, the critical one to
+check is the third assignment. Since there is no assignment where the premises
+are true and the conclusion is false, the sequent is valid.
+
+Examine this table and answer the questions:
+
+  1. Which sequent is being tested for validity in this table? answer
+  2. Is the sequent valid according to this table? answer
+
+True or false?
+
+  1. For any three formula φ, ψ, and γ, if φ &models; ψ, and ψ &models; γ, then φ &models; γ. answer
+  2. For any two formula φ and ψ, if φ &models; ψ, then ψ &models; φ? answer
+  3. For any two formula φ and ψ, if φ does not entail ψ, then ψ entails φ answer
+
+Use the full truth-table method to determine the validity of these sequents:
+
+  * ((P→Q)&R), (~Q∨R) &models; (P↔(Q↔R))
+  * (((P&Q)&~S) & (~Q↔R)), ~(~R→S) &models; ((P→Q)→(S→R))
+
+See this page for the answers.
+
+Confirm for yourself that the WFFs in each pair of WFFs below are logically
+equivalent to each other :
+
+  * (P→Q), (~Q→~P)
+  * (P↔Q), (~P↔~Q)
+  * ~(PvQ), (~P&~Q)
+  * ~(P&Q), (~Pv~Q)
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_54.txt b/data/crtw_54.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b0115f9b38e35b28d96e8e5247022f49d516e243
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_54.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+The full-truth-table method can be used to determine whether any given sequent
+in SL is valid or not. But as the number of sentence letters in the sequent
+increases, the number of rows we have to fill in increases exponentially. Here
+we introduce a more efficient method for determining validity.
+
+Here is the reasoning behind the so-called _indirect method_ (or the
+_reductio_ method): the full truth-table method shows that an argument is
+valid by examining all possible assignments of truth-values. However, to show
+that an argument is not valid, all we need to do is to find one assignment
+where all the premises are true and the conclusion is false. So in this method
+we first assume that the argument is invalid, and try to find one invalidating
+assignment. If we succeed, then the argument has been shown to be invalid.
+Otherwise it will lead to inconsistency, and we can conclude that the argument
+is valid after all.
+
+## §1. A valid sequent
+
+Let us use _modus ponens_ again as a simple example. We start by writing down
+the premises and the conclusion :
+
+P| (P→Q)| Q  
+---|---|---  
+| |  
+  
+If the sequent is invalid, then there is at least one assignment where both
+premises are true and the conclusion is false. So let us suppose this is true.
+So we write T below the premises and F under the conclusion :
+
+P| (P→Q)| Q  
+---|---|---  
+T | T| F  
+  
+This tells us that if the argument is invalid, “P” is true and “Q” is false.
+So we write the truth-values of these sentence letters on the second row :
+
+P| (P→Q)| Q  
+---|---|---  
+T | T T F| F  
+  
+But now we have discovered a contradiction : If “P” is T and “Q” is F, then
+“(P→Q)” has to be false, and not T as indicated. Since the original assumption
+that the sequent is invalid leads to a contradiction, we conclude that the
+assumption must be false. So the sequent is actually valid.
+
+## §2. An invalid sequent
+
+Let us now look at the following sequent. Again we assume that it is invalid
+by writing T below the main operators of the premises and F below that of the
+conclusion :
+
+(P∨Q)| (~P&Q)| (Q↔P)  
+---|---|---  
+T | T| F  
+  
+We now proceed to determine the truth-value of the individual sentence letters
+under such an assignment. Note that the second premise is a conjunction, so if
+it is true, then both conjuncts must be true. In other words, Q has to be true
+and so P has to be false :
+
+(P ∨ Q)| (~P & Q)| (Q ↔ P)  
+---|---|---  
+F T T | T F T T| T F F  
+10 1 8 | 5 6 2 4| 7 3 9  
+  
+The numbers on the third row shows the order in which the truth-values are
+filled in, to help you understand how the table is arrived at : Since “(~P&Q)”
+is T, “Q” is T (step 4) and “~P” is T (step 5), which also means that “P” is F
+(step 6). We then copy the truth-values of “P” and “Q” to other wffs (steps
+7-10). As you can see, this particular assignment of truth-value does not lead
+to any contradiction. So this assignment shows that it is possible for the
+premises to be true and the conclusion to be false at the same time. We have
+therefore come up with an invalidating assignment that proves that the sequent
+is invalid, and without having to list all the possible assignments.
+
+To show that a sequent is valid using the indirect method, why do we have to
+make the assumption that the sequent is invalid, and show that it leads to a
+contradiction? Why not just assume that it is valid, and see if we can
+construct an assignment of truth-values which would make the premises and the
+conclusion true?
+
+answer
+
+__This is because the sequent can still be invalid even if it is possible for
+the premises and the conclusion to be true under the same assignment. There
+might be other assignments under which the premises are true and the
+conclusion is false. We need to show that no such assignments are possible to
+prove validity.
+
+Suppose someone applies the indirect method in the following way, and says,
+"P&Q is false at step 4, so P is F at step 5 and ... but P is T at step 11. So
+there is a contradiction, and the sequent is valid." What is wrong with this
+reasoning?
+
+~(P & Q)| (~( Q & S) ↔ ~ R )| (R → (~ P & S))  
+---|---|---  
+T F F F | T F F F T F T| T F F T F F  
+1 5 4 6| 15 12 13 13 2 17 16| 7 3 9 11 8 10  
+answer
+
+__Although "(P &Q)" is F at step 4, it does not follow that both "P" and "Q"
+are F (steps 5 and 6). Perhaps only one of them is F. So what has been shown
+is only that there are no invalidating assignments where "P" and "Q" are both
+false. It does not show that there are no other invalidating assignments. Here
+is the correct answer :  ~ (P & Q)| (~( Q & S) ↔ ~ R )| (R → (~ P & S))  
+---|---|---  
+T T F T | F T T T T F T| T F F T F T  
+1 16 17 11| 7 10 8 9 2 6 5 | 4 3 14 15 13 12  
+  
+Consider this sequent : ((P∨~Q)→R), (~R→Q) &models; (R↔P).
+
+Is it correct to say that this sequent is valid when "R" is false, and invalid
+when "R" is true?
+
+answer
+
+__No. A sequent is either valid or it is not. Validity is not relative to
+assignments. If there exists any assignment under which the premises are true
+and the conclusion is false, then the sequent is invalid (not valid). Compare
+: If you have had sex then you are not a virgin. It would be wrong to say that
+you are a virgin when you are not having sex, and that you are not a virgin
+when you are having it!
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_55.txt b/data/crtw_55.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..da5918109a25ae591e0a44d4ac6b61ef5d27213f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_55.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Please complete these exercises by filling in the blanks with the correct
+truth-values. You should find the first four sequents to be valid, and the
+next four invalid. There might be more than one correct answer even though the
+answer provided here allows only one of them. Sorry about this.
+
+( | P | → |  ( | Q | & |  ( | R | → | S | )))  | P | ~  | S |  &models; | ~ |
+(  | Q | & | R | )  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  
+( | P  | ↔ |  ( | R | → |  ( | P  | ∨ |  ~ |  Q | )))  |  ~ |  ( | R  | → |  (
+| P  | ∨ | Q | ))  |  &models; |  Q  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  
+( | ~ | ( | P | & | Q | )  | & |  ~ | (  | ~  | P | ∨ |  ~  | Q | ))  |
+&models; | ~ | ( | ~ | ( |  P | ∨ | Q | )  | ↔ |  ( | ~ |  P | & | ~ | Q |  ))  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  |  |  
+~ | (( | ~ | P | & | Q | )  | ∨ |  ( | R | → | S | ))  | ( | ~ | ( | ~ | P | ∨
+| ~  | Q | ) |  & | ~ |  ( | R | → | S | ))  |  &models; | ( | ~ |  (( | R | →
+|  | S | ) | & | ~ | P | )  | ↔ |  ( | P | ∨ |  ( | R | ↔ | S | )))  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  
+((( | P | ∨ | Q | )  | → | R | )  | ↔ |  (( | ~ | P | & | ~ | Q | ) | ↔ | R |
+))  |  &models; | ( | P |  ∨ | Q | )  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  
+( | P | → |  ( | Q | & | ~ | R | )) | ( | ~ | P | ∨ | ~ | ( | ~ | Q | ∨ | ~ |
+S | ))  |  &models; | ( | S | → | ( | ~ | P  | ∨ | T | ))  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  
+( | ~  |  R |  →  | ~  | Q | )  | (( | ~  | P | & | R | )  | & | ~  | Q | )  |
+&models; | ~ | ( |  P |  ↔ |  ( | ~  | R | ∨ | Q | ))  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  
+(( | P | → | Q | ) |  →  | ( | ~ | P | ∨ | Q | ))  | ( | ~ | ( | P | ∨ | Q | )
+|  & | ( | ~ | P | & | ~ | Q | ))  |  &models; | ~ | ( | ~ | (( | P | → | Q |
+) |  & | ( | P | ∨ | ~ | Q | ))  | ∨ |  ( | P | ↔ | Q | ))  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  
+  
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_56.txt b/data/crtw_56.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fb6ebcab0ce9c06a6fd2da918a392385f2191bea
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+++ b/data/crtw_56.txt
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+## §1. Truth-functionality
+
+In this chapter we shall explain why the truth-table of "→" should look the
+way it does. The explanation might not be easy to understand. But do try your
+best and read the whole thing slowly and carefully, more than once if
+necessary.
+
+First recall the concept of a _sentential connective_. A sentential connective
+is simply a symbol or expression that connects to one or more sentence to form
+a new sentence. Expressions such as "John says that" and "It is true that" are
+both sentential connectives, as we can add these expressions to the front of a
+statement to form new statements:
+
+  * Snow is white.
+  * **It is true** that snow is white.
+  * **John says that** snow is white.
+
+A _truth-functional_ sentential connective is a special kind of sentential
+connective. To say that a connective is truth-functional is to say that the
+truth-value of the new sentence depends only on the truth-value of the
+component sentences, and nothing else.
+
+So for example "~" is a truth-functional connective, because the truth-value
+of "~φ" is simply the opposite of "φ". It does not depend on the meaning of φ
+or any other features. The same applies to all the other connectives in SL. In
+fact, if you can write down a truth-table for a connective, then it has to be
+a truth-functional connective, because by definition the truth-table tells you
+how the truth-value of the whole sentence depends on the truth-value of the
+component sentences and nothing else.
+
+But there can be connectives that are not truth-functional. Consider the
+sentential connective "Albert Einstein believed that". It is a sentential
+connective because you can put this in front of a sentence and end up with a
+new meaningful sentence. But it is not truth-functional because the truth of
+the new sentence is not determined by the truth-value of the embedded
+component sentence. Consider for example:
+
+  1. Albert Einstein believed that _1+1=2_.  
+
+  2. Albert Einstein believed that _Lee Teng-hui is the first elected president of Taiwan_. 
+
+Both embedded sentences in italics are true, but presumably statement (1) is
+true while statement (2) is false, since Albert Einstein probably has never
+heard of Lee. This shows that the connective "Albert Einstein believed that"
+cannot be truth-functional. If it were, the two sentences would have the same
+truth-value.
+
+## §2. "If ... then ..." and →
+
+What about "if ... then ..." ? It is very unlikely that it is a truth-
+functional connective with the same truth-table as "→". Here is why:
+
+  1. The truth-table of "(P→Q)" tells us that the whole sentence is true whenever the antecedent and the consequent are true. But this is counter-intuitive, e.g. "If London is in the UK then blackholes exist." 
+  2. "(P→Q)" is also true whenever "P" is false, e.g. "If London is not the capital of the United Kingdom then the earth is flat." is true, which again is problematic. 
+
+The problem seems to arise because in saying "if a then b" one seems to claim
+that there is some kind of connection between the truth of a and the truth of
+b. So whether the conditional is true or not depends on the connection, and
+not solely on the truth-values of a and b. This is why the connective is not
+truth-functional.
+
+So why do we still use "→" to translate "if ... then ..."? The short answer is
+that this is the only connective in SL that is closest in meaning to "if ...
+then ...", so this is the best we can do in a simple logical system such as
+SL. Of course, this still does not explain why we should pick the particular
+truth-table that "→" has. The longer answer is that if we use "→" to translate
+"if ... then ...", we want to make sure that certain logical properties are
+preserved.
+
+First of all, one thing that we accept is that "if φ then φ" is always true
+for any statement φ. So to preserve this fact, we need to ensure that the
+truth-value of "(φ→φ)" is always T whether φ is T or F. Since we are assuming
+that "→" is truth-functional, this implies that "(φ→ψ)" has the truth-value T
+whenever φ and ψ have the same truth-value, whatever that is. So we can now
+fill in half of the truth-table of "→":
+
+φ| ψ| | | (| φ| →| ψ| )  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+T| T| | | | | T| |  
+T| F| | | | | ?| |  
+F| T| | | | | ?| |  
+F| F| | | | | T| |  
+  
+So what we need to do is to fill in the remaining two rows. The second row of
+the truth-table is the easier one. A second fact about the conditional that we
+want to preserve is that when the antecedent of a conditional is true and the
+consequent is false, then the whole conditional should be false. Therefore :
+
+φ| ψ| | | (| φ| →| ψ| )  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+T| T| | | | | T| |  
+T| F| | | | | F| |  
+F| T| | | | | ?| |  
+F| F| | | | | T| |  
+  
+To fill in the third row of the truth-table, a different kind of argument is
+needed. This time we consider the properties that we _do not_ want "→" to
+possess. In particular, consider this sequent:
+
+(P→Q) &models; (Q→P)
+
+Surely we _do not_ want this argument to be valid. That means there should be
+an assignment where the premise is T and the conclusion is F. But this is not
+possible if "(P→Q)" is F when "P" is F and "Q" is T. So "(P→Q)" should be T
+under such an assignment. So finally combining the constraints we have
+considered we can see why the truth-table of "→" is the way it is:
+
+φ| ψ| | | (| φ| →| ψ| )  
+---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---  
+T| T| | | | | T| |  
+T| F| | | | | F| |  
+F| T| | | | | T| |  
+F| F| | | | | T| |  
+  
+In this tutorial we have looked at arguments that intend to show how the
+meaning of "if ... then ..." is different from that of "→". But we can now
+also understand why we still use the latter to translate the former in SL. The
+truth-table of "→" is deliberately constructed so that (a) it is a truth-
+functional connective, and (b) it captures some of the core logical properties
+of the natural language connective.
+
+Consider this statement : _It is not the case that if Tom is a philosopher
+then Tom is clever._
+
+Translate this statement into SL, and draw its truth-table. Show that the
+translated WFF entails "Tom is a philosopher" and "Tom is not clever." Can you
+see why this might be used to argue that "if P then Q" should not be analysed
+as "(P→Q)"?
+
+answer
+
+__One might think the statement should be translated as "~(P→Q)". But note
+that this WFF entails P, and it also entails ~Q. In other words, according to
+the translation the speaker is in fact saying that Tom is a philosopher and
+that Tom is not clever. However, in ordinary conversation a person who utters
+the English statement above might intend no such thing. He might simply be
+saying that even if Tom is a philosopher, it does not follow that he must be
+clever. Such a speaker might not in fact know whether Tom is a philosopher,
+nor might he know whether Tom is clever.
+
+So this example shows that the usual truth-table associated with "if __ then
+___" does not capture its correct meaning (given that negation is the correct
+translation for "it is not the case that").
+
+Suppose we introduce a new truth-functional connective "$" and you are only
+told that P is logically equivalent to $P. What does its truth-table look
+like?
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+If "P" and "$P" are logically equivalent, then they always have the same truth
+value. So the truth-table is the following one :
+
+P| $P  
+---|---  
+T| T  
+F| F  
+  
+Suppose we introduce a new truth-functional connective "$" and you are only
+told that P &models; $P. What can you conclude about the truth-table of "$"?
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+We only know that when "P" is true, "$P" must be true. We CANNOT conclude that
+when "P" is F, "$P" is F. Even when "$P" is T when "P" is F, "P" still entails
+"$P". In other words,
+
+P| $P  
+---|---  
+T| T  
+F| ?  
+  
+Suppose there is a truth-functional connective "#". Suppose further that
+"(φvψ)" entails "(φ#ψ)", for any WFF φ and ψ. Could "#" have the same truth-
+table as "→"?
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+Suppose "#" has the same truth-table as "→". Then if "P" is true and "Q" is
+false, "(P∨Q)" will then be true, and "(P#Q)" will be false. So "(P∨Q)" does
+not entail "(P#Q)".
+
+Since it is given that "(P∨Q)" entails "(P#Q)", "#" cannot have the same
+truth-table as "→".
+
+Suppose there is a truth-functional sentential connective "#", and you are
+only told that "((P#P)#P)" is a tautology. (a) What definite conclusions, if
+any, can you infer about the truth-table for the connective? (b) How about the
+truth-value of "((Q&~Q)#(S&~S))"? Explain your reasoning clearly.
+
+answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_57.txt b/data/crtw_57.txt
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+Now you will learn how to make derivations in sentential logic. A derivation
+displays step by step reasoning from premises to conclusion. Each step along
+the way follows the rules.
+
+The sort of system of rules you will study is often called a natural deduction
+system because it is somewhat like the way people actually deduce conclusions
+from premises. It isn't really natural -- it is an artificial, formal system
+-- but a natural deduction system can be easier to use and understand than
+other available methods.
+
+## §1. An example derivation
+
+Here is an example of a derivation in our system:
+
+This example shows, step by step, that "C" follows from "(A & D)" together
+with "(A → (B & C))". That is, starting with "(A & D)" and "(A → (B &C))" one
+can reach the conclusion "C" by following the rules of the system. In short,
+"C" is derivable in our system from "(A & D)" and "(A → (B & C))".
+
+In symbols:
+
+(A & D), (A → (B & C)) ⊢ C
+
+The symbol "⊢" is sometimes called the "turnstile". We will use it to mean
+that the formula on the right is derivable in our natural deduction system
+from the formulas, if any, on the left.
+
+## §2. The parts of a derivation
+
+Let's examine the sample derivation in detail.
+
+The middle column is a numbered list of well-formed formulas of sentential
+logic. This is the heart of the derivation. Each formula in the list is
+numbered. In this case there are five formulas, numbered from 1 to 5.
+
+The right column tells us what rule is followed. In this derivation three
+different rules are used. In line 1 "(A & D)" was written down by Rule A, the
+Rule of Assumption. The Rule of Assumption is also used on line 2. On lines 3
+and 5 Rule &E is followed, and line 4 employs rule →E. There are twelve
+different rules in all in our system.
+
+The left column contains a list of zero or more **dependencies**. For example,
+line 1 depends on line 1, and line 5 depends on lines 1 and 2. We'll see more
+about what the dependencies mean as we go along.
+
+In short, at each step in making a derivation you write down three things: a
+formula (with a line number), a note on the right saying which rule you have
+applied, and, on the left, a list of dependencies (if any).
+
+## §3. Three rules
+
+You have just seen three rules in action. Let us see more precisely how to use
+each of these three rules.
+
+The **Rule of Assumption** says that you can write down any well-formed
+formula of SL you like. The dependency is that formula itself.
+
+For example, we just saw this rule used twice:
+
+It may seem odd to be able to write down any formula you want at any time. But
+that does not mean you can derive anything at all. The rule does not merely
+say you can write down any formula. The rule says that you can write down any
+formula **depending on itself**.
+
+In effect, for any formula φ, the rule lets you say that φ follows from
+itself; φ is derivable from itself.
+
+In this case, for example, line 1 means that "(A & D)" is derivable from "(A &
+D)":
+
+(A & D) ⊢ (A & D)
+
+And line 2 means that "(A → (B & C))" is derivable from "(A → (B & C))":
+
+(A → (B & C)) ⊢ (A → (B & C))
+
+The **& Elimination Rule**, &E, says that if you have a line which is a
+conjunction you can write down either of the conjuncts. In other words, if you
+have a line (φ&ψ), you can write down φ or ψ.
+
+The new line depends on everything the conjunction depends on.
+
+That rule is used at line 3 of the sample derivation:
+
+One can use &E to write down "A" at line 3 because line 1 is a conjunction,
+"(A & D)". Line 3 depends on everything line 1 depends on. Line 1 depends only
+on line 1. So line 3 depends only on line 1. The annotation on the right says
+that you applied &E to line 1.
+
+The → **Elimination Rule** , →E, says that you can write down ψ if you have a
+line (φ→ψ) and another line φ. The new formula ψ depends on everything that
+(φ→ψ) depends on, together with everything that φ depends on. This rule is
+commonly called **Modus Ponens**.
+
+But we call it the → Elimination Rule to emphasize the similarity between this
+and other elimination rules, such as &E. Using an elimination rule, one writes
+down part of an earlier formula. So elimination rules let one move from longer
+formulas to shorter formulas.
+
+→E is used at line 4 of the sample derivation:
+
+In this case, we have "A" on line 3, and "(A → (B & C))" on line 2, so we can
+write down "(B & C)", depending on everything line 2 and line 3 depend on.
+
+Now you have seen 3 rules: &E, →E, and A. It is time to prove some things
+yourself! Make derivations to show the following, using only these 3 rules, if
+you can. Try not to look at the answers until you have finished your
+derivation, or have decided that it can't be done.
+
+Show the following using only &E, →E, and A.
+
+  1. (A & B) ⊢ A
+  2. ((A ∨ B) & (B→A)) ⊢ A 
+  3. (A → (B & C)), A ⊢ B 
+  4. A,B ⊢ (A & B) 
+  5. A, (A → (B → (C → (D → (E → F))))) ⊢ F
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+a. (A & B) ⊢ A
+
+    
+    
+    1 1. (A&B)    A
+    1 2. A        1 &E
+    
+
+b. ((A∨B) & (B→A)) ⊢ A
+
+    
+    
+    Cannot be shown with only these three rules.
+    
+
+c. (A→ (B & C)), A ⊢ B
+
+    
+    
+    1     1. (A→(B&C))    A
+    2     2. A            A
+    1,2   3. (B&C)        1,2 →E
+    1,2   4. B            3 &E
+    
+
+d. A,B ⊢ (A & B)
+
+e. A, (A → (B → (C → (D → (E → F))))) ⊢ F
+
+Both cannot be shown with only these three rules.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_58.txt b/data/crtw_58.txt
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+In the previous tutorial you learned three rules. This section and the next
+describe the remainder of the rules of our system. There are 9 more rules, for
+a total of 12 rules in all.
+
+If you are impatient, here is a list of all of the rules.
+
+At this point, there won't be much discussion about why the rules are the way
+they are, or whether the rules should be the way they are. We'll get to that
+in Topic RS. For now, just work on learning what the rules are, and how the
+rules work.
+
+## §1. Rules for "&"
+
+The conjunction elimination rule, &E was mentioned earlier. Let us state this
+rule carefully.
+
+####  &E (Conjunction Elimination)
+
+If you have derived (φ&ψ),  
+you can write down φ or ψ,  
+depending on everything (φ&ψ) depends on.
+
+According to this rule, if one of the lines of a derivation is a conjunction,
+(φ&ψ), then you can add a new line which is φ or you can add a line which is
+ψ. The greek letters 'φ' and 'ψ' stand for any well-formed formula of
+sentential logic. Note that the dependencies of the new line are just the same
+as the dependencies of the original line. That is what the rule means when it
+says that the formula you write down depends on "on everything (φ&ψ) depends
+on."
+
+&E helps you simplify things. You can eliminate the symbol '&' and write down
+only part of a formula. That is why &E is called an "elimination" rule.
+
+But sometimes you might not want to eliminate '&', but to add it into a
+derivation. Sometimes you might want to write down a formula which contains an
+'&' when that '&' wasn't there before. There is a rule for that:
+
+####  &I (Conjunction Introduction)
+
+If you have derived φ and ψ, you can write down (φ&ψ),  
+depending on everything φ and ψ depend on.
+
+For most of the connectives, the rules in the system come in pairs like these
+rules for '&'. There is an elimination rule, and an introduction rule. The
+elimination rule lets you get rid of a symbol, and the introduction rule lets
+you add a symbol when the symbol was not there before.
+
+Rule &I says that if one of the lines of a derivation is φ and one of the
+lines in the derivation is ψ then you can add a new line which is their
+conjunction: (φ&ψ). The dependencies of the new line are the same as all of
+the dependencies for the line with φ put together with all of the dependencies
+for the line with ψ. Here are two brief examples:
+
+Is this a correct derivation?
+
+answer
+
+Show (A & B) ⊢ (B & A).
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    1  1. (A&B)	A
+    1  2. B 	1 &E
+    1  3. A 	1 &E
+    1  4. (B&A)	2,3 &I
+    
+
+How many lines are there in the longest derivation in our system?
+
+answer
+
+## §2. Rules for "↔"
+
+The rules for '↔' are straightforward. Here is an example of a use of the
+biconditional elimination rule:
+
+And, unsurprisingly then, here is the introduction rule:
+
+Thus ↔E lets you change a biconditional into the conjunction of two
+conditionals. And ↔I lets you move in the opposite direction. The dependencies
+work just as they do for &E: the new dependencies are the same as the old
+dependencies. For both ↔E and ↔I, you just write down the same dependencies as
+before.
+
+Stated explictly:
+
+####  ↔I (Biconditional Introduction)
+
+If you have derived ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ)),  
+you can write down (φ↔ψ),  
+depending on everything ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ)) depends on.
+
+####  ↔E (Biconditional Elimination)
+
+If you have derived (φ↔ψ),  
+you can write down ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ))  
+depending on everything (φ↔ψ) depends on.
+
+You have now seen half of the rules in the system: &I, &E, A, →E, ↔E, and ↔I.
+We will get to the rest of the rules in a moment. But first, you should try
+deriving a few things.
+
+Show the following:
+
+  1. (A ↔ B), (B & C) ⊢ A 
+  2. (A → A) ⊢ (A ↔ A) 
+  3. (A ↔ B), (B ↔ C), A ⊢ C 
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+a. (A ↔ B), (B & C) ⊢ A
+
+    
+    
+    	1 	1. (A↔B) 		A
+    	2 	2. (B&C)		A
+    	2 	3. B 			2 &E
+    	1 	4. ((A→B)&(B→A))	1 ↔E
+    	1 	5. (B→A)      		4 &E
+    	1,2	6. A			3, 5 →E
+    	
+
+b. (A → A) ⊢ (A ↔ A)
+
+    
+    
+    	1 1. (A→A)		A
+    	1 2. ((A→A)&(A→A))	1, 1 &I
+    	1 3. (A↔A)		2 ↔I
+    	
+
+c. (A ↔ B), (B ↔ C), A ⊢ C
+
+    
+    
+    	1 	1. (A↔B) 		A
+    	2	2. (B↔C)		A
+    	3 	3. A			A
+    	1	4. ((A→B)&(B→A))	1 ↔E
+    	1 	5. (A→B)		4 &E
+    	1,3	6. B			3, 5 →E
+    	2	7. ((B→C)&(C→B))	2 ↔E
+    	2	8. (B→C) 		7 &E
+    	1,2,3	9. C			6, 8 →E		
+    	
+
+## §3. Rules for "→" and the Rule of Assumption
+
+Rule →E was introduced in section DS01:
+
+####  →E (Conditional Elimination or Modus Ponens)
+
+If you have derived (φ→ψ) and φ,  
+you can write down ψ,  
+depending on everything (φ→ψ) and φ depend on.
+
+Sometimes a rule like →E is called, using a Latin expression, **Modus
+Ponens**. But we'll just call it **Conditional Elimination** , or **→E** for
+short. An example of a use of such a rule in English would be:
+
+If John has measles then Harry has measles.  
+John has measles.  
+Therefore, Harry has measles.  
+
+As this seems clearly to be an example of good reasoning, you can see why we
+might like to have a version of this rule in our logical system.
+
+The introduction rule, →I, is a little different from the other rules you have
+seen. One important difference is that →I permits you to decrease the number
+of dependencies.
+
+Consider this short example showing B ⊢ (A → (A&B)).
+
+Notice that dependency of line 4 is only line 2, while line 3 has two
+dependencies: line 1 and line 2. Applying the rule →I yields the conditional
+on line 4 depending on everything line 3 depends on except line 1. Since line
+3 depends on 1 and 2, line 4 depends on just 2. The idea behind →I is that if
+you can show ψ given an assumption φ, then you have shown that if φ then ψ,
+that is (φ→ψ). Here is the rule stated explicitly:
+
+####  →I (Conditional Introduction)
+
+If you have assumed φ, and you have derived ψ,  
+you can write down (φ→ψ),  
+depending on everything ψ depends on except φ.
+
+Rule →I provides a powerful, direct way to derive a conditional, (φ→ψ). You
+simply assume φ and then, using that assumption try to derive ψ. If you
+succeed, you will have thereby shown (φ→ψ). And this conclusion will no longer
+depend on the assumption φ. Assuming φ was just a temporary measure.
+
+One point to keep in mind. Rule →I applies when you have **assumed** φ and
+**derived** ψ. Be careful: assuming and deriving are not the same. You have
+derived a formula when it is a line of the derivation you are working on. You
+have assumed a formula when it is written down in your derivation using the
+Rule of Assumption. The Rule of Assumption was explained in section DS01. Here
+it is again:
+
+####  A (Rule of Assumption)
+
+You can write down any SL wff, depending on itself.
+
+Can you give an example of a derivation where you assume a formula which you
+have not derived?
+
+answer
+
+Is this a correct derivation?
+
+answer
+
+What is wrong with the following derivation?
+
+answer
+
+Show the following:
+
+  1. (P → (Q → R)) ⊢ ((P → Q) → (P → R)) 
+  2. ⊢ (A→A) 
+  3. ⊢ ((A&B)→A) 
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+a. (P → (Q → R)) ⊢ ((P → Q) → (P → R))
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (P→(Q→R)) 		A
+    2	2. (P→Q)		A
+    3	3. P			A
+    2,3 	4. Q			2,3 →E
+    1,3 	5. (Q→R)		1,3 →E
+    1,2,3 	6. R			4,5 →E 
+    1,2	7. (P→R)		3,6 →I
+    1	8. ((P→Q)→(P→R))	2,7 →I
+    
+
+b. ⊢ (A→A)
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. A 		A
+    	2. (A→A) 	1,1 →I
+    
+
+c. ⊢ ((A&B)→A)
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. (A&B)	A
+    1 	2. A		1 &E
+    	3. ((A&B)→A)	1,2 →I
+    
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_59.txt b/data/crtw_59.txt
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+## §1. Rules for "v"
+
+As for '&' and '→', there is both an elimination rule and an introduction rule
+for '∨':
+
+#### ∨I (Disjunction Introduction)
+
+If you have derived φ,  
+you can write down (φ∨ψ) or (ψ∨φ),  
+depending on everything φ depends on.
+
+#### ∨E (Disjunction Elimination or Disjunctive Syllogism)
+
+If you have derived (φ∨ψ) and ~ψ,  
+you can write down φ,  
+depending on everything (φ∨ψ) and ~ψ depend on.  
+If you have derived (φ∨ψ) and ~φ,  
+you can write down ψ,  
+depending on everything (φ∨ψ) and ~φ depend on.
+
+The introduction rule says that you can take any formula you have written down
+so far and make it longer, by changing it into a disjunction. And you write
+down the same dependencies. So if the original formula is φ, then the new
+formula would be (φ∨ψ) or (ψ∨φ). Note that ψ can be any formula at all, from
+simple, like "A" or "B" to more complicated, like "(A & B)" or
+"((A→B)&(B→A))". For example
+
+The elimination rule for '∨' lets you break apart a disjunction and write down
+only one half. Like &I, ∨E starts from two formulas and permits you to write
+down a third. ∨E permits you to write down φ if you have (φ∨ψ) and ~ψ in your
+derivation. ∨E also permits you to write down ψ, if you have (φ∨ψ) and ~φ in
+your derivation. The dependencies of the new formula are the same as the
+dependencies of the two formulas you had already. A more traditional name for
+this sort of rule is **Disjunctive Syllogism** ; we will just call it ∨
+**Elimination** , or ∨E for short.
+
+For example:
+
+At this point you can show the interesting fact that anything is derivable
+from an explicit contradiction: for any φ and ψ, (φ&~φ) ⊢ ψ.
+
+For example, (B & ~B) ⊢ A. Can you see how to show that?
+
+Show (B & ~B) ⊢ A.
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    1 1. (B&~B) 	A
+    1 2. B		1 &E
+    1 3. ~B		1 &E
+    1 4. (B∨A) 	2 ∨I
+    1 5. A		3, 4 ∨E
+    
+
+There is one more rule involving '∨', **Proof by Cases** , or **PC** :
+
+#### PC (Proof by Cases)
+
+If you have derived (φ∨ψ) and (φ→α) and (ψ→β),  
+then you can write down (α∨β),  
+depending on everything (φ∨ψ) and  
+(φ→α) and (ψ→β) depend on.
+
+It may look complicated, but it is actually almost as simple as &I or ∨E. You
+need three formulas in order to apply the rule. Sometimes it may be difficult
+to see how to get these three formulas. But if you do have them written in
+your derivation, then you can write down a certain disjunction. The new
+formula depends on everything the three formulas you started with depend on.
+
+Can PC be applied, starting from only 2 different formulas?
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    Yes, for example:
+    
+    	1 	1.	(A∨A)	A
+    	2 	2.	(A→B)	A
+    	1,2	3.	(B∨B) 	1,2,2 PC
+
+Show ((P & P) ∨ (Q & Q)) ⊢ (P ∨ Q) answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. ((P&P)∨(Q&Q))		A
+    2 	2. (P&P)			A
+    2 	3. P				2 &E
+    	4. ((P&P)→P)			2,3 →I
+    5 	5. (Q&Q) 			A
+    5 	6. Q				5 &E
+    	7. ((Q&Q)→Q) 			5,6 →I
+    1 	8. (P∨Q)			1,4,7 PC
+
+Show (P ∨ P), (P → Q) ⊢ (P ∨ Q)
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. (P∨P)		A
+    2 	2. (P→Q)		A
+    3 	3. P			A
+    	4. (P→P) 		3, 3 →I
+    1, 2 	5. (P∨Q)		1, 2, 4 PC
+
+## §2. Rules for "~"
+
+There are just two more rules left, the rules for the introduction and
+elimination of the negation symbol '~'.
+
+Rules ~I and ~E are similar to →I in certain ways. Each of these three rules
+permits you to take away dependencies. In addition, with each of these three
+rules, you first assume something, and then you derive something, and then you
+apply the rule to write down a new formula.
+
+Here is Rule ~I:
+
+#### ~I (Negation Introduction)
+
+If you have assumed ψ, and you have derived (φ&~φ),  
+then you can write down ~ψ,  
+depending on everything (φ&~φ) depends on except ψ.
+
+Rule ~I provides one way to derive a negation like "~A" or "~(A&B)". Suppose,
+for example, you want to derive "~(A&B)". In using ~I you would first assume
+"(A&B)" and then derive an explicit contradiction. (An explicit contradiction
+is a formula of the form (φ&~φ) such as "(A&~A)" or "((B∨C)&~(B∨C))".) Then
+you can write down "~(A&B)".
+
+Here is an example using ~I to show (B→A) ⊢ ~(B & ~A).
+
+In this derivation line 2 is the assumption made for the purposes of using ~I.
+Since we hope to show "~(B & ~A)" using ~I, we assume "(B & ~A)" and try to
+derive an explicit contradiction. After reaching the explicit contradiction on
+line 6, we can then write down on line 7 the negation of the assumption on
+line 2. The result on line 7 depends on everything line 6 depends on except
+the relevant assumption on line 2.
+
+Notice that just a few changes turns that derivation into one that shows that
+(B & ~A) ⊢ ~(B→A).
+
+Show (~A∨~B) ⊢ ~(A & B) using ~I
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    	1	1. (~A∨~B)		A
+    	2	2. (A&B)		A
+    	2	3. A			2 &E
+    	4   	4. ~A  			A
+    	2, 4	5. (A&~A)	 	3, 4 &I
+    	2	6. ~~A			4, 5 ~I
+    	1, 2	7. ~B			1, 6 ∨E
+    	2	8. B			2 &E
+    	1, 2	9. (B&~B) 		7, 8 &I
+    	1	10. ~(A&B)		2, 9 ~I
+
+The elimination rule for '~' is almost the same as the introduction rule. The
+only difference is that instead of assuming ψ and writing down ~ψ at the end,
+you assume ~ψ and write down ψ at the end.
+
+#### ~E (Negation Elimination)
+
+If you have assumed ~ψ, and you have derived (φ&~φ), then you can write down
+ψ, depending on everything (φ&~φ) depends on except ~ψ.
+
+Here is an example of ~E:
+
+~~A ⊢ A
+
+    
+    
+    	1	1. ~~A			A
+    	2 	2. ~A			A
+    	1, 2 	3. (~A&~~A)		1, 2 &I
+    	1	4. A			2, 3 ~E
+    		
+
+You have seen all the rules of our natural deduction system! Now try making
+some derivations on your own.
+
+Show the following:
+
+  1. ⊢ (~~A → A) 
+  2. ~(P ∨ Q) ⊢ (~P & ~Q)
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+a. ⊢ (~~A → A)
+
+    
+    
+    	1	1. ~~A			A
+    	2 	2. ~A 			A
+    	1, 2 	3. (~A&~~A)		1, 2 &I
+    	1	4. A			2, 3 ~E
+    		5. (~~A→A)		1, 4 →I
+
+b. ~(P ∨ Q) ⊢ (~P & ~Q)
+
+    
+    
+    	1 	1. ~(P∨Q)		A
+    	2 	2. P			A
+    	2 	3. (P∨Q)		2 ∨I
+    	1, 2 	4. ((P∨Q)&~(P∨Q))	1, 3 &I
+    	1	5. ~P			2, 4 ~I
+    	6	6. Q			A
+    	6 	7. (P∨Q)		6 ∨I
+    	1, 6 	8. ((P∨Q)&~(P∨Q)) 	1, 7 &I
+    	1	9. ~Q			6, 8 ~I
+    	1	10. (~P&~Q)		5, 9 &I
+    	
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_6.txt b/data/crtw_6.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d3112682d3af6fa788929d77afd8fae491f911bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_6.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+In the last tutorial we discussed the importance of metacognition for critical
+thinking. There is an interesting test associated with metacognition and
+reflection that has been proposed by management professor Shane Frederick. It
+is known as the Cognitive Reflection Test. There are only three short
+questions in the test. You can try it out here.
+
+Get a pen and pencil ready and then click the button below to reveal the
+questions. There is no time limit but it should not take more than a few
+minutes.
+
+start test
+
+__
+
+1\. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
+ball. How much does the ball cost?
+
+2\. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
+100 machines to make 100 widgets?
+
+3\. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in
+size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long
+would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
+
+* * *
+
+When you are done, here are the answers:
+
+answers
+
+__
+
+The answers are: $0.05, 5 mins, 47 days.
+
+What is interesting about this test is that each of the question has an
+"intuitive" answer which is actually wrong. To get all questions right, most
+people would need to suppress their immediate reactions and reflect carefully
+to come to the correct answers. This is supposed to reflect the capacity for
+deliberate and reflective reasoning and to avoid jumping to conclusions.
+Researchers claim that the short test actually provides a rather good
+measurement of rational thinking and cognitive ability.
+
+In case you are wondering about how well other people do, here are the average
+scores for students at various US universities:
+
+  * Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 2.18 
+  * Princeton: 1.63 
+  * Harvard: 1.43 
+  * Michigan State: 0.79 
+
+Don't worry if you did not get all the answers right. What is important is to
+realize that in some situations, spending more time thinking about the
+question is better than coming up with an answer very quickly!
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_60.txt b/data/crtw_60.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..483f733451ece98ec29bb89aea0eba8ee15f5dc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_60.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+Note: in the following rules, the greek letters "φ" and "ψ" are names of SL
+wffs.
+
+**A (Rule of Assumption)**  
+You can write down any SL wff, depending on itself.
+
+**& I (Conjunction Introduction)**  
+If you have derived φ and ψ, you can write down (φ&ψ), depending on everything
+φ and ψ depend on.
+
+**& E (Conjunction Elimination)**  
+If you have derived (φ&ψ), you can write down φ or ψ, depending on everything
+(φ&ψ) depends on.
+
+**→I (Conditional Introduction)**  
+If you have assumed φ, and you have derived ψ, you can write down (φ→ψ),
+depending on everything ψ depends on except φ.
+
+**→E (Conditional Elimination or Modus Ponens)**  
+If you have derived (φ→ψ) and φ, you can write down ψ, depending on everything
+(φ→ψ) and φ depend on.
+
+**~I (Negation Introduction)**  
+If you have assumed ψ, and you have derived (φ&~φ), then you can write down
+~ψ, depending on everything (φ&~φ) depends on except ψ.
+
+**~E (Negation Elimination)**  
+If you have assumed ~ψ, and you have derived (φ&~φ), then you can write down
+ψ, depending on everything (φ&~φ) depends on except ~ψ.
+
+**∨I (Disjunction Introduction)**  
+If you have derived φ, you can write down (φ∨ψ) or (ψ∨φ), depending on
+everything φ depends on. (ψ is any SL wff.)
+
+**∨E (Disjunction Elimination or Disjunctive Syllogism)**  
+If you have derived (φ∨ψ) and ~ψ,you can write down φ, depending on everything
+(φ∨ψ) and ~ψ depend on.
+
+Also, if you have derived (φ∨ψ) and ~φ, you can write down ψ, depending on
+everything (φ∨ψ) and ~φ depend on.
+
+**PC (Proof by Cases)**  
+If you have derived (φ∨ψ) and (φ→α)and (ψ→β), then you can write down (α
+∨β),depending on everything (φ∨ψ) and (φ→α) and (ψ→β) depend on.
+
+**↔I (Biconditional Introduction)**  
+If you have derived ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ)), you can write down (φ↔ψ), depending on
+everything ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ)) depends on.
+
+**↔E (Biconditional Elimination)**  
+If you have derived (φ↔ψ), you can write down ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ)) depending on
+everything (φ ↔ψ) depends on.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_61.txt b/data/crtw_61.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5f5b2da4a65b9d9ddc197f5b99c161c5e2e34372
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_61.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+The list of rules of our natural deduction system fits on one page. The rules
+are not very complicated, and there are not many rules.
+
+Still, sometimes, it is not obvious how to make a certain derivation. And it
+is sometimes not obvious whether it is even possible to make a certain
+derivation.
+
+How, for example, to show this?
+
+~(P ∨ Q) ⊢ (~P & ~Q)
+
+As a start, we might write:
+
+But now we are stuck. No obvious rule, like &E or →E, applies to line 1. Line
+1 is not a conjunction, nor is line 1 a conditional. Line 1 is a negation.
+
+What can we do?
+
+In this section we will examine some strategies for making derivations.
+
+## §1. Do not make random assumptions
+
+One rule that might apply to line 1 is ~E. If we can derive an explicit
+contradiction, then we can apply ~E to write down "(P ∨ Q)". To use ~E we need
+to find an explicit contradiction, but we only have line 1 so far. Now the
+Rule of Assumption lets us write down any formula we like.
+
+So you might try this:
+
+Now we have an explicit contradiction, and can apply Rule ~E:
+
+We have now shown (P ∨ Q) ⊢ (P ∨ Q).
+
+That is no progress.
+
+A mistake we just made was to think that if we need some formula, we should
+simply use the Rule of Assumption to assume it. This is a common beginner's
+mistake. Assumptions can be useful in making a derivation. But assuming things
+haphazardly is rarely an effective strategy in making a derivation.
+
+We need a new approach.
+
+## §2. Think backwards
+
+One approach is to try to see what rule to apply to line 1 in order to move a
+step closer to the conclusion. We just tried that. It didn't work.
+
+Another approach is to think about things in the opposite direction: start
+with the last line and work backwards to the assumptions. Let's try that.
+
+We know that the last line of the derivation should be "(~P & ~Q)" depending
+only on "~(P ∨ Q)":
+
+What rule could have been used on that last step? (Not knowing how many lines
+there will be when the derivation is finished, I just wrote "20" for the last
+line. I'll fix that later.)
+
+Two possibilities are &I and ~E.
+
+Are there any other rules that could have been used on the last line of that
+derivation? answer
+
+Let's try &I.
+
+But now we seem to be stuck again. We need to show "~P" and "~Q". It is not
+obvious how to proceed.
+
+## §3. If you do not know what to do, try ~E or ~I
+
+When you do not know what to do next, one of the negation rules is worth
+trying. In this case, since you want to show "~P", you can assume "P" and try
+to show an explicit contradiction.
+
+If you succeed, you can write down "~P".
+
+(I just guessed that the assumption will be on line 10. We can fix that
+later.) Now we are almost there. We just need to see how, somehow, to put "P"
+(on line 10) together with "~(P ∨ Q)" (on line 1) to get an explicit
+contradiction. One explicit contradiction is "(P & ~P)". However to get that
+we would need "~P", and "~P" is what we are using ~I to show. So that won't
+work. Another possibility is to get something which explicitly contradicts
+"~(P ∨ Q)" on line 1--- that is, to reach "(P ∨ Q)". And then we have the
+solution, once we realize that "(P ∨ Q)" follows from "P" in one step by rule
+∨I:
+
+We have now succeeded in deriving "~P" from "~(P ∨ Q)".
+
+That is, we have shown ~(P ∨ Q) ⊢ ~P.
+
+This is what line 18 says.
+
+However, we are not finished yet.
+
+## §4. Think about what you have proved before
+
+We need to figure out how to reach "~Q" on line 19.
+
+We need to show ~(P ∨ Q) ⊢ ~Q.
+
+Sometimes in making a derivation, what you are trying to show is similar to
+something you have derived before. What we need to show now,
+
+~(P ∨ Q) ⊢ ~Q,
+
+is rather like what we have just shown,
+
+~(P ∨ Q) ⊢ ~P.
+
+Another useful strategy is to adapt a previous derivation to a new situation.
+In the previous derivation we used ~I, after assuming P. In this case, we can
+use ~I, after assuming Q:
+
+Now let's put the whole proof together, renumbering the lines appropriately.
+
+How can you show this?
+
+~((A & B) ∨ C) ⊢ (~(A & B) & ~C)
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    Just take the derivation for ~(P∨Q) ⊢ (~P&~Q),
+    and substitute every occurrence of "P" with
+    "(A&B)"and "Q" with "C".
+    
+    1	1. ~((A&B)∨C)			A
+    2	2. (A&B)			A
+    2  	3. ((A&B)∨C)			2 ∨I
+    1,2	4. (((A&B)∨C)&~((A&B)∨C))	1, 3 &I
+    1 	5. ~(A&B)			2, 4 ~I
+    6	6. C				A
+    6	7. ((A&B)∨C)			6 ∨I
+    1,6	8. (((A&B)∨C)&~((A&B)∨C))	1, 7 &I
+    1	9. ~C				6, 8 ~I
+    1	10. (~(A&B)&~C)			5, 9 &I
+    
+
+## §5. Problem solving
+
+By now you have seen several strategies for making derivations. Given the
+first few lines of the derivation, you can search for a rule which directly
+applies. It is also very useful to think backwards, looking for a rule which
+could have been used to get the last line. You can try to apply ~I or ~E. You
+can think about whether the derivation you are working on is like a derivation
+you have made already. And, as you have seen, in working out a derivation you
+can try all of these strategies.
+
+But what you have not seen is a method that will work in every situation.
+There is no "model answer" to be memorized. Cases which appear similar may
+require very different methods. To improve your skills in solving problems,
+try the following further examples.
+
+Show the following:
+
+  1. (P → Q), (R → Q) ⊢ ((P ∨ R) → Q)
+  2. (A & B), (C & D) ⊢ (A & D) 
+  3. (P & (Q & R)), S ⊢ (R & S) 
+  4. (P → Q), (Q → R), P ⊢ R 
+  5. (P → (Q → R)), (P & Q) ⊢ R 
+  6. (P → (Q → R)), Q ⊢ (P → R) 
+  7. ((P & Q) → R) ⊢ (P → (Q → R)) 
+  8. (P → (Q → R)) ⊢ ((P → Q) → (P → R))
+  9. P ⊢ (Q → P) 
+  10. (P → Q), (Q → R) ⊢ (P → R)
+  11. ~(P & ~Q) ⊢ (P → Q) 
+  12. P, ~P ⊢ ~Q
+  13. (~P → ~Q) ⊢ (Q → P) 
+  14. ((P ∨ Q)→ R) ⊢ (P → R)
+  15. ~(P → Q) ⊢ ~(~P ∨ Q) 
+  16. (P & (Q ∨ R)) ⊢ ((P & Q) ∨ (P & R))
+  17. (P ↔ ~Q) ⊢ ~(P ↔ Q) 
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+a. (P → Q), (R → Q) ⊢ ((P ∨ R) → Q)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (P → Q)		A
+    2	2. (R → Q)		A
+    3 	3. (P ∨ R)		A
+    1,2,3 	4. (Q ∨ Q)		1,2,3 PC
+    5 	5. ~Q			A
+    1,2,3,5 6. Q			4,5 ∨E
+    1,2,3,5 7. (Q & ~Q)		5,6 &I
+    1,2,3 	8. Q			5,7 ~E
+    1,2	9. ((P ∨ R) → Q)	3,8 →I
+    
+
+b. (A & B), (C & D) ⊢ (A & D)
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. (A & B)	A
+    2 	2. (C & D)	A
+    1 	3. A		1 &E
+    2 	4. D		2 &E
+    1,2 	5.(A&D)		3,4 &I
+    
+
+c. (P & (Q & R)), S ⊢ (R & S)
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. (P & (Q & R))	A
+    2 	2. S			A
+    1 	3. (Q & R)		1 &E
+    1 	4. R			3 &E
+    1,2	5. (R & S)		4,2 &I
+    
+
+d. (P → Q), (Q → R), P ⊢ R
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. (P → Q)	A
+    2 	2. (Q → R)	A
+    3 	3. P		A
+    1,3 	4. Q		1,3 →E
+    1,2,3 	5. R		2,4 →E
+    
+
+e. (P → (Q → R)), (P & Q) ⊢ R
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. (P → (Q → R))	A
+    2 	2. (P & Q)		A
+    2 	3. P			2 &E
+    1,2 	4. (Q → R)		1,3 →E
+    2 	5. Q			2 &E
+    1,2 	6. R			4,5 →E
+    
+
+f. (P → (Q → R)), Q ⊢ (P → R)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (P → (Q → R))	A
+    2	2. Q			A
+    3	3. P			A
+    1,3 	4. (Q → R)		1,3 →E
+    1,2,3	5. R			2,4 →E
+    1,2	6. (P → R)		3,5 →I
+    
+
+g. ((P & Q) → R) ⊢ (P → (Q → R))
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. ((P & Q) → R)	A
+    2	2. P			A
+    3	3. Q			A
+    2,3 	4. (P & Q)		2,3 &I
+    1,2,3	5. R			1,4 →E
+    1,2 	6. (Q → R)		3,5 →I
+    1	7. (P → (Q → R))	2,6 →I
+    
+
+h. (P → (Q → R)) ⊢ ((P → Q) → (P → R))
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (P →(Q → R))		A
+    2 	2. (P → Q)		A
+    3	3. P			A
+    2,3	4. Q			2,3 →E
+    1,3	5. (Q → R)		1,3 →E
+    1,2,3	6. R			4,5 →E
+    1,2 	7. (P → R)		3,6 →I
+    1 	8. ((P→Q) → (P→R))	2,7 →I
+    
+
+i. P ⊢ (Q → P)
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. P 		A
+    2 	2. Q 		A
+    1 	3. (Q → P) 	2,1 →I
+    
+
+j. (P → Q), (Q → R) ⊢ (P → R)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (P → Q)	A
+    2 	2. (Q → R)	A
+    3 	3. P		A
+    1,3	4. Q		1,3 →E
+    1,2,3	5. R		2,4 →E
+    1,2	6 (P → R)	3,5 →I
+    
+
+k. ~(P & ~Q) ⊢ (P → Q)
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1. ~(P & ~Q)		A
+    2	2. P			A
+    3	3. ~Q			A
+    2,3	4. (P & ~Q)		2,3 &I
+    1,2,3	5. ((P&~Q)&~(P&~Q)) 	1,4 &I
+    1,2	6. Q			3,5 ~E
+    1	7. (P → Q)		2,6 →I
+    
+
+l. P, ~P ⊢ ~Q
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. P			A
+    2	2. ~P			A
+    3	3. Q			A
+    1,2	4. (P & ~P)		1,2 &I
+    1,2	5. ~Q			3,4 ~I
+    
+
+m. (~P → ~Q) ⊢ (Q → P)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (~P → ~Q)		A
+    2	2. Q			A
+    3	3. ~P			A
+    1,3	4. ~Q			1,3 →E
+    1,2,3	5. (Q & ~Q)		2,4 &I
+    1,2	6. P			3,5 ~E
+    1	7. (Q → P)		2,6 →I
+    
+
+n. ((P ∨ Q)→ R) ⊢ (P → R)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. ((P ∨ Q) → R)	A
+    2	2. P			A
+    2	3. (P ∨ Q)		2 ∨I
+    1,2	4. R			1,3 →E
+    1	5. (P → R)		2,4 →I
+    
+
+o. ~(P → Q) ⊢ ~(~P ∨ Q)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. ~(P → Q)		A
+    2	2. (~P ∨ Q)		A
+    3	3. P			A
+    4	4. ~P			A
+    3,4 	5. (P & ~P)		3,4 &I
+    3	6. ~~P			4,5 ~I
+    2,3	7. Q			2,6 ∨E
+    2	8. (P → Q)		3,7 →I
+    1,2 	9. ((P→Q) & ~(P→Q))	1,8 &I
+    1	10. ~(~P ∨ Q)		2,9 ~I
+    
+
+p. (P & (Q ∨ R)) ⊢ ((P & Q) ∨ (P & R))
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (P & (Q∨R))		A
+    1	2. P			1 &E
+    1	3. (Q ∨ R)		1 &E
+    4	4. Q			A
+    1,4	5. (P & Q)		2,4 &I
+    6 	6. R			A
+    1, 6	7. (P & R)		2,6 &I
+    1	8. (Q → (P & Q))	4,5 →I
+    1	9. (R → (P & R))	6,7 →I
+    1	10. ((P&Q)∨(P&R))	3,8,9 PC
+    
+
+q. (P ↔ ~Q) ⊢ ~(P ↔ Q)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (P ↔ ~Q)		A
+    2	2. (P ↔ Q)		A
+    2	3. ((P → Q) & (Q → P))	2 ↔E
+    2	4. (P → Q)		3 &E
+    1	5. ((P → ~Q) & (~Q→P))	1 ↔E
+    1	6. (P → ~Q)		5 &E
+    7	7. P			A
+    2,7	8. Q			4,7 →E
+    1,7	9. ~Q			6,7 →E
+    1,2,7	10. (Q & ~Q)		8,9 &I
+    1,2 	11. ~P			7,10 ~I
+    12	12. ~(Q ∨ ~Q)		A
+    13 	13. Q			A
+    13 	14. (Q ∨ ~Q)		13 ∨I
+    12,13	15. ((Q∨~Q) & ~(Q∨~Q))	12,14 &I
+    12 	16. ~Q			13,15 ~I
+    12 	17. (Q ∨~Q)		16 ∨I
+    12	18. ((Q ∨~Q)&~(Q ∨~Q))	12,17 &I
+    	19. (Q ∨~Q) 		12,18 ~E
+    2 	20. (Q → P)		3 →E
+    1 	21. (~Q → P) 		5 →E
+    1,2 	22. (P ∨ P)		19,20,21 PC
+    23 	23. ~P 			A
+    1,2,23 	24. P			22,23 ∨E
+    1,2,23 	25. (P&~P) 		23,24 &I
+    1,2 	26. P			23,25 ~E
+    1,2 	27. (P&~P)		11,26 &I
+    1 	28. ~(P ↔ Q)		2,27 ~I
+    
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_62.txt b/data/crtw_62.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d74059102f1ffd6fd9aaa871e9965f935ca985e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_62.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+## §1. Metatheory
+
+You have studied how to make derivations in our natural deduction system; you
+learned how to use the rules to show that a formula is derivable from other
+formulas. But now let us reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of this rule
+system. Instead of working **within** the system, you will study **about** the
+system.
+
+This sort of study is called **metalogic** or **metatheory** , and is an
+important part of the study of logic. For any tool, one should learn not only
+how to use the tool, but one should learn about the tool-- what the tool can
+and cannot do. Here are some questions one might ask:
+
+  * Why are these rules good rules? 
+  * Are some other rules better?
+  * What happens if we change the rules?
+  * Should we change the rules?
+
+## §2. Two sound rules
+
+One reason that the rules are good is that the rules ensure that each formula
+you write down is entailed by its dependencies. That is, for each line of a
+derivation, if the dependencies are true, then the formula is true.
+
+Consider this short derivation:
+
+If the dependency of line 1 is true, then the formula on line 1 is true. Line
+1 is "(A&B)". The dependency of line 1 is line 1, which is "(A&B)". And if
+"(A&B)" is true then "(A&B)" must be true:
+
+(A&B) ⊨ (A&B)
+
+In other words, "(A&B)" entails "(A&B)".  
+(Note that the symbol "⊨" is the double turnstile which you learned about in
+SL05, not the single turnstile "⊢" discussed here.)
+
+If the dependency of line 2 is true, then the formula on line 2 is true. Line
+2 is "A". The dependency of line 2 is line 1, which is "(A&B)". And, if
+"(A&B)" is true then "A" must be true:
+
+(A&B) ⊨ A
+
+In other words, "(A&B)" entails "A". You can see that from a truth table:
+
+This truth table shows that in every case where "(A&B)" is true, "A" is true
+too.
+
+In a certain sense, you won't go wrong when you use Rule A or Rule &E. Rule A
+and Rule &E are both **sound** rules: when following these rules, the formula
+you write down is entailed by its dependencies.
+
+Explain why &I, ∨I and ∨E are all sound rules.
+
+answer
+
+__If φ is entailed by some formula or formulas then (φ∨ψ) and (ψ∨φ) are both
+entailed by those formulas too. Also, if φ is a tautology, then so are (φ∨ψ)
+and (ψ∨φ). So, in a derivation, if φ is entailed by its dependencies, and
+(φ∨ψ) is written down with the same dependencies, then (φ∨ψ) will be entailed
+by its dependencies too. And if (ψ∨φ) is written down with the same
+dependencies, then (ψ∨φ) will be entailed by its dependencies too. So ∨I is a
+sound rule. Similar reasoning holds for &I and ∨E.
+
+## §3. The soundness of the system
+
+If you think about each of the rules in our natural deduction system, you will
+see that each of the 12 rules is sound. (We won't discuss each of the rules
+here, but you can verify yourself that each is sound.) So at every line in
+every derivation, the formula on that line is entailed by its dependencies.
+
+Our system, therefore, has the property of **soundness** : if a formula is
+derivable in the system from some formulas, it is entailed by the formulas.
+
+More precisely, soundness means that:
+
+For any formula φ, if ⊢ φ, then ⊨ φ,
+
+and
+
+For any formula φ, and list of formulas **X** , if **X** ⊢ φ then **X** ⊨ φ.
+
+Would the system be sound if we add the following rule?
+
+If you have derived (φ∨φ), you can write down φ, depending on everything (φ∨φ)
+depends on.
+
+answer
+
+__Yes. This is a sound rule. If (φ∨φ) is entailed by some formula or formulas
+then φ is entailed by those formulas too. Also, if (φ∨φ) is a tautology, then
+φ is a tautology too. So, in a derivation, if (φ∨φ) is entailed by its
+dependencies, and φ is written down with the same dependencies, then φ will be
+entailed by its dependencies.
+
+Would the system be sound if we remove rule &I?
+
+answer
+
+__Yes. All the rules in the system are sound. After removing one rule the
+system, the remaining rules are still sound, so the system will continue to be
+sound.
+
+Would the system be sound if we change rule →I this way? Why or why not?
+
+If you have derived φ, and you have derived ψ, you can write down (φ→ψ),
+depending on everything ψ depends on except φ.
+
+answer
+
+__Yes. This is a sound rule. When using this rule, you will only be able to
+derive formulas that are entailed by their dependencies.
+
+## §4. Why sound rules are good
+
+At this point one might wonder why it is good to have a system that is sound.
+One way to think about that would be to suppose an unsound rule is added to
+the system:
+
+**Flip rule**
+
+If you have derived φ, you can write down ~φ, depending on everything φ
+depends on.
+
+Then one could make the following derivation:
+
+Thus, C is derivable from B. And, by changing "B" to any formula φ and "C" to
+any formula ψ, one can show that φ is derivable from ψ. In the revised system,
+anything is derivable from anything!
+
+The revised system is useless, insofar as one hopes to use a deduction system
+to show when a conclusion follows from some premises in an argument. For a
+conclusion of an argument does not always follow from the premises.
+
+Suppose we add the flip rule and remove Rule ∨E from our natural deduction
+system.  
+Would the resulting system be sound?
+
+answer
+
+__No. The flip rule is not sound. It would, for example, let you derive "~A"
+from "A". But "A" does not entail "~A". So adding the flip rule would make the
+system unsound, whether or not Rule ∨E is removed.
+
+## §5. Derivations and truth tables
+
+One way to find out whether a sequent is valid is to make a truth table. For
+example, a truth table will show whether or not this is a valid sequent:
+
+((P ∨ Q)→ R) ⊨ (P → R)
+
+In the truth table, if there is a line where "((P ∨ Q)→ R)" is true and "(P →
+R)" is false, then the sequent is invalid. Otherwise the sequent is valid.
+
+Since our natural deduction system is sound, you can use it to show that a
+sequent is valid. You can make a derivation to show the right hand side of the
+sequent is derivable from the left hand side:
+
+((P ∨ Q)→ R) ⊢ (P → R)
+
+and, then, since our system is sound, it follows that the sequent is valid.
+
+((P ∨ Q)→ R) ⊨ (P → R).
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_63.txt b/data/crtw_63.txt
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+In the last tutorial, you learned one reason why the rules of our natural
+deduction system are good: the system is sound. But this is not all we want to
+know about our system. We also want to know whether or not the rules are
+strong enough to show everything we need to show. In one of the previous
+exercises, you derived the tautology "(A → A)". But is the system strong
+enough to let you derive **any** tautology?
+
+For example, is the system strong enough to let you derive "(A → (A ∨ B))" or
+"(~A ∨ A)"? What about a valid sequent like "A, (B → ~A) ⊨ ~B"? WIll the
+system permit you to derive the conclusion "~B" from the premises "A" and "(B
+→ ~A)"? WIll the system permit you to derive the conclusion of **any** valid
+sequent from its premises?
+
+## §1. Is the system strong enough?
+
+Show that "(A → (A ∨ B))" is a tautology in two different ways.
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    Every row in the truth table for "(A → (A ∨ B))" is "T": 
+    
+    A B	(A → (A ∨ B)) 
+    T T 	   T 
+    T F 	   T 
+    F T 	   T 
+    F F 	   T 
+    
+    So "(A → (A ∨ B))" is a tautology. 
+    
+    "(A → (A ∨ B))" is derivable in our system with no dependencies: 
+    
+    1	1. A 			A 
+    1	2. (A ∨ B) 		1 ∨I 
+    	3. (A → (A ∨ B)) 	1,2 →I 
+    
+    Since our system is sound, any formula derivable with no dependencies is a tautology. 
+    So "(A → (A ∨ B))" is a tautology. 
+    
+
+This formula is not very difficult to derive in our natural deduction system.
+But, as you have seen, sometimes it is not easy to make a certain derivation.
+Sometimes, you get stuck, and you are not certain how to reach your goal.
+
+Suppose you are trying to derive "((A ∨ ~B) → ~(~A & B))". This is a
+tautology. So we would like to be able to derive this formula using our rules.
+
+But suppose you start making the derivation, and you get stuck. What should
+you think then? Perhaps there is a derivation of this formula, but you have
+not tried hard enough to find it. Maybe if you work harder you will eventually
+find a derivation. But, on the other hand, maybe there is no derivation of
+this formula in our system. Perhaps the system is not strong enough to derive
+this formula. Perhaps the system has the wrong rules, or not enough rules.
+
+Show that "((A ∨ ~B) → ~(~A & B))" is a tautology in two different ways.
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    Every row in the truth table for 
+    "((A ∨ ~B) → ~(~A & B))" is "T": 
+    
+    A B 	((A∨~B)	→ ~(~A & B)) 
+    T T 		T 
+    T F 		T 
+    F T 		T 
+    F F 		T 
+    
+    So "((A ∨ ~B) → ~(~A & B))" is a tautology. 
+    
+    "((A ∨ ~B) → ~(~A & B))" is derivable in our system with no dependencies: 
+    
+    1 	1. (A ∨ ~B) 			A 
+    2 	2. (~A & B) 			A 
+    2 	3. ~A 				2 &E 
+    1,2 	4. ~B 				1,3 ∨E 
+    2 	5. B 				2 &E 
+    1,2 	6. (B&~B) 			4,5 &I 
+    1 	7. ~(~A & B) 			2,6 ~I 
+    	8. ((A ∨ ~B) → ~(~A & B))	1,7 →I 
+    
+    Since our system is sound, any formula derivable 
+    with no dependencies is a tautology. 
+    So "(A → (A ∨ B))" is a tautology. 
+    
+
+Suppose we remove Rules →I, ~I and ~E from the system. Is it still possible to
+derive "((A ∨ ~B) → ~(~A & B))"?
+
+answer
+
+## §2. The system is complete
+
+Our system is strong enough to derive every tautology. Indeed, our system is
+strong enough to derive the conclusion of every valid sequent from its
+premises. In a word, the system is **complete**. Being complete is a good
+thing, because it means that we are not missing any rules. Our rules are
+strong enough.
+
+Here is **completeness** defined, in symbols:
+
+For any formula φ, if ⊨ φ then ⊢ φ.
+
+and
+
+For any formula φ, and list of formulas **X** , if **X** ⊨ φ then **X** ⊢ φ.
+
+It is possible to prove that our system is complete by careful reasoning. But
+that is a job for a more advanced course. For now, the main thing is to
+understand what completeness is.
+
+## §3. Are all the rules necessary?
+
+Suppose we get rid of some of the rules. For example, suppose we remove rules
+↔I and ↔E. Would the system still be complete?
+
+answer
+
+__No, the system would no longer be complete. There are formulas we could
+derive before that we will no longer be able to derive. For example, we would
+no longer be able to derive the tautology "(A↔A)".
+
+If we remove rules ↔I and ↔E the system will no longer be complete. There are
+formulas which we can no longer derive. For example, we can no longer derive
+"(A↔A)".
+
+Thus, if we revise our system by removing some rules, then the system might no
+longer be complete. The revised system is not complete if there is some
+formula which was derivable in the original system, but not derivable in the
+revised system.
+
+Suppose we add the following new rule to our system:
+
+**Flip rule**  
+If you have derived φ, you can write down ~φ, depending on everything φ
+depends on.
+
+Would the revised system still be complete?
+
+answer
+
+__Yes, the system would still be complete. In the revised system, we can still
+derive everything that we could derive before adding the rule. (However, the
+revised system is not sound.)
+
+## §4. Two methods
+
+One way to show that a sequent is valid is to make a truth table. You learned
+how in a previous topic. If there is no line in the truth table where all the
+premises are **T** and the conclusion is **F** then the sequent is valid.
+
+Another way to show that a sequent is valid is to make a derivation in our
+natural deduction system. If you can derive the conclusion of the sequent from
+its premises then that sequent is valid.
+
+One way to show that a sequent is not valid is to make a truth table. If there
+is a line in the truth table where all the premises are T and the conclusion
+is F then the sequent is not valid.
+
+Is there another way to show that a sequent is not valid? Our natural
+deduction system does not provide a method that can always show that an
+invalid sequent is invalid. If the sequent is invalid there is no derivation
+of the conclusion from the premises in our system. (If there were a derivation
+then our system would not be sound.) Following the rules of our system does
+not tell us that there is no derivation. Trying to make a derivation and
+failing is not a method to show that there is no derivation. (Maybe you
+haven't tried hard enough!)
+
+So in one important respect the truth table method is more powerful than our
+natural deduction system for sentential logic. The truth table method can
+always determine whether or not a sequent is valid. However, our natural
+deduction system does not provide a method to determine in every case whether
+or not a sequent is valid.
+
+## §5. Within and about the system
+
+In this tutorial and the previous one, you have learned that our system of
+sentential logic is both sound and complete. Instead of working **within** the
+system, you have studied **about** the system. This sort of study is called
+**metalogic** or **metatheory** , and is an important part of the study of
+logic. For any tool, one should learn not only how to use the tool, but one
+should learn about the tool -- what the tool can and cannot do.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_64.txt b/data/crtw_64.txt
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+Consider this argument :
+
+All hackers are nerds.  
+Mitch is a hacker.  
+So Mitch is a nerd.
+
+This argument is obviously valid, but its validity cannot be demonstrated in
+SL. This is because the best we can do in SL is to translate the premises and
+the conclusion using distinct sentence letters, as in :
+
+P, Q &models; R.
+
+Such a sequent is of course not valid in SL. To demonstrate the validity of
+the first argument, we need to analyse the internal structure of the premises
+and the conclusion in more details. A more powerful formal system, _predicate
+logic_ , allows us to do that. Like SL, PL is also a formal system of logic.
+It is at least as powerful as SL in that PL includes all the WFFs of SL, and
+any logical truth of SL can also be proved in PL. But in addition, PL can be
+used to express certain logical connections between statements that SL cannot,
+and carry out more complicated proofs.
+
+Determine whether these valid arguments can be shown to be valid in SL.
+
+  * All birds can fly. Anything that can fly has a moving part. So every bird has a moving part. answer
+  * If everyone is happy then Jane is happy. Everyone is happy. So Jane is happy. answer
+  * Some philosophers are clever. All philosophers are old people. So some old people are clever. answer
+  * Sammy is a girl. Every boy loves Sammy. So there is a girl that every boy loves. answer
+  * A horse is an animal. So the head of a horse is the head of an animal. answer
+
+__previous tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_65.txt b/data/crtw_65.txt
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+## §1. Lost in translation
+
+We have discussed the limitations of SL in an earlier tutorial. For example,
+SL cannot be used to show that the following argument is valid:
+
+All hackers are nerds.  
+Mitch is a hacker.  
+So Mitch is a nerd.
+
+Why can't SL show that this argument is valid? When this argument is
+translated into SL, some information is lost. When this argument is translated
+into SL, each statement is translated by a different sentence letter. The
+result is an invalid sequent:
+
+P, Q &models; R.
+
+Some information about the relation between the statements in this argument
+has been lost in translation. For one thing, the premise, "Mitch is a hacker",
+and the conclusion, "Mitch is a nerd", have something in common; both
+statements contain the name "Mitch". But in the translation, "Q" and "R" don't
+have anything in common.
+
+The relation between the statements in an argument is important to its
+validity. Indeed, the relation between the parts of statements in an argument
+is important to its validity. To see this, notice what happens if we change
+the name "Mitch" in the conclusion to the name "Henry". The result is an
+argument which is not valid:
+
+All hackers are nerds.  
+Mitch is a hacker.  
+So Henry is a nerd.
+
+In order to preserve relations between statements, we need a formal system
+which can formalize the parts of statements. Predicate logic (PL) does just
+that.
+
+## §2. Singular terms
+
+Some statements are very simple. Some statements, like "John eats" and
+"Archibald runs" have two parts. Traditionally, these parts have been called
+the subject and the predicate. For example, in "John eats", "John" is the
+subject and "eats" is the predicate. In "Archibald runs", "Archibald" is the
+subject and "runs" is the predicate. Similarly, in "Archibald is hungry",
+"Archibald" is the subject and "is hungry" is the predicate.
+
+What are the subject and predicate of "Mitch is a hacker"? answer
+
+In many cases, the subject of a sentence is a _singular term_. A singular term
+in a natural language is a linguistic expression that has the function of
+referring to or naming a particular object or thing. For our present purpose
+we shall take singular terms to include :
+
+  * proper names : "Peter", "Pakistan", and certain abstract nouns such as "patience", as in "patience is very rare" ...
+  * singular definite descriptions : "the man on the balcony", "the movie", ...
+  * demonstratives : "that cat", "this button here" ...
+
+A _singular statement_ is any simple statement with a singular term as the
+subject, followed by a predicate, which ascribes some property to the referent
+of the singular term. The following statements are all singular statements:
+
+  * **The tallest man in the world** is over two meters tall.
+  * **That insect on the window** is a grasshoper.
+  * **Tom Cruise** is an actor.
+  * **2** is my lucky number.
+
+_Names_ in PL are used to symbolize singular terms. A name is any non-italized
+letter such as "a", "b", "c". A name is said to _refer_ to some particular
+object, and the object to which the name refers is called its _referent_
+(sometimes also called the _extension_ of the name). For example, the name
+"Albert Einstein" refers to a famous scientist.
+
+In PL we assume that every name succeeds in referring to some existing object.
+This is certainly not true in natural languages. For example, the singular
+term "Santa Claus" presumably does not refer to any actual person. Such
+singular terms which fail to refer to anything real are said to be _empty_. In
+the branch of formal logic known as _free logic_ , there is no assumption that
+all names refer, but we shall not discuss that approach here.
+
+Are these singular terms?
+
+  1. "The most violent animal in the whole universe" answer
+  2. "every happy person" answer
+  3. "A bird with red feathers" answer
+  4. "snow is white" answer
+  5. "Alexander the Great" answer
+  6. "Beautiful dresses" answer
+
+Are these statements correct?
+
+  1. Beethoven is a singular term. answer
+  2. "Beethoven" refers to a person. answer
+  3. Beethoven does not refer to a person. answer
+  4. "Beethoven" refers to Beethoven. answer
+  5. Beethoven refers to "Beethoven". answer
+
+__next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_66.txt b/data/crtw_66.txt
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+## §1. Variables and open sentences
+
+We shall use small italic letters " _x_ ", " _y_ ", " _z_ ", ... as
+_variables_. Grammatically they function similarly as singular terms, even
+though they do not refer to any particular object. You can think of them as
+similar to a pronoun like "it".
+
+Given a complete sentence from a natural language, the result of substituting
+or replacing one or more singular term by a variable is called an _open
+sentence_.
+
+For example, replacing the numeral "5" in the sentence
+
+5 is smaller than 7.
+
+by the variable " _x_ " we end up with the open sentence
+
+_x_ is smaller than 7.
+
+Notice that although the original sentence is true, the open sentence that is
+produced is neither true nor false, because variables do not refer to any
+particular thing. Compare : if we don't know what the pronoun "it" refers to
+in "it is expensive", we would not be able to determine the truth or falsity
+of the sentence.
+
+The use of open sentences provides a way to describe a common feature between
+statements such as :
+
+  * 5 is smaller than 7.
+  * 4 is smaller than 7.
+  * 10 is smaller than 7.
+  * 21215 is smaller than 7.
+
+All of these statements can be constructed from the same open sentence "x is
+smaller than 7" by replacing the variable " _x_ " with the appropriate
+singular term.
+
+## §2. Predicates
+
+A _predicate_ in PL is any capital letter such as "A", "B", "C", "P", "Q",
+"R", etc. They are equivalent to the open sentences introduced earlier. So for
+example we might use the letter "C _x_ " to translate the open sentence " _x_
+is a city in Asia". Predicates can combine with names to form WFFs in PL.
+(Recall our discussion in sentential logic: WFF = well formed formula. i.e. a
+grammatical sentence defined by the rules of the language of the formal
+system.) So for example, suppose we use the following translation scheme:
+
+h : Hong Kong  
+o : Oxford  
+C _x_ : _x_ is a city in Asia.
+
+"Ch" would mean "Hong Kong is a city in Asia", which is true. "Co" would mean
+"Oxford is a city in Asia", and so is a false sentence.
+
+Consider these WFFs:
+
+Le, Ls, Ss, Se
+
+Translate them into English using the following translation scheme:
+
+e : The Earth  
+s : The Sun  
+L _x_ : _x_ is larger than the earth.  
+S _x_ : _x_ is smaller than the moon.
+
+Which of the WFFs are true, if any? answer
+
+## §3. More complicated WFFs
+
+In PL, those wffs made up of predicates and names can combine to form longer
+wffs just as in SL. So we can have wffs like "~Le", "(Ss&Se)", "(Le→Le)",
+etc.. "~Le" is of course true if and only if "Le" is false, and "(Ss&Se)" is
+true if and only if "Ss" and "Se" are both true. This is just a matter of
+applying the same rules in SL. "(Le→Le)" is of course a logical truth.
+
+____
+
+Look at the circle and star animation carefully.
+
+Suppose we use "a" to name the circle, "b" to name the star, the right, "Bx"
+to mean _x is black_ and "Ox" to mean "x is orange". Determine whether the
+following wffs are always true :
+
+  1. ( Oa ∨ Ob ) answer
+  2. ( ~Ba → Bb ) answer
+  3. ~ ( Ba ↔ Bb ) answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_67.txt b/data/crtw_67.txt
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+## §1. Something more
+
+As we have seen, the sentence "John eats" is translated into PL by choosing a
+predicate letter to translate "eats" (for example "F"), choosing a name to
+translate "John" (for example "a") and putting them together: "Fa".
+
+But what about statements like:
+
+Someone eats.  
+Something is red.  
+Everyone owns a Porsche.  
+
+One might think that the answer is obvious. All of the above sentences can be
+translated in just the way a simple statement like "Archibald eats" is
+translated, for example, as "Fa".
+
+But that answer is not acceptable. One should not translate words like
+"someone" and "everything" by names (as names like "Archibald" and "John" are
+translated). To see why, notice that "Archibald runs and Archibald does not
+run" is a contradiction which, quite rightly, can be translated by an
+inconsistent formula: "(Ra & ~Ra)". However, "Someone runs and someone does
+not run" is not a contradiction. But if we treated that sentence like
+"Archibald runs and Archibald does not run", its translation would be an
+inconsistent formula.
+
+Similarly, "Either this car is mine or this car is not mine" has to be true.
+So, quite rightly, it can be translated by a tautology: "(Mc v ~Mc)". However,
+"Either everything is mine or everything is not mine" is no tautology.
+
+For a related reason why one should not translate words like "someone" and
+"everything" by names consider the following valid argument:
+
+John eats. So, someone eats. If the argument is translated thus:
+
+Fa &models; Fb
+
+The result is an invalid sequent, which is not what we want.
+
+## §2. Speaking of everything
+
+An innovation, due to the logician Gottlob Frege, provides a way to translate
+sentences containing words like "something" and "everything". According to
+Frege, a sentence like "Something is red" is not like the sentence "John is
+red". "John is red" says that a certain individual, John, has the property of
+being red. The sentence "Something is red", according to Frege, is different.
+It says that the property of being red has a certain property: the property of
+being red has the property of being instantiated in the world.
+
+We have already learned how to translate sentences like "Archibald is red" or
+"This ball is red". You just put together a predicate letter and a name like
+this: "Fa". But, in PL, how can we talk about the property of being red
+without talking about a particular red object? We can't use a formula like
+"Fa", because in this formula the name "a" refers to a specific thing, like
+this ball, or a specific person, like Archibald.
+
+We need to talk about the property of being red without talking about a
+particular red object. Predicate Logic lets us do that with an open sentence
+such as "Fx". Here "x" is a variable, not a name. A name refers to a specific
+thing. A variable does not. We could think of "Fx" as translating the English
+sentence "It is red", where the word "it" is not referring to any particular
+thing. (Sometimes, logicians say that "Fx" translates the not quite English
+sentence "x is red".) Using variables avoids having to use a name, so avoids
+having to refer to a specific thing.
+
+Now we know how to talk about the property of being red in PL, without talking
+about a particular red thing. But we still need to see how to translate the
+sentence "Something is red". Frege's insight was the "Something is red" says
+that the property of being red is instantiated.
+
+In PL, we can say that the property of being red is instantiated by combining
+the open sentence "Fx" with an existential quantifier:
+
+∃xFx
+
+We can read this as saying "There is at least one thing x such that x is red".
+Or, more simply, "There is at least one thing that is red", in other words,
+"Something is red". Similarly, we can translate "Everything is red" by
+combining an open sentence like "Fx" with a universal quantifier:
+
+∀xFx
+
+We can read this as saying "Every x is such that x is red". Or, more simply,
+"Everything is red".
+
+In predicate logic _quantifiers_ are constructed by prefixing either the
+symbol "∀" or "∃" to a variable. Here are some examples :
+
+∀x ∃x ∀y ∃z
+
+Any quantifier that starts with "∃" (such as "∃x") is an _existential
+quantifier_. "∃x" is translated as "there exists an x such that ..." We can
+combine a quantifier with a predicate to make a well-formed formula, as in :
+
+∃xBx
+
+To understand such a wff, we can rewrite it as a semi-formal statement :
+
+There exists an x such that Bx.
+
+Or alternatively,
+
+There is at least one x such that Bx.
+
+So what it says is that there is some object x, and x is B. In other words, it
+simply says that something is B. If the predicate "Bx" means _x is a boy_ ,
+then the wff can be translated as _there is at least one boy_ , or _a boy
+exists_. Notice that "∃xBx", "∃yBy", "∃zBz", etc. all say the same thing. They
+are different wffs since they employ different variables. But they are
+logically equivalent nonetheless. Notice also that the truth of "∃xBx" is
+consistent with the claim that there is more than one B. It is just that this
+is not what "∃xBx" says. The latter wff says that there is one or more. It
+might be the case that there is just one, or it might be that there is more
+than one.
+
+Any quantifier that starts with "∀" is a _universal quantifer_. "∀x" means
+"for all x, ... ". Again we can combine a universal quantifier with a
+predicate to form a wff, such as :
+
+∀xBx
+
+In semi-formal notation, this means the same as "for all x, Bx". What this
+says is that for any object x, x is B. If "Bx" means _x is a boy_ , this wff
+would mean _for every x, x is a boy_. In other words, take any object
+whatsoever, it is a boy, which is just the same as saying that everything is a
+boy. Under such a translation, the wff is of course actually false.
+
+Now consider the following formula, what do you think it means? (Suppose "Dy"
+means _y is dirty_ , and "By" as before.)
+
+∀y(By→Dy)
+
+To work out what this wff is saying, we can rewrite the wff step-by-step as
+follows :
+
+For all y, (By→Dy)  
+For all y, if y is a boy, then y is dirty.  
+Everything is such that if it is a boy, then it is dirty.
+
+You might find the interpretation of wffs difficult at first, but if you try
+to understand them step-by-step, then it might become easier. We can see in
+the above example that the last sentence says the same as "Every boy is
+dirty", which is just what the wff means.
+
+What do these wffs mean? Use the same translation scheme as before.
+
+  1. ∀zDz answer
+  2. ∀z(Dz→Dz) answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_68.txt b/data/crtw_68.txt
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+Here are more examples. Make sure that you understand why the wffs are
+translated the way they are.
+
+  * ∀y~Dy: Everything is not D (i.e. Nothing is D.)
+  * ~∀yDy: Not everything is D 
+
+The second wff above actually means "It is not the case that EVERYTHING IS D."
+So it says that not everything is D. This is of course the same as saying that
+something is not D. If you are not sure why that is the case, look at the
+following diagram :
+
+Suppose the yellow region represents everything that is D. The area outside
+the yellow region represents things that are not D. To say that not everything
+is D is to say that something exists in the class represented by the region
+outside the D circle. So this is the same as saying that something is not D.
+
+  * ~∀y~Dy: It is not the case that everything is not D (In other words, something is D!) 
+  * ∃yDy: Something is D 
+  * ∃y~Dy: Something is not D 
+  * ~∃yDy: It is not the case that something is D (So everything is not D) 
+  * ~∃y~Dy: It is not the case that something is not D (So everything is D) 
+
+As you can see, some of these wffs are equivalent to each other :
+
+  * ∀yDy ≡ ~∃y~Dy
+  * ~∀yDy ≡ ∃y~Dy
+  * ∀y~Dy ≡ ~∃yDy
+  * ~∀y~Dy ≡ ∃yDy
+
+If you are not sure why, use the diagram above to help you. What the table of
+equivalence tells us is that the existential quantifier can be defined in
+terms of the universal quantifier, and vice versa. In general, we can assume
+these _quantifer exchange rules_ :
+
+(QE1) Whenever a wff in PL contains "∀x", replacing it with "~∃x~" will
+produce a logically equivalent wff.
+
+(QE2) Whenever a wff in PL contains "∃x", replacing it with "~∀x~" will
+produce a logically equivalent wff.
+
+Translate these wffs in PL into English. "Bz" means _z is a bird_ and "Fz"
+means _z can fly_.
+
+  1. ∀zBz
+  2. ~∀z~Bz
+  3. ~∃zFz
+  4. ∃z~Fz
+  5. ∀z~~Bz
+
+answer
+
+__(a) Everything is a bird. (b) It is not the case that everything is not a
+bird. (That is, something is a bird, or there is at least one bird.) (c) It is
+not the case that there is something that can fly. Or, nothing can fly. (d)
+There is something that cannot fly. (e) Everything is a bird.
+
+Use the quantifier exchange rules to rewrite each of above wffs into a
+different but logically equivalent wff. answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_69.txt b/data/crtw_69.txt
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+## §1. Defintion
+
+In these tutorials we will work with a simpler version of predicate logic
+(using only one-place predicate letters). We will call this _monadic predicate
+logic_ , or MPL. Let us first define the language of MPL more precisely:
+
+The language of MPL contains the following symbols:
+
+  1. Predicate letters : A, B, C, ... Z. If a subscript is added to a predicate letter, the result is a predicate letter, e.g. A1 , B274, etc. 
+  2. Names : a, b, c, ... t. If a subscript is added to a name, the result is a name, e.g. a1, b34, etc. 
+  3. Variables : u, v, w, x, y, z. If a subscript is added to a variable, the result is a variable, e.g. x11, y3233, etc. 
+  4. Five sentential connectives : 
+    * ~ (tilde, or the negation sign) 
+    * & (ampersand, or the conjunction sign) 
+    * ∨ (the wedge, or the disjunction sign) 
+    * → (the arrow) 
+    * ↔ (the double-arrow)
+    * Open and close brackets : ( )
+  5. The two quantifiers: ∃, ∀.
+
+An expression of MPL is a string of one or more symbols of MPL.
+
+The syntactic rules, or formation rules (rules of formation), for MPL are as
+follows :
+
+  1. Any predicate letter, or any predicate letter followed by a name, is a wff.
+  2. Any predicate letter _not_ followed by a name or a variable is a sentence letter.
+  3. If φ is a wff, then ~φ is a wff.
+  4. (φ&ψ), (φvψ), (φ→ψ), (φ↔ψ) are also wffs, if (a) φ and ψ are wffs, and (b) if any predicate letter ω appears in both φ and ψ, then either all occurrences of ω are sentence letters, or none of them are.
+  5. If φ is a wff that contains any name ω, and β is a variable which does not occur in φ, then the resulting expression that is obtained by replacing one or more occurrences of ω with β and then attaching "∃β" or "∀β" to the front, is also a wff. 
+  6. Nothing else is a wff.
+
+Rule #1 tells us that expressions such as "R", "Pa", "Qb", "Gc" are wffs.
+
+Rule #2 tells us that expressions such as "R", "P", "Q" are sentence letters,
+and "Pa", "Qb", "Gx" are not.
+
+Rules #3 and #4 are just like rules from SL. We can apply them to form new
+wffs such as "~~Pa", "~((Pa&Sc)↔(~Q∨Ka))".
+
+Part (b) of rule #4 is meant to rule out cases such as "(Pa&P)" as wff.
+Reason: This expression is formed from "Pa" and "P". They include the same
+predicate letter "P". But the first occurrence of "P" is not a sentence letter
+even though the second one is. So according to 4(b) they cannot be combined to
+form a wff. But the rule allows "(Pa&Pb)" to be a wff. "(P&P)" is also a wff.
+
+Rule #5 is a little complicated. It applies only to wffs that include at least
+one name. So it applies to expressions such as "Qa", "(~Pa→Qb)", "(Pa&Qa)",
+but not "∃xFx". The rule says that we can pick a name in a wff, replace one or
+more occurrences of that name by a single variable, and then add either an
+existential or universal quantifier to the front. Here are some examples:
+
+  * From "Qa", we can generate wffs such as "∃xQx", "∀yQy".
+  * From "(~Pa→Sa)", we get "∃y(~Py→Sy)" or "∃x(~Px→Sx)" or "∃x(~Px→Sa)" or "∃x(~Pa→Sx)", or "∀x(~Px→Sx), or "∀y(~Py→Sa)" etc.
+  * From "(~Qa→Qb)", we get "∃x(~Qx→Qb)", "∀z(~Qa→Qz)" (But not "∃x(~Qx→Qx)"!)
+  * From "(Pa&Qa)", we can get "∃x(Px&Qa)" and then "∃y∃x(Px&Qy)" by applying rule #5 twice.
+
+## §2. Construction trees
+
+A _complex wff in MPL_ is any wff that contains a quantifier or a connective.
+To show how a complex wff is constructed, we can draw a _construction tree_
+for that wff. A construction tree is a tree diagram with arrows linking wffs.
+Starting with non-complex wffs at the top, the diagram shows how a complex wff
+can be built up step-by-step using the formation rules of MPL. Here for
+example is a construction tree for "~(P&~Fa)" :
+
+We started off with "P" and "Fa" which are not non-complex wffs. An arrow from
+X to Y indicates that Y can be constructed from X by applying one of the
+formation rules. Similarly, an arrow from X and Y to Z indicates that Z can be
+constructed from X and Y. By drawing a construction tree for a wff we show
+clearly how the formation rules are used to build up the wff. As a second
+example here is a construction tree for "~∀x(P&~Fx)" :
+
+Of course, in this second example, we could have started off with "Fb"
+instead. So sometimes (not always) a wff can have more than one construction
+tree.
+
+If any of these expressions is a WFF of MPL, draw its construction tree:
+
+  1. (P&(P&~R)) answer
+
+__
+
+  2. ∃x(Mx↔~Qx) answer
+
+__
+
+  3. ~(~∀xKx∨∃y~Qy) answer
+
+__
+
+  4. ~∃x~(Ma↔~Qx) answer
+
+__
+
+  5. ∃x(P→Qa) answer
+
+__Not a wff!
+
+  6. ((∀xKx&∀yQy)∨Ma) answer
+
+__
+
+  7. (∀xKx&((∀yQy)∨Ma)) answer
+
+__Not a wff!
+
+  8. (∀yKx&∀xQy) answer
+
+__Not a wff!
+
+  9. ~~~∃x~~~Gx answer
+
+__
+
+  10. (~∃x~Gx&Hy) answer
+
+__Not a wff!
+
+  11. ~~∃x(~Gx&Hx) answer
+
+__
+
+  12. ∀x((Ga∨Bx)↔(Kb&Gx)) answer
+
+__
+
+  13. ∀x((Gx∨Bx)↔(Kx&Gx)) answer
+
+__
+
+Do wffs in MPL have unique construction trees? In other words, given any wff
+in MPL, is it true that there is only one single construction tree that can be
+drawn for the wff? Why or why not?
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_7.txt b/data/crtw_7.txt
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+There are different psychological tests that are used to evaluate critical
+thinking skills. The more popular ones are usually standardized tests that can
+be benchmarked against a larger sample.
+
+  * Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA) - The standard version consists of multiple choice questions for an hour-long test. There are two versions (A & B) that are supposed to be equivalent and so can be used to measure changes in critical thinking over a period of time.
+  * California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST) - A more recent test that can also be completed online, with sub-scores for different categories such as analysis, inference, induction, etc.
+  * California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory (CCTDI) - Designed to "designed to measure the disposition to engage problems and make decisions using critical thinking."
+  * The Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment (HCTA) - Focuses on five dimensions of critical thinking: verbal reasoning, argument analysis, thinking as hypothesis testing, likelihood and uncertainty, and decision making and problem solving.
+  * Cornell Critical Thinking Tests - There are two levels. Assessment topics include: induction, deduction, credibility, identification of assumptions, etc.
+  * Related to the assessment of critical thinking, there is also the interesting Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which consists of only 3 short questions. It provides a measurement of rational and reflective thinking. We have a copy of the CRT test on our web site here.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_70.txt b/data/crtw_70.txt
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+In this section we shall look at the interpretation of wffs in MPL. Although
+the syntax of MPL might seem rather complicated, it is actually not too
+difficult to understand the meanings of the wffs if you look at their syntax
+carefully.
+
+## §1. Non-quantified sentences
+
+Let us start by considering wffs that do not contain any quantifiers, but only
+predicates and names. The first thing you should remember is that a predicate
+letter followed by a name functions grammatically as a wff. An expression such
+as "Fa" says that a certain object a has the property F. Bearing this point in
+mind, when you come across a complicated wff, you can interpret the wff just
+as in SL. For example, "((Fb&Gb)→P)" is a conditional, and it says that if b
+is both F and G, then P. Similarly, "(Gc↔Gb)" is a biconditional, and it says
+that c is G if and only if b is also G.
+
+Suppose we have this translation scheme :
+
+a : Ann  
+b : Beth  
+Sx : x is a student  
+Tx : x is a teacher
+
+Use the above translation scheme to translate these wffs into English :
+
+  1. (~Ta&~Sa) answer
+  2. (Ta→~Sa) answer
+  3. (Sa↔~Tb) answer
+  4. ((Sa&~Sb)→(~Ta&Tb)) answer
+
+Translate the following English sentences into MPL. Use "P" to mean "it is
+going to rain" :
+
+  1. If it is not going to rain, then Ann will go out. answer
+  2. Although it is going to rain, Ann and Beth both go hiking. answer
+  3. If it is not going to rain, and if Ann goes hiking, then Beth goes hiking too. answer
+
+## §2. Quantified sentences
+
+Now let us see what the quantified sentences mean. A quantified sentence in
+MPL is simply any wff in MPL that starts with either an existential or a
+universal quantifier. A wff that starts with an existential quantifier can be
+taken as saying that some object satisfies the condition given by the open
+sentence that follows the quantifier. So for example, consider this wff :
+
+∃x((Fx&Gx)→P)
+
+Now "((Fa&Ga)→P)" says that if a is both F and G, then P. It is a wff that
+talks about a particular object a. The difference with the quantified sentence
+is that the latter is not talking about the object a anymore. What the
+qauntified sentence says is that _there is at least one object x_ such that if
+it is both F and G, then P. Maybe this object is a, or maybe it is some other
+object b, but the quantified sentence does not tell us which object it is.
+
+Now consider also this wff :
+
+∀x((Fx&Gx)→P)
+
+What this wff says is that everything is such that if it is F and G, then P.
+Notice that this is not the same as saying that if _everything is F and G_ ,
+then P. That would be formalized using this wff :
+
+(∀x(Fx&Gx)→P)
+
+Do you know what is the difference between the two wffs? Roughly, what the
+first wff says is that if you take any object you can find, if it is both F
+and G, then "P" is true. So it implies that "P" is true even when there is
+only one thing in the whole world that is both F and G. But the second wff has
+no such implication. It says that "P" is true when _everything_ is both F and
+G. So there is no guarantee that "P" is true when only one object is both F
+and G. Obviously, the first wff entails the second, but not vice versa.
+
+Here are a few more examples :
+
+∀y(By&Dy)
+
+    Everything is both B and D
+∀y(~By&Dy)
+
+    Everything is not B but D
+∀y(By&~Dy)
+
+    Everything is B but not D
+∀y(~By&~Dy)
+
+    Everything is such that it is not B and and it is not D
+∀y~(By&Dy)
+
+    Everything is such that it is not both B and D
+∀y(By→Dy)
+
+    Everything is such that if it is B then it is D (Or, every B is D)
+∀y(By→~Dy)
+
+    Every B is not D
+∀y(~By→Dy)
+
+    Everything that is not B is D
+∀y(~By→~Dy)
+
+    Everything that is not B is also not D
+∀y~(By→Dy)
+
+    Everything is such that it is not the case if it is B it is also D
+
+You can replace "∀" with "∃", and "every" by "some" (meaning "at least one")
+in these examples to obtain the translation of the corresponding existentially
+quantified wffs.
+
+Translate the wffs below into English using this translation scheme :
+
+a : Ann  
+b : Beth  
+Hx : x is heavy  
+Ox : x is old
+
+  1. ∃x(Hx→Ox) answer
+  2. ~∃y(Hy&Oy) answer
+  3. ~∀z(Hz&Oz) answer
+  4. ~∀z(Hz→Oz) answer
+  5. (∃xHx∨Oa) answer
+  6. (Oa→∃yOy) answer
+  7. (∃xHx↔~∀x~Hx) answer
+  8. ((∀xHx&∀x~Ox)→(Hb&~Oa)) answer
+  9. (∀x(Hx→Ox)→(Hb→Ob)) answer
+  10. ∀y(Hy∨Oy) answer
+  11. (∀yHy∨∀yOy) answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_71.txt b/data/crtw_71.txt
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+Notice that when we use the word "everything" in ordinary language, we do not
+always mean "absolutely everything in the whole universe". Suppose you are
+going on a trip and I ask, "Have you packed everything into your suitcase?" In
+such a situation, of course I am not asking whether you have got everything in
+the universe in your suitcase. Rather, "everything" here probably refers only
+to those portable items you need for the trip. This is an illustration of what
+is called _restricting the domain of quantification_. The _domain of
+quantification_ is the class of things we are talking about when we use
+quantifiers such as "every", "all", or "some". To restrict the domain of
+quantification is to limit the class to a particular group of objects. In the
+example just given, the domain of quantification includes only the items you
+need for your trip. Objects such as the moon, or the Eiffel Tower, are
+therefore not included in the class. Whereas if a physicist proclaims that
+"everything is made up of elementary particles", the domain of quantification
+will be larger and presumably includes all the physical objects in the whole
+universe. Similarly, when a teacher says "everyone is here" in a lecture, it
+might be that the only people included in the domain are his students.
+
+Restricting the domain of quantification can make formalization easier. For
+example, we might formalize "everyone is wicked" as " ∀x(Hx→Wx)". But if we
+restrict the domain of quantification so that we are only talking about human
+beings, then we can just write down "∀xWx", and leave it as understood that
+the domain includes all human beings only. But remember : if you do restrict
+the domain of quantification in formalization, you should define the domain
+explicitly. For example, consider this simple inference:
+
+Everyone is wicked.  
+If everyone is wicked, then nobody goes to heaven.  
+So nobody goes to heaven.
+
+By restricting the domain only to human beings, we can formalize the argument
+easily :
+
+Translation scheme:
+
+Domain : the set of all human beings  
+Wx : x is wicked  
+Gx : x goes to heaven.
+
+Formalized sequent:
+
+∀xWx, (∀xWx→~∃xGx) &models; ~∃xGx
+
+What if you do not restrict the domain? In such case the formalization can
+proceed as follows:
+
+Translation scheme:
+
+Domain : everything  
+Wx : x is wicked  
+Px : x is a person  
+Gx : x goes to heaven
+
+Formalized sequent:
+
+∀x(Px→Wx), (∀x(Px→Wx)→~∃x(Px&Gx)) &models; ~∃x(Px&Gx)
+
+So you can see that restricting the domain simplifies the formalization. But
+do remember that with any argument there should only be a single domain. That
+implies you should not use different domains to formalize the following
+argument:
+
+Every human being is an animal.  
+Every animal can feel pain.  
+So every human being can feel pain.
+
+The correct way to formalize this argument is not to restrict the domain at
+all, but to write down something like the following:
+
+Translation scheme :
+
+Hx : x is a human being  
+Ax : x is an animal  
+Cx : x can feel pain
+
+Formalized sequent :
+
+∀x(Hx→Ax), ∀x(Ax→Cx) &models; ∀x(Hx→Cx)
+
+It would be a mistake to have three domains, one for each premise and another
+one for the conclusion.
+
+Formalize these English sentences in MPL (let the domain be the set of all
+human beings) :
+
+  1. Everyone is happy. answer
+  2. If everyone is happy then nobody is sad. answer
+  3. If everyone is happy then someone is not sad. answer
+  4. If someone is sad, then not everyone is happy. answer
+  5. Everybody is sad if someone is sad. answer
+  6. Someone is not sad and not happy. answer
+  7. Nobody is sad and happy. answer
+  8. If nobody is sad and happy, then everyone who is sad is not happy, and everyone who is happy is not sad. answer
+
+__(~∃x(Sx &Hx)→(∀x(Sx→~Hx)&∀x(Hx→~Sx)))
+
+  9. Either Tom is happy, or Jane is sad. answer
+  10. Someone is either happy, or sad, but not both. answer
+  11. If Tom is happy, then everyone is happy. answer
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_72.txt b/data/crtw_72.txt
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+In SL, we can use truth-tables to check the validity of sequents, but this
+method is not applicable to many of the sentences in MPL, such as the
+quantified wffs. It is indeed possible to use other methods to prove the
+validity of a sequent in MPL, or PL, but we shall not discuss them in this
+introductory course. If you are interested you can look up the more advanced
+textbooks in the section on further readings.
+
+Basically, we can divide all the valid sequents in MPL into three kinds :
+
+  * Valid sequents of SL
+  * Sequents not in SL, but are truth-functionally valid
+  * All other valid sequents
+
+## §1. Valid sequents of SL are still valid in MPL
+
+Let us look at the first kind of valid sequents. Since SL is part of MPL, all
+the valid sequents of SL are also sequents in MPL. Of course these sequents
+remain valid in MPL. They include :
+
+  * P &models; P
+  * (P&Q) &models; P
+  * P, (P→Q) &models; Q
+  * P, (~P∨Q) &models; Q
+
+## §2. Truth-functional validity in MPL
+
+How about these sequents which can only be found in MPL?
+
+  * ∃zFz &models; ∃zFz
+  * (~Ca&Gb) &models; ~Ca
+  * Ka, (Ka→∀yDy) &models; ∀yDy
+  * ∃xWx, (~∃xWx∨Fc) &models; Fc
+
+These sequents are actually all valid. Even though they are not sequents of
+SL, we can see that they are of the same form as the four valid sequents of SL
+above them. The third sequent, for example, is simply an application of _modus
+ponens_.
+
+In other words, if any sequent of MPL has the same form as a valid sequent in
+SL, then it is also valid in MPL. What we need to do now is to give a more
+precise definition of this rule :
+
+### Definition of _truth-functional validity_ in MPL
+
+Suppose we have a valid sequent φ in SL.
+
+  1. Take any number N of distinct sentence letters α1, α2, ...αN that appear in φ. 
+  2. Take N WFFs of MPL β1, β2, ...βN, none of which contain sentence letters that appear in φ. 
+  3. Now replace all occurrences of α1 by β1, and replace all occurrences of α2 by β2, ... , and replace all occurrences of αN by βN. 
+  4. If the original sequent φ is a valid sequent in SL, then the resulting new sequent after replacement is also a _truth-functionally valid_ sequent in MPL. 
+
+So let us apply this rule once to see how it works. Consider this valid
+sequent φ in SL : (P→Q), (Q→R) &models; (P→R)
+
+  1. Take 2 distinct sentence letters "P" and "R" that appear in the sequent. 
+  2. Take 2 WFFs of MPL : "∀x(Fx&Gx)", "~S", none of which contain sentence letters that appear in φ (i.e. no "P" or "R"). 
+  3. Replace all occurrences of "P" in φ by "∀x(Fx&Gx)". Replace all occurrences of "R" by "~S". 
+  4. We end up with a new valid sequent : (∀x(Fx&Gx)→Q), (Q→~S) &models; (∀x(Fx&Gx)→~S) 
+
+Here are two more examples of truth-functionally valid sequents in MPL :
+
+**Example #1:**
+
+  1. Start with this valid sequent in SL : (P∨Q), ~Q &models; P 
+  2. Replacement scheme : P ⇒ ∃xFx, Q ⇒ He 
+  3. Result: (∃xFx∨He), ~He &models; ∃xFx 
+
+**Example #2:**
+
+  1. Start with this valid sequent in SL : (P&~Q) &models; ~(P↔Q) 
+  2. Replacement scheme : P ⇒ ∀x(Gx&Fx) 
+  3. Result: (∀x(Gx&Fx)&~Q) &models; ~(∀x(Gx&Fx)↔Q) 
+
+Show that these sequents are truth-functionally valid by identifying the
+replacement schemes and the SL-valid sequents from which they can be derived :
+
+  * (P↔∃xGx), ~~~∃xGx &models; ~P
+  * (∀xFx→S), (P→Gb) &models; (~(∀xFx&P)∨(S&Gb)) 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_73.txt b/data/crtw_73.txt
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+However, not all valid sequents in MPL or PL are truth-functionally valid and
+can be identified through replacement schemes. Here is an example:
+
+Every F is G. a is F. So, a is G.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), Fa &models; Ga
+
+It should be intuitive that this is a valid sequent. But if you are not sure,
+perhaps this informal explanation might help. "∀x(Fx→Gx)" says that every F is
+a G. You can think of this wff as logically equivalent to an infinite
+_conjunction_ "( (Fa→Ga) & (Fb→Gb) & (Fc→Gc) & ... )" where "a", "b", "c",
+etc. are names of all the objects in the domain. This infinite conjunction of
+course entails "(Fa→Ga)", which together with "Fa", entail "Ga" by _modus
+ponens_.
+
+Now consider another example of a sequent in MPL that is valid but not truth-
+functionally valid :
+
+a is F. a is G. So something is both F and G.
+
+Fa, Ga &models; ∃x(Fx&Gx)
+
+Again we can offer an informal explanation as to why this sequent is valid. An
+existentially quantified wff says that there is at least one object that
+satisfies some condition. So we can think of "∃x(Fx&Gx)" as logically
+equivalent to the infinite _disjunction_ "( (Fa&Ga) ∨ (Fb&Gb) ∨ (Fc&Gc) ∨ ...
+)". The first two premises of the sequent entail "(Fa&Ga)", and this
+conjunction in turn entails the infinite disjunction. So the sequent is indeed
+valid. It should be pointed out though that this argument is not very
+rigorous, and that a more precise justification can and should be given. But
+we shall not discuss the details here. What is important to remember is that
+an existentially quantified wff can be thought of as an infinite disjunction,
+and a universally quantified wff as an infinite conjunction. Bearing these two
+points in mind should help you understand why the following sequents are all
+valid sequents of MPL:
+
+Every F is G. Everything is F. So, everything is G.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), ∀xFx &models; ∀xGx
+
+Every F is G. Everything is not G. So, everything is not F.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), ∀x~Gx &models; ∀x~Fx
+
+Every F is G. Something is F. So, something is G.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), ∃xFx &models; ∃xGx
+
+Every F is G. Something is not G. So, something is not F.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), ∃x~Gx, &models; ∃x~Fx
+
+Everything is F or G. Everything is not F. So, everything is G.  
+∀x(Fx∨Gx), ∀x~Fx &models; ∀xGx
+
+Everything is F or G. Something is not G. So, something is F.  
+∀x(Fx∨Gx), ∃x~Gx &models; ∃xFx
+
+Everything is F and G. So, everything is F.  
+∀x(Fx&Gx) &models; ∀xFx
+
+Something is F and G. So, something is F.  
+∃x(Fx&Gx) &models; ∃xFx
+
+Every F is G. Every G is H. So, every F is H.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), ∀x(Gx→Hx) &models; ∀x(Fx→Hx)
+
+Every F is G. No G is H. So, no F is H.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), ∀x(Gx→~Hx) &models; ∀x(Fx→~Hx)
+
+Every F is G. Some F is not H. So, some G is not H.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), ∃x(Fx&~Hx) &models; ∃x(Gx&~Hx)
+
+Every F is G. Some H is not G. So, some H is not F.  
+∀x(Fx→Gx), ∃x(Hx&~Gx) &models; ∃x(Hx&~Fx)
+
+No F is G. Some F is H. So, some H is not G.  
+∀x(Fx→~Gx), ∃x(Fx&Hx) &models; ∃x(Hx&~Gx)
+
+No F is G. Some G is H. So, some H is not F.  
+∀x(Fx→~Gx), ∃x(Gx&Hx) &models; ∃x(Hx&~Fx)
+
+See if you can explain informally why the above sequents are valid.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_74.txt b/data/crtw_74.txt
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+Now you will learn a natural deduction system for MPL.
+
+## §1. The rules are very similar
+
+We adopt versions of the 12 rules from the natural deduction system for SL.
+While the old rules applied to SL formulas, these adopted rules apply to MPL
+formulas. Otherwise, the rules are unchanged. This provides rules for all the
+connectives of MPL.
+
+Additionally, rules for the quantifiers '∃' and '∀' are needed. For each
+quantifier, there is an elimination rule and an introduction rule. With the
+four quantifier rules, that makes 16 rules in all.
+
+Here are all of the rules, if you are in a hurry.
+
+Explain why rule &E for MPL is a sound rule.
+
+answer
+
+__In MPL, if (φ &ψ) is true under some interpretation then φ and ψ are true
+under that interpretation too. Thus, if (φ&ψ) is entailed by some formula or
+formulas, then φ and ψ are both entailed by those formulas too. So if in a
+derivation (φ&ψ) is entailed by its dependencies, and you write down φ or ψ
+with those dependencies, then the formula you write down will be entailed by
+its dependencies. Hence &E for MPL is a sound rule.
+
+## §2. Rule of Existential Quantifier Introduction
+
+The first quantifier rule is the rule of Existential Quantifier Introduction.
+Here is this rule in action to show Sa ⊢ ∃xSx:
+
+Rule ∃I says that you can take a formula you have written already, replace one
+or more occurrences of some name in the formula with a new variable, and then
+attach the existential quantifier to the front. The dependencies of the new
+formula are the same as the old formula.
+
+Notice that ∃I is a sound rule. That means that when you use the rule, the
+formula you write down is entailed by its dependencies. Consider the previous
+example, where the rule is used at line 2. Note that for any interpretation
+under which "Sa" is true, "∃xSx" is true under that interpretation too.
+
+Explain why for any interpretation under which "Sa" is true, "∃xSx" is true
+too.
+
+answer
+
+__Consider all interpretations under which "Sa" is true. For all such
+interpretations, the predicate S applies to the element a. That means for all
+such interpretations, there exists some element in the domain to which the
+predicate S applies. So for all interpretations under which "Sa" is true,
+"∃xSx" is true too.
+
+Here is another example of ∃I in action:
+
+Two details should be noted in using ∃I. The first detail is that ∃I applies
+to the whole formula, not to part of the formula. That means that the
+quantifier is added at the beginning of the formula, not in the middle. Thus,
+for example, the following derivation is incorrect:
+
+If you could do this, then rule ∃I would not be sound because you could write
+down a formula which is not entailed by its dependencies. Line 2 is not
+entailed by its dependency, line 1. Take an interpretation under which "Sa"
+and "Ab" are false, but "Sb" is true. This is an interpretation under which
+"(Sa → Ab)" is true and "(∃xSx → Ab)" is false. So "(Sa → Ab)" does not entail
+"(∃xSx → Ab)".
+
+So, remember: when using ∃I, the existential quantifier must be added to the
+front of the formula. The following is an example of a similar, but correct
+derivation:
+
+Show (Fa & Ga) ⊢ (∃xFx & Ga)
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. (Fa & Ga) 	A
+    1	2. Fa		1 &E
+    1	3. ∃xFx		2 ∃I
+    1	4. Ga		1 &E
+    1	5. (∃xFx & Ga) 	3, 4 &I
+    
+
+The second detail to be noted about ∃I is that the formula you write down must
+be a well-formed formula of MPL. Thus, for example, the following derivation
+is not correct:
+
+The derivation is not correct because the formula on line 2 is not a well-
+formed formula of MPL. The variable 'x' already occurs in line 1, so you
+cannot use the variable 'x' in applying ∃I. You need to choose a different
+variable. You could, for instance, use 'y' instead:
+
+In using ∃I you always need to choose a new variable or the expression you
+write down will not be a well-formed formula.
+
+Explain why "∃x(∃xSx & Rx)" is not a well-formed formula of MPL.
+
+answer
+
+__“∃x(∃xSx & Rx)”is not a WFF because it cannot be formed by applying the MPL
+formation rules as stated earlier. Rule 4 there stipulates that only a
+variable that has not occurred before can be used to generate a quantified
+WFF. Hence from the expression “(∃xSx & Ra)”, “∃y(∃xSx & Ry)” can be formed
+but not “∃x(∃xSx & Rx)”because“x” already occurs in“(∃xSx & Ra)”.
+
+On the list of rules, Rule ∃I is stated precisely using some shorthand
+symbolism:
+
+####  ∃I (Existential Quantifier Introduction)
+
+For any variable v and name c, if you have derived φv/c, and ∃vφ is a well-
+formed formula of MPL, then you can write down ∃vφ, depending on everything
+φv/c depends on.
+
+This statement of the rule uses the symbolism "φv/c". This symbolism is a
+shorthand which makes it simpler to state the quantifier rules. As we will be
+using it, "φv/c" means that you take an expression φ and replace all
+occurrences of v with c. For example, if φ is "(Fx&Fb)", v is "x" and c is
+"a", then φx/a is "(Fa&Fb)". If v is "x" and c is "b" then φx/b is "(Fb&Fb)".
+
+State Rule ∃I without the shorthand symbolism.
+
+answer
+
+__If you have derived φ, and φ contains at least one occurrence of some name
+c, then for any variable v which does not occur in φ, you can write down "∃",
+followed by v, followed by an expression formed by replacing one or more
+occurrences of c within φ by v, depending on everything φ depends on.
+
+## §3. Rule of Universal Quantifier Elimination
+
+A second straightforward rule for the quantifiers is the rule of universal
+quantifier elimination, ∀E:
+
+####  ∀E (Universal Quantifier Elimination)
+
+For any variable v and name c, if you have derived ∀vφ, then you can write
+down φv/c, depending on everything ∀vφ depends on.
+
+This rule is easy to use. For instance:
+
+Or, another example:
+
+However, the following is incorrect:
+
+This is incorrect because line 1 is a conjunction, not a formula beginning
+with a universal quantifier. Since the formula on line 1 does not begin with a
+universal quantifier, ∀E does not apply. ∀E only applies to formulas beginning
+with a universal quantifier.
+
+Explain why Rule ∀E is a sound rule.
+
+answer
+
+__In MPL, if ∀vφ is true under some interpretation, then φv/c is true under
+that interpretation too. Thus if ∀vφ is entailed by some formula or formulas,
+then φv/c is entailed by those formulas too. So if, in a derivation, ∀vφ is
+entailed by its dependencies, and you write down φv/c with those dependencies,
+then φv/c will be entailed by its dependencies. Hence ∀E is a sound rule.
+
+## §4. An example
+
+Here is an example of a derivation in MPL using rules you have learned so far:
+
+This shows (Sb→∀xEx), ~Ea ⊢ ~∀xSx .
+
+Find a shorter derivation showing that (Sb→∀xEx), ~Ea ⊢ ~∀xSx .
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_75.txt b/data/crtw_75.txt
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+Here is a summary of the Natural Deduction Rules for MPL.
+
+## §1. Quantifier Rules
+
+**∀E (Universal Quantifier Elimination)**  
+For any variable v and name c, if you have derived ∀vφ, then you can write
+down φv/c, depending on everything ∀vφ depends on.
+
+**∃I (Existential Quantifier Introduction)**  
+For any variable v and name c, if you have derived φv/c, and ∃vφ is a well-
+formed formula of MPL, then you can write down ∃vφ, depending on everything
+φv/c depends on.
+
+**∀I (Universal Quantifier Introduction)**  
+For any variable v and name c, if you have derived φv/c, and c does not occur
+in φ, and c does not occur in anything φv/c depends on, and ∀vφ is a well-
+formed formula of MPL, then you can write down ∀vφ, depending on everything
+φv/c depends on.
+
+**∃E (Existential Quantifier Elimination)**  
+For any variable v and name c, if you have derived ∃vφ, assumed φv/c, and
+derived ψ, and c does not occur in ψ, φ, or anything ψ depends on (except
+φv/c), then you can write down ψ a second time, depending on everything the
+first ψ depends on (except the assumption φv/c) together with everything ∃vφ
+depends on.
+
+## §2. Connective and other rules
+
+**A (Rule of Assumption)**  
+You can write down any MPL wff, depending on itself.
+
+**& I (Conjunction Introduction) **  
+If you have derived φ and ψ, you can write down (φ&ψ), depending on everything
+φ and ψ depend on.
+
+**& E (Conjunction Elimination) **  
+If you have derived (φ&ψ), you can write down φ or ψ, depending on everything
+(φ&ψ) depends on.
+
+**→I (Conditional Introduction)**  
+If you have assumed φ, and you have derived ψ, you can write down (φ→ψ),
+depending on everything ψ depends on except φ.
+
+**→E (Conditional Elimination or Modus Ponens)**  
+If you have derived (φ→ψ) and φ, you can write down ψ, depending on everything
+(φ→ψ) and φ depend on.
+
+**~I (Negation Introduction)**  
+If you have assumed ψ, and you have derived (φ&~φ), then you can write down
+~ψ, depending on everything (φ&~φ) depends on except ψ.
+
+**~E (Negation Elimination)**  
+If you have assumed ~ψ, and you have derived (φ&~φ), then you can write down
+ψ, depending on everything (φ&~φ) depends on except ~ψ.
+
+**∨I (Disjunction Introduction)**  
+If you have derived φ, you can write down (φ∨ψ) or (ψ∨φ), depending on
+everything φ depends on. (ψ is any MPL wff.)
+
+**∨E (Disjunction Elimination or Disjunctive Syllogism)**  
+If you have derived (φ∨ψ) and ~ψ, you can write down φ, depending on
+everything (φ∨ψ) and ~ψ depend on.
+
+Also, if you have derived (φ∨ψ) and ~φ, you can write down ψ, depending on
+everything (φ∨ψ) and ~φ depend on.
+
+**PC (Proof by Cases)**  
+If you have derived (φ∨ψ) and (φ→α) and (ψ→β), then you can write down (α∨β),
+depending on everything (φ∨ψ) and (φ→α) and (ψ→β) depend on.
+
+**↔I (Biconditional Introduction)**  
+If you have derived ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ)), you can write down (φ↔ψ), depending on
+everything ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ)) depends on.
+
+**↔E (Biconditional Elimination)**  
+If you have derived (φ↔ψ), you can write down ((φ→ψ)&(ψ→φ)) depending on
+everything (φ↔ψ) depends on.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_76.txt b/data/crtw_76.txt
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+So far you have learned two of the four quantifier rules. In this section you
+will learn the other two rules for the quantifiers.
+
+## §1. Universal Quantifier Introduction
+
+Universal Quantifier Introduction permits you, in some situations, to add a
+universal quantifier to a derivation. For example,
+
+This shows ∀x(Sx&Fx) ⊢ ∀xSx .
+
+Here is a statement of ∀I:
+
+####  ∀I (Universal Quantifier Introduction)
+
+For any variable v and name c, if you have derived φv/c, and c does not occur
+in φ, and c does not occur in anything φv/c depends on, and ∀vφ is a well-
+formed formula of MPL, then you can write down ∀vφ, depending on everything
+φv/c depends on.
+
+This may look a little complicated at first, but once you see the reason it is
+written that way, you will find it no more complicated than the quantifier
+rules you have learned already. Suppose you have written down φv/c in your
+derivation. If you want to write down ∀vφ using this rule you need to satisfy
+three restrictions. The first restriction is that c does not occur in φ. The
+second restriction is that c does not occur in anything φv/c depends on. The
+third and last restriction is that ∀vφ be a well-formed formula of MPL.
+
+Let's think about why these restrictions are built into the rule.
+
+If the third restriction was not present, then the following would be a
+correct derivation:
+
+The expression on line 2 is not a well-formed formula of MPL. One of the goals
+of our system is to make sure that each of the rules of our system is sound,
+that is, at each line in our derivation you write down a formula which is
+entailed by its dependencies. If you could write down line 2 we would have
+failed to achieve one of the goals of our system.
+
+The second restriction on Rule ∀I is that the name c does not occur in
+anything φv/c depends on. If that restriction was not present, Rule ∀I would
+not be a sound rule. It is easy to see why:
+
+"Fa" does not entail "∀xFx". So the formula on line 2 is not entailed by its
+dependencies. If you could use Rule ∀I to write down line 2, then Rule ∀I
+would not be sound. Rule ∀I does not permit you use line 1 to write down line
+2 because "a" occurs in "Fa" and the "Fa" on line 1 depends on "Fa".
+
+Explain why "Fa" does not entail "∀xFx".
+
+answer
+
+__Consider an interpretation under which "Fa" is true but "Fb" is false. Under
+this interpretation, "∀xFx" is false (because there exists an element in the
+domain to which the predicate F does not apply). Since there is an
+interpretation under which "Fa" is true and "∀xFx" is false, "Fa" does not
+entail "∀xFx".
+
+The final restriction on Rule ∀I is that c does not occur in φ. If this
+restriction was not present then, again, Rule ∀I would not be a sound rule:
+
+In this example, φ is "(Fa→Fx)", v is "x", c is "a", and φv/c is "(Fa→Fa)". If
+Rule ∀I worked this way, we would be able to show ⊢ ∀x(Fa→Fx) even though it
+is not the case that ⊨ ∀x(Fa→Fx). Thus, if Rule ∀I worked this way, it would
+be unsound.
+
+Explain why line 3 in the last example violates Rule ∀I.
+
+answer
+
+__Rule ∀I says that for any variable v and name c, if you have derived φv/c,
+and c does not occur in φ, and c does not occur in anything φv/c depends on,
+and ∀vφ is a well-formed formula of MPL, then you can write down ∀vφ,
+depending on everything φv/c depends on. In the example, φ is "(Fa→Fx)", v is
+"x", c is "a", and φv/c is "(Fa→Fa)". The formula on line 3 is "∀x(Fa→Fx)"
+which violates the restriction that c does not occur in φ, because clearly,
+"a" does occur in "(Fa→Fx)".
+
+Show that it is not the case that ⊨ ∀x(Fa→Fx).
+
+answer
+
+__If ⊨ ∀x(Fa→Fx), then "∀x(Fa→Fx)" is true under all interpretations. Consider
+an interpretation in which "Fa" is true but "Fb" is false. Under this
+interpretation, "(Fa→Fb)" is false. So "∀x(Fa→Fx)" is false under this
+interpretation as well. So "∀x(Fa→Fx)" is not true under all interpretations,
+and hence it is not the case that ⊨ ∀x(Fa→Fx).
+
+## §2. Existential Quantifier Elimination
+
+Now for the last quantifier rule, existential quantifier elimination. Here is
+an example:
+
+Rule ∃E permits you to derive things when you have an existentially quantified
+formula as in "∃x(Sx&Rx)" on line 1. To use the rule, you assume an instance
+of the existentially quantified formula and then derive something from it. In
+this case "(Sa & Ra)" is assumed and "∃xSx" is derived from it. At this point
+Rule ∃E lets you write down what you have just derived a second time, changing
+its dependencies. While line 4 depended on the assumption in line 2, the rule
+lets you write down the same formula depending on the existentially quantified
+formula in line 1.
+
+In essence, the idea behind the rule is this: when an existentially quantified
+formula like "∃xFx" is true under some interpretation, then you know that at
+least one formula like "Fa" or "Fb" or "Fc" or (and so on) is also true. But
+you don't know which one. Still, what you can do is assume one of these
+formulas (such as "Fb") and try to show something that you could show whether
+you assume "Fa" or "Fb" or "Fc" or whatever. For example, in the derivation
+above, we assumed "(Sa & Ra)" to derive "∃xSx". But we could have just as well
+assumed "(Sb & Rb)" or "(Sc & Rc)" etc. The choice of the name didn't matter
+in deriving "∃xSx". That shows that "∃xSx" follows not only from "(Sa & Ra)",
+but from "∃x(Sx&Rx)" as well.
+
+Here is the rule, with all its restrictions:
+
+####  ∃E (Existential Quantifier Elimination)
+
+For any variable v and name c, if you have derived ∃vφ, assumed φv/c, and
+derived ψ, and c does not occur in ψ, φ, or anything ψ depends on (except
+φv/c), then you can write down ψ a second time, depending on everything the
+first ψ depends on (except the assumption φv/c) together with everything ∃vφ
+depends on.
+
+Here are two examples of misuse of the rule, to help see how to use it
+correctly.
+
+In this last example, φ is "Fx", v is "x", c is "a", ∃vφ is "∃xFx", φv/c is
+"Fa", and ψ is "(Fa & Ga)". The problem here is that c occurs in ψ on line 4
+("a" occurs in the formula on line 4). So Rule ∃E cannot be used this way at
+line 5.
+
+Here is another example of an incorrect use of the rule:
+
+To be sure, this example is not correct, otherwise you would be able to show
+that if something is fat, then everything is fat!
+
+What restriction of the rule is violated on line 3 of the last example?
+
+answer
+
+__The rule says that for any variable v and name c, if you have derived ∃vφ,
+assumed φv/c, and derived ψ, and c does not occur in ψ, φ, or anything ψ
+depends on (except φv/c), then you can write down ψ a second time, depending
+on everything ∃vφ and the first ψ depend on, except the assumption φv/c. In
+this example, φ is "Fx", v is "x", c is "a", φv/c is "Fa", and ψ is "Fa". Line
+3 violates the restriction that c does not occur in ψ – because "a" does occur
+in "Fa".
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+## §1. Metalogic
+
+Our MPL natural deduction system is sound. You can verify this for yourself,
+by examining each of the rules to ensure that the rules only permit you to
+write down well-formed wffs which are entailed by their dependencies. That the
+system as a whole is sound means:
+
+For any MPL wff φ, if ⊢ φ, then ⊨ φ,
+
+and
+
+For any MPL wff φ, and list of MPL wffs X, if X ⊢ φ then X ⊨ φ.
+
+The system is also good for a further reason; it is complete. That the system
+is complete means:
+
+For any MPL wff φ, if ⊨ φ then ⊢ φ.
+
+and
+
+For any MPL wff φ, and list of MPL wffs X, if X ⊨ φ then X ⊢ φ.
+
+We won't prove the completeness of our MPL system in this introductory course.
+But it is useful to know that the system is complete. In SL you can use the
+truth table method to determine whether or not a particular SL wff is valid.
+But in MPL you cannot rely on the truth table method to determine whether or
+not an MPL wff is valid. You need some other method. Since the natural
+deduction is system for MPL is complete, if an MPL wff is valid, there is a
+derivation of the wff using the system.
+
+When we are carrying out derivations using the rules of MPL, we are working
+"within" the system. But when we describe and try to show whether MPL is sound
+and complete, we are using not just MPL, but also English, to talk about the
+system. The study of the these higher-level properties of a system of logic is
+known as "metalogic".
+
+Show that "∀x(Fx→Fx)" is valid in two different ways.
+
+answer
+
+__"∀x(Fx→Fx)" is true under every interpretation. So "∀x(Fx→Fx)" is valid.
+"∀x(Fx→Fx)" is derivable using MPL natural deduction:
+
+    
+    
+    1	1. Fa		A
+    	2. (Fa→Fa)	1,→I 
+    	3. ∀x(Fx→Fx)	2,∀I 
+    
+
+Since "∀x(Fx→Fx)" is derivable with no dependencies, and the system is sound,
+"∀x(Fx→Fx)" is valid.
+
+Suppose you try to find a derivation of a certain MPL wff, but you do not
+succeed in finding a derivation. Does it follow that that wff is not valid?
+
+answer
+
+__No. If there is no derivation, the wff is not valid. But not succeeding in
+finding a derivation does not mean that there isn't a derivation.
+
+Show the following:
+
+  1. ∀xHx ⊢ Ha
+  2. ∀xHx, (Hc → ∃xGx) ⊢ ∃xGx 
+  3. ∀x(Hx→Mx), ∀xHx ⊢ ∀xMx 
+  4. Ha ⊢ ∃yHy 
+  5. (Ab → Dc) ⊢ (Ab → ∃xDx) 
+  6. ∃x(Fx & Gx) ⊢ ∃xFx 
+  7. ∀x(Fx→∀yGy) ⊢ ∀x∀y(Fx→Gy) 
+  8. ∀x(Px→Qx), ∀x(Qx→Px) ⊢ ∀x(Px↔Qx)
+  9. ∃x~Px ⊢ ~∀xPx
+  10. (∃xPx→∀x(Qx→Rx)), (Pa&Qa) ⊢ Ra 
+  11. (∀x(Px→Qx)→∃x(Rx&Sx)), (∀x(Px→Sx)&∀x(Sx→Qx)) ⊢ ∃xSx 
+  12. (∀x(Px&~Qx)→∃xRx), ~∃x(Qx∨Rx) ⊢ ~∀xPx 
+  13. (∃x~Px→∀x~Qx), (∃x~Px→∃xQx), ∀x(Px→Rx) ⊢ ∀xRx 
+  14. ~∃x(Px∨Qx), (∃xRx→∃xPx), (∃xSx→∃xQx) ⊢ ~∃x(Rx∨Sx)
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+a. ∀xHx ⊢ Ha
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1)∀xHx 		A
+    1 	2) Ha 		1 ∀E
+    
+
+b. ∀xHx, (Hc → ∃xGx) ⊢ ∃xGx
+
+    
+    
+    1	1) ∀xHx		A
+    2	2) (Hc→∃xGx)	A
+    1 	3) Hc		1 ∀E
+    1, 2	4) ∃xGx		2, 3 →E
+    
+
+c. ∀x(Hx→Mx), ∀xHx ⊢ ∀xMx
+
+    
+    
+    1	1) ∀x(Hx→Mx)	A
+    2	2) ∀xHx		A
+    1	3) (Ha→Ma)	1 ∀E
+    2 	4) Ha		2 ∀E
+    1, 2 	5) Ma		3, 4 →E
+    1, 2	6) ∀xMx		5 ∀I 
+    
+
+d. Ha ⊢ ∃yHy
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1) Ha 		A
+    2 	2) ∃yHy 		1 ∃I
+    
+
+e. (Ab → Dc) ⊢ (Ab → ∃xDx)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1) (Ab→Dc)	A
+    2	2) Ab		A
+    1, 2 	3) Dc		1, 2 →E 
+    1, 2 	4) ∃xDx		3 ∃I
+    1	5) (Ab→∃xDx)	2, 4 →I
+    
+
+f. ∃x(Fx & Gx) ⊢ ∃xFx
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1) ∃x(Fx&Gx)		A
+    2 	2) (Fa&Ga)		A
+    2 	3) Fa			2 &E
+    2 	4) ∃xFx 			3 ∃I
+    1	5) ∃xFx			1, 2, 4 ∃E
+    
+
+g. ∀x(Fx→∀yGy) ⊢ ∀x∀y(Fx→Gy)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1) ∀x(Fx→∀yGy) 		A
+    1	2) (Fa→∀yGy)		1∀E
+    3	3) Fa			A
+    1, 3 	4) ∀yGy			2, 3 →E
+    1, 3 	5) Gb			4 ∀E
+    1	6) (Fa→Gb)		3, 5 →I
+    1	7) ∀y(Fa→Gy)		6 ∀I
+    1	8) ∀x∀y(Fx→Gy)		7 ∀I
+    
+
+h. ∀x(Px→Qx), ∀x(Qx→Px) ⊢ ∀x(Px↔Qx)
+
+    
+    
+    1	1) ∀x(Px→Qx) 		A
+    2	2) ∀x(Qx→Px)		A
+    1	3) (Pa→Qa)		1 ∀E
+    2 	4) (Qa→Pa)		2 ∀E
+    1, 2 	5) ((Pa→Qa)&(Qa→Pa))	3, 4 &I
+    1, 2	6) (Pa↔Qa)		5 ↔I
+    1, 2	7) ∀x(Px↔Qx)		6 ∀I
+    
+
+i. ∃x~Px ⊢ ~∀xPx
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1) ∃x~Px 	A
+    2	2) ∀xPx		A
+    3	3) ~Pa		A
+    2	4) Pa		2 ∀E
+    5 	5) ~(Qb&~Qb)	A
+    2, 3 	6) (Pa&~Pa) 	3, 4 &I
+    2, 3 	7) (Qb&~Qb)	5, 6 ~E
+    1, 2 	8) (Qb&~Qb)	1, 3, 7 ∃E
+    1	9) ~∀xPx	2, 8 ~I
+    
+
+j. (∃xPx→∀x(Qx→Rx)), (Pa&Qa) ⊢ Ra
+
+    
+    
+    1 	1) (∃xPx→∀x(Qx→Rx))	A
+    2	2) (Pa&Qa)		A
+    2	3) Pa			2 &E
+    2 	4) ∃xPx			3 ∃I
+    1, 2	5) ∀x(Qx→Rx)		1, 4 →E			
+    2 	6) Qa			2 &E
+    1, 2	7) (Qa→Ra) 		5 ∀E
+    1, 2	8) Ra			6, 7 →E
+    
+
+k. (∀x(Px→Qx)→∃x(Rx&Sx)), (∀x(Px→Sx)&∀x(Sx→Qx)) ⊢ ∃xSx
+
+    
+    
+    1	1) (∀x(Px→Qx)→∃x(Rx&Sx)) 	A
+    2	2) (∀x(Px→Sx)&∀x(Sx→Qx)) 	A
+    2	3) ∀x(Px→Sx) 			2 &E
+    2	4) ∀x(Sx→Qx)			2 &E
+    5	5) Pa				A
+    2 	6) (Pa→Sa)			3 ∀E
+    2, 5 	7) Sa				5, 6 →E
+    2 	8) (Sa→Qa)			4 ∀E
+    2, 5 	9) Qa				7, 8 →E
+    2	10) (Pa→Qa) 			5, 9 →I
+    2 	11) ∀x(Px→Qx)			10 ∀I
+    1, 2	12) ∃x(Rx&Sx)			1, 11 →E
+    13	13) (Rb&Sb) 			A
+    13 	14) Sb				13 &E
+    13 	15) ∃xSx				14 ∃I
+    1, 2 	16) ∃xSx				12, 13, 15 ∃E
+    
+
+l. (∀x(Px&~Qx)→∃xRx), ~∃x(Qx∨Rx) ⊢ ~∀xPx
+
+    
+    
+    1	1) (∀x(Px&~Qx)→∃xRx)		A
+    2	2) ~∃x(QxvRx) 			A
+    3	3) ∀xPx 			A 
+    4	4) Qa 				A
+    4	5) (QavRa)			4 vI
+    4	6) ∃x(QxvRx)			5 ∃I		
+    2, 4	7)(∃x(QxvRx)&~∃x(QxvRx))		2, 6 &I
+    2	8) ~Qa				4, 7 ~I
+    3	9) Pa				3 ∀E
+    2, 3	10) (Pa&~Qa)			8, 9 &I
+    2, 3	11) ∀x(Px&~Qx)			10 ∀I
+    1, 2, 3	12) ∃xRx				1, 11 →E
+    13	13) Rb				A
+    13	14) (QbvRb)			13 vI
+    13	15) ∃x(QxvRx)			14 ∃I
+    1, 2, 3	16) ∃x(QxvRx)			12, 13, 15 ∃E
+    1, 2, 3	17) (∃x(QxvRx)&~∃x(QxvRx))	2, 16 &I
+    1, 2	18) ~∀xPx 			3, 17 ~I
+    
+
+m. (∃x~Px→∀x~Qx), (∃x~Px→∃xQx), ∀x(Px→Rx) ⊢ ∀xRx
+
+    
+    
+    1		1) (∃x~Px→∀x~Qx)	A
+    2		2) (∃x~Px→∃xQx)		A
+    3		3) ∀x(Px→Rx)		A
+    4		4) ~Pc			A
+    4 		5) ∃x~Px			4 ∃I
+    1, 4 		6) ∀x~Qx		1, 5 →E
+    2, 4 		7) ∃xQx			2, 5 →E
+    8		8) Qa			A
+    9		9) ~(Sb&~Sb)		A
+    1, 4 		10) ~Qa			6 ∀E
+    1, 4, 8 	11) (Qa&~Qa)		8, 10 &I
+    1, 4, 8 	12) (Sb&~Sb) 		9, 11 ~E
+    1, 2, 4 	13) (Sb&~Sb)		7, 8, 12 ∃E
+    1, 2		14) Pc			4, 13 ~E
+    3		15) (Pc→Rc)		3∀E
+    1, 2, 3 	16) Rc			14, 15 →E
+    1, 2, 3		17) ∀xRx		16 ∀I 
+    
+
+n. ~∃x(Px∨Qx), (∃xRx→∃xPx), (∃xSx→∃xQx) ⊢ ~∃x(Rx∨Sx)
+
+    
+    
+    1		1) ~∃x(PxvQx)			A
+    2		2) (∃xRx→∃xPx)			A
+    3		3) (∃xSx→∃xQx)			A
+    4		4) ∃x(RxvSx)			A
+    5		5) Ra				A
+    5 		6) ∃xRx				5 ∃I
+    2, 5 		7) ∃xPx				2, 6 →E
+    8		8) Pb				A
+    8		9) (PbvQb)			8 vI
+    8		10) ∃x(PxvQx)			9∃I
+    2, 5		11) ∃x(PxvQx)			7,8,10 ∃E
+    1, 2, 5		12) (∃x(PxvQx)&~∃x(PxvQx))	1, 11 &I
+    1, 2		13) ~Ra				5, 12 ~I
+    14		14) Sa				A
+    14		15) ∃xSx				14 ∃I
+    3, 14 		16) ∃xQx				3, 15 →E
+    17		17) Qa				A
+    17		18) (PavQa)			17 vI
+    17		19) ∃x(PxvQx)			18 ∃I
+    3, 14 		20) ∃x(PxvQx)			16, 17, 19 ∃E
+    1, 3, 14	21) (∃x(PxvQx)&~∃x(PxvQx)) 	1, 20 &I
+    1, 3		22) ~Sa				14, 21 ~I
+    23		23) (RavSa)			A
+    24		24) ~(Tb&~Tb)			A
+    1, 2, 23	25) Sa				13, 23 vE
+    1 ,2, 3, 23	26) (Sa&~Sa)			22, 25 &I
+    1, 2, 3, 23	27) (Tb&~Tb)			24, 26 ~E
+    1, 2, 3, 4 	28) (Tb&~Tb)			4, 23, 27 ∃E
+    1, 2, 3		29) ~∃x(RxvSx)			4, 28 ~I	   
+    
+
+## §2. A final word
+
+MPL is a subset of what is known as first-order predicate logic. In MPL, our
+predicates are all "one-place" predicates which can be combined with only one
+variable or name. In standard predicate logic, we can have "two-place" or
+"multi-place" predicates, e.g. Pxy, Qabc. This allows for a system with higher
+expressive power. So for example, we can use Lbc to mean "b loves c", and then
+prove "something loves something", which we cannot do in MPL.
+
+A bit of history and metalogic: It was the mathematician and logician Kurt
+Gödel who first succeeded in proving the completeness of predicate logic in
+1929. His proof is known as Gödel's completeness theorem.
+
+But there is also another famous proof he has made, which is Gödel's
+**incompleteness** theorem! Roughly, what it says is that in any consistent
+formal system of logic that is powerful enough to include basic arithmetic,
+there will be valid wff that cannot be proven (these are systems more powerful
+than MPL). Think for a moment: it doesn't matter how powerful your
+mathematical rules are. There will always be true theorems that CANNOT be
+proven, and it is not because you are not smart enough! This is one of the
+most amazing and important results in modern logic and the foundations of
+mathematics.
+
+We have come to the end of the tutorials on formal logic. There is a lot more
+you can learn from here onwards. The next step would be to study first-order
+predicate logic in full. Afterwards, you can start learning about second-order
+logic, which include quantifying over properties. In addition, you can study
+the connections between set theory and logic, and see how they help us
+formalize arithmetic and other branches of mathematics. Furthermore, there are
+lots of interesting connections between computation and logic. There are also
+all sorts of systems of so-called non-classical logic which you can learn
+about. Have fun!
+
+__previous tutorial
+
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+There are lots of different branches of science, such as chemistry, biology,
+physics, etc. But generally speaking, there are four main components in
+scientific research :
+
+  1. Theories - These are the hypotheses, laws and facts about the empirical world.
+  2. The world - All the different objects, processes and properties of the universe.
+  3. Explanations and predictions - We use our theories to explain what is going on in the world, and to make predictions. Most predictions are about the future, but we can also have predictions about the past (retrodictions). For example, a geological theory about the earth's history might predict that certain rocks contains a high percentage of iron. A crucial part of scientific research is to test a theory by checking whether its predictions are correct or not.
+  4. Data (evidence) - The information that is gathered from observations or experiments. We use data to test our theories. They might also inspire new directions in research.
+
+So in order to understand a scientific theory, we need to be able to say: (1)
+which are the laws, principles and facts included in the theory, (2) what do
+these theories tell us about the nature of the world, (3) what can it predict
+and what can it explain, and (4) what are the main pieces of evidence used to
+support the theory, and whether there might be evidence against the theory.
+
+See if you can find an area of science which you are familiar with, and list
+the four main components in that area.
+
+## §1. Two misconceptions
+
+Here are two misconceptions about science which seem rather common:
+
+  * Some people like to say that nothing can be proven in science, so it is all based on faith, just like religion. What is right about this view is that most scientific claims cannot be proven because scientists are not 100% certain. But this does not mean that accepting them is solely a matter of faith, because we can still have very strong evidence supporting them. In life, we have to be content with probability, not absolute certainty. We cannot prove with 100% certainty that you will die if you jump out of an airplane without a parachute. In fact quite a few people have survived. But of course it would be very stupid for you to try it just because there is no such proof. 
+  * In science, a set of claims and principles about some particular subject matter is called a "theory". Sometimes this misleads some people because in ordinary language, "theory" is often used to talk about a tentative hypothesis with little evidence to support it. So now and then there are people who say things like "evolution is just a theory", "Einstein's theories are just that -- theories". These claims are not really helpful and not very clear. It is true that they are regarded as theories, but it does not mean they are speculative hypotheses on a par with any other wild guesses that people might come up with. A scientific theory can be a claim that is strongly supported by a wide range of evidence. Saying that it is "just" a theory would not be fair. 
+
+__next tutorial
+
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+## §1. The hypothetical-deductive method
+
+The hypothetical-deductive method (HD method) is a very important method for
+testing theories or hypotheses. It is sometimes said to be "the scientific
+method". This is not quite correct because surely there is not just one method
+being used in science. However, it is true that the HD method is of central
+importance, because it is one of the more basic methods common to all
+scientific disciplines, whether it is economics, physics, or biochemistry. Its
+application can be divided into four stages :
+
+> #### The hypothetical-deductive method
+>
+>   1. Identify the hypothesis to be tested.
+>   2. Generate predications from the hypothesis.
+>   3. Use experiments to check whether predictions are correct.
+>   4. If the predictions are correct, then the hypothesis is _confirmed_. If
+> not, then the hypothesis is _disconfirmed_.
+>
+
+## §2. Example
+
+Here is an illustration :
+
+  1. Suppose your portable music player fails to switch on. You might then consider the hypothesis that perhaps the batteries are dead. So you decide to test whether this is true.
+  2. Given this hypothesis, you predict that the music player should work properly if you replace the batteries with new ones.
+  3. So you proceed to replace the batteries, which is the "experiment" for testing the prediction.
+  4. If the player works again, then your hypothesis is confirmed, and so you throw away the old batteries. If the player still does not work, then the prediction is false, and the hypothesis is disconfirmed. So you might reject your original hypothesis and come up with an alternative one to test, e.g. the batteries are ok but your music player is broken.
+
+## §3. Some comments
+
+The example above helps us illustrate a few points about science and the HD
+method.
+
+### 1\. A scientific hypothesis must be testable
+
+**The HD method tells us how to test a hypothesis, and a scientific hypothesis
+must be one that is capable of being tested.**
+
+If a hypothesis cannot be tested, we cannot find evidence to show that it is
+probable or not. In that case it cannot be part of scientific knowledge.
+Consider the hypothesis that there are ghosts which we cannot see and can
+never interact with, and which can never be detected either directly or
+indirectly. This hypothesis is defined in such a way to exclude the
+possibility of testing. It might still be true and there might be such ghosts,
+but we would never be in a position to know and so this cannot be a scientific
+hypothesis.
+
+### 2\. Confirmation is not truth
+
+**In general, confirming the predictions of a theory increases the probability
+that a theory is correct. But in itself this does not prove conclusively that
+the theory is correct.**
+
+To see why this is the case, we might represent our reasoning as follows :
+
+If H then P.  
+P.  
+Therefore H.  
+
+Here H is our hypothesis "the batteries are dead", and P is the prediction
+"the player will function when the batteries are replaced". This pattern of
+reasoning is of course not valid, since there might be reasons other than H
+that also bring about the truth of P. For example, it might be that the
+original batteries are actually fine, but they were not inserted properly.
+Replacing the batteries would then restore the loose connection. So the fact
+that the prediction is true does not prove that the hypothesis is true. We
+need to consider _alternative hypotheses_ and see which is more likely to be
+true and which provides the best explanation of the prediction. (Or we can
+also do more testing!)
+
+In the next tutorial we shall talk about the criteria that help us choose
+between alternative hypotheses.
+
+### 3\. Disconfirmation need not be falsity
+
+**Very often a hypothesis generates a prediction only when given additional
+assumptions ( _auxiliary hypotheses_ ). In such cases, when a prediction fails
+the theory might still be correct.**
+
+Looking back at our example again, when we predict that the player will work
+again when the batteries are replaced, we are assuming that there is nothing
+wrong with the player. But it might turn out that this assumption is wrong. In
+such situations the falsity of the prediction does not logically entail the
+falsity of the hypothesis. We might depict the situation by this argument : (
+H=The batteries are dead, A=The player is not broken.)
+
+If ( H and A ) then P.  
+It is not the case that P.  
+Therefore, it is not the case that H.  
+
+This argument here is of course not valid. When P is false, what follows is
+not that H is false, only that the conjunction of H and A is false. So there
+are three possibilities : (a) H is false but A is true, (b) H is true but A is
+false, or (c) both H and A are false. So we should argue instead :
+
+If ( H and A ) then P.  
+It is not the case that P.  
+Therefore, it is not the case that H and A are both true.  
+
+Returning to our earlier example, if the player still does not work when the
+batteries are replaced, this does not prove conclusively that the original
+batteries are not dead. This tells us that when we apply the HD method, we
+need to examine the additional assumptions that are invoked when deriving the
+predictions. If we are confident that the assumptions are correct, then the
+falsity of the prediction would be a good reason to reject the hypothesis. On
+the other hand, if the theory we are testing has been extremely successful,
+then we need to be extremely cautious before we reject a theory on the basis
+of a single false prediction. These additional assumptions used in testing a
+theory are known as "auxiliary hypotheses".
+
+## §4. When should we reject a theory?
+
+When a theory makes a false prediction, sometimes it can be difficult to know
+whether we should reject the theory or whether there is something wrong with
+the auxiliary hypotheses. For example, astronomers in the 19th century found
+that Newtonian physics could not fully explain planet Mercury's orbit. It
+turns out that this is because Newtonian physics is wrong, and you need
+relativity to give a more accurate prediction of the orbit. However, when
+astronomers discovered Uranus in 1781, they also found out that its orbit was
+different from the predictions of Newtonian physics. But then scientists
+realized that it could be explained if there was an additional planet which
+affected Uranus, and Neptune was subsequently discovered as a result.
+
+In 2011, scientists in Italy reported that their experiment seemed to have
+shown that some subatomic particles could travel faster than the speed of
+light, which would seem to show that relativity theory is wrong. But on closer
+inspection, it was discovered that there was a problem with the experimental
+setup. So if a theory has been very successful, even when a result seems to
+show that theory is wrong, we need to make sure that the evidence is strong
+and reliable, and try to replicate the result and eliminate alternative
+explanations. "Extraordinary claim requires extraordinary evidence".
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+This is a short and succinct YouTube video on critical thinking:
+
+* * *
+
+What is the most important lesson of critical thinking? What is it supposed to
+achieve? Bertrand Russell's interview here is quite relevant.
+
+* * *
+
+## §1. Online courses
+
+There are now many online courses on critical thinking. They should not be
+difficult to find. Here are two you can try out:
+
+Kahn Academy has a course on critical thinking with videos and exercises. Try
+searching for "critical thinking".
+
+__http://www.khanacademy.org
+
+"Critical Reasoning for Beginners" from Department for Continuing Education at
+Oxford.
+
+__http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/series/critical-reasoning-beginners
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Whether in scientific research or in everyday life, we often need to choose
+between alternative explanations or theories. Here are six criteria we can use
+to evaluate them and help us decide which to accept.
+
+#### 1\. Consistency with observations
+
+What are the facts or observations we are trying to explain? Are they
+incompatible with any of the theories? If so, this will be a good reason to
+reject them, unless there are reasons to think that some of the observations
+are not reliable.
+
+#### 2\. Predictive power
+
+A scientific theory ought to help us make predictions and explain our
+observations. If a hypothesis generates no testable prediction, it fails the
+minimal requirement for a scientific hypothesis.
+
+When we evaluate the predictive power of a theory, we consier both the
+quantity and the quality of the predictions. How many predictions can the
+theory make? How accurate and precise are they? Does the theory make
+predictions across a wide range of phenomena?
+
+#### 3\. Mechanism
+
+In general, we want theories that can explain the connections between events
+by revealing the underlying causal mechanisms. This can help us generate more
+predictions to test the theory and make other discoveries.
+
+#### 4\. Fruitfulness
+
+This is about whether a theory helps us make surprising or unexpected
+predictions which turn out to be correct, and whether the theory helps us
+detect and explain connections which we would not have noticed otherwise.
+
+#### 5\. Simplicity
+
+A simple theory is (roughly) one with fewer assumptions, and which posits less
+entities than its competitors. Many scientists believe strongly that we should
+search for simple theories if feasible.
+
+#### 6\. Coherence
+
+A theory should be internally coherent in the sense that it is logically
+consistent. If not, there is something wrong with the theory as it stands, and
+so there is a need to revise the theory to come up with a better version.
+
+The other aspect of coherence is that we should look for theories that fit
+together with other well-confirmed facts and scientific theories. Widely
+accepted theories are already well-confirmed, so if a hypothesis is
+incompatible with existing science, the default response should be that the
+hypothesis is mistaken. An extraordinary claim incompatible with scientific
+knowledge should require very strong evidence before it can be accepted.
+
+* * *
+
+One piece of writing very relevant to the topic under discussion comes from
+the famous scientist and writer Carl Sagan. In one of his books he proposed
+what he calls “A Baloney Detection Kit,” a set of tools useful for scientific
+and everyday reasoning. Here they are:
+
+  1. Wherever possible there must be independent confirmation of the “facts.” 
+  2. Encourage substantive debate on the evidence by knowledgeable proponents of all points of view. 
+  3. Arguments from authority carry little weight — “authorities” have made mistakes in the past. They will do so again in the future. Perhaps a better way to say it is that in science there are no authorities; at most, there are experts. 
+  4. Spin more than one hypothesis. If there’s something to be explained, think of all the different ways in which it could be explained. Then think of tests by which you might systematically disprove each of the alternatives. 
+  5. Try not to get overly attached to a hypothesis just because it’s yours. It’s only a way station in the pursuit of knowledge. Ask yourself why you like the idea. Compare it fairly with the alternatives. See if you can find reasons for rejecting it. If you don’t, others will. 
+  6. If whatever it is you’re explaining has some measure, some numerical quantity attached to it, you’ll be much better able to discriminate among competing hypotheses. What is vague and qualitative is open to many explanations. 
+  7. If there’s a chain of argument, every link in the chain must work (including the premise) — not just most of them. 
+  8. Occam’s Razor. This convenient rule-of-thumb urges us when faced with two hypotheses that explain the data _equally well_ to choose the simpler. 
+  9. Always ask whether the hypothesis can be, at least in principle, falsified ... You must be able to check assertions out. Inveterate skeptics must be given the chance to follow your reasoning, to duplicate your experiments and see if they get the same result. 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+In science and everyday life, we are often interested in finding causes and
+using them to explain and control things. However, the nature of causation is
+a difficult philosophical topic. Some people think that causation is transfer
+of energy, others think that causation is a matter of manipulability. There
+are even philosophers who deny the existence of causation. Here we will
+discuss some of the useful concepts for thinking about causation in everyday
+life, and set aside the more controversial issues. (See the section on
+causation in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy if you are interested in
+these issues.)
+
+## §1. Some useful terminology
+
+We often talk about causation in two different ways. First of all, there is
+**singular causation** , which is a relation between two particular events,
+where a particular event is some activity or occurrence at some particular
+time or place. Here are some examples of singular causation :
+
+  * Her singing causes the windows to shatter.
+  * The viral infection caused his death.
+
+But we also speak of **general causation** as a relation between two **types**
+of events, as in :
+
+  * Smoking causes cancer.
+  * Heavy exercises cause sweating, thirst, and fatigue.
+
+It seems reasonable to think that general causation is to be analysed in terms
+of singular causation. So "type X events cause type Y events" might be
+understood as something roughly like "particular events of type X are highly
+likely to cause particular events of type Y."
+
+These concepts about causal connections are also quite useful:
+
+  * An event X is _causally necessary_ for an event Y if and only if Y would not have happened if X had not occurred.
+  * An event X is _causally sufficient_ for an event Y if and only if the presence of X alone is enough to bring about Y.
+
+So for example, heating a gas is causally sufficient but not necessary to
+increase its pressure - you can increase its pressure by compressing the gas
+as well. Pressing the light switch might be causally necessary to turn the
+light on but it is not sufficient since electricity is lso required.
+
+  * Sometimes, a causal factor can be _salient_ or relevant to the effect even if it is neither necessary nor sufficient, e.g. hardwork might be a _causally relevant factor_ that is part of the explanation of why a student has passed, but presumably it is neither necessary nor sufficient.
+  * We can also draw a distinction between _triggering_ and _standing_ or _structural_ causes. A triggering cause is a cause that sets into motion the chain of events that lead to an effect. Whereas a standing cause is some static condition that contributes to the effect only in conjunction with a triggering cause.
+
+For example, suppose there was an explosion in a room full of flammable gases.
+The triggering cause might be the event of someone lighting a match in the
+room, and the presence of the gases would be the standing cause. Similarly,
+the standing cause of a particular riot might have to do with high
+unemployment, with the triggering cause being some particular event such as
+perhaps someone being beaten up by the police.
+
+## §2. Causation and causal mechanisms
+
+The universe contains objects and processes at various levels. Bigger objects
+such as galaxies are made up of stars and planets, and societies are composed
+of smaller things such as individual human beings. Similarly, high level
+processes such as the conduction of electricity is composed of lower-level
+processes such as the movement of electrons. To explain causation, it is not
+enough just to know that A is the cause of B, we need a theory that explains
+how A causes B. What is needed is a theory of the lower-level causal
+mechanisms that lead from A to B.
+
+For example, to explain why heating causes a piece of metal to expand, we cite
+the fact that heating gives energy to the metal atoms, and as a result of
+increasing vibration due to higher energy the distance between the atoms
+increase and this constitutes expansion. The structure of this explanation can
+be represented by a diagram :
+
+What this diagram shows is that a high level physical causal process is
+explained in terms of lower-level mechanisms. Without lower-level mechanisms,
+we would not be able to understand how high-level causation can occur. This
+applies not just to physics but to other disciplines as well. For example, in
+macroeconomics, high-level properties like GDP, inflation and unemployment
+rate are also to be explained at a lower level by the actions of individuals
+in the economy.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was an English philosopher who wrote on a wide
+range of topics ranging from language and science to political philosophy. The
+so-called "Mill's methods" are five rules for investigating causes that he has
+proposed. It has been suggested that some of these rules were actually
+discussed by the famous Islamic scientist and philosopher Avicenna (980-1037).
+
+## §1. The Method of Agreement
+
+The best way to introduce Mill's methods is perhaps through an example.
+Suppose your family went out together for a buffet dinner, but when you got
+home all of you started feeling sick and experienced stomach aches. How do you
+determine the cause of the illness? Suppose you draw up a table of the food
+taken by each family member :
+
+Member / Food taken | Oyster | Beef | Salad | Noodles | Fallen ill?  
+---|---|---|---|---|---  
+Mum | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes  
+Dad | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes  
+Sister | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes  
+You | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes  
+  
+Mill's rule of agreement says that if in all cases where an effect occurs,
+there is a single prior factor C that is common to all those cases, then C is
+the cause of the effect. According to the table in this example, the only
+thing that all of you have eaten is oyster. So applying the rule of agreement
+we infer that eating oyster is the cause of the illnesses.
+
+## §2. The Method of Difference
+
+Now suppose the table had been different in the following way:
+
+Member / Food taken | Oyster | Beef | Salad | Noodles | Fallen ill?  
+---|---|---|---|---|---  
+Mum | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes  
+Dad | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes  
+Sister | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes  
+You | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No  
+  
+In this particular case you are the only one who did not fall ill. The only
+difference between you and the others is that you did not take salad. So that
+is probably the cause of the others' illnesses. This is an application the
+method of difference. This rule says that where you have one situation that
+leads to an effect, and another which does not, and the only difference is the
+presence of a single factor in the first situation, we can infer this factor
+as the cause of the effect.
+
+## §3. The Joint Method
+
+The joint method is a matter of applying _both_ the method of agreement and
+the method of difference, as represented by the diagram above. So application
+of the joint method should tell us that it is the beef which is the cause this
+time.
+
+Member / Food taken | Oyster | Beef | Salad | Noodles | Fallen ill?  
+---|---|---|---|---|---  
+Mum | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes  
+Dad | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes  
+Sister | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes  
+You | Yes | No | No | Yes | No  
+  
+## §4. The Method of Concomitant Variation
+
+The method of concomitant variation says that if across a range of situations
+that lead to a certain effect, we find a certain property of the effect
+varying with variation in a factor common to those situations, then we can
+infer that factor as the cause.
+
+Thus using the same kind of example, we might find that you felt somewhat sick
+having eaten one oyster, whereas your sister felt rather not well having eaten
+a few, and your father became critically ill having eaten ten in a row. Since
+the variation in the number of oysters corresponds to variation in the
+severity of the illness, it would be rational to infer that the illnesses were
+caused by the oysters.
+
+## §5. The Method of Residues
+
+According to the method of residues, if we have a range of factors believed to
+be the causes of a range of effects, and we have reason to believe that all
+the factors, except one factor C, are causes for all the effects, except one,
+then we should infer that C is the cause of the remaining effect.
+
+## §6. General comments on Mill's methods
+
+Mill's methods should come as no surprise, as these rules articulate some of
+the principles we use implicitly in causal reasoning in everyday life. But it
+is important to note the limitations of these rules.
+
+  * First, the rules presuppose that we have a list of candidate causes to consider. But the rules themselves do not tell us how to come up with such a list. In reality this would depend on our knowledge or informed guesses about likely causes of the effects.
+  * The other assumption presupposed by these methods is that among the list of factors under consideration, only one factor is the unique cause of the effect. But there is no guarantee that this assumption always holds. Also, sometimes the cause might be some complicated combinations of various factors.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+How do we infer causation based on our observations? This is not an easy task.
+A typical starting point is that we notice that one thing follows another, and
+then we try to determine whether there is a causal connection between the two.
+Suppose your phone is not working, and you realize the weather is very humid.
+Does the high humidity cause the phone to malfunction? This might just be a
+coincidence, but if this happens regularly, then you might be more confident
+that there is a causal connection. In a lot of situations, this is indeed how
+we infer causation. An event A is regularly followed by B, and we infer that A
+is the cause of B.
+
+However, this reliability of this inference depends on our ability to rule out
+other explanations. When there is a correlaton between events A and B, one
+possibility is that A causes B. But there are other possibilities we ought to
+consider. In this tutorial, we list some of these possibilities. So remember
+them next time when you try to identify causes and effects.
+
+#### 1\. The correlation between A and B is accidental
+
+  * It is probably true that whenever a baby is born, someone somewhere in the world will die on the same day. But this is hardly surprising given the number of people dying and being born each day. Any connection between the two is purely an accident.
+  * To see whether the connection between A and B is an accident, it is important to consider a _control situation_ where A is absent, and see if B would still occur. This is a very important of scientific thinking. But it applies to everyday life too. Some people think that playing music to plants will make them grow better. But we need to check whether tomatoes growing in similar conditions without the music will grow just as well or not.
+  * See also the Simpson's paradox.
+  * In fact, if you look long and hard enough, it is not difficult to come up with some spurious accidental correlations. There is in fact a website with lots of real data that allows you to discover some funny correlations, such as the connection between cheese consumption and the number of people who died by being tangled in their bedsheets:
+
+The diagram above and many other ones can be found here.
+
+#### 2\. B is the cause of A
+
+  * Sometimes correlation goes both ways. The fact that A causes B can explain the correlation, but maybe the reality is that B is the cause of A. For example, people who are depressed tend to have low self-esteem. Perhaps the former is the cause of the latter, but it is also possible that low self-esteem causes depression by making a person socially withdrawn and lacking in motivation. We need further observations to determine which possibility it is.
+
+#### 3\. A and B form a causal loop
+
+  * In many cases two causal factors can reinforce each other by forming a causal loop. In the example above, it is more plausible to think that depression affects self-esteem, and a lower self-esteem can cause further depression. 
+  * Of course, causal loops happen only between types of events. If a particular event A is the cause of a particular event B, then A must happen earlier than B and so B cannot be the cause of A.
+
+#### 4\. A and B have a common cause
+
+  * Young children with larger noses tend to be more intelligent, but it is not because the nose size somehow accelerates cognitive development. Rather young children with larger noses are children who are older, and older children are more intelligent than younger ones because their brains have developed further. So A and B are correlated not because A is the cause of B, but because there is an underlying common cause. 
+
+#### 5\. A is a minor cause of B
+
+  * An effect can have more than one cause, and some may be more important than others.
+
+#### 6\. B is a side effect of A
+
+  * These are cases where the effect might be wrongly attributed to A when in fact it is due to some side effect of A.
+  * It has been shown that medicine can have a placebo effect. The subjective belief that one is being treated can bring about relief from an illness even if the medical treatement being given is not really effective against the illness. For example, a patient might report that his pain has decreased as a result to taking a pill, even though the pill is a sugar pill with no effect on pain.
+
+* * *
+
+Here is a nice video about the Placebo effect:
+
+Suppose these correlations have been observed. For each of them, try to come
+up with different possible causal explanations.
+
+  1. Shark attacks correlate with ice-cream consumption.
+  2. A recent study finds that people who use two monitors are 44% more productive than those who are using a single monitor.
+  3. People who consume more expensive organic food regularly are healthier than those who do not eat organic food.
+  4. Children who eat breakfast are more likely to do better at school. （See Littlecott, H. J., Moore, G. F., Moore, L., Lyons, R. A., & Murphy, S. (2016). Association between breakfast consumption and educational outcomes in 9–11-year-old children. Public health nutrition, 19(09), 1575-1582.)
+
+Here is another interesting chart showing why we should not confuse
+correlation with causation:
+
+Source
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+The world being a complicated place, events are often related by complex
+causal connections. Cause and effect diagrams can play a very important role
+in understanding such connections, and assist in the calculation of
+statistical and probabilistic dependencies. By laying out such connections,
+diagrams can help us identify important crucial factors in the explanation,
+prediction and control of events. Here we discuss briefly two popular types of
+cause and effect diagrams.
+
+## §1. Causal networks
+
+Causal networks are diagrams that indicate causal connections using arrows.
+Here is a simple example where an arrow from A to B indicates that A is the
+cause of B.
+
+Causal networks are particularly useful in showing causal processes which
+involve a number of different stages. Here is a beautiful diagram created by
+Alfred Barr, the first director of the MOMA museum, showing the influences
+between movements in modern art:
+
+In science, the arrows in a cause and effect diagram can be given probability
+assignments to indicate how likely it is that one event would lead to another.
+Special algorithms or programs can then be used to calculate how likely it is
+for a particular effect to come about. These networks with probability are
+known as " _Bayesian networks_ " or _Belief nets_ ".
+
+## §2. Fishbone diagrams
+
+Fishbone diagrams are so-called because they resemble fishbones. They are also
+called "Ishikawa diagrams", named after Kaoru Ishikawa of Japan. A fishbone
+diagram is a graphical representation of the different factors that contribute
+to an effect. They are often used in business and management.
+
+In a typical fishbone diagram, the effect is usually a problem to be resolved,
+and is placed at the "fish head". The causes of the effect are then laid out
+along the "bones", and classified into different types along the branches.
+Further causes can be laid out alongside further side branches. So the general
+structure of a fishbone diagram is something like this:
+
+Here is an example of how a fishbone diagram can be used to display different
+types of causes:
+
+One advantage of these diagrams is that they give a big picture of the main
+causal factors leading to the effect. These diagrams are now often used in
+quality management, and in brainstorming sessions.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+Here are some typical mistakes in causal reasoning:
+
+  * **Post hoc fallacy - Inferring that X causes Y just because X is followed by Y**. Example: "Last time I wore these red pants I got hit by a car. It must be because they bring bad luck."
+  * **Mistaking correlation as causation** \- "Whenever I take this pill my cough clears up within a week, so this pill is very effective in curing coughs." But perhaps mild coughs go away eventually even without taking medicine? 
+  * **Reversing causal direction - Assuming that X causes Y without considering the possibility that Y is the cause of X** \- "Children who like violent video games are more likely to show violent behavior. This must be because they are copying the games." But can it be that children who are more prone to violence are more fond of such video games? 
+  * **Genetic fallacy - Thinking that if some item X is associated with a source with a certain property, then X must have the same property as well.** But of course this might not be the case. Example: "Eugenics was practised by the Nazis so it is obviously disgusting and unacceptable." 
+  * **Fallacy of the single cause - Wrongly presupposing that an event has a single cause when there are many causally relevant factors involved.** This is a fallacy where causal interactions are being over-simplified. For example, after tragedy such as a student committing suicide, people and the news media might start looking for "the cause", and blame it on either the parents, the amount of school work, the society, etc. But there need not be a single cause that led to the suicide. Many factors might be at work. 
+  * **Confusing good causal consequences with reasons for belief - Thinking that a claim C must be true because believing in C brings about some benefit.** Example: "God exists because after I have become a believer I am a lot happier and is now a better person." 
+
+Read the following research about the use of Facebook and longevity:
+https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/10/161031165135.htm. Should you use
+Facebook more and post more photos in order to live longer?
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
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+It is inevitable and also prudent that we make use of scientific research in
+our daily life. We might look up information about what to eat to become
+healthier, or we might want to find out what is the best way of learning a new
+language.
+
+One thing we should remember is that science is a human construction. It is
+the product of human beings who do not know everything, and who can be biased.
+So here are a few things to bear in mind when we read scientific research and
+make use of such information.
+
+  * Scientific theories progress through trial and error. As we learn more, old theories are rejected and improved upon. So we should expect that many things we accept as scientific facts right now might turn out to be wrong later on. Keeping an open mind is thus a good attitude. However, this does not mean it is irrational to accept scientific findings. What we think we know right now might be the approximate truth even if not exactly right. Also, although science might be wrong about many things, there are lots of other things which we can be quite confident about, e.g. the Earth is not flat, water contains oxygen and hydrogen, etc. 
+  * Very often scientific studies are carried out but not published or reported. For example, a pharmaceutical company might do an experiment to test whether a drug is effective, but does not publish the result when it fails to find a positive effect. This is something to bear in mind especially in the field of medicine. One paper reporting a positive effect in a clinical trial might turn out to be an unreliable anomaly if there are many other unpublished results with the opposite conclusion. 
+  * Results that can be replicated are of course more reliable. Recently some experts found that about 75% of social psychology experiments published in top journals cannot be replicated. 
+  * Scientists, like ordinary human beings, can be biased. Some might not be completely objective when it comes to evaluating evidence. Others might be incompetent or careless in running their experiments. There are also those who are downright dishonest and fabricate their results. So it is sensible to be skeptical of findings which have not gone through a rigorous peer review process. 
+  * Extraordinary discoveries that go against established theories in the field should be treated with caution unless they can be replicated by others and evaluated more objectively. 
+  * Science is often expensive. Scientists depend on an adequate source of funding to do their work. So some might be tempted to publish only results that are favorable to the companies that fund their work, and to suppress unfavorable evidence. So it is crucial for scientists to reveal the source of their funding and to avoid conflicts of interests. 
+  * We get a lot of information about scientific research indirectly through various news channels and social media. Very often the people who report such news might not be scientific experts and can easily get things wrong. For example, very often a discovery about a correlation between X and Y will be reported as a causal claim: X causes Y. But the scientists themselves might be more cautious. So if you have time, looking up the actual research publication might give you a more accurate picture. Very often the abstract of the article is available for free on the internet. Try to identify websites which offer more high-quality content. Do not put your trust in everything you read in online forums. Verify for yourself that the information is correct and cross-check with other sources. 
+  * Nobody knows everything about science. A scientist who is an expert in one area might not even understand fully the basic principles of a different area of science. So be cautious of experts who make big claims about some topic that is not in his field. 
+
+__previous tutorial
+
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+## §1. The origins of probability theory
+
+The notion of probability has been around for as long as people have gambled,
+and gambling has been around since ancient times. Everyone knows that some
+bets are riskier than others; betting that the next card drawn from a pack
+will be the queen of hearts is riskier than betting that it will be a heart. A
+successful gambler needs to be good at estimating the chance of winning a
+given bet. The notion of probability arose as a measure of chance; the higher
+the probability, the better the chance of winning.
+
+Modern probability theory also arose from gambling. In the seventeenth
+century, mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat worked out the
+theory of probabilities as a response to a problem posed to Pascal by a
+gambler. These days, probability theory is far more than just a theory of
+gambling. It helps us with all kinds of risk assessment--in the insurance
+industry, in medical research, in engineering, and in virtually every other
+human endeavor.
+
+Probability theory is the foundation of statistical reasoning, so if we are
+going to learn about statistical reasoning, we have to start with some
+probability theory. The first few sections cover the basics of probability
+theory, and each section ends with questions which enable you to check your
+understanding. The later sections contain examples of probabilistic reasoning,
+good and bad, including some of the most common mistakes people make when they
+use probabilities. If you already know how to calculate probabilities, you can
+skip straight to the examples.
+
+## §2. Representing probabilities
+
+A probability is represented by a number between 0 and 1. An event that is
+certain to happen is assigned a probability of 1. An event that is certain not
+to happen is assigned a probability of 0. To say that an event has some value
+in between means that it may or may not happen; the larger the probability,
+the more likely the event. To be more precise about what probability actually
+means is surprisingly difficult; click this button for a brief discussion of
+this topic:
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+### What is probability?
+
+There are at least three theories of probability that are worth mentioning.
+The _classical_ theory is based on the fundamental assumption that all basic
+outcomes are equally likely. So, for example, if you roll a die, the chance of
+it showing a 1 is 1/6, because there are six basic outcomes. This works fine
+for most gambling devices, because they are constructed so that the basic
+outcomes are equally likely. But outside the world of gambling, basic outcomes
+often don't have the same chance of occurring. For example, the chance of it
+raining on a given day in Hong Kong may well not be the same as the chance of
+it not raining.
+
+According to the _frequentist_ theory, the probability of an outcome is the
+proportion of the time that the outcome occurs, in the long run. So the
+probability that it will rain on a given day in Hong Kong is determined by
+conducting an experiment to determine the proportion of days on which it
+rains; in the long run, the result of this experiment tells you the
+probability of rain. However, some events are not repeatable. For example, the
+probability that Lee will win the election cannot be determined in this way,
+since this particular election only occurs once.
+
+Finally, according to the _personalist_ theory, the probability of an event
+(for me) is just my degree of belief that the event will occur. So if I say
+that the probability of Lee winning the election is 2/3, I am expressing how
+strongly I believe that he will win. According to the personalist theory,
+probabilities are _subjective_ ; they may vary from person to person.
+According to the classical and frequentist theories, probabilities are
+_objective_ ; the probability doesn't depend on what anyone thinks. The debate
+between these theories (especially the latter two) is still going on.
+
+Still, even if we can't say precisely what a probability _is_ , we all know
+how to _assign_ probabilities to simple events. For example, we all know that
+if we toss a coin, the probability of getting heads is 1/2. That's because
+there are two outcomes, heads and tails, and for a fair coin they have the
+same chance of occurring. Since the probabilities must add up to 1 (one or the
+other outcome is certain to happen), the probability of each outcome must be
+1/2. Similarly, if you roll a six-sided die, there are six equally probable
+outcomes, so the probability of each outcome is 1/6.
+
+As an abbreviation, it is customary to use a capital P to stand for
+probability. So, for example, we can abbreviate "The probability of getting
+heads when I toss this coin is 1/2" as follows:
+
+P(H)=1/2
+
+The symbol inside the parentheses stands for the outcome in question; I've
+used the letter H to stand for getting heads. Unless it's obvious, you need to
+state the meaning of the symbol you use to stand for the outcome.
+
+## §3. Probabilities and odds
+
+Odds are sometimes used instead of probability as a measure of chance. For
+example, suppose you are told that the odds of catching flu this year are
+200:1 (read "two-hundred to one"). The sizes of the numbers on either side of
+the colon represent the relative chances of not catching flu (on the left) and
+catching flu (on the right). In other words, what you are told is that the
+chance of not catching flu is 200 times as great as the chance of catching
+flu.
+
+Odds are usually presented in terms of whole numbers. So if you want to say
+that the chance of Lee losing the election is two and a half times as great as
+the chance of him winning, you would express this by saying that the odds of
+Lee winning are 5:2. The number on the left (the chance of him losing) is two
+and a half times bigger than the number on the right (the chance of him
+winning).
+
+Note that odds of 10:1 are _not_ the same as a probability of 1/10. If an
+event has a probability of 1/10, then the probability of the event not
+happening is 9/10. So the chance of the event not happening is _nine_ times as
+great as the chance of the event happening; the odds are 9:1.
+
+  1. What are the odds that tossing a fair coin will produce heads? answer
+  2. What are the odds that rolling a fair die will produce a 6? answer
+  3. Suppose the odds of the horse Blaise winning the 8 o'clock race at Happy Valley are 25:1 (and suppose that this actually represents the chance that the horse will win). What is the probability that Blaise will win? answer
+
+__The chance of Blaise losing is 25 times as big as the chance of Blaise
+winning. This is as if there were 26 equally likely outcomes in which only 1
+is the winning outcome. So the probability of Blaise winning is 1/26, and the
+probability of Blaise losing is 25/26. (Note that the odds at the racetrack
+are determined by the amount of money that has been bet on the horse, and
+don't necessarily reflect the actual chance that the horse will win.)
+
+  4. If the odds of Lee winning the election are 5:2, what is the probability of him winning? answer
+
+__In this case, we can imagine 7 equally likely outcomes, where 2 represent
+Lee winning and 5 represent him losing. So the probability of Lee winning is
+2/7, and the probability of him losing is 5/7.
+
+  5. If the odds of an event are x:y, what is its probability? answer
+
+__Generalizing from the above two questions, in this case we can imagine x+y
+outcomes, in which the event occurs for y outcomes and doesn't occur for x
+outcomes. So the probability of the event occurring is y/(x+y), and the
+probability of it not occurring is x/(x+y). This is the general formula for
+converting odds into probabilities.
+
+## §4. Combining probabilities
+
+Suppose I roll two dice. What is the probability that I will get at least one
+6? I might reason as follows: For each die, the probability of rolling a 6 is
+1/6. For two dice, the probability of getting at least one 6 is the
+probability that the first one is a 6 plus the probability that the second one
+is a 6. That is, the probability of at least one 6 is 1/6 + 1/6, which is 1/3.
+
+But there's clearly something wrong with that reasoning. Think about what
+would happen if I extended that reasoning to rolling six dice; the reasoning
+tells me that the probability of getting at least one 6 is 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 +
+1/6 + 1/6 +1/6, which is 1. But that's not true; it's not _certain_ that I'll
+get a 6. (And if I roll seven dice, the same reasoning tells me that the
+probability of getting at least one 6 is greater than 1, which is nonsense!)
+
+So what went wrong? Think about all the possible outcomes when you roll two
+dice. Since there are six possible outcomes for the first die and six possible
+outcomes for the second, there are 6 x 6 = 36 possible outcomes overall. Of
+those 36, six are outcomes in which the first die shows a 6, and six are
+outcomes in which the second die shows a six (count them!). But that _doesn't_
+mean that there are twelve outcomes overall in which one or more dice shows a
+6. Why not?
+
+The problem is that we counted one of the outcomes _twice_ , namely the
+outcome in which _both_ dice show a 6\. So in fact only _eleven_ of the 36
+outcomes are ones in which one or more dice shows a 6. So the real probability
+of rolling at least one 6 is 11/36, not 1/3.
+
+Suppose we use the letter A to stand for the first die showing 6, and the
+letter B to stand for the second die showing 6. In the above discussion, we
+have been considering the outcome in which either the first die shows a 6 _or_
+the second die shows a 6 (or both). We can write this outcome as "A or B".
+Then the probability we have been looking at, the probability that at least
+one of the dice shows 6, can be calculated using the following formula:
+
+  
+
+This says that the probability of either A or B (or both) occurring is the
+probability of A plus the probability of B, minus the probability of both A
+and B occurring (to avoid double counting). This formula can be applied to any
+two events, and is called the _addition rule_.
+
+Now let's look at a slightly different case. Suppose you're at the racetrack,
+and you believe that the horse Anova has a probability of 1/9 of winning the
+next race and the horse Blaise has a probability of 1/3 of winning. What is
+the probability that either Anova or Blaise wins? According to the addition
+rule, it's the probability of Anova winning, plus the probability of Blaise
+winning, minus the probability of both Anova and Blaise winning. But since
+it's not possible for two horses to win the same race, the probability of both
+horses winning is zero. So in this case, we can calculate the probability for
+either Anova or Blaise winning by simply adding the probabilities for Anova
+winning and for Blaise winning.
+
+Two events which cannot _both_ occur are called _mutually exclusive_. For
+mutually exclusive events, like horses winning a race, we don't have to worry
+about the double counting problem that we discussed earlier, and we can ignore
+the last term in the addition rule. This gives us the _special addition rule_
+for mutually exclusive events:
+
+  
+
+Now suppose I throw five coins in the air. What's the probability that at
+least one of them will show heads? To calculate this probability, we could use
+the addition rule over and over again, but this gets rather complicated. A
+much simpler approach is to calculate the probability of this event _not_
+happening--that is, the probability that _none_ of the coins will show heads.
+Since the probability of a single coin showing tails is 1/2, the probability
+of all five coins showing tails is 1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/32. The
+outcomes in which at least one coin shows heads include all the possible
+outcomes except the one in which I get five tails. So since the probabilities
+for all the possible outcomes must add up to 1, the probability that at least
+one coin shows heads is 1 minus the probability of getting five tails (1 -
+1/32 = 31/32).
+
+In general, the probability of an event _not_ occurring is 1 minus the
+probability of the event occurring. We can express this as a _subtraction
+rule_ :
+
+  
+
+  1. Consider an ordinary pack of 52 playing cards. You draw a card at random from the pack. What is the probability that it is a queen? answer
+  2. What is the probability that it is either a queen or a black ace? answer
+
+__The probability that the card is a queen is 4/52 (previous question). The
+probability that it is a black ace is 2/52. Since these outcomes are mutually
+exclusive, we can use the simplified addition rule, so the probability that
+the card is either a queen or a black ace is 4/52 + 2/52 = 6/52 = 3/26.
+
+  3. What is the probability that it is either a queen or a heart? answer
+
+__The probability that the card is a queen is 4/52, and the probability that
+it is a heart is 13/52. These are not mutually exclusive (there is a queen of
+hearts), so we need to use the full addition rule. The probability that the
+card is a queen _and_ a heart is 1/52. Putting these together, the probability
+that the card is either a queen or a heart is 4/52 + 13/52 - 1/52 = 16/52 =
+4/13.
+
+  4. What is the probability that it is neither a queen nor a heart? answer
+
+__The simplest way to answer this question is to use the subtraction rule,
+since being neither a queen nor a heart covers all the outcomes except those
+covered in the previous question. Hence the probability that the card is
+neither a queen nor a heart is 1 - 4/13 = 9/13.
+
+## §5. Conditional probability
+
+Suppose I pick a card at random from a pack of playing cards, without showing
+you. I ask you to guess which card it is, and you guess the five of diamonds.
+What is the probability that you are right? Since there are 52 cards in a
+pack, and only one five of diamonds, the probability of the card being the
+five of diamonds is 1/52. Next, I tell you that the card is red, not black.
+Now what is the probability that you are right? Clearly you now have a better
+chance of being right than you had before. In fact, your chance of being right
+is twice as big as it was before, since only half of the 52 cards are red. So
+the probability of the card being the five of diamonds is now 1/26. What we
+have just calculated is a _conditional_ probability--the probability that the
+card is the five of diamonds, _given_ that it is red.
+
+If we let A stand for the card being the five of diamonds, and B stand for the
+card being red, then the conditional probability that the card is the five of
+diamonds given that it is red is written P(A|B). The definition of conditional
+probability is:
+
+  
+
+In our case,  P(A and B) is the probability that the card is the five of
+diamonds and red, which is 1/52 (exactly the same as P(A), since there are no
+black fives of diamonds!). P(B), the probability that the card is red, is 1/2.
+So the definition of conditional probability tells us that P(A|B) = 1/26,
+exactly as it should. In this simple case we didn't really need to use a
+formula to tell us this, but the formula is very useful in more complex cases.
+
+If we rearrange the definition of conditional probability, we obtain the
+_multiplication rule_ for probabilities:
+
+  
+
+One might have expected that the probability of A and B would be obtained by
+simply multiplying the probabilities of A and B, but in fact this only works
+in special cases. For example, suppose A stands for "the person speaks
+Cantonese" and B stands for "the person is from Hong Kong". Suppose we pick a
+person at random from the world's population, and ask what the value of  P(A
+and B) is. The probability that the person speaks Cantonese is small--the
+proportion of Cantonese speakers in the world is about 0.01. The probability
+that the person is from Hong Kong is even smaller--about 0.001. If we
+multiplied these probabilities together, we would get 0.00001, but this is
+clearly the wrong way to calculate the probability that the person is both
+from Hong Kong and a Cantonese speaker.
+
+If we use the definition of conditional probability, we can see the mistake.
+P(A|B) is the conditional probability that a person speaks Cantonese _given_
+that they're from Hong Kong. This number is close to 1. So the correct
+estimate of the value of  P(A and B) is about the same as P(B), the
+probability that the person is from Hong Kong.
+
+If instead A stands for "the person is female" and B stands for "the person
+was born in March" then the situation changes. The probability that a person
+picked at random is female is roughly 1/2, and the probability that the person
+was born in March is roughly 1/12. The probability  P(A and B) that the person
+is both female and born in March is about 1/24, since about half the people
+born in March are female. In this case, the probability of A and B _is_
+obtained by multiplying the probabilities of A and B. The difference between
+this case and the last one is that a person's sex and birth date are
+_independent_ (as far as I know!), whereas a person's native language and
+where they come from are clearly _not_ independent.
+
+In terms of the multiplication rule, if A and B are independent, then the
+conditional probability P(A|B) is the same as P(A). (The probability that a
+person is female given that they were born in March is just the same as the
+probability that the person is female.) So for independent events, we have a
+_special multiplication rule_ :
+
+  
+
+We (implicitly) used the special multiplication rule earlier on, when we
+calculated that the probability that five tossed coins all show tails is 1/2 x
+1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2 = 1/32. In doing so, we assumed that the results of the
+five tosses are all independent of each other.
+
+  1. Suppose you throw two dice, one after the other. What is the probability that the first die shows a 2? answer
+  2. What is the probability that the second dice shows a 2? answer
+  3. What is the probability that both dice show a 2? answer
+  4. What is the probability that the dice add up to 4? answer
+
+__For the dice to add up to 4, there are three possibilities--either both dice
+show a 2, or the first shows a 3 and the second shows a 1, or the first shows
+a 1 and the second shows a 3. Each of these has a probability of 1/6 x 1/6 =
+1/36 (using the special multiplication rule, since the rolls are independent).
+Hence the probability that the dice add up to 4 is 1/36 + 1/36 + 1/36 = 3/36 =
+1/12 (using the special addition rule, since the outcomes are mutually
+exclusive).
+
+  5. What is the probability that the dice add up to 4 _given_ that the first die shows a 2? answer
+  6. What is the probability that the dice add up to 4 _and_ the first die shows a 2? answer
+
+__Note that we cannot use the simplified multiplication rule here, because the
+dice adding up to 4 is not independent of the first die showing a 2. So we
+need to use the full multiplication rule. This tells us that probability that
+the first die shows a 2 _and_ the dice add up to 4 is given by the probability
+that the first die shows a 2, multiplied by the probability that the dice add
+up to 4 _given_ that the first die shows a 2. This is 1/6 x 1/6 = 1/36.
+
+__next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_88.txt b/data/crtw_88.txt
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+For reference, here is a list of the rules of probability:
+
+  * Addition rule:   
+
+  
+
+  * Special addition rule (for mutually exclusive events):   
+
+  
+
+  * Subtraction rule:   
+
+  
+
+  * Multiplication rule:   
+
+  
+
+  * Special multiplication rule (for independent events):   
+
+  
+
+It is important to bear in mind the circumstances in which the special
+addition rule and the special multiplication rule can be used. Most mistakes
+in probabilistic reasoning occur because someone assumes that events are
+independent when they are not (or vice versa), or because someone assumes that
+events are mutually exclusive when they are not (or vice versa).
+
+Here is the original problem which led Pascal and Fermat to develop
+probability theory:
+
+####  The gambler's problem
+
+Suppose you roll a single die four times; what is the probability of rolling
+at least one 6? The gambler reasoned that since the chance of a 6 in each roll
+is 1/6, the chance of a 6 in 4 rolls is 4 x 1/6 = 2/3. Now suppose you roll a
+pair of dice 24 times; what is the probability of rolling at least one double
+6? The gambler reasoned that since the chance of a double 6 in one roll is
+1/36, the chance of a double 6 in 24 rolls is 24 x 1/36 = 2/3. In other words,
+the gambler expected to win each bet 2/3 of the time. His problem was that he
+seemed to lose more often with the second bet than the first. He was at a loss
+to explain this, so he asked his friend Pascal for an answer.
+
+What are the mistakes in the gambler's reasoning? What are the true
+probabilities of winning each bet?
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+In both his calculations, the gambler used the simplified addition rule. This
+overlooks the fact that the outcomes he is dealing with are not mutually
+exclusive; he may get a 6 (or a double 6) in more than one roll. To calculate
+the true probabilities, we need to use the full addition rule.
+
+In fact, the simplest way to proceed is to calculate the probability of
+getting _no_ 6 in four throws. Since the throws are independent, we can use
+the simplified multiplication rule, which tells us that the probability of
+getting no 6 in four throws is (5/6)4 = 0.482. Since the probability of
+getting at least one 6 covers all the other outcomes, we can use the
+subtraction rule to calculate this probability; it is 1 - 0.482 = 0.518.
+
+Similarly, we can calculate the probability of getting no double 6 in 24
+throws. Since the probability of not getting a double 6 in one throw is 35/36,
+and the throws are independent, the probability of getting no double 6 in 24
+throws is (35/36)24 = 0.509. Again, by the subtraction rule, the probability
+of getting at least one double 6 is 1 - 0.509 = 0.491. This is lower than the
+probability of getting at least one 6 in four throws, as the gambler had
+noticed.
+
+## §1. Examples and fallacies
+
+A fallacy is a mistake in reasoning. The following examples each contain some
+reasoning about probabilities, some of which is correct and some of which is
+mistaken. See if you can spot any mistake, and then click "correct" if you
+think the reasoning is o.k. and "fallacy" if you think it is wrong.
+
+  * Fred is playing roulette in a Macau casino. The roulette wheel has 36 numbers (ignoring the zero), of which half are red and half are black. Fred reasons as follows: In the last ten spins, all the winning numbers have been red. But on average, only half the winning numbers are red. So to even things out, there must be more black numbers than red numbers coming up. So I stand a better chance of winning if I bet on black. correct or fallacy
+
+__Yes, the reasoning is fallacious. The outcomes of the previous ten spins of
+the wheel can have no effect on the motion of the wheel and the ball; past
+outcomes can't affect future outcomes. In other words, the outcomes are
+independent. The probability of a black number is still 1/2 on each spin,
+irrespective of what has come before. For obvious reasons, this kind of
+mistake is called the _gambler's fallacy_. It is a very common mistake.
+
+?
+
+  * The chance of the Mark Six numbers being exactly the same two days in a row is extremely small. So to maximize my chances of winning today, I should not choose yesterday's winning numbers. correct
+
+__No, this reasoning is fallacious. Go back and ask yourself: What is the
+chance of winning if I choose yesterday's numbers? What is the chance of
+winning if I _don't_ choose yesterday's numbers?
+
+or fallacy
+
+__Yes, the reasoning is fallacious. It is another instance of the gambler's
+fallacy, since the winning numbers today are entirely independent of the
+winning numbers yesterday. This version of the gambler's fallacy is very
+tempting, as it is true that the probability of the same numbers coming up two
+days in a row is very small--about one in 10 million. So the chance of winning
+if you pick yesterday's numbers is only one in 10 million. But notice that the
+chance of winning is the same _whatever_ numbers you choose; for any set of
+six numbers you choose, the chance of getting them all correct is one in 10
+million. In fact, an argument can be made that you are better off picking
+yesterday's numbers. That is because if two people win, they have to share the
+prize. Since people tend to avoid yesterday's numbers (as well as "unlucky"
+numbers like 13), if you choose yesterday's numbers you are less likely to
+have to share your prize!
+
+?
+
+  * Suppose I am at the Pokfield Road bus terminus, waiting for the number 23 bus to leave for North Point. The number 23 leaves from here every 8 minutes. So the longer I wait for the bus, the higher the probability that it will leave in the next minute. correct
+
+__Yes, this reasoning is correct. Superficially, this case resembles the prior
+two examples, but the difference here is that the chance of a bus coming in a
+given minute is _not_ independent of what happened in the previous minutes,
+since the buses are timed to be a fixed number of minutes apart. When you
+first arrive at the bus stop, the bus has an equal chance of coming in each of
+the next 8 minutes, so the probability of it coming within one minute is 1/8.
+If it doesn't come in the first minute, then it must come in one of the
+following 7 minutes, so the probability of it coming within one minute goes up
+to 1/7. If it doesn't come in the first two minutes, the probability of it
+coming within one minute goes up to 1/6. And so on.
+
+or fallacy ?
+
+  * A city has a crackdown on speeding drivers, and the number of traffic fatalities falls by 12%. The local government claims that the increased enforcement has saved lives. But the crackdown was started because of a sudden increase in traffic fatalities the prior year. After an unusually high value, the number of deaths is likely to fall the following year anyway. So there is no reason to think that the crackdown caused the decrease in fatalities. correct
+
+__Yes, this reasoning is correct. In general, it is more probable that you
+will get a number of traffic fatalities that is close to average than one
+which is far higher than average. This is true whatever the number was for the
+prior year, since presumably the numbers of traffic fatalities in different
+years are largely independent. So for this year, it is likely that the number
+of traffic fatalities will be not too far from average, in which case it will
+be lower than last year's unusually high value. Statisticians call this
+phenomenon _regression to the mean_.
+
+or fallacy
+
+__No, this reasoning is correct. This case is quite tricky. It looks at first
+glance like a version of the gambler's fallacy, since the number of traffic
+fatalities in one year is presumably independent of the number of fatalities
+the prior year. But in fact it is not a fallacy; the very fact that this
+year's fatalities are independent of last year's means that this year's rate
+is likely to be lower than last year's. It might help to think about the
+following analogy: Suppose you roll five dice, and you get four sixes (which
+is an unusually high number of sixes--you can calculate the probability). What
+is the chance of getting four or more sixes on the next roll? What is the
+chance of getting fewer than four sixes? Go back and think about how that
+applies to this case.
+
+?
+
+  * "BALTIMORE (AP) A Maryland woman this week gave birth to triplets for the second time in less than two years, defying odds of about one in 50 million, hospital officials said." The reasoning here is that since only about one birth in seven thousand is of triplets, the odds of having two sets of triplets in a row is about one in 70002, which is one in 50 million. correct or fallacy
+
+__Yes, this reasoning is almost certainly fallacious. The odds of one in 50
+million were calculated using the simplified multiplication rule, which only
+applies if the two events are independent. But giving birth to triplets the
+second time may well not be independent of giving birth to triplets the first
+time; the woman may have a biological predisposition for multiple births. In
+that case, the probability of the second set of triplets--the probability of a
+woman giving birth to triplets _given_ that she has already had triplets--may
+be considerably greater than 1/7000. The chance of having two sets of triplets
+is obtained by multiplying this probability by the chance of having the first
+set of triplets (1/7000). This chance is still very small, but it may be
+nowhere near as small as reported.
+
+?
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_89.txt b/data/crtw_89.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c0cce6e6dc2388f95a17d6e300edbc2070a0ba69
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+++ b/data/crtw_89.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+As a final test of your understanding of probability, try the following rather
+famous puzzle.
+
+Imagine that you are a contestant on a television game show. You are shown
+three large doors. Behind one of the doors is a new car, and behind each of
+the other two is a goat. To win the car, you simply have to choose which door
+it is behind. When you choose a door, the host of the show opens one of the
+doors you have not chosen, and shows you that there is a goat behind it. You
+are then given a choice; you may stick with your original choice, or you may
+switch to the remaining closed door.
+
+What should you do to maximize your chances of winning the car? Think about it
+for a while, and when you have decided, read the two arguments below and
+decide which is right.
+
+**Argument 1. No need to switch** : Suppose you choose door number 1. The
+probability that the car is behind door 1 is initially 1/3 (since there are
+three doors, and the car has an equal chance of being behind each). Then
+suppose the host opens door number 3 and shows you that there is a goat behind
+it. We then need to calculate a conditional probability--the probability that
+the car is behind door 1, _given_ that there is a goat behind door 3. Since
+there are only two doors left, and there is an equal chance that the car is
+behind each of them, this probability is 1/2. But similarly, the probability
+that the car is behind door 2, given that there is a goat behind door three,
+is also 1/2. So whether you stick with door 1 or switch to door 2, your chance
+of winning is 1/2. So it really makes no difference whether you switch or not.
+
+**Argument 2. You should switch** : Suppose you choose door number 1. There
+are three possibilities; either the car is behind door 1, or door 2, or door
+3. Each of these possibilities has the same probability (1/3). In each of the
+three cases, consider which door the host will open. If the car is behind door
+1, the host could open either door 2 or door 3. In this case, if you stick
+with your original choice you win the car, but if you switch to the remaining
+door you lose. If the car is behind door 2, the host will open door 3. In this
+case, if you stick with your original choice you lose, but if you switch, you
+win. Finally, if the car is behind door 3, the host will open door 2. Again,
+if you stick with your original choice you lose, but if you switch, you win.
+Remember that each of the three possibilities has a probability of 1/3, and
+note that they are mutually exclusive (the car is only behind one door). If
+you switch, you will win in two cases out of three (probability 2/3), but if
+you stick you will only win in one case out of three (probability 1/3). So you
+should switch doors, since it doubles your chance of winning.
+
+Which argument do you think is right? Choose your answer:
+
+argument #1
+
+__
+
+This argument is incorrect. But don't feel bad--you're in good company. This
+argument has fooled a lot of people, including eminent mathematicians, and the
+reason it is incorrect is very subtle.
+
+For comparison, consider a variant on this game. Suppose you don't tell the
+host which door you have chosen. The host then opens a door with a goat behind
+it (say, door 3), and gives you a chance to change your choice. For this game,
+Argument 1 is correct; given that you know there is a goat behind door 3, the
+probability that there is a car behind door 1 is 1/2, and the same for door 2.
+
+Now let's go back to the original game. The difference here is that the host
+is not allowed to open the door you have chosen, and this means that the host
+often has no choice about which door to open. If you happen to have chosen the
+door with the car (which has probability 1/3), the host may open either of the
+other doors. But in the more likely event that you have chosen a door with a
+goat behind it (probability 2/3), the host has no choice; he has to open the
+other door with a goat. In this case, the door the host chooses _tells_ you
+where the car is. You can use this information; it tells you that 2/3 of the
+time, switching doors is the right strategy.
+
+argument #2
+
+If you're still not convinced about which answer is correct and why, don't
+worry - try it yourself. The simulation below keeps track of which strategy
+you use, and how frequently you win using each strategy, so you can see which
+strategy wins more often. Incidentally this game show puzzle is also called
+"The Monty Hall Problem", and it has got an interesting story behind.
+
+* * *
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_9.txt b/data/crtw_9.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4e2c100fe104fe1329f66fb58a24470ef9740867
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_9.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+Here is a collection of quotes from famous people about thinking skills and
+intellectual virtues. We hope you will find them inspiring.
+
+* * *
+
+> _Plato is dear to me but dearer still is truth._ \- Aristotle
+>
+>  _Absence of thought is indeed a powerful factor in human affairs,
+> statistically speaking the most powerful, not just in the conduct of the
+> many but in the conduct of all._ \- Hannah Arendt
+>
+>  _To think and to be fully alive are the same._ \- Hannah Arendt
+>
+>  _There are no dangerous thoughts; thinking itself is dangerous._ \- Hannah
+> Arendt
+>
+>  _It is a strange desire to seek power and to lose liberty._ \- Francis
+> Bacon
+>
+>  _Read not to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for granted;
+> nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider._ \- Francis Bacon
+>
+>  _If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he
+> will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties._ \-
+> Francis Bacon
+>
+>  _All colours will agree in the dark._ \- Francis Bacon
+>
+>  _I carry my thoughts about with me for a long time, often for a very long
+> time, before writing them down._ \- Ludwig van Beethoven
+>
+>  _The aim of education should be to teach us rather how to think, than what
+> to think -- rather to improve our minds, so as to enable us to think for
+> ourselves, than to load the memory with thoughts of other men._ \- Bill
+> Beattie
+>
+>  _Do not believe in anything simply because you have heard it. Do not
+> believe in anything simply because it is spoken and rumored by many. Do not
+> believe in anything simply because it is found written in your religious
+> books. Do not believe in anything merely on the authority of your teachers
+> and elders._ \- Buddha
+>
+>  _Reading without reflecting is like eating without digesting._ \- Edmund
+> Burke
+>
+>  _An intellectual is someone whose mind watches itself._ \- Albert Camus
+>
+>  _The fact is that if you have not developed language, you simply don't have
+> access to most of human experience, and if you don't have access to
+> experience, then you're not going to be able to think properly._ \- Noam
+> Chomsky
+>
+>  _Democratic societies can’t force people. Therefore they have to control
+> what they think._ \- Noam Chomsky
+>
+>  _To know what you know and what you do not know, that is true knowledge._
+> \- Confucius
+>
+>  _To study and not think is futile. To think and not study is dangerous._ \-
+> Confucius
+>
+>  _Acquire new knowledge whilst thinking over the old, and you may become a
+> teacher of others._ \- Confucius
+>
+>  _Discovery is the ability to be puzzled by simple things._ \- Noam Chomsky
+>
+>  _It is all right to say exactly what you think if you have learned to think
+> exactly._ \- Marcelene Cox
+>
+>  _Thinking is the hardest work in the world; and most of us will go to great
+> lengths to avoid it._ \- Louise Dudley
+>
+>  _The highest possible stage in moral culture is when we recognize that we
+> ought to control our thoughts._ \- Charles Darwin
+>
+>  _I think. Therefore, I am._ \- Descartes
+>
+>  _The most important attitude that can be formed is that of desire to go on
+> learning._ \- John Dewey
+>
+>  _We only think when we are confronted with a problem._ \- John Dewey
+>
+>  _We do not learn from experience... we learn from reflecting on
+> experience._ \- John Dewey
+>
+>  _Education is a social process; education is growth; education is not
+> preparation for life but is life itself._ \- John Dewey
+>
+>  _Anyone who has begun to think, places some portion of the world in
+> jeopardy._ \- John Dewey
+>
+>  _Genius was 1 percent inspiration and 99 percent perspiration._ \- Thomas
+> Edison
+>
+>  _Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more
+> violent. It takes a touch of genius -- and a lot of courage -- to move in
+> the opposite direction._ \- Albert Einstein
+>
+>  _I think and think for months and years. Ninety-nine times, the conclusion
+> is false. The hundredth time I am right._ \- Albert Einstein
+>
+>  _The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is
+> comprehensible._ \- Albert Einstein
+>
+>  _Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler._ \-
+> Albert Einstein
+>
+>  _To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a
+> new angle requires creative imagination and marks real advances in science._
+> \- Albert Einstein
+>
+>  _Intellect annuls fate. So far as a man thinks, he is free._ \- Ralph Waldo
+> Emerson
+>
+>  _What is the hardest task in the world? To think._ \- Ralph Waldo Emerson
+>
+>  _Be careful that you write accurately rather than much._ \- Erasmus
+>
+>  _The force of the temptation which urges us to seek for such evidence and
+> appearances as are in favour of our desires, and to disregard those which
+> oppose them, is wonderfully great._ \- Michael Faraday
+>
+>  _If you have knowledge, let others light their candle by it._ \- Margaret
+> Fuller
+>
+>  _Thinking is the hardest work there is, which is the probably reason why so
+> few engage in it._ \- Henry Ford
+>
+>  _Anyone who stops learning is old, whether at twenty or eighty. Anyone who
+> keeps learning stays young._ \- Henry Ford
+>
+>  _All truly wise thoughts have been thought already thousands of times; but
+> to make them truly ours, we must think them over again honestly, till they
+> take root in our personal experience._ \- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
+>
+>  _Irrationally held truths may be more harmful than reasoned errors._ \-
+> Thomas Henry Huxley
+>
+>  _The heart of man is made to reconcile the most glaring contradictions._ \-
+> David Hume
+>
+>  _There are two ways to slide easily through life: to believe everything or
+> to doubt everything. Both ways save us from thinking._ \- Alfred Korzybski
+>
+>  _Blind commitment to a theory is not an intellectual virtue: it is an
+> intellectual crime._ \- Lakatos
+>
+>  _New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other
+> reason but because they are not already common._ \- John Locke
+>
+>  _You see, but you do not observe._ \- Sir Arthur Conan Doyle
+>
+>  _It is a mistake to confound strangeness with mystery._ \- Sir Arthur Conan
+> Doyle
+>
+>  _Men are apt to mistake the strength of their feeling for the strength of
+> their argument. The heated mind resents the chill touch and relentless
+> scrutiny of logic._ \- William Gladstone
+>
+>  _What is written without effort is in general read without pleasure._ \-
+> Samuel Johnson
+>
+>  _He who has imagination without learning has wings and no feet._ \- Joseph
+> Joubert
+>
+>  _The ultimate court of appeal is observation and experiment ... not
+> authority._ \- Thomas Henry Huxley
+>
+>  _A great many people think they are thinking when they are merely
+> rearranging their prejudices._ \- William James
+>
+>  _Genius means little more than the faculty of perceiving in an unhabitual
+> way._ \- William James
+>
+>  _A problem well stated is a problem half solved._ \- Charles Franklin
+> Kettering
+>
+>  _Creativity takes courage._ \- Henri Matisse
+>
+>  _He who establishes his argument by noise and command shows that his reason
+> is weak._ \- Michel Montaigne
+>
+>  _As often as a study is cultivated by narrow minds, they will draw from it
+> narrow conclusions._ \- John Stuart Mill
+>
+>  _The logic of science is the logic of business and life._ \- John Stuart
+> Mill
+>
+>  _What I understand by ‘philosopher’: a terrible explosive in the presence
+> of which everything is in danger._ \- Friedrich Nietzsche
+>
+>  _I don’t know what I may seem to the world, but as to myself, I seem only
+> to have been like a boy playing on the sea-shore and diverting myself in now
+> and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst
+> the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me._ \- Isaac Newton
+>
+>  _The great composer does not set to work because he is inspired, but
+> becomes inspired because he is working._ \- Ernest Newman
+>
+>  _You need chaos in your soul to give birth to a dancing star._ \- Nietzsche
+>
+>  _Only the mind cannot be sent into exile._ \- Ovid
+>
+>  _Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present
+> controls the past._ \- George Orwell
+>
+>  _The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap
+> between one’s real and one’s declared aims, one turns as it were
+> instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish
+> squirting out ink._ \- George Orwell
+>
+>  _Man is but a reed, the weakest in nature, but he is a thinking reed._ \-
+> Blaise Pascal
+>
+>  _The best way to have a good idea is to have lots of ideas._ \- Linus
+> Pauling
+>
+>  _Men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from
+> religious conviction._ \- Blaise Pascal
+>
+>  _Philosophical habits of mind do not come quicker through fiber optics.
+> Clear thinking is not aided by better dot resolution. Understanding
+> ourselves and feeling for others does not come with a software upgrade._ \-
+> Linda Ray Pratt
+>
+>  _All life is problem solving._ \- Karl Popper
+>
+>  _No rational argument will have a rational effect on a man who does not
+> want to adopt a rational attitude._ \- Karl Popper
+>
+>  _Good tests kill flawed theories; we remain alive to guess again._ \- Karl
+> Popper
+>
+>  _Problems are to the mind what exercise is to the muscles; they toughen and
+> make strong._ \- Norman Vincent Peale
+>
+>  _If everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking._ \- George
+> Smith Patton
+>
+>  _Science is built up of facts, as a house is built of stones; but an
+> accumulation of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones is a
+> house._ \- Henri Poincarè
+>
+>  _Where observation is concerned, chance favours only the prepared mind._ \-
+> Louis Pasteur
+>
+>  _The artist is a receptacle for emotions that come from all over the place:
+> from the sky, from the earth, from a scrap of paper, from a passing shape,
+> from a spider's web._ \- Pablo Picasso
+>
+>  _Thinking is like loving or dying. Each of us must do it for himself._ \-
+> Josiah Royce
+>
+>  _Not to be absolutely certain is, I think, one of the essential things in
+> rationality._ \- Bertrand Russell
+>
+>  _To acquire immunity to eloquence is of the utmost importance to the
+> citizens of a democracy._ \- Bertrand Russell
+>
+>  _To understand the actual world as it is, not as we should wish it to be,
+> is the beginning of wisdom._ \- Bertrand Russell
+>
+>  _The most essential characteristic of scientific technique is that it
+> proceeds from experiment, not from tradition._ \- Bertrand Russell
+>
+>  _Every man, wherever he goes, is encompassed by a cloud of comforting
+> convictions, which move with him like flies on a summer day._ \- Bertrand
+> Russell
+>
+>  _We have, in fact, two kinds of morality side by side; one which we preach
+> but do not practice, and another which we practice but seldom preach._ \-
+> Bertrand Russell
+>
+>  _We all have a tendency to think that the world must conform to our
+> prejudices. The opposite view involves some effort of thought, and most
+> people would die sooner than think – in fact they do so._ \- Bertrand
+> Russell
+>
+>  _The great majority of men and women, in ordinary times, pass through life
+> without ever contemplating or criticising, as a whole, either their own
+> conditions or those of the world at large._ \- Bertrand Russell
+>
+>  _Without effort and change, human life cannot remain good. It is not a
+> finished Utopia that we ought to desire, but a world where imagination and
+> hope are alive and active._ \- Bertrand Russell
+>
+>  _Even when all the experts agree, they may well be mistaken._ \- Bertrand
+> Russell
+>
+>  _Good reasons must, of force, give place to better._ \- William Shakespeare
+>
+>  _The unexamined life is not worth living._ \- Socrates
+>
+>  _False words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with
+> evil._ \- Socrates
+>
+>  _The advantage of the incomprehensible is that it never loses its
+> freshness._ \- Paul Valery
+>
+>  _Strengthen the female mind by enlarging it, and there will be an end to
+> blind obedience._ \- Mary Wollstonecraft
+>
+>  _The appetites will rule if the mind is vacant._ \- Mary Wollstonecraft
+>
+>  _I must be allowed to add some explanatory remarks to bring the subject
+> home to reason—to that sluggish reason, which supinely takes opinions on
+> trust, and obstinately supports them to spare itself the labour of
+> thinking._ \- Mary Wollstonecraft
+>
+>  _Some women govern their husbands without degrading themselves, because
+> intellect will always govern._ \- Mary Wollstonecraft
+>
+>  _The mind will ever be unstable that has only prejudices to rest on._ \-
+> Mary Wollstonecraft
+
+And last but not least, let us not forget this quote from the Greek
+philosopher Diogenes the Cynics:
+
+> __One original thought is worth a thousand mindless quotings. __
+
+__previous tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_90.txt b/data/crtw_90.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ea3563eeae437b02573eda467a2e8722ca348077
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+++ b/data/crtw_90.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+## §1. Life's a gamble
+
+The theory of probability arose out of the study of gambling, as we saw
+earlier. Gambling is essentially a kind of risk; you risk a financial loss in
+the hope of a financial gain. Probability can be used to measure the risk, and
+to help you assess whether a particular kind of bet is worth taking. Not
+surprisingly, then, the most straightforward application of probability is to
+other forms of risk-taking behavior.
+
+The most obvious kinds of risk-taking behavior are economic. For example,
+investing in the stock exchange is clearly related to gambling, in that the
+investor accepts a degree of financial risk in the hope of financial gain. But
+risk-taking is involved in virtually every kind of human activity. When you
+take medicine, there is always a risk of adverse effects; when you take a bus,
+there is always a risk that you will be injured in an accident; and so on.
+Probability can be used to help us make reasonable choices in the face of the
+inevitable risks involved in life.
+
+## §2. Expected values
+
+The basic concept needed for the analysis of risks is _expected value_. For
+example, consider the following bet. I toss two coins, and I pay you $2 if
+they both show heads but you pay me $1 if one or both show tails. The expected
+value of this bet is obtained by multiplying the probability of each outcome
+by its value to you, and then adding the results. In the bet, there are four
+possible outcomes (HH, TT, HT and TH), each of which has a probability of 1/4.
+The first outcome has a positive value of $2 (you win two dollars), and the
+other three outcomes have a negative value of $1 (you lose a dollar). So the
+expected value to you of the bet is ($2 x 1/4) - ($1 x 3/4) = -$0.25.
+
+What does this expected value mean? Clearly it doesn't mean that you should
+expect to lose $0.25 on the bet, since you will either win $2 or lose $1. But
+it tells you something about what you should expect in the long run. If you
+bet over and over again, you will win some and lose some, but eventually your
+winnings and losses will average out to a loss of $0.25 per game. In the long
+run, this bet will not be financially worthwhile to you (but it will be
+worthwhile to me!).
+
+A bet with an expected value of zero is called a _fair bet_. For example, if
+the above bet is modified so that I pay you $3 if both coins show heads, then
+it is fair. It is fair in the sense that there is no built-in bias in favor of
+either one of us.
+
+The bets you can make at casinos or at the racetrack are almost never fair.
+The expected value of these bets is usually negative for the person making the
+bet, and positive for the house; that's how the house makes a profit. The
+expected profit for the house, expressed as a percentage of the amount bet, is
+called the _house edge_. For example, if a particular kind of bet costs $10
+and has an expected payout of $9, then the house has an expected profit of $1
+per bet, giving a house edge of 10%.
+
+For example, in the game of roulette, a ball is thrown onto a spinning wheel
+on which there are a number of indentations or "pockets"; when the wheel
+stops, the ball comes to rest in one of the pockets. (The idea for this device
+is often credited to Pascal.) The pockets are numbered from 1 to 36. A bet on
+a single number pays at 35:1, which means that a $1 bet returns $36 ($35
+winnings plus your original bet). If that were the whole story, then each bet
+would be fair, and the expected profit for the casino would be nothing.
+
+But of course that's not the whole story; there is also a pocket on the wheel
+numbered "zero", so the probability of each number is 1/37, not 1/36. If you
+bet $1 on a single number, the expected value of the bet is ($35 x 1/37) - ($1
+x 36/37) = -$0.027. In other words, the expected profit for the house is 2.7
+cents for every dollar bet, giving a house edge of 2.7%.
+
+Similarly at the racetrack. The odds quoted on a horse tell you the payout for
+a $1 bet; for example, if a horse has odds of 8:1, and you bet on it to win,
+then your payout is $9 if it wins ($8 plus your original bet). If the quoted
+odds told you the actual chance of the horse winning, then the bet would be
+fair. But the quoted odds don't necessarily have anything to do with the
+chance that the horse will win. Instead, they are calculated based on the
+amount of money that has been bet on that horse.
+
+For example, suppose a total of $1,000,000 has been bet on a given race
+(counting only bets to win), and suppose that $50,000 has been bet on the
+horse Blaise. To calculate the odds on Blaise, the house first subtracts 15%
+from the total bet, giving a "win pool" of $850,000. The house intends to
+divide this win pool among the winning bets. In other words, if Blaise wins,
+the house intends to pay out the $50,000 bet on Blaise plus $800,000 in
+winnings. Since the winnings are 16 times as big as the amount bet, the odds
+are set at 16:1. The odds are set in this way for each horse (and similarly
+for other kinds of bet), ensuring that the house edge is 15% whichever horse
+wins.
+
+Many books have been written on "systems" for winning at gambling games. Most
+of them don't work, because the house retains its edge no matter what you do.
+For example, whatever betting system you use when playing roulette, your
+expected loss is still 2.7 cents for every dollar you bet. However, for some
+types of game, there are ways to decrease your expected loss, and perhaps even
+turn it into an expected profit. In lottery games (like Mark Six), you can't
+increase your chance of winning, but you can increase your expected payout if
+you win. That's because the win pool is divided among the winning players; the
+fewer players that picked the same numbers as you, the more you win. If you
+pick unpopular numbers, the expected value of your bet goes up, and may even
+become positive. A similar system can be used at horse racing.
+
+For a detailed account of betting systems, good and bad, see J. D. McGervey
+(1986), _Probabilities in Everyday Life_. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
+
+  1. On a roulette wheel, 18 of the numbers are red and 18 are black (the zero doesn't count as either red or black). A bet on red or on black pays at 1:1. What is the expected value of this type of bet? answer
+
+__Since there are 37 pockets on the wheel, and you win on 18 of them, the
+probability of winning is 18/37 and the probability of losing is 19/37. So the
+expected value of a $1 bet is ($1 x 18/37) - ($1 x 19/37) = -$0.027. For each
+dollar you bet, your expected loss is 2.7 cents, exactly the same as for bets
+on a single number.
+
+  2. Fred uses the following betting system for roulette: He only bets if the previous five numbers have been the same color, and then he bets on the opposite color. What is the expected value of this strategy? answer
+
+__Since the probability of red or black is independent of the results of
+previous spins, the expected value of each $1 Fred bets is still a loss of 2.7
+cents. Fred has fallen victim to thegambler's fallacy. The expected value of
+each bet at roulette is always the same, whatever "strategy" you use.
+
+  3. American roulette wheels usually have 38 pockets: 36 numbers, a zero and a double zero. Bets on a single number pay at 35:1. What is the house edge? answer
+
+__The house wins $1 on 37 outcomes and loses $35 on one. So for each $1 bet,
+the expected value for the house is ($1 x 37/38) - ($35 x 1/38) = $0.053. The
+house edge is 5.3%. You can expect to lose your money twice as fast, on
+average, on a wheel with two zeros.
+
+  4. Suppose there is a weekly lottery game in which the players pick six different numbers between 1 and 20. The game costs $1 to play, and 60% of the proceeds are divided among the winners (those who match all six numbers). 120,000 people play each week. What is the probability of winning? answer
+
+__The chance that the first number drawn matches one of your six numbers is
+6/20. The chance that the second number drawn matches one of your remaining
+five numbers is 5/19 (since there are now only 19 numbers to draw from).
+Continuing in this way, the probability of matching all six numbers is 6/20 x
+5/19 x 4/18 x 3/17 x 2/16 x 1/15 = 0.0000258, or about 1/40,000.
+
+  5. In the above lottery, suppose you could ensure that if you win, you would share the prize with exactly two other people (the most likely scenario). What is the expected value of playing? What if you could ensure that you would share the prize with one other person? Or with no other people? answer
+
+__If 120,000 people play, the takings are $120,000 and the winnings are
+$72,000. If you could ensure that you share the winnings with two other
+people, your share would be $24,000. Taking the chance of winning to be
+1/40,000, the expected value of a ticket is ($24,000 x 1/40,000) - $1 =
+-$0.40. If you could ensure that you share the winnings with one other person,
+your share would be $36,000, and the expected value of a ticket would be
+($36,000 x 1/40,000) - $1 = -$0.10. If you could ensure that you do not share
+the prize, the expected value of a ticket would be ($72,000 x 1/40,000) - $1 =
+$0.80. If you could somehow ensure that you always pick numbers that nobody
+else picks, the expected value of playing this lottery is positive.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_91.txt b/data/crtw_91.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5b740219a2e648ab39121165a71ac24880488a98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_91.txt
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+## §1. Utility
+
+Most risks don't involve money--at least, not directly. For example, if you
+are worrying about the possible side-effects of a particular medication, your
+worry is not primarily about money. If we are going to be able to apply the
+concept of expected value to such contexts, we will need a way of comparing
+outcomes in terms which are not financial.
+
+The way to do this is via the concept of _utility_. The utility of an outcome
+provides a numerical measure of how good or bad the outcome is. To take a
+trivial example, suppose I am trying to decide whether to take my umbrella
+with me today. There are four possible outcomes, because it may or may not
+rain, and I may or may not take my umbrella. If it rains, it is clearly better
+to take my umbrella than not, but if the weather is fine, then it is
+marginally better not to take my umbrella, so that I have fewer things to
+carry. The best outcome for me is if it's fine and I don't take my umbrella,
+so I'll assign that outcome a utility of +10. The outcome in which it's fine
+and I do take my umbrella is only marginally worse than that, so I'll assign
+it a utility of +9. The worst outcome is if it rains and I don't take my
+umbrella; I'll assign it a utility of -10. The outcome in which it rains and I
+do take my umbrella is somewhere in the middle, so I'll assign it a utility of
+0.
+
+These utilities can be expressed in a table:
+
+  
+
+The numbers provide an indication of my feelings towards the various possible
+outcomes. Some readers may be skeptical that precise figures can be assigned
+to subjective feelings like this. However, the precise values of these figures
+are not important; all that is important is their relative values. It is clear
+from these figures that in fine weather I prefer not to have to carry an
+umbrella, but only slightly, and that I have a fairly strong preference for
+fine weather over rainy weather. I could equally well have used other numbers
+to express these preferences. It is usual to use positive numbers for good
+outcomes and negative numbers for bad outcomes, but this is not necessary.
+
+So should I take my umbrella? Well, it depends on how likely it is that it
+will rain today. Suppose the weather forecast tells me that there is a 20%
+chance of rain today. Then I can calculate the _expected utility_ of taking my
+umbrella; it is (0 x 1/5) + (9 x 4/5) = 7.2. Similarly, the expected utility
+of not taking my umbrella is (-10 x 1/5) + (10 x 4/5) = 6. Since the expected
+utility of taking my umbrella is greater, I should take my umbrella. Again,
+notice that the absolute value of these numbers is unimportant; only their
+relative value is significant.
+
+Strictly speaking, the conclusion that I should take my umbrella only follows
+under the assumption that I want to maximize my expected utility. Some people
+take this as a _descriptive_ principle about humanity; it is a true
+_description_ of human beings that they want to maximize their expected
+utility. Others take it as a _normative_ principle about rationality; if you
+are rational, you _should_ attempt to maximize your expected utility. Still
+others subscribe to neither of these principles.
+
+Still, whether or not either of these principles hold, it is uncontroversial
+that there are circumstances in which people want to maximize their expected
+utility--for example, when I am deciding whether or not to take my umbrella. I
+may not explicitly go through the above calculation, but something like it
+goes through my mind. If the chance of rain is high enough, I take my umbrella
+because I don't want to get wet, and otherwise I leave it at home because I
+can't be bothered carrying it.
+
+Nobody needs an expected utility calculation to tell them whether or not to
+take an umbrella, but they can be help in situations where more is at stake.
+For example, suppose you are considering whether to have your child vaccinated
+against whooping cough. The whooping cough vaccination protects children from
+a potentially fatal disease, and also has some rare but serious side-effects.
+Let us suppose that unvaccinated children have a 1 in 50,000 chance of dying
+of whooping cough, which is reduced to 1 in 1,000,000 by vaccination. Also,
+suppose that the vaccination carries a 1 in 200,000 chance of causing
+permanent brain damage. (If you were to carry out this calculation seriously,
+you would first need to find some reliable estimates for these probabilities;
+my figures are not reliable!)
+
+To carry out the calculation, you need to assign utilities to the possible
+outcomes. Suppose you assign a utility of -10 to your child's death, -8 to
+permanent brain damage, and 0 to normal health. (Remember that the absolute
+size of these numbers is arbitrary; only their relative size matters. A
+utility of -10 in this example clearly doesn't mean the same as a utility of
+-10 in the previous example!) Then the expected utility of vaccinating your
+child is (-10 x 1/1,000,000) + (-8 x 1/200,000) = -1/20,000. The expected
+utility of not vaccinating your child is -10 x 1/50,000 = -1/5,000. Since the
+expected utility of not vaccinating your child is lower (a larger negative
+number), then to maximize your expected utility you should vaccinate your
+child.
+
+Fred is short-sighted, and he is considering laser surgery to correct his
+vision. He does some research, and finds that the chance of a complete
+correction is 46%, the chance of a partial correction is 44%, the chance of no
+change in vision is 9% and the chance of a worsening of vision of 1%. Fred
+assigns a utility of +5 to achieving a complete vision correction, +2 to a
+partial correction, 0 to no change in vision, and -10 to a worsening of
+vision. He also assigns a utility of -2 to the cost and physical discomfort of
+the operation. Assuming Fred wants to maximize his expected utility, should he
+have the operation?
+
+answer
+
+__The expected utility of not having the operation is zero (no change in
+vision, no cost or discomfort due to the operation). The expected utility of
+having the operation is (5 x 0.46) + (2 x 0.44) + (0 x 0.09) + (-10 x 0.01) -
+2 = +1.08. The expected utility of having the operation is larger than the
+expected utility of not having the operation, so Fred should have the
+operation.
+
+## §2. Examples and fallacies
+
+There are many pitfalls in reasoning about risks. See if you can tell which of
+the following arguments are correct, and which are fallacies.
+
+  * The life expectancy in Hong Kong is 77 years for men and 83 years for women. So a man who is forty years old today can expect to live another 37 years, and a woman of the same age can expect to live another 43 years. Correct or fallacy? 
+  * The death rate from cancer in Hong Kong has more than doubled from 73 per 100,000 population in 1961 to 160 per 100,000 population in 1999. So living in Hong Kong has become more unhealthy in recent years. Correct or fallacy? 
+  * Between May 1995 and October 1996, 14 people in Britain died of CJD (Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease), which may have been caused by eating beef infected with BSE (bovine spongiform encephalitis, or "mad cow disease"). The utility of dying of this disease is very low! The utility of eating beef is at most only very slightly higher than the utility of eating pork or chicken. Hence those British people who continued to eat beef after 1996 were acting irrationally, since they were lowering their expected utility. The British government eventually banned the sale of certain beef products. This ban can be justified in terms of maximizing the overall expected utility of British people. Correct or fallacy? 
+  * Insurance companies make a profit on all the kinds of policy they offer, so the expected value of buying a travel insurance policy is negative. For the average traveller, then, if you want to minimize your expected financial losses, you shouldn't buy insurance. Correct or fallacy? 
+  * According to Christianity, if you believe in God and live your life as a Christian, you will be rewarded with an eternal life of bliss (heaven). Heaven has an extremely high, perhaps infinite, utility. On the other hand, if there is no afterlife, your utility after death will be zero (since you no longer exist!). Consequently, the expected utility of being a Christian is given by the utility of heaven multiplied by the probability that heaven exists. The expected utility of not being a Christian is at most zero; whether or not heaven exists, you don't go. So however small the probability is that heaven exists, the expected utility of being a Christian is greater (perhaps infinitely greater) than the expected utility of not being a Christian. So if you want to maximize your expected utility, you should be a Christian. Correct or fallacy? 
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_92.txt b/data/crtw_92.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6ad5ca8112199bb75697fd04cedcb85ac29b5867
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_92.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+Suppose you are working for an organization which opposes the government in an
+oppressive state, and you and one of your colleagues are arrested for
+distributing anti-government literature. You are taken to separate cells. The
+interrogator suspects you of being involved in a much larger plot to
+destabilize the government (which is true), but has no evidence, so he makes
+you the following offer. If you both say nothing, you will both be convicted
+of distributing anti-government literature, and will go to prison for one
+year. If you give evidence against your colleague, your colleague will be
+convicted of treason on the basis of your evidence, and will be executed, but
+you will go free. Conversely, if your colleague gives evidence against you,
+you will be executed for treason and your colleague will go free. Finally, if
+you both give evidence against each other, you will both be convicted of
+treason, but you will receive sentences of twenty years in prison in light of
+your cooperation. What should you do?
+
+Suppose you assign a utility of -10 to death, -8 to twenty years in prison, -1
+to a year in prison and 0 to going free, and suppose your colleague assigns
+the same utilities. Then we can represent the utilities of the various
+outcomes in the following table.
+
+Your utilities are the numbers in the bottom left of each box, and your
+colleague's utilities are in the top right.
+
+Of course, you don't know what your colleague is going to do. Suppose your
+colleague tells the interrogator what she knows. Then you get a utility of -10
+if you don't tell, and -8 if you do, so you maximize your utility if you tell.
+On the other hand, suppose your colleague doesn't tell. Then you get a utility
+of -1 if you don't tell, and 0 if you do, so again you maximize your utility
+if you tell. So it doesn't matter what your colleague does; if you want to
+maximize your utility, you should tell.
+
+Your colleague, though, if she also wants to maximize her utility, will reason
+in exactly the same way; whatever you do, she is better off telling. So if you
+both attempt to maximize your own expected utility, you will both tell, and
+both end up with a utility of -8 (twenty years in prison).
+
+But something very strange has happened here. If you both keep quiet, you get
+only one year in prison--clearly a better outcome. By attempting to maximize
+your own utility, you each get a worse outcome than you would if you had both
+ignored your own utility! This puzzle is known as the _prisoner's dilemma_. It
+appears to be a case where individual self-interest prevents the best overall
+outcome from occurring.
+
+The prisoner's dilemma is far more than just an idle philosophical example. It
+has attracted a good deal of attention from economists, political scientists,
+philosophers and even biologists. That's because it seems to have important
+consequences for general issues having to do with cooperation. For example,
+imagine a society with no law enforcement. In such a society, there is always
+a risk that your neighbor will break in when you are out and steal your
+possessions. If he does so, you would be better off if you went out and stole
+his things. In fact, even if he doesn't steal your things, you are still
+better off if you steal his things.
+
+Again, we can use a table to represent the utilities of the various outcomes.
+
+The worst outcome (-5) is having your things stolen without stealing anything
+back. If you steal some stuff back, the outcome isn't so bad (-3). If neither
+of you steals anything, the outcome is neutral (0), and if you steal things
+but nothing is stolen from you, you get an overall benefit (+2). Notice that
+the table has the same form as the prisoner's dilemma, and generates a similar
+conclusion. If you each act according to your own self-interest, you will both
+be constantly stealing each other's things (a utility of -3), whereas it would
+clearly be better if neither of you stole each other's things (a utility of
+0).
+
+An argument like this was first put forward by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes used this
+argument as a justification for government; we need a government with the
+power to enforce laws so that it is no longer in the citizens' interest to
+attack each other (see the self-test question at the end of this section). The
+general point Hobbes tried to make is that cooperation is in the overall
+interest of the citizens of a country, but that self-interest alone is not
+always enough to produce cooperation.
+
+Many political scientists think that such arguments still have relevance
+today, especially in the international arena. There is no "world government"
+capable of effectively enforcing cooperation between countries. The concern is
+that it may be in each country's self-interest to attack its neighboring
+countries, even though this may have disastrous overall consequences.
+
+This kind of analysis of strategies of interaction is called _game theory_.
+The prisoner's dilemma is one of the "games" that are studied, but there are
+many more; a different structure of utilities gives a different game. For
+example, "free rider" problems can be studied using game theory. Whooping
+cough vaccinations provide an example of a free rider problem. The vaccine
+carries a small risk of serious side-effects. As long as most parents have
+their children vaccinated, then a few "free riders" can avoid the risk by not
+having their children vaccinated. However, if too many parents act this way,
+only a small proportion of children will be vaccinated, and there is a large
+risk of a serious epidemic.
+
+Game theory originated in economics. However, it is now used in subjects as
+disparate as philosophy (e.g. to study the connections between self-interest
+and ethics) and biology (e.g. to study the mechanisms by which cooperative
+behavior in animals could evolve).
+
+In the stealing example above, we assumed that there was no law enforcement.
+Now suppose that the government punishes people who steal. How big must the
+punishment be (in utility units) in order to deter self-interested people from
+stealing? If only 25% of thieves are caught, then how big must the punishment
+be?
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+Suppose the punishment has utility p. Then the utility table becomes:
+
+So if p has a utility value lower than -2, then it is in my interest not to
+steal, and similarly for my neighbor. If we both act in our own self-interest,
+given these punishments, we will each get a utility of 0.
+
+If only 25% of thieves are caught, then the expected utility of punishment p
+is only p/4. So to deter stealing among self-interested people, the punishment
+must have a utility value lower than -8.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_93.txt b/data/crtw_93.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3213248aabb9c48eed475dbbd4ab4cc8441411e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_93.txt
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+## §1. Pictures: pros and cons
+
+When data are presented to an audience, whether it is on a news report or in a
+technical journal report, they are usually presented in the form of a diagram.
+Sometimes, a diagram is used simply to make the data more eye-catching; a list
+of numbers just doesn't grab anyone's attention. More often, though, the use
+of a diagram serves some further purpose. A diagram can be used to _summarize_
+large sets of data, or to focus attention on some _aspect_ of the data, or to
+display a _trend_ in the data over time. A good diagram enables the viewer to
+grasp in a single glance the relevant features of the data, features that
+wouldn't be obvious from the raw numbers themselves.
+
+However, the power that diagrams have to give us an instant impression of the
+data can also be abused. Diagrams can be constructed to give the impression
+that the data have a feature that they don't really have. In this section,
+we're going to look at some common ways of pictorially representing (and
+misrepresenting) data. For each diagram, see if you can tell why it is
+misleading, and then click on "Answer".
+
+###  Hong Kong's soaring population?
+
+The first graph shows Hong Kong's population from 1993 to 1999\. It has two
+misleading features, one worse than the other.
+
+  * Answer
+
+###  An effective campaign?
+
+In 1956, the U.S. state of Connecticut began a severe crackdown on speeding
+drivers. The following graph shows the annual number of traffic fatalities
+before and after the crackdown. In what way could this graph be misleading?
+
+  * Answer
+
+###  The mobile phone revolution
+
+The following diagram represents the increase in mobile phone ownership in
+Hong Kong from 1994 to 1998. In what way is it misleading?
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+The mobile phone usage in 1998 (420 per 1000 population) is six times bigger
+than the mobile phone usage in 1994 (71 per 1000 population). This is
+represented pictorially by the fact that the phone on the right is six times
+taller than the phone on the left. This might seem fair, but note that it is
+also six times wider, so it covers 6 x 6 = 36 times as much of the page area
+as the one on the left. In other words, 36 of the smaller phones would fit
+into the larger phone. The visual impression that the viewer receives is that
+phone usage has increased by a factor of 36, rather than the true factor of 6.
+
+The source of the data is the Census and Statistics Department of the Hong
+Kong SAR.
+
+## §2. Measuring the middle
+
+Data aren't only summarized by means of graphs and diagrams; quite frequently,
+data are summarized using numbers. The most frequently cited number is the
+_average_ of the data. For example, the 25 June, 2000 issue of the South China
+Morning Post (which just happened to be close at hand) cites averages in every
+section. In news features, researchers interviewing drug users "found that 18
+per cent had shared needles or syringes with three other people on average"
+("HIV rate among addicts sharing needles soars", p. 3). In business features,
+Thai officials report that "more than 360,000 tourists came for golf holidays
+last year, spending an average of 8,000 baht a day, almost twice that of the
+average visitor" ("Cheap health care may yet provide the biggest tourist lure
+for Thailand", p. 4). In sports, "ever since making a full debut against
+Brazil in 1994, as a 21-year-old, Milosevic has averaged something very close
+to a goal every two games" ("Yugoslav Villan turned hero", p. 14). Even the
+weather report tells us that "total rainfall since January 1st is 1,334.5 mm.
+against an average of 926.6 mm." (p. 2).
+
+When newspapers talk about the average value of some quantity, they are almost
+always referring to what statisticians call the _mean_. The mean of a set of N
+numbers is the sum of the numbers, divided by N. So, for example, the mean of
+the data set {2, 5, 5, 8, 10} is (2 + 5 + 5 + 8 + 10) &div;5 = 6. The mean
+gives an idea of where the "middle" of the data set lies.
+
+However, the mean is not the only way to express the "middle" of a set of
+data. Another way is to cite the _median_ of the data. The median is quite
+literally the middle value; list the numbers in the data set in increasing
+order, and the median is the middle one. So, for example, the median of the
+data set {2, 5, 5, 8, 10} is 5. If the size of the data set is even, then
+there are two numbers in the middle, and the median is the mean of these two
+numbers. So, for example, the median of {2, 5, 5, 8, 10, 12} is (5 + 8)&div;2
+= 6.5.
+
+The reason that the mean is most often used to typify a data set is that it
+has a central place in the theoretical machinery of statistics, and is closely
+connected with concepts such as probability and expected value. For example,
+suppose you play a game in which you toss a fair coin, and you win $2 if the
+coin lands heads and lose $1 if the coin lands tails. The probability of each
+outcome is 0.5, so the expected value of the game is (0.5 x $2) - (0.5 x $1) =
+$0.5. The concept of expected value is related to that of the mean in that if
+you play the game over and over again, your mean winnings per game will
+eventually get closer and closer to the expected value.
+
+Despite these advantages, the mean is not always the best way to summarize a
+data set. One advantage of the median over the mean is that it is not
+sensitive to _outliers_. An outlier is an extreme value which is exceptional
+in some way, and hence not representative of the quantity you are interested
+in. As we saw before, the mean of the data set {2, 5, 5, 8, 10} is 6, and the
+median is 5. If we change the data set to {2, 5, 5, 8, 100}, the mean rises to
+24, but the median remains unchanged at 5. In many cases, when the data set
+contains outliers the median provides a better way of summarizing the data.
+For example, perhaps the data represent the number of aeroplane flights taken
+by a sample of Hong Kong residents in the past year, and the figure of 100
+comes from a professional pilot; in this case, the median of 5 flights per
+year is probably more representative of the population at large than the mean
+of 24 flights per year. More examples can be found in the following self-test
+questions.
+
+The following table shows the starting salaries of the students graduating
+from a particular degree program at a Hong Kong university (the figures are
+invented):
+
+Student number |  Salary (HK$/month)  
+---|---  
+00001 |  14,000  
+00002 |  14,500  
+00003 |  14,000  
+00004 |  16,000  
+00005 |  19,000  
+00006 |  12,000  
+00007 |  15,500  
+00008 |  86,500  
+00009 |  16,500  
+00010 |  13,000  
+  
+Calculate the mean and median values for this data. Why are they so different?
+Which is likely to be the best way to summarize the data?
+
+answer
+
+__The mean starting salary is HK$22,100 per month. The median starting salary
+is HK$15,000 per month. The reason they are so different is that student 00008
+is an outlier, whose salary is five times larger than those of the other
+students. The salary of student 00008 is probably not typical of the graduates
+of this program; the other students' salaries are all fairly close to each
+other. In this case, the median value is probably the more informative way to
+summarize the data, since it is more likely to reflect the starting salary of
+the typical graduate from the program.
+
+Citing the mean in cases like this can be misleading. For example, in 1984 the
+University of Virginia stated that the average starting salary of students
+graduating from its program in rhetoric and communications was US$55,000
+(HK$430,000) per year! This was not a lie; however, one of the graduates was a
+talented basketball player, Ralph Sampson, whose starting salary for the
+Houston Rockets NBA team was probably not representative of students in the
+program. (Source: Larry Gonick and Woollcott Smith (1993), _The Cartoon Guide
+to Statistics_. New York: HarperCollins.)
+
+The following table shows students' marks for a particular coursework
+assignment (the figures are invented):
+
+Student number |  Mark  
+---|---  
+00001 |  59  
+00002 |  61  
+00003 |  57  
+00004 |  0  
+00005 |  51  
+00006 |  64  
+00007 |  70  
+00008 |  0  
+00009 |  55  
+00010 |  0  
+  
+Calculate the mean and median values for this data. Why are they so different?
+Suppose there is a policy that the mean mark for each assignment must be close
+to 58; if the mean is more than 5 points below 58, a fixed quantity is added
+to each student's mark so that the mean becomes 58. What does the policy
+require in this case? Does it seem like the right response in this instance?
+
+answer
+
+__The mean mark is 41.7, and the median mark is 56. The reason they are so
+different is that there are three outliers--students who scored zero on the
+assignment, perhaps because they did not complete the assignment for some
+reason. The policy requires that 16.3 (the required mean minus the actual
+mean) is added to each student's mark. This does not seem like the right
+response, since it results in all the students who completed the assignment
+getting marks which are significantly above the required mean of 58. In a
+situation like this, it might be better to use the median as a measure of the
+center of the data. Alternatively, you could disregard the outliers; among the
+students who completed the assignment, the mean mark is 59.6, which conforms
+with the policy.
+
+## §3. Measuring the spread
+
+Although the average is the most frequently used statistic for summarizing a
+set of data, it is often quite uninformative without some idea of how widely
+spread the data is--whether all the data points are clustered tightly around
+the average, or whether they range widely from the average. Two ways of
+expressing data spread are the _standard deviation_ and the _interquartile
+range_ ; the first is based on the mean, and the second is based on the
+median.
+
+The standard deviation is obtained, roughly speaking, by finding the average
+distance of the data points from the mean. But this has to be done in a
+particular way. The most obvious way of finding this average is to subtract
+the mean from each of the N data points, add the resulting numbers and divide
+by N. But this won't work. Why not?
+
+answer
+
+__If you follow that procedure for calculating the standard deviation, you
+will get zero every time. Roughly, this is because the mean is in the middle
+of the data set, so subtracting the mean from each number in the data set will
+give negative numbers as well as positive numbers. If you\'re interested,
+here\'s the proof. If the data set consists of the numbers  , then the mean
+is given by  . If we subtract  from each number in the data set, and then take
+the mean of the resulting numbers, we get
+
+The actual method for calculating the standard deviation uses the square of
+the distance from each data point to the mean. Since the square of a number is
+always positive, this problem is avoided.
+
+So instead, the standard deviation is calculated using the following recipe:
+
+  * For each of your N data points, calculate the _square_ of the distance between the data point and the mean. 
+  * Add these numbers together. 
+  * Divide the result by N-1. 
+  * Take the square root. 
+
+This recipe is rather involved; fortunately, most calculators can compute a
+standard deviation for you.
+
+Despite the complications of calculating it, the standard deviation is the
+most commonly cited measure of spread. This is because it is used in many
+statistical techniques, and it has useful connections to some common ways in
+which data points are distributed. For example, in many real-life situations,
+the distribution of data points follows what is known as the _normal_
+distribution (or bell curve). For data distributed in this way, it can be
+shown that two-thirds of the data lie within one standard deviation of the
+mean, 95% of the data lie within two standard deviations of the mean, and
+99.7% of the data lie within three standard deviations of the mean. The number
+of standard deviations from the mean for a particular result can be used as a
+measure of how unusual that result is; it is not terribly unusual to get a
+result over one standard deviation from the mean, but it is quite unusual to
+get a result over two standard deviations from the mean, and very unusual to
+get a result over three standard deviations from the mean. We will come back
+to this topic later.
+
+The interquartile ranged is based on the median of a data set. Remember that
+the median m divides the data set in two; half the data points are below it
+and half the data points are above it. Now take the points below m (including
+m, if it is a data point) and find _their_ median. Call this the _first
+quartile_. Then take the points above m (including m, if it is a data point)
+and find _their_ median. Call this the _third quartile_. The _second quartile_
+is m itself. What we have done is to divide the data into four equal parts; a
+quarter of the data points are below the first quartile, a quarter are between
+the first and second quartiles, a quarter are between the second and third,
+and a quarter are above the third quartile. The interquartile range, as its
+name implies, is the distance between the first and third quartiles.
+
+The advantage of the interquartile range is that it is easy to calculate and
+easy to visualize; exactly half the data points fall within the range.
+However, it does not have the nice connections to other statistical techniques
+that the standard deviation has.
+
+For large data sets, finer-grained distinctions into _percentiles_ are
+sometimes used. Percentiles are like quartiles, but they divide the data set
+into 100 equal parts. For example, the 34th _percentile_ of a data set is the
+value such that 34% of the data points are below it and 66% are above it. The
+50th percentile is the median.
+
+The following table shows (approximate) monthly market turnover for the Hong
+Kong Stock Exchange for 1999. (Source: Hong Kong Securities and Futures
+Commission).
+
+Month | Turnover (billion shares)  
+---|---  
+January | 50  
+February | 35  
+March | 75  
+April | 100  
+May | 130  
+June | 120  
+July | 135  
+August | 85  
+September | 215  
+October | 125  
+November | 145  
+December | 190  
+  
+Calculate the mean and the standard deviation. Find the median and the
+interquartile range. How many standard deviations below the mean is the
+February figure? How many standard deviations above the mean is the September
+figure?
+
+answer
+
+__The mean value of the market turnover is 117 billion stocks, with a standard
+deviation of 53 billion stocks. The median value is 122.5 billion stocks, with
+an interquartile range of 60 billion stocks. The February figure is 1.5
+standard deviations below the mean; the September figure is 1.8 standard
+deviations above the mean.
+
+## §4. The importance of spread
+
+In many contexts, the mean or median of a set of data is quoted without any
+indication of the spread of the data. Sometimes this is not a problem; for
+example, the fact that Yugoslav soccer player Savo Milosevic has scored an
+average of one goal every two games since 1994 is enough to tell you that he
+is an impressive striker. However, in other situations, knowledge of the
+spread is important.
+
+In the following examples, see if you can spot the flaw in the reasoning,
+which in each case concerns overlooking the spread of some quantity.
+
+  1. The average June temperatures in Hong Kong and Tucson, Arizona are both about 28°C. So you can expect similar temperatures in Hong Kong and Tucson in June. answer
+
+__Hong Kong has humid, subtropical climate in which there is very little
+temperature variation between day and night, whereas Tucson has a dry, desert
+climate in which the temperature variation is large. In Hong Kong in June the
+average daytime high is 31°C and the average nighttime low is 25°C; in Tucson
+the average daytime high is 37°C and the average nighttime low is 19°C. Then
+there is the variability in each of these figures to consider; the daytime
+high temperature, for example, typically varies more from day to day in desert
+climates than in subtropical ones. All in all, the mean temperature tells you
+very little about what to expect in the way of temperature.
+
+  2. The average household size is 3.6 people. So new housing should be built to accommodate 3 to 4 person households. answer
+
+__In the U.S., even though the mean family size is 3.6 people, only 45% of
+households are made up of 3 or 4 people; 35% have fewer than 3 people, and 20%
+have four or more people. Even so, builders often rely on the mean family
+size, and build primarily two-bedroom homes to accommodate them. This has led
+to an oversupply of two-bedroom homes in the U.S. and an undersupply of homes
+of other sizes. (Source: D. Huff (1973), _How to Lie with Statistics_.
+Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.)
+
+  3. The mean weight of one-year-old boys is 22.5 pounds. So parents of a one-year-old boy weighing 20 pounds should be concerned about their child's development. answer
+
+__When _deviations_ from the average are reported, such figures are of no use
+without some measure of spread. If the standard deviation of the weight of
+one-year-old boys is three pounds, then this particular child's weight is
+unremarkable; if the standard deviation is one pound, then it may be a matter
+of concern. In fact, the standard deviation is much closer to three pounds
+than to one pound, so there is nothing to worry about. (Source: J. M. Tanner
+(1978), _Foetus into Man_. London: Open Books.)
+
+  4. Two students take an IQ test. Student 1 scores 98, and student 2 scores 101. Since the mean IQ score is defined to be 100, student 1 is of below average intelligence, and student 2 is above average. answer
+
+__For one thing, there are legitimate concerns about whether or not it is
+appropriate to measure intelligence using a single linear scale. But even
+setting such concerns aside, we still cannot conclude that student 2 is more
+intelligent than student 1. This is because if a single student is given a
+series of IQ tests, the scores will vary slightly from test to test; the
+standard deviation is typically about 3 points. Hence the difference in score
+between student 1 and student 2 is too small to say anything conclusive about
+the difference in the intelligence of the students. For any measurement or
+test, it is important not to draw conclusions which the accuracy of the test
+doesn't justify. (Source: J. D. McGervey (1986), _Probabilities in Everyday
+Life_. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.)
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_94.txt b/data/crtw_94.txt
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+## §1. Samples
+
+Perhaps the most important uses of statistical reasoning are in dealing with
+samples. For example, a pollster who wants to find out how many people in Hong
+Kong are satisfied with the performance of the Chief Executive doesn't
+interview everyone in Hong Kong, for obvious reasons. Instead, the pollster
+interviews a _sample_ of Hong Kong residents, and uses statistical techniques
+to draw conclusions about the population as a whole.
+
+But sampling isn't limited to surveys and opinion polls. In manufacturing
+industries, sampling is used in quality control; for example, from the number
+of defects in a sample of electrical components, one can infer the overall
+reliability of the manufacturing process. In medical research, sampling is
+used to identify health risks; for example, from the difference in heart
+disease rates between a sample of smokers and a sample of non-smokers, one can
+infer the overall effect of smoking on the risk of developing heart disease.
+In general, sampling is necessary in any case where examining every member of
+the relevant population of people or things would be too expensive or too time
+consuming.
+
+In the next few sections, we are going to look at reasoning from samples, and
+some common ways it can go wrong. Ideally, what one wants from a sample is
+that the properties you are interested in are the same in the sample as in the
+whole population. For example, the pollster hopes that the proportion of
+people who are satisfied with the Chief Executive's performance is the same in
+the sample as in the population of Hong Kong as a whole. In general, this kind
+of assumption can fail in two different ways-- _bias_ and _sampling error_. We
+will examine them in turn.
+
+The next few sections cite several statistical results without proof. If you
+want to see where they come from, see any statistics text (e.g. Larry Gonick
+and Woollcott Smith (1993), _The Cartoon Guide to Statistics_. New York:
+HarperCollins).
+
+## §2. Bias
+
+We study samples to learn about a population. In this context, the
+_population_ is just the set of things we are interested in; they could be
+people, but they could also be companies or fish or door-handles. The _sample_
+is the subset of the population that we actually investigate. We collect data
+from the sample, and calculate the figure we are interested in--say, the mean
+number of employees in a sample of Hong Kong companies, or the mean mercury
+level in a sample of locally caught fish. We want to conclude that the figure
+applies also to the population as a whole--that we now know something about
+the mean number of employees in Hong Kong companies generally, or the mean
+mercury level in locally caught fish generally. Under what circumstances are
+such inferences justified?
+
+_Part_ of the answer is that the sample must be _random_. (For the rest of the
+answer, you'll have to wait until the next section.) This doesn't mean that
+the sample is chosen in a haphazard way; often it takes a lot of care to make
+sure that a sample is random. What it means is that each item in the
+population has an equal probability of being included in the sample. (A random
+sample is sometimes also called a _representative_ sample, although this name
+is somewhat misleading, since a random sample can fail to accurately represent
+the population, as we will see in the next section.)
+
+A sample which is not random is called _biased_. In a biased sample, some
+members of the population have a greater chance of being included in the
+sample than others. Because of this, any figures calculated on the basis of
+the sample may not be applicable to the population as a whole. For example,
+suppose we collect a sample of 100 fish from the waters next to an industrial
+area, and calculate their mean mercury level. Clearly such a sample is biased,
+since all the fish living away from the industrial area have a zero chance of
+being included in the sample. One might well expect that the mercury level of
+fish living close to the industrial area will be higher, on average, than that
+of fish living elsewhere. This may or may not in fact be the case, but since
+it could be true, the mercury level you have calculated is not necessarily a
+good guide to the population as a whole.
+
+Now suppose you take one netful of fish from every square mile of the relevant
+area. Now is your sample random? Suppose your net has 3-inch holes. Then you
+won't catch any fish smaller than 3 inches long, and fish less than 3 inches
+thick have a smaller chance of being caught than fish over three inches thick.
+So strictly speaking, your sample of fish still isn't random, since some fish
+have a higher chance of being caught than others. Is this a problem? You may
+have no reason to think that small fish have different mercury levels than big
+fish, but of course, it's possible. The beauty of a truly random sample is
+that it doesn't matter what other factors might be correlated with mercury
+level in fish, since each fish has an equal chance of being caught.
+
+As this example illustrates, getting a truly random sample is often very
+difficult. Not all sources of bias are equally serious, but it is always best
+to obtain a sample that is as random as possible, as only then are the
+statistical results of the next section fully justified.
+
+Identify possible sources of bias in each of the following examples:
+
+  1. A political poll is conducted by calling numbers picked at random from the telephone directory. answer
+
+__One potential source of bias is the fact that people who don't own a
+telephone have no chance of being included in the sample. This was a big
+problem in the past. For example, a 1936 telephone poll predicted that Landon
+would overwhelmingly beat Roosevelt in the U.S. presidential election, but in
+fact the reverse occurred. In 1936, only wealthy people owned telephones, and
+wealthy people were more likely to vote for Landon. These days, this is not
+such a serious source of bias; however, those people with two telephone lines
+are twice as likely to appear in the sample as those with only one telephone
+line. A second potential source of bias is the fact that those people who are
+home to answer their phone are not necessarily a random sample of voters,
+particularly if the calls are made during the day, when many people are at
+work. A third potential source of bias is that some people will refuse to
+answer the interviewer's questions, and those who do answer may not constitute
+a random sample of the population. These latter two sources of bias are both
+instances of _non-response bias_ ; even if a truly random sample of people is
+polled, those who respond may not constitute a random sample.
+
+  2. A survey on views about redevelopment in a particular residential area is conducted by knocking on doors of a random sample of homes in that area. answer
+
+__Again, non-response bias may be a factor here. People who agree to respond
+to the interviewer's questions may be those who have strong views about
+redevelopment, or those who have a lot of time on their hands. People who are
+at home when the interviewer calls may be more likely to be old people or
+those with young children. Any of these are potential sources of bias.
+
+  3. Tests to determine the incidence of hepatitis in the population are conducted on a random sample of people attending a blood donation centre. answer
+
+__People attending a blood donation centre may well not constitute a random
+sample of the population at large. For example, those who know that they have
+been exposed to hepatitis may choose not to give blood. This is a classic
+example of an _opportunity sample_ \--a sample which is chosen simply because
+it is easy to obtain. It is relatively easy to obtain blood samples for
+testing from people who have volunteered to donate blood; it would be much
+harder to persuade people chosen at random from the population to submit to a
+blood test. But a sample which is easy to obtain is not necessarily an
+informative sample.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_95.txt b/data/crtw_95.txt
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+Suppose we succeed in obtaining a truly random sample of fish from a given
+area of sea, and we calculate the mean mercury level in our sample. Will this
+level tell us the mean mercury level in local fish overall? Not necessarily.
+Suppose our random sample consists of two fish. What guarantee do we have that
+the mercury level in these two fish is representative of the mercury level in
+the population overall? It could well be that both of these fish just happen
+to have particularly high levels, or particularly low levels.
+
+What if we take a sample of a hundred fish? Again, it's possible that all
+these fish have particularly high or particularly low mercury levels, in which
+case our sample mean doesn't accurately represent the population mean. But
+intuitively, this seems much less likely in the case of a hundred fish than in
+the case of two fish. If the fish are really chosen at random, it seems like
+we would have to be very unlucky to get a sample of fish which had a very
+different mean mercury level than the population at large.
+
+In fact, this intuition can be given a rigorous statistical justification. The
+basic idea is that for a small sample, any quantity you calculate has a large
+_sampling error_. The sampling error provides a measure of how likely it is
+that the quantity you have calculated is a specified distance from the true
+population value. The larger the sample, the smaller the sampling error. Note
+that sampling error isn't an error in the sense of a _mistake_ ; every figure
+calculated from a sample has a sampling error, however good the sampling
+process. Due to the chance nature of random sampling, you can never completely
+eliminate the possibility that your sample is misleading. But if the sampling
+error is small enough, that tells you that it is unlikely that your calculated
+value is a long way from the true value in the population.
+
+Several different statistics can be used as a measure of the sampling error,
+but the one you will encounter most frequently is called a _confidence
+interval_. For example, suppose you collect a random sample of 100 fish,
+measure their mercury levels, and calculate the mean and standard deviation of
+the results. Suppose you obtain a mean of 0.265 ppm (parts per million) and a
+standard deviation of 0.081 ppm. Your best estimate of the mean mercury level
+of the fish in the population as a whole is 0.265 ppm, but how far is this
+likely to be from the true population mean? Using the standard deviation of
+the sample, you can calculate a quantity called the _standard error_ by
+dividing the standard deviation by  , where n is the sample size. In our case,
+then the standard error is given by 0.081/10 = 0.0081. As long as the sample
+is reasonably large (say, more than 30), the 95% confidence interval is an
+interval of two standard errors on either side of the sample mean. In our
+case, then, the 95% confidence interval for the mean mercury level in local
+fish is 0.265 ± 0.016 ppm.
+
+What does the 95% confidence interval tell us? Often, statistics books say
+things like the following: We can have 95% confidence that the true population
+mean lies between 0.249 ppm and 0.281 ppm. But this is slightly misleading, as
+it suggests that confidence intervals are about a particular kind of feeling
+of confidence you should have towards your result. What the confidence
+interval actually means is that if you take random samples of 100 fish over
+and over again, then 95% of the time, the confidence interval will contain the
+true population mean. Only 5% of the time will the true population mean lie
+outside the confidence interval, so you would have to be quite unlucky for the
+confidence interval not to contain the true mean. How this is connected with
+any feeling of confidence you may have about your result is a difficult
+philosophical question.
+
+Note that the width of the 95% confidence interval is proportional to 1/  ,
+where n is the sample size. In fact, this is generally true of all measures of
+sampling error. This provides a useful link between sampling error and sample
+size; for example, if you want to cut your sampling error in half, you need to
+multiply the size of your sample by four. Sampling error is purely a result of
+the _size_ of the sample, unlike bias, which is a result of the _way_ the
+sample is collected.
+
+Confidence intervals are often found in reports of the results of surveys and
+political polls. For example, political polls often quote a "margin of error",
+usually of around 3 percentage points. What this means is that the 95%
+confidence interval is the cited figure plus or minus 3 percentage points. If
+the poll says that 52% of voters support Lee, then the 95% confidence interval
+is 52 ± 3%. In 95% of such polls, you can expect the true level of voter
+support to be within the confidence interval. Remember, though, that the
+confidence interval is just a measure of the sampling error; it assumes that
+the sampling method has ruled out all sources of bias, which as we have seen,
+is very difficult to achieve.
+
+Suppose that Lee hires a pollster to estimate his support in the forthcoming
+election. A poll of 1000 people indicates that he has the support of 52% of
+people, with a margin of error of 3 percentage points. Lee would like a more
+accurate estimate. How many people would need to be polled in order to reduce
+the margin of error to 1 percentage point?
+
+answer
+
+__
+
+The margin of error is proportional to 1/ , where n is the sample size. So to
+reduce the margin of error by a factor of 3, we need to increase the sample
+size by a factor of 9. (If n becomes 9 times bigger, the margin of error
+becomes  = 3 times smaller.) Hence to achieve a margin of error of 1
+percentage point, we would need to increase the sample size from 1000 to 9000.
+This example shows why decreasing the sampling error beyond a certain point
+quickly becomes impractical. It is quite likely that sampling 9000 people for
+a political poll would be prohibitively expensive. Furthermore, there may be
+unavoidable biases in the sampling techniques (as discussed in the previous
+section), which introduce additional sources of error in the estimate.
+Increasing the sample size does nothing to reduce these errors.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_96.txt b/data/crtw_96.txt
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+So far, we have been looking at using samples to estimate a particular value,
+such as the mean mercury level in a population of fish. Another important use
+of samples is in _hypothesis testing_. For example, suppose you think that
+exactly half the fish in a given population are male. In your random sample of
+100 fish, you find that only 45 are male. Does this give you a good reason to
+think that fewer than half the fish in the population are male?
+
+We call the hypothesis that exactly half the fish are male the _null_
+hypothesis. The hypothesis that fewer than half the fish are male is called
+the _alternative_ hypothesis. In order to decide whether or not to reject the
+null hypothesis given our evidence, we calculate the probability that we would
+get such a small number of male fish in our sample purely by chance, if the
+null hypothesis is true.
+
+If the null hypothesis true, you should expect, on average, to find 50 male
+fish in the sample. But of course, since the sample is random, you won't get
+exactly 50 male fish every time. In fact, it is easy to calculate the standard
+deviation for the number of male fish in the sample; it is given by  , where n
+is the sample size and p is the proportion of male fish in the population.
+Since our null hypothesis says that p=1/2, the standard deviation is 5.
+
+We saw previously that, for many kinds of quantity, there is a probability of
+2/3 that the quantity will lie within one standard deviation of the mean, and
+a probability of 0.95 that it will lie within two standard deviations of the
+mean. The actual number of male fish in our sample (45) is exactly one
+standard deviation from the hypothesized mean (50), so if the null hypothesis
+is true, the probability of getting a result at least this far from the mean
+purely by chance is 1/3. This is quite a big chance; it would be jumping to
+conclusions to reject the null hypothesis on the basis of this evidence alone.
+
+So what evidence would it take for it to be reasonable to reject the null
+hypothesis? That depends on the situation. In some cases, you want it to be
+extremely unlikely that the result was due to chance before you reject null
+hypothesis; in other cases, it doesn't matter so much. The relevant measure is
+called the _significance level_ of the test. For example, if the test has a
+significance level of 0.1, this means that if the null hypothesis is true,
+there's a probability of 0.1 that you will get results at least this extreme
+by chance alone. In other words, such a test has a 1 in 10 chance of rejecting
+the null hypothesis _erroneously_.
+
+In most scientific contexts, a significance level of 0.1 is not considered
+good enough; the chance of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis when it
+is true is too high. A significance level of 0.05 is frequently used in the
+social sciences, and often only a significance level of 0.01 or less is
+acceptable in the physical sciences. Note that the smaller the significance
+level, the more stringent the test.
+
+We can answer the question of when to reject the hypothesis that exactly half
+the fish are male by choosing a significance level to use. Suppose we choose a
+significance level of 0.05. This means that we reject the null hypothesis if
+we obtain a result that has a probability of 0.05 or less of occurring by
+chance under the null hypothesis is true. Remembering that there is a
+probability of 0.95 that our result will lie within two standard deviations of
+the mean, we can conclude that there is a probability of 0.05 of getting a
+result at least 10 fish away from the mean. Adopting a significance level of
+0.05, then, means deciding to reject the null hypothesis if our sample of 100
+fish contains less than 40 males (or more than 60 males).
+
+In a famous 1968 trial, U.S. pediatrician and anti-war activist Dr. Benjamin
+Spock was accused of conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act, the
+mechanism by which Americans were drafted to fight in the Vietnam War. Spock's
+defence lawyers challenged jury selection procedure, on the grounds that none
+of the 12 jurors were women. (Women were perceived as being more favourably
+disposed towards Spock.) Suppose that 50% of eligible jurors are women, and
+that jurors are chosen at random. What is the probability of an all male jury
+occurring purely by chance? What does this tell us about the hypothesis that
+jury selection is random?
+
+answer
+
+__If selection is random, and 50% of the eligible jurors are women, then the
+probability of obtaining an all male jury by chance is (0.5) 12= 0.00024, or
+about one in 4000. Given that 50% of eligible jurors are women, this result
+suggests that we should reject the hypothesis that jury selection is random,
+in favour of the hypothesis that selection is biased towards picking men.
+
+(In practice, jury selection is considerably more complicated than this, and
+involves several stages. This makes the statistical analysis more involved,
+although the outcome in this case is the same. For details, see Hans Ziesel
+and Harry Kalven Jr., "Parking tickets and missing women: statistics and the
+law" in Judith M. Tanur et al., eds. (1989), _Statistics: A Guide to the
+Unknown_. Pacific Grove, CA: Wadsworth.)
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_97.txt b/data/crtw_97.txt
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+Two things are _correlated_ if the presence of one thing makes the other thing
+more likely, or less likely. For example, in humans being female is correlated
+with having a long life (say, over 80 years). A woman is more likely to live
+over 80 years than a man. This is a _positive_ correlation, since the first
+property (being female) makes the second property (living over 80 years)
+_more_ likely. There is a _negative_ correlation between smoking and long
+life; if you smoke, you are _less_ likely to live over 80 years than if you
+don't smoke.
+
+If two things are _uncorrelated_ , the presence or absence of the first thing
+has no effect of the probability of the second thing. For example, if I say
+that the day of the week is uncorrelated with the weather, I am saying that
+the probability of rain is unaffected by what day it is; the probability of
+rain is the same on a Sunday as on a Wednesday.
+
+To say that two things are uncorrelated is the same as saying that they are
+_independent_. Recall from before that if A and B are independent, the
+conditional probabilities P(A|B) and  P(A|not B) are the same--they are both
+equal to P(A). That is, the probability of A given the presence of B is just
+the same as the probability of A given the absence of B. On the other hand, if
+A is positively (or negatively) correlated with B, the probability of A given
+the presence of B will be greater than (or less than) the probability of A
+given the absence of B. We can use these facts to construct a precise
+definition of correlation. A and B are uncorrelated if P(A|B)=P(A|not B), or
+equivalently, if P(A|B) = P(A). They are positively correlated if P(A|B) >
+P(A|not B), or equivalently, if P(A|B)>P(A). They are negatively correlated if
+P(A|B) < P(A|not B), or equivalently, if P(A|B) < P(A).
+
+  1. You throw two dice, one after the other, and you want the sum to be 7. Is this outcome correlated with whether the first die shows a 3? answer
+
+__Let A stand for "the dice sum to 7" and let B stand for "the first die shows
+a 3". Since there are 6 possible outcomes in which the two dice sum to 7, and
+since each outcome has a probability of 1/36, the probability that the dice
+sum to 7 is P(A) = 6 x 1/36 = 1/6. Now suppose the first die shows a 3. Given
+this outcome, the second die must show a 4 if the dice are to sum to 7. The
+probability of this is 1/6, so the probability of getting a 7 given that the
+first die shows a 3 is P(A|B) = 1/6. Since P(A|B) = P(A), the two events are
+not correlated; whether the dice sum to 7 is independent of whether the first
+die shows a 3.
+
+  2. What if you want the sum to be 4? answer
+
+__Now let A stand for "the dice sum to 4", with B as before. There are 3
+outcomes in which the dice sum to 4, so P(A) = 3 x 1/36 = 1/12. If the first
+die shows a 3, then the second must show a 1 if the dice are to sum to 4.
+Since the probability of this is 1/6, P(A|B) = 1/6. In this case, then, P(A|B)
+> P(A). The two events are correlated; getting a 3 on the first throw
+increases the chances that the dice will sum to 4.
+
+  3. Suppose we collect data for 10 weeks, and we find that it rains on 5 out of 10 Sundays and 3 out of 10 Wednesdays. Does it follow that the day of the week is correlated with the weather? answer
+
+__Not necessarily; even under the hypothesis that day of the week and rainfall
+are uncorrelated, there is a reasonably high probability of getting a
+difference this big purely by chance. As we saw in the previous section, to
+properly test the hypothesis that day of the week and rainfall are
+uncorrelated, we need to use a test which has a low probability of rejecting
+the hypothesis erroneously. We would need to collect more data before we would
+be entitled to conclude that rainfall really is correlated with the day of the
+week. (Incidentally, recentresearch at Arizona State University suggests that
+in parts of the United States rainfall is correlated with the day of the week,
+with more rain falling on the weekends.)
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_98.txt b/data/crtw_98.txt
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..78e871b33b426dc41c5bfa0094d6fd3b6dc3e39d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/crtw_98.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+In 1973 there were 12,763 applications for graduate study at the University of
+California, Berkeley, of whom 8442 were male and 4321 were female. Of the male
+applicants, 3738 were admitted (44%), whereas of the female applicants only
+1494 were admitted (35%). This suggests that success at admission to Berkeley
+is positively correlated with being male. Assuming that male applicants and
+female applicants are equally well-qualified, this seems unfair; it suggests
+that there may be _sex discrimination_ in the selection procedure.
+
+Could it be that the difference in the admission rates between male and female
+applicants occurred purely by chance? This is a matter of hypothesis testing;
+under the null hypothesis that male and female applicants have an equal
+probability of being admitted, what is the probability of getting a difference
+at least this great between the number of males and females admitted? It turns
+out that, because the numbers of applicants are quite large, the probability
+of getting a difference this large by chance is extremely small. Given any
+reasonable significance level, it seems like one should reject the null
+hypothesis that male and female applicants have an equal chance of admission,
+and accept instead the hypothesis that admission is easier for men.
+
+In such a case, the next step is to try to find out who is to blame for the
+discrimination. Are some departments particularly culpable? Strangely, an
+analysis of the admission figures of the individual departments showed that
+most of them had roughly equal admission rates for men and women. Out of 101
+departments, only ten had a difference in admission rates between men and
+women which was significant at the 0.05 level (i.e. which would be expected to
+occur less than 5% of the time by chance alone). What's more, of these ten
+potentially discriminatory departments, four had a higher admission rate for
+men and six had a higher admission rate for women.
+
+How is it possible for there to be such strong evidence of a correlation
+between sex and admission rates at the university level, and yet little or no
+evidence of any correlation at the level of the individual departments? This
+puzzle is an example of _Simpson's paradox_ , or _spurious correlation_. The
+apparent correlation at the university level is _spurious_ ; the different
+admission rates aren't the result of different probabilities of admission for
+men and women, but of different choices about which department to apply to.
+
+To see how this works, consider a simple hypothetical example. Suppose that
+department A receives 150 applications, 100 from men and 50 from women.
+Department B also receives 150 applications, but here 50 are from men and 100
+are from women. Suppose that department A has an acceptance rate (for men and
+women) of 80%, and department B has an acceptance rate (for men and women) of
+20%. Then department A admits 80 men and 40 women, whereas department B admits
+10 men and 20 women. Overall, 90 men and 60 women are admitted, giving an
+acceptance rate of 60% for men and 40% for women.
+
+In this simple example, even though both departments are entirely fair in
+their admissions, the overall admission rate is much higher for men. The
+reason is that department B is harder to get into, and more women apply to
+department B. In the real-life case at Berkeley, the conclusion of the
+investigators was similar; women tend to apply in larger numbers to
+departments that are harder to get into. The investigators decided that there
+was no evidence of sex discrimination in graduate admissions, despite first
+appearances. The fault (if any) seemed to lie earlier in the education
+process; those departments which were easier to get into tended to teach more
+mathematical subjects, and female students tended to get less preparation in
+mathematics at the primary and secondary school level.
+
+Simpson's paradox can occur any time that data from different sources are
+pooled together. In this case, admissions data from different departments were
+pooled together to produce the admissions data for the university. Simpson's
+paradox occurs when correlations appear in the pooled data which were absent
+in the various data sets before pooling. In such cases, the correlation which
+appears in the pooled data is spurious. In fact, in some cases, a negative
+correlation between two quantities before pooling can appear as a positive
+correlation after pooling, and vice versa.
+
+The source of the data used in this section is P. J. Bickel, E. A. Hammel and
+J. W. O'Connell (1975), "Sex bias in graduate admissions: data from Berkeley",
+_Science_ 187: 398-404.
+
+The following table shows (fictional) data for travel by bus and by taxi
+between two points. The "Pass." columns show the mean number of passengers per
+day travelling between those points, and the "Time" columns show the mean
+travel time in minutes.
+
+| BUS | TAXI | OVERALL  
+---|---|---|---  
+| Pass. | Time | Pass. | Time | Pass. | Time  
+Sun. | 1524 | 38 | 231 | 23 | 1755 |  
+Mon. | 246 | 41 | 386 | 27 | 632 |  
+  
+Calculate the overall mean travel time for Sunday and for Monday. Is the
+overall mean travel time correlated with the day of the week? Is this
+correlation spurious?
+
+answer
+
+__The overall mean travel time for bus and taxi passengers is 36 minutes on
+Sunday and 32 minutes on Monday. The overall mean travel time is correlated
+with the day of the week--it is four minutes lower on Monday than on Sunday.
+However, this correlation is spurious, since the mean travel time by bus is
+lower on Sunday than on Monday, and so is the mean travel time by taxi. The
+reason that the overall mean travel time is lower on Monday is that a larger
+proportion of travellers use taxis on Monday, and taxis are faster than buses.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/crtw_99.txt b/data/crtw_99.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..edce1f7b5e43f9d2259dbffdcc642852aecdd02b
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+++ b/data/crtw_99.txt
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+Quite often, we don't want to know merely whether two quantities are
+correlated; we want to know whether they are _causally connected_. For
+example, we want to know not merely whether smoking is correlated with lung
+cancer, but whether it is causally connected with lung cancer.
+
+By itself, the fact that two things are correlated doesn't entail that they
+are causally connected. For example, the rate of television ownership for a
+country is positively correlated with its average life expectancy, but this
+doesn't mean that countries should encourage their populations to buy TVs.
+
+The mistake of confusing correlation with causation is a common one, and is
+often called the _post hoc fallacy_. The name comes from the Latin phrase
+_post hoc ergo propter hoc_ , which (roughly!) translated means "after that,
+therefore because of that". If B usually occurs just after A, it is tempting
+to conclude that B occurred _because_ of A, but this would be fallacious in
+the absence of other evidence. For example, the correlation may be the result
+of a _common cause_ \--a factor that causes both A and B. A common cause can
+explain the existence of the correlation, even if A does not cause B.
+
+Could there be a common cause explanation for the fact that the rate of
+television ownership in a country is correlated with its average life
+expectancy? answer
+
+__The common cause is likely to be wealth. Increased personal wealth tends to
+cause increased spending on consumer goods, and hence tends to increase the
+television ownership rate. Similarly, increased wealth tends to produce
+increased spending on health, and hence a higher life expectancy. The causal
+story might in fact be more complicated than this, but still it is no mystery
+how television ownership and life expectancy can be correlated, even if there
+is no direct causal link between owning a TV and living a long life.
+
+Read the following excerpts from the _South China Morning Post_ ("True
+believers' luckless stars", August 7, 2000):
+
+> No matter whether you are Pisces, Virgo or Cancer, the warning for this week
+> is the same for every astrological sign--poring over your horoscope can
+> damage your mental health.
+>
+> If you take star signs too seriously or if you worry unduly about walking
+> under a ladder, you are stunting your intelligence and making yourself
+> depressed. Psychologists have discovered a strong link between belief in
+> superstition and poor exam performance.
+>
+> They also found that those students who took account of black cats and
+> Friday the 13th were more likely to be neurotic, depressed and have a lower
+> IQ than their more sceptical counterparts.
+
+Is this an example of the post hoc fallacy? If so, what might explain the
+observed correlations? answer
+
+__Yes, this is an example of the post hoc fallacy. The fact that belief in
+superstition is correlated with neurosis, depression and low IQ does not show
+that belief in superstition causes these things. In fact, the causal
+explanation could be entirely the other way round; perhaps neurosis,
+depression and low IQ cause people to take superstitions such as astrology
+more seriously. Alternatively, there may be a common cause explanation;
+perhaps the social or psychological factors which tend to produce belief in
+superstition also tend to produce neurosis, depression and low IQ.
+
+__previous tutorial __next tutorial
+
diff --git a/data/morrow_weston_awfa.txt b/data/morrow_weston_awfa.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..65b6a96f4ba228cf0137ad17e38a1dac26a3cdc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/morrow_weston_awfa.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,14695 @@
+What’s the point of arguing?
+Many people think that arguing is simply stating their prejudices in a new
+form. This is why many people also think that arguments are unpleasant
+and pointless. One dictionary definition for "argument" is "disputation." In
+this sense we sometimes say that two people "have an argument": a verbal
+fistfight. It happens often enough. But it is not what arguments really are.
+In this book, "to give an argument" means to offer a set of reasons or
+evidence in support of a conclusion. Here an argument is not simply a
+statement of certain views, and it is not simply a dispute. Arguments are
+efforts to support certain views with reasons. Arguments in this sense are
+not pointless; in fact, they are essential.
+Argument is essential, in the first place, because it is a way of finding
+out which views are better than others. Not all views are equal. Some conclusions
+can be supported by good reasons; others have much weaker support.
+But often we don’t know which are which. We need to give arguments
+for different conclusions and then assess those arguments to see how strong
+they really are.
+Here argument is a means of inquiry. Some philosophers and activists
+have argued, for instance, that the factory farming of animals for meat
+causes immense suffering to animals and is therefore unjustified and immoral.
+Are they right? We can’t necessarily tell just by consulting our
+current opinions. Many issues are involved—we need to examine the arguments.
+Do we have moral obligations to other species, for instance, or is
+only human suffering really bad? How well can humans live without meat?
+Some vegetarians have lived to very old ages. Does this show that vegetarian
+diets are healthier? Or is it irrelevant when you consider that some
+non-vegetarians also have lived to very old ages? (You might make some
+progress by asking whether vegetarians live to old age at a higher rate.) Or
+might healthier people tend to become vegetarians, rather than vice versa?
+All of these questions need to be considered carefully, and the answers are
+not clear in advance.
+Argument is essential for another reason too. Once we have arrived at
+a conclusion that is well supported by reasons, we use arguments to explain
+and defend it. A good argument doesn’t merely repeat conclusions. Instead
+it offers reasons and evidence so that other people can make up their minds
+for themselves. If you become convinced that we should indeed change the
+xx Introduction
+way we raise and use animals, for example, you must use arguments to explain how you arrived at your conclusion. That is how you will convince others: by offering the reasons and evidence that convinced you—and to present those reasons in respectful, constructive ways. It is not a mistake to have strong views. The mistake is to have nothing else.
+Argument grows on you
+Typically we learn to "argue" by assertion. That is, we tend to start with our conclusions—our desires or opinions—without a whole lot to back them up. And it works, sometimes, at least when we’re very young. What could be better?
+Real argument, by contrast, takes time and practice. Marshaling our reasons, proportioning our conclusions to the actual evidence, listening to divergent views and considering objections, and all the rest—these are acquired skills. We have to grow up a little. We have to put aside our desires and our opinions for a while and actually think.
+School may help—or not. In courses concerned with teaching ever-larger sets of facts or techniques, students are seldom encouraged to ask the sorts of questions that arguments answer. Sure, the Constitution mandates an Electoral College—that’s a fact—but is it still a good idea? (For that matter, was it ever a good idea? What were the reasons for it, anyway?) Sure, many scientists believe that there is life elsewhere in the universe, but why? What’s the argument? Reasons can be given for different answers. In the end, ideally, you will both learn some of those reasons and also learn how to weigh them up—and how to seek out more yourself.
+Mostly, again, it takes time and practice. This book can help! Moreover, the practice of argument turns out to have some attractions of its own. Our minds become more flexible, open-ended, and alert. We come to appreciate how much difference our own critical thinking can really make. From everyday family life to politics, science, philosophy, and even religion, arguments are constantly offered to us for our consideration, and we may in turn offer back our own. Think of argument as a way to make your own place within these unfolding, ongoing dialogues. What could be better than that?
+Outline of this book
+This book begins by discussing fairly simple arguments and moves to extended arguments and their use in essays and oral presentations at the end.
+Chapters I–VI are about composing and assessing short arguments. Short arguments simply offer their reasons and evidence briefly, usually in
+Introduction xxi
+a few sentences or a paragraph. We begin with short arguments for several reasons. First, they are common: in fact so common that they are part of everyday conversation. Second, longer arguments are usually elaborations of short arguments, or a series of short arguments linked together. If you learn to write and assess short arguments first, then you can extend your skills to longer arguments in essays or presentations.
+A third reason for beginning with short arguments is that they are the best illustrations both of the common argument forms and of the typical mistakes in arguments. In longer arguments it can be harder to pick out the main points—and the main problems. Therefore, although some of the rules may seem obvious when first stated, remember that you have the benefit of a simple example. Other rules are hard enough to appreciate even in short arguments.
+Chapter VII guides you into sketching and then elaborating an extended argument, considering objections and alternatives as you do. Chapter VIII guides you from there into writing an argumentative essay. Chapter IX then adds rules specifically about oral presentation. Chapter X offers advice for engaging in constructive dialogue with other people, especially people who see things very differently than you do. Again, all of these chapters depend on Chapters I–VI, since extended arguments like these essentially combine and elaborate the kinds of short arguments that Chapters I–VI discuss. Don’t skip ahead to the later chapters, then, even if you come to this book primarily for help writing an essay or doing a presentation. At the very least, read through the shaded sections of the earlier chapters—the parts from the Rulebook for Arguments, on which this book is based—so that when you arrive at those later chapters you will have the tools you need to use them well. Instructors might wish to assign Chapters I–VI early in the term and Chapters VII–X when the time comes for essays, presentations, debate, and dialogue.
+Three appendixes close out Part 1 of the Workbook. The first is a listing of fallacies: types of misleading arguments that are so tempting and common, they even have their own names. The second offers three rules for constructing and evaluating definitions. The third, which is not included in the original Rulebook, covers argument mapping, which is a powerful technique for understanding how the pieces of an argument fit together. Use them when you need them!
+Part 2 of the Workbook offers model responses to the odd-numbered exercises in nearly every exercise set. Most model responses have commentaries that explain the strengths and weaknesses of each response.
+Part 3 of the Workbook contains longer critical thinking activities that build on the rules and exercises in Part 1. Some of these you can do on your own. Others you will need to do in class or with a group of classmates.
+xxii Introduction
+How to use the Workbook
+Throughout Part 1 of this book, you will notice that some passages have a green shaded bar beside them. The passages with the sidebar come from
+Anthony Weston’s Rulebook for Arguments. The passages without the sidebar are only in the Workbook for Arguments. The additions in Part 1 consist mainly of exercise sets designed to help you learn how to apply the lessons from the passages with the sidebars. You can get the main ideas of each chapter by reading just the passages with the sidebars. Before attempting an exercise set, though, be sure to read both the Rulebook text before it and the "Tips for success" that accompany the exercise set.
+After you have completed an exercise set—or at any rate, after you’ve given it your best shot—take a look at the model responses for that exercise set. You’ll find the model responses in Part 2. We strongly encourage you to read them even if you don’t need help doing the exercises. The model responses and the commentaries on them often contain important further discussions. Moreover, part of their aim, considered as a whole, is to paint a wide-ranging and compelling picture of critical intelligence at work. The spirit of critical thinking is just as vital as the letter, so to speak, and in the Workbook you will find both.
+Every exercise set ends with a suggestion about how to get more practice applying the skills used in that exercise set. Many of these suggestions are most effective if you work in a group. If you find that you consistently want more practice, form a study group with some of your classmates.
+From time to time, your instructor may have you complete one of the critical thinking activities from Part 3. These activities are designed to be especially enjoyable and engaging and to help you connect the material in this book to your own life. Be sure to find out whether your instructor has any additional or alternative instructions for the activity, or if he or she wants you to complete one of the variations listed at the end of the activity’s assignment sheet.
+Critical thinking is a skill—and like most skills, it’s a skill that you can always improve, even if you’re already good at it. Reading about guidelines for critical thinking, such as the rules presented in this book, is an important part of honing your skill, but there is no substitute for practice. (That could even be Rule 51: Practice, practice, practice.) The aim of this workbook is to give you an opportunity for guidance, practice, and feedback. With some persistence and hard work, you’ll find yourself thinking more clearly and more critically than ever.
+Part 1
+
+3
+Arguments begin by marshaling reasons and organizing them in a clear and fair way. Chapter I offers general rules for composing short arguments. Chapters II–VI discuss specific kinds of short arguments.
+Resolve premises and conclusion
+The very first step in making an argument is to ask yourself what you are trying to prove. What is your conclusion? Remember that the conclusion is the statement for which you are giving reasons. The statements that give your reasons are your premises.
+Let’s say that you want to persuade your friends (or children, or parents, or . . .) to eat more beans. Probably this does not seem like the world’s most promising proposition, or the most important either. But it is a good first illustration—and diet does matter! Let’s consider how you might make such an argument.
+You have your conclusion: we should eat more beans. That is your belief. But why? What are your reasons? You may need to state them for yourself, for clarity first of all, and then to check that they really are good reasons. Certainly you have to state good reasons clearly if you expect others to agree or to change how they eat.
+So again: What are your reasons? One main premise probably is that beans are healthy: higher in fibers and protein and lower in fat and cholesterol than what most people eat now. So, properly supplemented, a diet of more beans could lead to a longer and more active life. You may not want to assume that your friends or family have heard, or really appreciated, this reason before—at least it is useful to be reminded.
+To get people motivated, it would be helpful to add another main premise as well. Since beans are often stereotyped as boring, why not also argue that bean dishes actually can be varied and exciting? Give some examples, your own favorite bean dishes maybe: spicy black bean taco fillings, for instance, and hummus (made from garbanzo beans). Now you’ve got an argument—good solid reasons for a clear conclusion.
+Even jokes can be arguments, though the reasons may seem silly.
+Chapter I
+Short Arguments: Some General Rules
+Rule 1
+4 Rule 1: Resolve premises and conclusion
+Living on earth may be tough, but it includes a free ride around the sun every year.1
+Getting a free ride around the sun is not the sort of reason you normally expect for bearing up when life gets tough. That’s what makes the joke funny. But it is still a reason: an attempt to justify the claim that life isn’t quite so bad as it may sometimes seem. It’s a funny argument.
+In Rule 1—Resolve premises and conclusion—the word "resolve" has two related meanings. One is to distinguish them. Your reasons are different from your conclusion: keep them clearly separate. Getting a free ride around the sun is a distinct idea from bearing up when life gets tough, and it logically comes first. It’s a premise. Being better able to bear up might be something that follows. It’s a conclusion.
+Once you have distinguished your premises and conclusion, be sure that both are claims that you want to commit to. This is the other meaning of "resolve." If so, proceed. If not, change them! In any case, being clear to yourself is necessary before you can be clear to anyone else.
+This book offers you a ready list of different forms that arguments can take. Use this list to develop your premises. To defend a generalization, for instance, check Chapter II. It will remind you that you need to give a series of examples as premises, and it will tell you what sorts of examples to look for. If your conclusion requires a deductive argument like those explained in Chapter VI, the rules outlined in that chapter will tell you what types of premises you need. You may have to try several different arguments before you find one that works well.
+Exercise Set 1.1: Distinguishing premises from conclusions
+Objective: To give you practice distinguishing premises from conclusions in other people’s arguments.
+Instructions: Rewrite each argument below, underlining the conclusion of each argument and putting brackets around each premise.
+Tips for success: Distinguishing premises from conclusions is sometimes more of an art than a science. We wish people were always clear about the premises and conclusions of their argument, but that’s just not the case.
+1. Anonymous, Cool Funny Quotes, http://coolfunnyquotes.com. Accessed 2/6/17.
+Rule 1: Resolve premises and conclusion 5
+Therefore, learning to distinguish premises from conclusions takes practice. As you practice, there are two strategies that you should keep in mind.
+The first strategy is simply to ask yourself what the author of this argument is trying to convince you to believe. The claim that the author is trying to get you to believe is the argument’s conclusion. Then you can ask what reasons the author gives to try to convince you. These will be the argument’s premises.
+The second strategy for distinguishing premises from conclusions is to look for indicator words. Some words or phrases are conclusion indicators. These are words or phrases that tell you that you’re about to read or hear the conclusion of an argument. Other words or phrases are premise indicators. These tell you that you’re about to read or hear a premise. Here’s a sample of the most common conclusion and premise indicators:
+Conclusion Indicators Premise Indicators
+therefore because
+thus since
+hence given that
+so for
+consequently on the grounds that
+this shows that this follows from
+You’ll start to notice more indicator words as you get better at analyzing arguments.
+Two more pieces of advice: First, don’t rely solely on indicator words. Some arguments will not use any indicator words. Others will use indicator words in other ways. Some words, like because, since, and so, have many other uses; not every use of because indicates that you’re about to hear a premise. When in doubt, fall back on our first strategy: ask yourself whether the author is giving you a reason for the conclusion. If your answer is no, you haven’t found a premise, even if the sentence includes because or since.
+Second, don’t assume that everything in a passage is either a premise or a conclusion. Not all passages contain arguments. Some passages are telling stories, describing things, giving explanations, issuing commands, making jokes, or doing other things besides giving reasons for a conclusion. Even in passages that do contain arguments, some sentences or clauses will provide background information, make side comments, and so on. Again, the key is to ask yourself, "Is this sentence stating a conclusion or giving me a reason to believe that conclusion?" If it is doing either, it’s part of an argument; if not, it’s not.
+6 Rule 1: Resolve premises and conclusion
+1. Racial segregation reduces some persons to the status of things. Hence, segregation is morally wrong.
+Adapted from: Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail,"
+Liberation: An Independent Monthly, Jun 1963
+2. Since many people don’t realize that they drink more alcohol than is healthy for them, doctors ought to talk to their patients about alcohol consumption.
+Adapted from: Elisabeth Poorman, "How We Doctors Are Failing Our Patients
+Who Drink Too Much," WBUR, Mar 31, 2017, https://www.wbur.org/
+commonhealth/2017/03/31/not-alcholic-drink-heavily
+3. Professors shouldn’t give their students grades on their assignments because grades create bad incentives and they don’t provide useful feedback.
+Adapted from: Jesse Stommel, "Why I Don’t Grade," Oct 26, 2017,
+https://www.jessestommel.com/why-i-dont-grade/
+Sample
+[In order to prosper, a democracy needs its citizens to be able to carry out their responsibilities competently.] [Being a competent citizen requires familiarity with the basics of math, natural science, social science, history, and literature, as well as the ability to read and write well and the ability to think critically.] [A liberal education is essential to developing these skills.] Therefore, in order for a democracy to prosper, its citizens must get a liberal education.
+Adapted from: Steven M. Cahn, letter to the editor, New York Times,
+May 21, 2004
+The markings in this sample problem indicate that the last sentence is the conclusion and that each of the first three sentences is a separate premise. Although each sentence in this letter to the editor expresses either a premise or a conclusion, remember that many passages contain sentences (or parts of sentences) that are neither premises nor conclusions. You don’t need to bracket or underline those (parts of) sentences.
+Rule 1: Resolve premises and conclusion 7
+4. There are two ways of settling a dispute: by discussion and by physical force. Since the first way is appropriate for human beings and the second way appropriate for animals, we must resort to force only when we cannot settle matters by discussion.
+Adapted from: Cicero, De Officiis 11
+5. In October 2017, astronomers spotted a mysterious object that they named ‘Oumuamua. Not only does ‘Oumuamua originate from outside our solar system, but astronomers have determined that ‘Oumuamua has a strange, elongated shape, that it is unusually reflective, that it does not have a "tail" like a comet, and that it sped up after it passed the Sun. These features make it unlikely that ‘Oumuamua is an asteroid or a comet. Thus, it is worth considering the possibility that ‘Oumuamua was created by aliens.
+Adapted from: Abraham Loeb, "6 Strange Facts about the Interstellar Visitor
+‘Oumuamua," Nov 20, 2018, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/6-strange-facts-about-the-interstellar-visitor-oumuamua/
+6. The head of the spy ring is very dangerous. He is also exceptionally clever and a master of disguise. He has a dozen names and a hundred different appearances. But there is one thing he cannot disguise: he is missing the tip of his little finger. So, if you ever meet a man who is missing the top joint of his little finger, you should be very careful!
+Adapted from: The 39 Steps, directed by Alfred Hitchcock
+(London: Gaumont British, 1935)
+7. Some people buy college degrees on the Internet because they’re trying to pretend that they went to college. That’s a waste of money, since it’s easy to make a college degree on your computer, and a degree that you make yourself is just as good as a degree that you bought on the Internet.
+Adapted from: "Fake Degrees in Government," The Onion, Oct 18, 2006,
+http://www.theonion.com/articles/fake-degrees-in-government,15092/
+8. People are created equal and endowed with unalienable rights. Governments exist to protect those rights. When a government violates those rights, people have a right to rebel against that government and create a new one. The king of Great Britain has
+8 Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order
+repeatedly violated the rights of the American colonists. Thus, the American colonists have a right to rebel against the king of Great Britain.
+Adapted from: U.S. Declaration of Independence
+9. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau looks suspiciously like former Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Trudeau’s parents traveled to Cuba many times and met with Castro, and there are pictures of Trudeau’s mother looking fondly at Castro. Is it too far-fetched to believe that Fidel Castro is Justin Trudeau’s real father?
+Adapted from: Drew Brown, "We Investigated Those Damning Rumours About Fidel Castro Being Justin Trudeau’s Real Dad," VICE, Nov 29, 2016,
+https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/jmk95b/we-investigated-those-
+damning-rumours-about-fidel-castro-being-justin-trudeaus-real-dad
+10. The only remaining question was why the man had been murdered. Was it a politically motivated crime or a private one? I thought right away that it must be a privately motivated crime. Political assassins move quickly and flee. But in this case, the murderer’s footprints are all over the room, showing that he had spent quite a while in this room.
+Adapted from: Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study in Scarlet (London:
+Ward Lock & Co., 1888; repr., London: Penguin, 2001), 138
+Rule 2
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 327.
+Need more practice? Take a look at the editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editor on the Web site for your favorite newspaper. Most of these will contain arguments. Working by yourself or with a classmate, identify the premises and conclusions in those arguments.
+Unfold your ideas in a natural order
+Arguments move. Reasons and evidence lead to conclusions. But, like any other form of movement, arguments may be graceful or clumsy, sharp or confused, clean or muddled. You want clarity and efficiency—even grace, if you can manage it.
+Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order 9
+Take the argument about beans once more. If you were now going to write your argument out, how might you do it? One good way would be this:
+We should eat more beans. One reason is that beans are healthy. They are higher in fibers and protein and lower in fat and cholesterol than what most people eat now. Meanwhile, bean dishes can be quite varied and exciting too. Think of spicy black bean taco fillings or hummus.
+Each sentence in this passage prepares the way for the next one, and then the next one steps smoothly up to bat. The argument begins by stating its conclusion. This invites stating premises in turn, and the argument obliges by immediately stating a main premise, and then giving a brief reason for it in turn, explaining why beans are healthy. Then it offers the other main premise and its examples. The argument could be laid out in different ways—for example, the second main premise could be first, and/or the conclusion could be drawn at the end rather than the beginning—but either way, each part is in a good place.
+Getting an argument to unfold in this smooth way is an accomplishment, especially as arguments get more detailed and complex. It’s not easy to work out the right place for each part—and plenty of wrong places are usually available. For example, suppose we wrote the argument like this instead:
+Think of spicy black bean taco fillings or hummus. Beans are higher in fibers and protein and lower in fat and cholesterol than what most people eat now. Bean dishes can be quite varied and exciting. We should eat more beans. Beans are healthy.
+These are the same premises and conclusion, but they are in a different order, and the passage leaves out the signposts and transition words that help readers identify premises and conclusions (such as "one reason is that . . ."). The result is that the argument is totally garbled. The examples for the main premises, like how tasty bean dishes can be, are scattered through the passage rather than cited right next to the statement of those premises. You have to read the passage twice just to be sure what the conclusion is. Don’t count on your readers to be so patient.
+Expect to rearrange your argument several times to find the most natural order. Again, the rules offered in this book should help. You can use them to figure out not only what kinds of premises you need but also how to arrange them in the best order.
+10 Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order
+Objective: To give you practice rewriting arguments in a clear, logical structure.
+Instructions: Each of the following passages contains an argument. Put the premises in a natural, meaningful order, and write them out in a numbered list. Then, write the conclusion at the end of the list.
+Tips for success: It’s often helpful to outline arguments in premise-and-conclusion form. This involves several steps.
+First, identify the premises and the conclusions, just as you did in
+Exercise Set 1.1.
+Then, put the premises in a meaningful order—that is, an order that helps you understand how the premises connect with one another and with the conclusion. In many cases, there won’t be a single best ordering. Try a few different orderings and pick the one that makes the most sense to you.
+When you have settled on a meaningful order for the premises, write the premises down in a numbered list. It’s helpful to make each premise a complete sentence, replacing pronouns like him or it with the names of the people or things they stand for.
+Finally, write the conclusion at the end of the list. Some logicians draw a line between the premises and the conclusion, much like the line that mathematicians draw between an arithmetic problem and its answer. This line shows that the premises "add up" to the conclusion. Other logicians write therefore or include the symbol ∴ (which just means therefore)
+before the conclusion.
+Exercise Set 1.2: Outlining arguments in premise-and-conclusion form
+Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order 11
+1. A lot of people say that LeBron James is the greatest basketball player of all time. And he is really good. But LeBron went and said it about himself! He shouldn’t have said that. When you say that about yourself, it’s disrespectful to all of the great players that have come before you, like Bill Russell and Michael Jordan and Larry Bird. Those guys were amazing, too, and they did some of the same things that LeBron is boasting about.
+Adapted from: Nick Goss, "Celtics Legend Calls LeBron James’ GOAT Comments ‘Disrespectful’ to Past Players," NBC Sports, Jan 3, 2019, https://www.nbcsports.com/boston/celtics/celtics-legend-calls-lebron-james-goat-comments-disrespectful-past-players
+Sample
+Some companies are creating genetically modified animals, such as salmon, that provide more meat for consumers. If genetically modified salmon escaped into the wild, they would compete with "natural" salmon for food. Natural salmon, though, have been honed by natural selection to flourish in the wild. Genetically modified salmon are not designed to flourish in the wild. Thus, non-genetically modified salmon would outcompete genetically modified salmon if genetically modified salmon escaped into the wild.
+Adapted from: "Dawn of the Frankenfish," The Economist, Jun 10, 2010
+(1) If genetically modified animals escaped into the wild, they would compete with "natural" salmon for food.
+(2) Natural salmon have been honed by natural selection to flourish in the wild.
+(3) Genetically modified salmon are not designed to flourish in the wild.
+Therefore, (4) Non-genetically modified salmon would outcompete genetically modified salmon if genetically modified salmon escaped into the wild.
+This argument already presents its ideas in a natural order. The only thing needed to put it into premise-and-conclusion form is to identify the premises, put them in a numbered list, and add "therefore" before the conclusion.
+The first sentence in the passage is not a premise in the argument. Its purpose is to provide context for the argument, not to give a reason to accept the conclusion. We do not need to include it in our outline of the argument.
+12 Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order
+2. Someone who can’t get enough to eat clearly lives in poverty. But someone who can’t afford the things that his or her society regards as necessities also lives in poverty. Wealthier societies will regard more things as necessities than poorer societies. Thus, the "poverty line," which is the amount of money someone must have to count as "non-poor," will be higher in a wealthier society than in a poorer society.
+Adapted from: David Phillips, Quality of Life: Concept, Policy, and Practice
+(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006), 110
+3. A team of researchers led by Brendan Nyhan at Dartmouth wanted to study the effects of giving parents information on the safety of vaccines. They gave some parents information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stating that there is no evidence that vaccines cause autism. Other parents received no information about vaccine safety. When compared to parents who received no information, parents who received information were no more likely to vaccinate their children. Nyhan and his colleagues concluded that simply providing information about vaccine safety does not increase the proportion of parents who get their children vaccinated.
+Adapted from: Maria Konnikova, "I Don’t Want to Be Right," New Yorker, May 16, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/i-dont-want-to-be-right
+4. A company in Sweden makes tiny microchips to implant in people’s hands. With a wave of a hand, these microchips can communicate with nearby devices to do things like unlocking a door or paying for a purchase. The idea of implanting a microchip like that in your body makes a lot of people nervous. But people have been implanting other devices, like pacemakers to regulate their heartbeat, for a long time. Having a machine control your heartbeat is a way bigger deal than having a microchip in your hand. So, people really shouldn’t be worried about these microchips.
+Adapted from: Associated Press, "Companies Started Implanting Microchips into Workers’ Bodies," Los Angeles Times, Apr 3, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-microchip-employees-20170403-story.html
+Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order 13
+5. In 1908, something flattened eight hundred square miles of forest in a part of Siberia called Tunguska. Theories abound about "the Tunguska event." Some people say it was a UFO. Some even say it was a tiny black hole. Recently, however, scientists discovered that a lake in the area has the shape of an impact crater that would have been created by an asteroid or comet. So, the Tunguska event was caused by an asteroid or comet.
+Adapted from: Paul Rincon, "Fire in the Sky: Tunguska at 100," BBC News,
+Jun 30, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7470283.stm
+6. PowerPoint slides are ruining higher education. There are three main reasons for this. First, slides discourage complex thinking. They tempt people into reducing everything into bite-sized pieces of information without any real connections between them. Second, many students have come to think of a course as nothing more than a set of slides. This makes it difficult for professors to present the complexity and ambiguity of the material they’re teaching. Third, slides encourage unreasonable expectations. Students expect the slides to contain everything they need to know for the course. That causes them to skip things like reading the textbook or taking notes on what their professors say, as opposed to what they put on the slide.
+Adapted from: Paul Ralph, "Universities Should Ban PowerPoint—–It Makes Students Stupid and Professors Boring," Business Insider, Aug 25, 2017,
+https://www.businessinsider.com/universities-should-ban-
+powerpoint-it-makes-students-stupid-and-professors-boring-2015-6
+7. All cars should have a spear mounted on the steering wheel, aimed directly at the driver’s chest. After all, we should do everything we can to encourage cautious driving. Since people behave much more cautiously when they know that their life is on the line, steering wheel–mounted spears would make people drive much more cautiously.
+Adapted from: Steven E. Landsburg, The Armchair Economist (New York:
+Simon & Schuster, 1994), 5
+8. Human nature is not inherently good. Human nature consists of those human traits that are spontaneous; these things cannot be
+14 Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order
+learned. Thus, if something can be learned, then it is not part of human nature. Yet, goodness is not spontaneous; people must learn how to be good.
+Adapted from: Xunzi, Xunzi, in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy,
+2nd ed., edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. van Norden (Indianapolis:
+Hackett Publishing Company, 2005), 298–99
+9. It is possible for someone to wonder whether her life is meaningful even if she knows that she has enjoyed her life. This shows that a meaningful life is not the same as an enjoyable life. At the same time, someone who is alienated from her life or feels like her life is pointless, even if she is doing things that might seem worthwhile from an objective perspective, is not leading a meaningful life. This shows that a meaningful life is not the same as a life spent on objectively worthwhile projects. All of this shows that neither enjoyment nor objectively worthwhile projects, considered separately from the other, are sufficient for a meaningful life.
+Adapted from: Susan Wolf, "Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life,"
+Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997), 211
+10. Suppose that Tim learns that his grandfather had done something terrible in the 1920s, several years before the birth of Tim’s mother. Suppose also that Tim has invented a time machine. While it may seem that Tim could go back in time and kill his grandfather to prevent him from doing this terrible thing, in fact, it is impossible for Tim to kill his grandfather. The past has already happened. It cannot be changed. Since Tim’s grandparents had Tim’s mother, who went on to have Tim, it must be the case that Tim did not kill his grandfather.
+Adapted from: David Lewis, "The Paradoxes of Time Travel," American
+Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), 149–50
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 330.
+Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order 15
+Objective: To help you recognize short arguments in visual materials.
+Instructions: Go to the companion Web site for this book. Click on the link for "Chapter I" and then on the link for "Exercise Set 1.3." You will get a list of links to images and videos. Write a premise-and-conclusion outline of the argument that you think the image or video is trying to communicate.
+Tips for success: We are constantly bombarded by visual material—from billboards to artwork to online videos—that aims to persuade us of something. Sometimes the material tries to persuade us to do something or to want something. Sometimes it tries to persuade us to believe something. You can think of many of these materials as visual arguments. They don’t necessarily present their premises and conclusions in words, but many of them still can be read as offering reasons in support of conclusions—that is, as arguments.
+When you’re thinking about a visual argument, it’s entirely up to you to present the argument’s ideas in a natural order. The first thing you’ll need to do is determine the conclusion of the visual argument. What is the argument trying to get you to do or believe? Then you’ll need to ask
+For a more sophisticated way to show the relationships among premises in an argument, see Appendix III: Argument Mapping (p. 307). Argument maps are especially helpful in
+understanding complex arguments.
+Exercise Set 1.3: Analyzing visual arguments
+Need more practice? Following the steps described in the "Tips for success" section, outline the arguments from Exercise Set 1.1 in premise-and-conclusion form. Work with a friend or classmate if you want to be able to compare your work with someone else’s. For even more practice, do the same thing with the arguments in the editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editor that you found on your favorite newspaper’s Web site.
+16 Rule 2: Unfold your ideas in a natural order
+Critical thinking activity: Found arguments
+For an out-of-class activity that gives you practice in applying Rules 1 and 2, see the "Found arguments" assignment sheet (p. 503) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Creating a visual argument
+For an out-of-class activity that gives you practice in dealing with visual arguments, see the "Creating a visual argument" assignment sheet (p. 504) in Part 3.
+yourself whether the picture or video offers you reasons to believe that conclusion. If so, these will be the premises of the argument.
+To identify these premises, think about what the connection is between the images that you are seeing and the conclusion that those images are meant to support. To take an extremely simple case, suppose an advertisement shows an athlete enjoying a Sprite. The conclusion of this visual argument is that you ought to drink Sprite too. What is the connection between the image of the athlete drinking Sprite and the claim that you ought to drink it? If the athlete takes a sip after a hard game or workout, perhaps the message is that Sprite is especially refreshing. In that case, the argument might be something like this: "Sprite is especially refreshing. You like refreshing drinks. Therefore, you ought to drink Sprite." Or maybe the athlete is sitting around with her friends, and they are all having a good time and drinking Sprite. In that case, the message might be that hip young adults—especially people who like this particular athlete’s sport—drink Sprite and that if you want to be like these people, you should drink Sprite too.
+Different people are likely to come up with different interpretations of each visual argument. In fact, you can probably come up with different interpretations of each one yourself. Don’t worry about finding the one and only correct interpretation. Just focus on finding a plausible interpretation—one that the creator of the visual argument might recognize as the message he or she was trying to send.
+The exercises for this exercise set, including a sample exercise, can be found on the companion Web site for this book.
+Need more practice? Look through a recent magazine or a Web site that includes advertisements. Analyze the visual arguments offered in each of the advertisements that you encounter.
+Rule 3: Start from reliable premises 17
+Start from reliable premises
+No matter how well you argue from premises to conclusion, your conclusion will be weak if your premises are weak.
+Nobody in the world today is really happy. Therefore, it seems that human beings are just not made for happiness. Why should we expect what we can never find?
+The premise of this argument is the statement that nobody in the world today is really happy. Sometimes, on certain rainy afternoons or in certain moods, this may almost seem true. But ask yourself if this premise really is plausible. Is nobody in the world today really happy? Ever? What about that free ride around the sun every year?
+At the very least, this premise needs some serious defense, and very likely it is just not true. This argument cannot show, then, that human beings are not made for happiness or that you should not expect to be happy.
+Sometimes it is easy to start from reliable premises. You may have well-known examples at hand or reliable sources that are clearly in agreement. Other times it is harder. If you are not sure about the reliability of a premise, you may need to do some research and/or give an argument for the premise itself (see Rule 31 for more on this point). If you find you cannot argue adequately for your premise(s), then, of course, you need to try some other premise!
+Rule 3
+Exercise Set 1.4: Identifying reliable and unreliable premises
+Objective: To give you practice recognizing reliable starting points for arguments.
+Instructions: Rewrite the following arguments in premise-and-conclusion form, just as you did in Exercise Set 1.2. Then, state whether each premise is reliable and explain why or why not.
+Tips for success: Arguments are both a way to convince others of something and a way to learn new things. A good argument leads you (and/or others) from premises that you already accept to conclusions that you
+(and/or they) did not previously accept. To do that, however, arguments need to start from premises that you or they already accept. Furthermore, when two or more people hold different views on a topic, they can’t have a productive discussion unless they start from some kind of common ground.
+18 Rule 3: Start from reliable premises
+Therefore, an important part of learning to give good arguments is learning to recognize which premises are reliable and widely acceptable starting points. Deciding whether a starting point is reliable and acceptable in this way can be tricky, and can vary with the situation, but there are some rules of thumb that can guide your thinking.
+First, widely accepted facts are usually reliable starting points. For instance, it’s widely accepted that there is a wide variety of species on Earth and that these species resemble each other in various ways. Those facts can provide reliable starting points for an argument about evolution.
+It’s worth finding out how widely accepted your "facts" really are, though. Something that seems like common knowledge to you might be widely doubted in other social circles, other parts of the country, or other parts of the world. For instance, it is widely accepted in many parts of the world that the variety of species we see today evolved by natural selection, but there are also social circles and parts of the world where that is frequently denied. If you are addressing your argument to someone who denies what you regard as a widely accepted fact, you may need to find another starting point for your argument.
+Second, premises that are supported by appropriate testimony or sources are usually reliable. For instance, if a trustworthy person tells you that she has been to Brazil and seen pink dolphins living in the Amazon River, you could count "There are pink dolphins living in the Amazon River" as a reliable premise.
+There are also guidelines to help you spot unreliable premises. Premises that are widely known to be false or easily shown to be false are unreliable. (Again, though, remember that what’s "widely known to be false" in one context may be generally accepted elsewhere. Remember your audience!) Other premises are unreliable not because we know that they’re false but because we don’t know, or can’t know, whether they’re true; such claims can’t provide a solid foundation for an argument. Wild generalizations and overly vague claims fall into this category. So do controversial claims offered without support, and claims that we could not possibly verify. Remember, though, that there’s a difference between claiming that a premise is unreliable and claiming that it is false. Saying that a premise is unreliable could just mean that you don’t know whether it’s true.
+Later rules in this book, especially the rules in Chapter IV about using sources, will give you further and more developed guidelines for finding reliable starting points. Rule 31 will also invite you to offer additional reasons for seemingly unreliable premises, turning those premises into well-supported conclusions of their own arguments. But all of that is still to come. For now, just look at the premises before you, and use your common sense.
+Rule 3: Start from reliable premises 19
+Sample
+Artificial intelligence will soon be able to run cities or even whole continents. Artificial intelligence has been advancing quickly in recent years. One new artificial intelligence program, AlphaZero, can become an expert in complex games like chess and Go in a matter of hours, after being taught nothing more than the basic rules. If AlphaZero can master complex games, then surely it won’t be long before it can run cities or continents.
+Adapted from: Peter Dockrill, "In Just 4 Hours, Google’s AI Has Mastered All the Chess
+Knowledge in History," Futurism, Dec 7, 2017, https://futurism.com/4-hours-googles-ai-mastered-chess-knowledge-history/
+(1) Artificial intelligence has been advancing quickly in recent years.
+(2) AlphaZero can become an expert in complex games like chess and Go in a matter of hours, after being taught nothing more than the basic rules.
+(3) If AlphaZero can master complex games, then surely it won’t be long before it can run cities or continents.
+Therefore, (4) AlphaZero’s algorithm will soon be able to run cities or even whole continents.
+Premise (1)is reliable, as it’s fairly common knowledge. Premise (2) isn’t reliable, but it could presumably be made reliable by citing a few good sources, like reputable news sites. Premise (3), however, is unreliable. It’s implausible speculation to leap from being good at board games—even complicated ones like chess and Go—to something so much more open-ended, like running a city or a continent. Figuring out how to win at chess is very different than figuring out how to run a human society, which depends on the nuances of culture and social interactions and requires the capacity to confront open-ended problems that don’t have clear solutions.
+This response proceeds systematically through each premise, stating whether it is reliable and giving reasons for that judgment. The response suggests that premise (1) is common knowledge, though that might turn out to depend on the audience. This response takes a nuanced approach to premise (2), explaining that although the premise isn’t reliable, it could easily be made reliable by citing reputable sources—a topic we cover in Chapter IV. The real problem, as this response highlights, is with the reliability of premise (3). For the reasons given in the response, it’s controversial, to say the least, to think that an artificial intelligence that can learn how to excel at Go or chess would necessarily be able to run a complex and far less predictable human society, where the rules, problems, and solutions are not as well-defined as they are in board games.
+Notice that the response does not attempt to say whether the conclusion is reliable. Rule 3 is about the reliability of premises. You do not need to comment on the arguments’ conclusions in this exercise set.
+20 Rule 3: Start from reliable premises
+1. Anybody could become a zombie—a relative, a friend, or even a neighbor. Zombies are constantly looking to eat the brains of the living. This is why you should always be prepared to escape from or fight back against a zombie attack.
+Adapted from: "Zombies in Plain English," YouTube, Oct 23, 2007,
+http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVnfyradCPY
+2. Social networking sites have revolutionized the way we interact with our friends. Such sites allow people to stay in contact with hundreds or even thousands of people. Human nature, however, prevents us from having meaningful relationships with that many people. Therefore, most of your "friends" on those sites are not people with whom you have meaningful relationships.
+Adapted from: Robin Dunbar, "You’ve Got to Have (150) Friends,"
+New York Times, Dec 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/opinion/26dunbar.html
+3. Some people scoff at a liberal education as a waste of time. But a true education is not just about accumulating knowledge. It’s also about educating one’s emotions. A liberal arts education exposes students not only to history, science, and math, but also to the literature and arts that speak more directly to our emotions. Thus, a liberal arts education is an essential part of any "real" education.
+Adapted from: Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010)
+4. There are other advanced civilizations in our galaxy. To see why this must be so, consider the following facts: Humans have already spotted thousands of planets in our corner of the galaxy alone, and many of those look like they could be hospitable to life. The galaxy itself contains billions of stars. At least some of the many hospitable planets around all those billions of stars will probably develop intelligent life capable of producing advanced technology.
+Adapted from: Gideon Lichfield, "There Have Probably Been Trillions of Alien
+Civilizations, and Yet We May Still Never See One," Quartz, Jun 11, 2016,
+https://qz.com/704687/
+Rule 3: Start from reliable premises 21
+5. Radioactive materials are materials that decay into other materials. For instance, certain isotopes of carbon are radioactive; they decay into different isotopes of carbon. By looking at the ratios of radioactive materials to the products of radioactive decay in a piece of rock, we can estimate the age of the rock fairly well. This process is called "radiometric dating." Radiometric dating reveals that some large rock formations in the Earth’s crust are up to four billion years old. Thus, the Earth itself is at least four billion years old.
+Adapted from: G. Brent Dalrymple, The Age of the Earth (Palo Alto:
+Stanford University Press, 1994), 399
+6. Scholars have begun looking at the colonial period as a way of understanding economic development. During the colonial period, several European powers established colonies in the Americas. Some of these colonies have become economically successful, while others have not. The most striking difference between those that succeeded and those that did not is that the successful colonies had much lower levels of economic and social inequality than the unsuccessful colonies. Therefore, we suggest that inequality hinders economic development.
+Adapted from: Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Colonialism,
+Inequality, and Long-Run Paths of Development," in Abhijit V. Banerjee,
+Roland Bénabou, and Dilip Mookherjee, Understanding Poverty (New York:
+Oxford University Press, 2006), 37–57
+7. When someone uses a potentially lethal object to inflict intentional harm on someone else, the aggressor is assaulting the second with a deadly weapon. It is possible to send an image to someone’s phone that looks like a flashing strobe light. Flashing strobe lights can cause people with epilepsy to have a seizure. Epileptic seizures can be lethal. Therefore, sending an image of a flashing strobe light to an epileptic person’s phone for the purpose of inducing a seizure should count as assault with a deadly weapon.
+Adapted from: Rich McCormick, "U.S. Grand Jury Decides That a GIF Counts as a Deadly Weapon in Twitter Seizure Case," The Verge, Mar 22, 2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/22/15017080/gif-deadly-weapon-us-jury-kurt-eichenwald
+22 Rule 3: Start from reliable premises
+8. Despite what the skeptics would have you believe, many people are capable of seeing ghosts. Ghosts are real, and anyone with the psychic ability known as extrasensory perception (ESP) is capable of seeing them. ESP is a real phenomenon, according to Professor Joseph Rhine of Duke University. In fact, about half of all people have ESP, although many never realize it.
+Adapted from: Hans Holzer, Ghosts: True Encounters with the World Beyond
+(New York: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers, 1997), 29
+9. You should be a vegetarian. Every time you eat meat, your meal is the result of the suffering and death of an animal. Besides, it’s disgusting to put a piece of a dead animal’s carcass into your mouth and chew it. There is plenty of great vegetarian food, including tasty meat alternatives. Also, vegetarianism is healthier than eating meat. One more reason to be a vegetarian is that you’d be joining the company of a long list of incredible people, from Leonardo da Vinci, Isaac Newton, and Thomas Edison to Paul McCartney, Shania Twain, and Tobey Maguire.
+Adapted from: Johnny Durham, "Reasons to Be Vegetarian," YouTube,
+Jan 7, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t36dufpDn9g
+10. Governments should provide free childcare to every child from early infancy to age five. Providing free preschool to three- and four-year-old children helps children lead better and more productive lives and helps make them less likely to end up in jail. Now, new research by Nobel–prize winning economist James Heckman shows that providing low-income families with free childcare basically from birth produces an even bigger effect.
+Adapted from: Emma Brown, "A Nobel Prize Winner Says Public Preschool Programs Should Start at Birth," Washington Post, Dec 12, 2016, http://wapo.st/2hBAa2z
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 333.
+Need more practice? Go back to the arguments presented in Exercise Sets 1.1 and 1.2 and decide which of their premises are reliable. For even more practice, go to the Web site for this book and click on the "Chapter I" link. You’ll find a link to a list of Web sites that feature online debates. Find debates that interest you and read the arguments presented in those debates. Determine which premises are reliable and why.
+Rule 4: Be concrete and concise 23
+Rule 4
+Be concrete and concise
+Avoid abstract, vague, and general terms. "We hiked for hours in the sun" is a hundred times better than "It was an extended period of laborious exertion." Be concise too. Airy elaboration just loses everyone in a fog of words.
+NO:
+Regularly turning in for the night at an hour that precedes the time at which most of your compatriots go to bed, combined with the practice of awakening at an hour that is earlier than the hour at which most others arise, will tend to the acquisition of such desirable personal traits as a resilient physical constitution, a comfortably well-established financial situation, and the sort of intellectual abilities and capacity for sagacious discernment and judgment that tend to be conducive to earning the respect of others.
+YES:
+Early to bed and early to rise makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise.
+The "No" version might overdo it just a bit (you think?), but you see the point. Ben Franklin’s rhyme and rhythm help too, but the most important thing is that his words are sharp, simple, and few.
+Exercise Set 1.5: Decomplexifying artificially abstruse quotations
+Objective: To help you recognize and avoid overly elaborate writing.
+Instructions: Each passage in this exercise consists of a famous quote that has been rewritten using overly abstract, vague, or obscure terms. Rewrite the quote in simpler language.
+Tips for success: Start by reading the passage in its entirety to get a sense for the meaning of the whole passage. Then, go back over the passage phrase by phrase, trying to figure out what each phrase means. Rewrite each phrase in the simplest language you can find, deleting words or phrases that don’t add to the meaning of the sentence. Don’t worry about coming
+24 Rule 4: Be concrete and concise
+up with the exact wording of the original quotation. Just try to express the ideas in the passage as simply and directly as possible.
+Sample
+Of this relatively limited extension of one of the ambulatory limbs of this particular male of the species Homo sapiens, it might also be possible to declare that a relatively much larger extension of the reach of the human species as a whole, so to speak, is also concurrently taking place at this point in time.
+Adapted from: "Apollo 11 TV Broadcast—Neil Armstrong First Step on Moon,"
+YouTube, Jul 20, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CtwSgvstl8c
+This small step for a man is also a giant leap for humankind.
+Neil Armstrong’s original statement, which he made when he first set foot on the moon, is, "That’s one small step for [a] man, one giant leap for mankind." In the "complexified" form of this quotation, the first clause ("Of this relatively limited extension of one of the ambulatory limbs of this particular male of the species Homo sapiens") corresponds to the phrase "That’s one small step for [a] man," and the rest of the quotation corresponds to "one giant leap for mankind."
+The sample response isn’t exactly what Armstrong said, and that’s okay. It says what Armstrong said in a clear, straightforward way. That’s what matters for this exercise set.
+1. I seem to have the distinct impression that my canine companion and I are no longer physically located within the geographical confines of the midwestern American state generally known as Kansas.
+Adapted from: The Wizard of Oz, directed by Victor Fleming (Los Angeles:
+Metro-Goldwin-Mayer, 1939)
+2. Do not inquire as to what it is that your country might accomplish on your behalf, but instead inquire what actions you might take to further the interests of the country that you regard as your own.
+Adapted from: John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Jan 20, 1961
+Rule 4: Be concrete and concise 25
+3. Being able to express oneself in as concise a way as possible—that is, using the fewest, plainest words with which it is feasible to communicate the essential meaning of one’s thought—is at the very core of a knack for repartee.
+Adapted from: William Shakespeare, Hamlet 2.2
+4. Putting aside all prevarication, my most beloved one, it would be utterly impossible for me, even with great effort, to care any less than I do at this precise moment.
+Adapted from: Gone with the Wind, directed by Victor Fleming (Los Angeles:
+Metro-Goldwin-Mayer, 1939)
+5. We must strive to exhibit in our own persons the sorts of alterations that we most fervently desire to observe in the world that we inhabit.
+Adapted from: Mohandas Gandhi, quoted in John McCain & Mark Salter,
+Character Is Destiny (New York: Random House, 2005), 14
+6. Let it be the case, at the present time and forever into the future, that the probability of a positive outcome for you is relatively high.
+Adapted from: Suzanne Collins, The Hunger Games
+(New York: Scholastic Press, 2008)
+7. A trip from one location to another whose geographic extension comprises not just a hundred miles but ten times that much has as its initial component exactly one movement of exactly one foot from one location to another.
+Adapted from: Lao-tzu, Tao Te Ching, translated by Stephen Addiss
+and Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 64
+8. At a point in time subsequent to the present point in time, I will once again be in the location where I am presently located.
+Adapted from: The Terminator, directed by James Cameron
+(Los Angeles: Orion Pictures, 1984)
+9. A female member of the human species who finds herself without the company of a male of the species is akin to an aquatic, scale-covered vertebrate with gills and fins that has not the possession
+26 Rule 5: Build on substance, not overtone
+of a pedal-driven, two-wheeled vehicle that is powered by a rider sitting astride a frame to which the wheels are attached.
+Adapted from: Gloria Steinem, quoted in Deborah G. Felder, The 100 Most
+Influential Women of All Time (New York: Citadel Press, 2002), 258
+10. I harbor an aspiration that, at some point in the future, my four offspring, who are currently fairly young, will be assessed not according to the pigmentation of their skin but by considering the character traits that they possess.
+Adapted from: Martin Luther King, Jr., speech in Washington, DC, Aug 28, 1963
+Rule 5
+Build on substance, not overtone
+Offer actual reasons; don’t just play on the overtones of words.
+NO:
+Having so disgracefully allowed her once-proud passenger railroads to fade into obscurity, America is honor-bound to restore them now!
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 338.
+Need more practice? Make a list of famous quotations, well-known song lyrics, titles of famous books, etc., or find a list of famous quotes online. Have a friend or classmate do the same. Rewrite each item on the list in the overly abstract, complex style used in this exercise. Trade "complexified" lists with your friend or classmate and try to decipher the items on his or her list. For even more practice, repeat this activity with the arguments from other exercises in this book: rewrite each premise and conclusion in an overly complex style and challenge your classmate to figure out what the argument says.
+A helpful way to be concrete and concise is to define your terms carefully. For tips on giving good definitions, see Appendix II: Definitions (p. 295).
+Rule 5: Build on substance, not overtone 27
+This is supposed to be an argument for restoring (more) passenger rail service. But it offers no evidence for this conclusion whatsoever, just some emotionally loaded words—shopworn words, too, like a politician on automatic. Did passenger rail "fade" because of something "America" did or didn’t do? What was "disgraceful" about this? Many "once-proud" institutions outlive their times, after all—we’re not obliged to restore them all. What does it mean to say America is "honor-bound" to do this? Have promises been made and broken? By whom?
+Much can be said for restoring passenger rail, especially in this era when the ecological and economic costs of highways are becoming enormous. The problem is that this argument does not say it. It lets the emotional charge of the words do all the work, and therefore really does no work at all. We’re left exactly where we started. Overtones may sometimes persuade even when they shouldn’t, of course—but remember, here we are looking for actual, concrete evidence.
+Likewise, do not try to make your argument look good by using emotionally loaded words to label the other side. Generally, people advocate a position for serious and sincere reasons. Try to figure out their view—try to understand their reasons—even if you disagree entirely. For example, people who question a new technology are probably not in favor of "going back to the caves." (What are they in favor of? Maybe you need to ask.) Likewise, a person who believes in evolution is not claiming that her grandparents were monkeys. (And again: What does she think?) In general, if you can’t imagine how anyone could hold the view you are attacking, you probably just don’t understand it yet.
+Exercise Set 1.6: Diagnosing loaded language
+Objective: To train you to recognize and avoid loaded language.
+Instructions: Look for "loaded language"—that is, emotionally charged words or phrases—in each of the following arguments. If the argument contains loaded language, indicate which words or phrases are loaded and suggest a less loaded way of saying the same thing. If the passage does not contain any loaded language, say so.
+Tips for success: A good argument should be able to stand on the strength of its premises and the connection between the premises and the conclusion—not on the beauty of its rhetoric or the emotional charge of the way
+28 Rule 5: Build on substance, not overtone
+it’s presented. Learning to recognize loaded language helps you avoid being taken in by arguments that sound good but lack substance; it also helps you avoid giving arguments yourself that sound good but don’t actually provide good reasons for their conclusions.
+Loaded language comes in both negative and positive varieties. That is, some loaded language carries negative emotional overtones. It casts an idea, a person, or whatever in a negative light. For instance, calling bankers "corporate pirates" makes them sound bad. Other loaded language carries positive emotional overtones. For instance, calling a camp for holding prisoners of war a "pacification center" makes it sound good—almost like the kind of place you’d want to go for a relaxing vacation. Look out for both kinds of loaded language.
+Some loaded language is subtle. Its emotional power may depend on the context in which it is used. For instance, the term Ivy League school is not necessarily emotionally charged; it refers to one of a specific group of American universities. However, imagine two politicians in a debate. If one says, "Now, I may not have gone to an Ivy League school like my opponent, but . . .", the term Ivy League school suddenly has an air of elitism. It can make the politician’s opponent seem out of touch with ordinary people. Look out for subtle loaded language, too, and pay attention to context.
+When it comes to suggesting less loaded ways of saying the same thing, look for terms that carry less—and ideally, no—emotional charge. For instance, if you’re talking about doctors who perform abortions, don’t call them "baby killers." A phrase like that mostly just plays on our feelings. Many people think that performing abortion and killing babies are importantly different, and so they would not accept it as a neutral description. On the other hand, you shouldn’t call them "doctors who help women with medical problems" either. To people who think abortion is murder, this glosses over a tremendous moral difference between doctors who perform abortions and those who don’t. Instead, just call them "doctors who perform abortions."
+Rule 5: Build on substance, not overtone 29
+Sample
+Certain irresponsible American politicians have been spewing lies about the latest attempts at reform. Whether these lies come from a combination of stupidity and a hysterical imagination or from cleverness and a willingness to exploit innocent Americans for personal political gain, these lies must be exposed for the damaging falsehoods that they are.
+Adapted from: Keith Olbermann, Countdown with Keith Olbermann, MSNBC,
+Aug 10, 2009
+This argument is full of loaded language. Calling the politicians "irresponsible" makes them sound bad without yet saying what they’re doing wrong; it could be deleted without affecting the actual substance of the argument. "Spewing lies" is an emotionally evocative way of saying "making false statements." Speculating about whether the "lies" come from "stupidity and a hysterical imagination" or "a willingness to exploit innocent Americans" makes the politicians sound dumb, unstable, or evil, but it doesn’t actually add any facts to support the conclusion. Even worse, it falsely suggests that stupidity and malice are the only possible motives for these politicians’ statements. That whole clause can be cut, too. The argument could claim simply that some politicians are making false statements about the latest attempts at reform and that the falsehood of those statements should be made clear to the public.
+This response identifies specific instances of loaded language. It explains how each instance is emotionally charged and recommends an alternative. In cases where the loaded language adds nothing substantive to the argument, this response rightly recommends that the loaded language be deleted.
+Notice that in rephrasing Olbermann’s statement, this response arrives at a neutral statement that may still not be true. That is, his claim is that some politicians are making false statements about the latest attempts at reform. It remains to be seen if they are or are not; now we’d expect Olbermann to go on to offer some evidence. (Note that the original argument is so devoid of specifics that we can still use this example a decade later, even when most people can’t remember exactly what the "latest attempts at reform" were at the time!) The point of identifying and neutralizing loaded language is simply to bring us to the point of recognizing the need for evidence in this relatively open-minded way rather than being so worked up over the alleged lie-spewing and irresponsibility that we don’t have the breathing room to even notice that no evidence has yet been offered.
+30 Rule 5: Build on substance, not overtone
+1. Trump’s wall is just another fantasy of his fevered imagination. But the wall wouldn’t just be an exercise in xenophobia: it would be an ugly scar across a hot zone of precious biodiversity, wreaking untold ecological devastation to boost Trump’s fragile ego. Building the wall would be devastatingly stupid.
+Adapted from: Juan Cole, "Trump’s Wall an Ugly Scar across Hot Zone of Biodiversity, Threatening Endangered Species," Informed Comment, Feb 15, 2019, https://www.juancole.com/2019/02/biological-threatening-endangered.html
+2. Of course I’m going to beat Henry Cooper! He’s nothing! He’s a tramp! He’s a bum! I’ll knock him out in five rounds—no, three!
+Adapted from: "Muhammad Ali Engaging in Some of His Famous Trash Talk,"
+YouTube, Nov 11, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WsAC4lhbE0g
+3. The dirty little secret behind factory farms’ profits—namely, that there’s no good reason for their monstrously cruel mistreatment of animals—is getting out. Since morally decent people abhor senseless animal cruelty, people everywhere are turning against factory farms.
+Adapted from: Mylan Engel, Jr., "Animal Advocates’ Successes Have Factory
+Farmers Running Scared," Animal Ethics, Feb 6, 2007, http://animalethics
+.blogspot.com/2007/02/animal-advocates-successes-have-factory.html
+4. If you are trying to lose weight, it’s important that you not skip meals. If you skip meals, you’re likely to experience hunger and food cravings later, making it harder for you to stick to your diet. Instead of skipping meals to control your calorie intake, eat appropriately sized meals on a regular basis.
+Adapted from: Kandeel Judge, Maxine Barish-Wreden, and Karen K. Brees,
+The Complete Idiot’s Guide to the Secrets of Longevity (New York:
+Penguin, 2008), 80
+5. We can all agree that the defendant bought the murder weapon earlier that night. The pawn shop owner saw him buy it, and his friends saw him carrying it. So how does that switchblade end up in the old man’s chest if the boy didn’t kill him? Remember that imaginative little fable that the boy told? He claims that the knife
+Rule 5: Build on substance, not overtone 31
+fell through a hole in his pocket on his way to the movie theater. You don’t really believe that, do you? The boy’s a murderer, plain and simple.
+Adapted from: 12 Angry Men, directed by Sidney Lumet (Los Angeles:
+United Artist, 1957)
+6. Seriously? You’re going to try to murder a sweet, gentle, leaf-eating, doe-eyed deer, and you’re worried about what kind of pants you’re going to wear? Imagine you’re a deer. You’re prancing around the forest. You’re thirsty, so you stop at a clear, gently gurgling stream to take a nice, refreshing drink and—BAM! A bullet blows your head wide open, splattering bloodied bits of brains all over the place. Now, let me ask you: Are you going to care what kind of pants the jerk who shot you is wearing? No! It doesn’t matter what kind of pants you wear!
+Adapted from: My Cousin Vinny, directed by Jonathan Lynn (Los Angeles:
+Twentieth Century Fox, 1992)
+7. I cannot stay here, doing nothing, while innocent lives are lost. There is no one else willing to defend the world from Ares. So, I must go.
+Adapted from: Wonder Woman, directed by Patty Jenkins
+(Burbank, CA: Warner Bros., 2017)
+8. Democrats are starting to push a Green New Deal. If they get their way, everyone’s going to end up having to drive baby box Priuses. They’re going to eliminate the beef industry because cows contribute to global warming. So, you won’t have any more steak in your diet. They’re going to make everyone retrofit or rebuild their homes to make them more energy efficient. And they’re pretty much going to replace planes with trains. This is insanity, pure and simple, and I can’t believe anyone supports it.
+Adapted from: "As Heard on Hannity: The Democrats’ Radical Extremist Plan for America Is a Form of Insanity," FOX News, Feb 14, 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/sean-hannity-the-democrats-radical-extremist-plan-for-america-is-a-form-of-insanity
+32 Rule 6: Use consistent terms
+For exercises 9 and 10, find two examples of loaded language in the media,
+online, in conversations with friends or family, or anywhere else you can
+find it. Print, copy, or write down your examples. Identify the loaded words
+or expressions in each example, explain why they’re loaded, and suggest
+more neutral substitutes.
+Need more practice? Find online news sites that allow comments on their
+news stories. Look for instances of loaded language in the comments on
+that site. See if you can tell which comments are expressing substantive
+arguments and which are just spouting emotionally loaded language. For
+the comments that are expressing arguments, try to find more neutral ways
+to say the same thing.
+Use consistent terms
+Short arguments normally have a single theme or thread. They carry one
+idea through several steps. Therefore, couch that idea in clear and carefully
+chosen terms, and mark each new step by using those very same
+terms again.
+In their classic composition handbook, The Elements of Style, William
+Strunk and E. B. White cite Jesus’s famous Beatitudes as a compelling
+illustration of what they call "parallel construction" or "expressing
+coordinate ideas in similar form."
+Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of
+Heaven.
+Blessed are those who mourn: for they will be comforted.
+Blessed are the meek: for they will inherit the earth . . .
+(Matthew 5:3–5)
+"Blessed are the X: for Y" is the formula. It is not rephrased in each case,
+like "Also, those who are X will be consecrated, because Y." Instead, each
+sentence has exactly the same structure and exactly the same phrasing.
+Do the same for your arguments.
+NO:
+When you learn to care for a pet, you learn to attend to the
+needs of a dependent creature. Watching and responding
+carefully when a cat or a dog needs you, your ability to
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 339.
+Rule 6
+Chapter I Exercises 33
+recognize needs and adjust your behavior accordingly can improve
+toward young children as well. Becoming a more responsive
+keeper of domestic animals can therefore enhance
+your familial caregiving skills too.
+Huh? Each sentence may be fairly clear by itself, but the connections
+between them are totally lost in the underbrush—interesting underbrush,
+maybe, but too thick for moving effectively. (Remember, arguments
+need to move!)
+YES:
+When you learn to care for a pet, you learn to attend to the
+needs of a dependent creature. When you learn to attend to
+the needs of a dependent creature, you learn to be a better
+parent. Therefore, when you learn to care for a pet, you learn
+to be a better parent.
+The "Yes" version might not be stylish in a flowery way, but it more than
+makes up for that by being absolutely crystal clear. One simple feature
+makes the difference: the "No" version uses a new phrase for each key idea
+every time the idea recurs—for example, "When you learn to care for a pet"
+is described again in the "No" version’s conclusion as "Becoming a more
+responsive keeper of domestic animals"—whereas the "Yes" argument
+carefully and exactly repeats its key terms.
+If you are concerned about style—as sometimes you should be, of
+course—then go for the tightest argument, not the most flowery.
+MOST CONCISE:
+When you learn to care for a pet, you learn to attend to the
+needs of a dependent creature, and therefore in turn learn to
+be a better parent.
+CHAPTER EXERCISES
+Exercise Set 1.7: Evaluating letters to the editor
+Objective: To give you practice applying Rules 1–6.
+Instructions: The following arguments are adapted from letters to the editor
+in various newspapers and magazines. State how well each argument
+follows each of the rules presented in this chapter.
+34 Chapter I Exercises
+Sample
+Training poor farmers in developing countries how to use organic farming practices
+is an effective way to fight poverty. One organization, Harambee-Kenya,
+has trained hundreds of farmers to use natural farming methods, such as drip
+irrigation using buckets. These farmers have gone from food shortages to food
+security and even food surpluses. Some are using the cash they earn by selling
+their excess agricultural output to finance their children’s medical and educational
+expenses.
+Adapted from: Carol Carper, letter to the editor, Christian Science Monitor, Jul 19, 2010, http://www.
+csmonitor.com/Commentary/Letters-to-the-Editor/2010/0728/
+Letters-to-the-Editor-Weekly-Issue-of-July-19-2010
+This letter does a good job with Rule 1: the conclusion of the argument is clearly stated
+in the first sentence. The letter then presents the premises in a natural, understandable
+order (Rule 2). The premises are not yet known to be reliable, though (Rule 3). It
+would be better if the author cited a source where we could verify her claims about the
+Tips for success: For each argument, proceed through this chapter’s rules
+systematically. Think of each rule as asking a question about the argument:
+Is it easy to tell what the argument’s conclusion is and what the premises
+are (Rule 1)? Does the author present ideas in a natural order (Rule 2)? Are
+the premises reliable (Rule 3)? Could the argument be clearer or more
+concise (Rule 4)? If so, which words or expressions are unclear? What
+might the author have said instead? Does the argument use loaded language
+(Rule 5)? If so, which words or expressions are loaded? Can you
+suggest a more neutral substitute? Does the author confuse the argument
+by using more than one term for the same idea (Rule 6)? If so, identify the
+inconsistent terminology and suggest one term that the author might use
+throughout the argument.
+Be as specific as possible in explaining the ways in which the argument
+does or does not follow each rule. If you think some of the premises are
+unreliable, say which premises those are. Explain why those premises are
+unreliable. If the argument is unclear or wordy, say which words or expressions
+could be improved. If the argument uses loaded language, say which
+terms are loaded and briefly explain why they’re loaded, and suggest a
+more neutral substitute if you can. Likewise, if the author would be better
+off sticking to a single, consistent term for some idea, point out exactly
+what terms he or she uses and suggest the best one to use.
+Chapter I Exercises 35
+1. Marijuana edibles, like marijuana-infused gummy bears, ought to
+be sold and kept in childproof packaging. Adults should think of
+marijuana edibles as like a loaded gun: both are dangerous to children.
+Just as responsible gun owners keep their guns locked away
+in a gun safe, responsible purchasers of marijuana edibles ought to
+keep them locked up where kids can’t get to them.
+Adapted from: Steve Schweitzberger, letter to the editor, Denver Post, Nov 30, 2014,
+http://blogs.denverpost.com/eletters/2014/11/30/
+safety-marijuana-edibles-2-letters/34973/
+2. The conquest of England by French-speaking Normans in 1066
+completely transformed the English language. Consider Beowulf,
+written before the conquest, and Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales,
+written a few centuries after the conquest. Well-educated modern
+English speakers could understand The Canterbury Tales without
+too much difficulty, but they probably couldn’t understand a single
+line of Beowulf, which was written in Old English.
+Adapted from: Robert Hellam, letter to the editor, The Economist, Jun 10, 2010
+success of Harambee-Kenya’s program, since that is not part of most Americans’
+experience (and her audience consists of Americans). Most of the letter does a good job
+with Rule 4, although the last sentence could be simplified to something like: "Some
+are using the cash they earn by selling their extra food to pay for their children’s
+medical and school fees." The letter does not use loaded language (Rule 5). It has a few
+problems following Rule 6: it uses "organic" in the first sentence and "natural" in the
+second, and it uses "fight poverty" in the first sentence but much more elaborate
+phrases and ideas in the last two.
+Notice that this response addresses each rule. It also justifies most of its claims about how
+well the argument follows each rule. For example, instead of just saying, "The argument
+does not follow Rule 3," it explains why the premises are not reliable. Furthermore, it offers
+a nuanced evaluation with respect to various rules. For instance, instead of saying, "The
+argument does not follow Rule 4," this response acknowledges that the argument follows
+Rule 4 for the most part, but points out a specific sentence that could be more concrete and
+concise.
+36 Chapter I Exercises
+3. Politicians today are in love with thirty-second sound bites. They
+run screaming from anything requiring thoughtful, intelligent, or
+honest discussion. We ought to be ashamed of the level of discourse
+in our politics. Instead of actual debate, we get nothing but
+innuendo and idiocy.
+Adapted from: Margot LeRoy, letter to the editor, USA Today, Oct 31, 2010
+4. The meaning of any political statement depends on the context
+in which it is said. The slogan "Black Lives Matter" began after
+videos circulated showing police killing black people, sometimes
+for trivial offenses. In that context, it clearly means not that
+black lives matter more than others or that white people’s lives
+don’t matter, but that black lives matter just as much as others.
+That is the point that needed to be made in response to those
+videos. "Black lives matter" is therefore not a racist slogan—just
+the opposite.
+Adapted from: James Greene, letter to the editor, Washington Post,
+July 15, 2016, http://wapo.st/2agWax3
+5. Scientists need to further investigate how artificial lighting affects
+our physiology and behavior. The human eye contains special cells
+called intrinsically photosensitive retinal ganglion cells. When
+light hits these cells—especially short-wavelength light—it can
+affect our circadian rhythms and our alertness. Experiments with
+mice show that such short-wavelength light, which is more common
+during dawn and dusk, can stimulate activity in mice. This
+suggests that our artificial lighting could be affecting our alertness
+and sleep patterns.
+Adapted from: Manuel Spitschan, "Find the Switch for Healthy Artificial Lighting,"
+Nature 566 (2019), 182, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00551-w
+6. Despite what extremists like to claim, animal agriculture is not
+bad for the environment and it is not bad for people. The so-called
+scientific studies purporting to show that animals are bad for the
+environment have been repeatedly shown to be flawed. Ruminant
+animals, like cattle and sheep, are among the most sustainable
+food production systems on Earth, taking unusable land and
+Chapter I Exercises 37
+waste products from vegetable and grain production, and turning it into healthy, nutrient-dense foods. Furthermore, new scientific research is coming out showing that meat is extremely good for our health, and that a high-meat diet free of processed foods can actually reverse all kinds of chronic diseases.
+Adapted from: Kent Arnaud, letter to the editor, Joplin Globe, Aug 17, 2018,
+https://www.joplinglobe.com/opinion/columns/your-view-letters-
+to-the-editor/article_463709c6-a77d-592d-bb9d-e4263614ff6d.html
+7. Fight for your local library! Local libraries provide the public with free, equitable access to information. When you need a book for your child’s school report or want to learn how to plant a garden, train a pet, or repair a dryer, the library has the information you need—and librarians to help you find it. Furthermore, libraries encourage people to read and learn for pleasure. There are limits to what you can get on the Internet.
+Adapted from: Regina Powers, letter to the editor, Los Angeles Times,
+Nov 17, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/17/opinion/
+la-le-1117-wednesday-20101117
+8. Western countries claim to value justice, democracy, and egalitarianism. Yet, the United Nations Security Council’s permanent members—Britain, the United States, Russia, China, and France—have a veto over any matter before the Council. This gives each of those countries the power to overrule international consensus on important matters. That is neither just, democratic, nor egalitarian. It is only right, then, that the Security Council be reformed so that no country holds veto power.
+Adapted from: Paul Khurana, letter to the editor, The Economist, Dec 2, 2010,
+http://www.economist.com/node/17627530
+9. Silvio De Sousa is just a teenager who trusted the adults in his life to take care of him. He didn’t know that his legal guardian accepted an illicit bribe from Adidas to agree to send him to the University of Kansas to play basketball. But now the NCAA, which claims to care about its athletes, has ruled that De Sousa can’t follow his dream because of something that some
+38 Chapter I Exercises
+irresponsible crooks did without his knowledge. The NCAA
+should be ashamed, and De Sousa should get to play!
+Adapted from: Andi Stamper, letter to the editor, Kansas City Star, Feb 6, 2019,
+https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/letters-to-the-editor/article225625740.html
+10. A recent columnist suggested that high schools should skip the
+"hard" math because most people will never use it. This is as absurd
+as suggesting that schools shouldn’t bother to teach students
+advanced vocabulary since most people will never use it. Innumeracy
+is a public scourge, leading to all kinds of misunderstandings
+about things that are vital to good public policy. The strength
+of our democracy itself rests in the hands of those very teachers
+whom your columnist would seek to cast aside for wasting our
+children’s time. We need to teach math—even the "hard" stuff—
+to every single student.
+Adapted from: Gary Bunio, letter to the editor, Calgary Herald,
+Nov 2, 2018, https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/letters/your-letters-for-nov-2
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 341.
+Need more practice? Working with a friend or classmate, find the letters
+to the editor in your favorite magazine or newspaper. For each letter, decide
+whether the letter contains an argument. If so, evaluate how well the
+letter follows the rules from this chapter. Then, compare your evaluation
+with your friend’s or classmate’s. If you disagree about how well a letter
+follows any of the rules, see if you can come to an agreement by explaining
+how the letter does or does not follow the rule.
+Chapter I Exercises 39
+Critical thinking activity: Writing a letter to the editor
+For an out-of-class activity that gives you practice in constructing arguments of your own,
+see the "Writing a letter to the editor" assignment sheet (p. 505) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Analyzing unadapted arguments
+For an in-class or out-of-class activity that gives you practice in applying Rules 1 and 2 to
+arguments in their original context, see the "Analyzing unadapted arguments" assignment
+sheet (p. 506) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Reconstructing scientific reasoning
+For an in-class or out-of-class activity that gives you practice understanding scientific
+reasoning, see the "Reconstructing scientific reasoning" assignment sheet (p. 512) in
+Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Analyzing arguments in scientific
+reasoning
+For an in-class or out-of-class activity that gives you practice analyzing arguments in scientific
+sources, see the "Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning" assignment sheet
+(p. 513) in Part 3.
+40
+Some arguments offer one or more examples in support of a generalization.
+Women in earlier times were married very young. Juliet in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet was not even fourteen years old. In the Middle Ages, thirteen was the normal age of marriage for a Jewish woman. And during the Roman Empire, many Roman women were married at age thirteen or younger.
+This argument generalizes from three examples—Juliet, Jewish women in the Middle Ages, and Roman women during the Roman Empire—to "many" or most women in earlier times. To show the form of this argument most clearly, we can list the premises separately, with the conclusion on the "bottom line":
+Juliet in Shakespeare’s play was not even fourteen years old.
+Jewish women during the Middle Ages were normally married at thirteen.
+Many Roman women during the Roman Empire were married at age thirteen or younger.
+Therefore, women in earlier times were married very young.
+It is helpful to write short arguments in this way when we need to see exactly how they work.
+When do premises like these adequately support a generalization?
+One requirement, of course, is that the examples be accurate. Remember Rule 3: start from reliable premises! If Juliet wasn’t around fourteen, or if most Roman or Jewish women weren’t married at thirteen or younger, then the argument is much weaker. If none of the premises can be supported, there is no argument at all. To check an argument’s examples, or to find good examples for your own arguments, you may need to do some research.
+But suppose the examples are accurate. Even then, generalizing from them is a tricky business. The rules in this chapter offer a short checklist for assessing arguments by example.
+Chapter II
+Arguments by Example
+Rule 7: Use more than one example 41
+Use more than one example
+A single example can sometimes be used for the sake of illustration. The example of Juliet alone might illustrate early marriage. But a single example offers next to no support for a generalization. Juliet alone may just be an exception. One spectacularly miserable billionaire does not prove that rich people in general are unhappy. One great meal at a new restaurant in town does not necessarily mean that its whole menu is first-rate. More than one example is needed.
+NO:
+Solar power is widely used.
+Therefore, renewable energy is widely used.
+Solar power is one form of renewable energy, but only one. What about others?
+YES:
+Solar power is widely used.
+Hydroelectric power has long been widely used.
+Windmills were once widely used and are becoming widely used again.
+Therefore, renewable energy is widely used.
+The "Yes" version may not be perfect (Rule 11 returns to it), but it certainly is more energetic, so to speak, than the "No" version.
+In a generalization about a small set of things, the strongest argument should consider all, or at least many, of the examples. A generalization about your siblings should consider each of them in turn, for instance, and a generalization about all the planets in the solar system can do the same.
+Generalizations about larger sets of things require picking out a sample. We cannot list all women in earlier times who married young. Instead, our argument must offer a few women in earlier times as a sample of all women in earlier times. How many examples are required depends partly on how representative they are, a point the next rule takes up. It also depends partly on the size of the set being generalized about. Large sets usually require more examples. The claim that your town is full of remarkable people requires more evidence than the claim that, say, your friends are remarkable people. Depending on how many friends you have, even just two or three examples might be enough to establish that your friends are remarkable people; but, unless your town is tiny, many more examples are required to show that your town is full of remarkable people.
+Rule 7
+42 Rule 7: Use more than one example
+Exercise Set 2.1: Finding relevant examples
+Objective: To give you practice finding relevant examples to support a generalization.
+Instructions: Find two to three relevant examples to support each of the following generalizations. You may have to do a little research to find good examples in some cases.
+Tips for success: A generalization is a claim about some or all things of a certain type. When thinking about generalizations, it’s helpful to ask yourself two questions: First, what type of thing is the generalization about? Second, what does the generalization say about the things of that type?
+Consider the renewable energy example above. What type of thing is it about? It’s about sources of renewable energy. What does it say about the members of that group? It says that they’re all widely used.
+To give good examples in support of a generalization, you need to be sure that your examples are the right type of thing. If you want to support the generalization that renewable energy is widely used, you need to give examples of things that are kinds of renewable energy sources and are widely used.
+Some generalizations are negative—not because they say something mean about a type of thing, but because they say that few or no things of that type are a certain way. For instance, consider the generalization "No mammals can breathe underwater." What type of thing is this generalization about? Mammals. What does it say about mammals? It says that none of them can breathe underwater. To give examples for this generalization, you’ll need to find things that are mammals and are not able to breathe underwater.
+Not all generalizations are expressed as clearly as the ones we’ve considered so far. You will sometimes need to think carefully about what a generalization means before looking for examples.
+Rule 7: Use more than one example 43
+1. All birds can fly.
+2. Some billionaires are college dropouts.
+3. Most fruits are sweet when they’re ripe.
+4. Politicians are liars.
+5. It is possible to die from overdosing on most kinds of recreational drugs.
+6. Lots of shows on television right now are not worth watching.
+7. Developed, democratic countries no longer practice capital
+punishment.
+8. William Shakespeare wrote many tragedies.
+Sample
+Lots of professional sports teams are named after animals.
+The Charlotte Hornest, the Florida Marlins, and the Philadelphia Eagles are professional sports teams that are named after animals.
+To verify that these examples are appropriate, create a "mental checklist" of requirements for good examples. An example that supports this generalization must (a) be a professional sports team, and (b) be named after an animal. Compare each example against your "mental checklist" of requirements. Is each example a professional sports team (as opposed to, say, a college sports team)? Is each example named after an animal? If the answer to both questions is yes, then the example is appropriate. Sometimes you’ll need to think carefully about your answers, though. Is a Bruin an animal? Is a Canuck? Are the New York Red Bulls named after an animal or an energy drink?
+Of course, finding three examples doesn’t show that the generalization is correct. It could be that these are the only three, in which case it would be false that "lots" of professional sports teams are named after animals. The point of this exercise, however, is not to prove that the generalization is correct but only to find examples that provide evidence for the generalization.
+44 Rule 8: Use representative examples
+Need more practice? Working with a friend or classmate, create a list of generalizations. Then, go down your list and try to identify at least three examples for each generalization.
+Use representative examples
+Even a large number of examples may misrepresent the set of things being generalized about. Do all insects bite, for example? Sure, we can think of lots of insects that do, like mosquitoes and black flies, and naturally those are the examples we think of first. After all, we are bugged by them! We may have to consult a biology textbook or a good online source to remember how many kinds of insects there are that don’t bite—which is most of them, actually: moths, praying mantis, ladybugs, (most) beetles, and so on.
+Likewise, a large number of examples of ancient Roman women establishes very little about women generally, since ancient Roman women are not necessarily representative of other women in earlier times. If we want to make a sweeping claim about women in earlier times, the argument needs to consider women from other early times and from other parts of the world as well.
+It is easy to overlook how unrepresentative—often wildly unrepresentative—our personal "samples" often are. Actually, very few if any of us really know a representative sample of other people. Yet we constantly generalize about other people as a group, such as when we make claims about "human nature," or even how our town might vote in the next election.
+NO:
+Everyone in my neighborhood favors the School Bond. Therefore, the School Bond is sure to pass.
+This argument is weak because single neighborhoods seldom represent the voting population as a whole. A well-to-do neighborhood may favor a cause unpopular with everyone else. Student wards in university towns regularly are carried by candidates who do poorly elsewhere. Besides, we
+Rule 8
+9. England has produced famous musicians.
+10. The world’s most populous countries are in Asia.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 347.
+Rule 8: Use representative examples 45
+do not always have good evidence even about the views held in a specific neighborhood. The set of people eager to display their political preferences to the world in yard signs, for example, is unlikely to be a representative cross-section of the neighborhood as a whole.
+A good argument that "The School Bond is sure to win" requires a representative sample of the entire voting population. It is not easy to construct such a sample. In fact, it usually takes professional help, and even professional pollsters regularly predict elections incorrectly. Telephone pollsters used to call landlines, for example, because cell phone numbers are not as publicly accessible; but only certain demographic groups still have landlines, and they are increasingly unrepresentative.
+In general, look for the most accurate cross-section you can find of the population being generalized about. If you want to know what students think about some subject at your university, don’t just ask your friends or generalize from what you hear in class. Unless you have quite a range of friends and take a wide range of classes, your personal sample is very unlikely to accurately mirror the whole student body. Similarly, if you want to know what people in other countries think about the United States, don’t just ask foreign tourists—for they, of course, are the ones who chose to come here. A careful look at a diverse range of foreign media should give you a more representative picture.
+When your sample is people, an even more basic point is that no one should be able to self-select for it. This immediately disqualifies almost all online or mail-in polls to which individuals can decide whether to respond or not. Again, the set of people who are willing or eager to express their opinions is almost certainly not representative of the whole population, but are the people more likely to have strong opinions—or a lot of time on their hands. It may be interesting to know what that group thinks anyway, but not because they necessarily speak for anyone but themselves.
+Exercise Set 2.2: Improving biased samples
+Objective: To train you to recognize sources of sample bias in order to avoid unrepresentative examples.
+Instructions: Each of the following arguments uses an unrepresentative set of examples. Suggest specific ways to improve each argument by changing the way examples are chosen. Explain why those changes would make the argument’s examples more representative.
+46 Rule 8: Use representative examples
+Tips for success: Many generalizations are about diverse groups. Consider, for instance, an opinion poll showing that Europeans disapprove of capital punishment. Europeans are a diverse group of people. No single individual is representative of all Europeans. To find representative examples, then, we need to find or assemble a group of people that is, on the whole, representative of all Europeans. That is, we need to select examples so that our group has the same characteristics as the group of all Europeans—the same mix of ages and the same proportion of men to women, of college-educated people to non-college-educated people, of native-born people to immigrants, of wealthy people to poor people, etc. A group of examples is called a sample. One main implication of Rule 8, then, is that you want your sample to be representative of the group that you are making a generalization about. A sample that fails to represent the group accurately is called a biased sample.
+How can we ensure that our sample is unbiased? The simplest answer is that we want our sample to be a random sample. A random sample of a particular group—say, Europeans—is a sample in which every member of the group has an equal chance of being included in the sample.
+Collecting a random sample is not the same as choosing members of the group haphazardly or without a plan. Constructing a random sample is actually very difficult. Two rules of thumb can help you avoid the most common mistakes. You’ll want to think about these rules of thumb in offering advice about the arguments in this exercise.
+First, be sure that you are sampling from the entire group that you’re making a generalization about. For instance, if you’re generalizing about all North American college students, you need to be sure that students from a wide range of colleges have a proportionate probability of being included in your sample. Don’t overlook students from public and private colleges, large and small colleges, and colleges in various regions of North America, etc. You also need to be sure that all kinds of students have a proportionate chance of being in your sample—men and women, students who live in dorms and students who commute to campus, premeds and theater majors, eighteen-year-olds who came straight from high school and fifty-year-olds who are going back for a second degree, etc.
+Furthermore, Rule 8 requires choosing your examples in ways that ensure a truly proportionate sample. If you contact students at random from the college’s email directory, you’ll miss students who don’t use
+their college email address. If you approach students who are on campus during the day, you’ll miss students who only take evening classes. When you design your methods for choosing and contacting members of the group, think carefully about whether your methods overlook, or under- or
+Rule 8: Use representative examples 47
+over-represent, any part of the group. Do your best to ensure that each member of the group has an equal chance of being in the sample.
+Sometimes you can only sample a specific part of the population you’re interested in. In that case, it’s best to change your generalization, rather than offer a weak argument for your original generalization. For instance, if you can only manage to sample students at your school, then instead of making a claim about all North American college students, make a claim about college students at your school.
+Sample
+Derek Weatherby took a job at Schnucks, a grocery store in St. Louis, to help pay his way through college. As his student debt mounted, he took a break from school, planning to go back when his financial situation improved. But with the economy still stagnant years after the financial crisis, Derek has found that many of the other employees at Schnucks are college graduates themselves, some with degrees from prestigious schools. It seems that lots of college graduates can’t find work that pays any better than the job that Derek already has.
+Adapted from: Ben Cassellman and Marcus Walker, "Wanted: Jobs for the New ‘Lost’ Generation,"
+Wall Street Journal, Sep 14, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/1zCAnFH
+The argument could be improved by including college graduates who work in places other than Schnucks, being sure to include students from many different parts of the country. The conclusion is supposed to be about all recent college graduates, but it only looks at those who work at Schnucks. An unbiased sample would give all recent college graduates a chance to be included in the sample, perhaps by choosing people randomly from a list of recent graduates from a broad range of colleges.
+This response does three important things. First, it explains why the sample is biased: the sample consists only of recent graduates who work at Schnucks. (And of course those students don’t have better paying jobs than Derek!) Second, it offers a specific, conrete suggestion about how to improve the argument: draw names randomly from lists of recent graduates of a broad range of colleges. Third, it explains why that would make the sample less biased: it would give all recent college graduates an equal chance to be in the sample. (Since the conclusion is about all recent college graduates, that’s the group whose members each need an equal chance to be included.)
+48 Rule 8: Use representative examples
+1. Republican voters are starting to lean more libertarian. An extreme libertarian candidate easily won the most votes in a mock election held at the Republican Leadership Conference. The conference, held just outside the libertarian candidate’s home state, drew busloads of libertarian supporters, as well as political junkies from further afield who wanted to hear from early contenders for the Republican presidential nomination.
+Adapted from: Reuters, "Ron Paul Wins 2012 Republican Straw Poll in New Orleans," Reuters.com, Jun 18, 2011, http://reut.rs/mKVlb8
+2. People who work in the technology industry are increasingly limiting their kids’ screen time and their access to technology. Apple CEO Tim Cook prohibited his nephew from joining social media. Cook’s predecessor, Apple co-founder Steve Jobs, prohibited his young children from using iPads. Former Microsoft CEO Bill Gates wouldn’t let his kids have cell phones until they were teenagers.
+Adapted from: Nellie Bowles, "A Dark Consensus about Screens and Kids Begins to Emerge in Silicon Valley," New York Times, Oct 26, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2JkjOdJ
+3. Since 1938, the Harvard Study of Adult Development has followed the lives of two groups of men. One group consisted of sophomores at Harvard at the time. The other consisted of teenage boys who, at the time, lived in poor, troubled neighborhoods in Boston. Over the last seven and a half decades, Harvard researchers have checked in on these men every two years—interviewing them, looking at their medical records, and so on. The study shows one thing loud and clear: the most important thing that anyone can do to be happy and healthy is to have good relationships with other people.
+Adapted from: Robert Waldinger, "What Makes a Good Life?
+Lessons from the Longest Study on Happiness," TEDxBeaconStreet, Nov 2015,
+https://www.ted.com/talks/robert_waldinger_what_makes_a_
+good_life_lessons_from_the_longest_study_on_happiness
+4. People often assume that liberal arts majors will make less money than people with more practical degrees, like computer science, but in fact the opposite is true. A think tank looked at the top 10
+Rule 8: Use representative examples 49
+percent of earners from each of several different disciplines. They found that over the course of their career, top earners among computer science majors raked in $3.2 million—but top earners among philosophy majors totaled $3.46 million over their careers and top-earning history majors brought in $3.75 million.
+Adapted from: George Anders, "Good News Liberal-Arts Majors: Your Peers Probably Won’t Outearn You Forever," Wall Street Journal, Sep 11, 2016,
+https://www.wsj.com/articles/good-news-liberal-arts-majors-
+your-peers-probably-wont-outearn-you-forever-1473645902
+5. Drivers who switched to Allstate saved an average of $396 a year on their car insurance. Those who switched from GEICO saved even more, knocking an average of $473 off their bill. Therefore, most drivers can save money by switching to Allstate.
+Adapted from: Bob Trebilcock, "Car Insurance: Save Money by Switching?"
+CBS News, May 4, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/car-insurance-save-money-by-switching/
+6. Each package of Nestle Foods’ new line of high-quality, freeze-dried soup products contained a postage-paid survey form. The package encouraged customers to complete the survey and mail it back to Nestle Foods. Over ten thousand survey responses flooded the Nestle offices, and they were all extremely positive. Everybody loved it! Nestle had hit upon a winning product line.
+Adapted from: Anthony G. Bennett, The Big Book of Marketing
+(Columbus, OH: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 102
+7. Parenting can’t be that hard to figure out. After all, every single one of my ancestors over billions of years has successfully managed to raise at least one child to adulthood. So have the ancestors of every other living thing on this planet. And most of those ancestors didn’t even have language or culture to teach them what to do, much less parenting books and Internet forums; they just did what came naturally. Thus, parenting well comes naturally to most living things.
+Adapted from: Randall Munroe, "Natural Parenting," xkcd,
+Dec 11, 2009, http://xkcd.com/674
+50 Rule 8: Use representative examples
+8. There are over 450 species of sharks—for now, at least. Sharks have been subjected to serious overfishing, both for food and for the use of their cartilage, which allegedly has therapeutic powers. Beyond overfishing, the shark population is threatened by human encroachment on the mangroves that serve as nurseries for baby sharks. Great white sharks, hammerheads, and oceanic whitetip sharks, to name just a few, have seen population declines of 90 percent or more in the last few decades alone. Clearly, the word "biodiversity" has become nothing but a joke, and people don’t really care about endangered species at all.
+Adapted from: Abhijit Naik, "Endangered Shark Species That Need to Be Saved from Extinction," Buzzle.com, May 10, 2010, http://www.buzzle.com/articles/endangered-sharks-species-of-endangered
+-sharks.html
+9. The American justice system is so dysfunctional that it puts lots of people behind bars for crimes they didn’t commit. The Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School uses DNA testing to investigate the cases of people who were convicted of serious crimes prior to the widespread use of DNA evidence. In the first decade of its existence, the project exonerated nearly two-thirds of the inmates whose cases they investigated. That’s over one hundred people wrongly convicted of serious crimes!
+Adapted from: Donald E. Campbell, Incentives, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 14
+10. Over seven hundred scientists from around the world have gone to dissentfromdarwin.org to register their skepticism about the theory of evolution. These scientists include members of the national academies of science in their home countries and faculty from prestigious institutions in a range of scientific disciplines. Thus, many scientists are skeptical about the theory of evolution.
+Adapted from: "Ranks of Scientists Doubting Darwin’s Theory on the Rise,"
+Discovery Institute, Feb 8, 2007, http://www.discovery.org/a/2732
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 349.
+Rule 9: Background rates are often crucial 51
+Need more practice? Work with one or more classmates. Have each person create hypothetical scenarios in which someone tries unsuccessfully to create a representative sample to support a particular conclusion. Make them amusing too—mistakes in reasoning often are! These scenarios should take the form, "Suppose that someone tried to prove that all cars are made in America by driving around the parking lot of a Ford factory counting the different makes of cars"—or more generally, "Suppose that someone tried to prove X by doing Y to find examples." (Be sure that X is a generalization and that Y is a faulty method for finding a representative sample.) Then, trade scenarios with your classmates and suggest improvements to the methods for finding representative samples.
+Background rates are often crucial
+To persuade you that I am a first-rate archer, it is not enough to show you a bull’s-eye I have made. You should ask (politely, to be sure), "Yes, but how many times did you miss?" Getting a bull’s-eye in one shot tells quite a different story than getting a bull’s-eye in, say, a thousand, even though in both cases I genuinely do have a bull’s-eye to my name. You need a little more data.
+Leon’s horoscope told him that he would meet a vivacious new stranger, and lo and behold he did! Therefore, horoscopes are reliable.
+Dramatic as such an example may be, the problem is that we are only looking at the cases in which a horoscope came true. To properly evaluate this evidence, we need to know something else as well: how many horoscopes didn’t come true. When I survey my classes, we can usually find a few Leons out of twenty or thirty students. It’s a fun moment. But the other nineteen or twenty-nine horoscopes go nowhere. A kind of prediction that comes true only once out of twenty or thirty tries is hardly reliable—it’s just lucky once in a while. It may have some dramatic successes, like my archery, but its success rate may still be abysmal.
+To evaluate the reliability of any argument featuring a few vivid examples, then, we need to know the ratio between the number of "hits," so to speak, and the number of tries. It’s a question of representativeness again. Are the featured examples the only ones there are? Is the rate impressively high or low?
+This rule is widely applicable. Today, many people live in fear of crime, or constantly attend to stories of shark attacks, terrorism, or other dramatic events. Of course these things are awful when they occur, but the
+Rule 9
+52 Rule 9: Background rates are often crucial
+probability of any of them actually happening to any given individual—say, the shark attack rate—is extremely low. Crime rates continue to go down.
+No doubt we are preoccupied with the exceptions because they are constantly featured on TV and in the news. This does not mean that they are actually representative. The same goes, by the way, for desired things, like winning the lottery. Any individual’s chance of winning—that is, the winning rate—is so low as to be basically nil, but we seldom see the hundreds of thousands of losers, just the one or few winners raking in the money. So we wildly overestimate the background rates, and imagine that with the next lottery ticket purchase, we may be the one. Save your money, friends. Background rates make all the difference!
+Exercise Set 2.3: Identifying relevant background rates
+Objective: To give you practice identifying relevant background rates when dealing with generalizations and statistics.
+Instructions: Each of the following arguments jumps to a conclusion on the basis of dramatic statistics or a few vivid examples. In order to justify each conclusion, you would need to know more about relevant background rates. State what additional information you would need to know to calculate the relevant background rates. (This will require you to figure out which background rates are relevant.)
+Tips for success: Arguments from a few vivid examples work because we naturally tend to pay more attention to dramatic and vivid events or examples than to the relatively boring "background" where nothing happens, like horoscopes that didn’t work out or ships and planes that didn’t disappear in the Bermuda Triangle. But non-events or non-examples are actually just as important as examples in evaluating the generalization we might make from them. That is what the occurrence rate tells you: how significant the examples really are against the relevant background.
+When dealing with an argument for a generalization, think about which background rates are relevant for deciding how well the particular examples or statistics in the argument support the argument’s conclusion. In the horoscope example above, for instance, the relevant rate is the rate at which horoscopes make accurate predictions. Likewise, learning that a dozen famous models have lost weight following a particular diet plan doesn’t tell you much about the effectiveness of that plan. For one thing,
+Rule 9: Background rates are often crucial 53
+the models constitute a biased sample. (Do you see why?) But even more importantly, learning about those dozen models doesn’t tell you the relevant background rate, which is the percentage of people on this diet plan—models or not—who lose weight. We also need to know another rate to evaluate the argument: the percentage of people on any diet plan—and on none—who lose weight.
+Once you know what rate you’re looking for, ask yourself what further information you would need to calculate that rate. In the diet example, you would need to know (roughly) how many people are on this diet plan and how many of them have lost weight. Often, this information is the information you would be looking for if you responded to an argument for a generalization with the snide, but still appropriate, comment, "Oh, yeah—out of how many?"
+Sometimes background rates matter in a more subtle way. Consider this little puzzle:
+Tanya is a talented card player with the most impassive poker face you’ve ever seen. Which is she more likely to be: A high school teacher or a professional poker player?
+Tanya sounds a great deal like a professional poker player, and since this doesn’t appear to be an argument by generalization, you might not think to consider background rates. If you do consider background rates, though, you’ll realize that there are a very large number of high school teachers—many of whom could be excellent poker players—and almost no professional poker players at all. Thus, regardless of Tanya’s penchant for poker and the impassiveness of her face, she’s much more likely to be a high school teacher. The lesson here is to think about background rates even when the argument does not obviously invoke any generalizations.
+54 Rule 9: Background rates are often crucial
+1. In the second half of 2010, the University of Western Ontario did not have a single car stolen on campus. The campus police must be doing an outstanding job protecting the university.
+Adapted from: Jonathan Tieu, "Campus Police Report Zero Car Thefts,"
+Gazette (University of Western Ontario), Jan 18, 2011, https://westerngazette.ca/news/campus-police-report-zero-car-thefts/article_
+5dda6f8c-5253-5a73-9c93-a5e48aa4e936.html
+2. Despite record levels of success by women in the 2018 U.S. elections, Republican women remain vastly underrepresented in the U.S. House of Representatives. Only thirteen Republican women were elected to the House in 2018.
+Adapted from: Maureen Groppe, "‘Year of the Woman?’ Not for Republican Women in the House, Where Their Ranks Have Plunged to a 25-Year Low," USA Today, Dec 13, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/12/13/house-gop-women-shrinking-lowest-level-25-years/2207124002/
+Sample
+In a recent experiment, some students used a studying technique called "retrieval practice essays." After reading a passage, the students wrote down what they remembered from it, without the passage in front of them. A week later, these students answered about two out of three questions about the passage correctly. Therefore, writing retrieval practice essays is a good way to study.
+Adapted from: Pam Belluck, "To Really Learn, Quit Studying and Take a Test," New York Times,
+Jan 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/science/21memory.html
+We need to know how well students did if they studied using different techniques—or even if they didn’t study at all. That is, we need to know the proportion of questions that students got right if they used other forms of studying besides the "retrieval practice essay."
+You might think that this argument gives the only background rate that you need. However, in claiming that retrieval practice essays are a good way to study, the argument is implicitly comparing retrieval practice essays to other forms of studying. So, we need to be able to compare the rates for the various alternatives, including the rate for students who don’t study at all.
+Rule 9: Background rates are often crucial 55
+3. Exactly zero children died from measles in the United States between 2004 and 2015. But in that same time period, 106 infants died after exhibiting reactions to measles vaccines. Obviously, the real danger here is not measles; it’s the measles vaccine.
+Adapted from: Brian Shilhavy, "ZERO U.S. Measles Deaths in 10 Years, but Over 100 Measles Vaccines Deaths Reported," Health Impact News, Jan 30, 2015,
+http://healthimpactnews.com/2015/zero-u-s-measles-deaths-in-10-years-but-over-100-measles-vaccine-deaths-reported/
+4. Mercury is "retrograde" three times a year, meaning that it appears to move backward in the sky. As everyone knows, when Mercury is retrograde, it causes all kinds of miscommunication and confusion here on Earth. This year’s first occurrence of Mercury retrograde is especially troublesome, since Mercury will appear under the sign of Aquarius this time. The last time it happened was in 2008—the year of the major financial meltdown that ruined the world economy. Before that, it happened twice in 2001. During the first occurrence, the "dot com" bubble burst, plunging the economy into recession. The second included September 11, 2001, when terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Clearly, whenever Mercury is retrograde in Aquarius, there are many catastrophes here on Earth.
+Adapted from: Larry Schwimmer, "Mercury Retrograde: Jan 21–Feb 11th—It’s Groundhog Day All Over Again," Huffington Post, Jan 20, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-schwimmer/mercury-retrograde-jan-21_b_6508342.html
+5. Jennifer’s financial troubles began when she lost her job. After ordering supplies online to perform some hoodoo rituals, her financial situation has turned around. Tammie and Angela have similar stories: when they fell on hard times, they turned to hoodoo rituals and found their financial problems disappearing. Therefore, people in financial trouble who perform hoodoo rituals are likely to recover from their financial problems.
+Adapted from: Cameron McWhirter, "Need a Job? Losing Your House?
+Who Says Hoodoo Can’t Help?" Wall Street Journal, Dec 28, 2010,
+http://on.wsj.com/1w7s985
+56 Rule 9: Background rates are often crucial
+6. The death of the Ultimate Warrior, just days after his induction into the wrestling hall of fame, illustrates an often overlooked problem: professional wrestling is a grueling sport that poses a serious long-term risk to wrestlers’ health. Consider the wrestlers who participated in Wrestlemania VI in 1990, which was the pinnacle of the Ultimate Warrior’s career. Those wrestlers are only in their fifties or sixties now, but already twelve of them have died.
+Adapted from: "Ultimate Warrior: One-Third of WrestleMania VI Competitors Now Dead," ThePostGame, Apr 9, 2014, http://www.thepostgame.com/blog/list/201404/ultimate-warrior-dead-wrestlers-wrestlemania-vi-andre-savage-rude-hennig
+7. New York’s "Take 5" lotto game sells one hundred thousand winning tickets every single day. Therefore, buying a "Take 5" ticket gives you a good shot at winning too.
+Adapted from: "NY Lotto Commercial Take 5," YouTube, Feb 2, 2008,
+http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fMxRH2YQPo
+8. It took centuries for modern civilization to instill good manners in people, but all that progress is falling apart in a matter of decades. People today have far worse manners than their grandparents did. On overnight flights, for instance, people treat the plane like their own home, as if they weren’t out in public. I’ve seen one person floss his teeth while sitting in the seat next to me, another do push-ups in the aisle, and a third tossing chicken bones onto the floor!
+Adapted from: Adrian Wooldridge, "The De-civilising Process," 1843, Oct/Nov 2018, https://www.1843magazine.com/and-finally/reluctant-global-citizen/the-decivilising-process
+9. When you buy an expensive electronic device, like a phone, buying an extended warranty for it is a smart way to protect your investment. Lots of phones and similar devices get damaged after the manufacturer’s limited warranty expires or in ways that the manufacturer’s warranty doesn’t cover. In fact, between 2007 and 2018, Americans spent $10.7 billion dollars out of their own pockets to repair or replace iPhones that weren’t covered under
+Rule 10: Statistics need a critical eye 57
+Apple’s warranty—and that’s just for iPhones! It doesn’t include computers, iPads, or other kinds of phones and tablets.
+Adapted from: Jacob Stein, "Why You Should Invest in an Extended Warranty," Clyde, July 19, 2018, https://www.joinclyde.com/blog/why-buy-product-protection
+10. David Arroyo’s shooting spree in Tyler, Texas, left two people dead and wounded four others. Among the wounded were Arroyo’s son and several police officers. Among the dead were Arroyo’s ex-wife and a bystander, Mark Wilson, whose heroism prevented Arroyo’s rampage from becoming an even bigger tragedy. Wilson, who owns a handgun, heard Arroyo’s shots from his nearby apartment. He ran outside and started shooting at Arroyo, who was about to kill another victim. Arroyo turned to face Wilson instead. While the ensuing gun battle left Wilson fatally wounded, it bought enough time for more police to arrive. Those police officers managed to take Arroyo down. The lesson here is that if more law-abiding citizens carried guns, more deaths could be averted.
+Adapted from: John Lott, Jr., "Good Samaritan Gun Use," FOX News,
+Mar 8, 2005, http://www.aei.org/publication/good-samaritan-gun-use/
+Rule 10
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 352.
+Need more practice? Make a list of ten stereotypes. These could be stereotypes about types of people (e.g., scientists or musicians), types of events (e.g., baseball games, political elections, royal weddings), etc. Give one or two examples from real life or fiction that support the stereotype. Then ask yourself what background rate(s) you would need to know to determine whether the stereotype is true and what information you would need to calculate the relevant background rate(s).
+Statistics need a critical eye
+You cannot "prove anything with numbers"! Some people see numbers—any numbers—in an argument and conclude from that fact alone that it must be a good argument. Statistics seem to have an aura of authority and definiteness (and did you know that 88 percent of doctors agree?). In fact,
+58 Rule 10: Statistics need a critical eye
+though, numbers take as much critical thinking as any other kind of evidence. Don’t turn off your brain!
+After an era when some athletic powerhouse universities were accused of exploiting student athletes, leaving them to flunk out once their eligibility expired, college athletes are now graduating at higher rates. Many schools are now graduating more than 50 percent of their athletes.
+Fifty percent, eh? Pretty impressive! But this figure, at first so persuasive, does not really do the job it claims to do.
+First, although "many" schools graduate more than 50 percent of their athletes, it appears that some do not—so this figure may well exclude the most exploitative schools that really concerned people in the first place.
+The argument does offer graduation rates. But it would be useful to know how a "more than 50 percent" graduation rate compares with the graduation rate for all students at the same institutions. If it is significantly lower, athletes may still be getting the shaft.
+Most importantly, this argument offers no reason to believe that college athletes’ graduation rates are actually improving, because no comparison to any previous rate is offered! The conclusion claims that the graduation rate is now "higher," but without knowing the previous rates it is impossible to tell.
+Numbers may offer incomplete evidence in other ways too. Rule 9, for example, tells us that knowing background rates may be crucial. Correspondingly, when an argument offers rates or percentages, the relevant background information usually must include the number of examples. Car thefts on campus may have doubled, but if this means that two cars were stolen rather than one, there’s not much to worry about.
+Another statistical pitfall is over-precision:
+Every year this campus wastes 412,067 paper and plastic cups. It’s time to switch to reusable cups!
+We’re all for ending waste too, and we’re sure the amount of campus waste is huge. But no one really knows the precise number of cups wasted—and it’s extremely unlikely to be exactly the same every year. Here the appearance of exactness makes the evidence seem more authoritative than it really is.
+Be wary, also, of numbers that are easily manipulated. Pollsters know very well that the way a question is asked can shape how it is answered. These days we are even seeing "polls" that try to change people’s minds
+Rule 10: Statistics need a critical eye 59
+There’s much more to be said about statistics and probability than we could possibly say in this book. You might consider taking a course in statistics in order to understand these topics more deeply. We think everyone who aspires to be an educated person should take at least one such course! In the meantime, take a look at the "Resources" section on this book’s companion Web site for links to helpful books and online resources about statistics and probability. Perusing those resources might even help you complete the following exercises.
+Objective: To develop a critical eye for arguments using simple statistics.
+Instructions: Each of the following arguments uses numbers in a misleading way. Explain why each argument’s use of numbers does not adequately support the argument’s conclusions.
+Tips for success: Many misleading uses of statistics can be detected with three simple questions: What exactly are these statistics saying? Are these statistics believable? Do these statistics really show what the argument claims they show? Be sure to ask yourself each of these questions when evaluating the following arguments—or any arguments that use statistics.
+In addition, Rule 10 introduces some specific pitfalls in arguments that use simple statistics: rates or percentages offered without relevant
+about, say, a political candidate, just by asking loaded questions ("If you were to discover that she is a liar and a cheat, how would that change your vote?"). Then too, many apparently "hard" statistics are actually based on guesswork or extrapolation, such as data about semi-legal or illegal activities. Since people have a major motive not to reveal or report things like drug use, under-the-counter transactions, hiring illegal aliens, and the like, beware of any confident generalizations about how widespread they are.
+Yet again:
+If kids keep watching more TV at current rates, by 2025 they’ll have no time left to sleep!
+Right, and by 2040 they’ll be watching thirty-six hours a day. Extrapolation in such cases is perfectly possible mathematically, but after a certain point it tells you nothing.
+Exercise Set 2.4: Evaluating simple arguments that use numbers
+60 Rule 10: Statistics need a critical eye
+background information; statistics, often surprisingly precise, that no one is likely to know with any confidence; results of manipulative surveys or opinion polls; thoughtless extrapolations; and in general, the sloppy use of numbers to try to justify conclusions that the statistics just don’t support. Look out for all of these pitfalls in the arguments below.
+Whereas Rule 9 urged you to include background rates when giving examples, the use of rates or percentages without background information is just as problematic. If you see an argument that only gives rates or percentages, ask yourself whether those rates might be misleading. Do you know enough background information to figure out whether, say a 10 percent decline is significant? If not, the argument’s author may be trying to mislead you into thinking that something is a big deal, even when it’s not.
+Another question to ask yourself when dealing with statistics is how someone would or could have learned that particular statistic—and how reliable that method is. Suppose you are told that 68 percent of people floss daily. How would anyone know that? Most likely, a pollster asks people whether they floss daily. People sometimes lie (or, let’s just say, shade the truth) to pollsters, though—especially when they are embarrassed about the true answer, don’t quite want to face it themselves, or otherwise fear that the true answer is not "socially desirable." So, that figure of 68 percent probably overestimates the percentage of people who floss daily.
+In general, the harder it would be to figure out a statistic, the more skeptical you should be that a statistic is accurate. (But don’t go overboard with this, either. Statisticians have developed very clever techniques to overcome these kinds of problems. You’ll need to consider whether a particular argument was written by someone with the ability and motivation to use those techniques.)
+Even with statistics that could be determined with some accuracy, some organizations might be more interested in getting a particular result than learning the truth. Pollsters can skew the results by using biased samples or asking loaded questions. Running tests over and over again until you get the desired result is another way to manipulate statistics. A toothpaste company can keep asking groups of ten dentists which toothpaste they recommend until they find a group where nine out of ten recommend the company’s brand. If a statistic comes from a source that is more interested in getting their preferred result than in getting the truth, you should be skeptical of the statistic. (In fact, you should be at least somewhat skeptical of all their arguments! See Rule 15.)
+Rule 10: Statistics need a critical eye 61
+1. A burglary occurs every fifteen seconds in the United States. Up to 80 percent of forced entries occur through a front door or a window. That’s why it’s essential to invest in a product like the OnGARD Security Door Brace, which helps prevent would-be burglars from breaking through your front door.
+Adapted from: Front Door Security Products, "Home Security Door Stop | The OnGARD Brace Prevents Burglaries & Home Invasions," YouTube, Jul 24, 2012,
+https://youtu.be/Q0lRELhaCB4
+Sample
+According to U.S. News & World Report’s compilation of statistics provided by law schools, 93 percent of law school graduates have a job nine months after finishing law school. That’s up nearly ten percentage points from 1997, when law schools reported an average employment rate of 84 percent. The employment picture for law school graduates is better than ever!
+Adapted from: David Segal, "Is Law School a Losing Game?" New York Times, Jan 8, 2011,
+http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html
+This argument cites two "employment rates" for recent law school graduates to show that the employment picture for law school graduates is "better than ever." There are several reasons to be skeptical of this argument. First of all, it’s worth noting that these statistics come from the law schools themselves, who have an incentive to inflate employment rates. Second, the argument doesn’t specify that 93 percent of graduates are employed as lawyers, which is what we really want to know about. It could be that half are employed as lawyers and 43 percent are flipping burgers and making cappuccinos. Third, the argument claims that the employment picture is "better than ever," but it offers only one point of comparison: 1997. It could be that 1997 was a particularly bad year for law school graduates. We would need more background information to evaluate the relevance of that statistic.
+This response starts by explaining what the argument attempts to do with statistics. It then cites three reasons, related to those statistics, to be skeptical of the argument. Notice that the response doesn’t give us a strong reason to think the conclusion itself is false. The upshot is that we just don’t know. We would need to do more research to know whether law school graduates really do have good prospects. The point is that thinking critically about statistics can help prevent you from being taken in by misleading arguments.
+62 Rule 10: Statistics need a critical eye
+2. A recent survey by British researchers found that heterosexual men have an average of 12.7 sexual partners over the course of their lives. The same study found that heterosexual women average 6.5 sexual partners. An American survey, recently reported by the U.S. government, found a similar discrepancy: heterosexual men averaged seven sexual partners, while heterosexual women averaged four. Men must be more promiscuous than women.
+Adapted from: Gina Kolata, "The Myth, the Math, the Sex," New York Times,
+Aug 12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/weekinreview/
+12kolata.html
+3. After the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the rich have fared far better than the poor in Egypt. The number of billionaires in Egypt doubled, while the country’s average income per person only rose by 20 percent.
+Adapted from: Adapted from: Caroline Freund, Twitter post, Jan 25, 2016,
+https://twitter.com/carolinefreund/status/691708357296701441.
+4. The tiny town of Vail boasts Colorado’s largest ski resort. In February 2017, the local police department warned of a kind of crime wave that can only happen in a place like Vail: an 875 percent spike in sales of fake ski lift passes—a form of fraud in which a con artist sells someone a fake pass to ride the ski lifts up the mountain. Visitors to Vail had better beware! There are ski lift scams everywhere!
+Adapted from: Jesse Paul, "Vail Police Say Fraudulent Lift Ticket Cases Have Increased by 875 Percent in 12 Months," Colorado News, Feb 22, 2017,
+https://www.denverpost.com/2017/02/22/vail-lift-ticket-fraud/
+5. Environmentalists warn that humans’ carbon dioxide emissions are endangering the planet. But the Earth naturally emits far more carbon dioxide than we do. In fact, humans’ cumulative carbon dioxide emissions over the whole of human history are just 0.00022 percent of the total amount that has been emitted by volcanoes over geological history. Given that our emissions are such a tiny fraction of natural emissions, there’s no need to worry that our emissions will change the climate.
+Adapted from: Charlotte Meredith, "100 Reasons Why Climate Change Is Natural," Daily Express (London), Nov 20, 2012, http://express.co.uk/news/uk/146138/100-reasons-why-climate-change-is-natural
+Rule 10: Statistics need a critical eye 63
+6. Beef is not high in cholesterol. Three ounces of cooked lean beef contain 73 milligrams of cholesterol. By comparison, the same amount of roast chicken contains 76 mg; fried chicken, 74 mg; pork, 77 mg; shrimp, 130 mg; cheddar cheese, 90 mg.
+Adapted from: "12 Myths about Beef," a flyer distributed at the North Carolina State Fair on behalf of the National Cattleman’s Association, n.d.
+7. During a typical week, the average person lies to 34 percent of the people whom he or she encounters during that week. This includes both altruistic lies (i.e., lies told to avoid hurting someone’s feelings) and selfish lies (i.e., lies told to gain some advantage), as well as lies to both close friends and casual acquaintances. Clearly, you can’t believe much of anything that anyone says.
+Adapted from: B. D. DePaulo & D. A. Kashy, "Everyday Lies in Close and Casual Relationships," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (1998), 63–79
+8. Israel’s military is supposed to be the world’s leader in gender equality. Israel has opened 92 percent of the jobs in its military to women, including many combat roles. Yet, only 3 percent of women actually serve in combat roles. Clearly, women are not actually treated equally in the Israeli military.
+Adapted from: Jodi Rudoren, "Looking to Israel for Clues on Women in Combat," New York Times, Jan 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/middleeast/looking-to-israel-for-clues-on-women-in-combat.html?hp
+9. In 1996, the Australian government banned most guns. They forced gun owners to surrender 640,381 guns to the government. Guess what happened? In the following year, homicides increased 3.2 percent across the country; assaults were up 8.6 percent; armed robberies rose 43.2 percent; and most amazingly, gun homicides in the Australian state of Victoria soared 171 percent! There’s no doubt that crime has gotten much worse since the government banned guns.
+Adapted from: Jon E. Dougherty, "Crime Up Down Under," WorldNet Daily,
+Mar 3, 2000, http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?article_id=15304
+10. Hydraulic fracturing—or "fracking," as it’s commonly known—involves pumping special fluids into rocks at very high pressure to fracture the rock. This makes it easier to extract gas and oil from the rock. But those fracking fluids are nasty stuff. They contain
+64 Rule 11: Reckon with counterexamples
+Reckon with counterexamples
+Counterexamples are examples that contradict your generalization. No fun—maybe. But counterexamples actually can be a generalizer’s best friends, if you use them early and use them well. Exceptions don’t "prove the rule"—quite the contrary, they threaten to disprove it—but they can and should prompt us to refine it. Therefore, seek out counterexamples early and systematically. It is the best way to sharpen your own generalizations and to probe more deeply into your theme.
+Consider this argument once again:
+Solar power is widely used.
+Hydroelectric power has long been widely used.
+Rule 11
+208 different kinds of chemicals. And 96.6 percent of those chemicals are known to cause serious health problems, including birth defects and cancer. That’s why fracking should be banned.
+Adapted from: Shaleshock, "Drilling 101," shaleshock.org, n.d.,
+https://web.archive.org/web/20150314190442/shaleshock.org/drilling-101
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 355.
+Need more practice? Get together with a few classmates. Have each person pick a specific Web site, newspaper, or magazine and look for arguments that use statistics. Try to estimate how many arguments from your chosen site, newspaper, or magazine use statistics in relatively good versus relatively poor ways. As a group, rank the various sources in terms of the reliability of their use of statistics. Alternatively, each person could review a specific section from the same Web site, newspaper, or magazine.
+Critical thinking activity: Finding misleading statistics
+For an out-of-class activity that gives you practice in applying Rule 10, see the "Finding misleading statistics" assignment sheet (p. 521) in Part 3. This activity has an optional, in-class extension.
+Rule 11: Reckon with counterexamples 65
+Windmills were once widely used and are becoming widely
+used again.
+Therefore, renewable energy is widely used.
+The examples here certainly do help to show that many renewable energy
+sources are widely used: sun, wind, and rain. However, as soon as you start
+thinking about counterexamples instead of just more examples, you may
+find that the argument somewhat overgeneralizes.
+Are all renewables widely used? Look up the definition of "renewable
+energy" and you will find that there are other types as well, such as the tides
+and geothermal energy (the internal heat of the earth). And these, for better
+or worse, are not so widely used. They aren’t available everywhere, for
+one thing, and may be difficult to harness even when available.
+When you think of counterexamples to a generalization that you
+want to defend, then you need to adjust your generalization. If the renewable
+energy argument were yours, for instance, you might change the
+conclusion to "Many forms of renewable energy are widely used." Your
+argument still hits the high points, so to speak, while it acknowledges
+limits and the possibility for improvement in some areas.
+Counterexamples should prompt you to think more deeply about
+what you actually want to say. For example, maybe your interest in arguing
+about renewables is to try to show that there are ready and workable alternatives
+to the usual non-renewable sources. If that is your aim, you don’t
+necessarily need to argue that all renewables are widely used. It is enough
+that some are. You might even urge that the ones that are less widely used
+be better developed.
+Or, instead of arguing that every renewable source is or could be
+widely used, you might really want to be arguing that every (or most
+every?) place has at least some renewable source available to it, though
+there may be different sources in different places. This is a quite different
+and more subtle claim than the original, and gives your thinking some
+interesting room to move. (Might this argument have counterexamples
+too? We leave that question for you.)
+Ask yourself about counterexamples when you are assessing others’
+arguments as well as evaluating your own. Ask whether their conclusions
+might have to be revised and limited, or rethought in more subtle and
+complex directions. The same rules apply both to others’ arguments and to
+yours. The only difference is that you have a chance to correct your overgeneralizations
+yourself.
+66 Rule 11: Reckon with counterexamples
+Objective: To give you practice identifying counterexamples to generalizations.
+Instructions: Try to find a counterexample to each of the generalizations
+below. If there are no counterexamples, say so.
+Tips for success: Remember that a counterexample is an example that
+counts against a generalization. Consider the generalization "All birds can
+fly." It’s a generalization about birds. It says that all members of that group
+(i.e., birds) can fly. A counterexample to that generalization would be a
+bird that cannot fly. Penguins are counterexamples to the generalization.
+So are ostriches, and so (unfortunately for them) were dodo birds.
+In order to decide whether something is a counterexample to a particular
+generalization, you’ll need to think about the same questions you
+asked yourself in Exercise Sets 2.1 and 2.2: What type of thing is the
+generalization about? What does the generalization say about this type of
+thing? A counterexample must be the right type of thing. If your generalization
+is about birds, your counterexample must be a bird. Furthermore,
+your counterexample must contradict the generalization. If the generalization
+says that birds can fly, your counterexample must be a bird that is not
+able to fly.
+Many logicians, philosophers, and mathematicians use the word counterexample
+to refer specifically to an example that disproves a "universal"
+generalization—that is, a generalization that says something about all members
+of a group (e.g., "All birds can fly"). You might also think of counterexamples
+in a less technical sense as "exceptions" to a generalization, even
+non-universal generalizations. In this weaker sense of counterexample, the
+rainforests of Norway and Alaska are counterexamples to the generalization
+that most rainforests are in the tropics. While this exercise focuses
+exclusively on universal generalizations, it will be important to keep this
+weaker sense of counterexample in mind for later exercises.
+Remember that not all counterarguments count as counterexamples.
+A counterargument to a generalization is just any argument for thinking
+that the generalization is false. A counterexample has to be an example of
+a member of the relevant group that is an exception to the generalization.
+For instance, "My history teacher told me that there was a U.S. president
+who never married" is a counterargument to the generalization that all U.S.
+Exercise Set 2.5: Finding counterexamples
+Rule 11: Reckon with counterexamples 67
+Sample
+All major world leaders have been men.
+German chancellor Angela Merkel is a major world leader, and she is a woman.
+The generalization here is about major world leaders. It says that all of them have been men.
+Thus, a counterexample must be a major world leader who is not (or was not) a man. Angela
+Merkel became chancellor of Germany in 2005 and was still chancellor when we wrote this
+edition of the book, though she announced in 2018 that she would not run again in the next
+election. There are plenty of other counterexamples besides Merkel, of course: historical figures
+include Queen Elizabeth I (England), Catherine the Great (Russia), the Dowager Empress
+Cixi (China), and somewhat more recently, Indira Gandhi (India), Golda Meir (Israel),
+and Margaret Thatcher (UK). More contemporary figures include Theresa May (UK), Park
+Geun-hye (South Korea), Dilma Rousseff (Brazil), and Michelle Bachelet (Chile), among
+others.
+As usual, there may be some interpretive questions about the generalization. Cleopatra
+was the last pharaoh of ancient Egypt. She governed an important country and played an
+important role in the politics of the ancient Mediterranean world. Does that make her a
+"major world leader"? The American secretary of state plays an important role in world politics.
+Does that mean that Madeline Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton were
+major world leaders when they were secretaries of state? Queen Elizabeth II is technically
+the head of state of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and thirteen other Commonwealth
+realms. She presumably counts as a world leader, although one could argue that she’s
+really just a figurehead—unless being a world leader isn’t just about raw political power.
+Speaking of which, do major world leaders even have to be in politics? What about female
+leaders of major multinational organizations, such as Mary Barra, CEO of General Motors,
+or Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund? How about
+Mother Theresa?
+presidents have been married, but it’s not a counterexample. The only counterexample to that
+generalization is James Buchanan—the fifteenth president of the United States and the only one
+who never married.
+68 Rule 11: Reckon with counterexamples
+1. All Hollywood movie stars are native English speakers.
+2. College textbooks are deathly boring.
+3. Every country in the world belongs to the United Nations.
+4. No women have won the Nobel Prize in chemistry.
+5. No mammals lay eggs.
+6. Baseball players make too much money.
+7. Salads are made of vegetables.
+8. Spanish is the official language of all South American countries.
+9. Mammals have hair.
+10. Everything in the room you’re in right now was made outside the
+United States.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 359.
+Need more practice? See if you can find counterexamples to the generalizations
+in Exercise Sets 2.1 and 2.2. For even more practice, work with a
+friend or classmate to create a list of generalizations, and then look for
+counterexamples to each one.
+Chapter II Exercises 69
+CHAPTER EXERCISES
+Exercise Set 2.6: Evaluating arguments for generalizations
+Objective: To give you practice using Rules 7–11 to evaluate arguments
+for generalizations.
+Instructions: Evaluate how well each of the following arguments follows
+the rules from this chapter.
+Tips for success: To evaluate an argument is to decide how strong the
+argument is. When you encounter an argument in which someone tries to
+support a generalization by giving examples, ask yourself how well it follows
+Rules 7–11. The better it does, the stronger the argument is. To be
+sure that you’ve done a thorough job in evaluating an argument, it’s best
+to take a systematic approach. Go through Rules 7–11 one by one, asking
+yourself how well the argument follows each one.
+There are some things to keep in mind when applying these rules.
+In general, the more examples an argument gives, the better it does in
+following Rule 7. Although Rule 7 literally says that an argument should
+"use more than one example," two examples usually aren’t much better than
+one. The real question is whether the argument gives enough examples.
+How many is "enough?" That’s a tough question. When an argument is
+generalizing about a small number of things, it’s best to look at every one
+of those things. When there are too many examples to consider all of them,
+you need to take a sample. Knowing how big a sample needs to be to count
+as "enough" examples is tough, since it varies from case to case. But you
+should know that it’s possible to support generalizations about really large
+groups, like the entire population of the United States, based on surprisingly
+small samples—sometimes only one or two thousand people, provided
+that the samples are truly representative.
+In deciding how well an argument follows Rule 8, keep in mind what
+you learned from Exercise Set 2.2. Ask yourself how many of the examples
+are representative or whether the sample is unbiased. If most or all of them
+are representative or if the sample is reasonably unbiased, the argument
+does a good job following Rule 8.
+To decide whether an argument follows Rule 9, ask yourself whether
+you need to know any background rates. Often background rates are expressed
+in terms of percentages. Suppose someone tells you that faulty
+70 Chapter II Exercises
+ignition switches made by General Motors have caused thirty-one car
+crashes. In order to conclude that General Motors’ cars are notably unsafe,
+you’d need to know what percentage of General Motors cars have crashed
+because of defective ignition switches. Does the argument provide that
+percentage—or at least the information you’d need to calculate that percentage?
+Or can the arguer reasonably assume that you know the background
+rates (in this case, actually very low)? If not, the argument does a
+poor job following Rule 9.
+Deciding whether an argument follows Rule 10 is more difficult because
+there are so many ways that statistics can be abused. When you encounter
+statistics in an argument, think carefully about what the statistics
+mean, where they came from, and whether they really support the generalization
+that they’re meant to support.
+When it comes to Rule 11, ask yourself first whether the conclusion is
+a universal generalization—that is, a generalization that says something
+about all members of a group, such as "Everyone in Portland, Oregon, is a
+vegetarian." If it is a universal generalization, see if you can find a counterexample.
+If there are any counterexamples at all, then the argument’s conclusion
+is false, and the argument needs to be revised.
+What about conclusions that are not universal generalizations? You
+can’t prove such conclusions wrong by finding just a few exceptions to
+them. In the "Tips for success" for Exercise Set 2.5 though, we suggested a
+looser sense of "counterexample," in which any exception to a generalization
+is a counterexample to that generalization. Thus, if you can find so
+many exceptions to a generalization that you think the generalization is
+false, then the argument is not following Rule 11. In most cases where the
+argument overlooks that many exceptions, however, the argument also violates
+Rule 8. If the argument had used a genuinely representative sample,
+it probably would have found many of the counterexamples.
+Chapter II Exercises 71
+Sample
+Almost every Hollywood action movie features a male hero with a more competent
+female sidekick who should be the real star. But the female sidekick always
+ends up as a damsel in distress, only to be rescued by the male hero, who then
+gets the credit for saving the day. Don’t believe me? Think about it: In the original
+Star Wars movie, bumbling Luke ends up saving Leia, despite the fact that
+she’s the one who knows how to use a blaster. In Harry Potter and the Chamber of
+Secrets, Harry rescues his far smarter and more competent friend Hermione. In
+Guardians of the Galaxy, Gamora is one of the fiercest fighters anywhere, but
+Peter gets to save the day.
+Adapted from: Constance Grady and Javier Zarracina, "Every Semi-Competent Male Hero Has a More
+Talented Female Sidekick. Why Isn’t She the Hero Instead?" Vox, Apr 18, 2016,
+https://www.vox.com/2016/4/18/11433378/heroes-female-sidekicks
+While male heroes do outnumber female ones in Hollywood blockbusters, this argument
+is fairly weak. It follows the letter of Rule 7 by giving more than one example,
+but not the spirit of the rule, since it only gives three examples out of all the Hollywood
+action movies that were released since Star Wars, the argument’s oldest example, came
+out in 1977. It’s not clear whether the argument follows Rule 8 about using representative
+examples, since it’s not clear how they came up with them, but the examples
+don’t seem representative of all Hollywood action movies. For one thing, they’re all
+from the sci-fi and fantasy genre. The argument ought to tell us how many action
+movies Hollywood has produced in the last four decades (Rule 9)—although, if it did,
+it would be painfully obvious that it doesn’t supply enough examples. There are no
+statistics in the argument, so Rule 10 doesn’t apply here. A quick web search for
+"female action heroes" produces tons of counterexamples (Rule 11), from Lt. Ripley in
+the Alien movies to Katniss Everdeen in The Hunger Games movies and Imperator
+Furiosa in Mad Max: Fury Road, not to mention action movies like Charlie’s Angels
+and Kill Bill that focus exclusively on heroines. A far more modest generalization
+might be more appropriate, based on the examples given here.
+This response addresses each rule in turn. (It evens mentions Rule 10, if only to say that it’s
+not relevant.) By noting that three examples aren’t enough, the response recognizes that Rule
+7 isn’t really about ensuring that the argument includes two or more examples. Another
+strong point about this response is that it admits that we don’t know whether the argument
+follows Rule 8; don’t be afraid to say that we don’t have enough information to know whether
+an argument follows a particular rule. The response doesn’t go overboard with this, though.
+In the case of Rule 11, the response does more than say that counterexamples exist: it gives a
+bunch of them.
+72 Chapter II Exercises
+1. In a nationally representative online survey conducted by a dairy
+industry group, roughly seven percent of adult Americans—that’s
+16.4 million adult human beings—said that chocolate milk comes
+from brown cows. Therefore, seven percent of Americans think
+we live in some kind of Willy Wonka fantasy world where some
+cows produce chocolate milk.
+Adapted from: River Donaghey, "A Lot of American Adults Think Brown Cows Make
+Chocolate Milk," VICE, Jun 15, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/
+kzqk8e/a-lot-of-american-adults-think-brown-cows-make-chocolate-milk-vgtrn
+2. When you look at county-level data, most counties in the United
+States were strongly for one presidential candidate or the other in
+the 2016 presidential election. Only 303 counties, or almost one
+in ten counties in the country, had a margin of victory below ten
+percentage points. (The margin of victory is the percentage of the
+vote going to the winning candidate minus the percentage going
+to the losing candidate.) Meanwhile, 1,196 counties, well over
+one in three, had a margin of victory over fifty percentage points.
+This is a striking increase in partisanship over past elections.
+Adapted from: David Wasserman, "Purple America Has All but Disappeared,"
+FiveThirtyEight, Mar 8, 2017, http://53eig.ht/2mOFp5F
+3. No empire lasts very long. Just look at the empires that collapsed
+in the twentieth century. The Soviet Union was going to last forever,
+but it collapsed after seventy years. Hitler’s and Mussolini’s
+regimes were supposed to last for thousands of years. You know
+what happened to them. Even the British Empire came to an end!
+Adapted from: Associated Press, "Doris Lessing Wins
+2007 Nobel Literature Prize," FOXNews.com, Oct 11, 2007,
+https://www.foxnews.com/story/doris-lessing-wins-2007-nobel-literature-prize
+4. When public health experts try to help Americans become healthier,
+Americans just get fatter. When the government encouraged
+Americans to quit smoking, ex-smokers gained an estimated fifteen
+pounds on average. Take another example: When the public
+health experts said to switch to a low-fat diet, Americans switched.
+But they replaced their high-fat foods with sugary drinks and
+Chapter II Exercises 73
+low-fat snacks devoured by the fistful. What happened? Americans
+got so much fatter that the experts rescinded their low-fat
+advice.
+Adapted from: John Tierney, "When It Comes to Salt, No Rights or Wrongs. Yet,"
+New York Times, Feb 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/
+science/23tier.html
+5. Of the 3,141 counties in the United States, the 314 counties with
+the lowest rates of kidney cancer per year are almost all very rural
+counties. Furthermore, based on data from 2004, the only counties
+in which no one developed kidney cancer all had populations
+of less than 100,000. Thus, the counties where people have the
+lowest risk of kidney cancer are sparsely populated, rural
+counties.
+Adapted from: Howard Wainer, "The Most Dangerous Equation,"
+American Scientist, May–June 2007, 251–52
+6. The DNA analyses offered by companies like Ancestry DNA or
+23andMe are unreliable. We had a set of identical triplets—whose
+DNA is all exactly the same—send their DNA to one of these
+companies. While the tests correctly identified them as of European
+descent, they also said that one sister was only 11 percent
+French, a second was 18 percent French, and a third was 22.3
+percent French. How can these companies claim to be telling
+anyone about their ancestry when they give results like this?
+Adapted from: Inside Edition, "How Reliable Are Home DNA Ancestry Tests? Investigation
+Uses Triplets to Find Out," Yahoo! News, Feb 21, 2017, https://www.yahoo.com/
+news/reliable-home-dna-ancestry-tests-231600887.html
+7. Literally every major modern dictionary of the English language
+includes a definition of "literally" according to which "literally"
+means "figuratively." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
+Language does it, as does Collins English Dictionary and even
+the renowned Oxford English Dictionary. Merriam-Webster does
+it, too, and has done it since 1909, when the unabridged
+74 Chapter II Exercises
+Merriam-Webster explained that "literally" is "often used hyperbolically;
+as, he literally flew."
+Adapted from: Merriam-Webster, "Did We Change the Meaning of ‘Literally’?" Merriam-
+Webster: Usage Notes, n.d. https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/
+misuse-of-literally
+8. Themistocles was a virtuous man, and though he taught his son
+many things, he could not teach his son to be virtuous. Likewise,
+Aristides was a virtuous man, but his son was not, even though
+Aristides had his son trained in many things. Pericles, too, was a
+virtuous man whose son was not virtuous. Thucydides, another
+virtuous man, had two sons, to whom he gave a good education,
+but he did not succeed in making them virtuous. So, we can see
+that even a good man cannot teach his children to be virtuous.
+Adapted from: Plato, "Meno," in Five Dialogues, 2nd ed., translated by
+G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), 85–86
+9. In the 1920s, Dr. Harrison Matland was investigating whether
+boxing caused brain damage. A fight promoter gave him a list of
+twenty-three former boxers whom the promoter regarded as "punch
+drunk." Though he sought all twenty-three of them, Matland only
+located ten. Of those ten, all suffered clear signs of brain damage:
+Four had dementia. Two had difficulty speaking coherently. Two
+had trouble walking. One was blind. One had the symptoms like
+those of Parkinson’s disease. This proved that many former boxers
+have brain damage.
+Adapted from: Deborah Blum, "Will Science Take the Field?" New York Times,
+Feb 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/opinion/05blum.html
+10. We asked 599 first-year undergraduates at a selective Northeastern
+public university how much money they had borrowed in student
+loans during the previous academic year. When we compared
+those results to the university’s financial aid records, we found
+that only 228 of the students had answered within $1,000 of the
+actual amount they had borrowed. Therefore, most American college
+students do not know how much money they are borrowing
+to pay for college.
+Adapted from: Elizabeth J. Akers and Matthew W. Chingos, "Are College Students
+Borrowing Blindly?" (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2014), 3–5
+Chapter II Exercises 75
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 361.
+Need more practice? For more practice evaluating arguments for generalizations,
+look and listen for generalizations in newspapers, in conversations
+with your friends or family, on television, or online. Ask yourself what arguments
+people give for those generalizations—if any!—and see how well
+those arguments measure up against the rules from this chapter.
+Exercise Set 2.7: Arguing for and against generalizations
+Objective: To give you practice supporting generalizations by constructing
+arguments that follow Rules 7–11.
+Instructions: Consider the following generalizations. Are they true or
+false? Support your answer with an argument that follows Rules 7–11. You
+may need to do a little bit of research to complete this exercise. If you can’t
+find the examples to support your initial answer, even after doing some
+research, you may need to change your answer!
+Tips for success: If you’re not sure whether a generalization is true or false,
+look for examples and counterexamples before you begin constructing your
+argument. Examples count in favor of the generalization; counterexamples
+count against it.
+If you think that a generalization is true, give examples to support it,
+keeping in mind Rules 7, 8, 9, and 11 in particular. If you think that a generalization
+is false, give examples that support the opposite claim. For instance,
+if you think the generalization "Most reptiles are dangerous" is false,
+construct an argument to support a generalization like "Many reptiles are
+not dangerous."
+It’s natural to focus on examples that support whatever it is we believe
+(or want to believe). Rule 11, in particular, provides a helpful check on this
+tendency. No matter what generalization you’re considering, actively look
+for exceptions to that generalization.
+76 Chapter II Exercises
+Sample
+Illegal drugs are safer than alcohol.
+This generalization is false. While it’s arguable that some drugs, such as marijuana
+and certain hallucinogens, are safer than alcohol, most illegal drugs are more dangerous
+than alcohol. Cocaine, crack, methamphetamines, opium, and heroin are
+particularly dangerous because they are all highly addictive, they do serious damage
+to the body, and it’s easy to overdose on them. Ecstasy can cause brain damage, and
+impure ecstasy can be lethal. While alcohol is addictive and can damage your body or
+kill you, it is not as addictive or damaging as these drugs. Thus, in general, illegal
+drugs are not safer than alcohol.
+This response does two things. First, it states whether the generalization is true or false. Then,
+it gives an argument to support that claim. The argument does a reasonably good job following
+each of the rules from this chapter: It gives many examples (Rule 7), which are representative
+of the most widely used illegal drugs (Rule 8). While it doesn’t say how many kinds of
+illegal drugs there are (Rule 9), we can probably rely on the reader to know roughly how
+many kinds of drugs are left out. The argument does not give any statistics to support its
+claim, which means that it doesn’t give any misleading statistics (Rule 10), although wellchosen
+statistics could have strengthened the argument. The argument does mention some
+specific counterexamples (Rule 11), but only to point out that there are only a few of them.
+One thing the argument could do better is to clarify what it means by "illegal drugs." In
+particular, does it include drugs, like fentanyl, that are legally available by prescription but
+widely used (and often abused) by people who purchase them illegally?
+1. Most U.S. presidents were born in Ohio or Virginia.
+2. The Japanese make the best cars.
+3. Classical music is boring.
+4. Your classes this term are interesting.
+5. Skydiving is dangerous.
+6. Anything that can go wrong, will. (Murphy’s Law)
+Chapter II Exercises 77
+7. All generalizations have exceptions.
+8. Cat owners are more neurotic than dog owners.
+For exercises 9 and 10, write your own generalization and then support your
+generalization with an argument that follows Rules 7–11.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 365.
+Need more practice? Look and listen for generalizations in newspapers,
+in conversations with your friends or family, on television, or online. Ask
+yourself whether those generalizations are true or false, and then try to
+support your answer with arguments that follow the rules in this chapter.
+Critical thinking activity: Generalizations about your classroom
+For an in-class or out-of-class activity that gives you practice in applying all of these rules,
+see the "Generalizations about your classroom" assignment sheet (p. 522) in Part 3.
+78
+There is an exception to Rule 7 ("Use more than one example"). Arguments by analogy, rather than multiplying examples to support a generalization, argue from one specific example to another, reasoning that because the two examples are alike in many ways, they are also alike in one further specific way.
+Valentina Tereshkova, Russian astronaut and first woman in space, famously quipped that
+If women can be railroad workers in Russia, why can’t they fly in space?
+Russian women are as capable of demanding physical and technical work as men, Tereshkova is arguing, and as devoted to their work and their country—as proved by the example of female railroad workers. Therefore, women should also make fine astronauts. Spelled out, the argument looks like this:
+Women have proved themselves to be capable railroad workers in Russia.
+Being a railroad worker is like being an astronaut (because they both make extreme physical and technical demands).
+Therefore, women can be capable astronauts as well.
+Notice the italicized word "like" in the second premise. When an argument stresses the likeness between two cases, it is very probably an argument from analogy.
+Analogies require relevantly similar examples
+How do we evaluate arguments by analogy?
+The first premise of an argument by analogy makes a claim about the example used as an analogy. Remember Rule 3: make sure this premise is true. Tereshkova’s argument could not even get off the ground, so to speak, if women had not proved themselves to be capable railroad workers in Russia.
+Chapter III
+Arguments by Analogy
+Rule 12
+Rule 12: Analogies require relevantly similar examples 79
+The second premise in arguments by analogy claims that the example
+in the first premise is like the example about which the argument draws a
+conclusion. Evaluating this premise requires us to ask how relevantly similar
+the two cases are.
+They do not have to be similar in every way. After all, being an astronaut
+is very different than working on the railroad. Trains don’t fly, for example—
+or when they do, the story does not have a happy ending.
+Astronauts better not wield sledgehammers. But argument by analogy
+only requires relevant similarities. Technical skill and physical strength and
+stamina seem to be Tereshkova’s real themes. Both astronauts and railroad
+workers require a lot of both.
+So how relevantly similar, in the end, is Tereshkova’s analogy? For
+modern astronauts, you might think that sheer physical stamina is less
+relevant than skill at running experiments and making scientific observations—
+skills not necessarily related to being a good railroad worker. In
+Tereshkova’s time, however, physical strength and stamina were much
+more important, as was body size: the early capsules were quite small and
+actually suited women’s physiques better. The other key factor was that the
+early Russian astronauts had to eject from their capsule and parachute to
+the ground at the end of their missions—and Tereshkova was a champion
+parachutist. This was probably the key factor, and is related to strength and
+stamina, though not to railroad work.
+Tereshkova’s analogy partially succeeds, then, especially for her time,
+though it is less persuasive now. But of course, since there have now been
+many successful female astronauts, it is also less necessary.
+Here is a more challenging argument from analogy.
+An interesting switch was pulled in Rome yesterday by Adam
+Nordwell, an American Chippewa chief. As he descended his
+plane from California dressed in full tribal regalia, Nordwell
+announced in the name of the American Indian people that
+he was taking possession of Italy "by right of discovery" in the
+same way that Christopher Columbus did in America. "I proclaim
+this day the day of the discovery of Italy," said Nordwell.
+"What right did Columbus have to discover America when it
+had already been inhabited for thousands of years? The same
+right I now have to come to Italy and proclaim the discovery
+of your country."1
+1. Miami News, September 23, 1973.
+80 Rule 12: Analogies require relevantly similar examples
+Nordwell is suggesting that his "discovery" of Italy is like Columbus’s "discovery"
+of America in at least one important way: both Nordwell and Columbus
+claimed a country that already had been inhabited by its own
+people for centuries. Thus, Nordwell insists that he has as much "right" to
+claim Italy as Columbus had to claim America. But, of course, Nordwell
+has no right at all to claim Italy. It follows that Columbus had no right at
+all to claim America.
+Nordwell has no right to claim Italy for another people, let
+alone "by right of discovery" (because Italy has been inhabited
+by its own people for centuries).
+Columbus’s claim to America "by right of discovery" is like
+Nordwell’s claim to Italy (America, too, had been inhabited
+by its own people for centuries).
+Therefore, Columbus had no right to claim America for another
+people, let alone "by right of discovery."
+How good is Nordwell’s analogy? Obviously, twentieth-century Italy
+is not just like fifteenth-century America. Italy is known to every twentieth-
+century schoolchild, whereas America was unknown to much of the
+world in the fifteenth century. Nordwell is not an explorer, and a commercial
+jet is not the Santa Maria. But are these differences relevant to Nordwell’s
+analogy? Nordwell simply means to remind us that it is senseless to
+claim a country already inhabited by its own people. Whether that land is
+known to the world’s schoolchildren, or how the "discoverer" arrived there,
+is not important. The more appropriate reaction might have been to try to
+establish diplomatic relations, as we would try to do today if somehow the
+land and people of Italy had just been discovered. That’s Nordwell’s point,
+and, taken in that way, his analogy makes a good (and unsettling)
+argument.
+Exercise Set 3.1: Identifying important similarities
+Objective: To give you practice identifying the kinds of similarities needed
+to support an argument by analogy.
+Instructions: For each of the following pairs of things, come up with one
+to three important ways in which the things are similar.
+Tips for success: There are lots of different answers you could give to all
+of these questions. What matters is that you come up with important
+similarities between two things that might initially seem quite different.
+Rule 12: Analogies require relevantly similar examples 81
+Roughly, a similarity is "important" if noticing that two things are similar
+in that way gives you a reason to think that the things might be similar in
+some other way. For instance, noticing that Belize and New Zealand both
+have English as an official language is a reason to think that they were both
+British colonies. Noticing that they both have the letter e in their name
+doesn’t allow you to draw many inferences about one country based on
+what you know about the other.
+Sample
+Adopting a dog and having a child
+Adopting a dog is like having a child in that both require taking responsibility for
+another living being. Also, they can both turn your home into a big mess!
+1. Being a student and having a job
+2. Your brain and a computer
+3. First-degree murder and euthanasia (physician-assisted death)
+4. Butterflies and children
+5. Planet Earth and a globe
+6. Planet Earth and a living organism
+7. Planet Earth and a watch
+8. A cow and a six-foot diameter, 1,500-pound metal sphere
+9. A mouse and an adult human
+10. Cooking a meal and living a life
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 369.
+82 Rule 12: Analogies require relevantly similar examples
+Need more practice? Find a short list of recent or classic movies, like "Best
+Films of 2019" (or 1969). Many Web sites that compile information about
+movies will have such lists. Try to find at least one important way in which
+each movie on the list is like each other movie on the list.
+Exercise Set 3.2: Identifying important differences
+Objective: To give you practice identifying the kinds of differences that
+you will need to consider in evaluating an argument by analogy.
+Instructions: Go back to the pairs of things listed in Exercise Set 3.1. For
+each pair, identify one to three important ways in which the things differ.
+Tips for success: As in Exercise Set 3.1, there are lots of different answers
+you could give for each pair. Your criterion for "important" differences
+should be similar to the criterion you used for important similarities in the
+previous exercise: A difference is important, for our purposes, if noticing
+the difference makes it harder to draw conclusions about one thing from
+characteristics of the first. For instance, New Zealand and Belize are both
+former British colonies. Thus, you might expect them to be culturally similar.
+An important difference, however, is that Belize is in Latin America,
+whereas New Zealand is not. This makes it less likely that they are culturally
+similar. An unimportant difference for just about all purposes is that
+New Zealand’s capital is by the water, whereas Belize’s is not.
+Sample
+Adopting a dog and having a child
+Adopting a dog differs from having a child in that having a child involves taking on
+a lot more responsibility, creates a much longer commitment, and eventually leads to
+there being another adult human being in the world.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 372.
+Chapter III Exercises 83
+Need more practice? To get more practice, pair up with a friend or classmate.
+Have each partner fill in one blank in the sentence " is
+like ." See how many important similarities and differences you
+can find between the things in the blanks. Vary this activity by restricting
+the words you put in the blanks to specific categories (e.g., celebrities, historical
+figures, people you know, paintings, video games, animals, etc.).
+CHAPTER EXERCISES
+Exercise Set 3.3: Evaluating arguments by analogy
+Objective: To give you practice evaluating arguments by analogy.
+Instructions: Evaluate how well each of the following arguments follows
+Rule 12.
+Tips for success: Every argument by analogy compares two things. To
+make a judgment about how well an argument by analogy follows Rule 12,
+you need to think systematically about how similar those two things are.
+To do that, it helps to structure your thinking in terms of four questions:
+1. In what ways are the two things similar?
+2. How is each of these similarities relevant to the conclusion?
+3. In what ways are the two things different?
+4. How is each of these differences relevant to the conclusion?
+The author of an argument by analogy is likely to list some of the ways in
+which the two things are similar. You might be able to think of some more.
+The author may not point out the differences between the two things, so
+it’s essential that you think carefully about what those differences are. If
+you don’t have a list of both similarities and differences, you can’t make an
+informed judgment about the argument.
+You practiced coming up with answers to the first and third questions
+in Exercise Sets 3.1 and 3.2. In this Exercise Set, you’re more likely to have
+84 Chapter III Exercises
+to do a little bit of research to find the important differences. The argument
+is likely to list the important similarities, although you can usually dig up
+more of them.
+What about the other two questions? To explain how a similarity is
+relevant to the conclusion, you’ll need to argue that the similarity gives you
+a reason to think that the conclusion is true. (Think about the ways in
+which the similarities between railroad workers and astronauts support
+Tereshkova’s conclusion about female astronauts.) Likewise, to explain
+how the differences are relevant, you’ll need to argue that the differences
+give you a reason to doubt that the conclusion follows. It can often be hard
+to articulate why a similarity or difference is relevant. If you find yourself
+at a loss for words, imagine that you are explaining the similarity to a child:
+start from the very beginning and state all of your assumptions as plainly
+as you can.
+You might find it helpful to proceed systematically through these questions.
+First, generate a list of important similarities. Then, go through each
+similarity on the list and construct a brief argument to show that the similarity
+gives you a reason to think the conclusion is true. Third, generate a
+list of important differences. Then, go through each difference on your list
+and explain why the difference gives you a reason to doubt that the conclusion
+is well established by this analogy.
+Once you’ve compiled your list of the important similarities and differences
+and you understand why the similarities and differences are relevant,
+you need to make a judgment call about whether the similarities outweigh
+the differences or vice versa. Other people might not always agree with
+your judgment call. In that case, there’s sometimes nothing you can do to
+convince those people except try to come up with a different argument.
+This is one of the weaknesses of arguments by analogy.
+Chapter III Exercises 85
+Sample
+A store owner in Colorado had an unusual way of deterring shoplifters. When he
+caught one, the shop owner threatened to call the police unless the shoplifter
+turned over a shoe. He found that shoplifters were too embarrassed to come back
+to the store after having surrendered their shoe. The police used the following
+argument to stop this practice: Demanding a shoe in return for leniency is like
+demanding twenty dollars in return for leniency. Both involve threatening someone
+to get them to give up something of value. It would be a form of robbery to
+demand twenty dollars in return for leniency. Thus, it’s a form of robbery to demand
+a shoe in return for leniency.
+Adapted from: Associated Press, "Liquor Store Owner Told to Stop Taking Shoplifters’ Shoes," Post Independent
+(Glenwood Springs, CO), May 27, 2008, https://www.postindependent.com/news/
+durango-liquor-store-owner-told-to-stop-taking-shoplifters-shoes/
+This is a fairly strong argument because demanding twenty dollars and demanding
+a shoe are relevantly similar. Both involve threatening the shoplifter with harm (in this
+case, arrest) unless they surrender something of value. Since threatening someone to
+give you money is what makes, say, mugging a form of robbery, this similarity is
+relevant to the conclusion that demanding a shoe is robbery. There is one relevant difference.
+The store owner could spend the twenty dollars, but he can’t do anything with one
+shoe. This is relevant because it makes it clear that the owner’s goal is really to deter
+theft, not personal gain, which is the goal of robbery. But on balance, that difference
+doesn’t change the fact that demanding a shoe is still relevantly like robbery, since
+giving up the shoe is still a loss for the shoplifter. (Taking money by force is still robbery
+even if the robber gives the money to the poor or uses it to mulch his garden.)
+This response does more than list similarities and differences. After identifying an important
+similarity, it explains why that similarity gives us a reason to accept the conclusion: demanding
+a shoe in return for leniency shares the special feature that would make demanding
+money a form of robbery. After identifying an important difference—namely, that a single
+shoe is not valuable to the shop owner—the argument explains why this difference is relevant:
+it demonstrates that the shop owner is trying to deter theft, rather than seeking personal
+gain.
+Having explained the relevance of the similarities and differences, the response makes a
+final judgment about whether the analogy works: It does. The two things are relevantly similar,
+and so the analogy does a good job supporting its conclusion. The response even says a little
+bit about why the similarity outweighs the difference.
+You might make a different final judgment about the success of this argument, even if you
+agree about what the important similarities and differences are.
+86 Chapter III Exercises
+1. The Earth supports living organisms. Europa, one of the moons
+of Jupiter, is like Earth in that both have large oceans of liquid salt
+water. Therefore, Europa supports living organisms.
+Adapted from: Mike Wall, "Signs of Life on Europa May Be Just Beneath the Surface,"
+Scientific American, Jul 23, 2018, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
+signs-of-life-on-europa-may-be-just-beneath-the-surface/
+2. The mugger who forces me to give him my wallet is not entitled
+to my money. A nation that conquers another nation in an unjust
+war is like a mugger: both use violence to take what they want.
+Therefore, a nation that conquers another nation in an unjust war
+is not entitled to that nation’s resources.
+Adapted from: John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689; repr., Indianapolis:
+Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), 91
+3. We all know that people should not drive while they are drunk.
+Texting while driving is like driving while drunk in that both
+make people react more slowly to road hazards. Therefore, people
+should not text while driving.
+Adapted from: Nicole Arce, "Texting Is More Dangerous Than Drugs, Alcohol While
+Driving: Study," Tech Times, Jun 9, 2014, http://www.techtimes.com/articles/
+8185/20140609/texting-is-more-dangerous-than-drugs-alcohol-while-driving-study
+4. Religion is like opium in that both give people an illusory sense
+of happiness or hope, even if their lives are not going well. But
+people shouldn’t have anything to do with opium. Therefore, people
+shouldn’t have anything to do with religion.
+Adapted from: Karl Marx, "Toward a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,"
+in Selected Writings, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis: Hackett
+Publishing Company, 1994), 28
+5. A geneticist named Robert Naviaux injected pregnant mice with
+genes from a virus. As a result, the offsprings’ brain cells reacted
+differently to purines, which are naturally occurring chemicals in
+the body. When exposed to purines, the cells—
+including brain
+cells—would activate a "stress response" that made it harder for
+them to communicate with one another. These chronically stressed
+mice exhibited symptoms that are similar to those exhibited by
+Chapter III Exercises 87
+autistic humans, such as avoiding strangers and novel situations.
+Thus, autism in humans might be caused by a hyperactive stress
+response by brain cells.
+Adapted from: Elizabeth Norton, "Century-Old Drug Reverses Signs of
+Autism in Mice," Science News, Jun 17, 2014, http://news.sciencemag.org/
+biology/2014/06/century-old-drug-reverses-signs-autism-mice
+6. The First Amendment does not protect the right to shout "Fire!"
+in a crowded theater when there is no fire. During a war, distributing
+pamphlets that encourage people to resist a military draft is
+like shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater in that both present a
+danger to the public. Therefore, the First Amendment does not
+protect the right to distribute anti-draft pamphlets.
+Adapted from: Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
+7. Some people argue that there would be fewer mass shootings if
+more people had guns—especially in the kinds of places where
+mass shootings occur. But arguing that having more guns will
+solve the problem of mass shootings is like arguing that smoking
+more cigarettes will cure lung cancer.
+Adapted from: Stephen King, Twitter post, Oct 28, 2018, 6:02 PM, https://twitter.com/
+stephenking/status/1056682753016717312
+8. Imagine that a department store offered a storewide shopping
+spree for five thousand dollars. After paying your fee, you could
+take anything that you could carry out of the store, including designer
+clothes, expensive jewelry, and other luxury goods. Someone
+who paid the fee and walked out with a piece of bubble gum
+would be acting foolishly. Students who choose their college courses
+based on which courses are easiest or the most entertaining are
+like someone who picks up a piece of bubble gum in that imaginary
+department store shopping spree: After paying tuition, university
+students can learn things that the world’s greatest scientists
+and thinkers spent years discovering; they can have their pick of
+the world’s most valuable intellectual treasures. Instead of looking
+for the most valuable learning experiences they can, they go for
+the "mental bubble gum" offered by the easiest courses. Thus,
+88 Chapter III Exercises
+students who choose easy courses instead of the most stimulating
+and edifying courses are acting foolishly.
+Adapted from: Ronald Munson, The Way of Words: An Informal Logic
+(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 357
+9. The universe is like a house, in that every part appears to be
+carefully and skillfully designed for some purpose. In a house,
+for instance, the steps of the stairs are designed at exactly the
+right height and size for humans to walk up them. Likewise, we
+find in nature all kinds of things that are perfectly suited for
+some creature or other to use in some way. But you will notice
+that whenever we see a house, we can be confident that it has
+some creator. Likewise, we should infer that the universe as a
+whole has some creator.
+Adapted from: David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 2nd ed
+(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 15–16
+10. Imagine that you are walking by a shallow pond and you see a
+young child drowning in the pond. You know that you can wade
+into the pond and save the child at no risk to yourself, but you
+would ruin your shoes in the process. If you don’t do anything, the
+child will die. It would be wrong of you to let the child drown in
+order to avoid ruining your shoes. But we all do something like
+this every day. We could save the lives of children in developing
+countries by donating relatively small amounts of money to international
+relief organizations like Oxfam or CARE. Not donating
+money to international relief organizations is like letting a child
+drown in a shallow pond. Therefore, it’s wrong not to donate
+money to international relief organizations.
+Adapted from: Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality,"
+Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), 229–43
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 374.
+Chapter III Exercises 89
+Need more practice? Arguments by analogy are common in public debates.
+Watch your favorite news shows or look at editorials, op-eds, and letters to
+the editor in your favorite newspaper. When you hear or read an argument
+by analogy, assess how well it follows Rule 12.
+Exercise Set 3.4: Constructing arguments by analogy
+Objective: To give you practice constructing good arguments by analogy.
+Instructions: Construct an argument by analogy as prompted in each scenario
+below. Be sure that your argument follows Rule 12.
+Tips for success: Start by figuring out exactly what you want your conclusion
+to be. Your conclusion should have the form "X is/was F." For
+instance, the conclusion of Adam Nordwell’s argument, discussed above, is
+that Christopher Columbus was unjustified in claiming land for his own
+people. In that case, X stands for "Christopher Columbus" and F stands for
+"unjustified in claiming land for his own people."
+The next step in constructing your argument is to find something to
+compare to X. This thing—call it Y—should also be F. Thus, the first
+premise of your argument should have the form "Y is/was F." For instance,
+the first premise of Nordwell’s argument is that he, Adam Nordwell, is
+unjustified in claiming land for his own people. In that case, Y stands for
+"Adam Nordwell" and F, again, stands for "unjustified in claiming land for
+his own people." To make your argument work, you need to be sure that
+this first premise is fairly uncontroversial: everyone should agree that Y is
+F, just as everyone would agree that Nordwell didn’t really have the right
+to claim Italy for the Chippewa.
+The key step is to argue that X is relevantly like Y. The similarity that
+Nordwell uses is that he and Columbus were both claiming lands that were
+already inhabited. This is relevant to the claim that Columbus was unjustified
+in claiming lands for his own people because, other things being equal,
+claiming lands that are already inhabited amounts to stealing the land from
+its current inhabitants.
+Be sure to consider relevant differences between X and Y. If the differences
+outweigh the similarities, you’ll either need to find something else to
+compare X to or you’ll need to give up your conclusion that X is F.
+90 Chapter III Exercises
+Sample
+Imagine that you are a movie producer. You are trying to produce a new movie
+based on Dora the Explorer, the popular children’s television series. You have already
+lined up the original voice actors from the TV show, a great team of animators,
+and a well-known director of children’s movies. Construct an argument by
+analogy to convince executives at a major movie studio to back your movie.
+The SpongeBob SquarePants movie was quite successful, bringing in over $140
+million worldwide. A Dora the Explorer movie would be like the SpongeBob
+SquarePants movie in that it is based on a long-running animated children’s
+television series, so we know that lots of people like it. Like SpongeBob SquarePants, the
+television series on which the movie was based spawned a profitable line of toys and
+other merchandise, so we know that people are willing to spend money on Dora. And
+like SpongeBob SquarePants, the Dora movie would feature the original voice actors,
+which is important for winning over fans of the television series. Therefore, the Dora
+movie would also be extremely successful.
+This argument begins by identifying the thing to which the Dora movie is going to be compared:
+the SpongeBob SquarePants movie. It then explains how the two things are similar
+and why those similarities are important. Finally, it clearly states the point of the comparison:
+the Dora movie would be extremely successful.
+1. Suppose that a friend of yours has downloaded dozens of movies
+from the Internet without paying for them. Has your friend done
+something wrong? Or is it okay to download movies without paying
+for them? Construct an argument by analogy to support your
+position.
+2. Textbook publishers often provide instructors with "test banks"
+that contain questions the instructors can use on exams. These
+test banks are not supposed to be available to students, but some
+students gain access to them and review them before exams. Professors
+generally regard this as a form of cheating, but some students
+say that it’s just another way of studying. Is it cheating to
+use such test banks to prepare for an exam? Construct an argument
+by analogy to support your position.
+Chapter III Exercises 91
+3. Many states or countries have laws requiring people to wear helmets
+while riding motorcycles. Should it be illegal to ride a motorcycle
+without a helmet? Construct an argument by analogy to
+support your position.
+4. Imagine that your best friend is in a romantic relationship that
+has become destructive. When you encourage your best friend to
+get out of the relationship, your friend tells you to mind your own
+business. Do you think it’s appropriate for you to continue to encourage
+your friend to get out of the relationship? Construct an
+argument by analogy to support your position.
+5. Over three thousand years ago, a people called the Olmecs dominated
+what is now southern Mexico. Today, the Olmecs are most
+famous for the stone heads that they carved out of enormous
+boulders. Each head, as tall as a grown man and weighing up to
+forty tons, has a unique and expressive face. Archaeologists suspect
+that the heads depicted powerful Olmec rulers. The ancient
+Olmec city of San Lorenzo boasted ten of these colossal heads,
+but when the city collapsed, the heads were mutilated and buried.
+No one knows exactly why. Come up with your own guess about
+why the heads were mutilated and buried. Construct an argument
+by analogy to support your position. (Want a hint? Think about
+other instances in which a culture’s political or religious monuments
+have been destroyed.)
+6. Some politicians argue that most undocumented immigrants
+who were brought to the United States as children should be
+granted citizenship. Do you agree with this suggestion? Construct
+an argument by analogy to support your answer.
+7. People frequently argue that some activity should be avoided because
+it is "unnatural." For instance, some people argue that people
+should not be vegetarians because humans "naturally" eat an
+omnivorous diet. Construct an argument by analogy to show that
+this argument is flawed.
+92 Chapter III Exercises
+8. Is it reasonable to believe that the different species on Earth
+evolved by natural selection? Construct an argument by analogy
+to support your position.
+For exercises 9 and 10, pick a conclusion of your own and construct an argument
+by analogy to support it. You may need to consider several different
+conclusions before you find one that can be supported with an argument
+by analogy.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 380.
+Need more practice? Go to the companion Web site for this book and
+click on the link for "Chapter III." You’ll find links to Web sites that enable
+users to participate in structured debates on a wide range of topics. Browse
+the debates until you find one to which you could contribute a good argument
+by analogy. (If you want to participate in the debate, you can post
+your argument, but just thinking about what argument you would contribute
+can be good practice too.) For even more practice, see whether you can
+come up with a good argument by analogy for the other side of the same
+debate. While you’re there, of course, you can always contribute other kinds
+of arguments as well.
+Critical thinking activity: Using analogies to understand
+unusual objects
+For an out-of-class activity with an in-class component, see the "Using analogies to understand
+unusual objects" assignment sheet (p. 523) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Using analogies in ethical reasoning
+For an out-of-class activity with an optional in-class component, see the "Using analogies
+in ethical reasoning" assignment sheet (p. 524) in Part 3.
+93
+No one can be an expert through direct experience on everything there is to know. We do not live in ancient times ourselves and therefore cannot know first-hand at what age women tended to marry back then. Few of us have enough experience to judge which kinds of cars are safest in a crash. We do not know first-hand what is really happening in Sri Lanka or the state legislature, or even in the average American classroom or street corner. Instead, we must rely on others—better-situated people, organizations, surveys, or reference works—to tell us much of what we need to know about the world. We argue like this:
+X (a source that ought to know) says that Y.
+Therefore, Y is true.
+For instance:
+Dr. Aubrey de Grey says that people can live to be 1,000 years old.
+Therefore, people can live to be 1,000 years old.
+It’s a risky business, though. Supposed experts may be overconfident (they’re human too), or may be misled, or may not even be reliable.
+And everyone has biases, after all, even if innocent ones. Once again we must consider a checklist of standards that truly authoritative sources need to meet.
+Cite your sources
+Who’s got your back?
+Some factual assertions are so obvious or well known that they do not need support at all. It is usually not necessary to prove that the United States currently has fifty states or that Juliet loved Romeo. However, a precise figure for the current population of the United States, say, does need a citation. Likewise, to develop Valentina Tereshkova’s argument for sending women to space, we’d need to find knowledgeable authorities to establish that women were indeed capable railroad workers in Russia.
+Chapter IV
+Arguments from Authority
+Rule 13
+94 Rule 14: Seek informed sources—Who knows?
+NO:
+I once read that there are cultures in which makeup and clothes are mostly men’s business, not women’s.
+If you’re arguing about whether men and women everywhere follow the gender roles familiar to us, this is a relevant example—a striking case of different gender roles. But few of us know anything about this sort of difference first-hand , and it will probably seem surprising and even unlikely to many people. To nail down the argument, then you need to call upon a fully cited source.
+YES:
+Carol Beckwith’s classic study of "Niger’s Wodaabe" (National Geographic 164, no. 4 [October 1983], pp. 483–509) reports that among the West African Fulani peoples such as the Wodaabe, makeup and clothes are mostly men’s business.
+Citation styles vary—consult a handbook of style to find the appropriate format for your purposes—but all include the same basic information: enough so that others can easily find the source on their own.
+Rule 14
+The "Resources" section on this book’s companion Web site has links to instructions and advice for different styles for citing sources. Your school’s library or writing center may also have resources for you. (If you don’t know whether your school has a writing center, find out! Writing centers usually offer help on papers and other writing assignments.)
+Seek informed sources—
+Who knows?
+Sources must be qualified to make the statements they make. Honda mechanics are qualified to discuss the merits of different Hondas, midwives and obstetricians are qualified to discuss pregnancy and childbirth, teachers are qualified to discuss the state of their schools, and so on. These sources are qualified because they have the appropriate background and information. For the best information about global climate change, go to climatologists, not politicians.
+Where a source’s qualifications are not immediately clear, an argument must explain them. Dr. Aubrey de Grey says that people can live to be 1,000 years old? Well, who is this Aubrey de Grey to expect us to believe him about such things? Here is an answer: he is a gerontologist who has
+Rule 14: Seek informed sources—Who knows? 95
+developed detailed theories of the causes of aging (it is not inevitable, he argues) and possible preventive interventions, which he has laid out in several detailed books such as The Mitochondrial Free Radical Theory of Aging (Cambridge University Press, 1999), for which he was awarded a PhD in biology by Cambridge University in 2000. When someone like that says that people can live to be 1,000 years old—unlikely as it seems—it is not a random or unprofessional opinion. We should give him a serious hearing.
+As you explain your source’s qualifications, you can also add more direct evidence to your argument.
+Carol Beckwith’s classic study of "Niger’s Wodaabe" (National Geographic 164, no. 4 [October 1983], pp. 483–509) reports that among the West African Fulani peoples such as the Wodaabe, makeup and clothes are mostly men’s business. Beckwith and an anthropologist colleague lived with the Wodaabe for two years and observed many dances for which the men prepared by lengthy preening, face-painting, and teeth-whitening. (Her article includes many pictures too.) Wodaabe women watch, comment, and choose mates for their beauty—which the men say is the natural way. "Our beauty makes the women want us," one says.
+Note that an informed source need not fit our general stereotype of an "authority"—and a person who fits our stereotype of an authority may not even be an informed source. If you’re checking out colleges, for instance, students are the best authorities, not administrators or recruiters, because it’s the students who know what student life is really like. (Just be sure to find yourself a representative sample.)
+Note also that experts on one subject are not necessarily informed about every subject on which they offer opinions.
+Beyoncé is a vegan. Therefore, veganism is the best diet.
+Beyoncé may be a fabulous entertainer, but a diet expert she’s not. (Also, it is not entirely clear that she is a vegan, apparently.) Likewise, just because someone can put the title "Doctor" before their name—that is, just because they have a PhD or MD in some field—does not mean that they are qualified to deliver opinions on any subject whatsoever.
+Sometimes we must rely on sources whose knowledge is better than ours but still limited in various ways. On occasion, the best information we can get about what is happening in a war zone or a political trial or inside a business or bureaucracy is fragmentary and filtered through journalists,
+96 Rule 15: Seek impartial sources
+international human rights organizations, corporate watchdogs, and so on. If you must rely on a source that may have limited knowledge in this way, acknowledge the problem. Let your readers or hearers decide whether imperfect authority is better than none at all.
+Truly informed sources rarely expect others to accept their conclusions simply because they assert them. Good sources will offer at least some reasons or evidence—examples, facts, analogies, other kinds of
+arguments—to help explain and defend their conclusions. Beckwith, for example, offers photographs and stories from the years she lived with the Wodaabe. Thus, while we might need to take some of their specific
+claims on authority alone (for instance, we must take Beckwith at her word that she had certain experiences), we can expect even the best sources to offer arguments as well as their own judgments in support of their
+general conclusions. Look for those arguments then, and look at them critically as well.
+Seek impartial sources
+People who have the most at stake in a dispute are usually not the best sources of information about the issues involved. Sometimes they may not even tell the truth. People accused in criminal trials are presumed innocent until proven guilty, but we seldom completely believe their claims of innocence without confirmation from impartial witnesses.
+Readiness to tell the truth as one sees it, though, is not always enough. The truth as one honestly sees it can still be biased. We tend to see what we expect to see. We notice, remember, and pass on information that supports our point of view, but we may not be quite so motivated when the evidence points the other way.
+Therefore, look for impartial sources: people or organizations who do not have a stake in the immediate issue, and who have a prior and primary interest in accuracy, such as (some) university scientists or statistical databases. Don’t just rely on politicians or interest groups on one side of a major public question for the most accurate information about the issues at stake. Don’t just rely on manufacturers’ advertisements for reliable information concerning their products.
+NO:
+My car dealer recommends that I pay $300 to rustproof my car. He should know; I guess I’d better do it.
+Rule 15
+Rule 15: Seek impartial sources 97
+He probably does know, but he might not be entirely reliable, either. The best information about consumer products and services comes from independent consumer testing agencies, agencies not affiliated with any manufacturer or provider but answering to consumers who want the most accurate information they can get. Do some research!
+YES:
+Experts at Consumer Reports say that rust problems have almost vanished in modern cars due to better manufacturing, and advise that rustproofing is not needed (Consumer Reports, "Watch Out for These Car Sales Tricks," http://www.consumerreports.org/buying-a-car/car-sales-tricks/, 2 February 2017; and Sami Haaj-Assaad, "Should You Rust Proof Your New Car?" Auto-Guide.com, 21 March 2013).
+On political matters, especially when the disagreements are basically over statistics, look to independent government agencies, such as the Census Bureau, or to university studies or other independent sources. Organizations like Doctors Without Borders are relatively impartial sources on the human rights situation in other countries because they practice medicine, not politics: they are not trying to support or oppose any specific government.
+Of course, independence and impartiality are not always easy to judge, either. Be sure that your sources are genuinely independent and not just interest groups masquerading under an independent-sounding name. Check who funds them; check their other publications; look for their track record; watch the tone of their statements. Sources that make extreme or simplistic claims, or spend most of their time attacking and demeaning the other side, weaken their own claims. Again, seek out sources that offer constructive arguments and responsibly acknowledge and thoroughly engage the arguments and evidence on the other side. At the very least, try to confirm for yourself any factual claim quoted from a potentially biased source. Good arguments cite their sources (Rule 13); look them up. Make sure the evidence is quoted correctly and not pulled out of context, and check for further information that might be helpful.
+Exercise Set 4.1: Identifying biased sources
+Objective: To help you guard against biased sources.
+Instructions: For each of the questions below, think of one source that would not be impartial. Explain why that source would not be impartial.
+98 Rule 15: Seek impartial sources
+You do not need to name a specific person; you can simply describe what kind of person you have in mind.
+Tips for success: An impartial source is an unbiased source. This exercise asks you to find biased sources—sources that you would not want to use in your arguments because they are not impartial.
+Here’s one way to come up with biased sources: Ask yourself what answers different people might give to each question in this exercise. Then, for each answer, ask yourself whether there is someone who would benefit from convincing you of that answer.
+People can benefit in various ways from convincing you of a particular answer. Sometimes people benefit financially. For instance, a sales clerk at a store gains financially by convincing you that the jeans you’re considering look great on you. Sometimes people stand to gain in other ways. For instance, a candidate for political office can get extra votes by convincing voters that his or her opponent is corrupt. Thus, the sales clerk is a biased source about the jeans you’re considering and the politician is a biased source about his or her opponent.
+Remember, though, that sources can be biased even if they don’t stand to benefit from pushing a particular answer. Sources who are likely to reach a particular answer regardless of the truth are also biased. For instance, suppose you asked the parents of the players on a high school basketball team whether their children are better than the average player on the team. A significant majority of parents would probably say that their child is above average, even though it’s unlikely that a significant majority of the players really are better than average. The parents don’t stand to gain anything by convincing you that their child is better, but they’re still biased. This extends more generally to individuals’ beliefs about how they compare to others: individuals are frequently biased when it comes to rating their own abilities. For example, a study published in 1981 by Ola Svenson, of the University of Stockholm, found that 93 percent of Americans rated themselves as better drivers than the median driver. A similar study
+published in 1986 by Iain McCormick and his colleagues at Victoria
+University of Wellington found that up to 80 percent of drivers consider themselves above average.
+Rule 15: Seek impartial sources 99
+Sample
+Are e-cigarettes safer than regular cigarettes?
+An executive at a tobacco company is a biased source. The executive has a strong financial incentive to convince people that e-cigarettes are no safer than regular cigarettes. If people believe that the two kinds of smoking are equally bad for their health, they’re less likely to switch from regular cigarettes to e-cigarettes, and the company will do better.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 382.
+1. Is it worthwhile to buy an extended warranty on a new appliance?
+2. Are Macs better than PCs?
+3. What is the best university in the United States?
+4. Is LeBron James, who used to play for the Cleveland Cavaliers and now plays for the Los Angeles Lakers, the greatest basketball player of all time?
+5. Do vaccines weaken children’s immune systems?
+6. Is it better to save for retirement by putting your money in a savings account or by investing it through a stockbroker?
+7. How often do women suffer dangerous complications from an abortion?
+8. Do laws requiring background checks at gun stores reduce crime?
+9. Would Medicare for All reduce health care costs in the United States?
+10. Is there life after death?
+100 Rule 16: Cross-check sources—Don’t bet on a one-off
+Need more practice? To get more practice in brainstorming biased sources, go to your favorite news Web site and find an article that interests you. Imagine that you were a reporter assigned to write that article. Make a list of people or organizations that you think would be biased sources of information about the topic of that article. For each person or organization, explain why you suspect they might be biased. Are there steps you could take to compensate for that bias?
+Cross-check sources—
+Don’t bet on a one-off
+Consult and compare a variety of sources to see if other, equally good authorities agree. Are the experts sharply divided or in agreement? If they’re pretty much in agreement, theirs is the safe view to take—and the opposite view is, at the very least, unwise, however strongly it may appeal to us. Authoritative views can certainly be wrong at times. But nonauthoritative views are regularly wrong.
+On the other hand, cross-checking may sometimes reveal that the experts themselves disagree on some subject. In that case, reserve judgment yourself. Don’t jump in with two feet where truly informed people tread with care. Better to argue on some other grounds—or rethink your conclusions.
+What about our friend Aubrey de Grey, then, and our hopes of living 1,000 years? Alas, when you start to cross-check, it turns out that de Grey’s work is widely regarded as well-developed and his research as certainly worth pursuing, but very few other experts are persuaded.1 Many are sharply critical. He’s an outlier. Living vastly longer may be an appealing thought, but don’t count it very likely.
+On most significant topics you can probably find some disagreement if you look hard enough. Worse, on some topics the appearance of controversy may be created even when there is virtually no disagreement among qualified authorities. Although there was a time when experts disagreed about global climate change, for example, the world scientific community is now nearly unanimous that the climate is changing and that human
+1. For de Grey’s popular presentation of his theories, see his book Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs That Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetimes (St. Martins Griffin, 2008). A highly critical response by a group of fellow gerontologists is Huber Warner, et al., "Science Fact and the SENS Agenda," EMBO Reports 2005 (6): 1006–1008, http://embor.embopress.org/content/6/11/1006.
+Rule 16
+Rule 16: Cross-check sources—Don’t bet on a one-off 101
+activity has something to do with it. Sure, there’s still loud disagreement in some media and election campaigns, but virtually none among trained climate scientists looking at the data as objectively as they can. There are also a few reasoned critiques of the climate-change consensus, but in the best judgment of almost everyone actually in the field, they do not change the bottom line. Some of the critiques have even sharpened the science, but the critics, even when qualified, are (very markedly) outliers.
+Ideology seems to be the driving force here—not actual evidence or professional judgment. You may need to look into seeming controversies like these to see how seriously to take them.2
+2. For a contemporary summary of the state of climate science, also addressing some skeptical claims, start with G. Thomas Farmer’s short textbook, Modern Climate Change Science (Springer, 2015). Of course, once again, the consensus of experts may be wrong. Still, expert agreement is usually the best we can do. Even climate change "deniers" would not, say, go against the unanimous advice of their doctors if they were to learn that they might be seriously ill. They would not, so to say, bet their life that all their doctors are wrong, no matter how fervently they might wish it. But they would have us bet the future of Earth itself that the consensus of climate experts is wrong? Current efforts on the part of some politicians to shut down climate research, and even to prevent scientists from communicating with the public or public agencies from planning for climate-change adaptation, are even worse: they reveal not a constructive and evidence-based skepticism, but (it seems) just the opposite. Even responsible denial needs evidence!
+Exercise Set 4.2: Identifying independent sources
+Objective: To give you practice identifying independent sources.
+Instructions: For each of the following questions, think of two informed, impartial sources that you might cite in an argument. You do not need to find or cite specific sources; you can just describe the kind of source you have in mind. Be sure your two sources are genuinely independent—that is, that neither gets its information from the other and that the two are not relying on the same source for their information.
+Tips for success: Rules 14, 15, and 16 deal with three important features of arguments that use sources. Rule 14 requires that sources know what they’re talking about. Rule 15 requires that sources be unbiased.
+What about Rule 16? Rule 16 requires more than just checking multiple sources. When you are using multiple sources, it’s important that your
+102 Rule 16: Cross-check sources—Don’t bet on a one-off
+sources are independent of one another. Two sources are independent of one another when neither one is getting its information from the other.
+The idea of independent sources is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that, days before a mayoral election, a polling organization announces that the incumbent candidate is well ahead in the polls. On the basis of this announcement, the local newspaper runs the headline, "Mayor on Track to Win Second Term." If you cite both the polling organization and the local newspaper, have you cross-checked your sources? No. Since the local paper got its information from the polling organization, it is not an independent source. Citing the newspaper does not strengthen your argument. You would need to cite another source that did its own, independent polling.
+Sample
+Are gluten-free diets healthier for most people?
+1. A scientific paper published in a reputable medical journal.
+2. A professional dietitian (a specialist in the science of nutrition) other than the one(s) who wrote or were cited in the scientific paper used for source 1.
+Notice that both of these answers could be more specific. For instance, you might identify a specific reputable journal that is likely to publish papers on the health effects of gluten-free diets. Notice also that you’d want to find out where the dietitian was getting his or her information about gluten-free diets, in order to make sure that it wasn’t just coming from the paper that you used for source 1.
+1. What is the best way to get from Vancouver to the popular ski resort in Whistler, British Columbia?
+2. Do students do better in class if they take notes with a pen and paper instead of a computer?
+3. How do I write a good paper for a philosophy class?
+4. What are the best restaurants in Miami?
+Rule 17: Build your Internet savvy 103
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 384.
+5. Is it possible for deadly viruses like Ebola to become "airborne,"
+meaning that they could spread from person to person without
+direct contact?
+6. Is being a lawyer a rewarding career?
+7. Where was your great-grandmother born?
+8. How does religion affect contemporary Egyptian politics?
+9. Does the death penalty deter crime?
+10. What caused the collapse of the Soviet Union?
+Rule 17
+Need more practice? Go to your favorite news Web site and find an article
+that interests you. Check to see if the article attributes any claims to a
+specific source. If so, try to think of an additional, independent source that
+the article’s author could have used as well.
+Build your Internet savvy
+Online, even the most baseless or hateful opinion site can dress itself up to
+look plausible and even professional. Academic book publishers and even
+most public libraries have at least some checks on the reliability and tone
+of the books and other materials they collect, but on the Internet, it is still
+the Wild West—no checks. You’re on your own.
+"The Internet" by itself, in any case, is not any kind of authority. It
+merely transmits other sources. Savvy users know how to evaluate those
+sources—they apply the rules in this book. Rule 13, for example: What is
+the source? With many websites this may be difficult to tell—and that’s a
+red flag right there. Are the sources well-informed (Rule 14)? Reliable
+(15)? Or are the sites pushing an agenda—trying to sell you something, or
+to manipulate your view on some issues by, say, using loaded language (5),
+unrepresentative data (8), or outlying or phony "experts" (14 and 16)? At
+minimum, cross-check other, independent websites on the same issue (16).
+104 Rule 17: Build your Internet savvy
+Savvy users also dig deeper than the standard Web search. Search engines
+cannot search "everything"—far from it. In fact, the most reliable
+and detailed information on any given topic is often found in databases or
+other academic resources that standard search engines cannot enter at all.
+You may need a password; ask your teacher or librarian.
+Savvy users may also—cautiously!—consult Wikipedia. It’s certainly
+true that "anyone can edit Wikipedia," as is often objected, and as a result
+false and defamatory information has sometimes been posted. Subtle biases
+surely persist. Still, Wikipedia’s very openness can also be an advantage.
+Every article is subject to constant scrutiny and correction by other
+users. Many users are moved to contribute additional information or improvements
+too. Over time, many articles tend to become more comprehensive
+and neutral. Wikipedian editors sometimes intervene if there is
+too much contention, and some hot-topic articles are not open to general
+editing, but the end result is that Wikipedia’s error rate (remember Rule 9!)
+has been compared favorably even to the Encyclopedia Britannica.3
+Of course, savvy encyclopedia users know that they cannot simply cite
+Wikipedia (or, usually, any other encyclopedia) to back up their claims.
+Wikipedia’s intention is to organize and summarize knowledge on a subject,
+and then to point readers to the real sources. Savvy users also remain
+watchful—as in any source—for subtle hints of loaded language, dismissive
+accounts of disfavored views, and the like.
+Every reference source is a product of a group of people with their
+limits and biases, acknowledged and unacknowledged. At least as important
+as avoiding mistakes or bias is having a means of correcting them—
+and fast—and at that Wikipedia is unexcelled. Random insertions and
+vandalism are typically repaired within minutes, and every change is
+tracked and explained (check out every page’s "View History" tab) and
+sometimes widely debated as well (check out the "Talk" tabs). What other
+reference source is so transparent and self-correcting? Really savvy users
+might join the work of making Wikipedia still better!
+3. See Jim Giles, "Internet Encyclopedias Go Head to Head," Nature 438 (7070): 900–
+901, December 2005. The March 2006 issue of Nature includes a response from Encyclopedia
+Britannica and a rejoinder from Nature.
+Critical thinking activity: Recognizing reliable Web sources
+For an out-of-class activity that helps you apply Rule 17, see the "Recognizing reliable Web
+sources" assignment sheet (p. 525) in Part 3.
+Chapter IV Exercises 105
+CHAPTER EXERCISES
+Exercise Set 4.3: Evaluating arguments that use sources
+Objective: To give you practice evaluating the use of sources in arguments.
+Instructions: Evaluate how well each of the following arguments obeys
+Rules 13–17.
+Tips for success: You can divide your evaluation of these arguments into
+two steps.
+First, ask yourself how well the argument cites its source (Rule 13).
+This is not an all-or-nothing affair, and the level of detail you should expect
+depends on where you find the argument in the first place. An academic
+paper will give a full academic citation for each source. A newspaper,
+by contrast, might report that "researchers from the University of Alberta"
+published a paper on polar bear fossils "in this week’s issue of the journal
+Science," without giving the exact names of the researchers or title of the
+paper. This isn’t a full citation, but as long as you know the date that the
+news story was published, you’ll probably be able to find the original
+source. To determine how well an argument follows Rule 13, ask yourself
+how easy it would be for you to find the source, given what the argument
+tells you. The easier it is, the better the argument does.
+Second, ask yourself whether the sources are good—that is, whether
+they are informed (Rule 14), impartial (Rule 15), and independent (Rule
+16). If the source’s qualifications are not widely known, you might also
+consider whether the argument establishes that the source is a good one.
+If an argument only cites one source, of course, then it does not follow
+Rule 16. This is a bigger problem in some cases than in others. It’s a big
+problem in cases where the conclusion of the argument is controversial or
+disputed—that is, where the relevant experts disagree. The point of Rule
+16 is that even an informed, impartial source provides relatively little support
+if there are other, equally informed and impartial sources that say the
+opposite. Cross-checking sources is a way to ensure that there is consensus,
+or at least fairly widespread agreement, among the experts.
+A failure to cross-check sources might not be much of a problem in
+cases where facts are well established and widely known. When the source
+is extremely reputable, and the claim is not particularly controversial, you
+might not need to cross-check your source. For instance, if the U.S.
+106 Chapter IV Exercises
+Geological Survey announces that an earthquake measured 7.4 on the
+Richter scale, you probably wouldn’t need to check that claim against another
+source. Barring special circumstances, there is little reason to think
+that the U.S. Geological Survey would lie about or err in measuring the
+magnitude of an earthquake.
+There’s one further kind of case to keep in mind. Some facts are very
+hard or very expensive to discover. In cases like these, there may be only one
+source for a particular claim. (Other sources might repeat the claim, but
+they don’t count as independent sources.) The best an argument can do,
+then, is rely on the single source. For instance, it would be very difficult to
+figure out exactly how many people of Chinese origin are currently living in
+Canada. Statistics Canada, the Canadian government agency that conducts
+the Canadian census, is the only organization likely to obtain an
+accurate count. Thus, it would be reasonable for an argument to cite only the
+Canadian census to support a claim about the number of Chinese people
+in Canada.
+In most cases where you are evaluating someone else’s argument, violations
+of Rule 17 will probably show up as violations of other rules too. If
+the argument uses the Web in a careless or naïve way, its sources are likely
+to be improperly cited, uninformed, or biased. Keep in mind that you’ll
+need to assess different kinds of Web sites or pages in different ways. Some
+Web sites present original research—that is, information that they have
+discovered themselves. In that case, you should treat the Web site as the
+source for the argument and evaluate whether it is informed and impartial.
+Some Web sites merely cite other sources. In that case, you will need to
+determine whether you should trust the site’s sources. In some cases it’s
+simply unclear whether a Web site is informed, impartial, and independent.
+In that case, you should say that the argument fails Rule 17 by relying
+on a Web source whose credentials are hard to verify. After all, if you can’t
+tell where the information on a site comes from, you can’t tell whether the
+argument follows Rules 14, 15, and 16.
+Chapter IV Exercises 107
+Sample
+According to a recent study published online by the scientific journal Alcoholism:
+Clinical & Experimental Research, somewhere between 10 percent and 20 percent
+of the population carries a gene that makes them less likely to develop an addiction
+to alcohol. The lead author of the study, Dr. Kirk Wilhelmsen, is a professor
+of genetics at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
+Adapted from: Shari Roan, "Gene May Protect Against Alcoholism," Los Angeles Times, Oct 20, 2010,
+http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/20/news/la-heb-alcohol-gene-20101020
+This argument does a decent job citing its sources (Rule 13). It clearly identifies the
+author of the study and the journal that published the study. Since we know when the
+LA Times ran this article, we know roughly when the study was published. So, we
+could find the study with a little bit of work. The argument could do better by giving
+us the study’s exact title and publication date. The argument does a good job finding
+an informed and impartial source (Rules 14 and 15). As a geneticist at a good
+university, Dr. Wilhelmsen is presumably well-informed about genetics, and we
+have no reason to think that he has ulterior motives in claiming that a certain gene
+protects against alcoholism. The argument does not do a good job cross-checking
+sources (Rule 16). There may not be other studies on this exact gene, but it might help
+to know what other geneticists think of the study. Cross-checking sources would also
+help show that geneticists who have read Dr. Wilhelmsen’s paper agree with the way the
+newspaper has represented the study’s conclusions. The argument cites the online
+version of a scientific journal, which is a good Web source (Rule 17).
+This response proceeds methodically through the rules from Chapter IV. It addresses Rules 14
+and 15 together, which is appropriate when your reason for thinking that a source is well
+informed is the same as your reason for thinking that the source is impartial. Notice that the
+response gives brief but detailed explanations for its judgments about how well the argument
+follows each rule.
+1. Massimiliano Vasile, an aerospace engineer at the University of
+Glasgow, spent two years comparing nine different technologies
+that could be used if an asteroid were on a collision course with
+Earth. Dr. Vasile’s study revealed that it would be a bad idea to
+blow up an incoming asteroid with nuclear weapons. Thus, blowing
+up Earth-bound asteroids with nuclear weapons is a bad idea.
+Adapted from: Lia Miller, "The Best Way to Deflect an Asteroid," New York Times
+Magazine, December 9, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/magazine/
+09_5_asteroid.html
+108 Chapter IV Exercises
+2. It is possible to develop reliable, effective, data-driven measurements
+of teacher effectiveness in primary and secondary schools.
+Dr. William Sanders, a senior director of research for a company
+that helps school districts measure teacher performance, says that
+by using "rigorous, robust methods" of data analysis and adding
+"safeguards" to protect against error, school districts can reliably
+distinguish excellent teachers from average and poor teachers.
+Adapted from: Sam Dillon, "Method to Grade Teachers’ Skills Gains Acceptance,
+and Critics," New York Times, Aug 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
+2010/09/01/education/01teacher.html
+3. Once you start saving for retirement and investing your savings in
+the stock market, you might find yourself tempted to sell a stock
+whenever you see that you’ve lost money on it. In an interview
+with USA Today, economist Erik Angner said that you shouldn’t
+give in to this temptation. Angner, author of the best-selling textbook
+A Course in Behavioral Economics and a professor at the University
+of Stockholm, specializes in the way that human psychology
+affects economic decision-making. He points out that even
+though it’s tempting to sell stocks when you’ve lost money on
+them, people who do that will usually end up "buying high" and
+"selling low," which is not a good way to make money. Instead,
+Angner says, you should ignore past gains or losses and focus only
+on whether you expect the stock to do well in the future. Cass
+Sunstein, a professor at Harvard Law School who has also studied
+behavioral economics, agrees: focusing on short-term gains
+and losses leads people to sell underperforming stocks when they
+should hold onto them. Therefore, selling stocks just because
+you’ve lost money on them is a mistake.
+Adapted from: Robert Powell, "Financial Shortcuts to Avoid and Use When Saving and
+Investing for Retirement," USA Today, Feb 23, 2018, https://usat.ly/2olhzxA
+4. In accepting yet another award for her work on early childhood
+education, professor Nancy Carlsson-Paige says that preschool
+children learn best by playing, not by sitting in a classroom listening
+to a teacher. She complained that even though we have decades
+of educational and neuroscientific research supporting this
+idea, many schools are replacing playtime with instructional time.
+Chapter IV Exercises 109
+Clearly, young children will learn more if they play more instead of
+just listening to teachers.
+Adapted from: Valerie Strauss, "How ‘Twisted’ Early Childhood Education
+Has Become—From a Child Development Expert,"
+Washington Post, Nov 24, 2015, https://wapo.st/1PMrV29
+5. The world-famous physicist Stephen Hawking addressed the
+seventeenth International Conference on General Relativity and
+Gravitation at Oxford University in July 2004. In front of seven
+hundred people, Professor Hawking admitted that he had been
+wrong about black holes. The physicist had long held that the
+extreme gravitational fields of black holes somehow destroyed all
+of the information that entered the black holes. Professor Hawking
+now says that black holes never completely destroy the information
+that falls in. Instead, they continue to emit radiation for
+extended periods and eventually reveal the information within
+them.
+Adapted from: Carolyn Johnson, "A Black Hole Theory Zapped," The Boston Globe,
+July 22, 2004
+6. When President Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh to the U.S.
+Supreme Court, a psychology professor named Christine Blasey
+Ford testified before the U.S. Senate that Kavanaugh had sexually
+assaulted her when they were in high school. Kavanaugh then
+testified before the Senate, furiously insisting that he was innocent.
+After the hearing, more than 2,400 law professors signed an
+open letter, published in the New York Times, asserting that Kavanaugh’s
+testimony showed that he lacked the calm, courteous,
+even-handed temperament that a judge needs to have to hear and
+decide cases fairly. Therefore, Kavanaugh lacks the temperament
+needed to sit on the Supreme Court.
+Adapted from: "The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh,"
+New York Times, Oct 3, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2OBGfjC
+7. While vacationing in southern France, Belgian scientist Sophie
+Verheyden, who specializes in stalagmites, heard about a cave
+containing broken stalagmites. A previous archaeologist had used
+radiocarbon dating on bear bones in the cave to argue that
+110 Chapter IV Exercises
+Neanderthals had broken the stalagmites almost 50,000 years
+ago. Knowing that radiocarbon dating could be unreliable for
+bones that old, Verheyden instead measured trace levels of uranium
+in the stalagmites to estimate how long ago they had broken.
+She concluded, much to her own and everyone else’s
+astonishment, that someone had broken the stalagmites roughly
+176,500 years ago. Therefore, the stalagmites were broken roughly
+176,500 years ago.
+Adapted from: Ed Yong, "A Shocking Find in a Neanderthal Cave in France," The Atlantic,
+May 25, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/05/
+the-astonishing-age-of-a-neanderthal-cave-construction-site/484070/
+8. Fox Glacier and Franz Josef Glacier in New Zealand both attract
+thousands of tourists each year. According to companies that run
+glacier tours there, both glaciers have retreated so quickly over the
+last few years that once-popular hiking trips have become impossible.
+The only way to access the glaciers now is by taking a (much
+more expensive) helicopter ride.
+Adapted from: Mike Ives, "New Zealand Glaciers Ebb and Tour Guides Play
+Catch-Up," New York Times, Jan 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.
+com/2015/01/03/business/international/new-zealand-glaciers-ebb-and-tourguides-
+play-catch-up.html
+9. The National Center for Health Statistics, part of the U.S. government’s
+Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, runs a program
+called the National Health and Nutrition Examination
+System (NHANES). NHANES collects data on the health and
+nutrition of a representative cross-section of the American public.
+According to NHANES data for 2007/2008, about 33.8 percent
+of Americans over the age of twenty are obese. Thus, roughly one
+in every three American adults is obese.
+Adapted from: Katherine M. Flegal, Margaret D. Carroll, Cynthia L. Ogden, and
+Lester R. Curtin, "Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among U.S. Adults,
+1999–2008," Journal of the American Medical Association 303 (2010), 235–41
+10. Many Muslims object to images of Mohammed, even though
+Islam does not strictly prohibit them. Religious studies scholar
+Reza Aslan explains that the Quran does not specifically prohibit
+such images, and the history of Islamic art is full of images of
+Chapter IV Exercises 111
+Mohammed; but Islam does prohibit portraying God as a human
+being. According to Dalia Mogahed, director of research at a
+non-partisan think tank studying Muslim-American life, even
+though the Quran itself does not prohibit depictions of Mohammed,
+Islamic scholars have gradually extended the prohibition on
+depictions of God to include a prohibition on images of Mohammed.
+This has created a strong cultural norm against such images,
+even though there is technically no religious law against them.
+Adapted from: Amanda Taub, "What Everyone Gets Wrong about Islam and
+Cartoons of Mohammed," Vox, Jan 9, 2015, http://www.vox.com/
+2015/1/9/7517221/charlie-hebdo-blasphemy
+Need more practice? For more practice evaluating arguments that use
+sources, browse the editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editor in some of
+your favorite newspapers or magazines. When you find a piece in which
+the author uses sources to support his or her claims, evaluate how well the
+author has followed Rules 13–17. Alternatively, go to the companion Web
+site for this book and click on the link for "Chapter IV." You’ll find links to
+Web sites that allow users to post questions for other people to answer.
+Many of these sites encourage people to identify the sources on which they
+base their answers. Using the rules in this chapter, evaluate how well the
+people on those sites have used sources to support their claims.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 386.
+Exercise Set 4.4: Using sources in arguments
+Objective: To give you practice using sources in arguments.
+Instructions: In this exercise, you will use sources to construct arguments
+for or against specific claims. First, you will need to decide whether each
+claim below is true or false. This may require some research. Once you have
+decided whether each claim is true, do your best to construct arguments
+that follow this chapter’s rules for using sources. After each argument,
+briefly explain why you think your sources are good sources.
+Tips for success: This exercise set is a lot like Exercise Set 4.2. The biggest
+difference is that in this exercise, you’ll need to find specific sources so you
+can cite them in your argument. As in Exercise Set 4.2, be sure that your
+sources are informed, impartial, and independent.
+112 Chapter IV Exercises
+Sample
+The Chinese philosopher Confucius was born in 551 BCE.
+This claim is true. According to the historian of philosophy Fung Yu-Lan (A Short
+History of Chinese Philosophy, ed. Derk Bodde [1948; repr., New York: Free Press,
+1997], 4), Confucius was born in 551 BCE. This is the same date given by the
+Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Confucius.
+This response begins by stating clearly whether the response is true or false. It then identifies
+two independent, reliable sources that support the claim (although it could do even better by
+making sure that the Stanford Encyclopedia doesn’t rely on Fung’s book). It gives a detailed
+citation for A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, including a page number. It gives
+enough information about the other source (the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) that
+you could find the reference with a little bit of online research. (As it happens, the Stanford
+Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a highly reputable online encyclopedia, so it would be easy to
+find it online.)
+1. The United States produces more wine per year than any other
+country.
+2. Plutonium is the heaviest naturally occurring element.
+3. Worldwide, more than one million children die from diarrhea every
+year.
+4. There are more than four thousand known exoplanets (i.e., planets
+outside our solar system).
+5. Humans first came to the Americas more than 13,000 years ago.
+6. Given their limited technology, it would have been impossible for
+the ancient Egyptians to build the pyramids without help from
+aliens.
+7. The safest minivans are built by Japanese companies.
+8. The U.S. Constitution guarantees the separation of church and
+state.
+Chapter IV Exercises 113
+For exercises 9 and 10, pick any claim you want. Support that claim with
+sources, following this chapter’s rules for using sources.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 389.
+Need more practice? Go to the companion Web site for this book and
+click on the link for "Chapter IV." You’ll find links to Web sites that allow
+users to post questions for other people to answer. Using the rules in this
+chapter, you should be able to construct convincing answers to many questions
+on those site.
+Critical thinking activity: Finding good sources
+For an out-of-class activity that gives you practice finding good sources to support claims,
+see the "Finding good sources" assignment sheet (p. 526) in Part 3. This activity could also
+be done during class time in a library or computer lab.
+Critical thinking activity: Thinking critically about Wikipedia
+For several out-of-class activities that give you practice applying the rules from this chapter,
+go to the companion Web site for this book, click on the link for "Part 3," and then click on
+the link for "Thinking critically about Wikipedia."
+114
+Did you know that students who sit at the front of the classroom tend to get better grades? And that people who are married are, on average, happier than people who aren’t? Wealth, by contrast, doesn’t seem to correlate with happiness at all—so maybe it is true after all that "the best things in life are free." If you’d rather have the money anyway, you might be interested to know that people with "can-do" attitudes tend to be wealthier. So you’d better work on your attitude, eh?
+Here we come to arguments about causes and their effects—about what causes what. Such arguments are often vital. Good effects we want to increase, bad effects we want to prevent, and we often want to give appropriate credit or blame for both. It won’t surprise you, though, that reasoning about causes also takes care and critical thinking.
+Causal arguments start
+with correlations
+The evidence for a claim about causes is usually a correlation—a regular association—between two events or kinds of events: between your grades in a class and where you sit in the classroom; between being married and being happy; between the unemployment rate and the crime rate, etc. The general form of the argument therefore is:
+Event or condition E1 is regularly associated with event or condition E2.
+Therefore, event or condition E1 causes event or condition E2
+That is, because E1 is regularly associated with E2 in this way, we conclude that E1 causes E2. For example:
+People who meditate tend to be calmer.
+Therefore, meditation calms you down.
+Trends may also be correlated, as when we note that increasing violence on television correlates with increasing violence in the real world.
+Chapter V
+Arguments about Causes
+Rule 18
+Rule 19: Correlations may have alternative explanations 115
+Shows on television portray more and more violence, callousness, and depravity—and society is becoming more and more violent, callous, and depraved.
+Therefore, television is ruining our morals.
+Inverse correlations (that is, where an increase in one factor correlates to a decrease in another) may suggest causality too. For example, some studies correlate increased vitamin use with decreased health, suggesting that vitamins may (sometimes) be harmful. In the same way, noncorrelation may imply lack of cause, as when we discover that happiness and wealth are not correlated and therefore conclude that money does not bring happiness.
+Exploring correlations is also a scientific research strategy. What causes lightning? Why do some people become insomniacs, or geniuses, or Republicans? And isn’t there some way (please?) to prevent colds? Researchers look for correlates to these conditions of interest: that is, for other conditions or events that are regularly associated with lightning or genius or colds, for example, but without which lightning or genius or colds don’t tend to happen. These correlates may be subtle and complex, but finding them is often possible nonetheless—and then (hopefully) we have a handle on causes.
+Correlations may have
+alternative explanations
+Arguments from correlation to cause are often compelling. However, there is also a systematic difficulty with any such claim. The problem is simply that any correlation may be explained in multiple ways. It’s often not clear from the correlation itself how best to interpret the underlying causes.
+First, some correlations may simply be coincidental. For example, though the Seattle Seahawks and the Denver Broncos both went to the Super Bowl in the same year that their home states legalized marijuana—2012—it’s not likely that these events were actually connected.
+Second, even when there really is a connection, correlation by itself does not establish the direction of the connection. If E1 is correlated with E2, E1 may cause E2—but E2 may instead cause E1. For example, while it is true (on average) that people with "can-do" attitudes tend to be wealthier, it’s not at all clear that the attitude leads to the wealth. It may be more plausible the other way around: that the wealth causes the attitude. You’re more apt to believe in the possibility of success when you’ve already been successful. Wealth and attitude may correlate, then, but if you want to get wealthier, just working on your attitude may not get you very far.
+Rule 19
+116 Rule 19: Correlations may have alternative explanations
+Likewise, it’s entirely possible that calmer people tend to be drawn to meditation, rather than becoming calmer because they meditate. And the very same correlation that suggests that television is "ruining our morals" could instead suggest that our morals are ruining television (that is, that rising real-world violence is leading to an increase in the portrayal of violence on television).
+Third, some other cause may underlie and explain both of the correlates. Again E1 may be correlated with E2, but rather than E1 causing E2 or E2 causing E1, something else—some E3—may cause both E1 and E2. For example, the fact that students who sit in the front of the classroom tend to get better grades may not imply either that sitting in the front leads to better grades or that getting better grades leads to sitting in the front of the class. More likely, some students’ special commitment to making the most of their schooling leads both to sitting in the front of the classroom and to better grades.
+Finally, multiple or complex causes may be at work, and they may move in many directions at the same time. Violence on television, for example, surely reflects a more violent state of society, but also, to some degree, it surely helps to worsen that violence. Quite likely there are other underlying causes as well, such as the breakup of traditional value systems and the absence of constructive pastimes.
+Exercise Set 5.1: Brainstorming explanations for correlations
+Objective: To give you practice brainstorming possible explanations for a correlation.
+Instructions: For each of the correlations below, list at least two possible explanations for the correlation. The explanations do not need to be equally likely, but try to avoid explanations that are clearly outlandish. You do not need to decide which is most likely. The goal is to practice brainstorming alternative explanations for a correlation.
+Tips for success: In the discussion of Rules 18 and 19, we identified four possible explanations for a correlation: E1 may be correlated with E2 because E1 causes E2. E1 may be correlated with E2 because E2 causes E1. E1 may be correlated with E2 because E1 and E2 are both caused by or correlated with some third thing, E3. Finally, the correlation between E1 and E2 might just be a coincidence, with no causal connection between them. Keep all of these possibilities in mind when doing this exercise.
+Rule 19: Correlations may have alternative explanations 117
+1. The GRE is an exam used for graduate school admissions. Philosophy students tend to do extremely well on all sections of the test—especially the verbal reasoning and analytical writing sections. That is, there is a correlation between studying philosophy and doing well on the GRE.
+Adapted from: Justin Weinberg, "Philosophy Majors and the GRE 2011–2014,"
+Daily Nous, Aug 12, 2014, http://dailynous.com/2014/08/12/philosophy-majors-and-the-gre-2011-2014/
+2. There is an inverse correlation between the unemployment rate and the chance of a U.S. president being reelected for a second term. That is, when the unemployment rate is high at the end of a president’s first term, that president is less likely to be reelected.
+Adapted from: Nate Silver, "On the Maddeningly Inexact Relationship between
+Unemployment and Re-Election," New York Times, Jun 2, 2011,
+http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/on-the-maddeningly-inexact-relationship-between-unemployment-and-re-election/
+3. When the leaves on the trees turn colors, geese always fly south. That is, there’s a correlation between the leaves turning colors and geese flying south.
+Adapted from: Ramzi Nasser, "Deciding Whether There Is Statistical Independence
+or Not?" Journal of Mathematics and Statistics 3 (2007), 151
+Sample
+There is a correlation between being bitten by a specific kind of tropical mosquito called Aedes aegypti and developing yellow fever.
+One possible explanation is that A. aegypti carries a virus that causes yellow fever. Another possibility is that A. aegypti likes to bite people who are carrying the virus for yellow fever, and the mosquito can detect the virus before people show symptoms of the illness. A third possibility is that yellow fever is caused by something else that is common in the tropics; being in tropics makes you more likely both to get yellow fever and (independently) to get bitten by A. aegypti.
+This response gives three possible explanations for the stated correlation. It does not attempt to establish whether the correlation is true or figure out which explanation is most likely. While some of the proposed explanations are more likely than others, none are totally outlandish.
+118 Rule 19: Correlations may have alternative explanations
+4. The longer a homicide case goes unsolved, the less likely police are to arrest anyone. About half of homicide cases in major American cities lead to an arrest within ten days. But among cases that remain unsolved for more than a year, only 5 percent eventually lead to an arrest. Thus, there is an inverse correlation between the length of time that a homicide case has been open and the chance that police will arrest someone for the crime.
+Adapted from: Kimbriell Kelly and Steven Rich, "For Unsolved Cases Lasting a Year, Finding the Killer Becomes Nearly Impossible," Washington Post, Dec 28, 2018,
+https://wapo.st/2ETKkLC
+5. People who graduated from college tend to make more money than those who never attended or never graduated from college.
+Adapted from: Mary C. Daly and Leila Bengali, "Is It Still Worth Going to College?" Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco Economic Letters, May 5, 2014,
+http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2014/may/is-college-worth-it-education-tuition-wages/
+6. The Dow Jones index of the stock market correlates with the hemlines of women’s skirts and dresses. When the stock market goes up, so do hemlines: women tend to wear shorter skirts. When the stock market goes down, hemlines drop too.
+Adapted from: John L. Casti, Mood Matters: From Rising Skirt Lengths to
+the Collapse of World Powers (New York: Springer, 2010), 65–66
+7. Indians, who eat foods containing a lot of turmeric, have a much lower incidence of Alzheimer’s disease than do Americans. Most Americans do not eat much turmeric. That is, there is an inverse correlation between developing Alzheimer’s and eating turmeric.
+Adapted from: Hilary E. MacGregor, "Out of the Spice Box, Into the Lab,"
+Los Angeles Times, Feb 6, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/06/
+health/he-turmeric6
+8. There is a strong correlation between peace in a country—that is, how likely the country is to be involved in intra- and interstate conflict—and the treatment of women in that country, as
+Rule 19: Correlations may have alternative explanations 119
+measured by levels of violence against women, women’s equality before the law, and women’s participation in government.
+Adapted from: Valerie M. Hudson, "What Sex Means for World Peace," Foreign Policy, Apr 24, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/24/what-sex-means-for-world-peace
+9. After future U.S. president William Henry Harrison attacked the village of a Shawnee chief named Tecumseh, Tecumseh’s brother supposedly set a curse on Harrison. Harrison was elected president in 1840; he died in office in 1841. For the next 120 years, every U.S. president who was elected in a year ending in zero also died in office. That is, there is (or, at least, was) a correlation between being elected president in a year ending in zero and dying in office.
+Adapted from: "The Curse of Tecumseh," Snopes.com, Feb 12, 2009,
+http://www.snopes.com/history/american/curse.asp
+10. How do you draw a circle? It turns out that the answer to that question is correlated with where you’re from. By analyzing tens of thousands of drawings of circles from an online game called Quick, Draw!, researchers discovered that while most people in most countries (including the United States, France, South Korea, and the Vietnam) draw their circles counterclockwise, the vast majority of people in Japan, a slim majority of people in Taiwan, and close to half of people in Egypt and Iraq draw theirs clockwise. Thus, there is a correlation between living in particular countries and drawing circles clockwise.
+Adapted from: Thu-Huong Na and Nikhil Sonnad, "How Do You Draw
+a Circle? We Analyzed 100,000 Drawings to Show How
+Culture Shapes Our Instincts," Quartz, Jun 15, 2017, https://qz.com/994486/
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 391.
+Need more practice? Go to science journalism Web sites like LiveScience, Scientific American, or the science section of your favorite newspaper. Look for articles that mention correlations or causal connections. You can also find articles about correlation by entering the search term "correlation" in the Google News search engine at http://news.google.com. Brainstorm possible explanations for the correlations reported in those articles.
+120 Rule 20: Work toward the most likely explanation
+Work toward the most likely explanation
+Since a variety of explanations for a correlation are usually possible, the challenge for a good correlation-based argument is to find the most likely explanation.
+First, fill in the connections. That is, spell out how each possible explanation could make sense.
+NO:
+Independent filmmakers generally make more creative films than the big studios. Thus, their independence leads to their creativity.
+There’s a correlation, yes, but the causal conclusion is a little abrupt. What’s the connection?
+YES:
+Independent filmmakers generally make more creative films than the big studios. It makes sense that with less studio control, independent filmmakers are freer to try new things for more varied audiences. Independents also usually have much less money at stake, and therefore can afford for a creative experiment to fall flat. Thus, their independence leads to their creativity.
+Next, try to fill in the connections in this way not just for the explanation you favor, but also for alternative explanations. For example, consider studies that correlate increased vitamin use with decreased health. One possible explanation is that vitamins actually worsen health, or anyway that some vitamins (or taking a lot of them) are bad for some people. It is also possible, though, that people who already are in bad or worsening health may be using more vitamins to try to get better. In fact, this alternative explanation seems, at least at first glance, equally or even more plausible.
+Finally, try to decide which is the most likely explanation for the correlation. You may need more information. In particular, is there other evidence that (some?) vitamins can sometimes be harmful? If so, how widespread might these harms be? If there is little direct and specific evidence of harm to be found, especially when vitamins are taken in appropriate dosages, then it’s more likely that poorer health leads to more vitamin use than that more vitamin use leads to poorer health.
+Or again: Marriage and happiness correlate (again, on average), but is it because marriage makes you happier or because happier people tend to be more successful at getting and staying married? Fill in the connections for both explanations and then step back to think.
+Rule 20
+Rule 20: Work toward the most likely explanation 121
+Marriage clearly offers companionship and support, which could explain how marriage might make you happier. Conversely, it may be that happy people are better at getting and staying married. To us, though, this second explanation seems less likely. Happiness may make you a more appealing partner, but then again it may not—it could instead make you more self-absorbed—and it is not clear that happiness by itself makes you any more committed or responsive a partner. We’d prefer the first explanation.
+Note that the most likely explanation is very seldom some sort of conspiracy or supernatural intervention. It is possible, of course, that the
+Bermuda Triangle really is spooked and that is why ships and planes disappear there. But that explanation is far less likely than another simple and natural explanation: that the Bermuda Triangle is one of the world’s heaviest-traveled shipping and sailing areas, with tropical weather that is unpredictable and sometimes severe. Besides, people do tend to embellish spooky stories, so some of the more lurid accounts, having passed through countless retellings, aren’t (let’s just say) the most reliable.
+Likewise, although people fasten onto inconsistencies and oddities in dramatic events (the JFK assassination, 9/11, etc.) to justify conspiracy theories, such explanations usually leave a great deal more unexplained than the usual explanations, however incomplete. (For instance, why would any plausible conspiracy take this particular form?) Don’t assume that every little oddity must have some nefarious explanation. It’s hard enough to get the basics right. Neither you nor anyone else needs to have an answer for everything.
+Exercise Set 5.2: Identifying the most likely explanation
+Objective: To give you practice working toward the most likely explanation of a correlation.
+Instructions: Go back to your answers to the exercises in Exercise Set 5.1. (If you haven’t done Exercise Set 5.1 yet, complete it before doing these exercises.) For each of the exercises in Exercise Set 5.1, state which of your possible explanations you think is most likely. Give reasons to support your claim.
+Tips for success: There is no magic formula for identifying the most likely explanation. If E1 is correlated with E2, and you think this is because E1 causes E2, do your best to tell as convincing and detailed a story as possible about how E1 causes E2. Even better, see if you can come up with ways that
+122 Rule 20: Work toward the most likely explanation
+someone could test your story about how E1 causes E2. For instance, how could someone test the idea that the leaves’ changing colors causes geese to fly south in the autumn? (See the model response to exercise 3 for a hint!) Likewise, if you think E2 causes E1, tell as convincing and detailed a story as you can about how that happens. The more you know about E1 and E2, the easier this process will be. If you can’t come up with any convincing accounts of how one thing could cause the other, then the most likely explanation may be that the correlation is just a coincidence. Note that in scientific studies, it’s usually possible to say how likely or unlikely it is for the correlation to be a coincidence. If the study shows that the chance of a pure coincidence is 1 in 10,000, you may want to look harder for other explanations (besides a coincidence) than if the chance of a coincidence is 1 in 20.
+Sample
+There is a correlation between being bitten by a specific kind of tropical mosquito called Aedes aegypti and developing yellow fever.
+The most likely explanation of this correlation is that A. aegypti causes yellow fever. According to the Centers for Disease Control, yellow fever is caused by a virus that is "transmitted to humans through the bite of a mosquito." The World Health Organization’s online fact sheet about yellow fever states that A. aegypti is a "yellow fever vector," meaning that it transmits yellow fever. Presumably, it works like this: The bite of A. aegypti injects the virus into the human bloodstream. The virus then causes yellow fever.
+This response builds on the sample response in Exercise Set 5.1, which gave three possible explanations of the correlation between being bitten by A. aegypti and getting yellow fever. This response does two things. First, it cites an authoritative source to establish which of those three explanations is correct. This is only one of many ways to argue that one explanation is most likely, and it’s one that may not be available in all cases. (To be sure you’re doing it well, follow the rules in Chapter IV!) Second, this response explains how the causal connection is supposed to work. If you want to claim that a correlation is best explained by a causal connection, it’s usually important to be able to say something about how one thing causes the other, rather than just relying on an authoritative source.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 393.
+Rule 21: Expect complexity 123
+Rule 21
+Need more practice? Go to science journalism Web sites or the science
+section of your favorite newspaper. Look for stories about causal connections;
+most of them will tell you about a correlation, which someone has
+explained as a causal connection. Ask yourself what the best explanation of
+that correlation is. Do you agree with the article’s claim that the connection
+is causal? Why or why not?
+Expect complexity
+Plenty of happy people are not married, of course, and plenty of married
+people are unhappy. Still, it does not follow that marriage has no effect on
+happiness on average. It’s just that happiness and unhappiness (and, for
+that matter, being married or unmarried) have many other causes too.
+One correlation is not the whole story. The question in such cases is about
+the relative weight of different causes.
+If you or someone else has argued that some E1 causes some E2, it is
+not necessarily a counterexample if occasionally E1 doesn’t produce E2, or
+if another cause entirely may also sometimes produce E2. The claim is just
+that E1 often or usually produces E2, and that other causes less commonly
+do, or that E1 is among the major contributors to E2, though the full story
+may involve multiple causes and there may be other major contributors
+too. There are people who never smoke cigarettes at all and still get lung
+cancer, and also people who smoke three packs of cigarettes a day and
+never get it. Both effects are medically intriguing and important, but the
+fact remains that smoking is the prime cause of lung cancer.
+Many different causes may contribute to an overall effect. Though the
+causes of global climate change are many and varied, for instance, the fact
+that some of them are natural, such as changes in the sun’s brightness, does
+not show that human contributions therefore have no effect. Once again,
+the causal story is complex. Many factors are at work. (Indeed, if the sun is
+also contributing to global warming, there’s even more reason to try to
+decrease our contribution.)
+Causes and effects may "loop," too. Filmmakers’ independence may
+lead to their creativity, but, then again, creative filmmakers may seek independence
+from the start, leading to more creativity, and so on. Others may
+seek both creativity and independence because they prefer a less pressured
+life, or maybe they just have some great idea that they can’t sell to a big
+studio. It’s complicated. . . .
+124 Chapter V Exercises
+Objective: To give you practice evaluating arguments about causes.
+Instructions: Evaluate how well each of the following arguments obeys
+Rules 18–21.
+Tips for success: A good argument about causes should do two things.
+First, a good argument about causes should convince you that there
+really is a correlation between two things (Rule 18). Remember that a
+correlation is a systematic relationship between two things. Giving a few
+examples of one thing following another, for instance, does not prove that
+there is a correlation between the two things.
+There are two main ways for an argument to establish a correlation. It
+might do this by citing sources that establish the correlation. Alternatively,
+it might give a thorough argument by example or a statistical argument.
+When a claim about correlation relies on either of these techniques, you’ll
+need to apply the rules from Chapter IV or Chapter II to decide how well
+it does in establishing a correlation.
+Second, a good argument about causes should convince you that the
+best explanation for that correlation is that one thing causes the other. To
+decide whether an argument does this, you’ll need to brainstorm alternative
+explanations of the correlation, as you did in Exercise Set 5.1. Then, use
+the skills you developed in Exercise Set 5.2 to figure out whether you think
+the best explanation of the correlation really is the one claimed in the argument.
+If you think there are better explanations for the correlation, then
+the argument has failed Rule 19, Rule 20, or both.
+Rule 21 comes into play in two ways. First, some arguments will overstate
+the strength of their conclusions. If an argument seems to suggest
+that it has explained the entire cause of some effect, be suspicious that it’s
+ignoring complexity. On the other hand, just because an argument doesn’t
+address the full range of causes for an effect does not mean that the argument
+has failed to identify a genuine causal connection. For instance, when
+public health experts publish a study claiming that eating fast food causes
+obesity, the fast-food industry sometimes retorts, "Our products don’t
+cause obesity. Obesity is caused by a combination of genetics, diet, exercise,
+and other factors." They’re right: diet isn’t the only cause of obesity. Still,
+this retort violates Rule 21 when (if) it moves from the claim that diet isn’t
+the only cause of obesity to the suggestion that eating fast foods does not
+contribute to obesity at all. Don’t make the same mistake when you are
+evaluating arguments.
+CHAPTER EXERCISES
+Exercise Set 5.3: Evaluating arguments about causes
+Chapter V Exercises 125
+Sample
+Physical exercise makes people happier. This is shown by a recent review of many
+different scientific studies that looked at roughly half a million people from all
+walks of life. Across all of the studies, people who exercise even a little bit are
+happier than people who don’t exercise at all, and those who exercised more
+tended to be even happier than those who only exercised a little bit.
+Adapted from: Gretchen Reynolds, "Even a Little Exercise Might Make Us Happier,"
+New York Times, May 2, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2FCgs26
+This is a fairly weak argument. While it does a very good job establishing a strong
+correlation between exercise and happiness (Rule 18), it jumps to conclusions by not
+considering alternative explanations for that correlation (Rule 19) or showing that the
+specific causal connection claimed here is the most likely one (Rule 20). For instance,
+maybe people who don’t exercise are unhappy because they’re so busy that they don’t
+have time to exercise. Or maybe healthier people both exercise more and feel happier in
+general. At least this argument doesn’t underestimate the complexity of happiness by
+claiming that exercise is the only thing that causes happiness (Rule 21).
+This response addresses each of the rules from Chapter V in a systematic way, citing specific
+details from the argument to support its claims about how well the argument follows each
+rule. In thinking about how well an argument follows the rules from Chapter V, it’s important
+to do your own thinking about alternative explanations of correlations. In weaker
+arguments especially, the most important alternative explanations might not be explicitly
+mentioned, leaving you to come up with them on your own.
+Notice that the argument doesn’t do a good job supporting its conclusion even though it
+does a very good job establishing a correlation between exercise and happiness. This illustrates
+the importance of Rules 19 and 20, which will keep you from running afoul of the old adage
+that "correlation does not imply causation."
+1. Watching television will kill you. A study of 11,000 Australian
+adults found that people who watch an average of six hours of
+television per day die about five years younger than those who
+watch no television. More generally, the study found that each
+hour of television that you watch as an adult chops about twentytwo
+minutes off your lifespan. This is partly because people tend
+to eat junk food while watching television, partly because time
+spent in front of the television is time away from healthy activities
+126 Chapter V Exercises
+like exercising, and partly because people tend to be driven to
+watch a lot of television when they are lonely, isolated, or depressed,
+all of which can lead to worse health outcomes.
+Adapted from: Steven Reinberg, "Too Much TV May Take Years Off Your Life,"
+HealthDay, Aug 15, 2011, http://consumer.healthday.com/senior-citizeninformation-
+31/misc-death-and-dying-news-172/too-much-tvmay-
+take-years-off-your-life-655869.html
+2. Based on a study of 26,069 Canadian adolescents, researchers at
+McGill University found that eating dinner together as a family
+promotes better emotional health among teenagers. Teenagers’
+emotional well-being, trust in others, and overall life satisfaction
+improved with each additional dinner they ate with their families
+during the week.
+Adapted from: Sharon Jayson, "Each Family Dinner Adds Up to Benefits
+for Adolescents," USA Today, Mar 24, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/
+story/news/nation/2013/03/24/family-dinner-adolescent-benefits/2010731/
+3. North Carolina teacher Donna Gill Allen teaches her students
+about germs with a fun experiment that uses three slices of bread.
+She slides the first slice into a plastic bag using a plastic glove. She
+puts the second slice into a second bag using bare, but wellwashed
+hands. She takes the third slice and passes it around the
+room so that each student touches it with their unwashed hands
+before putting it into a third bag. Within a few days, the third
+slice is covered in mold and slime while the first two slices still
+look good enough to eat. Since the only difference between the
+slices is the way they were handled, and we know that kids’ hands
+have germs on them that could cause the growths on the bread,
+the best explanation is that the kids’ touching the bread caused it
+to grow mold.
+Adapted from: "This Teacher’s Neat (But Extremely Gross) Experiment for Her Students
+Just Went Viral," IFLScience, n.d., https://www.iflscience.com/chemistry/
+this-teachers-neat-but-extremely-gross-experiment-for-her-students-has-gone-viral/
+4. Lots of factors affect whether and how long a marriage lasts. But
+according to researcher John Gottman, the one sure sign that a
+marriage is doomed is when one or both partners start showing
+contempt for the other, such as by rolling their eyes, calling their
+Chapter V Exercises 127
+partner names, or making mean-spirited jokes at the other’s expense.
+That contempt tears relationships apart. Thus, contempt
+causes divorce.
+Adapted from: Drake Baer, "5 Factors That May Predict Divorce, According
+to Psychology," CNN.com, Nov 6, 2017, http://cnn.it/2zyogDv
+5. Serving in the military causes people to earn less money later in
+life. A decade after their military service, men who were drafted
+into the Vietnam War in the early 1970s earned about 85 percent
+as much as similar men who had not been drafted. Since people
+were chosen randomly for the draft, it can’t be that (future) income
+caused people to be drafted or that some other factor caused
+both being drafted and lower incomes.
+Adapted from: Peter Dizikes, "The Natural Experimenter,"
+MIT Technology Review, Jan 2, 2013,
+http://www.technologyreview.com/article/508381/the-natural-experimenter/
+6. Young American men don’t work as much as they did just two
+decades ago. Between 2000 and 2015, the number of hours
+worked by men in their twenties declined by 12 percent. For men
+aged thirty-one to fifty-five, hours worked declined by 8 percent.
+At the same time, the number of hours spent on leisure increased
+by the same number of hours that work decreased, and young
+men spent about three-quarters of those extra leisure hours playing
+video games. Thus, there is a strong inverse correlation between
+the number of hours young men are working and the
+number of hours they are playing video games. Some of this can
+be explained by falling wages: for those who can afford the leisure
+time, putting in those extra hours at work just isn’t worth it if
+they’re not getting paid as much. But the biggest cause is that
+video games are getting better: not only are men devoting more
+hours to leisure than they were, they are devoting more of their
+leisure time to video games, which suggests that technological
+improvements in video games have led young men to spend more
+time on their Xbox and less time on the job.
+Adapted from: Brian Wallheimer, "As Video Games Get Better, Young Men Work Less and
+Play More," Chicago Booth Review, Dec 20, 2017, http://review.chicagobooth.edu/
+economics/2017/article/video-games-get-better-young-men-work-less-and-play-more
+128 Chapter V Exercises
+7. People who are better at thinking critically are also better at spotting
+fake news, according to new research by psychologists David
+Rand and Gordon Pennycook. Specifically, the researchers had
+people take the Cognitive Reflection Test, which asks questions
+that people often get wrong if they don’t think analytically. (A
+famous example: "A bat and a ball together cost $1.10, and the bat
+costs exactly $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball
+cost?") People who scored well on the test could more accurately
+distinguish accurate headlines from inaccurate ones. Rand and
+Pennycook suggest this is because being good at critical thinking
+makes you better able to recognize when a headline conflicts with
+the facts, distorts the truth, or is not supported by evidence.
+Therefore, being good at critical thinking causes you to be good at
+spotting fake news.
+Adapted from: Robbie Gonzalez, "Don’t Want to Fall for Fake News? Don’t Be Lazy,"
+WIRED, Nov 9, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/
+dont-want-to-fall-for-fake-news-dont-be-lazy
+8. The word you use for tea depends, of course, on the language you
+speak. But the word your language uses for tea depends, surprisingly,
+on whether tea first arrived in your country by land or by
+sea. In most dialects of Chinese, the word for tea is something like
+cha. In languages that originated along the Silk Road—the old,
+land-based trading routes that carried goods through central Asia
+to and from China—the word for tea sounds like cha: chay in Persian
+and Turkish, chāy in Hindi, shay in Arabic, chai in Swahili,
+and so on. But in the Min Nan dialect of Chinese, spoken in the
+coastal Fujian province, tea is called te, not cha. Cultures that
+weren’t well-connected to the Silk Road learned about tea when
+the Dutch brought it—and the local word for it—from Fujian by
+sea. Thus, it’s called thee in Dutch, tea in English, tè in Italian, tèh
+in Javanese, tii in Maori, and so on.
+Adapted from: Nikhil Sonnad, "Tea if by Sea, Chai if by Land: Why the World Only Has
+Two Words for Tea," Quartz, Jan 11, 2018, https://qz.com/1176962/
+9. Among British people born around 1970, there is a correlation
+between IQ as a child and vegetarianism as an adult. Those with
+higher childhood IQs were more likely to be vegetarians as an
+adult. Researchers considered the possibility that vegetarianism
+causes a higher IQ, but this would require the vegetarians to have
+Chapter V Exercises 129
+become vegetarians when they were quite young. They found that
+this was not the case. The vast majority of vegetarians became
+vegetarians as teenagers or adults, not as children. It’s more likely
+that some other mechanisms are at work. For instance, higher IQ
+was correlated with greater educational attainment, which is correlated
+with vegetarianism. Perhaps having a higher IQ causes
+more education, which causes an increased likelihood of becoming
+a vegetarian. Even when researchers factored out education,
+however, they still saw a significant link between IQ and vegetarianism.
+More directly, then, maybe higher IQs increase the likelihood
+that one will respond to evidence about the health and other
+benefits of vegetarianism. There is presumably some mix of various
+mechanisms at work here.
+Adapted from: Catharine R. Gale, Ian J. Deary, Ingrid Schoon, and
+G. David Batty, "IQ in Childhood and Vegetarianism in Adulthood:
+1970 British Cohort Study," British Medical Journal 334 (2006), 245
+10. People read for fun much less often than they used to. The decline
+in recreational reading occurred at the same time as a decline in
+reading abilities in Americans, as measured by test scores and employers’
+reports about employees’ reading skills. The correlation
+shows up on the individual level too. Individuals who read for fun
+more often score better on tests of reading abilities. Thus, reading
+for fun causes people to become better readers.
+Adapted from: Motoko Rich, "Study Links Drop in Test Scores to a Decline in
+Time Spent Reading," New York Times, Nov 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.
+com/2007/11/19/arts/19nea.html
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 397.
+Need more practice? Return to the science journalism articles that you
+found in doing more practice for Exercise Set 5.2. Even better, use your
+library to find scientific papers on a topic that interests you. (If you’re not
+sure how to do this, ask your librarians. Librarians are experts in finding
+information!) How well do the arguments in those articles or papers follow
+Rules 18–21?
+130 Chapter V Exercises
+Objective: To give you practice constructing arguments about causes that
+follow Rules 18–21.
+Instructions: Each question below asks whether one thing causes another.
+Use the rules in this chapter to settle on an answer to each question. Construct
+an argument to defend your answer.
+Tips for success: Begin by establishing that there is a correlation between
+the alleged cause and effect. (None of the questions below are trick questions.
+In every case there really is a correlation.) You might establish a
+correlation by citing sources, in which case you should be sure to follow
+Rules 13–17. Alternatively, you might do this by giving examples, in which
+case you should be sure to follow Rules 7–11.
+Once you’ve established that a correlation exists, follow the steps you
+took in exercises 5.1 and 5.2 to identify the most likely explanation for that
+correlation. You may need to do some research to answer these questions.
+Then, explain why you think your chosen explanation is the most likely one.
+Exercise Set 5.4: Constructing arguments about causes
+Sample
+Do economic downturns cause anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States?
+As Harvard economist Benjamin Friedman documents in his book The Moral Consequences
+of Economic Growth, anti-immigrant sentiment tends to rise in the United
+States during economic downturns. Friedman’s book shows that this correlation has
+held since at least the nineteenth century. This is because economic downturns cause
+anti-immigrant sentiment. During economic downturns, many people face very
+difficult circumstances, often for reasons beyond their control. In trying to cope with
+and understand those challenges, people look for obvious changes in their environment.
+Recent immigrants, by definition, bring change to their new country. Thus, it is easy
+for people to make an erroneous connection between the arrival of the most recent
+immigrants and the economic downturn. Because people blame immigrants for their
+economic hardships, anti-immigrant sentiments increase. This is more plausible than
+claiming that the correlation is a pure coincidence, given how long it has gone on, or
+that anti-immigrant sentiment causes an economic downturn, since the antiimmigrant
+sentiment usually increases after the economy deteriorates.
+This response begins by citing a source to establish that there is a correlation between economic
+downturns and anti-immigrant sentiment. If there were no correlation, there would be no
+Chapter V Exercises 131
+argument for a causal connection. The response then argues that the most likely explanation
+for
+the correlation is that an economic downturn causes an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment.
+At the very end, it employs a useful tactic in arguing that causation must go in one direction
+rather than another: if one thing happens before another, the second cannot be the cause of the
+first.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 401.
+1. Does smoking cigarettes cause lung cancer?
+2. Does getting more education cause women to have fewer children?
+3. Do earthquakes cause volcanic eruptions?
+4. Does watching conservative news channels make people vote for
+conservative political candidates?
+5. Does sleeping with the light on as a baby cause myopia (nearsightedness)?
+6. Does having good public schools cause a neighborhood to be
+wealthy?
+7. Does attending religious services on a regular basis cause people
+to be happier?
+For exercises 8, 9, and 10, construct arguments about a causal connection
+of your choice. Be sure to establish a correlation between two things (Rule
+18) and then follows Rules 19–21 to show that the best explanation of the
+correlation is that one thing causes the other.
+Need more practice? Make a list of questions of the form "What causes X?"
+Do some research to see whether you can identify possible answers to each
+of those questions. Using Rules 17–21, try to identify the best answers.
+132 Chapter V Exercises
+Critical thinking activity: Bluffing about causal explanations
+For an in-class activity that gives you practice brainstorming alternative explanations of a
+correlation and working toward the best explanation, see the "Bluffing about causal explanations"
+assignment sheet (p. 527) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Reconstructing scientific reasoning
+For an in-class or out-of-class activity that gives you practice thinking about scientific reasoning,
+which frequently involves causal arguments, see the "Reconstructing scientific reasoning"
+assignment sheet (p. 512) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Analyzing arguments in scientific
+reasoning
+For an in-class or out-of-class activity that gives you practice analyzing causal arguments
+and other kinds of scientific reasoning, see the "Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning"
+assignment sheet (p. 513) in Part 3.
+133
+Consider this argument:
+If there are no chance factors in chess, then chess is a game of pure skill.
+There are no chance factors in chess.
+Therefore, chess is a game of pure skill.
+Suppose that the premises of this argument are true. In other words, suppose it’s true that if there are no chance factors in chess, then chess is a game of pure skill—and suppose there are no chance factors in chess. You can therefore conclude with perfect assurance that chess is a game of pure skill. There is no way to admit the truth of these premises but deny the conclusion.
+Arguments of this type are called deductive arguments. That is, a properly formed deductive argument is an argument of such a form that if its premises are true, the conclusion must be true too. Properly formed deductive arguments are called valid arguments.
+Deductive arguments differ from the sorts of arguments so far considered, in which even a large number of true premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion (although sometimes they may make it very likely). In nondeductive arguments, the conclusion unavoidably goes beyond the premises—that’s the very point of arguing by example, authority, and so on—whereas the conclusion of a valid deductive argument only makes explicit what is already contained in the premises, though it may not be clear until it is spelled out.
+In real life, of course, we can’t always be sure of our premises either, so the conclusions of real-life deductive arguments still have to be taken with a few (sometimes many) grains of salt. Still, when strong premises can be found, deductive forms are very useful. And even when the premises are uncertain, deductive forms offer an effective way to organize arguments.
+Chapter VI
+Deductive Arguments
+This chapter provides a brief introduction to the much larger topic of deductive logic. The "Resources" section on this book’s companion Web site has links to books and online resources for those who would like to explore deductive logic in more depth. Many of these resources are free, and some are interactive.
+134 Rulle 23:: Moduss ttollllenss
+Modus ponens
+Using the letters p and q to stand for declarative sentences, the simplest
+valid deductive form is
+If [sentence p] then [sentence q].
+[Sentence p].
+Therefore, [sentence q].
+Or, more briefly:
+If p then q.
+p.
+Therefore, q.
+This form is called modus ponens ("the mode of putting": put p, get q). Taking
+p to stand for "There are no chance factors in chess," and q to stand for
+"Chess is a game of pure skill," our introductory example follows modus
+ponens (check it out). Here is another:
+If drivers on cell phones have more accidents, then drivers
+should be prohibited from using them.
+Drivers on cell phones do have more accidents.
+Therefore, drivers should be prohibited from using cell phones.
+To develop this argument, you must explain and defend both of its premises,
+and they require quite different arguments (go back and look). Modus
+ponens gives you a way to lay them out clearly and separately from the start.
+Modus tollens
+A second valid deductive form is modus tollens ("the mode of taking": take
+q, take p).
+If p then q.
+Not-q.
+Therefore, not-p.
+Here "Not-q" simply stands for the denial of q, that is, for the sentence "It
+is not true that q." The same is true for "not-p."
+Want to play detective? Sherlock Holmes used a modus tollens argument
+at a key moment in "The Adventure of Silver Blaze." A horse had Rule 22 Rule 23
+Rule 24: Hypothetical syllogism 135
+been stolen out of a well-guarded barn. The barn had a dog, but the dog did
+not bark. Now what do we make of that?
+A dog was kept in the stables, and yet, though someone had
+been in and had fetched out a horse, [the dog] had not
+barked. . . . Obviously the . . . visitor was someone whom the
+dog knew well.1
+Holmes’ argument can be put as a modus tollens:
+If the visitor were a stranger, then the dog would have barked.
+The dog did not bark.
+Therefore, the visitor was not a stranger.
+To write his deduction in symbols, you could use s for "The visitor was
+a stranger" and b for "The dog barked."
+If s then b.
+Not-b.
+Therefore, not-s.
+"Not-b" stands for "The dog did not bark," and "not-s" stands for "The visitor
+was not a stranger." As Holmes puts it, the visitor was someone whom
+the dog knew well. It was an inside job!
+Be careful not to confuse modus ponens and modus tollens with their evil twins, "affirming the
+consequent" and "denying the antecedent." For details on those two invalid argument forms,
+see page 288 in Appendix I: Fallacies.
+Rule 24
+1. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, "The Adventure of Silver Blaze," in The Complete Sherlock
+Holmes (Garden City, NY: Garden City Books, 1930), p. 199.
+Hypothetical syllogism
+A third valid deductive form is "hypothetical syllogism."
+If p then q.
+If q then r.
+Therefore, if p then r.
+For instance, remember this argument from Rule 6:
+When you learn to care for a pet, you learn to attend to the
+needs of a dependent creature. When you learn to attend to
+136 Rule 25: Disjunctive syllogism
+the needs of a dependent creature, you learn to be a better
+parent. Therefore, when you learn to care for a pet, you learn
+to be a better parent.
+Separating out and slightly rephrasing the premises into "if–then" form:
+If you learn to care for a pet, then you learn to attend to the
+needs of a dependent creature.
+If you learn to attend to the needs of a dependent creature,
+then you learn to be a better parent.
+Therefore, if you learn to care for a pet, then you learn to be a
+better parent.
+Using the letters in boldface to stand for the component sentences in these
+premises, we have:
+If c then a.
+If a then p.
+Therefore, if c then p.
+And you see why using consistent terms and phrasing helps so much!
+Hypothetical syllogisms are valid for any number of premises, as long
+as each premise has the form "If p then q" and the q (called the "consequent")
+of one premise becomes the p (the "antecedent") of the next.
+Disjunctive syllogism
+A fourth valid deductive form is "disjunctive syllogism."
+p or q.
+Not-p.
+Therefore, q.
+For example, suppose we continue playing detective:
+Either Dorabella or Fiordiligi stole the tarts. But Dorabella
+didn’t do it. The implication is pretty clear . . .
+Using d for "Dorabella stole the tarts" and f for "Fiordiligi stole the tarts,"
+we have
+Either d or f.
+Not d.
+Therefore, f.
+Rule 25
+Rule 26: Dilemma 137
+There is one complication. In English the word "or" can have two different
+meanings. Usually "p or q" means that at least one of p or q is true,
+and possibly both. This is called an "inclusive" sense of the word "or" and is
+the sense normally assumed in logic. Sometimes, though, we use "or" in an
+"exclusive" sense, in which "p or q" means that either p or q is true but not
+both. "Either they’ll come by land or they’ll come by sea," for example,
+suggests that they won’t come both ways at once. In that case you might be
+able to infer that if they come one way, then they’re not coming the other
+way (better be sure!).
+Disjunctive syllogisms are valid regardless of which sense of "or" is
+used (check it out). But what else, if anything, you may be able to infer from
+a statement like "p or q"—in particular, whether you can conclude not-q if
+you also know p—depends on the meaning of "or" in the specific "p or q"
+premise you are considering. (For example, if we knew only that Dorabella
+stole the tarts, can we be sure Fiordiligi didn’t help?) Take care!
+Dilemma
+A fifth valid deductive form is the "dilemma."
+p or q.
+If p then r.
+If q then s.
+Therefore, r or s.
+Rhetorically, a dilemma is a choice between two options both of which
+have unappealing consequences. The pessimist philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer,
+for example, formulated what is sometimes called the "Hedgehog’s
+dilemma," which we could paraphrase like this:
+The closer two hedgehogs get, the more likely they are to poke
+each other with their spikes; but if they remain apart, they will
+be lonely. So it is with people: being close to someone inevitably
+creates conflicts and provocations and opens us to a lot of
+pain; but on the other hand, we’re lonely when we stand apart.
+In outline this argument might be put:
+Either we become close to others or we stand apart.
+If we become close to others, we suffer conflict and pain.
+If we stand apart, we’ll be lonely.
+Therefore, either we suffer conflict and pain or we’ll be lonely.
+Rule 26
+138 Rule 26: Dilemma
+And in symbols:
+Either c or a.
+If c then s.
+If a then l.
+Therefore, either s or l.
+A further argument in dilemma form could conclude, even more simply,
+something like "Either way we’ll be unhappy." We’ll leave this one to you
+to write out formally.
+Since this is such a jolly little conclusion, maybe we should add that
+hedgehogs are actually quite able to get close without poking each other.
+They can be together and comfortable too. So Schopenhauer’s second
+premise turns out to be false—at least for hedgehogs.
+Exercise Set 6.1: Identifying deductive argument forms
+Objective: To give you practice recognizing uses of Rules 22–26 in plain
+English.
+Instructions: State which of the preceding rules each of the following
+arguments follows.
+Tips for success: It’s easier to recognize which rule a deductive argument
+uses if you use letters to abbreviate the different parts of the argument. For
+instance, recall how we used the letters s and b to stand for different independent
+clauses in discussing modus tollens (Rule 23). We used s to abbreviate
+"The visitor is a stranger" and b to stand for "The dog barked."
+How do you figure out which parts of the argument to abbreviate?
+The first step is to look for uses of "if," "and," and "or." When these words
+are used to connect two independent clauses, they are called "logical connectives."
+(An independent clause is a part of a sentence that could be a
+sentence on its own. For instance, the sentence "If there are no chance
+factors in chess, then chess is a game of pure skill" has two independent
+clauses: "There are no chance factors in chess" and "Chess is a game of pure
+skill.")
+When you find one of these logical connectives, circle it. Then, underline
+the independent clauses that it connects. Assign a letter to each of
+those clauses; write the letter underneath or beside the clause. Logicians
+often use the letters p and q, but you can use any letters you want.
+Rule 26: Dilemma 139
+Remember that "if," "and," and "or" are not always used as logical connectives.
+For instance, the word "and" appears in lists of two or more things
+(e.g., "Lions and tigers and bears!"). Look for sentences that use these words
+to connect two independent clauses. Those are the most likely to be genuine
+logical connectives.
+Once you’ve found all of the logical connectives in an argument and
+assigned letters to the independent clauses that they connect, see if any of
+those clauses appear elsewhere in the argument. If so, underline the clause
+and write the letter for it underneath or beside it. Again, you can use any
+letters you want, but you must be consistent. If you used p to stand for
+"There are no chance factors in chess" once, you must use p for all and only
+instances of "There are no chance factors in chess" in that argument.
+Finally, check for sentences that say the opposite of one of the clauses
+that you’ve symbolized. Put a "not" in front of the letter for that clause.
+For instance, if you’re using b to stand for "The dog barked," look for sentences
+that say that the dog did not bark. Underline that sentence and write
+"not-b" underneath or beside it.
+Once you have done this, you will probably notice that there are phrases,
+clauses, or entire sentences that you have not yet symbolized. This is perfectly
+normal. You will usually find arguments embedded in larger passages.
+The passage might include background information or commentary
+on the premises of the argument. You do not need to symbolize these. They
+are probably not premises of the argument.
+Note that the arguments you encounter in your daily life may not
+always express one idea in the same way every time. If you’re confident that
+two different clauses express the same idea, you can use the same letter to
+symbolize them, even if they don’t use exactly the same words. For instance,
+consider the argument:
+Either the dog knew the visitor or the dog barked. The dog
+did not bark. Therefore, the visitor was not a stranger.
+The first clause and the last sentence express the same idea—namely,
+that the dog knew the visitor—in different words. It makes sense to symbolize
+them with the same letter.
+Once you’ve assigned letters to the clauses in your argument, compare
+the symbolized version of the argument to each of the preceding rules. If
+the symbolized version matches the form given by one of the rules, then the
+argument follows that rule. If not, it doesn’t. Note that the order of the
+premises doesn’t matter, though of course it does matter which sentence is
+the conclusion and which are the premises.
+140 Rule 26: Dilemma
+Sample
+If money is the most important thing in life, then we will pursue it for its own
+sake. We do not pursue money for its own sake, but rather as a means to achieving
+something else. Thus, money is not the most important thing in life.
+Adapted from: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis:
+Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 5
+Modus tollens.
+To see why the answer is modus tollens, let p stand for "money is the most important thing
+in life" and q stand for "we will pursue money for its own sake." We could symbolize the first
+sentence as "If p then q." The third sentence is not-q and the fourth sentence is not-p. This fits
+the form of modus tollens. Notice that the phrase "but rather as a means to achieving something
+else" is not part of the argument itself.
+1. If I am thinking, then I exist. I am thinking. Therefore, I exist.
+Adapted from: René Descartes, Discourse on Method, 4th ed., trans.
+Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 18
+2. The cat’s name is Samantha Peterson. I know this because it turned
+to look at me when I shouted, "Samantha Peterson!" If the cat
+turned to look at me when I shouted "Samantha Peterson," then
+its name must be Samantha Peterson.
+Adapted from: BBC Two, "Joe Lycett and the Missing Cat: Live at the Apollo," Facebook
+post, Oct 17, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/bbctwo/videos/1339304299512068/
+3. If the Great Spirit had desired me to be a white man, he would
+have made me a white man. He did not make me a white man.
+Hence, he did not desire me to be a white man.
+Adapted from: Chief Sitting Bull, quoted in David Ross,
+1,001 Pearls of Wisdom (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2006), 21
+4. This man claims to be part of the Resistance, but he’s lying. The
+secret police attacked the cell he belonged to in New York. He’s
+the only one who got away. That means that either the secret police
+got sloppy or they wanted him to escape because he’s working
+Rule 26: Dilemma 141
+for them. And the secret police are never sloppy. So they wanted
+him to escape because he’s working for them.
+Adapted from: "Revelations" (Episode 4), The Man in the High Castle,
+Amazon, Nov 20, 2015
+5. Many medical texts suggest that the best way to treat bee stings is
+by scraping the stinger without squeezing or pulling the stinger.
+Some researchers once tested this by allowing honeybees to sting
+them repeatedly. They scraped some stingers out and pulled the
+others out. They said that if scraping worked better than pulling,
+then scraping the stingers should leave a smaller welt. They found
+that scraping the stingers did not leave a smaller welt. Therefore,
+scraping the stingers out did not work better than pulling them out.
+Adapted from: Anahad O’Connor, "The Claim: Bee Stings Can Be Treated by
+Scraping out Stingers," New York Times, May 30, 2006, http://www
+.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/health/30real.html
+6. I’m offering you two pills: one red, one blue. You can take the red
+pill or you can take the blue pill. It’s up to you. But once you’ve
+made your choice, there’s no turning back. If you take the blue
+pill, you’ll forget this ever happened and you’ll go on living your
+life in blissful ignorance. If you take the red pill, your life will be
+changed forever by what I am about to show you. Thus, your
+choice is really between the life you know now and a totally different
+life that you cannot begin to imagine.
+Adapted from: The Matrix, directed by Andy Wachowski and Lana Wachowski
+(Burbank, CA: Warner Bros., 1999)
+7. Sports commentators really need to stop saying that "you can’t
+write a script like that." If screenwriters can write a dystopian sci-fi
+script about a world where people inhabit a simulated world while
+intelligent machines use their bodies to generate energy, they can
+certainly write a script about some soccer player scoring a lastsecond
+goal to tie the big game. And, of course, we know they can
+write a dystopian sci-fi script like that because they’ve done it. So
+we know that, no matter what the commentators say, they really
+could write a script like that.
+Adapted from: Brian D. Earp, Twitter post, May 9, 2016, 8:55 AM,
+https://twitter.com/briandavidearp/status/729671073642483712
+142 Rule 26: Dilemma
+8. The prosecution has presented a lot of evidence to show that the
+defendant killed her husband. But if my client had killed her husband,
+then she wouldn’t want to get caught, would she? And if she
+didn’t want to get caught, then she wouldn’t have left all that evidence
+behind. So, you see, if my client were guilty, then she
+wouldn’t have left behind all of the evidence that the prosecution
+has presented!
+Adapted from: Zach Weinersmith, "Comic for February 26, 2007," Saturday Morning
+Breakfast Cereal, Feb 26, 2007, http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?id=743
+9. You say I’m some kind of demon. Well, either you’re right about
+that, and I really am a demon, or you’re wrong about me, and I’m
+just a poor old country boy. Now, if I’m just a poor old country
+boy, you’d better be nice to me. But if I’m actually a demon, then
+you had really better be nice to me, because I could cause you all
+kinds of trouble. So either way, you’d better be nice to me!
+Adapted from: Montgomery Pittman, "The Last Rites of Jeff Myrtlebank," The Twilight
+Zone video, 24:55, Feb 23, 1962
+10. After drinking a potion labeled "DRINK ME," which had made
+her smaller, Alice found herself trapped. There was only one door
+out of the room, but it was locked. The key sat on top of the table,
+far out of her reach. Looking about for a solution to her problem,
+she discovered a tiny little cake labeled "EAT ME." She surmised
+that the cake might change her size too, although she wasn’t sure in
+what way. It might make her grow back to her original size, or it
+might make her shrink even further. If it made her grow, then she
+would be able to reach the key and unlock the door. If it made her
+shrink, then she would be able to slip under the door. Therefore, she
+reasoned, she would be able to unlock the door or she would be able
+to slip under the door. Either way, she could escape from the room!
+Adapted from: Lewis Carroll, Martin Gardner, and John Tenniel, The Annotated
+Alice: The Definitive Edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 18
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 404.
+Rule 26: Dilemma 143
+Exercise Set 6.2: Identifying deductive arguments
+in more complex passages
+Objective: To give you practice recognizing deductive argument forms
+when they are expressed in more complicated ways.
+Instructions: State which of the preceding rules each of the following
+arguments follows.
+Tips for success: Most of the deductive arguments you encounter won’t
+come as neatly packaged as those in Exercise Set 6.1. Most will be embedded
+in longer passages. Some will make their logical moves in ways that are
+less obvious than in the arguments above.
+Still, the basic technique for recognizing deductive argument forms in
+more complex passages is the same as in Exercise Set 6.1. Look for logical
+connectives. Assign letters to the independent clauses joined by the logical
+connectives. Look for other occurrences of those clauses elsewhere in the
+passage. Remember that you may find arguments embedded in larger passages.
+Some of the phrases, clauses, or sentences in the larger passage will
+not be premises of the argument. You do not need to symbolize everything
+in the passage. Symbolize only those clauses or sentences that express the
+premises or conclusion of the argument.
+One big difference between this exercise and the last one is that you
+will need to know about alternative ways of expressing "if p then q." Three
+of the most common are:
+p if q means if q then p
+p only if q means if p then q
+p unless q means if not-q then p
+Another problem that sometimes arises has to do with the little word
+"not." Consider, for example, the following argument:
+(1) If the murder was committed at noon, then the butler did
+not do it.
+(2) If the butler did not do it, then the maid must have done it.
+Therefore, (3) if the murder was committed at noon, then the
+maid must have done it.
+It would be natural to symbolize the argument as follows:
+(1) If a then not-b.
+(2) If not-b then c.
+Therefore, (3) if a then c.
+144 Rule 26: Dilemma
+On the face of it, this may not look like a hypothetical syllogism (Rule 24),
+since the discussion of hypothetical syllogism makes no mention of "nots"
+(check it out). If you look just a little more carefully, though, you will see
+that this arguments does exactly what any good hypothetical syllogism
+does: it makes a tight link between a and c by means of an intermediate
+term, which happens to be not-b in this case. To see this clearly, try using
+a new symbol for not-b, like d. Then the argument reads:
+(1) If a then d.
+(2) If d then c.
+Therefore, (3) if a then c.
+You can see that this argument forms just the sort of "chain" that makes
+hypothetical syllogisms valid. (Can you figure out what not-d means in
+English?)
+By the same token, an argument like
+(1) If not-m then not-j.
+(2) Not-m.
+Therefore, (3) not-j.
+is a straightforward modus ponens, despite all the "nots." As long as the antecedent
+(i.e., the first part) of premise (1) exactly matches what’s in premise
+(2), then the consequent (i.e., the second part) of premise (1) follows. What
+matters is the relation between the premises.
+Sample
+Scientists have known for some time now that Mars has water on it, but they have
+been unsure about whether that water ever flowed across the surface in streams or
+rivers. In 2012, NASA’s Curiosity rover found rocks on Mars that have smooth,
+rounded pebbles embedded in them. Pebbles have that shape only if they have
+been in a stream or river that was flowing for a long time. Thus, the pebbles must
+have been in a stream or river. This confirms that Mars had flowing water at some
+point in the past.
+Adapted from: NASA, "Pebbly Rocks Testify to Old Streambed on Mars," nasa.gov, May 30, 2013,
+http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/msl/news/msl20130530f.html
+Modus ponens.
+The key connective here is the word if in the third sentence. If we use p to stand for "the Martian
+pebbles have a smooth, rounded shape" and q to stand for "the pebbles were in a stream or
+Rule 26: Dilemma 145
+river," then the third sentence reads "p only if q." We know that this means "if p then q." So,
+once we notice that the second sentence asserts p and the fourth sentence asserts q, we know
+that we’re looking at an instance of modus ponens. Notice that the first sentence is just background
+information, and the last sentence tells us why the conclusion of our modus ponens
+argument is important. We don’t need to symbolize either sentence. Notice also that the "or" in
+"streams or rivers" isn’t a logical connective because it’s not connecting two independent clauses.
+1. In January 1610, Galileo pointed a new telescope at Jupiter. He
+noticed three points of light beside Jupiter that weren’t visible
+with his other, weaker telescopes. At first, he thought they were
+stars. But, as he wrote in his notes, he reasoned that if they were
+stars, then they should be about as bright as the other stars, and
+arranged randomly like the other stars. But they were brighter
+than the other stars and arranged in a straight line next to Jupiter.
+Thus, he concluded, they were not stars. This was his first step in
+discovering the moons of Jupiter.
+Adapted from: Robert J. Sternberg and Jacqueline P. Leighton, The Nature
+of Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 30–35
+2. All of our actions are motivated either by respect for duty or by
+something else. Our actions will always treat others as ends-inthemselves
+if they are motivated by respect for duty, and they will
+never have moral worth if they are not motivated by respect for
+duty. Thus, either our actions treat others as ends-in-themselves
+or they have no moral worth.
+Adapted from: Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,
+3rd ed., trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
+1993), 11, 36
+3. Without a government, people would have so little security that
+they would choose to steal from others—even killing others if they
+must—rather than try to produce and protect their own goods or
+food. If people living without a government are prone to steal
+from and kill one another, then life would be so terrible without a
+government that the only rational thing to do is to set up a government
+to force everyone to behave. Hence, we ought to set up a
+government to force everyone to behave.
+Adapted from: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis:
+Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 74–80
+146 Rule 26: Dilemma
+4. When federal prosecutors accused Ross Ulbricht of running the
+Silk Road, an online marketplace for illegal goods, Ulbricht said
+he’d been framed. He said he had no connection to the computers
+that hosted the Silk Road. Furthermore, his lawyers argued, the
+FBI had hacked into that server illegally, and so it could not use
+evidence from that server in court. But a judge countered that
+Ulbricht couldn’t have it both ways. Either he had some connection
+to the Silk Road server or he didn’t. If he did, then he couldn’t
+claim that he’d been framed. On the other hand, he had no
+grounds for objecting to the FBI’s methods of accessing the server
+unless he did have such a connection. So, either he had to give up
+his claim that he’d been framed or give up his claim that the government’s
+evidence was inadmissable in court.
+Adapted from: "The Silk Road Trial: Bitcoin Buccaneers," The Economist,
+Jan 17, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21639525-one-dreadpirate-
+trial-what-about-others-bitcoin-buccaneers
+5. In the 1700s, before the invention of modern chemistry, scientists
+believed that flammable materials contained a substance called
+"phlogiston." When something burned, it was thought to lose
+phlogiston. This "phlogiston theory" of combustion explained
+many scientific observations, but it also raised some puzzles. One
+puzzle was that certain metals gained weight when they burned.
+But burning metals would cause them to lose weight if burning
+was the release of phlogiston. Thus, the puzzle led some scientists
+to suspect that the phlogiston theory was incorrect.
+Adapted from: Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions:
+50th Anniversary Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 71–72
+6. As surprising as it may seem, I am now prepared to share with
+you something that philosophers have sought for centuries: a
+proof that the external world really exists. Observe: my right hand
+exists. My left hand, you will notice, also exists. Thus, there exist
+at least two hands. Notice, however, that if there exist at least
+two hands, as these two hands here exist, then the external world
+exists.
+Adapted from: G. E. Moore, "Proof of an External World," in Classics of
+Analytic Philosophy, edited by Robert Ammerman (Indianapolis:
+Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), 81
+Rule 26: Dilemma 147
+7. Part of an economist’s job is to figure out why people do stupid
+things—or at least, why they do things that appear stupid. Take
+celebrity endorsements of consumer goods, for instance. Companies
+hire celebrities to endorse their products even though the
+celebrities have no expertise related to the product. For some reason,
+consumers respond to these endorsements. That is, celebrity
+endorsements cause consumers to buy more of a product. Some
+people might think this is just stupidity. But economists assume
+it’s not. They reason that consumers wouldn’t respond to celebrity
+endorsements if celebrity endorsements didn’t signal a better
+product or a more trustworthy company. Thus, celebrity endorsements
+must signal a better product or a more trustworthy company.
+The puzzle for the economist is to figure out how celebrity
+endorsements do this.
+Adapted from: Steven E. Landsburg, The Armchair Economist (New York:
+Free Press, 1993), 14
+8. Drug-resistant strains of malaria have emerged twice since the
+first effective treatment was developed in the twentieth century.
+For reasons no one understands, in both cases, the drug-resistant
+strains emerged first in the Cambodian town of Pailin, near the
+border with Thailand. Now, scientists warn that malaria parasites
+seem to be developing resistance to the latest line of anti-malarial
+drugs. Some scientists are encouraging public health officials to
+wipe out the new strain of parasite quickly through a controversial
+and counterintuitive tactic of mass drug administration, in
+which everyone receives anti-malarial drugs, even if they don’t
+show any symptoms. If it’s done badly or not at all, then the drugresistant
+strain will become more common and starts to spread,
+and malaria may become untreatable once again if that happens.
+Adapted from: Robin McKie, "The Town That Breeds Resistance to Malaria Drugs," The
+Guardian, Apr 8, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/08/
+cambodian-town-breeds-resistance-malaria-drugs
+9. To call oneself a Christian, one must believe in certain things. At
+the very least, one must believe in God and immortality. If someone
+does not believe in those two things, that person is not truly
+148 Rule 26: Dilemma
+a Christian. Bertrand Russell did not believe in God or immortality.
+Thus, Bertrand Russell was not a Christian.
+Adapted from: Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (London:
+George Allen & Unwin, 1957; repr., London: Routledge, 2004), 2
+10. This man just told us that he’s going to steal a ship, pick up a pirate
+crew in Tortuga, and raid, pillage, and pilfer his way around
+the Caribbean. If he were telling the truth, he wouldn’t have told
+us all that. So he can’t be telling the truth!
+Adapted from: Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl,
+directed by Gore Verbinski (Burbank, CA: Walt Disney Pictures, 2003)
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 406.
+Exercise Set 6.3: Drawing conclusions with deductive arguments
+Objective: To train you to draw conclusions using deductive argument
+forms.
+Instructions: Each of the following sets of premises enables you to draw
+a specific conclusion using a deductive argument. State the conclusion that
+you can draw from each set of premises and the deductive argument form(s)
+that you used to draw the conclusion.
+Tips for success: As in Exercise Sets 6.1 and 6.2, it will help to start by
+symbolizing each statement. Look for statements containing logical connectives
+first. Once you’ve symbolized everything you can, see whether the
+statements you’ve symbolized match the premises of any argument forms.
+If so, use that argument form to draw a conclusion.
+Rule 26: Dilemma 149
+Sample
+If dolphins act similarly to us under similar circumstances, the psychology behind
+their behavior is probably similar to ours. Dolphins do act similarly to us under
+similar circumstances.
+Adapted from: Frans de Waal, "Looking at Flipper, Seeing Ourselves," New York Times, Oct 9, 2006,
+http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/opinion/09dewaal.html
+Using modus ponens, we can conclude that the psychology behind dolphins’ behavior is
+probably similar to ours.
+Using p to stand for "dolphins act similarly to us under similar circumstances" and q to stand
+for "the psychology behind dolphins’ behavior is probably similar to ours," we can symbolize the
+premises as:
+(1) If p then q.
+(2) p.
+These are the premises needed for modus ponens, which allows us to conclude that q is true—that
+is, that the psychology behind dolphins’ behavior is probably similar to ours.
+1. If the SAT were a useful test, then it would test skills like research
+and critical analysis. It does not test those skills.
+Adapted from: Jeanne Heifetz, letter to the editor, New York Times, Sep 22, 2006,
+http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/22/opinion/l22test.html
+2. Either moral judgments are derived from reason or they are
+caused by emotion. Moral judgments are not derived from reason.
+Adapted from: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: Two-Volume Set,
+edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
+2007), 293–301
+3. I believe that South America and Africa used to be joined together
+into a single supercontinent, but that they have since
+drifted apart. If this "continental drift" hypothesis were correct,
+then there would have been animals that lived nowhere but near
+the place where the old supercontinent split apart. And if there
+150 Rule 26: Dilemma
+were such animals, then there will be fossils in eastern South
+America that can be found nowhere else but in western Africa.
+Adapted from: Alfred Wegener, The Origin of Continents and Oceans,
+translated by John Biram (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1966), 70
+4. Unless we can be sure of the existence of objects, we cannot be
+sure that other people’s bodies exist. If we cannot be sure that
+other people’s bodies exist, then we cannot be sure that other
+people’s minds exist.
+Adapted from: Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912; repr.,
+New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004), 9
+5. Either light consists of tiny particles or it consists of waves. Light
+does not consist of tiny particles.
+Adapted from: M. Shamos, Great Experiments in Physics (New York:
+Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), 93–107
+6. If the rich countries had become rich purely by stealing from the
+rest of the world, then the rest of the world would be poorer now
+than it used to be. But the rest of the world is richer now than
+it used to be, even though it is not nearly as wealthy as the rich
+countries.
+Adapted from: Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty (New York: Penguin,
+2005), 31
+7. We’ve become slaves to our smartphones, constantly connected to
+each other and to a barrage of information. For many busy professionals,
+this has become a real problem, with work texts and emails
+interrupting their personal lives. Individuals could try to cut back
+their use on their own, or they could do it in cooperation with
+their colleagues. If they try to cut back on their own, however,
+then their colleagues may resent their time offline. Their colleagues
+will appreciate their time offline, however, if workers cut
+back in cooperation with everyone else.
+Adapted from: "Slaves to the Smartphone," The Economist, Mar 10, 2012,
+http://www.economist.com/node/21549904
+Rule 27: Reductio ad absurdum
+151
+Rule 27
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 408.
+8. The nametag on your mattress says "J. Watson." If your nametag
+says "J. Watson," then your first name is probably James.
+Adapted from: Young Sherlock Homes, directed by Barry Levinson
+(Hollywood, CA: Paramount Pictures, 1985)
+9. In 2012, a Turkish court convicted 330 military officers guilty of
+plotting a coup back in 2003. The court’s main evidence came
+from computer files allegedly created in 2003. But computer experts
+who examined the files found that they had been created
+using Microsoft Office 2007, which didn’t exist in 2003. Obviously,
+the files couldn’t have been created in 2003 if they had been
+created using Office 2007.
+Adapted from: Dani Rodrik, "Turkish Court Provides (Lack of) Reasoning Behind
+Sledgehammer Verdict," Dani Rodrik’s Weblog, Jan 8, 2013,
+http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2013/01/turkish-court-provides-lack-ofreasoning-
+behind-sledgehammer-verdict.html
+10. You can either measure the position of a subatomic particle or you
+can measure its momentum. A law of physics known as the Heisenberg
+uncertainty principle entails that if you measure its position,
+then you cannot know its momentum precisely, but if you measure
+its momentum, then you cannot know its position precisely.
+Adapted from: George Gamow, Mr. Tompkins in Paperback (1965; repr.,
+Cambridge University Press, 1993), 65–80
+Reductio ad absurdum
+One traditional deductive strategy deserves special mention even though,
+strictly speaking, it is only a version of modus tollens. This is the reductio
+ad absurdum, that is, a "reduction to absurdity." Arguments by reductio (or
+"indirect proof," as they’re sometimes called) establish their conclusions by
+showing that assuming the opposite leads to absurdity: to a contradictory
+or silly result. Nothing is left to do, the argument suggests, but to accept
+the conclusion.
+To prove: p.
+Assume the opposite: Not-p.
+152 Rule 27: Reductio ad absurdum
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: q.
+Show that q is false (contradictory, "absurd," morally or practically
+unacceptable . . .).
+Conclude: p must be true after all.
+Consider this intriguing little argument, for example:
+No one has yet had sex in space. No one has admitted to it, of
+course. But suppose, just for the sake of argument, that someone
+who has been to space did have sex there. That would
+mean that someone who has had sex in space hasn’t told anyone
+about it. And that is really hard to believe. No one would
+keep that to themselves!2
+Spelled out in reductio form, the argument is:
+To prove: No one has yet had sex in space.
+Assume the opposite: Someone has had sex in space.
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: Someone
+who has had sex in space has kept it secret.
+But: That is "really hard to believe."
+Conclude: No one has yet had sex in space
+A valid argument, but is the key premise true? Well, could you keep that
+secret?
+2. Adapted by David Morrow from Mike Wall, "No Sex in Space, Yet, Official Says,"
+Space.com, April 22, 2011. http://www.space.com/11473-astronauts-sex-spacerumors.
+html
+Exercise Set 6.4: Working with reductio ad absurdum
+Objective: To give you practice recognizing instances of reductio ad absurdum
+and to help you understand how reductio works.
+Instructions: Identify the reductio ad absurdum argument pattern in each
+of the passages below. That is, specify the claim to be proven, the assumption
+that is made, the conclusion that one is supposed to have to draw from
+that assumption, the reason for thinking that conclusion to be implausible,
+and the final conclusion of the reductio argument.
+Rule 27: Reductio ad absurdum 153
+Tips for success: As we noted above, reductio ad absurdum is closely related
+to modus tollens. Both argument forms work by arguing that one claim
+leads to another claim and that the second claim is false. That is, they work
+by arguing that "if p then q" and that q is false. This allows us to infer that
+p is false.
+One difference between modus tollens and reductio ad absurdum is that
+reductio ad absurdum involves a claim that is not just false, but absurd or
+ridiculous, whereas modus tollens only involves a claim that’s false.
+What’s the difference between being false and being ridiculous? The
+claim that every king of England was born in England is false—William
+III, for instance, was born in what is now the Netherlands—but you might
+have to look it up to find out whether it’s false. The claim that every king
+of England was born on Jupiter is ridiculous. You don’t need to look it up
+to know whether it’s true.
+Actually, the strongest form of reductio ad absurdum leads not just to a
+ridiculous claim, but to a contradiction—that is, to a pair of claims that
+could be symbolized as q and not-q. Outside of specialized contexts like
+mathematics, though, this is not common: usually the ridiculous, or "absurd,"
+is enough.
+The other difference between modus tollens and reductio ad absurdum is
+that modus tollens simply asserts that p leads to q. In a reductio ad absurdum,
+you’ll often find a lengthy argument showing that p leads to q.
+Your task in each of these exercises is to figure out what p and q are, as
+well as the reason that the author of the argument thinks that q is "absurd."
+To do this, look to see what the argument asks you to assume or suppose
+to be true. That will be p. The conclusion of the argument—the claim that
+the author wants to prove—will be not-p. Then, look to see what ridiculous
+implication that assumption would force us to accept. That will be q.
+Finally, check what, if anything, the author says about why q is hard to
+believe. (If it’s obviously ridiculous, of course, the author might not need
+to say anything about why it’s hard to believe!) You don’t need to symbolize
+or say anything more about the argument that the author uses to get
+from p to q.
+Once you have all of these pieces, you can insert them into the template
+above, as follows:
+To prove: Not-p
+Assume the opposite: p
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: q
+But: q is absurd (or obviously false)
+Conclude: Not-p
+See the sample below for an example.
+154 Rule 27: Reductio ad absurdum
+Sample
+Some people insist that Americans never really landed on the moon. They say that
+the moon landings were an elaborate hoax. NASA employed thousands of people
+to (allegedly) put astronauts on the moon, but in the decades since the first landing,
+no one involved in the project has claimed that the landings were staged.
+Suppose for a moment that the landings were a hoax. It’s ridiculous to think that
+NASA could have kept all of those people silent. Thus, the only reasonable thing
+to believe is that the landings were not a hoax.
+Adapted from: Brent Silby, "Of Course We Went to the Moon: A Defense of the Lunar Landings," DEFLOGIC,
+2001, http://www.def-logic.com/articles/lunarlanding.html
+To prove: The American moon landings were not a hoax.
+Assume the opposite: The landings were a hoax (i.e., astronauts never walked on the
+moon).
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: NASA has kept thousands of
+people silent about the hoax for decades.
+But: There’s no way NASA could have kept that many people silent for so long.
+Conclude: The American moon landings were not a hoax.
+In terms of the symbolization recommended in the "Tips for success" above, the main conclusion
+of this argument—which we suggested you symbolize as not-p—is "The American moon
+landings were not a hoax." This goes on the first and last lines of the reductio "template." The
+argument assumes the opposite of this conclusion—p—which is that the landings were a hoax.
+It then argues that the assumption would lead us to q, which stands for "NASA has kept thousands
+of people silent about the hoax for decades." Since it’s practically impossible for NASA to
+have done that, we’re entitled to reject the assumption that p. This leaves us with the main
+conclusion of the reductio: not-p. The American moon landings were not a hoax.
+Notice that strictly speaking, it’s not completely impossible that NASA kept thousands of
+people silent. The claim that NASA kept so many silent after a hoax, however, is sufficiently
+incredible that we should reject any assumption that would require us to believe that the claim
+is true. Remember also Rule 20: What’s the most likely explanation?
+Rulle 27:: Reducttiio ad abssurrdum 155
+1. The Sun can’t be bigger than the whole solar system because it’s a
+part of the solar system, and so for it to be bigger than the whole
+solar system, it would have to be bigger than itself. But nothing
+can be bigger than itself!
+Adapted from: A five-year-old boy named Darius, personal communication, June 2018
+2. Some people believe that ordinary citizens should be allowed to
+own any weapons that they want. Suppose that this were true. That
+would mean that ordinary citizens could own tanks, large stockpiles
+of explosives, fighter jets—even nuclear bombs! Clearly,
+ordinary
+citizens shouldn’t be allowed to own nuclear bombs.
+Thus, it’s false that ordinary citizens should be allowed to own any
+weapons they want.
+Adapted from: "Reductio Ad Absurdum—Use With Caution," IncreaseBrainPower.com,
+n.d., http://www.increasebrainpower.com/reductio-ad-absurdum.html
+3. During the trial of drug kingpin Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman,
+one witness claimed that El Chapo had paid a $100 million bribe
+to Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012 when Peña Nieto was presidentelect
+of Mexico. But to deliver such an enormous bribe in cash
+would have taken a literal truckload of cash, and it’s ridiculous to
+think they could have physically given Peña Nieto that much
+money without anyone noticing. Therefore, El Chapo did not give
+Peña Nieto a $100 million bribe.
+Adapted from: "Did ‘El Chapo’ Pay Mexico’s Ex-President $100 Million?"
+France 24, Jan 17, 2019, https://www.france24.com/
+en/20190117-mexico-el-chapo-guzman-bribe-president-enrique-pena-nieto-obrador
+4. There’s a popular myth out there that aliens were somehow involved
+in building the pyramids of Egypt. Assume, just for the
+sake of argument, that aliens really did build the pyramids. As
+anyone who’s been to the pyramids can tell you, the stones used in
+building the pyramids were clearly shaped by simple hand tools.
+You can see the chisel marks on the stones. This would mean that
+despite having the ability to reach Earth from some distant planet,
+the aliens would have had to rely on the Egyptians’ basic hand
+tools to shape the rocks. It’s ridiculous to think that any civilization
+with the technology for interplanetary travel wouldn’t have
+156 Rulle 27:: Reducttiio ad abssurrdum
+used something like a laser—or at least a high-powered, precision
+saw—to carve the stones used in the pyramids. That’s why I don’t
+believe that aliens were involved in building the pyramids.
+Adapted from: "Do You Think the Great Pyramids Were Built By Aliens?" Yahoo!
+Answers, May 2010, http://answers.yahoo.com/question/
+index?qid=20100518111720AAVHT6k
+5. Some people hold that Earth may be the only planet with life in
+our Milky Way galaxy. But astronomers now say that there could
+be up to thirty billion potentially habitable planets in the Milky
+Way. If we really were the only planet with life in the whole galaxy,
+then the probability of life arising on any potentially habitable
+planet would be so tiny as to basically be zero. But if the
+probability of life arising on any potentially habitable planet is
+basically zero, there should not be life on Earth either! Since there
+obviously is life on Earth, the supposition is absurd. There must
+be life elsewhere!
+Adapted from: Stephen Webb, If the Universe Is Teeming with Aliens . . . Where Is
+Everybody? Fifty Solutions to the Fermi Paradox and the Problem of Extraterrestrial
+Life (New York: Copernicus Books, 2002), 235
+6. The police claim that the defendants were using an elaborate code
+to arrange drug deals. The police also claim that they didn’t know
+about this code before they arrested the defendants a few hours
+ago. Suppose they’re telling the truth. That would mean that the
+police cracked this elaborate code within a matter of hours.
+There’s simply no way they could have pulled that off. It’s impossible
+for the cops to have cracked such a sophisticated code so
+quickly. Thus, the police must have known about the code before
+the arrests.
+Adapted from: David Simon, "–30–," The Wire, HBO, March 9, 2008
+7. It is impossible to accelerate something to the speed of light. To
+see this, suppose that you could accelerate a space ship to the speed
+of light. The theory of relativity says that as the space ship gets
+faster and faster, it will get shorter and shorter. If you were to
+accelerate the space ship to the speed of light, its length would
+Rule 27: Reductio ad absurdum 157
+become zero. But the idea of an object with a length of zero is
+absurd. Thus, it’s impossible to accelerate the space ship—or anything
+else—to the speed of light.
+Adapted from: Albert Einstein, Relativity, trans. Robert W. Lawson
+(New York: Pi Press, 2005), 47–48
+8. Physicists have proven that many features of our universe are
+"fine-tuned" for the existence of life as we know it. That is, things
+like the strength of the force of gravity are just right to make life
+possible. If they were very slightly different, there would be no life
+at all. If we assume that the universe is not designed by an intelligent
+creator, then this "fine-tuning" is just a freak accident. It is
+wildly improbable that the physics of our universe would be so
+perfectly adjusted for life by accident. Thus, the universe must be
+designed by an intelligent creator.
+Adapted from: "Precise Fine-Tuning of the Universe Suggests Design," YouTube,
+Dec 3, 2006, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KM7Q43KspuY
+9. Suppose the world has a Creator like a house does. When houses
+are imperfect, we know who to blame: the carpenters and masons
+who created them. But the world is also not wholly perfect.
+Therefore, it would seem to follow that the Creator of the world
+is not perfect. But it is absurd to suppose that the Creator is imperfect.
+Since we were led to this absurdity by the assumption
+that the world has a Creator like a house does, the only way to
+escape it is to abandon that assumption: the world does not have
+a Creator like a house does.
+Adapted from: David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 2nd ed.
+(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 35–36
+10. God is the greatest being that you can possibly imagine. This implies
+that you cannot imagine a being that is greater than God.
+Now, suppose that God did not exist. Then you could imagine a
+being that is exactly like God except that it exists. Since it is better
+to exist than not to exist, such a being would be even better than
+God. Thus, you would be imagining a being that is greater than
+Rule 27: Reductio ad absurdum
+158 Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps
+God—even though you cannot imagine a being that is greater
+than God. So, God must exist.
+Adapted from: St. Anselm, Proslogion, in Philosophy in the Middle Ages:
+The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions, 3rd ed., edited by Arthur Hyman
+and James J. Walsh (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2010), 162–63
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 411.
+Need more practice? Make a list of claims that are false. For each claim,
+can you show that you would be forced to accept an absurd conclusion if
+you assumed that the claim were true? Alternatively, work with a group of
+friends or classmates and see who can derive the most absurd conclusion
+from each false claim.
+Deductive arguments in multiple steps
+Many valid deductive arguments are combinations of the basic forms
+introduced in Rules 22–27. Here, for example, is Sherlock Holmes performing
+a simple deduction for Doctor Watson’s edification, meanwhile
+commenting on the relative roles of observation and deduction. Holmes
+has casually remarked that Watson visited a certain post office that morning,
+and furthermore that he sent off a telegram while there. "Right!" replies
+Watson, amazed, "Right on both points! But I confess that I don’t see
+how you arrived at it." Holmes replies:
+"It is simplicity itself. . . . Observation tells me that you have
+a little reddish mold adhering to your instep. Just opposite the
+Wigmore Street Post Office they have taken up the pavement
+and thrown up some earth, which lies in such a way that it is
+difficult to avoid treading in it in entering. The earth is of this
+peculiar reddish tint which is found, as far as I know, nowhere
+else in the neighborhood. So much is observation. The rest is
+deduction."
+[Watson]: "How, then, did you deduce the telegram?"
+[Holmes]: "Why, of course I knew that you had not written a
+letter, since I sat opposite to you all morning. I see also in your
+open desk there that you have a sheet of stamps and a thick
+bundle of postcards. What could you go into the post office Rule 28
+Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps 159
+for, then, but to send a wire? Eliminate all other factors, and
+the one which remains must be the truth."1
+Putting Holmes’s deduction into explicit premises, we might have:
+1. Watson has a little reddish mold on his boots.
+2. If Watson has a little reddish mold on his boots, then he has
+been to the Wigmore Street Post Office this morning (because
+there and only there is reddish dirt of that sort thrown up, and in
+a way difficult to avoid stepping in).
+3. If Watson has been to the Wigmore Street Post Office this
+morning, he either mailed a letter, bought stamps or cards, or
+sent a wire.
+4. If Watson had mailed a letter, he would have written the letter
+this morning.
+5. Watson wrote no letter this morning.
+6. If Watson had bought stamps or cards, he would not already
+have a drawer full of stamps and cards.
+7. Watson already has a drawer full of stamps and cards.
+8. Therefore, Watson sent a wire at the Wigmore Street Post Office
+this morning.
+We now need to break the argument down into a series of valid arguments
+in the simple forms presented in Rules 22–27. We might start with
+a modus ponens:
+2. If Watson has a little reddish mold on his boots, then he
+has been to the Wigmore Street Post Office this morning.
+1. Watson has a little reddish mold on his boots.
+I. Therefore, Watson has been to the Wigmore Street Post
+Office this morning.
+(We will use I, II, etc. to stand for the conclusions of simple arguments,
+which then can be used as premises to draw further conclusions.)
+Another modus ponens follows:
+1. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, "The Sign of Four," in The Complete Sherlock Holmes, pp.
+91–92.
+160 Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps
+3. If Watson has been to the Wigmore Street Post Office this
+morning, he either mailed a letter, bought stamps or cards, or
+sent a wire.
+I. Watson has been to Wigmore Street Post Office this
+morning.
+II. Therefore, Watson either mailed a letter, bought stamps or
+cards, or sent a wire.
+Two of these three possibilities now can be ruled out, both by modus
+tollens:
+4. If Watson had gone to the post office to mail a letter, he
+would have written the letter this morning.
+5. Watson wrote no letter this morning.
+III. Therefore, Watson did not go to the post office to mail a
+letter.
+and:
+6. If Watson had gone to the post office to buy stamps or
+cards, he would not already have a drawer full of stamps and
+cards.
+7. Watson already has a drawer full of stamps and cards.
+IV. Therefore, Watson did not go to the post office to buy
+stamps or cards.
+Finally we can put it all together:
+II. Watson either mailed a letter, bought stamps or cards, or
+sent a wire at the Wigmore Street Post Office this morning.
+III. Watson did not mail a letter.
+IV. Watson did not buy stamps or cards.
+8. Therefore, Watson sent a wire at the Wigmore Street Post
+Office this morning.
+This last inference is an extended disjunctive syllogism: "Eliminate all
+other factors, and the one which remains must be the truth."
+Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps 161
+Exercise Set 6.5: Identifying deductive arguments in several steps
+Objective: To give you practice recognizing deductive arguments in several
+steps.
+Instructions: Each of the following arguments uses two or more forms of
+deductive argument. For each argument, list all of the argument forms used
+in the argument.
+Tips for success: This exercise set builds on Exercise Sets 6.1 and 6.2. You
+should approach it in the same way: Look for logical connectives. Then,
+look for other occurrences of the independent clauses that are joined by
+logical connectives.
+The twist here is that the conclusion of one (short) argument will
+appear as a premise in the next (short) argument. It might help to think
+of the arguments as being "chained" together, with one claim serving as the
+link between one argument and the next. For instance, you might have a
+hypothetical syllogism (Rule 24) "chained" to a use of modus ponens (Rule
+22), as follows:
+If p then q.
+If q then r. hypothetical syllogism
+Therefore, if p then r.
+p. modus ponens
+Therefore, r.
+In this case, the claim "if p then r" is both the conclusion of the hypothetical
+syllogism and a premise in modus ponens. In general, keep an eye out
+for claims that function in this double way—that is, as both premises and
+conclusions. Those are likely to be the links between arguments that are
+"chained" together.
+In particularly difficult cases, the premises may appear out of order.
+When that happens, you should treat the argument like a jigsaw puzzle.
+Try rearranging the pieces to get them to fit together in a sensible or
+meaningful way. For instance, after you’ve symbolized the argument, you
+may find yourself with the following five statements:
+(1) If q then r.
+(2) p.
+(3) If p then q.
+Therefore, (4) If p then r.
+Therefore, (5) r.
+⎫
+⎬
+⎭ ⎫
+⎬
+⎭
+162 Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps
+You would need to rearrange these to see that (3), (1), and (4) constitute a
+hypothetical syllogism, while (2), (4), and (5) fit the form of modus ponens.
+Since (4) is both the conclusion of one argument and a premise in a
+second argument, we call (4) a "subconclusion." Since (5) is not used as a
+premise in any further argument, we call it the "main conclusion" of the
+whole argument.
+Sample
+Uranium emits rays similar to X-rays. These rays arise either from an interaction
+between the uranium and its surroundings or from the uranium itself. If the rays
+arise from an interaction between the uranium and its surroundings, then the
+amount of radiation should vary with temperature, illumination, or other factors.
+The radiation, however, is constant: it does not vary with temperature, illumination,
+or other factors. Thus, the radiation does not arise from an interaction between
+the uranium and its surroundings. The radiation, therefore, comes from the
+uranium itself.
+Adapted from: Marie Skłodowska Curie, "Radium and Radioactivity," Century Magazine
+(Jan 1904), 461–66
+Modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism.
+To see how this argument uses modus tollens and disjunctive syllogism, let p stand for "The
+rays arise from an interaction between the uranium and its surroundings," q stand for "The
+amount of radiation should vary with temperature, illumination, or other factors," and r
+stand for "The radiation arises from the uranium itself." We can symbolize the argument as
+follows:
+(1) p or r.
+(2) If p then q.
+(3) Not-q.
+Therefore, (4) Not-p.
+Therefore, (5) r.
+Notice that we did not symbolize the first sentence because it is not a premise in the argument.
+Premises (2) and (3) lead to (4) by modus tollens. Premises (1) and (4) lead to the main
+conclusion, (5), by disjunctive syllogism. (Check out the sample in Exercise Set 13.2 in Appendix
+III to see how you can represent this argument with argument maps.)
+Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps 163
+1. Either God is able to prevent evil or He is not. If God is unable
+to prevent evil, then God is not all powerful. After all, saying that
+God is unable to prevent evil is admitting that there is something
+that God does not have the power to do. On the other hand, if
+God is able to prevent evil and chooses not to do so, then God is
+not perfectly good. This is because a perfectly good being would
+not willingly permit evil to occur. So, either God is not all powerful
+or God is not all good. Let us accept that God is perfectly
+good. Then we must admit that God is not all powerful.
+Adapted from: John Stuart Mill, "Nature," in Three Essays on Religion
+(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 36–40
+2. If we were supposed to live forever, then we would live forever.
+Since we don’t live forever, it’s clear that we’re not supposed to
+live forever. If we’re not supposed to live forever, then I would
+not choose to live forever. Therefore, I would not choose to live
+forever.
+Adapted from: "Miss Alabama Quotes Blooper," The Slip-Up Archive,
+Apr 4, 2000, http://www.slipups.com/items/2868.html
+3. Miss Windham, you claim that your father was shot sometime
+after you arrived home from getting a perm. You say that you did
+not hear the gunshot because you were in the shower. Now, you
+also claim that you have had a perm every six months or so for the
+last fifteen years. But isn’t it the first rule of perm maintenance
+that you are not allowed to wet your hair for twenty-four hours
+after getting a perm, so as to avoid deactivating the ammonium
+thioglycolate? And if, as you claim, you’ve had thirty perms in
+your life, wouldn’t you know that? And if you knew not to wet
+your hair, you wouldn’t have gotten in the shower when you came
+home, would you? And if you wouldn’t have gotten in the shower,
+aren’t you lying about not hearing the gunshot? I think you are!
+You heard the gunshot, Miss Windham! Admit it!
+Adapted from: Legally Blonde, directed by Robert Luketic (Los Angeles:
+Metro-Goldywn-Mayer, 2001)
+164 Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps
+4. Here’s a puzzle that most people supposedly get wrong: Jack is
+looking at Anne, and Anne is looking at George. Jack is married,
+but George isn’t. Is a married person looking at an unmarried
+person—or do you not have enough information to know? (See if
+you can figure it out before you read on!) The puzzle doesn’t tell us
+whether Anne is married, but it turns out we don’t have to know
+that. Either Anne is married or she’s not. If she’s married, then
+there’s a married person—namely, Anne—looking at an unmarried
+person. If she’s unmarried, then Jack is looking at an unmarried
+person. And if Jack, who is married, is looking at an
+unmarried person, then there’s a married person looking at an
+unmarried person, which means that if Anne is unmarried, there’s
+a married person looking at an unmarried person. So, regardless
+of whether Anne is married, there’s a married person looking at
+an unmarried person in this scenario.
+Adapted from: Alex Bellos, "Did You Solve It? The Logic Question Almost Everyone Gets
+Wrong," The Guardian, Mar 28, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/
+mar/28/did-you-solve-it-the-logic-question-almost-everyone-gets-wrong
+5. Geologists have long known that the Earth’s core has two layers:
+an "outer core" of molten iron surrounds an "inner core" of solid
+iron crystals. Seismologists—scientists who study earthquakes—
+have noticed that the seismic waves generated by earthquakes
+move faster when they’re traveling between the north and south
+pole, rather than between points on the equator. This shows that
+the crystals in the inner core are aligned in a north-south direction.
+More recently, however, several seismologists discovered that
+when seismic waves travel close to the very center of the inner
+core, they move fastest when traveling between Central America
+and Southeast Asia, nearly perpendicular to the north-south direction
+of the crystals of the inner core. The seismologists did not
+observe the same effect for waves that only travel through the
+edge of the inner core. If the speed of north-south seismic waves
+indicates that most crystals in the inner core are aligned northsouth,
+then the speed of seismic waves traveling through the center
+of the inner core indicates that most crystals in the center
+inner corse are aligned east-west. And if the speed of seismic
+waves traveling through the center of the inner core indicates that
+the crystals there are aligned east-west, then the inner core has its
+Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps 165
+own "inner inner core." Thus, these researchers conclude, the
+Earth’s core has three layers: an outer core, an outer inner core,
+and an inner inner core.
+Adapted from: Tao Wang, Xiaodong Song, and Han H. Xia, "Equatorial
+Anistropy in the Inner Part of Earth’s Inner Core from Autocorrelation of Earthquake
+Code," Nature Geoscience 8 (2015): 224–27
+6. If the borogroves are all mimsy and the slithy toves are gimbling
+in the wabe, then my beamish boy has come galumphing back.
+My boy, being beamish, would come galumphing back only if he
+has snicker-snacked the manxome foe with his vorpal blade. So,
+you see, my boy must have snicker-snacked the manxome foe at
+last if the borogroves are all mimsy and the slithy toves are gimbling
+in the wabe. O frabjous day!
+Adapted from: Lewis Carroll, Martin Gardner, and John Tenniel, The Annotated
+Alice: The Definitive Edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 148–50
+7. It seems like I have awakened in my own apartment. But it’s also
+possible that I’m still asleep and still dreaming. If I am actually
+awake, then everything in my apartment will look and feel like it
+does in real life. If everything in my apartment looks and feels like
+it does in real life, then this carpet will feel like wool. But the
+carpet definitely feels like it is made of polyester. Thus, I can’t be
+awake. I must still be dreaming!
+Adapted from: Inception, directed by Christopher Nolan (Burbank, CA:
+Warner Bros., 2010)
+8. Behavioral economists study the psychology behind people’s economic
+decisions. According to behavioral economics, people will
+do seemingly irrational things to avoid feeling regret. To test this
+theory, we tried to buy people’s Powerball lottery tickets from
+them for more than they paid for the tickets in the first place.
+Note that no ticket has a greater chance of winning than any
+other ticket—and if no ticket has a greater chance of winning
+than any other ticket, then the rational thing to do would be for
+people to accept our offer and buy another lottery ticket because
+they would still have just as good a chance of winning but they
+would also have more money. If people refuse such an offer, we
+166 Rule 28: Deductive arguments in multiple steps
+would have evidence for behavioral economists’ theories about regret-avoidance. In fact, lots of people do refuse such an offer, often explaining that they would feel terrible if they sold the winning ticket. Thus, we have evidence for behavioral economists’ theories about regret-avoidance.
+Adapted from: Business Insider, Twitter post, Aug 23, 2017 8:10 PM, https://twitter.com/businessinsider/status/900525576384987136
+9. A law either fits with the moral law or it is unjust. Laws requiring or promoting racial segregation conflict with the moral law. If a law is unjust, then one has a moral responsibility to disobey it. Thus, one has a moral responsibility to disobey segregation laws.
+Adapted from: Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail,"
+Liberation: An Independent Monthly, Jun 1963
+10. In war, as in life, either you know the facts or you don’t. If you know the facts, you’re dealing with a known fact. If you don’t know the facts, then either you know you don’t know them or you don’t know that you don’t know them. If you know you don’t know the facts, you’ve got a known unknown. If you don’t know that you don’t know the facts, you’ve got an unknown unknown. So if you don’t know the facts, then you’ve got either a known unknown or an unknown unknown. Thus, either you’ve got a known fact or a known unknown fact or an unknown unknown fact.
+Adapted from: Donald Rumsfeld, "Department of Defense News Briefing,"
+Feb 12, 2002, http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript
+.aspx?transcriptid=2636
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 415.
+Critical thinking activity: Recognizing deductive argument forms
+For an in-class activity that gives you practice in recognizing deductive argument forms in difficult contexts, see the assignment sheet for "Recognizing deductive argument forms" (p. 528) in Part 3.
+167
+Now suppose that you have picked, or been assigned, an issue or question on which to work out an argumentative essay or oral presentation. Maybe you’re writing for a class; maybe you’re about to speak at a public forum or write a Letter to the Editor; maybe you’re just fascinated by the issue and want to figure out what you think.
+To do this you need to go beyond the short arguments we have so far considered. You must work out a more detailed line of thought, in which the main ideas are laid out clearly and their own premises in turn are spelled out and defended. Anything you say requires evidence and reasons, which in turn may take some research, and you will need to weigh arguments for opposing views as well. All of this is hard work, but it is also good work. For many people, in fact, it is one of the most rewarding and enjoyable kinds of thinking there is!
+Explore the issue
+You begin with an issue but not necessarily a position. Do not feel that you must immediately embrace some position and then try to shore it up with arguments. Likewise, even if you have a position, do not just dash off the first argument that occurs to you. You are not being asked for the first opinion that occurs to you. You are being asked to arrive at a well-informed opinion that can be defended with solid arguments.
+Is life likely on other planets? Here is one line of thought that some astronomers suggest. We are discovering that most stars have solar systems of their own. But there are hundreds of billions of stars in our galaxy alone—and hundreds of billions of galaxies in the universe. If even a tiny fraction of those billions and billions of solar systems have planets suitable for life, and even a tiny fraction of those actually have life, still there must be a myriad of planets with life. The number of chances is still unimaginably huge.1
+1. For a contemporary presentation of this argument, see astronomer Seth Shostak, "Are We Alone?" in Civilizations Beyond Earth, edited by Douglas Vakoch and Albert Harrison (Berghahn, 2013), pp. 31–42.
+Chapter VII
+Extended Arguments
+Rule 29
+168 Rule 29: Explore the issue
+Then again, why do some people have doubts? Find out. Some scientists
+point out that we really have no idea how common habitable planets
+might be, or how likely life is to develop on them. It’s all guesswork. Other
+critics argue that life elsewhere (or rather, intelligent life) by now should
+have announced itself, which (they say) hasn’t happened.
+All of these arguments carry some weight, and clearly much more must
+be said. You already see, then, that unexpected facts or perspectives may
+well turn up as you research and develop your argument. Be ready to be
+surprised. Be ready to hear evidence and arguments for positions you may
+not like. Be ready, even, to let yourself be swayed. True thinking is an openended
+process. The whole point is that you don’t know when you start where
+you’ll find yourself in the end.
+Even if you have been assigned not just a topic but a position on that
+topic, you still need to look at arguments for a variety of other views—if
+only to be prepared to respond to them—and very likely you still have a lot
+of leeway about how to develop and defend the view you’re given. On the
+most contentious issues, for example, you do not need to roll out the same
+arguments that everyone has heard a thousand times already. In fact, please
+don’t! Look for creative new approaches. You could even try to find common
+ground with the other side. In short, take the time to choose your
+direction carefully, and aim to make some real progress on the issue, even
+(if you must) from within "given" positions.
+Exercise Set 7.1: Identifying possible positions
+Objective: To give you practice identifying a variety of positions on any
+topic.
+Instructions: For each of the following questions, list at least three answers
+that you think are important enough to be worth considering.
+Tips for success: When you are considering what position to take on an
+issue, it’s often helpful to think about the issue in the form of a question.
+This both helps you focus on a specific aspect of the issue and identify a
+range of positions that you might consider. To take a position on an issue,
+after all, is just to adopt a specific answer to a question about that issue.
+For instance, suppose you are considering the issue of global poverty.
+Exactly what question are you trying to answer about global poverty? Do
+you want to know what life is like for the global poor? Do you want to
+know how the current disparity between developed countries and developing
+countries came to be? Are you trying to figure out whether people in
+Rule 29: Explore the issue 169
+developed countries have a moral obligation to help the global poor, or
+what they (we) could do to help? Or are you trying to answer some other
+question about global poverty?
+Once you have a specific question in mind, try to identify potential
+answers to that question. You don’t have to include every possible answer,
+of course. Focus on the answers that are either plausible or popular: if you
+think there’s a significant chance that some answer is correct, include it; if
+you know that many other people (or at least a few well-informed, thoughtful
+people) endorse a particular answer, include that one too. Even if you
+think that some popular answer is dead wrong, it’s worth including here
+because you’ll want to understand why people believe it. Besides, once you
+see the arguments for that answer, you may find it more plausible yourself.
+Don’t forget to include nuanced answers. Even if the question you’re
+considering is phrased as a "yes or no" question, think about answers that
+start with "Yes, but . . .", "No, but . . .", "No, unless . . .", or similar qualifications.
+For instance, if you are considering whether to go to medical school,
+don’t just list "Yes" and "No." Consider more nuanced answers, as well, such
+as "Yes, but only if I get a good financial aid package."
+Sample
+Should college students be required to learn a foreign language?
+(1) Yes.
+(2) No.
+(3) No, except for students pursuing certain majors.
+(4) Yes, but they need only learn to read and write the language, not necessarily
+speak it.
+This response doesn’t just list the simple answers of "Yes" and "No." It identifies some more
+nuanced possibilities. Of course, there are indefinitely many other answers you could give
+too. You might consider nuanced answers that begin with "Yes, except . . .", "Sometimes . . .",
+etc.
+Notice that these answers do not contain reasons for the answers; they simply give a direct
+answer to the question. We will consider reasons for each answer later.
+Some of the answers are a bit vague. For instance, answer (3) does not specify which majors
+should be required to learn a foreign language. When you’re just starting to explore an
+issue, such vagueness is okay. You may not know which majors you want to include. As you
+do more research, you’ll be able to refine your answers.
+170 Rule 29: Explore the issue
+1. Should marijuana be legalized?
+2. Should we increase taxes on the richest 1 percent of Americans to
+fund government programs to help middle-class households?
+3. Should developers be allowed to destroy the habitats of endangered
+species in order to build new housing developments?
+4. Should colleges require students to get regular exercise?
+5. How should schools measure how well teachers are doing their job?
+6. Should people be concerned about the apps on their phones
+tracking their movement and Internet usage?
+7. How should someone in his or her twenties save for retirement?
+8. Should universities consider the income level of applicants’ families’
+when making admissions decisions?
+For exercises 9 and 10, pick questions (on any topic) to which you would like
+to know the answer and identify at least three answers to each question.
+Exercise Set 7.2: Exploring issues of your choice
+Objective: To get you started thinking about possible issues for your own
+argumentative essay.
+Instructions: Pick three specific questions that you need to ask or would
+like to ask about the topic you have picked or been assigned. Then, identify
+at least three answers to each question.
+Tips for success: These exercises extend Exercise Set 7.1 to cover your
+assigned topic, if you have one, or a topic of your own choosing that is of
+particular interest to you. Later exercises will build on this set, culminating
+in an argumentative essay, so choose your questions carefully!
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 418.
+Rule 30: Spell out basic ideas as arguments 171
+The questions you choose should be neither too narrow nor too broad.
+If your questions are too narrow, they will be too easy to answer. That won’t
+make for a very interesting argumentative essay. (Only specialists want to
+read five pages about when the War of 1812 began.) If your questions are
+too broad, they will be too difficult to answer. That won’t make for a very
+convincing argumentative essay.
+Above all, be sure to pick questions that are interesting enough that
+you want to spend a lot of time thinking about them!
+See the Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.1 for models of good responses
+to these exercises.
+Need more practice? Find the opinion section in your favorite newspaper
+and look for editorials or op-eds on topics that interest you. Figure out
+exactly what issue the editorial or op-ed is addressing and what position it
+takes on that issue. Identify at least two other positions on that issue that
+are worth considering.
+Spell out basic ideas as arguments
+Now remember that you are constructing arguments: that is, specific conclusions
+backed by evidence and reasons. As you begin to formulate a position,
+take its basic idea and frame it as an argument. Get out a large sheet of
+scratch paper and literally draft your premises and conclusion in outline.
+Aim first for a relatively short argument—say, three to five premises—
+using the forms offered in this book. The basic argument just introduced
+for life on other planets, for example, might be put into premises-andconclusion
+form in this way:
+There are many solar systems beyond our own.
+If there are many solar systems beyond our own, then it is
+very probable that there are other planets like Earth.
+If it is very probable that there are other planets like Earth,
+then it is very probable that some of them have life.
+Therefore, it is very probable that some other planets have life.
+For practice, work this argument out as a deductive argument using modus
+ponens and hypothetical syllogism.
+For another example, consider a quite different topic. Some people
+have recently proposed a major expansion of student exchange programs.
+Many more young Americans should have the chance to go abroad, they
+Rule 30
+172 Rule 30: Spell out basic ideas as arguments
+say, and many more young people from other parts of the world should
+have the chance to come here. It would cost money, of course, and would
+take some adjustment all around, but a more cooperative and peaceful world
+might result.
+Suppose you want to develop and defend this proposal. First, again,
+sketch out the main argument for it—the basic idea. Why would people
+propose (and be so passionate about) expanding student exchange
+programs?
+FIRST TRY:
+Students who travel abroad learn to appreciate different
+countries.
+More appreciation between different countries would be
+good.
+Therefore, we should send more students abroad.
+This outline does capture a basic idea, but in truth it is a little too basic. It
+hardly says enough to be much more than a simple assertion. Why, for
+example, would more appreciation between different countries be good?
+And how does sending students abroad produce it? Even a basic argument
+can be worked out a little further.
+BETTER:
+Students who travel abroad learn to appreciate other
+countries.
+Students who travel abroad become person-to-person ambassadors
+who help their hosts appreciate the students’ home
+countries.
+More appreciation both ways will help us better coexist and
+cooperate in our interdependent world.
+Therefore, we should send more students abroad.
+You may have to try several different conclusions—even quite varied
+conclusions—before you find your best basic argument on a topic. Even
+after you have settled on the conclusion you want to defend, you may have
+to try several forms of argument before you find a form that really works
+well. (We are serious about that large sheet of scratch paper!) Again, use
+the rules in the earlier chapters of this book. Take your time—and give
+yourself time to take.
+Rule 30: Spell out basic ideas as arguments 173
+Objective: To give you practice formulating basic arguments for and
+against a position.
+Instructions: For each of the following positions, construct one basic argument
+for the position and one basic argument against the position.
+Tips for success: An argument for a particular position is just an argument
+that has the position itself as the conclusion of the argument. You
+can construct a basic argument for a position by providing some basic
+reasons that someone might give to support that position. If you are unsure
+about the appropriate level of detail, use the examples just presented in the
+discussion of Rule 30 as a guide.
+Remember that it is usually possible to find some arguments in favor of
+a position, even if you think the position is clearly false. Thus, by constructing
+arguments for a position, you are not committing yourself to thinking
+that the position is true. There might be more powerful arguments on
+the other side. This is why it’s important to look at arguments both for and
+against each position.
+In constructing arguments against each position, use the denial of that
+position as the conclusion of your argument. Though it’s not necessarily
+the most stylish way, you can express the denial of any claim by adding "It’s
+false that" to the front of it. So, if you were developing an argument against
+the position that judges should be forced to retire at age seventy, the conclusion
+of your argument could be put as: "It’s false that judges should be
+forced to retire at age seventy." (Logicians often call the denial of a claim
+its negation.)
+Exercise Set 7.3: Sketching arguments for and against positions
+Sample
+College students should be required to learn to read and write a foreign language,
+but not necessarily speak it.
+An argument for the position:
+(1) Being able to communicate with people in other countries is increasingly important
+for participating in exciting career and personal opportunities.
+(2) Most communication with people in other countries occurs in writing.
+Therefore, (3) College students should be required to learn to read and write a foreign
+language, but not necessarily speak it.
+174 Rule 30: Spell out basic ideas as arguments
+An argument against the position:
+(1) Traveling or living in a very foreign country is a valuable, mind-opening
+experience.
+(2) Colleges should equip students to have such valuable experiences.
+(3) To travel or live in a very foreign country, you need to be able to speak the
+language.
+Therefore, (4) College students should be required to learn to read, write, and speak a
+foreign language.
+Therefore, (5) It’s false that college students should be required to learn to read and
+write a foreign language but not necessarily speak it.
+These arguments contain only the basic premises needed to argue for or against the position.
+There’s still a lot to be said about each premise, including why anyone should think that the
+premises are true. There are also objections to be considered. As it is, though, the first argument
+conveys a reason for thinking that students should be required to learn to read and
+write but not necessarily speak a foreign language. The second argument conveys a reason for
+thinking that this position is false.
+Remember that when you are dealing with nuanced answers like this one, there are often
+many ways to argue against the answer. For instance, you could argue that students shouldn’t
+be required to learn a foreign language at all, that they shouldn’t be required to learn to read
+and write a foreign language, or that they should be required to do more than just read and
+write—as the second sample argument does.
+1. National service ought to be required of every American eighteenyear-
+old.
+2. Everyone should contribute the same proportion of their income
+in taxes—that is, pay a "flat tax" on their income.
+3. The extinction of an endangered species is a serious problem.
+4. The Founding Fathers considered the United States a Christian
+country.
+5. Social media is bad for teenagers’ mental health.
+Rule 30: Spell out basic ideas as arguments 175
+6. Low-carb, high-fat diets like the keto diet are healthy for most
+people.
+7. Alcohol is more dangerous than marijuana.
+8. If public school teachers should be encouraged to be critical of
+scientific theories such as evolution, then they should be encouraged
+to be critical of religious doctrines as well.
+9. All college students should be required to take at least one course
+in . [Fill in the blank with a subject of your choice.]
+10. The health care system in serves most of that
+country’s citizens well. [Fill in the blank with the country of your
+choice.]
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 420.
+Exercise Set 7.4: Sketching arguments about your own topic
+Objective: To help you construct or discover arguments about the topic of
+your own argumentative essay.
+Instructions: Complete Exercise Set 7.2 before beginning this one. Pick
+one of the three questions that you wrote down for Exercise Set 7.2. For
+each answer to that question that you wrote down for Exercise Set 7.2,
+construct two basic arguments for that answer and two basic arguments
+against that answer.
+Tips for success: Pick the question from Exercise Set 7.2 about which
+you would most like to write an argumentative essay. You should have
+identified at least three distinct answers to that question. Your job now
+is to find or come up with two arguments for each of those answers and
+two arguments against each of those answers, much as you did in Exercise
+Set 7.3. You will end up with twelve arguments—four arguments concerning
+each of the three answers that you wrote down for Exercise Set
+7.2. See Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.3 for further models of good
+responses.
+176 Rule 31: Defend basic premises with arguments of their own
+Need more practice? Find the results of some recent opinion polls by
+searching for "opinion polls" on the Internet. Each poll will report several
+different positions that respondents adopted. Identify or come up with one
+argument for each position reported in the polls. For instance, suppose
+that pollsters asked people which city should host the summer Olympics.
+The poll might report the top five choices. In that case, you could give an
+argument for holding the Olympics in each of those five cities.
+Defend basic premises with arguments of
+their own
+Once you have spelled out your basic idea as an argument, it will need
+defense and development. For anyone who disagrees—in fact, for anyone
+who doesn’t know much about the question in the first place—most of the
+basic premises will need supporting arguments of their own. Each premise
+therefore becomes the conclusion of a further argument that you need to
+work out.
+Look back, for example, at the argument about life on other planets (p.
+167). The argument begins with the premise that there are many solar
+systems beyond our own. This you can show by citing the scientific literature
+and news reports.
+As of 17 February 2017, the Paris Observatory’s "Extrasolar
+Planet Encyclopaedia" lists 3,577 known planets of other
+stars, including many in multi-planet systems (http://exoplanet.
+eu/).
+Therefore, there are many solar systems beyond our own.
+The second premise of the basic argument for life on other planets is
+that if there are other solar systems beyond our own, then it is very probable
+that some of them include planets like Earth. Well, how do we know
+this? What’s the supporting argument? Here you probably need to draw
+on factual knowledge and/or research. If you’ve paid attention to those
+same news reports, you have some good reasons to offer. The usual argument
+is an analogy:
+Our own solar system has a variety of kinds of planets, from
+gas giants to smaller rocky and watery planets suitable for life.
+As far as we know, other solar systems will be like ours. Rule 31
+Rule 31: Defend basic premises with arguments of their own 177
+Therefore, if there are other solar systems beyond our own,
+then it is very probable that there are other planets like Earth.
+Continue in this way for all the premises of your basic argument. Once
+again, it may take some work to find appropriate evidence for each premise
+that needs defense, and you may even find yourself changing some premises,
+and therefore the basic argument itself, so that they can be adequately
+supported by the kinds of evidence you end up finding. This is as it should
+be! Good arguments are usually in "flow," and each part depends on the
+others. It’s a learning experience.
+You’d need to approach the basic argument for student exchange programs
+in the same way. Why do you think, for instance—and how will you
+persuade others—that students who go abroad learn to appreciate other
+cultures? Examples would help, including perhaps the results of surveys or
+studies you can find through research or by consulting the experts (people
+who actually run student exchange programs, or social scientists). Again, in
+some way or other, you need to fill in the argument. The same goes for the
+second basic premise: How do we know that students abroad really do
+become "person-to-person ambassadors"?
+The third basic premise (the value of mutual appreciation) is less likely
+to be confusing or contested, and in some quick arguments you could reasonably
+leave it undeveloped. (A point to remember: not every premise of
+your basic argument necessarily needs development and defense.) However,
+it is also a fine occasion to make the force of the argument—the expected
+benefits—more vivid. Maybe this way:
+Appreciation leads us to see virtues in others’ ways, and to
+expect virtues even when we don’t see them yet.
+Appreciation is also a form of enjoyment: it enriches our own
+experience.
+When we see or expect virtues in others’ ways, and find that
+they enrich our own experience, we are less tempted to make
+harsh or single-minded judgments about them, and we will
+be better able to coexist and cooperate in our interdependent
+world.
+Therefore, mutual appreciation will help us better coexist and
+cooperate in our interdependent world.
+Add some concrete examples to fill out these premises in turn, and you’ll
+have yourself a fine argument overall.
+178 Rule 31: Defend basic premises with arguments of their own
+Objective: To give you practice developing basic arguments.
+Instructions: Identify one premise in each of the following arguments
+that is controversial but defensible—that is, a premise that might be reasonably
+doubted but for which a good argument could be given. Construct
+an argument for that premise.
+Tips for success: "Developing" an argument involves doing three things.
+First, it involves stating any assumptions that you have left unsaid. Second,
+it involves explaining any premises that your audience might not understand.
+Third, it involves defending, or giving arguments for, any premises
+that might be considered controversial. This exercise set focuses on the
+third aspect of developing an argument.
+To develop the arguments below, begin by deciding which premise
+you want to defend. (It will be easier to do that if you rewrite the argument
+in premise-and-conclusion form first.) On the one hand, you should pick
+a premise that is at least somewhat controversial. There’s no point in defending
+a premise that everybody already accepts. On the other hand, you
+should pick a premise that is defensible. If there are no good arguments for
+a premise, then you can’t defend it!
+Once you have chosen a premise to defend, construct a simple argument
+that has that premise as its conclusion, much as you did in Exercise
+Set 7.3. You may find it helpful to think about what kind of argument
+would best support the premise that you have decided to defend. Is the
+premise a generalization? Then give an argument that follows the rules from
+Chapter II. Can you think of an analogy that you could use to support the
+premise? If so, construct an argument by analogy using the techniques you
+learned in Chapter III. Is the premise the kind of thing that you could
+support by finding appropriate sources? Look to Chapter IV. Is the premise
+about a causal relationship? Follow the rules in Chapter V to construct
+a good causal argument. If you can think of a deductive argument to support
+the conclusion, be sure that it follows one of the rules from Chapter VI.
+Ideally, of course, developing an argument involves defending every
+controversial premise. For the purposes of this exercise, however, you only
+need to choose one.
+Exercise Set 7.5: Developing arguments in more detail
+Rule 31: Defend basic premises with arguments of their own 179
+Sample
+This response offers an argument for the second premise of the second sample
+argument in Exercise Set 7.3, which is that "Colleges should equip students to
+have valuable experiences, such as traveling or living in a foreign country." (Go
+back to p. 173 to check out the whole argument.)
+(1) One major purpose of college is to prepare students to live richer, more interesting lives.
+(2) Equipping students to have valuable experiences that they could not otherwise have
+is one way for colleges to prepare students to live richer, more interesting lives.
+Therefore, (3) Colleges should equip students to have valuable experiences, such as
+traveling or living in a foreign country.
+The premises in this response would benefit from further defense in turn. For instance, why
+should we think that preparing students to live richer, more interesting lives is a "major purpose"
+of college? By asking questions like these, you can develop an argument even further.
+Ideally, as Rule 3 points out, you would stop only when you reach premises that everyone in
+your audience finds reliable.
+When you’re developing an argument, it’s worthwhile to think about why someone would
+disagree with the argument’s premises and/or its conclusion. See if you can anticipate and address
+some of those concerns in the way that you support the premises in the argument you’re
+developing.
+1. Concussions are common in many high-impact sports, such as
+football and hockey. Concussions—especially repeated concussions—
+are also very dangerous. By encouraging their kids to play
+high-impact sports, parents are putting their kids at serious risk.
+Parents ought not to put their kids at serous risk. Therefore, parents
+ought not to encourage their kids to play high-impact sports.
+Adapted from: Joshua Shepherd, "Is It Morally Permissible for Parents to Encourage Their
+Children to Play High-Impact Sports?" Practical Ethics, Dec 12, 2013,
+http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2013/12/is-it-morally-permissible-for-parentsto-
+encourage-their-children-to-play-high-impact-sports/
+2. There is a clear trend between 2007 and 2018 of U.S. states
+banning capital punishment. This trend suggests that capital
+180 Rule 31: Defend basic premises with arguments of their own
+punishment is on its way to being prohibited across the United
+States. Therefore, capital punishment will soon be prohibited in
+the United States.
+Adapted from: Jorge L. Ortiz, "Death Knell for Capital Punishment? Washington Becomes
+20th State to Ban Executions," USA Today, Oct 11, 2018,
+https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/11/
+washington-bans-death-penalty-joining-very-clear-trend-nationally/1609439002/
+3. The mental and emotional lives of cows are not all that different
+from the mental and emotional lives of various mammals that
+people keep as pets. Yet, they are routinely abused on factory
+farms. It would be wrong to treat a dog or a cat in the way that
+cows are treated on factory farms. Therefore, it is wrong to treat
+cows like they are treated on factory farms.
+Adapted from: Marc Bekoff, "Cows: Science Shows They’re Bright and Emotional Individuals,"
+Psychology Today, Nov 2, 2017, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
+animal-emotions/201711/cows-science-shows-theyre-bright-and-emotional-individuals
+4. Our financial success is not always under our control. That’s why
+defining success in terms of money is risky. We do control whether
+we try to make a positive difference in the world. And trying to
+make a positive difference is something we can be proud of. That’s
+why it’s better to define success in terms of trying to make a positive
+difference in the world rather than in terms of money.
+Adapted from: Peter Buffett, "How Should College Graduates Define Success?" USA Today,
+May 25, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-05-25-
+Defining-success-for-college-grads_n.htm
+5. If there is no government, then people will constantly be afraid of
+everyone else. If people are constantly afraid of everyone else, then
+there will be no industry or business. Thus, if there is no government,
+then there will be no industry or business.
+Adapted from: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis:
+Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 76
+6. Either God exists or he doesn’t. If God exists, then it is in your
+interest to believe in God. If God does not exist, then you do not
+lose anything significant by believing in God. Therefore, either it
+Rule 31: Defend basic premises with arguments of their own 181
+is in your interest to believe in God or you do not lose anything
+significant by believing in God.
+Adapted from: Blaise Pascal, Pensées, tr. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett
+Publishing Company, 2005), 212–13
+7. Companies have a responsibility to protect their employees
+against sexual harassment. It’s much harder for companies to do
+that if victims of sexual harassment don’t notify the company of
+harassment. Victims of sexual harassment in the workplace are
+less likely to file complaints if they fear that doing so will harm
+their career. Allowing anonymous complaints can help reduce
+this fear. Therefore, companies should allow anonymous complaints
+about sexual harassment.
+Adapted from: Dina Gerdeman, "Sexual Harassment: What Employers Should Do About
+#MeToo," Forbes, Apr 11, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge
+/2018/04/11/sexual-harassment-what-employers-should-do-about-metoo/
+8. Carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of fossil fuels have
+caused a dramatic increase in the amount of carbon dioxide in
+Earth’s atmosphere. Some of this carbon dioxide is absorbed by
+the oceans. This causes "ocean acidification," which means that
+the ocean is becoming more acidic. In fact, the oceans are now
+more acidic than at any point in the last three hundred million
+years. Thus, the impacts of carbon dioxide emissions are not limited
+to climate change.
+Adapted from: Joseph Romm, Climate Change: What Everyone Needs to Know,
+2nd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 17–18
+9. Imagine that a mad scientist has developed a way to remove people’s
+brains from their bodies, keep them alive in a vat of nutrients,
+and stimulate the brain to mimic any experience that the
+scientist chooses. For instance, the scientist could mimic the experience
+of reading a good book about arguments [this one for
+example!]. If you were such a brain-in-a-vat, you would not be
+able to tell that you were a brain-in-a-vat; you would think that
+you were a "normal" person having normal experiences. Thus, you
+cannot use your current experiences to rule out the possibility that
+you are a brain-in-a-vat. But you have no other way to rule out
+182 Rule 31: Defend basic premises with arguments of their own
+the possibility that you are a brain-in-a-vat. If you have no way to
+rule out the possibility that you are a brain-in-a vat, then you cannot
+know that you aren’t a brain-in-a-vat. Therefore, you cannot
+know that you aren’t a brain-in-a-vat.
+Adapted from: Anthony Brueckner, "Skepticism and Closure," in Companion to
+Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup
+(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 14–15
+10. College students don’t like writing papers for required courses.
+Professors teaching those courses don’t like grading the enormous
+stacks of mostly uninspired essays that students turn in.
+Furthermore, those classes are too large for professors to give
+students the help they need to become better writers. If students
+aren’t interested in writing a paper and doing it isn’t going to
+help them become better writers, then there’s no good reason to
+ask students to write that paper. Therefore, professors should
+stop assigning papers in required college courses.
+Adapted from: Rebecca Schuman, "The End of the College Essay," Slate, Dec 13, 2013,
+http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2013/12/college_
+papers_students_hate_writing_them_professors_hate_grading_them_let.html
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 424.
+Exercise Set 7.6: Developing your own arguments
+Objective: To help you develop your own arguments for your own argumentative
+essay.
+Instructions: Complete Exercise Set 7.4 before beginning this one. Develop
+each of your arguments from Exercise Set 7.4 by working out an
+argument for every controversial premise in each of those arguments.
+Tips for success: The first step to completing this exercise set is to identify
+the controversial premises in each of your arguments from Exercise Set
+7.4. If you haven’t completed Exercise Set 7.5, read the "Tips for success"
+section of that exercise for advice on identifying controversial premises.
+Once you’ve identified the controversial premises, try to find or write
+good arguments for each of those premises, much as in Exercise Set 7.5. In
+Rule 32: Reckon with objections 183
+some cases, you will find that there is no good argument for a premise. You
+might even discover that the premise is false. In that case, you have learned
+something valuable: the argument in which that premise appears will need
+to be revised or abandoned.
+See the Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.5 for models of good responses.
+One big difference between this exercise set and Exercise Set 7.5,
+however, is that this exercise set asks you to defend every controversial
+premise in your arguments, not just one. Another big difference, of course,
+is that this time the argument is your own.
+Need more practice? If you want still more practice, look for controversial
+premises in the arguments presented throughout this book. Construct arguments
+for any controversial premise that you find. (This will keep you
+busy for a while!)
+Reckon with objections
+Too often, when we make arguments, we concern ourselves only with the
+pro side: what can be said in support. Objections tend to come as a shock.
+We realize, maybe a little late, that we didn’t think enough about possible
+problems. It’s better to do it yourself and to hone your argument—maybe
+even make fundamental changes—in advance. In this way, you also make
+it clear to your eventual audience that you have done your homework, that
+you have explored the issue thoroughly and (hopefully!) with a somewhat
+open mind. So always ask: What are the best arguments against the conclusion
+you are working on?
+Most actions have many effects, not just one. Maybe some of the
+other effects—ones you haven’t looked at yet—are less desirable. Thoughtful
+and well-meaning people may oppose even such obviously good
+ideas ("obvious" to us, anyway) as teating more beans or getting married in
+order to be happy or sending more students abroad. Try to anticipate and
+honestly consider their concerns.
+Students abroad, for example, may also end up in dangerous situations,
+and bringing large numbers of new foreign students here might raise
+national security risks. And all of it might cost a lot of money. These are
+important objections. On the other hand, perhaps they can be answered.
+Maybe you’ll want to argue that the costs are worth it, for example, in part
+because there are also costs of not reaching out to other cultures. After
+all, we are already sending large numbers of young people—in the
+Rule 32
+184 Rule 32: Reckon with objections
+military—into extreme danger abroad. You could argue that giving ourselves
+another kinf of face abroad might be a very good investment.
+Other objections may lead you to rethink your proposal or argument.
+In this case, for example, worries about national security might require us to
+be careful about who is invited to come here. Clearly they need to come—
+how else are we going to correct false impressions?—but (you could argue)
+it could be fair to impose certain restrictions too.
+Maybe you are making some general or philosophical claim: that humans
+have (or don’t have) free will, for example, or that war is (or isn’t)
+inherent in human nature, or that there is (or isn’t) life on other planets.
+Here too, anticipate objections. If you are writing an academic paper, look
+for criticisms of your claim or interpretation in the class readings, secondary
+texts, or (good) online sources. Talk to people who have different views.
+Sift through the concerns and objections that come up, pick the strongest
+and most common ones, and try to answer them. And don’t forget to reevaluate
+your own argument. Do your premises or conclusion need to be
+changed or developed to take account of the objections?
+Exercise Set 7.7: Working out objections
+Objective: To give you practice working out objections to arguments.
+Instructions: Go back to the arguments listed in Exercise Set 7.5. Work
+out one objection to each argument.
+Tips for success: Two kinds of objection are possible to any argument.
+One kind of objection seeks to prove that the conclusion of the argument
+is false. Another kind of objection seeks to prove only that the argument is
+flawed, without necessarily proving that the conclusion of the argument
+is false.
+Consider a lawyer who is defending someone accused of murder. The
+prosecution will, of course, present arguments designed to show that the
+defendant committed the murder. The defense could counter this argument
+in two ways, corresponding to the two kinds of objections. The defense
+could attempt to prove that the defendant did not commit the
+murder. (Maybe there’s a solid argument that the defendant was out of the
+country at the time of the murder.) Alternatively, the defense could simply
+try to prove that the prosecution’s argument is inconclusive—that the
+prosecution has not presented a strong enough case to convince the jury
+Rule 32: Reckon with objections 185
+that the defendant is guilty. (Maybe the prosecution’s argument relies on
+unreliable witnesses.)
+There are several common strategies for showing that a particular argument
+doesn’t work. First, you can argue that one or more of the premises
+is false or unreliable. Second, you can argue that the argument has a flaw
+in its logic. (One great way to do that is to explain how the argument violates
+one of the rules in this book.) Third, you can argue that while the argument
+gives some reason to accept the conclusion, it does not give enough
+reason. If you take this third approach, though, be prepared to say what
+more you would need. Would confirmation from additional sources do the
+trick? More or better examples? Does the argument overlook alternatives
+that need to be ruled out? The more specific you can be about what the
+argument lacks, the better.
+Sample
+This objection raises a specific objection to premise 3 of the "yes" argument we
+developed as a sample for Exercise Set 7.3, which is that "To travel or live in a very
+foreign country, you need to be able to speak the language." (Go back to p. 173 to
+check out the whole argument.)
+Many foreigners already speak English. And rapidly improving smartphone apps
+enable people to interact with one another even if they don’t speak a common language.
+Therefore, English speakers don’t need to speak a foreign language to travel in a foreign
+country.
+If this objection holds up, then it may not be true that to travel or live in a very foreign country,
+you need to be able to speak the language, and the argument sketched in Exercise Set 7.3
+fails as a whole.
+Notice that this objection is an argument in its own right. You could make this objection
+more convincing by developing it in more detail, just as you developed your arguments in
+Exercise Set 7.3. For instance, it would be helpful to find a good source to back up the claim
+that many foreigners can already speak English.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 426.
+186 Rule 33: Explore alternatives
+Objective: To help you identify objections to the arguments about the
+topic of your own argumentative essay.
+Instructions: Complete Exercise Set 7.6 before beginning this one. Work
+out one objection to each of the arguments that you developed in Exercise
+Set 7.6.
+Tips for success: If you haven’t completed Exercise Set 7.7, review the
+"Tips for success" section for that exercise. All of that advice applies here,
+too.
+In addition to objections that point out genuine weaknesses and flaws
+in your arguments, consider objections that are popular but, in your view,
+misguided. For instance, if you are arguing that high school teachers should
+be paid higher salaries, you might consider the objection that teachers
+are overpaid because they only work during school hours. This popular
+objection is misguided because schoolteachers spend considerable time after
+school preparing lesson plans, grading students’ homework, etc. Many people
+reading or listening to your argument will raise such objections. It’s
+important to be prepared to respond to them.
+See the Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.7 for further models of
+good responses.
+Need more practice? For a particularly challenging form of practice, make
+a list of some of your strong convictions, for example on moral or political
+questions, along with a brief argument for each of those convictions. Can
+you come up with objections to those arguments?
+Explore alternatives
+If you are defending a proposal, it is not enough to show that your proposal
+will solve a problem. You must also show that it is better than other plausible
+ways of solving that same problem.
+Durham’s swimming pools are overcrowded, especially on
+weekends. Therefore, Durham needs to build more pools.
+This argument is weak in several ways. "Overcrowded" is vague, for one
+thing: Who decides when there are too many people in a pool? Some
+Exercise Set 7.8: Working out objections to your own arguments
+Rule 33
+Rule 33: Explore alternatives 187
+people may even go for the crowds. But remedying this weakness still will
+not justify the conclusion. There may be other and more reasonable ways
+to address the (possible) problem.
+Maybe the existing pools could have more open-swim hours so that
+swimmers could spread themselves over more available times. Maybe the
+typically lighter-use times could be more widely publicized. Maybe swim
+meets and other closed-pool activities could be moved to the weekdays. Or
+maybe Durham should do nothing at all and let users adjust their swim
+schedules for themselves. If you still want to argue that Durham should
+build more pools, you must show that your proposal is better than any of
+these (far less expensive) alternatives.
+Exploring alternatives is not just a formality. The point is not just to
+quickly survey a few boringly obvious, easily countered alternatives and
+then (big surprise) to re-embrace your original proposal. Look for serious
+alternatives, and get creative. You might even come up with something
+quite new. How about . . . maybe keeping the pools open 24/7? How about
+putting in an evening smoothie bar or the like and enticing some of the
+day swimmers to come at odd hours instead?
+If you come up with something really good, you might even need to
+change your conclusion. Are there possibly much better ways to organize
+foreign exchange programs, for instance? Maybe we should extend such
+opportunities to all sorts of people, not just students. How about exchange
+programs for elders? Why not for families, congregations, or work groups?
+Then it’s not just about "sending students abroad" anymore . . . so it’s back
+to your scratch paper to recast the basic argument. This is how real thinking
+works.
+Even general or philosophical claims have alternatives. Some people
+argue, for instance, that there are not likely to be other civilizations elsewhere
+in the universe, because if there were, surely we’d have heard from
+them by now. But is the premise true? Aren’t there other possibilities?
+Maybe other civilizations are out there, but are just listening. Maybe they
+choose to keep still, or just aren’t interested, or are "civilized" in some other
+direction and do not have the technology. Maybe they are trying to communicate
+but not in the ways we are listening for. It’s a very speculative
+question, but the existence of alternative possibilities like these does
+weaken the objection.
+Many scientists also think, by the way, that life could arise on planets
+very different from Earth—it would just be a very different form of life.
+This is an alternative possibility too, and difficult to judge, but one that you
+could use to support and even extend the basic argument. Suppose life
+could be even more widespread than the basic argument suggests?
+188 Rule 33: Explore alternatives
+Exercise Set 7.9: Brainstorming alternatives
+Objective: To give you practice brainstorming alternative solutions to
+problems.
+Instructions: Each problem in this exercise identifies a proposal designed
+to solve a specific problem. Suggest two plausible alternative ways to solve
+the problem. Then, state which of the three proposals is best and briefly
+explain why.
+Tips for success: It’s easy to come up with alternatives by making small
+changes to existing proposals, but you’re more likely to hit upon an innovative
+idea if you look for genuinely different alternatives. If your friends
+suggested getting pizza at Gino’s, don’t just propose pizza at Giordano’s as
+an alternative. You might also consider a totally different type of food, such
+as falafel and hummus, Mongolian stir-fry, or Kenyan peanut soup; cooking
+dinner at home with your friends instead of going out to eat at all; or
+fasting (that is, not eating at all) and donating the food you’d otherwise
+have eaten, or the money you’d otherwise have spent, to a soup kitchen.
+One way to generate more interesting alternatives is to imagine a perfect
+solution to a problem and work backward to something practical. Are
+leftover fast-food wrappers a problem? What if they were edible, so that
+you could eat them for dessert? (Ice cream cones are, in a sense, edible
+wrappers for ice cream.) Even if edible wrappers aren’t on the menu in the
+near future, approaching the problem in this way might open your mind
+to genuine alternatives, as opposed to more trash cans or bigger fines for
+littering.
+Another way to find creative ideas is to consider how the problem has
+been addressed or viewed in other places or at different times. For example,
+if traffic is a problem in your community, do some research to find out how
+other communities have approached the problem or how they avoided the
+problem altogether. Building more and bigger roads isn’t the only solution.
+Finally, consider some ways of reframing the problem. Try thinking
+about the problem as a symptom of a deeper problem. If Americans are
+overweight, should we frame the problem in terms of Americans’ unhealthy
+diet choices? Or is the problem that junk food is cheaper than
+healthier alternatives? The first way of framing the problem suggests that a
+public health campaign might help. The second way suggests that subsidizing
+fresh fruits and vegetables might help more. Alternatively, try thinking
+of a problem as an opportunity. The summer sun heats rooftops, requiring
+building owners to spend more money on air conditioning. Instead of seeing
+that heat as a problem, maybe we can see it as a resource. If the building’s
+owners use the heat from the roof to heat water, they save money on
+Rule 33: Explore alternatives 189
+air conditioners and water heaters. Problems are only problems from a certain
+point of view. Try switching perspectives!
+Sample
+All college students should be required to study abroad in a non-English-speaking
+country in order to learn a foreign language.
+Alternative 1: All college students should be required to pass an intermediate foreign
+language course.
+Alternative 2: All college students should be required to download a translation app for
+their phone.
+Alternative 1 is the best proposal for learning a foreign language. While it may not
+be 100 percent effective—since it’s possible to pass an intermediate language course
+without truly mastering the language—it has distinct advantages over the other
+proposals. Alternative 1 is better than the original proposal because it is less burdensome.
+While studying abroad might be a valuable experience, not everyone is able to do
+so. For instance, students with children or spouses may not be able to spend time
+abroad. Besides, some people might prefer to study abroad in an English-speaking
+country. Alternative 1 is better than Alternative 2 because Alternative 2 doesn’t
+actually accomplish what it’s supposed to accomplish. Just because you have a translation
+app doesn’t mean that you’ve learned a language. In fact, it doesn’t mean that
+you’ve learned anything about the language! Furthermore, it would be awkward and
+maybe insulting to try to interact with someone in a foreign language through your
+electronic translator. And anyway, not everyone has a smartphone, so this alternative
+would be unfair to some people.
+Notice first that both alternatives are presented as ways to ensure that students master a foreign
+language, but while Alternative 2 is creative and may seem tempting, one big problem
+with it is that it doesn’t actually achieve the stated goal. (That’s not always a problem. Reframing
+a problem may lead you to pursue a different goal. Alternative 2 has other problems,
+as noted above.) Alternative 1 and the original proposal are both reasonably effective means
+of achieving the goal. In deciding between them, you’ll need to balance effectiveness with cost.
+The original proposal is more effective but more costly—in terms of time, money, potential
+strains on one’s family and friends, missed opportunities elsewhere, etc.
+It’s also worth noticing that you could create new alternatives by combining these proposals.
+For instance, a college could require students to pass an exam, study abroad in a non-
+English-speaking country, or pass an intermediate foreign language class in order to
+demonstrate mastery of a foreign language. Combining proposals is a great way to come up
+with new alternatives.
+190 Rule 33: Explore alternatives
+1. To discourage texting while driving, states should pass laws completely
+prohibiting the use of any handheld electronic device
+while driving.
+Adapted from: Nancy Bean Foster, "Police: Texting While Driving Tough to Prove," New
+Hampshire Union Leader, Jan 14, 2014, https://www.unionleader.com/news/safety/
+police-texting-while-driving-tough-to-prove/article_
+70367522-2853-51d1-879a-a12b39bb8d30.html
+2. To protect students against would-be mass shooters, American
+schoolteachers should be allowed to bring handguns to school, as
+long as they undergo special training.
+Adapted from: Jamiles Lartey, "Parkland Commission Recommends Teachers Be Allowed to
+Carry Guns," Guardian, Jan 2, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/
+jan/02/parkland-school-shooting-commission-report-teachers-carry-guns
+3. The United States should develop high-tech, high-speed "hyperloop"
+transport systems to make long-distance travel faster, easier,
+and more environmentally friendly.
+Adapted from: Dane Egli, "Hyperloop Will Improve Transportation and National
+Security," Baltimore Sun, Jul 31, 2017, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/
+oped/bs-ed-0801-hyperloop-elon-musk-20170728-story.html
+4. The U.S. government should encourage more nuclear power plants
+in order to reduce America’s dependence on foreign oil.
+Adapted from: Heritage Foundation, "Meeting America’s Energy and
+Environmental Needs," Aug 17, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/
+reports/2010/08/meeting-america-s-energy-and-environmental-needs
+5. Music fans should buy albums to support the musicians they love.
+Adapted from: Kelsey McKinney, "Buying an Album Isn’t the Best Way to Support a
+Recording Artists," Splinter, Nov 18, 2015, https://splinternews.com/
+buying-an-album-isnt-the-best-way-to-support-a-recordin-1793852977
+Rule 33: Explore alternatives 191
+6. Universities should pay upperclassmen to tutor freshmen in difficult
+classes in order to help students make it through their first
+year of college.
+Adapted from: Miranda Sain, "Georgia State Strives to Improve Graduation Rates
+and Help Student Keep HOPE," The Signal (Georgia State University), Jun 8, 2010,
+https://web.archive.org/web/20100704064310/http://www.gsusignal.com/news/
+georgia-state-strives-to-improve-graduation-rates-and-help-student-keephope-
+1.2273024
+7. To reduce plastic pollution, able-bodied individuals should ask not
+to receive a plastic drinking straw when they order a drink at a
+restaurant.
+Adapted from: Anika Chaturvedi, "Refuse Plastic Straws to Help the Environment," Red
+& Black, Jul 27, 2018, https://www.redandblack.com/opinion/opinion-refuse-plasticstraws-
+to-help-the-environment/article_bd279eba-9051-11e8-8d71-af1548a31ce5.html
+8. Governments should decriminalize prostitution in order to protect
+sex workers from sexually transmitted diseases.
+Adapted from: Jeffrey D. Klausner, "Decriminalize Prostitution—Vote Yes on
+Prop K," San Francisco Chronicle, Sep 8, 2008, http://articles.sfgate.com/
+2008-09-08/opinion/17156632_1_prostitution-decriminalization
+-san-francisco-task-force
+9. High schools should require students to wear uniforms in order
+to improve discipline in schools.
+Adapted from: Tracy Gordon Fox, "In Hartford Schools, Uniforms for All,"
+New York Times, Oct 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/
+nyregion/connecticut/05uniformct.html
+10. In order to deter locally elected prosecutors from seeking unreasonably
+harsh prison sentences, each county should have to pay
+the costs of imprisoning the people that it sends to jail.
+Adapted from: Leon Neyfakh, "How to Stop Overzealous Prosecutors," Slate, Feb 25, 2015,
+http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/02/overzealous_
+prosecutors_hold_them_accountable_by_defunding_state_prisons.html
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 429.
+192 Rule 33: Explore alternatives
+Exercise Set 7.10: Considering alternatives to your own conclusions
+Objective: To help you identify possible alternatives to the conclusions
+that you have considered so far for your own argumentative essay.
+Instructions: Complete Exercise Sets 7.2, 7.4, 7.6, and 7.8 before beginning
+this one. In light of what you have learned from Exercise Sets 7.4, 7.6,
+and 7.8, identify at least three alternative answers to your chosen question
+from Exercise Set 7.2. Then, state which answer you currently find most
+plausible and explain why.
+Tips for success: If you haven’t completed Exercise Set 7.9, review the
+"Tips for success" section for that exercise. All of that advice applies here
+too.
+In Exercise Sets 7.4, 7.6, and 7.8, you have devised and developed arguments
+about answers to a specific question from Exercise Set 7.2. For
+this exercise set, you are asked to identify three alternative answers to that
+same question. These alternatives could be slight modifications of the original
+answers, or they could be entirely different answers that you discovered
+in the course of your research for the other exercise sets.
+The purpose of devising alternatives at this stage of the process is that
+you now know a lot more about your topic than you did when you began.
+You might be able to recognize better, more nuanced, or more creative
+answers than you could initially. You might also be able to see problems
+with your original answers, which can be avoided or overcome by choosing
+slightly different answers.
+See the sample response and the Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.9
+for models of good responses.
+Need more practice? Find out about recent laws enacted by your local or
+state government. Identify the problems that those laws were designed to
+address and then identify alternatives that lawmakers might have considered
+instead. Alternatively, working on your own or with a classmate,
+brainstorm a list of problems at your school, in your town, etc., and then
+identify several options for addressing each of those problems.
+Rule 33: Explore alternatives 193
+Critical thinking activity: Compiling your research into an
+extended outline
+For an activity that gives you practice putting all of your work together to create an extended
+argument, see the "Compiling your research into an extended outline" assignment
+sheet (p. 533) in Part 3. This is part of a series of activities that builds up to writing and
+presenting an argumentative essay.
+194
+Suppose now that you have explored your issue, outlined a basic argument, and defended its premises. You are ready to go public—maybe by writing an argumentative essay.
+Remember that writing an extended essay is the last stage! If you have just picked up this book and opened it to this chapter, reflect: there is a reason that this is the eighth chapter and not the first. As the proverbial country Irishman said when a tourist asked him how to get to Dublin, "If you want to get to Dublin, don’t start here."
+Remember too that the rules in Chapters I–VI apply to writing an essay as well as to writing short arguments. Review the rules in Chapter I in particular. Be concrete and concise, build on substance and not overtone, and so forth. What follow are some additional rules specific to writing argumentative essays.
+Jump right in
+Launch straight into the real work. No windy windups or rhetorical padding.
+NO:
+For centuries, philosophers have debated the best way to be happy. . . .
+We knew that already. Get to your point.
+YES:
+In this essay I will try to show that the best things in life really are free.
+Chapter VIII
+Argumentative Essays
+Rule 34
+Rule 34: Jump right in 195
+Exercise Set 8.1: Writing good leads
+Objective: To give you practice writing good leads for argumentative essays.
+Instructions: Each question in this exercise set provides a summary of an argumentative essay. Write one to three sentences that you could use to begin each essay.
+Tips for success: Journalists excel at writing good opening sentences. In journalism, the beginning of a news story is called the lead (sometimes spelled "lede"). The lead is a journalist’s chance to get readers interested in his or her article. The same is true for the first few sentences of your argumentative essays, and you should take as much care in crafting those first sentences as journalists do in crafting theirs.
+Journalists distinguish between hard and soft leads. A hard lead communicates the main point of the story in one short sentence. A soft lead uses an indirect approach to catch the reader’s interest; if an article opens with a soft lead, the main point of the article may not appear for a few sentences.
+You can adapt this journalistic approach to writing your own essays. Especially when you’re writing an essay that’s only a few pages long, start with a hard lead—a strong sentence that communicates the main topic or main point of the essay. If you have more space, you can start with a soft lead, such as an anecdote about a recent event, a description of an imaginary example, or an interesting fact that illustrates or relates to the main point of the paper.
+For the purposes of this exercise, you can write a hard lead or a soft lead for each question. If you take the direct, hard lead approach, write one sentence that states the main point of the essay. If you take the indirect, soft lead approach, write a two- to three-sentence anecdote or story that illustrates the main topic or point of the paper in an interesting way. Since this is a written presentation of your ideas, however, even a soft lead should be presented more formally than if you were relating a story to your friends.
+You might find it helpful to browse through your favorite news source to see how its writers start their articles. If you are writing an essay in a particular discipline, such as history or philosophy, looking at essays or book chapters by professionals in that discipline can help give you ideas too.
+196 Rule 34: Jump right in
+1. When deciding what kinds of foods to eat, we should choose a diet that causes the least amount of unnecessary suffering to animals. While it might seem intuitive that this would be a vegetarian diet, it turns out that’s not the case. Planting crops requires clearing native vegetation, which kills many sentient animals and deprives others of necessary habitat. Range-fed cattle, on the other hand, coexist with the natural vegetation, enabling other
+Sample
+The U.S. Congress passed a new rule allowing members to bring smartphones, tablet computers, and other electronic devices into the House of Representatives. When they are in the House chambers, representatives should be devoting their full attention to the business at hand, not to checking their email, reading unrelated news, or booking their next plane ticket home. Thus, it is a bad idea to allow electronic devices, such as smartphones, into the House of Representatives.
+Adapted from: Editorial, Los Angeles Times, Jan 3, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/03/
+opinion/la-ed-devices-20110103
+Most people have grown accustomed to others constantly tapping away at handheld electronics, but you might hope that the hallowed halls of Congress would be a different story. A recent change in Congressional rules, however, means that the glow of smartphones and the tap-tap of keyboards may soon fill the House of Representatives.
+This soft lead begins with a comment about a common experience in modern life—people glued to the screens of their electronic devices. It immediately moves on to the main topic of the argument, which is the new rule that allows electronic devices into the House of Representatives. The tone of these sentences already suggests the conclusion of the argument too: allowing these devices into Congress is a mistake.
+A hard lead response to this question, by contrast, would get straight to the point: "Congress has made a mistake in allowing its members to bring smartphones and other electronic devices into the House of Representatives." This opening sentence identifies the issue and it indicates what position the essay will take on that issue. If you have trouble writing a hard lead for your own arguments, try writing a summary first and then condensing that summary even further to create a hard lead.
+Rule 34: Jump right in 197
+animals to continue to survive. (This isn’t true for cattle raised in feedlots.) Therefore, adding beef from range-fed cattle to your diet actually leads to less animal suffering than an entirely vegetarian diet.
+Adapted from: Mike Archer, "Ordering the Vegetarian Meal? There’s More Animal Blood on Your Hands," The Conversation, Dec 15, 2011, http://theconversation.com/ordering-the-vegetarian-meal-theres-more-animal-blood-on-your-hands-4659
+2. If you think that buying lots of stuff will make you happy, you’ll always be disappointed. No matter what you buy, you’ll quickly become used to having it, and then you’ll move on to wanting something else. Therefore, it’s foolish to think that you can buy your way to happiness.
+Adapted from: Elizabeth Kolbert, "No Time," New Yorker, May 26, 2014,
+http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/26/no-time
+3. The encryption software on your smartphone helps keep your data private. But until recently, Apple and Google could break into your phone if law enforcement needed access to that data. In 2014, they changed the software so that no one—including Apple, Google, or the government—can access the data on your phone without your password. This creates a big problem for law enforcement, which can often use the data on encrypted phones to solve crimes. It is irresponsible for Apple and Google to hamper law enforcement. Therefore, Apple and Google ought to reverse the change.
+Adapted from: Craig Timbert, "The Toughest Case: What if Osama Bin Laden Had an iPhone?" Washington Post, Sep 26, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/26/the-toughest-case-what-if-osama-bin-laden-had-an-iphone
+4. In most jurisdictions, a person accused of killing someone can only plead self-defense if they were unable to retreat or escape from their attacker. Florida’s Stand Your Ground law does away with this restriction, making it legal for any person to use lethal force to defend themselves or others. The law was meant to protect ordinary citizens. Police officers should be held to a higher standard than the average, untrained civilian. Therefore, Stand Your Ground laws should not apply to police officers who kill
+198 Rule 34: Jump right in
+someone in the line of duty. They should be governed instead by existing policies for the use of force by law enforcement.
+Adapted from: Frances Robles, "Officers in Florida Shootings Say They Can Stand Their Ground, Too," New York Times, Jan 28, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2GpYlxY
+5. Americans currently owe $1.4 trillion in student debt. If the government were to forgive all of that debt, it would lead to an extra $100 billion in economic activity every year and a 0.3 percentage point drop in unemployment. The cost to the government would be modest, all things considered. Therefore, the federal government should buy up and forgive all existing student debt in the United States.
+Adapted from: Katie Lobosco, "The Case for Canceling All Student Debt," CNN Money, Feb 15, 2018, http://cnnmon.ie/2F5ErIA
+6. When we empathize with someone who is suffering, we experience suffering ourselves. That can motivate us to relieve their suffering. When we think carefully about the best way to relieve their suffering without causing more problems further down the line, empathy can lead us to do good or even heroic things. For instance, a classic study by Samuel and Pearl Oliner found that empathy explains why some people helped rescue strangers from the Holocaust while others stood by and did nothing. Thus, empathy is a powerful force for good in the world.
+Adapted from: Denise Cummins, "The Claim: Empathy Makes the World Worse," Psychology Today, Mar 21, 2016, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/good-
+thinking/201603/the-claim-empathy-makes-the-world-worse
+7. Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn always stirs up controversy. The latest hubbub over the book involves a new edition that substitutes the word slave for the racial slur that Huck uses in the novel to describe Jim. The editor of this new edition has good intentions: he hopes that more people will read Twain’s masterpiece if it’s less offensive. But the bottom line is that other people’s literary works—especially masterpieces like Huckleberry Finn—should be left just as they are. The "n-word" is an integral part of Twain’s book. Instructors ought to confront the work as it is and use the opportunity to explore Twain’s and society’s use of the word.
+Adapted from: Kathleen Parker, "Leave Twain Alone," Washington Post,
+Jan 9, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
+2011/01/07/AR2011010704451.html
+Rule 34: Jump right in 199
+8. Presentation software, such as Microsoft PowerPoint, is often used badly. PowerPoint’s pre-built templates, cheesy clip art, and time-wasting animated transitions encourage people to create bad presentations. The result is that people come to hate PowerPoint because they hate the presentations that people make with PowerPoint. Well-done PowerPoint presentations, however, can be an effective communications tool. People should learn to use PowerPoint well, rather than dismissing it outright.
+Adapted from: Farhad Manjoo, "No More Bullet Points, No More Clip Art," Slate,
+May 5, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2253050/
+9. A recent study by two scholars at the University of Southern California found that films aimed at families with young children typically have far more male characters than female characters. Furthermore, the female characters are typically scantily clad and sexy. Many are ditzy, and very few do much that is heroic. Therefore, these films, which are aimed squarely at young boys and girls, reinforce negative gender stereotypes about women.
+Adapted from: Julia Baird, "Why Family Films Are So Sexist," Newsweek,
+Sep 22, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/22/why-family
+-films-are-so-sexist.html
+10. Assume for the moment that everything that happens is completely determined by the laws of nature and the state of the world at some time in the past. Assume also that we cannot be responsible for something if we could not have prevented it from happening. Given these assumptions, it follows that none of us are responsible for anything we have ever done. For our assumptions entail that everything that we do is completely determined by the laws of nature and the state of the world before we were born. Since we can’t change either the laws of nature or the way the world was before we were born, we couldn’t have prevented ourselves from doing anything that we’ve actually done.
+Adapted from: Peter van Inwagen, "The Incompatibility of Free Will and
+Determinism," Philosophical Studies 27 (1975): 185–99
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 432.
+200 Rule 35: Urge a definite claim or proposal
+Need more practice? Working with two or three other classmates, collect a dozen editorials and op-eds from your favorite newspapers. Have each person in your group write a new lead for each piece. Then, share your leads with one another and vote on which lead is the best. For practice writing leads for academic essays, find a professional journal in your preferred discipline. If you can, find one that includes abstracts, or short summaries, at the beginning of each paper. (You may need to ask your instructor for help.) Based on the abstracts, write a lead for each paper in the journal.
+Urge a definite claim or proposal
+If you are making a proposal, be specific. "Something should be done" is not a real proposal. You need not be elaborate. "Cell phones should be banned while driving" is a specific proposal but also a very simple one. If you want to argue that the United States should expand study-abroad programs, though, the idea is more complex and therefore needs some elaboration.
+Similarly, if you are making a philosophical claim or defending your interpretation of a text or event, begin by stating your claim or interpretation simply.
+Very probably there is life on other planets.
+That’s forthright and clear!
+Academic essays may aim simply to assess some of the arguments for or against a claim or proposal. You may not be making a claim or proposal of your own or even arriving at a specific decision. For example, you may be able to examine only one line of argument in a controversy. If so, make it clear immediately that this is what you are doing. Sometimes your conclusion may be simply that the arguments for or against some position or proposal are inconclusive. Fine—but make that conclusion clear immediately. You don’t want your own essay to seem inconclusive!
+Rule 35
+Rule 35: Urge a definite claim or proposal 201
+Objective: To give you practice making vague claims and proposals more definite.
+Instructions: Each statement below makes a vague claim or proposal. Write two more definite claims or proposals that sharpen the general idea of the vague statements in different ways.
+Tips for success: The main problem with vague claims or proposals is that your readers will not know exactly what you’re trying to say. (You might not know either!) One way to see that is to recognize that a vague statement can be made precise in more than one way. For instance, consider the claim, "Countries should use military force only in extreme circumstances." The phrase "in extreme circumstances" is vague. Thus, the claim might mean that countries should use military force only when they or their allies are being attacked. Alternatively, it might mean that countries should use military force only when they have tried every other way of getting what they want. This exercise asks you to find two alternative ways of making each claim more precise.
+To get started, determine which parts of the claim or proposal are vague or ambiguous. For instance, there might be a word or phrase that could mean many different things. Then, think about different possible interpretations of that vague or ambiguous part of the claim—that is, different ways of making it more precise. Pick your favorite two interpretations and use them to generate two more definite claims.
+Exercise Set 8.2: Making definite claims and proposals
+Sample
+Marijuana should be legal in some circumstances.
+Version 1: Marijuana should be legal for people suffering from terminal cancer or other painful, fatal illnesses.
+Version 2: Marijuana should be legal for recreational use by people over twenty-one.
+The phrase "in some circumstances" is vague. The two versions offered here make the claim more precise by citing the specific circumstances under which marijuana should be legal.
+What should you do if you have a long list of conditions under which marijuana should be legal? Listing them all in a single sentence may make your proposal awkward to read. The
+202 Rule 35: Urge a definite claim or proposal
+1. Schools should evaluate teachers by looking at how well they’re teaching their students.
+2. People should eat better.
+3. Governments should have to take future generations into account when making laws.
+4. Taxes are too high.
+5. Rich people are more likely to use drugs than poor people are.
+6. People shouldn’t watch movies whose stars have been accused of sexual harassment.
+7. America is a Christian nation.
+8. Illegal immigrants should be given a path to citizenship.
+9. There is life on other planets.
+10. God cares about what happens on Earth.
+best thing to do is to try to find a way to describe the various circumstances in a more general way. Ask yourself, "What ties these circumstances together?" Another alternative is to say something like, "Marijuana should be legal in four circumstances," and then describe those four circumstances in separate sentences.
+Note that there is another source of vagueness in the original claim too. What does it mean for marijuana to be legal? Does it mean that it is legal to possess it? Or does it mean that it is legal to grow, sell, and buy it? In many cases, you will have more than one option for making your claims more precise. You could even combine them. For instance, another response to this question would be, "It should be legal for anyone over twenty-one to grow, sell, buy, possess, and use marijuana."
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 434.
+Rule 36: Your argument is your outline 203
+Rule 36
+Need more practice? Work with a group of friends or classmates to generate a list of vague proposals or claims. Then, have each person in the group come up with more definite versions of each proposal or claim. See how many different versions of each proposal or claim your group can generate.
+Your argument is your outline
+You now move to the main body of your essay: your argument. First, just summarize it. Take the basic argument you’ve outlined and put it into a concise paragraph.
+Many solar systems are now being discovered beyond our own. I will argue that many of them are likely to include planets like Earth. Many of these planets in turn are likely to have life. Very probably, then, there is life on other planets.
+Here your aim is just to give the reader the big picture: a clear overview of where you are going and how you propose to get there.
+An argumentative essay should now advance each of the premises of this basic argument in turn, each with a paragraph that begins with a restatement of the premise and continues by developing and defending it.
+Consider first the remarkable fact that many other solar systems are being discovered beyond our own. As of 17 February 2017, the Paris Observatory’s "Extrasolar Planet Encyclopaedia" lists 3,577 known planets of other stars, including many in multi-planet systems (http://exoplanet.eu/). . . .
+You might go on to discuss a few examples—say, the most recent and intriguing discoveries. In a longer essay, you might cite other lists too, and/or explain the methods being used to discover these planets—it depends on how much room you have and the level of detail and support your readers need or expect. Then go on to explain and defend your other basic premises in the same way.
+Some premises in your basic argument may need fairly involved defenses. Treat them exactly the same way. First state the premise you are defending and remind your readers of its role in your main argument. Next summarize your argument for that premise in turn (that is, treating it now as the conclusion of a further argument). Then spell out that argument, giving a paragraph or so, in order, to each of its premises.
+204 Rule 36: Your argument is your outline
+For instance, in the last chapter (Rule 31) we developed a defense of the second premise of the basic argument for life on other planets. You could insert it now in paragraph form and with a little more style.
+Why might we think that other solar systems include planets like Earth? Astronomers propose an intriguing argument by analogy. They point out that our own solar system has a variety of kinds of planets—some huge gas giants, some others rocky and well suited for liquid water and life. As far as we know, they continue, other solar systems will be like ours. Therefore, they conclude, other solar systems very probably contain a variety of planets, including some that are rocky and well suited for liquid water and life.
+Now you may need to explain and defend these points in turn, maybe even giving some of them their own paragraph or two each. You could try to awaken your readers’ appreciation for the diversity of planets right here in our solar system, for example, or describe some of the variety of extra-solar planets already known.
+Depending on how long and involved all of this gets, you may need to reorient your reader to the basic argument when you return to it. Pull out the road map, as it were, and remind your readers—and yourself—where you are in your journey toward the main conclusion.
+We have seen, then, that solar systems are already being discovered beyond our own, and that it seems very probable that there are other planets like Earth. The last main premise of the argument is this: if there are other planets like Earth, then very probably some of them have life.
+In your outline you will have worked out an argument for this premise too, and you can now bring it smoothly up to bat.
+Notice, in all of these arguments, the importance of using consistent terms (Rule 6). Clearly connected premises such as these become the parallel sentences or phrases that hold the whole essay together.
+Exercise Set 8.3: Writing out your arguments
+Objective: To help you convert premise-and-conclusion outlines of your arguments into stylish prose.
+Rule 36: Your argument is your outline 205
+Instructions: Write out each of the arguments that you developed in Exercise Set 7.6 in a few stylish paragraphs. (You’ll need to have completed Exercise Sets 7.2, 7.4, and 7.6 before beginning this one.)
+Tips for success: The final product of Exercise Set 7.6 should be a set of arguments—most likely in the form of a premise-and-conclusion outline. (If you’ve studied Appendix III on argument mapping, you might have maps of your arguments too.) Your goal here is to convert those premise-and-conclusion outlines into the kind of stylish prose that you would see in a newspaper editorial or (occasionally) in an academic paper. Depending on the complexity of your argument, this may take one paragraph or it may take several.
+Remembering a few rules from Chapter I will help with this task. Use premise- and conclusion-indicators—but not too many of them—to identify your premises and your conclusion (Rule 1). Present your ideas in a natural order (Rule 2), so that someone who has never thought about your topic could follow along easily. Be concrete and concise (Rule 4), using consistent terms (Rule 6). Avoid loaded language (Rule 5). At this point, your arguments will be strong enough to stand on their own two feet, as it were, without the crutch of loaded language.
+Be prepared to revise your arguments several times to get them into really good shape.
+Sample
+Suppose that you are writing a paper in which you argue that the dinosaurs were killed by a meteor impact. You might have an argument that looks, in outline, like this:
+(1) The dinosaurs, along with many other kinds of plants and animals, went extinct approximately 65.5 million years ago.
+(2) There is a 110-mile-wide impact crater near the Mexican town of Chicxulub that dates to roughly sixty-five million years ago.
+(3) A 110-mile-wide impact crater must have been created by a huge meteor.
+Therefore, (4) A huge meteor must have struck Earth roughly sixty-five million years ago.
+(5) The impact of a huge meteor would have thrown enough dust into the atmosphere to change the climate and reduce sunlight for a long time.
+206 Rule 36: Your argument is your outline
+(6) Many species and ecosystems would not survive such a sudden, dramatic change in the climate.
+Therefore, (7) The impact of a meteor near Chicxulub, Mexico, roughly sixty-five million years ago caused the extinction of the dinosaurs.
+Buried beneath the Mexican town of Chicxulub is a sixty-five-million-year-old impact crater. The crater is over a hundred miles across. A crater that big could only have been caused by the impact of a huge meteor. An impact like that would have thrown enough dust into the atmosphere to cloud the sun and change the climate for years. Such a sudden, dramatic change in the climate would have been too much for many plants and animals. Entire ecosystems would have collapsed. And indeed, dinosaurs—along with many other plants and animals—disappear from the fossil record approximately 65.5 million years ago, right about the time of the Chicxulub impact. It stands to reason that the meteor that created the Chicxulub crater also caused the extinction of the dinosaurs.
+This response draws very heavily on the premise-and-conclusion outline above, as it should. It repeats the main ideas of each premise, even using a lot of the same words. However, it does reorder the premises to add some drama to the passage. After all, everyone knows that the dinosaurs went extinct. That’s not exciting (except to dinosaurs). But a hundred-mile-wide impact crater "buried" beneath a Mexican town? That’s a bit more intriguing. As long as you present your premises in a natural order (Rule 2), you don’t have to follow the order from your premise-and-conclusion outline.
+Need more practice? Get together with several classmates and exchange arguments from Exercise Set 7.6. Write each of your classmates’ arguments in stylish prose. For even more practice, work from the premise-and-conclusion outlines that you developed in Exercise Set 7.5 to write stylish prose arguments.
+Rule 37: Detail objections and meet them 207
+Rule 37
+Detail objections and meet them
+Rule 32 asks you to think about and rework your argument in light of possible objections. Detailing and responding to them in your essay helps to make your views more persuasive to your readers, and attests that you have thought carefully about the issue.
+NO:
+Someone might object that expanded student exchange programs will create too many risks for students. But I think that . . .
+Well, what kinds of risks? Why would such risks arise? Spell out the reasons behind the objection. Take the time to sketch the whole counterargument, not just to mention its conclusion as you rush by to defend your argument.
+YES:
+Someone might object that expanded student exchange programs will create too many risks for students. The concern is partly, I think, that students abroad, who are mostly young people after all and not so worldly, may be more easily taken advantage of or hurt, especially in places where life is more desperate and there are fewer safeguards and protections.
+In this time of rising fear and mistrust of foreigners, coupled with fears of terrorism, the concern may also take on more of an edge: students’ lives may be at stake. We would certainly not want exchange students to become hostages in desperate local power games. Western tourists abroad are already sometimes targeted by terrorists; we could justifiably fear that the same might happen to exchange students.
+These are serious concerns. Still, equally serious responses are also possible. . . .
+Now it is clear exactly what the objections are, and you can try to respond to them effectively. You might point out, for instance, that risks don’t just start at the border. Many foreign countries are safer than many American cities. A more complex response might be that it is also risky, at least to our society as a whole, not to send more cultural ambassadors abroad, since international misunderstandings and the hatreds they fuel are making the world more risky for all of us.
+And surely there are creative ways to design exchange programs to reduce some of the risks? You might not even have thought of these
+208 Rule 37: Detail objections and meet them
+possibilities, though, if you had not detailed the arguments behind the objection, and your readers would probably not have seen the point even if you had mentioned them. Detailing the objections enriches your argument in the end.
+Exercise Set 8.4: Detailing and meeting objections
+Objective: To give you practice writing detailed discussions of objections.
+Instructions: Each of the following passages sketches an argument and mentions an objection to that argument. Develop the objection in detail by providing a short argument for it, and then offer a brief response on behalf of the author of the original argument.
+Tips for success: As we noted in the "Tips for success" for Exercise Set 7.7, an objection is a kind of argument. Since all arguments have both premises and a conclusion, every objection therefore has both premises and a conclusion. Detailing an objection, like developing any other kind of argument, involves stating its premises explicitly.
+In each of the following arguments, the gist of an objection is given for you. Even if you think the objection is misguided, do your best to figure out how someone might develop that basic idea into a full-fledged objection. This may require a little research on your part. It’s important that you confront the strongest version of the objection that you can come up with. Spell out the objection just as you spell out your own arguments. (Again, think back to Exercise Sets 7.2, 7.4, and 7.6.)
+Once you have stated the objection in detail, you need to meet it. That is, you need to explain why, in your view, the objection doesn’t undermine the main argument. There are two main ways to do this. First, if you can find an argumentative flaw in the objection, explain why the objection doesn’t work. Since an objection is just a kind of argument, all of the rules that apply to arguments also apply to objections.
+Second, even if there is no argumentative flaw in the objection, you might still be able to explain why the main argument is stronger than the objection. There are good arguments on both sides of many important issues; sometimes the only thing to do is to admit that an objection is a good one and then explain why the arguments on the other side are even better.
+Sometimes, of course, you’ll discover an objection that turns out to be decisive. In that case, the only thing to do is to admit that the objection
+Rule 37: Detail objections and meet them 209
+undermines the original argument. You can either fall back on other arguments for the same conclusion or give up that conclusion altogether.
+When detailing an objection to your argument, it’s important to differentiate the objection from your own views. You don’t want your reader to think that you are endorsing the objection. Phrases like "It might be objected that . . ." can help you do this.
+Sample
+Electric cars will never be more than a niche product. They may become popular in dense urban areas, but never outside of big cities. The biggest reason for this is "range anxiety," the fear of not being able to go far enough before you run out of electricity. Green-technology enthusiasts dismiss range anxiety as a temporary problem, but it will be a long time before you can recharge your all-electric car on the side of the highway.
+Adapted from: Peter M. DeLorenzo, "Electrics as Part of the Mix," New York Times, Oct 7, 2010,
+http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/10/07/will-electric-cars-finally-succeed/electrics-as-part-of-the-mix
+Green-technology enthusiasts dismiss "range anxiety" as only a temporary problem. As more people buy electric cars, they claim, entrepreneurs will build recharging stations that allow owners to recharge their cars, just as gas stations allow drivers of gasoline-powered cars to refuel along the way. Over time, running out of battery power in your car will be no bigger a fear than running out of gas. Once this happens, the objection goes, there will be no major obstacles to using electric cars outside of big cities.
+This argument, however, faces a chicken-and-egg problem. Until there are enough recharging stations outside of big cities, people who live outside of big cities won’t buy electric cars, and people with electric cars won’t travel outside big cities. But until people are buying or driving electric cars outside of big cities, people won’t build recharging stations. Thus, range anxiety is likely to remain a problem for the foreseeable future.
+This response does not restate the main argument. It jumps right in with a detailed version of the objection. There are two things to notice about this response’s discussion of the objection.
+First and most importantly, the response treats the objection as a full-fledged argument. The response clearly states the conclusion of the objection, which is that range anxiety is a temporary problem. (Note that the conclusion of the objection is, in effect, that the main premise of the original argument is false. That is, the conclusion of the objection is that range anxiety is not just a temporary problem.) The response then gives premises for that
+210 Rule 37: Detail objections and meet them
+1. The world has no shortage of urgent problems, including disease, war, and poverty, to name a few. It is unconscionable for people like Elon Musk to spend millions of dollars on frivolous projects like launching his car into space to show off his company’s latest rocket. Even his broader aim of exploring Mars pales in comparison to the importance of tackling problems here on Earth. Musk and his supporters will surely object that we need to do fun and exciting things, too, but we can worry about fun when children aren’t dying of malaria, famine, and errant bombs.
+Adapted from: Nathan Robinson, "Why Elon Musk’s SpaceX Launch Is Utterly Depressing," The Guardian, Feb 7, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/07/elon-musk-spacex-launch-utterly-depressing
+2. From a career perspective, the smartest choice is to major in philosophy or liberal arts. That’s because artificial intelligence is going to replace most technical jobs, including things like accounting and programming, whereas the critical thinking skills you learn as a philosophy or liberal arts major are going to be much harder to automate. The parents of would-be philosophy majors might object that philosophy majors face terrible job prospects, but a philosophy major will pay off in the long run.
+Adapted from: Marguerite Ward, "Google Exec, Mark Cuban Agree That These College Majors Are the Most Robot-Resistant," CNBC, Apr 21, 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/21/these-college-majors-are-the-most-robot-resistant.html
+conclusion: More people buying electric cars will lead to people building recharging stations. Recharging stations will make range anxiety a thing of the past, just as gas stations ease anxiety about running out of gas.
+Second, the response makes it clear which views are the author’s and which are some-
+one else’s. It even attributes the objection to a specific kind of critic—"green-technology enthusiasts." The response uses the phrases "they claim" and "the objection goes" to remind the reader that it is considering an objection.
+After stating the objection in detail, the response gives a clear rebuttal that explains why the objection fails. This, too, is an argument—an objection to the objection—and the response treats it as one, clearly presenting premises and a conclusion.
+Rule 37: Detail objections and meet them 211
+3. People have speculated for decades about the fate of Amelia Earhart, who disappeared over the South Pacific in 1937 while trying to become the first woman to fly around the world. A recently discovered photograph from the Marshall Islands may help solve the mystery. The photograph shows several people standing and sitting on a dock, including a white woman with short hair and a seemingly white man with a receding hairline that matches the hairline of Earhart’s navigator, John Noonan. The photograph’s label indicates that it was taken at Jaluit Harbor, where some people believe Earhart ended up after crash-landing and being picked up by a Japanese ship. Earhart expert Richard Gillespie, however, disputes the claim that the woman in the photo is Earhart: the hair is too long, he says, compared to a photograph taken of Earhart just before she left.
+Adapted from: Laurel Wamsley, "Does a Newly Discovered Photo Show Amelia Earhart Survived a Crash Landing?" NPR, Jul 6, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/06/535861448/
+4. Classes in music and arts keep young students engaged and interested. It also offers them a creative outlet. Therefore, elementary schools should provide music and arts classes for all students. Some people might object that music and arts classes should be cut because of tight budgets and the need to focus on testing, but we need to keep our priorities straight.
+Adapted from: Kathy Bushouse, "Broward Schools to Consider Cuts
+to Physical Education, Arts and Music Classes," Sun Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, FL),
+Mar 8, 2010, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2010-03-08-fl-broward-elementary-specials-030910-doc20100308-story.html
+5. The world owes it to the people of North Korea to overthrow its oppressive government. Life in North Korea is a tragedy of almost unimaginable proportions. Its impoverished residents, who know virtually nothing of the outside world, live in constant fear—and rightly so. Even a trivial misstep that offends the government can land a person’s entire family in a prison camp that can only be described as a living hell. Many people will balk at the idea of overthrowing the North Korean regime because other recent efforts at replacing dictators have not turned out well, but the
+212 Rule 37: Detail objections and meet them
+prospects for North Korea are much better because of the possibility of reunification with South Korea.
+Adapted from: Hrishikesh Joshi, "The Human Tragedy of North Korea," The Diplomat, Feb 25, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/the-human-tragedy-of-north-korea/
+6. Some states have begun to legalize marijuana. Supporters say that legalization will bring many advantages. Critics, however, worry that legalizing marijuana will cause more and younger teenagers to experiment with marijuana. Perhaps this is true, but advocates claim that the other benefits probably outweigh the costs.
+Adapted from: Adam Nagourney and Rick Lyman, "Few Problems with Cannabis for California," New York Times, Oct 26, 2013, https://nyti.ms/1dxbHGY
+7. For better or for worse, students who attend elite colleges reap substantial benefits compared to students who go to less prestigious schools. Elite colleges spend far more money per student on education, providing all kinds of free perks that are not included elsewhere. Students at elite colleges are far more likely to graduate from college than students of similar ability who attend less prestigious schools. Students of similar ability, as measured by SAT scores, are also much more likely to go on to graduate or professional school if they attend an elite school. Some might insist that what really matters here is what you do with your time in college, not where you go. I wish that were true, but the facts simply don’t bear it out.
+Adapted from: "Room for Debate: Does It Matter Where You Go to College?"
+New York Times, Nov 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
+2010/11/29/does-it-matter-where-you-go-to-college
+8. Airport security has become a major hassle in the United States, leading to long waits, restrictive regulations, and invasive searches. All of this is done to prevent terrorists from hijacking airplanes. The United States should do what Israel does: it should use profiling to target people for additional screening, leaving everyone else alone. With the proper training, professionals can use identity and behavioral profiling to target people for extra screening while still treating people respectfully. The defenders of political correctness will object that this will lead to harassment or
+Rule 37: Detail objections and meet them 213
+discrimination, but profiling has worked well for Israel, and it would work well in the United States.
+Adapted from: Asra Q. Nomani, "Opposing View on Airport Screening: Follow the
+Israeli Model," USA Today, Dec 21, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/
+opinion/editorials/2010-12-22-editorial22_ST1_N.htm
+9. Upon entering college, many freshmen remain in close contact with their parents, even if they have traveled far from home to attend school. They call, text, and email parents about everything from choosing classes to writing papers to the grades they received on their latest exam. This constant contact has serious negative effects on the students. They don’t learn the independence, self-control, and perseverance necessary to succeed in life. Furthermore, if they resent their parents’ intrusions, they may suffer emotional problems. That’s why parents need to learn to let their children manage their own lives once they get to college. Especially with rising tuition costs, however, many parents will object that they are merely "protecting their investment." It’s not protecting your investment, though, if you’re preventing your child from transitioning into adulthood.
+Adapted from: "Room for Debate: Have College Freshmen Changed?" New York
+Times, Oct 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
+2010/10/11/have-college-freshmen-changed
+10. One in five American teenagers has already suffered some degree of hearing loss. That’s a 30 percent increase since shortly before the introduction of MP3 players. We can infer that teenagers’ constant use of MP3 players, often at extremely high volume for extended periods of time, is damaging their hearing. I can hear teenagers objecting already: People are exposed to loud noises all the time anyway, from subway trains to highway traffic. MP3 players couldn’t possibly make the difference. In fact, though, loud noises in the environment only make matters worse, because it causes people to turn their MP3 players up even further.
+Adapted from: "Room for Debate: How Dangerous Are iPods for Teenage Ears?," New York Times, Aug 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
+2010/08/18/how-dangerous-are-ipods-for-teenage-ears
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 437.
+214 Rule 37: Detail objections and meet them
+Exercise Set 8.5: Considering objections to your own arguments
+Objective: To help you develop discussions of objections for your own argumentative essay.
+Instructions: Complete Exercise Sets 7.2, 7.4, 7.6, and 7.8 before beginning this one. Write the objections that you worked out in Exercise Set 7.8 in stylish paragraphs. Then, write a response to each objection, also in a stylish paragraph.
+Tips for success: If you haven’t completed Exercise Set 8.4, review the "Tips for success" section for that exercise set. Much of that advice applies here too.
+You might find that some of the objections you worked out in Exercise Set 7.8 are truly devastating: there is no way to respond to the objection except to admit that the argument doesn’t work. If that’s the case, don’t be afraid to admit it—even if it was an argument that you initially thought was a good one or an argument for a conclusion that you believe or used to believe. Some people think that it shows some kind of personal flaw to admit that one of their arguments doesn’t work. Having to abandon an argument because you’ve discovered that it’s flawed is much less embarrassing, however, than clinging stubbornly to it even after you’ve seen that it’s flawed!
+Use the sample objection and the Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.4 for models of good responses.
+Need more practice? Go to the companion Web site for this book. Click on the "Chapter VIII" link to find links to Web sites on which users can engage in debates. Find debates that interest you, and identify objections that debaters raise against one another. Notice how the debaters detail and meet the objections. Then, using the main point of each objection as a starting point, write out your own version of the objection and a response that the other debater(s) might offer to your objection.
+Rule 38: Seek feedback and use it 215
+Seek feedback and use it
+Maybe you know exactly what you mean. Everything seems clear to you. However, it may be far from clear to anyone else! Points that seem connected to you may seem completely unrelated to someone reading your essay. We have seen students hand in essays that they think are sharp and clear only to find, when they get them back, that they themselves can barely understand what they were thinking when they wrote them. Their grades won’t be very encouraging either.
+Writers—at all levels—need feedback. It is through others’ eyes that you can see best where you are unclear or hasty or just plain implausible. Feedback improves your logic too. Objections may come up that you hadn’t expected. Premises you thought were secure may turn out to need defending, while other premises may turn out to be more secure than they seemed. You may even pick up a few new facts or examples. Feedback is a "reality check" all the way around. Welcome it.
+Some teachers build student feedback on paper drafts right into the timetable of their classes. If your teacher does not, arrange it yourself. Find willing fellow students and exchange drafts. Go to your campus Writing Center (yes, you have one). Encourage your readers to be critical, and commit yourself to being a critical reader for them in turn. If need be, you might even assign your readers a quota of specific criticisms and suggestions to make, so they don’t fear hurting your feelings by suggesting some. It may be polite but it really does not do you a favor if your would-be critics just glance over your writing and reassure you that it is lovely, whatever it says. Your teacher and eventual audience will not give you such a free pass.
+We may underrate feedback partly because we typically don’t see it at work. When we only read finished pieces of writing—essays, books, magazines—it can be easy to miss the fact that writing is essentially a process. The truth is that every single piece of writing you read—certainly this book, for one—is put together by people who start from scratch and make hundreds of choices and multiple revisions along the way. Development, criticism, clarification, and change are the keys. Feedback is what makes them go.
+Rule 38
+216 Rule 39: Modesty, please!
+Modesty, please!
+Summarize at the end—fairly. Don’t claim more than you’ve shown.
+NO:
+In sum, every reason favors sending more students abroad, and none of the objections stands up at all. What are we waiting for?
+YES:
+In sum, there is an appealing case for sending more students abroad. Although uncertainties may remain, on the whole it seems to be a promising step. It’s worth a try.
+Maybe the second version overdoes it in the other direction, but you see the point. Very seldom will you put all the objections to rest, and anyway the world is an uncertain place. We’re not experts, most of us, and even the experts can be wrong. "It’s worth a try" is the best attitude.
+Rule 39
+Critical thinking activity: Improving a sample paper
+For an activity that gives you practice applying many of these rules, see the "Improving a sample paper" assignment sheet (p. 534) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Compiling a draft of an
+argumentative essay
+For an out-of-class activity that helps you combine your work from Exercises Sets 8.3 and 8.5 into a draft of an argumentative essay, see the "Compiling a draft of an argumentative essay" assignment sheet (p. 537) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Peer-review workshop
+For an activity that gives you practice applying Rule 38—along with all of these rules in this chapter—see the "Peer-review workshop" assignment sheet (p. 538) in Part 3.
+217
+Sometimes you will find yourself arguing out loud: debating in front of a
+class; arguing for a bigger share of the student government budget or
+speaking for your neighborhood at City Council; invited to make a presentation
+on a subject of your interest or expertise by a group that is interested.
+Sometimes your audience will be friendly, sometimes they will be
+neutral but willing to listen, and sometimes they will really need to be won
+over. At all times, you’ll want to present good arguments effectively.
+All of the rules in the earlier chapters of this book apply to oral arguments
+as well as argumentative essays. Here are a few further rules for oral
+arguments in particular.
+Ask for a hearing
+In making an oral argument you are quite literally asking for a hearing. You
+want to be heard: to be listened to with respect and at least some degree of
+open-mindedness. But your hearers may or may not start out respectful or
+open-minded, and may not even bring a genuine interest in your topic. You
+need to reach out to them to create the kind of hearing you want to have.
+One way to reach out is through your own enthusiasm. Bring some of
+your own interest and energy for the topic into your talk early on. It personalizes
+you and notches up the energy in the room.
+I appreciate the chance to speak to you today. In this talk, I
+want to put forward a new idea on the subject of student exchange
+programs. It’s a proposal I find exciting and inspiring,
+and I’m hoping that, by the end, you will too.
+Notice also that this way of talking itself displays the inviting attitude
+toward your hearers that you’d like them to take toward you. You may not
+get it back from them, even so—but you certainly won’t get it from them if
+you don’t bring it to them in the first place. Arguing face to face can be a
+powerful thing, and done deftly and persistently, it can reinforce and build
+respect itself, even across major differences.
+Never give an audience the feeling that you are talking down to them.
+They may know less than you do about the subject, but they can certainly
+learn, and it is pretty likely that you have some learning to do too. You’re
+Chapter IX
+Oral Arguments
+Rule 40
+218 Rule 40: Ask for a hearing
+not there to rescue them from their ignorance, but rather to share some
+new information or ideas that you hope they’ll find as intriguing and suggestive
+as you do. Again, approach your audience from enthusiasm, not
+some sort of superiority.
+Respect your audience, then, and also respect yourself. You are there
+because you have something to offer, and they are there either because they
+want to hear it or because it is required by their jobs or studies. You do not
+need to apologize for taking their time. Just thank them for listening, and
+use the time well.
+Exercise Set 9.1: Reaching out to your audience
+Objective: To give you practice reaching out to the audience during an
+oral presentation.
+Instructions: Each exercise in Exercise Set 8.1 (p. 194) contains a summary
+of an argument. Read each summary and write a brief opening for an
+oral presentation of each argument that would engage the attention of a
+live audience. Assume that you would be presenting the argument to your
+classmates.
+Tips for success: Engaging a live audience in your presentation often
+requires a different approach than engaging someone through the written
+word. In many contexts, the opening of an oral presentation can be much
+less formal and more conversational than the opening lines of a written
+essay—less formal, even, than a "soft lead" for a written essay. You have
+a chance to make a personal connection with the audience that you don’t
+have in a written essay.
+The goal of your opening line is to engage your audience’s interest.
+There are lots of ways to do this. You might tell a story, raise a puzzle, or
+cite some surprising statistic that will make audience members want to
+hear about your topic. You might explain how your topic relates to their
+lives or have them recall an experience of their own that relates to your topic.
+You could ask the audience to imagine themselves in an interesting situation
+that relates to your topic. You might even ask a few audience members
+to tell you what they would do in that situation. Getting audience members
+actively engaged in your presentation, however briefly, is a good way
+to turn them from passive listeners into active listeners.
+Unless you are giving a very long presentation, aim for three to five
+sentences worth of introductory material. By the end of that paragraph,
+you should be ready to transition smoothly into the main topic of your
+presentation.
+Rule 40: Ask for a hearing 219
+When writing your opening, remember who your audience is. You
+wouldn’t want to use the same opening when presenting something to
+your classmates as you would when presenting the same material to, say,
+a group of bankers from whom you hope to get a loan.
+Sample
+The U.S. Congress passed a new rule allowing members to bring smartphones,
+tablet computers, and other electronic devices into the House of Representatives.
+When they are in the House chambers, representatives should be devoting their
+full attention to the business at hand, not to checking their email, reading unrelated
+news, or booking their next plane ticket home. Thus, it is a bad idea to
+allow electronic devices, such as smartphones, into the House of Representatives.
+Adapted from: Editorial, Los Angeles Times, Jan 3, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/03/
+opinion/la-ed-devices-20110103
+Some instructors, as you know, prohibit cell phones and laptops in the classroom—and
+with good reason. As students, we get a better view of what our fellow students are
+doing than instructors do. We know that the person in front of us is on Instagram, not
+taking notes. We see that the person next to us is texting, not looking for a new pen in
+her backpack. Computers, phones, and similar devices can be very distracting. That’s
+why Congress’s new rule allowing elected officials to bring electronic devices into the
+House of Representatives is a mistake.
+This opening begins with two topics that are likely to grab your classmates’ attention:
+instructors’ annoying rules and their classmates’ amusing (or annoying) misbehavior. It uses
+specific details—a student on Instagram and a student trying to hide her texting inside her
+backpack—to get students to recall things that they have most likely seen for themselves. These
+details connect those everyday experiences to the lives of the politicians that the argument is
+about. The response then transitions smoothly and quickly to the main topic of the
+presentation.
+Compare this sample response to the sample lead for Exercise Set 8.1, which called for an
+opening for a written essay on the same topic. This opening is slightly longer and more personal
+and engaging than either the hard or soft lead for the written essay.
+Notice that this response is carefully tailored to a specific audience—namely, a group of students.
+How would you change this opening if you were giving this presentation to a group of
+instructors or business executives—or, for that matter, to the House of Representatives?
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 441.
+220 Rule 41: Be fully present
+Need more practice? Working with two or three other classmates, collect
+a dozen editorials and op-eds from your favorite newspapers. Have each
+person in your group write an opening for an oral presentation of the argument
+in each editorial or op-ed. Then, share your openings with one another
+and vote on which opening is the best. For more practice, go to the
+companion Web site for this book and click on the link for "Chapter IX."
+You’ll find links to other Web sites containing videos of oral presentations
+on interesting topics. Watch videos on topics of interest to you and write
+new openings for each presentation.
+Critical thinking activity: Writing opening lines
+For an activity that gives you practice applying Rules 34 and 40, see the "Writing opening
+lines" assignment sheet (p. 541) in Part 3.
+Be fully present
+A public talk or speech is a face-to-face occasion. It is not simply a public
+version of what we do privately when we read. After all, if people just
+wanted your words, reading would be much more efficient. They are there
+partly for your presence.
+So, be present! For starters, look at your audience. Take the time to
+connect. Meet people’s eyes and hold them. People who get nervous speaking
+to groups are sometimes advised to talk to one person in the group, as
+if one to one. Do so, if you need to, but then go a step further: talk to your
+whole audience one to one, one person at a time.
+Speak with expression. Do not read your pre-prepared words as if it
+were a chore. Remember, you’re talking to people here! Imagine that you
+are having an animated conversation with a friend (OK, maybe a little
+one-sided . . .). Now speak to your audience in the same spirit.
+Writers seldom get to see their readers. When you speak in public,
+though, your hearers are right there in front of you, and you have constant
+feedback from them. Use it. Do people meet your eyes with interest? What
+is the feeling in the audience as a whole? Are people leaning forward to
+hear better . . . or not? If not, can you pick up the energy? Even if you have
+a presentation to get through, you can still adjust your style, or stop to
+explain or review a key point if necessary. When you are not sure of your Rule 41
+Rule 42: Signpost energetically 221
+audience, plan in advance to be able to adjust to different responses. Have
+an extra story or illustration ready to go, just in case.
+By the way, you are not glued to the floor behind the podium (should
+you have one). You can walk around or at least come out from behind the
+lectern. Depending on your own comfort level and the occasion, you can
+establish a much more engaged feeling in the room by visibly engaging
+with your audience yourself.
+Signpost energetically
+Readers can take in an argument selectively. They can stop and think, double
+back, or choose to drop it entirely and move on to something else. Your
+listeners can’t do any of these things. You set the pace for everyone.
+So be considerate. On the whole, oral arguments need to offer more
+signposting and repetition than written arguments. At the beginning, you
+may need to summarize the argument more fully, and then you need to
+refer more regularly back to the summary, or what Rule 36 called the
+"roadmap." For your summary, use labels like "Here is my basic argument."
+For your premises, as the argument turns, say something like, "We come
+now to the second [third, fourth, etc.] basic premise of my argument. . . ."
+Summarize again at the end. Pause to mark important transitions and to
+give people time to think.
+In debate training, students are often taught to literally repeat their
+key claims word for word—that’s right, to literally repeat their key claims
+word for word—mainly because other people will be writing them down.
+Teachers sometimes do this as well: it shows that they know that students
+are listening hard and that they may want or need the key points signposted.
+In other settings, this might seem odd. Even if you don’t repeat the
+key points word for word, at least mark them out in some way, and make it
+clear that—and why—you are doing so.
+Be especially alert to your audience at important transitions. Look
+around and make sure that most of your hearers are ready to move with
+you. You’ll communicate better and show your audience that you actually
+care that they take in and understand what you are saying.
+Rule 42
+222 Rule 42: Signpost energetically
+Exercise Set 9.2: Signposting your own arguments
+Objective: To help you develop transitions for oral presentations of your
+own arguments.
+Instructions: Complete Exercise Set 8.3 (p. 204) before beginning this
+one. Rewrite each of the arguments from Exercise Set 8.3, adding "signposts"
+to make it easier to follow an oral presentation of the argument.
+Assume that you have already engaged the audience’s attention and told
+them what your main conclusion is.
+Tips for success: In Exercise Set 8.3, you worked your arguments into
+stylish paragraphs. If you were going to present any of those arguments
+orally, however, the paragraphs that you wrote for Exercise Set 8.3 would
+probably be too dense. Your listeners might have a hard time following
+your train of thought.
+For this exercise set, you’ll need to introduce phrases that remind your
+listeners—sometimes more than once—where they are in the argument,
+how your various points fit together, and what the main point is.
+You will want to offer different kinds of signposts for different kinds
+of transitions. For instance, you may be transitioning between two premises
+that give examples. In that case, your signpost could be as simple as
+saying, "Another example is . . ." If your examples are complicated, you
+might want to remind your audience what the examples are examples
+of—that is, what the point of the examples is. Alternatively, you might be
+offering a complicated deductive argument. In that case, it might be helpful
+to provide a lengthier transition that reminds your reader of the steps
+that have come before and how the next step fits into the overall structure
+of the argument.
+The bottom line, though, is that your signposts have to work in an oral
+presentation. Be sure to read your arguments out loud to yourself—or better
+yet, to a friend or classmate—in order to be sure that they help your
+listener follow the argument.
+Rule 42: Signpost energetically 223
+Sample
+The sample argument from Exercise Set 8.3 was written out as follows: Buried beneath
+the Mexican town of Chicxulub is a sixty-five-million-year-old impact crater. The
+crater is over 100 miles across. A crater that big could only have been caused by
+the impact of a huge meteor. An impact like that would have thrown enough dust
+into the atmosphere to cloud the sun and change the climate for years. Such a
+sudden, dramatic change in the climate would have been too much for many
+plants and animals. Entire ecosystems would have collapsed. And indeed, dinosaurs—
+along with many other plants and animals—disappear from the fossil record
+approximately 65.5 million years ago, right about the time of the Chicxulub
+impact. It stands to reason that the meteor that created the Chicxulub crater also
+caused the extinction of the dinosaurs.
+The central argument for my claim that the dinosaurs were killed by a meteor begins
+beneath the Mexican town of Chicxulub. Buried beneath Chicxulub is an impact crater
+over 100 miles across. A crater that big could only have been caused by a truly huge
+meteor. What would the impact of such a large meteor do to the Earth? For starters, it
+would throw so much dust into the atmosphere that the sun would be clouded for a very
+long time. This would cause major changes in the climate and create problems for
+plants that rely on the sun for food. As a result, many plants and animals would have
+died, and entire ecosystems would have collapsed, which brings me to the dinosaurs. The
+Chicxulub crater dates to about sixty-five million years ago, right around the time that
+the dinosaurs went extinct. Since the impact of the Chicxulub meteor would have
+caused an ecological catastrophe and mass extinctions, and the dinosaurs, along with
+many other plants and animals, died at just about that time, it stands to reason that
+the Chicxulub meteor killed the dinosaurs.
+This passage begins by alerting the listeners that they are about to hear the central argument of
+the presentation. Sometimes listeners need to be reminded to listen especially closely! The passage
+also moves more slowly through the premises. It doesn’t quite repeat its main claims word for
+word, but it does restate them in slightly different forms. Two major signposts help listeners
+follow along with the argument: The rhetorical question, "What would the impact of such a
+large meteor do to the Earth?" makes it clear that the speaker is moving from a discussion of the
+meteor to a discussion of its effects. The phrase "which brings me to the dinosaurs" signals that
+the speaker is moving from the general effects to a discussion of the presentation’s main topic—
+the dinosaurs. The passage ends with a clear statement of the argument’s conclusion.
+There is a more subtle difference in this version of the argument too. The written version
+from Exercise Set 8.3 states the age of the Chicxulub crater right away. This version waits
+until the listener really needs to know that information—when the speaker is comparing the
+age of the crater to the date of the dinosaurs’ extinction. Readers can always go back and look at
+information you presented earlier. Listeners can’t. So while it’s not quite a matter of signposting,
+your listeners will follow more easily if you give them information on an as-needed basis.
+224 Rule 43: Hew your visuals to your argument
+Need more practice? Write oral presentations for each of the arguments
+in Exercise Set 7.6, being sure to include adequate signposting. For even
+more practice, find editorials or op-eds in your favorite newspaper and
+rewrite them for oral presentations.
+Hew your visuals to your argument
+Some visuals may help your presentation. Maybe your argument is complex
+enough that just seeing it written out can help your hearers. So hand out
+an outline. If you are presenting it in parts, slides can highlight the various
+parts as you move to them—an effective way to signpost. Or your argument
+may depend on certain kinds of data or other information that a few
+slides can illustrate. Maybe a short video can illustrate a key point or bring
+other compelling voices briefly into your case.
+But go light on these visuals. Don’t just turn yourself into a slidereader:
+your audience can do that better, and certainly faster, than you can.
+Meanwhile the bells and whistles in many visual presentation programs
+turn into major distractions in their own rights. And PowerPoint, the old
+standard, at this point is (let’s face it) pretty boring. Critics have also
+pointed out that cramming ideas into slide formats tends to oversimplify.
+The text on slides typically is very clipped; charts and graphs can display
+little detail. And the inevitable technical glitches during presentations lead
+to distractions and sometimes total disaster.
+To "hew" means to cut something back and shape it to fit. Rule 43 uses
+the term quite deliberately. Remember: your argument is the key thing. Cut
+and shape your use of visuals accordingly. Consider also whether your argument
+would be better developed, or your audience better engaged with
+it, in some quite different way. Ask for a show of hands on some subject,
+perhaps, or solicit some structured audience participation. Read briefly
+from a book or article. Put up a short video clip or some graphs or data, if
+needed, but then turn the screen off to continue talking.
+For the display of information, consider paper handouts. You can include
+far more—complex words and pictures; graphs, data, references,
+links—including much that can be left for people to read before or after
+the presentation if they choose. Distribute your handouts in advance, or
+only when you are ready to use them, or for reference at the end—and
+encourage people to take them when they go. Rule 43
+Rule 44: End in style 225
+End in style
+First of all, end on time. Find out how long you are supposed to speak and
+don’t go over. You know from your own experiences as a listener that nothing
+irritates an audience more than a speaker who goes on too long.
+But don’t just peter out. You don’t want to conclude by simply turning
+out the lights.
+NO:
+Well, I guess that’s about all the time I have. Why don’t I stop
+and we can chat a bit if any of these ideas have interested you?
+Come to a rousing end. End on a high note—with flair or a flourish.
+YES:
+In this talk I have tried to suggest that real happiness is attainable
+after all, and by everyone; that it takes no special luck
+or wealth; indeed, that its preconditions lie within easy reach,
+all around us. I thank you for your attention, my friends, and
+naturally wish you all the greatest happiness yourselves!
+The "Resources" section on this book’s companion Web site has links to advice on creating
+good visual aids and avoiding bad ones.
+Critical thinking activity: Creating a visual aid
+For an out-of-class activity that gives you practice in applying Rule 43, see the "Creating a
+visual aid" assignment sheet (p. 542) in Part 3.
+Rule 44
+Exercise Set 9.3: Ending in style
+Objective: To give you practice signaling important transitions and endings
+in oral arguments.
+Instructions: Each exercise in Exercise Set 8.1 (p. 194) contains a summary
+of an argument. In Exercise Set 9.1 you wrote an opening for an oral
+presentation of that argument. Now write a good ending for an oral presentation
+of the argument.
+226 Rule 44: End in style
+Tips for success: Your last few sentences are your best chance to remind
+your audience exactly what you want them to take away from your presentation.
+Reiterate your most important points, and do it in a way that
+will make your ideas stick in their head—but remember your modesty
+(Rule 39)!
+Of course, the way in which you end your arguments is a matter of
+style, and styles differ from person to person. Just as there is no single right
+way to reach out to your audience, there is no single right way to end a
+presentation. Find something that suits your personal voice and style and
+figure out how to make it work.
+Sample
+The U.S. Congress passed a new rule allowing members to bring smartphones,
+tablet computers, and other electronic devices into the House of Representatives.
+When they are in the House chambers, representatives should be devoting their
+full attention to the business at hand, not to checking their email, reading unrelated
+news, or booking their next plane ticket home. Thus, it is a bad idea to allow
+electronic devices, such as smartphones, into the House of Representatives.
+The main point is that electronic gadgets are distracting, and we don’t want our
+congressional representatives distracted when they’re supposed to be focused on
+governing. Thus, the recent move to allow electronic devices into the House chambers
+is a terrible idea. For those who have been looking at your phones the entire time,
+this is the point in the presentation where you nod in agreement and clap politely.
+Thank you.
+This response ends the presentation with a self-effacing if slightly snappy joke that not only
+relates to the topic of the presentation, but also clearly signals that the presentation is over. If
+ending with a joke is not your style (or if your joke falls flat), a firm, well-timed, "Thank you
+for your attention" will do the trick.
+Need more practice? Write endings for oral presentations based on other
+arguments from this book. Alternatively, find a letter to the editor or an
+editorial in your favorite newspaper and write endings for an oral presentation
+of the arguments in those letters or editorials.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 444.
+Chapter IX Exercises 227
+CHAPTER EXERCISES
+Exercise Set 9.4: Evaluating oral presentations
+Objective: To give you practice evaluating oral presentations of arguments.
+Instructions: Go to the companion Web site for this book. Click on the
+link for "Chapter IX" and then click on the link for "Exercise Set 9.4." You
+will get a list of links to online videos of oral presentations. Watch each
+video and evaluate how well the presenter in the video follows each of the
+rules from Chapter IX.
+Tips for success: Your focus here should be evaluating the oral presentation
+of the arguments, not the quality of the arguments themselves. Proceed
+through the rules from Chapter IX systematically, being sure to address
+each one in detail.
+In thinking about Rule 40 ("Ask for a hearing"), ask yourself both how
+well the presenter engages your attention at the beginning and how well he
+or she continues to reach out to the audience throughout the presentation.
+Identify specific things that the presenter does or says that increase or decrease
+your engagement with the presentation.
+Keep Rule 41 ("Be fully present") in mind throughout the entire presentation.
+If the presenter is speaking to the camera, does it feel like he or
+she is making eye contact with you through the screen? If the presenter is
+speaking to a live audience, does he or she engage with the audience? Identify
+specific things that the presenter does to make you feel connected or
+disconnected from him or her during the presentation.
+Another thing to watch for throughout the entire video is the presenter’s
+use of "signposting" (Rule 42). Try pausing the video periodically
+and asking yourself if you can explain the main point of the presentation
+and say how the previous sentence in the presentation—right before you
+paused the video—relates to that main point. If you can do that, then think
+about the specific signposts that the presenter used to enable you to do
+that. If you can’t, then ask yourself what the presenter might have done
+differently to clarify the presentation.
+Be sure to say something about the presenter’s use of visual aids (Rule
+43). Did the presenter include visual elements when presenting the argument?
+If so, were they helpful? (Note that if the presenter is talking to a
+live audience, the visuals might have been helpful to the live audience but
+228 Chapter IX Exercises
+not to those of us watching the video.) What changes would you recommend
+to improve the presenter’s use of visuals?
+Finally, did the presenter end in style (Rule 44)? Cite specific things that
+you liked or disliked about the way the presenter ended the presentation.
+The exercises for this set, including a sample evaluation of an oral presentation,
+can be found on the companion Web site for this book.
+Need more practice? Explore the Web sites that host the videos for this
+exercise. Find videos of other presentations and evaluate those presentations.
+The "Resources" section on this book’s companion Web site has links to
+resources for improving your publish speaking.
+Critical thinking activity: Oral presentations
+For an in-class or out-of-class activity that gives you practice in applying Rules 40–44, see
+the "Oral presentations" assignment sheet (p. 543) in Part 3.
+229
+A public debate may be a face-to-face conversation between people who
+care about a topic but come to it with very different points of view. Or it
+may be a larger occasion—more people involved, more points of view—in
+a classroom or community meeting. It may be a version of the political
+debates we sometimes see in public forums or on television. Or it may be
+carried on slower motion, through the exchange of extended written arguments—
+editorials, speeches, and the like—like those you have practiced
+constructing in Chapter VIII.
+Today most people would probably say that we are getting worse at
+this: that public argument, and especially political argument, is growing
+more shrill, less rational, more destructive than constructive. I am not sure
+that this is entirely true: it may just be that we romanticize the past. Still,
+it is certainly true that we can do a lot better. Here are some rules that
+should help.
+Do argument proud
+In public debate, as in any other kind of argument, give it your best. Today,
+especially, public debate is not easy. Stakes are high, shared solid ground
+seems hard to find, and passions are inflamed. On the other hand, you
+could also think: these are the kinds of times that argument has been waiting
+for. This is why you have rules for arguments in this book and have
+worked to build your skill at using them. So, use them! Seek the best evidence;
+don’t overgeneralize; take care with statistics; use analogies that are
+illuminating and relevant. Use only the best sources. Detail objections and
+try to meet them . . . and all the rest.
+The invitation is not simply to "sound off." Public debate is not another
+kind of opinion polling, and—as this book has tried to show from
+the start—argument of any kind is not simply a kind of fight. Public debate
+is, ideally, a process of thinking together. Come ready to do so. Join a
+debate to which you can genuinely contribute. Enter it with something
+worth arguing about. Bring some genuine evidence and ideas, and use your
+skills to present them fairly and well.
+Chapter X
+Public Debates
+Rule 45
+230 Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage
+And for sure, bring your passions. Many arguments arise from our
+passions and articulate and ground them—especially in challenging times.
+The critical point is only that passion is not an argument by itself. That
+someone feels strongly about some claim does not, by itself, give us a good
+reason to believe it. That a claim is made more insistently or shrilly does
+not make it better—in fact, you may begin to wonder whether the sound
+and fury are a cover for a lack of evidence. A good argument justifies its
+passion!
+Listen, learn, leverage
+Debate is an exchange. It is a back-and-forth with other people holding
+other positions, with their own arguments that they are also (ideally) trying
+to make as well as possible. It is not simply an occasion for you to declare
+your own position—nor is it an occasion for other people to simply
+declare theirs. Both you and they need to listen to each other.
+NO:
+I can’t think of anything stupider than giving up meat. People
+have always eaten it. Besides, our teeth aren’t made just for
+chewing beans!
+Although this sounds a lot like how some debates tend to go, it is exactly
+the wrong way to start. Someone who really can’t think of anything
+stupider than such a widely held position probably just doesn’t understand
+it at all (really? you can’t think of anything more stupid?). Throwing in a
+few one-line reasons to cover for dismissing the entire position without
+even considering its arguments is an unwise move too. (Teeth are destiny,
+eh?)
+Try for a more open-minded approach—before you "come back" with
+your own views. Your job is not only to understand other debaters’ conclusions,
+but also to understand their premises, their reasons—to listen for
+their arguments. This means much more than passively waiting out someone’s
+statement of their views. You need to actively seek out their reasons,
+and understand why they find those reasons so compelling.
+YES:
+I am still trying to understand people who think we should
+give up meat. How can some people go so far as to give up a Rule 46
+Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage 231
+type of food humans have always eaten? And aren’t our digestive
+systems meant partly for meat?
+The "No" statement is a declaration and a dismissal. There is nowhere to go
+from it—at least not without jumping right into a fight. But the "Yes"
+statement is a set of questions. You are still unpersuaded, but this time you
+clearly signal your wish to understand the other argument(s), and leave
+some space for your own rethinking too. Maybe you can even help out
+their argument a little bit too. At least, you will probably learn something,
+and in any case you’ll be better prepared to advance your own argument
+when your turn comes.
+Your turn—yes. For this little exchange is by no means over.
+Suppose that you have listened actively and questioned carefully, to
+the full satisfaction of the person you are arguing with. You have worked
+hard to understand their argument. Now you are entitled to ask for the
+same careful, extended, and active listening back. You have some leverage.
+Thank you for taking the time to explore your argument with
+me. I know I had lots of questions—we have talked about
+some interesting answers. I will have to think more about it.
+Now I’d like to explain my argument to you. Please ask questions
+as we go along, too. Ready?
+Some debaters will be surprised at this, even caught out. So far it has
+been all about them and their arguments. It’s gratifying—and rare—to be
+listened to so well in public arguments (or anywhere, for that matter). They
+may even think that because you have carefully worked through their argument
+with them, you now agree with them (which you might, of course,
+but not necessarily).
+Now, suddenly, they realize that the exchange is only half over. Now
+they have to listen, and in something like the open-minded way you have
+just modeled. This may be a new experience for many debaters. But they
+can hardly object, can they, since you have just listened so carefully and
+actively to them? So get on with it.
+Exercise Set 10.1: Listening even when it hurts
+Objective: To help you develop the skill of careful listening even when
+your own strong feelings are involved.
+232 Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage
+Instructions: For each argument below, write a short paragraph explaining
+the author’s main reasons for holding the view, even if you disagree
+with the view.
+Tips for success: Remember that your task in this exercise is simply to
+understand how other people could sensibly believe the views expressed in
+each passage. You do not need to agree with them, and you are not (now)
+being asked to defend or rebut the arguments or positions advanced in
+each passage. Try to keep your own views and feelings to yourself and focus
+on understanding.
+You may find yourself agreeing with some of the arguments. For others,
+you may disagree but still understand how someone could see things
+that way. For still others, though, you may find it hard to imagine anyone
+seriously or legitimately holding such a view at all. Again, you’re not expected
+to agree with all of the claims, even for a moment. Nonetheless,
+since some of our fellow citizens actually do seriously believe them, it
+would probably be a good idea to be able to do something other than brush
+them off as simply crazy. And maybe, just maybe, you might actually learn
+something from them—or at least get another perspective on the world.
+As you learned way back in Rule 1, the first thing to ask yourself as you
+read each passage is, What conclusion is the argument supporting? As in other
+cases, it may take some work to figure it out. It may take a little extra work
+with arguments like these, because strong views are often put in shrill and
+overstated ways. When people are worked up, they are less likely to think
+or speak as carefully as they can at their best. (Us too, right?) Do your best
+to cut through the noise and produce a clear, concise statement of the position
+as free from loaded language as possible.
+Then, ask yourself, sincerely, How could anyone believe this claim? What
+is the most plausible interpretation I can give to the argument in this passage?
+Assume, at least for the moment, that there is some kernel of truth somewhere
+in the view or the argument for it. Now, where is it? Look for real
+reasons for the claims in question—not psychological deficiencies or obvious
+stupidities. Maybe in your heart of hearts you think that people deny
+climate change because they have been duped by the oil companies, for
+instance, or because they are just too afraid to admit the consequences. (Or
+maybe you think people believe in climate change mainly because they
+hate capitalism and want an excuse to tear it down. Or maybe . . .) And
+perhaps this is even true for some people. Still, there are reasons involved
+too—actual arguments—and the challenge here is to consider what they
+may be.
+Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage 233
+Keep in mind the different argument forms that we’ve covered in this
+book. Does the argument fit into any of them? If so, think about how those
+kinds of arguments work and use that knowledge to reconstruct the argument
+in each passage.
+Be sure to take deep breaths regularly. Some of these passages may
+provoke strong feelings, and little in our training today prepares us to listen
+sympathetically when that happens. Quite the contrary, once our own
+strong feelings are aroused, we learn to hit back with ridicule, rejection,
+avoidance, and all the rest. A calmer and more considerate reading takes
+some courage and sometimes a strong stomach. But, again, we do have to
+live with each other at the end of the day, and not everyone else’s head is
+on as straight as our own, right? So what are you going to do?
+Sample
+"You never heard of a Presbyterian going crazy on religion. . . . We get up of a
+Sunday morning and put on the best harness we have got and trip cheerfully
+downtown; we subside into solemnity and enter the church; we stand up and duck
+our heads and bear down on a hymn book . . . when the minister prays; we stand
+up again while our hired choir are singing, and look in the hymn book and check
+off the verses to see that they don’t shirk any of the stanzas; we sit silent and grave
+while the minister is preaching, and count the waterfalls and bonnets furtively, and
+catch flies; we grab our hats and bonnets when the benediction is begun; when it
+is finished, we shove, so to speak. No frenzy, no fanaticism—no skirmishing; everything
+perfectly serene. You never see any of us Presbyterians getting in a sweat
+about religion and trying to massacre the neighbors. Let us all be content with the
+tried and safe old regular religions, and take no chances on wildcat."
+Mark Twain, "The New Wildcat Religion," The Golden Era,
+Mar 4, 1866, http://www.twainquotes.com/Era/18660304.html
+I think Twain’s key line is: "You never see any of us Presbyterians getting in a sweat
+about religion and trying to massacre the neighbors." Of course he overstates, for
+humor, and today would probably offend many people. I’m not going to agree that
+Presbyterians are necessarily insincere and inoffensive robots or that emotional or
+activist forms of religion—Christian or other, whether I agree with them or not—are
+"crazy" just for that. Still, I can agree that Twain has a serious point. "Massacring the
+neighbors" literally can happen when religion gets intense—both historically (e.g., the
+234 Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage
+Crusades, alas) and too often even in today’s world. One challenging point Twain
+would probably want to make today is that some forms of Christianity may be just as
+prone to "go crazy" as the prevailing stereotypes of Muslim extremists. Thanks, Mark!
+Twain was a famous skeptic about many things, and a master of ironic and satirical argument.
+When others make light of something that you take very seriously, it’s easy to get upset
+and dismiss the reasons they give for their view. This response sets aside the provocative parts
+of the satire to focus on Twain’s substantive point.
+Can you think of satirists in today’s media who argue in similar indirect but sharp ways?
+Can we bring ourselves to thank them, too, even or especially when the satire hits close to
+home?
+1. Of course guns don’t kill people by themselves (usually—though
+sometimes they do). But people don’t kill people with their bare
+hands either (usually—though sometimes they do)! So how could
+it not make sense to take guns out of the equation? "[G]ive a person
+a spoon and ice cream, they will get fat. Put a drunk person in
+a car, they will start to drive and will crash. You write down a
+strong argument and people will read and agree, or feel very
+shocked. You give a murderer a gun, he will kill. You don’t give all
+these people things, they won’t get fat, drink-drive . . . or shoot
+people. Comprende?"
+Adapted from: Jungelson, Web comment on "If Guns Kill People, Then . . . ," CreateDebate,
+2014, http://www.createdebate.com/debate/show/If_guns_kill_people_then
+2. "Only religion can say all fetuses are instantly human; any scientific
+understanding exposes this incontrovertibly as just crazy talk.
+But abortion rights don’t depend on fetuses not being human at
+all. If you want to take the argument off the religious turf, you
+have to acknowledge that there is no moral instant when a fetus
+becomes human—science can’t locate that transformation more
+precisely than sometime between conception and birth. For that
+matter, there is no moral bright line between human and animal
+as far as suffering and death, that separates a human from a chimpanzee
+from a pig from a dog. . . . There is moralizing, but not
+morality, in approving the grotesquely cruel slaughter of billions
+Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage 235
+of sentient animals for convenience or any reason at all, while labeling
+women who abort sixteen-cell fetuses as murderers."
+Philip N. Cohen, "Abortion Is Not a Holocaust, and Feminism Is Not About Convenience,"
+Family Inequality, Apr 13, 2018, https://familyinequality.wordpress.com/2018/04/13/
+abortion-is-not-a-holocaust-and-feminism-is-not-about-convenience/
+3. "America provided the political and economic structure for the
+peoples of the world to come together and achieve their full potential
+whilst making America the greatest industrial and military
+power in the world. The American dream, which is now under
+threat from the P.C. brigade, encourages entrepreneurial enterprise,
+innovation, self-reliance and patriotism. There now exists a
+fifth column of disgruntled losers whose sole aim in life is to sow
+the seeds of discontent through fake news and anti-American propaganda
+to undermine the foundations and principles that made
+America great."
+Cocopops, Web comment on "Is America Just One of a Bunch of Countries, or Are We
+Special?" CreateDebate, Mar 6, 2019, http://www.createdebate.com/debate/show/
+Is_America_just_one_of_a_bunch_of_ordinary_countries_or_are_we_special
+4. "I have yet to meet anyone who can point out from who or what
+we evolved from. Sure some say we evolved from apes; well if
+that’s true; wouldn’t all apes have evolved to humans? There’s
+some that say we evolved from a fish; wouldn’t all fish eventually
+have evolved to human? Yeah, it’s the easy way out to try and explain
+we came from something that was already here, but there
+has never been any exact science to prove your theory . . . I’ve
+worked in the science field almost my entire adult life and I can
+tell you nothing evolves without a human’s touch. Not a single cell
+will do anything without the intervention of someone or something
+feeding it or programming it. Could you imagine evolution
+actually existing? You have a pet fish in an aquarium tonight and
+tomorrow you wake up with a man or woman sitting on your
+couch . . ."
+Cottontop, Web comment on "Evolution vs. Creationism," CreateDebate, 2011,
+http://www.createdebate.com/debate/show/evolution_vs_creationism
+236 Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage
+5. When Muhammad Ali visited the ruins of the World Trade Center
+soon after the September 11 attacks, a reporter asked him how
+he felt about the attackers sharing his Muslim faith. He allegedly
+responded, "How do you feel about Hitler sharing yours?"
+Adapted from: David Mikkelson, "Thanks for Sharing," Snopes.com, Oct 31, 2001,
+https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/thanks-for-sharing/
+6. "Despite the most hostile and corrupt media in the history of
+American politics, the Trump Administration has accomplished
+more in its first two years than any other Administration. Judges,
+biggest Tax & Regulation Cuts, V.A. Choice, Best Economy,
+Lowest Unemployment & much more!"
+Donald J. Trump, Twitter post, Mar 10, 2019, 8:02 AM,
+https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1104714098724519936
+7. John Cardillo is glad that the Electoral College gives rural states
+disproportionate power in U.S. presidential elections because
+without it, he says, the people who voted for me (Alexandria Ocasio-
+Cortez) would make decisions for us. But "God forbid a diverse,
+working-class district [in New York City] that more
+accurately represents modern America actually have an equal say
+in our democracy as your weird uncle with questionable racial
+beliefs who shares fake conspiracy memes on Facebook."
+Adapted from: Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Twitter post, Nov 19, 2018, 5:29 AM,
+https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1064510927293292545
+8. "Man has been here 32,000 years. That it took a hundred million
+years to prepare the world for him is proof that that is what it was
+done for. I suppose it is, I dunno. If the Eiffel Tower were now
+representing the world’s age, the skin of paint on the pinnacleknob
+at its summit would represent man’s share of that age; and
+anybody would perceive that the skin was what the tower was
+built for. I reckon they would, I dunno."
+Mark Twain, Was the World Made for Man? (1903); repr., What Is Man?:
+and Other Philosophical Writings, Vol. 19 of Mark Twain, Works, edited by
+Paul Baender (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993)
+Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage 237
+9. "Instead of persuasion, many governments have taken to mandating
+a whole host of vaccines, including vaccines for nonlethal diseases.
+. . . I’m not a fan of government coercion, yet given the
+choice, I do believe that the benefits of most vaccines vastly outweigh
+the risks. Yet it is wrong to say there are no risks to vaccines.
+Even the government admits that children are sometimes
+injured by vaccines. . . . Despite the government admitting to and
+paying $4 billion for vaccine injuries, no informed consent is used
+or required when you vaccinate your child. This may be the only
+medical procedure in today’s world where informed consent is
+not required. . . . If the fear of [immunocompromised people contracting
+diseases from unvaccinated people] is valid, are we to find
+that next we’ll be mandating flu vaccines? . . . As we contemplate
+forcing parents to choose this or that vaccine, I think it’s important
+to remember that force is not consistent with the American
+story. Nor is force consistent with the liberty our forefathers
+sought when they came to America."
+Sen. Rand Paul, U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pension
+Hearing on Vaccines and Public Health, Mar 5, 2019, https://www.c-span.org/
+video/?c4784300/dr-rand-paul-vaccine-hearing
+10. Journalist: "What do you think of Western civilization?"
+Mahatma Gandhi: "I think it would be a good idea."
+Adapted from: " ‘What Do You Think of Western Civilization?’ ‘I Think It
+Would Be a Good Idea’," Quote Investigator, Apr 23, 2013,
+https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/04/23/good-idea/
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 446.
+Need more practice? Search for videos that support positions that you
+think are wrong or even upsetting—though you’ll likely want to limit just
+how upsetting a view you want to consider. Try to identify the speakers’
+views and objectively explain their arguments.
+Critical thinking activity: Unpopular opinions
+For an in-class activity that gives you practice in applying Rule 46, see the "Unpopular
+Opinions" assignment sheet (p. 544 in Part 3.
+238 Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage
+Objective: To give you practice opening a productive dialogue in the face
+of deep disagreements.
+Instructions: Look back at the passages in Exercise Set 10.1 and imagine
+that you are speaking to the author of each passage. For each passage, write
+a few sentences that you could use to begin a dialogue with the passage’s
+author about the views expressed in the passage. Then, write a few sentences
+in which you transition to asking the author to listen to your own
+views on the topic.
+Tips for success: In this exercise set, you’ll need to write two sets of sentences
+for each exercise: one set opens up a dialogue and the other asks for
+a hearing for your own views. Rule 46 offers some examples of each kind
+of move in the dialogue.
+When you’re trying to get the dialogue started, it helps to show some
+respectful interest. While it’s helpful (and simply honest) to signal that you
+may strongly disagree with them (if you do), try to make it clear that you’re
+sincerely trying to understand the other person’s views and the reasons for
+them. Hitting back right away is generally the worst way to do this, so one
+good method is simply to ask some questions. You may still have to take
+some deep breaths . . . but you may also find that the other person quickly
+becomes much more reasonable, too, once they know someone is actually
+giving them the time of day. Sometimes it is actually quite remarkable how
+fast the feelings in an argument/discussion can shift.
+When transitioning to a discussion of your own view, try not to give
+the impression that you think you’re sure to persuade them or that you
+think you’re the other person’s intellectual superior. Even if you really do
+believe that you’re about to enlighten some poor dimwit by heroically
+piercing the fog of ignorance that shrouds the truth from them, um, keep
+that to yourself. You’re only making your job harder, since no one likes
+being patronized. Present yourself as simply explaining the reasons that
+persuade you. You may or may not point out that you’ve listened respectfully
+to the other person and tried to keep an open mind, and that now
+you’re just asking for the same in return. Whatever you do, find some way
+to transition from listening to others’ ideas to presenting your own.
+Of course, these kinds of moves may not always work. Real dialogue is
+hard! Many people are not interested in it and may just give you back
+abuse. If so—in actual practice—you can just leave the (attempted)
+Exercise Set 10.2: Preparing for dialogue
+Rule 46: Listen, learn, leverage 239
+dialogue. Sometimes, though—more often than we may think—it will
+work. (It better, or we’re really in trouble!)
+It’s unlikely that you’ll disagree with all of the positions taken in Exercise
+Set 10.1. Some you may think are exactly right. This exercise set is
+mainly geared toward opening a dialogue when you disagree with someone.
+So, for exercises where you agree with the position, you have two
+choices. First, you’re welcome to write a response from the perspective of
+someone who disagrees with the position. Alternatively, you could write a
+response that tries to open a dialogue aimed at improving or clarifying the
+argument for that position. See the Model Responses for examples of both
+approaches.
+Sample
+"You never heard of a Presbyterian going crazy on religion. . . . We get up of a
+Sunday morning and put on the best harness we have got and trip cheerfully
+downtown; we subside into solemnity and enter the church; we stand up and duck
+our heads and bear down on a hymn book . . . when the minister prays; we stand
+up again while our hired choir are singing, and look in the hymn book and check
+off the verses to see that they don’t shirk any of the stanzas; we sit silent and grave
+while the minister is preaching, and count the waterfalls and bonnets furtively, and
+catch flies; we grab our hats and bonnets when the benediction is begun; when it
+is finished, we shove, so to speak. No frenzy, no fanaticism—no skirmishing; everything
+perfectly serene. You never see any of us Presbyterians getting in a sweat
+about religion and trying to massacre the neighbors. Let us all be content with the
+tried and safe old regular religions, and take no chances on wildcat."
+Mark Twain, "The New Wildcat Religion," The Golden Era, Mar 4, 1866,
+http://www.twainquotes.com/Era/18660304.html
+Opening a dialogue: "I know you’re being satirical, and it’s funny enough I guess.
+But let’s be serious, if a little boring, for a moment. For one thing, I wonder what you
+really do think about those ‘tried and safe regular religions.’ Are you really in favor of
+just going through the motions like that? At the other extreme, I also wonder what you
+think about the effects of non-belief. Would you claim that non-religious people or
+societies are more likely to leave their neighbors alone, or at least alive? Maybe so, but
+once again we’d have to look at some examples, right?"
+Asking for a hearing: "I’ve listened to your description of Sunday morning in church,
+and smiled at it too. You have my sympathies! But I’d also like to suggest another way
+of thinking. It seems to me that religion can also be an antidote to hatred. The Civil
+240 Rule 47: Offer something positive
+Rights movement, for example, was grounded in the black churches, and that was
+religion with passion! But they stood up with love, rather than hating back. Another
+example is Pope Francis. I am sure you’ll remind me that popes have historically
+embraced many kinds of inhumanity. But Francis has spoken with astonishing
+compassion for oppressed and even antagonistic peoples, many of whom are not Catholic
+or even Christian. The record is mixed, for sure, but doesn’t religion have a few more
+possibilities than you are letting on?"
+Responding to satire can be tricky, especially when you are not trying to argue so much as to
+make some sort of progress together. Both of these responses maintain at least a little bit of
+lightness and humor in reply. Still, on the whole, it’s certainly fine to be boring—it’s also usually
+a little clearer.
+By the way, Twain’s views about religion were actually complex—so much so that scholars
+still debate about them. Despite writing in extremely biting ways about religion in general
+and Christianity in particular (his family didn’t even allow his Letters to the Earth to be
+published until the 1960s), he also apparently found some comfort and intellectual stimulation
+in it, attended Presbyterian services and apparently even helped found a church. We can’t start
+a dialogue with Twain himself about this anymore, but his writings on this and many other
+subject can still engage our minds—in a sense we can still dialogue with him, and it can be an
+unsettling but also fascinating dialogue too.
+Need more practice? Prepare a few different ways of starting a dialogue
+and transitioning to the presentation of your own ideas. Then, get together
+with some trusted friends and find some topics about which you disagree.
+(The "Unpopular Opinions" activity on page 544 provides a helpful framework
+for doing this.) Use an exchange of views on these topics as a chance
+to rehearse your opening and your transition until they flow naturally.
+Offer something positive
+Public debates often get stuck because the people involved can see no good
+way forward. In part this is because so much of the focus is relentlessly
+negative—on what’s wrong with the other side. Better arguments offer
+people something to affirm—something appealing and positive.
+Come to a debate, then, with some suggestions about a better direction
+forward. Build up your candidate or position, don’t just tear down the
+other side. Propose some way to respond, something to do, not just
+Rule 47
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 449.
+Rule 47: Offer something positive 241
+something to resist or avoid or lament. Offer something real to do, something
+to hope for, some sense of possibility—at least some kind of positive
+spin.
+NO:
+This city stinks at conserving water! Even with the reservoirs
+down to a month’s supply, we’ve only been able to cut back
+consumption by 25 percent. And people still don’t get it about
+not washing their cars or leaving their sprinklers going
+forever. . . .
+Maybe, maybe. . . . But when we focus on the severity of a problem, we
+also run the risk of making people feel like nothing can be done about it.
+Couldn’t the same issue be framed in a more empowering way?
+YES:
+This city can and must conserve more water. We’ve been able
+to cut back consumption by 25 percent so far, but with the
+reservoirs down to a month’s supply, people should really start
+seeing the need to stop washing their cars or leaving their
+sprinklers going . . .
+These are exactly the same facts, even stated in similar phrases and
+sentences, but the overall feeling is sharply different.
+The point is not to be mindlessly optimistic. We should not ignore
+what is negative. But when we let it fill the screen entirely, negativity becomes
+the only reality. We create more of it, we preoccupy ourselves with
+it, and it gets our energy and attention, even if we wish to resist it.
+Part of the power of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s iconic "I Have a Dream"
+speech is that it is, after all, about dreams: about visions for a shared and
+just future. "I have a dream that the children of former slaves and the children
+of former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table
+of brotherhood. . . ." Imagine if he’d spoken only about nightmares instead:
+"I have a nightmare that the children of former slaves and the children of
+former slave-owners will never be able to sit down together at the table of
+brotherhood. . . ." In one way this is exactly the same idea—but if King had
+put it this way, would his great speech live on today?
+All arguments—not just in public debates—should try to offer something
+positive. Again, though, there is a special energy and often urgency
+in public debates, which is why I place this rule in this chapter. A group’s
+optimism and excitement can be infectious, and it can become a power of
+its own, as can a sense of gloom and disempowerment. Which will you
+choose to create?
+242 Rule 47: Offer something positive
+Objective: To give you practice presenting ideas in a positive light.
+Instructions: Rewrite each of the following passages in a positive way
+without changing the overall meaning of the passage.
+Tips for success: To keep discussion moving forward, it’s often helpful to
+focus on solutions instead of problems. Instead of pointing fingers or
+dwelling on things that are going badly, offering something positive involves
+emphasizing the people who are doing the right thing and focusing
+on solutions. This helps to reduce feelings of blame and defensiveness that
+can shut down debate and to redirect that energy in more constructive
+ways.
+In each of the following passages, look for an emphasis on people who
+are behaving badly or things that are going badly. Often, these are implicitly
+contrasted with people who are behaving well or things that are going
+well. For instance, a passage that emphasizes how many criminals are repeat
+offenders implicitly contrasts repeat offenders with people who abandon
+their criminal activity after being released from prison. To put a
+positive ending on a presentation about repeat offenders, emphasize the
+people who have reformed themselves or the programs or policies that
+have helped them do so.
+If the passage emphasizes a problem, see if you can frame your ending
+in terms of a potential solution to the problem. Often the statement of a
+problem contains hints of its solution. Focusing on the solution, not just on
+the problem, may help you transform those vague hints into a more concrete
+plan—or at least put you on the right track.
+Exercise Set 10.3: Reframing arguments in a positive way
+Sample
+If a plane catches on fire during a crash, passengers can have as little as ninety
+seconds to escape before the temperature inside the cabin becomes lethally hot.
+That leaves virtually no room for error. And yet the Federal Aviation Authority
+(FAA) estimates that up to 61 percent of passengers tune out during the safety
+announcements at the beginning of every flight. During FAA evacuation drills,
+many passengers didn’t follow proper procedures. Thus, one reason that plane
+crashes are so dangerous is that so many passengers don’t know what to do.
+Adapted from: "Room for Debate: Miracles and Plane Crashes," New York Times, Jan 16, 2009,
+http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/miracles-and-plane-crashes/
+Rule 47: Offer something positive 243
+1. If you’ve been trying to lose weight, I’ve got bad news for you.
+Those diet sodas you’ve probably been drinking are actually making
+it harder for you to lose weight. It turns out that the artificial
+sweeteners in diet sodas change the kinds of bacteria that live in
+your intestines. This change makes it harder for your body to metabolize
+sugars. This can lead to obesity and diabetes.
+Adapted from: Anna Almendrala "This Might Explain Why Diet Soda Drinkers Are Often
+Overweight," Huffington Post, Sep 18, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.
+com/2014/09/18/artificial-sweeteners-gut-bacteria_n_5837646.html
+2. Students in other countries routinely outperform American students
+on standardized tests in math, science, and reading. This is
+because students in those countries know that success requires
+hard work, whereas Americans are trapped in the belief that success
+depends on innate ability. We talk about being "good at math"
+or "good at reading," suggesting that those of us who are lucky
+enough to be good don’t need to work hard, and that those of us
+who aren’t good can’t get better by trying. This attitude is holding
+America back.
+Adapted from: Jonathan Zimmerman, "Why Shanghai Schooled the U.S.: Americans Think
+We’re Too Smart to Work Hard," Christian Science Monitor, Dec 14, 2010,
+http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/1214/
+Why-Shanghai-schooled-the-US-Americans-think-they-re-too-smart-to-work-hard
+Everyone knows that plane crashes are dangerous. If a plane catches on fire during a
+crash, passengers need to be able to evacuate in ninety seconds or less. The FAA requires
+safety announcements at the beginning of each flight, but only about 40 percent of
+passengers listen, and only some of the passengers follow proper procedure during FAA
+evacuation drills. If more people paid attention during safety announcements and
+knew what to do in an emergency, or if the airlines found more attention-grabbing
+ways to present that safety information, more lives could be saved.
+These two passages convey almost all of the same information, but they do so in very different
+ways. Whereas the original passage focuses on what people do wrong and on how dangerous it
+is, the response emphasizes the things that people do right and can easily do better—providing
+safety announcements, paying attention to those announcements, and following proper procedure
+during drills—and the fact that doing these things can save lives.
+244 Rule 47: Offer something positive
+3. It’s hard for museums to acquire archaeological artifacts in a legitimate
+way. Most artifacts were either stolen from their host
+countries long ago or were smuggled out more recently. The problem
+is that no one, including museums, with a legitimate interest
+in protecting artifacts is doing very much to excavate new
+artifacts.
+Adapted from: Bernard Frischer, "Museums Should Dig In," New York Times, Dec 22,
+2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/opinion/23frischer.html
+4. Environmentalists oppose nuclear energy, despite its very low
+carbon emissions and the high efficiency of nuclear power plants,
+so it’s unlikely that we’ll build more nuclear plants anytime soon.
+Instead, environmentalists are looking at things like solar power,
+wind farms, and biofuels. Neither solar nor wind, however, provides
+a steady source of electricity. Besides, solar farms and wind
+farms take up an unrealistic amount of space. Unfortunately, then,
+it looks like we’re going to have to keep building traditional power
+plants with the same old huge carbon footprints.
+Adapted from: Stewart Brand, "Debate: Does the World Need Nuclear Energy?" TED, Jun
+2010, http://www.ted.com/talks/debate_does_the_world_need_nuclear_energy.html
+5. It turns out that those sugary sports drinks that athletes guzzle
+during games and workouts aren’t doing that much good. A recent
+study found that drinking a sports drink during an intense
+workout didn’t improve athletes performance or recovery time
+any better than eating a banana did. Plus, the sports drinks tend
+to come with a hefty dose of dyes and artificial ingredients that
+some people would prefer to avoid. And then after you’re done,
+there’s still that plastic bottle to deal with. It really makes you
+wonder why so many people waste their money on drinks like
+that.
+Adapted from: Gretchen Reynolds, "Bananas vs. Sports Drinks? Bananas Win in Study,"
+New York Times, Apr 4, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2Ej2S35
+6. The threat of medical malpractice lawsuits drives medical costs
+through the roof. Doctors order unnecessary but expensive tests
+in order to avoid appearing negligent. They prescribe multiple
+treatments to avoid the suggestion that they failed to address a
+Rule 47: Offer something positive 245
+treatable problem. The result is that patients pay much more than
+they would if their doctors weren’t afraid of being sued.
+Adapted from: Peter Orszag, "Malpractice Methodology," New York Times, Oct 20, 2010,
+http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/opinion/21orszag.html
+7. Despite the introduction of new programs to improve their academic
+performance, about one out of every two Hispanic students
+is unprepared for college-level English courses, and two out of
+three are unprepared for college-level math. And that doesn’t
+even include students who don’t graduate from high school. This
+probably explains why, even though Hispanics are enrolling in
+college at a higher rate than black and non-Hispanic white students,
+the college graduation rate for Hispanics remains low.
+Adapted from: Delece Smith-Barrow, "National Initiatives Help Minorities Prepare for
+College Course Work," U.S. News & World Report, Sep 8, 2014, http://www.usnews.
+com/education/best-colleges/articles/2014/09/08/
+resources-minorities-can-use-to-ensure-college-readiness
+8. Lots of college students feel nervous when they arrive on campus.
+They deal with being in a new place by seeking out comforting
+things: friends from high school, people who have the same background
+they do, and all the same old activities they’ve been doing
+for years. These students miss out on one of the great benefits of
+college, which is expanding your horizons by meeting new kinds
+of people and learning new things. Some do just enough coursework
+to get by, without even bothering to try to find courses that
+really excite them, and very few bother to go to their professors’
+office hours, even though forming strong relationships with faculty
+is one of the best ways to get the most out of a college education.
+Taken altogether, these failures mean that lots of students
+are basically wasting their college experience.
+Adapted from: Frank Bruni, "How to Get the Most Out of College,"
+New York Times, Aug 17, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2OLfx4F
+9. Eleven thousand volunteers turned out in November 2013 to
+help make a wish come true for a seriously ill five-year-old: they
+turned San Francisco into Gotham City, and the boy spent a day
+fighting supervillains while dressed as "Batkid." It was a genuinely
+heartwarming event put on by the Make-a-Wish Foundation, but
+246 Rule 47: Offer something positive
+it was also a waste of money. The Make-a-Wish Foundation
+spends an average of $7,500 per "wish." These wishes bring joy to
+children who really need it. But donating that money to more effective
+charities, such as the Against Malaria Foundation, would
+literally save lives. That same $7,500 would pay for enough antimosquito
+bed nets to save at least two to three children’s lives.
+And no matter how valuable it is to brighten the day of a seriously
+ill child, it’s surely more valuable to save the lives of two or three
+others. That’s why donating to the Make-a-Wish Foundation is a
+poor use of money.
+Adapted from: Peter Singer, "Heartwarming Causes Are Nice, but Let’s Give to Charity
+with Our Heads," Washington Post, Dec 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
+opinions/heartwarming-causes-are-nice-but-lets-give-to-charity-with-our-heads/2013/1
+2/19/43469ae0-6731-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html
+10. Some statistics are too shocking to ignore—even if they aren’t
+true. For instance, the U.S. attorney general once claimed that
+"intimate partner homicide" was the leading cause of death for
+African-American women aged eighteen to forty-five. That’s just
+not true. Similarly, activists used to claim that domestic abuse
+skyrocketed on Super Bowl Sunday. Until a journalist did some
+fact-checking, this hoax popped up again every year. It even reappeared
+in a different guise during the World Cup, with British
+officials warning of domestic abuse after soccer matches. That
+myth also persisted until some journalists actually bothered to
+check their facts. As you can see, misinformation is everywhere,
+and it leads to bad policy decisions and unfair mistreatment of
+innocent people.
+Adapted from: Christina Hoff Sommers, "Domestic Violence Myths Help No One,"
+USA Today, Feb 4, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/
+2011-02-03-sommers04_st_N.htm
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 545.
+Rule 48: Work from common ground 247
+Need more practice? One good place to get more practice with this skill is
+by looking at your own arguments, such as those developed in the exercise
+sets in Chapter VI or those developed in papers for other courses. For even
+more practice, work with two or three other classmates and have each person
+in your group write a negative ending to several imaginary presentations
+on topics of interest to the group. Feel free to exaggerate the negativity
+in your endings, as this will make the process of rewriting them more
+challenging. Then, have each member of the group rewrite each ending in
+a positive way. Vote on the best positive ending to each imaginary
+presentation.
+Work from common ground
+Public debate is often framed by extreme positions. In fact, however, even
+most partisans in those debates actually hold "in-between" views when
+they speak more thoughtfully and carefully. Hardly anyone truly favors
+wholly eliminating guns, say, or ending all oil drilling. Likewise, hardly
+anyone favors leaving guns, or oil drilling, wholly unrestricted. Even in the
+never-ending and highly divisive abortion debate, most pro-choice advocates
+accept and indeed often favor some restrictions on abortion, and most
+pro-life advocates are willing to accept abortion in some circumstances.
+You have to look for this kind of common ground. If you only expect
+bumper-sticker-positions, simple and insistent, not only will you find
+them, but probably they’re all you will find. Everything else—the nuance
+of even the fiercest positions, and all views between—will be pushed into
+the shadows. Advocates of in-between positions may themselves feel
+forced toward the extremes, in order to be heard at all.
+When you look for in-between views and areas of overlap, disagreements—
+while still quite real—will seem manageable, even potentially
+productive.
+We still seem to differ about the causes of climate change.
+Whether it is mostly caused by natural processes or by human
+activity, though, surely we need to respond to it by smarter
+building and emergency planning. The seas are rising.
+Shouldn’t we be working together to meet these new challenges,
+regardless of cause?
+Even when disagreements really are radical, it is still more useful to try
+to work toward some sort of compromise, rather than trying to convert
+Rule 48
+248 Rule 48: Work from common ground
+someone straight out. You may debate animal rights all day, but most people
+on both (all!) sides would probably at least agree that we would be
+better off if we ate less meat. Pro-life and pro-choice sides actually have
+wide areas of agreement and have even worked together at times, for example
+to reduce the felt need for abortion in the first place.1 Disagreements
+certainly remain in these cases, and they are important and worth
+talking about, but they needn’t fill the whole screen or claim all our energy.
+There are intelligent ways of making progress together.
+Moreover, people’s actual positions are usually complex and, well, just
+plain interesting—even those with which we may disagree. Gun advocates
+have legitimate concerns about citizens being defenseless against tyranny
+if guns are outlawed, while gun opponents have legitimate concerns about
+safety when guns are everywhere. Meanwhile the actual evidence tends to
+complicate things, as it often does. Many countries have strict gun control
+without any kind of tyranny—Canada, for example. Meanwhile, the
+United States has far more guns per capita than almost any other country,
+including the most war-torn, but also a comparatively moderate gun death
+rate, although the sheer number remains distressingly high. Seriously addressing
+facts like these might transform the gun debate into something
+quite different.
+Still, there will be occasions where no change seems possible without
+repeated, persistent, even radical opposition. Go to it, then. But beware of
+supposing that every debate must be such a battle, or every argument a
+battering ram against the other side’s perversity or ignorance. No matter
+how they approach you—at first—invite something more collaborative, as
+if you both stand on the same side and need to address a shared problem
+together. Stick to it until they get it. See what happens.
+This approach might be used in more formal public debates too—
+debates with an audience, for example. Set it up not as two people versus
+each other, or even two arguments versus each other, but as a forum for
+exploring the arguments around an issue. And include more than two!
+1. Google the Common Ground Network for Life and Choice, a project of Search for
+Common Ground, whose current projects also deserve a look. For an academic treatment,
+see Robin West, Justin Murray, and Meredith Esser, editors, In Search of Common
+Ground: From Culture War to Reproductive Justice (Ashgate, 2014).
+Rule 48: Work from common ground 249
+Objective: To give you practice finding common ground between people
+on different sides of a controversial issue.
+Instructions: Each exercise in this set quotes two people who hold different
+positions on a controversial issue. List three claims that you think
+would provide useful common ground for a discussion between them.
+Tips for success: In the following exercises, each person takes a particular
+position on a controversial issue. To find common ground, you need to
+separate the person’s position from the beliefs, concerns, and values that motivate
+that position. While the two parties’ positions might not overlap,
+their beliefs, concerns, and values related to the issue at hand very likely do.
+Your task in this exercise set is to find that area of overlap.
+Before we get to some advice about how to do that, think about what
+it means to look for "claims that . . . would provide useful common ground
+for a discussion." You’ll want to find claims that both people would probably
+agree on and that seem like they could serve as useful premises in
+constructive arguments about the issue—that is, arguments that could
+plausibly lead one or both people to new insights or lead the two parties
+toward agreement. The claims might be claims about the way the world is,
+such as the claim that almost forty thousand people die from gunshots in
+the United States each year, or claims about what’s good or bad or right or
+wrong, such as the claims that murder is wrong or that suicide is normally
+a tragedy.
+In many cases, as soon as you shift from looking for disagreement to
+looking for agreement, points of agreement will actually leap out at you—
+including many beliefs and values that could serve as useful premises in
+constructive arguments, but which may have seemed so obvious that they
+weren’t worth mentioning.
+If you’re having trouble finding important points of agreement,
+though, try asking yourself, "What is each side right about?" Some disagreements
+arise not because parties disagree about which claims are true,
+but rather because they disagree about which claims are most important.
+In the debate over assisted suicide, for instance, proponents of legalizing
+assisted suicide focus on the fact that chronic suffering and the loss of autonomy
+are very bad, whereas opponents focus on the value of human life.
+Surely, in fact, both sides are right: suffering and the loss of autonomy are
+bad and life is precious. The question is how to balance those claims when
+Exercise Set 10.4: Finding common ground
+250 Rule 48: Work from common ground
+someone faces great suffering from terminal illness. Pointing out these
+shared concerns or values can open up fruitful debate.
+Asking what each side is right about still helps even when there are
+sharper differences in beliefs and concerns. In the debate over abortion, for
+instance, there are deep religious and metaphysical disagreements driving
+much of the political disagreement. But even here, we can see that some—
+maybe many—of the beliefs and concerns that motivate one person’s position
+are actually perfectly acceptable to the other person. For instance, just
+about everyone in the debate can agree that it would be better if there were
+fewer abortions, and that people ought to have control over their own bodies.
+So flag those shared beliefs and values as common ground. If nothing
+else you are offering something positive (Rule 47), and often once you have
+done so, possible solutions open up too.
+A final note: finding common ground doesn’t mean compromising
+your values. Your job here isn’t to identify compromise positions that both
+people could grudgingly accept or devise compromise solutions that both
+people could barely tolerate. Rather, your task is only to identify truly and
+possibly even enthusiastically shared beliefs, concerns, or values that could
+serve as starting points for further constructive dialogue.
+Sample
+Should every young athlete get a participation trophy?
+Parker Abate: Yes. While the best athletes
+will play sports through college or
+even professionally and never be satisfied
+with anything less than championships,
+most athletes won’t play beyond
+the age of fourteen or so. Most of those
+kids will dedicate time, effort, and enthusiasm
+to their teams, learning the
+value of teamwork, sportsmanship, and
+exercise. We should honor their efforts
+and contributions to the team.
+Betty Berdan: No. Giving every kid
+who shows up to the game a participation
+trophy diminishes the value of the
+trophies because each kid knows that
+every other kid has one, too. More importantly,
+though, it teaches kids that
+simply showing up is good enough—
+that "everyone’s a winner" even if they
+didn’t try very hard. And that leaves kids
+unprepared to face the real world, where
+simply showing up isn’t good enough.
+Adapted from: "Room for Debate: Should Every Young Athlete Get a Participation Trophy?,"
+New York Times, Oct 6, 2016, https://nyti.ms/2jI1Atk
+I think that Parker Abate and Betty Berdan could agree about these basics at least:
+Rule 48: Work from common ground 251
+1. Is raising the minimum wage a good idea?
+Heather Boushey: Raising the minimum
+wage means higher incomes and lower
+poverty rates. It makes people’s lives better.
+A number of states have raised their
+minimum wage over the last few years,
+and incomes have risen across the board.
+While correlation doesn’t imply causation,
+empirical studies suggest that the increase
+in the minimum wage was a significant
+cause of the rise in incomes.
+Michael Strain: Raising the minimum
+wage comes with trade-offs. Yes, it raises
+incomes for some workers, but because it
+makes it more expensive for companies to
+hire workers, it also means that other
+workers lose their jobs or can’t find jobs.
+When a lot of young men are feeling disconnected
+from the workforce, we should
+be making it easier for companies to hire
+people, not harder.
+Adapted from: "Room for Debate: Poverty, Prosperity and the Minimum Wage,"
+New York Times, Sep 29, 2016, https://nyti.ms/2H7e2hl
+1. There is a difference between winning and simply participating.
+2. People should be acknowledged and honored for their achievements.
+3. Athletes who simply participate still contribute something to their team.
+Betty Berdan and Parker Abate seem to hold diametrically opposed positions: Betty opposes
+participation trophies because they teach kids that showing up is good enough and Parker supports
+them because they honor kids’ contributions to their teams. Still, there is at least one obvious
+point of overlap: they both emphasize the difference between winning and simply
+participating—Betty very explicitly and Parker through his insistence that the best athletes
+will "never be satisfied with anything less than championships." So that’s the first point of
+common ground.
+Asking what each person is right about leads to the second and third points. Betty’s view
+seems to emphasize that people should be acknowledged and honored for their achievements,
+not just for showing up. But it turns out that Parker seems to think the same thing; it’s just
+that, unlike Betty, he thinks that athletes who don’t win still achieve something. So, there’s
+another point of common ground. And that second point leads to the third one: Parker emphasizes
+that simply putting in the effort is actually achieving something worth honoring—
+namely, contributing to the team. So, there’s the third point of common ground.
+Notice that this response doesn’t try to offer any sort of compromise solution, such as trophies
+for the champions and ribbons for everyone else. It focuses solely on identifying common
+ground.
+252 Rule 48: Work from common ground
+2. Do cats or dogs make better pets?
+Monique Irish: Dogs are obviously the
+best kind of pet one could possibly have.
+They love you unconditionally, wanting
+nothing more in return than love and
+whatever you feel like feeding them—and
+walks, of course. Who can help living vicariously
+through their dogs when you see
+how they delight in trotting along at the
+end of a leash and sniffing every dog they
+meet? But that pales in comparison to the
+sheer joy they feel when you come home,
+whether you’ve been gone for a minute, an
+hour, a day, or a year. No one else is ever
+that happy to see you. They’re great listeners,
+too, without a judgmental bone in
+their adorable bodies. They’re full of personality.
+And they’ll valiantly defend you
+against every sound and shadow that dares
+darken your doorstep. They’re way better
+than cats, who really couldn’t care less
+whether you live or die, who are constantly
+coughing up hairballs, and who callously
+tear up your furniture.
+Andrew Paxton: This contest isn’t even
+close. Cats are the best. They can satisfy
+your need for companionship, but usually
+from a safe distance that doesn’t encroach
+on your personal space or limit your independence.
+Cats don’t care if you’re gone all
+day. They’re not needy, like dogs are. But
+cats will sometimes curl up in your lap,
+and as the endless hours of cat videos on
+the internet demonstrate, they can provide
+plenty of entertainment on demand.
+They’re also much easier to care for than
+dogs: cats clean themselves, they don’t
+need a lot of space, and they never need to
+be walked or groomed. Plus, dogs can be
+dangerous—like seriously, fatally dangerous.
+Cats might scratch you to remind you
+who’s boss (hint: it’s them), but no one’s
+ever been killed by their pet cat. Dogs, on
+the other hand, are these big, needy, slobbery,
+smelly buffoons that can’t tell when
+their human just needs some space.
+Adapted from: Andrew Paxton and Monique Irish, "OPINION: Dogs vs. Cats: Which Is Better?"
+The Daily Wildcat (University of Arizona), Feb 4, 2018,
+http://www.wildcat.arizona.edu/article/2018/02/o-cats-dogs
+3. Should monuments to Confederate soldiers, officers, and politicians be removed?
+USA Today Editorial Board: Local communities
+and states should decide for
+themselves whether to remove Confederate
+monuments on a case-by-case basis,
+and they should do it through thoughtful
+political processes, not by mob rule. Communities
+will need to balance how much
+these symbols mean to some people
+against how hurtful they are to others.
+Maria Svart: Confederate monuments
+must be removed immediately, and if governments
+won’t do it, then activists should
+pull down the statues themselves. These
+monuments are grotesque reminders that
+white supremacist ideology remains an active
+threat in the United States today.
+That’s not only because they represent
+people who fought to preserve slavery, but
+Rule 48: Work from common ground 253
+They should also consider alternatives to
+removing the statue, such as adding more
+context to the monument to help people
+better understand the Civil War.
+also because most of them were erected
+during two twentieth-century waves of
+backlash against the expansion of black
+freedoms.
+Adapted from: USA Today Editorial Board, "On Confederate Monuments, Be Deliberate,"
+USA Today, Aug 17, 2017, https://usat.ly/2x8Tfkq;
+Maria Svart, "Confederate Monuments Must Go Immediately," USA Today,
+Aug 17, 2017, https://usat.ly/2wkJXEE
+4. Is the policing of drug possession and drug dealing in the United States racially biased?
+Gloria Browne-Marshall: Absolutely.
+Opioids like heroin have become a major
+problem in many communities. People are
+burglarizing homes to support their addiction,
+and possession of heroin is a
+crime, but in white, wealthy communities,
+people say that heroin addicts should get
+counseling, not arrested. Meanwhile, look
+at the disparities in the way we deal with
+powder cocaine versus crack cocaine,
+where we essentially have different laws
+for different people. That’s biased.
+Harry Stern: I started police work during
+the late 1980s, during the crack wars. And
+I can tell you that what brought police officers
+into black neighborhoods to arrest
+crack dealers was the violence. We were
+there, rather than somewhere else, because
+the crack cocaine trade generated so much
+violence. We’re not going after the guy
+who’s smoking weed and watching cartoons
+in his apartment because he’s not a
+threat to public safety. That’s the difference,
+and it’s not about race. It’s about
+protecting the public.
+Adapted from: "Policing Is Racially Biased," Intelligence2 Debates, Jan 11, 2017,
+https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/policing-racially-biased
+5. Is solar geoengineering worth considering?
+David Keith: Solar geoengineering is a
+hypothetical response to climate change
+that involves cooling the planet by reflecting
+a small fraction of incoming sunlight
+back into space—in other words, creating
+a giant sunshade for the planet. It sounds
+crazy at first, and it’s not a panacea, but
+climate models suggest that if it were used
+judiciously alongside reductions in greenhouse
+gas emissions, solar geoengineering
+ETC Group: Geoengineering is nothing
+more than a false solution to the climate
+crisis—a dangerous distraction from the
+urgent work of eliminating fossil fuels and
+cutting greenhouse gas emissions. It involves
+tinkering with complex systems at a
+massive scale, bringing with them massive
+risks and the potential for unexpected or
+undesirable side effects. For instance, it
+could disrupt precipitation patterns,
+254 Rule 48: Work from common ground
+Adapted from: David Keith, The Case for Climate Engineering (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013); ETC Group,
+Heinrich Böll Foundation, and Biofuelwatch, The Big Bad Fix: The Case against Geoengineering (n.p.: ETC
+Group, 2017), https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/bigbadfix.pdf
+6. Is free speech under threat on college campuses?
+Shaun Harper: Here’s what’s happening.
+Some person gets invited to speak on a
+campus. Some students at the campus
+think that the person’s views are so abhorrent
+that they shouldn’t be given a platform
+at the campus, and they voice that
+opinion. That’s not threatening free speech.
+It is free speech! It’s their right to be able
+to say, "I don’t want this person speaking
+at my campus." I get invited to speak at
+colleges all the time, and if some students
+opposed my coming to their college, I
+would defend their right to say so.
+John McWhorter: You’re missing the
+point! When students protest a speaker,
+and especially when they keep the speaker
+from actually speaking, they’re suppressing
+the range of things that can be said on
+their campus. Twenty years ago, students
+would have gone to hear the person (or
+not), found out what they thought, gone
+back to their dorms to do their work, and
+that would have been the end of it. So now
+there are more things that you can’t say on
+college campuses than there used to be.
+That limits free speech.
+Adapted from: "Free Speech Is Threatened on Campus," Intelligence2 Debates, Mar 1, 2016,
+https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/free-speech-threatened-campus
+could significantly reduce global climate
+risk, and it could do so quickly. Thus, while
+we still need lots more research to be sure,
+there’s good reason to think that solar
+geoengineering could help a lot of people—
+including the world’s poorest people,
+who are the most vulnerable to climate
+change. And more than that, it could protect
+a lot of ecosystems that are vulnerable
+to climate change, too. We still need to cut
+emissions, but we’re so far behind the
+curve in doing so that we ought to investigate
+whether solar geoengineering can
+help buy us some time so that we can wean
+ourselves off of fossil fuels.
+adversely affecting people who are already
+highly vulnerable to climate change. It
+also threatens peace and security as countries
+fight for control over the global thermostat—
+and, indeed, geoengineering
+itself could be weaponized. Furthermore,
+polluters are already pushing for more research
+in geoengineering because they can
+use it as an excuse to continue emitting
+greenhouse gases. We need international
+governance to limit research into geoengineering
+and ensure that irresponsible research
+and development does not derail
+efforts to truly solve the problem by eliminating
+our greenhouse gas emissions.
+Rule 48: Work from common ground 255
+7. Should the United States abolish the death penalty?
+Robert Blecker: We say that the punishment
+should fit the crime. For some people—
+the worst of the worst, who have
+done truly terrible things—that means
+death: some people deserve to die for their
+crimes. When society doesn’t execute
+them, when it simply locks them up in
+prison instead, justice is not served. Prisons,
+these days, are not about punishment.
+There is no one in a prison whose job is to
+ensure that people are punished. Instead,
+their job is to keep everyone safe—including
+the convicts inside the prison! And in
+doing that, they end up making life comfortable
+for people who don’t deserve it.
+Diann Rust-Tierney: The goal of the
+criminal justice system is to protect the
+public. The death penalty does not do that.
+For one thing, it doesn’t deter crime. Police
+chiefs will tell you that. Murderers
+aren’t thinking about the consequences of
+their actions, so the threat of execution
+won’t stop them. And what’s more, the
+death penalty is administered very unevenly—
+which means unfairly—across
+the country. Race, including the race of
+the perpetrator and the victim, has a huge
+influence on whether someone gets the
+death penalty. That’s unacceptable. The
+death penalty needs to be abolished.
+Adapted from: "Abolish the Death Penalty," Intelligence2 Debates, Apr 15, 2015,
+https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/abolish-death-penalty
+8. Should very young children get to watch television or use tablets?
+Leah Rumack: I let my two-year-old
+watch TV. In fact, I’ve done it since he was
+tiny, and I got him his own tablet before
+he was one and a half. I know the medical
+advice is not to let kids have any screen
+time until they’re two, but I think it’s okay
+in moderation. I don’t think a little bit of
+screen time is going to stunt his development.
+And after a busy day packed full of
+playdates, puzzles, activities, and walks in
+the park, I’d say my kid deserves a chance
+to kick back and relax. Plus, I can’t entertain
+him fourteen hours a day. I need
+something to occupy him while I do things
+like cook dinner. Besides, I have to admit
+that I like curling up on the couch at the
+end of the day with my husband and my
+son, all three of us engrossed in our separate
+screens together.
+Stacey Stein: I’m not a technophobe or
+anything, but I didn’t let my son watch any
+television or videos before the age of two,
+and even at age five, he has yet to use an
+iPhone or iPad. The American Academy
+of Pediatrics recommends against giving
+kids any screen time before the age of two,
+and when they make a recommendation,
+I’m going to listen. If there’s even a little
+bit of evidence that links screen time to
+shorter attention spans or slower language
+development, why take chances with your
+kids? Why not turn to more meaningful
+activities to occupy them, like blocks or
+crayons or music? Or just good old conversation
+for that matter? I hate seeing
+families at restaurants with kids staring,
+zombie-like, at screens instead of talking
+to their parents.
+Adapted from: Leah Rumack and Stacey Stein, "The Debate: Should You Let Your Toddler Watch TV?"
+Today’s Parent, Jan 4, 2013, https://www.todaysparent.com/family/parenting/toddler-watch-tv/
+256 Rule 48: Work from common ground
+10. Does God exist?
+9. Should the United States treat healthcare as a right or a privilege?
+Scot Conway: Thinking of healthcare as a
+right creates serious problems. First of all,
+most rights are rights to do something
+without interference from others. The
+right to life is the right not to be killed,
+but not necessarily the right to have whatever
+I need to survive. The right to free
+speech is the right to say what I want
+without punishment, but not the right to
+have a platform to broadcast my opinions.
+Of course, this has limits. I can’t shout
+"Fire!" in a crowded theater, because that
+threatens the other theater patrons’ right
+to life. Getting back to healthcare: a right
+to healthcare wouldn’t be a right to do
+something without interference. It would
+be a right to have something, and that
+brings up the question of who would provide
+you with healthcare and who would
+pay for it. If I had a right to healthcare,
+then doctors would be forced to provide it
+to me, even if they weren’t compensated.
+That’s just wrong. And I’d even be entitled
+to medical treatment for injuries or illnesses
+that I brought on myself through
+reckless behavior, no matter how expensive
+the treatment.
+Robert Pfaff: Healthcare is right—or, at
+least, it should be. We all have a right to
+life. But how can you have a right to life
+without access to healthcare? Or what
+about a right to equal opportunities? Besides,
+the government provides other
+things as a right: public education is a
+great example. Public libraries, too. How
+can healthcare be less important than education?
+And if someone were to argue that
+the government provides education because
+we need an educated workforce,
+well, don’t we need a healthy workforce,
+too? Furthermore, the economic and medical
+case for universal healthcare is overwhelming.
+For starters, when people aren’t
+covered by health insurance, they end up
+going to the emergency room for healthcare,
+which is way more expensive, and
+then the costs often get passed on to everyone
+else anyway. And when you look at
+other developed countries, you’ll find that
+they all treat health care as a right and that
+their health care systems deliver better
+health outcomes, on average, all for a fraction
+of the amount that Americans pay for
+healthcare.
+Adapted from: "Is Health Care a Privilege or a Right?" Quora, n.d.,
+https://www.quora.com/Is-health-care-a-privilege-or-a-right
+William Lane Craig: I think we have better
+reason to affirm that God exists than to
+say that God does not exist. My basic reason
+for this is very simple: I don’t think
+there are any good arguments for atheism,
+whereas I think there are good arguments
+for theism. Now, atheists have tried for
+Christopher Hitchens: Most people have
+come to accept that we humans were not
+designed, but rather evolved through natural
+selection over vast stretches of time. I
+think Dr. Craig would accept that view, and
+I applaud his willingness to engage with
+biology and physics on matters like these.
+Rule 48: Work from common ground 257
+centuries to prove that God doesn’t exist,
+but they have yet to come up with a convincing
+argument. There are many powerful
+arguments for theism, however. First,
+consider the cosmological argument,
+which posits that we need God to explain
+why the universe exists at all. Atheists have
+to say that the universe started with the
+Big Bang, but that the Big Bang itself was
+uncaused. They must say that the universe
+came from nothing and was caused by
+nothing. But that’s impossible. Nothing
+comes from nothing. Thus, there must have
+been a cause, and that cause is God. Second,
+consider the teleological argument,
+sometimes called the argument from design.
+The universe appears so finely tuned
+to make life possible that it would be absolutely
+incredible if these were just a coincidence.
+Theists can explain this fine-tuning.
+Atheists can’t. Third, consider the moral
+argument. If God does not exist, then morality
+is not and cannot be objective. But
+we all know, deep down, that some behaviors
+are objectively morally wrong and
+others morally right. Fourth, there is ample
+evidence that Jesus Christ rose from the
+dead, based on the testimony of his followers
+as recorded in the Bible. Atheism, of
+course, cannot explain Jesus rising from
+the dead. Finally, people can directly experience
+God. People can experience God
+speaking to them. So, you see, we have
+conclusive reason to believe in God, but no
+good reasons for atheism.
+Now, it is open to people of faith to claim
+that this was part of God’s design, and I
+can’t refute that argument because it’s immune
+to evidence one way or the other. It’s
+an article of faith. But it’s rather selfcentered,
+even arrogant, to think that those
+billions of years of evolution and the countless
+extinctions of other species were just a
+roundabout way of producing humans.
+On to the arguments about God’s existence,
+though. Dr. Craig contends that
+atheists can’t prove that God doesn’t exist. I
+think that misrepresents the atheist position.
+Speaking as an atheist, our position is
+and has always been that there’s no convincing
+reason to believe in God, including
+the reasons offered by Dr. Craig. Extraordinary
+claims require extraordinary evidence.
+Now, the claims that God exists and cares
+about us are surely extraordinary claims, but
+I don’t think we have anything like the extraordinary
+evidence needed to justify them.
+So why do people find them convincing?
+Because they’re told, "Seek and ye shall
+find," and off they go, seeking evidence to
+confirm what they have been taught or
+what they want to believe. We humans are
+very good at that, but it doesn’t necessarily
+get us to the truth. Consider Dr. Craig’s argument
+about the Big Bang. I would say
+that we are still so early in our understanding
+of the Big Bang that we simply must
+suspend judgment about what caused it. So,
+we are not entitled to say that there could be
+no cause but God, even if we are tempted to
+say so. And the other arguments for God’s
+existence aren’t much better.
+Adapted from: "Does God Exist? William Lane Craig vs. Christopher Hitchens," YouTube, Sep 28, 2014,
+https://youtu.be/0tYm41hb48o
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 459.
+258 Rule 49: At least be civil
+Need more practice? Find a debate that interests you on social media,
+debate Web sites like debate.org, or USA Today’s editorial page (which
+often features opposing views alongside their editorials). Try to identify
+points of common ground between pairs of people in those debates. For a
+more personal approach, sit down with friends or family, identify a topic on
+which you strongly disagree and then look for common ground.
+At least be civil
+Don’t deride or attack other debaters. This is a mistake that even has its
+own name: the ad hominem ("to the man") fallacy (see Appendix I). You
+don’t have to like the people you are debating with, let alone agree with
+them. You may have trouble even taking them seriously—and likely they
+will return the (dis)favor. You can still have some courtesy. So can they. In
+a way, such occasions are what civility is for.
+Focus on their arguments. Describe your opponents’ position in fair
+ways. Avoid loaded language: build on substance, as Rule 5 puts it, not
+overtone. Make it clear that you know that they have premises worth
+considering, even if you wholly reject their conclusions or their premises in
+the end.
+NO:
+My opponent’s argument reeks of centuries of illiberal ideas,
+going all the way back to Plato’s self-serving rationalization
+for the dictatorship of the elite. He ought to be ashamed to
+bring such discredited propaganda into public discussion
+today . . .
+YES:
+My opponent’s argument stands in a long tradition of conservative
+political thinking, going all the way back to the Athenian
+philosopher Plato’s mistrust of democracy. Plato had his
+reasons, for sure. That he was right, however, or that his reasons
+apply today, is quite another matter . . .
+Think of it as a minimalist kind of ethics. For better or worse, everyone
+with whom you debate is still part of the same society, someone with whom
+you have to live at the end of the day, and moreover is probably not an
+absolute scoundrel or crazy either. We debate with real people, not with Rule 49
+Rule 50: Leave them thinking when you go 259
+some stuffed-shirt caricatures. We’re all trying to make sense of a world
+that is complex and constantly in flux, not comprehended fully by any of
+us. And we are all trying, by our arguments among other means, to improve
+things a little bit, at least as we see it. Even the ranters and the most
+closed-minded, however backwards they appear to us. Civility honors
+them at least for that.
+And of course, likewise, we wish to be treated civilly ourselves, even by
+those who disagree with us and might even place us, shockingly enough,
+among the ranters or the closed-minded. From a purely practical point of
+view, then, civility gives us some leverage, as Rule 46 puts it. When we are
+civil to others, we have a clearer right to ask the same civility back. Certainly
+you are more apt to get civility back if you offer it than if you don’t!
+Sometimes it is hard to even think straight when we feel deliberately
+misrepresented and put down. In that case, you aren’t likely to feel too
+generous to the other side when your turn comes. Just remember that your
+opponents feel the same way. Civility appeals to everyone’s better selves.
+Besides, maybe—just maybe—your opponents aren’t totally wrong. In
+an uncertain and complex world, there is more than one way to "put it all
+together," as represented by the many people who do put it all together in
+ways very different from ourselves. We may have a few things to learn from
+them, or at least it would be polite to act as though we do. Civility in this
+case is partly a kind of honest humility.
+You don’t feel like others are being very civil right now? Me neither.
+We may hope for civility back from others, but we may not get it. Again,
+though, it is the job of civil debaters to get out in front regardless. Take the
+lead. Do it first. Maybe your generosity will be infectious, a model to others
+to shift their ways of debating too. In any case, you thereby uplift civility
+itself, in the larger society, even if it might have to follow a wider track to
+come back to you again.
+Leave them thinking when you go
+Even the best argument in the world is only part of a debate—maybe quite
+a small part. Debates stay with us because they have many related aspects,
+draw on many facts and claims that may be uncertain or controversial or
+conflicting themselves, and allow a variety of conclusions. Philosophers
+have been debating about happiness, for example, for a few thousand years.
+Certainly we have made progress, but no argument has simply "won," nor,
+surely, should it.
+Rule 50
+260 Rule 50: Leave them thinking when you go
+Single arguments may make a difference, then, but rarely will one argument
+make all the difference, even if it is completely correct. Single arguments
+or arguers may address one aspect of a debate, revise and improve
+certain other arguments, take up other aspects or new ideas . . . all the time
+changing as they go. But the debate itself shifts slowly, usually, like a great
+ship turning in the sea.
+The upshot is that public debate takes patience. The great ship is going
+to turn slowly no matter how energetically or persuasively we hold forth on
+deck. And because it is whole debates that shift, carrying with them a
+jumble of specific arguments on all sides, people may not change their
+minds on the biggest themes even when they acknowledge unanswered
+arguments against some parts of their views. The world may still seem to
+make more sense the old way. And they are not being irrational, any more
+than you or I are being irrational in holding onto our own favorite views of
+things even when (to be honest) there may be good arguments against
+parts of them also. Change not only takes time, it usually takes a more attractive
+overall view of things too.
+No matter how good your argument is, then, do not expect most people
+to rise as one to agree with you the moment you finish your case. Instead,
+just ask for their open-minded consideration. Expect them to be
+willing to consider changing. And, again, you will be most successful at this
+if you are visibly willing to consider changing yourself. Pushing harder may
+just bring up those unpleasant stereotypes of "argument" that drive people
+further into rigid thinking.
+Debate is certainly not the only, or even always the best way of taking
+part in public discourse. There will be times when passionate appeals are
+more to the point, perhaps, or personal testimony, or sermons. Moreover,
+there may be times when we are sorely tempted to make bad arguments
+ourselves: knowingly using loaded language, dubious sources, and all the
+rest, especially when it seems like the other side stoops that low routinely.
+It’s tempting, yes. But let me close with two cautions.
+One: in the long run, making bad arguments devalues good arguments—
+careful thinking—in general. This cannot be good for our society.
+Unfortunately, at times, it might be your side that has to carry the burden
+of clarity and thoughtfulness, if the other side truly is not. Still, in the long
+run, standing up for good arguments is the only truly winning way.
+Second, honestly, if the other side really does routinely stoop that low,
+then they are also probably much better at it: much better practiced, much
+better funded, and with many fewer remaining compunctions. It’s not a
+winning game for you. Play instead to your strength—doing argument
+proud, now that you have this book under your belt—which happens to be
+the right thing to do as well.
+Rule 50: Leave them thinking when you go 261
+Raise good arguments, then, as openly and thoughtfully as you can.
+Offer something positive. Hear the other side out, and respond and connect
+as best you can. But recognize that the debate will continue. Life is
+short, the debate is long. There are also many worthwhile and constructive
+things to do besides debate, both in and out of public discourse. At some
+point you will need to step away. Just leave them thinking when you go!
+Exercise Set 10.5: Posing good questions
+Objective: To practice constructive ways of leaving a debate.
+Instructions: For each topic below, consider two or three good questions
+that you could pose as constructive contributions to the ongoing debate,
+even as you yourself might step out of it.
+Tips for success: To think of yourself as leaving a debate gives you a different
+perspective from those who are still in it. You know you are not
+going to settle it, so you can just try to help it along. If you’ve been thoughtful
+about it along the way, maybe some basic puzzles or intriguing complexities
+have also emerged that you can share in parting. Or maybe you
+have made some experiments with it or had some experiences in your own
+life that others would find helpful to know about. These are the sorts of
+things that you want to leave them with as you go.
+Be careful not to make your questions a disguised way of promoting
+your own specific views—as if they are just one more parting shot from
+you. Try for something more open-ended. It’s not an occasion for one
+more desperate plea for your position. Take it that your position is already
+out there, whether in your own words or someone else’s. What can you
+offer to the debate now that will leave the participants who remain grateful
+to you for advancing everyone’s thinking? You don’t want people to just
+think, "Well, there she goes again," and happy to bid you goodbye. What
+would it take for even your opponents to be sorry to see you go?
+You can make your questions "big" questions. At least, not picayune or
+fussy questions—other people can raise or deal with those. That’s not how
+you want to be remembered. Be a bit more, well, philosophical! After all,
+you are (possibly?) in a philosophy class!
+Review the rules in this book. Maybe some analogies are in play that
+Rule 12 will nudge you to rethink. Maybe alternatives have not really been
+fully explored (Rule 33). It’s even possible that too much is being made of
+a few or unrepresentative examples (Rules 7 and 8), or counterexamples
+262 Rule 50: Leave them thinking when you go
+1. How to be happy
+2. Recreational drugs
+3. Genetic editing of human embryos for medical purposes
+4. Marriage
+have not been thoroughly enough considered (Rule 11), or some causal
+complexities have been overlooked (Rule 21). These and other rules will give
+you some directions for your questioning. This is the end of the main set of
+rules, after all—it’s a good time to look back through them all anyway!
+Sample
+Topic: Human free will
+One question that’s come up as I think about my own free will is about the free will of
+other creatures, like animals. Don’t they make choices too? And how about artificial
+intelligence? I wonder if we mightn’t think more clearly about free will if we look a
+little beyond humans too.
+Meanwhile, a useful practical question might be how we can just make ourselves a
+bit more free. Maybe it’s not so purely black and white. It feels to many people that there
+is increasing manipulation in our everyday lives—by loaded language and images in
+political ads, just for one example. So wouldn’t more critical dialogue help—making us
+not just better citizens but literally freer too? And if so, what does that mean about how
+we understand free will in the first place?
+A lot of the philosophical debate about free will tends to be all or nothing: either we have it or
+we don’t. The (very good) questions posed here suggest more complex possibilities. We can be
+(and make ourselves) more or less free, and so can others.
+Notice that this response doesn’t take a "parting shot" to try to sneak in one last argument.
+It doesn’t, for instance, say something like, "One final question that I’ve pondered is what artificial
+intelligence could teach us about free will. I bet if you do start to think about artificial
+intelligence and free will, you’ll come around to my view that we don’t actually have free will
+at all." That sort of closing question just shuts down debate rather than opening it up. By
+contrast, the response above doesn’t even make it clear exactly what the speaker’s view on free
+will is. Even if we could make some educated guesses based on the kinds of open-ended questions
+it’s asking, it doesn’t presuppose that the questions it raises will confirm that position. It
+really does just pose some helpful and intriguing questions.
+Rule 50: Leave them thinking when you go 263
+5. National security
+6. Life after death
+7. Evolution and creationism
+8. The value of a college education.
+9. What is true success?
+For exercise 10, choose a topic of interest to you.
+Need more practice? Look back at the exercises in the other exercise sets
+in Chapter X. Do the same thing for those topics that you did for the ones
+given in this exercise set. For even more practice, work through the topics
+discussed in the exercise sets for Chapters VII, VIII, and IX.
+Critical thinking activity: In-class debates
+For an in-class activity that gives you practice in applying all of the rules in this book, see the
+"In-class debates" assignment sheet (p. 545) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Extended in-class group debates
+For an extended in-class activity that gives you practice in applying all of the rules in this
+book, see the "Extended in-class group debates" assignment sheet (p. 547) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Best of enemies
+For an extended in-class activity that gives you practice in applying all the rules in this book,
+and especially those in Chapter X, see the "Best of enemies" assignment sheet (p. 549) in
+Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Constructive debate with outside partners
+For an extended activity with in-class and out-of-class components that gives you practice
+in applying all the rules in this book, and especially those in Chapter X, see the "Constructive
+debate with outside partners" assignment sheet (p. 550) in Part 3.
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 462.
+264
+Fallacies are misleading types of arguments. Many of them are so tempting, and therefore so common, that they even have their own names. This may make them seem like a separate and new topic. Actually, though, to call something a fallacy is usually just another way of saying that it violates one of the rules for good arguments. The fallacy of "false cause," for example, is a questionable conclusion about causes, and you can look to Chapter V for explanation.
+Here is a short list and explanation of some of the classical fallacies, including their Latin names when frequently used.
+ad hominem (literally, "to the man"): attacking the person of a source rather than his or her qualifications or reliability or the actual argument he or she makes. You know from Chapter IV that supposed authorities may be disqualified if they are not informed, impartial, or largely in agreement. But other sorts of attacks on supposed authorities are typically not legitimate.
+It’s no surprise that Carl Sagan argued for life on Mars—after all, he was a well-known atheist. I don’t believe it for a minute.
+Although Sagan did take part in the public discussion about religion and science, there is no reason to think that his views about religion colored his scientific judgment about Martian life. Look to the argument, not "the man."
+ad ignorantiam (appeal to ignorance): arguing that a claim is true just because it has not been shown to be false. A classic example is this statement by Senator Joseph McCarthy when he was asked for evidence to back up his accusation that a certain person was a Communist:
+I do not have much information on this except the general statement of the agency that there is nothing in the files to disprove his Communist connections.
+Of course, apparently there was nothing to prove it, either.
+Appendix I
+Some Common Fallacies
+Appendix I: Some Common Fallacies 265
+ad misericordiam (appeal to pity): appealing to pity as an argument for
+special treatment.
+I know I flunked every exam, but if I don’t pass this course, I’ll
+have to retake it in summer school. You have to let me pass!
+Pity is sometimes a good reason to help, but it is certainly inappropriate
+when objective evaluation is called for.
+ad populum: appealing to the emotions of a crowd; also, appealing to a
+person to go along with the crowd ("Everyone’s doing it!"). Arguments ad
+populum are good examples of bad arguments from authority. No reasons
+are offered to show that "everybody" is any kind of knowledgeable or reliable
+source.
+affirming the consequent: a deductive mistake of the form
+If p then q.
+q.
+Therefore, p.
+Remember that in the statement "if p then q," p is called the "antecedent"
+and q the "consequent." The second premise of modus ponens—a valid
+form—affirms (asserts) the antecedent, p (go back to Rule 22 and check).
+Affirming the consequent (q), though, yields quite a different—and invalid—
+form. A true conclusion is not guaranteed even if the premises are true. For
+example:
+When the roads are icy, the mail is late.
+The mail is late.
+Therefore, the roads are icy.
+Although the mail would be late if the roads were icy, it also may be late
+for other reasons too. This argument overlooks alternatives.
+begging the question: implicitly using your conclusion as a premise.
+God exists because it says so in the Bible, which I know is true
+because God wrote it, after all!
+To put this argument in premise-and-conclusion form, you’d have to write:
+The Bible is true, because God wrote it.
+The Bible says that God exists.
+Therefore, God exists.
+266 Appendix I: Some Common Fallacies
+To defend the claim that the Bible is true, the arguer claims that God
+wrote it. But, obviously, if God wrote the Bible, then God exists. Thus the
+argument assumes just what it is trying to prove.
+circular argument: same as begging the question.
+You can count on WARP News for the facts, because the station’s
+motto is "we just give you the facts," so that must be a
+fact too!
+Real-life circular arguments often follow a bigger circle, but they all eventually
+end up starting in the very place they want to end.
+complex question: posing a question in such a way that people cannot
+agree or disagree with you without committing themselves to some other
+claim you wish to promote. A simple example: "Are you still as self-centered
+as you used to be?" Answering either "yes" or "no" commits you to
+agreeing that you used to be self-centered. A more subtle example: "Will
+you follow your conscience instead of your pocketbook and donate to the
+cause?" Saying "no," regardless of their real reasons for not donating, makes
+people feel guilty. Saying "yes," regardless of their real reasons for donating,
+makes them noble. If you want a donation, just ask for it.
+denying the antecedent: a deductive mistake of the form
+If p then q.
+Not-p.
+Therefore, not-q.
+Remember that, in the statement "If p then q," p is called the "antecedent"
+and q the "consequent." The second premise of a modus tollens—a valid
+form—denies the consequent, q (go back to Rule 23 and check). Denying
+the antecedent (p), though, yields quite a different—and invalid—form.
+A true conclusion is not guaranteed even if the premises are true. For
+example:
+When the roads are icy, the mail is late.
+The roads are not icy.
+Therefore, the mail is not late.
+Although the mail would be late if the roads were icy, it may be late for
+other reasons too. This argument overlooks alternatives.
+Appendix I: Some Common Fallacies 267
+equivocation: sliding from one meaning of a term to another in the middle
+of an argument.
+Women and men are physically and emotionally different.
+The sexes are not "equal," then, and therefore the law should
+not pretend that we are.
+Between premise and conclusion this argument shifts the meaning of the
+term "equal." The sexes are not physically and emotionally "equal" in the
+sense in which "equal" means simply "identical." Equality before the law,
+however, does not mean "physically and emotionally identical" but "entitled
+to the same rights and opportunities." Rephrased with the two different
+senses of "equal" made clear, the argument goes:
+Women and men are not physically and emotionally identical.
+Therefore, women and men are not entitled to the same
+rights and opportunities.
+Once the equivocation is removed, it is clear that the argument’s conclusion
+is neither supported by nor even related to the premise. No reason is
+offered to show that physical and emotional differences imply different
+rights and opportunities.
+false cause: generic term for any questionable conclusion about cause and
+effect. To figure out specifically why the conclusion is (said to be) questionable,
+go back to Chapter V.
+false dilemma: reducing the options you consider to just two, often diametrically
+opposed to each other and unfair to the people against whom
+the dilemma is posed. For example, "America: Love It or Leave It." A more
+subtle example from a student paper: "Since the universe could not have
+been created out of nothingness, it must have been created by an intelligent
+life force. . . ." Well, maybe, but is creation by an intelligent life force
+the only other possibility? This argument overlooks alternatives.
+Ethical arguments seem especially prone to false dilemmas. Either the
+fetus is a human being with all the rights you and I have, we say, or else it
+is a lump of tissue with no moral significance at all. Either every use of animal
+products is wrong, or all of the current uses are acceptable. In fact,
+other possibilities usually exist. Try to increase the number of options you
+consider, not narrow them!
+loaded language: language that primarily plays on the emotions. It does
+not make an argument at all, in truth, but is only a form of manipulation.
+See Rule 5.
+268 Appendix I: Some Common Fallacies
+mere redescription: Offering a premise that really only rephrases the conclusion,
+rather than offering a specific, independent reason for it. (Mere
+redescription is a form of begging the question, broadly speaking, but
+here the premise and the conclusion are not really distinguished enough
+for us to say that the premise really presupposes the conclusion. It’s more
+helpful to recognize mere redescription as a separate fallacy.)
+Leo: Marisol is a fine architect.
+Laila: Why do you say that?
+Leo: Marisol is a very capable designer of buildings.
+But being a fine architect is basically the same thing as being a very capable
+designer of buildings. Leo hasn’t really offered any specific evidence for his
+first claim, but only restated it. Actual evidence might be professional recognitions
+and well-regarded buildings that Marisol has designed.
+A classical satirical example of mere redescription occurs in Molière’s
+play The Imaginary Invalid. One of the stuffed-shirt doctors explains why
+a certain medicine helps people to sleep by saying that it has a "dormitive
+principle." This sounds very helpful and scientific until you realize that it
+simply says that the medicine puts people to sleep—nothing about how or
+why. It looks like an explanation but in fact it explains nothing, only repeats
+itself in Latin. Ig-Bay eal-Day.
+non sequitur: drawing a conclusion that "does not follow," that is, a conclusion
+that is not a reasonable inference from, or even related to, the evidence.
+This is a very general term for a bad argument. Try to figure out specifically
+what is supposed to be wrong with it.
+overgeneralizing: generalizing from too few examples. Just because your
+student friends are all athletes or business majors or vegetarians, it doesn’t
+follow that all of your fellow students are the same (remember Rules 7 and
+8). You can’t generalize even from a large sample unless it is demonstrably
+representative. Take care!
+overlooking alternatives: forgetting that things may happen for a variety
+of reasons, not just one. For example, Rule 19 pointed out that just because
+events E1 and E2 may correlate, it does not follow that E1 causes E2. E2
+could cause E1; something else could cause both E1 and E2; E1 may cause
+E2 and E2 may cause E1; or E1 and E2 might not even be related. False
+dilemma is another example: there are usually many more options than two.
+Appendix I: Some Common Fallacies 269
+persuasive definition: defining a term in a way that may seem to be
+straightforward but in fact is loaded. For example, someone might define
+"evolution" as "the atheistic view that species develop as a result of mere
+chance events over a supposed period of billions of years." Persuasive definitions
+may be favorably loaded too: for example, someone might define a
+"conservative" as "a person with a realistic view of human limits."
+petitio principii: Latin for begging the question.
+poisoning the well: using loaded language to disparage an argument before
+even mentioning it.
+I’m confident you haven’t been taken in by those few holdouts
+who still haven’t outgrown the superstition that . . .
+More subtly:
+No sensitive person thinks that . . .
+post hoc, ergo propter hoc (literally, "after this, therefore because of this";
+sometimes just called the post hoc fallacy): assuming causation too readily
+on the basis of mere succession in time. Again a very general term for what
+Chapter V tries to make precise. Return to Chapter V and try to figure out
+if other causal explanations are more plausible.
+red herring: introducing an irrelevant or secondary subject and thereby
+diverting attention from the main subject. Usually the red herring is an
+issue about which people get heated quickly, so that no one notices how
+their attention is being diverted. In a discussion of the relative safety of
+different makes of cars, for instance, the issue of which cars are made in
+America is a red herring.
+straw person: A caricature of an opposing view, exaggerated from what
+anyone is likely to hold, so that it is easy to refute. See Rule 5.
+The "Resources" section on this book’s companion Web site has links to books and Web
+sites devoted specifically to fallacies.
+270 Appendix I: Exercises
+CHAPTER EXERCISES
+Exercise Set 11.1: Identifying fallacies (part 1)
+Objective: To give you practice identifying fallacies.
+Instructions: Most of the following arguments commit one of the fallacies
+from this list:
+• Ad hominem
+• Ad ignoratiam (appeal to ignorance)
+• Ad misericordiam (appeal to pity)
+• Ad populum
+• Begging the question/circular argument/petitio principii
+• Complex question
+• Equivocation
+• False cause
+• False dilemma
+Some of the arguments in this exercise set do not commit any fallacy. For
+arguments that you think commit one of these fallacies, state the name of
+the fallacy that the argument commits and explain how the argument
+commits that fallacy. For arguments that you think do not commit any of
+these fallacies, write "No fallacy." Note that some fallacies may appear
+more than once and others may not appear at all.
+Tips for success: Some of the fallacies below may be clear to you immediately.
+For others, you will probably need to look carefully at the descriptions
+and examples above to see which fallacy the argument commits. In
+some cases, there may even be more than one way to interpret the
+argument.
+The two fallacies that beginners usually find most confusing are the
+fallacy of equivocation and begging the question.
+To better understand the fallacy of equivocation, consider the fact that
+words or expressions sometimes have more than one meaning. Using the
+same word in two different ways, however, can lead to confusion. The old
+comedy History of the World Part I illustrates this nicely: the count de
+Appendix I: Exercises 271
+Monet warns the king of France that "the people are revolting," and the king
+replies, "You said it. They stink on ice." The count means that the people are
+rebelling; the king means that they are disgusting and, as a
+result, misunderstands the count’s warning.
+In the context of an argument, such confusion can make an obviously
+bad argument seem more persuasive. Consider this somewhat comedic
+example:
+A lukewarm soda is better than nothing. Nothing is better
+than cold ice cream on a sweltering day. Therefore, a lukewarm
+soda is better than cold ice cream on a sweltering day.
+You know very well that that isn’t true! But the argument seems to have a
+plausible and simple form: A is better than B. B is better than C. Therefore, A
+is better than C. For example, if the argument were Mercedes are better than
+Hondas. Hondas are better than Chevys. Therefore, Mercedes are better than
+Chevys, we’d be pretty sure that we could trust the conclusion (assuming
+the premises really are true). So hey, lukewarm soda, anyone?
+In the argument about cars, "Honda" refers to exactly the same thing
+in the same way in both premises. Logicians would call it the "middle
+term": it’s the B, in the form above, that reliably connects A and C. The
+problem in the argument about lukewarm soda, though, is that in this case
+the key middle term is "nothing," a very tricky term indeed. It does not
+refer to exactly the same thing in the same way in both premises. We can
+see this by rephrasing the argument in less ambiguous terms:
+A lukewarm soda is better than not having anything. There is
+no thing that is better than cold ice cream on a sweltering day.
+Therefore . . .
+. . . well, not much of anything. Once you clarify the different meanings of
+"nothing" in each premise, the argument no longer looks like a good argument,
+or even an argument at all. When an argument equivocates, substituting synonyms
+or rephrasing in this way should make it clear that one of the premises
+is false or irrelevant to the other and/or to the conclusion.
+Many examples of the fallacy of equivocation are a bit silly. That’s because
+the "serious" examples—the ones where you might be tempted to accept the
+argument, rather than just puzzled about exactly what’s wrong with it—are
+often harder to understand. For instance, consider the following argument,
+adapted from the philosopher John Stuart Mill:
+272 Appendix I: Exercises
+We ought to pursue whatever is desirable. Since all people
+desire happiness, happiness is clearly desirable. Therefore, we
+ought to pursue happiness.
+Mill’s critics point out that in the first sentence, desirable means "worthy of
+desire." In the second sentence, though, desirable means "able to be desired,"
+just as visible means "able to be seen." But when we replace desirable
+with those phrases, the last premise is clearly irrelevant to the conclusion
+that we ought to pursue happiness: since the first premise only claims we
+ought to pursue whatever is worthy of desire, the fact that happiness is able
+to be desired tells us nothing about whether we ought to pursue it. As you
+can see, this equivocation is a bit more subtle than the one about lukewarm
+soda. (It’s not all that subtle, though. Could someone as smart as Mill really
+have made such an elementary mistake? Or is there a more charitable
+way of interpreting his argument?)
+Here’s another example that we’ll leave to you to work out:
+Evolution is labeled a "theory" even by its strongest proponents.
+But "theory" really just means a vague speculation.
+Therefore, evolution is really just a vague speculation.
+What if this very familiar argument just possibly equivocates on the word
+"theory"?
+Moving on to the fallacy of begging the question: today people increasingly
+use the phrase "begs the question" to simply mean "raises the
+question," as in "The mayor’s speech begs the question of how the city is
+going to pay for all of those projects." When logicians say that an argument
+begs the question, however, they mean something quite different!
+Remember that an argument is supposed to convince you of something
+that you didn’t already believe. When an argument begs the question, it
+requires you to accept the conclusion before you can accept one of the
+premises. In the example about the Bible, given above, you have to accept
+that God exists before you can accept that God wrote the Bible. Thus, an
+argument based on the premise that God wrote the Bible can’t be a good
+argument for the claim that God exists. This is why begging the question is
+sometimes called circular reasoning: Like a road that takes you in a circle, an
+argument that begs the question might appear to take you somewhere new,
+but it doesn’t. The destination—that is, the conclusion—is not really different
+than the starting point—that is, the premises.
+Some people have the idea that any argument that makes a questionable
+assumption is begging the question. This is incorrect. In order to count
+as begging the question, the argument must assume the very conclusion
+Appendix I: Exercises 273
+that it is trying to prove. Otherwise, it’s just a regular argument with a
+questionable premise.
+Most of the other fallacies above are violations of or deviations from
+rules that you have seen earlier in this book. To figure out which fallacy a
+passage commits, check first to see if it is one of the types of arguments
+that we considered in Chapters II through VI. If so, check whether it violates
+any of the rules in that chapter. That will guide you in thinking about
+what kind of fallacy the argument commits.
+If you can’t identify the fallacy by considering the rules from a particular
+chapter, see if you can explain, in a general way, what (if anything!) is
+wrong with the argument. Then, look through the list of fallacies above
+and see which fallacy fits that general description.
+Explaining how an argument commits a particular fallacy involves explaining
+the definition of the fallacy and citing specific features of the argument
+that show that the argument fits that definition. Pay close attention
+to the sample exercise below to see how that’s done.
+Sample
+What’s there to talk about? There are twelve people in this room, and eleven of
+them think the defendant is guilty. It’s plain as day, and nobody but you even had
+to think twice about it. Come on. Admit it! He’s guilty!
+Adapted from: 12 Angry Men, directed by Sidney Lumet (Los Angeles: United Artists, 1957)
+Ad populum. An argument ad populum tries to get someone to "go along with the
+crowd" in deciding what to believe. The conclusion of this argument is that the defendant
+is guilty. The only reason offered for that conclusion, however, is that eleven out of
+twelve people in the room believe that it is true. No reason is given to think that those
+eleven people are right or know better than the one person who does not believe it. The
+speaker wants the listener to go along with everybody else in believing that the defendant
+is guilty.
+This response states which fallacy the argument commits, briefly defines that fallacy, and then
+explains, with reference to specific details of the argument, how the argument commits that
+fallacy. It does not simply say, "This argument commits the ad populum fallacy because it tries
+to convince someone that something is true by pointing out that everyone else believes it." Such
+a response simply repeats the definition of the fallacy, without giving any indication of how
+this argument fits that definition.
+274 Appendix I: Exercises
+1. The death penalty is wrong because it’s murder.
+Adapted from: "Capital Punishment and Warfare: Murder, or Justice," Beware the
+Darkness, Aug 20, 2010, http://bewarethedarkness.wordpress.com/2010/08/20/
+capital-punishment-murder
+2. You want people who have entered this country illegally to go
+back to their home countries. So tell me: Why do you hate
+immigrants?
+Adapted from: Jorge Ramos, "D. A. King Interview (August, 2013)," The Official Website of
+Jorge Ramos Álvaros, Aug 19, 2013, http://jorgeramos.com/
+en/d-a-king-interview-august-2013/
+3. Few pediatricians are trained to diagnose mental illness. Without
+that training, pediatricians can’t prescribe proper treatment for
+children with mental illness. This poses a huge problem for children
+with mental illness, because it means they can’t get access to
+vital medical care.
+Adapted from: Harold S. Koplewicz, letter to the editor, New York Times,
+Sep 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/opinion/l12drug.html
+4. You said that Hamas uses civilians as human shields in Palestine,
+but you didn’t offer any evidence to support your claim. Do you
+even have any evidence to offer? If you can’t prove it, it’s clearly
+not true.
+Adapted from: James Protheroe, Twitter post, Feb 17, 2019, 10:12 PM,
+https://twitter.com/prothero_james/status/1097348012395786240
+5. Atheists are hypocrites. Atheism is the view that there are no
+gods. But everyone, even the atheists themselves, have gods—
+things in their life that they elevate, worship, praise, and generally
+pour all of their emotional energy into. How can someone
+who has gods of his or her own say that there are no gods? You
+just can’t do it.
+Adapted from: "Atheists’ Stupid Statements #2," YouTube, Jan 26, 2011,
+http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mzxh1YuAVtc, accessed Apr 1, 2014
+Appendix I: Exercises 275
+6. The opponents of clean energy laws . . . are either fools or idiots.
+Think about it. Either they don’t mind our country being addicted
+to oil and dependent on oil-funded dictators or they think that
+some kind of global pandemic is going to wipe out at least 2.5
+billion people in the next few decades. The first option is foolish.
+The second is idiotic.
+Adapted from: Thomas L. Friedman, "What They Really Believe," New York Times,
+Nov 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/opinion/18friedman.html
+7. Everything that any person has ever done is caused by that person’s
+own desires and motivations. In other words, everything that
+a person does is done to satisfy the person’s own desires. Acting to
+satisfy one’s own desires is selfish. And as everybody knows, good
+people are not selfish—at least not all the time. Thus, at the end
+of the day, no one is really a good person.
+Adapted from: Joel Feinberg, "Psychological Egoism," in Reason and Responsibility,
+13th ed., edited by Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau (Belmont, CA:
+Wadsworth, 2007), 531
+8. If the United States had the same income distribution today as it
+did in the 1970s, the average American would be earning
+$120,000. The fact that the average American is now earning just
+$40,000 is Ronald Reagan’s fault. Before Reagan came into office,
+CEOs made 78 times as much as their minimum-wage workers.
+Today, they make almost 3,500 times as much!
+Adapted from: SemDem, "Obama v. Reagan," Daily Kos, Feb 7, 2014,
+http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/02/07/1275771/-
+Obama-v-Reagan-Fun-comparison-I-did-to-piss-off-awingnut-
+on-Reagan-s-B-day
+9. This whole business about President Trump colluding with Russia
+is just a politically motivated witch hunt. They say Trump was making
+deals with Russia and with Putin. Not only is this false—Trump
+had no deals with Russia—but it’s so obviously hypocritical. The
+haters are just using it as an excuse to attack the president. After all,
+Barack Obama made a deal with Iran, the biggest state sponsor of
+terrorism anywhere, and no one’s accusing him of collusion.
+Adapted from: Donald J. Trump, Twitter post, Feb 7, 2017, 7:11 AM,
+https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828939235499638784
+276 Appendix I: Exercises
+10. Women make up a large share of medical students. Many of these
+women will end up choosing to work part-time. Providing students
+with professional medical training is very expensive and it
+is not cost-effective to invest in someone who is going to end up
+working part-time. Medical schools should enroll fewer women
+to make room for men who will dedicate themselves to the medical
+profession on a full-time basis.
+Adapted from: Roger Alford, letter to the editor, The Times (London), Apr 5, 2016,
+https://www.thetimes.co.uk/past-six-days/2016-04-05/comment/
+locum-pay-and-the-staffing-crisis-in-the-nhs-vcppwclvg
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 466.
+Need more practice? Go to the companion Web site for this book. Click
+on the link for "Appendix I." You will find a list of Web sites that discuss
+fallacies and give examples, often drawn from sources like the ones used in
+this book. Read the examples given on those sites and write your own explanations
+for how they fit the definition for a particular fallacy.
+Exercise Set 11.2: Reinterpreting and revising fallacious
+arguments (part 1)
+Objective: To give you practice developing productive responses to fallacious
+arguments.
+Instructions: Review each of the arguments in Exercise Set 11.1. If you
+think that the argument commits a fallacy, then explain how you could
+reinterpret, revise, or rewrite the argument to avoid that fallacy, keeping as
+close to the original content and spirit of the argument as you can. If you
+think that an argument does not commit a fallacy, just write, "No fallacy."
+Tips for success: It is tempting to think that once an argument is diagnosed
+with a fallacy, the argument is hopeless. On this view, identifying a
+fallacy in someone else’s argument means that you don’t have to take the
+argument seriously anymore.
+Appendix I: Exercises 277
+A more constructive response to fallacious arguments is to recognize a
+fallacy as an opportunity to improve the argument. Sometimes this involves
+adding more premises or making explicit some important assumptions.
+Sometimes it involves toning down the rhetorical language in the
+argument to emphasize the legitimate point that the argument is making.
+Sometimes it means making a different argument that is nonetheless very
+close to the original argument. Just as the appropriate treatment for a medical
+condition depends on the diagnosis, so the appropriate treatment for
+a fallacious argument depends on the specific fallacy that the argument
+commits.
+Ad hominem arguments, for instance, are sometimes misguided ways of
+criticizing someone else’s claims. If you rebut someone’s argument by calling
+him or her a bigot, for instance, you’ve committed an ad hominem fallacy.
+But if his or her argument uses an unreliable premise that reflects
+some kind of bigotry, then it would be entirely appropriate to point out
+that the premise is false, perhaps because it rests on a false stereotype.
+Appeals to ignorance can sometimes be repaired by adding an additional
+premise. After all, the lack of evidence for a particular claim can be
+evidence that the claim is false, if there has been a serious attempt to look
+for evidence for that claim. Thus, adding a (true!) premise saying that there
+has been such an attempt can turn a fallacious appeal to ignorance into a
+reasonable argument. You might need to explain why a lack of evidence in
+this case counts as a good reason to think that the claim is false.
+A heartbreaking appeal to pity might just be a loaded way of arguing
+that a person’s hardship really does merit special treatment in this case.
+After all, hardship is sometimes a legitimate reason for special treatment.
+Focusing on the legitimate reasons that the hardship merits special treatment,
+rather than on the hardship itself, can therefore be an effective way
+to remedy a fallacious appeal to pity.
+Ad populum arguments invoke "the people" as an authority. In some
+cases, "the people" might very well be an authority on something. In those
+cases, the thing to do is to point out why it’s reasonable to believe what
+"everyone" is saying.
+Question-begging arguments often arise simply because the speaker
+doesn’t recognize that one of his or her premises assumes the truth of the
+conclusion. See if you can replace that premise with a similar but nonquestion-
+begging premise that leads to the same conclusion—perhaps
+with the addition of another premise or two.
+"Complex questions" work by suggesting that a certain assumption is
+true without offering evidence for it. Although some people may use
+278 Appendix I: Exercises
+complex questions as an intentional ruse, many complex questions arise
+simply because the speaker takes the assumption to be beyond doubt. In
+either case, the appropriate treatment is to ask for evidence or reasons for
+that assumption. This gives the speaker the chance to defend the assumption
+if he or she has good reasons to believe it.
+Equivocation is one of the few fallacies that can rarely be salvaged or
+reinterpreted in a more charitable way. Never say never, though. Consider
+John Stuart Mill’s argument for the desirability of happiness, which we
+discussed in the "Tips for success" for Exercise Set 11.1. Mill’s defenders
+interpret that argument as implicitly claiming that there is a special connection
+between the two senses of desirable—namely, that something’s
+being desired by everyone is evidence that it is worthy of desire. Thus, even
+though the argument seems to equivocate on desirable, perhaps it’s not as
+hopeless as it seems.
+When an argument appears to commit the fallacy of false cause, it may
+simply be that the argument’s author has failed to provide enough background
+information. With additional premises, the claim that one thing
+causes another might be more plausible. At any rate, the best response to a
+fallacy of false cause is to work sincerely toward finding the true cause(s)
+of the effect in question.
+This list of proposed "treatments" for various fallacies is not complete,
+of course. Again, different cases call for different responses.
+Admittedly, some arguments really are beyond hope. In such cases,
+nothing you can do can make a decent argument out of the fallacious one.
+If you think that one of the arguments in this exercise set is beyond repair
+in this way, say so and explain why. More generally, if you encounter a fallacy
+that’s truly beyond repair, don’t gloat about it. Instead, see if the person
+has other reasons to accept the conclusion. After all, it would be an appeal
+to ignorance to say, "Since your argument doesn’t work, your conclusion is
+false!"
+Appendix I: Exercises 279
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 469.
+Sample
+What’s there to talk about? There are twelve people in this room, and eleven of
+them think the defendant is guilty. It’s plain as day, and nobody but you even had
+to think twice about it. Come on. Admit it! He’s guilty!
+Adapted from: 12 Angry Men, directed by Sidney Lumet (Los Angeles: United Artist, 1957)
+This argument appears to commit the ad populum fallacy by appealing to the "crowd’s"
+beliefs to justify the conclusion. Given that the context for this argument is a jury’s
+deliberation, we might reinterpret the argument along these lines: "All twelve jurors
+heard and saw all of the same evidence in the courtroom. Eleven of us found that
+evidence extremely compelling. You don’t know any more than we do about the case, so
+if you disagree, either you’ve made some kind of mistake or we have. And it seems
+more likely to me that one of us has made a mistake than that eleven of us have. So I
+think it’s reasonable to believe that you’ve made some kind of mistake." The additional
+premises make it clear why the speaker takes the agreement of the other eleven jurors to
+be a good reason to believe that the twelfth juror is wrong.
+This response highlights the alleged fallacy and then offers a more charitable interpretation of
+the argument, according to which it does not commit a fallacy. Note that the reinterpreted
+argument is presented in a much less antagonistic way, which helps promote discussion
+rather than frustration—an issue we discuss in Chapter X. More importantly, the response
+uses specific details of the argument in its explanation, rather than relying on vague generalities
+about how to reinterpret or revise a specific kind of fallacy. This is important because
+not all instances of a particular fallacy are amenable to the same kind of reinterpretation. As
+in this case, reinterpreting an argument can involve stating important assumptions that
+went unstated in the original version of the argument. In this example, that means pointing
+out that all of the jurors have seen and heard the same evidence about the case. (For those who
+have seen 12 Angry Men, spelling the argument out this way also explains one way in
+which the argument goes wrong. The twelfth juror does have some additional evidence: because
+he owns a switchblade just like the defendant’s, he knows that the prosecution was
+wrong in claiming the knife was unusual. And as it turns out, the twelfth juror eventually
+convinces the other eleven that he’s right after all. The defendant is not guilty!)
+This way of thinking of the argument relates to a topic of discussion among philosophers
+who study epistemology, or the theory of knowledge: How, if at all, should we change our
+beliefs when we discover that other thoughtful people who have access to all of the same information
+disagree with us on a particular topic? So far, at least, philosophers can’t agree on
+the answer to that question.
+280 Appendix I: Exercises
+Need more practice? Working with a partner, have each partner write
+arguments
+that each commit one of the fallacies listed in this Appendix.
+Trade arguments and see how many you can reinterpret or revise to avoid
+committing a fallacy.
+Objective: To give you practice identifying the fallacies listed above.
+Instructions: Most of the following arguments commit one of the following
+fallacies:
+• Loaded language
+• Non sequitur
+• Overgeneralizing
+• Overlooking alternatives
+• Persuasive definition
+• Poisoning the well
+• Post hoc, ergo propter hoc
+• Red herring
+• Straw person
+Some of the arguments in this exercise set commit none of these fallacies.
+For arguments that commit one of these fallacies, state the name of the
+fallacy that the argument commits and explain how the argument commits
+that fallacy. For arguments that do not commit any of these fallacies,
+write "No fallacy." Note that some fallacies may appear more than once
+and others may not appear at all.
+Tips for success: As in Exercise Set 11.1, some of the fallacies in this
+exercise set may be clear to you immediately. For others, you will probably
+need to look carefully at the descriptions and examples above to see which
+fallacy the argument commits.
+You may have noticed that several of these fallacies are very closely
+related. For instance, "poisoning the well" often involves a specific way
+of using loaded language, and post hoc, ergo propter hoc is a specific way of
+Exercise Set 11.3: Identifying fallacies (part 2)
+Appendix I: Exercises 281
+Sample
+Look, some people were offended by what my client said. But now some people
+are insisting that he should apologize for his remarks. Listen, he’s not going to
+apologize, and he shouldn’t have to. If everybody apologized for everything, then
+all we would be doing is apologizing all day long.
+Adapted from: CNN State of the Union, Twitter post, Sep 4, 2016, 8:05 AM,
+https://twitter.com/cnnsotu/status/772420298859769856
+This argument commits the straw person fallacy. The speaker is addressing the claim
+that his client ought to apologize for making some specific offensive remarks. In
+rejecting that view, the speaker caricatures it as the view that "everybody" should
+apologize "for everything." That view is clearly ridiculous, but it’s not the view made by
+the people who are claiming that the speaker’s client ought to apologize for one specific
+thing.
+This response cites specific aspects of the argument to support the claim that the argument commits
+the straw person fallacy. This is much more effective than simply repeating the definition
+of the fallacy, since it makes it easy to see how this argument fits that definition.
+overlooking alternatives. It’s best to be as specific as possible in identifying
+fallacies. Thus, when you find an argument that commits the post hoc
+fallacy, say that it’s an instance of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, not just that it
+overlooks alternatives. This provides a more precise characterization of the
+argument’s flaw.
+More generally, many fallacious arguments include loaded language.
+There are often deeper problems with the argument, though. Thus, for
+many of these passages, you’ll need to think carefully about which of several
+possible answers best captures the most serious problem with the
+argument.
+282 Appendix I: Exercises
+1. Usually when I go to see the Cubs play baseball, I wear the jersey
+for my favorite player, Kris Bryant. But I’ve noticed that when I
+do that, Bryant doesn’t play very well. Since tonight’s game was so
+important, I didn’t want to mess things up for Bryant, so I wore a
+Geovany Soto jersey instead. And wouldn’t you know it? Bryant
+had a great game! It looks like wearing a different jersey did the
+trick.
+Adapted from: Alyson Footer, "Bill Murray Gave a Random Cubs Fan a Ticket to Game 6
+and Let Her Sit Next to Him," Cut4, Nov 2, 2016, https://www.mlb.com/cut4/
+bill-murray-gave-random-cubs-fan-ticket-to-game-6-and-let-her-sit-next-tohim/
+c-207860694
+2. People who think "flat Earthers" must be dumb won’t want to
+hear this, but it’s the truth: it’s not the flat Earthers’ fault that
+their brains are full of mush. No, the diseased logic that infects
+their brains comes from another source—the massive corporations
+like YouTube and Facebook that will give any fool a microphone
+to broadcast his idiocy to the unsuspecting masses.
+Adapted from: Chef Jared, Twitter post, Feb 22, 2019, 8:14 PM, https://twitter.com/
+realChefJared/status/1099130233813454848
+3. Students hate writing them. Professors hate grading them. Those
+sorry excuses for intelligent thought, dashed off in half an hour the
+night before they’re due, riddled with crimes against the English
+language and full of flaccid theses "supported" by complete non
+sequiturs. You know what I’m talking about: essays in required introductory
+college courses. I know professors assign them because
+they feel have they have to, but you know what? They don’t. And
+they shouldn’t. That’s right. Since everyone hates college essays,
+professors should just give multiple-choice exams in all introductory
+courses.
+Adapted from: Rebecca Schuman, "The End of the College Essay," Slate, Dec 13, 2013,
+http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/2013/12/college_papers_students_hate_
+writing_them_professors_hate_grading_them_let.html
+4. A politician is someone who tells you what you want to hear and
+then does whatever he or she wants to do. That’s why politicians
+can’t be trusted.
+Adapted from: Harry Browne, "The Quintessential Politician," HarryBrowne.org, Jun 22,
+2004, http://harrybrowne.org/articles/Reagan’’sLegacy.htm
+Appendix I: Exercises 283
+5. Batman is clearly a criminal. Why else does he wear a mask? Why
+does he conceal his identity? He hides who he is because he is an
+outlaw! And think about this: whenever we hear about Batman
+or see pictures of him, he is with criminals! Only a criminal would
+spend so much time with other criminals!
+Adapted from: "Dizzoner the Penguin," Batman, Twentieth Century Fox
+Television (Nov 3, 1966)
+6. So Monsanto—one of the biggest biotech companies in the
+world—puts out all these lies about how its genetically modified
+crops are essential to ending world hunger, how the crops are perfectly
+safe, and so on—all kinds of propaganda like this. But did
+you know that they’ve actually patented those seeds? And that
+they ban farmers from saving seeds from crops those farmers grew
+themselves to replant the next year? Monsanto’s not interested in
+helping anybody. They’re just looking out for their bottom line. So
+don’t believe them when they say that genetically modified crops
+are essential to ending world hunger.
+Adapted from: Episode 294, Real Time with Bill Maher, HBO, Sep 20, 2013
+7. thomas huxley: Based on the theory of evolution, I believe that
+humans are descended from apes.
+bishop e. r. wilberforce: Do you? Was the ape your grandmother
+or your grandfather?
+Adapted from: Isabella Sidgwick, "A Grandmother’s Tales," MacMillan’s
+Magazine, LXXVIII, Oct 1898, 433–34
+8. During the Ebola outbreak in West Africa during 2014, there
+were ten confirmed cases of Ebola in the United States. Before
+Obamacare became the law of the land, there had never been a
+single case of Ebola in the United States. So as you can see,
+Obamacare has led to Americans getting Ebola.
+Adapted from: Peter Sullivan, "Cruz Advisor’s ‘Bad Joke’: No Ebola Before
+ObamaCare," The Hill, Oct 23, 2014, http://thehill.com/blogs/
+blog-briefing-room/221747-cruz-advisors-bad-joke-no-us-ebola-before-obamacare
+284 Appendix I: Exercises
+9. I play video games, but I’m not violent. So to make a point, I
+asked people on Twitter to identify themselves if they play video
+games and aren’t violent. Tens of thousands of people retweeted
+me and more than a hundred thousand liked the post. It just goes
+to show: video games don’t make people violent.
+Adapted from: Analynn, Twitter post, Aug 26, 2018, 3:15 PM, https://twitter.com/
+bawlynn/status/1033810217677422592
+10. Ladies and gentleman of the jury, I’ll admit that the plaintiff ’s
+attorneys make a good case. I almost felt pity for the guy. They
+almost even convinced me that my client is guilty—that my client,
+a small-town school cafeteria chef in Colorado, really did
+swindle these record companies out of all of that money. But consider
+this. Chewbacca, from the Star Wars movies, is a Wookie. He
+comes from the planet Kashyyyk. He’s eight feet tall. And yet—
+and yet, ladies and gentlemen!—he lives on a moon called Endor
+with a bunch of two-foot-tall Ewoks! Ewoks, ladies and gentlemen!
+Does that make sense? No! No, it does not. It makes no sense.
+And so, you see, if Chewbacca lives on Endor, you must acquit!
+My client is not guilty!
+Adapted from: "Chef Aid," South Park, Comedy Central, Oct 7, 1998
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 471.
+Need more practice? Find news sites on the Web that allow users to comment
+on news stories. Look for stories on controversial topics and read the
+comments about those stories. Many of the comments will offer arguments
+about the news stories, about related (or unrelated) topics, or about other
+comments. See how many fallacies you can identify in those comments.
+Appendix I: Exercises 285
+Exercise Set 11.4: Reinterpreting and revising fallacious
+arguments (part 2)
+Objective: To give you practice developing productive responses to fallacious
+arguments.
+Instructions: Review each of the arguments in Exercise Set 11.3. If you
+think the argument commits a fallacy, explain how you could reinterpret,
+revise, or rewrite the argument to avoid that fallacy, keeping as close to the
+original content and spirit of the argument as you can. If you think an argument
+does not commit a fallacy, just write, "No fallacy."
+Tips for success: As in Exercise Set 11.2, your goal here is to offer something
+more productive than simply diagnosing fallacies. Your response will
+need to be tailored to the specific fallacies that you identify.
+When a conversational partner overlooks alternatives, the most productive
+response is to point out other salient alternatives and ask whether
+those alternatives change your partner’s conclusions. Acknowledging those
+alternatives may force the speaker to give up the argument, since the original
+argument may not work once he or she takes those alternatives into
+account. In some cases, however, adding new alternatives doesn’t change
+the ultimate conclusion. So don’t jump to any conclusions yourself when
+you notice that someone has overlooked alternatives.
+When someone uses loaded language in presenting an argument, ask
+yourself what you would think of the argument if all of the loaded language
+were replaced with neutral language. Just because an argument is
+couched in loaded language doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s a bad argument.
+It just means that you need to beware of getting carried away by
+emotion when you evaluate the argument. The same goes for poisoning the
+well. Ask yourself what you would think of the person’s claim or argument
+if he or she had not "poisoned the well" by associating the claim or argument
+with something unsavory.
+What looks like a non sequitur to you might look like a strong argument
+to someone who knows some additional information that links the
+argument’s premises to its conclusion. If you suspect that someone’s argument
+is a non sequitur, ask for clarification
+rather than attacking the argument.
+If the author isn’t available to clarify the argument for you, see if you
+can fill in any missing premises yourself. What must the author be assuming
+if he or she takes the premises of the argument to be good reasons for
+the conclusion? Are those assumptions defensible?
+286 Appendix I: Exercises
+Someone who appears to be generalizing from one or two examples
+might simply have offered those examples as illustrations, not evidence. Ask
+yourself or the argument’s author whether there are other plausible reasons
+to think that the generalization is true. Giving other reasons might involve
+giving additional examples, but it might involve other strategies, such as
+citing sources.
+As with other fallacies that smuggle assumptions into an argument,
+like circular reasoning and complex questions, the fallacy of persuasive
+definition is not always committed with malice aforethought. Don’t write
+off an argument just because the definition is loaded. Ask yourself whether
+the argument works with a more neutral definition or if you can give additional
+premises that would justify the assumption that’s built into a persuasive
+definition.
+An argument that seems to commit post hoc, ergo propter hoc, like an
+argument that commits the more general fallacy of false cause, may just be
+lacking in background information. There may be additional premises that
+make it more plausible to think that the alleged causal connection is real.
+Ask yourself or the argument’s author what those reasons might be.
+Red herrings are most effective when they drag an emotionally charged
+issue into a debate. Often this happens only because the person committing
+the fallacy is emotionally invested in the issue, and the fallacy works
+(when it does) because the hearer is emotionally invested in the issue too.
+But just because someone brings up an irrelevant point doesn’t mean that
+he or she hasn’t also given good reasons to accept some conclusion. Try to
+ignore the red herring altogether and see if you can find a decent argument
+in what’s left over.
+Straw person fallacies sometimes contain a grain of truth. Although
+they often present overly simple responses to overly simplified arguments,
+more elaborate versions of those responses might actually be legitimate
+criticisms of the argument that was being caricatured.
+As with the discussion of fallacies in Exercise Set 11.2, this list of
+"treatments" is far from comprehensive. Different circumstances will call for
+different responses. Remember that the goal of arguing is not to show who
+is right, but to discover what is right. Here the invitation is to focus on
+what each argument can offer, not on how it falls short.
+Appendix I: Exercises 287
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 474.
+Need more practice? The "Need more practice?" section after Exercise
+Set 11.3 suggested that you look for fallacious arguments in the comment
+sections of online news sites. For each fallacious argument that you find on
+those sites, ask yourself whether there is a way to reinterpret or revise the
+argument to avoid the fallacy.
+Sample
+As punishment for his chronic shoplifting, an Australian mother forced her tenyear-
+old son to walk around in public wearing a sign that read, "Do not trust me.
+I will steal from you as I am a THIEF." Critics called this public shaming a form
+of child abuse. But that’s ridiculous. Just because the mother doesn’t wrap her son
+in bubble wrap and protect him from ever having his feelings hurt doesn’t mean
+that she’s abusing her child.
+Adapted from: Wency Leung, "Mom Draws Flak for Publicly Shaming Son," Globe and Mail,
+Aug 24, 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/the-hot-button/momdraws-
+flak-for-publicly-shaming-shoplifting-son/article616865/
+In Exercise Set 11.3 we said that this argument commits the straw person fallacy.
+Improving this particular argument requires looking for a kernel of truth in the
+complaint that just because the mother won’t "protect him from ever having his feelings
+hurt" doesn’t mean she’s abusing her son. Maybe the claim is that good parenting
+sometimes requires allowing one’s child’s feelings to get hurt. We could then rephrase
+the core of the argument this way: "Good parenting sometimes requires allowing one’s
+child’s feelings to get hurt, at least to some degree. The mother’s punishment of her son
+did not involve excessively hurting her son’s feelings. Therefore, the mother was not
+abusing her child." The second premise of this revised argument might be up for debate,
+but at least the argument no longer commits the straw person fallacy; it now engages
+directly and honestly with the critics’ accusation that the mother was abusing her
+child.
+This response quickly identifies the fallacy that the argument appears to commit and then immediately
+moves on to explaining how to reinterpret and improve it. The premises in the revised
+argument are certainly debatable, as the response notes. But the response does what it’s
+supposed to do, which is to find whatever ideas it can extract from the original, fallacious argument,
+and use them to build a better one.
+288 Appendix I: Exercises
+Objective: To practice distinguishing modus ponens and modus tollens from
+affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent, and to better understand
+why the last two are fallacies.
+Instructions: Each of the arguments below fits the form of either modus
+ponens, modus tollens, affirming the consequent, or denying the antecedent.
+State which form each argument fits. For arguments that affirm the consequent
+or deny the antecedent, describe a scenario in which the antecedent
+of the conditional would be false and the consequent would be true. (Remember
+that in "if p then q," p is the antecedent, and q is the consequent.)
+Tips for success: Affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent
+look a lot like their non-fallacious relatives, modus ponens and modus tollens.
+Each starts with an "if–then" sentence. Each asserts or denies some part of
+that "if–then" sentence as its second premise, and then infers the truth or
+denial of the other part as its conclusion. Take a look at all four together:
+modus ponens modus tollens
+If p then q. If p then q.
+p. Not-q.
+Therefore, q. Therefore, not-p.
+affirming the consequent denying the antecedent
+If p then q. If p then q.
+q. Not-p.
+Therefore, p. Therefore, not-q.
+Despite the superficial similarities, there is a crucial difference between the
+top two—modus ponens and modus tollens—and the bottom two—affirming
+the consequent and denying the antecedent. The top two are valid deductive
+argument forms. The bottom two are not. They are fallacies. To determine
+which form an argument fits, symbolize the argument, just as you did for
+the arguments in Chapter VI. Then carefully compare your symbolization
+of the argument to the patterns above.
+Remember the definition of "validity" from Chapter VI: a deductive
+argument is valid when the form of the argument is such that it is impossible
+for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false.
+If "if p then q" is true, and p is also true, then it is impossible for q to
+be false. (If p were true and q were false, then "if p then q" would be false.)
+Exercise Set 11.5: Two deductive fallacies
+Appendix I: Exercises 289
+Sample
+If Rosalyn is babysitting Calvin tonight, then Calvin will have to go to bed early.
+Calvin’s going to bed early. So Rosalyn must be babysitting Calvin tonight.
+Adapted from: Bill Watterson, Calvin & Hobbes, Feb 7, 1989
+Affirming the consequent. The antecedent would be false and the consequent true if
+Calvin’s parents send him to bed early on a night when he doesn’t have a babysitter.
+This response correctly identifies the form of argument as affirming the consequent. It then
+briefly describes a scenario in which the antecedent of the conditional (i.e., "Rosalyn is babysitting
+Calvin tonight") is false, but the consequent (i.e., "Calvin will have to go to bed early") is
+true. Thus, the scenario illustrates why affirming the consequent is an invalid form of argument:
+if you learned that Calvin was going to bed early—which is true in this scenario—and
+concluded that Rosalyn is babysitting him—which is false in this scenario—you’d have moved
+from true premises to a false conclusion. That will never happen when you’re using valid
+arguments.
+Likewise, if "if p then q" and not-q are both true, then it is impossible for
+not-p to be false.
+Even if we assume that "if p then q" is true, however, we can usually
+come up with a scenario in which p is false while q is true. (When we can’t,
+that’s because "if q then p" is also true!) Such a scenario illustrates why
+affirming the consequent is invalid, because the possibility of such a scenario
+shows that it’s possible for the conclusion of the argument to be false
+even when the premises are true. In that same scenario, not-p will be true,
+and not-q will be false. Thus, the scenario also illustrates why denying the
+consequent is invalid. For example, it’s true that if my only pet is a dog,
+then my only pet is a mammal. But suppose that my only pet is a cat. Then
+it’s true that my only pet is a mammal, but false that my only pet is a dog.
+So, if you reasoned that because my only pet isn’t a dog, it’s not a mammal,
+you’d reach a false conclusion; likewise if you reasoned that because my
+only pet is a mammal, my only pet is a dog.
+Notice that you will not need to say whether any of the premises are
+actually true or false. Validity does not depend on whether the premises
+are true. It depends only on the connection between the premises and the
+conclusion—whether it would be possible for the conclusion to be false if
+the premises were true.
+290 Appendix I: Exercises
+1. If Bob is kind, then Bob is a socialist. Bob is kind. Therefore, Bob
+is a socialist.
+Adapted from: Cian Chartier, "A Review of Stefan Molyneux’s The Art of Argument,"
+Medium, Sep 5, 2017, https://link.medium.com/UQtSJGkNwU
+2. If the government owned your children, then it would be okay for
+the government to require you to vaccinate your children. But the
+government doesn’t own your children. Therefore, it’s not okay for
+the government to require you to vaccinate your children.
+Adapted from: Philip Rucker and Rosalind S. Helderman, "Vaccination Debate Flares in
+GOP Presidential Race, Alarming Medical Experts," Washington Post, Feb 2, 2015,
+http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/chris-christie-remarks-show-vaccines-potencyin-
+political-debate/2015/02/02/f1c49a6e-aaff-11e4-abe8-e1ef60ca26de_story.html
+3. I’m here in Texas, walking along a stretch of the U.S.–Mexico
+border where there is a high steel fence separating the two countries.
+Now, if there were lots of people on the Mexican side trying
+to cross into the United States, then the fence would be important
+to stop illegal immigration. But there’s nobody at all on the
+other side. So, clearly, building a fence is not important for stopping
+illegal immigration.
+Adapted from: Jim Acosta, Twitter post, Jan 10, 2019 11:14 AM, https://twitter.com/
+Acosta/status/1083411819354558467
+4. If time travel is possible, then we can easily learn about the past.
+We can easily learn about the past. Therefore, time travel is
+possible.
+Adapted from: H.G. Wells, The Time Machine (1895; repr., Madison, WI:
+Cricket House Books, 2011), 7
+5. If the Earth circles the Sun, then the planets will sometimes appear
+to move backward in the sky. The planets sometimes appear
+to move backward in the sky. Therefore, the Earth circles the Sun.
+Adapted from: Nicolas Copernicus, On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres (1543;
+repr., Philadelphia: Running Press, 2004), 346
+Appendix I: Exercises 291
+6. You would follow me if you loved me. But you won’t follow me. I
+guess you don’t love me after all.
+Adapted from: Georges Bizet, Carmen (Vocal Score), libretto by Henri Meilhac and
+Ludovic Halévy, trans. Theodore Baker (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2002), 203
+7. If the Man in Black’s drink was poisoned, then he will die soon.
+The Man in Black will not die soon. Therefore, the Man in Black’s
+drink was not poisoned.
+Adapted from: The Princess Bride, directed by Rob Reiner
+(Los Angeles: 20th Century Fox, 1987)
+8. If you don’t play the lottery, then you can’t win the lottery. You do
+play the lottery. Therefore, you can win the lottery.
+Adapted from: "Mega Millions Jackpot Has People Dreaming of Riches," YouTube,
+Dec 31, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbMc-N9EGgo
+9. If this girl is possessed by a demon and I sprinkle holy water on
+her, then she should react violently. I sprinkled ordinary water on
+her, not holy water. Therefore, she should not react violently.
+Adapted from: The Exorcist, directed by William Friedkin
+(Burbank: Warner Bros., 1973)
+10. If the tropical rainforests are not saved, then countless species and
+many unique cultures will be lost forever. Countless species and
+many unique cultures will be lost forever. Therefore, the tropical
+rainforests will not be saved.
+Adapted from: "Facts about the Rainforest," Save The Rainforest, n.d., https://web.archive.
+org/web/20150206001120/http://www.savetherainforest.org/savetherainforest_007.htm
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 476.
+Need more practice? Working with a classmate, generate a list of ten "if–
+then" sentences. Write one argument based on each of those ten sentences,
+with some arguments following the form of modus ponens, some modus tollens,
+some affirming the consequent, and some denying the antecedent.
+Swap lists with your partner and see how quickly you can identify which
+arguments are which.
+292 Appendix I: Exercises
+Critical thinking activity: Relating rules and fallacies
+For an activity to help you connect the fallacies in this Appendix to the rules from Chapters
+I through VI, see the "Relating rules and fallacies" assignment sheet (p. 552) in Part 3.
+Exercise Set 11.6: Constructing fallacious arguments
+Objective: To improve your understanding of fallacies.
+Instructions: Construct an argument that commits each of the fallacies
+listed below. Then, explain how the argument commits that fallacy.
+Tips for success: It’s easier to construct some kinds of fallacies than others.
+For instance, constructing an ad hominem fallacy is simple. Pick a person
+who endorses a particular position and write an argument that tries to
+prove that position to be false by attacking the person.
+Other fallacies can be more difficult to write. One approach is to begin
+with the most distinctive feature of the relevant fallacy. For instance, the
+most distinctive feature of the fallacy of equivocation is the use of a single
+word or expression with multiple meanings. So, to write an argument that
+commits the fallacy of equivocation, begin by picking a word that has multiple
+meanings and try to build an argument around those meanings. Similarly,
+a false dilemma begins with a forced choice between two options, even
+though there are other options available. So, to write a false dilemma, begin
+by identifying a situation in which there are at least three options, and then
+write an argument that involves a forced choice between just two of those
+options.
+Another approach is to think about which rule(s) a fallacy violates.
+Once you’ve figured that out, you can write an argument that follows the
+relevant rules and then tweak it to turn it into a fallacy. For instance, overgeneralizing
+involves a violation of Rules 7 and 8. If you write a good argument
+for a generalization, you can turn it into a fallacy of overgeneralization
+by reducing the number of examples used in the argument.
+Whatever your approach, it may help to begin by picking a specific
+conclusion for your fallacious argument. Then, think about good or bad
+Appendix I: Exercises 293
+Sample
+Straw person.
+"My history professor says that everyone should study world history because that’s the
+only way to understand what’s going on in the world today. What a self-absorbed jerk.
+A lot of people understand the world just fine without getting a PhD in history!"
+This argument commits the straw person fallacy because it caricatures the history
+professor’s position in order to show that it’s incorrect. The history professor says that
+everyone should "study world history." The argument misrepresents this position as the
+claim that everyone should get a PhD in history. You can study world history by
+taking a class or two—or even by reading books in your free time. You don’t need to get
+a PhD to study world history. Thus, the fact that you can understand the world without
+getting a PhD in history doesn’t undermine the professor’s claim that everyone should
+study world history in order to understand the world.
+This response presents an argument that clearly commits the straw person fallacy. It then explains
+how the argument commits the fallacy, drawing on specific details of the fallacious argument to
+do so.
+ways of arguing for that conclusion. If you can find a good argument for it,
+see if you can change it to turn it into a fallacy.
+If you want to make this even more challenging for yourself, try to
+write "realistic" fallacies—that is, fallacies that someone might actually mistake
+for good arguments.
+1. Complex question
+2. Straw person
+3. Equivocation
+4. Persuasive definition
+5. Post hoc, ergo propter hoc
+294 Appendix I: Exercises
+Need more practice? Working with a friend or classmate, pick five or ten
+fallacies from this Appendix. Construct arguments that commit each of the
+fallacies you’ve chosen. Exchange arguments with your partner and try to
+identify the fallacies that he or she created. To make it harder, throw in an
+argument or two that doesn’t commit any of these fallacies.
+6. Begging the question
+7. Ad hominem
+8. False dilemma
+9. Ad ignorantiam (appeal to ignorance)
+10. Red herring
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 478.
+Critical thinking activity: Identifying, reinterpreting, and
+revising fallacies
+For a group activity that helps you recognize fallacies, see the "Identifying, reinterpreting,
+and revising fallacies" assignment sheet (p. 554) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Critical-thinking public service
+announcements
+For an out-of-class activity that helps you understand specific fallacies and strategies for
+avoiding them, see the "Critical-thinking public service announcements" assignment sheet
+(p. 555) in Part 3.
+295
+Some arguments require attention to the meaning of words. Sometimes
+we may not know the established meaning of a word, or the established
+meaning may be specialized. If the conclusion of your argument is that
+"Wejacks are herbivorous," your first task is to define your terms, unless
+you are speaking to an Algonquian ecologist.1 If you encounter this conclusion
+elsewhere, the first thing you need is a dictionary.
+Other times, a term may be in popular use but still unclear. We debate
+"assisted suicide," for example, but don’t necessarily understand exactly
+what it means. Before we can argue effectively about it, we need an agreedupon
+idea of what we are arguing about.
+Still another kind of definition is required when the meaning of a
+term is contested. What is a "drug," for example? Is alcohol a drug? Is
+tobacco? What if they are? Can we find any logical way to answer these
+questions?
+When terms are unclear, get specific
+A neighbor of one of the authors was taken to task by the city’s Historic
+Districts Commission for putting up a four-foot model lighthouse in her
+front yard. City ordinances prohibit any yard fixtures in historic districts.
+She was hauled before the commission and told to remove it. A furor
+erupted and the story got into the newspapers.
+Here the dictionary saved the day. According to Webster’s, a "fixture" is
+something fixed or attached, as to a building, such as a permanent appendage
+or structural part. The lighthouse, however, was moveable—more like
+a lawn ornament. Hence, it was not a "fixture"—seeing as the law did not
+specify any alternative definition. Hence, not prohibited.
+When issues get more difficult, dictionaries are less helpful. Dictionary
+definitions often offer synonyms, for one thing, that may be just as
+1. "Wejack" is the Algonquian name for a weasel-like animal of eastern North America
+called the "fisher" in English. "Herbivores" are animals that eat only or mostly plants.
+Actually, wejacks are not herbivorous.
+Appendix II
+Definitions
+Rule D1
+296 Rule D1: When terms are unclear, get specific
+unclear as the word you’re trying to define. Dictionaries also may give
+multiple definitions, so you have to choose between them. And sometimes,
+dictionaries are just plain wrong. Webster’s may be the hero of the last story,
+but it also defines "headache" as "a pain in the head"—far too broad a definition.
+A bee sting or cut on your forehead or nose would be a pain in the
+head but not a headache.
+For some words, then, you need to make the term more precise yourself.
+Use concrete, definite terms rather than vague ones (Rule 4). Be specific
+without narrowing the term too much.
+Organic foods are foods produced without chemical fertilizers
+or pesticides.
+Definitions like this call a clear idea to mind, something you can investigate
+or evaluate. Be sure, of course, to stick to your definition as you go on
+with your argument (no equivocation).
+One virtue of the dictionary is that it is fairly neutral. Webster’s defines
+"abortion," for example, as "the forcible expulsion of the mammalian fetus
+prematurely." This is an appropriately neutral definition. It is not up to the
+dictionary to decide if abortion is moral or immoral. Compare a common
+definition from one side of the abortion debate:
+"Abortion" means "murdering babies."
+This definition is loaded. Fetuses are not the same as babies, and the term
+"murder" unfairly imputes evil intentions to well-intentioned people. That
+ending the life of a fetus is comparable to ending the life of a baby is an
+arguable proposition, but it is for an argument to show—not simply assume
+by definition. (See also Rule 5, and the fallacy of persuasive definition.)
+You may need to do a little research. You will find, for example, that
+"assisted suicide" means allowing doctors to help aware and rational people
+arrange and carry out their own dying. It does not include allowing doctors
+to "unplug" patients without their consent (that would be some form of
+"involuntary euthanasia"—a different category). People may have good
+reasons to object to assisted suicide so defined, but if the definition is made
+clear at the outset, at least the contending parties will be talking about the
+same thing.
+Sometimes we can define a term by specifying certain tests or procedures
+that determine whether or not it applies. This is called an operational
+definition. For example, Wisconsin law requires that all legislative meetings
+be open to the public. But what exactly counts as a "meeting" for
+purposes of this law? The law offers an elegant criterion:
+Rule D1: When terms are unclear, get specific 297
+A "meeting" is any gathering of enough legislators to block
+action on the legislative measure that is the subject of the
+gathering.
+This definition is far too narrow to define the ordinary word "meeting."
+But it does accomplish the purpose of this law: to prevent legislators from
+making crucial decisions out of the public eye.
+Exercise Set 12.1: Making definitions more precise
+Objective: To give you practice making definitions more precise.
+Instructions: For each of the following definitions, think of an example
+of something that should be covered by the definition but isn’t and/or of
+something that is covered by the definition but shouldn’t be. Then, suggest
+a better definition that correctly classifies the example(s) you gave.
+Tips for success: Definitions provide a way to carve up the world into
+things that are "covered" by a term and things that aren’t—that is, things to
+which the term applies and things to which it does not. This is often difficult
+to do.
+Even a relatively good definition can run into two kinds of problems:
+it can include something that it ought not to include, and it can exclude
+something that it ought not to exclude. (Or both!) For instance, as we
+noted above, the dictionary’s definition of headache—"a pain or ache in the
+head"—incorrectly includes a bee sting on your head as a headache. This
+is a case of the definition being too broad or covering too much. On the
+other hand, a definition like "a pain or ache in the head caused by tension
+or illness" would exclude things that shouldn’t be excluded, like headaches
+caused by dehydration or loud noises. This is a case of a definition being
+too narrow or not covering enough.
+The first step in each exercise in this set is to think of something that
+exemplifies one of these problems. One good way to begin looking for
+examples is to ask yourself whether the definition seems too narrow or too
+broad. If it’s too broad, try to think of things that fit the definition, but to
+which you wouldn’t apply the term. If it’s too narrow, try to think of things
+to which you would normally apply the term, but which don’t fit the
+definition.
+The second step in each exercise in this set is to suggest a better definition
+for the term being defined. One criterion for improving your
+298 Rule D1: When terms are unclear, get specific
+definition is that it should correctly classify the example you gave in the
+first part of the exercise. Thus, if you gave an example of something that
+was included when it shouldn’t be, you will need to make the definition
+narrower. If you gave an example of something that was excluded when it
+shouldn’t be, you’ll need to make the definition broader. Take care, though,
+that it does not introduce new problems that didn’t exist with the original
+definition. Especially, make sure that changing the definition doesn’t overcompensate
+in the other direction—make a too-narrow definition too broad,
+for example. You want to include all and only the things that intuitively
+"fit" under the term being defined.
+Sample
+Arguably, even a country that guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the
+press may have the right to restrict the sale of pornography. "Pornography" is any
+material—audio-visual or written—that is sexually explicit.
+Adapted from: Caroline West, "Pornography and Censorship," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
+Fall 2018 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/
+pornography-censorship/
+This definition of "pornography" includes educational materials that are sexually
+explicit but not pornographic (e.g., medical textbooks or textbooks for sex education
+classes). A better definition of "pornography" would be "sexually explicit audio-visual
+or written material that is specifically designed to stimulate sexual arousal."
+This response specifies the term being defined and offers an example of something that is
+included
+by the original definition, but shouldn’t be. It then suggests a better, narrower definition.
+The definition may not be perfect, but it’s a big improvement.
+1. In many cities, you need a permit to hold a parade. A "parade" is a
+ceremonial procession that includes people marching.
+Adapted from: "Parade," WordNet, n.d., http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/
+webwn?s=parade
+2. A sandwich is a piece of meat placed between two pieces of bread.
+Adapted from: Tolly Wright, "Stephen Colbert Gets Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Official Ruling
+on Hot Dogs v. Sandwiches," Vulture, Mar 22, 2018, https://www.vulture.com/2018/03/
+colbert-gets-ruth-bader-ginsburgs-ruling-on-hot-dogs.html
+Rule D1: When terms are unclear, get specific 299
+3. Many school districts would like to ensure that their schools are
+staffed by highly qualified teachers. A "highly qualified elementary
+school teacher" is one who holds at least a bachelor’s degree
+and has passed a rigorous state examination to demonstrate subject
+knowledge and teaching skills in reading, writing, mathematics,
+and other areas commonly included in elementary school
+curricula.
+Adapted from: 20 United States Code §7801
+4. Some universities prohibit students from throwing parties in the
+dormitories. A "party" is a gathering of six or more people in a
+room where alcohol is being served.
+Adapted from: "Alcohol and Other Drug Biennial Review—2018," St. Bonaventure
+University Office of Student Life, 2018, https://www.sbu.edu/docs/default-source/
+heoa-compliance/2018-biennal-review.pdf
+5. It is morally wrong for an adult to knowingly give a child poison.
+A "poison" is any product that can harm a person or animal if it is
+used incorrectly or in the wrong dosage.
+Adapted from: "Poison Law & Legal Definition," U.S. Legal, n.d., http://
+definitions.uslegal.com/p/poison/
+6. Achieving "success" in life means holding a stable, respectable job
+in which you earn a lot of money.
+Adapted from: Dennis Nishi, "How to Define Success for Yourself," Wall Street Journal,
+Oct 25, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
+how-to-define-success-for-yourself-1414284614
+7. In order to protect a valued way of life, people should strive to buy
+as much of their food as they can from family farms. A "family
+farm" is a farm that is owned by a single family.
+Adapted from: Leslie A. Duram, Encyclopedia of Organic, Sustainable, and
+Local Foods (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2010), 144
+300 Rule D1: When terms are unclear, get specific
+8. A "sport" is any activity that facilitates the display of physical
+skills.
+Adapted from: David Papineau, "Chess Is Not a Sport but a Game. So What’s the
+Difference?" Aeon, Jan 27, 2016, https://aeon.co/ideas/
+chess-and-bridge-are-games-that-don-t-belong-in-the-olympics
+9. A "data breach" occurs when someone hacks into a computer to
+steal data or when someone tricks another person into giving
+them data.
+Adapted from: Lorenzo Francheschi-Bicchierai, "Why We’re Not Calling the Cambridge
+Analytica Story a ‘Data Breach,’ " Motherboard, Mar 19, 2018, https://motherboard.vice.
+com/en_us/article/3kjzvk/facebook-cambridge-analytica-not-a-data-breach
+10. An "unhealthy relationship" is any relationship in which one person
+inflicts physical, sexual, or emotional violence on the other.
+Adapted from: notMYkid, "Unhealthy Relationships," notmykid.org, n.d.,
+http://notmykid.org/unhealthy-relationships/
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 481.
+Need more practice? Even dictionary definitions aren’t perfect, as the example
+of "headache" shows. Working with a group of classmates, look for
+dictionary definitions that are too narrow or too broad. (You might see
+who can find the greatest number of inappropriate definitions in ten minutes
+or how many inappropriate definitions the whole group can find in
+five minutes.) Give an example of something that is inappropriately included
+or excluded by each definition. Then, as a group, try to work out
+better definitions for each word.
+Rule D2: When terms are contested, work from the clear cases 301
+When terms are contested,
+work from the clear cases
+Sometimes a term is contested. That is, people argue over the proper application
+of the term itself. In that case, it’s not enough simply to propose a
+clarification. A more involved kind of argument is needed.
+When a term is contested, you can distinguish three relevant sets of
+things. One set includes those things to which the term clearly applies. The
+second includes those things to which the term clearly does not apply. In
+the middle will be those things whose status is unclear—including the
+things being argued over. Your job is to formulate a definition that
+1. includes all the things that the term clearly fits;
+2. excludes all the things that the term clearly does not fit; and
+3. draws the plainest possible line somewhere in between, and
+explains why the line belongs there and not somewhere else.
+For example, consider what defines a "bird." Exactly what is a bird,
+anyway? Is a bat a bird?
+To meet requirement 1, it is often helpful to begin with the general
+category (genus) to which the things being defined belong. For birds, the
+natural genus would be animals. To meet requirements 2 and 3, we then
+need to specify how birds differ from other animals (the differentia). Our
+question therefore is: Precisely what differentiates birds—all birds and only
+birds—from other animals?
+It’s trickier than it may seem. We can’t draw the line at flight, for example,
+because ostriches and penguins don’t fly (so the proposed definition
+wouldn’t cover all birds, violating the first requirement), and bumblebees
+and mosquitoes do (so the proposed definition would include some nonbirds,
+violating the second).
+What distinguishes all and only birds, it turns out, is having feathers.
+Penguins and ostriches have feathers even though they don’t fly—they’re still
+birds. But flyinginsects do not, and neither (in case you were wondering)
+do bats.
+Now consider a harder case: What defines a "drug"?
+Start again with the clear cases. Heroin, cocaine, and marijuana clearly
+are drugs. Air, water, most foods, and shampoos clearly are not drugs—
+though all of these are "substances," like drugs, and are all ingested or applied
+to our body parts. Unclear cases include tobacco and alcohol.2
+2. Unclear in another way are substances such as aspirin, antibiotics, vitamins, and
+antidepressants—the kinds of substances we buy in "drugstores" and call drugs in a
+pharmaceutical sense. But these are medicines and not "drugs" in the moral sense we are
+exploring.
+Rule D2
+302 Rule D2: When terms are contested, work from the clear cases
+Our question, then, is: Does any general description cover all of the
+clear cases of drugs and none of the substances that clearly aren’t drugs,
+drawing a clear line in between?
+A drug has been defined—even by a presidential commission—as a
+substance that affects mind or body in some way. But this definition is far
+too broad. It includes air, water, food, and so on, too, so it fails on the second
+requirement.
+We also can’t define a drug as an illegal substance that affects mind or
+body in some way. This definition might cover more or less the right set of
+substances, but it does not meet requirement 3. It does not explain why the
+line belongs where it is. After all, part of the point of trying to define
+"drug" in the first place might well be to decide which substances should
+be legal and which should not! Defining a drug as an illegal substance
+short-circuits this project. (Technically, it commits the fallacy of begging
+the question.)
+Try this:
+A "drug" is a substance used primarily to alter our state of
+mind in some specific way.
+Heroin, cocaine, and marijuana obviously count. Food, air, and water
+don’t—because even though they have effects on the mind, the effects are
+not specific, and are not the primary reason why we eat, breathe, and drink.
+Unclear cases we then approach with the question: Is the primary effect
+specific and on the mind ? Perception-distorting and mood-altering effects
+do seem to be the chief concern in current moral debates about drugs, so
+arguably this definition captures the kind of distinction people really want
+to make.
+Should we add that drugs are addictive? Maybe not. Some substances
+are addictive but not drugs—certain foods, perhaps. And what if a substance
+that "alter[s] our state of mind in some specific way" turns out to be
+nonaddictive (as some people have claimed about marijuana, for example)?
+Is it therefore not a drug? Maybe addiction defines "drug abuse," but not
+"drug" as such.
+Exercise Set 12.2: Starting from clear cases
+Objective: To give you practice developing definitions for unclear and
+contested concepts.
+Instructions: For each of the terms below, give one example of something
+to which the term clearly applies, one example of something to which it
+Rule D2: When terms are contested, work from the clear cases 303
+clearly does not apply, and one example of something to which it is unclear
+if the term applies. Then, in light of those examples, suggest a definition for
+the term and say briefly why it is a good definition and how it clarifies the
+unclear case.
+Tips for success: Just as Rule D2 suggests, begin by thinking about clear
+cases—that is, cases where the term clearly applies or clearly does not apply.
+Ask yourself what separates the cases where the term clearly applies from
+those where it clearly doesn’t apply. What is true of all and only the cases
+to which the term applies? Let your answer to that question guide you in
+framing a definition.
+Think carefully about what your proposed definition implies for some
+unclear cases. Which of them end up being covered by the term under your
+definition? Are you satisfied covering those examples, but not the others?
+The answer to that question—as with the answer of many definitional
+questions—depends on your interest in the term.
+For instance, consider the term "military vehicle." Tanks and fighter
+jets are clearly military vehicles. Subcompact sedans made by Toyota or
+Ford are clearly not military vehicles. Humvees are somewhere in the
+middle. They are used as military vehicles, but they have also been sold and
+used as civilian vehicles (Hummers). How you draw the line between military
+and non-military vehicles will very likely depend on why you are interested
+in defining "military vehicles" in the first place. If you are trying to
+define "military vehicle" because you are trying to decide what kind of vehicles
+should not be available to the public, you might want to focus on
+how dangerous the vehicle is. If you are interested in figuring out which
+vehicles to include in a museum of military history, you might want to
+focus on whether the vehicles were ever actually used by the military. For
+the purposes of this exercise set, you are not given a particular reason for
+defining the term, but it may help you to think about the question, "Why
+might it matter how this term is defined?" If you can think of several different
+reasons why it might matter, pick one of them, state it explicitly, and
+use it to guide your thinking.
+304 Rule D2: When terms are contested, work from the clear cases
+1. Bald
+2. Adult
+3. Fast-food restaurant
+Sample
+Slow
+The definition of "slow" will depend on context. Suppose we are defining "slow" in the
+context of vehicles used for everyday travel, like commuting to work or going to the
+grocery store. A golf cart, with a top speed of about 15 miles per hour, is clearly slow. A
+Tesla Model S, with a top speed of 155 miles per hour, is clearly not slow. A Vespa
+Primavera 50 scooter, with a top speed of 40 miles per hour, is a borderline case. It’s fast
+for a scooter, though relatively slow for riding on highways. One plausible definition
+of "slow" for a vehicle is "unable to maintain a speed of at least 20 miles per hour."
+This means that Vespas and similar vehicles don’t count as slow, since they can
+achieve speeds of more than 20 miles per hour, but golf carts do count as slow. That
+seems right, since Vespas could keep up with cars and motorcycles on most roads, but
+golf carts couldn’t.
+This response begins by pointing out that what we mean by "slow" depends dramatically on
+context. After all, slow for a street-legal, civilian motor vehicle is very different from slow
+for a sloth or slow for a rocket. The response then stipulates a context arbitrarily. It could just
+as well have stipulated "slow for a large African mammal" or "slow [to move] for a chess
+master"—although it would have to have used different examples, or different kinds of examples,
+in that case!
+After clarifying the context for its definition, this response offers a case that is clearly covered
+by the term (namely, golf carts) and a case that is clearly not covered (namely, the Tesla
+Model S electric car). It also explains briefly why those cases are clear cases by citing their top
+speeds. It then gives a borderline example (namely, Vespas) and justifies its suggestion that
+this example really is unclear. Finally, the response suggests a definition, explains how the
+definition resolves the unclear case, and briefly makes an argument for resolving the unclear
+case in that way.
+Just as focusing on "everyday vehicles" is certainly not the only context you might have
+chosen, "unable to maintain a speed of more than 20 miles per hour" is not the only plausible
+definition you might have given. Especially in an area where most travel requires getting on
+a highway, "unable to maintain a speed of at least 40 miles per hour" might be a better definition.
+Context matters!
+Rule D3: Definitions don’t replace arguments 305
+4. Expensive
+5. Brave
+6. Weapon
+7. Made in America
+8. Patriotic
+9. Natural
+10. Consensual
+Rule D3
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 487.
+Need more practice? Browse the headlines in your favorite newspaper
+or magazine, looking for unclear terms. Identify cases to which the terms
+clearly apply, cases to which they clearly do not apply, and borderline cases.
+Then, check the articles under the headlines to see whether the article is
+about a clear case or a borderline case.
+Definitions don’t replace arguments
+Definitions help us to organize our thoughts, group like things with like,
+and pick out key similarities and differences. Sometimes, after words are
+clearly defined, people may even discover that they do not really disagree
+about an issue at all.
+By themselves, though, definitions seldom settle difficult questions.
+We seek to define "drug," for example, partly to decide what sort of stance
+to take toward certain substances. But such a definition cannot answer this
+question by itself. Under the proposed definition, coffee is a drug. Caffeine
+certainly alters the state of the mind in specific ways. It is even addictive.
+But does it follow that coffee should be banned? No, because the effect is
+mild and socially positive for many people. Some attempt to weigh benefits
+against harms is necessary before we can draw any conclusions.
+306 Rule D3: Definitions don’t replace arguments
+Marijuana is a drug under the proposed definition. Should it be
+banned? Just as with coffee, more argument is necessary. Some people
+claim that marijuana has only mild and socially positive effects too. Supposing
+they’re right, you could argue that marijuana shouldn’t be banned
+even though it is a drug (like coffee). Others argue that it has far worse
+effects and tends to be a "gateway" to harder drugs besides. If they’re right,
+you could argue for banning marijuana whether it is a drug or not.
+Or perhaps marijuana is most akin to certain antidepressants and
+stimulants—medicines that (take note) also turn out to be drugs on the
+proposed definition, but call not for bans but for control.
+Alcohol, meanwhile, is a drug under the proposed definition. In fact,
+it is the most widely used drug of all. Its harms are enormous, including
+kidney disease, birth defects, half of all traffic deaths, and more. Should it
+be limited or banned? Maybe—although there are counterarguments too.
+Once again, though, this question is not settled by the determination that
+alcohol is a drug. Here the effects make the difference.
+In short, definitions contribute to clarity, but seldom do they make
+arguments all by themselves. Clarify your terms—know exactly what questions
+you’re asking—but don’t expect that clarity alone will answer them.
+Critical thinking activity: Defining key terms in an essay
+For an out-of-class activity that gives you practice in defining terms in the context of an
+argumentative essay, see the "Defining key terms in an essay" assignment sheet (p. 556) in
+Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Defining difficult terms
+For an in-class group activity that gives you practice in defining difficult terms, see the
+"Defining difficult terms" assignment sheet (p. 557) in Part 3.
+307
+When you are dealing with complex arguments, drawing a diagram or "map" of the argument can help you understand the argument’s structure. This is important because it helps you understand how the different parts of the argument relate to one another, what parts might need more support, and how problems with one part of the argument affect problems with another part of the argument.
+An argument map is like a flow chart of an argument. It shows visually how the various premises relate to one another and how they lead to the argument’s main conclusion. You can also use them to help you write argumentative essays (remember, for example, Rule 36: Your argument is your outline!) and organize your oral presentations. A variety of argument "mapping" methods are also widely used in formal debating.
+Learning to draw argument maps is an extension of learning to analyze arguments. Basic argument analysis involves distinguishing premises from conclusions (Rule 1) and presenting the premises in a natural order (Rule 2). More detailed argument analysis involves understanding exactly what role each premise plays in supporting the argument’s main conclusion. Argument mapping is just a way to represent that detailed analysis graphically.
+The elements of an argument map are numbers, which represent the premises and conclusion in an argument, and arrows, which connect the premises and conclusions.
+Start with the following very simple argument:
+The New York Yankees have won more World Series championships than any other team in baseball history. Therefore, the New York Yankees are the greatest team in baseball history.
+The first step in mapping this argument is to identify all of the claims in the argument, just as we did in Exercise Set 1.1. We can do that by bracketing each claim and assigning a number to it, like this:
+1[The New York Yankees have won more World Series championships than any other team in baseball history.] Therefore, 2[the New York Yankees are the greatest team in baseball history.]
+Appendix III
+Argument Mapping
+308 Appendix III: Argument Mapping
+The second step is to distinguish the argument’s conclusion from its premises
+(Rule 1). The conclusion indicator "therefore" shows us that claim (2) is
+the conclusion. This leaves claim (1) as the only premise in the argument.
+So far, this is nothing new.
+The new step comes in representing the relationship between claims
+(1) and (2) graphically, which we do as follows:
+(1)
+$
+(2)
+In this diagram, (2) represents the conclusion of the argument ("The New
+York Yankees are the greatest team in baseball history") and (1) represents
+the argument’s premise ("The New York Yankees have won more World
+Series championships than any other team in baseball history"). We put
+the conclusion—(2)—at the bottom of the argument map, and we use a
+downward arrow to indicate that (1) "leads to" (2)—that is, that (1) is a
+premise for (2).
+Most arguments, of course, aren’t that simple. For one thing, most arguments
+have more than one premise. How about this one?
+Participating in musical ensembles, like orchestras and choruses,
+is fun. Participating in musical ensembles also teaches
+valuable lessons about discipline and teamwork. Therefore,
+children should be encouraged to participate in musical
+ensembles.
+Once again, the first thing to do is to bracket all of the claims in the argument
+and assign a number to each one:
+1[Participating in musical ensembles, like orchestras and
+choruses, is fun.] 2[Participating in musical ensembles also
+teaches valuable lessons about discipline and teamwork.]
+Therefore, 3[children should be encouraged to participate in
+musical ensembles.]
+Next, we want to distinguish the premises from the conclusion. Again, the
+conclusion indicator "therefore" points the way: (3) is the conclusion, and
+(1) and (2) are premises.
+We can use arrows to represent the relationships among these claims,
+as follows:
+(1) (2)
+( '
+(3)
+Appendix III: Argument Mapping 309
+As always, we put the argument’s conclusion—in this case, (3)—at the
+bottom of the argument map. We put the premises above it and draw arrows
+from the premises to the conclusion. Here, the arrow from (1) to (3)
+indicates that (1) is a premise for (3), and the arrow from (2) to (3) indicates
+that (2) is also a premise for (3).
+In some arguments, two or more premises work together, as it were, to support
+a conclusion. Consider, for instance, this argument:
+1[Children should be protected from media that might encourage
+them to do dangerous things.] 2[Violent video games
+might encourage children to do dangerous things.] Therefore,
+3[children should not be allowed to purchase violent video
+games without parental consent.]
+Once again, we need to distinguish premises from conclusion, and once
+again we see that (3) is the conclusion and (1) and (2) are premises for (3).
+Notice, however, that premises (1) and (2) are "linked" in a special way:
+they only support (3) when they are combined, rather than providing independent
+reasons for (3). In this case, (1) is only a reason for (3) because
+(2) is true, and (2) is only a reason for (3) because (1) is true. If either of
+these premises were false, the other premise would cease to be a good reason
+for (3).
+Given that (1) and (2) are related in this special way, we need to draw
+our argument map differently if it is to represent the relationships among
+the claims accurately. We can represent the link between (1) and (2) as
+follows:
+(1) + (2)
+$
+(3)
+We link (1) and (2) by drawing a plus sign between them, and then we
+draw a single arrow from the linked pair to (3). This shows that (1) and (2)
+jointly support (3).
+Contrast this argument with the earlier argument about musical ensembles.
+In that earlier argument, each premise provided an independent
+reason to believe the conclusion. The fact that participating in musical ensembles
+is fun is a reason—all on its own—to encourage children to participate
+in them. It would count as a reason to encourage participation
+even if participating didn’t teach valuable lessons. Likewise, the fact
+that participating in musical ensembles is a reason—all on its own—to
+310 Appendix III: Argument Mapping
+encourage
+children to participate in them, and it would count as a reason
+even if participating weren’t fun. Thus, we drew separate arrows from (1)
+to (3) and from (2) to (3), indicating that each premise leads to the conclusion
+independently of the other premise.
+This highlights one advantage of argument maps over premise-and-conclusion
+outlines of arguments. Argument maps enable you to show the
+relationships between premises. Premise-and-conclusion outlines don’t.
+The other major advantage of argument maps comes when we consider
+more complex arguments, like this one:
+1[There is a finite amount of oil in the world.] Thus, 2[we
+cannot continue to use oil for fuel forever.] That’s why 3[we
+need to develop alternative sources of energy.]
+We’ve bracketed and numbered the claims in this argument. But when
+we go to distinguish premises from conclusions, we see a problem. Both
+(2) and (3) are introduced with conclusion indicators ("Thus" and "That’s
+why"). Which is the conclusion?
+If we step back and look at the argument as a whole, we can see that
+the main point of the argument is that we need to develop alternative
+sources of energy. Thus, the main conclusion of the argument is (3). (2) is
+offered as a reason for (3), which makes (2) a premise of the argument. So
+why does it also have a conclusion indicator in front of it? Because (2) is
+supported by (1)—or to put it another way, (1) is offered as a reason for (2).
+Thus, (2) acts as both a premise and a conclusion, like a middle link in a
+chain. A claim that serves as both a premise and a conclusion is called a
+subconclusion. The argument-within-an-argument that leads to the subconclusion
+is called a subargument.
+Argument maps enable us to represent these relationships graphically:
+(1)
+$
+(2)
+$
+(3)
+As always, we put the main conclusion—(3)—at the bottom of the argument
+map. We put (2) just above it, with a downward arrow connecting (2)
+to (3). We then put (1) above (2), with a downward arrow connecting (1)
+to (2). This argument map shows at a glance that (1) is offered as a reason
+for (2), which in turn is offered as a reason for (3).
+Appendix III: Argument Mapping 311
+We can combine the techniques we’ve used so far to map more complex
+arguments as well. In fact, the more complex the argument, the more helpful
+the map. Consider this argument:
+1[A standard layout should be required for all Web sites.] 2[A
+standard layout would save users time] because 3[everyone
+would know exactly where to go for the information they
+want.] Also, 4[a standard layout would make it easier for
+people to put up their own Web sites.] This is because 5[a
+standard layout could be based on one simple template] and
+6[a layout based on one simple template would make "do
+it yourself " programs easy to create and teach.] 7[Designers
+wouldn’t have to spend as much time coming up with their
+own layouts, either.]
+Some careful analysis of this argument shows that the last three claims are
+premises for (4), although (5) and (6) are linked to one another and (7) is
+independent. (3) is a premise for (2). (2) and (4) are independent premises
+for the main conclusion, (1). Explaining that in words makes it tough to
+follow; it’s much easier to see all of this if we draw a picture! We can map
+this argument as follows:
+(5) + (6) (7) (3)
+$ $
+(4) (2)
+( '
+(1)
+This argument map represents the complexity of this argument much more
+clearly than any premise-and-conclusion outline could. It shows each subargument
+clearly. It evens reveals the structure of the subarguments: not
+only do (5), (6), and (7) all lead to (4), but (5) and (6) are linked, whereas
+(7) is independent. (2) and (4) are independent premises for the main conclusion,
+rather than linked premises.
+(
+The "Resources" section on this book’s companion Web site has links to further reading
+and resources for argument mapping, including links to argument mapping software.
+312 Appendix III: Exercises
+Objective: To give you practice drawing argument maps.
+Instructions: Copy each argument below. Bracket and number the conclusion
+and all of the premises of each argument. Then, work out an argument
+map for the argument.
+Tips for success: Drawing argument maps will take some time to learn—
+but it is a skill that you can learn with a bit of practice, and it is extremely
+useful for any kind of argument analysis.
+The first step in mapping an argument is identifying and numbering
+all of the premises and the conclusion of the argument. Remember that, as
+in Exercise Sets 1.1 and 1.2, not every sentence in a passage is a premise or
+conclusion of an argument. Bracket the claims that are premises or conclusions
+and assign a number to each.
+All of the arguments in this exercise set are relatively simple in structure.
+Some exercises will require you to distinguish between linked and
+independent premises. Others will ask you to identify a series of subarguments
+that have one premise each—just like the three-step argument above
+about oil and alternative energy sources.
+In distinguishing linked from independent premises, try assuming
+that one of the two premises is false and then ask yourself whether the
+other one still provides a reason for the conclusion. If not, then the premises
+are linked, and you should put a plus sign between them in your argument
+map. If each premise would be a good reason for the conclusion on
+its own, then the premises are independent, and you should draw a separate
+arrow from each premise to the conclusion.
+Exercise Set 13.1: Mapping simple arguments
+Appendix III: Exercises 313
+Sample
+The meat company Bell & Evans has introduced a more humane method of
+slaughtering chickens. Bell & Evans is a financially successful company. Therefore,
+humane handling of animals is compatible with financial success. I wonder
+if fast-food companies will get the memo?
+Adapted from: Tracy Reiman, letter to the editor, New York Times, Oct 30, 2010, http://www
+.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/opinion/lweb31chicken.html
+1[The meat company Bell & Evans has introduced a more humane method of slaughtering
+chickens.] 2[Bell & Evans is a financially successful company.] Therefore,
+3[humane handling of animals is compatible with financial success.] I wonder if
+fast-food companies will get the memo?
+(1) + (2)
+$
+(3)
+The first part of this response involves bracketing and numbering the claims in the original
+argument. (Notice that the last sentence of the passage is not bracketed because it is neither a
+premise nor a conclusion in the argument.) Numbering the claims is necessary so that we
+know what the numbers in the argument map represent.
+The second part of this response involves actually drawing a map of the argument. Once
+you’ve identified all of the claims in the argument, all you need to do to map the argument is
+figure out which claim is the main conclusion and whether the premises are linked or
+independent.
+In this case, the main conclusion is (3), so the response puts (3) at the bottom of the argument
+map. This argument map shows that the premises—(1) and (2)—are linked. This is
+because (1) doesn’t show that humane practices are compatible with financial success unless
+(2) is true (and vice versa). (Why not? Suppose that Bell & Evans had switched to a more
+humane method of slaughtering chickens and gone bankrupt as a result. In that case, Bell &
+Evans’ new practice would not be a reason to think that humane handling of animals is
+compatible with financial success.)
+1. Poverty, illiteracy, and child mortality are all falling faster than ever.
+The average person is less likely to be affected by war, governed by
+a dictator, or die in a natural disaster than ever before. This shows
+that there has never been a better time to be alive than right now.
+Adapted from: Johan Norberg, "Why Can’t We See That We’re Living in a Golden Age?"
+Spectator, Aug 20, 2016, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/08/
+why-cant-we-see-that-were-living-in-a-golden-age/
+314 Appendix III: Exercises
+2. Movies often depict Tyrannosaurus rex chasing people or other
+dinosaurs, but some scientists suspect that it wasn’t actually very
+fast. To better understand T. rex’s hunting habits, scientists at the
+University of Manchester built a sophisticated computer model
+of T. rex. The model shows that T. rex’s skeleton wasn’t strong
+enough to withstand the impact of high speeds. Therefore, T. rex
+could not run very fast. And that means that T. rex couldn’t have
+chased down fleet-footed prey.
+Adapted from: Helen Briggs, "Mighty T. Rex ‘Walked Rather than Sprinted,’ " BBC, Jul 18,
+2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-40632751
+3. Most Americans live too far from their place of work for it to be
+practical to ride a bicycle to work. This makes bike paths largely a
+waste of money—as a solution to traffic problems, at least. The
+government should find other ways to reduce traffic besides building
+expensive bike paths.
+Adapted from: Lily Gray, letter to the editor, Los Angeles Times, Mar 7, 2011,
+https://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-xpm-2011-mar-07-la-le-0307-monday-
+20110307-story.html
+4. The state needs to ensure that DNA tests are available to all defendants
+in capital murder trials. The state has an obligation to
+ensure that justice is done in criminal courts—especially when the
+death penalty is at stake. The only way to do justice is to ensure
+that all available evidence, including DNA tests, is available in
+capital murder trials.
+Adapted from: Sam Millsap, letter to the editor, New York Times, Oct 23, 2010,
+http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/opinion/l24dna.html
+5. By reducing student debt, eliminating tuition at medical schools
+would enable more new doctors to become primary care physicians.
+We have a shortage of primary care physicians in this country.
+Therefore, medical schools ought to be free.
+Adapted from: Peter B. Bach and Robert Kocher, "Why Medical School
+Should Be Free," New York Times, May 28, 2011,
+http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/opinion/29bach.html
+Appendix III: Exercises 315
+6. Jefferson Davis’s only historically important legacy was leading a
+war in defense of slavery. We should not honor someone for leading
+a war in defense of slavery. Thus, the state of Virginia should
+not honor Jefferson Davis by naming things after him or maintaining
+statues of him in public places.
+Adapted from: Ilya Somin, "Renaming Jefferson Davis Highway," Washington Post,
+Sep 19, 2016, https://wapo.st/2deOJuI
+7. To better understand why men outnumber women at more senior
+levels in businesses, researchers analyzed the workplace behavior
+of one hundred employees at a large, multinational firm. They
+found that it’s the difference in the way women are treated, not
+the way they behave, that leads to starkly different professional
+outcomes. To figure this out, they tracked and studied thousands
+of interactions over four months. They found essentially no difference
+in the behavior of men and women. If there’s no difference
+in the way men and women behave, then the difference between
+men and women in terms of career success must result from men
+and women being treated differently.
+Adapted from: Stephan Turban, Laura Freeman, and Ben Waber, "A Study That Used
+Sensors to Show That Men and Women Are Treated Differently at Work,"
+Harvard Business Review, Oct 23, 2017,
+https://hbr.org/2017/10/a-study-used-sensors-to-show-that-menand-
+women-are-treated-differently-at-work
+8. It’s ridiculous that people are blaming the celebrities whose nude
+photos were stolen by hackers and splashed all over the Internet.
+If someone at the post office had opened a sealed envelope containing
+a celebrity’s nude Polaroid photos, everyone would blame
+the post office worker, not the celebrity who mailed the photos.
+But having your photos stolen from a password-protected online
+system is just like having them stolen from a sealed envelope that
+you sent through the mail.
+Adapted from: Jimmy Kimmel, "Jimmy Kimmel’s Leaked iCloud Photo," Vimeo,
+Sep 29, 2015, https://vimeo.com/140869474
+316 Appendix III: Exercises
+9. Some western European countries are banning Muslim women
+from wearing the burqa on the grounds that it is an insult to
+women’s dignity. If Europeans are truly concerned with Muslim
+women’s dignity, then they should be addressing not only the
+burqa but also highly sexualized images of (non-Muslim) women
+in the European media. After all, if they’re so worried about Muslim
+women’s dignity, they ought to be concerned with all women’s
+dignity. And if they are concerned with all women’s dignity, then
+they ought to be just as concerned about highly sexualized portrayals
+of women in, say, European advertising as they are about
+the burqa.
+Adapted from: Gabriele vom Bruck, letter to the editor, The Economist, Jun 3, 2010,
+http://www.economist.com/node/16270944
+10. People often think that because of their notorious practice of
+human sacrifice, the Aztecs were much more barbaric than the
+Europeans of the time. This isn’t true. The Aztecs were sacrificing
+about 3,500 people a year in the 1500s. If England’s population at
+the time had been as large as that of the Aztec empire, the English
+would have executed about twice that many people each year.
+And English executions of the time were every bit as barbaric as
+Aztec sacrifices.
+Adapted from: Charles C. Mann, 1491: New Revelations of the Americas before
+Columbus, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 136–37
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 490.
+Need more practice? Draw argument maps of each of the arguments in
+Exercise Sets 1.1, 1.2, 6.1, and 6.2. For even more practice, map the arguments
+in the letters to the editor in your favorite newspaper or magazine.
+Appendix III: Exercises 317
+Exercise Set 13.2: Mapping complex arguments
+Objective: To give you practice mapping more complex arguments.
+Instructions: Draw an argument map for each of the following arguments.
+Tips for success: As with mapping simple arguments, the first step in
+mapping complex arguments is to identify, bracket, and number each claim
+in the argument. Remember that you only need to number the premises
+and the conclusion. Any other sentences, such as those providing background
+information or expressing thoughts that are only indirectly related
+to the argument, need not be included.
+The second step in mapping an argument is figuring out how the various
+premises relate to one another and to the main conclusion. There are
+several ways to go about this, and you should find the strategy that works
+best for you.
+One strategy is to work backward. Start by identifying the main conclusion
+and put it at the very bottom of the argument. Then, figure out
+which of the premises lead immediately to the main conclusion. Those go
+one row up from the main conclusion. (Don’t worry yet whether they are
+linked or independent.) Next, look at each premise in that row and ask
+yourself what reasons the argument gives for each of those premises. Put
+those reasons one more row up from the main conclusion, being sure to
+keep track of which premises lead to which subconclusions. Repeat this
+process until you have placed all of the premises on your map.
+Once you have figured out which premises lead to which (sub)conclusions,
+look at each subargument and ask yourself whether the premises of
+that subargument are linked or independent. Start by looking at pairs of
+premises. Suppose that one of those premises is false, and ask yourself
+whether the other premise still counts as a reason to accept the premises’
+immediate conclusion. If so, then the premises are independent. If not,
+then they are linked.
+Some people prefer a less systematic approach to mapping arguments.
+One such approach is to proceed as if you were solving a jigsaw puzzle. See
+which "pieces" of the argument "fit together" by thinking about which
+claims lead to which other claims and which claims are linked to which
+other claims. As you connect premises into subarguments, the overall structure
+of the argument may become clearer, enabling you to connect all of
+the pieces into a single argument map. You could even use numbered index
+318 Appendix III: Exercises
+Sample
+Uranium emits rays similar to X-rays. These rays arise either from an interaction
+between the uranium and its surroundings or from the uranium itself. If the rays
+arise from an interaction between the uranium and its surroundings, then the
+amount of radiation should vary with temperature, illumination, or other factors.
+The radiation, however, is constant: it does not vary with temperature, illumination,
+or other factors. Thus, the radiation does not arise from an interaction between
+the uranium and its surroundings. The radiation, therefore, comes from the
+uranium itself.
+Adapted from: Marie Skłodowska Curie, "Radium and Radioactivity," Century Magazine
+(Jan 1904), 461–66
+Uranium emits rays similar to X-rays. 1[These rays arise either from an interaction
+between the uranium and its surroundings or from the uranium itself.] 2[If the rays
+arise from an interaction between the uranium and its surroundings, then the amount
+of radiation should vary with temperature, illumination, or other factors.] 3[The radiation,
+however, is constant: it does not vary with temperature, illumination, or other
+factors.] Thus, 4[the radiation does not arise from an interaction between the uranium
+and its surroundings.] 5[The radiation, therefore, comes from the uranium itself.]
+(2) + (3)
+$
+(4) + (1)
+$
+(5)
+This argument is the same as the sample argument for Exercise Set 6.5. (Page 161. Go back
+and look!) Notice how much more clearly an argument map reveals the structure of the argument,
+as compared to the premise-and-conclusion outline used in Exercise Set 6.5.
+As explained in Exercise Set 6.5, premises (2) and (3) jointly lead, via modus tollens
+(Rule 23), to (4). Premises (4) and (1) jointly lead, via disjunctive syllogism (Rule 25), to the
+cards or sticky notes to represent the claims and try arranging them in different
+ways on a table or wall.
+Whatever approach you take, remember that you will probably need
+to try out several different possibilities for each argument before you find
+one that you think is correct.
+Appendix III: Exercises 319
+main conclusion, (5). (Hint: the premises of the deductive argument forms introduced in
+Chapter VI are always linked.)
+To piece this argument together, it helps to begin by identifying the main conclusion: (5).
+Once you’ve found the main conclusion, ask yourself which of the premises lead directly to the
+main conclusion. Premises (1) and (4) do the trick. What role, then, do (2) and (3) have in the
+argument? Since (4) is introduced by the conclusion indicator "Thus," we can guess that it’s a
+subconclusion. This means that there must be reasons given for it in the argument. (2) and (3)
+work as reasons for (4), so we place them above (4) in our argument map as the premises of a
+subargument.
+If you bracketed and labeled the first sentence of the passage—the one that provides the
+background information that uranium emits rays similar to X-rays—you might have trouble
+figuring out where it fits into the argument map. If you find a claim that doesn’t seem to fit
+into the argument map anywhere, it might be because it’s not really part of the argument
+at all.
+1. Governments ought not to pay ransoms to terrorists who have
+kidnapped people. Doing so encourages terrorists to kidnap
+more people. Paying ransom also provides the terrorists with the
+resources to kill even more people. Therefore, even though ransoming
+hostages can save the hostages’ lives, paying ransom ultimately
+leads to more deaths. As hard as it may be to accept, it’s
+more important to minimize the overall harm that terrorists do
+than it is to save any specific hostage.
+Adapted from: Peter Singer, "Refusing to Pay Ransoms Saves Lives in the End," Denver
+Post, Dec 13, 2014, http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_27126654/
+refusing-pay-ransoms-saves-lives-end
+2. Basketball brings in a lot of money for a lot of universities. This
+money depends on the hard work and dedication of student
+athletes.
+Thus, student athletes contribute a great deal to many universities’
+finances. Yet, these athletes receive little compensation—
+often no more than the cost of tuition—compared to the amount
+of money they bring in. Clearly, student athletes deserve more
+compensation for their work.
+Adapted from: Ramogi Huma, "A Fair Day’s Pay for a Fair Day’s Work," U.S. News &
+World Report, Apr 1, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/
+should-ncaa-athletes-be-paid/a-fair-days-pay-for-a-fair-days-work
+320 Appendix III: Exercises
+3. When Tonya Illman pulled an old bottle from a sand dune in
+Western Australia in 2018, she didn’t expect to find a piece of
+paper inside. She unrolled the paper to find a carefully handwritten
+note. To her surprise, the note was dated from 1886. Staff at a
+local museum helped translate the note from German. It claimed
+to have been tossed into the Indian Ocean from a German ship
+called the Paula as part of a scientific study of ocean currents. Had
+Tonya really discovered a 132-year-old message-in-a-bottle, or
+was it some kind of hoax? The German Maritime and Hydrographic
+Agency tracked down a log for the Paula. The handwriting
+on the note matched the handwriting in the Paula’s log exactly.
+Furthermore, the log confirmed that the Paula had been in the
+Indian Ocean in 1886. Because the details of that ship’s voyage
+are not easily accessible, very few people could have known
+enough to fake the letter. Thus, it appears the note was authentic.
+Adapted from: Merrit Kennedy, "Oldest-Known Message in a Bottle Found in Australia,"
+NPR, Mar 6, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/06/591177889/
+4. Archaeologists have found Viking artifacts on Baffin Island in
+northern Canada. Admittedly, these artifacts could have arrived
+there by trade. But archaeologists have also found ruins of a large,
+old stone structure. Since the native people of Baffin Island only
+built small, cozy structures, the structure must have been built by
+Vikings. The Vikings wouldn’t have built such a large structure
+unless they’d actually settled on the island. Thus, the Vikings actually
+settled on Baffin Island for a time.
+Adapted from: Heather Pringle, "Face-to-Face," National Geographic,
+Nov 2012, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2012/11/
+vikings-native-american/
+5. I see your wife is out of town. How do I know? Since the female
+detective you’re working with is wearing men’s deodorant, I take
+it she borrowed someone else’s deodorant this morning. And
+since it smells the same as your deodorant, it stands to reason that
+she’s wearing your deodorant. Which she would only do if she’d
+woken up at your place after spending the night there. So she
+spent the night at your place—I’m right so far, aren’t I? Of course
+Appendix III: Exercises 321
+I am. And since you’re married, she wouldn’t have spent the night
+with you unless your wife was out of town. That’s how I know.
+Adapted from: Sherlock, "A Study in Pink," BBC, Jul 25, 2010
+6. High schools should start later. Teenagers today are likely to stay
+up late playing video games or scrolling social media on their
+phones. The light from those screens, combined with a teenager’s
+natural sleep cycle, makes it hard to get to sleep early. Furthermore,
+teenagers’ brains are naturally wired in such a way that it’s
+difficult to wake up at 6:00 am. Yet, many high schools start by
+7:30 am, requiring teenagers to do just that. Thus, teenagers end
+up staying up late and getting up early. The resulting lack of sleep
+leads to problems concentrating at school. It can also have serious
+health consequences. What are we doing to our kids?
+Adapted from: Henry Nicholls, "Let Teenagers Sleep In," New York Times,
+Sep 20, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2NsDSjz
+7. When one person knowingly causes a fatal injury to another, it is
+murder. Capitalism deprives many people of the basic necessities
+of life. It requires them to live in cramped, squalid, toxic conditions.
+It leaves them without resources for medical care. It leaves
+them unable to afford the most minimally nutritious food. It
+leaves them no respite from work, save sex and drink. Furthermore,
+because capitalism leaves wealth and power in the hands of
+the few, it leads to power structures that prevent the oppressed
+from taking the necessities of life by force. Being deprived of the
+necessities of life leads to death just as surely as does being
+actively harmed. Society knows full well that capitalism has this
+effect. Thus, society is committing murder by allowing capitalism
+to continue.
+Adapted from: Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in
+England (1845; repr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 106–7
+8. I have an idea of God. This idea of God is an idea of an infinite
+and perfect being. Thus, I have an idea of an infinite and perfect
+being. Now, all ideas have causes, and only an infinite and perfect
+being can be the cause of my idea of God. Therefore, an infinite
+322 Appendix III: Exercises
+and perfect being exists. I myself, of course, am not an infinite and
+perfect being. So, I cannot be the cause of my idea of God. It follows
+that some other being besides myself exists, and it is God.
+Adapted from: Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress
+(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993)
+9. Our distant ancestors lived in very small societies. On a normal
+day, everyone they met would be someone they had known all of
+their lives. These societies did not interact very much with other
+societies. Just about everything they ate, everything they wore,
+and every tool they used was made within that group. Today,
+of course, we live in vast societies. We can look out at a busy city
+street and see, all at once, more people than our ancestors saw in
+their entire lives. We live in a global trading system. Indeed, our
+world is unimaginably different from the world of our distant ancestors.
+Our minds, however, are designed for the life of our distant
+ancestors. Thus, our minds may not be well adapted to the
+special challenges of the modern world.
+Adapted from: Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World
+of Strangers (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), xi–xii
+10. If people see a child about to fall down a well, they will immediately
+want to help the child. This desire will not come from selfinterested
+motives. It will not come from the desire to win the
+favor of the child’s parents. It will not come from the desire to
+gain a reputation for heroism or to avoid a reputation for callousness.
+This shows that people naturally want to help others avoid
+suffering. Since people naturally want to help others avoid suffering,
+and helping others to avoid suffering is part of being a good
+person, all people have it within themselves to be a good person.
+If you have it within yourself to become a good person, then you
+can make yourself a good person by focusing on your own virtue.
+Thus, you can make yourself a good person by focusing on your
+own virtue.
+Adapted from: Mengzi, Mengzi, translated by Bryan W. Van Norden
+(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008), 46
+Model responses for odd-numbered exercises can be found on page 494.
+Appendix III: Exercises 323
+Need more practice? Draw argument maps of the arguments from Exercise
+Set 1.6, from the exercises in Chapters II through V, from Exercise
+Set 6.4, and for the arguments that you created for the exercise sets in
+Chapter VII. For even more practice, map the arguments in the editorials
+or op-eds in your favorite newspaper. The companion Web site for this
+book also has links to classic texts for argument analysis. Find them under
+the "Resources" link on the site and map the arguments you find in the texts.
+Critical thinking activity: Argument mapping workshop
+For an activity that gives you practice mapping arguments, see the "Argument mapping
+workshop" assignment sheet (p. 558) in Part 3.
+Critical thinking activity: Developing your own arguments using
+argument maps
+For an activity that gives you practice using argument maps to develop your own arguments
+in more detail, see the "Developing your own arguments using argument maps" assignment
+sheet (p. 559) in Part 3.
+
+Part 2
+
+327
+Model responses to all odd-numbered exercises in the Exercise Sets of Part 1 appear below. Both strong and weak model responses are given for some exercises. Many responses are followed by commentary that explains the particular strengths and/or weaknesses of the response. For most of the exercises in this book, there will be more than one good response. The responses below are offered only as guides to help you understand what a good response to the exercises looks like.
+Model Responses to Selected Exercises
+with Commentary
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER I: SHORT ARGUMENTS
+Exercise Set 1.1: Distinguishing premises from conclusions
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+[Racial segregation reduces some persons to the status of things.] Hence, segregation is morally wrong.
+The main clue in this argument is the word "Hence," which is a conclusion indicator. Since "Hence" introduces the clause "segregation is morally wrong," that clause is likely to be the conclusion. Furthermore, it makes more sense to see "Racial segregation reduces some persons to the status of things" as a reason for thinking that segregation is morally wrong, rather than the other way around.
+Note that the word "Hence" is not underlined in the response. Conclusion indicators point you to the conclusion, but they are not part of the conclusion itself.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+Professors shouldn’t give their students grades on their assignments because [grades create bad incentives] and [they don’t provide useful feedback.]
+328 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.1
+In this argument, the premises and conclusion are part of a single sentence.
+The premise indicator because is your clue that the premises come in the
+second part of the sentence. The conclusion comes in the first part. Because is
+a special indicator word in this respect. It usually comes in between the
+conclusion and a premise. Thus, it helps you identify both the conclusion and
+a premise.
+Notice that this model response treats the second part of the sentence as
+providing two separate premises. You could put brackets around everything
+after because and treat it all as a single premise, but it’s better to treat
+"grades create bad incentives" and "they don’t provide useful feedback" as
+two separate premises because they provide two quite different reasons for
+the conclusion.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+In October 2017, astronomers spotted a mysterious object that they
+named ‘Oumuamua. Not only does [‘Oumuamua originate from
+outside our solar system], but astronomers have determined that
+[‘Oumuamua has a strange, elongated shape], that [it is unusually
+reflective,] that [it does not have a "tail" like a comet,] and that [it sped
+up after it passed the Sun]. These features make it unlikely that
+‘Oumuamua is an asteroid or a comet. Thus, it is worth considering the
+possibility that ‘Oumuamua was created by aliens.
+This argument contains five premises, most of which appear as a separate
+clause in a single sentence. The conclusion indicator thus signals that the
+conclusion appears in the last sentence. The first sentence just provides background
+information, so we don’t need to bracket it.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+Some people buy college degrees on the Internet because they’re trying
+to pretend that they went to college. That’s a waste of money, since[it’s
+easy to make a college degree on your computer,] and [a degree that
+you make yourself is just as good as a degree that you bought on the
+Internet.]
+The only genuine indicator word in this argument is the premise indicator
+since. That’s your clue that you’re about to see a premise. If you were still
+having trouble identifying the conclusion after you’ve found those premises,
+ask yourself which of the remaining sentences the premises would be good
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.1 329
+reasons for. In this case, it makes sense to take the premises as reasons to
+think that buying college degrees online is a waste of money. It doesn’t make
+sense to take the premises as reasons to think that people do buy college degrees
+online. Thus, we can mark "That’s a waste of money" as the conclusion
+of the argument.
+Notice that we have marked the last two clauses as separate premises. You
+could also have marked everything after since as one long premise, but in
+general, it’s better to treat each independent clause as its own premise. (Remember:
+an independent clause is a clause that could be a complete sentence
+on its own. For instance, "it’s easy to make a college degree on your computer"
+is an independent clause, whereas "a degree that you make yourself "
+is not.)
+The first sentence is background information. It is neither a premise nor the
+conclusion of the argument. So why does it have a because in it? Remember
+that not every instance of because, since, or other common premise indicators
+is actually an indicator word. In this case, because connects a piece of
+background information to an explanation of that information. An explanation
+differs from an argument in that an argument gives you a reason to
+think that something is true, whereas an explanation merely helps you understand
+why or how something is true.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+[Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau looks suspiciously like
+former Cuban leader Fidel Castro.] [Trudeau’s parents traveled to Cuba
+many times and met with Castro,] and[there are pictures of Trudeau’s
+mother looking fondly at Castro.] Is it too far-fetched to believe that
+Fidel Castro is Justin Trudeau’s real father?
+This argument presents several challenges to beginning students. First of all,
+there are no indicator words. Second, the conclusion is presented as a rhetorical
+question rather than a statement. (A good rule of thumb is that when
+you encounter a rhetorical question in an argument, you should rephrase it
+as a statement. People sometimes try to smuggle dubious claims or unsupported
+assertions into an argument as rhetorical questions!) But once you
+recognize that the conclusion is that Fidel Castro is Justin Trudeau’s father,
+it’s fairly easy to identify the three reasons given for that conclusion.
+In the interest of forestalling yet more conspiracy theories, it’s worth noting
+a decisive objection to this argument’s conclusion: Justin Trudeau was
+born years before his parents ever visited Cuba. But we’re getting ahead of
+ourselves! We’ll come back to the idea of objections in Chapter VII.
+330 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.2
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+1) LeBron James said that he is the greatest basketball player of all
+time.
+(2) Lots of amazing basketball players, like Bill Russell, Michael
+Jordan, and Larry Bird, have done many of the things that LeBron
+James has done.
+(3) When LeBron James says that he is the greatest of all time, it’s
+disrespectful of those players.
+Therefore, (4) LeBron James shouldn’t have said that he is the greatest
+of all time.
+This argument is a bit tricky to analyze precisely because of the order in
+which the claims are presented. Once you realize that the main point—the
+conclusion of the argument—is that James shouldn’t have said that he’s the
+greatest of all time, it becomes easier to figure out how the argument works.
+We think this order makes the most sense, but your ordering might look a
+little bit different.
+Pay attention to the way this model response rephrases sentences from the
+original passage so that they can "stand on their own" in the outline: you
+can understand what each claim means just by reading it on its own. For
+instance, the sentence "He shouldn’t have said that" becomes "LeBron James
+shouldn’t have said that he is the greatest of all time."
+Note that some of the sentences in the original passage, such as the one
+pointing out that James is really good, are not reasons for thinking that
+James shouldn’t have said that he is the greatest of all time. Thus, it’s not
+part of the argument and doesn’t need to go in the premise-and-conclusion
+outline.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+(1) A team of researchers led by Brendan Nyhan of Dartmouth gave
+some parents information from the Centers for Disease Control and
+Prevention stating that there is no evidence that vaccines cause
+autism.
+(2) The team gave other parents no information about vaccine safety.
+Exercise Set 1.2: Outlining arguments in premise-and-conclusion form
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.2 331
+(3) When compared to parents who received no information, parents
+who received the information were no more likely to vaccinate their
+children.
+Therefore, (4) simply providing information about vaccine safety does
+not increase the proportion of parents who get their children vaccinated.
+This exercise gives a simple example of scientific reasoning. Accounts of scientific
+reasoning are often presented as stories about what a group of scientists
+have done, but you can usually reconstruct the scientists’ reasoning from
+the story. In this case, the story starts with an explanation of the scientists’
+hypothesis—that is, the idea they wanted to test. They wanted to test the
+idea that giving parents information about vaccine safety would increase
+the proportion of parents who vaccinate their children. The word concluded
+in the last sentence tells you that you’re about to read the conclusion of the
+researchers’ reasoning: in this case, the conclusion is that their hypothesis
+was false—that providing information about vaccine safety does not make
+parents more likely to vaccinate their children.
+Notice that the reasons given for this conclusion don’t just consist of observations
+the researchers collected. The researchers did an experiment: they
+gave information only to some parents, and then they compared the behavior
+of those parents to the behavior of parents who did not receive that information.
+Scientific reasoning often works this way. You start with a
+hypothesis, and then you do an experiment to generate exactly the kinds of
+observations you need to test your hypothesis, and then you reason from your
+observations to a conclusion.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+(1) In 1908, something flattened eight hundred square miles of forest
+in a part of Siberia called Tunguska.
+(2) Scientists discovered that a lake in the area has the shape of an
+impact crater that would have been created by an asteroid or comet.
+Therefore, (3) the Tunguska event was caused by an asteroid or comet.
+The fact that there are other popular theories about what caused the "Tunguska
+event" might make us more skeptical about the conclusion of this
+argument. Since they are not reasons for that conclusion, though, we do not
+include them when outlining this argument in premise-and-conclusion
+form.
+332 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.2
+Note that, like the previous exercise, this argument illustrates the scientific
+method in action. Since there are numerous competing hypotheses about
+the cause of the Tunguska event, scientists try to find ways to test those different
+hypotheses. Developing and testing multiple hypotheses is an important
+part of doing good science. Drawing conclusions from those tests
+requires careful reasoning.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+(1) People behave much more cautiously when they know that their life
+is on the line.
+Therefore, (2) People would drive much more cautiously if there were a
+spear mounted on the steering wheel of every car.
+(3) We should do everything we can to encourage cautious driving.
+Therefore, (4) all cars should have a spear mounted on the steering
+wheel, aimed directly at the driver’s chest.
+This argument contains a subargument—that is, an argument within an
+argument. Premise (1) is a reason for (2), and (2) is a reason for the main
+conclusion. Thus, we call (2) a subconclusion. We indicate that (2) follows
+from (1) by writing "Therefore" before (2). (For more on subarguments and
+subconclusions, see Appendix III [p. 310].)
+As with exercise 3 of this set, just because this argument seems ridiculous
+(but is it really?), it doesn’t mean that we can’t put it in premise-and-conclusion
+form. Putting an argument in premise-and-conclusion form is a
+very different task from figuring out whether it is a good argument.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+(1) It is possible for someone to wonder whether her life is meaningful
+even if she knows that she has enjoyed her life.
+Therefore, (2) a meaningful life is not the same as an enjoyable life.
+(3) Someone who is alienated from her life or feels like her life is
+pointless, even if she is doing things that might seem worthwhile from
+an objective perspective, is not leading a meaningful life.
+Therefore, (4) a meaningful life is not the same as a life spent on
+objectively worthwhile projects.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.3 333
+Therefore, (5) neither enjoyment nor objectively worthwhile projects,
+each considered separately from the other, are sufficient for a meaningful
+life.
+Like the argument in exercise 7 of this set, this argument contains subarguments.
+Premise (1) is a reason for premise (2) and premise (3) is a
+reason for premise (4). Premises (2) and (4), taken together, are reasons for
+the main conclusion, (5).
+A more precise and visually appealing way to represent the structure of
+arguments is to literally draw a picture of them, creating what is sometimes
+called an argument map. In this case, we can represent the relation
+between these various premises and their subconclusions and final conclusion
+like this:
+(1) (3)
+$ $
+(2) + (4)
+$
+(5)
+We introduce argument maps in Appendix III (p. 307). You won’t need
+them to do the other exercises in this book, but studying argument mapping
+may help you understand and construct more complex arguments.
+Exercise Set 1.3: Analyzing visual arguments
+See the companion Web site for this book for model responses to Exercise Set 1.3.
+Exercise Set 1.4: Identifying reliable and unreliable premises
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+(1) Anybody could become a zombie.
+(2) Zombies are constantly looking to eat the brains of the living.
+Therefore, (3) you should always be prepared to escape from or fight
+back against a zombie attack.
+The premises of this argument are unreliable because it is a widely
+known fact that zombies don’t exist. Thus, it’s false that anybody
+could become a zombie (premise 1), and it’s false that zombies are
+constantly looking to eat the brains of the living (premise 2).
+334 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.4
+This response explicitly addresses each premise in the argument. It explains
+that the premises are unreliable because they rest on an assumption that is
+widely known to be false.
+Some people do believe in zombies, of course, and so they would not accept
+this response’s justification for rejecting the premises. However, we do not
+need complete agreement on the truth or falsity of a premise to decide whether
+it’s reliable or unreliable. Use your judgment to decide whether there is
+enough agreement or controversy about a particular premise to make it a
+good starting point for an argument. If in doubt, specify what you think the
+argument’s target audience is, and state whether members of that audience
+would accept the premise.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+(1) A true education involves accumulating knowledge and educating
+one’s emotions.
+(2) A liberal arts education exposes students to history, science, math,
+literature, and the arts.
+(3) Exposure to literature and the arts speaks directly to our emotions.
+Therefore, (4) a liberal arts education is an essential part of any "real"
+education.
+Premises (2) and (3) are reliable because they are widely accepted
+facts. Premise (1) is unreliable because the use of the vague expression
+"true education" makes it too hard to tell whether it’s true. What counts
+as a "true education"? At the very least, we would need to see an
+argument for the claim that a "true education" involves accumulating
+knowledge and "educating the emotions."
+Sometimes it’s hard to know whether a premise is reliable because it’s hard to
+know exactly what the premise means. That is arguably the case with the
+first premise in this argument. The best way to try to make such premises
+reliable is to make the claim as precise as possible (see Rule 4 and Appendix
+II) and offer reasons for it.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.4 335
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+(1) By looking at the ratios of radioactive materials to products of
+radioactive decay in a piece of rock, we can estimate the age of the rock
+fairly well.
+(2) Radiometric dating reveals that some large rock formations in the
+Earth’s crust are up to four billion years old.
+Therefore, (3) the Earth itself is at least four billion years old.
+Premise (1) is reliable because it is a widely known fact that you can
+estimate the age of a rock by looking at radioactive materials in the
+rock. However, depending on the audience, some readers might not
+know that, and so it would be even better if the argument cited a source
+to support this claim. Premise (2) is unreliable because it is neither
+widely known nor supported by a source or an argument in this
+passage. Thus, we can’t be sure whether it’s true.
+This response omits several sentences from the passage. These sentences are
+explaining terminology (e.g., "radioactive" and "radiometric dating") or
+giving examples, not providing reasons to accept the conclusion of the argument.
+That’s why we don’t include them in our premise-and-conclusion
+outline of the argument.
+The response claims that premise (1) is reliable because it’s a widely
+known fact. The response also admits that some people might deny or be
+unaware that premise (1) is true. Remember that what counts as a "widely
+known fact" will vary with the intended audience of the argument. This is
+why the difference between a premise’s being reliable and its being true is so
+important: A fact is a fact whether anyone knows it or not. Just because a
+premise is true, though, doesn’t mean that it’s a reliable starting point for an
+argument. Since arguments are supposed to take us from things that we justifiably
+believe to be true to things that we didn’t previously know, we have
+to start with premises that are reliable—that is, premises that we justifiably
+believe.
+Finally, the response points out that premise (2) is unreliable in the context
+of this argument. Remember that this is not saying that premise (2) is
+false. It’s just saying that we don’t have a good reason to accept it in the
+context of this argument. If the premise is true and there are good sources
+that show that it’s true, the author of the argument could have avoided this
+problem by citing those sources.
+This argument illustrates yet another important aspect of scientific reasoning:
+science builds on itself. That is, scientific arguments rest on premises
+that were themselves shown to be true through previous scientific
+336 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.4
+investigation, and we can’t expect every argument to restate the entire
+chain of reasoning supporting every single premise. (Instead, we often expect
+arguments to cite their sources, so that readers can follow up if they’re
+unsure of the truth of a particular claim.) This argument, for instance, rests
+on an established body of knowledge about how different kinds of carbon
+atoms decay over time. Understanding scientific arguments, therefore, often
+requires knowing a bit about lots of different things. That’s one reason to get
+a broad scientific education.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+(1) Flashing strobe lights can cause people with epilepsy to have a
+seizure.
+(2) Epileptic seizures can be lethal.
+(3) It is possible to send an image to someone’s phone that looks like a
+flashing strobe light.
+(4) When someone uses a potentially lethal object to inflict intentional
+harm on someone else, the aggressor is assaulting the second with a
+deadly weapon.
+Therefore, (5) sending an image of a flashing strobe light to an
+epileptic person’s phone for the purpose of inducing a seizure should
+count as assault with a deadly weapon.
+Premises (1) and (2) are both reliable because they are commonly
+known facts about epilepsy. Premise (3) is reasonably reliable because
+everyone knows that you can send images to other people’s phones, and
+that those images can depict all kinds of things. The only reason to
+question its reliability is because, in the context of the argument, it
+seems like it means that you can send someone an image that really
+does flash like a strobe light, and I could imagine someone being
+skeptical that a GIF or other image could do that. Premise (4) is reliable
+because it follows from the definition of "assault with a deadly
+weapon.".
+This response identifies some ambiguity in premise (3) that raises some
+questions about the premise’s reliability. Remember that lack of clarity and
+specificity can undermine the reliability of a premise because if it’s hard to
+know what a premise means, then it can be hard to know whether to accept
+it. That’s one reason that you should always state your premises as clearly as
+possible.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.4 337
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+(1) Every time you eat meat, your meal is the result of the suffering
+and death of an animal.
+(2) It’s disgusting to put a piece of a dead animal’s carcass into your
+mouth and chew it.
+(3) There is plenty of great vegetarian food.
+(4) Vegetarianism is healthier than eating meat.
+(5) By becoming a vegetarian, you’d be joining the company of great
+people like Leonardo da Vinci, Isaac Newton, Thomas Edison, Paul
+McCartney,
+Shania Twain, and Tobey Maguire.
+Therefore, (6) you should be a vegetarian.
+Premise (1) is mostly reliable. It’s obvious that when you eat meat,
+your meal is the result of an animal’s death. Most meat, but not all,
+comes from animals who suffered (e.g., in factory farms or slaughterhouses)
+in order to produce that meat. Premise (2) is unreliable. It’s too
+subjective and controversial a statement to count as a good starting
+point. Since many people do not find it disgusting to eat meat, and
+eating meat involves putting a piece of an animal’s carcass in your
+mouth, apparently they don’t agree that that’s disgusting! Premise (3)
+is fairly reliable. Most people by now know that there is a lot of great
+vegetarian food, especially when you look at cuisines other than
+American cuisine.
+Premise (4) is unreliable because it’s too vague a statement.
+Some vegetarian diets are healthier than some omnivorous diets, but
+other vegetarian diets are unhealthy. In order to be reliable, the premise
+would have to be more precise about the kinds of diets it has in mind—
+and probably about the ways in which vegetarian diets are healthier.
+Finally, premise (5) is partly reliable, since it’s widely known that
+some of those people (like Paul McCartney) are vegetarians, but not
+well known that some of the others are or were vegetarians.
+This response proceeds systematically through each premise, offering nuanced
+evaluations of each of them. Some of the premises are only partly reliable,
+and the response explains which parts are reliable and which parts are not.
+Notice that premises (2) and (3) are both "subjective" statements, but the
+response claims that one premise is reliable while the other is not. Many
+people are tempted to dismiss all subjective statements as "mere opinion," but
+even some subjective statements are sometimes accepted widely enough to
+provide good starting points for a debate. For instance, "A cool swim on a
+338 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.5
+hot summer day is wonderful" is a subjective statement, but most people
+would probably accept it as a reliable premise in an argument. The same
+goes for ethical statements. "Abortion is always immoral" is too controversial
+to count as a reliable premise, but "It’s wrong to torture people for fun and
+profit" is so widely accepted that most people would think it odd to say that
+it’s an unreliable premise.
+Exercise Set 1.5: Decomplexifying artificially abstruse quotations
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore.
+You may not come up with the exact wording of the original quotation. If
+you don’t, that’s fine; just aim for clarity and directness. Responses like "I
+don’t think we’re in Kansas anymore" or "I don’t feel like we’re in Kansas
+anymore" would be perfectly good.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+Brevity is the soul of wit.
+Notice that in the "complexified" version of this quotation, the clause between
+the dashes simply repeats the first part of the sentence without adding
+any new content. Thus, it can be cut entirely from the simplified version;
+there is no need to say, "Brevity, or conciseness, is the soul of wit." Just figure
+out the basic meaning of the entire quotation and restate it as plainly as
+possible.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+We must be the change that we wish to see in the world.
+Notice that parts of the "complexified" version of the quotation are simply
+redundant. For instance, the complexified version ends with "the world that
+we inhabit." Since it’s clear from the context that "the world" means "the
+world that we inhabit," rather than some other world (Jupiter?), you can
+delete the words "that we inhabit" without changing the meaning of the
+sentence.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.6 339
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.
+This response substitutes single words (e.g., "journey" and "step") for longer
+phrases (e.g., "trip from one location to another" and "one movement of exactly
+one foot from one location to another"). Having a large vocabulary
+should help you say the same thing in fewer and better-focused words, not
+more.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+A woman without a man is like a fish without a bicycle.
+Among many other changes, this response substitutes the more common
+phrase "is like" for the less common "is akin to." Take care when using unusual
+phrases in place of more common words. Sometimes it is very effective,
+but sometimes it just makes you sound like you’re trying too hard to "sound
+smart."
+Exercise Set 1.6: Diagnosing loaded language
+Model Responses for Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This argument contains at least five instances of loaded language.
+Calling Trump’s proposed wall between Mexico and the United States a
+"fantasy of his fevered imagination" makes it sound bad, but it’s not
+entirely clear what it’s trying to say. Maybe it’s saying that it’s
+"unlikely to be built." Calling the wall "an exercise in xenophobia" is
+definitely not a neutral description; it implies, without argument, that
+the motivation is a fear of outsiders. If the author wants to claim that
+the wall is xenophobic, he should offer some reasons for thinking so.
+Calling the wall an "ugly scar" adds no substance. It should be cut.
+Phrases like "untold ecological devastation" and "boost Trump’s fragile
+ego" are inflammatory ways to claim that the wall would be ecologically
+damaging and that it is motivated by Trump’s desire to protect or
+boost his own self-esteem. Finally, saying that building the wall would
+be "devastatingly stupid" is a loaded way to say that it is a bad idea or
+that it shouldn’t be done.
+This response does three things: it works methodically through the argument
+to identify specific words or phrases that are "loaded" with emotional
+340 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.6
+overtones, it explains why they are loaded, and it suggests ways the author
+could revise the argument to avoid each instance of loaded language.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+The argument contains loaded language: "fevered imagination," "ugly
+scar," and "devastatingly stupid."
+While this response does identify several instances of loaded language, it
+neither explains what makes them loaded nor suggests more neutral alternatives.
+It also overlooks several instances of loaded language in the
+argument.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+This argument uses several loaded expressions: "dirty little secret,"
+"monstrously cruel mistreatment," and "senseless animal cruelty" all
+have strong negative overtones. The first two could be avoided by
+describing the factory farm’s practices in neutral terms (e.g., by
+describing the size of the crates in which factory-farmed chickens are
+kept), leaving it to the reader to decide whether those practices are
+"monstrously cruel." The expression "senseless animal cruelty" could be
+replaced with "treating animals in this way." Finally, by saying that
+"morally decent people abhor" such practices, the argument suggests
+that anyone who is not outraged by factory farms is morally indecent;
+this might be expressed more modestly by asserting that "Many
+people believe it is wrong to treat animals in this way."
+Sometimes there is no neutral substitute for a particular expression because
+of the way a sentence is written. Avoiding loaded language sometimes requires
+rewriting entire sentences, as this response recommends.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+This argument relies on a more subtle use of loaded language: the
+phrase "imaginative little fable" suggests—without argument—that
+the boy’s claim about losing the knife is false. Likewise, the question,
+"You don’t really believe that, do you?" suggests that anyone who
+believes the "fable" is gullible or stupid, but it doesn’t actually give
+any reasons for thinking that the boy’s claim is false.
+Note that the words "murder weapon" and "murderer," which might count
+as loaded language in other contexts, are not loaded in this context. The
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.7 341
+Model Responses for Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This letter does a decent job distinguishing its conclusion from its premises (Rule 1). Although it doesn’t use any indicator words, the structure of the letter makes it clear that the first sentence is the main conclusion. The letter presents its premises in a natural order (Rule 2). The premises are reasonably reliable (Rule 3), since they’re pretty much common sense, although some people might deny that all responsible gun owners have to keep their guns in a gun safe. (Maybe a trigger lock is enough in a household without children, for instance.) The argument could probably be made more concise (Rule 4), since the first sentence and the last clause basically say the same thing. While none of the language is particularly loaded (Rule 5), comparing marijuana edibles to guns is a bit inflammatory. Comparing them to prescription drugs might prevent some readers from getting riled up.
+argument is about someone who is on trial for murder. The knife in question was used to kill someone; it really is a murder weapon. If the boy did commit the crime, as the argument tries to show, then he is, literally, a murderer.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+This argument does not use loaded language. There are a few phrases that might seem to be loaded, like "while innocent lives are being lost" and "no one else is willing," but consider the source of the argument. Wonder Woman is set during World War I, when innocent lives really are being lost and no one else from Wonder Woman’s home island is willing to defend the world from Ares. There is no more neutral way to describe the situation.
+If you haven’t seen Wonder Woman, you may well come to a different conclusion about this argument. After all, people do sometimes trot out phrases like "innocent lives" to play on our emotions. But in context, this language is not loaded. The fact that many of the people dying are innocent is directly relevant to Wonder Woman’s reasoning for wanting to help. There is no more neutral way to describe the situation that accurately captures the substance of her reasoning. And that’s what Rule 5 is all about: focusing on the substance of your reasoning, rather than the way it’s presented.
+Exercise Set 1.7: Evaluating letters to the editor
+342 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.7
+The letter does a fairly good job using consistent terms (Rule 6),
+although the first and last sentences have slightly different terms for
+explaining where marijuana edibles should be stored.
+This response proceeds methodically through each of the six rules from Chapter
+I. It explains in some detail how the letter follows (or fails to follow) each
+rule. It also offers nuanced evaluations in cases where the argument mostly
+obeys a rule but could do better.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This letter follows most of these rules: Rules 1, 2, 4, and 6. One rule it
+maybe does not follow is Rule 3, "Start from reliable premises." And it
+totally violates Rule 5! Comparing marijuana to guns is totally
+ridiculous and really loaded language.
+Although this response mostly agrees with the strong response above, this one
+is far too quick and too vague. It does not address each rule individually—
+it
+just lists them without explaining how the letter follows them. When it addresses
+Rule 3, it simply says that the argument might not follow the rule.
+It does not explain how the argument runs afoul of Rule 3, nor does it indicate
+how badly it violates Rule 3. Are all of the premises unreliable—or
+just one? Are the premises clearly false—or just, maybe, questionable?
+Why? Finally, in claiming that the argument violates Rule 5, the response
+offers a very quick assertion that it’s "ridiculous" and "really loaded" to compare
+marijuana to guns, but it doesn’t say why. (For more on when and how
+it’s reasonable to compare seemingly different things, see Chapter III!)
+Model Responses for Exercise 3
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This letter to the editor does a poor job with Rules 1 and 2. The conclusion
+is presumably that we "ought to be ashamed of the level of discourse
+in our politics," but this is buried in the middle of the letter. The
+argument would be much clearer if the author switched the third and
+fourth sentences. That way, the sentence about "innuendo and idiocy"
+would be next to the sentence about "honest discussion," where it
+belongs, and the conclusion would come at the end of the letter. The
+letter does a decent, but not great, job with Rule 3. All three premises
+probably resonate with most people’s experience, but they’re stated as
+vague, sweeping generalizations. The letter does a good job following
+Rule 4. A few words, like "thoughtful," could be deleted without
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.7 343
+changing the meaning, but the letter is straightforward and concise.
+The letter does a poor job following Rule 5. The expressions "run screaming"
+and "idiocy" all cast politicians in a strongly negative light.
+"Idiocy" could be deleted and "avoid" could be substituted for "run
+screaming." As for Rule 6, the letter does reasonably well, though it
+uses "discussion," "discourse," and "debate" as synonyms instead of
+picking one and sticking with it.
+This response offers concrete, constructive suggestions for making the letter
+follow each rule.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This argument is great, and it makes a really important point. The
+conclusion (Rule 1) is about how politicians avoid intelligent debate,
+which is so true (Rule 3). The argument makes perfect sense to me
+(Rule 2), and it’s not overly abstract (Rule 4) or loaded (Rule 5).
+This response praises the argument largely because the author agrees with
+the argument’s conclusion. The response tries to connect its praise of the letter
+with various rules, but it does so briefly and incorrectly. Following Rule 1
+is not a matter of the reader identifying or accepting the conclusion; it’s a
+matter of the argument making it easy for the reader to recognize premises
+and conclusions. Rule 2 is about the arrangement of the premises being sensible
+and easy to follow: commentary on it should focus on the order and
+"flow" of the premises. Rule 3 is not about the truth of the conclusion, but
+about the reliability of the premises.
+This response does offer brief assessments of Rules 4 and 5, though it
+doesn’t support its claims. The response makes no mention of Rule 6. In general,
+evaluating an argument is not about whether you accept the argument’s
+conclusion. It involves asking targeted questions about how well the author
+presents the argument and how well the premises support the conclusion.
+Model Responses for Exercise 5
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+Even though it doesn’t use any premise or conclusion indicators, it is
+fairly easy to tell that the first sentence gives the conclusion of the
+argument, with the premises following it (Rule 1). The premises unfold
+in a meaningful order (Rule 2), which makes it easier to distinguish
+the premises from the conclusion. The big problem is that none of these
+premises are reliable—at least, not for a general audience (Rule 3).
+344 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.7
+Maybe this is good enough when talking to a bunch of specialists, but
+most people would need to be given good reasons to believe the things in
+this argument. The language isn’t loaded (Rule 5) or inconsistent
+(Rule 6), but it’s a bit harder to say how well the argument follows
+Rule 4: the argument includes some very technical words and phrases,
+such as "intrinsically photosensitive retinal ganglion cells." While
+they’re not exactly fluff, they don’t actually add much to the argument,
+either, and the author could probably have done without them.
+This response highlights the connection between Rule 1 and Rule 2. When
+someone presents ideas in a natural order, it is easier to identify the conclusion
+of the person’s argument.
+This response also highlights a common issue in arguments about highly
+technical topics. When writing or speaking about technical topics, people
+often use technical terms. In some cases, this aids communication by enabling
+people to express complex ideas more precisely. In other cases, it hinders
+communication by making it harder for people to follow. Much of this
+depends on the audience and the context, and reasonable people could disagree
+about whether some technical term is useful or not in any particular
+situation.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This argument follows Rule 1 and 2. It does not follow Rule 3 because
+the premises aren’t supported. It follows Rules 5, and 6, but not 4
+because of all the jargon.
+This response is better than the weak responses to the earlier exercises in that
+it addresses each rule individually and even gives a (very!) brief explanation
+of how the argument violates Rule 3. However, it does not justify any
+of its claims, and it dismisses the technical terminology as "jargon" a bit too
+hastily.
+Model Responses for Exercise 7
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This letter makes it clear what the general conclusion of the argument
+is, and it’s clear that the rest of the letter consists of reasons for the
+conclusion (Rule 1). With respect to Rule 2, the letter presents its ideas
+in a natural order, except for the last sentence. That sentence should
+probably come before the third sentence. All of the premises are reliable
+(Rule 3) because they’re common knowledge, and the letter avoids
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.7 345
+overly abstract writing (Rule 4). The premises avoid loaded language
+(Rule 5), but the conclusion is fairly inflammatory, and it doesn’t
+say exactly what the author wants us to believe or do. Should people be
+writing letters to their local governments? Holding used book sales or
+buying bumper stickers that say "Support Your Local Library"?
+Forming angry mobs and picketing the homes of politicians who want
+to cut library funding? We can’t tell which of these the author means
+from the command "Fight for your library!" The letter does not use
+different words to express the same idea (Rule 6).
+This response explains the ways in which the argument follows or violates
+each rule. It explains in detail why the conclusion contains more emotional
+power than substance by illustrating the various things that the conclusion
+could be taken to mean.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+The argument doesn’t use any conclusion indicators, so it fails Rule 1.
+It presents its ideas in a natural order (Rule 2), except that the last
+sentence seems out of place. When it comes to Rule 3, the argument
+needs a lot more work. How does the author know that my local library
+has books on the topics that she mentions? She hasn’t been to every
+library in the country. She hasn’t justified the claim that libraries
+encourage people to read for pleasure, either. She needs to give statistics
+to support that claim. As for the claim that there are limits to what you
+can find on the Internet, I’ll bet the author just hasn’t looked hard
+enough. The conclusion builds more on overtone than substance (Rule
+5), but the rest of the language in the letter is fine (Rules 4 and 6).
+This response is detailed, but it applies two of the rules incorrectly. An argument
+does not necessarily need to use conclusion or premise indicators in
+order to follow Rule 1. As long as the argument makes clear what the conclusion
+is and what the premises are, which this argument does, it follows
+Rule 1. With respect to Rule 3, this response is far too demanding. It’s reasonable
+to assume that most libraries have books on the topics mentioned in
+the letter, even if the letter’s author hasn’t been to every library. It’s also
+reasonable to assume that libraries promote reading for pleasure, even
+without detailed statistics. Finally, since many people have had the experience
+of looking for information on the Internet and not being able to find it,
+it’s more reasonable to think that there are limits to what you can find on
+the Internet than to think that the author simply hasn’t looked hard enough.
+Remember that premises do not need to be beyond doubt in order to be reliable.
+Following Rule 3 only means providing premises that the argument’s
+audience can accept as reasonable starting points.
+346 Model Responses for Exercise Set 1.7
+Model Responses for Exercise 9
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This letter is reasonably clear about the main message, and some of the
+sentences are clearly supposed to support that main message, but it’s a
+little unclear what role a few of the other sentences or phrases play in
+the passage (Rule 1). For instance, what does the claim that the NCAA
+"claims to care about its athletes" play in the argument? Is that a
+premise or not? The problem arises partly because the ideas don’t flow in
+a natural order for understanding the argument (Rule 2). They should
+be rewritten so that they begin with the accusation against De Sousa,
+followed by the claim that he didn’t know about it, and then to the
+conclusion that he should get to play. The argument definitely violates
+Rule 3, since the author doesn’t offer any evidence that De Sousa
+didn’t know about the payments or that the NCAA has ruled him
+ineligible, and these aren’t exactly common knowledge—although it’s
+possible that they were in Kansas City at the time. The argument could
+do a bit better on Rule 4 by cutting some of the unnecessary commentary,
+and it could definitely do better on Rule 5 by replacing phrases
+like "can’t follow his dream" and "irresponsible crooks" with "can’t
+play college basketball" and "other people." The argument does not
+violate Rule 6 by using terms inconsistently.
+Again, this response addresses each rule individually and explains how the
+argument follows the rule (or doesn’t), offering specific examples to support
+its claims and making specific suggestions about how to improve the
+argument..
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This letter fails Rule 3 miserably.I have no idea who Silvio De Sousa is
+or whether he is really as innocent as this author says—or, for that
+matter, whether he’s been ruled ineligible or whether Adidas actually
+bribed De Sousa’s guardian. Basically, I don’t know anything about
+this, so I’m not convinced of anything.
+This response focuses too narrowly on one particular problem with the argument.
+The entire response is a criticism of the letter’s claims about Silvio
+De Sousa and his legal guardian. The response is correct that the letter’s
+author gives us no particular reason to believe his claims about De Sousa,
+and that this is a problem with respect to Rule 3. But the response does not
+offer any constructive suggestions about how to improve it. Nor does it address
+how well the argument follows any of the other rules from this
+chapter.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.1 347
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+Pigeons, parakeets, and swans
+Appropriate examples for this generalization must be birds and they must be able to fly. Pigeons, parakeets, and swans all fit the bill.
+Notice that there are some borderline examples, too. Chickens, for example, can’t fly very far or very well, but they can propel themselves through the air with their wings for a short distance. Do they count? Sticking with clear-cut examples provides better support for the generalization, so stay away from those debatable cases.
+The generalization in this exercise is false, of course. Some birds, such as ostriches and penguins, can’t fly. Thus, even though it’s easy to produce lots of examples of birds that can fly, that doesn’t entitle us to conclude that all birds can fly. It’s often possible to find examples to support any generalization, true or false. Thus, being able to trot out a few good examples isn’t enough to show that a generalization is true.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+Pineapple, orange, and guava
+Appropriate examples for this generalization must meet two criteria: they must be fruits and they must be sweet (when ripe). Notice that some people might dispute certain examples: if you gave butternut squash as an example, some people might object that it’s not a fruit—even though it technically is. Some people might object that it’s not sweet enough to count as "sweet."
+The same kinds of problems crop up in collecting data for scientific studies. Scientists often deal with these problems by defining their terms in much more detail. For instance, instead of using vague terms like sweet, they might specify that most fruits contain at least a certain amount of sugars per gram. (But what about fruit and ripe, which are also vague?) For more on definitions, see Appendix II.
+For the purpose of this exercise, sticking with clear-cut examples allows you to avoid those difficulties.
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER II: ARGUMENTS BY EXAMPLE
+Exercise Set 2.1: Finding relevant examples
+348 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.1
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+Cocaine, heroin, fentanyl
+Appropriate examples for this generalization must meet three criteria: they
+must be (1) drugs that (2) are used recreationally, and (3) can kill users
+who overdose on them. A medical drug that has no recreational use would
+not count, even if users can overdose on it, and neither would a recreational
+drug on which users cannot fatally overdose. Note that some potentially lethal
+drugs, such as fentanyl, are used both recreationally and medically.
+Such drugs still fit the criteria, even though they have other uses, too.
+Note that this generalization is expressed in a different way than the
+others. The earlier exercises had forms like "Most Xs are Y." This one has the
+form "Y is true of many Xs." Be on the lookout for generalizations expressed
+in different ways!
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+Australia, Italy, and Canada
+Appropriate examples for this generalization must be developed, democratic
+countries that do not practice capital punishment. Australia, Italy and
+Canada are all developed, democratic countries, and none of them practice
+capital punishment.
+As with the generalization in exercise 5, this generalization is actually
+false. The United States and Japan are developed, democratic countries, and
+both use capital punishment.
+Notice also that this generalization leaves some crucial details open to
+interpretation. How developed must a country be to count as "developed"?
+How democratic must it be to count as "democratic"? And for that matter,
+what counts as "practicing capital punishment"? For instance, Russia hasn’t
+abolished capital punishment, but it has had a moratorium on executions
+since 1996. Does it "practice capital punishment"? (For that matter, is it
+democratic?)
+In most cases, there may not be a single best interpretation of the generalization.
+What matters most is that you pick one definition and stick to it.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+John Lennon, David Bowie, and Ed Sheeran
+Appropriate examples for this question must be musicians, they must be
+famous, and they must be from England.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.2 349
+Exercise Set 2.2: Improving biased samples
+Once again, you may need to think carefully about what this generalization means before you choose examples. Who counts as a musician? Do songwriters, composers, or orchestral conductors count? Who counts as famous? Most people have heard of John Lennon, so that’s easy. David Bowie was clearly famous too. But what about Ed Sheeran? He’s famous among younger music fans, but your parents and grandparents probably don’t know who he is. (Neither does one of the coauthors of this book.) What about someone like the English cellist Jacqueline du Pré? Classical music aficionados consider her one of the greatest cellists of all time, but most people have probably never heard of her. Is she famous? As with exercise 7, what matters is that you pick one interpretation of the generalization and stick with it.
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+This argument could be improved by sampling all likely Republican voters throughout the United States, rather than looking just at people who attended the Republican National Conference. The "political junkies" who attended that conference are probably more politically involved than the average voter, since most voters wouldn’t bother to go. And there are probably more people at that particular conference who support the libertarian candidate who won, since the conference is close to his home state and drew "busloads" of libertarian supporters.
+This response explains what group you would need to sample to improve the argument, and it explains clearly why the existing sample—namely, people attending this conference—is not representative of the group discussed in the conclusion—namely, Republican voters in general. If you’re having trouble figuring out whether a sample is biased, ask yourself how the people or things in the sample are likely to differ from other people or things in the group discussed in the argument’s conclusion.
+Notice that the response cites details from the argument—e.g., the fact that conference attendees are "political junkies"—to support its reasoning.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+This argument draws a conclusion about what makes all people happy based on a study of men who lived in Boston in 1938. While the researchers at least made an effort to include people from different socioeconomic backgrounds, this argument would be stronger if it
+350 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.2
+looked at a far broader range of people, including women, people from
+younger generations, and people from other cities and other countries.
+The argument doesn’t say what fraction of the men are white, but they
+would probably do well to include people from more diverse racial and
+ethnic backgrounds, too. Other factors might be more important to
+people from these other groups besides good relationships, and the study
+might miss factors that affect other people’s happiness, like sexism or
+racism.
+As this response points out, the conclusion is about a very large group: all
+people. The examples, though, are all drawn from a very specific subgroup:
+men who lived in Boston in 1938. To improve the argument, we need to
+look at a wider set of examples.
+The response not only identifies the way in which the examples are unrepresentative,
+but it also lists other kinds of people who should be considered
+and explains why the existing sample bias weakens the argument.
+Of course, the Harvard researchers can’t go back to 1938 and start their
+study over, but a new study with more diverse participants might be illuminating—
+at least for those of you who are around in another seventy-five
+years to see the results!
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+This argument looks only at drivers who chose to switch from their old
+insurance provider to Allstate. This results in a biased sample because
+it excludes everyone who decided not to switch. The argument would be
+stronger if it looked at a random sample of all drivers (e.g., by calling
+people who were randomly selected from a list of everyone with a
+driver’s license) rather than just those who decided for themselves to
+switch to Allstate. That would give us a more accurate estimate of how
+much the average driver could expect to save (or lose) by switching to
+Allstate.
+This is a subtle example of allowing people to decide for themselves whether
+to be included in the sample. Social scientists run into this sort of problem all
+the time when they’re trying to figure out the impact of some program, policy,
+or action. For instance, consider the fact that Americans who marry at
+a young age are more likely to divorce than people who wait to marry later
+in life. Does this mean that the average person would be less likely to get
+divorced if he or she waited another five years to get married? Or is it that
+the kind of people who marry young are also the kind of people who are
+likely to get divorced, so that they would still be more likely to get divorced,
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.2 351
+even if they waited another five years to marry? You can’t tell just by comparing
+the average divorce rates for people who married young to those who
+married later. You need more sophisticated techniques, such as comparing
+people who are similar except in that they married at different ages. Those
+techniques are well beyond the scope of this book, but you can learn about
+them by taking a statistics course. The need for such statistical sophistication
+is one reason that social science is so challenging.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+This argument ignores all of the organisms throughout history who
+have had offspring but not managed to raise them to adulthood. Thus,
+to construct an unbiased sample, it would have to look at organisms
+whose children did not survive to have offspring of their own—which
+might well include most offspring.
+As the author of this facetious argument points out, each of us comes from a
+long, unbroken line of organisms that succeeded in raising their offspring to
+an age where those offspring could have offspring of their own. But this, as
+the author says, is "the mother of all sampling bias," for it excludes precisely
+those organisms whose offspring did not survive. Just as the sample exercise
+for this exercise set looks only at college graduates who work at Schnucks,
+this argument looks only at organisms who succeeded (however minimally)
+as parents. To avoid this kind of error, be sure that your sample doesn’t automatically
+exclude anything that wouldn’t support the conclusion.
+It’s also worth noting that many of the examples might not really be examples
+of organisms that were good parents in any reasonable sense of the
+term: an organism that creates thousands of offspring and leaves them all to
+fend for themselves hardly qualifies as a good parent, but as long as just one
+of those offspring survives, it could have lots of descendants today through
+that one survivor.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+Since the conclusion of this argument is about Americans convicted of
+serious crimes, the examples need to be drawn randomly from all
+prison inmates convicted of serious crimes. Although the argument
+doesn’t specify this, the Innocence Project presumably looks for inmates
+for whom there is evidence of (or at least a high likelihood of) a
+wrongful conviction, since those are the kinds of cases with which
+they’re concerned, and cases where they’re likely to have the greatest
+352 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.3
+Exercise Set 2.3: Identifying relevant background rates
+chance of reversal. To improve the argument, we would need to pick long-term inmates at random and have the Innocence Project defend them.
+This response identifies another subtle source of sample bias: the examples are selected by someone whose primary goal is not to do an objective study of the criminal justice system. The Innocence Project is trying to free people who have been wrongly imprisoned, and so they quite understandably look for people who are likely to be innocent. If they are doing their job well, we should expect many of their clients to be exonerated.
+The unrepresentative nature of this sample is not a problem for the Innocence Project. It is a problem for any attempt to conclude, on the basis of the Innocence Project’s cases, that many Americans are wrongfully imprisoned.
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+First, we need to know how many cars there are on campus: that is, we need to know (or readily be able to calculate) the theft rate on campus. Second, we would need to know what the rate of car thefts is in the sur-
+rounding area. If there are few cars on campus or a very low theft rate in the surrounding area, then it’s not as big an accomplishment if there have been no car thefts on campus.
+We could get even more precise here by figuring out how we’re going to count the number of cars on campus. Are we looking at the number of cars on campus on, say, an average weekday morning at 10 a.m.? The average number of cars parked on campus overnight? The total number of cars parked on campus at any point during the month? All of these suggestions are ways of refining the basic idea that we need to know how many cars there are on campus.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+To determine which is more dangerous—measles or the measles vaccine—we’d need to know what fraction of people who get measles died (i.e., the death rate from measles) and what fraction of people who get a measles vaccine died (i.e., the death rate from the vaccine). Far more people get the measles vaccine than get measles. So, even if the death rate from the measles vaccine were much lower than the death rate from measles, the total number of deaths from the vaccine would probably be higher.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.3 353
+Being able to think critically about numbers is crucial to think clearly about
+vaccines. Measles kills only about 0.2% of people who contract it. That’s two
+in every thousand people. Serious reactions to the measles vaccine occur in
+about one in every three thousand people who get the shot. Thus, even if all
+of the deaths reported in this argument really were caused by the measles
+vaccine (rather than simply happening after an adverse reaction to the vaccine),
+careful consideration of the background rates suggest that getting the
+vaccine really is safer than getting the measles. One of the ironies of this
+debate is that there were so few measles cases in the United States because so
+many people had been vaccinated against it.
+The current controversy about vaccines depends in part on the difficulty of
+thinking clearly about statistics. (It also depends in part on common mistakes
+in reasoning about causes. See Chapter V to learn more about arguments
+about causes.) It’s easy for people on both sides of the debate to produce
+statistics that seem convincing, and debunking the bad arguments often
+depends on a subtle understanding of things like the importance of background
+rates. So, next time you get involved in a debate about vaccines,
+remember to think very carefully about the reasoning you encounter, and do
+your best to (politely) encourage others to do the same.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+We would need to know several things to justify this conclusion. First,
+we would need to know how many other financially troubled people who
+turned to hoodoo saw an improvement in their financial situation. That
+is, we need a rate, and not merely a few, probably unrepresentative
+examples (without even last names!). Second, we would need to know
+the rate at which people who did not turn to hoodoo also saw an improvement
+in their financial situation. Only by comparing the two rates
+can we decide whether people who turn to hoodoo are more likely to
+recover from financial troubles.
+We’re implicitly comparing people who turned to hoodoo to people who did
+not turn to hoodoo. Thus, if we’re going to say that hoodoo is connected to
+financial recovery, we need to know the rate of financial improvements for
+both groups.
+Scientists have a technique for comparing background rates to determine
+if two events really are connected. They use something called a "control
+group." The basic idea is to get two groups of people (or animals, trees, etc.)
+that resemble each other very closely, and then expose one of those groups to
+the "treatment" in question (e.g., hoodoo). That group is called the "experimental
+group." The other group, which does not get the "treatment," is the
+354 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.3
+control group. This allows scientists to calculate the rate at which members
+of each group experience the expected effect (e.g., recovery from financial
+troubles). They can then compare the rates for the experimental group and
+the control group to see if people in the experimental group really do have a
+significantly greater (or lesser) chance of experiencing the effect in
+question.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+We need to know how many Take 5 tickets the New York lottery sells
+every day. This would enable you to figure out the percentage of tickets
+that win, which is what you would need to know to decide whether
+buying one ticket gives you a good shot at winning.
+The relevant background rate here is the percentage of winning tickets. The
+information we need to calculate that rate is the number of winning and
+non-winning tickets sold.
+Notice that the number of tickets sold is probably much higher than the
+number of people who play the lottery in a given day, since some people buy
+multiple tickets. Thus, you need to focus on the number of winning tickets and
+not just the number of people who won the lottery.
+Another way in which the argument might be deceptive is that it doesn’t
+distinguish between different types of "winners." Lotteries sometimes pay a
+large number of very small prizes so they can claim that an impressive
+number of tickets were "winning tickets." This is almost surely the case in
+New York, since there’s no way the lottery could support one hundred thousand
+big prizes every day. Of those one hundred thousand tickets that the ad
+touts as having won money, then, only a very few—maybe only one or two,
+if any—actually won big money, which is what we usually mean by
+"winning the lottery." In general, like all forms of institutionalized gambling,
+lotteries are a profit-making enterprise, so you know before you even
+start that in the long run the state will come out ahead.
+Suppose that only one ticket in one hundred thousand wins big. One person
+goes home with (say) five hundred grand, but the holders of the other
+99,999 (more or less) go home with little or nothing. At a one-in-a-hundredthousand
+rate (.001 percent), you are more likely to get a huge payback by
+just randomly giving your money away to strangers.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+To know how likely you are to use an extended warranty, we’d need to
+know two different rates, neither of which is given in the argument.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.4 355
+Exercise Set 2.4: Evaluating simple arguments that use numbers
+First, we need to know how many expensive electronic devices get damaged in ways that aren’t covered by a manufacturer’s warranty, not just the amount of money that Americans spent paying for such damage on one particular kind of phone. Second, we’d need to know how many expensive electronic devices are never damaged or are only damaged in ways that are covered by a manufacturer’s warranty.
+As this model response suggests, this argument doesn’t even begin to tell us what we’d need to know to decide if its conclusion is true. To decide whether the warranty makes good financial sense, you need to know how likely you are to need to use it, how much the warranty costs, and how much you’re likely to pay if the device breaks but you don’t buy the warranty. Most finance experts advise people that, as a general rule, extended warranties aren’t worth the money. (Don’t believe us? Use the rules from this chapter to find out if we’re right! You might want to look at Chapter IV first.)
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+This argument tries to convince you to buy a security door brace by claiming that "up to 80 percent of forced entries" occur through a front door or a window. This is misleading for many reasons. First, why does it say "up to 80 percent"? Does this mean that, as a national average, nearly 80 percent of forced entries occur through a front door or a window, or does it mean something less impressive? Also, the statistic mentions only forced entries. How many burglaries result from forced entries, as opposed to other methods of entry? And notice that the statistic is for entries through a front door or a window. What share of those forced entries occur through a window, for which a door security brace wouldn’t help?
+This response explains what the argument tries to do with statistics and then explains, in a methodical way, why that statistic may be misleading. To do this, it suggests various interpretations of the statistics and explains why some plausible interpretations do not support the argument’s conclusion.
+This argument is adapted from a YouTube video that functions as an advertisement, even though it’s disguised as an informational video. Unfortunately, advertisers frequently do try to mislead with statistics. This response does better than simply stating that the argument’s authors have an ulterior motive. It identifies specific aspects of the statistic that raise doubts about its reliability.
+356 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.4
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+There are two problems with the way this argument uses statistics. The
+simpler problem is that it only gives us the rate of increase in the
+number of billionaires. Looking through old versions of Wikipedia’s
+list of billionaires by country, it looks like the number of billionaires
+in Egypt went from four to eight in those years. Comparing just a few
+highly unusual people with the population as a whole doesn’t tell us
+that much about the contrast between rich and poor in Egypt.
+The more subtle problem is that we don’t know how rich the new
+billionaires were in 2010. For all this argument has shown, incomes
+grew by 20 percent across the board in Egypt, but those four people were
+already so rich that a 20 percent rise in income took them from multimillionaires
+to billionaires.
+The rules of thumb that we gave in the "Tips for success" will help you spot
+lots of problems with statistics, but some problems are more subtle. The advice
+to look for absolute numbers when you’re given rates will get you to the
+first problem pointed out in this response: a doubling in the number of billionaires
+isn’t as impressive when there aren’t very many of them to begin
+with.
+In writing this response, we actually trolled through old versions of a
+Wikipedia page to find the absolute number of billionaires in Egypt. When
+you can find good evidence that the rate is misleading, that’s great. Use it!
+But even when you can’t, if there’s a good reason to think the rate might be
+misleading, you can still point out that the argument would be much stronger
+if it gave both the rate and the number.
+This response also points out a second, more subtle problem. One way to
+notice this problem is to notice that the argument tries to compare the rich to
+the poor by pointing to two statistics—but they’re actually two different
+kinds of statistics. One is about the number of people who fall into a certain
+category, and the other is about the increase in the average income per person.
+In other words, it’s not "comparing apples to apples," which should
+make you suspicious.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+This argument compares humans’ cumulative carbon dioxide emissions
+to the cumulative emissions from volcanoes over all of geological
+history. It notes that our emissions are tiny in comparison to those
+volcanic emissions—less than one-thousandth of a percent. This is
+misleading because it’s comparing human emissions over, say, ten
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.4 357
+thousand years to natural emissions over four and a half billion
+years. Furthermore, the argument gives no reason to think that this
+comparison is relevant. Why would it even matter how humans’
+emissions stack up against all the volcanic emissions in geological
+history?
+Throwing around very small (or very big) numbers can make an argument
+sound very impressive. After all, "less than one-thousandth of a percent"
+doesn’t sound like very much. But it’s easy to make anything sound very
+small (or very big) by picking the right units. For instance, Jeff Bezos (the
+world’s richest person) owns just 0.0005 percent of all the world’s wealth.
+That doesn’t sound like much, does it? And if you save for college by putting
+a quarter in a piggy bank every week, it would take you over nine thousand
+years to save enough to pay the average cost of tuition at a private college—
+even if costs didn’t rise. Sounds like a lot, doesn’t it?
+The lesson here is to pay close attention to the units in an argument, not
+just to the numbers themselves. Are the numbers expressing distance in feet
+or miles? Are they expressing costs in pennies or dollars—or maybe in millions
+of dollars? Sometimes, as in this case, you’ll need to think carefully
+about what those units are. Be especially wary if the units seem unusual—
+like "fractions of the cumulative volcanic emissions over the past four and a
+half billion years."
+There’s another lesson, too. Just because something sounds like a little (or a
+lot) doesn’t mean that it has a minor (or major) impact. A lethal dose of
+arsenic, for instance, is just three millionths of an adult’s body weight. So
+just because a number is very small doesn’t mean you can assume that it
+doesn’t matter.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+The conclusion of this argument is that we can’t believe much of what
+anyone says. In other words, it’s about the percentage of statements
+that are true. The premise, though, is about the percentage of people to
+whom the average person lies. Since the conclusion and the allegedly
+relevant statistic are about different things, the statistic doesn’t
+support the conclusion. To see why, suppose that I say 100 things to
+each of 100 people during the week, for a total of 10,000 statements. If I
+tell one lie to a third of those people, I’ve lied to nearly 34 percent of the
+people, but only 33 out of 10,000 statements—a third of one percent—
+were lies.
+358 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.4
+This response explains how the statistic in the argument isn’t talking about
+exactly the same thing as the conclusion. This is a good example of the importance
+of asking what exactly the statistic is saying and whether it really
+shows what the argument needs it to show. Since the point is put rather
+abstractly in the first part of the response, the response gives an example to
+clarify the idea.
+There is at least one other issue with this argument, which is the definition
+of lie. Suppose that you are feeling ill. You pass a coworker in the hall,
+and she asks, "Hi, how are you?" If you say, "Fine, thanks," is that counted
+as a lie in the study? That could make a big difference in what you think of
+the claim that people lie to 34 percent of people during a typical week. To
+find out for sure, you would need to read the original study, which you can
+probably find through your school’s library. (Ask a librarian!)
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+This argument uses extremely precise numbers to convey an air of
+authority, but it doesn’t provide the background information we need
+to make sense of the relevant statistics. In general, the argument gives
+rates of increase without giving underlying numbers. But what
+should we make of a 171 percent increase in gun homicides, for
+instance, if we don’t know how many gun homicides there were the
+previous year? Furthermore, the argument isn’t clear about whether the
+increases are increases in crimes per person ("per capita," as it’s
+usually put) or just in the total number of these crimes. Since the
+population of Australia is increasing, the total number of crimes could
+go up even when the number of crimes per capita stays the same or goes
+down.
+This response notes the purpose of the extremely precise statistics in the argument
+before zeroing in on the argument’s main flaws. First, it gives only
+rates of change, without giving actual numbers. In this case, this is a serious
+flaw. According to Snopes.com, there were nine gun homicides in Victoria
+in 1996 and nineteen in 1997. That turns out not to be a statistically
+significant increase. (That is, even though homicides more than doubled,
+both numbers are so tiny compared to the total population as to be basically
+the same from a statistical perspective.)
+Second, the argument focuses on the rate of change in the total number of
+crimes, not on the rate of change in crime rates. This matters because changes
+in the total number of crimes do not always coincide with significant changes
+in an area’s crime rate—that is, in the percentage of people who are victims
+of a crime. For instance, the total number of crimes in an area will change
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.5 359
+Exercise Set 2.5: Finding counterexamples
+as the area’s population grows, even if the crime rate stays the same. To say that crime is getting better or worse in an area, we need to focus on changes in the crime rate, not just in the raw numbers.
+It’s worth noting, of course, that even if violent crimes did go up after the gun ban, that doesn’t prove that the gun ban caused crime to go up. To learn how to construct and evaluate arguments about what caused what, see Chapter V.
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+Javier Bardem is a Hollywood movie star, but his native language is Spanish.
+The generalization in this exercise is about Hollywood movie stars. It says that all Hollywood movie stars are native English speakers. Thus, to find a counterexample to the generalization, we need to find someone who is a Hollywood movie star but is not a native English speaker. Javier Bardem grew up in Spain, and his native language is Spanish, so he is a counterexample to the generalization.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+The Holy See (Vatican City)
+This exercise is more difficult than it might appear because the generalization is open to interpretation. The Holy See is the only fully recognized, independent country that is not a full-fledged member of the United Nations, making it the only clear counterexample to this generalization. (The Holy See is a "permanent observer" at the UN, but since "membership" in the UN is clearly defined, that part of the generalization is less open to interpretation.)
+Areas that consider themselves to be independent countries, but are not generally recognized as such, pose a special problem for this generalization. Take Taiwan (the Republic of China), for instance. Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, although it used to be. Taiwan regards itself as an independent, sovereign country, but China and most other countries do not. Thus, its status as a counterexample to this generalization is disputed. In general, it’s best to avoid disputed counterexamples if you can find undisputed counterexamples.
+360 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.5
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+Platypuses
+The generalization in this exercise is a negative generalization about mammals.
+It says that they do not lay eggs. Thus, a counterexample to this generalization
+would be a mammal that does lay eggs. Platypuses, which live in
+Australia, are mammals, but they lay eggs. (There are only four other species
+of mammals that do so.)
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+Egg salad
+This generalization is about salads. It says that salads are made from vegetables.
+This leaves a lot of room for interpretation. What, exactly, counts as
+a salad? And does the generalization mean that the salad is made entirely
+from vegetables, mostly from vegetables, or at least partly from vegetables?
+For that matter, what counts as a vegetable?
+Egg salad is presumably a salad, and its main ingredients, obviously, are
+eggs, which are not vegetables. Thus, it is a counterexample to the
+generalization.
+What about Greek salad, which typically includes tomato (technically a
+fruit), cucumber and bell peppers (both of which are also technically fruits),
+olives (fruit), cheese, and onion? Strictly speaking, it is mainly fruits and
+cheese, though it includes at least one vegetable (onion). Whether Greek
+salad counts as a clear counterexample depends on your interpretation of the
+generalization. (Also, many people think that tomatoes, cucumbers, bell peppers,
+and olives are vegetables, despite their actually being, technically, fruits.
+See Appendix II for more on definitions.)
+If you find yourself unable to decide whether something is a counterexample,
+try refining the generalization to resolve the interpretive problems.
+For instance, if you can’t decide whether Greek salad is a counterexample
+to the generalization "Salads are made of vegetables," try making the generalization
+more precise: Greek salad is a clear counterexample to "Salads
+are made entirely of vegetables," but it is clearly not a counterexample to
+"Salads contain at least some vegetables."
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+There are no counterexamples to this generalization.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.6 361
+Model Responses for Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This argument is not very strong. On the one hand, it sounds like it does reasonably well on the first three rules: It probably uses enough examples (Rule 7), since it’s based on a survey that at least claims to be nationally representative. And it sounds like it’s trying to follow Rule 8, although the fact that it’s an online survey raises some questions about how random the sample really is. (We’d need more information to find out.) There’s no real question of background rates here (Rule 9). The argument even does fine on counterexamples (Rule 11), since it implicitly acknowledges that 93 percent of adults surveyed did not believe that chocolate milk comes from brown cows. The problem with this argument, though, is that it takes the survey answers at face value, rather than looking at the statistics with a critical eye (Rule 10). The statistic we’re given shows that 7 percent of survey respondents in an online poll said that they think chocolate milk comes from brown cows. But it seems way more likely that most of those people were just joking than that they really believe this (let’s hope).
+This response proceeds methodically through each rule, citing specific features of the argument to support its evaluation of how well the argument follows that rule. In the end, though, it all comes down to Rule 10. In this case, we need to think about exactly where the relevant statistic came from and whether we think survey respondents have answered honestly. Always remember: there’s a big difference between someone telling a pollster something—or, even worse, entering something on an online form—and someone’s really believing that thing.
+This is another tricky case. The generalization is about mammals, and it says that all mammals have hair. The generalization might mean that all types of mammals typically have hair (at least at some stage of their lives). If that’s what it means, then the generalization is clearly true; it’s part of the definition of a mammal that it has hair. (Even whales and dolphins have a few hairs when they are very young.) On the other hand, it might mean that every individual mammal has hair. In that case, it might be false. Individuals may sometimes lose all of their hair due to an autoimmune disease. Are they counterexamples to this generalization?
+Exercise Set 2.6: Evaluating arguments for generalizations
+362 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.6
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This argument is quite strong, but it could be stronger. It says the
+examples come from a "nationally representative" survey, so it must
+have lots of examples (Rule 7) that represent the US population as a
+whole (Rule 8). It reports both percentages and absolute numbers, which
+helps us understand the background rate (Rule 9). It should probably
+look at the statistic about chocolate milk coming from chocolate cows
+more critically, though (Rule 10). It accounts for counterexamples
+(Rule 11) by looking at everyone in the survey, not just those who
+think that chocolate milk comes from chocolate cows. So, it follows all
+of the rules from this chapter except for one.
+Like the strong response, this response proceeds methodically through each
+rule and cites specific features of the argument in connection with each rule.
+In that respect, it’s a reasonably good response. (There is one problem in its
+handling of Rule 8, though: this response could be a little more skeptical of
+the claim that the online survey is nationally representative.) The main
+problem, however, is that it treats the strength of the argument as if it’s just
+a question of how many rules the argument follows. As the strong response
+above shows, the argument’s failure to follow Rule 10 completely undermines
+it: it is because of that failure that you probably should not accept the
+argument’s conclusion. The point here is that applying these rules robotically
+won’t work; you need to think about them carefully.
+Model Responses for Exercise 3
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This argument is not very strong. It does give several examples (Rule
+7), but they are not representative (Rule 8). The argument is about all
+empires, but the examples are all from the twentieth century. While the
+author might expect us to know how many empires there have been in
+the last century, she would do well to think about how many empires
+there have been throughout history (Rule 9). There are no statistics in
+this argument, so Rule 10 doesn’t apply. There are lots of counterexamples,
+which the author ignores (Rule 11). Think of the Roman Empire,
+the Ottoman Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Spanish
+Empire, not to mention China.
+In addition to touching on each rule from this chapter, this response explains
+in detail how the argument fails on Rules 8 and 11. In discussing Rule 11,
+the response gives specific counterexamples (though it could elaborate).
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.6 363
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This argument follows Rule 7, but not Rules 8, 9, or 11. The argument
+doesn’t use any statistics.
+For the most part, this response just states which rules the argument does
+and does not follow. It does not explain how the argument follows or fails to
+follow each rule.
+Model Responses for Exercise 5
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This is a weak argument, but for subtle reasons. On the one hand, it
+gives lots of examples—314 of them, to be exact (Rule 7). And because
+it’s looking at all 3,141 counties in the United States, it’s not "cherry
+picking" just the counties that support its conclusion (Rule 8) or
+ignoring counterexamples (Rule 11). The problem here has to do with
+background rates (Rule 9) and the use of statistics (Rule 10). Because
+of the very low background rate of people developing kidney cancer, the
+statistics given in the argument don’t support the conclusion that
+people in rural counties have a lower risk of developing kidney cancer.
+In densely populated counties, even a low background rate will lead to
+lots of cases of kidney cancer. But in sparsely populated counties, that
+same rate would often mean that no one in the county develops kidney
+cancer in a given year. So, it’s no surprise that those counties have the
+lowest rates of kidney cancer. But that’s different than saying that
+people in those counties have a lower risk of kidney cancer.
+This response acknowledges what the argument does well and then explains,
+in detail, why the argument’s use of statistics fails to support its conclusion.
+The flaw in this argument illustrates a common mistake based on "small
+sample sizes"—that is, statistics generated by looking at small groups. When
+you have a random process at work in a small group, you’re far more likely
+to get "extreme" results than when you have that same process at work in a
+large group. For instance, suppose that you toss four quarters in the air, and
+your professor tosses a hundred quarters in the air. When the coins land, it
+would be much more likely that all of your coins landed heads than that all
+of your professor’s coins did. But this doesn’t mean that your quarters have a
+greater chance (or a greater "risk") of landing heads.
+To avoid this sort of problem, scientists prefer to look at large samples,
+where statistical flukes are much rarer. The size of the group that you need
+depends on a lot of factors, including the rarity of the events you’re trying to
+364 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.6
+study. For instance, if you’re trying to study the common cold, which occurs
+quite frequently, you won’t need nearly as large a group as if you’re trying
+to study kidney cancer, which is rare.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This is a strong argument. It gives over three hundred examples (Rule
+7), drawn from a complete survey of all American counties (Rule 8).
+Because it gives us the total number of counties, we can calculate the
+percentage of counties that have low rates of kidney cancer (Rule 9).
+The argument could be a bit more detailed about its statistics (Rule 10)
+by, for example, telling us the average rate of kidney cancer in those
+safest 341 counties. The argument does not ignore counterexamples
+(Rule 11).
+This response does address each rule from this chapter. However, it doesn’t
+apply them very well. For one thing, notice how much clearer the discussion
+of Rules 8 and 11 was in the strong model response, which explains in detail
+how the argument follows those rules. But more importantly, this response
+displays a mechanical, unthinking application of Rules 9 and 10. In
+the case of Rule 9, this response calculates a percentage based on the two
+numbers that we’re given. That’s sometimes helpful, but not in this case. As
+shown in the strong model response, there are deeper, more subtle issues at
+work here related to statistics and background rates. In general, remember
+that the rules give you a checklist of things to think about, but you’ll need to
+apply them carefully and thoughtfully, not mechanically.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+This seems like a fairly strong argument. It uses several examples
+(Rule 7), and they are all representative examples of "major English
+dictionaries" (Rule 8), but it’s a little unclear whether it’s used enough
+examples because the category "major English dictionaries" is a little
+vague. How many are there? Background rates don’t really apply here
+(Rule 9) and there are no statistics to consider with a critical eye (Rule
+10). It’s hard to tell whether the argument grapples with counterexamples
+(Rule 11) because we can’t tell whether it’s left any dictionaries
+out. The argument would have been stronger if it had begun by listing
+all the major English dictionaries and then said which ones include a
+definition for "literally" that means "figuratively."
+This response illustrates the importance of background knowledge in evaluating
+arguments—as well as the importance of recognizing when you
+lack the background knowledge to fully evaluate an argument. To someone
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.7 365
+Model Responses for Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This generalization is false. A surprising number of U.S. presidents were born in Ohio or Virginia—namely, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, McKinley, Taft, and Harding in Ohio and Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, William Henry Harrison, Tyler, Taylor, and Wilson in Virginia. That’s just over a third of all U.S. presidents. The majority, however, were born elsewhere. Five were born in New York; four in Massachusetts; two each in North Carolina,
+who knows what all the major English dictionaries are, it would be clear whether this argument lists them all and so whether it follows Rules 7, 8, and 11. The rest of us are left a little unsure.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+This argument is fairly weak. The argument gives ten examples. This is a fairly small sample, so the argument doesn’t do a great job with Rule 7. We don’t know whether the examples are representative, so we don’t know how well the argument does with Rule 8. Where did the unnamed "fight promoter" get his list of twenty-three boxers? Were those boxers more likely than average to have brain damage? Furthermore, what distinguishes the ten boxers that Dr. Matland found from the thirteen that he didn’t? Maybe brain-damaged boxers were easier to find because they had been in more fights and were therefore better known. The argument does not allow us to determine the background rate of any of the ailments that Dr. Matland identified (Rule 9), especially because we don’t know how old the boxers were when Dr. Matland found them. After all, the background rate of dementia in thirty-year-olds is much lower than in seventy-year-olds. There are no statistics involved in the argument, so we don’t need to worry about Rule 10. Dr. Matland did look at every boxer he could find, and he presumably looked just as hard for non-damaged boxers and for damaged boxers, so he is not ignoring counterexamples (Rule 11).
+Like the model response to exercise 7 in this exercise set, this response proceeds methodically through each rule from this chapter and explains how the argument violates each one.
+Exercise Set 2.7: Arguing for and against generalizations
+366 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.7
+Texas, and Vermont; and the birthplaces of the rest are in over a dozen
+other states. And yes, Barack Obama was born in Hawaii.
+This response begins by considering counterexamples (Rule 11). It identifies
+all of the counterexamples and makes it clear that there are not enough of
+them to show that the generalization is false. It then identifies the specific
+states in which fifteen presidents were born, although it doesn’t name the
+presidents. This provides a decent number of examples (Rule 7), and the
+broad sample of presidents ensures that we have representative examples
+(Rule 8). The author of the argument summarizes the relevant background
+rate (Rule 9) by pointing out that the fifteen presidents born in Ohio and
+Virginia make up just over a third of all presidents. In this case, the author
+could probably have counted on the audience knowing roughly how many
+U. S. presidents there have been—forty-five as of 2019 (Rule 9). There are
+no other relevant statistics involved in this argument, so the argument
+doesn’t run afoul of Rule 10, either.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This generalization is false. Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and
+George W. Bush were not born in Ohio or Virginia..
+This response is weak because it looks only at very recent U.S. presidents.
+This very small and comparatively unrepresentative sample leaves out all of
+the counterexamples.
+Model Responses for Exercise 3
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This generalization is false. A lot of classical music is exciting. Think
+of the opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony or the "Ode to Joy" at the
+end of his Ninth Symphony. Think of the "Gloria" from Bach’s Mass
+in B Minor, the "Hallelujah Chorus" from Handel’s Messiah, Mozart’s
+Don Giovanni, Tchaikovsky’s "1812 Overture," Wagner’s "Ride of the
+Valkyries," Mahler’s Symphony No. 2, the finale to Stravinsky’s
+Firebird, or Copland’s "Fanfare for the Common Man." That doesn’t
+even get into composers like Brahms, Strauss, Mussorgsky, Verdi,
+Mahler, Ravel, Bartók, Prokofiev, or Shostakovich. These are all exciting
+pieces, even to people who don’t listen to a lot of classical music.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.7 367
+This response begins by asserting that the generalization is false. It then offers
+an alternative generalization, meant to show that the original generalization
+is false: a lot of classical music is exciting. (Note that this isn’t the
+only way to argue against the claim that classical music is boring. You might
+argue that classical music is interesting, rather than exciting.)
+The response then gives many examples to support the claim that a lot of
+classical music is exciting (Rule 7). It gives ten specific examples of exciting
+pieces of classical music and then mentions nine additional composers who
+wrote exciting music. The composers and pieces come from a wide range of
+time periods and countries, providing a nicely representative sample of classical
+music (Rule 8). We know, of course, that there are many more classical
+composers and classical pieces than those mentioned here, so the argument
+doesn’t need to tell us that these examples cover just a small fraction of all
+classical music (Rule 9). Since the conclusion here is just that "a lot" of classical
+music is exciting, though, that’s okay.
+Of course, it would be easier to decide whether the examples given in this
+argument are good examples if we had a good definition of "exciting music."
+The argument could also be more fully developed by describing some of the
+examples to demonstrate that they are indeed exciting.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This generalization is false. A lot of classical music is very interesting
+once you understand it, and some of it is downright exciting. The
+problem is that people don’t really know how to appreciate it. If you
+don’t know what you’re listening for, Bach’s fugues, for instance, are
+kind of boring. But if you know what’s going on, a fugue can be as
+exciting and interesting as any murder mystery.
+Like the previous response, this response begins by claiming that the generalization
+is false and offering an alternative. However, the argument for
+that alternative cites only one example of exciting classical music—Bach’s
+fugues—and even then it admits that Bach’s fugues are only exciting and
+interesting to those who really understand them. The response spends more
+time explaining why people think that classical music is boring than actually
+arguing that it’s not. Throughout this exercise, concentrate on giving
+examples and using statistics to support your claims about each generalization,
+rather than supporting your claims in other ways.
+368 Model Responses for Exercise Set 2.7
+Model Responses for Exercise 5
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This generalization is false. The U.S. Parachute Association reported
+2.2 million skydiving jumps in 2007. From those 2.2 million jumps,
+there were only 821 injuries and eighteen deaths. That’s a death rate of
+less than one in ten thousand and an injury rate of four in one
+thousand. According to Bandolier, a journal written by Oxford scientists,
+that’s only a slightly higher death rate than tennis.
+This response begins by stating that the generalization in question is false.
+It then uses statistics to support that generalization, including a comparison
+to tennis—an activity that most people would never consider dangerous.
+Notice that it takes a little bit of interpretation to see that the claim "Skydiving
+is dangerous" is making a generalization. The claim says that many
+or all people who go skydiving face significant risks. A good way to show
+that something is not risky is to show that few people get hurt or die while
+doing it. That’s what this argument sets out to do.
+Notice that after finding the death rate, the argument puts that rate in
+context by comparing it to something else that people don’t consider dangerous.
+This is often helpful in dealing with vague terms like dangerous.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This generalization is true. Think about it. Throwing yourself out an
+airplane thousands of feet in the air is obviously dangerous. There are
+so many things that could go wrong, from a parachute that doesn’t
+deploy correctly to landing in the water and getting tangled in your
+ropes. Why do you think they require people to take special classes and
+make their first jumps tied to a professional instructor?
+This argument demonstrates a common mistake people make when arguing
+for (or against) a generalization. Rather than looking at particular examples—
+that is, working out the statistics to tell you how likely you are to get
+injured—this argument gives other kinds of reasons for thinking that skydiving
+is dangerous. But the proof is in the number of people who do (and
+don’t!) get injured while skydiving. After all, maybe the kinds of problems
+that the argument mentions are exceedingly rare. In that case, even though
+they would obviously be very bad for you if they happened, they’re so unlikely
+to happen as to pose only a minor risk.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.1 369
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+Being a student and having a job both involve specific tasks that you’re expected to do at specific times. Both give you the chance to develop new skills. You can get kicked out of school/lose your job if you don’t perform well.
+This response gives three similarities between being a student and having a job. But how can you tell whether those similarities are "important"? The first step is to avoid obviously silly or trivial similarities. Beyond that, ask yourself what conclusions someone might draw based on the similarities you mention. Taking this response as an example, someone might give the following argument by analogy: "You should take advantage of being a student by learning as much as you can from your studies. Having a job is like being a student in that both give you the chance to develop new skills. Thus, you should take advantage of having a job by learning as much as you can from your work."
+You don’t need to include an argument as part of your response, but if you’re unsure if a similarity you’ve picked is important, try to think of one—especially one that has an important, interesting, or unexpected conclusion. If you can, then you can be confident that your similarity is an important one.
+Model Responses for Exercise 7
+This generalization is false. There are generalizations that have no exceptions. For instance, the generalizations "All triangles have three sides" and "All mountains over 8,000 meters above sea level are in Asia" have no exceptions.
+Proving that a universal generalization is false is easy. All you need to do is produce a counterexample. This response gives two counterexamples to the claim that "All generalizations have exceptions"—which means, of course, that this generalization applies to itself because it, too, has exceptions!
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER III: ARGUMENTS BY ANALOGY
+Exercise Set 3.1: Identifying important similarities
+370 Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.1
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+First-degree murder and euthanasia both involve intentionally
+causing someone’s death. Both are illegal (in most places, at least).
+While there are obvious differences between first-degree murder and euthanasia,
+your task here is to focus on the similarities. Even if you don’t like the
+idea of comparing two things, you can almost always find some important
+ways in which they are similar. Remember: saying that two things are
+similar in certain respects is not saying that they’re the same or even that
+they are similar in most respects.
+Analogies can be helpful tools in thinking about difficult ethical issues.
+One important skill in thinking about ethical issues is learning to recognize
+relevant similarities and differences between two actions or two
+situations.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+The shape of the continents drawn on the globe is the same as the shape
+of the continents on Earth. Two cities that are on opposite sides of the
+globe are on opposite sides of the Earth. If one river is to the north of
+another river on the globe, it’s also north of that other river on Earth.
+This response points out various similarities between a globe and the Earth
+that make the globe a good model of the Earth. To say that one thing is a
+good model of the other is just to say that the two are similar in ways that
+enable us to learn about the second thing by studying the first. Think of a
+model train. Studying a model train enables us to learn what the different
+parts of a real train are, how they’re connected, etc. A globe is just a model of
+the Earth, much like a model train is a model of a real train. A globe shows
+where different geographical features (e.g., continents, rivers, and mountains)
+are in relation to one another or where different cities or countries are
+in relation to one another. You can learn a lot about the Earth by looking at
+a globe—for instance, which countries share borders with one another,
+where various rivers go, which cities are close to the ocean, and so on. When
+we draw these conclusions about the Earth, based on what we see on the
+globe, we’re using an argument by analogy along these lines: "The Amazon
+River flows into the Atlantic Ocean on the globe. The position of a river on
+the globe is similar to the position of that river on Earth. Therefore, the
+Amazon River flows into the Atlantic Ocean on Earth."
+Models are important in scientific reasoning. They enable us to draw conclusions
+about one thing (e.g., the weather, proteins, or human immune
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.1 371
+systems) by looking at something else (e.g., computer models of the weather,
+physical models of a protein, or other animals’ immune systems) that’s easier
+to study. Drawing these conclusions involves using arguments by analogy.
+The similarities in your response don’t have to relate to the use of globes as
+models. We’ve picked these similarities as a way of illustrating how models
+work.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+Earth and a watch both consist of many parts that fit together in
+intricate ways that enable them to achieve some apparent purpose.
+This response gives only one similarity. That’s fine; it’s all that’s strictly required
+of you in the instructions. To find important similarities between the
+Earth and a watch, you need to think quite abstractly. The eighteenthcentury
+philosopher William Paley famously used an analogy between the
+universe and a watch to argue that the universe had been designed by an
+intelligent creator. In his Natural Theology, Paley notes that the watch
+seems to serve a purpose and that if the parts were made or assembled in a
+different way, the watch would not serve that purpose. Many parts of nature,
+such as an eye, are the same way: they serve a purpose, and if the parts
+were "made" or "assembled" differently, they would not serve that purpose.
+Since we take the apparent design of the watch as proof that it had a designer,
+we should take the apparent design of nature as proof that it had a
+designer—or so Paley argued.
+You’ll notice that the arguments by design, like this one, are a running
+theme in the exercises for this chapter, all told discussed here, in model response
+7 for exercise 3.2, and in model response 9 for exercise 3.3.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+Mice and humans are both mammals. Both can get cancer. Many
+things that are toxic to mice are also toxic to humans.
+The similarities mentioned in this response partly explain why biologists
+and biomedical researchers often use mice as models for humans. (If you
+missed it, go back right now and check out our discussion after the model
+response to exercise 5, where we said that models are important in scientific
+reasoning.) When scientists say that they’re using mice as models to study,
+say, cancer in humans, they mean that they’re studying cancer or cancer
+372 Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.2
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+One (usually) pays to be a student, but one gets paid to do a job.
+The differences that you cite in this exercise set need not have anything to do with the similarities that you noted in Exercise Set 3.1. You can use the same standard, though, for deciding whether your differences are important: ask yourself whether you could imagine this difference affecting the strength of an argument by analogy.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+First-degree murder involves killing someone against their will, whereas euthanasia involves helping someone die with their consent or upon their request. Euthanasia is, according to the definition used here, necessarily performed by a doctor, whereas murder can be committed by anybody.
+Euthanasia involves helping a terminally ill patient die. In some cases, called "passive euthanasia," this involves nothing more than stopping or withholding lifesaving treatment at the patient’s request. In other cases, called "active euthanasia," it involves prescribing or even administering a lethal dose of medication. One big difference between murder and any form of voluntary euthanasia is that euthanasia requires the patient’s consent. Bioethicists—philosophers who study ethical questions in biology and medicine—disagree about whether euthanasia—especially active euthanasia—is morally acceptable.
+The second difference—that, by definition, only doctors can perform
+euthanasia—highlights an important point about analogies. Sometimes differences can actually strengthen an argument by analogy. Suppose you wanted to argue that euthanasia is morally wrong because it is relevantly similar to murder. Many opponents of euthanasia think that the fact that
+treatments in mice and then drawing conclusions—using arguments by analogy!—about how cancer or cancer treatments work in humans.
+A professional biologist, of course, could cite much more specific similarities between mice and humans. Those more specific similarities are important for thinking that mice really are good models for studying specific biological processes in humans. Even if you’re a budding biologist yourself, though, you shouldn’t expect to be able to come up with those sophisticated similarities just yet.
+Exercise Set 3.2: Identifying important differences
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.2 373
+euthanasia is performed by a doctor, despite being a difference between euthanasia
+and murder, actually makes it more likely that euthanasia is
+wrong. After all, doctors are supposed to help people, not harm them, and
+killing people certainly sounds like a way of harming them. (But is it
+always?)
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+The Earth has an atmosphere, whereas the globe does not. The globe is
+hollow, whereas the Earth has various layers beneath the surface, such
+as the mantle and the core. Globes often have dark lines to represent the
+borders between countries, but there are no such lines on the Earth itself
+(in most places).
+In discussing the model response to exercise 5 in the previous exercise set, we
+explained that the globe is a good model of the Earth in that it enables us to
+draw certain conclusions about the Earth by studying the globe. The first
+two differences cited in this model response show that any scientific model
+has its limits. A globe is useful for learning about geography, but it’s not
+useful for learning about weather or geological processes going on under the
+Earth’s surface. The third difference—that borders show up as dark lines on
+the globe, but not on the Earth—shows that even in areas for which our
+model is good, such as geography, we have to think carefully before drawing
+inferences. The model won’t resemble the thing being modeled in every way,
+and we can end up drawing false conclusions if we don’t think about the
+differences between them.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+There are scientific explanations for how the Earth and its intricacies
+could have developed without being intentionally designed, but there is
+no such explanation for how watches could have come into existence. The
+Earth has a far greater ability to "repair" itself than a watch does.
+Both of these differences are important, but they are important for different
+reasons. The first difference is important if you are considering William Paley’s
+argument for the existence of a creator. (Again, a running theme in the exercises
+for this chapter, all told discussed here, in model response 7 for exercise 3.1,
+and in model response 9 for exercise 3.3.) The second difference is probably not
+important for Paley’s argument, but it might be important for arguments
+about how we treat the Earth or how we respond to ecological problems.
+374 Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.3
+Model Responses for Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This is a reasonable start to an argument for the possibility of life on Europa, but it could be a lot stronger. It’s a good start because the argument identifies a very important similarity between Earth and Europa—namely, having large oceans of (liquid, salty) water. Water is essential for life as we know it, and so Europa’s oceans provide a strong reason to think that life is possible on Europa. However, life requires other things, too, like a source of energy. Scientists believe that
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+Mice are far less intelligent than humans. Compared to human embryos, mouse embryos have higher levels of an antioxidant called glutathione.
+This response mentions one obvious difference and one difference that requires scientific training to discover—or even understand. Both differences show the limits of using mice as models for understanding humans. The importance of the first difference is clear. The second difference seems minor, but it turns out to be tragically important: Because of this specific difference in antioxidant levels between mouse and human embryos, which was documented by a scientist named Jürgen Knobloch and his colleagues in 2008, mice are immune to certain damaging effects of a drug called thalidomide. Thalidomide caused devastating birth defects in humans in the 1960s, but studying thalidomide in mice wouldn’t have revealed the dangers to humans because of this subtle difference in their biology. On the other hand, the artificial sweetener saccharin was long thought to cause bladder cancer in humans because it does so in mice. After further study, however, it was shown that the biological differences between mice and humans mean that in the specific case of saccharin, the fact that it causes bladder cancer in mice does not show that it causes bladder cancer in humans. The U.S. government removed saccharin from the list of possible carcinogens in 2000. The general lesson here is that using mouse models can tell us a lot about humans, but in any given case, there’s a chance that mice and humans differ in subtle ways that undermine the analogy. (Incidentally, one reason to think that mice are generally good models for humans is based on the sort of argument we explored in Chapter II: there are lots and lots of examples in which lessons learned from studying mice turned out to apply to humans, too.)
+Exercise Set 3.3: Evaluating arguments by analogy
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.3 375
+radioactivity in Europa’s rocky core may generate heat that could fuel
+chemical reactions in the ocean, and mentioning that both Earth and
+Europa have sources of energy would strengthen the argument. A
+bigger problem with this argument is that there are important differences
+between Earth and Europa. The biggest difference is that Europa’s
+oceans are much colder and darker than Earth’s—in fact, they’re
+covered in miles of ice—which makes it harder to generate or sustain
+life. There may be further differences too, which are not addressed by the
+argument. Perhaps the oceans on Europa are so acidic, for instance,
+that it would be hard for life to survive there. The last big problem with
+the argument is that the conclusion is too strong. The argument gives a
+decent reason to think that there might be life on Europa, but not a
+decent reason to think that there is life on Europa.
+This response does several things. First, it gives a nuanced overall assessment
+of how well the argument follows Rule 12. Second, it discusses why
+the similarity mentioned in the argument is relevant to the conclusion.
+Third, it touches on a very important difference between Earth and Europa,
+explains why it’s relevant to the conclusion, and mentions another possible
+difference. Finally, the response recognizes that the argument would be better
+if it had a more cautious conclusion. That’s more constructive than just
+saying that the argument fails.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This is a bad argument by analogy. It mentions one important similarity—
+that both Earth and Europa have oceans of water—but it doesn’t
+mention any of the differences. Besides, water may be necessary for
+life on Earth, but that doesn’t mean it’s necessary for life on other
+planets. Maybe scientists just need to have more imagination about
+what kinds of life forms could exist.
+While this response makes some good points, there are three major problems
+with it. First, it doesn’t explain in detail why the similarity is relevant to
+the conclusion. Second, it doen’t identify any differences between Earth and
+Europa, much less explain why any particular difference is relevant. Third,
+the response goes off on a tangent about whether water is necessary for life
+on other planets. This is a very interesting point, but it is not relevant to
+assessing this argument, since the argument implies that Europa is likely to
+harbor life like the life that exists on Earth. The open-ended nature of
+analogies makes it tempting to include irrelevant material when evaluating
+arguments by analogy. Stay focused on why the similarities and differences
+are relevant to the conclusion of this specific argument.
+376 Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.3
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+This is a good argument by analogy. Although it only identifies one
+similarity between texting while driving and driving drunk, that
+similarity provides a very strong reason to accept the conclusion. Since
+one big reason not to drive drunk is because it decreases your ability to
+avoid road hazards, showing that texting while driving also decreases
+your ability to avoid road hazards provides a very strong reason to
+think that people shouldn’t text while driving. There are important
+differences, of course. The most important, perhaps, is that a driver can
+put down the phone if traffic becomes heavier or conditions more
+dangerous. A drunk driver can’t suddenly become sober when necessary.
+Thus, it’s easier to be responsible about texting while driving than
+about driving while drunk. Still, given that we can’t always predict
+when hazards are going to appear, the similarity outweighs the difference
+just mentioned.
+This response explains clearly why the similarity is relevant to the conclusion.
+It also identifies an important difference between the two things being
+compared, and it explains why that difference is important.
+Most importantly, the response explicitly states that the similarity between
+texting while driving and driving while drunk outweighs the difference.
+It even explains why the similarity outweighs the difference. This is
+why the response claims that the argument is a good one. You might disagree
+about the relative weight of the similarity and difference; you might think
+that the drunk’s inability to sober up on command makes the difference more
+important than the similarity. In that case, you are less likely to find this
+argument compelling. Since it can be very hard to reach agreement on the
+proper weighting of different reasons, such a disagreement can be very difficult
+to resolve. In those cases, the best thing to do is to look for other arguments
+for or against the same conclusion. But what matters most for the
+purposes of this exercise, again, is your assessment of the relevant similarities
+and differences between drunk driving and driving while texting.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+This is not a very strong argument by analogy. The relevant similarity
+is that the mice avoid strangers and novelty, as autistic people do. This
+similarity is important because it suggests that whatever is going on
+in the brains of the affected mice might be the same as what’s going on
+in the brains of autistic people. And if that’s true, then whatever is
+causing that condition in the mouse brains might also be causing
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.3 377
+autism in humans. Displaying some behaviors that are typical of
+autistic humans, however, is not necessarily the same as being autistic.
+Furthermore, it seems like a stretch to use mice as a model for
+something as complicated as autism. While Naviaux’s research raises
+interesting possibilities for understanding autism, the argument
+presented here doesn’t provide a very strong reason to think that autism
+in humans is caused by the kind of "hyperactive stress response"
+found in Naviaux’s mice.
+As with exercise 9 in each of the previous two exercise sets, this exercise deals
+with the use of mice as models for humans. This response does a good job of
+explaining why the similarity is supposed to be relevant to the conclusion. It
+goes on to say that the similarity, while relevant, is not strong enough to
+support the conclusion. The response would be better if it offered more evidence
+to think that autism is too complicated to be studied by using mice as
+models. (What kind of evidence might you give? See Chapter IV!)
+Notice that the response doesn’t say that the conclusion of the argument is
+false. In fact, it even admits that the argument offers a good reason to investigate
+the conclusion further. But the response denies that this argument, by
+itself, gives us enough reason to accept the conclusion. Lots of good science is
+like this: it doesn’t establish that a particular claim is correct, but it provides
+enough evidence to continue taking that claim seriously and to investigate
+it further.
+Model Responses for Exercise 7
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This is a very weak argument. This argument compares two other
+arguments, though neither one is spelled out in detail. Roughly, the
+arguments are, first, that we should have more guns around because
+that would reduce the number of mass shootings, and second, that
+people should smoke more cigarettes because that would reduce the
+number of people who get lung cancer. There is a similarity between the
+two arguments: both rely on the idea that having more of some thing,
+X, would reduce the incidence of some other thing, Y, even though X’s
+are part of the cause of Y’s happening. The argument would be stronger
+if it spelled all of this out clearly, but it still wouldn’t be very strong
+because it overlooks a crucial difference between the guns argument
+and the cigarettes argument. In the guns argument, there’s an explanation
+about how having more guns is supposed to reduce the number
+of mass shootings. It’s controversial, to be sure, but at least people who
+make the argument can explain why they believe it. With the
+378 Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.3
+cigarettes argument, there’s absolutely no explanation for how smoking
+more cigarettes would reduce the incidence of lung cancer. This
+difference undermines the argument.
+The argument by analogy in exercise 7 is unusual in that its purpose is to
+prove something about another argument. Specifically, its purpose is to prove
+that the "guns argument"—the one about guns and mass shootings—is a
+bad argument. To do this, the analogy compares the "guns argument" to a
+similar argument that is obviously bad. In effect, it says, "Argument A is like
+Argument B. Argument B is obviously bad. Thus, Argument A must be a
+bad argument too." This is sometimes a very effective tactic in refuting
+someone else’s arguments, even if you can’t put your finger on exactly what’s
+wrong with Argument A. (For a famous example, look up St. Anselm’s ontological
+proof of God’s existence and Gaunilo’s "lost island" refutation by
+analogy.).
+In this case, however, the argument might make for good rhetoric, but it’s
+not good reasoning. As this model response shows, it takes some work to even
+figure out exactly what two arguments we’re comparing—and then it takes
+even more work to figure out how they’re supposed to be similar. If you’re
+trying to refute an argument by showing that it shares the same underlying
+logic as an obviously faulty argument, you need to spell out both arguments
+as clearly and as charitably as you can.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This is a shining example of a terrible argument. It is like the author
+got carried away with how much he hates guns. It’s stupid to compare
+stopping a mass shooter with a gun to curing cancer with a cigarette.
+And anyway, the author does a terrible job of explaining what exactly
+he’s comparing and why they’re even similar.
+In one sense, this model response hits a lot of the main points of the better
+model response: it points out that the argument doesn’t clearly identify the
+arguments to be compared and it at least hints at the explanation for how
+guns are supposed to stop mass shootings. But this model response doesn’t go
+into much detail, and it makes no effort to reconstruct the two arguments
+that we’re supposed to be comparing to see the argument in its best light.
+This model response also gives in to a very common temptation. The argument
+in this exercise offers a provocative and apparently poorly reasoned
+take on a politically sensitive issue. The stronger model response offers a
+calm, measured, and charitable evaluation of the argument and carefully
+explains where it seems to go wrong. This model response, on the other hand,
+fires back with vitriol and provocation of its own. The better model response
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.3 379
+is more likely to lead to productive conversation—and, ultimately, to change
+minds. For more on having civil and productive debates, see Chapter X.
+Model Response for Exercise 9
+This is a relatively weak argument by analogy, but it could be made
+stronger. The argument draws an analogy between the universe and a
+house. The relevant similarity is that both contain parts that appear to
+be carefully and skillfully designed for some purpose. The argument
+would be stronger, however, if it gave more examples of such apparent
+design. It would also be stronger if it explained more precisely how that
+similarity is supposed to support the conclusion and if it considered
+relevant differences. The most important difference is that we have
+experience with the creation of houses, whereas we don’t have any
+experience with the creation of the universe. That is, we know that people
+build houses, no one’s ever seen a house that wasn’t built by somebody,
+and we have no idea how a house could come into existence without a
+builder; whereas we’ve never seen anyone or anything create a universe,
+and we have at least some idea about how the universe could come
+into existence without a creator. If the author had addressed this difference,
+maybe the argument would be stronger.
+People have long drawn analogies between the universe and human artifacts
+to argue that the universe must have been designed and created by an
+intelligent being. How else, they reason, can we explain the incredible complexity
+of the universe and the way that different parts seem so well adapted
+to one another? Arguments like this are often called "arguments from design."
+Recall model responses 7 for exercise 3.1 and 3.2, which discussed
+William Paley’s analogy between the Earth like a watch..
+This model response is similar to the response that eighteenth-century philosopher
+David Hume famously gave to an argument from design in his
+Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. He points out that we never
+see stones and timbers arrange themselves naturally into a house, but we do
+sometimes see—or we can at least imagine—order arising spontaneously in
+the natural world. (But do we really see this? Hume’s example is of ideas
+arranging themselves in the human mind. What could supporters of the
+argument from design say to this? What other examples might Hume have
+given?) More generally, Hume insists that the differences between a house,
+which we understand quite well, and the universe as a whole, of which we
+understand relatively little, are so vast that we cannot draw inferences
+about the creation of the latter from the creation of the former.
+380 Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.4
+Model Response for Exercise 1
+Stealing a DVD from a store is wrong. Downloading a movie without paying for it is like stealing a DVD from a store. Both involve acquiring something that somebody created without paying the creators for it (and without the creators’ permission). Thus, downloading movies without paying for them is wrong.
+The key to exercise 1 is to find an activity that is similar to downloading movies but that is clearly wrong (or clearly not wrong, if you are arguing that downloading movies is not wrong).
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+It is not illegal to smoke cigarettes. Smoking cigarettes is like riding a motorcycle without a helmet in that both significantly increase your chances of dying in particular ways. Thus, riding a motorcycle without a helmet should not be illegal.
+This argument does what it is asked to do, but it still may be rather weak. The relevant consideration is not actually that cigarette smoking is legal. It’s that cigarette smoking should be legal. If you just point out that smoking is legal, as in this argument, the analogy could just as well work the other way—to show that since it’s illegal to ride a motorcycle without a helmet (in some places), it should be illegal to smoke cigarettes! When constructing arguments by analogy, be sure that you’re emphasizing the right thing.
+Model Response for Exercise 5
+When the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, a large statue of Hussein was pulled off its pedestal in Baghdad’s Firdos Square. The destruction of the statue symbolized the overthrow of the old Iraqi government. The mutilation and burial of the Olmec heads is like the destruction of the statue in Firdos Square
+This model response goes beyond Hume’s response in pointing out that we have some ideas about where the universe came from and how the appearance of design arises, but modern ideas about evolution and the Big Bang weren’t available to Hume.
+For yet more of Hume’s response to the argument by design, see also model response 9 for exercise 6.4.
+Exercise Set 3.4: Constructing arguments by analogy
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 3.4 381
+in that both involve getting rid of a symbol of a particular ruler (or set
+of rulers). Thus, the burial of the heads may have been part of a revolution
+or invasion that toppled the government of San Lorenzo.
+This response compares the Olmec heads to a specific example of the destruction
+of a large political monument. (There are plenty of similar examples
+you might have picked to make the same argument.) That’s more helpful
+than just comparing it to "the destruction of political monuments during
+revolutions or invasions," since it makes it easier to identify specific similarities
+and differences.
+This exercise illustrates the use of analogies in the scientific process of "hypothesis
+formation." That’s a fancy way of saying that scientists sometimes
+come up with a hypotheses by reasoning by analogy. If an archaeologist used
+this argument to come up with the hypothesis that the heads were destroyed
+as part of a revolution of invasion, the next step would be to look for evidence
+that supports or contradicts that hypothesis. For instance, if there is
+some other Olmec city that suddenly becomes more prominent around the
+same time that the heads were buried in San Lorenzo, that would support
+the hypothesis that the heads were destroyed as part of an invasion.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+It is silly to argue that humans shouldn’t use radiation therapy to cure
+cancer on the grounds that humans do not naturally use radiation
+therapy. Arguing that humans shouldn’t be vegetarians because we
+are not naturally vegetarians is just like arguing that humans
+shouldn’t use radiation therapy on the grounds that it’s unnatural.
+Both arguments infer that we shouldn’t do something from the fact
+that we don’t naturally do it. Thus, it’s silly to argue that humans
+shouldn’t be vegetarians on the grounds that we are not naturally
+vegetarians.
+This response illustrates an important strategy in reasoning. One way to
+refute an argument is to give another argument that is similar to the first
+but very clearly flawed. The power of this strategy, which logicians call "refutation
+by logical analogy," is that you can use it even if you’re not sure how
+to explain what’s wrong with the original argument. In this example, we
+don’t need to say exactly why it’s silly to argue from a premise about what’s
+natural to a conclusion about what we ought to do. We only need to show an
+example of that reasoning that is clearly flawed. (See the model response to
+exercise 7 in Exercise Set 3.3 for another example of a refutation by logical
+analogy.)
+382 Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.1
+Model Responses for Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+The employees at a major electronics store chain may be biased sources. They may tell you to buy the warranty, even if it is mostly unnecessary, if they get bonuses or other perks for selling warranties and other add-ons.
+At least, you’d want to ask the salesperson some pointed and specific questions, like how frequently appliances like the one you are buying actually break.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+A good friend who bought the extended warranty on a new television is a biased source. He or she is just going to tell you to buy the warranty to avoid looking stupid by admitting that the warranty is not worth buying.
+This response exaggerates an otherwise legitimate concern about bias. Most people don’t like to admit to making a mistake. If your friend now thinks that buying the warranty was a mistake, he or she may not like to admit it. This minor bias, though, is probably overcome by the fact that this person is your good friend. A good friend presumably cares more about helping you than about admitting a mistake.
+This holds a larger lesson. Lots of people have minor biases on any given issue. This doesn’t necessarily disqualify them as impartial sources. The question is whether their interest in telling you the truth outweighs whatever minor biases they may have.
+Model Response for Exercise 3
+The president of one of the top-ranked universities in the United States is a biased source. Part of a university president’s job is to promote that university, and so no matter what he or she really thought, the president of a top-ranked university is going to insist that his or her university is the best.
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER IV: ARGUMENTS FROM AUTHORITY
+Exercise Set 4.1: Identifying biased sources
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.1 383
+Model Responses for Exercise 5
+One biased source would be a celebrity who gets a lot of money and
+publicity by writing books about how vaccines weaken children’s
+immune systems. Such a celebrity would have a lot to lose by acknowledging
+that vaccines don’t weaken children’s immune systems.
+The kind of celebrity described in this response is a classic case of someone
+with a strong financial incentive to push for a particular answer to the
+question. Vaccine manufacturers would be too.
+Some people are tempted to say that pediatricians are a biased source on
+this topic. After all, pediatricians make money by providing medical services,
+and vaccines are one kind of medical service. Furthermore, if vaccines
+really did weaken children’s immune systems, that would provide pediatricians
+with more business in the future, since their patients would be more
+likely to get sick in the future. People sometimes make similar kinds of arguments
+about public health researchers who study vaccines—or about scientists
+who study other controversial topics, such as climate change. The
+thinking is that those scientists want to reach a particular conclusion (e.g.,
+that vaccines are safe or that climate change is dangerous) in order to keep
+the grant money flowing.
+But money is not the only thing that motivates people. Professional and
+social norms matter, too. In medicine, those norms require doctors to promote
+their patients’ health—and even more importantly, not to harm their patients.
+The overwhelming majority of pediatricians recommend or even insist
+that parents vaccinate their children. If vaccines were actually
+dangerous, this would mean that most of the medical profession had turned
+its back on one its core values. Likewise, the norms in science require researchers
+to pursue the truth rather than a politically predetermined answer.
+These sorts of norms are crucial to protecting the integrity of medicine and
+science, and so even though there are surely some bad eggs who violate those
+norms, most doctors and scientists take them very seriously.
+In short, when you’re thinking about whether a source counts as biased,
+you’ll need to balance these sorts of motivations against other kinds of
+incentives.
+Model Response for Exercise 7
+A politician who is running for office on a strong anti-abortion
+platform is a biased source. Such a politician may exaggerate the
+likelihood of complications for two reasons. First, if the politician can
+convince you that abortion is dangerous, you may be more likely to
+384 Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.2
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+A travel guidebook for Canada and someone who lives in Vancouver and goes to Whistler frequently.
+support his or her campaign. Second, anti-abortion candidates may be reluctant to say anything that sounds like a concession to supporters of abortion rights, since highly ideological voters might interpret that as being "soft on abortion." Single-issue politicians have a special incentive to exaggerate, even more so in the heat of a campaign.
+Notice that this response does not say that all politicians are biased sources on this question or they are insincere in their beliefs. Instead of condemning an entire group, the response specifies that politicians running on a "strong anti-abortion platform" would not count as impartial sources on this subject. The same goes, of course, for politicians running on a strong pro-choice platform.
+Model Responses for Exercise 9
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+An executive at a health insurance company would be a biased source. Medicare for All usually refers to plans to have the government run a single health insurance program, which could put health insurance companies out of business. This gives the executive a clear incentive to convince other people—especially American voters—that Medicare for All wouldn’t lower health care costs.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+A biased source would be a university researcher who published a research paper showing that Medicare for All would reduce health care costs. He or she wouldn’t want to be proven wrong.
+The second response makes another common mistake. Some people think that anyone who has taken a position in a debate is automatically a biased source. Unless you have some specific reason to think otherwise, however, it’s reasonable to assume that the researcher has reached his or her conclusion based on a careful assessment of the evidence, not on the basis of personal bias. Being biased is not the same as having a view on an issue; being biased is having a view that is determined by something other than good reasons.
+Exercise Set 4.2: Identifying independent sources
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.2 385
+Your philosophy professor or the Web site of Jim Pryor, a philosophy professor at New York University, whose site contains useful tips on writing good papers.
+This assumes, of course, that Jim Pryor isn’t your professor! If he is, you could turn to any of several helpful books instead, such as Lewis Vaughn’s Writing Philosophy.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and a scientific paper published in a reputable academic journal, though you’d have to make sure that neither one cites the other.
+On a question this technical, any source aimed at a mass audience, such as a newspaper, will have to get its information from a more technical source, such as a scientific paper. So if you cited a newspaper, you’d really be relying indirectly on the scientific study that the newspaper’s journalists had read. Citing that study yourself wouldn’t then count as citing another independent source.
+This model response explicitly points out that you’d have to check whether either of your sources cites the other. Just about every scientific study relies heavily on previously published work by other scientists. That’s how science works: one group of scientists builds on the research done by earlier scientists. To find out whether a particular study is getting its information from somewhere else, you’ll have to track down the original paper. (Ask your librarian for help!) Then find the sentence or paragraph where the researchers make the claim you’re interested in and see if there’s a citation to another source. If so, that other source is the one you want. (Unless, of course, that source just got the information from some other source. . . . )
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Your grandmother or grandfather and birth records from the area where your great-grandmother was born.
+Finding independent, well-informed sources on this topic may be harder than it appears. If your grandparents are no longer living, you can’t ask them. (Your grandparents might also be unsure or misinformed about exactly where your great-grandmother was born—especially if she was born
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+386 Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.3
+in a different country.) If you have no idea where your great-grandmother was born, you can’t very well track down birth records from that area, such as birth certificates or a record of births in a local parish. Even if you do know where she was born, it might be difficult or impossible for you to go there and find birth records. In many areas, birth records may not even exist for your great-grandmother’s generation.
+You might need to enlist an expert’s help just to find the right documents here. Genealogists or genealogical Web sites might be able to help you track down the right area—though you should beware the biases created by their’ financial incentive to find you a convincing lead—and local librarians or archivists at local historical societies might be able to point you to the right documents. In general, librarians are extremely helpful in locating appropriate sources.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+A respected social scientist who studies the criminal justice system and a genuinely non-partisan think tank.
+Note that genuinely unbiased researchers on such a controversial topic may not be easy to find! The best thing to do on such a topic might be to get input from as many experts as you can.
+Exercise Set 4.3: Evaluating arguments that use sources
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+This argument does a fairly poor job following Rule 13. The argument relies on a study by a Dr. Vasile, but it provides nothing more than the author’s name and his professional affiliation. We don’t know when or where Dr. Vasile published his study, which makes the source hard to find. As an aerospace engineer, Dr. Vasile is presumably an informed source (Rule 14). We have no particular reason to think that he is biased, so the argument does a decent job with Rule 15. The argument does not follow Rule 16; it does not attempt to cross-check Dr. Vasile’s study. Rule 17 does not apply here.
+This response systematically addresses each of the rules from this chapter. It gives a nuanced analysis of Rule 13 rather than simply saying that the argument does or doesn’t follow the rule. This response explains why Dr. Vasile is an informed source.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.3 387
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+This is a good argument. It cites its source (Rule 13), in some sense, by
+explaining that USA Today interviewed Erik Angner and explaining
+who he is. Presumably, USA Today also interviewed Cass Sunstein for
+the article. Angner is clearly well informed about the psychology of
+economic decision-making, based on the credentials cited in the
+argument, and Sunstein seems like he probably is, too (Rule 14).
+There’s no particular reason to suspect that either source is biased (Rule
+15), since they are academics who study people’s decision-making and
+don’t stand to gain money if people take their advice, and they are
+presumably coming to this conclusion independently (Rule 16). The
+argument does not use any Web sources (Rule 17).
+Like the model response to exercise 1, this response proceeds methodically
+through each of the rules from this chapter, offering specific reasons for its evaluation
+of the argument with respect to each rule. Notice, as this response points
+out, that this argument relies on direct communication with experts (in the
+form of interview), so it cites its sources by quoting the experts themselves.
+Notice that the argument in exercise 3 is better than the one in exercise 1
+in various ways—including one way that’s not captured by the rules in this
+chapter: this argument gives us the experts’ reasons for their conclusion. We
+might still want to rely on the experts’ judgment about the strength of those
+reasons, but knowing their reasons can help us understand why their conclusion
+are true.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+This argument does a decent job following Rule 13. It gives the date
+and venue for Stephen Hawking’s speech, which would make it fairly
+easy to learn more about his remarks. It’s hard to find a more informed
+source (Rule 14) on black holes than Hawking, and Hawking doesn’t
+stand to gain anything by admitting that he’s been wrong for decades
+(Rule 15). The biggest problem with this argument is that it doesn’t
+cross-check Hawking’s claim (Rule 16). Do other experts agree with
+him, or is Hawking’s new view of black holes controversial? Mightn’t
+he (and we) be wiser to avoid, for now, taking any definitive view of
+such an obscure matter?
+Like the model responses to exercises 1 and 3, this response proceeds systematically
+through the rules from this chapter. It does not mention Rule 17,
+388 Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.3
+since the argument does not rely on any sources from the Web. It also gives
+reasons for each of its claims.
+The last line of the response highlights the fact that even the experts might
+not know very much about some topics. And even when the experts do know
+a lot about a topic, sometimes they’re wrong about a particular aspect of it.
+Science is never fully settled; even things that seem beyond doubt are occasionally
+discovered to be false. That’s why many scientists say that science is
+not a set of facts; it’s a method for discovering facts.
+The example in this exercise also highlights that science is not just based
+on authority. Stephen Hawking, whose life was dramatized in the 2014
+film, A Theory of Everything, was one of the best-known astrophysicists
+of the last century. But that doesn’t mean that he has a monopoly on the
+truth in astrophysics.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+This argument does not cite its source well (Rule 13). It tells us who the
+relevant expert is, but it doesn’t tell us where she’s published her conclusions
+or how we can find them to learn more. Sophie Verheyden is an
+informed source (Rule 14), since she’s an expert on stalagmites. There’s
+no particular reason to think she’s biased (Rule 15). The argument does
+okay on Rule 16, but not great. It mentions an archaeologist who had
+previously reached a rather different conclusion, but it also explains
+why Verheyden thinks he was wrong. It would be better to hear what
+other experts think about Verheyden’s technique and conclusions. The
+argument doesn’t use Web sources (Rule 17).
+This argument highlights an important feature of scientific reasoning. Disagreement
+between scientists—and scientific progress—often depends on
+differences in scientific techniques. In this case, an archaeologist had used one
+technique (radiocarbon dating) to estimate when someone broke the stalagmites,
+whereas Verheyden used a different technique that is better suited to
+the question at hand.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+This argument uses sources reasonably well, but it could be better. The
+argument identifies its source as NHANES (Rule 13), and it explains
+what NHANES is, in a way that shows that we can treat it as an
+informed (Rule 14) and impartial (Rule 15) source. However, the
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.4 389
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+This claim is false. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Italy, France, and Spain each produces more wine than does the United States. The data available from their FAOSTAT Web site show that France produced over five million tons of wine in 2012, Italy produced roughly four million tons, and Spain produced over three million tons, whereas the United States produced just under three million tons. The Wine Institute, an advocacy group for California wine producers, also reports that France, Italy, and Spain produce more wine than does the United States. Their report is available from the "Statistics" section of their Web site.
+This response cites two independent sources to confirm that the United States produces less wine than some other countries. Both sources are well informed about wine production, and neither is likely to be biased. (Since the Wine Institute advocates for California wine producers, we might be suspicious of their impartiality if the question were about, say, the quality of California wines, but it’s harder to distort the truth about quantities produced—and
+argument could do a better job with Rule 13 by explaining how someone could access the NHANES data that it cites. The argument doesn’t cross-check its sources (Rule 16), but this may be because there are no good independent sources. It’s expensive to collect detailed data on such a large population, so there may not be any sources that are anywhere near as reliable as NHANES on this issue. It’s not clear whether the NHANES data is from the Web, but if it is, the CDC is clearly a reliable Web source (Rule 17). Despite these problems, the argument uses sources well enough that we can trust its conclusion.
+This response acknowledges that the argument could be better in some specific ways, but it also recognizes that the argument is good enough to establish its conclusion. Arguments can be convincing even if they aren’t perfect. The response also recognizes that the topic of this argument might make it difficult or impossible to cross-check sources. Again, when it is very difficult or expensive to gather a particular kind of information, there may not be more than one independent source.
+Exercise Set 4.4: Using sources in arguments
+390 Model Responses for Exercise Set 4.4
+besides, they wouldn’t lie about the United States producing less wine than
+other countries.) The response cites its sources in a rather informal way, but it
+provides enough information that we could find the relevant sources easily.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+This claim is false. According to the World Health Organization’s Fact
+Sheet #330, on "diarrhoeal disease," diarrhea kills about 525,000
+children under five each year. The fact sheet is dated May 2, 2017, and it
+is available on the WHO Web site.
+This response clearly cites its source, which was published by a well-informed
+and impartial organization. The response also notes the date of the fact
+sheet, which is important for a topic like this, since statistics about global
+public health generally change over time. (In fact, we had to update the
+reference to a new fact sheet and change the number of deaths from 760,000
+to 525,000 for this edition of the book because fewer children are dying of
+diarrhea now compared to just a few years ago.) If you are using old sources,
+you should think about whether things might have changed since those
+sources were published.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+This claim is true. David G. Anderson, a professor of anthropology at
+the University of Tennessee, specializes in the early settlement of what
+is now the southeastern United States. In a paper published in the 2014
+book Paleoamerican Odyssey, Anderson and his colleagues summarize
+evidence from a range of scholarly papers on evidence about the
+early settlement of the Americas. This evidence shows that humans
+lived in the Americas at least 13,000 years ago, but probably arrived a
+few hundred or even a few thousand years before that. Furthermore, a
+survey of experts by Amber Wheat, published in the Society for
+American Archaeology’s SAA Archaeological Record in 2012, found
+that 58 percent of respondents thought humans had arrived in the
+Americas at least 15,000 years ago.
+You could, of course, write an entire paper—or an entire book!—on this
+topic. But this response does several important things to try to establish that
+the experts agree that humans arrived in the Americas at least 13,000 years
+ago. It identifies informed, unbiased sources (Rules 14 and 15), which it
+cites relatively clearly (Rule 13). The response emphasizes that each of the
+two sources rely on a range of other experts to establish their conclusion; the
+people that this response cites are not maverick researchers bucking the
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.1 391
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Maybe studying philosophy trains one to think in the ways that are required to do well on the GRE. (That is, maybe studying philosophy causes one to be able to do well on the GRE.) On the other hand, maybe students who are already likely to do well on the GRE (e.g., because they are already good at the kinds of tasks the GRE tests) are more likely to choose to study philosophy, because the skills that are useful on the GRE are also useful in philosophy. Of course, it’s possible that both of these causes are at work: maybe people with the skills to excel on the GRE are more likely to study philosophy and studying philosophy further improves those skills.
+This response suggests three different explanations of the observed correlation. The first is that studying philosophy causes high GRE scores. The second
+scientific consensus. And that’s what Rule 16 is really about: showing that the experts generally agree on your conclusion. Of course, the majority of scientists sometimes gets it wrong, but those of us who are not experts need very strong reasons to think that the majority of experts are wrong about something. So, establishing that most experts agree on something does give us non-experts a good reason to accept the experts’ claim.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+This claim is False. According to the Web site for the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (http://www.iihs.org), an American minivan—the Chrysler Pacifica—was among the IIHS’s "Top Safety Picks" from 2016 through 2019, and the Kia Sedona, built by a Korean company, was also among the Top Safety Picks from 2016 through 2018.
+This argument points readers to the IIHS’s Web site and highlights exactly what the IIHS said that allows the argument’s author to conclude that not all of the safest minivans in the United States are made by Japanese car companies.
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER V: ARGUMENTS ABOUT CAUSES
+Exercise Set 5.1: Brainstorming explanations for correlations
+392 Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.1
+is that there is some common cause of both high GRE scores and studying philosophy. The final suggestion is more nuanced: maybe both of the first two suggestions are partly correct.
+Notice that this response says a little bit about why the different explanations might be plausible. Specifically, it notes that studying philosophy might improve the skills needed for the GRE and that having those skills might increase the chances that one will choose to study philosophy.
+For this exercise, you do not need to attempt to figure out which explanation is the most likely. You’re just brainstorming plausible explanations.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Maybe the shorter days of autumn cause the leaves to turn colors and the geese to fly south. Or, it could be a coincidence: maybe the geese head south because of something farther south, like the reappearance of a new food source, that just happens to occur when the leaves are changing color in the north. I suppose it’s also possible that the geese are responding to the color of the leaves, flying south to escape colors that they don’t like.
+This response does more than just say that the correlation could be a coincidence. It offers a suggestion for how that coincidence could come about.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+It could be that graduating from college causes you to earn more over the course of your life, perhaps because college improves people’s skills, access to professional networks, and so on. Alternatively, it could be that people who have the capacity, support, etc., to finish college are more likely to earn a lot of money, regardless of whether they went to college. Or it could be a combination of both of those things.
+The "Tips for success" for this exercise set mention several possible explanations for a correlation. Not all of them make sense in every case. For instance, it’s clear that earning more money later in life doesn’t cause you to have graduated from college earlier in life. (Of course, not everyone goes to college earlier in life, but the number of older students is small compared to the number of younger students.) So, while you can use the possibilities from the "Tips for success" to generate ideas, think carefully about whether each possible explanation makes sense.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.2 393
+On the other hand, don’t give up on alternatives just because you think you have a good explanation for a correlation. It’s important to have multiple "working hypotheses" in science—that is, multiple ideas about what’s causing the thing you’re interested in.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Perhaps turmeric contains some compound that protects people against Alzheimer’s. Alternatively, there may be a genetic trait that is common among Indians, but not Americans, that predisposes people to like the taste of turmeric and to have lower incidence of Alzheimer’s. This would be a common factor that causes both turmeric consumption and low incidence of Alzheimer’s. Or it could just be a coincidence: one difference between Indians and Americans (maybe just accidents of culture) causes the disparity in turmeric consumption and another, unrelated difference causes the disparity in Alzheimer’s incidence.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Either it’s just a coincidence or Tecumseh’s brother’s curse has caused these presidents to die in office.
+While this correlation is real, it’s worth noting that the argument in exercise 9 doesn’t tell you how many U.S. presidents died in office after being elected in a year that didn’t end in zero. (See Rule 9.) If lots of presidents had died in office, there might be no correlation here to explain. Whenever someone claims that there is some especially astonishing correlation, take a good critical look at the evidence!
+Exercise Set 5.2: Identifying the most likely explanation
+Model Responses to Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+The most likely explanation is the combined one: students who already have the skills to excel on the GRE are more likely to study philosophy, and studying philosophy further improves those skills. In order for either part of this explanation to be plausible, it must be the case that the skills needed for the GRE, such as critical thinking and careful reading, are also used in philosophy. But if the same skills are needed in both contexts, then those who already have them are more likely to study philosophy, since they’re likely to enjoy philosophy and be good
+394 Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.2
+at it from the start, and those who study philosophy are likely to
+improve those skills even more. Thus, the combined explanation is more
+plausible than either explanation alone.
+This response gives a detailed justification for the claim that the third, combined
+explanation (from the model response to exercise 1 in Exercise Set
+5.1) is more plausible than the other explanations. Notice that this response
+touches on all of the possible explanations given in exercise 1 from Exercise
+Set 5.1.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+Obviously, the most likely explanation is the combined one. It’s more
+likely than the simple explanation that studying philosophy causes
+one to do better on the GRE. It’s also more likely than the simple
+explanation that having the skills to do well on the GRE causes one to
+study philosophy.
+This response does not give any specific reasons for thinking that the "combined"
+explanation is the most plausible. It simply asserts (and then reasserts
+twice more) that the combined explanation is more likely than each
+of the other explanations. Someone who didn’t understand why the combined
+explanation is more likely than the others would not learn anything
+from this response.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+The best explanation is that the autumn weather causes the leaves to
+turn colors and the geese to fly south. Because of the shorter days,
+leaves do not generate enough energy from sunlight; as a result, they
+turn colors and fall off. The shorter days also prompt migratory behavior
+in birds. Since the seasonal migration of many bird species is a wellknown
+fact, and changes in leaf color are also well known to relate to
+seasonal changes, this is unlikely to be a coincidence. It is also
+unlikely that the geese are fleeing from the leaves, since cage-raised
+birds, who are not exposed to leaves that change color, also display some
+of the same behaviors as migrating birds during the fall.
+Chances are that you didn’t know that caged birds exhibit some of the same
+behaviors as migrating birds during the fall. Yet, this fact can help support
+the claim that geese are not responding to visual cues, such as leaf color. This
+is a nice example of how knowing more about a topic can help you make
+better judgments about what causes what.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.2 395
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+The best explanation is a complex one: college causes higher earnings
+and having the right kind of abilities, support, etc., causes both higher
+graduate rates and higher earnings. This is because both explanations
+clearly have a grain of truth to them: college does teach you new,
+valuable skills that can lead to higher paying jobs. It also connects you
+to other people who are more likely to have higher paying jobs, and that
+network can help you get a higher paying job yourself. On the other
+hand, people who have the abilities you need to graduate from college
+(e.g., discipline and perseverance) and good financial and social
+support from friends and family are likely to get better paying jobs,
+get promoted, etc., than those who lack those skills. Finally, people who
+face obstacles to graduating from college, such as chronic illness or
+especially demanding family situations, might also have trouble
+finding or keeping high-paying jobs.
+When it comes to causal relationships, sometimes the best answer really is
+the complicated one. In situations like these, however, the more interesting
+question is often how much each factor contributes to the final outcome. For
+instance, how much of a college graduate’s extra earnings are caused by
+graduating from college, as opposed to that person’s personal abilities and
+social situation?
+In some cases, it’s possible to answer these sorts of questions by using a
+"randomized control trial," in which some people (or animals or whatever)
+are randomly assigned to a different group (e.g., to the group that gets a
+particular medicine or the one that gets a plain sugar pill). This enables
+scientists to measure how big of an effect a particular cause has. Those kinds
+of trials are much easier to do in some sciences, such as medicine or cognitive
+psychology, than in others, such as sociology or economics. In general, they’re
+easier to do in the natural sciences than in the social sciences. In the social
+sciences, researchers often have to rely on sophisticated statistical techniques
+to measure the effect of something like a college education.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+There are so many differences between Indian and American diets,
+environments, and cultures that it seems hasty to conclude that higher
+turmeric consumption leads to lower Alzheimer’s incidence. Furthermore,
+it seems unlikely that a single genetic mutation would both
+predispose someone to like turmeric and make them less likely to
+develop Alzheimer’s. Thus, the best explanation at present seems to be
+396 Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.2
+that the correlation is coincidental. If, however, someone discovered a
+mechanism by which turmeric could reduce the incidence of Alzheimer’s,
+then we would have good reason to believe that there is a causal
+relationship at work here.
+Notice that this response does not rule out the possibility that there is a
+causal connection. Nor does it leap to conclusions based on a correlation that
+could conceivably have a causal explanation. Instead, it notes that the best
+explanation at present—that is, given what we currently know—is that
+the correlation is coincidental, and it specifies what we would need to discover
+in order to think that the relationship is causal.
+It turns out that some researchers believe that they have found a mechanism
+by which turmeric reduces the risk of Alzheimer’s: a compound called
+curcumin that is found in turmeric. This is another case in which knowing
+lots of background information improves your critical thinking abilities—
+and thus another reason to get a broad education!
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+The only plausible explanation for this correlation is coincidence. Of the
+eight presidents who died in office, seven were elected (though not
+always for the first time) in years ending in zero. Of those, four were
+assassinated and three died of different kinds of natural causes.
+(Harrison himself died because he caught pneumonia giving an overly
+long inaugural address in the rain.) In order for the so-called Curse of
+Tippecanoe to have caused these deaths, it would somehow have had to
+cause both Harrison’s bombast and the two other natural deaths as well
+as motivate all four assassins, none of whom had any obvious interest
+in Native American issues, to kill their respective victims. Since there
+is no plausible explanation for how this could happen, it is implausible
+that the curse caused the deaths.
+This response highlights the lack of a plausible explanation for how one
+thing could have caused another. The lack of any such explanation is often a
+good reason to think that a correlation is just coincidental. Notice the difference
+between this exercise and exercise 7. The model response for that exercise
+reached the more modest conclusion that unless someone can discover a
+mechanism by which turmeric causes reduced rates of Alzheimer’s disease,
+the correlation is probably a coincidence, whereas this model response argues
+straight out that the correlation is a coincidence. The reason for this difference
+is that we know that foods can affect people’s health. We just don’t know
+whether turmeric affects people’s health in this particular way. By contrast,
+we have no evidence whatsoever that curses kill people.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.3 397
+Model Responses to Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+In addition to violating the rule from Chapter I about avoiding loaded language, this argument does only a mediocre job following the rules from Chapter V. It follows Rule 18 by citing the study of 11,000 Australians to establish the inverse correlation between television watching and longevity. It seems like the authors probably thought about alternative explanations (Rule 19), since they list several, but they could do a better job spelling out the different options. The argument suggests some reasons to think that the most plausible explanation for the correlation is that watching television (indirectly) causes poor health (Rule 20), and it does a good job recognizing the complexity of the causal connections here (Rule 21), but it doesn’t offer any evidence to show that those suggestions are correct. For instance, it doesn’t actually show that people who watch more television eat more junk food or exercise less than other people, and it doesn’t show that being isolated or lonely leads to worse health outcomes.
+This response begins by explaining how the argument establishes that a correlation really exists. It then works systematically through Rules 19, 20, and 21. Even better, it offers more than a superficial evaluation of the argument with respect to those rules: For instance, the response recognizes that by suggesting various causal mechanisms, the authors show that they’ve thought about alternative explanations, even if they don’t explicitly say so. Furthermore, the response doesn’t blindly accept the argument’s explanation for the correlation, noting that the argument doesn’t offer any evidence to support the assumptions behind their explanations.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This argument follows Rule 18. There is a correlation between increased television watching and dying younger. The argument also follows Rules 19 and 20. The correlation is best explained by saying that watching television causes you to die younger.
+This response offers no argument or analysis but only assertion. It doesn’t explain how the argument establishes the existence of a correlation. Nor does it offer any critical analysis of the argument’s reasons for thinking that there’s a causal connection between watching television and dying younger.
+Exercise Set 5.3: Evaluating arguments about causes
+398 Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.3
+Someone who was unsure how good this argument is wouldn’t be any better
+off after reading this response.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+This is a fairly strong argument, though it could be better. It establishes
+a correlation, in a sense, between the bread’s being touched by a
+bunch of unwashed hands and its growing mold (Rule 18). While the
+argument itself doesn’t explicitly consider other explanations of that
+pattern, and so doesn’t do a great job with Rule 19, it does briefly argue
+that the only plausible explanation of the correlation is that the kids’
+touching the bread with unwashed hands caused the mold to grow
+(Rule 20). And the teacher’s experiment does seem to rule out at least
+one alternative hypothesis, which is that touching the bread at all
+would cause mold to grow, since the teacher touched the second slice
+with her own well-washed hands. The argument doesn’t really consider
+complexity (Rule 21), but it does seem like a pretty straightforward
+causal connection.
+In one sense, this is a pretty straightforward causal argument, but it does
+have one interesting feature: it focuses on a very small number of events. In
+many causal arguments, we establish a correlation—that is, a certain kind
+of statistical relationship between two kinds of things or events—by looking
+at a very large number of examples. But the "correlation" in this argument
+is just a connection between a single event (the kids’ touching the bread
+with unwashed hands) and another single event (the bread growing mold)
+that doesn’t appear when we look at two similar events. In some cases, like
+this one, it’s clear how the connection works, which can justify the conclusion.
+In many cases, though, it’s easy to mistake a coincidence for a causal
+connection.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This is a fairly weak causal argument. It begins by asserting an
+inverse correlation between military service in Vietnam and income a
+decade later (Rule 18). The author mentions some other possible explanations
+(Rule 19), but argues that those can’t be right because the
+draft was random (Rule 20). The argument overlooks two sources of
+complexity, however (Rule 21). First, it ignores the fact that some
+people were able to avoid the draft (e.g., by staying in school), and that
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.3 399
+wealthier, better-connected people might have been more likely to do that
+and more likely to earn higher incomes later. Second, the argument
+generalizes too quickly from the example of American men serving in
+the Vietnam War to all people serving in the military anywhere at any
+time. Maybe there was something special about Vietnam, or about the
+American economy in the 1970s and ’80s.
+In addition to all the usual hallmarks of a good response, such as proceeding
+methodically through each rule, this response does three especially noteworthy
+things. First, it uses concrete details from the argument to support its
+evaluation: in discussing Rule 20, it cites the argument’s point about the
+draft being random to explain how the argument works toward the best
+explanation. Second, it exhibits careful thought about why military service
+in Vietnam and income in the 1980s might be inversely correlated. Third, it
+doesn’t get carried away with the alternative explanations. It describes
+them as additional sources of complexity, rather than as completely undermining
+the argument.
+Keeping in mind the caveats expressed in this model response, the military
+draft served as what social scientists call a "natural experiment." In
+commenting on the model response to exercise 5 in Exercise Set 5.2, we
+noted that social scientists usually have to use statistical methods to measure
+the effect of something, since they can’t randomly assign people to serve in
+the military, graduate from college, etc. But sometimes there’s a way to get
+pretty close to a randomized experiment: finding situations in the world
+where people have already been (more or less) randomly chosen for something,
+and then they see what happened to those people as opposed to people
+who were not chosen.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This is a great argument! It really goes to show that veterans are treated
+unfairly by establishing that serving in the military causes people to
+have worse job prospects! More people need to be aware of this issue!
+In addition to all the usual hallmarks of a weak response, such as failing to
+connect the response to any of the relevant rules, this response does two especially
+regrettable things. First, it leaps from the claim that veterans earn less
+than non-veterans to the claim that veterans are being treated unfairly.
+Maybe they are, but this argument hasn’t shown that. For all that’s been
+said in this argument, maybe serving in Vietnam helped veterans see what’s
+important in life and that led many of them to choose jobs that were more
+personally rewarding than financially rewarding. Second, the response
+shows a lack of critical thinking about other possible explanations of the
+400 Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.3
+observed correlation. Thus, it concludes that the argument is stronger than
+it is. When you’re passionate about an important issue, such as the fair
+treatment of veterans, it’s tempting to accept weaker arguments just because
+you want to be able to use them to support your favorite position. But in the
+end, you don’t do yourself any favors by leaning on weak evidence.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+This is a decent causal argument, but it could be much better. It clearly
+states that there is a correlation between critical thinking ability and
+skill at spotting fake news (Rule 18), and it supports this claim by
+pointing to a recent study by David Rand and Gordon Pennycook. It
+offers an explanation for how skill at critical thinking is supposed to
+cause people to be able to spot fake news, but it doesn’t consider alternative
+explanations (Rule 19) or show that this one is the most likely
+(Rule 20). For instance, maybe there’s some other factor that causes
+people to be more careful about spotting fake news, and practice at
+watching out for fake news leads them to develop the kind of analytical
+skills that lead to high scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test. The
+argument doesn’t do terribly on Rule 21, but it could do better, since it
+doesn’t suggest that critical thinking ability is the only factor in
+being good at spotting fake news, but it doesn’t consider the complex
+relationship between being good at spotting fake news and being good
+at answering tricky questions like the ones on the Cognitive Reflection
+Test.
+Like most good responses, this model response proceeds systematically through
+the rules for the relevant kind of argument, citing specific details from the
+argument to supports its evaluation. When arguments fail to engage with
+possible alternative explanations of a correlation, as this one does, it’s important
+to put in the effort to come up with those explanations on your own,
+as this model response does. That will help you evaluate how convincing the
+proposed explanation really is.
+For what it’s worth, the study described in this argument aimed primarily
+to test a different claim than the one in the conclusion of this argument.
+While some researchers think that being good at critical thinking makes you
+better at spotting fake news, others have argued that it makes you worse at
+it because it makes you better at coming up with reasons to support claims
+you agree with and doubt claims that you don’t. Fortunately for you (and
+us!), Rand and Pennycook’s study provides evidence for the former hypothesis
+and against the latter. In other words, it provides evidence for a
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.4 401
+Exercise Set 5.4: Constructing arguments about causes
+correlation, even if it doesn’t necessarily determine the causal relationships between the things that are correlated.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+This is a fairly strong causal argument. It begins by asserting a correlation (Rule 18), although it doesn’t say anything about how we know that this correlation exists. It considers several different possible explanations of the correlation (Rule 19), ranging from vegetarianism causing a higher IQ to various ways that higher IQs might cause vegetarianism. It then gives reasons to prefer some of those explanations to others (Rule 20). Finally, it admits that the true explanation of the correlation is probably some complex combination of the proposed mechanisms by which higher IQs cause vegetarianism (Rule 21).
+This response notes that, as stated, the argument does not justify its claim that there is a correlation between childhood IQ and vegetarianism in adulthood. This is one reason that the argument is only "fairly" strong. The response also cites specific aspects of the argument, such as the proposed explanations of the correlation, to support its own claims about how well the argument follows various rules.
+Model Responses to Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+Smoking cigarettes does cause lung cancer. According to the "Fact Sheet on the Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking" on the CDC’s Web site, men who smoke are twenty-three times more likely to develop lung cancer than men who don’t, and female smokers are thirteen times more likely to develop lung cancer than female non-smokers. Thus, there is a strong correlation between smoking and lung cancer. It’s also implausible that getting lung cancer makes people smoke, since most people start smoking long before they get lung cancer. Furthermore, there is a clear mechanism by which smoking causes cancer. Cigarette smoke contains toxic chemicals. When smokers inhale these chemicals into the lungs, the chemicals damage cells in their lungs, eventually leading to lung cancer. The existence of this mechanism, along with the strength of the correlation between smoking and cancer, makes it very unlikely that the correlation is simply a coincidence.
+402 Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.4
+This response does four things particularly well. First, it states its claim
+clearly at the beginning. Then, it cites a reliable source to establish a correlation
+between smoking and lung cancer. (It could have done even better by
+giving a Web address for the fact sheet.) Then, it considers and rejects another
+explanation for the correlation. Finally, it briefly explains how smoking
+causes lung cancer.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+Smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer. Everyone knows that smokers
+get lung cancer more often than non-smokers. That’s because cigarette
+smoke has tar and chemicals in it, like arsenic.
+This response does provide the major elements of a causal argument: it makes
+a clear causal claim. It asserts that there is a correlation between the cause
+and the effect. It explains vaguely how cigarette smoke causes cancer. However,
+it appeals to common knowledge to establish a correlation. This is better
+than nothing, but not much. Sometimes things that "everyone knows" turn
+out to be false. Furthermore, it does not address any alternative
+explanations
+for the correlation.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Earthquakes do cause volcanic eruptions. A study by scientists at the
+University of Oxford, reported on January 12, 2009 on the Web site
+ScienceDaily, shows that large earthquakes are followed by up to four
+times as many volcanic eruptions as usual. The scientists suggest that
+the earthquakes disturb the magma underneath nearby volcanoes. This
+leads to a buildup of pressure under the volcanoes, issuing in eruptions.
+The study’s careful statistical analysis shows that this is
+unlikely to be a coincidence. There is no obvious third factor causing
+both earthquakes and eruptions. Volcanic eruptions do cause earthquakes,
+which makes the causal connection between earthquakes and
+eruptions complicated. However, since the eruptions in the study
+happened after the large earthquakes—sometimes several months
+afterward—the eruptions didn’t cause these earthquakes. Thus, at least
+some large earthquakes cause volcanic eruptions.
+This response appeals to a careful statistical analysis to support the claim
+that the correlation is not merely coincidental. Statisticians can often estimate
+how likely a correlation is to result from pure chance. When scientists
+report that an effect is "statistically significant," they usually mean that
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 5.4 403
+there’s only a 1-in-20 (or sometimes a 1-in-100) probability that the effect
+resulted from pure chance. Note, however, that even a very small effect can
+still be statistically significant; statistical significance only has to do with the
+probability that an observed effect is just a coincidence.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Sleeping with lights on as an infant does not cause nearsightedness.
+Although an article in the prestigious scientific journal Nature,
+published in 1999, found a correlation between sleeping with lights on
+and becoming nearsighted later in life, the best explanation is not that
+one causes the other. Subsequent studies in Nature showed that
+nearsighted parents were more likely to leave the lights on in a baby’s
+room. Children of nearsighted parents are more likely to become
+nearsighted themselves. These subsequent studies showed that, once we
+control for parents’ nearsightedness, there is no correlation between
+sleeping with the lights on and nearsightedness. Thus, there is a factor
+that causes both nearsightedness and sleeping with the light on as an
+infant—namely, having nearsighted parents, who presumably don’t
+want to wander into a darkened room at night when they wouldn’t be
+wearing their glasses.
+This response illustrates an important point about the scientific process.
+When one group of scientists discovers a correlation between two things,
+they often suggest that there might be a causal connection between them.
+This spurs other scientists to investigate the connection between these two
+things; they may find a better explanation for the correlation. Of course, the
+media often exaggerates the initial suggestion of a causal link, leading to
+news stories about "the myth that X causes Y" being disproven by new studies.
+When you read about a study showing a correlation between two things,
+look for follow-up studies that try to explain or debunk that correlation.
+One good way to find follow-up studies is with scholarly search engines like
+Google Scholar (which is free) or Web of Science (which is probably accessible
+through your library’s Web site).
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Attending religious services regularly probably does make people
+happier. "Are We Happy Yet?," a 2006 report by the Pew Research Center,
+finds that people who attend religious services at least once a week are
+much more likely to say that they are "very happy" than those who
+404 Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.1
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Modus ponens: p stands for "I am thinking," and q for "I exist."
+To get started symbolizing the argument in exercise 1, notice that the first sentence is an "if–then" sentence. Those are often good places to start. Let p stand for the part of that sentence between "if" and "then." Let q stand for the part after "then." Notice that the second sentence is the same as p and the last sentence is the same as q. Once we label them accordingly, we see that the argument matches the form of modus ponens.
+seldom or never attend religious services. The relationship between religious attendance and happiness is certainly very complicated. There are probably other factors that cause both happiness and religious attendance. For instance, maybe people from religious families tend to be closer to their family, which can make people happier and encourage them to go to religious services. However, going to religious services provides a great deal of social interaction, which makes people happier, and may contribute to a sense of purpose in life, which also makes people happier.
+This response illustrates the difficulty of determining causal relationships in the social sciences. There are so many factors involved in creating happiness that it is extremely difficult to disentangle them. It is best to be modest about such claims, as this response is: it concludes only that religious attendance "probably" makes people happier. Notice that nothing in this response implies that the only way to become happy is through religious attendance. Other activities provide social interaction and a sense of purpose, as well. Remember to expect complexity in causal relationships!
+As suggested in the commentary of the previous model response, the 2006 study spurred follow-up studies probing the connection between religious attendance and happiness. One such study, published in December 2010 in the American Sociological Review, concludes that the gains in happiness come from the strengthened social networks that people build by attending religious services. Remember to look for follow-up studies whenever you’re evaluating a scientific finding.
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER VI: DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS
+Exercise Set 6.1: Identifying deductive argument forms
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.1 405
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Modus tollens: p stands for "The Great Spirit desired me to be a white
+man," and q for "The Great Spirit made me a white man."
+When people express deductive arguments in plain English, they’ll often use
+slightly different grammatical tenses to say more or less the same thing (e.g.,
+"the Great Spirit had desired me to be a white man" versus "the Great Spirit
+desired me to be a white man"). Most of the time, you can just ignore those
+grammatical differences.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Modus tollens: p stands for "Scraping stingers out worked better than
+pulling stingers out," and q stands for "Scraping the stingers out
+should leave smaller welts than pulling the stingers out."
+This argument illustrates one connection between deductive logic and scientific
+reasoning. A key part of scientific reasoning is "hypothesis testing," in
+which scientists first figure out what they should expect to observe in a particular
+situation if a hypothesis were correct; then put themselves in that
+situation; and finally, check whether they observe what they expected. If
+they didn’t, that’s a reason to conclude that the hypothesis is false, just as the
+researchers described in this argument did.
+At least, that’s the cartoon version of how science works. In real life,
+things are more complex. Maybe the scientists were wrong about what the
+hypothesis means for the situation in question. Maybe they didn’t create
+quite the right situation. Maybe their measurements were off. It takes rigorous
+experimentation and careful thought to show that the hypothesis has
+really been "falsified"—that is, shown to be false. In terms of deductive logic,
+what’s going on is often that the if–then sentence in the argument isn’t
+strictly true: it’s possible that the hypothesis could be correct, and yet the
+scientists should not expect to observe what they think they should. In short,
+modus tollens is a helpful way to think about what’s going on in hypothesis
+testing, but only if you remember that the if–then sentences in science aren’t
+always 100 percent accurate.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Modus ponens: p stands for "Screenwriters can write a dystopian sci-fi
+script about a world where people inhabit a simulated world while
+intelligent machines use their bodies to generate energy," and q for
+406 Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.2
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Modus tollens: p stands for "The points of light are stars," and q for "The points of light will be arranged randomly like the other stars."
+Don’t be thrown off by the background information in this passage. Look for the logical connectives (in this case, "if") and then look for restatements of the ideas linked by the connectives. Notice that this is another example of hypothesis testing, as we discussed in connection with the model response to exercise 5 in Exercise Set 6.1.
+"They can certainly write a script about some soccer player scoring a last-second goal to tie the big game."
+Note that the original passage contains a very short argument for p: we know they can write such a script "because they have done it." (The dystopian sci-fi script in question, in case you’re wondering, is for The Matrix.) That argument for p, though, isn’t part of the argument that fits the modus ponens structure. So, we don’t need to symbolize it for the purpose of this exercise.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Dilemma: p stands for "I’m just a poor old country boy," q stands for "I’m a demon," and r and s both stand for "You’d better be nice to me."
+An equally good way to answer this questions would be to say that p stands for "I’m just a poor old country boy," q stands for "I’m a demon," r stands for "you’d better be nice to me," and the argument takes the following form: Either p or q. If p, then r. If q, then r. Therefore, r. That might not look quite like a dilemma at first. After all, aren’t dilemmas supposed to yield conclusions of the form "r or s"? But since p and q each entail r, the conclusion here would be "r or r," which is the same as r. As we hinted in discussing the "Hedgehog’s dilemma," this is actually a common use of dilemma: by showing that there are only two possibilities, and that either one leads to the same conclusion, you can show that the conclusion must be true.
+Exercise Set 6.2: Identifying deductive argument in more complex passages
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.2 407
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Modus ponens: p stands for "People living without a government are
+prone to steal from and kill one another," and q for "The thing to do is
+to set up a government to force everyone to behave."
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Modus tollens: p stands for "Burning was the release of phlogiston,"
+and q stands for "Burning metals would cause them to lose weight."
+One thing that makes this example somewhat difficult is that p and q are
+expressed in slightly different ways at different times. For instance, q is first
+expressed as "Burning metals causes them to gain weight," but not-q is expressed
+as "Burning metals would cause them to lose weight." And although
+p is initially expressed as "Burning was the release of phlogiston," the conclusion
+(not-p) is stated in a more general way: "The phlogiston theory was
+incorrect." You’d only recognize that "the phlogiston theory was incorrect"
+counts as not-p if you realize that the phlogiston theory says, "burning is the
+release of phlogiston." (Strictly speaking, "burning is not the release of phlogiston"
+and "the phlogiston theory is incorrect," say slightly different things.
+But for purposes of understanding the reasoning in this argument, we can
+treat them as equivalent.)
+This exercise illustrates another important feature of hypothesis testing in
+scientific reasoning. You might think that scientists immediately gave up the
+phlogiston theory when they learned that metals gained weight when
+burned. But many didn’t. Instead, they amended the phlogiston theory. For
+instance, some scientists proposed that phlogiston had "negative weight," so
+that losing phlogiston involved gaining weight, in something like the way
+that releasing helium from a balloon causes it to fall. The point is that testing
+a hypothesis requires holding constant a wide range of background assumptions.
+So, when the test of a hypothesis appears to undermine that
+hypothesis, it might be because one of those background assumptions is false.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Modus tollens: p stands for "Celebrity endorsements do not signal a
+better product or a more trustworthy company," and q for "Consumers
+do not respond to celebrity endorsements."
+This argument can be confusing because p and q are expressed in a negative
+way—that is, in terms of what celebrity endorsements do not do and what
+408 Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.3
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Using modus tollens, we can conclude that the SAT is not a useful test.
+Let p stand for "The SAT is a useful test," and q stand for "The SAT tests skills like research and critical analysis." The premises would then be "if p then q" and not-q. Modus tollens lets us infer not-p from those premises. In this case, not-p stands for "The SAT is not a useful test."
+consumers do not respond to. Many people are tempted to use p to stand for "Celebrity endorsements signal a better product or a more trustworthy company" and q to stand for "Consumers respond to celebrity endorsements." That’s fine as long as you recognize that the first premise of the argument is then "if not-p then not-q." The second premise would be n"ot-not-q" (or, equivalently, q), leading to the conclusion p. As you can see, though, it’s simpler to use p and q as in the model response above.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Modus ponens: p stands for "Bertrand Russell did not believe in God or immortality," and q for "Bertrand Russell was not a Christian."
+There are a few tricky things about this argument. First, the second premise and the conclusion are stated in a negative way, as they were in exercise 7 of this exercise set.
+Another tricky thing about this argument is that it shifts between talking about "someone" and talking about Bertrand Russell. The first premise just says that if "someone" does not believe in God and immortality, then that person is not a Christian. The second premise says that Bertrand Russell did not believe in God or immortality. We haven’t developed the technical tools to formalize this argument completely, but it should be clear that Russell would have allowed us to rephrase his argument as: "If Bertrand Russell did not believe in God or immortality, then he could not truly have been a Christian. Russell did not believe in God or immortality. Thus, Russell was not a Christian."
+Exercise Set 6.3: Drawing conclusions with deductive arguments
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.3 409
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Using disjunctive syllogism, we can conclude that if the "continental
+drift" hypothesis is correct, then there will be fossils in eastern South
+America that can be found nowhere else but in western Africa.
+Let p stand for "The ‘continental drift’ hypothesis is correct," q stand for
+"There would have been animals that lived nowhere but near the place
+where the old supercontinent split apart," and r stand for "There will be
+fossils in eastern South America that can be found nowhere else but in western
+Africa." The premises are then "if p then q" and "if q then r." The conclusion
+of a hypothetical syllogism is an if–then sentence that begins like the
+first premise and ends like the second premise—in this case, "if p then r."
+Whenever you have two "if–then sentences" in an argument, you should
+check to see if they fit together in the right way to form a hypothetical syllogism.
+If they don’t, check to see if the argument is a dilemma.
+This argument illustrates another role that deductive reasoning plays in
+scientific reasoning. Wegener first proposed his idea of continental drift in
+1915, claiming that continents could combine and separate over periods of
+millions of years. On an oversimplified view of science, this might seem like
+an unscientific hypothesis, since no one can directly observe anything that
+happens over millions of years. How, then, can you test such a hypothesis?
+To overcome this problem, scientists use deductive and other kinds of reasoning
+to figure out what observations they could make to test the hypothesis.
+In this case, Wegener reasons that if his hypothesis is true, then we should
+be able to find some fossils that appear only in South America and Brazil.
+In fact, there are such fossils—most famously, those of a freshwater reptile
+called a Mesosaurus. Note, however, that this merely provides evidence for
+Wegener’s hypothesis, rather than a deductively valid proof of it. (Can you
+see why?)
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Using disjunctive syllogism, we can conclude that light consists of
+waves.
+Let p stand for "Light consists of tiny particles" and q stand for "Light consists
+of waves." We would then symbolize the two premises as "p or q" and
+"not-p." Disjunctive syllogism allows us to infer q: "Light consists of waves."
+The physicist Thomas Young offered an argument like this one after conducting
+his famous "double-slit" experiment in 1801. In a mind-bending
+turn of events, modern physics has shown that Young’s conclusion was right
+410 Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.3
+but that one of his premises was wrong: light is a wave, and so q is true, but
+light is also a particle, making the premise not-p false! (Remember, using a
+valid deductive argument form like disjunctive syllogism doesn’t always
+means that your conclusions will be true. It only guarantees that your conclusion
+will be true if all of your premises are true.)
+As with exercise 5 in the previous exercise set, this example illustrates the
+importance of background assumptions in hypothesis testing. Young assumed
+that light had to be either a particle or wave—not both. That seems
+like a very reasonable assumption, but it turns out to be false.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Using dilemma we can conclude that either people’s colleagues will
+resent their time offline or their colleagues will appreciate their time
+offline.
+Let p stand for "Individuals could try to cut back their smartphone use on
+their own," q for "Individuals could try to cut back their smartphone use in
+cooperation with their colleagues," r for "People’s colleagues will resent their
+offline time," and s for "People’s colleagues will appreciate their offline time."
+The third sentence is p or q. The fourth is if p then r, and the last sentence is
+if q then s.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Using modus ponens, we can conclude that the computer files couldn’t
+have been created in 2003.
+Let p stand for "The computer files were created with Microsoft Office 2007"
+and q stand for "The computer files couldn’t have been created in 2003." We
+can then symbolize the last two sentences in the exercise as p and if p then
+q. (Remember from the previous exercise set that "q if p" means if p then q!)
+Note that you won’t always find premises in the order you expect. The typical
+form for modus ponens is: "If p then q. p. Therefore, q." Here, the order
+of the premises is reversed. Feel free to rearrange the premises to make them
+fit the rules—just be very careful not to change the premises in the process!
+You might have been tempted to conclude that the computer files weren’t
+created in 2003. That would be a reasonable thing to say, although it’s is a
+different (and weaker) claim than saying that they couldn’t have been created
+in 2003. The logical relationships between the way things are, the way
+things might be, and the way they have to be are studied in a branch of
+deductive logic called modal logic.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.4 411
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+To prove: The Sun is not bigger than the whole solar system.
+Assume the opposite: The Sun is bigger than the whole solar system.
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: The Sun is bigger than itself.
+But: Nothing is bigger than itself.
+Conclude: The Sun is not bigger than itself.
+The first step in fitting this argument to the form of reductio ad absurdum is to recognize that the conclusion of the argument is that the Sun is not bigger than itself.
+Like all reductio arguments, this argument asks us to assume—for the sake of argument—that the intended conclusion is false. That is, it asks to assume that the Sun is bigger than the whole solar system, which is the opposite of the claim it’s trying to prove. (If we were to symbolize the conclusion as p, this claim would be not-p.)
+When you put the assumption that the Sun is bigger than the whole solar system together with the premise that the Sun is a part of the solar system, you’re forced to conclude that the Sun is bigger than itself. Notice that for the purposes of this exercise, we don’t need to spell out exactly how the assumption leads to that conclusion; we just need to identify the ridiculous conclusion itself.
+The conclusion that the Sun is bigger than itself is ridiculous in itself, but we can spell things out even further by adding that nothing can be bigger than itself. If we wanted to be even more explicit, we could go on to say that because nothing can be bigger than itself, the Sun is not bigger than itself, leaving us with the supposition that the Sun is bigger than itself and the contradictory claim that the Sun is not bigger than itself. Since the point of a reductio ad absurdum argument is to show your audience that an assumption leads to an outcome they know to be absurd, you can sometimes stop before you get to such an explicit contradiction.
+Notice that the conclusion (on the last line of your reductio form) is the same as the claim that the argument is trying to prove (on the first line of your reductio form). This should be the case for all of your answers in this exercise set.
+Exercise Set 6.4: Working with reductio ad absurdum
+412 Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.4
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+To prove: El Chapo did not give Peña Nieto a $100 million bribe.
+Assume the opposite: El Chapo did give Peña Nieto a $100 million
+bribe.
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: El Chapo
+delivered a truckload of cash to Peña Nieto without anybody noticing.
+But: There’s no way he could have done so.
+Conclude: El Chapo did not give Peña Nieto a $100 million bribe.
+Once again, we begin by identifying the main conclusion of the argument
+and then assuming the opposite. Through some chain of reasoning, which
+you don’t need to include in your reductio form for the purposes of this
+exercise, this assumption leads to the claim that El Chapo delivered a truckload
+of cash to Peña Nieto without anybody noticing.
+This argument reveals two kinds of weaknesses to look for in reductio
+arguments. First, the chain of reasoning that leads from the initial assumption
+to the (allegedly) absurd conclusion isn’t as secure as the author wants
+us to believe: surely there are ways of getting a hundred million dollars in
+cash to a well-connected person without driving a truckload of cash up to
+their office or home? For instance, maybe they delivered it in small
+increments—or maybe they didn’t use cash at all. Second, the allegedly absurd
+conclusion may be hard to believe, but it’s certainly not impossible that
+El Chapo delivered a truckload of cash to Peña Nieto without anyone noticing.
+After all, El Chapo did specialize in transporting large quantities of
+drugs across borders without anybody noticing. Thus, this argument isn’t as
+convincing as Peña Nieto would probably like it to be.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+To prove: There must be life on other planets in the Milky Way.
+Assume the opposite: There is no life on any other planet in the Milky
+Way.
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: The probability
+of life arising on Earth is basically zero.
+But: Life did arise on Earth.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.4 413
+Conclude: There must be life on other planets in the Milky Way.
+This argument is a fancy way of expressing the idea that it’s really hard to
+believe that Earth is the only habitable planet on which life developed. But
+don’t be fooled: the fact that something has a probability of almost zero
+doesn’t mean it’s impossible. Consider, for instance, that the probability of
+any given ticket winning the Powerball lottery jackpot is one in
+175,223,510, or 0.000000005707 percent. Yet, people do sometimes win
+that jackpot. By analogy, even if the probability of life arising on Earth is
+basically zero, that doesn’t strictly contradict the claim that life did arise on
+Earth. But then again, remember that some reductio arguments don’t rely
+on strict contradictions. (And furthermore, if you’ve read Chapter III and
+thought about using analogies to refute arguments, you’ll know to look for
+important differences between the lottery and the development of life. Can
+you think of any?)
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+To prove: It is impossible to accelerate something to the speed of light.
+Assume the opposite: It is possible to accelerate something to the speed of
+light.
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: The thing you
+accelerated to the speed of light would have a length of zero.
+But: Nothing can have a length of zero.
+Conclude: It is impossible to accelerate something to the speed of light.
+Notice that the argument that leads from the assumption to the claim that
+the thing you’ve accelerated would have a length of zero depends on Einstein’s
+theory of relativity. Thus, instead of rejecting the assumption that it
+is possible to accelerate something to the speed of light, we could reject the
+theory of relativity. This is usually the case in reductio arguments: you could
+avoid rejecting your assumption by rejecting another premise of the argument
+instead.
+Even if you are unsure about which premise you want to reject, you can
+use reductio arguments to draw inferences about the implications of a theory.
+For instance, Einstein used this argument to show that his theory of
+relativity implied that you can’t accelerate anything to the speed of light.
+That’s one reason that he insisted on keeping the premise that his theory of
+relativity was correct, rather than the assumption that one can accelerate
+414 Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.4
+something to the speed of light; he was trying to see what would follow if we
+took the theory to be true.
+A common variation on this argument points out that, according to the
+theory of relativity, it would take an infinite amount of energy to accelerate
+something to the speed of light—but it’s impossible to apply an infinite
+amount of energy to anything.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+To prove: The world does not have a Creator in the way a house does.
+Assume the opposite: The world does have a Creator in the way a house
+does.
+Argue that from the assumption we’d have to conclude: The Creator is
+imperfect.
+But: The Creator cannot be imperfect.
+Conclude: The world does not have a Creator in the way a house does.
+The eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume uses this reductio ad absurdum
+to rebut the argument that the world must have a Creator because
+it shows signs of being designed. (Recall again Chapter III, where variants
+of this argument are discussed in model responses 7 for Exercise Sets 3.1 and
+3.2 and model response 9 in Exercise Set 3.3.) Hume’s reasoning from the
+initial assumption to the (allegedly) absurd result is clear enough: when
+houses have flaws, they reflect the limitations or flaws of the people who
+made them, and so if the world—which has flaws—has a Creator in the
+way that a house does, those flaws must reflect the limitations or flaws of the
+Creator. But the next step might seem surprising: Why is it absurd to think
+that the Creator of the universe is imperfect? The idea of an imperfect Creator
+isn’t self-contradictory in the way that, say, the idea of a round triangle
+is self-contradictory. (At least, it’s not obviously self-contradictory, but you
+might reconsider this idea after working through exercise 10 in this exercise
+set!) The key to understanding Hume’s argument is to recognize that he’s
+addressing it to devout Christians, who believe both that God created the
+universe and that God is perfect. And it is self-contradictory to believe (1)
+that God created the universe, (2) that God is perfect, and (3) that the Creator
+of the universe is imperfect. Thus, if nothing else, the argument shows
+that Christians who accept (1) and (2) cannot use the appearance of intelligent
+design to argue that God created the universe in the way humans
+create houses.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.5 415
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Dilemma and disjunctive syllogism: p stands for "God is able to prevent evil," q stands for "God is unable to prevent evil," r stands for "God is not all powerful," and s stands for "God is not perfectly good."
+The premises in the argument in this exercise are given in the order one would expect for dilemma and disjunctive syllogism. The only thing that makes this tricky, other than the large number of statements involved, is that the passage includes some explanatory sentences that are not part of the argument itself.
+Incidentally, the problem raised by the argument in this exercise is known in the philosophy of religion as "the problem of evil." Philosophers and religious people have responded to it in many different ways. Some accept that if God is all powerful and perfectly good, then there is no evil in the world and then use modus ponens to conclude that there is no genuine evil in the world—only things that seem "evil" to us because we do not understand God’s plan. Others take the approach used in this argument, inferring that God is not perfect and all powerful. (In fact, some take the existence of evil as evidence that God does not exist at all.) Still others deny the alleged connection between God’s power and goodness and the existence of evil. Perhaps God allows evil because he wants us to have free will. Perhaps, in his perfect wisdom, he sees evil as a means to achieving some higher purpose.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Hypothetical syllogism (twice) and modus ponens: p stands for "Miss Windham has had thirty perms in her life," q for "Miss Windham knows not to wet her hair after getting a perm," and r for "Miss Windham would not have gotten in the shower after getting a perm." These three claims make up the first hypothetical syllogism, leading to the conclusion if p then r. These claims are followed by s, "Miss Windham is lying about not hearing the gunshot." Putting if p then r together with if r then s leads to the conclusion if p then s. Since it is
+In discussing exercise 7, we noted that you can avoid the conclusion of a reductio argument by rejecting one of the assumptions that lead from the initial assumption to the absurdity. This argument illustrates another way that you can avoid the conclusion of a reductio: namely, by rejecting one of the assumptions that makes the allegedly absurd claim seem absurd.
+Exercise Set 6.5: Identifying deductive arguments in several steps
+416 Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.5
+implied that p is true, we can use modus ponens to infer s, which is the
+main conclusion of the argument.
+The pieces of this argument are presented in order in exercise 3, but not all
+of the intermediate steps are laid out explicitly there. For instance, nowhere
+does it actually say, "If Miss Windham has had thirty perms in her life, then
+she would not have gotten into the shower after getting a perm." This intermediate
+conclusion is implied by the argument. This is quite common, since
+it would be pedantic to reiterate each intermediate conclusion throughout
+the argument.
+As with many arguments that combine hypothetical syllogisms and
+modus ponens, it is possible to interpret this argument as a series of modus
+ponens arguments instead. On this interpretation, we would formalize the
+argument as follows: p. If p, then q. Therefore, q. If q, then r. Therefore, r. If
+r, then s. Therefore, s. Both of these are fine, although the use of hypothetical
+syllogism is closer to the original text of the argument.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Hypothetical syllogism and modus ponens. Let p stand for "The speed
+of north-south seismic waves indicates that most crystals in the inner
+core are aligned north-south" and q stand for "The speed of seismic
+waves traveling through the center of the inner core indicates that most
+crystals in the center inner core are aligned east-west." Let r stand for
+"The inner core has its own ‘inner inner core.’" The two if–then sentences
+toward the end of the paragraph are if p then q and if q then r,
+respectively. By hypothetical syllogism, these entail if p then r. Earlier
+in the paragraph, the sentence "This shows that the crystals in the inner
+core are aligned in a north-south direction" means that same thing as
+p. Modus ponens gets us the main conclusion, r.
+As with exercise 3, some steps of this argument aren’t made explicit, such as
+the inference from if p then q and if q then r to if p then r. And as with
+exercise 3, you could interpret this as a series of modus ponens arguments
+rather than a hypothetical syllogism. What makes this argument harder to
+follow than the one in exercise 3 is the technical nature of the content. But
+you don’t actually need to understand exactly what the argument is saying
+in order to understand its logical structure.
+This argument highlights an often-overlooked feature of science: while
+schoolteachers usually emphasize that science involves making lots of observations,
+science also requires a lot of careful reasoning—including deductive
+reasoning. The seismologists discussed in this exercise certainly looked at
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 6.5 417
+many observations of the seismic waves generated by earthquakes. To get
+from those observations to an interesting conclusion, however, they had to
+construct a long chain of careful reasoning. (In fact, if you read the original
+scientific paper from which this argument is adapted, the reasoning is even
+more complicated than it appears in this exercise.) Science is not really a
+matter of "look and see." It’s more a matter of "look and see and think."
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Hypothetical syllogism, modus tollens, and disjunctive syllogism.
+Let p stand for "I am awake" and q stand for "I am still dreaming."
+Let r stand for "Everything in my apartment looks and feels like it
+does in real life," and s for "This carpet will feel like wool." The first two
+sentences can be interpreted as "p or q." The third sentence is "if p then
+r," and the fourth is "if r then s." Putting these together with hypothetical
+syllogism entails "if p then s." The fifth sentence, which says that
+the carpet feels like polyester, can be interpreted as "not-s," since the
+carpet doesn’t feel like wool if it feels like polyester. Putting not-s
+together with "if p then s" yields the sixth sentence, not-p, by modus
+tollens. Putting not-p together with "p or q" (from the first sentence)
+leads to the final conclusion, q, by disjunctive syllogism.
+As with the argument in exercise 5, this argument skips over some of the
+intermediate steps, such as the conclusion of the hypothetical syllogism ("if
+p then s"). It also states some of the premises in rather indirect ways. For
+instance, the first two sentences don’t use the word "or," but together they
+express the same idea as the sentence, "Either I am awake or I am still
+dreaming." That’s why we can interpret them as "p or q." Furthermore,
+the claim that the carpet feels like polyester is not literally the same as the
+sentence, "The carpet does not feel like wool." In the context of this argument,
+however, the claim about the carpet feeling like polyester is to say that the
+carpet does not feel like wool. (If you wanted to be more rigorous about this,
+you could add an extra deductive argument here: "The carpet feels like polyester.
+If the carpet feels like polyester, then it does not feel like wool. Therefore,
+the carpet does not feel like wool." This would give you not-s.) As a
+general rule, when faced with complex deductive arguments, you may need
+to add a few steps yourself to make the argument fit the rules precisely. Alternatively,
+you may need to reinterpret some of the claims in the arguments
+to make them fit together with the other claims more precisely. Just be careful
+not to change the meaning of the claims when you reinterpret them!
+418 Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.1
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER VII: EXTENDED ARGUMENTS
+Exercise Set 7.1: Identifying possible positions
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Disjunctive syllogism and modus ponens. To see clearly how this works, it helps to rewrite the argument a little bit. Let p stand for "Segregation laws fit with the moral law," q for "Segregation laws are unjust," and r for "One has a moral obligation to disobey segregation laws." We can then read the argument as follows: "p or q. Not-p. Therefore, q. If q then r. Therefore, r."
+As with exercise 9 in Exercise Set 6.2, we haven’t covered enough formal logic to handle all of the complexities of this argument. To understand the basic form of the argument, we need to simplify it a bit. While the original argument is more complex than the one presented in this model response, King would presumably recognize the argument in this response as a version of the argument he presented—at least as applied to the specific case of segregation laws.
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+(1) Yes
+(2) No
+(3) Yes, but only for people over eighteen
+(4) Yes, but only for medical uses
+(5) No, but possession of marijuana should carry only a small fine
+As this response illustrates, identifying good answers may require thinking carefully about what the question means. What counts as "legalizing" marijuana? Does it mean that anyone may grow, sell, buy, and use marijuana? Or does it mean that people are allowed to grow and use marijuana on their own, but are not allowed to sell it? Or grow and sell it only for certain purposes? Thinking about the different interpretations of the question will help you identify more nuanced answers.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.1 419
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+(1) Yes
+(2) No
+(3) Only if the developers help to expand the species’ habitat elsewhere
+There are many different conditions under which you might think it is appropriate
+for a developer to destroy the habitats of endangered species. Endorsing
+some of these conditions is so close to a simple "Yes" or "No" answer
+that they’re not worth considering. For instance, "Yes, as long as the developer
+could not make as much money building elsewhere" is pretty much like
+just saying Yes. (If the developer could make more money elsewhere, why
+would he or she build in the endangered species’ habitat anyway?) Similarly,
+"No, unless the alternative is that some people become homeless," is
+usually tantamount to just saying No.
+You might not know which conditions you want to attach to your answers
+now. That’s okay. When you are working on an extended argument, you can
+always revisit and reconsider your answers later.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+(1) By looking at their students’ standardized test scores at the end of
+the year
+(2) By comparing their students’ standardized test scores at the
+beginning of the year to their scores at the end of the year
+(3) Based on student evaluations
+(4) By having principals from other schools observe their teaching
+(5) Some combination of the above
+You don’t need to invent all of your answers from scratch. Almost any topic
+you consider has already been considered by someone else. It’s usually worth
+your time to find out what answers other people have proposed. They may
+have come up with ideas that wouldn’t have occurred to you.
+Notice that it may be possible to combine potential solutions to a problem.
+For instance, if test scores and student evaluations both have shortcomings as
+measures of teacher performance, schools might measure teacher performance
+more accurately by looking at both test scores and student evaluations.
+420 Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.3
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+An argument for the position:
+(1) Requiring national service of all eighteen-year-olds would force teenagers to interact with fellow citizens from very different walks of life.
+(2) Interacting with fellow citizens from very different walks of life instills a deeper understanding of and appreciation for the diversity of the United States.
+(3) It would be a good thing for all American citizens to acquire a deeper understanding of and appreciation for the diversity of the United States.
+Therefore, (4) national service should be required of all American eighteen-
+year-olds.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+(1) By relying on national pension schemes, such as Social Security
+(2) By putting a set fraction of their paychecks into a savings account each month
+(3) By buying stocks
+(4) By buying bonds
+(5) By buying a mix of stocks and bonds
+(6) People in their twenties should not be saving for their retirement.
+Some questions are "loaded," meaning that they frame an issue in such a way that they seem to preclude certain answers. (See also the fallacy of "Complex Question" in Appendix I.) Asking how twenty-somethings ought to save for retirement seems to assume that they should be saving for their retirement. It’s important to recognize when a question has such built-in assumptions and to consider answers that reject those assumptions, as the last answer in this response does. (Technically, those won’t be answers to the question, but they might still be appropriate responses to someone who asks the question.)
+Exercise Set 7.3: Sketching arguments for and against positions
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.3 421
+An argument against the position:
+(1) The United States prides itself on being a free country.
+(2) In a free country, the government does not tell adults what to do
+with their lives.
+Therefore, (3) national service should not be required of all American
+eighteen-year-olds.
+This response offers two basic arguments: one for the stated position and one
+against it. Both arguments have only a few premises. (Depending on your
+argument, you might need four or five premises—or you might only need one.)
+Many of these premises are in need of further defense or clarification. For
+instance, someone might justifiably want to know why it would be a good
+thing for all American citizens to acquire a deeper understanding of their
+country’s diversity. Don’t worry about providing that justification here.
+You can fill in the details later.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+An argument for the position:
+(1) Once a species goes extinct, it is gone forever.
+(2) Losing something forever is a serious problem.
+Therefore, (3) the extinction of an endangered species is a serious
+problem.
+An argument against the position:
+(1) Species have gone extinct throughout the planet’s history.
+(2) When species have gone extinct in the past, new species appear or
+move in to take the place of the species that have gone extinct.
+Therefore, (3) the extinction of an endangered species is not a serious
+problem.
+The first of the two arguments in this response is more of a philosophical
+argument. It addresses the significance of a permanent loss. You may be able
+to come up with arguments like this just by thinking through the issue, although
+you can always do some research to see what others have said about it
+too. The second argument depends on certain facts about the history of life on
+Earth. You may need to do some research to come up with this argument—or
+422 Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.3
+at least, you may need to do some research when it comes time to support the
+premises. (See Rule 31.)
+You should consider both kinds of arguments. Many debates can’t be settled
+with just one type of argument or the other. You’ll need to dig up some facts, and
+you’ll need to think carefully about the issues involved in your argument.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+An argument for the position:
+(1) In teenagers, spending too much time on social media is correlated
+with negative feelings, like loneliness and envy, as well as mental
+health problems, like anxiety and depression.
+(2) When people spend too much time on social media, they end up
+comparing their real lives to the fake lives that other people present
+through social media.
+(3) When people spend too much time on social media, they don’t have
+enough time to spend on other activities that make their lives more fun
+and meaningful.
+Therefore, (4) spending too much time on social media causes mental
+health problems in teenagers.
+An argument against the position:
+(1) Socializing is important for teenagers’ mental health.
+(2) Social media provide a way for teenagers to socialize all the time,
+even when they’re not with their friends.
+Therefore, (3) social media are actually good for teenagers’ mental
+health.
+Each of these arguments raises an important point about social media use
+among teenagers. Each argument is also seriously incomplete. The first argument
+is a causal argument, and it goes some way toward following the rules for
+Chapter V: it starts with a correlation and then argues that the correlation is
+explained by a particular causal connection. But the premises need more
+support, and it needs to consider alternative explanations of the correlation.
+The second argument needs more support for its premises. For the purposes of
+this exercise, that’s all fine! At this point in the process, you’re not trying to come
+up with the most complete arguments you can; you’re just trying to sketch the
+basic ideas behind each position. That’s what these arguments do.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.3 423
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+An argument for the position:
+(1) It is possible to die from an overdose of alcohol.
+(2) It is not possible to die from an overdose of marijuana.
+Therefore, (3) alcohol is more dangerous than marijuana.
+An argument against the position:
+(1) People who use marijuana sometimes move on to other, more dangerous
+drugs, like cocaine or heroin.
+(2) It is much less common for alcohol use to lead to doing harder
+drugs.
+Therefore, (3) marijuana is more dangerous than alcohol.
+The second argument in this response relies on the idea that marijuana is a
+"gateway" drug. Defenders of marijuana use might complain that this argument
+is misleading. They might claim that on closer inspection, the premises
+do not really support the conclusion. It is often worth considering
+popular arguments for or against a position, even if you think those arguments
+are ultimately misguided. Doing so can help you understand why
+people disagree with you on a topic and what you might say to change their
+mind. (Of course, you might also discover that their arguments are more
+powerful than you think. That might change your mind!)
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+An argument for the position:
+(1) People can’t properly understand debates about many important
+topics, including political topics, if they don’t understand statistics.
+(2) It’s important for people to understand debates about important
+topics, including political topics.
+Therefore, (3) everyone should be required to take at least one course in
+statistics.
+An argument against the position:
+(1) People learn enough about statistics in regular math classes in
+high school.
+424 Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.5
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+(1) For a study published in December 2012, researchers from the Boston University School of Medicine examined the brains of eighty-five deceased patients, in which they found evidence that repeated concussions had caused a kind of brain damage called "chronic traumatic encephalopathy," which has symptoms similar to Alzheimer’s disease.
+(2) In 2014, the Committee on Sports-Related Concussions in Youth found that most studies of repeated concussions show "unfavorable changes" in patients’ cognitive abilities, such as memory and processing speed.
+Therefore, (3) concussions—especially repeated concussions—are very dangerous.
+When confronted with claims from certain specialized disciplines, such as medicine, it’s often best to look for recent authoritative sources to support the claim. Remember, though, to cross-check your sources: When you set out to find a source to support a particular claim, you’re likely to overlook or ignore sources that contradict that claim. Making a conscious effort to check for sources that contradict the claim can help you catch unreliable premises or studies that have later been disproven.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+(1) A review of existing scientific research, published by Lori Marino and Kristin Allen in Animal Behavior and Cognition in 2017, found that cows have rich mental, emotional, and social lives.
+Therefore, (2) it’s false that everyone should be required to take at least one course in statistics.
+This exercise asks you to customize the position being debated by filling in the blank with an academic subject of your choosing. This response filled in the blank with "statistics." You, of course, are free to choose something different—including a subject that you really don’t think everyone should be required to take.
+Exercise Set 7.5: Developing arguments in more detail
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.5 425
+(2) A 2014 study by biologist Daniel Weary shows that cows experience
+emotional suffering when farmers separate calves from their
+mothers
+(3) Dogs and cats have rich mental, emotional, and social lives and
+can form strong bonds with other animals
+Therefore, (4) the mental and emotional lives of cows are not all that
+different from the mental and emotional lives of various mammals
+that people keep as pets.
+This response cites two expert sources to support the claim that cows have
+rich mental, emotional, and social lives, and then points out that these are
+similar to dogs and cats, which people keep as pets. Note that it takes the
+rules from Chapter IV into account by citing multiple informed and (possibly?)
+unbiased sources. The argument could be developed further, of course,
+but this is a strong start.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+(1) If people are constantly afraid of everyone else, then they will be
+afraid to invest their time and effort in producing things that others
+can take from them.
+(2) If people are afraid to invest their time and effort in producing
+things that others can take from them, then there will be no business or
+industry.
+Thus, (3) if people are constantly afraid of everyone else, then there will
+be no business or industry.
+This response uses a hypothetical syllogism (Rule 24) to spell out the connection
+between fear of others and a lack of business and industry. Hypothetical
+syllogism is often useful for spelling out causal connections.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+(1)Some victims of sexual harassment do not expect to be taken
+seriously if they report sexual harassment.
+(2) Some also may fear reprisals.
+Therefore (3), some victims of sexual harassment may reasonably fear
+that reporting harassment will harm their careers.
+426 Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.7
+(4) Some victims of sexual harassment will not choose or be able to risk harming their careers.
+Therefore, (5) victims of sexual harrassment in the workplace are less likely to file complaints if they fear that doing so will harm their career.
+This response provides two distinct reasons for thinking that victims of workplace sexual harassment are less likely to file complaints if they fear doing so will harm their career—namely, that some people won’t think the risk is worth it because they don’t expect anything to happen and that some people simply can’t afford to run the risk of reprisal. This would be a good argument to diagram if you’ve already worked through Appendix III on argument mapping.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+(1) If you were a brain-in-a-vat, then your experiences might be identical to the experiences you would have if you were a normal person.
+(2) If your experiences as a brain-in-a-vat might be identical to the experiences you would have if you were a normal person, then you might not be able to tell whether you are a brain-in-a-vat or a normal person, since you can’t distinguish between two things that are identical.
+Therefore, (3) if you were a brain-in-a-vat, then you might not be able to tell that you were a brain-in-a-vat.
+This response uses hypothetical syllogism (Rule 24) to argue for the claim that if you were a brain-in-a-vat, then you might not be able to tell that you were a brain-in-a-vat. This is often a promising strategy when you are trying to provide an argument for a conditional (i.e., "if–then") sentence.
+Exercise Set 7.7: Working out objections
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+The argument claims that "parents ought not to put their kids at serious risk." But parents can’t—and shouldn’t—try to protect their kids from all risks. For instance, allowing teenagers to date puts them at risk of having their hearts broken, but prohibiting them from dating
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.7 427
+limits an important part of their personal development. So, the argument
+doesn’t work.
+This objection argues that a particular premise in the argument is false. It
+does that by arguing that the premise is "too strong"—i.e., that it claims too
+much. In response to this objection, we might want to modify the premise in
+question. We could change it to something like, "Parents ought not to put
+their kids at serious risk unless doing so is necessary for achieving an important
+goal." Of course, then you’d have to show that encouraging kids to play
+high-impact sports is necessary for achieving an important goal. (What
+goal? Why is it important? Are there other ways of achieving it?)
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+The argument draws an analogy between pets and cows. The argument
+is correct that there are relevant similarities between the two, but it
+ignores some crucial differences. In particular, it ignores the fact that
+people have a special fondness for animals like cats and dogs. It is
+only because of this fondness that it is wrong to abuse them. Since
+people aren’t generally fond of cows in the same way, the analogy
+doesn’t work.
+Recognizing that the argument for this exercise is really an argument by
+analogy, this objection draws on Chapter III to try to undermine the
+argument.
+For the record, we don’t find this objection convincing at all. (Why not?
+What’s our objection? Roughly, we don’t think that it’s wrong to abuse cats
+and dogs only because people are especially fond of them.) In fact, we find the
+original argument pretty compelling. But this response illustrates what you
+can do when you are trying to work out objections to an argument that you
+think is compelling: think about the kinds of objections that other people
+make, and then try to spell them out in as sympathetic a way as possible. If
+nothing else, it will give you a better appreciation for other people’s views so
+that you can engage in more productive conversations about the topic.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+The first premise of this argument is false. If there were no government,
+people might be afraid of strangers, but they would still have friends
+and relatives whom they trust.
+428 Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.7
+The objection we considered in the model response to exercise 1 showed
+that the conclusion of the argument needed to be revised. The objection in
+this response shows that one of its premises needs to be revised. Perhaps we
+don’t want to say that without a government, everyone would fear everyone
+else. Maybe we want to say something less sweeping—something like,
+"If there is no government, then people will be afraid to interact with strangers."
+This might still be enough to make a powerful argument.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Despite having some benefits, allowing anonymous complaints about
+sexual harassment would be a mistake because it will make people take
+the allegations less seriously and increase some people’s tendency to
+dismiss allegations as fabrications. This, in turn, will make victims
+of sexual harassment more doubtful that their allegations will be
+treated seriously, which will diminish their willingness to report sexual
+harassment.
+This is a rebutting objection: rather than trying to show that any of
+the premises in the argument are unreliable or irrelevant, it attempts to
+show that the conclusion of the original argument is false. Specifically, it
+claims to show that the reasons to reject the conclusion outweigh the
+reasons to accept it.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+The argument in this response depends on the claim that there is no
+way, other than on the basis of one’s experience, to know that one isn’t a
+brain-in-a-vat. This claim needs to be defended. Maybe there are
+sophisticated philosophical arguments—or unsophisticated ones!—that
+show that we’re not brains-in-vats. Unless that claim is supported, the
+argument doesn’t work.
+Remember that not all objections involve claiming that one of the premises in
+an argument is false. There are other kinds of flaws that can weaken an argument.
+In this case, the flaw is that the argument involves an unsupported—
+and therefore unreliable—premise (Rule 3).
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.9 429
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Alternative 1: Governments should start a media campaign, including public service announcements, to make texting while driving as socially unacceptable as drinking and driving.
+Alternative 2: Governments should require car manufacturers to install devices that block cell phone reception inside moving cars.
+Alternative 1 is the best option. The original proposal will be no more effective than existing laws against texting while driving—maybe even less so, since drivers might see texting while driving and using their phone’s GPS navigation as equivalent, since they would both be breaking the same law. Besides, it’s impractical to ban the use of GPS navigation. Alternative 2 would not only make it harder to use GPS navigation, but it would prohibit passengers in the car from sending texts, making calls, looking up nearby gas stations or restaurants, and so on. This major inconvenience would probably drive people to find ways to disable the blocking device.
+Sometimes coaxing people into doing something is more effective than forcing them to do it. After all, people are much more willing to cooperate with you when you convince them that you’re asking them to do the right thing.
+Note that the solutions to most problems tend to create problems of their own—or, at the very least, to require paying some cost in terms of time, money, or energy. Therefore, it’s important to consider the balance of benefits to costs in evaluating a proposal, rather than just choosing the proposal that would most effectively accomplish your chosen goal. Alternative 2, for instance, would be very effective at discouraging texting while driving, but it would create all sorts of new problems. When you’re thinking about ways to solve a problem, be sure to think about what other problems you might be creating in the process.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Alternative 1: The U.S. government should incentivize companies to make currently popular forms of long-distance travel—namely, planes, trains, and automobiles—safer and more environmentally friendly.
+Alternative 2: Americans should develop technology that makes long-distance travel less important, such as better virtual reality (to
+Exercise Set 7.9: Brainstorming alternatives
+430 Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.9
+simulate going to exotic places) and holographic telecommunications
+(to make traveling for meetings unnecessary).
+The original proposal is the best one. Existing travel technologies won’t
+be able to compete with "hyperloop," since cars aren’t going to get any
+faster than they are now, trains won’t get fast enough, and planes are
+much more environmentally destructive than a hyperloop. Alternative
+2 is exciting but has two problems. First, I’m not sure it’s realistic to
+think we could invent things like holographic telecommunications.
+Second, even if we did have such technology, lots of people would still
+want or need to travel long distances, so Alternative 2 leaves the
+original problem unsolved.
+The original proposal aims to make long-distance travel faster, safer, and
+more environmentally friendly. The two alternatives take very different
+approaches. The first looks for an alternative set of technologies to do the
+same thing as the original proposal. The second suggests that if we find
+long-distance travel difficult, unsafe, or environmentally destructive,
+maybe we could find ways to reduce the need for long-distance travel in the
+first place. In other words, instead of trying to solve the problem directly,
+Alternative 2 considers ways we can avoid the problem entirely.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Alternative 1: Music fans should send money directly to their favorite
+musicians through platforms like Patreon.
+Alternative 2: Music fans should attend their favorite musicians’
+concerts and buy merchandise there.
+Alternative 1 is the best option. Buying albums is an inefficient way
+to get money into musicians’ pockets, since so much of the money
+gets siphoned off by the record companies. So, if your goal is to provide
+financial support to musicians, then paying them directly is the best
+way to do it. And while going to concerts is fun and a good way to
+support musicians, your favorite musicians might not do concerts in
+your area.
+In choosing among the alternatives, it can be helpful to think a bit more
+deeply about the goal. The original proposal expressed the goal as "supporting"
+musicians. If that means helping them make a living from their music,
+then the question is whether buying albums is a good way to do that—and,
+indeed, whether it’s the best way. Once you’ve refined the goal that far,
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 7.9 431
+Alternative 1 looks like a better choice than the original proposal. (But is it
+the best interpretation of what it means to "support" a musician? Would
+buying albums or attending concerts count as supporting them in some other
+way? Which is most important?)
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Alternative 1: People who need or would like to use straws should bring
+their own metal or wooden straws with them to restaurants.
+Alternative 2: Restaurants should not offer plastic straws to anyone,
+but should make paper straws available upon request.
+Alternative 2 is the best option. It’s better than Alternative 1 because it’s
+a pain to have to carry a straw everywhere. It’s better than the original
+proposal because the original proposal doesn’t change the fact that
+restaurants would still be using plastic straws and giving them out
+by default. Plus, the original proposal places all the responsibility on
+the individual instead of the restaurant, which is in a better position to
+make real change. Finally, Alternative 2 makes drinking without a
+straw the default option while still making straws available for those
+who want them or for those who need them, like some people with
+disabilities.
+When considering alternatives to a proposal, be sure to ask yourself who is
+supposed to take action under the original proposal and consider whether
+there might be someone else who could or should take action instead. This can
+open up entirely new possibilities.
+The case of straw bans raises another important point. Alternative proposals
+may affect different groups differently. While most people can drink
+without a straw, some people with disabilities cannot. Proposals that ban
+straws outright therefore cause serious problems for some restaurant patrons.
+It’s worth thinking about who might be most negatively affected by
+each alternative.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Alternative 1: Schools should impose harsh penalties, such as suspension
+or expulsion, on unruly students.
+Alternative 2: School districts should provide parenting lessons to
+parents of young children and counseling to older children as a means
+of preventing or reducing behavioral problems.
+432 Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.1
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+As surprising as it may seem, a diet that includes beef from range-fed cattle causes less animal suffering than an entirely vegetarian diet.
+This hard lead clearly lays out the main conclusion of the argument. This is an especially effective way to start off when your conclusion is surprising or otherwise likely to grab the reader’s attention all on its own.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Imagine that your child has been kidnapped. The police have caught the kidnapper, but he refuses to say where he’s keeping your child. The kidnapper’s iPhone might contain clues about where he’s been—and where your child might be. Wouldn’t you want the police to be able to access the data on that iPhone? So why has Apple made it impossible for them to do that?
+The original proposal is the best alternative. Schools that have introduced uniforms report that discipline, academic performance, and students’ self-image all improve as a result of the uniforms. Thus, introducing uniforms achieves several important goals. Alternative 1 may improve discipline within the school, but it means that unruly students won’t get as good an education, which might lead to even bigger problems for those students later in life. Alternative 2 might help, but it would be more expensive and difficult to implement than Alternative 1.
+Note that this response’s argument for the original proposal includes at least two claims that are controversial: First, what reason do we have to believe that schools that have introduced uniforms see the results that this response claims? (Are there reliable studies of the effects of school uniforms?) Second, would Alternative 2 really be more expensive and difficult to implement than Alternative 1? Thus, the argument in this response is ripe for further research and development. (See Exercise Set 7.3.)
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER VIII: ARGUMENTATIVE ESSAYS
+Exercise Set 8.1: Writing good leads
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.1 433
+This soft lead begins with an imaginary scenario that vividly illustrates the
+main reason for thinking that Apple (and Google) ought to reverse the
+change to their encryption software. Another approach here would be to
+track down an actual case in which police used a suspect’s cell phone to solve
+a crime.
+You could just as easily have gone with a hard lead for this exercise, although
+it might take two sentences to do it: "Apple and Google have made
+law enforcement’s job harder by encrypting the data on everyone’s phones.
+This was a mistake." Nothing says a hard lead has to be a single sentence.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+What would you do if all of your student debt vanished overnight?
+Would you buy something you’ve wanted—or maybe needed—for
+years? Would you start your own business? If so, you’re not alone. In
+fact, some economists think that freeing people from student debt
+would spark so much economic activity that the government should
+consider buying up all the debt and forgiving it.
+For an American audience—and especially an audience of American college
+students or recent graduates—this soft lead is almost certain to grab their
+interest. But it does more than that. In getting listeners engaged in thinking
+about what they would do if their debt disappeared, it subtly introduces two
+of the major effects of student debt forgiveness and then segues quickly to the
+main conclusion.
+A hard lead for this exercise could be just as exciting for the right audience:
+"The U.S. government should buy up and forgive all $1.4 trillion of
+outstanding student debt."
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+No high school newspaper would run a story that used the "n-word" to
+refer to an African-American. Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn,
+however, uses the word over two hundred times, and it is a staple of the
+high school English curriculum. The difference is that Huck Finn is a
+classic of American literature.
+This is a "softer" lead than the model responses to most earlier exercises in this
+set. It uses a (very brief!) imaginary scenario to lead the reader into the
+issue of Twain’s use of the "n-word."
+Notice that these introductory sentences set up the main argument, which
+centers on Huckleberry Finn’s status as a literary masterpiece, but they
+434 Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.2
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Version 1: Schools should look at the change in students’ test scores between one year and the next to measure teacher’s effectiveness.
+Version 2: Schools should hire recently retired teachers to observe other teachers in the classroom in order to evaluate how well each teacher is doing.
+The original proposal in this question is so vague as to be almost meaningless. How else would you evaluate a teacher except by looking at how well they’re teaching? The question is what, precisely, schools should do to figure out how well teachers are teaching.
+This response suggests two very different approaches to measuring teacher effectiveness. Both responses could be made even more precise. For the first version, we might specify what kinds of tests we should use. For the second version, we might specify how often the teachers should be observed, how many different observers should evaluate them, what rubric should be used in evaluating them, etc.
+don’t actually say what the main point of the essay is. They don’t mention the new edition of the novel, from which the offending word has been removed, and they don’t state the author’s main position, which is that the book should be left unedited. In fact, this lead is compatible with an argument that the book ought to be censored but is not, because people are squeamish about editing a "classic of American literature."
+It’s okay if you don’t state the main conclusion of the essay in the first few sentences, but be sure to state it somewhere in the introductory paragraph(s).
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Of the top ten family films on the Internet Movie Database (IMDB), exactly one has a female protagonist. This is not an anomaly. In general, family films portray women as highly sexualized, ditzy characters who rarely do anything as heroic or significant as their male costars.
+This lead mixes a hard and a soft approach. The first sentence uses an interesting fact to illustrate the main point of the essay. The third sentence states that main point explicitly. The second sentence ties the other two sentences together.
+Exercise Set 8.2: Making definite claims and proposals
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.2 435
+It’s often a judgment call about whether to include those extra details in
+your first statement of your claim or proposal. If you can include the details
+without making the claim too long or hard to understand, it’s often worth
+doing. If including the details muddies your message, then leave them for
+later.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Version 1: There should be people in the government whose job is to
+represent the interests of future generations, just as there are people
+whose job is to represent the interests of different geographical areas.
+Version 2: Before passing any law with major long-term impacts, the
+government should be required to conduct a study that examines the
+long-term social, economic, and environmental consequences of the
+proposed law.
+The main source of vagueness in the proposal concerns how governments are
+supposed to take the interests of future generations into account. These two
+proposals offer very different mechanisms by which governments could do so.
+Version 1 suggests including representatives of future generations in government.
+Version 2 suggests, instead, a change in the procedures that governments
+use when passing laws with long-term consequences.
+Note that both of these proposals would need to be fleshed out in more
+detail. For Version 1, would these representatives be elected? If so, by whom?
+How many would there be? Would they have votes in the legislature? For
+Version 2, how do you decide if a law would have "major long-term impacts"?
+How "long-term" are these long-term consequences anyway? And
+don’t we already do this, to some extent, with Environmental Impact
+Statements? How has that worked out so far?
+Don’t feel like you need to eliminate all vagueness from the proposal for
+this exercise set. The point is to sharpen the original proposal in different
+ways.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Version 1: People in the richest 10 percent of the population are more
+likely to have used marijuana, cocaine, or heroin than are people in the
+poorest 10 percent of the population.
+Version 2: People in the richest 1 percent of the population are more
+likely to use illegal narcotics than are people living below the federal
+poverty line.
+436 Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.2
+There are three sources of vagueness in the original claim: the terms rich and
+poor, the word use, and the word drug. Each of these could be made more
+specific in various ways, and Version 1 and Version 2 take different approaches
+to each of them.
+Let’s start with the different ways this response deals with the vagueness
+of rich and poor. Version 1 treats rich and poor similarly, asking us to look
+at the top and bottom 10 percent of the wealth distribution. Version 2 uses
+criteria that have more cultural salience: the "top 1 percent" is often taken to
+have special significance for thinking about economic inequality, and the
+federal poverty line provides an official dividing line between the poor and
+the non-poor.
+It would be possible to adopt a more scientifically sophisticated approach
+here by looking at correlations between wealth and the probability of drug
+use, rather than just comparing people at the very top and bottom of the
+wealth distribution. Such an approach would require a more technical approach
+to statistics than we’ve introduced in this book.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Version 1: The majority of Americans are Christian.
+Version 2: America’s laws and public institutions should honor and be
+guided by Christian beliefs and values.
+The oft-repeated claim that "America is a Christian nation" could mean
+many different things, and at least some of the disagreement about it might
+stem from failing to get clear about what it means. If it just means that the
+majority of Americans are Christian, then it’s easy enough to figure out
+whether it’s true, but it’s harder to say just what follows in terms of how
+Christianity should influence American laws and institutions. If the claim
+is supposed to mean something closer to Version 2, then you’re going to need
+a very different kind of argument to show that it’s true.
+As with the first exercise in this exercise set, both Version 1 and Version 2
+in this model response could be made more precise. Is Version 1 talking about
+American citizens? And is it talking about people who answer "Yes" when
+asked if they’re a Christian? People who attend a Christian church regularly?
+Or what? In Version 2, what exactly does it mean to say that American
+laws should "honor and be guided by Christian beliefs and values"?
+Despite this vagueness, both versions are much clearer than the original
+claim that "America is a Christian nation."
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.4 437
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Elon Musk and his supporters will surely object that we need to do fun and exciting things, in addition to tackling urgent problems here on Earth. They might argue, first, that we will never completely eliminate problems like hunger and disease, so it’s foolish to wait until they’re eliminated to address other concerns. Second, they might say that doing exciting things is part of what inspires innovation that can help solve those urgent problems.
+While it’s true that we’ll never completely eliminate problems like hunger and disease, the point is that we should do what we can on those urgent problems before moving on to other things. And there’s no reason that the urgent problems of hunger, disease, war, and so on shouldn’t inspire innovation, if only people would see that solving world hunger is just as grand an accomplishment as launching a spaceship to Mars.
+This response briefly restates the objection from the exercise. It then offers two reasons that someone might offer for the objection, presented in ways that don’t downplay or dismiss them. In the second paragraph, it moves on to rebutting those objections—in this case, to explaining why the first reason in support of the objection is irrelevant and the second one isn’t strong enough.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Version 1: There are technologically sophisticated civilizations on other planets, with technology at least as advanced as our own.
+Version 2: There are life forms on other planets, but they may be no more sophisticated than bacteria and other single-celled organisms here on Earth.
+This response highlights the fact that a proposal that looks quite definite might actually be quite vague. The response offers two wildly different versions of the basic claim that there is life on other planets. According to Version 1, that "life" includes intelligent life forms capable of advanced technology. According to Version 2, that "life" might be no more complex than some of the simplest organisms on Earth.
+Exercise Set 8.4: Detailing and meeting objections
+438 Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.4
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Amelia Earhart expert Richard Gillespie, however, disputes the claim
+that the woman in the photo is Earhart: the hair is too long, he says,
+compared to a photograph taken of Earhart just before she left. If
+Earhart was taken to Jaluit Harbor soon after crash-landing, then the
+picture would be taken no more than a few days after she’d left. Thus,
+according to this line of reasoning, her hair wouldn’t be noticeably
+longer in this photograph than in the one from right before she left.
+TThis objection, however, assumes that Earhart didn’t remain on
+Jaluit Island for more than a few days after her crash landing. It’s
+possible that the Japanese brought her to Jaluit and left her there for
+some time while they decided what to do with her. That could have given
+her hair plenty of time to grow to account for the difference between the
+pictures. Thus, while the objection pushes us to make some extra assumptions,
+it doesn’t rule out the possibility that the picture really does
+show Earhart.
+This response restates the objection and then spells out the reasoning behind
+it in more detail. The second paragraph identifies a crucial weakness in the
+objection: it rashly assumes that Earhart wouldn’t have spent much time on
+Jaluit Island. Since that assumption is debatable, we can acknowledge the
+basic point behind the objection—namely, that the woman in the photo has
+longer hair than Earhart did when she left—without giving up the conclusion
+that the woman in the photo is Earhart herself.
+Notice that the weakness in the objection might not have been apparent
+if we hadn’t developed the objection in detail. This shows that the benefit of
+spelling out an objection isn’t just that you can be sure you’re addressing the
+objection in its strongest form; sometimes you find out that the objection is
+actually weaker than it seemed.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Many people will balk at the idea of overthrowing the North Korean
+regime because other recent efforts at replacing dictators have not
+turned out well. The recent American interventions in Libya, Afghanistan,
+and Iraq are just the latest examples in American experience. More
+broadly, the Arab Spring tried to topple dictators—and sometimes
+succeeded—but with very mixed results. The attempt to overthrow
+Bashar al-Assad in Syria, for instance, sparked a vicious civil war.
+These examples overlook a crucial difference, however, between
+North Korea and other recent interventions. Overthrowing the Kim
+regime wouldn’t require replacing it with another one. Instead, North
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.4 439
+Korea could reunite with South Korea, which has a stable, functioning
+democracy. It would be more like reuniting East Germany with West
+Germany than like replacing Saddam Hussein or Assad.
+Since the objection in this exercise relies on a generalization about recent
+attempts to replace dictators, the obvious way to develop the objection is to
+give some examples. Note that this response doesn’t restrict itself to American
+efforts to topple dictators. (You might have to do a little research to
+identify such examples. That’s fine. It shows that you’re really making an
+effort to figure out whether there’s any substance to the objection. After all,
+some objections will be based on generalizations that aren’t actually supported
+by the evidence.)
+The second paragraph points out a crucial difference between North Korea
+and the examples given in the objection. In other words, it claims that the
+examples aren’t sufficiently representative to support a generalization that
+applies to North Korea. It even goes a step further and cites a counterexample—
+namely, German reunification—that more closely resembles the
+case of North Korea. This is an especially impressive critical move. Remember
+that you can always use the rules from earlier chapters both to develop
+objections and to respond to them.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Some might object that what really matters in college is not where you
+go, but what you do while you’re there. There are plenty of very successful
+people who did not go to elite colleges. What makes them successful
+is that they work hard, make smart choices about the kinds of classes
+they take and the extracurricular activities that they are involved in,
+and pursue opportunities, such as internships, that advance their
+careers.
+This does not undermine the basic point, however, that elite
+colleges provide their students with important benefits compared with
+other schools. Hard work and smart choices are important, but they will
+bring greater rewards if they are combined with the greater support,
+better resources, and better opportunities offered by elite colleges. Thus,
+the objection simply misses the point of the argument.
+In detailing the objection, this response begins by rephrasing the main point
+of the objection—namely, that "what you do" matters more than "where you
+go." It then offers some reasons to think that what you do matters more than
+where you go. For instance, it notes that there are many successful people
+who did not go to elite colleges. That is, it provides premises to support the
+440 Model Responses for Exercise Set 8.4
+conclusion that where you go to college is not as important as what you do
+while you’re there.
+In responding to that objection, the response explains why the objection
+does not undermine the main argument. The conclusion of the main argument
+is that going to an elite college brings substantial benefits over going
+elsewhere. The objection, therefore, is somewhat beside the point. The main
+argument isn’t claiming that you can’t be successful elsewhere; it’s only claiming
+that, other things being equal, going to an elite school brings greater
+benefits than going elsewhere.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Many parents will object that they are merely "protecting their investment."
+Many parents pay enormous sums of money to send their
+children to college. They do this because they expect that attending
+college will benefit their children. Some students might not reap those
+benefits on their own, though, because they have a hard time adjusting
+to college. In the worst case scenario, difficulties adjusting to college
+could lead to bad outcomes, such as failing out of school. Parents who
+stay in constant contact with their children are just trying to avoid
+such outcomes. This is a reasonable strategy for many parents, even if
+it limits their children’s chances to become more independent. It is like
+choosing to put money in a savings account rather than investing in
+risky stocks: the returns might be lower, but so is the risk of a very bad
+outcome.
+For parents who have good reason to think that their child will
+have serious difficulty adjusting to college, this is a reasonable
+concern. However, most freshmen do adjust to college life without
+constant parental supervision. Furthermore, there is surely a middle
+ground between the kind of constant supervision that inhibits independence
+and the totally "hands-off" approach that leaves students at
+risk of failure. Thus, the need to protect one’s investment does not
+justify constant supervision of most freshmen.
+In detailing the objection, the response begins by restating the main point of
+the objection—namely, that parents are protecting their investment. It then
+explains what the objection means and then gives strong reasons to think
+that this is a reasonable thing to do. (Notice the investment-related argument
+by analogy that’s used to support the objection.)
+In responding to the objection, the response takes a nuanced approach. It
+acknowledges the legitimate points made in the objection, but it notes that
+these points only apply to some freshmen and that they do not entirely
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 9.1 441
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+We all know that we have a lot of choices in how we eat. Do we pick up burgers at the drive-thru or cook our own food at home? Should we eat beef? What about chicken? Fish? Farmed fish or wild fish? The list goes on. Let’s suppose for the moment that I’m trying to decide whether to eat beef or go completely vegetarian, and I want to make whatever decision will cause the least animal suffering. How many of you think that, if I want to minimize animal suffering, I should eat beef? How many think I should go completely vegetarian? Well, it turns out the answer is: eat beef. Here’s why.
+This response starts by eliciting an experience that everyone in the audience has: deciding what to eat. And then it invites the audience members to engage with the presentation by asking them to answer a question, presumably using a show of hands. Finally, it grabs their attention by revealing that the correct answer to that question is not the one that most of them probably expected.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Think about all of the photos, texts, and other stuff on your cell phone right now. Is there anything on there that you wouldn’t want most people to see? If so, you’re probably glad that Apple and Google have made it harder for hackers to break into your cell phone. But here’s something you might not have thought about: Apple and Google have now made it so hard to break into a phone that even the police can’t do it—not even if they need the information on that phone to prosecute
+justify the need for constant parental supervision even of those freshmen. The main conclusion of the original remains plausible: parents need to let college freshmen manage their own lives.
+Especially when presented with a powerful objection, this kind of nuanced response is often appropriate. Do not pretend that there are no good reasons on the other side of a debate. You can acknowledge those reasons while still defending your own position.
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER IX: ORAL ARGUMENTS
+Exercise Set 9.1: Reaching out to your audience
+442 Model Responses for Exercise Set 9.1
+dangerous criminals. That’s a problem, and Apple and Google should
+fix it.
+Like the response to exercise 9.1, this response opens with a question for the
+audience. Unlike exercise 9.1, however, it’s probably best to let the audience
+members keep their answers to themselves in this case. This response also
+contains a little "plot twist." The first few sentences make it seem like the
+speaker supports stronger encryption, but then pivots to introduce an argument
+against stronger encryption. As long as you’re crystal clear about what
+position you’re actually taking, this can be an effective device for grabbing
+listeners’ attention and winning some sympathy from people who might
+otherwise resist your final conclusion.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+The movie Fight Club ends with the main characters blowing up bank
+buildings to wipe out the records of everyone’s credit card debt. What if
+we could do that for student debt—but without blowing anything up?
+What if the government, as a one-time stimulus to the economy, just
+bought up everybody’s student debt and forgave it? That’s the question I
+want to explore today.
+This response opens with a reference to a dramatic event in a famous film,
+which it uses to dramatize the proposal being discussed. (Notice that it’s not
+actually important whether the audience members have seen Fight Club.
+Unless you’re sure that most or all of the audience will have seen a movie,
+make sure that your opening will work even for people who haven’t seen it!)
+The opening then quickly segues into the proposal and clearly states the main
+topic of the presentation.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Think of all the words that would have gotten you in trouble if you had
+said them in your high school English class. Now, think about how
+many books you read in your high school English class that used one
+or more of those words over and over again. What are they? Maybe The
+Catcher in the Rye comes to mind, but that’s pretty mild, really. The
+one that stands out most in my high school experience, at least, is
+Huckleberry Finn. Huck Finn is full of the "n-word"—over two
+hundred instances of it. At least, it was full of it until recently: a new
+edition has just come out that replaces the "n‑word" with the word
+"slave." I’m going to argue today that this is a mistake. Teachers
+should stick to the original text, "n-word" and all.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 9.1 443
+Like the response to exercise 3 in this set, this response asks the audience to
+recall something from their own experience. It also asks audience members
+to report about their experience by asking them which books contain "inappropriate
+language." (Depending on the sensitivities of your classroom,
+you might even ask students to call out some of the words that would have
+gotten them in trouble in high school. This kind of "ice breaker" activity can
+be helpful when your audience is bored, tired, or otherwise apathetic.) After
+asking audience members to report on their experiences, the response establishes
+a connection between the presenter and the audience by having the
+presenter share his or her personal experience about reading The Catcher in
+the Rye and Huckleberry Finn in high school. Finally, it transitions to
+the main topic of the presentation and states the main conclusion of the
+presentation quite bluntly. (See Rule 42: it helps to give your audience clear
+signposts telling them where you’re going.)
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+I don’t know about you, but I’m pretty sure that if you put on the
+soundtrack
+to the Disney movie The Little Mermaid, I could sing along
+to the whole thing. That’s because my sister loved The Little Mermaid.
+She watched it over and over again. And what did she see when she, as
+a little girl, watched The Little Mermaid? She saw a sexy cartoon
+mermaid who wore nothing but a seashell bra, who made ditzy mistakes
+like combing her hair with a fork, who needed to be rescued by
+brave Prince Eric (a male) and watched over by Sebastian the Crab
+(also male), and her father (also male). The only powerful female
+character in the movie is Ursula the Sea Witch, the hideous, evil
+villain. And if you think about your favorite childhood movies, I’ll bet
+you’ll find something similar: the female characters—especially the
+"good" ones—tend to be sexy, ditzy, and in need of male help. These
+movies, I submit, send bad messages about gender roles to our nation’s
+children.
+This response begins with a quirky fact about the presenter—one that, depending
+on the speaker’s personality, might elicit a laugh from the audience.
+Revealing unusual or even slightly embarrassing things about oneself is an
+effective way to engage the audience’s interest and get them to lower their
+guard.
+The response continues with a brief story about the experiences of the presenter
+and someone he or she knows. This is followed by an invitation to
+compare the presenter’s experience to one’s own experience. Having engaged
+the audience’s interest and made them think about some of their own experiences
+on the topic, the response reveals the main point of the presentation.
+444 Model Responses for Exercise Set 9.3
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Here’s the bottom line: if you care about animal suffering, the question about what to eat isn’t as simple as it seems. There’s no way to feed ourselves without causing some amount of animal suffering. But as surprising as it may be, certain kinds of animal husbandry, such as range-fed cattle, cause less animal suffering than growing crops. So if you really want to save animals’ lives, put down that tofu and pick up a hamburger!
+This response reiterates the central argument and ends with a quip that will help the audience remember the main "take-away" from the presentation.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Now that you’ve heard my argument, think again about that stuff on your cell phone that you don’t want other people to see. Maybe it’s embarrassing. Maybe it would get you in a bit of trouble with your parents or the dean. But what’s more important? Protecting your embarrassing photos? Or protecting people from dangerous criminals? Because as I’ve argued, the new, stronger encryption reduces law enforcement’s ability to fight crime. Apple and Google ought to undo what they’ve done.
+By using the phrase "Now that you’ve heard my argument," this response explicitly signals that the presentation is coming to an end. It then harkens back to the opening paragraph of the presentation. (Go back to the model responses to exercise 9.1 and see!) This is often an elegant way to wrap things up, especially if you can use your opening example or anecdote to recapitulate your main argument, as this response does. And as with the model response to exercise 1 in this exercise set, this response closes with an explicit statement of what the speaker wants the audience members to take away from the presentation.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+I’ll admit that when I first heard the idea of the government forgiving everyone’s student debt, I thought it was outlandish. Perhaps you did, too. But the more I think about it, the better an idea it seems. Perhaps hearing my arguments has changed your mind, too. If you agree, then I encourage you to write to your government representatives and tell
+Exercise Set 9.3: Ending in style
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 9.4 445
+See the companion Web site for this book for model responses to Exercise Set 9.4.
+them about the idea and the benefits that I’ve outlined here today. Maybe by the time we come back for our ten-year reunion, everyone single one of us will be student-debt-free!
+This response not only clearly signals the end of the presentation, but it issues a clear call to action—"Write to your government representatives!"—and emphasizes how relevant and important the issue is to the audience member’s lives.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+I’m sure that the editor of this latest edition of Huckleberry Finn has good intentions. But, as I’ve argued, his alteration of the text removes an integral part of Twain’s text and deprives instructors of a valuable educational opportunity. The text deserves to stay as it is, "n-word" and all.
+This response uses the phrase "as I’ve argued" to signal that the presentation is coming to a close. It concludes with a pithy restatement of the main point of the argument.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+In summary, then, the study that I’ve been discussing today finds three main complaints about films aimed at families with young children: first, there aren’t enough female characters; second, the female characters that do appear in the films are scantily clad and sexy; and third, the female characters rarely do anything heroic or especially respectable. So the next time you’re wondering where kids get their ideas of gender roles, look no further than the latest "kid-friendly" blockbuster.
+This response uses very explicit signposting—"In summary," "first," "second," "third," etc.—to show that the speaker is summarizing the argument. It then relates the argument back to the audience’s personal experiences by reminding them of the real-world implications of the argument’s topic.
+Exercise Set 9.4: Evaluating oral presentations
+446 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.1
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+The author is saying that giving the wrong person a tool to do something makes it more likely that the person will do that thing, and
+that this sometimes produces bad consequences. The example of putting a drunk in a car is the most similar to giving a murderer a gun because you have someone who’s already inclined to do something impetuous and dangerous, and you’re enabling that person—making it easier to do the impetuous and dangerous thing. The argument doesn’t really generalize to all people with guns, but I guess that’s not the author’s point.
+The claim about the dangers of giving someone a spoon to eat ice cream was offered as a first example. It’s amusing, but probably neither true nor a great analogue for giving a murderer a gun. This response focuses on the stronger analogy between putting a drunk in a car and giving a murderer a gun. Doing this helps focus any future dialogue on the best argument, rather than getting bogged down in the weaker or even silly part of the argument.
+Note that by restating the author’s argument, you’re not necessarily agreeing with it. You’re just reporting what the author said so that you can understand it, stripped of the rhetoric that gun owners might find upsetting.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+The author is making three points. The first is that in the decades after World War II, America helped shape an international political and economic order that allowed for tremendous economic growth and, in many countries, peace and security. The second is that the American way of life has some features that the author, at least, thinks are very good: entrepreneurship, innovation, self-reliance, and patriotism. The third is that, according to the author, certain critics of American society—presumably those on the political left—are doing things that threaten that American way of life and, indirectly, all of the good things that this way of life promotes.
+Like the model response to exercise 1, this response carefully avoids the inflammatory rhetoric to focus on the author’s substantive points. You might not agree with those points (and even if you do, you might well want to
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR CHAPTER X: PUBLIC DEBATES
+Exercise Set 10.1: Listening even when it hurts
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.1 447
+consider what the critic says, likewise in as neutral a voice as you can manage).
+The point of this exercise, however, is neither to endorse the views
+being expressed nor to lay out objections to them; it’s simply to restate them
+in a neutral way to create a basis for further dialogue.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+I think what Ali is saying here is that people of all religions—at least
+formally affiliated with them—have done terrible things, but that this
+doesn’t tell us anything about the other followers of that religion. He’s
+not saying that Christians ought to answer for Hitler’s sins. Instead,
+he’s saying that, yes, the people who carried out the September 11
+attacks were Muslims, but that this doesn’t have anything to do with
+him or other Muslims, just like Hitler’s atrocities don’t have anything
+to do with other Christians.
+It’s not clear that Ali actually said this, but let’s set that aside for now. What
+point would he have been making if he had said it?
+Understanding one-liners like this—the bumper sticker slogans of political
+debate—requires especially careful thought because the point they’re trying
+to make can be unclear and the reasons for that point aren’t explicitly
+given. So, the first thing to do is think about what substantive point the
+author or speaker might be making. Try to get past the most outrageous or
+provocative interpretation of the statement, and look for something plausible
+or at least some kernel of truth. Then, think about what reasons are
+implied or could be given to support that point.
+You may disagree with the basic premise behind a one-liner like this, too.
+Many Christians dispute the claim that Hitler was really Christian. In this
+case, it might not even matter, since Ali’s point is that when a follower of a
+particular religion does something bad, it doesn’t tell us anything about
+other followers of that religion. He could just as well have asked about some
+other Christian who did horrible things or asked how a Christian would
+have felt if Hitler or the September 11 hijackers had been Christian. But
+since the goal here is just to understand Ali’s (implied) argument, not evaluate
+it, we can temporarily set aside the question of whether his premises are
+reliable.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+After reporting on something that someone else said, Alexandria
+Ocasio-Cortez is making several distinct points here. First, she’s
+claiming that her district in New York City actually represents
+448 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.1
+"modern America" better than the residents of rural states. Second,
+she’s claiming that at least some residents of rural states are old,
+racist, uninformed, and caught up in conspiracy theories, which I
+guess is supposed to suggest that voters in her district would actually
+make better decisions, so that it wouldn’t be a bad thing if they "make
+decisions for us." Third, she’s reaffirming the argument that it’s unfair
+that rural states have disproportionate power in American presidential
+elections because all Americans ought to have an equal say in who
+gets elected president.
+This response disentangles three very different aspects of what Ocasio-
+Cortez is saying here. That’s important because you might think some of
+them are more reliable and relevant than the others. For instance, you might
+dispute the claim that Ocasio-Cortez’s district more accurately represents
+America. Or you might think that any district, including Ocasio-Cortez’s,
+has its share of uninformed voters with questionable beliefs, so the fact that
+rural states have such voters isn’t relevant to who should get more say or
+who would make better decisions. But you could reject both of those points
+and still think that all Americans ought to have an equal say in who gets to
+be president.
+With respect to the second point (about racist, uninformed voters), it’s
+possible to read Ocasio-Cortez’s tweet as suggesting that most voters in
+rural states are distinctively or totally racist and uninformed. Especially if
+you come from a rural state, it might be tempting to read it that way. We
+often reach for more outrageous interpretations of statements that offend us.
+But in the context of her point about everyone having an equal say, maybe
+we could interpret it as saying that when each voter in a rural state has
+more influence over electoral outcomes than each voter in a more populous
+state, the "bad apples" in rural states have more power than they should. In
+general, it’s important to look for the most plausible interpretation of an
+inflammatory statement—the kernel of truth behind it, if there is one.
+(You’ll often hear this described as looking for the most "charitable" interpretation.)
+Doing so can prevent inflammatory rhetoric from derailing an
+otherwise possibly constructive conversation.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Rand Paul’s main point here is that the government shouldn’t be
+forcing people to undergo any medical procedure, including vaccination,
+because forcing people to do so is inconsistent with American
+principles of liberty as well as standard medical practice. He also
+suggests that the reasons for mandating vaccinations would also seem
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.2 449
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Example of a response from someone who disagrees with the position
+Opening a dialogue: "I hear what you’re saying about guns making it easier to kill people. And, of course, I share your concern about people getting killed, even if I’m not sure I share your views about gun control. I’d like to understand your point a bit better, though. What exactly do you mean by ‘taking guns out of the equation’? I’d also like to hear more about what you think would happen if murderers couldn’t get guns."
+Asking for a hearing: "I think I understand your position a bit better now. I guess I’ve always thought about guns and gun rights a bit differently than you do. Where I live, people think about guns as tools for hunting and self-defense, not as murder weapons. Can I try to explain where I’m coming from now?"
+For someone who supports strong gun rights, the suggestion that we should "take guns out of the equation" so that murderers cannot get guns may seem as silly as banning cars because some people drive drunk. If that’s your view, you might be tempted to jump in with objections, even if they’re disguised as
+to imply that the government should require flu vaccines, which he implies would be undesirable. He does say that, even if the balance of reasons suggests that people ought to get vaccines, we shouldn’t ignore the fact that vaccines do carry risks, but I don’t think this is crucial for his argument.
+It would be easy to get hung up on Paul’s discussion of the risks of vaccines, since this is such a controversial topic in the debate over vaccines. But this response rightly notes that the point about risks isn’t all that important to his overall argument. His main point is about whether the government should be requiring people to undergo a medical procedure against their will, and this response highlights both of the key premises in his argument against doing so.
+It would also be easy to slide from talking about Paul’s argument to talking about other arguments against mandatory vaccinations. Try to focus on the reasons that are actually given, though, rather than other reasons that could be given for the same conclusion.
+Exercise Set 10.2: Preparing for dialogue
+450 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.2
+questions. ("I hear what you’re saying, but is taking guns from responsible
+gun owners really the solution?") Try to slow down a bit. Your turn will
+come . . . but if you dismiss the other person’s views right off the bat, neither
+one of you is likely to learn anything.
+Instead, this response tries to open the dialogue by asking sincere questions
+to better understand exactly what the other person means and how to spell
+out the arguments for that view. Also note the subtle difference between "I’d
+like to understand your position better" and "I don’t understand your position."
+Someone might interpret the latter as saying, "I don’t think your position
+makes sense," whereas the former indicates a genuine interest in
+learning more. This response also reassures the other person that you have
+listened and tried to understand their view and emphasizes some common
+ground.
+When asking for a hearing, the response politely indicates disagreement
+and suggests one key difference with the author of the original argument.
+Note that for the purpose of this exercise, you don’t need to indicate what
+your arguments are. The point is to practice indicating your disagreement
+constructively and asking for a chance to explain things from your
+perspective.
+Example of a response from someone who agrees with the position
+Opening a dialogue: "I think I agree with you that we need to take
+guns out of the equation, but I wonder: What exactly do you mean by
+that? I’m also not sure I understand the argument about cars and
+guns. That analogy seems the strongest, but I am not so clear how it is
+supposed to work. Can we flesh that out a little more?"
+Asking for a hearing: "Okay, good, now I know I agree with your
+position, and I think we’re making progress. I think we could make the
+argument stronger still. Here’s what I’m thinking."
+There’s room for clarification and improvement in each of the exercises in
+this exercise set. This response illustrates one way to press someone to improve
+their thinking on the topic. Again, it doesn’t jump right in with criticisms
+of the argument or offers to improve it. Instead, it begins by asking for
+clarification and only later transitions to making (better-informed)
+suggestions.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.2 451
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Example of a response from someone who disagrees with the position
+Opening a dialogue: "I don’t see things the same way, but I can tell
+that you feel strongly about this, so I’d like to understand where you’re
+coming from. I hear you saying that the American way of life contributed
+to economic prosperity, peace and security, and a bunch of things
+that you value, like self-reliance and patriotism. And I hear you
+saying that you think ‘fake news’ and ‘political correctness’ are
+undermining the American way of life and threatening all of those
+things. Have I got that right? Could you tell me more about what you
+mean?"
+Asking for a hearing: "I see what you’re saying about the impact of
+capitalism and American democracy and power, but I see some dark
+sides to all of those things, too. And where you see ‘political correctness’
+and efforts to undermine the American dream, I see people trying to be
+more respectful of one another and trying to make America even better.
+I’d like to explain things from my perspective to see what you think."
+The first part of the response clearly indicates disagreement and then restates
+the other person’s argument in a less provocative way. This indicates that
+you’ve been listening and gives the other person a chance to correct any misunderstandings
+right at the beginning of the discussion. It then politely
+prompts the other person to try to support the premises of the main
+argument.
+The second part of the response sketches some main points of disagreement,
+using language that emphasizes the difference in perspectives ("I see things
+this way") instead of pushing for confrontation ("But you’re totally wrong
+about that!").
+Example of a response from someone who agrees with the position
+Opening a dialogue: "I hear you saying that the American way of life
+contributed to economic prosperity, peace and security, and a bunch of
+things that you value, like self-reliance and patriotism. And I hear
+you saying that you think ‘fake news’ and ‘political correctness’ are
+undermining the American way of life and threatening all of those
+things. That all sounds right to me, but if you’re going to convince
+other people, we might need to get clearer on how fake news and political
+correctness threaten all those good things you mentioned. Can you
+tell me what you have in mind?"
+452 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.2
+Asking for a hearing: "I think we’re on the right track, but I think
+some more concrete examples and statistics related to the effect of
+American foreign policy on peace and prosperity would really help
+strengthen the argument."
+Note that the first part of this response is almost identical to the first response
+of the previous response. Restating the other person’s argument is a
+useful way to start a conversation whether you agree with them or not, as it
+leads naturally into further exploration of that argument.
+The second part identifies a specific weakness in the argument and suggests
+one way forward.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Opening a dialogue: "That’s a provocative way to put it! Can you
+explain the analogy a bit more?"
+Asking for a hearing: "Thanks. Now I understand what you’re saying
+much better. It seems to me, that there’s a crucial difference between the
+hijackers and Hitler, though I can’t put my finger on it very precisely
+yet. Would you help me try?"
+Especially with a provocative one-liner or slogan, sometimes there’s nothing
+more to do than to ask for clarification—especially if you find the one-liner
+very provocative or even offensive, which can make it hard to appreciate the
+other person’s point or any possible argument behind it. Beware of phrases
+like "I don’t understand how that’s relevant," which could come across as
+accusatory rather than as a sincere expression of confusion.
+Notice that the second part of this response draws on the understanding of
+analogies from Chapter III to indicate the main source of concern: a crucial
+difference between the two things being compared.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Opening a dialogue: "Wait—you’re Facebook friends with my uncle,
+too? Really, though, I take it your main point here is that you think
+it’s unfair that some Americans have more say in presidential elections
+than others, right? I’m sure you know why people like John
+Cardillo think it would be unfair if the big cities completely dominated
+the elections, so I’d like to hear what you have to say about that. I’d also
+be interested to know if you really think that rural states don’t
+represent ‘modern America’ and rural voters are less informed than
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.2 453
+urban voters, since I can’t tell exactly what you were saying about
+that."
+Asking for a hearing: "Okay. Now that I’ve heard your reasons for
+thinking that every person’s vote should count equally, I think I see
+exactly where we disagree about that. So let me tell you my reasons for
+preferring the Electoral College."
+This response starts off with a little bit of humor—emphasis on "little bit"—
+which can sometimes be an effective way at defusing tension and establishing
+a connection with someone. This specific joke also acknowledges a grain
+of truth in what the other person has said without conceding that the overall
+point is correct. The rest of the response is a bit blunter than some of the
+other model responses in this exercise set, but it still indicates a genuine interest
+in hearing more about the other person’s views.
+Notice the phrase "I’m sure you know why people like John Cardillo think
+it would be unfair if the big cities completely dominated the elections." There
+is strategy behind speaking this way. It serves to push the debate forward by
+skipping over some well-worn arguments that both sides will be familiar
+with. It’s saying, "I know you know the first line of objection to your view,
+so let’s just cut to the interesting part: tell me about your response to that
+objection." This is also a way of giving the other person credit for being more
+reasonable than their first statement may make them sound—and invites
+them to live up to it as you go on together.
+The second part of the response doesn’t indicate why you disagree with the
+other person, but it emphasizes that you have listened and understood and
+are prepared to focus on specific points of disagreement.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Opening a dialogue: "It sounds to me like the main issue for you isn’t
+about risks from vaccines, but about government coercion. That’s
+interesting to me because it’s not the argument I usually hear about
+this, and I certainly understand the basic argument. Can you help me
+think through it some more? Do you think the government is ever
+justified in forcing people to do something to protect other people?"
+Asking for a hearing: "Thanks. That really helps me understand your
+perspective. To me, though, the similarities between vaccines and other
+things that governments can legitimately mandate are pretty striking.
+For instance, the government requires people to get driver’s
+licenses before they can drive a car to reduce the chance that someone
+will accidentally injure someone else while driving. On the other hand,
+454 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.3
+Exercise Set 10.3: Reframing arguments in a positive way
+I do see the differences between those two things. Maybe we could talk about that analogy to see where we disagree?"
+The first part of this response focuses exclusively on the crux of the argument, setting aside other, more controversial aspects entirely. (You can always come back to them later in the discussion.) It then focuses the discussion even more narrowly by asking the other person to address a specific possible weakness in the original argument. Notice, though, that it does so in an open-minded way, rather than saying something like, "Surely you’ll admit that the government is sometimes justified in forcing people to do something to protect other people! How is this any different?"
+The second part of this response gestures at a specific objection, but rather than insisting at the outset that the objection is decisive, it invites the other person to join you in exploring the objection together, with a goal of improved mutual understanding.
+Model Responses to Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+If you’re trying to lose weight, I’ve got good news for you! Researchers have discovered a way to help your body metabolize sugars more effectively, which can help prevent obesity and diabetes. And it’s simple: stay away from diet soda. It turns out that the artificial sweeteners in those diet sodas change the kinds of bacteria that live in your intestine, which in turn makes it harder to metabolize sugars. Of course, eating a well-balanced diet and getting regular exercise are also essential, but for those of us who are trying to lose weight, it’s always helpful to find one more trick for trimming fat.
+Notice that this response contains almost exactly the same information, but with a completely different "spin." Instead of putting a negative spin on the fact that diet sodas make it harder to lose weight, this response emphasizes the positive side of that fact: staying away from diet soda might make it easier to lose weight. (Be careful here! It’s tempting to say that giving up diet soda will help you lose weight, but strictly speaking, the information you’re given in this exercise doesn’t actually say that your gut bacteria goes back to "normal" when you give up diet soda. You’d need to do more research before coming to that conclusion.)
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.3 455
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+If you’re overweight and drinking diet sodas to try to lose a few
+pounds, I’ve got bad news for you. It turns out that the artificial
+sweeteners in those sodas make it harder for your body to metabolize
+real sugars, which in turn makes it harder to lose weight. Ultimately,
+though, I think that’s a good thing. Once people know that you can’t
+shed extra weight by switching to diet soda, they’ll probably try harder
+to avoid gaining weight in the first place! So, sorry if you’re already
+overweight, but at least this research might help other people.
+In some sense, the main message of this response isn’t that different from
+the message of the strong response, but it’s framed in a way that will be
+discouraging—and maybe even insulting—to audience members who are
+overweight. When thinking about whether your message is "positive," think
+about how different kinds of audience members are likely to feel when they
+hear it.
+Model Responses to Exercise 3
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+It used to be that museums were willing to accept archaeological
+artifacts that had been stolen from ancient sites or smuggled out of
+their home countries. Most museums have since thought better of these
+illicit methods of acquiring artifacts. Since no one else is funding
+new excavations, however, it is difficult for museums to acquire new
+artifacts. By funding excavations themselves, archaeological museums
+can not only acquire new artifacts but also further their missions
+of increasing the world’s knowledge about ancient sites.
+Whereas the original passage focused on a problem, this response focuses on
+the solution to the problem. It also focuses on the positive changes that have
+led to the problem—namely, the fact that museums are no longer willing to
+accept stolen or smuggled artifacts.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+Museums that display archaeological artifacts have gotten over their
+nasty habit of buying stolen artifacts. It’s important that museums
+continue to expand their collections. In order to make this a reality,
+though, everyone needs to pitch in to finance excavations. We can do it!
+456 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.3
+This response differs from the strong response mainly in that it ignores the
+concrete proposals given in the strong response and focuses only on the vague,
+feel-good idea that if everyone "pitches in," museums can expand their collections
+through legitimate means. Offering something positive requires
+more than being optimistic. It requires offering a realistic plan or proposal
+for solving a problem.
+Model Responses to Exercise 5
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+It turns out that bananas are just as good for athletes as sports drinks.
+A recent study found that eating a banana during an intense workout
+produced the same benefits as a sports drink, without the artificial
+ingredients or plastic packaging. Plus, bananas are cheaper than
+sports drinks. So next time you’re working out or playing hard, grab a
+banana instead of a sports drinks.
+Whereas the original passage complains that sports drinks are no better
+than bananas at improving athletes’ performance and recovery, this response
+looks on the bright side: bananas are just as good as sports drinks. It
+then takes each of the complaints the passage makes about sports drinks and
+points out that bananas don’t suffer from the same flaws.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+Put down the Gatorade and grab a banana instead! Science shows that
+bananas are better for athletes.
+Besides lacking the detail of the stronger response, this response goes beyond
+what the original passage tells us. The original passage strongly implies that
+bananas and sports drinks are equally effective, but this response says that
+bananas are better (in some unspecified way). Offering something positive
+doesn’t require exaggerating the benefits of your idea.
+Model Responses to Exercise 7
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+Hispanic students are now enrolling in college at a higher rate than
+blacks or non-Hispanic whites. Many are still struggling to graduate,
+however, because only half are prepared for college-level English courses
+and only one in three for college-level math. We can hope that new
+programs aimed at improving Hispanic students’ academic
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.3 457
+performance can boost those numbers, ensuring that the college
+graduation rate catches up with the enrollment rate.
+The statistics presented in the original passage are discouraging. Putting a
+bright face on them is challenging. One way to do this is focus on the bright
+spots, such as the high college enrollment rate and the introduction of new
+programs to boost academic performance. Another, more subtle way is to
+reframe the statistics in terms of students who are prepared for college-level
+work, rather than those who aren’t. Since these changes only go so far in
+putting a positive spin on things, this response avoids unwarranted optimism
+by concluding only that "we can hope" that the new programs will
+improve graduation rates.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+Some people think that Hispanic high school graduates aren’t prepared
+for college. Sure, maybe many such students don’t graduate, but at
+least they’re enrolling in college at a higher rate than other groups.
+And half of them show up ready to excel in college-level English
+courses. That sounds pretty good to me—especially when you compare it
+to where we used to be.
+Like the stronger response, this response focuses on the students who are
+doing well by noting that about half of Hispanic students are prepared for
+college-level English courses. (Be careful not to exaggerate the good news,
+though! Being told that half of Hispanic students are unprepared isn’t
+enough to infer that the other half are prepared to "excel" in college-level
+English courses!) Stating that high enrollment numbers "sound pretty good"
+shows a positive attitude, but it also shows a certain refusal to face the facts.
+If half or more students are unprepared for college-level work, that is a bad
+thing. Instead of putting on a happy face and pretending that this is an acceptable
+situation, it’s better to admit that there is a problem and explain
+why you think it’s solvable. Some actual data about "where we used to be"
+would also be helpful.
+Model Responses to Exercise 9
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+You have the power to save lives. Through donations to effective charities
+like the Against Malaria Foundation, you can provide anti-mosquito
+bed nets to families who otherwise couldn’t afford them. These nets
+literally save the lives of children who would otherwise die of malaria.
+458 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.3
+For every $7,500 in donations, the Against Malaria Foundation can
+provide enough bed nets to save at least two or three children. That’s the
+same amount that it takes to fund the average "wish" granted by the
+Make-a-Wish Foundation, but instead of just brightening someone’s
+day, you’re saving someone’s life. That’s not to say that the heartwarming
+work of the Make-a-Wish Foundation isn’t valuable. Rather, it’s to
+say that you have the opportunity and the power to do even more good
+if you donate to organizations that put your money to the best use
+possible—and that’s something you should really feel good about.
+In some ways, the original passage already offers something positive—
+namely, a way to save kids’ lives. But it does so in a fairly antagonistic way.
+The original passage focuses on the badness of "wasting" money just making
+sick kids feel good. Telling your audience that they’re bad people for wanting
+to support Batkid is not a very effective way of winning their support. This
+response focuses instead on the goodness of saving lives by donating to the
+Against Malaria Foundation. It’s far less disparaging of the Make-a-Wish
+Foundation, focusing not on the alleged wastefulness of donating money to
+them, but on the additional good to be done by donating elsewhere.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+Donating $7,500 to the Make-a-Wish Foundation can help make a
+sick child’s dream come true. Seeing those dreams come true can be a
+truly heartwarming experience, as when 11,000 people turned out to
+help a sick five-year-old play "Batkid" for a day. But you can do even
+more good by donating that same money to other charities—charities
+that save lives, rather than just brightening someone’s day. Sure,
+brightening a kid’s day makes you feel good, but shouldn’t saving a
+kid’s life make you feel even better?
+While it offers more or less the same message as the strong response, this response
+weakens its case in three ways. First, it dwells too much on the Batkid
+example, which tugs at listeners’ heartstrings and makes them less
+willing to see the alternative proposal in a positive light. Second, it fails to
+provide specifics about the proposed positive alternative. Which charities
+will save children’s lives? How will they do it? Finally, in saying that saving
+lives should make you feel better about yourself than brightening someone’s
+day, the response risks alienating listeners who, like most people, get
+more joy out of the Batkid story than out of impersonal statistics about the
+number of anonymous children who didn’t die of malaria.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.4 459
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+1. Raising the minimum wage increases incomes for at least some workers.
+2. The correlation between increases in the minimum wage and rising incomes doesn’t necessarily imply causation.
+3. Other things being equal, it’s better to make it easier for companies to hire people.
+The first claim in this response is something that both Heather Boushey and Michael Strain explicitly say, so it’s an obvious point of common ground. The second and third claims, however, are found only in one response or the other. What’s the basis for thinking that they might serve as common ground? Claim 2, about correlation not implying causation, is a concession that Boushey makes to the other side: she’s acknowledging that the burden of proof is on her to show that one thing caused the other. This is something that Strain would probably be keen to emphasize. Claim 3 is a weaker version of a claim that Strain makes. Why should we think that Boushey would accept it as common ground? We have to speculate a bit here. Given that Boushey seems interested in ensuring that people can make a decent living, it seems safe to assume that she would agree that it’s better to make it easier for people to get jobs—other things being equal. That is, she would probably agree that it’s better to make it easier for people to get jobs, as long as doing so doesn’t come with some other downside, such as lowering incomes.
+Especially when you don’t have a lot of information about different people’s views—or about the views of someone you’re debating—you might have to extrapolate from what they’ve said to what else they probably believe. Just remember to proceed with caution, especially about stereotyping other people. Of course, it also helps to check in with them whenever possible.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+1. Some people find Confederate monuments offensive.
+2. In some cases, it would be appropriate to remove Confederate monuments.
+3. It’s undesirable for public monuments to send the wrong message.
+Exercise Set 10.4: Finding common ground
+460 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.4
+It may seem hard to find much common ground between these two views,
+but it’s there if you look hard enough. For one thing, both sides explicitly
+acknowledge that some people find the monuments offensive. (Note that this
+is different than both sides agreeing that the monuments are offensive.) And
+the USA Today Editorial Board implicitly acknowledges that at least some
+monuments should be removed. If that were never appropriate, then we
+wouldn’t need to decide "on a case-by-case basis." Claim 3 requires a bit
+more thought. Maria Svart clearly implies this when she describes the monuments
+as "grotesque reminders" of "white supremacist ideology." The Editorial
+Board also seems to imply this when they suggest that providing more
+context might be a good alternative, since the purpose of providing more
+context is to clarify the message that the monuments are supposed to send.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+1. Climate change is real, it is caused by humans, and it is dangerous.
+2. The world needs to cut greenhouse gas emissions and stop using
+fossil fuels.
+3. We ought to ensure that vulnerable people are not harmed.
+Underneath the vehement disagreement between David Keith and the
+ETC Group is some obvious common ground. Both Keith and ETC agree
+that climate change is dangerous and that the world needs to cut its emissions
+by (among other things) eliminating fossil fuel use. It’s also clear from
+their respective statements that they think it’s important to protect vulnerable
+people. Their disagreements, then, are about how solar geoengineering
+relates to those goals. Keith thinks it could help protect people while we cut
+emissions, whereas ETC thinks that it actively endangers people and makes
+it harder to cut emissions.
+This exercise highlights that what counts as common ground depends on
+the context. It’s not very interesting to point out that both Keith and ETC
+believe that the Earth is round and that water is wet. Just about everyone
+agrees about those things, and anyway, they’re not relevant to the disagreement
+at hand. By contrast, it’s worth pointing out that they believe climate
+change is real, human-caused, and dangerous (because some people don’t),
+and it highlights that Keith and ETC do share a common and even urgent
+understanding of the problem—at least in part—even if they disagree
+about the solution.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.4 461
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+1. It’s unacceptable for race to have a huge influence on whether someone
+gets the death penalty.
+2. The threat of execution won’t always stop people from committing
+murder.
+3. Punishment should fit the crime.
+This is a particularly difficult exercise because Robert Blecker and Diann
+Rust-Tierney seem to approach the issue from such different angles. But if
+we look closely, we can discern some common ground—or at least make some
+reasonable guesses. Rust-Tierney makes Claim 1 explicitly, while it seems
+to follow implicitly from Blecker’s insistence that the punishment should fit
+the crime. After all, that implies that two people who commit the same
+crime should get the same punishment, which means that race shouldn’t
+have an influence on who gets the death penalty. Claim 2 is something that
+Rust-Tierney says explicitly and that it would be pretty hard for Blecker to
+deny. Claim 3, by contrast, is something that Blecker says explicitly, and we
+have to ask ourselves whether Rust-Tierney is likely to agree with it. It’s
+hard to believe that she would disagree with it entirely: if the goal of the
+criminal justice system is to protect the public, as she says, then different
+crimes will need to be punished differently to achieve that goal. Besides, it
+just seems implausible to think that murderers and, say, shoplifters should
+face the same penalty. But, of course, Blecker and Rust-Tierney are likely to
+disagree about just what it means for the punishment to fit the crime. Highlighting
+their agreement over the general principle paves the way for understanding
+their disagreement about what it means.
+As this exercise illustrates, it can be hard work to identify common ground,
+especially when people seem to be talking past each other. When there’s no
+obvious common ground, look at each person’s claims one by one and ask
+whether it’s likely that the other person would accept it. If you can show that
+it’s implied by something else they’ve said, even better!
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+1. Everyone has a right to life.
+2. The right to life differs from the right to healthcare in important
+ways.
+3. The government guarantees a right to an education.
+462 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.5
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+So, that’s what I think I have learned in my life so far about how to be happy. Here’s a final thought. It has helped me a great deal to look back carefully at my experiences to draw these conclusions. May I recommend the same to you? You too might reflect on a time or two in your lives when you’ve been deeply happy. What was it about that moment or that day or that year that made you so happy?
+You could also think about how you felt during that time. Peaceful and contented? Or euphoric and excited? Those are two quite different kinds of happiness. How do those feelings fit with what you and I have been saying about happiness?
+Think also about whether you picked a moment or a day or a year. Is happiness—real happiness of the sort we’ve been discussing—the kind of thing that you can have for just a moment or, on the other hand, the kind of thing that could really last for a whole year?
+It’s easy to find a little bit of common ground here, but we need to speculate a bit, too. Obviously, both Scot Conway and Robert Pfaff agree that people have a right to life: they both rely on that idea in their arguments. Beyond that, though, they approach the issue very differently and don’t suggest many points of agreement. So, the best we can do is look for things in one person’s argument that the other person is likely to accept and that might serve as a good starting point for discussion. Conway’s point that the right to life (at least as he understands it) differs from the right to healthcare seems undeniable. Getting Pfaff to focus on that difference might help illuminate some of their disagreement. Likewise, it’s clear that the government treats public education as a right, as Pfaff points out. And that could help generate some useful discussion about Conway’s argument that treating healthcare as a right would mean that doctors and nurses would end up being compelled to provide medical care without compensation. Teachers aren’t so compelled, right?
+When searching for common ground among people who have very different perspective, look for seemingly uncontroversial premises in one person’s argument that have important implications for the other person’s argument. In other words, don’t focus exclusively on what beliefs they’re likely to share, but look for beliefs that are likely to generate constructive dialogue.
+Exercise Set 10.5: Posing good questions
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.5 463
+This response offers three related questions that a speaker could use to leave
+an audience thinking. The first asks the audience to evaluate the reasons the
+speaker has given by reflecting on their own lives. (It also implicitly invokes
+the rules from Chapter V to encourage people to be sure they’ve found the
+things that made them happy.) The second and third questions use the reflections
+of the first to get at two very different kinds of questions about happiness—
+the sort of Big Questions that you shouldn’t expect to settle in a single
+discussion—or maybe even in a three-thousand-year-long philosophical
+tradition, for that matter. The hope here is that they’ll leave people thinking,
+and maybe open new, fruitful avenues for discussion and reflection after
+you’ve gone.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+I think one of the most interesting points you brought up was the fear
+of a slippery slope from editing embryos for medical purposes to editing
+them to create "designers babies." I guess I still have a few questions
+about this. I don’t have answers to them, but they seem like they could
+be important.
+One is: What if we imagine ourselves in the shoes of parents
+whose children could benefit from gene editing for medical purposes? If
+we ban embryo editing for medical purposes because of slippery slope
+concerns, we’re saying to those parents, "You can’t provide this benefit
+to your child because other people might abuse the technology you
+would need to do so." How would we feel about that in their shoes? Are
+there other cases where we forbid the use of a technology because it
+might be abused? Or cases where we allow technologies even though
+they’re abused? Do any of those cases hold lessons for this one?
+This response identifies a specific issue related to the assigned topic—namely,
+slippery slope concerns about "designer babies"—and then asks some questions
+related specifically to that issue. You may find it useful to identify a
+specific issue that you think you’d discuss if you were engaged in a discussion
+about the assigned topic. That can help focus the questions you ask.
+Here’s something else to notice about this response. It would have been
+easy to jump from asking people to imagine being in those parents’ shoes to
+arguing against a ban on embryo editing. But this is not the time to do that.
+That time has passed. The task at hand is to nudge debate onward, and this
+response does that by asking a series of open-ended questions that arise from
+the case of the parents who cannot access a technology because someone else
+might abuse it.
+464 Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.5
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+This has been a really thought-provoking discussion. It makes me
+wonder about what we prioritize in national security. We’ve talked
+about a lot of things that we think should (or shouldn’t) happen for the
+sake of national security, and we didn’t come to agreement on very
+much. I wonder if we might find some ground for compromise if we
+thought about which of those things is most important. If you had a
+magic wand and could accomplish just one of the things you mentioned
+in our discussion, what would it be? Why?
+Our discussion also makes me wonder how we prioritize national
+security relative to other things. I’m a big fan of the zombie television
+series The Walking Dead. At many points in the show, the main
+characters have to decide whether they’re willing to put their own safety
+at risk for something else—whether that’s to help their friends, to oppose
+some bad guys, or just to build a better overall society. It’s usually a
+hard question, but part of what makes the characters admirable, in my
+view, is that they sometimes put their security at risk for causes that I,
+at least, see as noble causes. So I guess I’d ask us the same question: Is
+there anything that we think is so important that we would accept some
+risk to our national security to achieve it? What is it? How does that
+line up with the things we actually risk our national security for?
+This response illustrates two very different approaches to this exercise set.
+The first question tries to break a logjam in the discussion by trying to zero
+in on the most important issues from among the topics that were already
+covered in the discussion. But notice that it does so without trying to convince
+anyone of anything; it’s just provoking further thought. The second
+question, by contrast, zooms way out to invite everyone to think about the
+issue in a seemingly new way. It also connects the question to a specific fictional
+world, which provides a rich source of arguments by analogy. It even
+offers just such an analogy, but it does so tentatively and broadly so as to
+avoid closing discussion down.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Thanks for that discussion. It struck me that there were a couple of
+questions that we asked along the way for which neither one of us had
+good answers, and these seem like things worth thinking about. I
+asked you how evolution could explain humans’ appreciation of
+natural beauty, which doesn’t seem to serve any evolutionary purpose,
+and you said you weren’t sure. And you asked me how creationism
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 10.5 465
+explains gradual changes in the fossil record, and I admitted that I
+wasn’t sure about that. So there’s some food for thought.
+But at one point, you noted that lots of religious people do believe
+in evolution, and now I’m wondering if we’ve overlooked an important
+alternative to our respective views. Does it really have to be one or the
+other? Could evolution be the mechanism that God uses to develop His
+creation, maybe with a nudge here or there to ensure that it would
+eventually lead to beings that could understand Him?
+This response explicitly draws on comments and unanswered questions that
+came up in the conversation. Rather than treating unanswered questions as
+proof that the other person’s view is faulty, this response recognizes that
+there might be good answers out there, and simply flags the questions as
+deserving further scrutiny. In its second paragraph, the response offers a
+possible middle ground—an alternative view that shares some similarities
+with the views that each speaker had espoused.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+We’ve been going back and forth about whether true success lies in
+high achievement in some field or in living a contented, personally
+meaningful life. It’s a shame we didn’t have time to think through
+more cases of lives well lived, because I think that would have helped me
+better understand where you’re coming from. For example, is someone
+who attends a fancy law school and rises quickly to be a wealthy
+partner at a big corporate law firm necessarily a high achiever in your
+sense? Or do they need to have made some kind of distinctive mark on
+their field—some specific accomplishment they could point to on their
+death bed and say, "I did that"?
+One of my favorite philosophers, David Hume, wrote many books
+of philosophy, but none of them made that much of an impact in his
+lifetime, and he never got a job as a philosopher. After he died, though,
+people came to recognize the importance of his work, and he’s now
+regarded as an extremely important figure. So in one sense, he’s
+clearly a high achiever, but does it matter that he only "succeeded" after
+his death?
+Or here’s one more that I think about often. My great-grandmother
+was a stay-at-home mom to four kids. She never had a career
+outside the home. She had a happy and personally meaningful life
+and she loved her family, but she certainly doesn’t fit the stereotype of
+a "high achiever." But she always thought she was. She used to say that
+her great accomplishment in life was raising four outstanding
+466 Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.1
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Begging the question. The conclusion is that the death penalty is wrong. One of the key premises is that the death penalty is murder. But murder is just wrongful killing. (For instance, killing in self-defense isn’t murder because it’s not morally wrong.) So, saying that the death penalty is murder is just saying that the death penalty is wrongful killing—that is, the death penalty is morally wrong.
+Since begging the question (also known as circular reasoning) involves assuming the conclusion in order to justify one of the premises, this response begins by identifying the conclusion. It then explains how the one premise in this argument assumes the truth of that conclusion. In this case, you wouldn’t accept the premise of this argument—namely, that capital punishment is murder—unless you already accepted the conclusion that capital punishment is wrong.
+Notice that this response does not simply restate the definition of the fallacy. That is, it does not just say that this argument commits the fallacy of begging the question because the premise assumes the truth of the conclusion (which would be more or less begging the question itself). Instead, this response cites specific details to show that the argument meets the definition of the fallacy.
+children. And really, all four of her kids were pretty outstanding people, including my grandfather. When you think about it, producing four outstanding human beings is a pretty fantastic accomplishment, even if it’s the kind of thing that lots of people do and no one wins awards for. So was she a high achiever?
+This response presents three different examples to provoke further thought about the other person’s view. They’re not presented as counterexamples to the view or as disguised arguments for the speaker’s view. Instead, they’re presented as prompts for further thought. At the same time, they do raise some difficult questions for the view that true success lies in high achievement. These are hard cases that will force all participants in the conversation to think deeply and critically about their own views. And that’s what these questions—and this book—are supposed to do.
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR APPENDIX I: SOME COMMON FALLACIES
+Exercise Set 11.1: Identifying fallacies (part 1)
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.1 467
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+No fallacy.
+Medical students, it is said, develop a kind of hypochondria: they constantly
+suspect themselves and others of having the diseases that they are studying
+in medical school. When studying fallacies, it is easy to develop a similar
+enthusiasm for spotting fallacies. Don’t be too quick to attribute a fallacy to
+an argument. Forcing yourself to explain in detail how the argument fits
+the definition of a particular fallacy is a good way to avoid the critical
+thinking student’s equivalent of "medical student syndrome."
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Equivocation. The argument uses the word "gods" in two different
+ways, and the argument doesn’t work if we substitute appropriate
+synonyms for each use of "gods." In defining atheism, the argument
+uses the word "gods" to mean "deities" in the strict religious sense. In
+claiming that atheists have gods, however, the argument uses "gods" to
+mean something like "things that are esteemed very highly." If we
+replace "gods" with these synonyms, the argument goes like this:
+"Atheists don’t believe in deities. But they do value certain things very
+highly. Therefore, atheists do believe in deities, which makes atheists
+hypocrites." The second premise in that argument is irrelevant to the
+conclusion. Thus, the argument fails.
+In order for an argument to commit the fallacy of equivocation, two things
+must be true. First, the argument must use a word or expression in more
+than one way. Second, it must be the case that substituting appropriate
+synonyms for each use of the word ruins the argument—either by making
+some of the premises false or by making them irrelevant to each other or the
+conclusion.
+This response not only identifies the word that is used in more than one
+way (namely, "gods"), but it explains each meaning in detail and why the
+argument would be faulty if we substituted appropriate synonyms for each
+use of "gods."
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Equivocation. The argument uses the word "selfish" in two different
+ways. The third sentence effectively defines "selfish" as "acting to
+satisfy one’s own desires." The next sentence claims that "good people
+are not selfish," where "selfish" probably means something like
+468 Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.1
+"concerned only with one’s own interests." Since acting to satisfy
+one’s own desires is not necessarily being concerned only with one’s
+own interest—some people desire to help others, including family
+members, friends, and strangers—this amounts to using "selfish" in
+two different ways. The claim that people always act on their own
+desires is significantly different from the claim that good people are
+concerned with more than their own interests.
+The argument in exercise 7 addresses a view that philosophers call "psychological
+egoism," which is the view that everyone always acts selfishly. As
+philosophers from Bishop Butler to Joel Feinberg have long argued, however,
+this view is either plainly false, trivial, or just confused.
+This instance of equivocation is far more subtle than the one in exercise 5.
+You may have to think about it for a while to see that the two uses of "selfish"
+really are different. (It might help to think about some specific cases in which
+one person’s acting on his or her own desires doesn’t count as being concerned
+only with his or her own interests.) Most of the instances of equivocation
+that you encounter in "real life" will probably be more like this instance than
+the more obvious one in exercise 5.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Equivocation. This argument uses the expression "make a deal" to mean
+two very different things. The gist of the argument is that (1) critics of
+U.S. president Donald Trump would be hypocritical to complain that he
+was making a deal with Russian president Vladimir Putin because
+(2), Barack Obama had made a deal with Iran when he was president.
+But in (1), "make a deal" means to arrange for a private and possibly
+illegal transaction for Trump’s personal benefit, whereas in (2), "make
+a deal" means negotiate a political agreement between the governments
+of the two countries that was (at least supposed to be) in the public
+interest. If you replace "make a deal" with "struck a private bargain for
+personal benefit" and "negotiated an agreement between two governments,"
+the argument no longer makes sense: it’s not hypocritical to
+criticize someone for doing one thing while refraining from criticizing
+someone else for doing a very different thing.
+For an argument to commit the fallacy of equivocation, it must use some
+word or phrase in two different ways such that clarifying that difference
+would undermine the argument. This response clearly states up front what
+phrase is used in two different ways: "Make a deal." It then presents the
+argument in a clearer form, explains the two meanings of the phrase in
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.2 469
+question, and explains why clarifying the two meanings undermines the argument.
+Recognizing this fallacy requires a fair amount of background knowledge. You have to know something about the deal that Trump’s critics claim he made with Putin and something about the deal that Obama made with Iran. This is not uncommon in more subtle forms of equivocation: you’ll only recognize that someone is talking about two different things if you know enough about the subject.
+Note that there are a number of other things going on in this argument, too, including a lot of loaded language. Equivocation is a much bigger problem, though, as it would remain even if you cleaned up the loaded language.
+Exercise Set 11.2: Reinterpreting and revising fallacious arguments (part 1)
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+This argument begs the question, since the premise is just another way of restating the conclusion. Improving the argument would require replacing the premise with a neutral definition of the death penalty, such as "the execution of a person convicted of a capital crime," and then showing that the death penalty is unjustified killing—i.e., murder.
+Someone making an argument like this most likely does not see the premise as another way of stating the conclusion. If pressed to explain the difference between the two, the author of the argument might be able to come up with reasons that the execution of a person convicted of a capital crime amounts to unjustified killing. If he or she can produce such reasons, then this fallacious argument will be transformed into a non-fallacious argument.
+This response doesn’t specify exactly what premises we would use to show that the death penalty is unjustified killing. Instead, it simply explains what we would have to do to "fix" the fallacy.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+No fallacy.
+Since the argument in exercise 3 contains no fallacy, there is no need to reinterpret or change it in order to avoid a fallacy.
+470 Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.2
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+This argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. Taken as an argument about the falsity of atheism, there is no clear way to avoid this fallacy without writing a completely different argument.
+This response ultimately concludes that the argument is beyond saving—that is, that no argument similar to this one could support a conclusion similar to the conclusion of this argument. Instead of rejecting the argument simply because it commits a fallacy, however, this response arrives at this pessimistic conclusion only after considering what it would take to make this argument respectable.
+In general, it is very difficult to reinterpret or revise a fallacy of equivocation. Often, the best thing to do, as suggested in this response, is simply to look for a different argument for the same conclusion.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+This argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. By changing some of the argument slightly, we might be able to salvage it. In particular, we could add the premise that many people’s desires are primarily concerned with their own interests, change the second-to-last sentence to say, "Good people are not primarily selfish," and change the conclusion to say, "Many people are not good people." This argument may or may not work, but at least it avoids an outright fallacy.
+Here is a rare case in which you might be able to save an argument that commits the fallacy of equivocation—but notice that "saving" the argument, in this case, means tweaking the conclusion. Like many fallacious arguments, this argument takes a reasonable claim—that many people act selfishly—and blows it out of proportion. In order to avoid fallacies, we may need to tone down the conclusion and rework the argument a bit.
+Notice that the reinterpreted argument is no longer an argument for psychological egoism (i.e., the view that everyone always acts selfishly). It’s an argument for the much weaker—and arguably false!—claim that most people are usually selfish. This is an importantly different claim.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+This argument is an equivocation on "make a deal," eliding the difference between Trump’s (alleged) private deal with Putin and Obama’s negotiation of an agreement between the U.S. and Iranian governments. It’s hard to salvage the argument, since the difference between those two kinds of agreements is so significant, but here’s one possibility: maybe the idea is that support for Obama’s Iran deal suggests a willingness to make deals with hostile foreign powers when
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.3 471
+doing so is in the national interest, and that even if Trump had made a private deal with Russia, it was in the United States’ national interest to have a good relationship with Russia, and so like Obama, Trump was just acting in the national interest.
+This response briefly explains the fallacy again and concedes that the argument is hard to repair. But even if the reinterpretation doesn’t really save the argument, it at least gets us to more fertile ground for discussion by using the comparison with Obama’s Iran deal to focus discussion on exactly which aspects of the alleged Trump–Russia deal are supposed to be problematic.
+The reinterpretation of the argument in this response reflects a willingness to assume that the speaker is arguing in good faith—meaning, in this case, that he really does believe the comparison between the alleged Trump–Russia deal and Obama’s Iran deal is somehow exculpatory. It then identifies a set of assumptions on which that belief might seem more reasonable than it did in the original argument. This makes the reinterpretation a good illustration of the constructive spirit in which we hope you’ll approach fallacies: assume that the author of an apparently fallacious argument is nonetheless trying to reason in good faith and try to understand how that argument could seem like a good one. See Chapter X as well.
+Exercise Set 11.3: Identifying fallacies (part 2)
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Post hoc, ergo propter hoc. An argument commits the post hoc fallacy when it incorrectly infers a causal connection between two things based on the fact that one happened after the other. This argument jumps from the premise that Kris Bryant’s performance correlates with the speaker’s wearing a Bryant jersey to the conclusion that Bryant performed better in a particular game because the speaker wore a different jersey. Obviously, whether some random fan wears a Bryant jersey has no impact on whether Bryant has a good game. A much better explanation is that the correlation is just a coincidence.
+This response identifies the fallacy, briefly defines the fallacy, and then explains—with reference to details of the argument—how this argument fits that definition. In the case of post hoc fallacies, that last step involves saying something about why the inference from correlation to causation is unwarranted.
+The author of this argument is, of course, far from the only fan to act as if their actions or good luck charms have some effect on the outcome of their favorite teams’ games. For many people, this is just part of the fun of rooting for a team, but we’d
+472 Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.3
+also suggest there’s sometimes another process at work: once you begin to suspect that, say, wearing a certain jersey makes your team lose, you’ll start to take note of the times that your team loses while you’re wearing that jersey and ignore the times when they win. Before long, it will seem like there is a strong correlation between wearing that jersey and the team’s performance—so strong that it seems like it can’t just be a coincidence. In reality, you’ve just duped yourself through something called confirmation bias, where you look for evidence that confirms your belief while avoiding or just not noticing evidence that conflicts with it.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Loaded language. An argument uses loaded language when it relies on emotionally charged language to get the reader to accept its conclusion. This argument uses inflammatory phrases like "sorry excuses for intelligent thought," "crimes against the English language," and "flaccid theses" to try to get the reader to accept that essays in introductory college classes are bad.
+You might object to several aspects of this argument, but of the list provided for this exercise set, the argument’s loaded language is the best choice. The strength of the argument rests on the idea that these essays are terrible. By presenting this idea that the argument presents in a very inflammatory way, the argument tries to get readers riled up, so that they will more readily accept the idea of doing away with the essays altogether.
+You might have been tempted to say that this argument commits the fallacy of overgeneralizing. After all, not all students hate writing essays in required introductory classes, not all of those essays suffer from the flaws the argument cites, and so on. While it’s true that the argument therefore relies on false generalizations, this argument does not argue for those generalizations by pointing to just a few examples. That’s why "overgeneralization" is not the best answer to this exercise.
+You might have noticed one other fallacy in this argument—one that’s not on the list for this exercise set: false dilemma. The argument concludes that professors should switch to multiple-choice exams rather than assigning essays, as if the only two choices are multiple-choice exams or essays.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Overlooking alternatives. This argument overlooks alternative explanations of Batman’s mask and the fact that he is only seen with criminals. The most plausible explanation is that he wears a mask so that criminals can’t target him in his daily life as Bruce Wayne, and that he’s only seen with criminals because he only goes out as Batman when he’s going to fight crime.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.3 473
+This response gives a quick explanation of how the argument commits the relevant fallacy and then explains it in more detail. Simply giving the "quick" explanation, though—that the argument overlooks alternative explanations of Batman’s mask and his frequent appearance with criminals—would not be enough; such a response is the kind of answer that one could give just by knowing the definition of "overlooking alternatives." So, rather than stopping at that superficial answer, this response uses specific details of the argument to support the claim that the argument overlooks alternatives.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Straw person. A straw person fallacy involves misrepresenting someone’s position or argument in order to make it look ridiculous or easy to refute. In this exchange, Bishop Wilberforce commits a straw person fallacy because Huxley is not claiming that his (Huxley’s) grandparents were apes. Huxley is claiming only that the extremely distant ancestors of humans were apes.
+This exchange allegedly comes from a famous debate in 1860 between Thomas Huxley, an important early proponent of Darwin’s ideas about evolution, and Bishop Wilberforce, a critic of evolution.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Overgeneralizing. An argument overgeneralizes when it makes a generalization about a group based on too few examples. While the argument does point to an enormous number of examples, the examples obviously do not constitute a representative sample of gamers and it is explicitly designed to avoid looking for counterexamples. This is a self-selecting sample drawn exclusively from gamers on Twitter, and while the retweets and likes show lots of people who (claim that they) are nonviolent gamers, they don’t tell us anything about how many gamers didn’t retweet or like the tweet (or shouldn’t have done so) because they are violent. So, it doesn’t have enough examples of the right kind.
+The argument in this exercise nicely illustrates why it’s better to think about the rules for good arguments than to focus too much on defining kinds of bad arguments. If you focus just on overgeneralizing from too small a sample, this argument might look overwhelmingly strong: it has tens of thousands of (alleged) examples! But when you recognize that the real problem is making a generalization when your examples don’t live up to rules from
+474 Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.4
+Chapter II, you see that there are plenty of ways for an argument to go wrong even when it does have lots of examples.
+It’s also worth pointing out another flaw in this argument—one that doesn’t fit neatly into any of the fallacies we’ve listed for this exercise set but is important nonetheless. The conclusion of this argument is that video games don’t make people violent. To support this conclusion, the argument points to tens of thousands of gamers who aren’t violent. But that’s not enough. To show that video games don’t make people violent, you would need to show that gamers are no more violent than non-gamers, and you can’t do that by looking just at gamers.
+Exercise Set 11.4: Reinterpreting and revising fallacious arguments (part 2)
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+This argument commits a post hoc fallacy about the connection between the jersey that the speaker wears and Kris Bryant’s performance in a baseball game. Unfortunately, there’s simply no way to reinterpret or revise this argument to make it more plausible: there is just no remotely plausible causal connection between the jersey and Bryant’s performance.
+Sometimes you really can’t salvage a bad argument. Sometimes there is no grain of truth behind the fallacy. When that’s the case, it’s worth being as clear as you can about why the argument is beyond repair. This response does that by stating explicitly that there is "no remotely plausible causal connection" in this case.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+It would be easy enough to eliminate the loaded language in this argument by explaining the alleged flaws in many college essays in a more neutral way. For instance, the argument might say, "Students often write these essays at the last minute, which means that they contain grammatical errors and lack well-defined theses or adequate argumentation." With this reworded premise, however, it becomes less clear that these problems really justify professors in scrapping essays altogether. Perhaps students just need more structure and support to write good essays. So, the argument’s author might need to revise her conclusion.
+When an argument contains loaded language, it’s usually easy to rewrite the offending premises in a neutral way. But it’s worth rethinking about the argument with that new, more neutral language in place, as this response
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.4 475
+does. Without the loaded language, the argument might seem much weaker than it did before.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+This argument overlooks the most likely explanation of Batman’s behavior, which is that he is a vigilante who needs to protect his identity from criminals. It is unlikely that this argument could be saved, since we know that Batman is not a criminal.
+This response acknowledges that the argument’s conclusion is almost surely false and that it is therefore very difficult to "fix" the argument.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+This argument seems to commit a straw person fallacy, since Huxley is clearly not claiming that his grandparents were apes. While Wilberforce’s argument is unlikely to undermine the theory of evolution, it at least raises a legitimate and interesting question: When a new species evolves from an existing species, at what point in the family tree do we say, "This individual is a member of a new species"? Wilberforce could therefore improve his argument by changing its (implied) conclusion. Instead of implying that the theory of evolution is false, he could claim that this is an interesting challenge for the theory.
+Some apparent straw person fallacies, like the one in the sample exercise for this exercise set, are poorly expressed versions of plausible arguments. Others, like the one in this exercise, conceal rather weak arguments. One way to improve a weak argument is to change its conclusion to something less ambitious. This response, for instance, suggests that Wilberforce should not argue that the theory of evolution is false, but only that it faces a specific challenge. This is a less ambitious claim in the sense that it is easier to establish that a theory faces a particular challenge than it is to establish that the theory is false.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+This argument overgeneralizes by inferring something about gamers as a group based on a biased, opt-in survey conducted on social media. The argument would be a bit stronger if we reinterpret the conclusion to say something like, "Video games don’t make all gamers violent" (which is true but hardly surprising), or maybe, "Despite the stereotype, there are lots and lots of nonviolent gamers." The fact that the argument’s author can get tens of thousands of people to retweet and like
+476 Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.5
+her tweet so quickly suggests that there are a lot of people who (claim that they) are nonviolent gamers. By analogy, suppose someone told you that she has lots of friends on campus. You’d probably count it as some evidence for her claim if she happened to run into ten friends (independently) while walking from one building to the next.
+This response suggests two ways to reinterpret the conclusion to avoid the fallacy. Notice that the first way avoids the fallacy more easily, but at the cost of making the argument trivial. (Of course gaming doesn’t make all gamers violent. Who ever thought that it did?) The second interpretation is a little vaguer and not quite as well supported by the argument, but it’s also a more interesting claim that receives some support from the premises.
+Exercise Set 11.5: Two deductive fallacies
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Modus ponens.
+Remember that when you’re deciding whether an argument commits a formal fallacy, all that matters is the form of the argument. The first premise of this argument is clearly false, since there are kind persons who are not socialists, but that doesn’t change the fact that the argument fits the form of modus ponens. Thus, the argument is valid but does not establish its conclusion, since it has a false premise.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+Denying the antecedent. Maybe there is no one on the Mexican side at that location trying to cross into the United States precisely because there’s a fence there, and so it’s true both that there’s no one on the other side and that the fence is important for stopping illegal immigration.
+Notice that this response explains how it could be true that there is no one on the Mexican side trying to cross into the United States and that the fence is important for stopping illegal immigration.
+Jim Acosta, the reporter who made (or at least implied) this argument in a video he posted to Twitter, was widely mocked for "proving that the wall works." But while his argument is indeed fallacious, it’s too strong to say that Acosta’s short video proves the opposite of his conclusion. That would require us to say, "If the fence works, then there will be no one on the Mexican side trying to get in. There is no one on the Mexican side trying to get in. Therefore, the fence works." As you’ll see if you look closely, that’s the other fallacious evil twin.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.5 477
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Affirming the consequent. Imagine that the Earth is the center of the universe, with the sun, moon, planets, and stars revolving around it. But suppose that the planets also move in "epicycles," as ancient and medieval European astronomers believed. That means that while they’re orbiting the Earth, they’re also following smaller circular paths centered on their orbits around Earth. (Picture people in the Mad Tea Party ride at Disney World, each spinning around the center of their own tea cup while the tea cup spins around the center of the ride.) In that case, each planet will sometimes appear to move backward in the sky, but the sun will circle the Earth.
+The scenario described in this response, where the Earth is at the center of the universe and the planets moving in epicycles is essentially the old, Ptolemaic theory of the universe (credited to the ancient Roman/Egyptian astronomer Ptolemy). That theory used the idea of epicycles to explain the fact that the planets do sometimes appear to move backward in the sky. You could also have dreamed up even more creative scenarios to show how the planets seem to move backward even if the Earth did not orbit the sun.
+This question illustrates an interesting feature of the scientific method. Scientists—like Copernicus, on whose work this exercise is based—regularly think about the implications of their ideas. We can think about these implications in terms of "if–then" relationships, such as the claim that if the Earth circles the sun, then the planets will sometimes appear to move backward in the sky. Scientists then compare those implications with what they observe about the world. When they observe what their hypothesis
+predicted—e.g., the planets sometimes appearing to move backward—they consider the hypothesis "confirmed." But as you can see from this example, confirmation doesn’t provide a deductively valid proof of the hypothesis. To think that it did would be to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent. All that confirmation can do is provide evidence for that hypothesis. Perhaps the more interesting case is when observations don’t match what the scientists expected. Then they have to determine whether the "if–then" sentence in their argument was false or if they should use modus tollens to conclude that their hypothesis is incorrect.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+Modus tollens.
+If you have seen The Princess Bride, you’ll know that the Man in Black is immune to the poison that he drinks during his battle of wits with Vizzini.
+478 Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.6
+So, even though he does not die, his drink was poisoned. Thus, the argument in this exercise leads us to a false conclusion. So how can it be valid? It’s valid because the validity of an argument does not depend on whether the premises or conclusions are actually true. To say that an argument is valid is just to say that its conclusion would be true if the premises were all true. But in this case, the first premise—the "if–then" sentence—is false: the Man in Black will not die, even if his cup is poisoned. So the valid argument form modus tollens is taking us from a false premise to a false conclusion.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Denying the antecedent. Suppose that the girl is possessed but reacted violently to the ordinary water in order to make the speaker doubt that she is possessed.
+It might have taken you a while to realize that in saying that he did not sprinkle holy water on the girl, the speaker was saying that the antecedent of his "if–then" sentence was false. After all, the antecedent is that the girl is possessed by a demon and the speaker sprinkled holy water on her. But notice that if p is false, then so is p and q.
+In the film The Exorcist, Father Karras sprinkles ordinary tap water on the girl who is allegedly possessed. The girl reacts violently, which Father Karras thinks is evidence that she’s not really possessed. But as you can see from this exercise, Father Karras has overlooked an important possibility.
+Exercise Set 11.6: Constructing fallacious arguments
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+"Mr. Ashworth, you have steadfastly maintained your innocence throughout this trial. And you’ve put on a good show. After all, your spending habits haven’t changed since the bank robbery, which makes it easy for you to claim you weren’t the robber. But what I want to know, Mr. Ashworth, is this: Since you haven’t been spending it, did you stash the money in a safe place nearby, or is it already squirreled away in some offshore bank account?"
+This commits the complex question fallacy. The question assumes that Mr. Ashworth did steal six million dollars from the bank. Mr. Ashworth can’t accept either answer without admitting to stealing the money.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.6 479
+This response uses some additional text to set up the context for the fallacious argument. Many fallacies depend on context in this way, so you should feel free to explain the context in your response—either indirectly, as this response does, or directly, by saying something like, "At a trial for a bank robbery, the prosecution asks the defendant, ‘What did you do with the six million dollars that you stole from the bank?’"
+This response also explains briefly how the argument commits the fallacy in question.
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+"The dean says that Chris should be expelled for selling drugs on campus. But other people sell drugs on campus all the time—sometimes even to the dean!—without getting in trouble. After all, caffeine is a drug, and we have a coffee shop on campus. Therefore, it’s unfair for the dean to expel Chris."
+This argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. It uses the word drug in two different ways. In the first premise, it means "illegal drugs," such as cocaine. In the rest of the argument, it means something like "substances that alter the user’s state of mind when ingested." If we substitute these synonyms in for the word drugs, the premises about the dean allowing the coffee shop to sell caffeine become irrelevant and so the argument fails.
+This response explains why the argument falls apart when we distinguish the two different senses of drug. That’s an important step in demonstrating that an argument’s use of an ambiguous term really does amount to equivocation.
+It’s hard to come up with fallacies of equivocation that aren’t glaringly obvious or even silly. You might need to resort to something silly for this exercise. That may not be ideal, but it at least shows that you understand what the fallacy is.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+"I felt like I was getting a cold last week, so I drank lots of orange juice. This week I feel better. I guess the orange juice did the trick."
+This fallacy commits the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. It assumes that the orange juice caused the speaker to feel better, without considering alternative explanations for the correlation. For instance, maybe the speaker had a very mild cold last week and was going to feel better this week regardless of what he or she did.
+480 Model Responses for Exercise Set 11.6
+This response offers a very common instance of post hoc reasoning: reasoning about what makes you sicker or healthier. Pay attention to your friends’ and families’ discussions of their health, and you’ll probably spot some instances of post hoc reasoning. But remember: there’s no need to act superior when you think someone else has committed a fallacy. Instead, try asking them gently why they think there’s a real causal connection between their health and whatever they ate, drank, or did.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+"My dad caught me smoking, and he said that I should quit because smok-
+ing is bad for you. What a hypocrite! That guy smokes two packs a day!"
+This argument commits the ad hominem fallacy. Instead of responding directly to the dad’s argument that the speaker should stop smoking because smoking is unhealthy, it attacks the speaker’s dad for being a hypocrite. The speaker’s dad’s hypocrisy doesn’t undermine the strength of his argument. Smoking is bad for you, and that is a good reason to quit, regardless of whether the speaker’s dad smokes. Maybe the speaker’s dad is desperately trying to stop himself and hopes at least to keep the speaker from getting hooked.
+This response highlights another common kind of fallacious argument. Many people are tempted to accept or to use ad hominem arguments that accuse someone of being a hypocrite. (In fact, it’s so common that logicians have a special name for this version of the ad hominem fallacy: tu quoque, which is Latin for "You too.") As this response explains, however, the other person’s hypocrisy doesn’t undermine the strength of the argument.
+Remember, the problem with ad hominem arguments isn’t that the personal attack is false or unwarranted. The problem is that personal attacks don’t undermine a good argument unless the argument relies on the expertise of the arguer. Being a hypocrite isn’t a good thing—but just because someone is a hypocrite (if they really are) doesn’t mean his or her arguments aren’t good arguments.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+"Our product is perfectly safe. There is absolutely no good scientific evidence to show otherwise."
+This argument commits the ad ignorantiam fallacy (appeal to ignorance). It argues that a product is "perfectly safe" by pointing out that
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.1 481
+there is no "good scientific evidence" to prove that it’s not safe. That is, it claims that the conclusion is true just because no one has proven otherwise.
+This response highlights the fact that the argument’s only reason for believing the product to be safe is because it hasn’t yet been conclusively proven harmful (to the arguer’s satisfaction, anyway). Without some further premises, that’s just an appeal to ignorance. (Of course, it would normally be just as fallacious to say, "That product is dangerous. There’s been no research to prove otherwise!") If the argument had included a premise such as, "There have been many rigorous scientific tests of our product’s safety," things would be different. After all, if there had been many rigorous tests of the product, and the tests all showed no evidence of harms, you could rewrite the argument as follows: "Our product is perfectly safe. It has been subjected to rigorous testing, and all of the tests have found the product to be safe." This is not appealing to ignorance; it is appealing to positive reasons to think that the product is safe. Similarly, you could establish a presumption that the product is dangerous by pointing out that the product is similar to others that were proven to be dangerous or otherwise providing a reason to demand research proving the product’s safety.
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR APPENDIX II: DEFINITIONS
+Exercise Set 12.1: Making definitions more precise
+Model Responses to Exercise 1
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This definition of parade would exclude a procession consisting entirely of floats, cars, tanks, etc., without any people marching. A better definition would be "a ceremonial procession through a public area consisting of people marching and/or vehicles."
+This response points out a type of parade that is incorrectly excluded by the original definition. It then offers a revised definition that simply adds the excluded category. This is the simplest way to improve a definition: add a word or clause that includes or excludes the examples that were incorrectly excluded or included by the original definition.
+Notice that the proposed definition is not as precise as it could be. For instance, it is unclear whether "vehicles" includes only motorized vehicles,
+482 Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.1
+like cars and trucks, or if it also includes things like bicycles. What about riding lawn mowers? Are they vehicles? It is also unclear exactly what counts as a "public area" and what counts as the relevant kind of procession. In some sense, Westminster Abbey in London is a public area, and Kate, duchess of Cambridge, processed down the aisle with several other people when she married Prince William. Was her bridal procession a parade? As these examples illustrate, you may not always be able to make your definitions perfectly clear, but that doesn’t mean that you can’t get close or that there’s no point in trying.
+Here’s another way in which the revised definition is imperfect: unless you’re willing to count horses as vehicles (which seems like a stretch), the revised definition would exclude a procession of people on horseback. That might not be a big problem for modern parades in major cities, but it would exclude many parades in other times and places. This goes to show that when you’re coming up with a definition, you might need to think about how it would apply in other places or other periods of history.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This definition of parade would exclude a parade consisting entirely of floats, cars, tanks, etc., without any people marching. A better definition would be "any group of vehicles or people moving in unison down a designated route."
+This response correctly identifies a problem with the original definition: it excludes things that it shouldn’t exclude. The definition proposed in this response, however, goes too far in the other direction. It includes things that it shouldn’t include, such as students walking down a hallway to get to a classroom, people driving down the highway to get to work, contra dancers, and a football team running down the field after a kickoff.
+Model Responses to Exercise 3
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This definition of highly qualified elementary school teacher would exclude a teacher who has been teaching for thirty years and is widely recognized by her principal, her colleagues, and her students and their parents as a good teacher but has not passed a state exam because she has never taken one. For the purposes of ensuring that teachers are good at their jobs, a better definition would be "someone who either has at least ten years’ experience as an elementary school teacher or someone who has at least a bachelor’s degree and has passed a rigorous state
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.1 483
+examination to demonstrate subject knowledge and teaching skills in reading, writing, mathematics, and other areas commonly included in elementary school curricula."
+The original definition in exercise 3 is presumably an operational definition. It substitutes a precise but bureaucratic definition of "highly qualified elementary school teacher" for a more natural but less readily quantified definition like "an elementary school teacher who has a strong grasp of the subjects that he or she teaches, the methods for teaching them, and techniques of classroom management in an elementary school setting."
+This response recognizes that the original, operational definition overlooks the possibility that people with adequate experience could be highly qualified teachers even if they have never taken a state examination. To remedy this, the response suggests a definition that offers two distinct ways of counting as "highly qualified"—having ten years’ experience or getting a bachelor’s degree and passing a state examination—and requires only that someone meet one of those criteria to count as "highly qualified."
+An alternative response could have focused on examples that are incorrectly included by the definition, such as people who have a bachelor’s degree and have passed the exam but who cannot even begin to manage a classroom full of kids.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This definition wrongly includes someone who secretly hates children. You wouldn’t want that person teaching in elementary school, even if he or she had a college degree and had passed the state exam. A better definition would be "someone with a college degree who has passed the state exam andmenjoys working with children."
+This response runs together two distinct issues. We are trying to define a specific term here—namely, "highly qualified elementary school teacher." This is not quite the same thing as trying to determine which people would be the best choice to teach elementary school. This response is getting at the fact that someone could be a highly qualified elementary school teacher and still not be a good choice to teach elementary school. Since being qualified for a job and being well suited for a job are not quite the same thing, however, we shouldn’t try to define them in the same way.
+484 Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.1
+Model Responses to Exercise 5
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This definition of poison incorrectly includes guns, which can kill people if used incorrectly, and medicines, which can kill people when used in the wrong dosage. A better definition would be "a non-medicinal chemical substance that can harm a person or animal if ingested."
+This response emphasizes things that are incorrectly included by the definition—that is, something that does not obviously count as a poison but nonetheless fits the definition. The response offers two examples instead of one to highlight two distinct problems with the definition. The first problem is that the definition includes things like firearms, which can kill people but are not poisons. To fix this problem, the response changes the definition to include only chemical substances. The second problem is that lots of things that don’t count as poisons, such as medicines, will kill a person if used in the wrong dosage. To fix this problem, the response changes the definition to include only non-medicinal substances. (But then, can’t overdoses of medicines count as poisoning too? The warning label on a bottle of Tylenol instructs you to call Poison Control in the event of an overdose. How might you amend the definition to fix that problem?)
+You might think that the revised definition in this response is too narrow. For instance, it excludes substances, such as alcohol, that could kill someone but are very rarely, if ever, explicitly used for that purpose. One way to defend the proposed definition is to argue that such substances might be poisonous if ingested in large quantities, but they are not poisons.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This definition of poison incorrectly includes cars, which can kill people if used incorrectly, and water, which can kill people if they are exposed to too much of it (i.e., if they drown). A better definition would be "a substance that is toxic." Neither cars nor water are toxic, even if they can sometimes kill people.
+Like the strong response to this exercise, this response identifies items that are incorrectly covered by the original definition. It then suggests a definition that correctly excludes those items, but only by introducing another equally problematic term: toxic. Since toxic is closely related in meaning to the word poison and is just about as hard to define, defining a poison as "a substance that is toxic" does not bring us much closer to understanding what poison is.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.1 485
+Model Responses to Exercise 7
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This definition of a family farm incorrectly includes farms that are owned by a family but managed by a giant corporation and worked exclusively by migrant laborers who have no connection to the family. A better definition would be "a farm that is owned and mostly worked by a single family."
+This response emphasizes the owners of a farm are not always the ones who manage or work the farm. The proposed definition is closer to the legal definition of "a family farm" in the United States, which requires that the family that owns a farm manage and work on the farm.
+Recognizing defects in a definition may require questioning some assumptions of the terms in the definition. While some people may have assumed that ownership of a farm and management of a farm went together, the flaw in this definition is that this is not always the case.
+If you don’t know a lot about the term being defined, it can be hard to come up with examples that reveal the flaws in the definition. One approach for identifying such examples is to consult a broad range of definitions—not just in dictionaries, but also in legislation, government documents (e.g., the tax code), newspaper articles, and so on—to see how those definitions differ. Ask yourself what examples would be covered by one definition but not another. That can get you started thinking about ways in which "family farms" might differ from one another.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This definition of a family farm incorrectly includes farms that are owned by giant corporations that are owned by a single family. A better definition would be "a farm that is owned by a family that lives on the farm and does not own a giant corporation."
+It is debatable whether the original definition of "a family farm" in this question really includes farms owned by giant, family-owned corporations. There are also far fewer farms owned by giant, family-owned corporations than there are farms that are owned by a family but operated by someone else. (Of course, in terms of physical size, corporation-owned farms might be huge.) Thus, the exceptions identified in the strong response are more important than the exceptions identified in this weak response.
+Furthermore, the definition proposed in this response is not much better than the original definition. It includes two extra conditions: the family must live on the farm and they must not own a giant corporation. The first
+486 Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.1
+condition is not strong enough. A farm that is operated entirely with hired labor is not a family farm, even if the family lives on the farm. The second condition is too narrow because it focuses only on a very special problem with the original definition, leaving aside the more general problem about who actually operates the farm. You are better off looking for general criteria, rather than addressing problems one by one.
+Model Responses to Exercise 9
+Example of a strong response to this exercise
+This definition of a data breach is too narrow. By focusing the first part of the definition on hacking into a computer, it excludes the possibility of someone stealing data that’s been printed out or written down. For instance, if I write down a list of my passwords and someone steals it, that’s a data breach, even though no hacking was involved. A better definition would be "gaining access to someone else’s data without their informed consent."
+This response offers a concrete example to illustrate the more general problem that it identifies with the original definition. But note that the revised definition addresses not only the concrete example but also the broader problem of focusing too narrowly on data stored on computers.
+You might argue, however, that the revised definition is too broad. The source for this particular definition was a March 2018 VICE article debating whether the leak of fifty million Facebook users’ data to a company called Cambridge Analytica in 2016 constituted a data breach. The author of the article, Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, contends that the leak did not constitute a data breach because users directly or indirectly agreed to provide that data to an academic researcher through their or their friends’ use of a personality-test app on Facebook. In this case, a lot probably turns on the definition of "informed" consent.
+Example of a weak response to this exercise
+This definition of a data breach is way too narrow. People own their own data, which includes all of the information about them. They should be able to decide what happens to that data. A data breach is any time one person learns something about a second person that the second person doesn’t want the first person to know.
+There are two main problems with this response. First, this response relies on the controversial idea that each individual should be able to decide what
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.2 487
+happens to all of the information about them. (Imagine if the defendants in murder cases could derail their trials by insisting that no information about their actions could be shared with the jurors!) It’s unhelpful to build such controversial ideas into the very definition of a term because it makes it difficult to use the term in conversation with people who don’t share those ideas.
+Second, motivated by the overly broad idea of data ownership, the response gives an extremely overbroad definition. On this definition, if one person makes an obnoxious comment to a second person, and the second person learns (against the first person’s wishes) that the first person is obnoxious, the first person has suffered a data breach.
+Exercise Set 12.2: Starting from clear cases
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+Patrick Stewart, who played Charles Xavier in the X-Men movies and Captain Picard on Star Trek: The Next Generation, is clearly bald. Bradley Cooper is clearly not bald. The actor Woody Harrelson, who played Haymitch Abernathy in the Hunger Games movies, is borderline bald. A good definition of "bald" would be "so little hair growing between the forehead and the crown of the head that the scalp is clearly visible across that entire area when the head is not covered." This definition gives a reasonably simple test for baldness. It excludes people with receding hairlines and shaved heads but includes people who have just a little bit of hair on the top of their heads, whom we might better describe as "balding." It also includes people who cover their heads with a "comb-over."
+This response mentions three examples that many people can likely picture in their heads, making it easy for them to see—in their mind’s eye, at least—what counts as "bald." The definition is reasonably precise, and the justification for the definition cites the ease with which it is applied and mentions the kinds of borderline cases that are included and excluded. (Consider an alternative definition that focused on, say, hairs per square inch of scalp. This might be a lot more exact, but it would be very difficult to use, since we rarely have a chance to count someone’s hairs!)
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+McDonald’s is clearly a fast-food restaurant. The French Laundry, a high-end restaurant in Napa Valley that only serves nine-course
+488 Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.2
+meals and is consistently rated as one of the best restaurants in the world, is clearly not a fast-food restaurant. Chipotle is a borderline case. A good definition of fast-food restaurant is "any restaurant in which there are no table servers, requiring customers to order their food at a counter or cash register." This includes restaurants like Chipotle, since Chipotle does not have table servers. This is better than definitions that focus on, e.g., the price of the food or the speed of service, since it makes sense to say that a restaurant is "expensive for a fast-food place" or "slow for a fast-food place."
+This response justifies its proposed definition by contrasting it with other
+salient approaches to drawing a bright line between fast-food restaurants and other kinds of restaurants.
+As usual, where you want to draw the line will probably depend on your interests. If you’re a business analyst writing about the rise of chains like Chipotle, you might want a definition that cuts up the restaurant market more finely, so that Chipotle doesn’t get lumped into the same category as Taco Bell. In that case, you might focus on other factors, such as how much of the food is delivered to the restaurant frozen or consists of highly processed ingredients, or whether it is prepared to order.
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+Suppose we are classifying actions (rather than people) as brave. A middle school student who publicly sticks up for an unpopular student who is being picked on is acting bravely, since it requires standing up to a lot of peer pressure. A teacher who fails to stick up for that student because he is afraid that the students will make fun of him is not acting bravely. A student who secretly encourages his or her friends to stop picking on the unpopular student is a borderline case. A good definition of brave would be "willing to face physical or emotional dangers in order to achieve something important." That would probably exclude the student who only sticks up for the unpopular kid in secret, since he or she is not really facing any physical or emotional danger.
+You might well have given examples in which people faced physical danger, such as firefighters running into a burning building. If you’d focused only on those examples, you might have defined bravery in terms of willingness to face physical danger. But as this response highlights, willingness to face physical danger is not the only kind of bravery. Coming up
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 12.2 489
+with a range of examples that clearly fit and do not fit the term can help you devise a better definition.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+A piece of wooden furniture that is crafted by an American woodworker using wood grown in the United States is clearly "made in America." A t-shirt that was manufactured in Bangladesh using cotton that was grown in India and milled in China was clearly not made in America. A Toyota truck that is designed in Japan and assembled in the United States, with some parts made in Mexico, is a borderline case. A good definition of made in America is "manufactured or at least assembled in the United States from parts or materials most of which are made in America." That would exclude things that are barely American-made, like a car assembled in the United States but made entirely from parts that were manufactured abroad; but it would include things that include some imported components, like a phone that is manufactured in the United States but contains some copper that was imported from China.
+In an age of global industry, it turns out to be harder than you might expect to say where something was made. Since some Americans prefer to buy things that are "made in America," it’s important that someone establish a standard definition for that term. It would be easy enough to adopt a very strict definition in which something is "made in America" if and only if it is manufactured entirely in the United States containing materials and parts that were grown, mined, or created in the United States. But that’s probably too narrow to reflect the real interests of people who prefer to buy things that are made in America. As it happens, the United States government has settled on a definition much like the one offered in this model response, although the government’s definition is more precise.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Earthquakes are clearly natural. Computers are clearly unnatural. Dairy cattle are borderline cases, since they are animals that exist in their present form only because people have domesticated them. A good definition of natural would be "came into being and/or came to have its present form without significant human intervention." This definition captures the essential element of human intervention, but it excludes seemingly natural things that have been shaped by humans, like dairy cattle or lakes created as a result of a dam built by people.
+490 Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.1
+This definition proposes a fairly broad definition of "natural." It allows as "natural" those unclear cases where something has been only slightly altered by humans. It excludes those things that have been significantly altered. For instance, a mountainside would still count as natural even if a few people had blazed trails along it. It would not count as natural if the slope were cleared and converted to farmland, or rearranged by bulldozers for a road or subdivision. In some cases, you might need to do some research to figure out whether something meets the definition. You might be surprised, for instance, to learn that modern dairy cattle are significantly different from their undomesticated cousins. Notice that this definition of "natural" is entirely neutral. Some things that count as "natural" on this definition are bad (e.g., earthquakes) and some things that count as unnatural are good (e.g., computers). "Natural" is one of many terms that are often defined in a loaded way, which makes critical thinking more difficult.
+MODEL RESPONSES FOR APPENDIX III: ARGUMENT MAPPING
+Exercise Set 13.1: Mapping simple arguments
+Model Responses to Exercise 1
+1[Poverty, illiteracy, and child mortality are all falling faster than ever.] 2[The average person is less likely to be affected by war, governed by a dictator, or die in a natural disaster than ever before.] This shows that 3[there has never been a better time to be alive than right now.]
+(1) (2)
+( '
+(3)
+The argument map in this response shows that the first two sentences of the argument—labeled (1) and (2)—are independent premises for the main conclusion, (3), which appears (as always) at the bottom of the argument map. (The main conclusion is indicated in the original argument by the conclusion indicator "This shows that.")
+The two premises are independent, rather than linked, because each one provides a reason—all by itself, without help from the other—for believing the conclusion.
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.1 491
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+1[Most Americans live too far from their place of work for it to be practical to ride a bicycle to work.] 2[This makes bike paths largely a waste of money—as a solution to traffic problems, at least.] 3[The government should find other ways to reduce traffic besides building expensive bike paths.]
+(1)
+$
+(2)
+$
+(3)
+The argument map in this response shows that each sentence in the argument is given as a reason for the next sentence. Claim (1) is a premise for (2), which is, in turn, a premise for the main conclusion, (3).
+There are no conclusion indicators in the argument to give this away. You need to figure it out by thinking about what the main point of the argument is and how the various claims relate to one another.
+One way to approach this problem is to think about which arrangements make the most sense. Claim (1) is a good reason to believe (2). Claim (2) is not as convincing as a reason for (1). Thus, it makes more sense to read (1) as a premise for (2) than vice versa. Claim (2), in turn, seems like a good reason for (3). Thus, the arrangement shown in this response’s argument map seems like a reasonable interpretation of the argument.
+Notice that (1) might seem like a good reason for (3) all by itself. Why not just draw an arrow from (1) to (3)? No doubt you would, if all you were offered were (1) and (3). Remember, though, that your goal here is to diagram the argument as it is written. Since (2) is included as well, we need to try to find a place for it. Claim (2) doesn’t make sense as the main conclusion of the argument. It’s neither linked with (1) nor independent of (1). Instead, it seems to fit most naturally as a subconclusion in between (1) and (3).
+As this example illustrates, mapping arguments takes a fair amount of playing around with different options. (In the authors’ view, this is one of the most enjoyable aspects of argument analysis!) Sometimes, the choice between one argument map and another will be a matter of interpretation.
+492 Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.1
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+1[By reducing student debt, eliminating tuition at medical schools would enable more new doctors to become primary care physicians.] 2[We have a shortage of primary care physicians in this country.] Therefore, 3[medical schools ought to be free.]
+(1) + (2)
+$
+(3)
+The first two sentences of the argument are both premises. They jointly lead to the conclusion, which is the third sentence. This is shown in the argument map by linking (1) and (2) with a plus sign and drawing a single arrow to the main conclusion at the bottom of the map.
+To see that the premises are linked, rather than independent, consider this: We would have no reason to take steps to increase the number of primary care physicians if we weren’t facing a shortage of them, so (1) would not be a reason for (3) if (2) weren’t true. And the need for more primary care physicians wouldn’t give us a reason to eliminate tuition at medical schools if doing so wouldn’t increase the number of primary care physicians, so (2) would not be a reason for (3) if (1) weren’t true.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+To better understand why men outnumber women at more senior levels in businesses, researchers analyzed the workplace behavior of one hundred employees at a large, multinational firm. They found that 1[it’s the difference in the way women are treated, not the way they behave, that leads to starkly different professional outcomes.] To figure this out, they tracked and studied thousands of interactions over four months. 2[They found essentially no difference in the behavior of men and women.] 3[If there’s no difference in the way men and women behave, then the difference between men and women in terms of career success must result from men and women being treated differently.]
+(2) + (3)
+$
+(1)
+Since the main conclusion of this argument appears first in the argument itself—and is labeled (1) in the response—this response puts (1) at the
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.1 493
+bottom of the argument map. It shows that the premises—labeled (2) and (3) in the argument—are linked, jointly supporting (1). The first sentence in the passage provides background information. It does not constitute a premise in the argument.
+If you’ve read Chapter VI, you’ll hopefully recognize this argument as an instance of modus ponens (Rule 22). As a general rule, deductive arguments involve linked premises. (You need p and "if p then q" as premises in an instance of modus ponens. Without one, the other does nothing to support the conclusion, q.)
+One common mistake when mapping arguments that use "if–then" sentences is to treat each part of the sentence as a separate claim. It may be tempting, for instance, to separately map the statement "there’s no difference in the way men and women behave" and the statement "the difference between men and women in terms of career success must result from men and women being treated differently." This would be a mistake. When you map an argument’s structure, map whole premises, like "if p then q," not their constituent statements.
+To see why, think about the linked structure of the argument. Premise (3) says that there is a certain kind of connection between premise (2) and the conclusion, (1). That’s why you need both (2) and (3) to support (1): Someone might accept that the men and women in the study are behaving identically but still insist that the difference in professional outcomes is due to something other than the way men and women are treated. To get from premise (2) to the conclusion, something like premise (3) must be true.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+Some western European countries are banning Muslim women from wearing the burqa on the grounds that it is an insult to women’s dignity. 1[If Europeans are truly concerned with Muslim women’s dignity, then they should be addressing not only the burqa but also highly sexualized images of (non-Muslim) women in the European media.] After all, 2[if they’re so worried about Muslim women’s dignity, they ought to be concerned with all women’s dignity.] And 3[if they are concerned with all women’s dignity, then they ought to be just as concerned about highly sexualized portrayals of women in, say, European advertising as they are about the burqa.]
+(2) + (3)
+$
+(1)
+494 Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.2
+Notice that this argument is not claiming that Europeans are truly concerned with women’s dignity (which is the statement that is the p in this case). In fact, the argument suggests, but does not say, that Europeans are mainly concerned about something other than women’s dignity. The argument is only saying that if Europeans care about Muslim women’s dignity, then they ought to address both the burqa and highly sexualized images of women. That entire "if–then" sentence is a single claim, and it needs to be mapped as such
+Exercise Set 13.2: Mapping complex arguments
+Model Response to Exercise 1
+1[Governments ought not to pay ransoms to terrorists who have kidnapped people.] 2[Doing so encourages terrorists to kidnap more people.] 3[Paying ransom also provides the terrorists with the resources to kill even more people.] Therefore, 4[even though ransoming hostages can save the hostages’ lives, paying ransom ultimately leads to more deaths.] As hard as it may be to accept, 5[it’s more important to minimize the overall harm that terrorists do than it is to save any specific hostage.]
+(2) (3)
+( '
+(4) + (5)
+$
+(1)
+The "jigsaw puzzle" approach works well for this argument. The conclusion indicator therefore signals that claim (4) is either the conclusion or a subconclusion. When we think about its relationship to the other claims, we can see that (2) and (3) both work as reasons for (4), but that (4) seems to be a reason for (1) rather than the other way around. So that gives us one subargument: (2) and (3) somehow lead to (4). And how do we get from (4) to (1)? By joining (4) to (5). So that gives us the rest of the diagram.
+All we need to do now is figure out which premises are linked and which are independent. Since either (2) or (3) would provide a reason for (4) on its own, those premises are independent. What about (4) and (5)? Claims (4), (5), and (1) fit a general pattern that should tip you off: Claim (4) states that an action would have a particular effect. Claim (5) states that we ought not to take actions that have that effect. The main conclusion is
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.2 495
+that we ought not to take the action described in (4). Whenever you see this pattern—doing x would lead to y, and we ought to avoid y, so we ought not to do x—you should expect the premises to be linked rather than independent. (Can you explain why?)
+Model Response to Exercise 3
+When Tonya Illman pulled an old bottle from a sand dune in Western Australia in 2018, she didn’t expect to find a piece of paper inside. She unrolled the paper to find a carefully handwritten note. To her surprise, the note was dated from 1886. Staff at a local museum helped translate the note from German. 1[It claimed to have been tossed into the Indian Ocean from a German ship called the Paula as part of a scientific study of ocean currents.] Had Tonya really discovered a 132-year-old message-in-a-bottle, or was it some kind of hoax? The German Maritime and Hydrographic Agency tracked down a log for the Paula. 2[The handwriting on the note matched the handwriting in the Paula’s log exactly.] Furthermore, 3[the log confirmed that the Paula had been in the Indian Ocean in 1886.] Because 4[the details of that ship’s voyage are not easily accessible], 5[very few people could have known enough to fake the letter.] Thus, 6[it appears the note was authentic.]
+(4)
+$
+(1) + (2) + (3) + (5)
+$
+(6)
+While you could work backward from the main conclusion, given in the very last sentence, you may find it easier to approach this argument like a jigsaw puzzle. The first thing to do is figure out which sentences are giving background information and which are stating premises.
+The next step is figuring out which premises belong together. Claims (2) and (3), about the Paula’s log book, seem like they belong near each other on the argument map, and they also seem closely connected to claim (1) about the content of the note. But are they linked or independent? Claim (2), about the handwriting, wouldn’t count as evidence unless the note claimed to be from the Paula, so (1) and (2) are definitely linked. Similarly, claim (3) is linked to (1), since the fact that the Paula passed through the Indian
+496 Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.2
+Ocean wouldn’t count as a reason for (6) unless the note claimed to be from the Paula. Taken together, these three premises would lead directly to the main conclusion, (6).
+What about claims (4) and (5)? The premise indicator "because" shows that (4) is a premise for (5). And (5) is a reason for the main conclusion, (6). So the only real question left is whether (5) is linked to the first three premises. It’s debatable, as these things sometimes are, but we think it’s best to think of it as linked to the other three. Here’s why: if the Paula’s log were easily accessible—say, through Google Books—then anyone could copy the handwriting and put the right year on the message. But once we add the fact that the log is not easily accessible, it becomes much more likely that the note is authentic.
+Eagle-eyed readers might notice that the way we’ve drawn the diagram suggests that (2) wouldn’t provide a reason for (6) without (3), and vice versa. This doesn’t seem quite right. With more advanced argument-
+mapping techniques, we could represent the fact that (1) and (2) work together and (1) and (3) work together, but you’ll have to turn to a more detailed book on argument mapping for that!
+Model Response to Exercise 5
+1[I see your wife is out of town.] How do I know? Since 2[the female detective you’re working with is wearing men’s deodorant,] I take it 3[she borrowed someone else’s deodorant this morning.] And since 4[it smells the same as your deodorant,] it stands to reason that 5[she’s wearing your deodorant.] 6[Which she would only do if she’d woken up at your place after spending the night there.] So 7[she spent the night at your place]—I’m right so far, aren’t I? Of course I am. And since 8[you’re married,] 9[she wouldn’t have spent the night with you unless your wife was out of town.] That’s how I know.
+(2)
+$
+(3) + (4)
+$
+(5) + (6) (8)
+$ $
+(7) + (9)
+$
+(1)
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.2 497
+Working backward and paying close attention to premise and conclusion indicators can help you map this complex argument from the BBC’s Sherlock Holmes reboot.
+The main conclusion is clearly (1). So let’s put that at the bottom of the argument map. Claim (9) states that the detective would not have spent the night unless the listener’s wife was out of town, where (7) states that the detective did spend the night. Those two claims jointly entail the conclusion, so let’s add them as the next layer up.
+The premise indicator "since" reveals that (8) is a premise for what comes next, which in this case is claim (9). So let’s add (8) as a premise for (9) in our diagram.
+Now, how does Sherlock know that the detective spent the night with his listener? After figuring out that she’s wearing the listener’s deodorant—which is claim (5)—Sherlock reasons that she would only do that if she’d spent the night there—which is claim (6). So let’s add those to the diagram above claim (7).
+But how did he know that she was wearing his deodorant? Again, follow the indicator words. The word "since" before claim (4) tells us that it’s a premise for (5). And since it’s claim (3) that makes (4) into a strong reason for (5), we’ll put those two together as the premises for (5).
+Finally, claim (2) is offered as a reason for claim (3), so that goes on yet another line, completing Sherlock’s chain of reasoning.
+As this example illustrates, arguments that seem very complicated on the surface often turn out to be nothing more than a chain of relatively easy-to-understand arguments. By focusing on one step at a time, you can often make great progress in understanding what otherwise seems impenetrable.
+Model Response to Exercise 7
+1[When one person knowingly causes a fatal injury to another, it is murder.] 2[Capitalism deprives many people of the basic necessities of life.] 3[It requires them to live in cramped, squalid, toxic conditions.] 4[It leaves them without resources for medical care.] 5[It leaves them unable to afford the most minimally nutritious food.] 6[It leaves them no respite from work, save sex and drink.] Furthermore, because 7[capitalism leaves wealth and power in the hands of the few,] 8[it leads to power structures that prevent the oppressed from taking the necessities of life by force.] 9[Being deprived of the necessities of life leads to death just as surely as does being actively harmed.] 10[Society knows full well that capitalism has this effect.] Thus, 11[society is committing murder by allowing capitalism to continue.]
+498 Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.2
+(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
+( ( ' ' '
+(1) + (2) + (8) + (9) + (10)
+$
+(11)
+The key to mapping this argument is to pull the two subarguments out of the main argument. Focus for a moment just on (1), (2), (8), (9), and (10). Together they jointly provide an argument for believing that society is committing murder. But why should we believe that capitalism deprives people of the basic necessities of life? To support this claim, the argument offers (3), (4), (5), and (6) as independent reasons for accepting (2). The argument offers (7) as a reason for accepting (8).
+You might also interpret (2), (8), (9), and (10) as jointly leading to an unstated subconclusion—call it (12*)—that society knows that capitalism causes fatal harm to some people. You could then interpret (1) and (12*) as jointly leading to (11). Sometimes, adding unstated subconclusions to an extremely complex argument can help you organize the premises more effectively.
+This argument comes from Friedrich Engels’ famous account of the conditions of the working class in England in 1844. His book is widely considered a classic study of the social effects of the Industrial Revolution. Engels went on to co-author The Communist Manifesto with Karl Marx.
+Model Response to Exercise 9
+1[Our distant ancestors lived in very small societies.] 2[On a normal day, everyone they met would be someone they had known all of their lives.] 3[These societies did not interact very much with other societies.] 4[Just about everything they ate, everything they wore, and every tool they used was made within that group.] 5[Today, of course, we live in vast societies.] 6[We can look out at a busy city street and see, all at once, more people than our ancestors saw in their entire lives.] 7[We live in a global trading system.] Indeed, 8[our world is unimaginably different from the world of our distant ancestors.] 9[Our minds, however, are designed for the life of our distant ancestors.] Thus, 10[our minds may not be well adapted to the special challenges of the modern world.]
+Model Responses for Exercise Set 13.2 499
+(1) (5) (3)
+$ $ $
+(2) + (6) (4) + (7)
+( '
+(9) + (8)
+$
+(10)
+Working backward is a useful approach to mapping this argument. The main conclusion is (10)—that our minds may not be well adapted to the challenges of the modern world. The argument condenses the basic reasons for this into two premises: the modern world is radically different from that of our distant ancestors, but our minds are designed for their world, not ours.
+The rest of the premises constitute subarguments that are designed to show that our world is unimaginably different from theirs. One strand of this argument focuses on the number and variety of people that we encounter: they encountered very few strangers (because they lived in small societies) whereas we encounter many strangers (because we live in a vast society). The other strand of the argument contrasts the self-sufficiency of ancient societies with our global trading network.
+Many arguments, especially those with this level of complexity, can be mapped in multiple ways. For instance, you might group (2) and (4) together as linked premises for (8), in which case you would want to group (6) and (7) together too. Thus, there may be more than one good response to this exercise.
+
+Part 3
+
+503
+The following activities provide you with longer, more in-depth, and more collaborative ways to develop your critical thinking skills. Some of these activities can be done in the classroom, some will need to be outside of class, some could be done inside the classroom or at home, and a few combine work done outside with work done inside the classroom.
+Many of the activities—such as the "Found arguments" and "Writing a letter to the editor" activities—can be repeated profitably, with or without the listed variations. Others you will want to do only once.
+Some of the activities list variations at the end. Of course, your instructor might have other variations in mind—or entirely different activities, perhaps inspired by the activities below. Always find out whether your instructor has alternative or additional instructions for you before beginning one of these activities.
+Found arguments
+Objective: To give you practice finding and analyzing arguments.
+Instructions: Read the discussion of Rules 1 and 2 and complete Exercise Sets 1.1 and 1.2 before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Find a brief argument outside of this class. Find an argument that is no longer than one or two paragraphs’ worth of text. Good places to look for arguments include books, news sites, and magazines; online sources like social media, blogs, and Web forums; audio-visual materials including podcasts, radio broadcasts, television shows, movies, or online videos; advertisements and sales pitches; lectures or textbooks from other courses; and conversations that you’ve had or overheard—really just about anywhere!
+2.
+Print out, photocopy, or write down the original argument. If your argument is already in printed form, print it out, cut it
+Critical Thinking Activities
+504 Critical Thinking Activities: Creating a visual argument
+out, or photocopy it from the original source. If it’s in a video,
+conversation, or other non-printed format, write it down,
+sticking as closely to the original language as you can.
+3. Rewrite the argument in premise-and-conclusion form. Begin by
+identifying the conclusion and premises of the argument, just
+as you did in Exercise Set 1.1. Then, organize the premises into
+a numbered list with the conclusion at the end, as in Exercise
+Set 1.2.
+Final product: The final product of this activity should consist of a printed
+or written version of the original argument and a premise-and-conclusion
+outline of the argument.
+Variation: Complete the activity as above using a "visual argument"—that
+is, an image or video that tries to convince the viewer to do or believe
+something without explicitly stating an argument in words. See Exercise
+Set 1.3 for advice on creating a premise-and-conclusion outline of an argument
+based on an image or video.
+Variation: Chapters II through VI describe specific kinds of arguments.
+After reading one of those chapters, complete the activity as above, but
+find an argument of the kind discussed in the chapter you read (e.g., an
+argument about generalizations, as discussed in Chapter II).
+Variation: After studying Appendix III, complete the activity as above, but
+create an argument map of your "found argument," rather than a premiseand-
+conclusion outline.
+Creating a visual argument
+Objective: To help you understand arguments presented in images.
+Instructions: Read the commentary for Rules 1 and 2 and complete Exercise
+Set 1.3 before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete
+each of the following steps in order.
+1. Create a visual argument on any topic you want. A visual argument
+is an image or video that tries to persuade the viewer to do or
+believe something without necessarily stating an argument in
+words. Your visual argument can be as simple or elaborate as you
+Critical Thinking Activities: Writing a letter to the editor 505
+wish—from a hand-drawn stick figure cartoon to a collage of
+magazine cutouts to a video that you create. (Before you create a
+video, be sure that you have the means to display it in class, and
+your instructor’s permission to do so.)
+2. Create a premise-and-conclusion outline of your visual argument.
+Write your interpretation of your own visual argument in
+premise-and-conclusion form, just as you did in Exercise Set 1.3.
+3. (Optional) Analyze the visual arguments created by your classmates.
+Bring your visual argument to class. Form a group of three or
+four people. Share your visual argument with your group and
+write a premise-and-conclusion outline of the arguments
+presented by your group members. Compare each person’s
+premise-and-conclusion outline of each argument and pick the
+two that best capture the message of the image or video.
+Final product: The final product of this activity should consist of a visual
+argument and a premise-and-conclusion outline of that argument. If you
+completed the optional Step 3, your final product will also include a set of
+premise-and-conclusion outlines of two or three of your classmates’ visual
+arguments.
+Writing a letter to the editor
+Objective: To give you practice constructing arguments and expressing
+them in plain English.
+Instructions: Read Chapter I and complete Exercise Sets 1.1, 1.2, and 1.7
+before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the
+following steps in order.
+1. Find a recent news or magazine article on which you would like to
+comment. Many newspapers, news sites, and magazines publish
+letters about recent articles. The first step in writing a letter to
+the editor is to find a recent article about which you have
+something to say.
+2. Construct an argument that makes a point about your chosen article.
+First, figure out what the main point of your letter is; that will
+506 Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing unadapted arguments
+be the conclusion of your argument. Then, write a premise-andconclusion
+outline of your argument, similar to those you created
+for Exercise Set 1.2.
+3. Rewrite your argument as a letter to the editor. In Exercise Set 1.2,
+you went from a prose version of an argument to a premise-andconclusion
+outline. In this step, take the premise-and-conclusion
+outline you created in Step 2 and rewrite it in normal prose. Be
+sure to follow any guidelines, such as word limits, set by your
+chosen publication.
+4. Send your letter to the editor of your chosen publication. Most
+publications accept letters to the editor via email or a form on
+their Web site. Find out how to submit a letter to your chosen
+publication and send your letter to the editor, being sure to
+include all required information. Watch upcoming issues to see if
+your letter gets published. Good luck!
+Final product: The final product of this activity should be an electronic or
+paper copy of an original letter to the editor. The letter should contain an
+argument related to a recent newspaper or magazine article. Your instructor
+may want proof that you have submitted your letter to the editor, such
+as a copy of your email or a printout of the Web form.
+Analyzing unadapted arguments
+Objective: To give you practice analyzing arguments in their original
+contexts.
+Instructions: Read the discussion of Rules 1 and 2 and complete Exercise
+Sets 1.1 and 1.2 before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete
+each of the following steps in order:
+1. Identify the conclusion and premises for each of the arguments in the
+box below. Unlike the arguments in the exercise sets throughout
+this book, the arguments below have not been simplified; they
+have been reprinted here (almost) word for word, in all their original
+messiness and complexity. This means you’ll need to think
+more carefully about what the main conclusion is and take more
+care in separating the premises from background information. It
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing unadapted arguments 507
+may help you to underline the conclusion and bracket the premises,
+as you did in Exercise Set 1.1.
+2. Write a premise-and-conclusion outline of each argument in the box
+below. For each argument, write a premise-and-conclusion outline,
+as you did in Exercise Set 1.2. Since these arguments were
+reprinted word for word from their original sources, you may need
+to rephrase more of the premises than you did in Exercise Set 1.2.
+When rephrasing premises, be sure not to change their meaning.
+Final product: The final product of this activity should consist of a set of
+ten premise-and-conclusion outlines—one for each argument in the box
+below.
+Variation: After reading Appendix III and completing Exercise Sets 13.1
+and 13.2, create argument maps for each of the arguments in the box
+below.
+SOME ARGUMENTS FOR ANALYSIS
+1. "Most coca farmers live in remote regions in southern and eastern Colombia.
+Many farmers need to grow coca in order to earn a living, because decades of government
+neglect have failed to provide the necessary infrastructure to make it
+possible to transport perishable food crops from these remote regions to distant
+markets."
+Gary Leech, Beyond Bogotá: Diary of a Drug War Journalist in Colombia
+(Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), 45
+2. "Science has indisputably established the fact that, as Dr. Keith Moore writes in
+The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology, 7th edition, ‘Human development
+begins at fertilization. This highly specialized, totipotent cell marked
+the beginning of each of us as a unique individual.’ A preborn child is not a potential
+person, but a person with potential—a whole, distinct, living human being. The
+difference between you as an embryo or fetus and you today as a college student is
+only a function of time and nutrition. Since it is a scientific fact that abortion kills
+508 Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing unadapted arguments
+a unique and genetically unrepeatable human being, the question [about the morality
+of abortion] cannot be ‘about a woman’s control over her own body.’ "
+Andrew Guernsey and Jessica Janneck, "A Fetus Is a Human with a Right to Live,"
+The Johns Hopkins News-Letter, Oct 30, 2014, http://www.jhunewsletter.
+com/2014/10/30/a-fetus-is-a-human-with-a-right-to-live-26841
+3. "Properly speaking, there are in the world no such men as self-made men. [That
+term] implies an individual independence which does not exist.
+"Our best and most valued acquisitions have been obtained either from those
+who stand about us or from those who have gone before us in the field of thought
+and discovery. We have all either begged, borrowed or stolen—reaped where others
+sowed, gathered where others strewed."
+Frederick Douglass, Self-Made Men, Address before Students of the Indian Industrial School at Carlisle, Pa.,
+1874, From Library of Congress, Frederick Douglass Papers, http://www.loc.gov/item/mfd.29014/
+4. "We sometimes mistakenly see our careers as the ‘selfish’ part of our lives because
+we earn money or make profit, while our altruistic acts—giving to charity, say, or
+volunteering at the soup kitchen or giving blood—that’s the work we do for others.
+We think that’s what we do that makes the world a better place. We forget that
+being good at our job helps others and makes the world a better place, too.
+"Being an extraordinary teacher changes the lives of your students. Being a
+great boss means creating ways for employees to flourish and use their skills. Running
+a great restaurant gives people a chance to meet their friends for something
+more than food—for conversation, for friendship and creating memories. And
+giving people a chance to pay less for shirts or apples or tires because you’ve figured
+out a way to reduce inventory costs and sell those items more cheaply lets
+people satisfy their desires at a lower cost than they otherwise would have to pay."
+Russ Roberts, How Adam Smith Can Change Your Life
+(New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2014), 169–70
+5. "Though from a Western point of view, women’s identification [in Chinese culture]
+with the family or the inner quarters . . . may seem unduly restrictive, the
+social significance of these three roles [of daughter, wife, and mother] should not
+be underestimated. In Chinese tradition, the family is the model for the Empire,
+and the most necessary part of the social structure. Women’s role in the family,
+therefore, is essential to their role in public life. It also serves as a model for the
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing unadapted arguments 509
+king, whose success depends on responding to the needs of the people in much
+the same way that a woman must respond to the needs of her family. Chinese
+culture envisions the wise and virtuous woman empowering her husband and her
+children for social leadership, from which the whole family and state will
+benefit."
+Robin Wang, Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture
+(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), xiii
+6. "Obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected freedom of speech
+or press . . . under the First Amendment. . . . In the light of history, it is apparent
+that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to
+protect every utterance. . . . The protection given speech and press was fashioned
+to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
+social changes desired by the people. . . . All ideas having even the slightest redeeming
+social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
+hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the
+[First Amendment] guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
+the limited area of more important interests; but implicit in the history of the
+First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
+importance."
+Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
+7. "Deciding what to keep on the basis of what sparks joy in your heart is the most
+important step in tidying. But what concrete steps are needed to efficiently eliminate
+excess?
+"Let me begin by telling you what not to do. Don’t start selecting and discarding
+by location. Don’t think ‘I’ll tidy the bedroom first and then move on to the
+living room’ or ‘I’ll go through my drawers one by one starting from the top.’ This
+approach is fatal. Why? Because most people don’t bother to store similar items
+in the same place.
+"In the majority of households, items that fall into the same category are
+stored in two or more places scattered around the house. Say, for example, you
+start with the bedroom closet. After you have finished sorting and discarding
+everything in it, you are bound to come across clothes you kept in a different
+510 Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing unadapted arguments
+closet or a coat draped over a living room chair. You will then have to repeat the
+whole process of choosing and storing, wasting time and effort, and you cannot
+make an accurate assessment of what you want to keep and discard under such
+conditions. Repetition and wasted effort can kill motivation, and therefore it
+must be avoided.
+"For this reason, I recommend that you always think in terms of category, not
+place."
+Marie Kondo, The Life-Changing Magic of Tidying Up
+(Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed Press, 2014), 42–43
+8. "If you have to take out student loans, you essentially have two choices: federal
+student loans and private loans.
+"For most borrowers, federal student loans are the best option. When you
+start to pay back your federal loans, the interest rate will be fixed, which will help
+you predict your payments after graduation. And in some cases, the federal government
+will pay the interest on your loans while you are in school—these loans
+are called subsidized loans.
+"Other student loans are generally private student loans. The most common
+private student loans are offered by banks. Their interest rates are often variable,
+which means your interest rates and payments could go up over time. Private
+loans can also be more expensive—rates have been as high as 16% over the past
+couple of years. And when it is time to repay, private loans don’t offer as many
+options to reduce or postpone payments.
+"For most people, federal student loans are a better deal than private student
+loans, so you’ll want to take advantage of federal options first."
+U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, "Choose a Student Loan," consumerfinance.gov, n.d.,
+http://www.consumerfinance.gov/paying-for-college/choose-a-student-loan/
+9. "After I took office, my administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq
+and Afghanistan to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat
+that: Not only did Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every
+strike that America takes. Every strike. That includes the one instance when we
+targeted an American citizen—Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operations
+for [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula]. . . .
+"[W]hen a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively
+plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States, nor our
+partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing unadapted arguments 511
+citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an
+innocent crowd should be protected from a SWAT team.
+"That’s who Anwar Awlaki was—he was continuously trying to kill people.
+He helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S.-
+bound cargo planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009.
+When Farouk Abdulmutallab—the Christmas Day bomber—went to Yemen in
+2009, Awlaki hosted him, approved his suicide operation, helped him tape a
+martyrdom video to be shown after the attack, and his last instructions were to
+blow up the airplane when it was over American soil. I would have detained and
+prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot, but we
+couldn’t. And as President, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized
+the strike that took him out."
+Barack Obama, "Remarks at National Defense University," May 23, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
+DCPD-201300361/html/DCPD-201300361.htm
+10. "Friends and fellow citizens: I stand before you tonight under indictment for the
+alleged crime of having voted at the last presidential election, without having a
+lawful right to vote. It shall be my work this evening to prove to you that in thus
+voting, I not only committed no crime, but, instead, simply exercised my citizen’s
+rights, guaranteed to me and all United States citizens by the national Constitution,
+beyond the power of any state to deny. . . .
+"The preamble of the federal Constitution says:
+" ‘We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
+establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense,
+promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
+our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
+America.’
+"It was we, the people; not we, the white male citizens; nor yet we, the male
+citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed the Union. And we formed it, not
+to give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not to the half of ourselves and
+the half of our posterity, but to the whole people—women as well as men. And
+it is a downright mockery to talk to women of their enjoyment of the blessings
+of liberty while they are denied the use of the only means of securing them provided
+by this democratic-republican government—the ballot."
+Susan B. Anthony, An Account of the Proceedings of the Trial of Susan B. Anthony on the Charge of
+Illegal Voting at the Presidential Election in Nov., 1872 (Rochester, NY: Daily Democrat and Chronicle
+Book Print, 1874), 151–53
+512 Critical Thinking Activities: Reconstructing scientific reasoning
+Reconstructing scientific reasoning
+Objective: To give you practice understanding the reasoning behind scientific
+experiments.
+Instructions: Read Chapter I and complete at least Exercise Sets 1.1, 1.2,
+and 1.3 before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete the
+following steps in order.
+1. Find a description of a famous experiment in the history of science.
+Using your library or the Internet, find a description of a famous
+experiment in the history of science, such as Galileo’s experiment
+on the speed of falling objects, Thomas Young’s experimental test
+of whether light is a wave or a particle, or Ernest Rutherford’s
+experiment that revealed the basic structure of the atom. After
+identifying an experiment that you’d like to study, you may need
+to do a little research to find an adequately detailed description
+of it. Photocopy or print out this description to turn in later.
+2. Reconstruct the reasoning by which the experimenter reached his or her
+conclusion. In your own words, summarize the reasoning behind
+the experiment. What did the experiment prove? Use that as the
+conclusion of the argument. What did the experimenter do to
+prove that conclusion? What assumptions did he or she make in
+the process? Those are the premises of the argument.
+3. Write out a premise-and-conclusion outline of the experimenter’s
+reasoning. Rewrite your summary from Step 2 in a premise-andconclusion
+outline, just as you did in Exercise Set 1.2.
+Final product: The final product of this activity should consist of a photocopied
+or printed description of a famous scientific experiment and a
+premise-and-conclusion outline of the reasoning behind the experiment.
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning
+513
+Analyzing arguments in
+scientific reasoning
+Objective: To give you practice recognizing and understanding arguments
+in scientific sources, including science textbooks.
+Instructions: Read the discussion of Rules 1 and 2 and complete Exercise
+Sets 1.1 and 1.2 before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete
+each of the following steps in order.
+1. Identify the conclusion and premises for each of the arguments in the
+box below. Unlike the arguments in the exercise sets throughout
+this book, the arguments below have not been simplified; they
+have been reprinted here word for word, in all their original
+messiness and complexity. This means you’ll need to think more
+carefully about what the main conclusion is and take more care
+in separating the premises from background information. It may
+help you to underline the conclusion and bracket the premises,
+as you did in Exercise Set 1.1.
+2. Write a premise-and-conclusion outline of each argument in the box
+below. For each argument, write a premise-and-conclusion
+outline, as you did in Exercise Set 1.2. Since these arguments
+were reprinted word for word from their original sources, you
+may need to rephrase more of the premises than you did in
+Exercise Set 1.2. When rephrasing premises, be sure not to
+change their meaning.
+Final product: The final product of this activity should consist of a set of
+ten premise-and-conclusion outlines—one for each argument in the box
+below.
+Variation. After reading Appendix III and completing Exercise Sets 13.1
+and 13.2, create argument maps for each of the arguments in the box
+below.
+Variation. After reading Chapters II through VI, identify the type(s) of
+argument(s) used in each argument in the box below. (Do the arguments
+involve arguments from examples? Arguments by analogy? Arguments by
+authority? Deductive reasoning—which forms?) Optionally, evaluate each
+argument using the rules from the corresponding chapter(s).
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing scientific
+514 Thinking Activities: Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning
+SOME EXAMPLES OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING
+1. "To explore whether monkeys’ preferences are affected by their decisions, we
+adapted [a] famous choice task for use with our nonverbal capuchin [monkey]
+subjects. We first found a set of objects for the monkeys to choose between: different-
+colored M&Ms candies. We then allowed our monkeys to make a choice between
+two M&Ms of different colors—let’s say red and blue—and then tested
+how this choice affected monkeys’ preference for the color they chose against. To
+test this, we gave the monkeys a second choice between an M&M of the color
+they rejected and another M&M of a third color (e.g., green). We found that
+monkeys’ preference for the rejected M&M changed after making a choice against
+it. Monkeys reliably preferred the novel colored M&M color over the rejected
+color, suggesting that choosing against an item might change the monkeys’ preferences
+as well. Importantly, we found that such preference changes do not occur in
+cases in which the monkeys themselves are not involved in the choice. In a control
+condition in which the experimenter made the choice for the monkey, our subjects
+did not show any subsequent preference changes, suggesting that it is the act of
+choosing that causes the monkeys to alter their future preferences."
+Laurie R. Santos and Louisa C. Egan Brad, "What Primates Can Tell Us About the Surprising Nature of
+Human Choice," in Navigating the Social World: What Infants, Children, and Other Species Can Teach
+Us, edited by Mahzarin R. Banaji and Susan A. Gelman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 344
+2. "Funisia is one such example of an early sex-fossil. It is an upright-standing wormlike
+animal that looks a little like a section of rope. It is revered because it is one of
+the first animals of which we can say with a degree of certainty that, yes, it was
+having sex. How can we be so sure? You might imagine digging up hundreds of
+the things, fossilized mid-coitus, but no—nothing like that has ever been found.
+Instead, we know of their sex lives because of the ‘sprats’. Sprats are young Funisia,
+and in fossils they generally appear in little clusters, each containing individuals all
+within the same size and age band, which on the face of it doesn’t sound very sexy.
+Except that we see exactly the same thing in modern-day animals like corals and
+sea-worms, which broadcast sperm and eggs out into the water, often on highly
+specific nights of the year. Fertilised eggs descend in the water column, hit the
+floor, grow, and hey presto—sprats. The products of sex. They are a little like sex’s
+trace fossils, like a footprint or fossilised faeces. And it is one of the earliest pieces
+of evidence that sex was taking place in those early seas."
+Jules Howard, Sex on Earth (London: Bloomsbury Sigma, 2014), 24
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing scientific reasoning
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning
+515
+3. "Suppose you were put in charge of writing the constitution and laws for a country.
+Would you give the president of the country authority over the policies of the
+central bank? Or would you allow the central bank to make decisions free from
+such political influence? . . .
+"Countries vary greatly in how they choose to answer this question. In some
+countries, the central bank is a branch of the government; in others, the central
+bank is largely independent. In the Untied States, [Federal Reserve] governors are
+appointed by the president for 14-year terms, and they cannot be recalled if the
+president is unhappy with their decisions. This institutional structure gives the Fed
+a degree of independence similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court.
+"Many researchers have investigated the effects of constitutional design on
+monetary policy. They have examined the laws of different countries to construct
+an index of central-bank independence. . . . The researchers then examined the
+correlation between central-bank independence and macroeconomic performance.
+"The results of these studies are striking: more independent central banks are
+strongly associated with lower and more stable inflation. [During the period 1955
+to 1988,] [c]ountries that had an independent central bank, such as Germany,
+Switzerland, and the United States, tended to have low average inflation. Countries
+that had central banks with less independence, such as New Zealand and
+Spain, tended to have higher average inflation.
+"Researchers have also found there is no relationship between central-bank independence
+and real economic activity. In particular, central-bank independence is
+not correlated with average unemployment, the volatility of unemployment, the
+average growth of real GDP, or the volatility of real GDP. Central-bank independence
+appears to offer countries a free lunch: it has the benefit of lower inflation
+without any apparent cost."
+N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics, 6th ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2007), 423–24
+4. "In the 1980s, psychologists [studying babies] began making use of one of the few
+behaviors that young babies can control: the movement of their eyes. These really
+are windows into the baby’s soul. How long babies stare at an object or a person—
+their ‘looking time’—can tell you a lot about their understanding.
+"One specific looking-time method is habituation. Like adults, if babies see the
+same thing over and over again, they’ll get bored and look away. Boredom—or
+‘habituation’—is a response to sameness, so this method reveals what babies see as
+similar and as different. . . .
+"More generally, looking-time methods can help assess what someone finds to
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing scientific
+516 Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning
+be new, interesting, or unexpected. . . .
+" . . .
+"In a classic study, Karen Wynn found that babies can also do rudimentary math
+with objects. The demonstration is simple. Show a baby an empty stage. Raise a
+screen in the middle of the stage. Put a Mickey Mouse doll behind the screen. Then
+put another Mickey Mouse doll behind the screen. Now drop the screen. Adults
+expect two dolls, and so do five-month-olds; if the screen drops to reveal one or
+three dolls, the babies look longer than they do if the screen drops to reveal two."
+Paul Bloom, Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil (New York: Crown Publishing, 2013), 20–23
+5. "For more than a century, ‘culture’ has been invoked to explain different levels of
+violence within the United States and between the United States and other nations.
+. . .
+"In the present context the term ‘culture’ is akin to widely shared belief
+systems. . . .
+"Culture-based theories have great intuitive appeal, but they are tricky to prove
+empirically. One problem is that belief systems are hard to quantify and often seem
+to go hand in hand with other factors that facilitate violence, such as disadvantage
+and the breakdown of order. . . .
+"Muddling things further, violence rates can be very different across regions that
+look pretty similar. Take the filmmaker Michael Moore’s examination of the United
+States and Canada, neighboring nations that share a British heritage and frontier
+traditions, high levels of economic development, open democratic governance, even
+popular culture—but have very different levels of gun violence. In Bowling for Columbine,
+Moore suggests that Canadians have less gun violence because they are less
+volatile and more deferential to collective, consensus approaches to problem solving,
+a common characterization. But it’s also true that Canada has much stricter
+gun laws than does the United States and much lower rates of handgun ownership.
+So is Canadian cultural ‘niceness’ keeping the gun homicide rate low? Or are Canada’s
+gun laws keeping matters in check? Or is it both—the culture gave rise to the
+laws, which reinforce the culture?
+"No one can say for sure, at least for now. But circumstantial evidence leads us to
+question ‘culture’ as the overriding explanation for violence (though we believe it
+may matter in certain circumstances). Our general skepticism stems from the fact
+that, although the United States has a gun homicide rate roughly seven times that
+of Canada, the two countries actually have comparable rates of nongun homicides.
+Thinking Activities: Analyzing scientific reasoning
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning 517
+Likewise, within the United States, the exceptional rate of southern violence is
+really a problem of gun violence, not violence by other means. If cultural predispositions
+were to blame for violence, we would expect to see disparities between the
+United States and peer nations, and between the American South and other regions,
+in nongun assaults and homicides. But where these differences exist, they
+tend to be small."
+Philip J. Cook and Kristina A. Goss, The Gun Debate: What
+Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2014), 62–64
+6. "[T]he strongest evidence that a recreational drug can cause brain damage comes
+from the study of amphetamine, methamphetamine, and the synthetic amphetamine-
+like drug MDMA (Ecstasy). The results of animal studies show that doses
+of MDMA approximating those taken by human users result in the degeneration
+of very fine serotonergic neuron terminals. In rodents, these terminals regrow
+within a few months after drug use is stopped; but, in monkeys, the terminal loss
+may be permanent. . . . "
+Bryan Kolb and Ian Q. Winshaw, Fundamentals of Human Neuropsychology,
+Sixth Edition (New York: Worth Publishers, 2009), 189
+7. "My investigations have had for their object to determine the different circumstances
+that affect the thermal action of the rays of light that proceed from the
+sun. . . .
+"The experiments were made with an air-pump and two cylindrical receivers of
+the same size, about four inches in diameter and thirty in length. In each were
+placed two thermometers. . . . After both had acquired the same temperature they
+were placed in the sun, side by side . . . .
+"The highest effects of the sun’s rays I have found to be in carbonic acid gas
+[carbon dioxide].
+"One of the receivers was filled with it, the other with common air, and the result
+was as follows [based on thermometer readings taken every few minutes]:
+In Common Air In Carbonic Acid Gas
+In shade In sun In shade In sun
+80 90 80 90
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing scientific reasoning
+518 Thinking Activities: Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning
+81 94 84 100
+80 99 84 110
+81 100 85 120
+The receiver containing the gas became itself much heated—very sensibly more so
+than the other—and on being removed, it was many times as long in cooling. . . .
+"On comparing the sun’s heat in different gases, I found it to be in hydrogen gas,
+104˚; in common air, 106˚; in oxygen gas 108˚; and in carbonic acid [carbon dioxide]
+gas, 125˚."
+Eunice Foote, "Circumstances affecting the Heat of the Sun’s Rays,"
+The American Journal of Science and Arts XXII (1856), 382–83
+8. "We currently know of 115 different elements, ranging form the simplest—hydrogen,
+containing one proton—to the most complex, called ununoctium and discovered
+in 1999, with 118 protons and 181 neutrons in its nucleus. . . .
+"How and where did all these elements form? Were they always present in the
+universe, or were they created after the universe formed? Since the 1950s, astronomers
+have come to realize that the hydrogen and most of the helium in the universe
+are primordial—that is, these elements date from the very earliest
+times. . . . All other elements in our universe result from stellar nucleosynthesis—
+that is, they were formed by nuclear fusion in the hearts of stars.
+"To test this idea, we must consider not just the list of different kinds of elements
+and isotopes but also their observed abundances. . . . Any theory proposed
+for the creation of the elements must reproduce these observed abundances. The
+most obvious feature is that the heavy elements are much less abundant than the
+most light elements. . . .
+"The modern picture of element formation involves many different types of
+nuclear reactions occurring at many different stages of stellar evolution, from
+main-sequence stars all the way to supernovae. Light elements—from hydrogen to
+iron—are built first by fusion, then by alpha capture, with proton and neutron
+capture filling in the gaps. We are reassured of the basic soundness of our theories
+by [the following] evidence.
+"[T]he rate at which various nuclei are captured and the rate at which they
+decay are known from laboratory experiments. When these rates are incorporated
+into detailed computer models of the nuclear processes occurring in stars and
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing scientific reasoning
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning 519
+supernovae, the resulting elemental abundances agree extremely well, point by
+point, with the observational data [about the abundance of elements in the universe].
+The match is remarkably good for elements up through iron and is still
+fairly close for heavier nuclei."
+Eric Chaisson and Steve McMillan, Astronomy Today,
+Fourth Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 552–60
+9. "The [historic] temperatures are compared with results from climate models that
+participated in an exercise coordinated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
+Change, or IPCC, for its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report. Nineteen models
+participated, from around the world, and they are all driven by the same scenarios
+only. Each model was run twice, once with natural climate forcings only, and once
+by natural plus human climate forcings [such as greenhouse gas emissions and
+soot from power plants]. . . .
+"The model simulations do a fairly good job of capturing the temperature rise
+in the early part of the twentieth century, but only the runs that include the human
+impact on climate are able to reproduce and explain the warming in the last few
+decades. This [result] is considered to be the ‘smoking gun,’ proof that humans
+have already affected the climate of the Earth. . . .
+"What would it take for the global warming forecast to be substantially wrong?
+Is it possible, or does it seem likely, that humans could put as much CO2 [carbon
+dioxide] in the air as we like without changing the Earth’s climate, and the whole
+global warming issue could just go away?
+"There are two obstacles to this possibility. First, there would have to be some
+other mechanism to explain the recent warming since the 1970s: some large perturbation
+to the energy budget of the Earth that no one has measured or conceived
+of yet. It takes a lot of energy to warm up the whole surface of the Earth including
+deep into the ocean, and it cannot happen just by random chaos. Certainly there
+will always be things about the natural world that are not perfectly understood,
+maybe even things about which we have no clue yet. But so far, in spite of intensive
+and highly motivated searching, no one has come up with an alternative source of
+energy to account for all that warming. This can be seen in the failure of the climate
+models without the human climate forcings to warm up enough.
+"Second, there would have to be a reason to throw out the greenhouse effect
+theory, some explanation of why increasing CO2 would not block outgoing IR
+[infrared] energy by absorbing in its bending vibrational mode, perhaps, or how
+some negative, compensating feedback might neutralize the warming tendency
+from the CO2, somehow allowing the Earth to shed the excess energy without
+warming up.
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing scientific reasoning
+520 Thinking Activities: Analyzing arguments in scientific reasoning
+"Overcoming either of these obstacles seems like a long shot, given how much
+intense, motivated searching has been done. Overcoming both obstacles together
+seems extremely unlikely to me."
+David Archer, Global Warming: Understanding the Forecast,
+2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 2012), 143–44
+10. "[Since] there has been during the long course of ages much migration from one
+part of the world to another, owing to . . . climatal and geographical changes and to
+the many occasional and unknown means of dispersal, then we can understand, on
+the theory of descent with modification [i.e., evolution], most of the great leading
+facts in [the] distribution [of species]. . . . We see the full meaning of the wonderful
+fact, which must have struck every traveller, namely, that on the same continent,
+under the most diverse conditions, under heat and cold, on mountain and lowland,
+on deserts and marshes, most of the inhabitants within each great class are plainly
+related; for they will generally be descendants of the same progenitors and early
+colonists. . . .
+"On this view of migration, with subsequent modification, we can see why oceanic
+islands should be inhabited by only few species, but of these, why many are
+peculiar or endemic forms. We clearly see why those animals which cannot cross
+wide spaces of ocean, as frogs and terrestrial mammals, should not inhabit oceanic
+islands; and why, on the other hand, new and peculiar species of bats, which can
+traverse the ocean, are often found on islands far distant from any continent. Such
+facts as the presence of peculiar species of bats, and the absence of all other mammals,
+on oceanic islands, are utterly inexplicable on the theory of independent acts
+of creation.
+". . . [And again], it is a rule of high generality that the inhabitants of each area
+are related to the inhabitants of the nearest source whence immigrants might have
+been derived. We see this in nearly all the plants and animals of the Galapagos
+Archipelago, of Juan Fernandez, and of the other American islands being related in
+the most striking manner to the plants and animals of the neighbouring American
+mainland; and those of the Cape de Verde archipelago and other African islands to
+the African mainland. . . . [T]hese facts receive no explanation on the theory of
+creation."
+Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, Sixth Edition
+(London: John Murray, 1872), 418–19
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analyzing scientific reasoning
+Critical Thinking Activities: Finding misleading statistics 521
+Finding misleading statistics
+Objective: To give you practice finding and explaining misleading
+uses of statistics.
+Instructions: Read the section on Rule 10 and complete Exercise
+Set 2.4 before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following
+steps in order:
+1. Find an argument that uses statistics in a misleading way. You
+can find arguments on news sites or other Web sites, on
+social media, on television shows or videos, advertisements,
+in conversations with friends or family, etc.
+2. Print out or write down the argument. If the argument is in a
+video or other non-written format, write out the argument,
+sticking as closely as you can to the original language. If
+the argument is more than one or two paragraphs long, you
+may choose to summarize the argument.
+3. Explain how the use of statistics in the argument is misleading.
+In one or two paragraphs, explain why you think the use of
+statistics in the argument is misleading. If you can, suggest
+a way to improve the argument so that it is less misleading.
+4. (Optional) Find the most misleading use of statistics in a small
+group of your classmates. Form a group with three or four of
+your classmates. Have each member of your group share
+the argument that he or she found and explain why the use
+of statistics in the argument is misleading. As a group,
+decide which of the arguments makes the most misleading
+use of statistics. Choose someone to share that argument
+with your class.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a
+written document of no more than a few pages. It should contain
+both the original argument (or your summary of it) and your explanation
+of how the argument’s use of statistics is misleading.
+522 Critical Thinking Activities: Generalizations about your classroom
+Generalizations about your classroom
+Objective: To give you practice constructing arguments for generalizations
+based on examples that you find yourself.
+Instructions: Read Chapter II and complete Exercise Sets 2.6 and 2.7
+before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps
+in order.
+1. In a small group, write a generalization about your classroom or
+campus that could be verified in fifteen to thirty minutes. Examples
+of generalizations about your classroom include "Most of the
+students in this room have been to a concert in the last two
+weeks" or "Nothing in this room is made in the United States."
+Examples of generalizations about your campus include "Most
+of the buildings on campus are accessible for people in wheelchairs"
+or "There’s no space left in the bike racks around campus."
+Remember, these should be generalizations for which a
+small group of students could collect an adequate number of
+examples in about fifteen to thirty minutes (or whatever time
+limit is set by your instructor). Deciding which generalizations
+qualify is part of the challenge!
+2. Trade generalizations with another group in your class. Each group
+in the class should give its generalization to another group. Each
+group should receive exactly one generalization from some other
+group.
+3. As a group, find examples to construct a good argument for or against
+the generalization that you have been given. A good argument, in
+this case, is one that follows the rules from Chapter II. You will
+need to find and keep track of examples. For instance, if another
+group gave you the generalization "None of the classrooms in this
+building are currently set up for small group discussions," you will
+need to find and make a list of classrooms in your building,
+noting which ones are set up for small groups. If your generalization
+includes things around campus, you may need to be creative
+in getting information about examples. Are you trying to find out
+what’s scheduled in classrooms in many different buildings?
+Consider looking online rather than trekking all over campus. Be
+sure to find out from your instructor if there is a time limit on
+your search.
+CriticalThinking Activities: Using analogiesto understand unusualobjects 523
+4. As a group, write out your argument, based on the examples that you
+found. Write out your argument for or against the generalization
+you were given, much as you did for Exercise Set 2.7. Be sure to
+state whether the generalization is true or false. Choose someone
+in your group to share your argument with the class.
+Final product: The final products of this assignment should be a list of
+examples and a written version of your argument. The list should clearly
+indicate which examples support the generalization and which are
+counterexamples.
+Using analogies to understand
+unusual objects
+Objective: To give you practice constructing arguments by analogy.
+Instructions: Read Chapter III before beginning this activity. Then, complete
+each of the following steps in order.
+1. Find an unusual object. Find an unusual object—something that
+will not be familiar to most of your classmates. Check out your
+local flea markets, antique shops, or specialty stores; think also
+about specific types of objects that are familiar to you from some
+prior experience or skill that is not likely to be shared by many
+others. For example, you can usually find something unfamiliar
+to most people at a hardware store or craft store.
+2. Write a brief description of the object’s purpose or use. Write down a
+two- or three-sentence description of the main use or purpose of
+the object.
+3. Share your object with a small group of classmates. Form a group of
+four or five people. Share your object with the other members of
+your group, but do not share the description of the object’s
+purpose or use.
+4. As a group, use analogical reasoning to try to figure out the use or
+purpose of your group’s objects. For each of the objects in your
+group, come up with analogies that suggest possible uses for the
+object. That is, find similarities between the objects from Step 1
+Critical Thinking Activities: Analogies for unusual objects
+524 Critical Thinking Activities: Using analogies in ethical reasoning
+and more familiar objects. Use these similarities as the basis for
+an argument by analogy to make an educated guess about the
+object’s purpose. Have one group member record these arguments
+by analogy.
+5. Reveal the true purpose or use of your object to your group. Share
+your description of your object’s use or purpose with the rest of
+your group. See how close your group was to figuring out the
+real purpose of each object.
+6. Choose one object from your group to share with the class. Choose
+one of your group’s objects to share with your class. Show the
+object to the class. Have the rest of the class use analogical
+reasoning to infer the purpose or use of the object. Then, explain
+the analogical reasoning that your group used to draw a conclusion
+about the object’s purpose or use. Finally, reveal its actual
+purpose.
+Final product: The final products of this assignment should be a set of
+unusual objects, a description of the purpose or use of each object, and a
+written argument by analogy about each object.
+Using analogies in ethical reasoning
+Objective: To give you practice applying arguments by analogy to ethical
+dilemmas.
+Instructions: Read Chapter III and complete Exercise 3.4 before beginning
+this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order..
+1. Write a short paragraph about an ethical problem. You could write
+about an ethical problem that you have faced recently, one that
+you’ve read about in a book or seen in a movie, etc. The problem
+should involve a difficult moral or ethical decision.
+2. Construct an argument by analogy to argue for a specific solution to
+your ethical problem. Think of a situation that is similar to the one
+you described in Step 1 except that it is much less ethically
+puzzling. That is, it should be a situation where most people
+would agree about the right thing to do. Using an argument by
+Critical Thinking Activities: Recognizing reliable web sources 525
+analogy, compare the problem from Step 1 to this other situation
+in order to argue that the solution to the ethical problem is like
+the proper response to the other situation. Write this argument
+out in a paragraph or two.
+3. (Optional) Share your work with a classmate and see if he or she
+agrees with your solution. Have a classmate read your work from
+Steps 1 and 2. Discuss your argument with your classmate to
+find out whether he or she agrees with your proposed solution to
+the ethical problem. If he or she does not agree, find out
+why not.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a written
+document of roughly two or three paragraphs. The first paragraph should
+describe an ethical problem. The remaining paragraphs should use an argument
+by analogy to argue for a specific solution to that problem.
+Recognizing reliable Web sources
+Objective: To help you distinguish between reliable and unreliable sources
+on the Web.
+Instructions: Read Rule 17 before beginning this activity. Then, complete
+each of the following steps in order.
+1. Find the Web page for this activity on the companion Web site for this
+book. Go to the companion Web site for this book. Click on the
+link for "Part 3." Then, click on the link for "Recognizing
+Reliable Web Sources."
+2. Examine each of the Web sites linked from the Web page for this
+activity. The Web page from Step 1 will contain links to various
+Web sites. Some of these sites are legitimate sites on which
+well-informed, relatively impartial experts present information.
+Others are not (in one interesting way or another). Examine
+each of the sites carefully, trying to distinguish the sites that
+make reliable sources from those that do not. For those that do
+not, try to tell, if you can, what the intention of the site actually
+is and who its creators might be.
+526 Critical Thinking Activities: Finding good sources
+3. Make a list of sites that would be reliable sources of information and
+a list of sites that would not be reliable sources of information. Next
+to each entry on your list, make a few notes about how you came
+to the conclusion about the site’s reliability as a source.
+4. In a small group, compare lists to devise a list of reliable sources, a list
+of unreliable sources, and a list of sources about which you are unsure.
+If everyone agrees that a particular site is reliable, put it on your
+group’s list of reliable sources. If everyone agrees that a site is
+unreliable, put it on your group’s list of unreliable sources. If your
+group disagrees on a site, see if you can resolve that disagreement
+through discussion or further research. If you can’t, put it on your
+group’s list of sources about which you are unsure.
+5. As a class, compile a single list of reliable sources and a single list of
+unreliable sources. As a class, compare the lists that each group
+produced. Try to resolve any disagreements and uncertainties
+through discussion so that everyone agrees on which sites belong
+on which list.
+Final product: The final product of this activity should be three sets of
+lists: your own lists of reliable and unreliable sites; your group’s lists of sites
+that are reliable, sites that are unreliable, and sites about which your group
+is unsure; and your class’s lists of reliable and unreliable sites.
+Finding good sources
+Objective: To give you practice finding good sources to support claims.
+Instructions: Read Chapter IV before beginning this activity. Then, complete
+each of the following steps in order:
+1. Choose a paper of yours from a previous class. The paper can be on
+any topic, and it need not be an argumentative essay.
+2. Choose three claims from your paper that could be supported with
+sources. In choosing claims, consider both whether the claim is the
+kind that can be supported by sources and whether you think you
+can find good sources to support those claims. Pick claims for
+which you did not already provide sources in the original paper.
+Write each claim on a separate piece of paper.
+Critical Thinking Activities: Bluffing about causal explanations 527
+3. Find two good sources to support each claim. Identify two independent,
+well-informed, impartial sources that support each of the
+three claims you identified in Step 2. Write out a complete citation
+for each source, using Chicago citation style or any style that
+your instructor requires.1
+4. Write a brief paragraph explaining why the source is a good source to
+support your claim. Your paragraph should quote or paraphrase the
+part of the source that supports the claim. The paragraph should
+also explain why you think each source is well informed and
+impartial.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a written
+document of three pages. Each page should have a single claim at the top,
+all three claims taken from the same paper. Each page should then have
+citations for two sources and brief paragraphs explaining why those are
+good sources for supporting the claim at the top of that page.
+Bluffing about causal explanations
+Objective: To give you practice brainstorming alternative explanations of
+correlations and working toward the most likely explanation.
+Instructions: Read Chapter V before beginning this activity. Then, complete
+each of the following steps in order.
+1. Working in a small group, identify an interesting or surprising correlation.
+Try to find a correlation for which you can think of several
+plausible explanations.
+2. As a group, decide on the best explanation of the correlation. If you can
+find good sources that establish the genuine explanation for the
+correlation, use that explanation. If you cannot find good sources,
+follow the rules from Chapter V to decide what you think is the
+best explanation of the correlation. The best explanation may or
+may not involve a causal connection between the things or events
+1. For more information about citation styles, see the "Resources" section of the companion
+Web site for this book.
+528 Critical Thinking Activities: Recognizing deductive argument forms
+that are correlated. Write a brief paragraph that presents this explanation
+of the correlation.
+3. As a group, create two alternative explanations. Write two separate
+paragraphs detailing two alternative explanations for the correlation
+(besides the one you identified in Step 2). Try to make them
+as convincing as possible.
+4. Read all three explanations to your class. Do not tell the rest of the
+class which explanation is the correct one.
+5. Have your classmates vote on which explanation they think is correct.
+After the class has voted, reveal which explanation you believe is
+correct and explain why you think so
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be three separate
+explanations for a particular correlation—one correct explanation and
+two fake explanations.
+Recognizing deductive argument forms
+Objective: To give you practice recognizing deductive argument forms in
+difficult contexts.
+Instructions: Read Chapter VI and complete Exercise Sets 6.1, 6.2, and
+6.5 before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following
+steps in order.
+1. Form a small group, choose a name for your group, and write your
+group’s name on ten sticky notes. Be sure to leave some extra space
+on each sticky note for later steps.
+2. Working in a small group, identify the argument forms of the
+arguments in the box below. Each argument uses at least one of
+the deductive argument forms described in Chapter VI. Some
+use deductive arguments in several steps, as explained in Rule 28.
+Write the argument form(s) used in each argument on a different
+sticky note.
+3. Stick your sticky notes on the board to show which argument follows
+which rule. Your instructor will write the number of each
+Critical Thinking Activities: Recognizing deductive argument forms 529
+argument on the board. Affix a sticky note to the board to show
+which argument form each argument uses.
+4. As a class, discuss the arguments about which different groups
+disagreed. If there are arguments about which groups disagree,
+have each group explain their reasoning. Try to figure out which
+argument form(s) the argument really uses.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a board full
+of sticky notes, showing which argument forms each of the following arguments
+follow.
+Variation: The arguments in the box below all have to do with philosophical
+topics and come from contemporary or historical philosophers. Therefore,
+not only can they help you practice analyzing deductive arguments
+(and some of them are hard—they make for good practice!), they also give
+you a small taste of what philosophical argument can look like. This is especially
+useful if your course is being offered through a philosophy department
+or if you plan to take philosophy courses in the future. Instructors
+who are not in a philosophy department, however, might want to provide
+an alternative set of arguments for deductive analysis.
+Variation: Instead of using the arguments below, have each group find or
+create an argument that follows exactly one of the rules from Chapter VI.
+Use those arguments as the basis for this activity.
+Variation: After studying Appendix III and completing Exercise Sets 13.1
+and 13.2, work in groups to create argument maps of the arguments below.
+To facilitate working on argument maps in groups, write numbers on index
+cards, which you can arrange and rearrange to try out different ways of
+mapping each argument.
+530 Critical Thinking Activities: Recognizing deductive argument forms
+Some Philosophical Arguments for Use in
+"Recognizing Deductive Argument Forms"
+1. Although we rarely acknowledge it, the history of philosophy is really a great clash
+of personal temperaments. Professional philosophers are, when it comes to temperament,
+either "tender minded" or "tough minded." If a philosopher is tender
+minded, then he or she is going to be most tempted by philosophies that are rationalistic,
+religious, idealistic, and optimistic. On the other hand, a philosopher will
+be drawn to more empiricist, irreligious, skeptical, and pessimistic views if he or
+she is tough minded. Thus, professional philosophers will tend to be either rationalistic,
+religious, idealistic, and optimistic or empiricist, irreligious, skeptical, and
+pessimistic.
+Adapted from: William James, Pragmatism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 8–10
+2. It is possible to find fault with any philosophical position, and yet it is impossible
+to say that my own philosophical position has any faults. It would, of course, be
+possible to find fault with my own philosophical position if I had one. But on the
+other hand, it is possible to find fault with my philosophical position only if I have
+one, which I do not.
+Adapted from: Nagarjuna, Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani: The Dispeller of Disputes,
+translated by Jan Westerhoff (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29
+3. The first step to overcoming the fear of death is to recognize that neither our body
+nor our soul exists after death. If no part of us exists after death, neither as a soul
+nor as a body, then we can suffer no pain or harm in death. If we can suffer no pain
+or harm in death, then death is nothing to fear. Thus, death is nothing to fear.
+Adapted from: Epicurus, "Letter to Menoeceus," in The Epicurus Reader, translated by Brad Inwood
+and Lloyd P. Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 29
+4. You have said that justice involves doing good to our friends who are good and just
+and doing evil to those who are evil and our enemies. If you are right, then the just
+person will do evil to those who are unjust. Yet, doing evil to someone harms them,
+and harming something makes it worse. If, then, the just person does evil to those
+who are evil and unjust enemies, then those enemies will be made even worse.
+That is, they will be made even more evil and more unjust. Surely the just person
+Critical Thinking Activities: Recognizing deductive argument forms 531
+does not, by acting justly, make others more unjust! So I am afraid that you are
+wrong about your definition of justice.
+Adapted from: Plato, Republic, translated by C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
+Company, 2004), 11
+5. Let me tell you about the theories of our friend, Ivan Fyodorovitch. He has asserted
+that if someone does not believe in the immortality of the soul, as I do not,
+then that person is obliged to believe that nothing is immoral—not even cannibalism.
+Indeed, he thinks that for such a person, pure selfishness is the only reasonable
+path. So, it seems, I am obliged to believe that nothing is immoral.
+Adapted from: Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, translated by Constance Garnett
+(New York: Modern Library, 1996), 72
+6. If I understand you correctly, you are suggesting that the soul and the body must
+proceed, each according to their own laws, in such a way that they appear to interact
+with one another, but in fact do not. Now, this seems to me to be perfectly
+possible. Yet I regard it as nothing more than a hypothesis, for God, if He is all
+powerful, is not limited by what we can imagine. As we know that He is all
+powerful, we must acknowledge that he is not limited by our feeble imaginations,
+and we could regard this view of yours as more than a hypothesis only if God
+could not do more than what we can imagine.
+Adapted from: Damaris Cudworth, letter to G. W. Leibniz, March 29, 1704, in Women
+Philosophers of the Early Modern Period, edited by Margaret Atherton
+(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 83
+7. Either the meaning of life is to be found in the pursuit of happiness or the pursuit
+of morality or it is to be found in something else—something that may not
+maximize our own happiness or the total amount of justice or goodness in the
+world. Some reflection on the kinds of activities that many of us deem most central
+to leading a meaningful life reveals that they are not the activities that lead to
+the greatest individual happiness or to the most moral life imaginable. A meaningful
+life, then, is to be found in something beyond the pursuit of happiness or
+morality, important as those things may be.
+Adapted from: Susan Wolf, Meaning in Life and Why It Matters (Princeton: Princeton
+University Press, 2010), 49
+532 Critical Thinking Activities: Recognizing deductive argument forms
+8. In order to establish knowledge on a firmer footing, I have temporarily persuaded
+myself that all of the familiar things of the world do not really exist. I
+have even temporarily persuaded myself that God does not exist. But can I believe
+that I do not exist? I cannot, for if I did not exist, then it would be impossible
+for me to have persuaded myself of anything or for me to believe that I do
+not exist. I must exist, after all, in order to persuade myself of something or to
+believe something. As long as I am considering whether I exist, then, it is evident
+that I cannot believe that I do not exist.
+Adapted from: René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Third Edition, translated by
+Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 18
+9. Desires exist. To desire something is to recognize that thing as the type of thing
+that has produced pleasure in the past. If desiring something requires recognizing
+it as the type of thing that has produced pleasure in the past, then the existence
+of desires would be proof of an enduring entity—a self—that can experience
+pleasure and remember the things that produced it. Therefore, desires would be
+proof of a self. If desires exist and they would be proof of a self, then the self exists.
+This is one way that we know that the self exists.
+Adapted from: The Nyāya-sūtra: Selections with Early Commentaries, translated by Matthew Dasti and
+Stephen Phillips (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2017), 75
+10. Some things, like our opinions, desires, and actions, are in our control. Other
+things, like our health, our possessions, and our reputation, are beyond our control.
+With respect to things that lie beyond your control, you can either acknowledge
+that they are beyond your control or you can pine after them, pretending
+that they are within your control. You will be constantly disturbed and distressed
+if you pine after them as if they were in your control, but if you recognize that
+they are beyond your control, no one can ever force you to do anything or prevent
+you from doing anything, and no one will be able to harm you. The choice, then,
+is up to you: you can have a life of constant distress or a life free from compulsion
+and harm. This lies within your control.
+Adapted from: Epictetus, The Handbook (The Encheiridion), translated by N. P. White
+(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 11
+Critical Thinking Activities: Compiling your research 533
+Compiling your research into an
+extended outline
+Objective: To help you learn to compile shorter arguments on a specific
+topic into a single, extended outline for use in an argumentative essay or
+presentation.
+Instructions: Read Chapter VII and complete Exercise Sets 7.2, 7.4, 7.6,
+7.8, and 7.10 before beginning this activity. When you are ready,
+complete each of the following steps in order.
+1. Write down the question that you have been exploring in Exercise
+Sets 7.2, 7.4, 7.6, 7.8, and 7.10. In Exercise Set 7.2, you identified
+several questions. In the exercise sets that followed, you explored
+one of those questions in detail. Write that question at the top
+of a piece of paper or the beginning of a document in a word
+processor.
+2. On the basis of the arguments and objections that you developed in
+Exercise Sets 7.4, 7.6, and 7.8, decide which answer to your question
+is best supported by arguments. In Exercise Sets 7.4, 7.6, and 7.8,
+you considered arguments and objections related to one of the
+questions that you identified in Exercise Set 7.2. On the basis of
+all of those arguments, decide which answer to your question is
+best supported by arguments. Be sure to consider alternative
+answers to the question, which you identified in Exercise Set
+7.10. Write this answer down. This answer will be the main
+conclusion of your extended argument.
+3. Identify the strongest argument(s) for your answer. In Exercise Set
+7.6, you developed at least two arguments for the answer that
+you have now chosen as your main conclusion. Write down your
+strongest argument(s) for that answer, in premise-and-conclusion
+form.
+4. Identify the most important objections to your arguments. In
+Exercise
+Set 7.8, you worked out at least one objection to the
+argument(s) that you chose in Step 3. Write down your objections
+to your chosen argument(s).
+5. Identify the strongest argument(s) against competing answers. Write
+down the strongest argument(s) from Exercise Set 7.6 against
+each of the other plausible answers to your question, including
+the alternative answers that you identified in Exercise Set 7.10.
+534 Critical Thinking Activities: Improving a sample paper
+Final product: The final product of this activity should be a single document
+containing a statement of the question being considered, a statement
+of the answer that you think is best supported by arguments, premise-andconclusion
+outlines of one or more strong arguments for that answer, clear
+statements of at least one objection to each of those arguments, and premiseand-
+conclusion outlines of strong arguments against alternative answers to
+the question being considered.
+Improving a sample paper
+Objective: To give you practice applying the rules from Chapter VIII to a
+sample paper.
+Instructions: Read Chapter VIII before beginning this activity. Then,
+complete each of the following steps in order.
+1. Read the sample paper at the end of this assignment sheet. You may
+want to annotate the paper to make later parts of this activity
+easier for you: that is, mark the main conclusion of the paper,
+each of the major arguments, any objections that the paper
+considers, and the author’s responses to those objections.
+2. Write one or two paragraphs in response to each of the following
+questions about the paper. Be as specific as possible in your
+responses, citing specific sentences or passages and offering
+concrete suggestions about how to improve the paper.
+a. Does the author’s introduction get right to the point
+(Rule 34)? What changes could the author make in order
+to improve the introduction?
+b. Does the paper make a definite claim (Rule 35)? Would
+you recommend any changes to clarify the main claim of
+the paper?
+c. How well does this paper communicate its main argument(
+s)? Do the arguments in the paper follow all of the
+relevant rules from Chapters I through VI? What changes
+would you recommend to clarify the argument(s) and/or
+make them follow the relevant rules?
+Critical Thinking Activities: Improving a sample paper 535
+d.
+Does the paper detail and respond to objections (Rule 37)? What changes would you recommend to improve the author’s handling of objections?
+e.
+Does the paper state an appropriately modest conclusion (Rule 39)? What changes would you recommend to improve the paper’s conclusion?
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a written document of five to ten paragraphs. The document should provide concrete advice to the author of the sample paper.
+Media Piracy Is Wrong
+Since the beginning of time, people have debated whether it is morally wrong to download music, movies, and other media without paying for it. There are many arguments on both sides of the issue, and there will probably never be total agreement about it. Downloading media first became a major problem around the year 2000, when a software program called Napster made it possible for people to share MP3 files. Napster was eventually shut down by the courts, after a lawsuit by the recording companies. People’s appetite for music couldn’t be contained, though, and new file-sharing platforms developed, including gnutella and BitTorrent. Since then, people have begun downloading movies, TV shows, and other media too. In response, media companies started suing individual people who downloaded media files without paying for them, often imposing ridiculously high fines for minor offenses, such as downloading a few files. Many people thought that these lawsuits were overly harsh, and so the media companies discontinued them so as not to look bad. Although it did make the companies look bad, the companies were justified in bringing the lawsuits, because it is both illegal and morally wrong for people to download copyrighted media files without paying for them.
+Downloading media without paying for it is wrong because it is a form of stealing. It is easy to see that downloading media files is stealing by noticing that downloading a movie without paying for it is like stealing a DVD from Walmart. It’s true that the artists aren’t going to suffer significantly from the loss of revenue from a single movie, just as losing a single DVD isn’t going to affect the largest corporation in the world. Nonetheless, the DVD belongs to Walmart, and the song, movie, or whatever belongs to the artist(s) who created it. Just as stealing the DVD deprives Walmart of the right to control what happens to its property, so downloading media files deprives the artists of the right to control what happens to their property. Whenever one person takes another’s property without the owner’s permission, that is stealing. For instance, if a musician records a song and a record company gets hold of the recording and distributes it without the musician’s permission, the record company has stolen the musician’s intellectual property—even if the record company doesn’t
+536 Critical Thinking Activities: Improving a sample paper
+charge for the song. When people download a media file without paying for it, they are
+behaving much like that record company. They are undermining artists’ control over their
+intellectual property. When a musician writes a song or a filmmaker makes a movie, that
+song or movie is the intellectual property of its creator. Since it is the creator’s property, he
+or she gets to decide who can use the song or movie. Therefore, taking a song, movie, or
+whatever without the creator’s permission is stealing, and stealing is morally wrong.
+Not everyone finds this analogy convincing. Some people object that downloading
+media files isn’t like stealing a DVD because downloading a file doesn’t involve taking anything
+physical. When someone steals a DVD, on this view he or she is taking something
+away from Walmart. When one person downloads a media file from someone else’s computer,
+the other person still has the media file. This objection doesn’t work, though, because
+the difference between stealing a DVD and downloading a file isn’t morally relevant.
+Others might object to this argument by pointing out that even if downloading media
+files is a form of stealing, it is not morally wrong, because it does not harm anyone. In fact,
+some people argue that downloading media files benefits the artists because it encourages
+the people who download the files to go to concerts, buy t-shirts for their favorite bands,
+and so on. This is implausible, however. If giving away music for free boosted overall profits,
+then record companies and musicians would be happy about it. Instead, they are trying to
+stop it. Furthermore, this logic does not apply to the downloading of movies, television
+shows, or other forms of media. There are no concert tours for movies, and people rarely buy
+t-shirts or other memorabilia for their favorite movies and television shows in the way that
+they buy memorabilia for their favorite bands.
+Besides, the reason that stealing is wrong is not only because it causes harm but also
+because it violates the owners’ rights. Even if downloading media did benefit the artists,
+it would still be wrong because it is a violation of their rights.
+One final objection is that many people download media files as a way of deciding
+whether they want to buy a song or a movie. This might make downloading media files okay
+if people deleted the media files after they downloaded them, but many people do not.
+Downloading a media file to "try it out" is like stealing a piece of clothing from a store in
+order to try it on at home. The more appropriate thing to do is to use one of the approved
+methods for "trying out" a song or movie, such as listening to samples online or renting the
+movie. This is like trying on a piece of clothing in the store, which everyone agrees is okay.
+The main argument against downloading media files without paying for them is that
+doing so amounts to stealing, which is wrong. Downloading media is stealing because it
+undermines the artists’ intellectual property rights, which give the artists the right to decide
+who can access their creations. The objections considered above attempt to show either that
+downloading media is not stealing or that in the case of media files, stealing is not wrong.
+Since none of these objections succeed, it is reasonable to conclude that downloading media
+files is wrong. People who download media files are therefore criminals, like burglars, muggers,
+and pirates. They ought to be forced to serve jail time, just like burglars and muggers.
+Critical Thinking Activities: Compiling a draft 537
+Compiling a draft of an
+argumentative essay
+Objective: To help you learn to compile shorter arguments on a specific
+topic into a single, extended argument for use in an argumentative essay or
+presentation.
+Instructions: Read Chapter VIII; complete Exercise Sets 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and
+8.5; and do the "Compiling your research into an extended outline" activity
+(p. 533) before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each
+of the following steps in order.
+1. Write a brief introduction to your essay. Your introduction should
+introduce the issue in a clear and engaging way (Rule 34).
+It should provide the reader with just enough background
+information to help them understand what the issue is and
+why it matters. Most importantly, it should clearly indicate the
+question that you will be answering and the answer that you will
+be arguing for (Rule 35). Use the question and the answer that
+you chose while completing the "Compiling your research into
+an extended outline" activity.
+2. Add the prose version of your strongest arguments for your main
+conclusion. When you compiled your research into an extended
+outline, you identified one or more arguments as the strongest
+arguments for your answer. In exercise 8.3, you converted those
+arguments into prose paragraphs. Insert those paragraphs after
+your introduction, adding appropriate transitions between them.
+3. Add the objections and responses to each of your main arguments.
+When you compiled your research into an extended outline, you
+identified one or more objections to each of the arguments for
+your main answer. In Exercise Set 8.5, you converted those
+objections into complete paragraphs and added responses to
+them. Add those objections to your essay, along with your
+response to them. Depending on the length of your arguments
+and objections, it might work best to include objections immediately
+after each argument. In other cases, you might prefer to
+give all of your arguments and then discuss all of your objections.
+538 Critical Thinking Activities: Peer-review workshop
+4. Add arguments against any other plausible answers to the question
+answered in your essay. If there are other very plausible answers
+to the question that you are answering in your essay, you might
+want to tell your readers why those answers are not as good
+as yours. When you compiled your research into an extended
+outline, you identified the strongest arguments against each of
+those answers. In exercise 8.3, you converted those arguments
+into prose paragraphs. Choose one or two plausible alternatives
+to your chosen answer, and add the arguments against them to
+your essay, using appropriate transitions.
+5. Write a brief conclusion to your essay. Your conclusion should
+reiterate the main points of your essay. In particular, remind your
+reader of your main conclusion and the main arguments that you
+use to support that conclusion. And remember: don’t claim more
+than you have shown (Rule 39)!
+Final product: The final product of this activity will be a complete draft of
+an argumentative essay. This will be a big accomplishment—congratulations!
+Remember, though, that you’re not done with the writing process. You still
+need to get feedback on your draft and use that feedback to make your
+essay even better (Rule 38).
+Peer-review workshop
+Objective: To give you practice applying the rules from Chapter VIII to
+provide constructive feedback on someone else’s argumentative essay and
+use someone else’s feedback to plan improvements to your own essay.
+Instructions: Read Chapter VIII before beginning this activity. Then,
+complete each of the following steps in order.
+1. Choose an argumentative essay of your own to use for this activity.
+This might be an essay that you wrote for the "Compiling a draft
+of an argumentative essay" activity (p. 537), an essay that you
+wrote for another class, or an essay you wrote for some other
+purpose.
+2. Exchange argumentative essays with a group of classmates. Form a
+group of three or four people. Give one copy of your essay to
+Critical Thinking Activities: Peer-review workshop 539
+each person in the group and get an essay from each person in the group.
+3.
+Write a detailed evaluation of your classmates’ essays, using the peer-review worksheet at the end of this activity as a guide. Your goal is to provide constructive feedback that will help your classmates know what they have done well and how they can improve their essays. Your evaluation should include concrete advice that is framed directly but constructively and politely. Your evaluation can take the form of a numbered list of responses to the prompts on the peer-review worksheet. You may also find it helpful to write some comments directly on your classmates’ essays.
+4.
+Return your evaluations to your classmates and collect your peers’ evaluations of your own essay.
+5.
+Make a plan for revising your essay. Read your classmates’ evaluations of your essay. Decide which of their criticisms are worth addressing and which suggestions are worth taking. Make a list of specific changes that you intend to make to your draft to meet those criticisms and implement those suggestions.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment consists of several documents. You should have two or three peer evaluations of your essay and a list of specific changes that you intend to make to your paper in light of those evaluations. Each evaluation should consist of a numbered list of responses to the prompts on the peer-review worksheet and, optionally, a copy of your essay with comments written directly on it. (Each member of your group should also have your evaluation of their essay.)
+540 Critical Thinking Activities: Peer-review workshop
+Peer-Review Worksheet
+Instructions: Answer the following questions to provide feedback on a draft of a classmate’s
+paper. Be as specific as possible in all of your answers.
+1. Does the draft have an engaging opening? If so, what makes it engaging? If not, suggest
+a way to make it more engaging.
+2. Is the draft’s introduction an appropriate length? Does it include any sentences that are
+off topic, redundant, or overly long? Are there any topics that ought to be covered in the
+introduction, but aren’t?
+3. Does the draft contain a clear, definite statement of the paper’s main thesis or proposal?
+In your own words, what do you think the paper’s main thesis or proposal is?
+4. On the draft itself, put an asterisk next to each of the paper’s main arguments. Does the
+draft present these arguments clearly? If not, identify specific aspects of the draft’s presentation
+that you find confusing or important assumptions that are left out.
+5. Does the draft develop the main argument(s) in enough detail, or are there premises
+that need further explanation and/or support? If so, which premises are they?
+6. What types of arguments are used in this paper (arguments by example, deductive arguments,
+analogies, etc.)? Do they follow the relevant rules in this book?
+7. On the draft itself, put two asterisks next to each objection that the author considers.
+Does the draft explain each objection in detail? Do any of them need further development?
+If so, which ones?
+8. On the draft itself, put three asterisks next to the author’s response to each objection.
+Does the draft meet each objection that it raises? If not, which objections need to be
+addressed further, and how do you suggest the author address those objections?
+9. Are there any other objections that you think the author should consider?
+10. Are there alternative theses or proposals that you think the author should consider? If
+so, what are they, and why do you think they are important?
+11. Does the draft contain an appropriate conclusion, which restates the paper’s main
+points and avoids making overly bold claims?
+12. If you could change just one thing about this draft, what would it be and why? Be as
+specific as possible.
+13. What is the best thing about this draft? Be as specific as possible.
+14. What other comments or suggestions do you have about how the author might improve
+this draft?
+Critical Thinking Activities: Writing opening lines 541
+Writing opening lines
+Objective: To give you practice writing openings for written essays and oral presentations.
+Instructions: Read Rules 34 and 40 and complete Exercise Sets 8.1 and 9.1 before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Read the pieces provided by your instructor. Your instructor will provide you with three editorials or op-eds from recent newspapers or magazines. Read each piece carefully.
+2.
+Write three openings for each of those pieces. For each of the three pieces that your instructor gave you, imagine that you were going to write an essay or give an oral presentation arguing for the editorial or op-ed’s main point. Write a hard lead for a written essay, a soft lead for a written essay, and an opening for an oral presentation of that piece.
+3.
+Share your openings with a group. Form a group of five people. Have each member of the group share all three of his or her openings for each of the three pieces that your instructor gave you.
+4.
+Choose one opening for each piece. As a group, choose the best opening for each piece, leaving you with a list of three openings for the entire group.
+5.
+Share your group’s chosen openings with the class. Share your group’s openings with the rest of the class, including a few words about why you chose each one.
+Final product: The final product of this activity should be a written list of nine openings for each member of your group, consisting of one hard lead, one soft lead, and one presentation opening for each of the three pieces, as well as a list of the three openings that the group chose to share with the class.
+542 Critical Thinking Activities: Creating a visual aid
+Creating a visual aid
+Objective: To give you practice applying Rule 43 from Chapter IX to create good visual aids for oral presentations.
+Instructions: Read Chapter IX before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Choose an argumentative essay to use for this activity. This might be an essay of your own, such as one that you wrote for the "Compiling a draft of an argumentative essay" activity (p. 537) or one that you wrote for another class. If your instructor allows it, you might also use an op-ed from a news site or an argumentative essay from a book or textbook.
+2.
+Create a visual aid for an oral presentation of the argument from your chosen essay. Create a visual aid to accompany an oral pres-
+entation of the argument from the essay you picked in Step 1. This can take any form you want—a PowerPoint presentation, a handout, etc.
+Think very carefully about the structure and content of this visual aid. In addition to the advice given under Rule 43, you might also look for advice online about making good use of the kind of visual aid you’re planning to use. The visual aid should complement and enhance your presentation without making your oral presentation redundant.
+3.
+Write one or two pages explaining why you chose to design your visual aid as you did. First, explain why you chose the form that you did. For instance, if you chose to draw your visual aid on a board as you talk, explain why you chose to do that rather than use PowerPoint. If you did (or didn’t) use a handout (instead of or in addition to, say, PowerPoint), why (or why not)? Second, explain why you included the content that you did, rather than other content or no content at all. Be as specific as possible, even if that means discussing each slide separately.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment consists of a copy of the essay you chose in Step 1, a hard copy of the visual aid you created in
+Critical Thinking Activities: Oral presentations 543
+Step 2, and the one- to two-page explanatory document that you wrote for Step 3. If your visual aid is a PowerPoint presentation, provide a printout of your slides. If your visual aid is something that you would create during the presentation, such as a series of drawings on a board, create a paper copy in advance to turn in to your instructor.
+Oral presentations
+Objective: To give you practice applying the rules from Chapter IX on oral arguments.
+Instructions: Read Chapter IX before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Choose an argumentative essay to use for this activity. This might be an essay of your own, such as one that you wrote for the "Compiling a draft of an argumentative essay" activity (p. 537) or one that you wrote for another class. If your instructor allows it, you might also use an op-ed from a newspaper or an argumentative essay from a book or textbook. Be sure to choose an essay whose basic argument you could present in about ten minutes.
+2.
+Prepare an oral presentation of the argument from that essay. Follow the rules from Chapter IX to prepare a ten-minute oral presentation of the argument from the essay you chose in Step 1. You may need to simplify the argument a bit. Think carefully about which parts you can cut from the presentation while retaining the overall structure of the argument.
+You may want to complete the "Creating a visual aid" activity (p. 542) when preparing your visual aid.
+3.
+Deliver your oral presentation to your class. Rehearse your presentation in advance so that you can deliver the presentation rather than reading from a page or a screen. Rehearsing your presentation also helps ensure that you can finish your presentation in the allotted time.
+Be sure to find out whether you are expected to take questions after your presentation. If so, think about the kinds of questions you’re likely to get, and prepare some answers for
+544 Critical Thinking Activities: Unpopular opinions
+them. In particular, be prepared to answer questions about the parts of the essay that you chose to cut in order to fit your presentation into the allotted time.
+Arrange to record your presentation. A video is best, since you can see and hear what you’re doing, but even an audio recording made on a computer can be helpful. You can learn a lot about public speaking by watching or listening to your own presentation.
+4.
+Make a list of things that you did well and things that you could improve. Watch or listen to the recording of your presentation. Then, create a list of things that you did well in the presentation and things that you could improve. For each item that you could improve, write a few sentences explaining what you could do differently to give a better presentation. Be as specific as possible.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be an oral presentation of an argument, along with a set of notes for your presentation—or even a full, written-out version of the presentation, if that helps you feel prepared. Your final product should also include a recording of your presentation and a list of things that you did well, aspects of your presentation that you could improve, and specific things you could do to improve those aspects.
+Unpopular opinions
+Objective: To give you practice listening to and understanding people’s reasons for holding views that differ from your own.
+Instructions: Read Chapter X and complete Exercise Set 10.1 before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1. Find a partner. Find out from your instructor whether you may choose your own partner or if your instructor will assign one to you.
+2. Make a list of five "unpopular opinions" that you hold. These should be beliefs that you think your partner will disagree with. Tread very carefully, however, with beliefs that may be offensive or hurtful.
+Critical Thinking Activities: In-class debates 545
+3. Identify which of those "unpopular opinions" your partner disagrees with most vehemently. Read your list of unpopular opinions to your partner. Have your partner choose one that seems least plausible to him or her. If your partner agrees with all of your unpopular opinions, repeat Steps 2 and 3 until you’ve found something about which the two of you disagree.
+4. Explain your reasons for your "least popular opinion." Write a short paragraph in which you give your reasons for believing the opinion that your partner said was least plausible in
+Step 3.
+5. Listen to your partner’s reasons and explain them back to them. Listen carefully as your partner reads the paragraph he or she wrote in Step 4. Then, write those reasons down in your own words.
+6. Review your partner’s restatement of your reasons. Read your partner’s restatement of your reasons. Discuss that restatement with your partner. Do you feel like your partner accurately and fairly captured your reasons? Why or why not?
+7. Discuss whether each partner still regards the other’s "unpopular opinion" as quite so implausible. Briefly discuss whether this activity has changed your mind about the other’s opinion.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a list of "unpopular opinions" and three short paragraphs: the first should explain your reasons for holding one of the opinions from your list. The second should explain your partner’s reasons for holding one of the opinions from his or her list. The third should be a brief report of the results of this exercise after Step 7.
+In-class debates
+Objective: To give you practice applying all of the rules from this book in the context of an in-class debate.
+Instructions: Reread Chapters I, VII, VIII, IX, and X before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order.
+546 Critical Thinking Activities: In-class debates
+1.
+Pair up with a debate partner. Find out from your instructor whether you may choose your own debate partner or if your instructor will assign one to you.
+2.
+Identify a specific debate question. Your instructor may assign a specific question for each pair or provide guidelines for choosing a question of your own. If you are choosing your own question, pick a question that interests both you and your debate partner.
+3.
+Assign each debater to argue for a different answer to the debate question. In Step 2, you picked a specific question for your debate. Identify possible answers to that question (there may be more than two, of course), and choose one for each debater to defend. For the purposes of this activity, be sure that you and your partner are arguing for different answers. It’s fine if you are arguing for an answer that you don’t actually believe.
+4.
+Prepare a five-minute oral argument for your assigned answer. Outside of class, prepare a five-minute oral argument for your assigned answer. This will probably take a bit of research. (See Chapter VII for guidance on researching your argument.) Be sure that your argument follows the rules in this book—especially the rules in Chapter I—and that your oral presentation follows the rules in Chapters IX and X.
+5.
+Join with another pair of debate partners to form a debate group of four people. The other pair of partners need not be debating the same question that you are.
+6.
+Debate your partner in front of the rest of your debate group. Pick one pair of debate partners to go first. Follow these steps to hold a structured debate on the topic:
+a.
+Have each partner present his or her oral argument to the debate group. Give each partner five uninterrupted minutes to present his or her argument to the group.
+b.
+Have each partner offer a two-minute rebuttal to his or her partner’s argument. Give each partner two uninterrupted minutes to raise objections and ask questions about the other’s argument.
+Critical Thinking Activities: Extended in-class group debates 547
+c.
+Have each partner conclude with a two-minute response. These responses can address objections, answer questions, and wrap up the case for each partner’s view.
+7.
+Discuss the arguments and rebuttals as a group. Spend five minutes discussing the arguments, questions, and objections as a group. See if you can decide on which answer is best.
+8.
+Repeat Steps 6 and 7 with the other pair of debate partners in your group.
+9.
+(Optional) Have several pairs of partners from the class repeat their debate in front of the whole class. Your instructor may pick several pairs of debate partners to repeat Step 6 in front of the class, with the whole class participating in the question-and-answer session. Use the class discussion to try to decide which answer is best.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a series of debates and discussions between you and your classmates. Your instructor may also ask you to turn in a written version of your initial oral argument.
+Extended in-class group debates
+Objective: To give you practice applying all of the rules from this book in the context of an extended series of in-class debates.
+Instructions: Reread Chapters I, VII, VIII, IX, and X before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Identify a specific problem for the class to address. Your entire class should identify a single problem that they would like to consider for this activity. This could be a problem in your school or com-
+munity, or a more general problem of contemporary interest.
+2.
+Form debate groups of five people. Find out from your instructor whether you may choose your own group or whether you will be assigned to a specific group.
+3.
+Prepare a five-minute oral argument for a proposed response to the assigned problem. In Step 1, you identified a specific problem that your class would address. Think carefully about various possible
+548 Critical Thinking Activities: Extended in-class group debates
+responses to the problem, keeping the rules from Chapter VII in mind. Then, choose a specific proposal for responding to that problem, keeping Rule 35 in mind. Construct an argument for that proposal, following the rules from Chapter VIII. Then, develop a five-minute oral presentation of that argument, following the rules in Chapters IX and X.
+4.
+Hold a debate within your debate group to identify your group’s strongest proposal. Follow these steps to hold a structured debate in which your group identifies the strongest of the proposals that your group develops:
+a.
+Have each member of the group present his or her oral argument. Give each group member five uninterrupted minutes to present his or her argument to the debate group.
+b.
+Discuss possible objections and revisions to each proposal. Discuss each proposal as a group, raising objections, considering responses to those objections, and considering possible revisions to each proposal. Do your best to identify the strongest possible proposal that you can.
+c.
+Choose a single proposal to use in the next round of debate. Choose a single proposal to put forward as your group’s proposal in the next round of debate. This could be one of the original proposals or a revised version that emerged during discussion. If your group can’t reach a unanimous decision, you may need to vote on the best proposal.
+5.
+Prepare a ten-minute oral argument to present to the whole class. Work with your debate group to prepare a ten-minute oral argument for the proposal that you chose in Step 4(c).
+6.
+Hold a debate as a class to identify the strongest proposal. Follow these steps to hold a structured debate in which the whole class identifies the strongest of the groups’ proposals:
+a.
+Have each group present their oral argument. Give each group ten uninterrupted minutes to present their argument to the entire class.
+b.
+Hold a question-and-answer session about each group’s proposals. Immediately after each group’s proposals, give the class five minutes to ask questions about the proposal.
+Critical Thinking Activities: Best of enemies 549
+c.
+Choose one proposal as the strongest. If the class can’t reach a unanimous decision about which proposal is the strongest, choose a single proposal by a class vote.
+7.
+(Optional) Propose revisions to the chosen proposal. Hold a class discussion to consider revisions to the proposal that you chose in Step 6(c). These revisions may involve incorporating elements of the other proposals.
+8.
+Submit your proposal to an appropriate stakeholder. Choose someone to produce a written version of the proposal that your class chose in Step 6(c). With your instructor’s help, identify an appropriate person and send that person your class’s proposal. For instance, if your proposals address a problem in your city, you might send the proposal to the mayor’s office.
+Final product: After two rounds of debate, the final product of this activity should be a written proposal for a response to address a specific problem. Your instructor may ask you to turn in additional materials, such as written versions of your oral arguments.
+Best of enemies
+Objective: To give you practice engaging in constructive dialogue on a controversial topic.
+Instructions: Review Chapters VII, VIII, and X before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Find a partner. Find out from your instructor whether you may choose your own partner or if your instructor will assign one to you.
+2.
+Choose a paper topic on which you and your partner have very different views. Spend some time talking with your partner until you have identified some issues about which you have very different views. Pick one of those issues to be the topic of a co-authored paper.
+550 Critical Thinking Activities: Constructive debate
+3.
+Co-author a constructive paper on the issue. Prepare an argumentative essay together that makes some sort of constructive contribution to the issue. The aim of this paper is to do much more than simply outline and rehearse your and your partner’s views along with your disagreements. Your real challenge is to make some progress on the issue together. Maybe you will propose a new approach to the topic. Is some sort of workable compromise possible? Is there some way to head off the whole problem entirely? At the very least you might be able to clear up some persistent misunderstanding about it that you have discovered—and worked through—in your own dialogue.
+Walk carefully through the steps laid out in Chapters VII and VIII as you prepare your essay. Preceding critical thinking activities on compiling your research, drafting an essay, and getting feedback should also help. Most of all, though, you’ll need to apply the rules from Chapter X to make this process work. Think through each other’s arguments with an open mind and strive to approach discussions in a respectful and constructive way. The hardest part might be agreeing on a definite claim or proposal that both of you can accept. This may take patience! Remember that you shouldn’t try to decide on the main conclusion of your paper until you’ve thoroughly explored the arguments about the issue and done your best to understand your partner’s perspective.
+Final product: The final product of this activity should be a single coauthored argumentative essay on a topic about which the two authors had very different views—at least initially!
+Constructive debate with
+outside partners
+Objective: To give you practice engaging in constructive and responsible public debate on a controversial topic.
+Instructions: Review Chapter X before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the following steps in order.
+Critical Thinking Activities: Constructive debate 551
+1.
+Form a small team. You may choose or your instructor may place you in groups of three to four fellow students.
+2.
+Find a topic on which your team members agree. Spend some time talking with your team until you have identified an issue about which you each have definite views, but views that are mostly the same or at least are fairly compatible. You do not have to exactly and entirely agree, but be sure that you at least roughly agree. Then write down your topic and a clear and specific statement of your joint view about it, and be sure everyone is comfortable with the statement.
+3.
+Recruit a debate partner from outside your school community who holds a very different view. Look at local advocacy organizations, search online, and ask friends or teachers who might have good leads. You are seeking an informed person, clearly committed to a different view, who would also be willing and able to hold a constructive debate in a class setting with a group of students such as yourselves. That means, among other things, that they must be willing to let you talk too, to listen respectfully and engage with you, and should not presuppose some starting-points so different from yours that you will only end up debating basic assumptions and attitudes and not the issue itself.
+4.
+Arrange for your debate partner to visit the class and debate the issue with your team in front of the class. Coordinate with your instructor and your debate partner to set the time and place. Communicate early and effectively. Be considerate of your guest’s time and effort (taking them to lunch or coffee before or after the debate, for example, would be an appreciative gesture). Be sure your partner understands the invitation: it is not to simply give a speech or long presentation; it is to enter into a persuasive but also constructive dialogue with you. (A good idea would be to also ask your partner to read Chapter X as well!)
+5.
+Prepare thoughtfully and thoroughly. Study up: remember that your visitor is going to be very well informed and probably passionate about his or her views—the opposite of yours. Organize your arguments with your teammates: Who is going to present what, in what order? Try to anticipate the arguments that your debate partner is likely to use. How will you respond to them? Who will give your team’s responses? How do you think your debate partner will respond to your arguments? How will
+552 Critical Thinking Activities: Relating rules and fallacies
+you address those objections? Who will offer those responses? Plan to use the time efficiently. Appoint a moderator from your team whose job will be to keep track of time and help things go smoothly. If you have time, do a "practice run" with someone from your team standing in for the debate partner. Stay in touch with your instructor. Your instructor should give you some guidance about readings. You should speak to your partner about readings as well: ideally the class should be able to read some preparatory overview material—perhaps more, if time allows—so that the actual debate does not have to start from scratch.
+6.
+Hold the debate. Remember that your goal is not to "win" but above all to have a constructive exchange in accord with the spirit of Chapter X. Give yourselves credit for this: it is certainly not the norm today . . . but that is why you are doing this exercise. Good luck!
+Final product: The final product of this activity is the debate itself. Debrief it with your classmates and instructor afterward. How well did you do? How might it go (still) better the next time?
+Relating rules and fallacies
+Objective: To help you understand the connections between the rules in Chapters I through VI and the fallacies in Appendix I.
+Instructions: Read Chapters I through VI and Appendix I before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Make a table listing the fallacies in Appendix I along the left-hand side and the rules from Chapters I through VI along the top. You can draw the table by hand or use a spreadsheet.
+2.
+Next to each fallacy, put an X in the column(s) corresponding to the rule(s) that each fallacy violates. Most of the fallacies in Appendix I violate specific rules from Chapters I through VI of this book. In the row for each fallacy, put an X in the column for each of the specific rule(s) that the fallacy violates. A few of the
+Critical Thinking Activities: Relating rules and fallacies 553
+fallacies do not directly violate any rule from this book. For those fallacies, you do not need to write anything down.
+3.
+Identify rules that are not associated with any of the fallacies in Appendix I. Some of the columns in your table will not have any X’s in them. These columns correspond to rules that are not associated with any of the fallacies listed on your table.
+4.
+Suggest names for arguments that violate each of the rules from Step 3. For each rule that is not associated with a fallacy listed on your table, name a new fallacy that involves violating that rule. Add a new row to the bottom of your table for each of these new fallacies.
+5.
+Write a brief description of the fallacies you named in Step 4. On a separate piece of paper, write a one- or two-sentence description of the fallacies from Step 4. If possible, give an example of an argument that commits that fallacy.
+6.
+Create a master table for the class by comparing your table with your classmates’ tables. Working in small groups or as an entire class, compare your tables with your classmates’ tables. If there are any differences between your tables, try to resolve the differences through discussion. Once you have resolved your disagreements about which rules each fallacy violates, create a master table that shows the consensus about which fallacies violate which rules.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a table of fallacies and rules, showing all of the fallacies in Appendix I as well as new fallacies involving other rules from this book. This should be accompanied by a separate document containing brief descriptions and examples of any fallacies in the table that are not described in Appendix I. If you come up with some especially good names for fallacies not listed in this book, send them to us care of the publisher!
+554 Critical Thinking Activities: Fallacies
+Identifying, reinterpreting, and revising fallacies
+Objective: To help you learn to recognize, reinterpret, and avoid fallacies.
+Instructions: Read Appendix I and complete Exercise Sets 11.1–11.4 before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Bring six copies of a fallacious argument to class. This could be a fallacious argument that you found on your own or one that you wrote yourself (e.g., while completing Exercise Set 11.3). Bring six copies of the argument on six separate pieces of paper. Do not write the name of the fallacy on the paper.
+2.
+Form a group of four or five people. Your instructor may assign you to a group, or you may choose your own group.
+3.
+Choose two fallacious arguments from your group. Each member of your group has brought one fallacious argument. Share the arguments with one another and then, as a group, choose two arguments that you will share with the other groups. These could be the most subtle, the most persuasive, or the most entertaining fallacies that your group has found or written.
+4.
+Distribute your two chosen arguments to other groups in the class. Your group should have six copies of each of the arguments that you chose in Step 3. Give one copy to your instructor. Distribute the other five copies among five other groups in the class. During this step, your group should receive up to five arguments from various other groups in the class.
+5.
+Identify the fallacy committed by each of the arguments you received from the other groups. In Step 4, you received several fallacious arguments from other groups in the class. As a group, decide which fallacy each argument commits.
+6.
+Suggest a way to reinterpret or improve each of the arguments you received in order to avoid committing a fallacy. It is usually possible to reinterpret an argument in such a way that it avoids committing a fallacy, or at least to suggest additional premises that could be added to avoid the fallacy. Offer such a reinterpretation or
+Critical Thinking Activities: Public service announcements 555
+revision of each argument from Step 4, just as you did in Exercise Sets 11.2 and 11.4.
+7.
+Compare your results with the rest of the class. As a class, go through each of the arguments that were distributed in Step 4. Have each group that received that particular argument state which fallacy they think the argument commits and how they would reinterpret or revise it to avoid the fallacy. If there is disagreement, see if the class can resolve the disagreement through discussion.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a set of fallacious arguments, given to your group by other groups, each labeled with the name of the fallacy that the argument commits and accompanied by a suggestion for reinterpreting or revising the argument to avoid the fallacy.
+Critical-thinking public service announcements
+Objective: To help you learn to understand specific fallacies and strategies for avoiding them.
+Instructions: Read Appendix I before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Identify a type of fallacy to focus on for this activity. Your instructor may assign you to focus on a specific type of fallacy (e.g., the straw person fallacy) or you may be allowed to choose your own kind of fallacy.
+2.
+Create a public service announcement about your chosen fallacy. Follow the steps below to create a public service announcement (PSA) educating the public about the "dangers" of the fallacy you chose or were assigned and offering advice on how to avoid it. Think creatively about the format and content of your PSA. Whether it’s a video, an audio recording, a brochure, a Web page, or something else, your PSA should explain the fallacy and offer advice about avoiding it.
+556 Critical Thinking Activities: Defining key terms in an essay
+3.
+(Optional) Share your public service announcement with your class. Share your final product with your classmates by distributing or presenting it in class or posting it online.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment is a public service announcement about a specific fallacy. This may take the form of a pamphlet, a PowerPoint presentation, an audio recording, a video, or any other format that your instructor allows.
+Defining key terms in an essay
+Objective: To give you practice defining key terms in an argumentative essay.
+Instructions: Read Appendix II and complete Exercise Sets 12.1 and 12.2 before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Choose an argumentative essay of your own to use for this activity. This might be an essay that you wrote for the "Compiling a draft of an argumentative essay" activity (p. 537), an essay that you wrote for another class, or an essay you wrote for some other purpose.
+2.
+Identify the thesis statement of your essay. Find the thesis statement (i.e., the main conclusion) of the argumentative essay that you chose in Step 1. If the essay does not contain a clear statement of its conclusion, write your own statement of its conclusion.
+3.
+Provide a definition for the key terms in the essay’s thesis statement. Make a list of all of the most important terms in the essay’s thesis statement. Then, provide a definition for each word on that list. Be sure the definitions follow the rules from Appendix II.
+4.
+(Optional) Exchange essays and definitions with a classmate and check to see that all of your classmate’s definitions follow the rules from Appendix II. Quickly skim your classmate’s essay so that you have some idea of the context for these definitions. Then, look at each definition and decide how well it follows each of the rules from Appendix II. Write a brief paragraph summarizing how well the definitions follow those rules. If any of the definitions violate the rules, suggest better definitions.
+Critical Thinking Activities: Defining difficult terms 557
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a list of definitions for key terms in your essay’s thesis statement. Optionally, it may also include a brief paragraph critiquing a classmate’s definitions and suggesting improvement to those definitions.
+Defining difficult terms
+Objective: To give you practice defining difficult terms.
+Instructions: Read Appendix II and complete Exercise Sets 12.1 and 12.2 before beginning this activity. When you are ready, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Form a group of four or five people. Your instructor may assign you to a group, or you may be allowed to choose your own group.
+2.
+Identify two words that are difficult to define. As a group, identify two words that are difficult to define. They should be difficult because they are abstract, vague, or loaded, not because they are rare or obscure words.
+3.
+Write your two words on the board. Choose one person from your group to write your two words on the board or post them somewhere so that everyone in the class can see them.
+4.
+Come up with definitions for all of the words on the board. In Step 3, each group put two words on the board. As a group, come up with the best definitions you can for each word, keeping in mind the rules from Appendix II.
+5.
+Compare definitions from each group. As a class, go through each of the words that were written on the board in Step 3. Have each group share their definition of the word. After everyone has shared their definition for a given word, vote on the best definition. Optionally, see if you can combine definitions to make an even better definition.
+Final product: The final product of this assignment should be a list of words that are difficult to define, and proposed definitions for those words.
+558 Critical Thinking Activities: Argument mapping workshop
+Argument mapping workshop
+Objective: To give you practice mapping arguments and thinking about argument maps.
+Instructions: Read Appendix III and complete Exercise Sets 13.1 and 13.2 before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Form a group of two to five people. Find out from your instructor whether you may choose your own group or whether you will be assigned to a specific group.
+2.
+Write out a paragraph-length argument in plain English. As a group, construct an argument on any topic that interests you. Write out your argument in plain English—that is, in the style in which the arguments from the exercise sets in Appendix III are written. Your argument should be about the length of a medium-sized paragraph. It should be simple enough that someone else could read it and draw an argument map of it in five or ten minutes.
+3.
+Draw an argument map of your argument on a separate piece of paper. As a group, draw an argument map of the argument from Step 2. Draw your map on a different piece of paper than the one containing your written argument.
+4.
+Put your argument map in an envelope and pass the envelope and your argument to another group. Place the argument map from Step 3, but not the written argument itself, in an envelope. Write your group members’ names on the envelope, but do not seal it. Pass your written argument and the envelope to another group in the class. Be sure that your group receives an argument and envelope from another group.
+5.
+Draw an argument map of the argument you received in Step 4. As a group, draw an argument map for the argument that you received in Step 4. Don’t look at the argument map that’s already in the envelope.
+6.
+Add your argument map to the envelope, and pass the argument and envelope to another group. Add your argument map from Step 5 to the envelope that you received in Step 4. Then, pass
+Critical Thinking Activities: Developing your own arguments 559
+the argument and envelope on to another group. Be sure that your group receives a new argument and envelope from another group.
+7.
+Repeat Step 6 as many times as you can in the time allotted. Find out from your instructor how much time you have. Repeat Step 6 as many times as you can in that time.
+8.
+Return the envelopes and arguments to their creators. Return each envelope and written argument to the group that originally wrote the argument.
+9.
+Compare the various argument maps of your argument. Compare the other groups’ maps of your argument. If the argument maps are not all identical, figure out how many different maps there are. Decide which argument maps are accurate representations of your argument and which are not. Choose one argument map as the best representation of your argument.
+10.
+(Optional) Draw the argument map of your argument on the board. Choose one person to draw your group’s map of your argument on the board. Choose another person to explain why your group mapped the argument as it did and how other groups mapped it (if they mapped it differently).
+Final product: The final product of this activity is a written version of your argument and an envelope containing several different maps of the argument.
+Variation: Instead of creating an argument together during Step 2, have each member of your group write his or her own argument before class. As a group, choose your favorite argument and then proceed to Step 3.
+Developing your own arguments using argument maps
+Objective: To give you practice mapping arguments and using argument maps to develop your own arguments.
+560 Critical Thinking Activities: Developing your own arguments
+Instructions: Read Appendix III and complete Exercise Sets 13.1 and 13.2 before beginning this activity. Then, complete each of the following steps in order.
+1.
+Choose an argumentative essay of your own to use for this activity. This might be an essay that you wrote for the "Compiling a draft of an argumentative essay" activity (p. 537), an essay that you wrote for another class, or an essay you wrote for some other purpose.
+2.
+Draw an argument map for each of the major arguments in your essay. If your essay contains only one, large argument, draw a single argument map. If your essay contains multiple arguments, draw a separate argument map for each argument.
+3.
+Highlight all of the premises on the argument maps that are not supported by other premises. On each argument map, circle or highlight the numbers representing premises that are not supported by other premises—that is, premises that are not also subconclusions.
+4.
+Identify the unsupported premises that need more support. Of the premises that you highlighted in Step 3, identify those that need more support (e.g., because they are controversial or because most readers might not know whether they are true).
+5.
+Develop and map arguments for each of the premises that need more support. Develop an argument for each of the premises that you identified in Step 4. Add those arguments to your argument maps.
+6.
+Repeat Steps 3–5 until there are no more premises in need of more support.
+Final product: The final product of this activity is a (set of) argument map(s), along with new arguments devised to support selected premises in the original arguments.
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+Introduction
+This book is a brief introduction to philosophy
+for people who don't know the first thing about
+the subject. People ordinarily study philosophy
+only when they go to college, and I suppose that
+most readers will be of college age or older. But
+that has nothing to do with the nature of the
+subject, and I would be very glad if the book
+were also of interest to intelligent high school
+students with a taste for abstract ideas and theoretical
+arguments-should any of them read it.
+Our analytical capacities are often highly developed
+before we have learned a great deal
+about the world, and around the age of fourteen
+many people start to think about philosophical
+problems on their own-about what really exists,
+whether we can know anything, whether
+[ 3]
+What Does It All Mean?
+anything is really right or wrong, whether life
+has any meaning, whether death is the end.
+These problems have been written about for
+thousands of years, but the philosophical raw
+material comes directly from the world and our
+relation to it, not from writings of the past. That
+is why they come up again and again, in the
+heads of people who haven't read about them.
+This is a direct introduction to nine philosophical
+problems, each of which can be understood
+in itself, without reference to the history
+of thought. I shall not discuss the great phiiosophical
+writings of the past or the cultural background
+of those writings. The center of philosophy
+lies in certain questions which the
+reflective human mind finds naturally puzzling,
+and the best way to begin the study of philosophy
+is to think about them directly. Once you've
+done that, you are in a better position to appreciate
+the work of others who have tried to solve
+the same problems.
+Philosophy is different from science and from
+mathematics. Unlike science it doesn't rely on
+experiments or observation, but only on
+thought. And unlike mathematics it has no formal
+methods of proof. It is done just by asking
+questions, arguing, trying out ideas and thinking
+of possible arguments against them, and wondering
+how our concepts really work.
+[ 4 ]
+Introduction
+The main concern of philosophy is to question
+and understand very common ideas that all of us
+use every day without thinking about them. A
+historian may ask what happened at some time
+in the past, but a philosopher will ask, "What is
+time?" A mathematician may investigate the relations
+among numbers, but a philosopher will
+ask, "What is a number?" A physicist will ask
+what atoms are made of or what explains gravity,
+but a philosopher will ask how we can know
+there is anything outside of our own minds. A
+psychologist may investigate how children learn
+a language, but a philosopher will ask, "What
+makes a word mean anything?" Anyone can ask
+whether it's wrong to sneak into a movie without
+paying, but a philosopher will ask, "What makes
+an action right or wrong?"
+We couldn't get along in life without taking
+the ideas of time, number, knowledge, language,
+right and wrong for granted most of the time;
+but in philosophy we investigate those things
+themselves. The aim is to push our understanding
+of the world and ourselves a bit deeper. Obviously
+it isn't easy. The more basic the ideas you
+are trying to investigate, the fewer tools you
+have to work with. There isn't much you can assume
+or take for granted. So philosophy is a
+somewhat dizzying activity, and few of its results
+go unchallenged for long.
+[ 5 ]
+
+Introduction
+about them yourself. Before learning a lot of
+philosophical theories it is better to get puzzled
+about the philosophical questions which those
+theories try to answer. And the best way to do
+that is to look at some possible solutions and see
+what is wrong with them. I'll try to leave the
+problems open, but even if I say what I think,
+you have no reason to believe it unless you find
+it convincing.
+There are many excellent introductory texts
+that include selections from the great philosophers
+of the past and from more recent writings.
+This short book is not a substitute for that approach,
+but I hope it provides a first look at the
+subject that is as clear and direct as possible. If
+after reading it you decide to take a second look,
+you'll see how much more there is to say about
+these problems than I say here.
+
+
+What Does It All Mean?
+prove to yourself that there was an outside
+world would just be part of the dream. If you
+knocked on the table or pinched yourself, you
+would hear the knock and feel the pinch, but
+that would be just one more thing going on inside
+your mind like everything else. It's no use: If
+you want to find out whether what's inside your
+mind is any guide to what's outside your mind,
+you can't depend on how things seem-from inside
+your mind-to give you the answer.
+But what else is there to depend on? All your
+evidence about anything has to come through
+your mind-whether in the form of perception,
+the testimony of books and other people, or
+memory-and it is entirely consistent with
+everything you're aware of that nothing at all exists
+e~cept the inside of your mind.
+It's even possible that you don't have a body
+or a brain-since your beliefs about that come
+only through the evidence of your senses.
+You've never seen your brain-you just assume
+that everybody has one-but even if you had
+seen it, or thought you had, that would have
+been just another visual experience. Maybe you,
+the subject of experience, are the only thing that
+exists, and there is no physical world at all-no
+stars, no earth, no human bodies. Maybe there
+isn't even any space.
+If you try to argue that there must be an external
+physical world, because you wouldn't see
+[ 10]
+How Do We Know Anything?
+buildings, people, or stars unless there were
+things out there that reflected or shed light into
+your eyes and caused your visual experiences,
+the reply is obvious: How do you know that? It's
+just another claim about the extemal world and
+your relation to it, and it has to be based on the
+evidence of your senses. But you can rely on that
+specific evidence about how visual experiences are
+caused only if you can already rely in general on the
+contents of your mind to tell you about the external
+world. And that is exactly what has been called into
+question. If you try to prove the reliability of your
+impressions by appealing to your impressions,
+you're arguing in a circle and won't get
+anywhere.
+The most radical conclusion to draw from this
+would be that your mind is the only thing that
+exists. This view is called solipsism. It is a very
+lonely view, and not too many people have held
+it. As you can tell from that remark, I don't hold
+it myself. If I were a solipsist I probably
+wouldn't be writing this book, since I wouldn't
+believe there was anybody else to read it. On the
+other hand, perhaps I would write it to make my
+inner life more interesting, by including the
+impression of the appearance of the book in
+print, of other people reading it and telling me
+their reactions, and so forth. I might even get
+the impression of royalties, if I'm lucky.
+Perhaps you are a solipsist: in that case you
+[ 11 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+will regard this book as a product of your own
+mind, coming into existence in your experience
+as you read it. Obviously nothing I can say can
+prove to you that I really exist, or that the book
+as a physical object exists.
+On the other hand, to conclude that you are
+the only thing that exists is more than the evidence
+warrants. You can't know on the basis of
+what's in your mind that there's no world outside
+it. Perhaps the right conclusion is the more
+modest one that you don't know anything beyond
+your impressions and experiences. There
+may or may not be an external world, and if
+there is it may or may not be completely different
+from how it seems to you-there's no way
+for you to tell. This view is called skepticism
+about the external world.
+An even stronger form of skepticism is possible.
+Similar arguments seem to show that you
+don't know anything even about your own past
+existence and experiences, since all you have to
+go on are the present contents of your mind, including
+memory impressions. If you can't be
+sure that the world outside your mind exists
+now, how can you be sure that you yourself existed
+before now? How do you know you didn't
+just come into existence a few minutes ago, complete
+with all your present memories? The only
+evidence that you couldn't have come into exis-
+[ 12 ]
+How Do We Know Anything?
+tence a few minutes ago depends on beliefs
+about how people and their memories are produced,
+which rely in turn on beliefs about what
+has happened in the past. But to rely on those
+beliefs to prove that you existed in the past
+would again be to argue in a circle. You would
+be assuming the reality of the past to prove the
+reality of the past.
+It seems that you are stuck with nothing you
+can be sure of except the contents of your own
+mind at the present moment. And it seems that
+anything you try to do to argue your way out of
+this predicament will fail, because the argument
+will have to assume what you are trying to
+prove-the existence of the external world beyond
+your mind.
+Suppose, for instance, you argue that there
+must be an external world, because it is incredible
+that you should be having all these experiences
+without there being some explanation in
+terms of external causes. The skeptic can make
+two replies. First, even if there are external
+causes, how can you tell from the contents of
+your experience what those causes are like?
+You've never observed any of them directly. Second,
+what is the basis of your idea that everything
+has to have an explanation? It's true that
+in your normal, nonphilosophical conception of
+the world, processes like those which go on in
+[ 13 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+your mind are caused, at least in part, by other
+things outside them. But you can't assume that
+this is true if what you're trying to figure out is
+how you know anything about the world outside
+your mind. And there is no way to prove such a
+principle just by looking at what's inside your
+mind. However plausible the principle may seem
+to you, what reason do you have to believe that
+it applies to the world?
+Science won't help us with this problem
+either, though it might seem to. In ordinary scientific
+thinking, we rely on general principles of
+explanation to pass from the way the world first
+seems to us to a different conception of what it
+is really like. We try to explain the appearances
+in terms of a theory that describes the reality behind
+them, a reality that we can't observe directly.
+That is how physics and chemistry conclude
+that all the things we see around us are
+composed of invisibly small atoms. Could we
+argue that the general belief in the external
+world has the same kind of scientific backing as
+the belief in atoms?
+The skeptic' s answer is that the process of scientific
+reasoning raises the same skeptical problem
+we have been considering all along: Science
+is just as vulnerable as perception. How can we
+know that the world outside our minds corresponds
+to our ideas of what would be a good
+[ 14 ]
+How Do We Know Anything?
+theoretical explanation of our observations? If
+we can't establish the reliability of our sense experiences
+in relation to the external world,
+there's no reason to think we can rely on our scientific
+theories either.
+There is another very different response to
+the problem. Some would argue that radical
+skepticism of the kind I have been talking about
+is meaningless, because the idea of an external
+reality that no one could ever discover is meaningless.
+The argument is that a dream, for instance,
+has to be something from which you can
+wake up to discover that you have been asleep;
+a hallucination has to be something which others
+(or you later) can see is not really there. Impressions
+and appearances that do not correspond
+to reality must be contrasted with others that do
+correspond to reality, or else the contrast between
+appearance and reality is meaningless.
+According to this view, the idea of a dream
+from which you can never wake up is not the
+idea of a dream at all: it is the idea of realitythe
+real world in which you live. Our idea of the
+things that exist is just our idea of what we can
+observe. (This view is sometimes called verificationism.)
+Sometimes our observations are mistaken,
+but that means they can be corrected by
+other observations- as when you wake up from
+a dream or discover that what you thought was
+[ 15 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+a snake was just a shadow on the grass. But without
+some possibility of a correct view of how
+things are (either yours or someone else's), the
+thought that your impressions of the world are
+not true is meaningless.
+If this is right, then the skeptic is kidding himself
+if he thinks he can imagine that the only
+thing that exists is his own mind. He is kidding
+himself, because it couldn't be true that the
+physical world doesn't really exist, unless somebody
+could obseroe that it doesn't exist. And what
+the skeptic is trying to imagine is precisely that
+there is no one to observe that or anything
+else-except of course the skeptic himself, and
+all he can observe is the inside of his own mind.
+So solipsism is meaningless. It tries to subtract
+the external world from the totality of my
+impressions; but it fails, because if the external
+world is subtracted, they stop being mere
+impressions, and become instead perceptions of
+reality.
+Is this argument against solipsism and skepticism
+any good? Not unless reality can be defined
+as what we can observe. But are we really unable
+to understand the idea of a real world, or a fact
+about reality, that can't be observed by anyone,
+human or otherwise?
+The skeptic will claim that if there is an external
+world, the things in it are observable because
+[ 16 ]
+How Do We Know Anything?
+they exist, and not the other way around: that
+existence isn't the same thing as observability.
+And although we get the idea of dreams and hallucinations
+from cases where we think we can observe
+the contrast between our experiences and
+reality, it certainly seems as if the same idea can
+be extended to cases where the reality is not
+observable.
+If tqat is right, it seems to follow that it is not
+meaningless to think that the world might consist
+of nothing but the inside of your mind,
+though neither you nor anyone else could find
+out that this was true. And if this is not meaningless,
+but is a possibility you must consider,
+there seems no way to prove that it is false, without
+arguing in a circle. So there may be no way
+out of the cage of your own mind. This is sometimes
+called the egocentric predicament.
+And yet, after all this has been said, I have to
+admit it is practically impossible to believe seriously
+that all the things in the world around you
+might not really exist. Our acceptance of the external
+world is instinctive and powerful: we cannot
+just get rid of it by philosophical arguments.
+Not only do we go on acting as if other people
+and things exist: we believe that they do, even
+after we've gone through the arguments which
+appear to show we have no grounds for this belief.
+(We may have grounds, within the overall
+[ 17 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+system of our beliefs about the world, for more
+particular beliefs about the existence of particular
+things: like a mouse in the breadbox, for example.
+But that is different. It assumes the existence
+of the external world.)
+If a belief in the world outside our minds
+comes so naturally to us, perhaps we don't need
+grounds for it. We can just let it be and hope
+that we're right. And that in fact is what most
+people do after giving up the attempt to prove
+it: even if they can't give reasons against skepticism,
+they can't live with it either. But this means
+that we hold on to most of our ordinary beliefs
+about the world in face of the fact that (a) they
+might be completely false, and (b) we have no
+basis for ruling out that possibility.
+We are left then with three questions:
+1. Is it a meaningful possibility that the
+inside of your mind is the only thing
+that exists-or that even if there is a
+world outside your mind, it is totally
+unlike what you believe it to be?
+2. If these things are possible, do you
+have any way of proving to yourself
+that they are not actually true?
+3. If you can't prove that anything exists
+outside your own mind, is it all right
+to go on believing in the external
+world anyway?
+[ 18 ]
+3
+Other Minds
+There is one special kind of skepticism which
+continues to be a problem even if you assume
+that your mind is not the only thing there isthat
+the physical world you seem to see and feel
+around you, including your own body, really exists.
+That is skepticism about the nature or even
+existence of minds or experiences other than
+your own.
+How much do you really know about what
+goes on in anyone else's mind? Clearly you observe
+only the bodies of other creatures, including
+people. You watch what they do, listen to
+what they say and to the other sounds they
+make, and see how they respond to their environment-
+what things attract them and what
+things repel them, what they eat, and so forth.
+You can also cut open other creatures and look
+[ 19 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+at their physical insides, and perhaps compare
+their anatomy with yours.
+But none of this will give you direct access to
+their experiences, thoughts, and feelings. The
+only experiences you can actually have are your
+own: if you believe anything about the mental
+lives of others, it is on the basis of observing
+their physical construction and behavior.
+To take a simple example, how do you know,
+when you and a friend are eating chocolate ice
+cream, whether it tastes the same to him as it
+tastes to you? You can try a taste of his ice
+cream, but if it tastes the same as yours, that
+only means it tastes the same to you: you haven't
+experienced the way it tastes to him. There seems
+to be no way to compare the two flavor experiences
+directly.
+Well, you might say that since you're both
+human beings, and you can both distinguish
+among flavors of ice cream-for example you
+can both tell the difference between chocolate
+and vanilla with your eyes closed-it's likely that
+your flavor experiences are similar. But how do
+you know that? The only connection you've ever
+observed between a type of ice cream and a flavor
+is in your own case; so what reason do you
+have to think that similar correlations hold for
+other human beings? Why isn't it just as consistent
+with all the evidence that chocolate tastes to
+him the way vanilla tastes to you, and vice versa?
+[ 20 ]
+Other Minds
+The same question could be asked about other
+kinds of experience. How do you know that red
+things don't look to your friend the way yellow
+things look to you? Of course if you ask him how
+a fire engine looks, he'll say it looks red, like
+blood, and not yellow, like a dandelion; but
+that's because he, like you, uses the word "red"
+for the color that blood and fire engines look to
+him, whatever it is. Maybe it's what you call yellow,
+or. what you call blue, or maybe it's a color
+experience you've never had, and can't even
+imagine.
+To deny this, you have to appeal to an assumption
+that flavor and color experiences are
+uniformly correlated with certain physical stimulations
+of the sense organs, whoever undergoes
+them. But the skeptic would say you have .no evidence
+for that assumption, and because of the
+kind of assumption it is, you couldn't have any
+evidence for it. All you can observe is the correlation
+in your own case.
+Faced with this argument, you might first concede
+that there is some uncertainty here. The
+correlation between stimulus and experience
+may not be exactly the same from one person to
+another: there may be slight shades of difference
+between two people's color or flavor experience
+of the same type of ice cream. In fact, since people
+are physically different from one another,
+this wouldn't be surprising. But, you might say,
+[ 21 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+the difference in experience can't be too radical,
+or else we'd be able to tell. For instance, chocolate
+ice cream couldn't taste to your friend the
+way a lemon tastes to you, otherwise his mouth
+would pucker up when he ate it.
+But notice that this claim assumes another
+correlation from one person to another: a correlation
+between inner experience and certain
+kinds of observable reaction. And the same
+question arises about that. You've observed the
+connection between puckering of the mouth
+and the taste you call sour only in your own case:
+how do you know it exists in other people?
+Maybe what makes your friend's mouth pucker
+up is an experien~e like the one you get from
+eating oatmeal.
+If we go on pressing these kinds of questions
+relentlessly enough, we will move from a mild
+and harmless skepticism about whether chocolate
+ice cream tastes exactly the same to you and
+to your friend, to a much more radical skepticism
+about whether there is any similarity between
+your experiences and his. How do you
+know that when he puts something in his mouth
+he even has an experience of the kind that you
+would call ajlavor? For all you know, it could be
+something you would call a sound-or maybe
+it's unlike anything you've ever experienced, or
+could imagine.
+[ 22]
+Other Minds
+If we continue on this path, it leads finally to
+the most radical skepticism of all about other
+minds. How do you even know that your friend
+is conscious? How do you know that there are
+any minds at all besides your own?
+The only example you've ever directly observed
+of a correlation between mind, behavior,
+anatomy, and physical circumstances is yourself.
+Even if other people and animals had no experiences
+whatever, no mental inner life of any
+kind, but were just elaborate biological machines,
+they would look just the same to you. So
+how do you know that's not what they are? How
+do you know that the beings around you aren't
+all mindless robots? You've never seen into their
+minds-you couldn't-and their physical behavior
+could all be produced by purely physical
+causes. Maybe your relatives, your neighbors,
+your cat and your dog have no inner experiences
+whatever. If they don't, there is no way you could
+ever find it out.
+You can't even appeal to the evidence of their
+behavior, including what they say-because that
+assumes that in them outer behavior is connected
+with inner experience as it is in you; and
+that's just what you don't know.
+To consider the possibility that none of the
+people around you may be conscious produces
+an uncanny feeling. On the one hand it seems
+[ 23]
+What Does It All Mean?
+conceivable, and no evidence you could possibly
+have can rule it out decisively. On the other
+hand it is something you can't really believe is
+possible: your conviction that there are minds in
+those bodies, sight behind those eyes, hearing in
+those ears, etc., is instinctive. But if its power
+comes from instinct, is it really knowledge? Once
+you admit the possibility that the belief in other
+minds is mistaken, don't you need something
+more reliable to justify holding on to it?
+There is another side to this question, which
+goes completely in the opposite direction.
+Ordinarily we believe that other human
+beings are conscious, and almost everyone believes
+that other mammals and birds are conscious
+too. But people differ over whether fish
+are conscious, or insects, worms, and jellyfish.
+They are still more doubtful about whether onecelled
+animals like amoebae and paramecia have
+conscious experiences, even though such creatures
+react conspicuously to stimuli of various
+kinds. Most people believe that plants aren't
+conscious; and almost no one believes that rocks
+are conscious, or kleenex, or automobiles, or
+mountain lakes, or cigarettes. And to take another
+biological example, most of us would say,
+if we thought about it, that the individual cells
+of which our bodies are composed do not have
+any conscious experiences.
+[ 24]
+Other Minds
+How do we know all these things? How do you
+know that when you cut a branch off a tree it
+doesn't hurt the tree-only it can't express its
+pain because it can't move? (Or maybe it loves
+having its branches pruned.) How do you know
+that the muscle cells in your heart don't feel
+pain or excitement when you run up a flight of
+stairs? How do you know that a kleenex doesn't
+feel anything when you blow your nose into it?
+And what about computers? Suppose computers
+are developed to the point where they
+can be used to control robots that look on the
+outside like dogs, respond in complicated ways
+to the environment, and behave in many ways
+just like dogs, though they are just a mass of circuitry
+and silicon chips on the inside? Would we
+have any way of knowing whether such machines
+were conscious? ·
+These cases are different from one another, of
+course. If a thing is incapable of movement, it
+can't give any behavioral evidence of feeling or
+perception. And if it isn't a natural organism, it
+is radically different from us in internal constitution.
+But what grounds do we have for thinking
+that only things that behave like us to some
+degree and that have an observable physical
+structure roughly like ours are capable of having
+experiences of any kind? Perhaps trees feel
+things in a way totally different from us, but we
+[ 25]
+What Does It All Mean?
+have no way of finding out about it, because we
+have no way of discovering the correlations between
+experience and observable manifestations
+or physical conditions in their case. We could
+discover such correlations only if we could observe
+both the experiences and the external
+manifestations together: but there is no way we
+can observe the experiences directly, except in
+our own case. And for the same reason there is
+no way we could observe the absence of any experiences,
+and consequently the absence of any
+such correlations, in any other case. You can't
+tell that a tree has no experience, by looking inside
+it, any more than you can tell that a worm
+has experience, by looking inside it.
+So the question is: what can you really know
+about the conscious life in this world beyond the
+fact that you yourself have a conscious mind? Is
+it possible that there might be much less conscious
+life than you assume (none except yours),
+or much more (even in things you assume to be
+unconscious)?
+[ 26]
+4
+The Mind-Body
+Problem
+Let's forget about skepticism, and assume the
+physical world exists, including your body and
+your brain; aqd let's put aside our skepticism
+about other minds. I'll assume you're conscious
+if you assume I am. Now what might be the relation
+between consciousness and the brain?
+Everybody knows that what happens in consciousness
+depends on what happens to the
+body. If you stub your toe it hurts. If you close
+your eyes you can't see what's in front of you. If
+you bite into a Hershey bar you taste chocolate.
+If someone conks you on the head you pass out.
+The evidence shows that for anything to happen
+in your mind or consciousness, something
+has to happen in your brain. (You wouldn't feel
+any pain from stubbing your toe if the nerves in
+your leg and spine didn't carry impulses from
+[ 27]
+What Does It All Mean?
+the toe to your brain.) We don't know what happens
+in the brain when you think, "I wonder
+whether I have time to get a haircut this afternoon."
+But we're pretty sure something doessomething
+involving chemical and electrical
+changes in the billions of nerve cells that your
+brain is made of.
+In some cases, we know how the brain affects
+the mind and how the mind affects the brain. We
+know, for instance, that the stimulation of certain
+brain cells near the back of the head produces
+visual experiences. And we know that
+when you decide to help yourself to another
+piece of cake, certain other brain cells send out
+impulses to the muscles in your arm. We don't
+know many of the details, but it is clear that
+there are complex relations between what happens
+in your mind and the physical processes
+that go on in your brain. So far, all of this belongs
+to science, not philosophy.
+But there is also a philosophical question
+about the relation between mind and brain, and
+it is this: Is your mind something different from
+your brain, though connected to it, or is it your
+brain? Are your thoughts, feelings, perceptions,
+sensations, and wishes things that happen in addition
+to all the physical processes in your brain,
+or are they themselves some of those physical
+processes?
+( 28]
+The Mind-Body Problem
+What happens, for instance, when you bite
+into a chocolate bar? The chocolate melts on
+your tongue and causes chemical changes in
+your taste buds; the taste buds send some electrical
+impulses along the nerves leading from
+your tongue to your brain, and when those impulses
+reach the brain they produce further
+physical changes there; finally, you taste the taste
+of chocolate. What is that? Could it just be a physical
+event in some of your brain cells, or does it
+have to be something of a completely different
+kind?
+If a scientist took off the top of your skull and
+looked into your brain while you were eating the
+chocolate bar, all he would· see is a grey mass of
+neurons. If he used instruments to measure
+what was happening inside, he would. detect
+complicated physical processes of many different
+kinds. But would he find the taste of
+chocolate?
+It seems as if he couldn't find it in your brain,
+because your experience of tasting chocolate is
+locked inside your mind in a way that makes it
+unobservable by anyone else-even if he opens
+up your skull and looks inside your brain. Your
+experiences are inside your mind with a kind of
+insideness that is different from the way that your
+brain is inside your head. Someone else can
+open up your head and see what's inside, but
+[ 29]
+What Does It All Mean?
+they can't cut open your mind and look into itat
+least not in the same way.
+It's not just that the taste of chocolate is a flavor
+and therefore can't be seen. Suppose a scientist
+were crazy enough to try to observe your
+experience of tasting chocolate by licking your
+brain while you ate a chocolate bar. First of all,
+your brain probably wouldn't taste like chocolate
+to him at all. But even if it did, he wouldn't
+have succeeded in getting into your mind and
+observing your experience of tasting chocolate.
+He would just have discovered, oddly enough,
+that when you taste chocolate, your brain
+changes so that it tastes like chocolate to other
+people. He would have his taste of chocolate
+and you would have yours.
+If what happens in your experience is inside
+your mind in a way in which what happens in
+your brain is not, it looks as though your experiences
+and other mental states can't just be
+physical states of your brain. There has to be
+more to you than your body with its humming
+nervous system.
+One possible conclusion is that there has to be
+a soul, attached to your body in some way which
+allows them to interact. If that's true, then you
+are made up of two very different things: a complex
+physical organism, and a soul which is
+purely mental. (This view is called dualism, for
+obvious reasons.)
+[ 30]
+The Mind-Body Problem
+But many people think that belief in a soul is
+old-fashioned and unscientific. Everything else
+in the world is made of physical matter-different
+combinations of the same chemical elements.
+Why shouldn't we be? Our bodies grow
+by a complex physical process from the single
+cell produced by the joining of sperm and egg
+at conception. Ordinary matter is added gradually
+in such a way that the cell turns into a baby,
+with arms, legs, eyes, ears, and a brain, able to
+move and feel and see, and eventually to talk and
+think. Some people believe that this complex
+physical system is sufficient by itself to give rise
+to mental life. Why shouldn't it be? Anyway, how
+can mere philosophical argument show that it
+isn't? Philosophy can't tell us what stars or diamonds
+are made of, so how can it tell us ·what
+people are or aren't made of?
+The view that people consist of nothing but
+physical matter, and that their mental states are
+physical states of their brains, is called physicalism
+(or sometimes materialism). Physicalists
+don't have a specific theory of what process in
+the brain can be identified as the experience of
+tasting chocolate, for instance. But they believe
+that mental states are just states of the brain, and
+that there's no philosophical reason to think
+they can't be. The details will have to be discovered
+by science.
+The idea is that we might discover that expe-
+[ 31 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+riences are really brain processes just as we have
+discovered that other familiar things have a real
+nature that we couldn't have guessed until it was
+revealed by scientific investigation. For instance,
+it turns out that diamonds are composed of carbon,
+the same material as coal: the atoms are
+just differently arranged. And water, as we all
+know, is composed of hydrogen and oxygen,
+even though those two elements are nothing like
+water when taken by themselves.
+So while it might seem surprising that the experience
+of tasting chocolate could be nothing
+but a complicated physical event in your brain,
+it would be no stranger than lots of things that
+have been discovered about the real nature of
+ordinary objects and processes. Scientists have
+discovered what light is, how plants grow, how
+muscles move-it is only a matter of time before
+they discover the biological nature of the mind.
+That's what physicalists think.
+A dualist would reply that those other things
+are different. When we discover the chemical
+composition of water, for instance, we are dealing
+with something that is clearly out there in
+the physical world-something we can all see
+and touch. When we find out that it's made up
+of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, we're just breaking
+down an external physical substance into
+smaller physical parts. It is an essential feature
+[ 32]
+The Mind-Body Problem
+of this kind of analysis that we are not giving a
+chemical breakdown of the way water looks, feels,
+and tastes to us. Those things go on in our inner
+experience, not in the water that we have broken
+down into atoms. The physical or chemical analysis
+of water leaves them aside.
+But to discover that tasting chocolate was
+really just a brain process, we would have to analyze
+something mental-not an externally observed
+physical substance but an inner taste sensation-
+in terms of parts that are physical. And
+there is no way that a large number of physical
+events in the brain, however complicated, could
+be the parts out of which a taste sensation was
+composed. A physical whole can be analyzed
+into smaller physical parts, but a mental process
+can't be. Physical parts just can't add up· to a
+mental whole.
+There is another possible view which is different
+from both dualism and physicalism. Dualism
+is the view that you consist of a body plus a soul,
+and that your mental life goes on in your soul.
+Physicalism is the view that your mental life consists
+of physical processes in your brain. But another
+possibility is that your mental life goes on
+in your brain, yet that all those experiences, feelings,
+thoughts, and desires are not physical processes
+in your brain. This would mean that the
+grey mass of billions of nerve cells in your skull
+[ 33]
+What Does It All Mean?
+is not just a physical object. It has lots of physical
+properties-great quantities of chemical and
+electrical activity go on in it-but it has mental
+processes going on in it as well.
+The view that the brain is the seat of consciousness,
+but that its conscious states are not
+just physical states, is called dual aspect theory.
+It is called that because it means that when you
+bite into a chocolate bar, this produces in your
+brain a state or process with two aspects: a physical
+aspect involving various chemical and electrical
+changes, and a mental aspect-the flavor
+experience of chocolate. When this process occurs,
+a scientist looking into your brain will be
+able to observe the physical aspect, but you
+yourself will undergo, from the inside, the mental
+aspect: you will have the sensation of tasting
+chocolate. If this were true, your brain itself
+would have an inside that could not be reached
+by an outside observer even if he cut it open. It
+would feel, or taste, a certain way to you to have
+that process going on in your brain.
+We could express this view by saying that you
+are not a body plus a soul-that you are just a
+body, but your body, or at least your brain, is
+not just a physical system. It is an object with
+both physical and mental aspects: it can be dissected,
+but it also has the kind of inside that
+can't be exposed by dissection. There's some-
+[ 34]
+The Mind-Body Problem
+thing it's like from the inside to taste chocolate
+because there's something it's like from the inside
+to have your brain in the condition that is
+produced when you eat a chocolate bar.
+Physicalists believe that nothing exists but the
+physical world that can be studied by science:
+the world of objective reality. But then they have
+to find room somehow for feelings, desires,
+thoughts, and experiences-for you and mein
+such a world.
+One theory offered in defense of physicalism
+is that the mental nature of your mental states
+consists in their relations to things that cause
+them and things they cause. For instance, when
+you stub your toe and feel pain, the pain is
+something going on in your brain. But its painfulness
+is not just the sum of its physical. characteristics,
+and it is not some mysterious nonphysical
+property either. Rather, what makes it
+a pain is that it is the kind of state of your brain
+that is usually caused by injury, and that usually
+causes you to yell and hop around and avoid the
+thing that caused the injury. And that could be
+a purely physical state of your brain.
+But that doesn't seem enough to make something
+a pain. It's true that pains are caused by
+injury, and they do make you hop and yell. But
+they also feel a certain way, and that seems to be
+something different from all their relations to
+[ 35]
+What Does It All Mean?
+causes and effects, as well as all the physical
+properties they may have-if they are in fact
+events in your brain. I myself believe that this
+inner aspect of pain and other conscious experiences
+cannot be adequately analyzed in terms
+of any system of causal relations to physical stimuli
+and behavior, however complicated.
+There seem to be two very different kinds of
+things going on in the world: the things that belong
+to physical reality, which many different
+people can observe from the outside, and those
+other things that belong to mental reality, which
+each of us experiences from the inside in his
+own case. This isn't true only of human beings:
+dogs and cats and horses and birds seem to be
+conscious, and fish and ants and beetles probably
+are too. Who knows where it stops?
+We won't have an adequate general conception
+of the world until we can explain how, when
+a lot of physical elements are put together in the
+right way, they form not just a functioning biological
+organism but a conscious being. If consciousness
+itself could be identified with some
+kind of physical state, the way would be open for
+a unified physical theory of mind and body, and
+therefore perhaps for a unified physical theory
+of the universe. But the reasons against a purely
+physical theory of consciousness are strong
+enough to make it seem likely that a physical the-
+[ 36 ]
+The Mind-Body Problem
+ory of the whole of reality is impossible. Physical
+science has progressed by leaving the mind out
+of what it tries to explain, but there may be more
+to the world than can be understood by physical
+science.
+[ 37]
+
+The Meaning of Words
+really something they contribute to the meaning
+of sentences or statements. Words are mostly
+used in talking and writing, rather than just as
+labels.
+However, taking that as understood, let us ask
+how a word can have a meaning. Some words
+can be defined in terms of other words:
+"square" for example means "four-sided equilateral
+equiangular plane figure." And most of
+the terms in that definition can also be defined.
+But definitions can't be the basis of meaning for
+all words, or we'd go forever in a circle. Eventually
+we must get to some words which have
+meaning directly.
+Take the word "tobacco," which may seem
+like an easy example. It refers to a kind of plant
+whose Latin name most of us don't know, and
+whose leaves are used to make cigars and cigarettes.
+All of us have seen and smelled tobacco,
+but the word as you use it refers not just to the
+samples of the stuff that you have seen, or that
+is around you when you use the word, but to all
+examples of it, whether or not you know of their
+existence. You may have learned the word by
+being shown some samples, but you won't understand
+it if you think it is just the name of
+those samples.
+So if you say, "I wonder if more tobacco was
+smoked in China last year than in the entire
+[ 39]
+What Does It All Mean?
+Western hemisphere," you have asked a meaningful
+question, and it has an answer, even if you
+can't find it out. But the meaning of the question,
+and its answer, depend on the fact that
+when you use the word "tobacco," it refers to
+every example of the substance in the worldthroughout
+all past and future time, in fact-to
+every cigarette smoked in China last year, to
+every cigar smoked in Cuba, and so forth. The
+other words in the sentence limit the reference
+to particular times and places, but the word "tobacco"
+can be used to ask such a question only
+because it has this enormous but special reach,
+beyond all your experience to every sample of a
+certain kind of stuff.
+How does the word do that? How can a mere
+noise or scribble reach that far? Not, obviously,
+because of its sound or look. And not because of
+the relatively small number of examples of tobacco
+that you've encountered, and that have
+been in the same room when you have uttered
+or heard or read the word. There's something
+else going on, and it is something general, which
+applies to everyone's use of the word. You and
+I, who have never met and have encountered different
+samples of tobacco, use the word with the
+same meaning. If we both use the word to ask
+the question about China and the Western hemisphere,
+it is the same question, and the answer
+[ 40]
+The Meaning of Words
+is the same. Further, a speaker of Chinese can
+ask the same question, using the Chinese word
+with the same meaning. Whatever relation the
+word "tobacco" has to the stuff itself, other
+words can have as well.
+This very naturally suggests that the relation
+of the word "tobacco" to all those plants, cigarettes,
+and cigars in the past, present, and future,
+is indirect. The word as you use it has
+something else behind it-a concept or idea or
+thought-which somehow reaches out to all the
+tobacco in the universe. This, however, raises
+new problems.
+First, what kind of thing is this middleman? Is
+it in your mind, or is it something outside your
+mind that you somehow latch onto? It would
+seem to have to be something that you and I and
+a speaker of Chinese can all latch onto, in order
+to mean the same thing by our words for tobacco.
+But how, with our very different experiences
+of the word and the plant, do we do that?
+Isn't this just as hard to explain as our all being
+able to refer to the same enormous and widespread
+amount of stuff by our different uses of
+the word or words? Isn't there just as much of a
+problem about how the word means the idea or
+concept (whatever that is) as there was before
+about how the word means the plant or
+substance?
+[ 41 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+Not only that, but there's also a problem
+about how this idea or concept is related to all
+the samples of actual tobacco. What kind of
+thing is it that it can have this exclusive connection
+with tobacco and nothing else? It looks as
+though we've just added to the problem. In
+trying to explain the relation between the word
+"tobacco" and tobacco by interposing between
+them the idea or concept of tobacco, we've just
+created the further need to explain the relations
+between the word and the idea, and between the
+idea and the stuff.
+With or without the concept or idea, the problem
+seems to be that very particular sounds,
+marks, and examples are involved in each person's
+use of a word, but the word applies to
+something universal, which other particular
+speakers can also mean by that word or other
+words in other languages. How can anything as
+particular as the noise I make when I say "tobacco"
+mean something so general that I can
+use it to say, "I bet people will be smoking tobacco
+on Mars 200 years from now."
+You might think that the universal element is
+provided by something we all have in our minds
+when we use the word. But what do we all have
+in our minds? Consciously, at least, I don't need
+anything more than the word itself in my mind
+to think, "Tobacco is getting more expensive
+[ 42]
+The Meaning of Words
+every year." Still, I certainly may have an image
+of some sort in my mind when I use the word:
+perhaps of a plant, or of some dried leaves, or
+of the inside of a cigarette. Still, this will not help
+to explain the generality of the meaning of the
+word, because any such image will be a particular
+image. It will be an image of the appearance or
+smell of a particular sample of tobacco; and how
+is that supposed to encompass all actual and possible
+examples of tobacco? Also, even if you have
+a certain picture in your mind when you hear or
+use the word "tobacco," every other person will
+probably have a different picture; yet that does
+not prevent us all from using the word with the
+same meaning.
+The mystery of meaning is that it doesn't seem
+to be located anywhere-not in the word; not in
+the mind, not in a separate concept or idea hovering
+between the word, the mind, and the
+things we are talking about. And yet we use language
+all the time, and it enables us to think
+complicated thoughts which span great reaches
+of time and space. You can talk about how many
+people in Okinawa are over five feet tall, or
+whether there is life in other galaxies, and the
+little noises you make will be sentences which are
+true or false in virtue of complicated facts about
+far away things that you will probably never encounter
+directly.
+[ 43]
+What Does It All Mean?
+You may think I have been making too much
+of the universal reach of language. In ordinary
+life, most of the statements and thoughts we use
+language for are much more local and particular.
+If I say "Pass the salt," and you pass me the
+salt, this doesn't have to involve any universal
+meaning of the word "salt," of the kind that's
+present when we ask, "How long ago in the history
+of our galaxy was salt first formed out of
+sodium and chlorine?" Words are often used
+simply as tools in the relations between people.
+On a sign in a bus station you see the little figure
+with the skirt, and an arrow, and you know that's
+the way to the ladies' room. Isn't most of language
+just a system of signals and responses like
+that?
+Well, perhaps some of it is, and perhaps that's
+how we start to learn to use words: "Daddy,"
+"Mommy," "No," "All gone." But it doesn't
+stop there, and it's not clear how the simple
+transactions possible using one or two words at
+a time can help us to understand the use of language
+to describe and misdescribe the world far
+beyond our present neighborhood It seems
+more likely, in fact, that the use of language for
+much larger purposes shows us something about
+what is going on when we use it on a smaller
+scale.
+A statement like, "There's salt on the table,"
+[ 44 ]
+The Meaning of Words
+means the same whether it's said for practical
+reasons during lunch, or as part of the description
+of a situation distant in space and time, or
+merely as a hypothetical description of an imaginary
+possibility. It means the same whether it is
+true or false, and whether or not the speaker or
+hearer know if it's true or false. Whatever is
+going on in the ordinary, practical case must be
+something general enough also to explain these
+other, quite different cases where it means the
+same thing.
+It is of course important that language is a social
+phenomenon. Each person doesn't make it
+up for himself. When as children we learn a language,
+we get plugged into an already existing
+system, in which millions of people have been
+using the same words to talk to one another for
+centuries. My use of the word "tobacco" doesn't
+have a meaning just on its own, but rather as
+part of the much wider use of that word in
+English. (Even if I were to adopt a private code,
+in which I used the word "blibble" to mean tobacco,
+I'd do it by defining "blibble" to myself
+in terms of the common word "tobacco.") We
+still have to explain how my use of the word gets
+its content from all those other uses, most of
+which I don't know about-but putting my
+words into this larger context may seem to help
+explain their universal meaning.
+[ 45]
+What Does It All Mean?
+But this doesn't solve the problem. When I
+use the word, it may have its meaning as part of
+the English language, but how does the use of
+the word by all those other speakers of English
+give it its universal range, well beyond all the situations
+in which it is actually used? The problem
+of the relation of language to the world is not so
+different whether we are talking about one sentence
+or billions. The meaning of a word contains
+all its possible uses, true and false, not only
+its actual ones, and the actual uses are only a tiny
+fraction of the possible ones.
+We are small finite creatures, but meaning enables
+us with the help of sounds or marks on
+paper to grasp the whole world and many things
+in it, and even to invent things that do not exist
+and perhaps never will. The problem is to explain
+how this is possible: How does anything we
+say or write mean anything-including all the
+words in this book?
+[ 46]
+6
+Free Will
+Suppose you're going through a cafeteria line
+and when you come to the desserts, you hesitate
+between a peach and a big wedge of chocolate
+cake with creamy icing. The cake looks good, but
+you know it's fattening. Still, you take it ~nd eat
+it with pleasure. The next day you look in the
+mirror or get on the scale and think, ''I wish I
+hadn't eaten that chocolate cake. I could have
+had a peach instead."
+"I could have had a peach instead." What
+does that mean, and is it true?
+Peaches were available when you went
+through the cafeteria line: you had the opportunity
+to take a peach instead. But that isn't all you
+mean. You mean you could have taken the peach
+instead of the cake. You could have done some-
+[ 47]
+What Does It All Mean?
+thing different from what you actually did. Before
+you made up your mind, it was open
+whether you would take fruit or cake, and it was
+only your choice that decided which it would be.
+Is that it? When you say, "I could have had a
+peach instead," do you mean that it depended
+only on your choice? You chose chocolate cake,
+so that's what you had, but if you had chosen the
+peach, you would have had that.
+This still doesn't seem to be enough. You
+don't mean only that if you had chosen the
+peach, you would have had it. When you say, "I
+could have had a peach instead," you also mean
+that you could have chosen it-no "ifs" about it.
+But what does that mean?
+It can't be explained by pointing out other occasions
+when you have chosen fruit. And it can't
+be explained by saying that if you had thought
+about it harder, or if a friend had been with you
+who eats like a bird, you would have chosen it.
+What you are saying is that you could have chosen
+a peach instead of chocolate cake just then,
+as things actuall_'Y were. You think you could have
+chosen a peach even if everything else had been
+exactly the same as it was up to the point when
+you in fact chose chocolate cake. The only difference
+would have been that instead of thinking,
+"Oh well," and reaching for the cake, you
+would have thought, "Better not," and reached
+for the peach.
+[ 48]
+Free Will
+This is an idea of "can" or "could have"
+which we apply only to people (and maybe some
+animals). When we say, "The car could have
+climbed to the top of the hill," we mean the car
+had enough power to reach the top of the hill if
+someone drove it there. We don't mean that on
+an occasion when it was parked at the bottom of
+the hill, the car could have just taken off and
+climbed to the top, instead of continuing to sit
+there. Something else would have had to happen
+differently first, like a person getting in and
+starting the motor. But when it comes to people,
+we seem to think that they can do various things
+they don't actually do, just like that, without anything
+else happening differently first. What does
+this mean?
+Part of what it means may be this: Nothing up
+to the point at which you choose determines irrevocably
+what your choice will be. It remains an
+open possibility that you will choose a peach until
+the moment when you actually choose chocolate
+cake. It isn't determined in advance.
+Some things that happen are determined in
+advance. For instance, it seems to be determined
+in advance that the sun will rise tomorrow at a
+certain hour. It is not an open possibility that
+tomorrow the sun won't rise and night will just
+continue. That is not possible because it could
+happen only if the earth stopped rotating, or the
+sun stopped existing, and there is nothing going
+[ 49]
+What Does It All Mean?
+on in our galaxy which might make either of
+those things happen. The earth will continue rotating
+unless it is stopped, and tomorrow morning
+its rotation will bring us back around to face
+inward in the solar system, toward the sun, instead
+of outward, away from it. If there is no
+possibility that the earth will stop or that the sun
+won't be there, there is no possibility that the
+sun won't rise tomorrow.
+When you say you could have had a peach instead
+of chocolate cake, part of what you mean
+may be that it wasn't determined in advance
+what you would do, as it is determined in advance
+that the sun will rise tomorrow. There
+were no processes or forces at work before you
+made your choice that made it inevitable that
+you would choose chocolate cake.
+That may not be all you mean, but it seems to
+be at least part of what you mean. For if it was
+really determined in advance that you would
+choose cake, how could it also be true that you
+could have chosen fruit? It would be true that
+nothing would have prevented you from having
+a peach if you had chosen it instead of cake. But
+these ifs are not the same as saying you could
+have chosen a peach, period. You couldn't have
+chosen it unless the possibility remained open
+until you closed it off by choosing cake.
+Some people have thought that it is never pos-
+[ 50]
+Free Will
+sible for us to do anything different from what
+we actually do, in this absolute sense. They acknowledge
+that what we do depends on our
+choices, decisions, and wants, and that we make
+different choices in different circumstances:
+we're not like the earth rotating on its axis with
+monotonous regularity. But the claim is that, in
+each case, the circumstances that exist before we
+act determine our actions and make them inevitable.
+The sum total of a person's experiences,
+desires and knowledge, his hereditary constitution,
+the social circumstances and the nature of
+the choice facing him, together with other factors
+that we may not know about, all combine to
+make a particular action in the circumstances
+inevitable.
+This view is called determinism. The idea is
+not that we can know all the laws of the universe
+and use them to predict what will happen. First
+of all, we can't know all the complex circumstances
+that affect a human choice. Secondly,
+even when we do learn something about the circumstances,
+and try to make a prediction, that is
+itself a change in the circumstances, which may
+change the predicted result. But predictability
+isn't the point. The hypothesis is that there are
+laws of nature, like those that govern the movement
+of the planets, which govern everything
+that happens in the world-and that in accor-
+[ 51 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+dance with those laws, the circumstances before
+an action determine that it will happen, and rule
+out any other possibility.
+If that is true, then even while you were making
+up your mind about dessert, it was already
+determined by the many factors working on you
+and in you that you would choose cake. You
+couldn't have chosen the peach, even though you
+thought you could: the process of decision is just
+the working out of the determined result inside
+your mind.
+If determinism is true for everything that happens,
+it was already determined before you were
+born that you would choose cake. Your choice
+was determined by the situation immediately before,
+and that situation was determined by the
+situation before it, and so on as far back as you
+want to go.
+Even if determinism isn't true for everything
+that happens-even if some things just happen
+without being determined by causes that were
+there in advance-it would still be very significant
+if everything we did were determined before
+we did it. However free you might feel when
+choosing between fruit and cake, or between
+two candidates in an election, you would really
+be able to make only one choice in those circumstances-
+though if the circumstances or your
+desires had been different, you would have chosen
+differently.
+[52]
+Free Will
+If you believed that about yourself and other
+people, it would probably change the way you
+felt about things. For instance, could you blame
+yourself for giving in to temptation and having
+the cake? Would it make sense to say, "I really
+should have had a peach instead," if you couldn't
+have chosen a peach instead? It certainly
+wouldn't make sense to say it if there was no
+fruit. So how can it make sense if there was fruit,
+but you couldn't have chosen it because it was
+determined in advance that you would choose
+cake?
+This seems to have serious consequences. Besides
+not being able sensibly to blame yourself
+for having had cake, you probably wouldn't be
+able sensibly to blame anyone at all for doing
+something bad, or praise them for doing something
+good. If it was determined in advanc.e that
+they would do it, it was inevitable: they couldn't
+have done anything else, given the circumstances
+as they were. So how can we hold them
+responsible?
+You may be very mad at someone who comes
+to a party at your house and steals all your Glenn
+Gould records, but suppose you believed that
+his action was determined in advance by his nature
+and the situation. Suppose you believed
+that everything he did, including the earlier actions
+that had contributed to the formation of
+his character, was determined in advance by ear-
+[ 53]
+What Does It All Mean?
+lier circumstances. Could you still hold him responsible
+for such low-grade behavior? Or
+would it be more reasonable to regard him as a
+kind of natural disaster-as if your records had
+been eaten by termites?
+People disagree about this. Some think that if
+determinism is true, no one can reasonably be
+praised or blamed for anything, any more than
+the rain can be praised or blamed for falling.
+Others think that it still makes sense to praise
+good actions and condemn bad ones, even if
+they were inevitable. After all, the fact that
+someone was determined in advance to behave
+badly doesn't mean that he didn't behave badly.
+If he steals your records, that shows inconsiderateness
+and dishonesty, whether it was determined
+or not. Furthermore, if we don't blame
+him, or perhaps even punish him, he'll probably
+do it again.
+On the other hand, if we think that what he
+did was determined in advance, this seems more
+like punishing a dog for chewing on the rug. It
+doesn't mean we hold him responsible for what
+he did: we're just trying to influence his behavior
+in the future. I myself don't think it makes
+sense to blame someone for doing what it was
+impossible for him not to do. (Though of course
+determinism implies that it was determined in
+advance that I would think this.)
+[54 J
+Free Will
+These are the problems we must face if determinism
+is true. But perhaps it isn't true. Many
+scientists now believe that it isn't true for the
+basic particles of matter-that in a given situation,
+there's more than one thing that an electron
+may do. Perhaps if determinism isn't true
+for human actions, either, this leaves room for
+free will and responsibility. What if human actions,
+or at least some of them, are not determined
+in advance? What if, up to the moment
+when you choose, it's an open possibility that
+you will choose either chocolate cake or a
+peach? Then, so far as what has happened before
+is concerned, you could choose either one.
+Even if you actually choose cake, you could have
+chosen a peach.
+But is even this enough for free will? Is this all
+you mean when you say, "I could have chosen
+fruit instead?"-that the choice wasn't determined
+in advance? No, you believe something
+more. You believe that you determined what you
+would do, by doing it. It wasn't determined in
+advance, but it didn't just happen, either. You did
+it, and you could have done the opposite. But
+what does that mean?
+This is a funny question: we all know what it
+means to do something. But the problem is, if
+the act wasn't determined in advance, by your
+desires, beliefs, and personality, among other
+[55]
+What Does It All Mean?
+things, it seems to be something that just happened,
+without any explanation. And in that
+case, how was it your doing?
+One possible reply would be that there is no
+answer to that question. Free action is just a
+basic feature of the world, and it can't be analyzed.
+There's a difference between something
+just happening without a cause and an action
+just being done without a cause. It's a difference
+we all understand, even if we can't explain it.
+Some people would leave it at that. But others
+find it suspicious that we must appeal to this
+unexplained idea to explain the sense in which
+you could have chosen fruit instead of cake. Up
+to now it has seemed that determinism is the big
+threat to responsibility. But now it seems that
+even if our cJ::10ices are not determined in advance,
+it is still hard to understand in what way
+we can do what we don't do. Either of two
+choices may be possible in advance, but unless I
+determine which of them occurs, it is no more
+my responsibility than if it was determined by
+causes beyond my control. And how can I determine
+it if nothing determines it?
+This raises the alarming possibility that we're
+not responsible for our actions whether determinism
+is true or whether it's false. If determinism
+is true, antecedent circumstances are re-
+[56]
+Free Will
+sponsible. If determinism is false, nothing is
+responsible. That would really be a dead end.
+There is another possible view, completely opposite
+to most of what we've been saying. Some
+people think responsibility for our actions requires
+that our actions be determined, rather
+than requiring that they not be. The claim is that
+for an action to be something you have done, it
+has to be produced by certain kinds of causes in
+you. For instance, when you chose the chocolate
+cake, that was something you did, rather than
+something that just happened, because you
+wanted chocolate cake more than you wanted a
+peach. Because your appetite for cake was
+stronger at the time than your desire to avoid
+gaining weight, it resulted in your choosing the
+cake. In other cases of action, the psychological
+explanation will be more complex, but there will
+always be one-otherwise the action wouldn't
+be yours. This explanation seems to mean that
+what you did was determined in advance after
+all. If it wasn't determined by anything, it was
+just an unexplained event, something that happened
+out of the blue rather than something
+that you did.
+According to this position, causal determination
+by itself does not threaten freedom-only a
+certain kind of cause does that. If you grabbed
+[57]
+What Does It All Mean?
+the cake because someone else pushed you into
+it, then it wouldn't be a free choice. But free action
+doesn't require that there be no determining
+cause at all: it means that the cause has to be
+of a familiar psychological type.
+I myself can't accept this solution. If I thought
+that everything I did was determined by my circumstances
+and my psychological condition, I
+would feel trapped. And if I thought the same
+about everybody else, I would feel that they were
+like a lot of puppets. It wouldn't make sense to
+hold them responsible for their actions any
+more than you hold a dog or a cat or even an
+elevator responsible.
+On the other hand, I'm not sure I understand
+how responsibility for our choices makes sense if
+they are not determined. It's not clear what it
+means to say I determine the choice, if nothing
+about me determines it. So perhaps the feeling
+that you could have chosen a peach instead of a
+piece of cake is a philosophical illusion, and
+couldn't be right whatever was the case.
+To avoid this conclusion, you would have to
+explain (a) what you mean if you say you could
+have done something other than what you did,
+and (b) what you and the world would have to be
+like for this to be true.
+[58]
+7
+Right and Wrong
+Suppose you work in a library, checking people's
+books as they leave, and a friend asks you to let
+him smuggle out a hard-to-find reference work
+that he wants to own.
+You might hesitate to agree for various reasons.
+You might be afraid that he'll be caught,
+and that both you and he will then get into trouble.
+You might want the book to stay in the library
+so that you can consult it yourself.
+But you may also think that what he proposes
+is wrong-that he shouldn't do it and you
+shouldn't help him. If you think that, what does
+it mean, and what, if anything, makes it true?
+To say it's wrong is not just to say it's against
+the rules. There can be bad rules which prohibit
+what isn't wrong-like a law against criticizing
+[59]
+What Does It All Mean?
+the government. A rule can also be bad because
+it requires something that is wrong-like a law
+that requires racial segregation in hotels and restaurants.
+The ideas of wrong and right are different
+from the ideas of what is and is not
+against the rules. Otherwise they couldn't be
+used in the evaluation of rules as well as of
+actions.
+If you think it would be wrong to help your
+friend steal the book, then you will feel uncomfortable
+about doing it: in some way you won't
+want to do it, even if you are also reluctant to
+refuse help to a friend. Where does the desire
+not to do it come from; what is its motive, the
+reason behind it?
+There are various ways in which something
+can be wrong, but in this case, if you had to explain
+it, you'd probably say that it would be unfair
+to other users of the library who may be just
+as interested in the book as your friend is, but
+who consult it in the reference room, where anyone
+who needs it can find it. You may also feel
+that to let him take it would betray your employers,
+who are paying you precisely to keep this
+sort of thing from happening.
+These thoughts have to do with effects on others-
+not necessarily effects on their feelings,
+since they may never find out about it, but some
+kind of damage nevertheless. In general, the
+[ 60]
+Right and Wrong
+thought that something is wrong depends on its
+impact not just on the person who does it but on
+other people. They wouldn't like it, and they'd
+object if they found out.
+But suppose you try to explain all this to your
+friend, and he says, "I know the head librarian
+wouldn't like it if he found out, and probably
+some of the other users of the library would be
+unhappy to find the book gone, but who cares?
+I want the book; why should I care about them?"
+The argument that it would be wrong is supposed
+to give him a reason not to do it. But if
+someone just doesn't care about other people,
+what reason does he have to refrain from doing
+any of the things usually thought to be wrong, if
+he can get away with it: what reason does he
+have not to kill, steal, lie, or hurt others? If he
+can get what he wants by doing such things, why
+shouldn't he? And if there's no reason why he
+shouldn't, in what sense is it wrong?
+Of course most people do care about others
+to some extent. But if someone doesn't care,
+most of us wouldn't conclude that he's exempt
+from morality. A person who kills someone just
+to steal his wallet, without caring about the victim,
+is not automatically excused. The fact that
+he doesn't care doesn't make it all right: He
+should care. But why should he care?
+There have been many attempts to answer this
+[ 61 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+question. One type of answer tries to identify
+something else that the person already cares
+about, and then connect morality to it.
+For example, some people believe that even if
+you can get away with awful crimes on this earth,
+and are not punished by the law or your fellow
+men, such acts are forbidden by God, who will
+punish you after death (and reward you if you
+didn't do wrong when you were tempted to). So
+even when it seems to be in your interest to do
+such a thing, it really isn't. Some people have
+even believed that if there is no God to back up
+moral requirements with the threat of punishment
+and the promise of reward, morality is an
+illusion: "If God does not exist, everything is
+permitted.''
+This is a rather crude version of the religious
+foundation for morality. A more appealing version
+might be that the motive for obeying God's
+commands is not fear but love. He loves you,
+and you should love Him, and should wish to
+obey His commands in order not to offend Him.
+But however we interpret the religious motivation,
+there are three objections to this type of
+answer. First, plenty of people who don't believe
+in God still make judgments of right and wrong,
+and think no one should kill another for his wallet
+even if he can be sure to get away with it. Second,
+if God exists, and forbids what's wrong,
+[ 62]
+Right and Wrong
+that still isn't what makes it wrong. Murder is
+wrong in 'itself, and that's why God forbids it (if
+He does.) God couldn't make just any old thing
+wrong-like putting on your left sock before
+your right-simply by prohibiting it. If God
+would punish you for doing that it would be inadvisable
+to do it, but it wouldn't be wrong.
+Third, fear of punishment and hope of reward,
+and even love of God, seem not to be the right
+motives for morality. If you think it's wrong to
+kill, cheat, or steal, you should want to avoid
+doing such things because they are bad things to
+do to the victims, not just because you fear the
+consequences for yourself, or because you don't
+want to offend your Creator.
+This third objection also applies to other explanations
+of the force of morality which ~ppeal
+to the interests of the person who must act. For
+example, it may be said that you should treat
+others with consideration so that they'll do the
+same for you. This may be sound advice, but it
+is valid only so far as you think what you do will
+affect how others treat you. It's not a reason for
+doing the right thing if others won't find out
+about it, or against doing the wrong thing if you
+can get away with it (like being a hit and run
+driver).
+There is no substitute for a direct concern for
+other people as the basis of morality. But mo-
+[ 63 J
+What Does It All Mean?
+rality is supposed to apply to everyone: and can
+we assume that everyone has such a concern for
+others? Obviously not: some people are very selfish,
+and even those who are not selfish may care
+only about the people they know, and not about
+everyone. So where will we find a reason that everyone
+has not to hurt other people, even those
+they don't know?
+Well, there's one general argument against
+hurting other people which can be given to anybody
+who understands English (or any other language),
+and which seems to show that he has
+some reason to care about others, even if in the
+end his selfish motives are so strong that he persists
+in treating other people badly anyway. It's
+an argument that I'm sure you've heard, and it
+goes like this: "How would you like it if someone
+did that to you?"
+It's not easy to explain how this argument is
+supposed to work. Suppose you're about to steal
+someone else's umbrella as you leave a restaurant
+in a rainstorm, and a bystander says, "How
+would you like it if someone did that to you?"
+Why is it supposed to make you hesitate, or feel
+guilty?
+Obviously the direct answer to the question is
+supposed to be, "I wouldn't like it at all!" But
+what's the next step? Suppose you were to say,
+"I wouldn't like it if someone did that to me. But
+[ 64]
+Right and Wrong
+luckily no one is doing it to me. I'm doing it to
+someone else, and I don't mind that at all!"
+This answer misses the point of the question.
+When you are asked how you would like it if
+someone did that to you, you are supposed to
+think about all the feelings you would have if
+someone stole your umbrella. And that includes
+more than just "not liking it"-as you wouldn't
+"like it" if you stubbed your toe on a rock. If
+someone stole your umbrella you'd resent it.
+You'd have feelings about the umbrella thief,
+not just about the loss of the umbrella. You'd
+think, "Where does he get off, taking my umbrella
+that I bought with my hard-earned money
+and that I had the foresight to bring after reading
+the weather report? Why didn't he bring his
+own umbrella?" and so forth.
+When our own interests are threatened by the
+inconsiderate behavior of others, most of us find
+it easy to appreciate that those others have a reason
+to be more considerate. When you are hurt,
+you probably feel that other people should care
+about it: you don't think it's no concern of
+theirs, and that they have no reason to avoid
+hurting you. That is the feeling that the "How
+would you like it?" argument is supposed to
+arouse.
+Because if you admit that you would resent it
+if someone else did to you what you are now
+[ 65]
+What Does It All Mean?
+doing to him, you are admitting that you think
+he would have a reason not to do it to you. And
+if you admit that, you have to consider what that
+reason is. It couldn't be just that it's you that he's
+hurting, of all the people in the world. There's
+no special reason for him not to steal your umbrella,
+as opposed to anyone else's. There's
+nothing so special about you. Whatever the reason
+is, it's a reason he would have against hurting
+anyone else in the same way. And it's a reason
+anyone else would have too, in a similar
+situation, against hurting you or anyone else.
+But if it's a reason anyone would have not to
+hurt anyone else in this way, then it's a reason
+you have not to hurt someone else in this way
+(since anyone means everyone). Therefore it's a
+reason not to steal the other person's umbrella
+now.
+This is a matter of simple consistency. Once
+you admit that another person would have a reason
+not to harm you in similar circumstances,
+and once you admit that the reason he would
+have is very general and doesn't apply only to
+you, or to him, then to be consistent you have to
+admit that the same reason applies to you now.
+You shouldn't steal the umbrella, and you ought
+to feel guilty if you do.
+Someone could escape from this argument if,
+when he was asked, "How would you like it if
+someone did that to you?" he answered, "I
+[ 66]
+Right and Wrong
+wouldn't resent it at all. I wouldn't like it if
+someone stole my umbrella in a rainstorm, but I
+wouldn't think there was any reason for him to
+consider my feelings about it." But how many
+people could honestly give that answer? I think
+most people, unless they're crazy, would think
+that their own interests and harms matter, not
+only to themselves, but in a way that gives other
+people a reason to care about them too. We all
+think that when we suffer it is not just bad for us,
+but bad, period.
+The basis of morality is a belief that good and
+harm to particular people (or animals) is good or
+bad not just from their point of view, but from
+a more general point of view, which every thinking
+person can understand. That means that
+each person has a reason to consider not only
+his own interests but the interests of others in
+deciding what to do. And it isn't enough if he is
+considerate only of some others-his family and
+friends, those he specially cares about. Of
+course he will care more about certain people,
+and also about himself. But he has some reason
+to consider the effect of what he does on the
+good or harm of everyone. If he's like most of
+us, that is what he thinks others should do with
+regard to him, even if they aren't friends of his.
+» cc
+Even if this is right, it is only a bare outline of
+the source of morality. It doesn't tell us in detail
+[ 67]
+What Does It All Mean?
+how we should consider the interests of others,
+or how we should weigh them against the special
+interest we all have in ourselves and the particular
+people close to us. It doesn't even tell us
+how much we should care about people in other
+countries in comparison with our fellow citizens.
+There are many disagreements among those
+who accept morality in general, about what in
+particular is right and what is wrong.
+For instance: should you care about every
+other person as much as you care about yourself?
+Should you in other words love your neighbar
+as yourself (even if he isn't your neighbor)?
+Should you ask yourself, every time you go to a
+movie, whether the cost of the ticket could provide
+more happiness if you gave it to someone
+else, or donated the money to famine relief?
+Very few people are so unselfish. And if someone
+were that impartial between himself and
+others, he would probably also feel that he
+should be just as impartial among other people.
+That would rule out caring more about his
+friends and relatives than he does about strangers.
+He might have special feelings about certain
+people who are close to him, but complete impartiality
+would mean that he won't Javor
+them-if for example he has to choose between
+helping a friend or a stranger to avoid suffering,
+or between taking his children to a movie and
+donating the money to famine relief.
+[ 68 J
+Right and Wrong
+This degree of impartiality seems too much to
+ask of most people: someone who had it would
+be a kind of terrifying saint. But it's an important
+question in moral thought, how much impartiality
+we should try for. You are a particular
+person, but you are also able to recognize that
+you're just one person among many others, and
+no more important than they are, when looked
+at from outside. How much should that point of
+view influence you? You do matter somewhat
+from outside-otherwise you wouldn't think
+other people had any reason to care about what
+they did to you. But you don't matter as much
+from the outside as you matter to yourself, from
+the inside-since from the outside you don't
+matter any more than anybody else.
+Not only is it unclear how impartial we ~hould
+be; it's unclear what would make an answer to
+this question the right one. Is there a single correct
+way for everyone to strike the balance between
+what he cares about personally and what
+matters impartially? Or will the answer vary
+from person to person depending on the
+strength of their different motives?
+This brings us to another big issue: Are right
+and wrong the same for everyone?
+Morality is often thought to be universal. If
+something is wrong, it's supposed to be wrong
+for everybody; for instance if it's wrong to kill
+someone because you want to steal his wallet,
+[ 69]
+What Does It All Mean?
+then it's wrong whether you care about him or
+not. But if something's being wrong is supposed
+to be a reason against doing it, and if your reasons
+for doing things depend on your motives
+and people's motives can vary greatly, then it
+looks as though there won't be a single right and
+wrong for everybody. There won't be a single
+right and wrong, because if people's basic motives
+differ, there won't be one basic standard of
+behavior that everyone has a reason to follow.
+There are three ways of dealing with this
+problem, none of them very satisfactory.
+First, we could say that the same things are
+right and wrong for everybody, but that not everyone
+has a reason to do what's right and avoid
+what's wrong: only people with the right sort of
+"moral" motives-particularly a concern for
+others-have any reason to do what's right, for
+its own sake. This makes morality universal, but
+at the cost of draining it of its force. It's not
+clear what it amounts to to say that it would be
+wrong for someone to commit murder, but he
+has no reason not to do it.
+Second, we could say that everyone has a reason
+to do what's right and avoid what's wrong,
+but that these reasons don't depend on people's
+actual motives. Rather they are reasons to
+change our motives if they aren't the right ones.
+This connects morality with reasons for action,
+[ 70]
+Right and Wrong
+but leaves it unclear what these universal reasons
+are which do not depend on motives that
+everyone actually has. What does it mean to say
+that a murderer had a reason not to do it, even
+though none of his actual motives or desires
+gave him such a reason?
+Third, we could say that morality is not universal,
+and that what a person is morally required
+to do goes only as far as what he has a
+certain kind of reason to do, where the reason
+depends on how much he actually cares about
+other people in general. If he has strong moral
+motives, they will yield strong reasons and
+strong moral requirements. If his moral motives
+are weak or nonexistent, the moral requirements
+on him will likewise be weak or nonexistent.
+This may seem psychologically realistic, but
+it goes against the idea that the same moral rules
+apply to all of us, and not only to good people.
+The question whether moral requirements are
+universal comes up not only when we compare
+the motives of different individuals, but also
+when we compare the moral standards that are
+accepted in different societies and at different
+times. Many things that you probably think are
+wrong have been accepted as morally correct by
+large groups of people in the past: slavery, serfdom,
+human sacrifice, racial segregation, denial
+of religious and political freedom, hereditary
+[ 71 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+caste systems. And probably some things you
+now think are right will be thought wrong by future
+societies. Is it reasonable to believe that
+there is some single truth about all this, even
+though we can't be sure what it is? Or is it more
+reasonable to believe that right and wrong are
+relative to a particular time and place and social
+background?
+There is one way in which right and wrong are
+obviously relative to circumstances. It is usually
+right to return a knife you have borrowed to its
+owner if he asks for it back. But if he has gone
+crazy in the meantime, and wants the knife to
+murder someone with, then you shouldn't return
+it. This isn't the kind of relativity I am talking
+about, because it doesn't mean morality is
+relative at the basic level. It means only that the
+same basic moral principles will require different
+actions in different circumstances.
+The deeper kind of relativity, which some people
+believe in, would mean that the most basic
+standards of right and wrong-like when it is
+and is not all right to kill, or what sacrifices
+you're required to make for others-depend entirely
+on what standards are generally accepted
+in the society in which you live.
+This I find very hard to believe, mainly because
+it always seems possible to criticize the accepted
+standards of your own society and say
+[ 72 ]
+Right and Wrong
+that they are morally mistaken. But if you do
+that, you must be appealing to some more objective
+standard, an idea of what is really right
+· and wrong, as opposed to what most people
+think. It is hard to say what this is, but it is an
+idea most of us understand, unless we are slavish
+followers of what the community says.
+There are many philosophical problems about
+the content of morality-how a moral concern
+or respect for others should express itself;
+whether we should help them get what they want
+or mainly refrain from harming and hindering
+them; how impartial we should be, and in what
+ways. I have left most of these questions aside
+because my concern here is with the foundation
+of morality in general-how universal and objective
+it is.
+I should answer one possible objection to the
+whole idea of morality. You've probably heard it
+said that the only reason anybody ever does anything
+is that it makes him feel good, or that not
+doing it will make him feel bad. If we are really
+motivated only by our own comfort, it is hopeless
+for morality to try to appeal to a concern for
+others. On this view, even apparently moral conduct
+in which one person seems to sacrifice his
+own interests for the sake of others is really motivated
+by his concern for himself: he wants to
+avoid the guilt he'll feel if he doesn't do the
+[ 73]
+What Does It All Mean?
+"right" thing, or to experience the warm glow
+of self-congratulation he'll get if he does. But
+those who don't have these feelings have no motive
+to be "moral."
+Now it's true that when people do what they
+think they ought to do, they often feel good
+about it: similarly if they do what they think is
+wrong, they often feel bad. But that doesn't
+mean that these feelings are their motives for
+acting. In many cases the feelings result from
+motives which also produce the action. You
+wouldn't feel good about doing the right thing
+unless you thought there was some other reason
+to do it, besides the fact that it would make you
+feel good. And you wouldn't feel guilty about
+doing the wrong thing unless you thought that
+there was some other reason not to do it, besides
+the fact that it made you feel guilty: something
+which made it right to feel guilty. At least that's
+how things should be. It's true that some people
+feel irrational guilt about things they don't have
+any independent reason to think are wrongbut
+that's not the way morality is supposed to
+work.
+In a sense, people do what they want to do.
+But their reasons and motives for wanting to do
+things vary enormously. I may "want" to give
+someone my wallet only because he has a gun
+pointed at my head and threatens to kill me if I
+[ 74]
+Right and Wrong
+don't. And I may want to jump into an icy river
+to save a drowning stranger not because it will
+make me feel good, but because I recognize that
+his life is important, just as mine is, and I recognize
+that I have a reason to save his life just as
+he would have a reason to save mine if our positions
+were reversed.
+Moral argument tries to appeal to a capacity
+for impartial motivation which is supposed to be
+present in all of us. Unfortunately it may be
+deeply buried, and in some cases it may not
+be present at all. In any case it has to compete
+with powerful selfish motives, and other personal
+motives that may not be so selfish, in its bid
+for control of our behavior. The difficulty of justifying
+morality is not that there is only one
+human motive, but that there are so many.
+[ 75]
+8
+justice
+Is it unfair that some people are born rich and
+some are born poor? If it's unfair, should anything
+be done about it?
+The world is full of inequalities-within countries,
+and from one country to another. Some
+children are born into comfortable, prosperous
+homes, and grow up well fed and well educated.
+Others are born poor, don't get enough to eat,
+and never have access to much education or
+medical care. Clearly, this is a matter of luck: we
+are not responsible for the social or economic
+class or country into which we are born. The
+question is, how bad are inequalities which are
+not the fault of the people who suffer from
+them? Should governments use their power to
+[ 76]
+justice
+try to reduce inequalities of this kind, for which
+the victims are not responsible?
+Some inequalities are deliberately imposed.
+Racial discrimination, for example, deliberately
+excludes people of one race from jobs, housing,
+and education which are available to people of
+another race. Or women may be kept out of jobs
+or denied privileges available only to men. This
+is not merely a matter of bad luck. Racial and
+sexual discrimination are clearly unfair: they are
+forms of inequality caused by factors that should
+not be allowed to influence people's basic welfare.
+Fairness requires that opportunities should
+be open to those who are qualified, and it is
+clearly a good ·thing when governments try to
+enforce such equality of opportunity.
+But it is harder to know what to say about inequalities
+that arise in the ordin:iry course of
+events, without deliberate racial or sexual discrimination.
+Because even if there is equality of
+opportunity, and any qualified person can go to
+a university or get a job or buy a house or run
+for office-regardless of race, religion, sex, or
+national origin-there will still be plenty of inequalities
+left. People from wealthier backgrounds
+will usually have better training and
+more resources, and they will tend to be better
+able to compete for good jobs. Even in a system
+[ 77]
+What Does It All Mean?
+of equality of opportunity, some people will
+have a head start and will end up with greater
+benefits than others whose native talents are the
+same.
+Not only that, but differences in native talent
+will produce big differences in the resulting benefits,
+in a competitive system. Those who have
+abilities that are in high demand will be able to
+earn much more than those without any special
+skills or talents. These differences too are partly
+a matter of luck. Though people have to develop
+and use their abilities, no amount of effort
+would enable most people to act like Meryl
+Streep, paint like Picasso, or manufacture automobiles
+like Henry Ford. Something similar is
+true of lesser accomplishments. The luck of both
+natural talent and family and class background
+are important factors in determining one's income
+and position in a competitive society.
+Equal opportunity produces unequal results.
+These inequalities, unlike the results of racial
+and sexual discrimination, are produced by
+choices and actions that don't seem wrong in
+1 hem selves. People try to provide for their children
+and give them a good education, and some
+have more money to use for this purpose than
+others. People pay for the products, services,
+;1nd rwrfnrmances they want, and some per;
+... ·: ;:w:~ or Jll<lllubcturers get richer than others
+[ 78]
+.Justice tnv.:.;:
+FIL
+because what they have to offer is wanted by
+more people. Businesses and organizations of all
+kinds try to hire employees who will do the job
+well, and pay higher salaries for those with unusual
+skills. If one restaurant is full of people
+and another next door is empty because the first
+has a talented chef and the second doesn't, the
+customers who choose the first restaurant and
+avoid the second haven't done anything wrong,
+even though their choices have an unhappy effect
+on the owner and employees of the second
+restaurant, and on their families.
+Such effects are most disturbing when they
+leave some people in a very bad way. In some
+countries large segments of the population live
+in poverty from generation to generation. But
+even in a wealthy country like the United States,
+lots of people start life with two strikes against
+them, from economic and educational disadvantages.
+Some can overcome those disadvantages,
+but it's much harder than making good from a
+higher starting point.
+Most disturbing of all are the enormous inequalities
+in wealth, health, education, and development
+between rich and poor countries.
+Most people in the world have no chance of ever
+being as well off economically as the poorest
+people in Europe, Japan, or the United States. ~
+These large differences in good and ha~ 1~~~ ~
+[ 79 ] l\!_;r.., '· . f*
+What Does It All Mean?
+certainly seem unfair; but what, if anything,
+should be done about them?
+We have to think about both the inequality itself,
+and the remedy that would be needed to reduce
+or get rid of it. The main question about
+the inequalities themselves is: What kinds of
+causes of inequality are wrong? The main question
+about remedies is: What methods of interfering
+with the inequality are right?
+In the case of deliberate racial or sexual discrimination,
+the answers are e;1sy. The cause of
+the inequality is wrong because the discriminator
+is doing something wrong. And the remedy is
+simply to prevent him from doing it. If a landlord
+refuses to rent to blacks, he should be
+prosecuted.
+But the questions are more difficult in other
+cases. The problem is that inequalities which
+seem wrong can arise from causes which don't
+involve people doing anything wrong. It seems
+unfair that people born much poorer than others
+should suffer disadvantages through no fault
+of their own. But such inequalities exist because
+some people have been more successful than
+others at earning money and have tried to help
+their children as much as possible; and because
+people tend to marry members of their own economic
+and social class, wealth and position accumulate
+and are passed on from generation to
+[ 80]
+justice
+generation. The actions which combine to form
+these causes-employment decisions, purchases,
+marriages, bequests, and efforts to provide
+for and educate children, don't seem wrong
+in themselves. What's wrong, if anything, is the
+result: that some people start life with undeserved
+disadvantages.
+If we object to this kind of bad luck as unfair,
+it must be because we object to people's suffering
+disadvantages through no fault of their own,
+merely as a result of the ordinary operation of
+the socioeconomic system into which they are
+born. Some of us may also believe that all bad
+luck that is not a person's fault, such as that of
+being born with a physical handicap, should be
+compensated if possible. But let us leave those
+cases aside in this discussion. I want to concentrate
+on the undeserved inequalities that arise
+through the working of society and. the economy,
+particularly a competitive economy.
+The two main sources of these undeserved inequalities,
+as I have said, are differences in the
+socioeconomic classes into which people are
+born, and differences in their natural abilities or
+talents for tasks which are in demand. You may
+not think there is anything wrong with inequality
+caused in these ways. But if you think there is
+something wrong with it, and if you think a society
+should try to reduce it, then you must pro-
+[ 81 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+pose a remedy which either interferes with the
+causes themselves, or interferes with the unequal
+effects directly.
+Now the causes themselves, as we have seen,
+include relatively innocent choices by many people
+about how to spend their time and money
+and how to lead their lives. To interfere with
+people's choices about what products to buy,
+how to help their children, or how much to pay
+their employees, is very different from interfering
+with them when they want to rob banks or
+discriminate against blacks or women. A more
+indirect interference in the economic life of individuals
+is taxation, particularly taxation of income
+and inheritance, and some taxes on consumption,
+which can be designed to take more
+from the rich than from the poor. This is one
+way a government can try to reduce the development
+of great inequalities in wealth over generations-
+by not letting people keep all of their
+money.
+More important, however, would be to use the
+public resources obtained through taxes to provide
+some of the missing advantages of education
+and support to the children of those families
+that can't afford to do it themselves. Public
+social welfare programs try to do this, by using
+tax revenues to provide basic benefits of health
+care, food, housing, and education. This attacks
+the inequalities directly.
+[ 82]
+justice
+When it comes to the inequalities that result
+from differences in ability, there isn't much one
+can do to interfere with the causes short of abolishing
+the competitive economy. So long as
+there is competition to hire people for jobs,
+competition between people to get jobs, and
+competition between firms for customers, some
+people are going to make more money than others.
+The only alternative would be a centrally directed
+economy in which everyone was paid
+roughly the same and people were assigned to
+their jobs by some kind of centralized authority.
+Though it has been tried, this system has heavy
+costs in both freedom and efficiency-far too
+heavy, in my opinion, to be acceptable, though
+others would disagree.
+If one wants to reduce the inequalities resulting
+from different abilities without getting rid of
+the competitive economy, it will be necessary to
+attack the inequalities themselves. This can be
+done through higher taxation of higher incomes,
+and some free provision of public services
+to everyone, or to people with lower incomes.
+It could include cash payments to those
+whose earning power is lowest, in the form of a
+so-called "negative income tax." None of these
+programs would get rid of undeserved inequalities
+completely, and any system of taxation will
+have other effects on the economy, including effects
+on employment and the poor, which may
+[ 83]
+What Does It All Mean?
+be hard to predict; so the issue of a remedy is
+always complicated.
+But to concentrate on the philosophical point:
+the measures needed to reduce undeserved inequalities
+arising from differences in class background
+and natural talent will involve interference
+with people's economic activities, mainly
+through taxation: the government takes money
+from some people and uses it to help others.
+This is not the only use of taxation, or even the
+main use: many taxes are spent on things which
+benefit the well-off more than the poor. But redistributive
+taxation, as it is called, is the type relevant
+to our problem. It does involve the use of
+government power to interfere with what people
+do, not because what they do is wrong in itself,
+like theft or discrimination, but because it contributes
+to an effect which seems unfair.
+There are those who don't think redistributive
+taxation is right, because the government
+shouldn't interfere with people unless they are
+doing something wrong, and the economic
+transactions that produce all these inequalities
+aren't wrong, but perfectly innocent. They may
+also hold that there's nothing wrong with the resulting
+inequalities themselves: that even though
+they're undeserved and not the fault of the victims,
+society is not obliged to fix them. That's
+just life, they will say: some people are more for-
+[ 84]
+justice
+tunate than others. The only time we have to do
+anything about it is when the misfortune is the
+result of someone's doing a wrong to someone
+else.
+This is a controversial political issue, and
+there are many different opinions about it.
+Some people object more to the inequalities that
+come from the socioeconomic class a person is
+born into, than to the inequalities resulting from
+differences in talent or ability. They don't like
+the effects of one person being born rich and
+another in a slum, but feel that a person deserves
+what he can earn with his own effortsso
+that there's nothing unfair about one person
+earning a lot and another very little because the
+first has a marketable talent or capacity for
+learning sophisticated skills while the second can
+only do unskilled labor.
+I myself think that inequalities resulting from
+either of these causes are unfair, and that it is
+clearly unjust when a socioeconomic system results
+in some people living under significant material
+and social disadvantages through no fault
+of their own, if this could be prevented through
+a system of redistributive taxation and social
+welfare programs. But to make up your own
+mind about the issue, you have to consider both
+what causes of inequality you find unfair, and
+what remedies you find legitimate.
+[ 85 J
+What Does It All Mean?
+We've been talking mainly about the problem
+of social justice within one society. The problem
+is much more difficult on a world scale, both because
+the inequalities are so great and because
+it's not clear what remedies are possible in the
+absence of a world government that could levy
+world taxes and see that they are used effectively.
+There is no prospect of a world government,
+which is just as well, since it would probably
+be a horrible government in many ways.
+However there is still a problem of global justice,
+though it's hard to know what to do about
+it in the system of separate sovereign states we
+have now.
+[ 86]
+9
+Death
+Everybody dies, but not everybody agrees about
+what death is. Some believe they will survive
+after the death of their bodies, going to Heaven
+or Hell or somewhere else, becoming a ghost, or
+returning to Earth in a different body, perhaps
+not even as a human being. Others believe they
+will cease to exist-that the self is snuffed out
+when the body dies. And among those who believe
+they will cease to exist, some think this is a
+terrible fact, and others don't.
+It is sometimes said that no one can conceive
+of his own nonexistence, and that therefore we
+can't really helievc that our existence will con11.'
+to an end with our deaths. But this dot'sn't s<·cin
+true. Of course you can't corKei,·e of your own
+nonexistence from the inside. You can't conceive
+[ 87 ]
+What Does It All Mean?
+of what it would be like to be totally annihilated,
+because there's nothing it would be like, from
+the inside. But in that sense, you can't conceive
+of what it would be like to be completely unconscious,
+even temporarily. The fact that you can't
+conceive of that from the inside doesn't mean
+you can't conceive of it at all: you just have to
+think of yourself from the outside, having been
+knocked out, or in a deep sleep. And even
+though you have to be conscious to think that, it
+doesn't mean that you're thinking of yourself as
+conscious.
+It's the same with death. To imagine your own
+annihilation you have to think of it from the outside-
+think about the body of the person you
+are, with all the life and experience gone from
+it. To imagine something it is not necessary to
+imagine how it would feel for you to experience
+it. When you imagine your own funeral, you are
+not imagining the impossible situation of being
+present at your own funeral: you're imagining
+how it would look through someone else's eyes.
+Of course you are alive while you think of your
+own death, but that is no more of a problem
+than being conscious while imagining yourself
+unconscious.
+The question of survival after death is related
+to the mind-body problem, which we discussed
+earlier. If dualism is true, and each person con-
+[ 88]
+Death
+sists of a soul and a body connected together, we
+can understand how life after death might be
+possible. The soul would have to be able to exist
+on its own and have a mental life without the
+help of the body: then it might leave the body
+when the body dies, instead of being destroyed.
+It wouldn't be able to have the kind of mental
+life of action and sensory perception that depends
+on being attached to the body (unless it
+got attached to a new body), but it might have a
+different sort of inner life, perhaps depending
+on different causes and influences-direct communication
+with other souls, for instance.
+I say life after death might be possible if dualism
+were true. It also might not be possible, because
+the survival of the soul, and its continued
+consciousness, might depend entirely on . the
+support and stimulation it gets from the body in
+which it is housed-and it might not be able to
+switch bodies.
+But if dualism is not true, and mental processes
+go on in the brain and are entirely dependent
+on the biological functioning of the brain
+and the rest of the organism, then life after
+death of the body is not possible. Or to put it
+more exactly, mental life after death would require
+the restoration of biological, physical life:
+it would require that the body come to life again.
+This might become technically possible some
+[ 89]
+What Does It All Mean?
+day: It may become possible to freeze people's
+bodies when they die, and then later on by advanced
+medical procedures to fix whatever was
+the matter with them, and bring them back to
+life.
+Even if this became possible, there would still
+be a question whether the person who was
+brought to life several centuries later would be
+you or somebody else. Maybe if you were frozen
+after death and your body was later revived, you
+wouldn't wake up, but only someone very like
+you, with memories of your past life. But even if
+revival after death of the same you in the same
+body should become possible, that's not what's
+ordinarily meant by life after death. Life after
+death usually means life without your old body.
+It's hard to know how we could decide
+whether we have separable souls. All the evidence
+is that before death, conscious life depends
+entirely on what happens in the nervous system.
+If we go only by ordinary observation, rather
+than religious doctrines or spiritualist claims to
+communicate with the dead, there is no reason
+to believe in an afterlife. Is that, however, a reason
+to believe that there is not an afterlife? I
+think so, but others may prefer to remain
+neutral.
+Still others may believe in an afterlife on the
+basis of faith, in the absence of evidence. I my-
+[ 90]
+Death
+self don't fully understand how this kind of
+faith-inspired belief is possible, but evidently
+some people can manage it, and even find it
+natural.
+Let me turn to the other part of the problem:
+how we ought to feel about death. Is it a good
+thing, a bad thing, or neutral? I am talking about
+how it's reasonable to feel about your own
+death-not so much about other people's.
+Should you look forward to the prospect of
+death with terror, sorrow, indifference, or
+relief?
+Obviously it depends on what death is. If
+there is life after death, the prospect will be grim
+or happy depending on where your soul will end
+up. But the difficult and most philosophically interesting
+question is how we should feel ab<;>ut
+death if it's the end. Is it a terrible thing to go
+out of existence?
+People differ about this. Some say that nonexistence,
+being nothing at all, can't possibly be
+either good or bad for the dead person. Others
+say that to be annihilated, to have the possible
+future course of your life cut off completely, is
+the ultimate evil, even if we all have to face it.
+Still others say death is a blessing-not of course
+if it comes too early, but eventually-because it
+would be unbearably boring to live forever.
+If death without anything after it is either a
+[ 91 J
+What Does It All Mean?
+good or a bad thing for the person who dies, it
+must be a negative good or evil. Since in itself it
+is nothing, it can't he either pleasant or unpleasant.
+If it's good, that must be because it is the
+absence of something bad (like boredom or
+pain); if it's bad, that must be because it is the
+absence of something good (like interesting or
+pleasant experiences).
+Now it might seem that death can't have any
+value, positive or negative, because someone
+who doesn't exist can't be either benefited or
+harmed: after all, even a negative good or evil
+has to happen to somebody. But on reflection, this
+is not really a problem. We can say that the person
+who used to exist has been benefited or
+harmed by death. For instance, suppose he is
+trapped in a burning building, and a beam falls
+on his head, killing him instantly. As a result, he
+doesn't suffer the agony of being burned to
+death. It seems that in that case we can say he
+was lucky to be killed painlessly, because it
+avoided something worse. Death at that time was
+a negative good, because it saved him from the
+positive evil he would otherwise have suffered
+for the next five minutes. And the fact that he's
+not around to enjoy that negative good doesn't
+mean it's not a good for him at all. "Him" means
+the person who was alive, and who would have
+suffered if he hadn't died.
+[ 92]
+Death
+The same kind of thing could be said about
+death as a negative evil. When you die, all the
+good things in your life come to a stop: no more
+meals, movies, travel, conversation, love, work,
+books, music, or anything else. If those things
+would be good, their absence is bad. Of course
+you won't miss them: death is not like being
+locked up in solitary confinement. But the ending
+of everything good in life, because of the
+stopping of life itself, seems clearly to be a negative
+evil for the person who was alive and is now
+dead. When someone we know dies, we feel
+sorry not only for ourselves but for him, because
+he can't see the sun shine today, or smell the
+bread in the toaster.
+When you think of your own death, the fact
+that all the good things in life will come to_ an
+end is certainly a reason for regret. But that
+doesn't seem to be the whole story. Most people
+want there to be more of what they enjoy in life,
+but for some people, the prospect of nonexistence
+is itself frightening, in a way that isn't adequately
+explained by what has been said so far.
+The thought that the world will go on without
+you, that you will become nothing, is very hard
+to take in.
+It's not clear why. We all accept the fact that
+there was a time before we were born, when we
+didn't yet exist-so why should we be so dis-
+[ 93]
+What Does It All Mean?
+turbed at the prospect of nonexistence after our
+death? But somehow it doesn't feel the same.
+The prospect of nonexistence is frightening, at
+least to many people, in a way that past nonexistence
+cannot be.
+The fear of death is very puzzling, in a way
+that regret about the end of life is not. It's easy
+to understand that we might want to have more
+life, more of the things it contains, so that we see
+death as a negative evil. But how can the prospect
+of your own nonexistence be alarming in a positive
+way? If we really cease to exist at death,
+there's nothing to look forward to, so how can
+there be anything to be afraid of? If one thinks
+about it logically, it seems as though death
+should be something to be afraid of only if we
+will survive it, and perhaps undergo some terrifying
+transformation. But that doesn't prevent
+many people from thinking that annihilation is
+one of the worst things that could happen to
+them.
+[ 94]
+10
+The Meaning of
+Life
+Perhaps you have had the thought that nothing
+really matters, because in two hundred years
+we'll all be dead. This is a peculiar thought, because
+it's not clear why the fact that we'll be
+dead in two hundred years should imply that
+nothing we do now really matters.
+The idea seems to be that we are in some kind
+of rat race, struggling to achieve our goals and
+make something of our lives, but that this makes
+sense only if those achievements will be permanent.
+But they won't be. Even if you produce a
+great work of literature which continues to be
+read thousands of years from now, eventually
+the solar system will cool or the universe will
+wind down or collapse, and all trace of your efforts
+will vanish. In any case, we can't hope for
+[ 95]
+What Does It All Mean?
+even a fraction of this sort of immortality. If
+there's any point at all to what we do, we have
+to find it within our own lives.
+Why is there any difficulty in that? You can explain
+the point of most of the things you do. You
+work to earn money to support yourself and perhaps
+your family. You eat because you're hungry,
+sleep because you're tired, go for a walk or
+call up a friend because you feel like it, read the
+newspaper to find out what's going on in the
+world. If you didn't do any of those things you'd
+be miserable; so what's the big problem?
+The problem is that although there are justifications
+and explanations for most of the
+things, big and small, that we do within life, none
+of these explanations explain the point of your
+life as a whole-the whole of which all these activities,
+successes and failures, strivings and disappointments
+are parts. If you think about the
+whole thing, there seems to be no point to it at
+all. Looking at it from the outside, it wouldn't
+matter if you had never existed. And after you
+have gone out of existence, it won't matter that
+you did exist.
+Of course your existence matters to other
+people-your parents and others who care
+about you-but taken as a whole, their lives
+have no point either, so it ultimately doesn't
+matter that you matter to them. You matter to
+[ 96]
+The Meaning of Life
+them and they matter to you, and that may give
+your life a feeling of significance, but you're just
+taking in each other's washing, so to speak.
+Given that any person exists, he has needs and
+concerns which make particular things and people
+within his life matter to him. But the whole
+thing doesn't matter.
+But does it matter that it doesn't matter? "So
+what?" you might say. "It's enough that it matters
+whether I get to the station before my train
+leaves, or whether I've remembered to feed the
+cat. I don't need more than that to keep going."
+This is a perfectly good reply. But it only works
+if you really can avoid setting your sights higher,
+and asking what the point of the whole thing is.
+For once you do that, you open yourself to the
+possibility that your life is meaningless.
+The thought that you'll be dead in two
+hundred years is just a way of seeing your life
+embedded in a larger context, so that the point
+of smaller things inside it seems not to be
+enough-seems to leave a larger question unanswered.
+But what if your life as a whole did
+have a point in relation to something larger?
+Would that mean that it wasn't meaningless
+after all?
+There are various ways your life could have a
+larger meaning. You might be part of a political
+or social movement which changed the world for
+[ 97]
+What Does It All Mean?
+the better, to the benefit of future generations.
+Or you might just help provide a good life for
+your own children and their descendants. Or
+your life might be thought to have meaning in a
+religious context, so that your time on Earth was
+just a preparation for an eternity in direct contact
+with God.
+About the types of meaning that depend on
+relations to other people, even people in the distant
+future, I've already indicated what the
+problem is. If one's life has a point as a part of
+something larger, it is still possible to ask about
+that larger thing, what is the point of it? Either
+there's an answer in terms of something still
+larger or there isn't. If there is, we simply repeat
+the question. If there isn't, then our search for
+a point has come to an end with something
+which has no point. But if that pointlessness is
+acceptable for the larger thing of which our life
+is a part, why shouldn't it be acceptable already
+for our life taken as a whole? Why isn't it all
+right for your life to be pointless? And if it isn't
+acceptable there, why should it be acceptable
+when we get to the larger context? Why don't we
+have to go on to ask, "But what is the point of
+all that?" (human history, the succession of the
+generations, or whatever).
+The appeal to a religious meaning to life is a
+bit different. If you believe that the meaning of
+[ 98]
+The Meaning of Life
+your life comes from fulfilling the purpose of
+God, who loves you, and seeing Him in eternity,
+then it doesn't seem appropriate to ask, "And
+what is the point of that?" It's supposed to be
+something which is its own point, and can't have
+a purpose outside itself. But for this very reason
+it has its own problems.
+The idea of God seems to be the idea of something
+that can explain everything else, without
+having to be explained itself. But it's very hard
+to understand how there could be such a thing.
+If we ask the question, "Why is the world like
+this?" and are offered a religious answer, how
+can we be prevented from asking again, "And
+why is that true?" What kind of answer would
+bring all of our "Why?" questions to. a stop,
+once and for all? And if they can stop there, why
+couldn't they have stopped earlier?
+The same problem seems to arise if God and
+His purposes are offered as the ultimate explanation
+of the value and meaning of our lives.
+The idea that our lives fulfil God's purpose is
+supposed to give them their point, in a way that
+doesn't require or admit of any further point.
+One isn't supposed to ask "What is the point of
+God?" any more than one is supposed to ask,
+"What is the explanation of God?"
+But my problem here, as with the role of God
+as ultimate explanation, is that I'm not sure I
+[ 99]
+What Does It All Mean?
+understand the idea. Can there really be something
+which gives point to everything else_ by encompassing
+it, but which couldn't have, or need,
+any point itself? Something whose point can't be
+questioned from outside because there is no
+outside?
+If God is supposed to give our lives a meaning
+that we can't understand, it's not much of a consolation.
+God as ultimate justification, like God
+as ultimate explanation, may be an incomprehensible
+answer to a question that we can't get
+rid of. On the other hand, maybe that's the
+whole point, and I am just failing to understand
+religious ideas. Perhaps the belief in God is the
+belief that the universe is intelligible, but not to
+us.
+Leaving that issue aside, let me return to the
+smaller-scale dimensions of human life. Even if
+life as a whole is meaningless, perhaps that's
+nothing to worry about. Perhaps we can recognize
+it and just go on as before. The trick is to
+keep your eyes on what's in front of you, and
+allow justifications to come to an end inside your
+life, and inside the lives of others to whom you
+are connected. If you ever ask yourself the question,
+"But what's the point of being alive at
+all?"-leading the particular life of a student or
+bartender or whatever you happen to be-you'll
+answer "There's no point. It wouldn't matter if
+[ 100]
+The Meaning of Life
+I didn't exist at all, or if I didn't care about anything.
+But I do. That's all there is to it."
+Some people find this attitude perfectly satisfying.
+Others find it depressing, though unavoidable.
+Part of the problem is that some of us
+have an incurable tendency to take ourselves seriously.
+We want to matter to ourselves "from
+the outside." If our lives as a whole seem pointless,
+then a part of us is dissatisfied-the part
+, that is always looking over our shoulders at what
+we are doing. Many human efforts, particularly
+those in the service of serious ambitions rather
+than just comfort and survival, get some of their
+energy from a sense of importance-a sense
+that what you are doing is not just important to
+you, but important in some larger. sense: important,
+period. If we have to give this up, it may
+threaten to take the wind out of our sails. If iife
+is not real, life is not earnest, and the grave is its
+goal, perhaps it's ridiculous to take ourselves so
+seriously. On the other hand, if we can't help
+taking ourselves so seriously, perhaps we just
+have to put up with being ridiculous. Life may
+be not only meaningless but absurd.
diff --git a/data/singer_pract_ethics.txt b/data/singer_pract_ethics.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..874d3e280726eabad4173ddc45ca779b78a03cb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/singer_pract_ethics.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,13838 @@
+PREFACE
+Practical ethics covers a wide area. We can find ethical ramifications
+in most of our choices, if we look hard enough. This
+book does not attempt to cover this whole area. The problems
+it deals with have been selected on two grounds: their relevance,
+and the extent to which philosophical reasoning can contribute
+to a discussion of them.
+I regard an ethical issue as relevant if it is one that any thinking
+person must face. Some of the issues discussed in this book
+confront us daily: what are our personal responsibilities towards
+the poor? Are we justified in treating animals as nothing more
+than machines- producing flesh for us to eat? Should we be
+using paper that is not recycled? And why should we bother
+about acting in accordance with moral principles anyway?
+Other problems, like abortion and euthanasia, fortunately are
+not everyday decisions for most of us; but they are issues that
+can arise at some time in our lives. They are also issues of current
+concern about which any active participant in our society's decision-
+making process needs to reflect.
+The extent to which an issue can usefully be discussed philosophically
+depends on the kind of issue it is. Some issues are
+controversial largely because there are facts in dispute. For example,
+whether the release of new organisms created by the
+use of recombinant DNA ought to be permitted seems to hang
+largely on whether the organisms pose a serious risk to the
+environment. Although philosophers may lack the expertise to
+tackle this question, they may still be able to say something
+useful about whether it is acceptable to run a given risk of
+vii
+Preface
+environmental damage. In other cases, however, the facts are
+clear and accepted by both sides; it is conflicting ethical views
+that give rise to disagreement over what to do. Then the kind
+of reasoning and analysis that philosophers practise really can
+make a difference. The issues discussed in this book are ones
+in which ethical, rather than factual, disagreement determines
+the positions people take. The potential contribution of philosophers
+to discussions of these issues is therefore considerable.
+This book has played a central role in events that must give
+pause to anyone who thinks that freedom of thought and
+expression can be taken for granted in liberal democracies today.
+Since its first publication in 1979, it has been widely read and
+used in many courses at universities and colleges. It has been
+tr-anslated into German, Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and Swedish.
+The response has generally been positive. There are, of
+course, many who disagree with the arguments presented in
+the book, but the disagreement has almost always been at the
+level of reasoned debate. The only exception has been the reaction
+in German-speaking countries. In Germany, Austria, and
+Switzerland opposition to the views contained in this book
+reached such a peak that conferences or lectures at which I was
+invited to speak have been cancelled, and courses at German
+universitiej in which the book was to be used have been subjected
+to such repeated disruption that they could not continue.
+For readers interested in further details of this sorry story a fuller
+account is reprinted as an appendix.
+Naturally, the German opposition to this book has made me
+reflect on whether the views I have expressed really are, as at
+least some Germans appear to believe, so erroneous or so dangerous
+that they must not be uttered. Although much of the
+German opposition is simply misinformed about what I am
+saying, there is an underlying truth to the claim that the book
+breaks a taboo - or perhaps more than one taboo. In Germany
+since the defeat of Hitler it has not been possible openly to
+viii
+Preface
+discuss the question of euthanasia, nor the issue of whether a
+human life may be so full of misery as not to be wortl. living.
+More fundamental still, and not limited to Germany, is the taboo
+on comparing the value of human and nonhuman lives. In the
+commotion that followed the cancellation of a conference in
+Germany at which I had been invited to speak, the German
+sponsoring organisation, to disassociate itself from my views,
+passed a series of motions, one of which read: 'The uniqueness
+of human life forbids any comparison - or more specifically,
+equation - of human existence with other living beings, with
+their forms of life or interests.' Comparing, and in some cases
+equating, the lives of humans and animals is exactly what this
+book is about; in fact it could be said that if there is any single
+aspect of this book that distinguishes it from other approaches
+to such issues as human equality, abortion, euthanasia, and the
+environment, it is the fact that these topics are approached with
+a conscious disavowal of any assumption that all members of
+our own species have, merely because they are members of our
+species, any distinctive worth or inherent value that puts them
+above members of other species. The belief in human superiority
+is a very fundamental one, and it underlies our thinking in many
+sensitive areas. To challenge it is no trivial matter, and that such
+a challenge should provoke a strong reaction ought not to suprise
+us. Nevertheless, once we have understood that the
+breaching of this taboo on comparing humans and animals is
+partly responsible for the protests, it becomes clear that there is
+no going back. For reasons that are developed in subsequent
+chapters, to prohibit any cross-species comparisons would be
+philosophically indefensible. It would also make it impossible
+to overcome the wrongs we are now doing to nonhuman animals,
+and would reinforce attitudes that have done immense
+irreparable damage to the environment of this planet that we
+share with members of other species.
+So I have not backed away from the views that have caused
+so much controversy in German-speaking lands. If these views
+ix
+Preface
+have their dangers, the dangers of attempting to continue to
+maintain the present crumbling taboos are greater still. Needless
+to say, many will disagree with what I have to say. Objections
+and counter-arguments are welcome. Since the days of Plato,
+philosophy has advanced dialectically as philosophers have offered
+reasons for disagreeing with the views of other philosophers.
+Disagreement is good, because it is the way to a more
+defensible position; the suggestion that the views I have advanced
+should not even be discussed is, however, a totally different
+matter, and one that I am quite content to leave to readers,
+after they have read and reflected upon the chapters that follow.
+Though I have not changed my views on the issues that have
+aroused the most fanatical opposition, this revised edition contains
+many other changes. I have added two new chapters on
+important ethical questions that were not covered in the previous
+edition: Chapter 9 on the refugee question and chapter
+lOon the environment. Chapter 2 has a new section on equality
+and disability. The sections of Chapter 6 on embryo experimentation
+and fetal tissue use are also new. Every chapter has
+been reworked, factual material has been updated, and where
+my position has been misunderstood by my critics, I have tried
+to make it clearer.
+As far as my underlying ethical views are concerned, some
+of my friends and colleagues will no doubt be distressed to find
+that countless hours spent discussing these matters with me
+have served only to reinforce my conviction that the consequentialist
+approach to ethics taken in the first edition is fundamentally
+sound. There have been two significant changes to
+the form of consequentialism espoused. The first is that I make
+use of the distinction drawn by R. M. Hare, in his book Moral
+Thinking, between two distinct levels of moral reasoning - the
+everyday intuitive level and the more reflective, critical level.
+The second is that I have dropped the suggestion - which I
+advanced rather tentatively in the fifth chapter ofthe first edition
+- that one might try to combine both the 'total' and 'prior
+x
+Preface
+existence' versions of utilitarianism, applying the former to sentient
+beings who are not self-conscious and the latter to those
+who are. I now think that preference utilitarianism draws a
+sufficiently sharp distinction between these two categories of
+being to enable us to apply one version of utilitarianism to all
+sentient beings. Nevertheless, I am still not entirely satisfied with
+my treatment of this whole question of how we should deal
+with ethical choices that involve bringing a being or beings into
+existence. As Chapters 4-7 make clear, the way in which we
+answer this perplexing question has implications for the issues
+of abortion, the treatment of severely disabled newborn infants,
+and for the killing of animals. The period between editions of
+this book has seen the publication of by far the most intricate
+and far-sighted analysis to date of this problem: Derek Parfii's
+Reasons and Persons. Unfortunately, Parfit himself remains baffled
+by the questions he has raised, and his conclusion is that
+the search for 'Theory X' - a satisfactory way of answering the
+question - must continue. So perhaps it is hardly to be expected
+that a satisfactory solution can emerge in this, both slimmer
+and more wide-ranging, volume.
+In writing this book I have made extensive use of my own
+previously published articles and books. Thus Chapter 3 is based
+on Animal Liberation (New York ReviewlRandom House, 2d
+edition, 1990), although it takes into account objections made
+since the book first appeared in 1975. The sections of Chapter
+6 on such topics as in vitro fertilisation, the argument from
+potential, embryo experimentation, and the use of fetal tissue,
+all draw on work I wrote jointly with Karen Dawson, which
+was published as 'IVF and the Argument From Potential' in
+Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 17 (1988), and in Peter Singer,
+Helga Kuhse, and others, Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge
+UniversiW Press, 1990). In this revised edition, Chapter 7 includes
+points reached together with Helga Kuhse in working
+on our much fuller treatment of the issue of euthanasia for
+xi
+Preface
+severely disabled infants, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford University
+Press, 1985). Chapter 8 restates arguments from 'Famine,
+Affluence and Morality', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1
+(1972) and from 'Reconsidering the Famine Relief Argument'
+in Peter Brown and Henry Shue (eds.) Food Policy: The Responsibility
+of the United States in the Life and Death Choices (New York,
+The Free Press, 1977). Chapter 9 again draws on a co-authored
+piece, this time written with my wife, Renata Singer, and first
+published as 'The Ethics of Refugee Policy' in M. Gibney (ed.),
+Open Borders? Closed Societies? (Greenwood Press, New York,
+1988). Chapter lOis based on 'Environmental Values', a chapter
+that I contributed to Ian Marsh (ed.), The Environmental Challenge
+(Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991). Parts of Chapter
+11 draw on my first book, Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford,
+Clarendon Press, 1973).
+H. J. McCloskey, Derek Parfit, and Robert Young provided
+useful comments on a draft version of the first edition of this
+book. Robert Young's ideas also entered into my thinking at an
+earlier stage, when we jointly taught a course on these topics
+at La Trobe University. The chapter on euthanasia, in particular,
+owes much to his ideas, though he may not agree with everything
+in it. Going back further still, my interest in ethics was
+stimulated by H. J. McCloskey, whom I was fortunate to have
+as a teacher during my undergraduate years; while the mark
+left by R. M. Hare, who taught me at Oxford, is apparent in the
+ethical foundations underlying the positions taken in this book.
+Jeremy Mynott, of Cambridge University Press, encouraged me
+to write the book and helped to shape and improve it as it went
+along.
+For assistance with the revised edition, I must thank those
+with whom I have worked jointly on material that has been
+included in this book: Karen Dawson, Helga Kuhse, and Renata
+Singer. Helga Kuhse, in particular, has been a close colleague
+for the past ten years, and during that period I have learned
+much by discussing most of the topics in this book with her.
+xii
+Preface
+She also read and commented on several chapters of this revised
+edition. Paola Cavalieri gave me detailed comments and criticism
+on the entire draft, and I thank her for suggesting several
+improvements. There are, of course, many others who have
+challenged what I wrote in the first edition and forced me to
+think about these issues again, but to thank them all is impossible,
+and to thank a few would be unjust. This time it was
+Terence Moore, at Cambridge University Press, whose enthusiasm
+for the book provided the stimulus for me to carry out
+the revisions.
+To give an uncluttered text, the notes, references, and suggested
+further reading are grouped together at the end of the
+book.
+xiii
+1
+ABOUT ETHICS
+THIS book is about practical ethics, that is, the application
+of ethics or morality - I shall use the words interchangeably
+- to practical issues like the treatment of ethnic minorities,
+equality for women, the use of animals for food and research,
+the preservation of the natural environment, abortion, euthanasia,
+and the obligation of the wealthy to help the poor. No
+doubt the reader will want to get on to these issues without
+delay; but there are some preliminaries that must be dealt with
+at the start. In order to have a useful discussion within ethics,
+it is necessary to say a little about ethics, so that we have a clear
+understanding of what we are doing when we discuss ethical
+questions. This first chapter therefore sets the stage for the remainder
+of the book. In order to prevent it from growing into
+an entire volume itself, I have kept it brief. If at times it is
+dogmatic, that is because I cannot take the space properly to
+consider all the different conceptions of ethics that might be
+opposed to the one I shall defend; but this chapter will at least
+serve to reveal the assumptions on which the remainder of the
+book is based.
+WHAT ETHICS IS NOT
+Some people think that morality is now out of date. They regard
+morality as a system of nasty puritanical prohibitions, mainly
+designed to stop people having fun. Traditional moralists claim
+to be the defenders of morality in general, but they are really
+defending a particular moral code. They have been allowed to
+1
+Pradical Ethics
+preempt the field to such an extent that when a newspaper
+headline reads BISHOP ATIACKS DECLINING MORAL STANDARDS,
+we expect to read yet again about promiscuity, homosexuality,
+pornography, and so on, and not about the puny
+amounts we give as overseas aid to poorer nations, or our reckless
+indifference to the natural environment of our planet.
+So the first thing to say about ethics is that it is not a set of
+prohibitions particularly concerned with sex. Even in the era of
+AIDS, sex raises no unique moral issues at all. Decisions about
+sex may involve considerations of honesty, concern for others,
+prudence, and so on, but there is nothing special about sex in
+this respect, for the same could be said of decisions about driving
+a car. (In fact, the moral issues raised by driving a car, both
+from an environmental and from a safety point of view, are
+much more serious than those raised by sex.) Accordingly, this
+book contains no discussion of sexual morality. There are more
+important ethical issues to be considered.
+Second, ethics is not an ideal system that is noble in theory
+but no good in practice. The reverse of this is closer to the truth:
+an ethical judgment that is no good in practice must suffer from
+a theoretical defect as well, for the whole point of ethical judgments
+is to guide practice.
+Some people think that ethics is inapplicable to the real world
+because they regard it as a system of short and simple rules like
+'Do not lie', 'Do not steal', and 'Do not kill'. It is not surprising
+that those who hold this view of ethics should also believe that
+ethics is not suited to life's complexities. In unusual situations,
+simple rules conflict; and even when they do not, following a
+rule can lead to disaster. It may normally be wrong to lie, but
+if you were living in Nazi Germany and the Gestapo came to
+your door looking for Jews, it would surely be right to deny
+the existence of the Jewish family hiding in your attic.
+Like the failure of a restrictive sexual morality, the failure of
+an ethic of simple rules must not be taken as a failure of ethics
+as a whole. It is only a failure of one view of ethics, and not
+2
+About Ethics
+even an irremediable failure of that view. The deontologists -
+those who think that ethics is a system of rules - can rescue
+their position by finding more complicated and more specific
+rules that do not conflict with each other, or by ranking the
+rules in some hierarchical structure to resolve conflicts between
+them. Moreover, there is a long-standing approach to ethics
+that is quite untouched by the complexities that make simple
+rules difficult to apply. This is the consequentialist view. Consequentialists
+start not with moral rules but with goals. They
+assess actions by the extent to which they further these goals.
+The best-known, though not the only, consequentialist theory
+is utilitarianism. The classical utilitarian regards an action as
+right if it produces as much or more of an increase in the happiness
+of all affected by it than any alternative action, and wrong
+if it does not.
+The consequences of an action vary according to the circumstances
+in which it is performed. Hence a utilitarian can never
+properly be accused of a lack of realism, or of a rigid adherence
+to ideals in defiance of practical experience. The utilitarian will
+judge lying bad in some circumstances and good in others, depending
+on its consequences.
+Third, ethics is not something intelligible only in the context
+of religion. I shall treat ethics as entirely independent of religion.
+Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because
+the very meaning of 'good' is nothing other than 'what
+God approves'. Plato refuted a similar claim more than two
+thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of some
+actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case
+it cannot be the gods' approval that makes them good. The
+alternative view makes divine approval entirely arbitrary: if the
+gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of
+helping our neighbours, torture would have been good and
+helping our neighbours bad. Some modem theists have attempted
+to extricate themselves from this type of dilemma by
+maintaining that God is good and so could not possibly approve
+3
+\
+Pradical Ethics
+of torture; but these theists are caught in a trap of their own
+making, for what can they possibly mean by the assertion that
+God is good? That God is approved of by God?
+Traditionally, the more important link between religion and
+ethics was that religion was thought to provide a reason for
+doing what is right, the reason being that those who are virtuous
+will be rewarded by an eternity of bliss while the rest roast in
+hell. Not all religious thinkers have accepted this argument:
+Immanuel Kant, a most pious Christian, scorned anything that
+smacked of a self-interested motive for obeying the moral law.
+We must obey it, he said, for its own sake. Nor do we have to
+be Kantians to dispense with the motivation offered by traditional
+religion. There is a long line of thought that finds the
+source of ethics in the attitudes of benevolence and sympathy
+for others that most people have. This is, however, a complex
+topic, and since it is the subject of the final chapter of this book
+I shall not pursue it here. It is enough to say that our everyday
+observation of our fellow human beings clearly shows that ethical
+behaviour does not require belief in heaven and hell.
+The fourth, and last, claim about ethics that I shall deny in
+this opening chapter is that ethics is relative or subjective. At
+least, I shall deny these claims in some of the senses in which
+they are often made. This point requires a more extended discussion
+than the other three.
+Let us take first the oft -asserted idea that ethics is relative to
+the society one happens to live in. This is true in one sense and
+false in another. It is true that, as we have already seen in
+discussing consequentialism, actions that are right in one situation
+because of their good consequences may be wrong in
+another situation because of their bad consequences. Thus casual
+sexual intercourse may be wrong when it leads to the existence
+of children who cannot be adequately cared for, and not
+wrong when, because of the existence of effective contraception,
+it does not lead to reproduction at all. But this is only a superficial
+form of relativism. While it suggests that the applicability
+4
+About Ethics
+of a specific principle like 'Casual sex is wrong' may be relative
+to time and place, it says nothing against such a principle being
+objectively valid in specific circumstances, or against the universal
+applicability of a more general principle like 'Do what
+increases happiness and reduces suffering:
+The more fundamental form of relativism became popular in
+the nineteenth century when data on the morai-beliefs and
+practices of far-flung societies began pouring in. To the strict
+reign of Victorian prudery the knowledge that there were places
+where sexual relations between unmarried people were regarded
+as perfectly wholesome brought the seeds of a revolution
+in sexual attitudes. It is not surprising that to some the new
+knowledge suggested, not merely that the moral code of nineteenth-
+century Europe was not objectively valid, but that no
+moral judgment can do more than reflect the customs of the
+society in which it is made.
+Marxists adapted this form of relativism to their own theories.
+The ruling ideas of each period, they said, are the ideas of its
+ruling class, and so the morality of a society is relative to its
+dominant economic class, and thus indirectly relative to its economic
+basis. So they triumphantly refuted the claims of feudal
+and bourgeois morality to objective, universal validity. But this
+raises a problem: if all morality is relative, what is so special
+about communism? Why side with the proletariat rather than
+the bourgeoisie?
+Engels dealt with this problem in the only way possible, by
+abandoning relativism in favour of the more limited claim that
+the morality of a society divided into classes will always be
+relative to the ruling class, although the morality of a society
+without class antagonisms could be a 'really human' morality.
+This is no longer relativism at all. Nevertheless, Marxism, in a
+confused sort of way, still provides the impetus for a lot of woolly
+relativist ideas.
+The problem that led Engels to abandon relativism defeats
+ordinary ethical relativism as well. Anyone who has thought
+5
+Practical Ethics
+through a difficult ethical decision knows that being told what
+our society thinks we ought to do does not settle the quandary.
+We have to reach our own decision. The beliefs and customs
+we were brought up with may exercise great influence on us,
+but once we start to reflect upon them we can decide whether
+to act in accordance with them, or to go against them.
+The opposite view - that ethics is always relative to a particular
+society - has most implausible consequences. If our society
+disapproves of slavery, while another society approves of it, we
+have no basis to choose between these conflicting views. Indeed,
+on a relativist analysis there is really no conflict - when I say
+slavery is wrong I am really only saying that my society disapproves
+of slavery, and when the slaveowners from the other
+society say that slavery is right, they are only saying that their
+society approves of it. Why argue? Obviously we could both be
+speaking the truth.
+Worse still, the relativist cannot satisfactorily account for the
+nonconformist. If 'slavery is wrong' means 'my society disapproves
+of slavery', then someone who lives in a society that
+does not disapprove of slavery is, in claiming that slavery is
+wrong, making a simple factual error. An opinion poll could
+demonstrate the error of an ethical judgment. Would-be reformers
+are therefore in a parlous situation: when they set out
+to change the ethical views of their fellow-citizens they are
+necessarily mistaken; it is only when they succeed in winning
+most of the society over to their own views that those views
+become right.
+These difficulties are enough to sink ethical relativism; ethical
+subjectivism at least avoids making nonsense of the valiant efforts
+of would-be moral reformers, for it makes ethical judgments
+depend on the approval or disapproval of the person
+making the judgment, rather than that person's society. There
+are other difficulties, though, that at least some forms of ethical
+subjectivism cannot overcome.
+If those who say that ethics is subjective mean by this that
+6
+About Ethics
+when I say that cruelty to animals is wrong I am really only
+saying that I disapprove of cruelty to animals, they are faced
+with an aggravated form of one of the difficulties of relativism:
+the inability to account for ethical disagreement. What was true
+for the relativist of disagreement between people from different
+societies is for the subjectivist true of disagreement between any
+two people. I say cruelty to animals is wrong: someone else
+says it is not wrong. If this means that I disapprove of cruelty
+to animals and someone else does not, both statements may be
+true and so there is nothing to argue about.
+Other theories often described as 'subjectivist' are not open
+to this objection. Suppose someone maintains that ethical judgmeJ:?
+ts are neither true nor false because they do not describe
+anything - neither objective moral facts, nor one's own subjective
+states of mind. This theory might hold that, as C. 1.
+Stevenson suggested, ethical judgments express attitudes, rather
+than describe them, and we disagree about ethics because we
+try, by expressing our own attitude, to bring our listeners to a
+similar attitude. Or it might be, as R. M. Hare has urged, that
+ethical judgments are prescriptions and therefore more closely
+related to commands than to statements of fact. On this view
+we disagree because we care about what people do. Those features
+of ethical argument that imply the existence of objective
+moral standards can be explained away by maintaining that this
+is some kind of error - perhaps the legacy of the belief that
+ethics is a God-given system of law, or perhaps just another
+example of our tendency to objectify our personal wants and
+preferences. J. 1. Mackie has defended this view.
+Provided they are carefully distinguished from the crude form
+of subjectivism that sees ethical judgments as descriptions of the
+speaker's attitudes, these are plausible accounts of ethics. In
+their denial of a realm of ethical facts that is part of the real
+world, existing quite independently of us, they are no doubt
+correct; but does it follow from this that ethical judgments are
+immune from criticism, that there is no role for reason or ar-
+7
+Practical Ethics
+gument in ethics, and that, from the standpoint of reason, any
+ethical judgment is as good as any other? I do not think it does,
+and none of the three philosophers referred to in the previous
+paragraph denies reason and argument a role in ethics, though
+they disagree as to the significance of this role.
+This issue of the role that reason can play in ethics is the
+crucial point raised by the claim that ethics is subjective. The
+non-existence of a mysterious realm of objective ethical facts
+does not imply the non-existence of ethical reasoning. It may
+even help, since if we could arrive at ethical judgments only by
+intuiting these strange ethical facts, ethical argument would be
+more difficult still. So what has to be shown to put practical
+ethics on a sound basis is that ethical reasoning is possible. Here
+the temptation is to say simply that the proof of the pudding
+lies in the eating, and the proof that reasoning is possible in
+ethics is to be found in the remaining chapters of this book; but
+this is not entirely satisfactory. From a theoretical point of view
+it is unsatisfactory because we might find ourselves reasoning
+about ethics without really understanding how this can happen;
+and from a practical point of view it is unsatisfactory because
+our reasoning is more likely to go astray if we lack a grasp of
+its foundations. I shall therefore attempt to say something about
+how we can reason in ethics.
+WHAT ETHICS IS: ONE VIEW
+What follows is a sketch of a view of ethics that allows reason
+an important role in ethical decisions. It is not the only possible
+view of ethics, but it is a plausible view. Once again, however,
+I shall have to pass over qualifications and objections worth a
+chapter to themselves. To those who think these undiscussed
+objections defeat the position I am advancing, I can only say,
+again, that this whole chapter may be treated as no more than
+a statement of the assumptions on which this book is based. In
+8
+About Ethics
+that way it will at least assist in giving a clear view of what I
+take ethics to be.
+What is it to make a moral judgment, or to argue about an
+ethical issue, or to live according to ethical standards? How do
+moral judgments differ from other practical judgments? Why
+do we regard a woman's decision to have an abortion as raising
+an ethical issue, but not her decision to change her job? What
+is the difference between a person who lives by ethical standards
+and one who doesn't?
+An these questions are reJated, so we only need to consider
+one of them; but to do this we need to say something about
+the nature of ethics. Suppose that we have studied the lives of
+a number of different people, and we know a lot about what
+they do, what they believe, and so on. Can we then decide
+which of them are living by ethical standards and which are
+not?
+We might think that the way to proceed here is to find out
+who be~teves it wrong to lie, cheat, steal, and so on and does
+not do any of these things, and who has no such beliefs, and
+shows no such restraint in their actions. Then those in the first
+group would be living according to ethical standards and those
+in the second group would not be. But this procedure mistakenly
+assimilates two distinctions: the first is the distinction between
+living according to (what we judge to be) the right ethical standards
+and living according to (what we judge to be) mistaken
+ethical standards; the second is the distinction between living
+according to some ethical standards, and living according to no
+ethical standards at all. Those who lie and cheat, but do not
+believe what they are doing to be wrong, may be living according
+to ethical standards. They may believe, for any of a
+number of possible reasons, that it is right to lie, cheat, steal,
+and so on. They are not living according to conventional ethical
+standards, but they may be living according to some other ethical
+standards.
+This first attempt to distinguish the ethical from the non-
+9
+Practical Ethics
+ethical was mistaken, but we can learn from our mistakes. We
+found that we must concede that those who hold unconventional
+ethical beliefs are still living according to ethical standards,
+if they believe, for any reason, that it is right to do as they are doing.
+The italicised condition gives us a clue to the answer we are
+seeking. The notion of living according to ethical standards is
+tied up with the notion of defending the way one is living, of
+giving a reason for it, of justifying it. Thus people may do all
+kinds of things we regard as wrong, yet still be living according
+to ethical standards, if they are prepared to defend and justify
+what they do. We may find the justification inadequate, and
+may hold that the actions are wrong, but the attempt at justification,
+whether successful or not, is sufficient to bring the
+person's conduct within the domain of the ethical as opposed
+to the non-ethical. When, on the other hand, people cannot
+put forward any justification for what they do, we may reject
+their claim to be living according to ethical standards, even if
+what they do is in accordance with conventional moral principles.
+We can go further. If we are to accept that a person is living
+according to ethical standards, the justification must be of a
+certain kind. For instance, a justification in terms of self -interest
+alone will not do. When Macbeth, contemplating the murder
+of Duncan, admits that only 'vaulting ambition' drives him to
+do it, he is admitting that the act cannot be justified ethically.
+'So that I can be king in his place' is not a weak attempt at an
+ethical justification for assassination; it is not the sort ofreason
+that counts as an ethical justification at all. Self-interested acts
+must be shown to be compatible with more broadly based ethical
+principles if they are to be ethically defen~ible, for the notion
+of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the
+individual. If I am to defend my conduct on ethical grounds, I
+cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I must address
+myself to a larger audience.
+From ancient times, philosophers and moralists have exlO
+/
+About Ethics
+pressed the idea that ethical conduct is acceptable from a point
+of view that is somehow universal. The 'Golden Rule' attributed
+to Moses, to be found in the book of Leviticus and subsequently
+repeated by Jesus, tells us to go beyond our own personal interests
+and 'love thy neighbour as thyself' - in other words, give
+the same weight to the interests of others as one gives to one's
+own interests. The same idea of putting oneself in the position
+of another is involved in the other Christian formulation of the
+commandment, that we do to others as we would have them
+do to us. The Stoics held that ethics derives from a universal
+natural law. Kant developed this idea into his famous formula:
+'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same
+time will that it should become a universal law.' Kant's theory
+has itself been modified and developed by R. M. Hare, who sees
+universalisability as a logical feature of moral judgments. The
+eighteenth -century British philosophers Hutcheson, Hume, and
+Adam Smith appealed to an imaginary 'impartial spectator' as
+the test of a moral judgment, and this theory has its modem
+version in the Ideal Observer theory. Utilitarians, from Jeremy
+Bentham to J. J. C. Smart, take it as axiomatic that in deciding
+moral issues 'each counts for one and none for more than one';
+while John Rawls, a leading contemporary critic of utilitarianism,
+incorporates essentially the same axiom into his own theory
+by deriving basic ethical principles from an imaginary choice in
+which those choosing do not know whether they will be the
+ones who gain or lose by the principles they select. Even Continental
+European philosophers like the existentialist Jean -Paul
+Sartre and the critical theorist Jiirgen Habermas, who differ in
+many ways from their English-speaking colleagues - and from
+each other - agree that ethics is in some sense universal.
+One could argue endlessly about the merits of each of these
+characterisations of the ethical; but what they have in common
+is more important than their differences. They agree that an
+ethica~rinciple cannot be justified in relation to any partial or
+sectional group. Ethics takes a universal point of view. This does
+II
+Practical Ethics
+not mean that a particular ethical judgment must be universally
+applicable. Circumstances alter causes, as we have seen. What
+it does mean is that in making ethical judgments we go beyond
+our own likes and dislikes. From an ethical point of view, the
+fact that it is I who benefit from, say, a more equal distribution
+of income and you who lose by it, is irrelevant. Ethics requires
+us to go beyond T and 'you' to the universal law, the universalisable
+judgment, the standpoint of the impartial spectator
+or ideal observer, or whatever we choose to call it.
+Can we use this universal aspect of ethics to derive an ethical
+theory that will give us guidance about right and wrong? Philosophers
+from the Stoics to Hare and Rawls have attempted
+this. No attempt has met with general acceptance. The problem
+is that if we describe the universal aspect of ethics in bare, formal
+terms, a wide range of ethical theories, including quite irreconcilable
+ones, are compatible with this notion of universality;
+if, on the other hand, we build up our description of the universal
+aspect of ethics so that it leads us ineluctably to one
+particular ethical theory, we shall be accused of smuggling our
+own ethical beliefs into our definition of the ethical - and this
+definition was supposed to be broad enough, and neutral
+enough, to encompass all serious candidates for the status of
+'ethical theory'. Since so many others have failed to overcome
+this obstacle to deducing an ethical theory from the universal
+aspect of ethics, it would be foolhardy to attempt to do so in a
+brief introduction to a work with a quite different aim. Nevertheless
+I shall propose something only a little less ambitious.
+The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive,
+although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly
+utilitarian position.
+My reason for suggesting this is as follows. In accepting that
+ethical judgments must be made from a universal point of view,
+I am accepting that my own interests cannot, simply because
+they are my interests, count more than the interests of anyone
+else. Thus my very natural concern that my own interests be
+12 .r
+About Ethics
+Iboked after must, when I think ethically, be extended to the
+interests of others. Now, imagine that I am trying to decide
+between two possible courses of action - perhaps whether to
+eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with
+others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical
+vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations - I
+am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage ofthinking. How would
+I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant
+would be how the possible courses of action will affect my
+interests. Indeed, if we define 'interests' broadly enough, so that
+we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it
+is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would
+seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one's own interests can
+be relevant to the decision.
+Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognising
+that my own interests cannot count for more, simply
+because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place
+of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests
+of all those affected by my decision. This requires me to
+weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action most
+likely to maximise the interests of those affected. Thus at least
+at some level in my moral reasoning I must choose the course
+of action that has the best consequences, on balance, for all
+affected. (I say 'at some level in my moral reasoning' because,
+as we shall see later, there are utilitarian reasons for believing
+that we ought not to try to calculate these consequences for
+every ethical decision we make in our daily lives, but only in
+very unusual circumstances, or perhaps when we are reflecting
+on our choice of general principles to guide us in future. In
+other words, in the specific example given, at first glance one
+might think it obvious that sharing the fruit that I have gathered
+has better consequences for all affected than not sharing them.
+This may in t~ end also be the best general principle for us all
+to adopt, but before we can have grounds for believing this to
+be the case, we must also consider whether the effect of a general
+13
+Practical Ethics
+practice of sharing gathered fruits will benefit all those affected,
+by bringing about a more equal distribution, or whether it will
+reduce the amount of food gathered, because some will cease
+to gather anything if they know that they will get sufficient from
+their share of what others gather.)
+The way of thinking I have outlined is a form of utilitarianism.
+It differs from classical utilitarianism in that 'best consequences'
+is understood as meaning what, on balance, furthers the interests
+of those affected, rather than merely what increases pleasure
+and reduces pain. (It has, however, been suggested that classical
+utilitarians like Bentham and John Stuart Mill used 'pleasure'
+and 'pain' in a broad sense that allowed them to include achieving
+what one desired as a 'pleasure' and the reverse as a 'pain'.
+If this interpretation is correct, the difference between classical
+utilitarianism and utilitarianism based on interests disappears.)
+What does this show? It does not show that utilitarianism
+can be deduced from the universal aspect of ethics. There are
+other ethical ideals - like individual rights, the sanctity of life,
+justice, purity, and so on - that are universal in the required
+sense, and are, at least in some versions, incompatible with
+utilitarianism. It does show that we very swiftly arrive at an
+initially utilitarian position once we apply the universal aspect
+of ethics to simple, pre-ethical decision making. This, I believe,
+places the onus of proof on those who seek to go beyond utilitarianism.
+The utilitarian position is a minimal one, a first base
+that we reach by universalising self-interested decision making.
+We cannot, if we are to think ethically, refuse to take this step.
+If we are to be persuaded that we should go beyond utilitarianism
+and accept non-utilitarian moral rules or ideals, we need
+to be provided with good reasons for taking this further step.
+Until such reasons are produced, we have some grounds for
+remaining utilitarians.
+This tentative argument for utilitarianism corresponds to the
+way in which I shall discuss practical issues in this book. I am
+inclined to hold a utilitarian position, and to some extent the
+14
+About Ethics
+book may be taken as an attempt to indicate how a consistent
+utilitarianism would deal with a number of controversial problems.
+But I shall not take utilitarianism as the only ethical position
+worth considering. I shall try to show the bearing of other
+views, of theories of rights, of justice, of the sanctity of life, and
+so on, on the problems discussed. In this way readers will be
+able to come to their own conclusions about the relative merits
+of utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches, and about the
+whole issue of the role of reason and argument in ethics.
+}
+15
+2
+EQUALITY AND ITS
+IMPLICATIONS
+THE BASIS OF EQUALITY
+THE present century has seen dramatic changes in moral
+attitudes. Most ofthese changes are still controversial. Abortion,
+almost everywhere prohibited thirty years ago, is now legal
+in many countries (though it is still opposed by substantial and
+respected sections of the population). The same is true of
+changes in attitudes to sex outside marriage, homosexuality,
+pornography, euthanasia, and suicide. Great as the changes
+have been, no new consensus has been reached. The issues
+remain controversial and it is possible to defend either side
+without jeopardising one's intellectual or social standing.
+Equality seems to be different. The change in attitudes to
+inequality - especially racial inequality - has been no less sudden
+and dramatic than the change in attitudes to sex, but it has
+been more complete. Racist assumptions shared by most Europeans
+at the tum of the century are now totally unacceptable,
+at least in public life. A poet could not now write of 'lesser
+breeds without the law', and retain - indeed enhance - his
+reputation, as Rudyard Kipling did in 1897. This does not mean
+that there are no longer any racists, but only that they must
+disguise their racism if their views and policies are to have any
+chance of general acceptance. Even South Africa has abandoned
+apartheid. The principle that all humans are equal is now part
+of the prevailing political and ethical orthodoxy. But what, exactly,
+does it mean and why do we accept it?
+Once we go beyond the agreement that blatant forms of racial
+16 r
+Equality and Its Implications
+discrimination are wrong, once we question the basis of the
+principle that all humans are equal and seek to apply this principle
+to particular cases, the consensus starts to weaken. One
+sign of this was the furor that occurred during the 1970s over
+the claims made by Arthur Jensen, professor of educational
+psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, and H. J.
+Eysenck, professor of psychology at the University of London,
+about genetically based variations in intelligence between different
+races. Many of the most forceful opponents of Jensen
+and Eysenck assume that these claims, if sound, would justify
+racial discrimination. Are they right? Similar questions can
+be asked about research into differences between males and
+females.
+Another issue requiring us to think about the principle of
+equality is 'affirmative action'. Some philosophers and lawyers
+have argued that the principle of equality requires that when
+allocating jobs or university places we should favour members
+of disadvantaged minorities. Others have contended that the
+same principle of equality rules out any discrimination on racial
+grounds, whether for or against the worst-off members of society.
+We can only answer these questions if we are clear about
+what it is we intend to say, and can justifiably say, when we
+assert that all humans are equal - hence the need for an inquiry
+into the ethical foundations of the principle of equality.
+When we say that all humans are equal, irrespective of race
+or sex, what exactly are we claiming? Racists, sexists, and other
+opponents of equality have often pointed out that, by whatever
+test we choose, it simply is not true that all humans are equal.
+Some are tall, some are short; some are good at mathematics,
+others are poor at it; some can run 100 metres in ten seconds,
+some take fifteen> or twenty; some would never intentionally
+hurt another being, others would kill a stranger for $100 if they
+could get away with it; some have emotional lives that touch
+the heights of ecstasy and the depths of despair, while others
+17
+Pradical Ethics
+live on a more even plane, relatively untouched by what goes
+on around them. And so we could go on. The plain fact is that
+humans differ, and the differences apply to so many characteristics
+that the search for a factual basis on which to erect the
+principle of equality seems hopeless.
+John Rawls has suggested, in his influential book A Theory of
+Justice, that equality can be founded on the natural characteristics
+of human beings, provided we select what he calls a 'range
+property'. Suppose we draw a circle on a piece of paper. Then
+all points within the circle - this is the 'range' - have the property
+of being within the circle, and they have this property
+equally, Some points may be closer to the centre and others
+nearer the edge, but all are, equally, points inside the circle.
+Similarly, Rawls suggests, the property of 'moral personality' is
+a property that virtually all humans possess, and all humans
+who possess this property possess it equally. By 'moral personality'
+Rawls does not mean 'morally good personality'; he is
+using 'moral' in contrast to 'amoral'. A moral person, Rawls
+says, must have a sense of justice. More broadly, one might say
+that to be a moral person is to be the kind of person to whom
+one can make moral appeals, with some prospect that the appeal
+will be heeded.
+Rawls maintains that moral personality is the basis of human
+equality, a view that derives from his 'contract' approach to
+justice. The contract tradition sees ethics as a kind of mutually
+beneficial agreement - roughly, 'Don't hit me and I won't hit
+you.' Hence only those capable of appreciating that they are not
+being hit, and of restraining their own hitting accordingly, are
+within the sphere of ethics.
+There are problems with using moral personality as the basis
+of equality. One objection is that having a moral personality is
+a matter of degree. Some people are highly sensitive to issues
+of justice and ethics generally; others, for a variety of reasons,
+have only a limited awareness of such principles. The suggestion
+that being a moral person is the minimum necessary for coming
+18
+Equality and Its Implications
+within the scope of the principle of equality still leaves it open
+just where this minimal line is to be drawn. Nor is it intuitively
+obvious why, if moral personality is so important, we should
+not have grades of moral status, with rights and duties corresponding
+to the degree of refinement of one's sense of justice.
+Still more serious is the objection that it is not true that all
+humans are moral persons, even in the most minimal sense.
+Infants and small children, along with some intellectually disabled
+humans, lack the required sense of justice. Shall we then
+say that all humans are equal, except for very young or intellectually
+disabled ones? This is certainly not what we ordinarily
+understand by the principle of equality. If this revised principle
+implies that we may disregard the interests of very young or
+intellectually disabled humans in ways that would be wrong if
+they were older or more intelligent, we would need far stronger
+arguments to induce us to accept it. (Rawls deals with infants
+and children by including potential moral persons along with
+actual ones within the scope of the principle of equality. But
+this is an ad hoc device, confessedly designed to square his
+theory with our ordinary moral intuitions, rather than something
+for which independent arguments can be produced. Moreover
+although Rawls admits that those with irreparable
+intellectual disabilities 'may present a difficulty' he offers no
+suggestions towards the solution of this difficulty.)
+So the possession of 'moral personality' does not provide a
+satisfactory basis for the principle that all humans are equal. I
+doubt that any natural characteristic, whether a 'range property'
+or not, can fulfil this function, for I doubt that there is any
+morally significant property that all humans possess equally.
+There is another possible line of defence for the belief that
+there is a factual basis for a .principle of equality that prohibits
+racism and sexism. We can admit that humans differ as individuals,
+and yet insist that there are no morally significant differences
+between the races and sexes. Knowing that someone
+is of African or European descent, female or male, does not
+-' 19
+Pradical Ethics
+enable us to draw conclusions about her or his intelligence,
+sense of justice, depth of feelings, or anything else that would
+entitle us to treat her or him as less than equal. The racist claim
+that people of European descent are superior to those of other
+races in these capacities is in this sense false. The differences
+between individuals in these respects are not captured by racial
+boundaries. The same is true of the sexist stereotype that sees
+women as emotionally deeper and more caring, but also less
+rational, less aggressive, and less enterprising than men. Obviously
+this is not true of women as a whole. Some women are
+emotionally shallower, less caring, and more rational, more
+aggressive and, more enterprising than some men.
+The fact that humans differ as individuals, not as races or
+sexes, is important, and we shall return to it when we come to
+discuss the implications of the claims made by Jensen, Eysenck,
+and others; yet it provides neither a satisfactory prinCiple of
+equality nor an adequate defence against a more sophisticated
+opponent of equality than the blatant racist or sexist. Suppose
+that someone proposes that people should be given intelligence
+tests and then classified into higher or lower status categories
+on the basis of the results. Perhaps those who scored above 125
+would be a slave-owning class; those scoring between 100 and
+125 would be free citizens but lack the right to own slaves;
+while those scoring below 100 would be made the slaves of
+those who had scored above 125. A hierarchical society of this
+sort seems as abhorrent as one based on race or sex; but if we
+base our support for equality on the factual claim that differences
+between individuals cut across racial and sexual boundaries, we
+have no grounds for opposing this kind of inegalitarianism. For
+this hierarchical society would be based on real differences between
+people.
+We can reject this 'hierarchy of intelligence' and similar fantastic
+schemes only if we are clear that the claim to equality
+does not rest on the possession of intelligence, moral personality,
+rationality, or similar matters offact. There is no logically com-
+20
+Equality and Its Implications
+pelling reason for assuming that a difference in ability between
+two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration
+we give to their interests. Equality is a basic ethical principle,
+not an assertion of fact. We can see this if we return to
+our earlier discussion of the universal aspect of ethical judgments.
+We saw in the previous chapter that when I make an ethical
+judgment I must go beyond a personal or sectional point of view
+and take into account the interests of all those affected. This
+means that we weigh up interests, considered simply as interests
+and not as my interests, or the interests of Australians, or of
+people of European descent. This provides us with a basic principle
+of equality: the principle of equal consideration of interests.
+The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests
+is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the
+like interests of all those affected by our actions. This means
+that if only X and Y would be affected by a possible act, and if
+X stands to lose more than Y stands to gain, it is better not to
+do the act. We cannot, if we accept the principle of equal consideration
+of interests, say that doing the act is better, despite
+the facts described, because we are more concerned about Y
+than we are about X. What the principle really amounts to is
+this: an interest is an interest, whoever's interest it may be.
+We can make this more concrete by considering a particular
+interest, say the interest we have in the relief of pain. Then the
+principle says that the ultimate moral reason for relieving pain
+is simply the undesirability of pain as such, and not the undesirability
+of X's pain, which might be different from the undesirability
+of V's pain. Of course, X's pain might be more
+undesirable than V's pain because it is more painful, and then
+the principle of equal consideration would give greater weight
+to the relief of X's pain. Again, even wftere the pains are equal,
+other factors might be relevant, especially if others are affected.
+If there has been an earthquake we might give priority to the
+relief of a dpctor's pain so she can treat other victims. But the
+21
+Practical Ethics
+doctor's pain itself counts only once, and with no added weighting.
+The principle of equal consideration of interests acts like a
+pair of scales, weighing interests impartially. True scales favour
+the side where the interest is stronger or where several interests
+combine to outweigh a smaller number of similar interests; but
+they take n~ account of whose interests they are weighing.
+From this point of view race is irrelevant to the consideration
+of interests; for all that counts are the interests themselves. To
+give less consideration to a specified amount of pain because
+that pain was experienced by a member of a particular race
+would be to make an arbitrary distinction. Why pick on race?
+Why not on whether a person was born in a leap year? Or
+whether there is more than one vowel in her surname? All
+these characteristics are equally irrelevant to the undesirability
+of pain from the universal point of view. Hence the principle
+of equal consideration of interests shows straightforwardly why
+the most blatant forms of racism, like that of the Nazis, are
+wrong. For the Nazis were concerned only for the welfare of
+members of the 'Aryan' race, and the sufferings of Jews, Gypsies,
+and Slavs were of no concern to them.
+The principle of equal consideration of interests is sometimes
+thought to be a purely formal principle, lacking in substance
+and too weak to exclude any inegalitarian practice. We have
+already seen, however, that it does exclude racism and sexism,
+at least in their most blatant forms. If we look at the impact of
+the principle on the imaginary hierarchical society based on
+intelligence tests we can see that it is strong enough to provide
+a basis for rejecting this more sophisticated form of inegalitarianism,
+too.
+The principle of equal consideration of interests prohibits
+making our readiness to consider the interests of others depend
+on their abilities or other characteristics, apart from the characteristic
+of having interests. It is true that we cannot know
+where equal consideration of interests will lead us until we
+know what interests people have, and this may vary according
+22
+Equality and Its Implications
+to their abilities or other characteristics. Consideration of the
+interests of mathematically gifted children may lead us to teach
+them advanced mathematics at an early age, which for different
+children might be entirely pointless or positively harmful. But
+the basic element, the taking into account of the person's interests,
+whatever they may be, must apply to everyone, irrespective
+of race, sex, or scores on an intelligence test. Enslaving
+those who score below a certain line on an intelligence test
+would not - barring extraordinary and implausible beliefs'about
+human nature - be compatible with equal consideration. Intelligence
+has nothing to do with many important interests that
+humans have, like the interest in avoiding pain, in developing
+one's abilities, in satisfying basic needs for food and shelter, in
+enjoying friendly and loving relations with others, and in being
+free to pursue one's projects without unnecessary interference
+from others. Slavery prevents the slaves from satisfying these
+interests as they would want to; and the benefits it confers on
+the slave-owners are hardly comparable in importance to the
+harm it does to the slaves.
+So the principle of equal consideration of interests is strong
+enough to rule out an intelligence-based slave society as well
+as cruder forms of racism and sexism. It also rules out discrimination
+on the grounds of disability, whether intellectual or
+physical, in so far as the disability is not relevant to the interests
+under consideration (as, for example, severe intellectual disability
+might be if we are considering a person's interest in voting
+in an election). The principle of equal consideration of interests
+therefore may be a defensible form of the principle that all
+humans are equal, a form that we can use in discussing more
+controversial issues about equality. Before we go on to these
+- .. topics, however, it will be useful to say a little more about the
+nature of the principle.
+Equal consideration of interests is a minimal prinCiple of
+equality in the sense that it does not dictate equal treatment.
+Take a relatively straightforward example of an interest, the
+23
+Practical Ethics
+interest in having physical pain relieved. Imagine that after an
+earthquake I come across two victims, one with a crushed leg,
+in agony, and one with a gashed thigh, in slight pain. I have
+only two shots of morphine left. Equal treatment would suggest
+that I give one to each injured person, but one shot would not
+do much to relieve the pain of the person with the crushed leg.
+She would still be in much more pain than the other victim,
+and even after I have given her one shot. giving her the second
+shot would bring greater relief than giving a shot to the person
+in slight pain. Hence equal consideration of interests in this
+situation leads to what some may consider an inegalitarian result:
+two shots of morphine for one person, and none for the
+other.
+There is a still more controversial inegalitarian implication of
+the principle of equal consideration of interests. In the case
+above, although equal consideration of interests leads to unequal
+treatment, this unequal treatment is an attempt to produce
+a more egalitarian result. By giving the double dose to the more
+seriously injured person, we bring about a situation in which
+there is less difference in the degree of suffering felt by the two
+victims than there would be if we gave one dose to each. Instead
+of ending up with one person in considerable pain and one in
+no pain, we end up with two people in slight pain. This is in
+line with the principle of declining marginal utility, a principle
+well-known to economists, which states that for a given individuaL
+a set amount of something is more useful when people
+have little of it than when they have a lot. If I am struggling to
+survive on 200 grams of rice a day, and you provide me with
+an extra fifty grams per day, you have improved my position
+significantly; but if I already have a kilo of rice per day, I won't
+care much about the extra fifty grams. When marginal utility
+is taken into account the principle of equal consideration of
+interests inclines us towards an equal distribution of income,
+and to that extent the egalitarian will endorse its conclusions.
+What is likely to trouble the egalitarian about the principle of
+24
+Equality and Its Implications
+equal consideration of interests is that there are circumstances
+in which the principle of declining marginal utility does not
+hold or is overridden by countervailing factors.
+We can vary the example of the earthquake victims to illustrate
+this point. Let us say, again, that there are two victims,
+one more severely injured than the other, but this time we shall
+say that the more severely injured victim, A, has lost a leg and
+is in danger of losing a toe from her remaining leg; while the
+less severely injured victim, B, has an injury to her leg, but the
+limb can be saved. We have medical supplies for only one person.
+If we use them on the more severely injured victim the
+most we can do is save her toe, whereas if we use them on the
+less severely injured victim we can save her leg. In other words,
+we assume that the situation is as follows: without medical
+treatment, A loses a leg and a toe, while B loses only a leg; if
+we give the treatment to A, A loses a leg and B loses a leg; if we
+give the treatment to B, A loses a leg and a toe, while Bioses
+nothing.
+Assuming that it is worse to lose a leg than it is to lose a toe
+(even when that toe is on one's sole remaining foot) the principle
+of declining marginal utility does not suffice to give us the
+right answer in this situation. We will do more to further the
+interests, impartially considered, of those affected by our actions
+if we use our limited resources on the less seriously injured
+victim than on the more seriously injured one. Therefore this
+is what the principle of equal consideration of interests leads us
+to do. Thus equal consideration of interests can, in special cases,
+widen rather than narrow the gap between two peQple at different
+levels of welfare. It is for this reason that the principle is
+a minimal principle of equality, rather than a thoroughgoing
+egalitarian principle. A more thoroughgoing form of egalitarianism
+would, however, be difficult to justify, both in general
+terms and in its application to special cases of the kind just
+described.
+Minimal as it is, the principle of equal consideration of in-
+25
+Practical Ethics
+terests can seem too demanding in some cases. Can any of us
+really give equal consideration to the welfare of our family and
+the welfare of strangers? This question will be dealt with in
+Chapter 9, when we consider our obligations to assist those in
+need in poorer parts of the world. I shall try to show then that
+it does not force us to abandon the principle, although the
+principle may force us to abandon some other views we hold.
+Meanwhile we shall see how the principle assists us in discussing
+some of the controversial issues raised by demands for equality.
+EQUALITY AND GENETIC DIVERSITY
+In 1969 Arthur Jensen published a long article in the Harvard
+Educational Review entitled 'How Much Can We Boost IQ and
+Scholastic Achievement?' One short section of the article discussed
+the probable causes of the undisputed fact that - on
+average - African Americans do not score as well as most other
+Americans in standard IQ tests. Jensen summarised the upshot
+of this section as follows:
+All we are left with are various lines of evidence, no one of which
+is definitive alone, but which, viewed altogether, make it a not
+unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated
+in the average negro-white intelligence difference. The
+preponderance of evidence is, in my opinion, less consistent with
+a strictly environmental hypothesis than with a genetic hypothesis,
+which, of course, does not exclude the influence of environment
+or its interaction with genetic factors.
+This heavily qualified statement comes in the midst of a detailed
+review of a complex scientific subject, published in a scholarly
+journal. It would hardly have been surprising if it passed unnoticed
+by anyone but scientists working in the area of psychology
+or genetics. Instead it was widely reported in the
+popular press as an attempt to defend racism on scientific
+grounds. Jensen was accused of spreading racist propaganda
+and likened to Hitler. His lectures were shouted down and stu-
+26
+Equality and Its Implications
+dents demanded that he be dismissed from his university post.
+H. J. Eysenck, a British professor of psychology who supported
+Jensen's theories received similar treatment, in Britain and Australia
+as well as in the United States. Interestingly, Eysenck's
+argument did not suggest that those of European descent have
+the highest average intelligence among Americans; instead, he
+noted some evidence that Americans of Japanese and Chinese
+descent do better on tests of abstract reasoning (despite coming
+from backgrounds lower on the socioeconomic scale) than
+Americans of European descent.
+The opposition to genetic explanations of alleged racial differences
+in intelligence is only one manifestation of a more
+general opposition to genetic explanations in other socially sensitive
+areas. It closely parallels, for instance, initial feminist hostility
+to the idea that there are biological factors behind male
+dominance. (The second wave of the feminist movement seems
+to be more willing to entertain the idea that biological differences
+between the sexes are influential in, for example, greater
+male aggression and stronger female caring behaviour.) The
+opposition to genetic explanations also has obvious links with
+the intensity of feeling aroused by sociobiological approaches
+to the study of human behaviour. The worry here is that if
+human social behaviour is seen as deriving from that of other
+social mammals, we shall come to think of hierarchy, male
+dominance, and inequality as part of our evolved nature, and
+as unchangeable. More recently, the commencement of the international
+scientific project that is designed to map the human
+genome - that is, to provide a detailed scientific description of
+the genetic code typical of human beings - has attracted prot~~ts
+because of apprehension over what such a map might reveal
+about genetic differences between humans, and the use to which
+such information might be put.
+It would be inappropriate for me to attempt to assess the
+scientific merits of biological explanations of human behaviour
+in general, or of racial or sexual differences in particular. My
+27
+Practical Ethics
+concern is rather with the implications of these theories for the
+ideal of equality. For this purpose it is not necessary for us to
+establish whether the theories are right. All we have to ask is:
+suppose that one ethnic group does tum out to have a higher
+average IQ than another, and that part of this difference has a
+genetic basis. Would this mean that racism is defensible, and
+we have to reject the principle of equality? A similar question
+can be asked about the impact of theories of biological differences
+between the sexes. In neither case does the question assume
+that the theories are sound. It would be most unfortunate
+if our scepticism about such things led us to neglect these questions
+and then unexpected evidence turned up confirming the
+theories, with the result that a confused and unprepared public
+took the theories to have implications for the ideal of equality
+that they do not have.
+I shall begin by considering the implications of the view that
+there is a difference in the average IQ of two different ethnic
+groups, and that genetic factors are responsible for at least a
+part of this difference. I shall then consider the impact of alleged
+differences in temperament and ability between the sexes.
+Racial Differences and Racial Equality
+Let us suppose, just for the sake of exploring the consequences,
+that evidence accumulates supporting the hypothesis that there
+are differences in intelligence between the different ethnic
+groups of human beings. (We should not assume that this would
+mean that Europeans come out on top. As we have already
+. seen, there is some evidence to the contrary.) What significance
+would this have for our views about racial equality?
+First a word of caution. When people talk of differences in
+intelligence between ethnic groups, they are usually referring
+to differences in scores on standard IQ tests. Now 'IQ' stands
+for 'intelligence quotient' but this does not mean that an IQ test
+really measures what we mean by 'intelligence' in ordinary
+28
+Equality and Its Implications
+contexts. Obviously there is some correlation between the two:
+if schoolchildren regarded by their teachers as highly intelligent
+did not generally score better on IQ tests than schoolchildren
+regarded as below normal intelligence, the tests would have to
+be changed - as indeed they were changed in the past. But this
+does not show how close the correlation is, and since our ordinary
+concept of intelligence is vague, there is no way of telling.
+Some psychologists have attempted to overcome this difficulty
+by simply defining 'intelligence' as 'what intelligence tests measure',
+but this merely introduces a new concept of 'intelligence',
+which is easier to measure than our ordinary notion but may
+be quite different in meaning. Since 'intelligence' is a word in
+everyday use, to use the same word in a different sense is a sure
+path to confusion. What we should talk about, then, is differences
+in IQ, rather than differences in intelligence, since this is
+all that the available evidence could support.
+The distinction between intelligence and scores on IQ tests
+has led some to conclude that IQ is of no importance; this is
+the opposite, but equally erroneous, extreme to the view that
+IQ is identical with intelligence. IQ is important in our society.
+One's IQ is a factor in one's prospects of improving one's occupational
+status, income, or social class. If there are genetic
+factors in racial differences in IQ, there will be genetic factors
+in racial differences in occupational status, income, and social
+class. So if we are interested in equality, we cannot ignore IQ.
+When people of different racial origin are given IQ tests, there
+tend to be differences in the average scores they get. The existence
+of such differences is not seriously disputed, even by those
+who most vigorously opposed the views put forward by Jensen
+and Eysenck. What is hotly disputed is whether the differeI\ces I
+are primarily to be explained by heredity or by enviro~ent _
+in other words, whether they reflect innate differences between
+different groups of human beings, or whether they are due to
+the different social and educational situations in which these
+groups find themselves. Almost everyone accepts that environ-
+29
+Practical Ethics
+mental factors do playa role in IQ differences between groups;
+the debate is over whether they can explain all or virtually all
+of the differences.
+Let us suppose that the genetic hypothesis turns out to be
+correct (making this supposition, as I have said, not because we
+believe it is correct but in order to explore its implications);
+what would be the implications of genetically based differences
+in IQ between different races? I believe that the implications of
+this supposition are less drastic than they are often supposed to
+be and give no comfort to genuine racists. I have three reasons
+for this view.
+First, the genetic hypothesis does not imply that we should
+reduce our efforts to overcome other causes of inequality between
+people, for example, in the quality of housing and schooling
+available to less well-off people. Admittedly, if the genetic
+hypothesis is correct, these efforts will not bring about a situation
+in which different racial groups have equal IQs. But this
+is no reason for accepting a situation in which any people are
+hindered by their environment from doing as well as they can.
+Perhaps we should put special efforts into helping those who
+start from a position of disadvantage, so that we end with a
+more egalitarian result.
+Second, the fact that the average IQ of one racial group is a
+few points higher than that of another does not allow anyone
+to say that all members of the higher IQ group have higher IQs
+than all members of the lower IQ group - this is clearly false
+for any racial group - or that any particular individual in the
+higher IQ group has a higher IQ than a particular individual in
+the lower IQ group - this will often be false. The point is that
+these figures are averages and say nothing about individuals.
+There will be a substantial overlap in IQ scores between the two
+groups. So whatever the cause of the difference in average IQs,
+it will provide no justification for racial segregation in education
+or any other field. It remains true that members of different
+30
+Equality and Its Implications
+racial groups must be treated as individuals, irrespective of their
+race.
+The third reason why the genetic hypothesis gives no support
+for racism is the most fundamental of the three. It is simply
+that, as we saw earlier, the principle of equality is not based on
+any actual equality that all people share. I have argued that the
+only defensible basis for the principle of equality is equal consideration
+of interests, and I have also suggested that the most
+important human interests - such as the interest in avoiding
+pain, in developing one's abilities, in satisfying basic needs for
+food and shelter, in enjoying warm personal relationships, in
+being free to pursue one's projects without interference, and
+many others - are not affected by differences in intelligence.
+We can be even more confident that they are not affected by
+differences in IQ. Thomas Jefferson, who drafted the ringing
+assertion of equality with which the American Declaration of
+Independence begins, knew this. In reply to an author who had
+endeavoured to refute the then common view that Africans lack
+intelligence, he wrote:
+Be assured that no person living wishes more sincerely than I
+do, to see a complete refutation of the doubts I have myself
+entertained and expressed on the grade of understanding allotted
+to them by nature, and to find that they are on a par with
+ourselves ... but whatever be their degree of talent, it is no measure
+of their rights. Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to
+others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the property
+or person of others.
+Jefferson was right. Equal status does not depend on intelligence.
+Racists who maintain the contrary are in peril of being
+forced to kneel before the next genius they encounter.
+These three reasons suffice to show that claims that for genetic
+reasons one racial group is not as good as another at IQ tests
+do not provide grounds for denying the moral principle that all
+humans are equal. The third reason, however, has further ram-
+31
+Practical Ethics
+ifications that we shall follow up after discussing differences
+between the sexes.
+Sexual Differences and Sexual Equality
+The debates over psychological differences between females and
+males are not about IQ in general. On general IQ tests there are
+no consistent differences in the average scores of females and
+males. But IQ tests measure a range of different abilities, and
+when we break the results down according to the type of ability
+measured, we do find significant differences between the sexes.
+There is some evidence suggesting that females have greater
+verbal ability than males. This involves being better able to
+understand complex pieces of writing and being more creative
+with words. Males, on the other hand, appear to have greater
+mathematical ability, and also do better on tests involving what
+is known as 'visual-spatial' ability. An example of a task requiring
+visual-spatial ability is one in which the subject is asked
+to find a shape, say a square, which is embedded or hidden in
+a more complex design.
+We shall discuss the significance of these relatively minor
+differences in intellectual abilities shortly. The sexes also differ
+markedly in one major non-intellectual characteristic: aggression.
+Studies conducted on children in several different cultures
+have borne out what parents have long suspected: boys are
+more likely to play roughly, attack each other and fight back
+when attacked, than girls. Males are readier to hurt others than
+females; a tendency reflected in the fact that almost all violent
+criminals are male. It has been suggested that aggression is
+associated with competitiveness and the drive to dominate others
+and get to the top of whatever pyramid one is a part of. In
+contrast, females are readier to adopt a role that involves caring
+for others.
+These are the major psychological differences that have repeatedly
+been observed in many studies of females and males.
+32
+Equality and Its Implications
+What is the origin of these differences? Once again the rival
+explanations are environmental versus biological, nurture versus
+nature. Although this question of origin is important in some
+special contexts, it was given too much weight by the first wave
+of feminists who assumed that the case for women's liberation
+rested on acceptance of the environmental side of the controversy.
+What is true of racial discrimination holds here, too:
+discrimination can be shown to be wrong whatever the origin
+of the known psychological differences. But first let us look
+briefly at the rival explanations.
+Anyone who has had anything to do with children will know
+that in all sorts of ways children learn that the sexes have different
+roles. Boys get trucks or guns for their birthday presents;
+girls get dolls or brush and comb sets. Girls are put into dresses
+and told how nice they look; boys are dressed in jeans and
+praised for their strength and daring. Children's books almost
+invariably used to portray fathers going out to work while mothers
+clean the house and cook the dinner; some still do, although
+in many countries feminist criticisms of this type of literature
+have had some impact.
+Social conditioning exists, certainly, but does it explain the
+differences between the sexes? It is, at best, an incomplete explanation.
+We still need to know why our society - and not just
+ours, but practically every human society - should shape children
+in this way. One popular answer is that in earlier, simpler
+societies, the sexes had different roles because women had to
+breast-feed their children during the long period before weaning.
+This meant that the women stayed closer to home while
+the men went out to hunt. As a result females evolved a more
+social and emotional character, while males became tougher
+and more aggressive. Because physical strength and aggression
+were the ultimate forms of power in these simple societies, males
+became dominant. The sex roles that exist today are, on this
+view, an inheritance from these simpler circumstances, an inheritance
+that became obsolete once technology made it possible
+33
+Practical Ethics
+for the weakest person to operate a crane that lifts fifty tons, or
+fire a missile that kills millions. Nor do women have to be tied
+to home and children in the way they used to be, since a woman
+can now combine motherhood and a career.
+The alternative view is that while social conditiOning plays
+some role in determining psychological differences between the
+sexes, biological factors are also at work. The evidence for this
+view is particularly strong in respect of aggression. In The Psychology
+of Sex Differences, Eleanor Emmons Maccoby and Carol
+Nagy Jacklin give four grounds for their belief that the greater
+aggression of males has a biological component:
+Males are more aggressive than females in all human societies
+in which the difference has been studied.
+2 Similar differences are found in humans and in apes and other
+closely related animals.
+3 The differences are found in very young children, at an age
+when there is no evidence of any social conditioning in this
+direction (indeed Maccoby and Jacklin found some evidence
+that boys are more severely punished for showing aggression
+than girls).
+4 Aggression has been shown to vary according to the level of
+sex hormones, and females become more aggressive if they
+receive male hormones.
+The evidence for a biological basis of the differences in visualspatial
+ability is a little more complicated, but it consists largely
+of genetic studies that suggest that this ability is influenced by
+a recessive sex-linked gene. As a result, it is estimated, approximately
+50 per cent of males have a genetic advantage in situations
+demanding visual-spatial ability, but only 25 per cent
+of females have this advantage.
+Evidence for and against a biological factor in the superior
+verbal ability of females and the superior mathematical ability
+of males is, at present, too weak to suggest a conclusion one
+way or the other.
+Adopting the strategy we used before in discussing race and
+IQ, I shall not go further into the evidence for and against these
+34
+/
+Equality and Its Implications
+biological explanations of differences between males and females.
+Instead I shall ask what the implications of the biological
+hypotheses would be.
+The differences in the intellectual strengths and weaknesses
+of the sexes cannot explain more than a minute proportion of
+the difference in positions that males and females hold in our
+society. It might explain why, for example, there should be more
+males than females in professions like architecture and engineering,
+professions that may require visual-spatial ability; but
+even in these professions, the magnitude of the differences in
+numbers cannot be explained by the genetic theory of visualspatial
+ability. This theory suggests that half as many females
+are as genetically advantaged in this area as males, which would
+account for the lower average scores offemales in tests of visualspatial
+ability, but cannot account for the fact that in most countries
+there are not merely twice as many males as females in
+architecture and engineering, but at least ten times as many.
+Moreover, if superior visual-spatial ability explains the male
+dominance of architecture and engineering, why isn't there a
+corresponding female advantage in professions requiring high
+verbal ability? It is true that there are more women journalists
+than engineers, and probably more women have achieved lasting
+fame as novelists than in any other area of life; yet female
+journalists and television commentators continue to be outnumbered
+by males, outside specifically 'women's subjects' such
+as cookery and child care. So even if one accepts biological
+explanations for the patterning of these abilities, one can still
+argue that women do not have the same opportunities as men
+to make the most of the abilities they have.
+What of differences in aggression? One's first reaction might
+be that feminists should be delighted with the evidence on this
+point - what better way could there be of showing the superiority
+of females than by demonstrating their greater reluctance
+to hurt others? But the fact that most violent criminals are male
+may be only one side of greater male aggression. The other side
+35
+Practical Ethics
+could be greater male competitiveness, ambition, and drive to
+achieve power. This would have different, and for feminists less
+welcome, implications. Some years ago an American sociologist,
+Steven Goldberg, built a provocatively entitled book, The Inevitability
+of Patriarchy, around the thesis that the biological basis
+of greater male aggression will always make it impossible to
+bring about a society in which women have as much political
+power as men. From this claim it is easy to move to the view
+that women should accept their inferior position in society and
+not strive to compete with males, or to bring up their daughters
+to compete with males in these respects; instead women should
+return to their traditional sphere of looking after the home and
+children. This is just the kind of argument that has aroused the
+hostility of some feminists to biological explanations of male
+dominance.
+As in the case of race and IQ, the moral conclusions alleged
+to follow from the biological theories do not really follow from
+them at all. Similar arguments apply.
+First, whatever the origin of psychological differences between
+the sexes, social conditioning can emphasise or soften
+these differences. As Maccoby and Jacklin stress, the biological
+bias towards, say, male visual-spatial superiority is really a
+greater natural readiness to learn these skills. Where women
+are brought up to be independent, their visual-spatial ability is
+much higher than when they are kept at home and dependent
+on males. This is no doubt true of other differences as well.
+Hence feminists may well be right to attack the way in which
+we encourage girls and boys to develop in distinct directions,
+even if this encouragement is not itself responsible for creating
+psychological differences between the sexes, but only reinforces
+innate predispositions.
+Second, whatever the origin of psychological differences between
+the sexes, they exist only when averages are taken, and
+some females are more aggressive and have better visual-spatial
+ability than some males. We have seen that the genetic hypo-
+36
+Equality and Its Implications
+thesis offered in explanation of male visual-spatial superiority
+itself suggests that a quarter of all females will have greater
+natural visual-spatial ability than half of all males. Our own
+observations should convince us that there are females who are
+also more aggressive than some males. So, biological explanations
+or not, we are never in a position to say: 'You're a woman,
+so you can't become an engineer', or 'Because you are female,
+you will not have the drive and ambition needed to succeed in
+politiCS: Nor should we assume that no male can possibly have
+sufficient gentleness and warmth to stay at home with the children
+while their mother goes out to work. We must assess
+people as individuals, not merely lump them into 'female' and
+'male' if we are to find out what they are really like; and we
+must keep the roles occupied by females and males flexible if
+people are to be able to do what they are best suited for.
+The third reason is, like the previous two, parallel to the
+reasons I have given for believing that a biological explanation
+of racial differences in IQ would not justify racism. The most
+important human interests are no more affected by differences
+in aggression than they are by differences in intelligence. Less
+aggressive people have the same interest in avoiding pain,
+developing their abilities, having adequate food and shelter,
+enjoying good personal relationships, and so on, as more aggressive
+people. There is no reason why more aggressive people
+ought to be rewarded for their aggression with higher salaries
+and the ability to provide better for these interests.
+Since aggression, unlike intelligence, is not generally regarded
+as a desirable trait, the male chauvinist is hardly likely to deny
+that greater aggression in itself provides no ethical justification
+of male supremacy. He may, however, offer it as an explanation,
+rather than a justification, of the fact that males hold most of
+the leading positions in politics, business, the universities and
+other areas in which people of both sexes compete for power
+and status. He may then go on to suggest that this shows that
+the present situation is merely the result of competition between
+37
+Practical Ethics
+males and females under conditions of equal opportunity.
+Hence, it is not, he may say, unfair. This suggestion raises the
+further ramifications of biological differences between people
+that, as I said at the close of our discussion of the race and IQ
+issue, need to be followed up in more depth.
+FROM EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY TO EQUALITY
+OF CONSIDERATION
+In most Western societies large differences in income and social
+status are commonly thought to be all right, as long as they
+were brought into being under conditions of equal opportunity.
+The idea is that there is no injustice in Jill earning $200,000
+and Jack earning $20,000, as long as Jack had his chance to
+be where Jill is today. Suppose that the difference in income is
+due to the fact that Jill is a doctor whereas Jack is a farm worker.
+This would be acceptable if Jack had the same opportunity as
+Jill to be a doctor, and this is taken to mean that Jack was not
+kept out of medical school because of his race, or religion, or
+a disability that was irrelevant to his ability to be a doctor, or
+something similar - in effect, if Jack's school results had been
+as good as Jill's, he would have been able to study medicine,
+become a doctor, and earn $200,000 a year. Life, on this view,
+is a kind of race in which it is fitting that the winners should
+get the prizes, as long as all get an equal start. The equal start
+represents equality of opportunity and this, some say, is as far
+as equality should go.
+To say that Jack and Jill had equal opportunities to become
+a doctor, because Jack would have got into medical school if
+his results had been as good as Jill's, is to take a superficial view
+of equal opportunity that will not stand up to further probing.
+We need to ask why Jack's results were not as good as Jill's.
+Perhaps his education up to that point had been inferior - bigger
+classes, less qualified teachers, inadequate resources, and so on.
+If so, he was not competing on equal terms with Jill after all.
+38
+Equality and Its Implications
+Genuine equality of opportunity requires us to ensure that
+schools give the same advantages to everyone.
+Making schools equal would be difficult enough, but it is the
+easiest of the tasks that await a thoroughgoing proponent of
+equal opportunity. Even if schools are the same, some children
+will be favoured by the kind of home they come from. A quiet
+room to study, plenty of books, and parents who encourage
+their child to do well at school could explain why Jill succeeds
+where Jack, forced to share a room with two younger brothers
+and put up with his father.'s complaints that he is wasting his
+time with books instead of getting out and earning his keep,
+does not. But how does one equalise a home? Or parents?
+Unless we are prepared to abandon the traditional family setting
+and bring up our children in communal nurseries, we can't.
+This might be enough to show the inadequacy of equal opportunity
+as an ideal of equality, but the ultimate objection -
+the one that connects with our previous discussion of equality
+- is still to come. Even if we did rear our children communally,
+as on a kibbutz in Israel, they would inherit different abilities
+and character traits, including different levels of aggression and
+different IQs. Eliminating differences in the child's environment
+would not affect differences in genetic endowment. True, it
+might reduce the disparity between, say, IQ scores, since it is
+likely that, at present, social differences accentuate genetic differences;
+but the genetic differences would remain and on most
+estimates they are a major component of the existing differences
+in IQ. (Remember that we are now talking of individuals. We
+do not know if race affects IQ, but there is little doubt that
+differences in IQ between individuals of the same race are, in
+part, genetically determined.)
+So equality of opportunity is not an attractive ideal. It rewards
+the lucky, who inherit those abilities that allow them to pursue
+interesting and lucrative careers. It penalises the unlucky, whose
+genes make it very hard for them to achieve similar success.
+We can now fit our earlier discussion of race and sex differ-
+39
+Practical Ethics
+ences into a broader picture. Whatever the facts about the social
+or genetic basis of racial differences in IQ, removing social disadvantages
+will not suffice to bring about an equal or a just
+distribution of income - not an equal distribution, because those
+who inherit the abilities associated with high IQ will continue
+to earn more than those who do not; and not a just distribution
+because distribution according to the abilities one inherits is
+based on an arbitrary form of selection that has nothing to do
+with what people deserve or need. The same is true of visualspatial
+ability and aggression, if these do lead to higher incomes
+or status. If, as I have argued, the basis of equality is equal
+consideration of interests, and the most important human interests
+have little or nothing to do with these factors, there is
+something questionable about a society in which income and
+social status correlate to a significant degree with them.
+When we pay people high salaries for programming computers
+and low salaries for cleaning offices, we are, in effect,
+paying people for having a high IQ, and this means that we are
+paying people for something determined in part before they are
+born and almost wholly determined before they reach an age
+at which they are responsible for their actions. From the point
+of view of justice and utility there is something wrong here.
+Both would be better served by a society that adopted the famous
+Marxist slogan: 'From each according to his ability, to
+each according to his needs.' If this could be achieved, the
+differences between the races and sexes would lose their social
+significance. Only then would we have a society truly based on
+the principle of equal consideration of interests.
+Is it realistic to aim at a society that rewards people according
+to their needs rather than their IQ, aggression, or other inherited
+abilities? Don't we have to pay people more to be doctors or
+lawyers or university professors, to do the intellectually demanding
+work that is essential for our well-being?
+There are difficulties in paying people according to their needs
+rather than their inherited abilities. If one country attempts to
+40
+Equality and Its Implications
+introduce such a scheme while others do not, the result is likely
+to be some kind of 'brain drain'. We have already seen this, on
+a small scale, in the number of scientists and doctors who have
+left Britain to work in the United States - not because Britain
+does pay people according to need rather than inherited abilities,
+but because these sections of the community, though relatively
+well-paid by British standards, were much better paid in the
+United States. If anyone country were to make a serious attempt
+to equalise the salaries of doctors and manual workers, there
+can be no doubt that the number of doctors emigrating would
+greatly increase. This is part of the problem of 'socialism in one
+country'. Marx expected the socialist revolution to be a worldwide
+one. When the Russian Marxists found that their revolution
+had not sparked off the anticipated world revolution,
+they had to adapt Marxist ideas to this new situation. They did
+so by harshly restricting freedom, including the freedom to emigrate.
+Without these restrictions, during the communist period
+in the Soviet Union and other communist states, and despite
+the considerable pay differentials that still did exist in those
+nations when under communist rule, and that continue to exist
+in the remaining communist countries, there would have been
+a crippling outflow of skilled people to the capitalist nations,
+which rewarded skill more highly.l But if 'socialism in one
+country' requires making the country an armed camp, with
+border guards keeping watch on the citizens within as well as
+the enemy without, socialism may not be worth the price.
+To allow these difficulties to lead us to the conclusion that
+we can do nothing to improve the distribution of income that
+now exists in capitalist countries would, however, be too pessimistic.
+There is, in the more affluent Western nations, a good
+According to one observer, salary differentials in China are quite steep, in
+some areas steeper than in Western nations. For instance, a full professor
+gets almost seven times as much as a junior lecturer, whereas in Britain,
+Australia, or the United States, the ratio is more like three to one. See Simon
+Leys, Chinese Shadows (New York, 1977).
+41
+Practical Ethics
+deal of scope for reducing pay differentials before the point is
+reached at which significant numbers of people begin to think
+of emigrating. This is, of course, especially true of those countries,
+like the United States, where pay differentials are presently
+very great. It is here that pressure for a more equitable distribution
+can best be applied.
+What of the problems of redistribution within a single nation?
+There is a popular belief that if we did not pay people a lot of
+money to be doctors or university professors, they would not
+undertake the studies required to achieve these positions. I do
+not know what evidence there is in support of this assumption,
+but it seems to me highly dubious. My own salary is considerably
+higher than the salaries ofthe people employed by the university
+to mow the lawns and keep the grounds clean, but if our salaries
+were identical I would still not want to swap positions with
+them - although their jobs are a lot more pleasant than some
+lowly paid work. Nor do I believe that my doctor would jump
+at a chance to change places with his receptionist if their salaries
+did not differ. It is true that my doctor and I have had to study
+for several years to get where we are, but I at least look back
+on my student years as one of the most enjoyable periods of
+my life.
+Although I do not think it is because of the money that people
+choose to become doctors rather than receptionists, there is one
+qualification to be made to the suggestion that payment should
+be based on need rather than ability. It must be admitted that
+the prospect of earning more money sometimes leads people to
+make greater efforts to use the abilities they have, and these
+greater efforts can benefit patients, customers, students, or the
+public as a whole. It might therefore be worth trying to reward
+effort, which would mean paying people more if they worked
+near the upper limits of their abilities, whatever those abilities
+might be. This, however, is quite different from paying people
+for the level of ability they happen to have, which is something
+they cannot themselves control. As Jeffrey Gray, a British pro-
+42
+-.
+Equality and Its Implications
+fessor of psychology, has written, the evidence for genetic control
+of IQ suggests that to pay people differently for 'upper-class'
+and 'lower-class' jobs is 'a wasteful use of resources in the guise
+of "incentives" that either tempt people to do what is beyond
+their powers or reward them more for what they would do
+anyway'.
+We have, up to now, been thinking of people such as university
+professors, who (at least in some countries) are paid by
+the government, and doctors, whose incomes are determined
+either by government bodies, where there is some kind of national
+health service, or by the government protection given to
+professional associations like a medical association, which enables
+the profession to exclude those who might seek to advertise
+their services at a lower cost. These incomes are therefore
+already subject to government control and could be altered
+without drastically changing the powers of government. The
+private business sector of the economy is a different matter.
+Business people who are quick to seize an opportunity will,
+under any private enterprise system, make more money than
+their rivals or, if they are employed by a large corporation, may
+be promoted faster. Taxation can help to redistribute some of
+this income, but there are limits to how effective a steeply progressive
+tax system can be - there almost seems to be a law to
+the effect that the higher the rate of tax, the greater the amount
+of tax avoidance.
+So do we have to abolish private enterprise if we are to eliminate
+undeserved wealth? That suggestion raises issues too large
+to be discussed here; but it can be said that private enterprise
+has a habit of reasserting itself under the most inhospitable
+conditions. As the Russians and East Europeans soon found,
+communist societies still had their black markets, and if you
+wanted your plumbing fixed swiftly it was advisable to pay a
+bit extra on the side. Only a radical change in human nature -
+a decline in acquisitive and self-centred desires - could overcome
+the tendency for people to find a way around any system
+43
+Practical Ethics
+that suppresses private enterprise. Since no such change in human
+nature is in sight, we shall probably continue to pay most
+to those with inherited abilities, rather than those who have
+the greatest needs. To hope for something entirely different is
+unrealistic. To work for wider recognition of the principle of
+payment according to needs and effort rather than inherited
+ability is both realistic and, I believe, right.
+AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
+The preceding section suggested that moving to a more egalitarian
+society in which differences of income are reduced is
+ethically desirable but likely to prove difficult. Short of bringing
+about general equality, we might at least attempt to ensure that
+where there are important differences in income, status, and
+power, women and racial minorities should not be on the worse
+end in numbers disproportionate to their numbers in the community
+as a whole. Inequalities among members of the same
+ethnic group may be no more justifiable than those between
+ethnic groups, or between males and females, but when these
+inequalities coincide with an obvious difference between people
+like the differences between African Americans and Americans
+of European descent, or between males and females, they do
+more to produce a divided society with a sense of superiority
+on the one side and a sense of inferiority on the other. Racial
+and sexual inequality may therefore have a more divisive effect
+than other forms of inequality. It may also do more to create a
+feeling of hopelessness among the inferior group, since their sex
+or their race is not the product of their own actions and there
+is nothing they can do to change it.
+How are racial and sexual equality to be achieved within an
+inegalitarian society? We have seen that equality of opportunity
+is practically unrealisable, and if it could be realised might allow
+innate differences in aggression or IQ unfairly to determine
+44
+Equality and Its Implications
+membership of the upper strata. One way of overcoming these
+obstacles is to go beyond equality of opportunity and give preferential
+treatment to members of disadvantaged groups. This is
+affirmative action (sometimes also called 'reverse discrimination').
+It may be the best hope of reducing long-standing inequalities;
+yet it appears to offend against the principle of
+equality itself. Hence it is controversial.
+Affirmative action is most often used in education and employment.
+Education is a particularly important area, since it
+has an important influence on one's prospects of earning a high
+income, holding a satisfying job, and achieving power and status
+in the community. Moreover in the United States education has
+been at the centre of the dispute over affirmative action because
+of Supreme Court cases over university admission procedures
+favouring disadvantaged groups. These cases have arisen because
+males of European descent were denied admission to
+courses although their academic records and admission test
+scores were better than those of some African American students
+admitted. The universities did not deny this; they sought to
+justify it by explaining that they operated admission schemes
+intended to help disadvantaged students.
+The leading case, as far as United States law is concerned, is
+Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. Alan Bakke applied
+for admission to the medical school of the University of California
+at Davis. In an attempt to increase the number of members
+of minority groups who attended medical school, the university
+reserved 16 out of every 100 places for students belonging to a
+disadvantaged minority. Since these students would not have
+won sQ,JIlany places in open competition, fewer students of
+European descent were admitted than there would have been
+without this reservation. Some of these students denied places
+would certainly have been offered them if, scoring as they did
+on the admission tests, they had been members of a disadvantaged
+minority. Bakke was among these rejected European
+45
+Practical Ethics
+American students and on being rejected he sued the university.
+Let us take this case as a standard case of affirmative action. Is
+it defensible?
+I shall start by putting aside one argument sometimes used
+to justify discrimination in favour of members of disadvantaged
+groups. It is sometimes said that if, say, 20 per cent of the
+population is a racial minority, and yet only 2 per cent of doctors
+are from this minority, this is sufficient evidence that, somewhere
+along the line, our community discriminates on the basis
+of race. (Similar arguments have been mounted in support of
+claims of sexual discrimination.) Our discussion of the geneticsversus-
+environment debate indicates why this argument is inconclusive.
+It may be the case that members of the underrepresented
+group are, on average, less gifted for the kind of
+study one must do to become a doctor. I am not saying that
+this is true, or even probable, but it cannot be ruled out at this
+stage. So a disproportionately small number of doctors from a
+particular ethnic minority is not in itself proof of discrimination
+against members of that minority. (Just as the disproportionately
+large number of African American athletes in the U.S.
+Olympic athletic team is not in itself proof of discrimination
+against European Americans.) There might, of course, be other
+evidence suggesting that the small number of doctors from the
+minority group really is the result of discrimination; but this
+would need to be shown. In the absence of positive evidence
+of discrimination, it is not possible to justify affirmative action
+on the grounds that it merely redresses the balance of discrimination
+existing in the community.
+Another way of defending a decision to accept a minority
+student in preference to a student from the majority group who
+scored higher in admission tests would be to argue that standard
+tests do not give an accurate indication of ability when one
+student has been severely disadvantaged. This is in line with
+the point made in the last section about the impossibility of
+achieving equal opportunity. Education and home background
+46
+Equality and Its Implications
+presumably influence test scores. A student with a background
+of deprivation who scores 55 per cent in an admission test may
+have better prospects of graduating in minimum time than a
+more privileged student who scores 70 per cent. Adjusting test
+scores on this basis would not mean admitting disadvantaged
+minority students in preference to better-qualified students. It
+would reflect a decision that the disadvantaged students really
+were better qualified than the others. This is not racial discrimination.
+The University of California could not attempt this defence,
+for its medical school at Davis had simply reserved 16 per cent
+of places for minority students. The quota did not vary according
+to the ability displayed by minority applicants. This may be in
+the interests of ultimate equality, but it is undeniably racial
+discrimination.
+In this chapter we have seen that the only defensible basis
+for the claim that all humans are equal is the principle of equal
+consideration of interests. That principle outlaws forms of racial
+and sexual discrimination which give less weight to the interests
+of those discriminated against. Could Bakke claim that in rejecting
+his application the medical school gave less weight to
+his interests than to those of African American students?
+We have only to ask this question to appreciate that university
+admission is not normally a result of consideration of the interests
+of each applicant. It depends rather on matching the
+applicants against standards that the university draws up with
+certain policies in mind. Take the most straightforward case:
+admission rigidly governed by scores on an intelligence test.
+Suppose those rejected by this procedure complained that their
+interests had been given less consideration than the interests of
+applicants of higher intelligence. The university would reply that
+its procedure did not take the applicants' interests into account
+at all, and so could hardly give less consideration to the interests
+of one applicant than it gave to others. We could then ask the
+university why it used intelligence as the criterion of admission.
+47
+Practical Ethics
+It might say, first, that to pass the examinations required for
+graduation takes a high level of intelligence. There is no point
+in admitting students unable to pass, for they will not be able
+to graduate. They will waste their own time and the university's
+resources. Secondly, the university may say, the higher the intelligence
+of our graduates, the more useful they are likely to
+be to the community. The more intelligent our doctors, the
+better they will be at preventing and curing disease. Hence the
+more intelligent the students a medical school selects, the better
+value the community gets for its outlay on medical education.
+This particular admission procedure is of course one-sided; a
+good doctor must have other qualities in addition to a high
+degree of intelligence. It is only an example, however, and that
+objection is not relevant to the point I am using the example
+to make. This point is that no one objects to intelligence as a
+criterion for selection in the way that they object to race as a
+criterion; yet those of higher intelligence admitted under an
+intelligence-based scheme have no more of an intrinsic right to
+admission than those admitted by reverse discrimination. Higher
+intelligence, I have argued before, carries with it no right or
+justifiable claim to more of the good things our society offers.
+If a university admits students of higher intelligence it does so
+not in consideration of their greater interest in being admitted,
+nor in recognition of their right to be admitted, but because it
+favours goals that it believes will be advanced by this admission
+procedure. So if this same university should adopt new goals
+and use affirmative action to promote them, applicants who
+would have been admitted under the old procedure cannot
+claim that the new procedure violates their right to be admitted,
+or treats them with less respect than others. They had no special
+claim to be admitted in the first place; they were the fortunate
+beneficiaries of the old university policy. Now that this policy
+has changed others benefit, not they. If this seems unfair, it is
+only because we had become accustomed to the old policy.
+So affirmative action cannot justifiably be condemned on the
+48
+Equality and Its Implications
+grounds that it violates the rights of university applicants, or
+treats them with less than equal consideration. There is no inherent
+right to admission, and equal consideration of the interests
+of applicants is not involved in normal admission tests.
+If affirmative action is open to objection it must be because the
+goals it seeks to advance are bad, or because it will not really
+promote these goals.
+The principle of equality might be a ground for condemning
+the goals of a racially discriminatory admissions procedure.
+When universities discriminate against already disadvantaged
+minorities we suspect that the discrimination really does result
+from less concern for the interests of the minority. Why else did
+universities in the American South excluded African Americans
+until segregation was held to be unconstitutional? Here, in contrast
+to the affirmative action situation, those rejected could
+justifiably claim that their interests were not being weighed
+equally with the interests of European Americans who were
+admitted. Other explanations may have been offered, but they
+were surely specious.
+Opponents of affirmative action have not objected to the goals
+of social equality and greater minority representation in the
+professions. They would be hard put to do so. Equal consideration
+of interests supports moves towards equality because of
+the principle of diminishing marginal utility, because it relieves
+the feeling of hopeless inferiority that can exist when members
+of one race or sex are always worse off than members of another
+race or the other sex, and because severe inequality between
+races means a divided community with consequent racial
+tension.
+Within the overall goal of social equality, greater minority
+representation in professions like law and medicine is desirable
+for several reasons. Members of minority groups are more likely
+to work among their own people than those who come from
+the mainstream ethnic groups, and this may help to overcome
+the scarcity of doctors and lawyers in poor neighbourhoods
+49
+Practical Ethics
+where most members of disadvantaged minorities live. They
+may also have a better understanding of the problems disadvantaged
+people face than any outsider would have. Minority
+and female doctors and lawyers can serve as role models to
+other members of minority groups, and to women, breaking
+down the unconscious mental barriers against aspiring to such
+positions. Finally, the existence of a diverse student group will
+help members of the dominant ethnic group to learn more about
+the attitudes of African Americans and women, and thus become
+better able, as doctors and lawyers, to serve the whole
+community.
+Opponents of affirmative action are on stronger ground when
+they claim that affirmative action will not promote equality. As
+Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., said, in the Bakke case, 'Preferential
+programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that
+certain groups are unable to achieve success without special
+protection: To achieve real equality, it might be said, members
+of minority groups and women must win their places on their
+merits. As long as they get into law school more easily than
+others, law graduates from disadvantaged minority groups -
+including those who would have got in under open competition
+- will be regarded as inferior.
+There is also a long-term objection to affirmative action as a
+means to equality. In the present social climate we may be
+confident that race will be taken into account only to benefit
+disadvantaged minorities; but will this climate last? Should old
+-fashioned racism return, won't our approval of racial quotas
+now make it easier to tum them against minority groups? Can
+we really expect the introduction of racial distinctions to advance
+the goal of the elimination of racial distinctions?
+These practical objections raise difficult factual issues. Though
+they were referred to in the Bakke case, they have not been
+central in the American legal battles over affirmative action.
+Judges are properly reluctant to decide cases on factual grounds
+on which they have no special expertise. Alan Bakke won his
+50
+Equality and Its Implications
+case chiefly on the grounds that the u.s. Civil Rights Act of
+1964 provides that no person shall, on the grounds of colour,
+race, or national origin, be excluded from any activity receiving
+federal financial assistance. A bare majority of the judges held
+that this excluded all discrimination, benign or not. They added,
+however, that there would be no objection to a university including
+race as one among a number of factors, like athletic or
+artistic ability, work experience, demonstrated compassion, a
+history of overcoming disadvantage, or leadership potential. The
+court thus effectively allowed universities to choose their student
+body in accord with their own goals, as long as they did
+not use quotas.
+That may be the law in the United States, but in other countries
+- and in general, when we look at the issue with an eye
+to ethics, rather than the law - the distinction between quotas
+and other ways of giving preference to disadvantaged groups
+may be less significant. The important point is that affirmative
+action, whether by quotas or some other method, is not contrary
+to any sound principle of equality and does not violate any
+rights of those excluded by it. Properly applied, it is in keeping
+with equal consideration of interests, in its aspirations at least.
+The only real doubt is whether it will work. In the absence of
+more promising alternatives it seems worth a try.
+A CONCLUDING NOTE: EQUALITY AND DISABILITY
+In this chapter we have been concerned with the interplay of
+the moral principle of equality and the differences, real or alleged,
+between groups of people. Perhaps the clearest way of
+seeing the irrelevance of IQ, or specific abilities, to the moral
+principle of equality, is to consider the situation of people with
+disabilities, whether physical or intellectual. When we consider
+how such people are to be treated, there is no argument about
+whether they are as able as people without disabilities. By definition,
+they are lacking at least some ability that normal people
+51
+Practical Ethics
+have. These disabilities will sometimes mean that they should
+be treated differently from others. When we are looking for firefighters,
+we can justifiably exclude someone who is confined to
+a wheelchair; and if we are seeking a proof-reader, a blind
+person need not apply. But the fact that a specific disability may
+rule a person out of consideration for a particular position does
+not mean that that person's interests should be given less consideration
+than those of anyone else. Nor does it justify discrimination
+against disabled people in any situation in which the
+particular disability a person has is not relevant to the employment
+or service offered.
+For centuries, disabled people have been subjected to prejudice,
+in some cases no less severe than those under which
+racial minorities have suffered. Intellectually disabled people
+were locked up, out of sight of the public, in appalling conditions.
+Some were virtual slaves, exploited for cheap labour in
+households or factories. Under a so-called "euthanasia program"
+the Nazis murdered tens of thousands of intellectually
+disabled people who were quite capable of wanting to continue
+living and enjoying their lives. Even today, some businesses will
+not hire a person in a wheelchair for a job that she could do as
+well as anyone else. Others seeking a salesperson will not hire
+someone whose appearance is abnormal. for fear that sales will
+fall. (Similar arguments were used against employing members
+of racial minorities; we can best overcome such prejudices by
+becoming used to people who are different from us.)
+We are now just starting to think about the injustice that has
+been done to disabled people, and to consider them as a disadvantaged
+group. That we have been slow in doing so may
+well be due to the confusion between factual equality and moral
+equality discussed earlier in this chapter. Because disabled people
+are different, in some respects, we have not seen it as discriminatory
+to treat them differently. We have overlooked the
+fact that, as in the examples given above, the disabled person's
+disability has been irrelevant to the different - and disadvan-
+52
+Equality and Its Implications
+tageous - treatment. There is therefore a need to ensure that
+legislation that prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity
+or gender also prohibits discrimination on the grounds of
+disability, unless the disability can be shown to be relevant to
+the employment or service offered.
+Nor is that all. Many of the arguments for affirmative action
+in the case of those disadvantaged by race or gender apply even
+more strongly to disabled people. Mere equality of opportunity
+will not be enough in situations in which a disability makes it
+impossible to become an equal member of the community. Giving
+disabled people equal opportunity to attend university is
+not much use if the library is accessible only by a flight of stairs
+that they cannot use. Many disabled children are capable of
+benefitting from normal schooling, but are prevented from taking
+part because additional resources are required to cope with
+their special needs. Since such needs are often very central to
+the lives of disabled people, the principle of equal consideration
+of interests will give them much greater weight than more minor
+needs of others. For this reason, it will generally be justifiable
+to spend more on behalf of disabled people than we spend on
+behalf of others. Just how much more is, of course, a difficult
+question. Where resources are scarce, there must be some limit.
+By giving equal consideration to the interests of those with
+disabilities, and empathetically imagining ourselves in their situation,
+we can, in principle, reach the right answer; but it will
+not be easy to determine what exactly, in each particular situation,
+that answer should be.
+Some will claim to find a contradiction between this recognition
+of disabled people as a group that has been subjected to
+unjustifiable discrimination, and arguments that appear later in
+this book defending abortion and infanticide in the case of a
+fetus or an infant with a severe disability. For these later arguments
+presuppose that life is better without a disability than
+with one; and is this not itself a form of prejudice, held by
+people without disabilities, and parallel to the prejudice that it
+53
+Practical Ethics
+is better to be a member of the European race, or a man, than
+to be of African descent, or a woman?
+The error in this argument is not difficult to detect. It is one
+thing to argue that people with disabilities who want to live
+their lives to the full should be given every possible assistance
+in doing so. It is another, and quite different thing, to argue
+that if we are in a position to choose, for our next child, whether
+that child shall begin life with or without a disability, it is mere
+prejudice or bias that leads us to choose to have a child without
+a disability. If disabled people who must use wheelchairs to get
+around were suddenly offered a miracle drug that would, with
+no side effects, give them full use of their legs, how many of
+them would refuse to take it on the grounds that life with a
+disability is in no way inferior to life without a disability? In
+seeking medical assistance to overcome and eliminate disabilfry,
+when it is available,· disabled people themselves show that the
+preference for a life without disability is no mere prejudice.
+Some disabled people might say that they make this choice only
+because society puts so many obstacles in the way of disabled
+people. They claim that it is social conditions that disable them,
+not their physical or intellectual condition. This assertions twists
+the more limited truth, that social conditions make the lives of
+the disabled much more difficult than they need be, into a
+sweeping falsehood. To be able to walk, to see, to hear, to be
+relatively free from pain and discomfort, to communicate effectively
+- all these are, under virtually any social conditions,
+genuine benefits. To say this is not to deny that people lacking
+these abilities may triumph over their disabilities and have lives
+of astonishing richness and diversity. Nevertheless, we show no
+prejudice against disabled people if we prefer, whether for ourselves
+or for our children, not to be faced with hurdles so great
+that to surmount them is in itself a triumph.
+54
+3
+EQUALITY FOR ANIMALS?
+RACISM AND SPECIESISM
+I N Chapter 2, I gave reasons for believing that the fundamental
+principle of equality, on which the equality of all human
+beings rests, is the principle of equal consideration of interests.
+Only a basic moral principle of this kind can allow us to defend
+a form of equality that embraces all human beings, with all the
+differences that exist between them. I shall now contend that
+while this principle does provide an adequate basis for human
+equality, it provides a basis that cannot be limited to humans.
+In other words I shall suggest that, having accepted the principle
+of equality as a sound moral basis for relations with others of
+our own species, we are also committed to accepting it as a
+sound moral basis for relations with those outside our own
+species - the non-human animals.
+This suggestion may at first seem bizarre. We are used to
+regarding discrimination against members of racial minorities,
+or against women, as among the most important moral and
+political issues facing the world today. These are serious matters,
+worthy of the time and energy of any concerned person. But
+animals? Isn't the welfare of animals in a different category
+altogether, a matter for people who are dotty about dogs and
+cats? How can anyone waste their time on equality for animals
+when so many humans are denied real equality?
+This attitude reflects a popular prejudice against taking the
+interests of animals seriously - a prejudice no better founded
+than the prejudice of white slaveowners against taking the in-
+55
+Practical Ethics
+terests of their African slaves seriously. It is easy for us to criticise
+the prejudices of our grandfathers, from which our fathers freed
+themselves. It is more difficult to distance ourselves from our
+own views, so that we can dispassionately search for prejudices
+among the beliefs and values we hold. What is needed now is
+a willingness to follow the arguments where they lead, without
+a prior assumption that the issue is not worth our attention.
+The argument for extending the principle of equality beyond
+our own species is simple, so simple that it amounts to no more
+than a clear understanding of the nature ofthe principle of equal
+consideration of interests. We have seen that this principle implies
+that our concern for others ought not to depend on what
+they are like, or what abilities they possess (although precisely
+what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the
+characteristics of those affected by what we do). It is on this
+basis that we are able to say that the fact that some people are
+not members of our race does not entitle us to exploit them,
+and similarly the fact that some people are less intelligent than
+others does not mean that their interests may be disregarded.
+But the principle also implies that the fact that beings are not
+members of our species does not entitle us to exploit them, and
+similarly the fact that other animals are less intelligent than we
+are does not mean that their interests may be disregarded.
+We saw in Chapter 2 that many philosophers have advocated
+equal consideration of interests, in some form or other, as a
+basic moral principle. Only a few have recognised that the principle
+has applications beyond our own species, one of the few
+being Jeremy Bentham, the founding father of modem utilitarianism.
+In a forward-looking passage, written at a time when
+African slaves in the British dominions were still being treated
+much as we now treat nonhuman animals, Bentham wrote:
+The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may
+acquire those rights which never could have been withholden
+from them but by the hand oftyranny. The French have already
+discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a
+56
+Equality for Animals?
+human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice
+of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised that the
+number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination
+of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning
+a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should
+trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps
+the faculty of discourse? But a fullgrown horse or dog is beyond
+comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal,
+than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old.
+But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The
+question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can
+they suffer?
+In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as
+the vital characteristic that entitles a being to equal consideration.
+The capacity for suffering - or more strictly, for suffering
+and/or enjoyment or happiness - is not just another characteristic
+like the capacity for language, or for higher mathematics.
+Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark 'the insuperable
+line' that determines whether the interests of a being
+should be considered happen to have selected the wrong characteristic.
+The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a
+prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be
+satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful
+way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests
+of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone
+does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that
+we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare.
+A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being
+tormented, because mice will suffer if they are treated in this
+way.
+If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing
+to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what
+the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that
+the suffering be counted equally with the like suffering - in so
+far as rough comparisons can be made - of any other being. If
+a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment
+57
+Practical Ethics
+or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is
+why the limit of sentience (using the term as a convenient, if
+not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or
+experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible
+boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this
+boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality
+would be to mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not choose some
+other characteristic, like skin colour?
+Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater
+weight to the interests of members of their own race when there
+is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of
+another race. Racists of European descent typically have not
+accepted that pain matters as much when it is felt by Africans,
+for example, as when it is felt by Europeans. Similarly those I
+would call 'speciesists' give greater weight to the interests of
+members of their own species when there is a clash between
+their interests and the interests of those of other species. Human
+speciesists do not accept that pain is as bad when it is felt by
+pigs or mice as when it is felt by humans.
+That, then, is really the whole of the argument for extending
+the principle of equality to nonhuman animals; but there may
+be some doubts about what this equality amounts to in practice.
+In particular, the last sentence of the previous paragraph may
+prompt some people to reply: 'Surely pain felt by a mouse just
+is not as bad as pain felt by a human. Humans have much
+greater awareness of what is happening to them, and this makes
+their suffering worse. You can't equate the suffering of, say, a
+person dying slowly from cancer, and a laboratory mouse undergoing
+the same fate.'
+I fully accept that in the case described the human cancer
+victim normally suffers more than the nonhuman cancer victim.
+This in no way undermines the extension of equal consideration
+of interests to nonhumans. It means, rather, that we must take
+care when we compare the interests of different species. In some
+situations a member of one species will suffer more than a
+58
+Equality for Animals?
+member of another species. In this case we should still apply
+the principle of equal consideration of interests but the result
+of so doing is, of course, to give priority to relieving the greater
+suffering. A simpler case may help to make this clear.
+If I give a horse a hard slap across its rump with my open
+hand, the horse may start, but it presumably feels little pain. Its
+skin is thick enough to protect it against a mere slap. If I slap
+a baby in the same way, however, the baby will cry and presumably
+does feel pain, for the baby's skin is more sensitive. So
+it is worse to slap a baby than a horse, if both slaps are administered
+with equal force. But there must be some kind of blow
+- I don't know exactly what it would be, but perhaps a blow
+with a heavy stick - that would cause the horse as much pain
+as we cause a baby by a simple slap. That is what I mean by
+'the same amount of pain' and if we consider it wrong to inflict
+that much pain on a baby for no good reason then we must,
+unless we are speciesists, consider it equally wrong to inflict the
+same amount of pain on a horse for no good reason.
+There are other differences between humans and animals that
+cause other complications. Normal adult human beings have
+mental capacities that will, in certain circumstances, lead them
+to suffer more than animals would in the same circumstances.
+If, for instance, we decided to perform extremely painful or
+lethal scientific experiments on normal adult humans, kidnapped
+at random from public parks for this purpose, adults
+who entered parks would become fearful that they would be
+kidnapped. The resultant terror would be a form of suffering
+additional to the pain of the experiment. The same experiments
+performed on nonhuman animals would cause less suffering
+since the animals would not have the anticipatory dread of being
+kidnapped and experimented upon. This does not mean, of
+course, that it would be right to perform the experiment on
+animals, but only that there is a reason, and one that is not
+speciesist, for preferring to use animals rather than normal adult
+humans, if the experiment is to be done at all. Note, however,
+59
+Practical Ethics
+that this same argument gives us a reason for preferring to use
+human infants - orphans perhaps - or severely intellectually
+disabled humans for experiments, rather than adults, since infants
+and severely intellectually disabled humans would also
+have no idea of what was going to happen to them. As far as
+this argument is concerned, nonhuman animals and infants and
+severely intellectually disabled humans are in the same category;
+and if we use this argument to justify experiments on
+nonhuman animals we have to ask ourselves whether we are
+also prepared to allow experiments on human infants and severely
+intellectually disabled adults. If we make a distinction
+between animals and these humans, how can we do it, other
+than on the basis of a morally indefensible preference for members
+of our own species?
+There are many areas in which the superior mental powers
+of normal adult humans make a difference: anticipation, more
+detailed memory, greater knowledge of what is happening, and
+so on. These differences explain why a human dying from cancer
+is likely to suffer more than a mouse. It is the mental anguish
+that makes the human's position so much harder to bear. Yet
+these differences do not all point to greater suffering on the part
+of the normal human being. Sometimes animals may suffer
+more because of their more limited understanding. If, for instance,
+we are taking prisoners in wartime we can explain to
+them that while they must submit to capture, search, and confinement
+they will not otherwise be harmed and will be set free
+at the conclusion of hostilities. Ifwe capture wild animals, however,
+we cannot explain that we are not threatening their lives.
+A wild animal cannot distinguish an attempt to overpower and
+confine from an attempt to kill; the one causes as much terror
+as the other.
+It may be objected that comparisons of the sufferings of different
+species are impossible to make, and that for this reason
+when the interests of animals and humans clash, the principle
+of equality gives no guidance. It is true that comparisons of
+60
+Equality for Animals?
+suffering between members of different species cannot be made
+precisely. Nor, for that matter, can comparisons of suffering
+between different human beings be made precisely. Precision is
+not essential. As we shall see shortly, even if we were to prevent
+the infliction of suffering on animals only when the interests of
+humans will not be affected to anything like the extent that
+animals are affected, we would be forced to make radical
+changes in our treatment of animals that would involve our
+diet, the farming methods we use, experimental procedures in
+many fields of science, our approach to wildlife and to hunting,
+trapping and the wearing of furs, and areas of entertainment
+like circuses, rodeos, and zoos. As a result, the total quantity of
+suffering caused would be greatly reduced; so greatly that it is
+hard to imagine any other change of moral attitude that would
+cause so great a reduction in the total sum of suffering in the
+universe.
+So far I have said a lot about the infliction of suffering on
+animals, but nothing about killing them. This omission has been
+deliberate. The application of the principle of equality to the
+infliction of suffering is, in theory at least, fairly straightforward.
+Pain and suffering are bad and should be prevented or minimised,
+irrespective of the race, sex, or species of the being that
+suffers. How bad a pain is depends on how intense it is and
+how long it lasts, but pains of the same intensity and duration
+are equally bad, whether felt by humans or animals. When we
+come to consider the value of life, we cannot say quite so confidently
+that a life is a life, and equally valuable, whether it is
+a human life or an animal life. It would not be speciesist to hold
+that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought,
+of planning for the future, of complex acts of communication,
+and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being without
+these capacities. (I am not saying whether this view is justifiable
+or not; only that it cannot simply be rejected as speciesist, because
+it is not on the basis of species itself that one life is held
+61
+Practical Ethics
+to be more valuable than another.) The value of life is a notoriously
+difficult ethical question, and we can only arrive at a
+reasoned conclusion about the comparative value of human and
+animal life after we have discussed the value of life in general.
+This is a topic for a separate chapter. Meanwhile there are important
+conclusions to be derived from the extension beyond
+our own species of the principle of equal consideration of interests,
+irrespective of our conclusions about the value of life.
+SPECIESISM IN PRACTICE
+Animals as Food
+For most people in modem, urbanised societies, the principal
+form of contact with nonhuman animals is at meal times. The
+use of animals for food is probably the oldest and the most
+widespread form of animal use. There is also a sense in which
+it is the most basic form of animal use, the foundation stone on
+which rests the belief that animals exist for our pleasure and
+convenience.
+If animals count in their own right, our use of animals for
+food becomes questionable - especially when animal flesh is a
+luxury rather than a necessity. Eskimos living in an environment
+where they must kill animals for food or starve might be justified
+in claiming that their interest in surviving overrides that of the
+animals they kill. Most of us cannot defend our diet in this way.
+Citizens of industrialised societies can easily obtain an adequate
+diet without the use of animal flesh. The overwhelming weight
+of medical evidence indicates that animal flesh is not necessary
+for good health or longevity. Nor is animal production in industrialised
+societies an efficient way of producing food, since
+most of the animals consumed have been fattened on grains
+and other foods that we could have eaten directly. When we
+feed these grains to animals, only about 10 per cent of the
+nutritional value remains as meat for human consumption. So,
+62
+Equality for Animals?
+with the exception of animals raised entirely on grazing land
+unsuitable for crops, animals are eaten neither for health, nor
+to increase our food supply. Their flesh is a luxury, consumed
+because people like its taste.
+In considering the ethics of the use of animal flesh for human
+food in industrialised societies, we are considering a situation
+in which a relatively minor human interest must be balanced
+against the lives and welfare of the animals involved. The principle
+of equal consideration of interests does not allow major
+interests to be sacrificed for minor interests.
+The case against using animals for food is at its strongest when
+animals are made to lead miserable lives so that their flesh can
+be made available to humans at the lowest possible cost. Modem
+forms of intensive farming apply science and technology to the
+attitude that animals are objects for us to use. In order to have
+meat on the table at a price that people can afford, our society
+tolerates methods of meat production that confine sentient animals
+in cramped, unsuitable conditions for the entire duration
+of their lives. Animals are treated like machines that convert
+fodder into flesh, and any innovation that results in a higher
+'conversion ratio' is liable to be adopted. As one authority on
+the subject has said, 'Cruelty is acknowledged only when profitability
+ceases: To avoid speciesism we must stop these practices.
+Our custom is all the support that factory farmers need.
+The decision to cease giving them that SUppOIt may be difficult,
+but it is less difficult than it would have been for a white Southerner
+to go against the traditions of his society and free his slaves;
+if we do not change our dietary habits, how can we censure
+those slaveholders who would not change their own way of
+living?
+These arguments apply to animals who have been reared in
+factory farms - which means that we should not eat chicken,
+pork, or veal, unless we know that the meat we are eating was
+not produced by factory farm methods. The same is true of beef
+that has come from cattle kept in crowded feedlots (as most
+63
+Practical Ethics
+beef does in the United States). Eggs will come from hens kept
+in small wire cages, too small even to allow them to stretch
+their wings, unless the eggs are specifically sold as 'free range'
+(or unless one lives in a relatively enlightened country like
+Switzerland, which has prohibited the cage system of keeping
+hens).
+These arguments do not take us all the way to a vegetarian
+diet, since some animals, for instance sheep, and in some countries
+cattle, still graze freely outdoors. This could change. The
+American pattern of fattening cattle in crowded feedlots is
+spreading to other countries. Meanwhile, the lives offree-ranging
+animals are undoubtedly better than those of animals reared
+in factory farms. It is still doubtful if using them for food is
+compatible with equal consideration of interests. One problem
+is, of course, that using them as food involves killing them -
+but this is an issue to which, as I have said, we shall return
+when we have discussed the value of life in the next chapter.
+Apart from taking their lives there are also many other things
+done to animals in order to bring them cheaply to our dinner
+table. Castration, the separation of mother and young, the
+breaking up of herds, branding, transporting, and finally the
+moments of slaughter - all of these are likely to involve suffering
+and do not take the animals' interests into account. Perhaps
+animals could be reared on a small scale without suffering in
+these ways, but it does not seem economical or practical to do
+so on the scale required for feeding our large urban populations.
+In any case, the important question is not whether animal flesh
+could be produced without suffering, but whether the flesh we
+are considering buying was produced without suffering. Unless
+we can be confident that it was, the principle of equal consideration
+of interests implies that it was wrong to sacrifice important
+interests of the animal in order to satisfy less important
+interests of our own; consequently we should boycott the end
+result of this process.
+For those of us living in cities where it is difficult to know
+64
+Equality for Animals?
+how the animals we might eat have lived and died, this conclusion
+brings us close to a vegetarian way of life. I shall consider
+some objections to it in the final section of this chapter.
+Experimenting on Animals
+Perhaps the area in which speciesism can most clearly be observed
+is the use of animals in experiments. Here the issue stands
+out starkly, because experimenters often seek to justify experimenting
+on animals by claiming that the experiments lead us
+to discoveries about humans; if this is so, the experimenter must
+agree that human and nonhuman animals are similar in crucial
+respects. For instance, if forcing a rat to choose between starving
+to death and crossing an electrified grid to obtain food tells us
+anything about the reactions of humans to stress, we must assume
+that the rat feels stress in this kind of situation.
+People sometimes think that all animal experiments serve
+vital medical purposes, and can be justified on the grounds that
+they relieve more suffering than they cause. This comfortable
+belief is mistaken. Drug companies test new shampoos and cosmetics
+they are intending to market by dripping concentrated
+solutions of them into the eyes of rabbits, in a test known as
+the Draize test. (Pressure from the animal liberation movement
+has led several cosmetic companies to abandon this practice.
+An alternative test, not using animaL has now been found.
+Nevertheless, many companies, including some of the largest,
+still continue to perform the Draize test.) Food additives, including
+artificial colourings and preservatives, are tested by what
+is known as the LD50 - a test designed to find the 'lethal dose',
+or level of consumption that will make 50 per cent of a sample
+of animals die. In the process nearly all of the animals are made
+very sick before some finally die and others pull through. These
+tests are not necessary to prevent human suffering: even if there
+were no alternative to the use of animals to test the safety of
+the products, we already have enough shampoos and food col-
+65
+'I
+I
+I
+Practical Ethics
+ourings. There is no need to develop new ones that might be
+dangerous.
+In many countries, the armed forces perform atrocious experiments
+on animals that rarely come to light. To give just one
+example: at the u.s. Armed Forces Radiobiology Institute, in
+Bethesda, Maryland, rhesus monkeys have been trained to run
+inside a large wheel. If they slow down too much, the wheel
+slows down, too, and the monkeys get an electric shock. Once
+the monkeys are trained to run for long periods, they are given
+lethal doses of radiation. Then, while sick and vomiting, they
+are forced to continue to run until they drop. This is supposed
+to provide information on the capacities of soldiers to continue
+to fight after a nuclear attack.
+Nor can all university experiments be defended on the
+grounds that they relieve more suffering than they inflict. Three
+experimenters at Princeton University kept 256 young rats without
+food or water until they died. They concluded that young
+rats under conditions of fatal thirst and starvation are much
+more active than normal adult rats given food and water. In a
+well-known series of experiments that went on for more than
+fifteen years, H. F. Harlow of the Primate Research Center, Madison,
+Wisconsin, reared monkeys under conditions of maternal
+deprivation and total isolation. He found that in this way he
+could reduce the monkeys to a state in which, when placed
+among normal monkeys, they sat huddled in a comer in a
+condition of persistent depression and fear. Harlow also produced
+monkey mothers so neurotic that they smashed their
+infant's face into the floor and rubbed it back and forth. Although
+Harlow himself is no longer alive, some of his former
+students at other U.S. universities continue to perform variations
+on his experiments.
+In these cases, and many others like them, the benefits to
+humans are either nonexistent or uncertain, while the losses to
+members of other species are certain and real. Hence the ex-
+66
+Equality for Animals?
+periments indicate a failure to give equal consideration to the
+interests of all beings, irrespective of species.
+In the past, argument about animal experimentation has often
+missed this point because it has been put in absolutist terms:
+would the opponent of experimentation be prepared to let thousands
+die from a terrible disease that could be cured by experimenting
+on one animal? This is a purely hypothetical question,
+since experiments do not have such dramatic results, but as long
+as its hypothetical nature is clear, I think the question should
+be answered affirmatively - in other words, if one, or even a
+dozen animals had to suffer experiments in order to save thousands,
+I would think it right and in accordance with equal
+consideration of interests that they should do so. This, at any
+rate, is the answer a utilitarian must give. Those who believe
+in absolute rights might hold that it is always wrong to sacrifice
+one being, whether human or animal. for the benefit of another.
+In that case the experiment should not be carried out. whatever
+the consequences.
+To the hypothetical question about saving thousands of people
+through a single experiment on an animal. opponents of
+speciesism can reply with a hypothetical question of their own:
+would experimenters be prepared to perform their experiments
+on orphaned humans with severe and irreversible brain damage
+if that were the only way to save thousands? (I say 'orphaned'
+in order to avoid the complication of the feelings of the human
+parents.) If experimenters are not prepared to use orphaned
+humans with severe and irreversible brain damage, their readiness
+to use nonhuman animals seems to discriminate on the
+basis of species alone, since apes, monkeys, dogs, cats, and even
+mice and rats are more intelligent, more aware of what is happening
+to them, more sensitive to pain, and so on, than many
+severely braindamaged humans barely surviving in hospital
+wards and other institutions. There seems to be no morally
+relevant characteristic that such humans have that nonhuman
+67
+II
+II
+Ii:
+,I
+II
+Pradical Ethics
+animals lack. Experimenters, then, show bias in favour of their
+own species whenever they carry out experiments on nonhuman
+animals for purposes that they would not think justified
+them in using human beings at an equal or lower level of sentience,
+awareness, sensitivity, and so on. If this bias were eliminated,
+the number of experiments performed on animals would
+be greatly reduced.
+Other Forms of Speciesism
+I have concentrated on the use of animals as food and in research,
+since these are examples of large-scale, systematic speciesism.
+They are not, of course, the only areas in which the
+principle of equal consideration of interests, extended beyond
+the human species, has practical implications. There are many
+other areas that raise similar issues, including the fur trade,
+hunting in all its different forms, circuses, rodeos, zoos, and the
+pet business. Since the philosophical questions raised by these
+issues are not very different from those raised by the use of
+animals as food and in research, I shall leave it to the reader to
+apply the appropriate ethical principles to them.
+SOME OBJECTIONS
+I first put forward the views outlined in this chapter in 1973.
+At that time there was no animal liberation .or animal rights
+movement. Since then a movement has sprung up, and some
+of the worst abuses of animals, like the Draize and LD50 tests,
+are now less widespread, even though they have not been eliminated.
+The fur trade has come under attack, and as a result fur
+sales have declined dramatically in countries like Britain, the
+Netherlands, Australia, and the United States. Some countries
+are also starting to phase out the most confining forms of factory
+farming. As already mentioned, Switzerland has prohibited the
+cage system of keeping laying hens. Britain has outlawed the
+68
+Equality for Animals?
+raising of calves in individual stalls, and is phasing out individual
+stalls for pigs. Sweden, as in other areas of social reform, is in
+the lead here, too: in 1988 the Swedish Parliament passed a
+law that will, over a ten-year period, lead to the elimination of
+all systems of factory farming that confine animals for long
+periods and prevent them carrying out their natural behaviour.
+Despite this increasing acceptance of many aspects of the case
+for animal liberation, and the slow but tangible progress made
+on behalf of animals, a variety of objections have emerged, some
+straightforward and predictable, some more subtle and unexpected.
+In this final section of the chapter I shall attempt to
+answer the most important of these objections. I shall begin
+with the more straightforward ones.
+How Do We Know That Animals Can Feel Pain?
+We can never directly experience the pain of another being,
+whether that being is human or not. When I see my daughter
+fall and scrape her knee, I know that she feels pain because of
+the way she behaves - she cries, she tells me her knee hurts,
+she rubs the sore spot, and so on. I know that I myself behave
+in a somewhat similar - if more inhibited - way when I feel
+pain, and so I accept that my daughter feels something like what
+I feel when I scrape my knee.
+The basis of my belief that animals can feel pain is similar to
+the basis of my belief that my daughter can feel pain. Animals
+in pain behave in much the same way as humans do, and their
+behaviour is sufficient justification for the belief that they feel
+pain. It is true that, with the exception of those apes who have
+been taught to communicate by sign language, they cannot
+actually say that they are feeling pain - but then when my
+daughter was very young she could not talk, either. She found
+other ways to make her inner states apparent, thereby demonstrating
+that we can be sure that a being is feeling pain even
+if the being cannot use language.
+69
+Practical Ethics
+To back up our inference from animal behaviour, we can
+point to the fact that the nervous systems of all vertebrates, and
+especially of birds and mammals, are fundamentally similar.
+Those parts of the human nervous system that are concerned
+with feeling pain are relatively old, in evolutionary terms. Unlike
+the cerebral cortex, which developed fully only after our ancestors
+diverged from other mammals, the basic nervous system
+evolved in more distant ancestors common to ourselves and the
+other 'higher' animals. This anatomical parallel makes it likely
+that the capacity of animals to feel is similar to our own.
+It is significant that none of the grounds we have for believing
+that animals feel pain hold for plants. We cannot observe behaviour
+suggesting pain - sensational claims to the contrary
+have not been substantiated - and plants do not have a centrally
+organised nervous system like ours.
+Animals Eat Each Other, So Why Shouldn't We
+Eat Them?
+This might be called the Benjamin Franklin Objection. Franklin
+recounts in his Autobiography that he was for a time a vegetarian
+but his abstinence from animal flesh came to an end when he
+was watching some friends prepare to fry a fish they had just
+caught. When the fish was cut open, it was found to have a
+smaller fish in its stomach. 'Well', Franklin said to himself, 'if
+you eat one another, I don't see why we may not eat you' and
+he proceeded to do so.
+Franklin was at least honest. In telling this story, he confesses
+that he convinced himself of the validity of the objection only
+after the fish was already in the frying pan and smelling 'admirably
+well'; and he remarks that one of the advantages of
+being a 'reasonable creature' is that one can find a reason for
+whatever one wants to do. The replies that can be made to this
+objection are so obvious that Franklin's acceptance of it does
+testify more to his love of fried fish than to his powers of reason.
+70
+Equality for Animals?
+For a start, most animals who kill for food would not be able
+to survive if they did not, whereas we have no need to eat
+animal flesh. Next, it is odd that humans, who normally think
+of the behaviour of animals as 'beastly' should, when it suits
+them, use an argument that implies that we ought to look to
+animals for moral guidance. The most decisive point, however,
+is that nonhuman animals are not capable of considering the
+alternatives open to them or of reflecting on the ethics of their
+diet. Hence it is impossible to hold the animals responsible for
+what they do, or to judge that because of their killing they
+'deserve' to be treated in a similar way. Those who read these
+lines, on the other hand, must consider the justifiability of their
+dietary habits. You cannot evade responsibility by imitating
+beings who are incapable of making this choice.
+Sometimes people point to the fact that animals eat each other
+in order to make a slightly different point. This fact suggests,
+they think, not that animals deserve to be eaten, but rather that
+there is a natural law according to which the stronger prey upon
+the weaker, a kind of Darwinian 'survival of the fittest' in which
+by eating animals we are merely playing our part.
+This interpretation of the objection makes two basic mistakes,
+one a mistake of fact and the other an error of reasoning. The
+factual mistake lies in the assumption that our own consumption
+of animals is part of the natural evolutionary process. This
+might be true of a few primitive cultures that still hunt for food,
+but it has nothing to do with the mass production of domestic
+animals in factory farms.
+Suppose that we did hunt for our food, though, and this was
+part of some natural evolutionary process. There would still be
+an error of reasoning in the assumption that because this process
+is natural it is right. It is, no doubt, 'natural' for women to
+produce an infant every year or two from puberty to menopause,
+but this does not mean that it is wrong to interfere with this
+process. We need to know the natural laws that affect us in
+order to estimate the consequences of what we do; but we do
+71
+Practical Ethics
+not have to assume that the natural way of doing something is
+incapable of improvement.
+Differences between Humans and Animals
+That there is a huge gulf between humans and animals was
+unquestioned for most of the course of Western civilisation. The
+basis of this assumption has been undermined by Darwin's discovery
+of our animal origins and the associated decline in the
+credibility of the story of our Divine Creation, made in the image
+of God with an immortal soul. Some have found it difficult to
+accept that the differences between us and the other animals
+are differences of degree rather than kind. They have searched
+for ways of drawing a line between humans and animals. To
+date these boundaries have been shortlived. For instance, it used
+to be said that only humans used tools. Then it was observed
+that the Galapagos woodpecker used a cactus thorn to dig insects
+out of crevices in trees. Next it was suggested that even if other
+animals used tools, humans are the only toolmaking animals.
+But Jane Goodall found that chimpanzees in the jungles of
+Tanzania chewed up leaves to make a sponge for sopping up
+water, and trimmed the leaves off branches to make tools for
+catching insects. The use of language was another boundary
+line - but now chimpanzees, gorillas, and an orangutan have
+learnt Ameslan, the sign language of the deaf, and there is some
+evidence suggesting that whales and dolphins may have a complex
+language of their own.
+If these attempts to draw the line between humans and animals
+had fitted the facts of the situation, they would still not
+carry any moral weight. As Bentham pointed out, the fact that
+a being does not use language or make tools is hardly a reason
+for ignoring its suffering. Some philosophers have claimed that
+there is a more profound difference. They have claimed that
+animals cannot think or reason, and that accordingly they have
+72
+Equality for Animals?
+no conception of themselves, no self-consciousness. They live
+from instant to instant, and do not see themselves as distinct
+entities with a past and a future. Nor do they have autonomy,
+the ability to choose how to live one's life. It has been suggested
+that autonomous, self-conscious beings are in some way much
+more valuable, more morally significant, than beings who live
+from moment to moment, without the capacity to see themselves
+as distinct beings with a past and a future. Accordingly,
+on this view, the interests of autonomous, self-conscious beings
+ought normally to take priority over the interests of other beings.
+I shall not now consider whether some nonhuman animals
+are self-conscious and autonomous. The reason for this omission
+is that I do not believe that, in the present context, much depends
+on this question. We are now considering only the application
+of the principle of equal consideration of interests. In
+the next chapter, when we discuss questions about the value
+of life, we shall see that there are reasons for holding that selfconsciousness
+is crucial in debates about whether a being has
+a right to life; and we shall then investigate the evidence for
+self-consciousness in nonhuman animals. Meanwhile the more
+important issue is: does the fact that a being is self-conscious
+entitle that being to some kind of priority of consideration?
+The claim that self-conscious beings are entitled to prior consideration
+is compatible with the principle of equal consideration
+of interests if it amounts to no more than the claim that
+something that happens to self-conscious beings can be contrary
+to their interests while similar events would not be contrary to
+the interests of beings who were not self-conscious. This might
+be because the self-conscious creature has greater awareness of
+what is happening, can fit the event into the overall framework
+of a longer time period, has different desires, and so on. But
+this is a point I granted at the start of this chapter, and provided
+that it is not carried to ludicrous extremes - like insisting that
+if I am self-conscious and a veal calf is not, depriving me of veal
+73
+Practical Ethics
+causes more suffering than depriving the calf of his freedom to
+walk, stretch and eat grass - it is not denied by the criticisms I
+made of animal experimentation and factory farming.
+It would be a different matter if it were claimed that, even
+when a self-conscious being did not suffer more than a being
+that was merely sentient, the suffering of the self-conscious
+being is more important because these are more valuable types
+of being. This introduces nonutilitarian claims of value - claims
+that do not derive simply from taking a universal standpoint in
+the manner described in the final section of Chapter 1. Since
+the argument for utilitarianism developed in that section was
+admittedly tentative, I cannot use that argument to rule out all
+nonutilitarian values. Nevertheless we are entitled to ask why
+self-conscious beings should be considered more valuable and
+in particular why the alleged greater value of a self-conscious
+being should result in preferring the lesser interests of a selfconscious
+being to the greater interests of a merely sentient
+being, even where the self-consciousness of the former being is
+not itself at stake. This last point is an important one, for we
+are not now considering cases in which the lives of self-conscious
+beings are at risk but cases in which self-conscious beings
+will go on living, their faculties intact, whatever we decide. In
+these cases, if the existence of self-consciousness does not affect
+the nature of the interests under comparison, it is not clear why
+we should drag self-consciousness into the discussion at all, any
+more than we should drag species, race or sex into similar discussions.
+Interests are interests, and ought to be given equal
+consideration whether they are the interests of human or nonhuman
+animals, self-conscious or non-self-conscious animals.
+There is another possible reply to the claim that selfconsciousness,
+or autonomy, or some similar characteristic, can
+serve to distinguish human from nonhuman animals: recall that
+there are intellectually disabled humans who have less claim to
+be regarded as self-conscious or autonomous than many nonhuman
+animals. If we use these characteristics to place a gulf
+74
+1
+Equality for Animals?
+between humans and other animals, we place these less able
+humans on the other side of the gulf; and if the gulf is taken
+to mark a difference in moral status, then these humans would
+have the moral status of animals rather than humans.
+This reply is forceful, because most of us find horrifying the
+idea of using intellectually disabled humans in painful experiments,
+or fattening them for gourmet dinners. But some philosophers
+have argued that these consequences would not really
+follow from the use of a characteristic like self-consciousness or
+autonomy to distinguish humans from other animals. I shall
+consider three of these attempts.
+The first suggestion is that severely intellectually disabled humans
+who do not possess the capacities that mark the normal
+human off from other animals should nevertheless be treated
+as if they did possess these capacities, since they belong to a
+species, members of which normally do possess them. The suggestion
+is, in other words, that we treat individuals not in accordance
+with their actual qualities, but in accordance with the
+qualities normal for their species.
+It is interesting that this suggestion should be made in defence
+of treating members of our species better than members of another
+species, when it would be firmly rejected if it were used
+to justify treating members of our race or sex better than members
+of another race or sex. In the previous chapter, when discussing
+the impact of possible differences in IQ between
+members of different ethnic groups, I made the obvious point
+that whatever the difference between the average scores for different
+groups, some members of the group with the lower average
+score will do better than some members of groups with
+the higher average score, and so we ought to treat people as
+individuals and not according to the average score for their
+ethnic group, whatever the explanation of that average might
+be. If we accept this we cannot consistently accept the suggestion
+that when dealing with severely intellectually disabled humans
+we should grant them the status or rights normal for their spe-
+75
+Practical Ethics
+cies. For what is the significance of the fact that this time the
+line is to be drawn around the species rather than around the
+race or sex? We cannot insist that beings be treated as individuals
+in the one case, and as members of a group in the other.
+Membership of a species is no more relevant in these circumstances
+than membership of a race or sex.
+A second suggestion is that although severely intellectually
+disabled humans may not possess higher capacities than other
+animals, they are nonetheless human beings, and as such we
+have special relations with them that we do not have with other
+animals. As one reviewer of Animal Liberation put it: 'Partiality
+for our own species, and within it for much smaller groupings
+is, like the universe, something we had better accept . . . The
+danger in an attempt to eliminate partial affections is that it
+may remove the source of all affections.'
+This argument ties morality too closely to our affections. Of
+course some people may have a closer relationship with the
+most profoundly intellectually disabled human than they do
+with any nonhuman animal, and it would be absurd to tell
+them that they should not feel this way. They simply do, and
+as such there is nothing good or bad about it. The question is
+whether our moral obligations to a being should be made to
+depend on our feelings in this manner. NotOriously, some human
+beings have a closer relationship with their cat than with
+their neighbours. Would those who tie morality to affections
+accept that these people are justified in saving their cats from
+a fire before they save their neighbours? And even those who
+are prepared to answer this question affirmatively would, I trust,
+not want to go along with racists who could argue that if people
+have more natural relationships with, and greater affection towards,
+others of their own race, it is all right for them to give
+preference to the interests of other members of their own race.
+Ethics does not demand that we eliminate personal relationships
+and partial affections, but it does demand that when we act we
+76
+Equality for Animals?
+assess the moral claims of those affected by our actions with
+some degree of independence from our feelings for them.
+The third suggestion invokes the widely used 'slippery slope'
+argument. The idea of this argument is that once we take one
+step in a certain direction we shall find ourselves on a slippery
+slope and shall slither further than we wished to go. In the
+present context the argument is used to suggest that we need
+a clear line to divide those beings we can experiment upon,
+or fatten for dinner, from those we cannot. Species membership
+makes a nice sharp dividing line, whereas levels of selfconsciousness,
+autonomy, or sentience do not. Once we allow
+that an intellectually disabled human being has no higher moral
+status than an animal, the argument goes, we have begun our
+descent down a slope, the next level of which is denying rights
+to social misfits, and the bottom of which is a totalitarian gov-
+, ernment disposing of any groups it does not like by classifying
+them as subhuman.
+The slippery slope argument may serve as a valuable warning
+in some contexts, but it cannot bear too much weight. If we
+believe that, as I have argued in this chapter, the special status
+we now give to humans allows us to ignore the interests of
+billions of sentient creatures, we should not be deterred from
+trying to rectify this situation by the mere possibility that the
+principles on which we base this attempt will be misused by
+evil rulers for their own ends. And it is no more than a possibility.
+The change I have suggested might make no difference
+to our treatment of humans, or it might even improve it.
+In the end, no ethical line that is arbitrarily drawn can be
+secure. It is better to find a line that can be defended openly
+and honestly. When discussing euthanasia in Chapter 7 we shall
+see that a line drawn in the wrong place can have unfortunate
+results even for those placed on the higher, or human side of
+the line.
+It is also important to remember that the aim of my argument
+77
+Practical Ethics
+is to elevate the status of animals rather than to lower the status
+of any humans. I do not wish to suggest that intellectually
+disabled humans should be force-fed with food colourings until
+half of them die - although this would certainly give us a more
+accurate indication of whether the substance was safe for humans
+than testing it on rabbits or dogs does. I would like our
+conviction that it would be wrong to treat intellectually disabled
+humans in this way to be transferred to nonhuman animals at
+similar levels of self-consciousness and with similar capacities
+for suffering. It is excessively pessimistic to refrain from trying
+to alter our attitudes on the grounds that we might start treating
+intellectually disabled humans with the same lack of concern
+we now have for animals, rather than give animals the greater
+concern that we now have for intellectually disabled humans.
+Ethics and Reciprocity
+In the earliest surviving major work of moral philosophy in the
+Western tradition, Plato's RepUblic, there is to be found the following
+view of ethics:
+They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice,
+evil; but that there is more evil in the latter than good in the
+former. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice
+and have had experience of both, any who are not able to avoid
+the one and obtain the other, think that they had better agree
+among themselves to have neither; hence they begin to establish
+laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law
+is termed by them lawful and just. This, it is claimed, is the origin
+and nature of justice - it is a mean or compromise, between the
+best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the
+worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of
+retaliation.
+This was not Plato's own view; he put it into the mouth of
+Glaucon in order to allow Socrates, the hero of his dialogue, to
+refute it. It is a view that has never gained general acceptance,
+but has not died away either. Echoes of it can be found in the
+78
+Equality for Animals?
+ethical theories of contemporary philosophers like John Rawls
+and David Gauthier; and it has been used, by these philosophers
+and others, to justify the exclusion of animals from the sphere
+of ethics, or at least from its core. For if the basis of ethics is
+that I refrain from doing nasty things to others as long as they
+don't do nasty things to me, I have no reason against doing
+nasty things to those who are incapable of appreciating my
+restraint and controlling their conduct towards me accordingly.
+Animals, by and large, are in this category. When I am surfing
+far out from shore and a shark attacks, my concern for animals
+will not help; I am as likely to be eaten as the next surfer,
+though he may spend every Sunday afternoon taking potshots
+at sharks from a boat. Since animals cannot reciprocate, they
+are, on this view, outside the limits of the ethical contract.
+In assessing this conception of ethics we should distinguish
+between explanations of the origin of ethical judgments, and
+justifications of these judgments. The explanation of the origin
+of ethics in terms of a tacit contract between people for their
+mutual benefit has a certain plausibility (though in view of the
+quasi-ethical social rules that have been observed in the societies
+of other mammals, it is obviously a historical fantasy). But we
+could accept this account, as a historical explanation, without
+thereby committing ourselves to any views about the rightness
+or wrongness of the ethical system that has resulted. No matter
+how self-interested the origins of ethics may be, it is possible
+that once we have started thinking ethically we are led beyond
+these mundane premises. For we are capable of reasoning, and
+reason is not subordinate to self-interest. When we are reasoning
+about ethics, we are using concepts that, as we saw in the
+first chapter of this book, take us beyond our own personal
+interest, or even the interest of some sectional group. According
+to the contract view of ethics, this universalising process should
+stop at the boundaries of our community; but once the process
+has begun we may come to see that it would not be consistent
+with our other convictions to halt at that point. Just as the first
+79
+Practical Ethics
+mathematicians, who may have started counting in order to
+keep track of the number of people in their tribe, had no idea
+that they were taking the first steps along a path that would
+lead to the infinitesimal calculus, so the origin of ethics tells us
+nothing about where it will end.
+When we turn to the question of justification, we can see that
+contractual accounts of ethics have many problems. Clearly,
+such accounts exclude from the ethical sphere a lot more than
+nonhuman animals. Since severely intellectually disabled humans
+are equally incapable of reciprocating, they must also be
+excluded. The same goes for infants and very young children;
+but the problems of the contractual view are not limited to these
+special cases. The ultimate reason for entering into the ethical
+contract is, on this view, self-interest. Unless some additional
+universal element is brought in, one group of people has no
+reason to deal ethically with another if it is not in their interest
+to do so. If we take this seriously we shall have to revise our
+ethical judgments drastically. For instance, the white slave traders
+who transported African slaves to America had no selfinterested
+reason for treating Mricans any better than they did.
+The Africans had no way of retaliating. If they had only been
+contractualists, the slave traders could have rebutted the abolitionists
+by explaining to them that ethics stops at the boundaries
+of the community, and since Africans are not part of their
+community they have no duties to them.
+Nor is it only past practices that would be affected by taking
+the contractual model seriously. Though people often speak of
+the world today as a single community, there is no doubt that
+the power of people in, say, Chad, to reciprocate either good
+or evil that is done to them by, say, citizens ofthe United States
+is limited. Hence it does not seem that the contract view provides
+for any obligations on the part of wealthy nations to poorer
+nations.
+Most striking of all is the impact of the contract model on
+80
+Equality for Animals?
+our attitude to future generations. 'Why should I do anything
+for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me?' would be
+the view we ought to take if only those who can reciprocate
+are within the bounds of ethics. There is no way in which those
+who will be alive in the year 2100 can do anything to make
+our lives better or worse. Hence if obligations only exist where
+there can be reciprocity, we need have no worries about problems
+like the disposal of nuclear waste. True, some nuclear
+wastes will still be deadly for a quarter of a million years; but
+as long as we put it in containers that will keep it away from
+us for 100 years, we have done all that ethics demands of us.
+These examples should suffice to show that. whatever its
+origin, the ethics we have now does go beyond a tacit understanding
+between beings capable of reciprocity. The prospect of
+returning to such a basis wilt I trust, not be appealing. Since
+no account of the origin of morality compels us to base our
+morality on reciprocity, and since no other arguments in favour
+of this conclusion have been offered, we should reject this view
+of ethics.
+At this point in the discussion some contract theorists appeal
+to a looser view of the contract idea, urging that we include
+within the moral community all those who have or will have
+the capacity to take part in a reciprocal agreement, irrespective
+of whether they are in fact able to reciprocate, and irrespective,
+too, of when they will have this capacity. Plainly, this view is
+no longer based on reciprocity at alL for (unless we care greatly
+about having our grave kept tidy or our memory preserved for
+ever) later generations plainly cannot enter into reciprocal relationships
+with us, even though they will one day have the
+capacity to reciprocate. If contract theorists abandon reciprocity
+in this manner, however, what is left of the contract account?
+Why adopt it at all? And why limit morality to those who have
+the capacity to enter into agreements with us, if in fact there is
+no possibility of them ever doing so? Rather than cling to the
+81
+Pradical Ethics
+husk of a contract view that has lost its kernel. it would be
+better to abandon it altogether, and consider, on the basis of
+universalisabiIity, which beings ought to be included within
+morality.
+82
+4
+WHAT'S WRONG WITH KILLING?
+AN oversimplified summary of the first three chapters of
+this book might read like this: the first chapter sets up a
+conception of ethics from which, in the second chapter, the
+principle of equal consideration of interests is derived; this principle
+is then used to illuminate problems about the equality
+of humans and, in the third chapter, applied to non-human
+animals.
+Thus the principle of equal consideration of interests has been
+behind much of our discussion so far; but as I suggested in the
+previous chapter, the application of this principle when lives
+are at stake is less clear than when we are concerned with
+interests like avoiding pain and experiencing pleasure. In this
+chapter we shall look at some views about the value of life, and
+the wrongness oftaking life, in order to prepare the ground for
+the following chapters in which we shall tum to the practical
+issues of killing animals, abortion, euthanasia, and environmental
+ethics.
+HUMAN LIFE
+People often say that life is sacred. They almost never mean
+what they say. They do not mean, as their words seem to imply,
+that life itself is sacred. If they did, killing a pig or pulling up a
+cabbage would be as abhorrent to them as the murder of a t f I
+human being. When people say that life is sacred, it is !!uman I I:::,'" i'l r; ""-,
+Jife they have in mind. But why should huma,!! life have special :/
+value? r I ;( i,." 11"",-- F/,' (111 (fe. ? .• ,,] -jj )$:'" i'V 83
+~ - (~:/" ,{
+La; ,j).je I~ H,c' "\C'''''1'>1\.«11 ) .11\Jl'\,. , ,
+,)j .. A_ir~.
+Practical Ethics
+In discussing the doctrine of the sanctity of human life I shall
+not take the term 'sanctity' in a specifically religious sense. The
+doctrine may well have a religious origin, as I shall suggest later
+in this chapter. but it is now part of a broadly secular ethic, and
+it is as part of this secular ethic that it is most influential today.
+Nor shall I take the doctrine as maintaining that it is always
+wrong to take human life, for this would imply absolute pacifism,
+and there are many supporters of the sanctity of human
+life who concede that we may kill in self-defence. We may take
+the doctrine of the sanctity of human life to be no more than
+a way of saying that human life has some special value, a value
+quite distinct from the value of the lives of other living things.
+The view that human life has unique value is deeply rooted
+in our society and is enshrined in our law. To see how far it
+can be taken, I recommend a remarkable book: The Long Dying
+a/Baby Andrew, by Robert and Peggy Stinson. In December 1976
+Peggy Stinson, a Pennsylvania schoolteacher, was twenty-four
+weeks pregnant when she went into premature labor. The baby,
+whom Robert and Peggy named Andrew, was marginally viable.
+Despite a firm statement from both parents that they wanted
+'no heroics', the doctors in charge of their child used all the
+technology of modem medicine to keep him alive for nearly six
+months. Andrew had periodic fits. Towards the end of that
+period, it was clear that if he survived at all, he would be seriously
+and permanently impaired. Andrew was also suffering
+considerably: at one point his doctor told the Stinsons that it
+must 'hurt like hell' every time Andrew drew a breath. Andrew's
+treatment cost $104,000, at 1977 cost levels - today it could
+easily be three times that, for intensive care for extremely premature
+babies costs at least $1,500 per day.
+Andrew Stinson was kept alive, against the wishes of his
+parents, at a substantial financial cost, notwithstanding evident
+suffering, and despite the fact that, after a certain point it was
+clear that he would never be able to live an independent life,
+or to think and talk in the way that most humans do. Whether
+84 ,
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+such treatment of an infant human being is or is not the right
+thing to do - and I come back to this question in Chapter 7 -
+it makes a striking contrast with the casual way in which we
+take the lives of stray dogs, experimental monkeys, and beef
+cattle. What justifies the difference?
+In every society known to us there has been some prohibition
+on the taking of life. Presumably no society can survive if it
+allows its members to kill one another without restriction. Precisely
+who is protected, however, is a matter on which societies
+have differed. In many tribal societies the only serious offence
+is to kill an innocent member of the tribe itself - members of
+other tribes may be killed with impunity. In more sophisticated
+nation-states protection has generally extended to all within the
+nation's territorial boundaries, although there have been cases
+- like slave-owning states - in which a minority was excluded.
+Nowadays most agree, in theory if not in practice, that, apart
+from special cases like self-defence, war, possibly capital punishment,
+and one or two other doubtful areas, it is wrong to
+kill human beings irrespective of their race, religion, class, or
+nationality. The moral inadequacy of narrower principles, limiting
+the respect for life to a tribe, race, or nation, is taken for
+granted; but the argument of the preceding chapter must raise
+doubts about whether the boundary of our species marks a more
+defensible limit to the protected circle.
+At this point we should pause to ask what we mean by terms
+, like 'human life' or 'human being'. These terms figure prominently
+in debates about, for example, abortion. 'Is the fetus a
+human being?' is often taken as the crucial question in the
+abortion debate; but unless we think carefully about these terms
+such questions cannot be answered.
+It is possible to give 'human being' a precise meaning. We
+can use it as equivalent to 'member of the species Homo sapiens'.
+Whether a being is a member of a given species is something .i/,«Y>!~!CH~
+that can be determined scientifically, by an examination of the 'J.
+nature of the chromosomes in the cells of living organisms. In
+85
+Practical Ethics
+this sense there is no doubt that from the first moments of its
+existence an embryo conceived from human sperm and eggs is
+a human being; and the same is true of the most profoundly
+and irreparably intellectually disabled human being, even of an
+infant who is born anencephalic - literally, without a brain.
+There is another use of the term 'human', one proposed by
+Joseph Fletcher, a Protestant theologian and a prolific writer on
+ethical issues. Fletcher has compiled a list of what he calls 'indicators
+of humanhood' that includes the following: selfawareness,
+self-control, a sense ofthe future, a sense ofthe past,
+the capadty to relate to others, concern for others, communication,
+and curiosity. This is the sense of the term that we have
+in mind when we praise someone by saying that she is 'a real
+human being' or shows 'truly human qualities'. In saying this
+we are not, of course, referring to the person's membership in
+the spedes Homo sapiens which as a matter of biological fact
+is rarely in doubt; we are implying that human beings characteristically
+possess certain qualities, and this person possesses
+them to a high degree.
+These two senses of 'human being' overlap but do not coindde.
+The embryo, the later fetus, the profoundly intellectually
+disabled child, even the newborn infant - all are indisputably
+members of the spedes Homo sapiens, but none are self-aware,
+have a sense of the future, or the capadty to relate to others.
+Hence the choice between the two senses can make an important
+difference to how we answer questions like 'Is the fetus a
+human being?'
+When choosing which words to use in a situation like this
+we should choose terms that will enable us to express our meaning
+clearly, and that do not prejudge the answer to substantive
+questions. To stipulate that we shall use 'human' in, say, the
+first of the two senses just described, and that therefore the fetus
+is a human being and abortion is immoral would not do. Nor
+would it be any better to choose the second sense and argue
+86
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+on this basis that abortion is acceptable. The morality of abortion
+is a substantive issue, the answer to which cannot depend on
+a stipulation about how we shall use words. In order to avoid
+begging any questions, and to make my meaning clear, I shall
+for the moment put aside the tricky term 'human' and substitute
+two different terms, corresponding to the two different senses
+of 'human'. For the first sense, the biological sense, I shall simply
+use the cumbersome but predse expression 'member of the
+spedes Homo sapiens' while for the second sense I shall use the
+term 'person'.
+This use of 'person' is itself, unfortunately, liable to mislead,
+since 'person' is often used as if it meant the same as 'human
+being'. Yet the terms are not equivalent; there could be a person
+who is not a member of our spedes. There could also be members
+of our spedes who are not persons. The word 'person' has
+its origin in the Latin term for a mask worn by an actor in
+classical drama. By putting on masks the actors Signified that
+they were acting a role. Subsequently 'person' came to mean
+one who plays a role in life, one who is an agent. According to
+the Oxford Dictionary, one of the current meanings of the term
+is 'a self-consdous or rational being'. This sense has impeccable
+philosophical precedents. John Locke defines a person as 'A
+thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can
+consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times
+and places:
+This definition makes 'person' close to what Fletcher meant
+by 'human', except that it selects two crudal characteristics -
+rationality and self-consdousness - as the core of the concept.
+Quite possibly Fletcher would agree that these two are central,
+and the others more or less follow from them. In any case, I
+propose to use 'person', in the sense of a rational and selfconsdous
+being, to capture those elements of the popular sense
+of 'human being' that are not covered by 'member of the spedes
+Homo sapiens'.
+87
+Practical Ethics
+The Value of the Life of Members of the Species
+Homo Sapiens
+With the clarification gained by our terminological interlude,
+and the argument of the preceding chapter to draw upon, this
+section can be very brief. The wrongness of inflicting pain on a
+being cannot depend on the being's species: nor can the wrongness
+of killing it. The biological facts upon which the boundary
+of our species is drawn do not have moral significance. To give
+preference to the life of a being simply because that being is a
+member of our species would put us in the same position as
+racists who give preference to those who are members of their
+race.
+To those who have read the preceding chapters of this book,
+this conclusion may seem obvious, for we have worked towards
+it gradually; but it differs strikingly from the prevailing attitude
+in our society, which as we have seen treats as sacred the lives
+of all members of our species. How is it that our society should
+have come to accept a view that bears up so poorly under critical
+scrutiny? A short historical digression may help to explain.
+If we go back to the origins of Western civilisation, to Greek
+or Roman times, we find that membership of Homo sapiens
+was not sufficient to guarantee that one's life would be protected.
+There was no respect for the lives of slaves or other
+'barbarians'; and even among the Greeks and Romans themselves,
+infants had no automatic right to life. Greeks and Romans
+killed deformed or weak infants by exposing them to the elements
+on a hilltop. Plato and Aristotle thought that the state
+should enforce the killing of deformed infants. The celebrated
+legislative codes said to have been drawn up by Lycurgus and
+Solon contained similar provisions. In this period it was thought
+better to end a life that had begun inauspiciously than to attempt
+to prolong that life, with all the problems it might bring.
+Our present attitudes date from the coming of Christianity.
+There was a specific theological motivation for the Christian
+88
+t·
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+insistence on the importance of species membership: the belief
+that all born of human parents are immortal and destined for
+an eternity of bliss or for everlasting torment. With this belief,
+the killing of Homo sapiens took on a fearful significance, since
+it consigned a being to his or her eternal fate. A second Christian
+doctrine that led to the same conclusion was the belief that since
+we are created by God we are his property, and to kill a human
+being is to usurp God's right to decide when we shall live and
+when we shall die. As Thomas Aquinas put it, taking a 'human
+life is a sin against God in the same way that killing a slave
+would be a sin against the master to whom the slave belonged.
+Non-human animals, on the other hand, were believed to have
+been placed by God under man's dominion, as recorded in the
+Bible (Genesis 1:29 and 9:1-3). Hence humans could kill nonhuman
+animals as they pleased, as long as the animals were
+not the property of another.
+During the centuries of Christian domination of European
+thought the ethical attitudes based on these doctrines became
+part of the unquestioned moral orthodoxy of European civilisation.
+Today the doctrines are no longer generally accepted,
+but the ethical attitudes to which they gave rise fit in with the
+deep-seated Western belief in the uniqueness and special privileges
+of our species, and have survived. Now that we are reassessing
+our speciesist view of nature, however, it is also time to
+reassess our belief in the sanctity of the lives of members of our
+species.
+The Value of a Person's Life
+We have broken down the doctrine of the sanctity of human
+life into two separate claims, one that there is special value in
+the life of a member of our species, and the other that there is
+special value in the life of a person. We have seen that the
+former claim cannot be defended. What of the latter? Is there
+89
+Practical Ethics
+special value in the life of a rational and self-conscious being,
+as distinct from a being that is merely sentient?
+One line of argument for answering this question affirmatively
+runs as follows. A self-conscious being is aware of itself as a
+distinct entity, with a past and a future. (This, remember, was
+Locke's criterion for being a person.) A being aware of itself in
+this way will be capable of having desires about its own future.
+For example, a professor of philosophy may hope to write a
+book demonstrating the objective nature of ethics; a student
+may look forward to graduating; a child may want to go for a
+ride in an aeroplane. To take the lives of any of these people,
+without their consent, is to thwart their desires for the future.
+Killing a snail or a day-old infant does not thwart any desires
+of this kind, because snails and newborn infants are incapable
+of having such desires.
+It may be said that when a person is killed we are not left
+with a thwarted desire in the same sense in which I have a
+thwarted desire when I am hiking through dry country and,
+pausing to ease my thirst, discover a hole in my waterbottle. In
+this case I have a desire that I cannot fulfil. and I feel frustration
+and discomfort because of the continuing and unsatisfied desire
+for water. When I am killed the desires I have for the future do
+not continue after my death, and I do not suffer from their nonfulfilment.
+But does this mean that preventing the fulfilment of
+these desires does not matter?
+Classical utilitarianism, as expounded by the founding father
+of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, and refined by later philosophers
+like John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick, judges actions
+by their tendency to maximise pleasure or happiness and minimise
+pain or unhappiness. Terms like 'pleasure' and 'happiness'
+lack precision, but it is clear that they refer to something that
+is experienced, or felt - in other words, to states of consciousness.
+According to classical utilitarianism, therefore, there is no
+direct significance in the fact that desires for the future go un-
+90
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+fulfilled when people die. If you die instantaneously, whether
+you have any desires for the future makes no difference to the
+amount of pleasure or pain you experience. Thus for the classical
+utilitarian the status of 'person' is not directly relevant to the
+wrongness of killin,S.
+Indirectly, however, being a person may be important for the
+classical utilitarian. Its importance arises in the following manner.
+If I am a person, I have a conception of myself. I know
+that I have a future. I also know that my future existence could
+be cut short. If I think that this is likely to happen at any moment,
+my present existence will be fraught with anxiety, and
+will presumably be less enjoyable than if I do not think it is
+likely to happen for some time. If I learn that people like myself
+are very rarely killed, I will worry less. Hence the classical utilitarian
+can defend a prohibition on killing persons on the indirect
+ground that it will increase the happiness of people who would
+otherwise worry that they might be killed. I call this an indirect
+ground because it does not refer to any direct wrong done to
+the person killed, but rather to a consequence of it for other
+people. There is, of course, something odd about objecting to
+murder, not because of the wrong done to the victim, but because
+of the effect that the murder will have on others. One
+has to be a tough-minded classical utilitarian to be untroubled
+by this oddness. (Remember, though, that we are now only
+considering what is especially wrong about killing a person. The
+classical utilitarian can still regard killing as wrong because it
+eliminates the happiness that the victim would have experienced,
+had she lived. This objection to murder will apply to any
+being likely to have a happy future, irrespective of whether the
+being is a person.) For present purposes, however, the main
+point is that this indirect ground does provide a reason for taking
+the killing of a person, under certain conditions, more seriously
+than the killing of a non-personal being. If a being is incapable
+of conceiving of itself as existing over time, we need not take
+91
+Practical Ethics
+into account the possibility of it worrying about the prospect of
+its future existence being cut short. It can't worry about this,
+for it has no conception of its own future.
+I said that the indirect classical utilitarian reason for taking
+the killing of a person more seriously than the killing of a nonperson
+holds 'under certain conditions'. The most obvious of
+these conditions is that the killing of the person may become
+known to other persons, who derive from this knowledge a
+more gloomy estimate of their own chances of living to a ripe
+old age, or simply become fearful of being murdered. It is of
+course possible that a person could be killed in complete secrecy,
+so that no one else knew a murder had been committed. Then
+this indirect reason against killing would not apply.
+To this last point, however, a qualification must be made. In
+the circumstances described in the last paragraph, the indirect
+classical utilitarian reason against killing would not apply in so
+far as we judge this individual case. There is something to be said,
+however, against applying utilitarianism only or primarily at the
+level of each individual case. It may be that in the long run, we
+will achieve better results - greater overall happiness - if we
+urge people not to judge each individual action by the standard
+of utility, but instead to think along the lines of some broad
+principles that will cover all or virtually all of the situations that
+they are likely to encounter.
+Several reasons have been offered in support of this approach.
+R.M. Hare has suggested a useful distinction between two levels
+of moral reasoning: the intuitive and the critical. To consider,
+in theory, the possible circumstances in which one might maximise
+utility by secretly killing someone who wants to go on
+living is to reason at the critical level. As philosophers, or just
+as reflective, self-critical people, it can be interesting and helpful
+to our understanding of ethical theory to think about such unusual
+hypothetical cases. Everyday moral thinking, however,
+must be more intuitive. In real life we usually cannot foresee
+all the complexities of our choices. It is simply not practical to
+92
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+try to calculate the consequences, in advance, of every choice
+we make. Even if we were to limit ourselves to the more significant
+choices, there would be a danger that in many cases
+we would be calculating in less than ideal circumstances. We
+could be hurried, or flustered. We might be feeling angry, or
+hurt, or competitive. Our thoughts could be coloured by greed,
+or se~ual de~re, or thoughts of vengeance. Our own interests,
+or the interests of those we love, might be at stake. Or we might
+just not be very good at thinking about such complicated issues
+as the likely consequences of a significant choice. For all these
+reasons, Hare suggests, it will be better if, for our everyday
+ethical life, we adopt some broad ethical principles and do not
+deviate from them. These principles should include those that
+experience has shown, over the centuries, to be generally conducive
+to producing the best consequences: and in Hare's view
+that would include many of the standard moral principles, for
+example, telling the truth, keeping promises, not harming others,
+and so on. Respecting the lives of people who want to go
+on living would presumably be among these principles. Even
+though, at the critical level, we can conceive of circumstances
+in which better consequences would flow from acting against
+one or more of these principles, people will do better on the
+whole if they stick to the principles than if they do not.
+On this view, soundly chosen intuitive moral principles
+should be like a good tennis coach's instructions to a player.
+The instructions are given with an eye to what will payoff most
+of the time; they are a guide to playing "percentage tennis".
+Occasionally an individual player might go for a freak shot, and
+pull off a winner that has everyone applauding; but if the coach
+is any good at all, deviations from the instructions laid down
+will, more often than not, lose. So it is better to put the thought
+of going for those fr~ shots out of one's mind. Similarly, if
+we are guided by a set of well-chosen intuitive principles, we
+may do better if we do not attempt to calculate the consequences
+of each significant moral choice we must make, but instead
+93
+Practical Ethics
+consider what principles apply to it, and act accordingly. Perhaps
+very occasionally we will find ourselves in circumstances in
+which it is absolutely plain that departing from the principles
+will produce a much better result than we will obtain by sticking
+to them, and then we may be justified in making the departure.
+But for most of us, most of the time, such circumstances will
+not arise and can be excluded from our thinking. Therefore even
+though at the critical level the classical utilitarian must concede
+the possibility of cases in which it would be better not to respect
+a person's desire to continue living, because the person could
+be killed in complete secrecy, and a great deal of unalleviated
+misery could thereby be prevented, this kind of thinking has
+no place at the intuitive level that should guide our everyday
+actions. So, at least. a classical utilitarian can argue.
+That is, I think, the gist of what the classical utilitarian would
+say about the distinction between killing a person and killing
+some other type of being. There is, however, another version
+of utilitarianism that gives greater weight to the distinction. This
+other version of utilitarianism judges actions, not by their tendency
+to maximise pleasure or minimise pain, but by the extent
+to which they accord with the preferences of any beings affected
+by the action or its consequences. This version of utilitarianism
+is known as 'preference utilitarianism'. It is preference utilitarianism,
+rather than classical utilitarianism, that we reach by
+universalising our own interests in the manner described in the
+opening chapter of this book - if, that is, we make the plausible
+move of taking a person's interests to be what. on balance and
+after reflection on all the relevant facts, a person prefers.
+According to preference utilitarianism, an action contrary to
+the preference of any being is, unless this preference is outweighed
+by contrary preferences, wrong. Killing a person who
+prefers to continue living is therefore wrong, other things being
+equal. That the victims are not around after the act to lament
+the fact that their preferences have been disregarded is irrelevant.
+The wrong is done when the preference is thwarted.
+94
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+For preference utilitarians, taking the life of a person will
+normally be worse than taking the life of some other being,
+since persons are highly future-oriented in their preferences. To
+kill a person is therefore, normally, to violate not just one, but
+a wide range of the most central and significant preferences a
+being can have. Very often, it will make nonsense of everything
+that the victim has been trying to do in the past days, months,
+or even years ... In contrast, beings who cannot see themselves
+as entities with a future cannot have any preferences about their
+own future existence. This is not to deny that such beings might
+struggle against a situation in which their lives are in danger,
+as a fish struggles to get free of the barbed hook in its mouth;
+but this indicates no more than a preference for the cessation
+of a state of affairs that is perceived as painful or frightening.
+Struggle against danger and pain does not suggest that fish
+are capable of preferring their own future existence to nonexistence.
+The behaviour of a fish on a hook suggests a reason
+for not killing fish by that method, but does not in itself suggest
+a preference utilitarian reason against killing fish by a method
+that brings about death instantly, without first causing pain or
+distress. (Again, remember that we are here considering what
+is especially wrong about killing a person; I am not saying that
+there are never any preference utilitarian reasons against killing
+conscious beings who are not persons.)
+Does a Person Have a Right to Life?
+Although preference utilitarianism does provide a direct reason
+for not killing a person, some may find the reason - even when
+coupled with the important indirect reasons that any form of
+utilitarianism will take into account - not sufficiently stringent.
+Even for preference utilitarianism, the wrong done to the person
+killed is merely one factor to be taken into account, and the
+preference of the victim could sometimes be outweighed by the
+preferences of others. Some say that the prohibition on killing
+95
+Practical Ethics
+people is more absolute than this kind of utilitarian calculation
+implies. Our lives, we feel, are things to which we have a right,
+and rights are not to be traded off against the preferences or
+pleasures of others.
+I am not convinced that the notion of a moral right is a helpful
+or meaningful one, except when it is used as a shorthand way
+of referring to more fundamental moral considerations. Nevertheless,
+since the idea that we have a 'right to life' is a popular
+one, it is worth asking whether there are grounds for attributing
+rights to life to persons, as distinct from other living beings.
+Michael Tooley, a contemporary American philosopher, has
+argued that the only beings who have a right to life are those
+who can conceive of themselves as distinct entities existing over
+time - in other words, persons, as we have used the term. His
+argument is based on the claim that there is a conceptual connection
+between the desires a being is capable of having and
+the rights that the being can be said to have. As Tooley puts it:
+The basic intuition is that a right is something that can be violated
+and that, in genera!, to violate an individual's right to something
+is to frustrate the corresponding desire. Suppose, for example,
+that you own a car. Then I am under a prima facie obligation
+not to take it from you. However, the obligation is not unconditional:
+it depends in part upon the existence of a corresponding
+desire in you. If you do not care whether I take your car, then
+I generally do not violate your right by doing so.
+Tooley admits that it is difficult to formulate the connections
+between rights and desires precisely, because there are problem
+cases like people who are asleep or temporarily unconscious.
+He does not want to say that such people have no rights because
+they have, at that moment, no desires. Nevertheless, Tooley
+holds, the possession of a right must in some way be linked
+with the capacity to have the relevant desires, if not with having
+the actual desires themselves.
+The next step is to apply this view about rights to the case of
+the right to life. To put the matter as simply as possible - more
+96
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+simply than Tooley himself does and no doubt too simply - if
+the right to life is the right to continue existing as a distinct
+entity, then the desire relevant to possessing a right to life is the
+desire to continue existing as a distinct entity. But only a being
+who is capable of conceiving herself as a distinct entity existing
+over time - that is, only a person - could have this desire.
+Therefore only a person could have a right to life.
+This is how Tooley first formulated his position, in a striking
+article entitled "Abortion and Infanticide", first published in
+1972. The problem of how precisely to formulate the connections
+between rights and desires, however, led Tooley to alter
+his position in a subsequent book with the same title, Abortion
+and Infantidde. He there argues that an individual cannot at a
+given time - say, now - have a right to continued existence
+unless the individual is of a kind such that it can now be in its
+interests that it continue to exist. One might think that this
+makes a dramatic difference to the outcome of Tooley's position,
+for while a newborn infant would not seem to be capable of
+conceiving itself as a distinct entity existing over time, we commonly
+think that it can be in the interests of an infant to be
+saved from death, even if the death would have been entirely
+without pain or suffering. We certainly do this in retrospect: I
+might say, ifI know that I nearly died in infancy, that the person
+who snatched my pram from the path of the speeding train is
+my greatest benefactor, for without her swift thinking I would
+never have had the happy and fulfilling life that I am now living.
+Tooley argues, however, that the retrospective attribution of an
+interest in living to the infant is a mistake. I am not the infant
+from whom I developed. The infant could not look forward to
+developing into the kind of being I am, or even into any intermediate
+being, between the being I now am and the infant. I
+cannot even recall being the infant; there are no mental links
+between us. Continued existence cannot be in the interests of
+a being who never has had the concept of a continuing self -
+that is, never has been able to conceive of itself as existing over
+97
+Practical Ethics
+time. If the train had instantly killed the infant, the death would
+not have been contrary to the interests of the infant, because
+the infant would never have had the concept of existing over
+time. It is true that I would then not be alive, but I can say that
+it is in my interests to be alive only because I do have the concept
+of a continuing self. I can with equal truth say that it is in my
+interests that my parents met, because if they had never met,
+they could not have created the embryo from which I developed,
+and so I would not be alive. This does not mean that the creation
+of this embryo was in the interests of any potential being who
+was lurking around, waiting to be brought into existence. There
+was no such being, and had I not been brought into existence,
+there would not have been anyone who missed out on the life
+I have enjo'yed living. Similarly, we make a mistake if we now
+construct an interest in future life in the infant, who in the first
+days following birth can have no concept of continued existence,
+and with whom I have no mental links.
+Hence in his book Tooley reaches, though by a more circuitous
+route, a conclusion that is practically equivalent to the
+conclusion he reached in his article. To have a right to life, one
+must have, or at least at one time have had, the concept of
+having a continued existence. Note that this formulation avoids
+any problems in dealing with sleeping or unconscious people;
+it is enough that they have had, at one time, the concept of
+continued existence for us to be able to say that continued life
+may be in their interests. This makes sense: my desire to continue
+living - or to complete the book I am writing, or to travel
+around the world next year - does not cease whenever I am
+not consciously thinking about these things. We often desire
+things without the desire being at the forefront of our minds.
+The fact that we have the desire is apparent if we are reminded
+of it, or suddenly confronted with a situation in which we must
+choose between two courses of action, one of which makes the
+fulfilment of the desire less likely. In a similar way, when we
+go to sleep our desires for the future have not ceased to exist.
+98
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+They will still be there, when we wake. As the desires are still
+part of us, so, too, our interest in continued life remains part
+of us while we are asleep or unconscious.
+People and Respect for Autonomy
+To this point our discussion of the wrongness of killing people
+has focused on their capacity to envisage their future and have
+desires related to it. Another implication of being a person may
+also be relevant to the wrongness of killing. There is a strand
+of ethical thought, associated with Kant but including many
+modem writers who are not Kantians, according to which respect
+for autonomy is a basic moral principle. By 'autonomy'
+is meant the capacity to choose, to make and act on one's own
+decisions. Rational and self-conscious beings presumably have
+this ability, whereas beings who cannot consider the alternatives
+open to them are not capable of choosing in the required sense
+and hence cannot be autonomous. In particular, only a being
+who can grasp the difference between dying and continuing to
+live can autonomously choose to live. Hence killing a person
+who does not choose to die fails to respect that person's autonomy;
+and as the choice of living or dying is about the most
+fundamental choice anyone can make, the choice on which all
+other choices depend, killing a person who does not choose to
+die is the gravest possible violation of that person's autonomy.
+Not everyone agrees that respect for autonomy is a basic moral
+principle, or a valid moral principle at all. Utilitarians do not
+respect autonomy for its own sake, although they might give
+great weight to a person's desire to go on living, either in a
+preference utilitarian way, or as evidence that the person's life
+was on the whole a happy one. But if we are preference utilitarians
+we must allow that a desire to go on living can be
+outweighed by other desires, and if we are classical utilitarians
+we must recognise that people may be utterly mistaken in their
+expectations of happiness. So a utilitarian, in objecting to the
+99
+Practical Ethics
+killing of a person, cannot place the same stress on autonomy
+as those who take respect for autonomy as an independent
+moral principle. The classical utilitarian might have to accept
+that in some cases it would be right to kill a person who does
+not choose to die on the grounds that the person will otherwise
+lead a miserable life. This is true, however, only on the critical
+level of moral reasoning. As we saw earlier, utilitarians may
+encourage people to adopt, in their daily lives, principles that
+will in almost all cases lead to better consequences when followed
+than any alternative action. The principle of respect for
+autonomy would be a prime example of such a principle. We
+shall discuss actual cases that raise this issue shortly, in the
+discussion of euthanasia in Chapter 7. \
+It may be helpful here to draw together our conclusions about
+the value of a person's life. We have seen that there are four
+possible reasons for holding that a person's life has some distinctive
+value over and above the life of a merely sentient being:
+the classical utilitarian concern with the effects of the killing on
+others; the preference utilitarian concern with the frustration
+of the victim's desires and plans for the future; the argument
+that the capacity to conceive of oneself as existing over time is
+a necessary condition of a right to life; and respect for autonomy.
+Although at the level of critical reasoning a classical utilitarian
+would accept only the first, indirect, reason, and a preference
+utilitarian only the first two reasons, at the intuitive level utilitarians
+of both kinds would probably advocate respect for autonomy
+too. The distinction between critical and intuitive levels
+thus leads to a greater degree of convergence, at the level of
+everyday moral decision making, between utilitarians and those
+who hold other moral views than we would find if we took
+into account only the critical level of reasoning. In any case,
+none of the four reasons for giving special protection to the lives
+of persons can be rejected out of hand. We shall therefore bear
+all four in mind when we tum to practical issues involving
+killing.
+100
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+Before we do tum to practical questions about killing, however,
+we have still to consider claims about the value of life that
+are based neither on membership of our species, nor on being
+a person.
+CONSCIOUS LIFE
+There are many beings who are sentient and capable of experiencing
+pleasure and pain, but are not rational and selfconscious
+and so not persons. I shall refer to these beings as
+conscious being. Many non-human animals almost certainly
+fall into this category; so must newborn infants and some
+intellectually disabled humans. Exactly which of these lack
+self-consciousness is something we shall consider in the next
+chapters. If Tooley is right, those beings who do lack selfconsciousness
+cannot be said to have a right to life, in the full
+sense of 'right'. Still, for other reasons, it might be wrong to kill
+them. In the present section we shall ask if the life of a being
+who is conscious but not self-conscious has value, and if so,
+how the value of such a life compares with the value of a
+person's life.
+Should We Value Conscious Life?
+The most obvious reason for valuing the life of a being capable
+of experiencing pleasure or pain is the pleasure it can experience.
+If we value our own pleasures - like the pleasures of
+eating, of sex, of running at full speed and of swimming on a
+hot day - then the universal aspect of ethical judgments requires
+us to extend our positive evaluation of our own experience of
+these pleasures to the similar experiences of all who can experience
+them. But death is the end of all pleasurable experiences.
+Thus the fact that beings will experience pleasure in the
+future is a reason for saying that it would be wrong to kill them.
+Of course, a similar argument about pain points in the opposite
+101
+Practical Ethics
+direction, and it is only when we believe that the pleasure that
+beings are likely to experience outweighs the pain they are likely
+to suffer, that this argument counts against killing. So what this
+amounts to is that ~e should not cut short a measap! .. ~.
+This seems simple enough: we value pleasure, killing those
+who lead pleasant lives eliminates the pleasure they would
+otherwise experience, therefore such killing is wrong. But stating
+the argument in this way conceals something that, once
+noticed, makes the issue anything but simple. There are two
+ways of reducing the amount of pleasure in the world: one is
+to eliminate pleasures from the lives of those leading pleasant
+lives; the other is to eliminate those leading pleasant lives. Th~
+former leaves behind beings who experience less pleasure than
+they otherwise would have. The latter does not. This means
+that we cannot move automatically from a preference for a
+pleasant life rather than an unpleasant one, to a preference for
+a pleasant life rather than no life at all. For, it might be objected,
+being killed does not make us worse off; it makes us cease to
+exist. Once we have ceased to exist, we shall not miss the pleasure
+we would have experienced.
+Perhaps this seems sophistical - an instance of the ability of
+academic philosophers to find distinctions where there are no
+significant differences. If that is what you think, consider the
+opposite case: a case not of reducing pleasure, but of increasing
+it. There are two ways of increasing the amount of pleasure in
+the world: one is to increase the pleasure of those who now
+exist; the other is to increase the number of those who will lead
+pleasant lives. If killing those leading pleasant lives is bad because
+of the loss of pleasure, then it would seem to be good to
+increase the number of those leading pleasant lives. We could
+do this by having more children, provided we could reasonably
+expect their lives to be pleasant, or by rearing large numbers of
+animals under conditions that would ensure that their lives
+would be pleasant. But would it really be good to create more
+pleasure by creating more pleased beings?
+102
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+There seem to be two possible approaches to these perplexing
+issues. The first approach is simply to accept that it is good to
+increase the amount of pleasure in the world by increasing the
+number of pleasant lives, and bad to reduce the amount of
+pleasure in the world by reducing the number of pleasant lives.
+This approach has the advantage of being straightforward and
+clearly consistent, but it requires us to hold that if we could
+increase the number of beings leading pleasant lives without
+making others worse off, it would be good to do so. To see
+whether you are troubled by this conclusion, it may be helpful
+to consider a specific case. Imagine that a couple are trying to
+decide whether to have children. Suppose that as far as their
+own happiness is concerned, the advantages and disadvantages
+balance out. Children will interfere with their careers at a crucial
+stage of their professional lives, and they will have to give up
+their favourite recreation, cross-country skiing, for a few years
+at least. At the same time, they know that, like most parents,
+they will get joy and fulfilment from having children and watching
+them develop. Suppose that if others will be affected, the
+good and bad effects will cancel each other out. Finally, suppose
+that since the couple could provide their children with a good
+start in life, and the children would be citizens of a developed
+nation with a high living standard, it is probable that their
+children will lead pleasant lives. Should the couple count the
+likely future pleasure of their children as a significant reason
+for having children? I doubt that many couples would, but if
+we accept this first approach, they should.
+I shall call this approach the 'total' view since on this view
+we aim to increase the total amount of pleasure (and reduce
+the total amount of pain) and are indifferent whether this is
+done by increasing the pleasure of existing beings, or increasing
+the number of beings who exist.
+The second approach is to count only beings who already
+exist, prior to the decision we are taking, or at least will exist
+independently of that decision. We can call this the 'prior ex-
+103
+Practical Ethics
+istence' view. It denies that there is value in increasing pleasure
+by creating additional beings. The prior existence view is more
+in harmony with the intuitive judgment most people have (I
+think) that couples are under no moral obligation to have children
+when the children are likely to lead pleasant lives and no
+one else is adversely affected. But how do we square the prior
+existence view with our intuitions about the reverse case, when
+a couple are considering having a child who, perhaps because
+it will inherit a genetic defect. would lead a thoroughly miserable
+life and die before its second birthday? We would think
+it wrong for a couple knowingly to conceive such a child; but
+if the pleasure a possible child will experience is not a reason
+for bringing it into the world, why is the pain a possible child /
+will experience a reason against bringing it into the world? The
+prior existence view must either hold that there is nothing
+wrong with bringing a miserable being into the world, or explain
+the asymmetry between cases of possible children who are likely
+to have pleasant lives, and possible children who are likely to
+have miserable lives. Denying that it is bad knowingly to bring
+a miserable child into the world is hardly likely to appeal to
+those who adopted the prior existence view in the first place
+because it seemed more in harmony with their intuitive judgments
+than the total view; but a convincing explanation of the
+asymmetry is not easy to find. Perhaps the best one can say -
+and it is not very good - is that there is nothing directly wrong
+in conceiving a child who will be miserable, but once such a
+child exists, since its life can contain nothing but misery, we
+should reduce the amount of pain in the world by an act of
+euthanasia. But euthanasia is a more harrowing process for the
+parents and others involved than non-conception. Hence we
+have an indirect reason for not conceiving a child bound to have
+a miserable existence.
+So is it wrong to cut short a pleasant life? We can hold that
+it is, on either the total view or the prior existence view, but
+our answers commit us to different things in each case. We can
+104
+"
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+only take the prior existence approach if we accept that it is not
+wrong to bring a miserable being into existence - or else offer
+an explanation for why this should be wrong, and yet it not be
+wrong to fail to bring into existence a being whose life will be
+pleasant. Alternatively we can take the total approach, but then
+we must accept that it is also good to create more beings whose
+lives will be pleasant - and this has some odd practical implications.
+Some of these implications we have already seen. Others
+will become evident in the next chapter.
+Comparing the Value of Different Lives
+If we can give an affirmative - albeit somewhat shaky - anSWer
+to the question whether the life of a being who is conscious but
+not self-conscious has some value, can we also compare the
+value of different lives, at different levels of consciousness or
+self-consciousness? We are not, of course, going to attempt to
+assign numerical values to the lives of different beings, or even
+to produce an ordered list. The best that we could hope for is
+some idea of the principles that, when supplemented with the
+appropriate detailed information about the lives of different
+beings, might serve as the basis for such a list. But the most
+fundamental issue is whether we can accept the idea of ordering
+the value of different lives at all.
+Some say that it is anthropocentric, even speciesist, to order
+the value of different lives in a hierarchical manner. If we do
+so we shall, inevitably, be placing ourselves at the top and other
+beings closer to us in proportion to the resemblance between
+them and ourselves. Instead we should recognise that from the
+points of view of the different beings themselves, each life is of
+equal value. Those who take this view recognise, of course, that
+a person's life may include the study of philosophy while a
+mouse's life cannot; but they say that the pleasures of a mouse's
+life are all that the mouse has, and so can be presumed to mean
+as much to the mouse as the pleasures of a person's life mean
+105
+Practical Ethics
+to the person. We cannot say that the one is more or less valuable
+than the other.
+Is it speciesist to judge that the life of a normal adult member
+of our species is more valuable than the life of a normal adult
+mouse? It would be possible to defend such a judgment only if
+we can find some neutral ground, some impartial standpoint
+from which we can make the comparison.
+The difficulty of finding neutral ground is a very real practical
+difficulty, but I am not convinced that it presents an insoluble
+theoretical problem. I would frame the question we need to ask
+in the following manner. Imagine that I have the peculiar property
+of being able to tum myself into an animal. so that like
+Puck in A Midsummer-Night's Dream, 'Sometimes a horse I'll be, /
+sometimes a hound: And suppose that when I am a horse, I
+really am a horse, with all and only the mental experiences of
+a horse, and when I am a human being I have all and only the
+mental experiences of a human being. Now let us make the
+additional supposition that I can enter a third state in which I
+remember exactly what it was like to be a horse and exactly
+what it was like to be a human being. What would this third
+state be like? In some respects - the degree of self-awareness
+and rationality involved, for instance - it might be more like a
+human existence than an equine one, but it would not be a
+human existence in every respect. In this third state, then, I
+could compare horse-existence with human-existence. Suppose
+that I were offered the opportunity of another life, and given
+the choice of life as a horse or as a human being, the lives in
+question being in each case about as good as horse or human
+lives can reasonably be expected to be on this planet. I would
+then be deciding, in effect, between the value of the life of a
+horse (to the horse) and the value of the life of a human (to
+the human).
+Undoubtedly this scenario requires us to suppose a lot of
+things that could never happen, and some things that strain our
+imagination. The coherence of an existence in which one is
+106
+what's Wrong with Killing?
+neither a horse nor a human, but remembers what it was like
+to be both, might be questioned. Nevertheless I think I can make
+some sense of the idea of choosing from this position; and I am
+fairly confident that from this position, some forms of life would
+be seen as preferable to others.
+If it is true that we can make sense of the choice between
+existence as a mouse and existence as a human, then - whichever
+way the choice would go - we can make sense of the idea
+that the life of one kind of animal possesses greater value than
+the life of another; and if this is so, then the claim that the life
+of every being has equal value is on very weak ground. We
+cannot defend this claim by saying that every being's life is allimportant
+for it, since we have now accepted a comparison that
+takes a more objective - or at least intersubjective - stance and
+thus goes beyond the value of the life of a being considered
+solely from the point of view of that being.
+So it would not necessarily be speciesist to rank the value of
+different lives in some hierarchical ordering. How we should go
+about doing this is another question, and I have nothing better
+to offer than the imaginative reconstruction of what it would
+be like to be a different kind of being. Some comparisons may
+be too difficult. We may have to say that we have not the
+slightest idea whether it would be better to be a fish or a snake;
+but then, we do not very often find ourselves forced to choose
+between killing a fish or a snake. Other comparisons might not
+be so difficult. In general it does seem that the more highly
+developed the conscious life of the being, the greater the degree
+of self-awareness and rationality and the broader the range of
+possible experiences, the more one would prefer that kind of
+life, if one were choosing between it and a being at a lower
+level of awareness. Can utilitarians defend such a preference?
+In a famous passage John Stuart Mill attempted to do so:
+Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of
+the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a
+beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to
+107
+Practical Ethics
+be a fool. no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person
+of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though
+they should be persuaded that the fool. the dunce, or the rascal
+is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs ... It is
+better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better
+to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool.
+or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know
+their own side ofthe question. The other party to the comparison
+knows both sides.
+As many critics have pointed out, this argument is weak. Does
+Socrates really know what it is like to be a fool? Can he truly
+experience the joys of idle pleasure in simple things, untroubled
+by the desire to understand and improve the world? We may
+doubt it. But another significant aspect of this passage is less/
+often noticed. Mill's argument for preferring the life of a human
+being to that of an animal (with which most modem readers
+would be quite comfortable) is exactly paralleled by his argument
+for preferring the life of an intelligent human being to that
+offool. Given the context and the way in which the term "fool"
+was commonly used in his day, it seems likely that by this he
+means what we would now refer to as a person with an intellectual
+disability. With this further conclusion some modem
+readers will be distinctly uncomfortable; but as Mill's argument
+suggests, it is not easy to embrace the preference for the life of
+a human over that of a non-human, without at the same time
+endorsing a preference for the life of a normal human being
+over that of another human at a similar intellectual level to that
+of the non-human in the first comparison.
+Mill's argument is difficult to reconcile with classical utilitarianism,
+because it just does not seem true that the more intelligent
+being necessarily has a greater capacity for happiness; and
+even if we were to accept that the capacity is greater, the fact
+that, as Mill acknowledges, this capacity is less often filled (the
+fool is satisfied, Socrates is not) would have to be taken into
+consideration. Would a preference utilitarian have a better prospect
+of defending the judgments Mill makes? That would de-
+108
+I
+I
+I
+I '
+What's Wrong with Killing?
+pend on how we compare different preferences, held with
+differing degrees of awareness and self-consciousness. It does
+not seem impossible that we should find ways of ranking such
+different preferences, but at this stage the question remains
+open.
+This chapter has focussed on the killing of conscious beings.
+Whether there is anything wrong about taking non-conscious
+life - the lives of trees or plants, for instance - will be taken up
+in Chapter 10, on environmental ethics.
+109
+5
+TAKING LIFE: ANIMALS
+I N Chapter 4 we examined some general principles about the
+value of life. In this and the following two chapters we shall
+draw from that discussion some conclusions about three cases
+of killing that have been the subject of heated debate: abortion,
+euthanasia, and killing animals. Of these three, the question of /
+killing animals has probably aroused the least controversy;
+nevertheless, for reasons that will become clear later, it is impossible
+to defend a position on abortion and euthanasia without
+taking some view about the killing of non-human animals.
+So we shall look at that question first.
+CAN A NON-HUMAN ANIMAL BE A PERSON?
+We have seen that there are reasons for holding that the killing
+of a person is more seriously wrong than the killing of a being
+who is not a person. This is true whether we accept preference
+utilitarianism, Tooley's argument about the right to life, or the
+principle of respect for autonomy. Even a classical utilitarian
+would say that there may be indirect reasons why it is worse
+to kill a person. So in discussing the wrongness of killing nonhuman
+animals it is important to ask if any of them are persons.
+It sounds odd to call an animal a person. This oddness may
+be no more than a symptom of our habit of keeping our own
+species sharply separated from others. In any case, we can avoid
+the linguistic oddness by rephrasing the question in accordance
+with our definition of 'person'. What we are really asking
+is whether any non-human animals are rational and self-
+IlO
+Taking Life: Animals
+conscious beings, aware of themselves as distinct entities with
+a past and a future.
+Are animals self-conscious? There is now solid evidence that
+some are. Perhaps the most dramatic evidence comes from apes
+who can communicate with us using a human language. The
+ancient dream of teaching our language to another species was
+realised when two American scientists, Allen and Beatrice Gardner,
+guessed that the failure of previous attempts to teach chimpanzees
+to talk was due to the chimpanzees' lacking, not the
+intelligence required for using language, but the vocal equipment
+needed to reproduce the sounds of human language. The
+Gardners therefore decided to treat a young chimpanzee as if
+she were a human baby without vocal chords. They communicated
+with her, and with each other when in her presence,
+by using American Sign Language, a language widely used by
+deaf people.
+The technique was a striking success. The chimpanzee, whom
+they called 'Washoe', learned to understand about 350 different
+signs, and to use about 150 of them correctly. She put signs
+together to form simple sentences. As for self-consciousness,
+Washoe does not hesitate, when shown her own image in a
+mirror and asked 'Who is that?' to reply: 'Me, Washoe: Later
+Washoe moved to Ellensburg, Washington, where she lived
+with other chimpanzees under the care of Roger and Deborah
+Fouts. Here she adopted an infant chimpanzee and soon began
+not only signing to him, but even deliberately teaching him
+signs, for example, by moulding his hands into the sign for 'food'
+in an appropriate context.
+Gorillas appear to be as good as chimpanzees at learning sign
+language. Almost twenty years ago Francine Patterson began
+signing and also speaking English with Koko, a lowland gorilla.
+Koko now has a working vocabulary of over 500 signs, and she
+has used about 1000 signs correctly on one or more occasions.
+She understands an even larger number of spoken English
+words. Her companion MichaeL who began to be exposed to
+III
+Pradical Ethics
+signs at a later age, has used about 400 signs. In front of a
+mirror, Koko will make faces, or examine her teeth. When
+asked: 'What's a smart gorilla?' Koko responded: 'Me: When
+someone remarked of Koko, in her presence, 'She's a goofball!'
+Koko (perhaps not understanding the term) signed: 'No, gorilla:
+An orangutan, Chantek, has been taught sign language by
+Lyn Miles. When shown a photograph of a gorilla pointing to
+her nose, Chantek was able to imitate the gorilla by pointing
+to his own nose. This implies that he has an image of his own
+body and can transfer that image from the two-dimensional
+plane of the visual image to perform the necessary bodily action.
+Apes also use signs to refer to past or future events, thus
+showing a sense of time. Koko, for example, when asked, si,i
+days after the event, what had happened on her birthday, signed
+'sleep eat'. Even more impressive is the evidence of temporal
+sense shown by the regular festivities held by the Fouts for the
+chimpanzees at Ellensburg. Each year, after Thanksgiving,
+Roger and Deborah Fouts set up a Christmas tree, covered with
+edible ornaments. The chimpanzees use the sign combination
+'candy tree' to refer to the Christmas tree. In 1989, when snow
+began to fall just after Thanksgiving but the tree had not yet
+appeared, a chimpanzee named Tatu asked 'Candy tree?' The
+Fouts interpret this as showing not only that Tatu remembered
+the tree, but also that she knew that this was the season for it.
+Later Tatu also remembered that the birthday of one of the
+chimpanzees, Dar, followed closely on that of Deborah Fouts.
+The chimpanzees got ice cream for their birthdays; and after
+the festivities for Deborah's birthday were over, Tatu asked: 'Dar
+ice cream?'
+Suppose that on the basis of such evidence we accept that
+the signing apes are self-conscious. Are they exceptional among
+all the non-human animals in this respect, precisely because
+they can use language? Or is it merely that language enables
+these animals to demonstrate to us a characteristic that they,
+and other animals, possessed all along?
+112
+Taking Life: Animals
+Some philosophers have argued that thinking requires language:
+one cannot think without formulating one's thoughts in
+words. The Oxford philosopher Stuart Hampshire, for example,
+has written:
+The difference here between a human being and an animal lies
+in the possibility of the human being expressing his intention
+and putting into words his intention to do so-and-so, for his own
+benefit or for the benefit of others. The difference is not merely
+that an animal in fact has no means of communicating, or of
+recording for itself, its intention, with the effect that no one can
+ever know what the intention was. It is a stronger difference,
+which is more correctly expressed as the senselessness of attributing
+intentions to an animal which has not the means to reflect
+upon, and to announce to itself or to others, its own future
+behaviour ... It would be senseless to attribute to an animal a
+memory that distinguished the order of events in the past, and
+it would be senseless to attribute to it an expectation of an order
+of events in the future. It does not have the concepts of order,
+or any concepts at all.
+Obviously Hampshire was wrong to distinguish so crudely between
+humans and animals; for as we have just seen, the signing
+apes have clearly shown that they do have 'an expectation of
+an order of events in the future: But Hampshire wrote before
+apes had learned to use sign language, so this lapse may be
+excusable. The same cannot be said for the much later defence
+of the same view by another English philosopher, Michael
+Leahy, in a book entitled Against Liberation. Like Hampshire,
+Leahy argues that animals, lacking language, cannot have intentions,
+or act 'for a reason:
+Suppose that such arguments were to be re-phrased so that
+they referred to animals who have not learned to use a language,
+rather than all animals. Would they then be correct? If so, no
+being without language can be a person. This applies, presumably,
+to young humans as well as to non-signing animals. It
+might be argued that many species of animals do use language,
+just not our language. Certainly most social animals have some
+113
+Practical Ethics
+means of communicating with each other, whether it be the
+melodious songs of the humpback whales, the buzzes and whistles
+of dolphins, the howls and barks of dogs, the songs of birds,
+and even the dance performed by honey bees returning to the
+hive, from which other bees learn the distance and direction of
+the food source from which the bee has come. But whether any
+of these amount to language, in the required sense, is doubtful;
+and since it would take us too far from our topic to pursue that
+issue, I shall assume that they do not, and consider what can
+be learned from the non-linguistic behaviour of animals.
+Is the line of argument that denies intentional behaviour to
+animals sound when it is limited to animals without language?
+I do not believe that it is. Hampshire's and Leahy's arguments
+are typical of those of many philosophers who have written
+along similar lines, in that they are attempts to do philosophy
+from the armchair, on a topic that demands investigation in the
+real world. There is nothing altogether inconceivable about a
+being possessing the capacity for conceptual thought without
+having a language and there are instances of animal behaviour
+that are extraordinarily difficult, if not downright impossible,
+to explain except under the assumption that the animals are
+thinking conceptually. In one experiment, for example, German
+researchers presented a chimpanzee named Julia with two series
+of five closed and transparent containers. At the end of one
+series was a box with a banana; the box at the end of the other
+series was empty. The box containing the banana could only
+be opened with a distinctively shaped key; this was apparent
+from looking at the box. This key could be seen inside another
+locked box; and to open that box, Julia needed another distinctive
+key, which had to be taken out of a third box which
+could only be opened with its own key, which was inside a
+fourth locked box. Finally, in front of Julia, were two initial
+boxes, open and each containing a distinctive key. Julia was
+able to choose the correct initial key, by which she could open
+the next box in the series that led, eventually, to the box with
+114
+Taking Life: Animals
+the banana. To do this, she must have been able to reason
+backwards from her desire to open the box with the banana to
+her need to have the key that would open it, to her need for
+the key that would open that box, and so on. Since Julia had
+not been taught any form of language, her behaviour proves
+that beings without language can think in quite complex ways.
+Nor is it only in laboratory experiments that the behaviour
+of animals points to the conclusion that they possess both memory
+of the past and expectations about the future, and that they
+are self-aware, that they form intentions and act on them. Frans
+de Waal and his colleagues have for several years watched chimpanzees
+living in semi-natural conditions in two acres of forest
+at Amsterdam Zoo. They have often observed co-operating activity
+that requires planning. For example, the chimpanzees like
+to climb the trees and break off branches, so that they can eat
+the leaves. To prevent the rapid destruction of the small forest,
+the zookeepers have placed electric fencing around the trunk
+of the trees. The chimpanzees overcome this by breaking large
+branches from dead trees (which have no fences around them)
+and dragging them to the base of a live tree. One chimpanzee
+then holds the dead branch while another climbs up it, over
+the fence and into the tree. The chimpanzee who gets into the
+tree in this way shares the leaves thus obtained with the one
+holding the branch.
+De Waal has also observed deliberately deceptive behaviour
+that clearly shows both self-consciousness and an awareness of
+the consciousness of another. Chimpanzees live in groups in
+which one male will be dominant and will attack other males
+Who mate with receptive females. Despite this, a good deal of
+sexual activity goes on when the dominant male is not watching.
+Male chimpanzees often seek to interest females in sexual activity
+by sitting with their legs apart, displaying their erect penis.
+(Human males who expose themselves in a similar way are
+continuing a form of chimpanzee behaviour that has become
+SOcially inappropriate.) On one occasion a junior male was en-
+115
+Practical Ethics
+tieing a female in this manner when the dominant male walked
+over. The junior male covered his erection with his hands so
+that the dominant male could not see it.
+Jane Goodall has described an incident showing forward
+planning by Figan, a young wild chimpanzee in the Gombe
+region of Tanzania. In order to bring the animals closer to her
+observation post, Goodall had hidden some bananas in a tree:
+One day, sometime after the group had been fed, Figan spotted
+a banana that had been overlooked - but Goliath [an adult male
+ranking above Figan in the group's hierarchy] was resting directly
+underneath it. After no more than a quick glance from the fruit
+to Goliath, Figan moved away and sat on the other side of the
+tent so that he could no longer see the fruit. Fifteen minutes
+later, when Goliath got up and left, Figan without a moment's
+hesitation went over and collected the banana. Quite obviously
+he had sized up the whole situation: if he had climbed for the
+fruit earlier, Goliath would almost certainly have snatched it
+away. If he had remained close to the banana, he would probably
+have looked at it from time to time. Chimps are very quick to
+notice and interpret the eye movements of their fellows, and
+Goliath would possibly, therefore, have seen the fruit himself.
+And so Figan had not only refrained from instantly gratifying his
+desire but had also gone away so that he could not 'give the
+game away' by looking at the banana.
+Goodall's description of this episode does, of course, attribute
+to Figan a complex set of intentions, including the intention to
+avoid 'giving the game away' and the intention to obtain the
+banana after Goliath's departure. It also attributes to Figan an
+'expectation of an order of events in the future', namely the
+expectatiGll that Goliath would move away, that the banana
+would still be there, and that he, Figan, would then go and get
+it. Yet there seems nothing at all 'senseless' about these attributions,
+despite the fact that Figan cannot put his intentions or
+expectations into words. If an animal can devise a careful plan
+for obtaining a banana, not now but at some future time, and
+can take precautions against his own propensity to give away
+116
+I
+I I,
+~
+,i
+!
+Taking Life: Animals
+the object of the plan, that animal must be aware of himself as
+a distinct entity, existing over time.
+KILLING NON· HUMAN PERSONS
+Some non-human animals are persons, as we have defined the
+term. To judge the significance of this we must set it in the
+context of our earlier discussion, in whieh I argued that the only
+defensible version of the doctrine of the sanctity of human life
+was what we might call the 'doctrine ofthe sanctity of personal
+life'. I suggested that if human life does have special value or a
+special claim to be protected, it has it in so far as most, human
+beings are persons. But if some non-human animals are persons,
+too, the lives of those animals must have the same special value
+or claim to protection. Whether we base these special moral
+features of the lives of human persons on preferential utilitarianism,
+on a right to life deriving from their capacity to see
+themselves as continuing selves, or on respect for autonomy,
+these arguments must apply to non-human persons as well.
+Only the indirect utilitarian reason for not killing persons - the
+fear that such acts are likely to arouse in other persons - applies
+less readily to non-human persons since non-humans are less
+likely than humans to learn about killings that take place at a
+distance from them. But then, this reason does not apply to all
+killings of human persons either, since it is possible to kill in
+such a way that no one learns that a person has been killed.
+Hence we should reject the doctrine that places the lives of
+members of our species above the lives of members of other
+species. Some members of other species are persons: some members
+of our own species are not. No objective assessment can
+support the view that it is always worse to kill members of our
+species who are not persons than members of other species who
+are. On the contrary, as we have seen there are strong arguments
+for thinking that to take the lives of persons is, in itself, more
+serious than taking the lives of non-persons. So it seems that
+117
+Practical Ethics
+killing, say, a chimpanzee is worse than the killing of a human
+being who, because of a congenital intellectual disability, is not
+and never can be a person.
+At present the killing of a chimpanzee is not regarded as a
+serious matter. Large numbers of chimpanzees are used in scientific
+research, and many of them die in the course of this
+research. For many years, because chimpanzees were difficult
+to breed in captivity, the corporations that supplied these animals
+captured them in African jungles. The standard method
+was to shoot a female with an infant by her side. The infant
+was then captured and shipped to Europe and the United States.
+Jane Goodall has estimated that for every infant who reached
+/ his or her destination alive, six chimpanzees died. Although
+chimpanzees have been placed on the threatened list, and this
+trade has now been banned, illegal killing and trading of chimpanzees,
+and of gorillas and orangutans, still continues.
+The great apes - chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans - may
+be the clearest cases of non-human persons, but there are almost
+certainly others. Systematic observation of whales and dolphins
+has, for obvious reasons, lagged far behind that of apes, and it
+is quite possible that these large-brained mammals will tum out
+to be rational and self-conscious. Despite an official moratorium,
+the whaling industry slaughters thousands of whales annually
+in the name of 'research', and the whaling nations are seeking
+to overturn the International Whaling Commission's moratorium
+so that they can return to full-scale commercial whaling.
+Closer to home, many of those who live with dogs and cats are
+convinced that these animals are self-conscious and have a sense
+of the future. They begin to expect their companion human
+being to come home at a certain time. In her book Emma and
+I, Sheila Hocken relates how her guide-dog spontaneously began
+to take her, every Friday, to the places where she did her
+weekend shopping, without needing to be told the day. People
+who feed feral cats on a weekly basis have found that they, too,
+will tum up on the right day of the week. Such observations
+118
+Taking Life: Animals
+may be 'unscientific', but to those who know dogs and cats well
+they are plausible and in the absence of better studies they
+should be taken seriously. According to official United States
+Department of Agriculture figures, approximately 140,000 dogs
+and 42,000 cats die in laboratories in the United States each
+year, and smaller but still sizeable numbers are used in every
+'developed' nation. And if dogs and cats qualify as persons, the
+mammals we use for food cannot be far behind. We think of
+dogs as being more like people than pigs; but pigs are highly
+intelligent animals and if we kept pigs as pets and reared dogs
+for food, we would probably reverse our order of preference.
+Are we turning persons into bacon?
+Admittedly, all this is speculative. It is notoriously difficult to
+establish when another being is self-conscious. But if it is wrong
+to kill a person when we can avoid doing so, and there is real
+doubt about whether a being we are thinking of killing is a
+person, we should give that being the benefit of the doubt. The
+rule here is the same as that among deer hunters: if you see
+something moving in the bushes and are not sure if it is a deer
+or a hunter, don't shoot! (We may think the hunters shouldn't
+shoot in either case, but the rule is a sound one within the
+ethical framework hunters use.) On these grounds, a great deal
+of the killing of non-human animals must be condemned.
+KILLING OTHER ANIMALS
+Arguments against killing based on the capacity to see oneself
+as an individual existing over time apply to some non-human
+animals, but there are others who, though presumably conscious,
+cannot plausibly be said to be persons. Of those animals
+that humans regularly kill in large numbers, fish appear to be
+the clearest case of animals who are conscious but not persons.
+The rightness or wrongness of killing these animals seems to
+rest on utilitarian considerations, for they are not autonomous
+119
+Practical Ethics
+and - at least if Tooley's analysis of rights is correct - do not
+qualify for a right to life.
+Before we discuss the utilitarian approach to killing itself, we
+should remind ourselves that a wide variety of indirect reasons
+will figure in the utilitarian's calculations. Many modes of killing
+used on animals do not inflict an instantaneous death, so there
+is pain in the process of dying. There is also the effect of the
+death of one animal on his or her mate or other members of
+the animal's social group. There are many species of birds in
+which the bond between male and female lasts for a lifetime.
+The death of one member of this pair presumably causes distress,
+and a sense of loss and sorrow for the survivor. The mother-
+/ child relationship in mammals can be a source of intense suffering
+if either is killed or taken away. (Dairy farmers routinely
+remove calves from their mothers at an early age, so that the
+milk will be available for humans; anyone who has lived on a
+dairy farm will know that, for days after the calves have gone,
+the cows keep calling for them.) In some species the death of
+one animal may be felt by a larger group - as the behaviour of
+wolves and elephants suggests. All these factors would lead the
+utilitarian to oppose a lot of killing of animals, whether or not
+the animals are persons. These factors would not, however, be
+reasons for opposing killing non-persons in itself, apart from
+the pain and suffering it may cause.
+The utilitarian verdict on killing that is painless and causes
+no loss to others is more complicated, because it depends on
+how we choose between the two versions of utilitarianism outlined
+in the previous chapter. If we take what I called the 'prior
+existence' view, we shall hold that it is wrong to kill any being
+whose life is likely to contain, or can be brought to contain,
+more pleasure than pain. This view implies that it is normally
+wrong to kill animals for food, since usually we could bring it
+about that these animals had a few pleasant months or even
+years before they died - and the pleasure we get from eating
+them would not outweigh this.
+120
+Taking Life: Animals
+The other version of utilitarianism - the 'total' view - can
+lead to a different outcome that has been used to justify meateating.
+The nineteenth-century British political philosopher Leslie
+Stephen once wrote:
+'Of all the arguments for Vegetarianism none is so weak as
+the argument from humanity. The pig has a stronger interest
+than anyone in the demand for bacon. If all the world were
+Jewish, there would be no pigs at all:
+Stephen views animals as if they were replaceable, and with
+this those who accept the total view must agree. The total version
+of utilitarianism regards sentient beings as valuable only
+in so far as they make possible the existence of intrinsically
+valuable experiences like pleasure. It is as if sentient beings are
+receptacles of something valuable and it does not matter if a
+receptacle gets broken, so long as there is another receptacle to
+which the contents can be transferred without any getting spilt.
+(This metaphor should not be taken too seriously, however;
+unlike precious liquids, experiences like pleasure cannot exist
+independently from a conscious being, and so even on the total
+view, sentient beings cannot properly be thought of merely as
+receptacles.) Stephen's argument is that although meat-eaters
+are responsible for the death of the animal they eat and for the
+loss of pleasure experienced by that animaL they are also responsible
+for the creation of more animals, since if no one ate
+meat there would be no more animals bred for fattening. The
+loss meat-eaters inflict on one animal is thus balanced, on the
+total view, by the benefit they confer on the next. We may call
+this 'the replaceability argument'.
+The first point to note about the replaceability argument is
+that even if it is valid when the animals in question have a
+pleasant life it would not justify eating the flesh of animals reared
+in modem factory farms, where the animals are so crowded
+together and restricted in their movements that their lives seem
+to be more of a burden than a benefit to them.
+A second point is that if it is good to create happy life, then
+121
+Practical Ethics
+presumably it is good for there to be as many happy beings on
+our planet as it can possibly hold. Defenders of meat -eating had
+better hope that they can find a reason why it is better for there
+to be happy people rather than just the maximum possible number
+of happy beings, because otherwise the argument might
+imply that we should eliminate almost all human beings in order
+to make way for much larger numbers of smaller happy animals.
+If, however, the defenders of meat-eating do come up with a
+reason for preferring the creation of happy people to, say, happy
+mice, then their argument will not support meat-eating at all.
+For with the possible exception of arid areas suitable only for
+pasture, the surface of our globe can support more people if we
+grow plant foods than if we raise animals. .
+These two points greatly weaken the replaceability argument
+as a defence of meat-eating, but they do not go to the heart of
+the matter. Are some sentient beings really replaceable? The
+response to the first edition of this book suggests that the replaceability
+argument is probably the most controversial, and
+widely criticised, argument in this book. Unfortunately none of
+the critics have offered satisfactory alternative solutions to the
+underlying problems to which replaceability offers one - if not
+very congenial- answer.
+Henry Salt, a nineteenth-century English vegetarian and author
+of a book called Animals' Rights thought that the argument
+rested on a simple philosophical error:
+The fallacy lies in the confusion of thought that attempts to
+compare existence with non-existence. A person who is already
+in existence may feel that he would rather have lived than not,
+but he must first have the terra firma of existence to argue from:
+the moment he begins to argue as if from the abyss of the nonexistent,
+he talks nonsense, by predicating good or evil, happiness
+or unhappiness, of that of which we can predicate nothing.
+When I wrote the first edition of Animal Liberation I accepted
+Salt's view. I thought that it was absurd to talk as if one conferred
+a favour on a being by bringing it into existence, since
+122
+Taking Life: Animals
+at the time one confers this favour, there is no being at all. But
+now I am less confident. After all, as we saw in Chapter 4, we
+do seem to do something bad if we knowingly bring a miserable
+being into existence, and if this is so, it is difficult to explain
+why we do not do something good when we knowingly bring
+a happy being into existence.
+Derek Parfit has described another hypothetical situation that
+amounts to an even stronger case for the replaceability view.
+He asks us to imagine that two women are each planning to
+have a child. The first woman is already three months pregnant
+when her doctor gives her both bad and good news. The bad
+news is that the fetus she is carrying has a defect that will
+significantly diminish the future child's quality oflife - although
+not so adversely as to make the child's life utterly miserable, or
+not worth living at all. The good news is that this defect is easily
+treatable. All the woman has to do is take a pill that will have
+no side-effects, and the future child will not have the defect. In
+)
+this situation, Parfit plausibly suggests, we would all agree that
+the woman should take the pill, and that she does wrong if she
+refuses to take it.
+The second woman sees her doctor before she is pregnant,
+when she is about to stop using contraception, and also receives
+bad and good news. The bad news is that she has a medical
+condition that has the effect that if she conceives a child within
+the next three months, that child will have a significant defect
+- with exactly the same impact on the child's quality of life as
+the defect described in the previous paragraph. This defect is
+not treatable, but the good news is that the woman's condition
+is a temporary one, and if she waits three months before becoming
+pregnant, her child will not have the defect. Here too,
+Parfit suggests, we would all agree that the woman should wait
+before becoming pregnant, and that she does wrong if she does
+not wait.
+Suppose that the first woman does not take the pill, and the
+second woman does not wait before becoming pregnant, and
+123
+Practical Ethics
+that as a result each has a child with a significant disability. It
+would seem that they have each done something wrong. Are
+their wrong-doings of equal magnitude? If we assume that it
+would have been no greater hardship for the second woman to
+wait three months before becoming pregnant than it would have
+been for the first woman to take the pill, it would seem that
+the answer is yes, what each has done is equally wrong. But
+now consider what this answer implies. The first woman has
+harmed her child. That child can say to her mother: 'You should
+have taken the pill. If you had done so, I would not now have
+this disability, and my life would be significantly better: But if
+the child of the second woman tries to make the same claim,
+her mother has a devastating response. She can say: 'If I had /
+waited three months before becoming pregnant you would
+never have existed. I would have produced another child, from
+a different egg and different sperm. Your life, even with your
+disability, is definitely above the point at which life is so miserable
+that it ceases to be worth living. You never had a chance
+of existing without the disability. So I have not harmed you at
+all: This reply seems a complete defence to the charge of having
+harmed the child now in existence. If, despite this, we persist
+in our belief that it was wrong of the woman not to postpone
+her pregnancy, where does the wrongness lie? It cannot lie in
+bringing into existence the child to whom she gave birth, for
+that child has an adequate quality of life. Could it lie in not
+bringing a possible being into existence - to be precise, in not
+bringing into existence the child she would have had if she had
+waited three months? This is one possible answer, but it commits
+us to the total view, and implies that, other things being
+equal, it is good to bring into existence children without disabilities.
+A third possibility is that the wrong-doing lies, not in
+harming an identifiable child, nor simply in omitting to bring
+a possible child into existence, but in bringing into existence a
+child with a less satisfactory quality of life than another child
+whom one could have brought into existence. In other words,
+124
+I
+: !
+I
+" ~t :.'~ .. ' .•...
+'~~r-' tf
+Taking Life: Animals
+we have failed to bring about the best possible outcome. This
+last seems the most plausible answer, but it too suggests that at
+least possible people are replaceable. The question then becomes
+this: At what stage in the process that passes from possible
+people to actual people does replaceability cease to apply? What
+characteristic makes the difference?
+If we think of living creatures - human or non-human - as
+self-conscious individuals, leading their own lives and wanting
+to go on living, the replace ability argument holds little appeal.
+It is possible that when Salt so emphatically rejected the idea
+of replaceability, he was thinking of such beings, for he concludes
+the essay quoted above by claiming that Lucretius long
+ago refuted Stephen's 'vulgar sophism' in the following passage
+of De Rerum Natura:
+What loss were ours, if we had known not birth?
+Let living men to longer life aspire,
+While fond affection binds their hearts to earth:
+But who never hath tasted life's desire,
+Unborn, impersonal, can feel no dearth.
+This passage supports the claim that there is a difference between
+killing living beings who 'to longer life aspire' and failing to
+create a being who, unborn and impersonal, can feel no loss of
+life. But what of beings who, though alive, cannot aspire to
+longer life, because they lack the conception of themselves as
+living beings with a future? These being are, in a sense, 'impersonal'.
+Perhaps, therefore, in killing them, one does them
+no personal wrong, although one does reduce the quantity of
+happiness in the universe. But this wrong, if it is wrong, can
+be counter-balanced by bringing into existence similar beings
+who will lead equally happy lives. So perhaps the capacity to
+see oneself as existing over time, and thus to aspire to longer
+life (as well as to have other non-momentary, future-directed
+interests) is the characteristic that marks out those beings who
+cannot be considered replaceable.
+Although we shall return to this topic in the next two chap-
+125
+Practical Ethics
+ters, we can note here that this conclusion is in harmony with
+Tooley's views about what it takes to have a right to life. For a
+preference utilitarian, concerned with the satisfaction of preferences
+rather than experiences of suffering or happiness, there
+is a similar fit with the distinction already drawn between killing
+those who are rational and self-conscious beings, and those who
+are not. Rational, self-conscious beings are individuals, leading
+lives of their own and cannot in any sense be regarded merely
+as receptacles for containing a certain quantity of happiness.
+They have, in the words of the American philosopher James
+Rachels, a life that is biographical, and not merely biological.
+In contrast, beings who are conscious, but not self-conscious,
+more nearly approximate the picture of receptacles for experi- /
+ences of pleasure and pain, because their preferences will be of
+a more immediate sort. They will not have desires that project
+their images of their own existence into the future. Their conscious
+states are not internally linked over time. We can presume
+that if fish become unconscious, then before the loss of consciousness
+they would have no expectations or desires for anything
+that might happen subsequently, and if they regain
+consciousness, they have no awareness of having previously
+existed. Therefore if the fish were killed while unconscious and
+replaced by a similar number of other fish who could be created
+only because the first group of fish were killed, there would,
+from the perspective of fishy awareness, be no difference between
+that and the same fish losing and regaining consciousness.
+For a non-self-conscious being death is the cessation of experiences,
+in much the same way that birth is the beginning of
+experiences. Death cannot be contrary to an interest in continued
+life, any more than birth could be in accordance with an
+interest in commencing life. To this extent, with non-selfconscious
+life, birth and death cancel each other out; whereas
+with self-conscious beings the fact that once self-conscious one
+126
+Taking Life: Animals
+may desire to continue living means that death inflicts a loss
+for which the birth of another is insufficient compensation.
+The test of universalisability supports this view. If I imagine
+myself in tum as a self-conscious being and a conscious but not
+self-conscious being, it is only in the former case that I could
+have forward-looking desires that extend beyond periods of
+sleep or temporary unconsciousness, for example a desire to
+complete my studies, a desire to have children, or simply a desire
+to go on living, in addition to desires for immediate satisfaction
+or pleasure, or to get out of painful or distressing situations.
+Hence it is only in the former case that my death involves a
+greater loss than just a temporary loss of consciousness, and is
+not adequately compensated for by the creation of a being with
+similar prospects of pleasurable experiences.
+In reviewing the first edition of this book H. L. A. Hart, formerly
+professor of jurisprudence at the University of Oxford,
+suggested' that for a utilitarian, self-conscious beings must be
+replaceable in just the same way as non-self-conscious beings
+are. Whether one is a preference utilitarian or a classical utilitarian
+will, in Hart's view, make no difference here, because
+preference Utilitarianism is after all a form of maximizing utilitarianism:
+it requires that the overall satisfaction of different persons'
+preferences be maximized just as Classical Utilitarianianism
+requires overall experienced happiness to be maximized ... If
+preferences, even the desire to live, may be outweighed by the
+preferences of others, why cannot they be outweighed by new
+preferences created to take their place?
+It is of course true that preference utilitarianism is a form of
+maximising utilitarianism in the sense that it directs us to maximise
+the satisfaction of preferences, but Hart is on weaker
+ground when he suggests that this must mean that existing
+preferences can be outweighed by new preferences created to
+take their place. For while the satisfaction of an existing preference
+is a good thing, the package deal that involves creating
+127
+Pradical Ethics
+and then satisfying a preference need not be thought of as equivalent
+to it. Again, universalisability supports this way of conceiving
+preference utilitarianism. If I put myself in the place of
+another with an unsatisfied preference, and ask myself if I want
+that preference satisfied, the answer is (tautologically) yes. If,
+however, I ask myself whether I wish to have a new preference
+created that can then be satisfied, I will be quite uncertain. If I
+think of a case in which the satisfaction of the preference will
+be highly pleasurable, I may say yes. (We are glad that we are
+hungry if delicious food is on the table before us, and strong
+sexual desires are fine when we are able to satisfy them.) But
+if I think of the creation of a preference that is more like a
+privation, I will say no. (We don't cause ourselves headaches /
+simply in order to be able to take aspirin and thus satisfy our
+desire to be free of the pain.) This suggests that the creation and
+satisfaction of a preference is in itself neither good nor bad: our
+response to the idea of the creation and satisfaction of a preference
+varies according to whether the experience as a whole
+will be desirable or undesirable, in terms of other, long-standing
+preferences we may have, for example for pleasure rather than
+pain.
+Exactly how preference utilitarianism ought to evaluate the
+creation and satisfaction of a preference, as distinct from the
+satisfaction of an existing preference, is a difficult issue. In my
+initial response to Hart's criticism, I suggested that we think of
+the creation of an unsatisfied preference as putting a debit in a
+kind of moral ledger that is merely cancelled out by the satisfaction
+of the preference. (Some will see in this model confirmation
+of Marx's scornful remark that Bentham's utilitarianism
+is a philosophy suitable for a nation of shopkeepers!) The 'moral
+ledger' model has the advantage of explaining the puzzling
+asymmetry mentioned in the previous chapter, in connection
+with the difference between the total and the prior existence
+interpretations of utilitarianism. We consider it wrong to bring
+into existence a child who, because of a genetic defect, will lead
+128
+I
+I
+f
+I
+Taking Life: Animals
+a thoroughly miserable existence for a year or two and then
+die; yet we do not consider it good or obligatory to bring into
+existence a child who, in all probability, will lead a happy life.
+The 'debit' view of preferences just outlined would explain why
+this should be so: to bring into existence a child, most of whose
+preferences we will be unable to satisfy, is to create a debit that
+we cannot cancel. This is wrong. To create a child whose preferences
+will be able to be satisfied, is to create a debit that can
+be cancelled. This is, in itself, I thought, ethically neutral. The
+model can also explain why, in Parfit's example, what the two
+women do is equally wrong - for both quite unnecessarily bring
+into existence a child who is likely to have a larger negative
+balance in the ledger than a child they could have brought into
+existence.
+Unfortunately, this same view carries a less desirable implication:
+it makes it wrong, other things being equal, to bring
+into existence a child- who will on the whole be very happy,
+and will be able to satisfy nearly all of her preferences, but will
+still have some preferences unsatisfied. For if the creation of
+each preference is a debit that is cancelled only when the desire
+is satisfied, even the best life will, taken in itself, leave a small
+debit in the ledger. Since everyone has some unsatisfied desires,
+the conclusion to be drawn is that it would have been better if
+none of us had been born. Thus the moral ledger model of
+creating and satisfying a preference will not do. It might be
+saved by attaching to it a stipulation that sets a given level of
+preference satisfaction, below complete satisfaction, as a minimum
+for overcoming the negative entry opened by the creation
+of a being with unsatisfied preferences. This might be the level
+at which we consider a life ceases to be worth living, from the
+perspective of the person leading that life. Such a solution seems
+a little ad hoc, but it may be possible to incorporate it into a
+plausible version of preference utilitarianism.
+Another possibility is to take our model from Shakespeare,
+Who speaks of 'life's uncertain voyage', and see the lives of self-
+129
+Practical Ethics
+conscious beings as arduous and uncertain journeys, at different
+stages, in which various amounts of hope and desire, as well
+as time and effort have been invested in order to reach particular
+goals or destinations. Suppose that I am thinking of travelling
+to Nepal, where I plan to trek to Thyangboche Monastery, at
+the base of Mt. Everest. I have always loved high mountains,
+and I know that I would enjoy being in the Himalayas for the
+first time. If during these early days of musing on the possibility
+of such a trip an insuperable obstacle arises - perhaps the Nepalese
+government bans tourism on the grounds that it is an
+environmental hazard - I will be a little put out, naturally, but
+my disappointment will be nothing compared with what it
+would have been if I had already arranged to take the necessary /
+time off work, perhaps bought a non-refundable plane ticket to
+Kathmandu, or even trekked a long distance towards my destination,
+before being barred from reaching my goal. Similarly,
+one can regard a decision not to bring an infant into the world
+as akin to preventing a journey from getting underway, but this
+is not in itself seriously wrong, for the voyager has made no
+plans and set no goals. Gradually, as goals are set, even if tentatively,
+and a lot is done in order to increase the probability
+of the goals being reached, the wrongness of bringing the journey
+to a premature end increases. Towards the end of life, when
+most things that might have been achieved have either been
+done, or are now unlikely to be accomplished, the loss of life
+may again be less of tragedy than it would have been at an
+earlier stage of life.
+The great virtue of this 'journey' model of a life is that it can
+explain why beings who can conceive of their own future existence
+and have embarked on their life journey are not replaceable,
+while at the same it can account for why it is wrong
+to bring a miserable being into existence. To do so is to send a
+being out on a journey that is doomed to disappointment and
+frustration. The model also offers a natural explanation of why
+Parfit's two women both do wrong, and to an equal degree:
+130
+! ,)
+Taking Life: Animals
+they both quite unnecessarily send out voyagers with fewer
+prospects of making a successful journey than other voyagers
+whom they might have placed at the starting line. The women's
+children can be thought of as replaceable before the journey
+begins, but this does not require us to hold that there is an
+obligation to bring more children into existence, let alone to
+regard people as replaceable once life's journey has properly
+begun.
+Both the modified moral ledger model and the journey model
+are metaphors, and should not be taken too literally. At best
+they suggest ways of thinking about when beings might be
+considered replaceable, and when they might not be so considered.
+As I indicated in the Preface, this is an area in which fully
+satisfactory answers are still to be found.
+Before we leave the topic of killing non-self-conscious beings,
+I should emphasise that to take the view that non-self-conscious
+beings are replaceable is not to say that their interests do not
+count. I hope that the third chapter of this book makes it clear
+that their interests do count. As long as sentIent beings are
+conscious, they have an interest in experiencing as much pleasure
+and as little pain as possible. Sentience suffices to place a
+being within the sphere of equal consideration of interests; but
+it does not mean that the being has a personal interest in continuing
+to live.
+CONCLUSIONS
+If the arguments in this chapter are correct, there is no single
+answer to the question: 'Is it normally wrong to take the life of
+an animal?' The term 'animal' - even in the restricted sense of
+'non-human animal' - covers too diverse a range of lives for
+one principle to apply to all of them.
+Some non-human animals appear to be rational and selfconscious,
+conceiving themselves as distinct beings with a past
+and a future. When this is so, or to the best of our knowledge
+131
+Practical Ethics
+may be so, the case against killing is strong, as strong as the
+case against killing permanently intellectually disabled human
+beings at a similar mental level. (I have in mind here the direct
+reasons against killing; the effects on relatives of the intellectually
+disabled human will sometimes - but not always - constitute
+additional indirect reasons against killing the human. For
+further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 7.)
+In the present state of our knowledge, this strong case against
+killing can be invoked most categorically against the slaughter
+of chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans. On the basis of what
+we now know about these near-relatives of ours, we should
+immediately extend to them the same full protection against
+being killed that we extend now to all human beings. A case
+can also be made, though with varying degrees of confidence,
+on behalf of whales, dolphins, monkeys, dogs, cats, pigs, seals,
+bears, cattle, sheep and so on, perhaps even to the point at
+which it may include all mammals - much depends on how
+far we are prepared to go in extending the benefit of the doubt,
+where a doubt exists. Even if we stopped at the species I have
+named, however - excluding the remainder of the mammals -
+our discussion has raised a very large question mark over the
+justifiability of a great deal of killing of animals carried out by
+humans, even when this killing takes place painlessly and without
+causing suffering to other members of the animal community.
+(Most of this killing, of course, does not take place
+under such ideal conditions.)
+When we come to animals who, as far as we can tell, are not
+rational and self-conscious beings, the case against killing is
+weaker. When we are not dealing with beings aware of themselves
+as distinct entities, the wrongness of painless killing derives
+from the loss of pleasure it involves. Where the life taken
+would not, on balance, have been pleasant, no direct wrong is
+done. Even when the animal killed would have lived pleasantly,
+it is at least arguable that no wrong is done if the animal killed
+will, as a result of the killing, be replaced by another animal
+132
+Taking Life: Animals
+living an equally pleasant life. Taking this view involves holding
+that a wrong done to an existing being can be made up for by
+a benefit conferred on an as yet non-existent being. Thus it is
+possible to regard non-self-conscious animals as interchangeable
+with each other in a way that self-conscious beings are not.
+This means that in some circumstances - when animals lead
+pleasant lives, are killed painlessly, their deaths do not cause
+suffering to other animals, and the killing of one animal makes
+possible its replacement by another who would not otherwise
+have lived - the killing of non-self -conscious animals may
+not be wrong.
+/ Is it possible, along these lines, to justify raising chickens for
+their meat, not in factory farm conditions but roaming freely
+around a farmyard? Let us make the questionable assumption
+that chickens are not self-conscious. Assume also that the birds
+can be killed painlessly, and the survivors do not appear to be
+affected by the death of one of their numbers. Assume, finally,
+that for economic reasons we could not rear the birds if we did
+not eat them. Then the replaceability argument appears to justify
+killing the birds, because depriving them of the pleasures of
+their existence can be offset against the pleasures of chickens
+who do not yet exist, and will exist only if existing chickens are
+killed.
+As a piece of critical moral reasoning, this argument may be
+sound. Even at that level, it is important to realise how limited
+it is in its application. It cannot justify factory farming, where
+animals do not have pleasant lives. Nor does it normally justify
+the killing of wild animals. A duck shot by a hunter (making
+the shaky assumption that ducks are not self-conscious, and the
+almost certainly false assumption that the shooter can be relied
+upon to kill the duck instantly) has probably had a pleasant
+life, but the shooting of a duck does not lead to its replacement
+by another. Unless the duck population is at the maximum that
+can be sustained by the available food supply, the killing of a
+duck ends a pleasant life without starting another, and is for
+133
+Practical Ethics
+that reason wrong on straightforward utilitarian grounds. So
+although there are situations in which it is not wrong to kill
+animals, these situations are special ones, and do not cover very
+many of the billions of premature deaths humans inflict, year
+after year, on animals.
+In any case, at the level of practical moral principles, it would
+be better to reject altogether the killing of animals for food,
+unless one must do so to survive. Killing animals for food makes
+us think of them as objects that we can use as we please. Their
+lives then count for little when weighed against our mere wants.
+As long as we continue to use animals in this way, to change
+our attitudes to animals in the way that they should be changed
+will be an impossible task. How can we encourage people to
+respect animals, and have equal concern for their interests, if
+they continue to eat them for their mere enjoyment? To foster
+the right attitudes of consideration for animals, including nonself-
+conscious ones, it may be best to make it a simple principle
+to avoid killing them for food.
+134
+I
+I
+!
+6
+TAKING LIFE: THE EMBRYO
+AND THE FETUS
+THE PROBLEM
+FEW ethicaUssues are as bitterly fought over today as abortion,
+and, while the pendulum has swung back and forth,
+neither side has had much success in altering the opinions of
+its opponents. Until 1967, abortion was illegal in almost all the
+Western democracies except Sweden and Denmark. Then Britain
+changed its law to allow abortion on broad social grounds,
+and in the 1973 case of Roe v Wade, the United States Supreme
+Court held that women have a constitutional right to an abortion
+in the first six months of pregnancy. Western European
+nations, including Roman Catholic countries like Italy, Spain
+and France, allliberalised their abortion laws. Only the Republic
+of Ireland held out against the trend.
+Opponents of abortion did not give up. In the United States,
+conservative Presidents have changed the composition of the
+Supreme Court, which in tum has nibbled around the margins
+of the Roe v Wade decision, allowing states to restrict, in various
+ways, access to abortion. Outside the United States, the issue
+of abortion re-surfaced in Eastern Europe after the collapse of
+communism. The communist states had allowed abortion, but
+as nationalist and religiOUS forces gathered strength, there were
+strong moves in countries like Poland for the re-introduction
+of restrictive laws. Since West Germany had more restrictive
+laws than East Germany, the need to introduce a single law for
+a united Germany also caused an intense debate.
+In 1978 the birth of Louise Brown raised a new issue about
+135
+Practical Ethics
+the status of early human life. For Louise Brown was the first
+human to have been born from an embryo that had been fertilised
+outside a human body. The success of Robert Edwards
+and Patrick Steptoe in demonstrating the possibility of in vitro
+fertilization, or IVF, was based on several years of experimentation
+on early human embryos - none of which had survived.
+IVF is now a routine procedure for certain types of infertility,
+and has given rise to thousands of healthy babies. To reach this
+point, however, many more embryos had to be destroyed in
+experiments, and further improvement of IVF techniques will
+require continued experimentation. Perhaps more significant
+still, for the long-term, are the possibilities for other forms of
+experimentation opened up by the existence of a viable embryo
+outside the human body. Embryos can now be frozen and stored
+for many years before being thawed and implanted in a woman.
+Normal children develop from these embryos, but the technique
+means that there are large numbers of embryos now preserved
+in special freezers around the world. (At the time of writing
+there were about 11,000 frozen embryos in Australia alone.)
+Because the IVF procedure often produces more embryos than
+can safely be transferred to the uterus of the woman from whom
+the egg came, many of these frozen embryos will never be
+wanted, and presumably will either be destroyed, be donated
+for research, or given to other infertile couples.
+Other new technologies loom just a little way ahead. Embryos
+can be screened for genetic abnormalities, and then discarded
+if such abnormalities are found. Edwards has predicted that it
+will become scientifically feasible to grow embryos in vitro to
+the point at which, about 17 days after fertilisation, they develop
+blood stem cells, which could be used to treat various nowlethal
+blood diseases. Others, speculating about the further future'
+have asked if one day we will have banks of embryos or
+fetuses to provide organs for those who need them.
+Abortion and destructive embryo experimentation pose dif-
+136
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+ficult ethical issues because the development ofthe human being
+is a gradual process. If we take the fertilised egg immediately
+after conception, it is hard to get upset about its death. The
+fertilised egg is a single cell. After several days, it is still only a
+tiny cluster of cells without a single anatomical feature of the
+being it will later become. The cells that will eventually become
+the embryo proper are at this stage indistinguishable from the
+cells that will become the placenta and amniotic sac. Up to about
+14 days after fertilisation, we cannot even tell if the embryo is
+going to be one or two individuals, because splitting can take
+place, leading to the formation of identical twins. At 14 days,
+the first anatomical feature, the so-called primitive streak, appears
+in the position in which the backbone will later develop.
+At this point the embryo could not possibly be conscious or feel
+pain. At the other extreme is the adult human being. To kill a
+human adult is murder, and, except in some special circumstances
+like those to be discussed in the next chapter, is unhesitatingly
+and universally condemned. Yet there is no obvious
+sharp line that divides the fertilised egg from the adult. Hence
+the problem.
+Most of this chapter will be concerned with the problem of
+abortion, but the discussion of the status of the fetus will have
+obvious implications for two related issues: embryo experimentation,
+and the use of fetal tissue for medical purposes. I
+begin the discussion of abortion stating the position of those
+opposed to abortion, which I shall refer to as the conservative
+position. I shall then examine some of the standard liberal responses,
+and show why they are inadequate. Finally I shall use
+our earlier discussion of the value of life to approach the issue
+from a broader perspective. In contrast to the common opinion
+that the moral question about abortion is a dilemma with no
+solution, I shall show that, at least within the bounds of nonreligious
+ethics, there is a clear-cut answer and those who take
+a different view are simply mistaken.
+137
+Practical Ethics
+THE CONSERVATIVE POSITION
+The central argument against abortion, put as a formal argument,
+would go something like this:
+First premise: It is wrong to kill an innocent human being.
+Second premise: A human fetus is an innocent human being.
+Conclusion: Therefore it is wrong to kill a human fetus.
+The usual liberal response is to deny the second premise of
+this argument. So it is on whether the fetus is a human being
+that the issue is joined, and the dispute about abortion is often
+taken to be a dispute about when a human life begins.
+On this issue the conservative position is difficult to shake.
+The conservative points to the continuum between the fertilised
+egg and child, and challenges the liberal to point to any stage
+in this gradual process that marks a morally significant dividing
+line. Unless there is such a line, the conservative says, we
+must either upgrade the status of the earliest embryo to that
+of the child, or downgrade the status of the child to that of
+the embryo; but no one wants to allow children to be dispatched
+on the request of their parents, and so the only tenable
+position is to grant the fetus the protection we now grant the
+child.
+Is it true that there is no morally significant dividing line
+between fertilised egg and child? Those commonly suggested
+are: birth, viability, quickening, and the onset of consciousness.
+Let us consider these in tum.
+Birth
+Birth is the most visible possible dividing line, and the one that
+would suit liberals best. It coincides to some extent with our
+sympathies - we are less disturbed at the destruction of a fetus
+we have never seen than at the death of a being we can all see,
+hear and cuddle. But is this enough to make birth the line that
+138
+I I I
+I
+I
+I
+I
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+decides whether a being mayor may not be killed? The conservative
+can plausibly reply that the fetuslbaby is the same
+entity, whether inside or outside the womb, with the same
+human features (whether we can see them or not) and the same
+degree of awareness and capacity for feeling pain. A prematurely
+born infant may well be less developed in these respects than a
+fetus nearing the end of its normal term. It seems peculiar to
+hold that we may not kill the premature infant, but may kill
+the more developed fetus. The location of a being - inside or
+outside the womb - should not make that much difference to
+the wrongness of killing it.
+Viability
+If birth does not mark a crucial moral distinction, should we
+push the line back to the time at which the fetus could survive
+outside the womb? This overcomes one objection to taking birth
+as the decisive point, for it treats the viable fetus on a par with
+the infant, born prematurely, at the same stage of development.
+Viability is where the United States Supreme Court drew the
+line in Roe v. Wade. The Court held that the state has a legitimate
+interest in protecting potential life, and this interest becomes
+'compelling' at viability 'because the fetus then presumably has
+the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb'.
+Therefore statutes prohibiting abortion after viability would not,
+the Court said, be unconstitutional. But the judges who wrote
+the majority decision gave no indication why the mere capacity
+to exist outside the womb should make such a difference to the
+state's interest in protecting potential life. After all, if we talk,
+as the Court does, of potential human life, then the nonviable
+fetus is as much a potential adult human as the viable fetus. (I
+shall return to this issue of potentiality shortly; but it is a different
+issue from the conservative argument we are now discussing,
+which claims that the fetus is a human being, and not
+just a potential human being.)
+139
+Practical Ethics
+There is another important objection to making viability the
+cut-off point. The point at which the fetus can survive outside
+the mother's body varies according to the state of medical
+technology. Thirty years ago it was generally accepted that a
+baby born more than two months premature could not survive.
+Now a six-month fetus - three months premature - can often
+be pulled through, thanks to sophisticated medical techniques,
+and fetuses born after as little as five and a half months of
+gestation have survived. This threatens to undermine the Supreme
+Court's neat division of pregnancy into trimesters, with
+the boundary of viability lying between the second and third
+trimesters.
+In the light of these medical developments, do we say that a
+six-month-old fetus should not be aborted now, but could have
+been aborted without wrongdoing thirty years ago? The same
+comparison can also be made, not between the present and the
+past, but between different places. A six-month-old fetus might
+have a fair chance of survival if born in a city where the latest
+medical techniques are used, but no chance at all if born in a
+remote village in Chad or New Guinea. Suppose that for some
+reason a woman, six months pregnant, was to fly from New
+York to a New Guinea village and that, once she had arrived
+in the village, there was no way she could return quickly to a
+city with modem medical facilities. Are we to say that it would
+have been wrong for her to have an abortion before she left
+New York, but now that she is in the village she may go ahead?
+The trip does not change the nature of the fetus, so why should
+it remove its claim to life?
+The liberal might reply that the fact that the fetus is totally
+dependent on the mother for its survival means that it has no
+right to life independent of her wishes. In other cases, however,
+we do not hold that total dependence on another person means
+that that person may decide whether one lives or dies. A newborn
+baby is totally dependent on its mother, if it happens to
+140
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+be born in an isolated area in which there is no other lactating
+woman, nor the means for bottle feeding. An elderly woman
+may be totally dependent on her son looking after her, and a
+hiker who breaks her leg five days' walk from the nearest road
+may die if her companion does not bring help. We do not think
+that in these situations the mother may take the life ~fher baby,
+the son of his aged mother, or the hiker of her injured companion.
+So it is not plausible to suggest that the dependence of
+the nonviable fetus on its mother gives her the right to kill it;
+and if dependence does not justify making viability the dividing
+line, it is hard to see what does.
+Quickening
+If neither birth nor viability marks a morally significant distinction,
+there is less still to be said for a third candidate,
+quickening. Quickening is the time when the mother first feels
+the fetus move, and in traditional Catholic theology, this was
+thought to be the moment at which the fetus gained its soul.
+If we accepted that view, we might think quickening important,
+since the soul is, on the Christian view, what marks
+humans off from animals. But the idea that the soul enters
+the fetus at quickening is an outmoded piece of superstition,
+discarded now even by Catholic theologians. Putting aside
+these religious doctrines makes quickening insignificant. It is
+no more than the time when the fetus is first felt to move of
+its own accord; the fetus is alive before this moment, and
+ultrasound studies have shown that fetuses do in fact start
+moving as early as six weeks after fertilization, long before
+they can be felt to move. In any case, the capacity for physical
+motion - or the lack of it - has nothing to do with the
+seriousness of one's claim for continued life. We do not see
+the lack of such a capacity as negating the claims of paralysed
+people to go on living.
+141
+Practical Ethics
+Consciousness
+Movement might be thought to be indirectly of moral significance,
+in so far as it is an indication of some form of awareness
+- and as we have already seen, consciousness, and the capaCity
+to feel pleasure or pain, are of real moral significance. Despite
+this, neither side in the abortion debate has made much mention
+of the development of consciousness in the fetus. Those
+opposed to abortion may show films about the 'silent scream'
+of the fetus when aborted, but the intention behind such films
+is merely to stir the emotions of the uncommitted. Opponents
+of abortion really want to uphold the right to life of the human
+being from conception, irrespective of whether it is conscious
+or not. For those in favour of abortion, to appeal to the absence
+of a capacity for consciousness has seemed a risky strategy.
+On the basis of the studies showing that movement takes place
+as early as six weeks after fertilization, coupled with other
+studies that have found some brain activity as early as the
+seventh week, it has been suggested that the fetus could be
+capable of feeling pain at this early stage of pregnancy. That
+possibility has made liberals very wary of appealing to the
+onset of consciousness as a point at which the fetus has a
+right to life. We shall return to the issue of consciousness in
+the fetus later in this chapter, because it is relevant to the
+issue of embryo and fetal experimentation. We will also then
+consider an earlier marker that could be relevant to embryo
+experimentation, but not to the abortion debate. As far as
+abortion is concerned, the discussion up to now has shown
+that the liberal search for a morally crucial dividing line between
+the newborn baby and the fetus has failed to yield any
+event or stage of development that can bear the weight of
+separating those with a right to life from those who lack such,
+a right, in a way that clearly shows fetuses to be in the latter
+category at the stage of development when most abortions
+take place. The conservative is on solid ground in insisting
+142
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+that the development from the embryo to the infant is a gradual
+process.
+SOME LIBERAL ARGUMENTS
+Some liberals do not challenge the conservative claim that the
+fetus is an innocent human being, but argue that abortion is
+nonetheless permissible. I shall consider three arguments for
+this view.
+The Consequences of Restrictive Laws
+The first argument is that laws prohibiting abortion do not stop
+abortions, but merely drive them underground. Women who
+want to have abortions are often desperate. They will go to
+backyard abortionists or try folk remedies. Abortion performed
+by a qualified medical practitioner is as safe as any medical
+operation, but attempts to procure abortions by unqualified people
+often result in serious medical complications and sometimes
+death. Thus the effect of prohibiting abortion is not so much to
+reduce the number of abortions performed as to increase the
+difficulties and dangers for women with unwanted pregnancies.
+This argument has been influential in gaining support for
+more liberal abortion laws. It was accepted by the Canadian
+Royal Commission on the Status of Women, which concluded
+that: 'A law that has more bad effects than good ones is a bad
+law ... As long as it exists in its present form thousands of
+women will break it.'
+The main point to note about this argument is that it is an
+argument against laws prohibiting abortion, and not an argument
+against the view that abortion is wrong. This is an important
+distinction, often overlooked in the abortion debate.
+The present argument well illustrates the distinction, because
+one could quite consistently accept it and advocate that the law
+should allow abortion on request, while at the same time de-
+143
+Practical Ethics
+ciding oneself - if one were pregnant - or counselling another
+who was pregnant, that it would be wrong to have an abortion.
+It is a mistake to assume that the law should always enforce
+morality. It may be that, as alleged in the case of abortion,
+attempts to enforce right conduct lead to consequences no one
+wants, and no decrease in wrong-doing; or it may be that, as
+is proposed by the next argument we shall consider, there is an
+area of private ethics with which the law ought not to interfere.
+So this first argument is an argument about abortion law, not
+about the ethics of abortion. Even within those limits, however,
+it is open to challenge, for it fails to meet the conservative claim
+that abortion is the deliberate killing of an innocent human
+being, and in the same ethical category as murder. Those who
+take this view of abortion will not rest content with the assertion
+that restrictive abortion laws do no more than drive women to
+backyard abortionists. They will insist that this situation can be
+changed, and the law properly enforced. They may also suggest
+measures to make pregnancy easier to accept for those women
+who become pregnant against their wishes. This is a perfectly
+reasonable response, given the initial ethical judgment against
+abortion, and for this reason the first argument does not succeed
+in avoiding the ethical issue.
+Not the Law's Business?
+The second argument is again an argument about abortion laws
+rather than the ethics of abortion. It uses the view that, as the
+report of a British government committee inquiring into laws
+about homosexuality and prostitution put it: 'There must remain
+a realm of private morality and immorality that is, in brief
+and crude terms, not the law's business: This view is widely
+accepted among liberal thinkers, and can be traced back to John
+Stuart Mill's On Liberty. The'one very simple principle' of this
+work is, in Mill's words:
+144
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
+over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is
+to prevent harm to others ... He cannot rightfully be compelled
+to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because
+it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to
+do so would be wise or even right.
+Mill's view is often and properly quoted in support of the repeal
+of laws that create 'victimless crimes' - like laws prohibiting
+homosexual relations between consenting adults, the use of
+marijuana and other drugs, prostitution, gambling and so on.
+Abortion is often included in this list, for example by the criminologist
+Edwin Schur in his book Crimes Without Victims. Those
+who consider abortion a victimless crime say that, while everyone
+is entitled to hold and act on his or her own view about
+the morality of abortion, no section of the community should
+try to force others to adhere to its own particular view. In a
+pluralist society, we should tolerate others with different moral
+views and leave the decision to have an abortion up to the
+woman concerned.
+The fallacy involved in numbering abortion among the victimless
+crimes should be obvious. The dispute about abortion
+is, largely, a dispute about whether or not abortion does have
+a 'victim'. Opponents of abortion maintain that the victim of
+abortion is the fetus. Those not opposed to abortion may deny
+that the fetus counts as a victim in any serious way. They might,
+for instance, say that a being cannot be a victim unless it has
+interests that are violated, and the fetus has no interests. But
+however this dispute may go, one cannot simply ignore it on
+the grounds that people should not attempt to force others to
+follow their own moral views. My view that what Hitler did to
+the Jews is wrong is a moral view, and ifthere were any prospect
+of a revival of Nazism I would certainly do my best to force
+others not to act contrary to this view. Mill's principle is defensible
+only if it is restricted, as Mill restricted it, to acts that do
+not harm others. To use the principle as a means of avoiding
+145
+Practical Ethics
+the difficulties of resolving the ethical dispute over abortion is
+to take it for granted that abortion does not harm an 'other' -
+which is precisely the point that needs to be proven before we
+can legitimately apply the principle to the case of abortion.
+A Feminist Argument
+The last of the three arguments that seek to justify abortion
+without denying that the fetus is an innocent human being is
+that a woman has a right to choose what happens to her own
+body. This argument became prominent with the rise of the
+women's liberation movement and has been elaborated by
+American philosophers sympathetic to feminism. An influential
+argument has been presented by Judith Jarvis Thomson by
+means of an ingenious analogy. Imagine, she says, that you
+wake up one morning and find yourself in a hospital bed, somehow
+connected to an unconscious man in an adjacent bed. You
+are told that this man is a famous violinist with kidney disease.
+The only way he can survive is for his circulatory system to be
+plugged into the system of someone else with the same blood
+type, and you are the only person whose blood is suitable. So
+a society of music lovers kidnapped you, had the connecting
+operation performed, and there you are. Since you are now in
+a reputable hospital you could, if you choose, order a doctor to
+disconnect you from the violinist; but the violinist will then
+certainly die. On the other hand, if you remain connected for
+only (only?) nine months, the violinist will have recovered and
+you can be unplugged without endangering him.
+Thomson believes that if you found yourself in this unexpected
+predicament you would not be morally required to allow
+the violinist to use your kidneys for nine months. It might be
+generous or kind of you to do so, but to say this is, Thomson
+claims, quite different from saying that you would be doing
+wrong if you did not do it.
+146
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+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+Note that Thomson's conclusion does not depend on denying
+that the violinist is an innocent human being, with the same
+right to life as any other innocent human being. On the contrary,
+Thomson affirms that the violinist does have a right to life -
+but to have a right to life does not, she says, entail a right to
+the use of another's body, even if without that use one will die.
+The parallel with pregnancy, especially pregnancy due to rape
+should be obvious. A woman pregnant through rape finds herself,
+through no choice of her own, linked to a fetus in much
+the same way as the person is linked to the violinist. True, a
+pregnant woman does not normally have to spend nine months
+in bed, but opponents of abortion would not regard this as a
+sufficient justification for abortion. Giving up a newborn baby
+for adoption might be more difficult, psychologically, than parting
+from the violinist at the end of his illness; but this in itself
+does not seem a sufficient reason for killing the fetus. Accepting
+for the sake of the argument that the fetus does count as a fullyfledged
+human being, having an abortion when the fetus is not
+viable has the same moral significance as unplugging oneself
+from the violinist. So if we agree with Thomson that it would
+not be wrong to unplug oneself from the violinist, we must also
+accept that, whatever the status of the fetus, abortion is not
+wrong - at least not when the pregnancy results from rape.
+Thomson's argument can probably be extended beyond cases
+of rape. Suppose that you found yourself connected to the violinist,
+not because you were kidnapped by music lovers, but
+because you had intended to enter the hospital to visit a sick
+friend, and when you got into the elevator, you carelessly
+pressed the wrong button, and ended up in a section of the
+hospital normally visited only by those who have volunteered
+to be connected to patients who would not otherwise survive.
+A team of doctors, waiting for the next volunteer, assumed you
+were it, jabbed you with an anaesthetic, and connected you. If
+Thomson's argument was sound in the kidnap case it is
+probably sound here too, since nine months unwillingly sup-
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+Practical Ethics
+porting another is a high price to pay for ignorance or carelessness.
+In this way the argument might apply beyond rape
+cases to the much larger number of women who become pregnant
+through ignorance, carelessness, or contraceptive failure.
+But is the argument sound? The short answer is this: It is
+sound if the particular theory of rights that lies behind it is
+sound; and it is unsound if that theory of rights is unsound.
+The theory of rights in question can be illustrated by another
+of Thomson's fanciful examples: suppose I am desperately ill
+and the only thing that can save my life is the touch of my
+favourite film star's cool hand on my fevered brow. Well, Thomson
+says, even though I have a right to life, this does not mean
+that I have a right to force the film star to come to me, or that
+he is under any. moral obligation to fly over and save me -
+although it would be frightfully nice of him to do so. Thus
+Thomson does not accept that we are always obliged to take
+the best course of action, all things considered, or to do what
+has the best consequences. She accepts, instead, a system of
+rights and obligations that allows us to justify our actions independently
+of their consequences.
+I shall say more about this conception of rights in Chapter 8.
+At this stage it is enough to notice that a utilitarian would reject
+this theory of rights, and would reject Thomson's judgment in
+the case of the violinist. The utilitarian would hold that, however
+outraged I may be at having been kidnapped, if the consequences
+of disconnecting myself from the violinist are, on balance,
+and taking into account the interests of everyone affected,
+worse than the consequences of remaining connected, I ought
+to remain connected. This does not necessarily mean that utilitarians
+would regard a woman who disconnected herself as
+wicked or deserving of blame. They might recognize that she
+has been placed in an extraordinarily difficult situation, one in
+which to do what is right involves a considerable sacrifice. They
+might even grant that most people in this situation would follow
+148
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+self-interest rather than do the right thing. Nevertheless, they
+would hold that to disconnect oneself is wrong.
+In rejecting Thomson's theory of rights, and with it her judgment
+in the case of the violinist, the utilitarian would also be
+rejecting her argument for abortion. Thomson claimed that her
+argument justified abortion even if we allowed the life of the
+fetus to count as heavily as the life of a normal person. The
+utilitarian would say that it would be wrong to refuse to sustain
+a person's life for nine months, if that was the only way the
+person could survive. Therefore if the life of the fetus ~s. gi~en
+the same weight as the life of a normal person, the utIhtanan
+would say that it would be wrong to refuse to carry the fetus
+until it can survive outside the womb.
+This concludes our discussion of the usual liberal replies to
+the conservative argument against abortion. We have seen that
+liberals have failed to establish a morally significant dividing
+line between the newborn baby and the fetus, and their arguments
+- with the possible exception of Thomson's argument if
+her theory of rights can be defended - also fail to justify abortion
+in ways that do not challenge the conservative claim that the
+fetus is an innocent human being. Nevertheless, it would be
+premature for conservatives to assume that their case against
+abortion is sound. It is now time to bring into this debate some
+more general conclusions about the value of life.
+THE VALUE OF FETAL LIFE
+Let us go back to the beginning. The central argument against
+abortion from which we started was:
+First premise: It is wrong to kill an innocent human bein~.
+Second premise: A human fetus is an innocent human bemg.
+Conclusion: Therefore it is wrong to kill a human fetus.
+The first set of replies we considered accepted the first premise
+of this argument but objected to the second. The second set of
+149
+Practical Ethics
+replies rejected neither premise, but objected to drawing the
+conclusion from these premises (or objected to the further conclusion
+that abortion should be prohibited by law). None of the
+replies questioned the first premise of the argument. Given the
+widespread acceptance of the doctrine of the sanctity of human
+life, this is not surprising; but the discussion of this doctrine in
+the preceding chapters shows that this premise is less secure
+than many people think.
+The weakness of the first premise of the conservative argument
+is that it relies on our acceptance of the special status of
+human life. We have seen that 'human' is a term that straddles
+two distinct notions: being a member of the species Homo sapiens,
+and being a person. Once the term is dissected in this way,
+the weakness of the conservative's first premise becomes apparent.
+If 'human' is taken as equivalent to 'person', the second
+premise of the argument, which asserts that the fetus is a human
+being, is clearly false; for one cannot plausibly argue that a fetus
+is either rational or self-conscious. If, on the other hand, 'human'
+is taken to mean no more than 'member of the species
+Homo sapiens', then the conservative defence of the life of the
+fetus is based on a characteristic lacking moral significance and
+so the first premise is false. The point should by now be familiar:
+whether a being is or is not a member of our species is, in itself
+no more relevant to the wrongness of killing it than whether it
+is or is not a member of our race. The belief that mere membership
+of our species, irrespective of other characteristics,
+makes a great difference to the wrongness of killing a being is
+a legacy of religious doctrines that even those opposed to abortion
+hesitate to bring into the debate.
+Recognising this simple point transforms the abortion issue.
+We can now look at the fetus for what it is - the actual characteristics
+it possesses - and can value its life on the same scale
+as the lives of beings with similar characteristics who are not
+members of our species. It now becomes apparent that the 'Pro
+Life' or 'Right to Life' movement is misnamed. Far from having
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+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+concern for all life, or a scale of concern impartially based on
+the nature of the life in question, those who protest against
+abortion but dine regularly on the bodies of chickens, pigs and
+calves, show only a biased concern for the lives of members of
+our own species. For on any fair comparison of morally relevant
+characteristics, like rationality, self-consciousness, awareness,
+autonomy, pleasure and pain, and so on, the calf, the pig and
+the much derided chicken come out well ahead of the fetus at
+any stage of pregnancy - while if we make the comparison with
+a fetus of less than three months, a fish would show more signs
+of consciousness.
+My suggestion, then, is that we accord the life of a fetus no
+greater value than the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar
+level of rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to
+feel, etc. Since no fetus is a person, no fetus has the same claim
+to life as a person. We have yet to consider at what point the
+fetus is likely to become capable of feeling pain. For now it will
+be enough to say that until that capacity exists, an abortion
+terminates an existence that is of no "intrinsic" value at all.
+Mterwards, when the fetus may be conscious, though not selfconscious,
+abortion should not be taken lightly (if a woman
+ever does take abortion lightly). But a woman's serious interests
+would normally override the rudimentary interests even of a
+conscious fetus. Indeed, even an abortion late in pregnancy for
+the most trivial reasons is hard to condemn unless we also
+condemn the slaughter of far more developed forms of life for
+the taste of their flesh.
+The comparison between the fetus and other animals leads
+us to one more point. Where the balance of conflicting interests
+does make it necessary to kill a sentient creature, it is important
+that the killing be done as painlessly as possible. In the case of
+nonhuman animals the importance of humane killing is widely
+accepted; oddly, in the case of abortion little attention is paid
+to it. This is not because abortion is known to kill the fetus
+SWiftly and humanely. Late abortions - which are the very ones
+151
+Pradical Ethics
+in which the fetus may be able to suffer - are sometimes performed
+by injecting a salt solution into the amniotic sac that
+surrounds the fetus. It has been claimed that the effect of this
+is to cause the fetus to have convulsions and die between one
+and three hours later. Afterwards the dead fetus is expelled from
+the womb. If there are grounds for thinking that a method of
+abortion causes the fetus to suffer, that method should be
+avoided.
+THE FETUS AS POTENTIAL LIFE
+One likely objection to the argument I have offered in the preceding
+section is that it takes into account only the actual characteristics
+of the fetus, and not its potential characteristics. On
+the basis of its actual characteristics, some opponents of abortion
+will admit, the fetus compares unfavourably with many nonhuman
+animals; it is when we consider its potential to become
+a mature human being that membership of the species Homo
+sapiens becomes important, and the fetus far surpasses any
+chicken, pig or calf.
+Up to this point I have not raised the question of the potential
+of the fetus because I thought it best to concentrate on the central
+argument against abortion; but it is true that a different argument,
+based on the potential of the fetus, can be mounted. Now
+is the time to look at this other argument. We can state it as
+follows:
+First premise: It is wrong to kill a potential human being.
+Second premise: A human fetus is a potential human being.
+Conclusion: Therefore it is wrong to kill a human fetus.
+The second premise of this argument is stronger than the
+second premise of the preceding argument. Whereas it is problematic
+whether a fetus actually is a human being - it depends
+on what we mean by the term - it cannot be denied that the
+152
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+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+fetus is a potential human being. This is true whether by 'human
+being' we mean 'member of the species Homo sapiens' or a
+rational and self-conscious being, a person. The strong second
+premise of the new argument is, however, purchased at the cost
+of a weaker first premise, for the wrongness of killing a potential
+human being - even a potential person - is more open to challenge
+than the wrongness of killing an actual human being.
+It is of course true that the potential rationality, selfconsciousness
+and so on of a fetal Homo sapiens surpasses that
+of a cow or pig; but it does not follow that the fetus has a
+stronger claim to life. There is no rule that says that a potential
+X has the same value as an X, or has all the rights of an X.
+There are many examples that show just the contrary. To pull
+out a sprouting acorn is not the same as cutting down a venerable
+oak. To drop a live chicken into a pot of boiling water
+would be much worse than doing the same to an egg. Prince
+Charles is a potential King of England, but he does not now
+have the rights of a king.
+In the absence of any general inference from 'A is a potential
+X' to 'A has the rights of an X', we should not accept that a
+potential person should have the rights of a person, unless we
+can be given some specific reason why this should hold in this
+particular case. But what could that reason be? This question
+becomes especially pertinent if we recall the grounds on which,
+in the previous chapter, it was suggested that the life of a person
+merits greater protection than the life of a being who is not a
+person. These reasons - from the indirect classical utilitarian
+concern with not arousing in others the fear that they may be
+the next killed, the weight given by the preference utilitarian
+to a person's desires, Tooley's link between a right to life and
+the capacity to see oneself as a continuing mental subject, and
+the principle of respect for autonomy - are all based on the fact
+that persons see themselves as distinct entities with a past and
+future. They do not apply to those who are not now and never
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+Practical Ethics
+have been capable of seeing themselves in this way. If these are
+the grounds for not killing persons, the mere potential for becoming
+a person does not count against killing.
+It might be said that this reply misunderstands the relevance
+of the potential of the human fetus, and that this potential is
+important, not because it creates in the fetus a right or claim to
+life, but because anyone who kills a human fetus deprives the
+world of a future rational and self-conscious being. If rational
+and self-conscious beings are intrinsically valuable, to kill a
+human fetus is to deprive the world of something intrinsically
+valuable, and so wrong. The chief problem with this as an argument
+against abortion - apart from the difficulty of establishing
+that rational and self-conscious beings are of intrinsic
+value - is that it does not stand up as a reason for objecting to
+all abortions, or even to abortions carried out merely because
+the pregnancy is inconveniently timed. Moreover the argument
+leads us to condemn practices other than abortion that most
+anti-abortionists accept.
+The claim that rational and self-conscious beings are intrinsically
+valuable is not a reason for objecting to all abortions
+because not all abortions deprive the world of a rational and
+self-conscious being. Suppose a woman has been planning to
+join a mountain-climbing expedition in June, and in January
+she learns that she is two months pregnant. She has no children
+at present, and firmly intends to have a child within a year or
+two. The pregnancy is unwanted only because it is inconveniently
+timed. Opponents of abortion would presumably think
+an abortion in these circumstances particularly outrageous, for
+neither the life nor the health of the mother is at stake - only
+the enjoyment she gets from climbing mountains. Yet if abortion
+is wrong only because it deprives the world of a future person,
+this abortion is not wrong; it does no more than delay the entry
+of a person into the world.
+On the other hand this argument against abortion does lead
+us to condemn practices that reduce the future human popu-
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+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+lation: contraception, whether by 'artificial' means or by 'natural'
+means such as abstinence on days when the woman is
+likely to be fertile; and also celibacy. This argument has, in fact,
+all the difficulties of the 'total' form of utilitarianism, discussed
+in the previous two chapters, and it does not provide any reason
+for thinking abortion worse than any other means of population
+control. If the world is already overpopulated, the argument
+provides no reason at all against abortion.
+Is there any other significance in the fact that the fetus is a
+potential person? If there is I have no idea what it could be. In
+writings against abortion we often find reference to the fact that
+each human fetus is unique. Paul Ramsey, a former Professor
+of Religion at Princeton University, has said that modem genetics,
+by teaching us that the first fusion of sperm and ovum
+creates a 'never-to-be-repeated' informational speck, seems to
+lead us to the conclusion that' all destruction of fetal life should
+be classified as murder'. But why should this fact lead us to this
+conclusion? A canine fetus is also, no doubt, genetically unique.
+Does this mean that it is as wrong to abort a dog as a human?
+When identical twins are conceived, the genetic information is
+repeated. Would Ramsey therefore think it permissible to abort
+one of a pair of identical twins? The children that my wife and
+I would produce if we did not use contraceptives would be
+genetically unique. Does the fact that it is still indeterminate
+precisely what genetically unique character those children
+would have make the use of contraceptives less evil than abortion?
+Why should it? And if it does could the looming prospect
+of successful cloning - a technique in which the cells of one
+individual are used to reproduce a fetus that is a genetic carbon
+copy of the original - diminish the seriousness of abortion?
+Suppose the woman who wants to go mountain climbing were
+able to have her abortion, take a cell from the aborted fetus and
+then reimplant that cell in her womb so that an exact genetic
+replica of the aborted fetus would develop - the only difference
+being that the pregnancy would now come to term six months
+155
+Practical Ethics
+later, and thus she could still join the expedition. Would that
+make the abortion acceptable? I doubt that many opponents of
+abortion would think so.
+THE STATUS OF THE EMBRYO IN THE LABORATORY
+It is now time to tum to the debate about experimenting on
+early human embryos, kept alive in a special fluid, outside the
+human body. This is a relatively new debate, because the possibility
+of keeping an embryo alive outside the body is new; but
+in many respects it goes over the same ground as the abortion
+debate. Although one central argument for abortion - the claim
+that a woman has the right to control her own body - is not
+directly applicable in the newer context, the argument against
+embryo experimentation relies on one of the two claims we
+have already examined: either that the embryo is entitled to
+protection because it is a human being, or that the embryo is
+entitled to protection because it is a potential human being.
+One might therefore think that the case against embryo experimentation
+is stronger than the case for abortion. For one
+argument in favour of abortion does not apply, while the major
+arguments against abortion do. In fact, however, the two arguments
+against abortion do not apply as straightforwardly as
+one might imagine to the embryo in the laboratory.
+First, is the embryo already a human being? We have already
+seen that claims for a right to life should not be based on species
+membership, so the fact that the embryo is of the species Homo
+sapiens does not show that the embryo is a human being in any
+morally relevant sense. And if the fetus is not a person, it is
+even more apparent that the embryo cannot be one. But there
+is a further interesting point to be made against the claim that
+the early embryo is a human being: human beings are individuals,
+and the early embryo is not even an individual. At any
+time up to about 14 days after fertilisation - and that is longer
+than human embryos have so far been kept alive outside the
+156
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+I I I
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+body - the embryo can split into two or more genetically identical
+embryos. This happens naturally and leads to the formation
+of identical twins. When we have an embryo prior to this point,
+we cannot be sure if what we are looking at is the precursor of
+one or two individuals.
+This poses a problem for those who stress the continuity of
+our existence from conception to adulthood. Suppose we have
+an embryo in a dish on a laboratory bench. If we think of this
+embryo as the first stage of an individual human being, we might
+call it Mary. But now suppose the embryo divides into two
+identical embryos. Is one of them still Mary, and the other Jane?
+If so, which one is Mary? There is nothing to distinguish the
+two, no way of saying that the one we call Jane split off from
+the one we call Mary, rather than vice versa. So should we say
+that Mary is no longer with us, and instead we have Jane and
+Helen? But what happened to Mary? Did she die? Should we
+grieve for her? There is something absurd about these speculations.
+The absurdity stems from thinking of the embryo as an
+individual at a time at which it is only a cluster of cells. So,
+until the possibility of twinning is past, it is even more difficult
+to maintain that the embryo is a human being, in any morally
+significant sense, than it is to maintain that the fetus is a human
+being in a morally significant sense. This provides some basis
+for the laws and guidelines in Britain and various other countries
+that allow experimentation on the embryo up to 14 days after
+fertilisation. But for reasons already given, and others that we
+are about to discuss, this is still an unnecessarily restrictive limit.
+What of the argument from potential? Can the familiar claims
+about the potential of the embryo in the uterus be applied to
+the embryo in a dish in the laboratory? Before Robert Edwards
+began the research that led to the IVF procedure, no-one had
+observed a viable human embryo prior to the stage at which it
+implants in the wall of the uterus. In the normal process of
+reproduction inside the body, the embryo, or 'pre-embryo' as
+it is now sometimes called, remains unattached for the first
+157
+Practical Ethics
+seven to fourteen days. As long as such embryos existed only
+inside the woman's body, there was no way of observing them
+during that period. The very existence of the embryo could not
+be established until after implantation. Under these circumstances,
+once the existence of an embryo was known, that embryo
+had a good chance of becoming a person, unless its
+development was deliberately interrupted. The probability of
+such an embryo becoming a person was therefore very much
+greater than the probability of an egg in a fertile woman uniting
+with sperm from that woman's partner and leading to a child.
+There was also, in those pre-IVF days, a further important
+distinction between the embryo and the egg and sperm.
+Whereas the embryo inside the female body has some definite
+chance (we shall consider later how great a chance) of developing
+into a child unless a deliberate human act interrupts its
+growth, the egg and sperm can only develop into a child if there
+is a deliberate human act. So in the one case, all that is needed
+for the embryo to have a prospect of realising its potential is for
+those involved to refrain from stopping it; in the other case, they
+have to carry out a positive act. The development of the embryo
+inside the female body can therefore be seen as a mere unfolding
+of a potential that is inherent in it. (Admittedly, this is an oversimplification,
+for it takes no account of the positive acts involved
+in childbirth; but it is close enough.) The development
+of the separated egg and sperm is more difficult to regard in this
+way, because no further development will take place unless the
+couple have sexual intercourse or use artificial insemination.
+Now consider what has happened as a result of the success
+ofIVF. The procedure involves removing one or more eggs from
+a woman's ovary, placing them in the appropriate fluid in a
+glass dish, and then adding sperm to the dish. In the more
+proficient laboratories, this leads to fertilisation in about 80%
+of the eggs thus treated. The embryo can then be kept in the
+dish for two to three days, while it grows and divides into two,
+four, and then eight cells. At about this stage the embryo is
+158
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+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+usually transferred to a woman's uterus. Although the transfer
+itself is a simple procedure, it is after the transfer that things are
+most likely to go wrong: for reasons that are not fully understood,
+with even the most successful IVF teams, the probability
+of a given embryo that has been transferred to the uterus actually
+implanting there, and leading to a continuing pregnancy, is
+always less than 20%, and generally no more than 10%. In
+summary, then, before the advent of IVF, in every instance in
+which we knew of the existence of a normal human embryo,
+it would have been true to say of that embryo that, unless it
+was deliberately interfered with, it would most likely develop
+into a person. The process ofIVF, however, leads to the creation
+of embryos that cannot develop into a person unless there is
+some deliberate human act (the transfer to the uterus) and that
+even then, in the best of circumstances, will most likely not
+develop into a person.
+The upshot of all this is that IVF has reduced the difference
+between what can be said about the embryo, and what can be
+said about the egg and sperm, when still separate, but considered
+as a pair. Before IVF, any normal human embryo known to us
+had a far greater chance of becoming a child than any egg plus
+sperm prior to fertilisation taking place. But with IVF, there is
+a much more modest difference in the probability of a child
+resulting from a 2-cell embryo in a glass dish, and the probability
+of a child resulting from an egg and some sperm in a glass dish.
+To be specific, if we assume that the laboratory's fertilisation
+rate is 80% and its rate of pregnancy per embryo transferred is
+10%, then the probability of a child resulting from a given
+embryo is 10%, and the probability of a child resulting from an
+egg that has been placed in a fluid to which sperm has been
+added is 8%. So if the embryo is a potential person, why are
+not the egg-and--sperm, considered jointly, also a potential person?
+Yet no member of the pro-life movement wants to rescue
+eggs and sperm in order to save the lives of the people that they
+have the potential to become.
+159
+Practical Ethics
+Consider the following, not too improbable scenario. In the
+IVF laboratory, a woman's egg has been obtained. It sits in one
+dish on the bench. The sperm from her partner sits in an adjacent
+dish, ready to be mixed into the solution containing the egg.
+Then some bad news arrives: the woman is bleeding from the
+uterus, and will not be in a suitable condition to receive an
+embryo for at least a month. There is therefore no point in going
+ahead with the procedure. A laboratory assistant is told to dispose
+of the egg and sperm. She does so by tipping them down
+the sink. So far, so good; but a few hours later, when the
+assistant returns to prepare the laboratory for the next procedure,
+she notices that the sink is blocked. The egg and its fluid
+are still there, in the bottom of the sink. She is about to clear
+the blockage, when she realizes that the sperm has been tipped
+into the sink too. Quite possibly, the egg has been fertilised!
+Now what is she to do? Those who draw a sharp distinction
+between the egg-and-sperm and the embryo must hold that,
+while the assistant was quite entitled to pour the egg and sperm
+down the sink, it would be wrong to clear the blockage now.
+This is difficult to accept. Potentiality seems not to be such an
+all-or-nothing concept; the difference between the egg-andsperm
+and the embryo is one of degree, related to the probability
+of development into a person.
+Traditional defenders of the right to life of the embryo have
+been reluctant to introduce degrees of potential into the debate,
+because once the notion is accepted, it seems undeniable that
+the early embryo is less of a potential person than the later
+embryo or the fetus. This could easily be understood as leading
+to the conclusion that the prohibition against destroying the
+early embryo is less stringent than the prohibition against destroying
+the later embryo or fetus. Nevertheless, some defenders
+of the argument from potential have invoked probability.
+Among these has been the Roman Catholic theologian John
+Noonan:
+160
+Taking Lzfe: The Embryo and the Fetus
+As life itself is a matter of probabilities, as most moral reasoning
+is an estimate of probabilities, so it seems in accord with the
+structure of reality and the nature of moral thought to found a
+moral judgment on the change in probabilities at conception ...
+Would the argument be different if only one out of ten children
+conceived came to term? Of course this argument would be
+different. This argument is an appeal to probabilities that actually
+exist, not to any and all states of affairs which may be imagined
+... If a spermatozoon is destroyed, one destroys a being which
+had a chance of far less than 1 in 200 million of developing into
+a reasoning being, possessed of the genetic code, a heart and
+other organs, and capable of pain. If a fetus is destroyed, one
+destroys a being already possessed of the genetic code, organs
+and sensitivity to pain, and one which had an 80 per cent chance
+of developing further into a baby outside the womb who, in
+time, would reason.
+The article from which this quotation is taken has been influential
+in the abortion debate, and has often been quoted and
+reprinted by those opposed to abortion, but the development
+of our understanding of the reproductive process has made
+Noonan's position untenable. The initial difficulty is that Noonan's
+figures for embryo survival even in the uterus are no longer
+regarded as accurate. At the time Noonan wrote, the estimate
+of pregnancy loss was based on clinical recognition of pregnancies
+at six to eight weeks after fertilisation. At this stage, the
+chance of lOSing the pregnancy through spontaneous abortion
+is about 15%. Recent technical advances allowing earlier recognition
+of pregnancy, however, provide startlingly different
+figures. If pregnancy is diagnosed before implantation (within
+14 days of fertilisation) the probability of a birth resulting is 25
+to 30%. Post-implantation this increases initially to 46 to 60%,
+and it is not until six weeks gestation that the chance of birth
+occurring increases to 85 to 90%.
+Noonan claimed that his argument is 'an appeal to probabilities
+that actually exist, not to any and all states of affairs which
+may be imagined'. But once we substitute the real probabilities
+161
+Practical Ethics
+of embryos, at various stages of their existence, becoming persons,
+Noonan's argument no longer supports the moment of
+fertilisation as the time at which the embryo gains a significantly
+different moral status. Indeed, if we were to require an 80%
+probability of further development into a baby - the figure
+Noonan himself mentions - we would have to wait until nearly
+six weeks after fertilisation before the embryo would have the
+significance Noonan wants to claim for it.
+At one point in his argument Noonan refers to the number
+of sperm involved in a male ejaculation, and says that there is
+only one chance in 200,000,000 of a sperm becoming part of
+a living being. This focus on the sperm rather than the egg is a
+curious instance of male bias, but even if we let that pass, new
+technology provides still one more difficulty for the argument.
+There now exists a means of overcoming male infertility caused
+by a low sperm count. The egg is removed as in the normal in
+vitro procedure; but instead of adding a drop of seminal fluid
+to the dish with the egg, a single sperm is picked up with a fine
+needle and micro-injected under the outer layer of the egg. So
+if we compare the probability of the embryo becoming a person
+with the probability of the egg, together with the single sperm
+that has been picked up by the needle and is about to be microinjected
+into the egg, becoming a person, we will be unable to
+find any sharp distinction between the two. Does that mean
+that it would be wrong to stop the procedure, once the sperm
+has been picked up? Noonan's argument from probabilities
+would seem to commit him either to this implausible claim, or
+to accepting that we may destroy human embryos. This procedure
+also undermines Ramsey's claim about the importance
+of the unique genetic blueprint - that' "never-to-be-repeated"
+informational speck' having been determined in the case of the
+embryo but not in the case of the egg and sperm. For that too
+is here determined before fertilisation.
+In this section I have tried to show how the special circum-
+162
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+stances of the embryo in the laboratory affect the application
+of the arguments discussed elsewhere in this chapter about the
+status of the embryo or fetus. I have not attempted to cover all
+aspects of in vitro fertilisation and embryo experimentation. To
+do that it would be necessary to investigate several other issues,
+including the appropriateness of allocating scarce medical resources
+to this area at a time when the world has a serious
+problem of overpopulation, and the speculation that the new
+techniques will be misused to produce children 'made-to order',
+either at the behest of parents or, worse still, of some mad
+dictator. To cover these important but disparate matters would
+take us too far from the main themes of this book. Brief mention
+must, however, be made of one other aspect of embryo experimentation:
+the role of the couple from whose gametes the
+embryo has developed.
+Feminists have played a valuable role in pointing out how
+vulnerable a couple may be to pressure from the medical team
+to donate an embryo for research purposes. They may be desperate
+for a child. The IVF team represent their last hope of
+achieving this goal. They know that there are many other couples
+seeking treatment. All this means that they are likely to be
+prepared to go to great lengths in order to please the medical
+team. When they are asked to donate eggs or embryos, can they
+really make a free choice? Only, I think, if it is quite clear that
+their answer will not affect their IVF treatment in any way.
+Wherever experimentation on embryos is carried out, there is
+a need to develop safeguards and forms of oversight to ensure
+that this is always the case.
+MAKING USE OF THE FETUS
+The prospects of using human fetuses for medical purposes has
+created a further controversial issue related to abortion. Research
+carried out specifically on fetuses has led to the hope of
+163
+Practical Ethics
+finding cures for many serious illnesses by the transplantation
+of tissue or cells from the fetus. Compared with adult tissue,
+fetal tissue appears to grow better after transplantation, and to
+be less likely to be rejected by the patient. The example that
+has received the most publicity to date is Parkinson's disease,
+but the use of fetal tissue has also been suggested in the treatment
+of Alzheimer's Disease, Huntington's Disease, and diabetes;
+and fetal transplants have been used to save the life of
+another fetus, in a case in which a 30 week old fetus, in utero,
+suffering from a fatal immune system disorder was given fetal
+cells from aborted fetuses.
+Do fetuses have rights or interests that may be violated or
+harmed by using them for these purposes? I have already argued
+that the fetus has no right to, nor strictly speaking even an
+interest in, life. But we have seen that, in the case of animals,
+to say that a being has no right to life does not mean that the
+being has no rights or interests at all. If the fetus is capable of
+feeling pain, then, like animals, the fetus has an interest in not
+suffering pain, and that interest should be given equal consideration
+with the similar interests of any other being. It is easy
+to imagine that keeping a fetus alive after an abortion in order
+to preserve the tissue of the fetus in the best possible condition
+could cause pain and suffering to a fetus capable of feeling pain.
+So we must now return to a more detailed investigation of a
+topic touched upon earlier in this chapter: When does the fetus
+become conscious?
+Fortunately it is now possible to give a reasonably definite
+answer to this question. The part of the brain associated with
+sensations of pain, and more generally with consciousness, is
+the cerebral cortex. Until 18 weeks of gestation, the cerebral
+cortex is not sufficiently developed for synaptic connections to
+take place within it - in other words, the signals that give rise
+to pain in an adult are not being received. Between 18 and 25
+weeks, the brain of the fetus reaches a stage at which there is
+some nerve transmission in those parts associated with con-
+164
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+sciousness. Even then, however, the fetus appears to be in a
+persistent state of sleep, and therefore may not be able to perceive
+pain. The fetus begins to 'wake up' at a gestational age of
+around 30 weeks. This is, of course, well beyond the stage of
+viability, and a 'fetus' that was alive and outside the womb at
+this stage would be a premature baby, and not a fetus at all.
+In order to give the fetus the benefit of the doubt, it would
+be reasonable to take the earliest possible time at which the
+fetus might be able to feel anything as the boundary after which
+the fetus should be protected. Thus we should disregard the
+uncertain evidence about wakefulness, and take as a more definite
+line, the time at which the brain is physically capable of
+receiving signals necessary for awareness. This suggests a
+boundary at 18 weeks of gestation. Prior to that time, there is
+no good basis for believing that the fetus needs protection from
+harmful research, because the fetus cannot be harmed. After
+that time, the fetus does need protection from harm, on the
+same basis as sentient, but not self-conscious, nonhuman animals
+need it.
+There is, however, one qualification that must be added to
+this statement. While the fetus prior to 18 weeks may, strictly
+speaking, be unable to be harmed, if the fetus is allowed to
+develop into a child, the future child could be very seriously
+harmed by an experiment that caused the child to be born in
+a disabled state. Therefore research that allows the fetus to survive
+beyond 18 weeks does not come under the permissive rule
+suggested in the previous paragraph.
+In discussions of the use of fetal tissue there is often mention
+of the risk of 'complicity' in the immoral act of abortion. Those
+wishing to defend the use of fetal tissue therefore go to great
+lengths in order to show that the use of fetal tissue can be kept
+entirely separate from the decision to carry out the abortion,
+and so does not serve to 'legitimise' abortions. For the same
+reason, many countries now have, or are developing, laws or
+guidelines for the use of fetal tissue from induced abortions,
+165
+Practical Ethics
+and many of these laws or guidelines are drawn up on the basis
+of the assumption, implicit or explicit, that it is important to
+separate the decision for the abortion from the use of the fetal
+tissue, lest the use of fetal tissue serve to increase the incidence
+of abortions. There may be, for example, a requirement that the
+donation has to be an entirely anonymous one. This prevents
+a woman having an abortion in order to donate tissue that might
+save the life of a relative, perhaps one of her existing children.
+It is possible that the motivation for such requirements is to
+protect the woman from pressure to have an abortion. Whether
+that is a valid ground for requiring anonymity is something I
+shall consider shortly. Here I wish only to point out that if it is
+the premise that abortion is immoral that supplies the motive
+for seeking to prevent any 'complicity' between the use of the
+fetal tissue and the carrying out of the abortion, or to ensure
+that fetal tissue use does not contribute to a higher incidence
+of abortions, then the arguments presented in this chapter count
+against that view. At least when carried out before 18 weeks,
+abortion is in itself morally neutral. Even later abortions, when
+some pain may be involved, could be justified if the outcome
+were to prevent much greater suffering by saving the life of a
+child suffering from an immune system disorder, or to cure
+Parkinson's or Alzheimer's disease in an older person. If the
+requirement that we separate the act of abortion from the donation
+of fetal tissue cannot be soundly based on the need to
+protect the fetus, can it be founded instead on a need to protect
+the parents, in particular the woman? Different aspects of this
+separation need to be considered. If the doctor counselling the
+pregnant woman about her abortion and the doctor seeking
+fetal tissue for a dying patient are one and the same, the conflict
+of interest is clear, and there seems a real risk that the doctor
+will not be able to give disinterested advice to the pregnant
+woman. So this separation is an important aspect of protecting
+the position of the pregnant woman.
+What, though, of the view that the pregnant woman must
+166
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+be separated from the recipient by a veil of anonymity? This,
+of course, prevents her having an abortion in order to provide
+tissue to someone she knows. Is this restriction justified by consideration
+of her own interests? On the one hand, without this
+protection it is easy to imagine scenarios in which a pregnant
+woman would find herself under great pressure to abort a pregnancy
+in order to save the life of a dying relative; or a woman
+who is not pregnant might feel that she has to become pregnant
+and then terminate the pregnancy to provide the needed fetal
+tissue. Feminists may well feel that in a society in which men
+are dominant, the prospects for further intensifying the oppression
+of women in this way is reason enough to exclude the
+designation of tissue for a particular known person.
+Yet the argument for the opposite conclusion is also strong.
+It is neither unusual nor unreasonable for a parent to make
+great sacrifices for a child. We allow both men and women to
+work long hours doing meaningless factory labor in order to
+save enough money to ensure that their children receive a good
+education. This suggests that sacrifice for the sake of a relative
+or loved one is not in itself wrong or something we need to
+prohibit. In many countries, we also allow women to have
+abortions for reasons that are far less important than the saving
+of a life. This indicates that we do not regard an abortion as
+something so bad (from the point of view of the fetus, or of the
+woman) that it should be prohibited, or even restricted to situations
+in which it is necessary to save a life. If we accept the
+assumptions that underly both these attitudes, we can scarcely
+criticise a woman who decides to have an abortion in order to
+provide fetal tissue that could save the life of her child. Not
+every woman may want to do this, but those who do may well
+be making a perfectly reasonable, autonomous decision. It is
+highly paternalistic for the law to step in and say that a doctor
+must not give effect to such decisions. From this perspective it
+is odd that some feminists, whom one might expect to find
+upholding the right of women to autonomy, should be among
+167
+Pradical Ethics
+those who think that women need special laws to protect them
+against the effects of their own freely chosen actions.
+There is considerable force in both of these opposed arguments,
+but we should favour autonomy unless there is clear
+evidence that the results of doing so are very bad indeed. I know
+of no evidence to that effect. I suspect, in fact. that much (though
+certainly not all) of the motivation for prohibiting designated
+donations of tissue derives from a desire to avoid causing more
+abortions, and in particular, to avoid women becoming pregnant
+in order to make fetal tissue available. But for the reasons
+already given, I see nothing inherently wrong with more abortions,
+or with pregnancies being undertaken in order to provide
+fetal tissue, as long as the women involved are freely choosing
+to do this, and the additional abortions really do make some
+contribution to saving the lives of others. If the chief objection
+is that the women's actions might be coerced rather than freely
+chosen, the solution would be not to prohibit all choices for
+abortion to provide fetal tissue, but rather to set up procedures
+to ensure that those who do this have chosen freely, in the light
+of all the available relevant information.
+At this point commerce is bound to rear its head. Someone
+will ask: What if women become pregnant and terminate their
+pregnancies not in order to save the lives of those they care
+about, but because they will be paid for the fetal tissue? Do not
+arguments from autonomy suggest that this, too, should be up
+to the woman to decide? Is it really worse to become pregnant
+and terminate the pregnancy in order to receive, say, $10,000
+than to spend six months doing repetitious labour in a noisy,
+polluted, hazardous factory for the same amount of money?
+Despite my willingness to facilitate fetal tissue use, I am much
+more reluctant to embrace the free market. This is not because
+I think that women would be unable to protect themselves from
+the exploitation of the market; it really does not seem to me a
+worse form of exploitation than those that we accept in more
+common forms of employment. Rather, I dislike the idea of a
+168
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+free market in fetal tissue because, as R.M. Titmuss argued many
+years ago in the case of blood supplies for medical purposes,
+when we choose between a social policy based on altruism and
+one based on commerce, we are choosing between two different
+types of society. It may well be better, for a variety of reasons,
+that there are some things that money cannot buy; some circumstances
+in which we must rely on the altruism of those we
+love, or even of strangers in our society. I support efforts to
+resist the creeping commercialisation of every aspect of our lives,
+and so I would resist the commercialisation of fetal tissue.
+ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE
+There remains one major objection to the argument I have
+advanced in favour of abortion. We have already seen that the
+strength of the conservative position lies in the difficulty liberals
+have in pointing to a morally significant line of demarcation
+between an embryo and a newborn baby. The standard liberal
+position needs to be able to point to some such line, because
+liberals usually hold that it is permissible to kill an embryo or
+fetus but not a baby. I have argued that the life of a fetus (and
+even more plainly, of an embryo) is of no greater value than
+the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality,
+self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel. etc., and that
+since no fetus is a person no fetus has the same claim to life as
+a person. Now it must be admitted that these arguments apply
+to the newborn baby as much as to the fetus. A week-old baby
+is not a rational and self-conscious being, and there are many
+nonhuman animals whose rationality, self-consciousness,
+awareness, capacity to feel. and so on, exceed that of a human
+baby a week or a month old. If the fetus does not have the same
+claim to life as a person, it appears that the newborn baby does
+not either, and the life of a newborn baby is of less value to it
+than the life of a pig, a dog, or a chimpanzee is to the nonhuman
+animal. Thus while my position on the status of fetal life may
+169
+Pradical Ethics
+be acceptable to many, the implications of this position for the
+status of newborn life are at odds with the virtually unchallenged
+assumption that the life of a newborn baby is as sacrosanct
+as that of an adult. Indeed, some people seem to think that the
+life of a baby is more precious than that of an adult. Lurid tales
+of German soldiers bayoneting Belgian babies figured prominently
+in the wave of anti-German propaganda that accompanied
+Britain's entry into the First World War. and it seemed
+to be tacitly assumed that this was a greater atrocity than the
+murder of adults would be.
+I do not regard the conflict between the position I have taken
+and widely accepted views about the sanctity of infant life as a
+ground for abandoning my position. These widely accepted
+views need to be challenged. It is true that infants appeal to us
+because they are small and helpless, and there are no doubt
+very good evolutionary reasons why we should instinctively
+feel protective towards them. It is also true that infants cannot
+be combatants and killing infants in wartime is the clearest
+possible case of killing civilians, which is prohibited by international
+convention. In general. since infants are harmless and
+morally incapable of committing a crime, those who kill them
+lack the excuses often offered for the killing of adults. None of
+this shows, however, that the killing of an infant is as bad as
+the killing of an (innocent) adult.
+In thinking about this matter we should put aside feelings
+based on the small. helpless, and - sometimes - cute appearance
+of human infants. To think that the lives of infants are of special
+value because infants are small and cute is on a par with thinking
+that a baby seal. with its soft white fur coat and large round
+eyes deserves greater protection than a gorilla, who lacks these
+attributes. Nor can the helplessness or the innocence of the
+infant Homo sapiens be a ground for preferring it to the equally
+helpless and innocent fetal Homo sapiens, or. for that matter.
+to laboratory rats who are 'innocent' in exactly the same sense
+170
+I
+I I
+(
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+as the human infant, and, in view of the experimenters' power
+over them, almost as helpless.
+If we can put aside these emotionally moving but strictly
+irrelevant aspects of the killing of a baby we can see that the
+grounds for not killing persons do not apply to newborn infants.
+The indirect, classical utilitarian reason does not apply, because
+no one capable of understanding what is happening when a
+newborn baby is killed could feel threatened by a policy that
+gave less protection to the newborn than to adults. In this respect
+Bentham was right to describe infanticide as 'of a nature not to
+give the slightest inquietude to the most timid imagination'.
+Once we are old enough to comprehend the policy, we are too
+old to be threatened by it.
+Similarly, the preference utilitarian reason for respecting the
+life of a person cannot apply to a newborn baby. Newborn babies
+cannot see themselves as beings who might or might not have
+a future, and so cannot have a desire to continue living. For the
+same reason, if a right to life must be based on the capacity to
+want to go on living, or on the ability to see oneself as a continuing
+mental subject, a newborn baby cannot have a right to
+life. Finally, a newborn baby is not an autonomous being, capable
+of making choices, and so to kill a newborn baby cannot
+violate the principle of respect for autonomy. In all this the
+newborn baby is on the same footing as the fetus, and hence
+fewer reasons exist against killing both babies and fetuses than
+exist against killing those who are capable of seeing themselves
+as distinct entities, existing over time.
+It would, of course, be difficult to say at what age children
+begin to see themselves as distinct entities existing over time.
+Even when we talk with two and three year old children it
+is usually very difficult to elicit any ccherent conception of
+death, or of the possibility that someone - let alone the child
+herself - might cease to exist. No doubt children vary greatly
+in the age at which they begin to understand these matters,
+171
+Pradical Ethics
+as they do in most things. But a difficulty in drawing the line
+is not a reason for drawing it in a place that is obviously
+wrong, any more than the notorious difficulty in saying how
+much hair a man has to have lost before we can call him
+'bald' is a reason for saying that someone whose pate is as
+smooth as a billiard ball is not bald. Of course, where rights
+are at risk, we should err on the side of safety. There is some
+plausibility in the view that, for legal purposes, since birth
+provides the only sharp, clear and easily understood line, the
+law of homicide should continue to apply immediately after
+birth. Since this is an argument at the level of public policy
+and the law, it is quite compatible with the view that. on
+purely ethical grounds, the killing of a newborn infant is not
+comparable with the killing of an older child or adult. Alternatively,
+recalling Hare's distinction between the critical and
+intuitive levels of moral reasoning, one could hold that the
+ethical judgment we have reached applies only at the level of
+critical morality; for everyday decision-making, we should act
+as if an infant has a right to life from the moment of birth.
+In the next chapter, however, we shall consider another possibility:
+that there should be at least some circumstances in
+which a full legal right to life comes into force not at birth,
+but only a short time after birth - perhaps a month. This
+would provide the ample safety margin mentioned above.
+If these conclusions seem too shocking to take seriously, it
+may be worth remembering that our present absolute protection
+of the lives of infants is a distinctively Christian attitude
+rather than a universal ethical value. Infanticide has been
+practised in societies ranging geographically from Tahiti to
+Greenland and varying in culture from the nomadic Australian
+aborigines to the sophisticated urban communities of ancient
+Greece or mandarin China. In some of these societies infanticide
+was not merely permitted but. in certain circumstances,
+deemed morally obligatory. Not to kill a deformed or sickly
+infant was often regarded as wrong, and infanticide was prob-
+172
+Taking Life: The Embryo and the Fetus
+ably the first, and in several societies the only, form of population
+control.
+We might think that we are just more 'civilised' than these
+'primitive' peoples. But it is not easy to feel confident that we
+are more civilised than the best Greek and Roman moralists. It
+was not just the Spartans who exposed their infants on hillsides:
+both Plato and Aristotle recommended the killing of deformed
+infants. Romans like Seneca, whose compassionate moral sense
+strikes the modem reader (or me, anyway) as superior to that
+of the early and mediaeval Christian writers, also thought infanticide
+the natural and humane solution to the problem posed
+by sick and deformed babies. The change in Western attitudes
+to infanticide since Roman times is, like the doctrine of the
+sanctity of human life of which it is a part, a product of Christianity.
+Perhaps it is now possible to think about these issues
+without assuming the Christian moral framework that has, for
+so long, prevented any fundamental reassessment.
+None of this is meant to suggest that someone who goes
+around randomly killing babies is morally on a par with a
+woman who has an abortion. We should certainly put very
+strict conditions on permissible infanticide; but these restrictions
+might owe more to the effects of infanticide on others than to
+the intrinsic wrongness of killing an infant. Obviously, in most
+cases, to kill an infant is to inflict a terrible loss on those who
+love and cherish the child. My comparison of abortion and
+infanticide was prompted by the objection that the position I
+have taken on abortion also justifies infanticide. I have admitted
+this charge - without regarding the admission as fatal to my
+position - to the extent that the intrinsic wrongness of killing
+the late fetus and the intrinsic wrongness of killing the newborn
+infant are not markedly different. In cases of abortion, however,
+we assume that the people most affected - the parents-to-be,
+or at least the mother-to-be - want to have the abortion. Thus
+infanticide can only be equated with abortion when those closest
+to the child do not want it to live. As an infant can be adopted
+173
+Practical Ethics
+by others in a way that a pre-viable fetus cannot be, such cases
+will be rare. (Some of them are discussed in the following chapter.)
+Killing an infant whose parents do not want it dead is, of
+course, an utterly different matter.
+174
+7
+TAKING LIFE: HUMANS
+I N dealing with an objection to the view of abortion presented
+in Chapter 6, we have already looked beyond abortion to
+infanticide. In so doing we will have confirmed the suspicion
+of supporters of the sanctity of human life that once abortion
+is accepted, euthanasia lurks around the next comer - and for
+them, euthanasia is an unequivocal evil. It has, they point out,
+been rejected by doctors since the fifth century B.C., when physicians
+first took the Oath of Hippocrates and swore 'to give no
+deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel'.
+Moreover, they argue, the Nazi extermination programme
+is a recent and terrible example of what can happen once we
+give the state the power to kill innocent human beings.
+I do not deny that if one accepts abortion on the grounds
+provided in Chapter 6, the case for killing other human beings,
+in certain circumstances, is strong. As I shall try to show in this
+chapter, however, this is not something to be regarded with
+horror, and the use of the Nazi analogy is utterly misleading.
+On the contrary, once we abandon those doctrines about the
+sanctity of human life that - as we saw in Chapter 4 - collapse
+as soon as they are questioned, it is the refusal to accept killing
+that, in some cases, is horrific.
+'Euthanasia' means, according to the dictionary, 'a gentle and
+easy death', but it is now used to refer to the killing of those
+who are incurably ill and in great pain or distress, for the sake
+of those killed, and in order to spare them further suffering or
+distress. This is the main topic of this chapter. I shall also consider,
+however, some cases in which, though killing is not con-
+175
+Pradical Ethics
+trary to the wishes of the human who is killed, it is also not
+carried out specifically for the sake of that being. As we shall
+see, some cases involving newborn infants fall into this category.
+Such cases may not be 'euthanasia' within the strict meaning
+of the term, but they can usefully be included within the same
+general discussion, as long as we are clear about the relevant
+differences.
+Within the usual definition of euthanasia there are three different
+types, each of which raises distinctive ethical issues. It
+will help our discussion if we begin by setting out this threefold
+distinction and then assess the justifiability of each type.
+TYPES OF EUTHANASIA
+Voluntary Euthanasia
+Most of the groups currently campaigning for changes in the
+law to allow euthanasia are campaigning for voluntary euthanasia
+- that is, euthanasia carried out at the request of the person
+killed.
+Sometimes voluntary euthanasia is scarcely distinguishable
+from assisted suicide. In Jean's Way, Derek Humphry has told
+how his wife Jean, when dying of cancer, asked him to provide
+her with the means to end her life swiftly and without pain.
+They had seen the situation coming and discussed it beforehand.
+Derek obtained some tablets and gave them to Jean, who took
+them and died soon afterwards.
+Dr Jack Kevorkian, a Michigan pathologist, went one step
+further when he built a 'suicide machine' to help terminally ill
+people commit suicide. His machine consisted of a metal pole
+with three different bottles attached to a tube of the kind used
+to provide an intravenous drip. The doctor inserts the tube in
+the patient's vein, but at this stage only a harmless saline solution
+can pass through it. The patient may then flip a switch,
+which will allow a coma-inducing drug to come through the
+176
+Taking Life: Humans
+tube; this is automatically followed by a lethal drug contained
+in the third bottle. Dr Kevorkian announced that he was prepared
+to make the machine available to any terminally ill patient
+who wished to use it. (Assisting suicide is not against the law
+in Michigan.) In June 1990, Janet Adkins, who was suffering
+from Alzheimer's disease, but still competent to make the decision
+to end her life, contacted Dr Kevorkian and told him of
+her wish to die, rather than go through the slow and progressive
+deterioration that the disease involves. Dr Kevorkian was in
+attendance while she made use of his machine, and then reported
+Janet Adkins's death to the police. He was subsequently
+charged with murder, but the judge refused to allow the charge
+to proceed to trial, on the grounds that Janet Adkins had caused
+her own death. The following year Dr Kevorkian made his
+device available to two other people, who used it in order to
+end their lives. 1
+In other cases, people wanting to die may be unable to kill
+themselves. In 1973 George Zygmaniak was injured in a motorcycle
+accident near his home in New Jersey. He was taken
+to hospital, where he was found to be totally paralysed from
+the neck down. He was also in considerable pain. He told his
+doctor and his brother, Lester, that he did not want to live in
+this condition. He begged them both to kill him. Lester questioned
+the doctor and hospital staff about George's prospects of
+recovery: he was told that they were nil. He then smuggled a
+gun into the hospital, and said to his brother: 'I am here to end
+your pain, George. Is it all right with you?' George, who was
+now unable to speak because of an operation to assist his breathing'
+nodded affirmatively. Lester shot him through the temple.
+The Zygmaniak case appears to be a clear instance of voluntary
+euthanasia, although without some of the procedural
+Dr Kevorkian was again charged with murder, and with providing a prohibited
+substance, in connection with the latter two cases, but was once more
+discharged.
+177
+Practical Ethics
+safeguards that advocates of the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia
+propose. For instance, medical opinions about the patient's
+prospects of recovery were obtained only in an informal
+manner. Nor was there a careful attempt to establish, before
+independent witnesses, that George's desire for death was of a
+fixed and rational kind, based on the best available information
+about his situation. The killing was not carried out by a doctor.
+An injection would have been less distressing to others than
+shooting. But these choices were not open to Lester Zygmaniak,
+for the law in New Jersey, as in most other places, regards mercy
+killing as murder, and if he had made his plans known, he
+would not have been able to carry them out.
+Euthanasia can be voluntary even if a person is not able, as
+Jean Humphry, Janet Adkins, and George Zygmaniak were able,
+to indicate the wish to die right up to the moment the tablets
+are swallowed, the switch thrown, or the trigger pulled. A person
+may, while in good health, make a written request for
+euthanasia if, through accident or illness, she should come to
+be incapable of making or expressing a decision to die, in pain,
+or without the use of her mental faculties, and there is no
+reasonable hope of recovery. In killing a person who has made
+such a request, who has re-affirmed it from time to time, and
+who is now in one of the states described, one could truly claim
+to be acting with her consent.
+There is now one country in which doctors can openly help
+their patients to die in a peaceful and dignified way. In the
+Netherlands, a series of court cases during the 1980s upheld a
+doctor's right to assist a patient to die, even if that assistance
+amounted to giving the patient a lethal injection. Doctors in the
+Netherlands who comply with certain guidelines (which will
+be described later in this chapter) can now quite openly carry
+out euthanasia and can report this on the death certificate without
+fear of prosecution. It has been estimated that about 2,300
+deaths each year result from euthanasia carried out in this way.
+178
+Taking Life: Humans
+Involuntary Euthanasia
+I shall regard euthanasia as involuntary when the person killed
+is capable of consenting to her own death, but does not do so,
+either because she is not asked, or because she is asked and
+chooses to go on living. Admittedly this definition lumps two
+different cases under one heading. There is a significant difference
+between killing someone who chooses to go on living and
+killing someone who has not consented to being killed, but if
+asked, would have consented. In practice, though, it is hard to
+imagine cases in which a person is capable of consenting and
+would have consented if asked, but was not asked. For why
+not ask? Only in the most bizarre situations could one conceive
+of a reason for not obtaining the consent of a person both able
+and willing to consent.
+Killing someone who has not consented to being killed can
+properly be regarded as euthanasia only when the motive for
+killing is the desire to prevent unbearable suffering on the part
+of the person killed. It is, of course, odd that anyone acting from
+this motive should disregard the wishes of the person for whose
+sake the action is done. Genuine cases of involuntary euthanasia
+appear to be very rare.
+Non-voluntary Euthanasia
+These two definitions leave room for a third kind of euthanasia.
+If a human being is not capable of understanding the choice
+between life and death, euthanasia would be neither voluntary
+nor involuntary, but non-voluntary. Those unable to give consent
+would include incurably ill or severely disabled infants, and
+people who through accident, illness, or old age have permanently
+lost the capacity to understand the issue involved, without
+having previously requested or rejected euthanasia in these
+circumstances.
+179
+Practical Ethics
+Several cases of non-voluntary euthanasia have reached the
+courts and the popular press. Here is one example. Louis Repouille
+had a son who was described as 'incurably imbecile',
+had been bed-ridden since infancy and blind for five years.
+According to Repouille: 'He was just like dead all the time .... He
+couldn't walk, he couldn't talk, he couldn't do anything: In
+the end Repouille killed his son with chloroform.
+In 1988 a case arose that well illustrates the way in which
+modem medical technology forces us to make life and death
+decisions. Samuel Linares, an infant, swallowed a small object
+that stuck in his windpipe, causing a loss of oxygen to the brain.
+He was admitted to a Chicago hospital in a coma and placed
+on a respirator. Eight months later he was still comatose, still
+on the respirator, and the hospital was planning to move Samuel
+to a long-term care unit. Shortly before the move, Samuel's
+parents visited him in the hospital. His mother left the room,
+while his father produced a pistol and told the nurse to keep
+away. He then disconnected Samuel from the respirator, and
+cradled the baby in his arms until he died. When he was sure
+Samuel was dead, he gave up his pistol and surrendered to
+police. He was charged with murder, but the grand jury refused
+to issue a homicide indictment, and he subsequently received
+a suspended sentence on a minor charge arising from the use
+of the pistol.
+Obviously, such cases raise different issues from those raised
+by voluntary euthanasia. There is no desire to die on the part
+of the infant. It may also be questioned whether, in such cases,
+the death is carried out for the sake of the infant, or for the sake
+of the family as a whole. If Louis Repouille's son was 'just like
+dead all the time', then he may have been so profoundly braindamaged
+that he was not capable of suffering at all. That is also
+likely to have been true of the comatose Samuel Linares. In that
+case, while caring for him would have been a great and no
+doubt futile burden for the family, and in the Linares case, a
+drain on the state's limited medical resources as well, the infants
+180
+Taking Life: Humans
+were not suffering, and death could not be said to be in, or
+contrary to, their interests. It is therefore not euthanasia, strictly
+speaking, as I have defined the term. It might nevertheless be
+a justifiable ending of a human life.
+Since cases of infanticide and non-voluntary euthanasia are
+the kind of case most nearly akin to our previous discussions
+of the status of animals and the human fetus, We shall consider
+them first.
+JUSTIFYING INFANTICIDE AND
+NON-VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
+I As we have seen, euthanasia is non-voluntary when the subject
+has never had the capacity to choose to live or die. This is
+the situation of the severely disabled infant or the older human
+being who has been profoundly intellectually disabled
+since birth. Euthanasia or other forms of killing are also nonvoluntary
+when the subject is not now but once was capable
+of making the crucial choice, and did not then express any
+preference relevant to her present condition.
+The case of someone who has never been capable of choosing
+to live or die is a little more straightforward than that of a person
+who had, but has now lost, the capacity to make such a decision.
+We shall, once again, separate the two cases and take the more
+straightforward one first. For simplicity, I shall concentrate on
+infants, although everything I say about them would apply to
+older children or adults whose mental age is and has always
+been that of an infant.
+Life and Death Decisions for Disabled Infants
+If we were to approach the issue of life or death for a seriously
+disabled human infant without any prior discussion of the ethics
+181
+Practical Ethics
+of killing in generaL we might be unable to resolve the conflict
+between the widely accepted obligation to protect the sanctity
+of human life, and the goal of reducing suffering. Some say that
+such decisions are 'subjective', or that life and death questions
+must be left to God and Nature. Our previous discussions have,
+however, prepared the ground, and the principles established
+and applied in the preceding three chapters make the issue much
+less baffling than most take it to be.
+In Chapter 4 we saw that the fact that a being is a human
+being, in the sense of a member of the species Homo sapiens,
+is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather, characteristics
+like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness
+that make a difference. Infants lack these characteristics. Killing
+them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing normal human
+beings, or any other self-conscious beings. This conclusion is
+not limited to infants who, because of irreversible intellectual
+disabilities, will never be rationaL self-conscious beings. We saw
+in our discussion of abortion that the potential of a fetus to
+become a rationaL self-conscious being cannot count against
+killing it at a stage when it lacks these characteristics -:- not, that
+is, unless we are also prepared to count the value of rational
+self-conscious life as a reason against contraception and celibacy.
+No infant - disabled or not - has as strong a claim to life
+as beings capable of seeing themselves as distinct entities, existing
+over time.
+The difference between killing disabled and normal infants
+lies not in any supposed right to life that the latter has and the
+former lacks, but in other considerations about killing. Most
+obviously there is the difference that often exists in the attitudes
+of the parents. The birth of a child is usually a happy event for
+the parents. They have, nowadays, often planned for the child.
+The mother has carried it for nine months. From birth, a natural
+affection begins to bind the parents to it. So one important
+reason why it is normally a terrible thing to kill an infant is the
+effect the killing will have on its parents.
+182
+Taking Life: Humans
+It is different when the infant is born with a serious disability.
+Birth abnormalities vary, of course. Some are trivial and have
+little effect on the child or its parents; but others turn the normally
+joyful event of birth into a threat to the happiness of the
+parents, and any other children they may have.
+Parents may, with good reason, regret that a disabled child
+was ever born. In that event the effect that the death of the
+child will have on its parents can be a reason for, rather than
+against killing it. Some parents want even the most gravely
+disabled infant to live as long as possible, and this desire would
+then be a reason against killing the infant. But what if this is
+not the case? In the discussion that follows I shall assume that
+the parents do not want the disabled child to live. I shall also
+assume that the disability is so serious that - again in contrast
+to the situation of an unwanted but normal child today - there
+are no other couples keen to adopt the infant. This is a realistic
+assumption even in a society in which there is a long waitinglist
+of couples wishing to adopt normal babies. It is true that
+from time to time cases of infants who are severely disabled and
+are being allowed to die have reached the courts in a glare of
+publicity, and this has led to couples offering to adopt the child.
+Unfortunately such offers are the product of the highly publicised
+dramatic life-and-death situation, and do not extend to
+the less publicised but far more common situations in which
+parents feel themselves unable to look after a severely disabled
+child, and the child then languishes in an institution.
+Infants are sentient beings who are neither rational nor selfconscious.
+So if we turn to consider the infants in themselves,
+independently of the attitudes of their parents, since their species
+is not relevant to their moral status, the principles that govern
+the wrongness of killing non-human animals who are sentient
+but not rational or self-conscious must apply here too. As we
+saw, the most plausible arguments for attributing a right to life
+to a being apply only if there is some awareness of oneself as
+a being existing over time, or as a continuing mental self. Nor
+183
+Practical Ethics
+can respect for autonomy apply where there is no capacity for
+autonomy. The remaining principles identified in Chapter 4 are
+utilitarian. Hence the quality of life that the infant can be expected
+to have is important.
+One relatively common birth disability is a faulty development
+of the spine known as spina bifida. Its prevalence varies in
+different countries, but it can affect as many as one in five
+hundred live births. In the more severe cases, the child will be
+permanently paralysed from the waist down and lack c?ntrol
+of bowels or bladder. Often excess fluid accumulates III the
+brain, a condition known as hydrocephalus, which can result
+in intellectual disabilities. Though some forms of treatment exist,
+if the child is badly affected at birth, the paralysis, incontinence,
+and intellectual disability cannot be overcome.
+Some doctors closely connected with children suffering from
+severe spina bifida believe that the lives of the worst affected
+children are so miserable that it is wrong to resort to surgery
+to keep them alive. Published descriptions of the lives of these
+children support the judgment that these worst affected children
+will have lives filled with pain and discomfort. They ne,ed repeated
+major surgery to prevent curvature of the spine, due to
+the paralysis, and to correct other abnormalities. Some children
+with spina bifida have had forty major operations before they
+reach their teenage years.
+When the life of an infant will be so miserable as not to be
+worth living, from the internal perspective of the being who
+will lead that life, both the 'prior existence' and the 'total' version
+of utilitarianism entail that, if there are no 'extrinsic' reasons
+for keeping the infant alive - like the feelings M the parents
+- it is better that the child should be helped to die without
+further suffering. A more difficult problem arises - and the convergence
+between the two views ends - when we consider
+disabilities that make the child's life prospects significantly less
+promising than those of a normal child, but not so bleak as to
+make the child's life not worth living. Haemophilia is probably
+184
+Taking Life: Humans
+in this category. The haemophiliac lacks the element in normal
+blood that makes it clot and thus risks prolonged bleeding,
+especially internal bleeding, from the slightest injury. If allowed
+to continue, this bleeding leads to permanent crippling and
+eventually death. The bleeding is very painful and although
+improved treatments have eliminated the need for constant
+blood transfusions, haemophiliacs still have to spend a lot of
+time in hospital. They are unable to play most sports and live
+constantly on the edge of crisis. Nevertheless, haemophiliacs do
+not appear to spend their time wondering whether to end it
+all; most find life definitely worth living, despite the difficulties
+they face.
+Given these facts, suppose that a newborn baby is diagnosed
+as a haemophiliac. The parents, daunted by the prospect of
+bringing up a child with this condition, are not anxious for him
+to live. Could euthanasia be defended here? Our first reaction
+may well be a firm 'no', for the infant can be expected to have
+a life that is worth living, even if not quite as good as that of a
+normal baby. The 'prior existence' version of utilitarianism supports
+this judgment. The infant exists. His life can be expected
+to contain a positive balance of happiness over misery. To kill
+him would deprive him of this positive balance of happiness.
+Therefore it would be wrong.
+On the 'total' version of utilitarianism, however, we cannot
+reach a decision on the basis of this information alone. The total
+view makes it necessary to ask whether the death of the haemophiliac
+infant would lead to the creation of another being
+who would not otherwise have existed. In other words, if the
+haemophiliac child is killed, will his parents have another child
+whom they would not have if the haemophiliac child lives? If
+they would, is the second child likely to have a better life than
+the one killed?
+Often it will be possible to answer both these questions affirmatively.
+A woman may plan to have two children. If one
+dies while she is of child-bearing age, she may conceive another
+185
+Practical Ethics
+in its place. Suppose a woman planning to have two children
+has one normal child, and then gives birth to a haemophiliac
+child. The burden of caring for that child may make it impossible
+for her to cope with a third child; but if the disabled child were
+to die, she would have another. It is also plausible to suppose
+that the prospects of a happy life are better for a normal child
+than for a haemophiliac.
+When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of
+another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total
+amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is
+killed. The loss of happy life for the first infant is outweighed
+by the gain of a happier life for the second. Therefore, if killing
+the haemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on others, it
+would, according to the total view, be right to kill him.
+The total view treats infants as replaceable, in much the same
+way as it treats non-self-conscious animals (as we saw in Chapter
+5). Many will think that the replaceability argument cannot
+be applied to human infants. The direct killing of even the most
+hopelessly disabled infant is still officially regarded as murder;
+how then could the killing of infants with far less serious problems,
+like haemophilia, be accepted? Yet on further reflection,
+the implications of the replaceability argument do not seem
+quite so bizarre. For there are disabled members of our species
+whom we now deal with exactly as the argument suggests we
+should. These cases closely resemble the ones we have been
+discussing. There is only one difference, and that is a difference
+of timing - the timing of the discovery of the problem, and the
+consequent killing of the disabled being.
+Prenatal diagnosis is now a routine procedure for pregnant
+women. There are various medical techniques for obtaining
+information about the fetus during the early months of pregnancy.
+At one stage in the development of these procedures, it
+was possible to discover the sex of the fetus, but not whether
+the fetus would suffer from haemophilia. Haemophilia is a sexlinked
+genetic defect, from which only males suffer; females can
+186
+Taking Life: Humans
+carry the gene and pass it on to their male offspring without
+themselves being affected. So a woman who knew that she
+carried the gene for haemophilia could, at that stage, avoid
+giving birth to a haemophiliac child only by finding out the sex
+of the fetus, and aborting all males fetuses. Statistically, only
+half of these male children of women who carried the defective
+gene would have suffered from haemophilia, but there was then
+no way to find out to which half a particular fetus belonged.
+Therefore twice as many fetuses were being killed as necessary,
+in order to avoid the birth of children with haemophilia. This
+practice was widespread in many countries, and yet did not
+cause any great outcry. Now that we have techniques for
+identifying haemophilia before birth, we can be more selective,
+but the principle is the same: women are offered, and usually
+accept, abortions in order to avoid giving birth to children with
+haemophilia.
+The same can be said about some other conditions that can
+be detected before birth. Down's syndrome, formerly known as
+mongolism, is one of these. Children with this condition have
+intellectual disabilities and most will never be able to live independently,
+but their lives, like those of small children, can be
+joyful. The risk of having a Down's syndrome child increases
+sharply with the age of the mother, and for this reason prenatal
+diagnosis is routinely offered to pregnant women over 35.
+Again, undergoing the procedure implies that if the test for
+Down's syndrome is positive, the woman will consider aborting
+the fetus and, if she still wishes to have another child, will start
+another pregnancy, which has a good chance of being normal.
+Prenatal diagnosis, followed by abortion in selected cases, is
+common practice in countries with liberal abortion laws and
+advanced medical techniques. I think this is as it should be. As
+the arguments of Chapter 6 indicate, I believe that abortion can
+be justified. Note, however, that neither haemophilia nor
+Down's syndrome is so crippling as to make life not worth living,
+from the inner perspective of the person with the condition. To
+187
+Practical Ethics
+abort a fetus with one of these disabilities, intending to have
+another child who will not be disabled, is to treat fetuses as
+interchangeable or replaceable. If the mother has previously
+decided to have a certain number of children, say two, then
+what she is doing, in effect, is rejecting one potential child in
+favour of another. She could, in defence of her actions, say: the
+loss of life of the aborted fetus is outweighed by the gain of a
+better life for the normal child who will be conceived only if
+the disabled one dies.
+When death occurs before birth, replaceability does not conflict
+with generally accepted moral convictions. That a fetus is
+known to be disabled is widely accepted as a ground for abortion.
+Yet in discussing abortion, we saw that birth does not
+mark a morally significant dividing line. I cannot see how one
+could defend the view that fetuses may be 'replaced' before
+birth, but newborn infants may not be. Nor is there any other
+point, such as viability, that does a better job of dividing the
+fetus from the infant. Self-consciousness, which could provide
+a basis for holding that it is wrong to kill one being and replace
+it with another, is not to be found in either the fetus or the
+newborn infant. Neither the fetus nor the newborn infant is an
+individual capable of regarding itself as a distinct entity with a
+life of its own to lead, and it is only for newborn infants, or for
+still earlier stages of human life, that replaceability should be
+considered to be an ethically acceptable option.
+It may still be objected that to replace either a fetus or a
+newborn infant is wrqng because it suggests to disabled people
+living today that their lives are less worth living than the lives
+of people who are not disabled. Yet it is surely flying in the face
+of reality to deny that, on average, this is so. That is the only
+way to make sense of actions that we all take for granted. Recall
+thalidomide: this drug, when taken by pregnant women, caused
+many children to be born without arms or legs. Once the cause
+of the abnormal births was discovered, the drug was taken off
+the market, and the company responsible had to pay compen-
+188
+Taking Life: Humans
+sation. If we really believed that there is no reason to think of
+the life of a disabled person as likely to be any worse than that
+of a normal person, we would not have regarded this as a
+tragedy. No compensation would have been sought, or awarded
+by the courts. The children would merely have been 'different'.
+We could even have left the drug on the market, so that women
+who found it a useful sleeping pill during pregnancy could continue
+to take it. If this sounds grotesque, that is only because
+we are all in no doubt at all that it is better to be born with
+limbs than without them. To believe this involves no disrespect
+at all for those who are lacking limbs; it simply recognises the
+reality of the difficulties they face.
+In any case, the position taken here does not imply that it
+would be better that no people born with severe disabilities
+should survive; it implies only that the parents of such infants
+should be able to make this decision. Nor does this imply lack
+ofrespect or equal consideration for people with disabilities who
+are now living their own lives in accordance with their own
+wishes. As we saw at the end of Chapter 2, the principle of
+equal consideration of interests rejects any discounting of the
+interests of people on grounds of disability.
+Even those who reject abortion and the idea that the fetus is
+replaceable are likely to regard possible people as replaceable.
+Recall the second woman in Partit's case of the two women,
+described in Chapter 5. She was told by her doctor that if she
+went ahead with her plan to become pregnant immediately,
+her child would have a disability (it could have been haemophilia);
+but if she waited three months her child would not have
+the disability. If we think she would do wrong not to wait, it
+can only be because we are comparing the two possible lives
+and judging one to have better prospects than the other. Of
+course, at this stage no life has begun; but the question is, when
+does a life, in the morally significant sense, really begin? In
+Chapters 4 and 5 we saw several reasons for saying that life
+only begins in the morally significant sense when there is aware-
+189
+Pradical Ethics
+ness of one's existence over time. The metaphor of life as a
+journey also provides a reason for holding that in infancy, life's
+voyage has scarcely begun.
+Regarding newborn infants as replaceable, as we now regard
+fetuses, would have considerable advantages over prenatal diagnosis
+followed by abortion. Prenatal diagnosis still cannot
+detect all major disabilities. Some disabilities, in fact. are not
+present before birth; they may be the result of extremely premature
+birth, or of something going wrong in the birth process
+itself. At present parents can choose to keep or destroy their
+disabled offspring only if the disability happens to be detected
+during pregnancy. There is no logical basis for restricting parents'
+choice to these particular disabilities. If disabled newborn
+infants were not regarded as having a right to life until, say, a
+week or a month after birth it would allow parents, in consultation
+with their doctors, to choose on the basis of far greater
+knowledge of the infant's condition than is possible before birth.
+All these remarks have been concerned with the wrongness
+of ending the life of the infant, considered in itself rather than
+for its effects on others. When we take effects on others into
+account, the picture may alter. Obviously, to go through the
+whole of pregnancy and labour, only to give birth to a child
+who one decides should not live, would be a difficult, perhaps
+heartbreaking, experience. For this reason many women would
+prefer prenatal diagnosis and abortion rather than live birth with
+the possibility of infanticide; but ifthe latter is not morally worse
+than the former, this would seem to be a choice that the woman
+herself should be allowed to make.
+Another factor to take into account is the possibility of adoption.
+When there are more couples wishing to adopt than normal
+children available for adoption, a childless couple may be
+prepared to adopt a haemophiliac. This would relieve the
+mother of the burden of bringing up a haemophiliac child, and
+enable her to have another child, if she wished. Then the replaceability
+argument could not justify infanticide, for bringing
+190
+Taking Life: Humans
+the other child into existence would not be dependent on the
+death ofthe haemophiliac. The death ofthe haemophiliac would
+then be a straightforward loss of a life of positive quality, not
+outweighed by the creation of another being with a better life.
+So the issue of ending life for disabled newborn infants is not
+without complications, which we do not have the space to
+discuss adequately. Nevertheless the main point is clear: killing
+a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person.
+Very often it is not wrong at all.
+Other Non-voluntary Life and Death Decisions
+In the preceding section we discussed justifiable killing for
+beings who have never been capable of choosing to live or die.
+Ending a life without consent may also be considered in the
+case of those who were once persons capable of choosing to
+live or die, but now, through accident or old age, have permanently
+lost this capacity, and did not, prior to losing it, express
+any views about whether they wished to go on living in such
+circumstances. These cases are not rare. Many hospitals care for
+motor accident victims whose brains have been damaged beyond
+all possible recovery. They may survive, in a coma, or
+perhaps barely conscious, for several years. In 1991, the Lancet
+reported that Rita Greene, a nurse, had been a patient at D.C.
+General Hospital in Washington for thirty-nine years without
+knowing it. Now aged sixty-three, she had been in a vegetative
+state since undergoing open heart surgery in 1952. The report
+stated that at any given time, between 5,000 and 10,000 Americans
+are surviving in a vegetative state. In other developed
+countries, where life-prolonging technology is not used so aggressively,
+there are far fewer long-term patients in this
+condition.
+In most respects, these human beings do not differ importantly
+from disabled infants. They are not self-conscious, rational,
+or autonomous, and so considerations of a right to life
+191
+Practical Ethics
+or of respecting autonomy do not apply. If they have no experiences
+at all, and can never have any again, their lives have
+no intrinsic value. Their life's journey has come to an end. They
+are biologically alive, but not biographically. (If this verdict
+seems harsh, ask yourself whether there is anything to choose
+between the following options: (a) instant death or (b) instant
+coma, followed by death, without recovery, in ten years' time.
+I can see no advantage in survival in a comatose state, if death
+without recovery is certain.) The lives of those who are not in
+a coma and are conscious but not self-conscious have value if
+such beings experience more pleasure than pain, or have preferences
+that can be satisfied; but it is difficult to see the point
+of keeping such human beings alive if their life is, on the whole,
+miserable.
+There is one important respect in which these cases differ
+from disabled infants. In discussing infanticide in the final section
+of Chapter 6, I cited Bentham's comment that infanticide
+need not 'give the slightest inquietude to the most timid imagination'.
+This is because those old enough to be aware of the
+killing of disabled infants are necessarily outside the scope of
+the policy. This cannot be said of euthanasia applied to those
+who once were rational and self-conscious. So a possible objection
+to this form of euthanasia would be that it will lead to
+insecurity and fear among those who are not now, but might
+come to be, within its scope. For instance, elderly people, knowing
+that non-voluntary euthanasia is sometimes applied to senile
+elderly patients, bedridden, suffering, and lacking the capacity
+to accept or reject death, might fear that every injection or tablet
+will be lethal. This fear might be quite irrational, but it would
+be difficult to convince people of this, particularly if old age
+really had affected their memory or powers of reasoning.
+This objection might be met by a procedure allowing those
+who do not wish to be subjected to non-voluntary euthanasia
+under any circumstances to register their refusal. Perhaps this
+192
+Taking Life: Humans
+would suffice; but perhaps it would not provide enough reassurance.
+If not, non-voluntary euthanasia would be justifiable
+only for those never capable of choosing to live or die.
+JUSTIFYING VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
+Under existing laws in most countries, people suffering uruelievable
+pain or distress from an incurable illness who beg their
+doctors to end their lives are asking their doctors to risk a murder
+charge. Although juries are extremely reluctant to convict in
+cases of this kind the law is clear that neither the request, nor
+the degree of suffering, nor the incurable condition of the person
+killed, is a defence to a charge of murder. Advocates of voluntary
+euthanasia propose that this law be changed so that a doctor
+could legally act on a patient's desire to die without further
+suffering. Doctors have been able to do this quite openly in the
+Netherlands, as a result of a series of court decisions during the
+1980s, as long as they comply with certain conditions. In Germany,
+doctors may provide a patient with the means to end her
+life, but they may not administer the substance to her.
+The case for voluntary euthanasia has some common ground
+with the case for non-voluntary euthanasia, in that death is a
+benefit for the one killed. The two kinds of euthanasia differ,
+however, in that voluntary euthanasia involves the killing of a
+person, a rational and self-conscious being and not a merely
+conscious being. (To be strictly accurate it must be said that this
+is not always so, because although only rational and self-conscious
+beings can consent to their own deaths, they may not be
+rational and self-conscious at the time euthanasia is contemplated
+- the doctor may, for instance, be acting on a prior written
+request for euthanasia if, through accident or illness, one's rational
+faculties should be irretrievably lost. For simplicity we
+shall, henceforth, disregard this complication.)
+We have seen that it is possible to justify ending the life of a
+193
+Practical Ethics
+human being who lacks the capacity to consent. We must now
+ask in what way the ethical issues are different when the being
+is capable of consenting, and does in fact consent.
+Let us return to the general principles about killing proposed
+in Chapter 4. I argued there that killing a self-conscious being
+is a more serious matter than killing a merely conscious being.
+I gave four distinct grounds on which this could be argued:
+The classical utilitarian claim that since self-conscious beings
+are capable of fearing their own death, killing them has worse
+effects on others.
+2 The preference utilitarian calculation that counts the thwarting
+of the victim's desire to go on living as an important reason
+against killing.
+3 A theory of rights according to which to have a right one must
+have the ability to desire that to which one has a right, so that
+to have a right to life one must be able to desire one's own
+continued existence.
+4 Respect for the autonomous decisions of rational agents.
+Now suppose we have a situation in which a person suffering
+from a painful and incurable disease wishes to die. If the individual
+were not a person - not rational or self-conscious -
+euthanasia would, as I have said, be justifiable. Do any of the
+four grounds for holding that it is normally worse to kill a person
+provide reasons against killing when the individual is a person
+who wants to die?
+The classical utilitarian objection does not apply to killing that
+takes place only with the genuine consent of the person killed.
+That people are killed under these conditions would have no
+tendency to spread fear or insecurity, since we have no cause
+to be fearful of being killed with our own genuine consent. If
+we do not wish to be killed, we simply do not consent. In fact,
+the argument from fear points in favour of voluntary euthanasia,
+for if voluntary euthanasia is not permitted we may, with good
+cause, be fearful that our deaths will be unnecessarily drawn
+out and distressing. In the Netherlands, a nationwide study
+commissioned by the government found that 'Many patients
+194
+Taking Life: Humans
+want an assurance that their doctor will assist them to die should
+suffering become unbearable: Often, having received this assurance,
+no persistent request for euthanasia eventuated. The
+availability of euthanasia brought comfort without euthanasia
+having to be provided.
+Preference utilitarianism also points in favour of, not against,
+voluntary euthanasia. Just as preference utilitarianism must
+count a desire to go on living as a reason against killing, so it
+must count a desire to die as a reason for killing.
+Next, according to the theory of rights we have considered,
+it is an essential feature of a right that one can waive one's
+rights if one so chooses. I may have a right to privacy; but I
+can, if I wish, film every detail of my daily life and invite the
+neighbours to my home movies. Neighbours sufficiently intrigued
+to accept my invitation could do so without violating
+my right to privacy, since the right has on this occasion been
+waived. Similarly, to say that I have a right to life is not to say
+that it would be wrong for my doctor to end my life, if she does
+so at my request. In making this request I waive my right to
+life.
+Lastly, the principle of respect for autonomy tells us to allow
+rational agents to live their own lives according to their own
+autonomous decisions, free from coercion or interference; but
+if rational agents should autonomously choose to die, then respect
+for autonomy will lead us to assist them to do as they
+choose.
+So, although there are reasons for thinking that killing a selfconscious
+being is normally worse than killing any other kind
+of being, in the special case of voluntary euthanasia most of
+these reasons count for euthanasia rather than against. Surprising
+as this result might at first seem, it really does no more
+than reflect the fact that what is special about self-conscious
+beings is that they can know that they exist over time and will,
+unless they die, continue to exist. Normally this continued existence
+is fervently desired; when the foreseeable continued ex-
+195
+Practical Ethics
+istence is dreaded rather than desired however, the desire to die
+may take the place of the normal desire to live, reversing the
+reasons against killing based on the desire to live. Thus the case
+for voluntary euthanasia is arguably much stronger than the
+case for non-voluntary euthanasia.
+Some opponents of the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia
+might concede that all this follows, if we have a genuinely free
+and rational decision to die: but, they add, we can never be
+sure that a request to be killed is the result of a free and rational
+decision. Will not the sick and elderly be pressured by their
+relatives to end their lives quickly? Will it not be possible to
+commit outright murder by pretending that a person has requested
+euthanasia? And even if there is no pressure of falsification,
+can anyone who is ill, suffering pain, and very probably
+in a drugged and confused state of mind, make a rational decision
+about whether to live or die?
+These questions raise technical difficulties for the legalisation
+of voluntary euthanasia, rather than objections to the underlying
+ethical principles; but they are serious difficulties nonetheless.
+The guidelines developed by the courts in the Netherlands
+have sought to meet them by proposing that euthanasia
+is acceptable only if
+• It is carried out by a physician.
+• The patient has explicitly requested euthanasia in a manner
+that leaves no doubt of the patient's desire to die.
+• The patient's decision is well-informed, free, and durable.
+• The patient has an irreversible condition causing protracted
+physical or mental suffering that the patients finds unbearable.
+• There is no reasonable alternative (reasonable from the patient's
+point of view) to alleviate the patient's suffering.
+• The doctor has consulted another independent professional
+who agrees with his or her judgment.
+Euthanasia in these circumstances is strongly supported by the
+Royal Dutch Medical Association, and by the general public in
+the Netherlands. The guidelines make murder in the guise of
+196
+Taking Life: Humans
+euthanasia rather far-fetched, and there is no evidence of an
+increase in the murder rate in the Netherlands.
+It is often said, in debates about euthanasia, that doctors can
+be mistaken. In rare instances patients diagnosed by two competent
+doctors as suffering from an incurable condition have
+survived and enjoyed years of good health. Possibly the legalisation
+of voluntary euthanasia would, over the years, mean
+the deaths of a few people who would otherwise have recovered
+from their immediate illness and lived for some extra years. This
+is not, however, the knockdown argument against euthanasia
+that some imagine it to be. Against a very small number of
+unnecessary deaths that might occur if euthanasia is legalised
+we must place the very large amount of pain and distress that
+will be suffered if euthanasia is not legalised, by patients who
+really are terminally ill. Longer life is not such a supreme good
+that it outweighs all other considerations. (If it were, there
+would be many more effective ways of saving life - such as a
+ban on smoking, or a reduction of speed limits to 40 kilometres
+per hour - than prohibiting voluntary euthanasia.) The possibility
+that two doctors may make a mistake means that the
+person who opts for euthanasia is deciding on the balance of
+probabilities and giving up a very slight chance of survival in
+order to avoid suffering that will almost certainly end in death.
+This may be a perfectly rational choice. Probability is the guide
+of life, and of death, too. Against this, some will reply that
+improved care for the terminally ill has eliminated pain and
+made voluntary euthanasia unnecessary. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross,
+whose On Death and Dying is perhaps the best-known book on
+care for the dying, has claimed that none of her patients request
+euthanasia. Given personal attention and the right medication,
+she says, people come to accept their deaths and die peacefully
+without pain.
+Kubler-Ross may be right. It may be possible, now, to eliminate
+pain. In almost all cases, it may even be possible to do it
+in a way that leaves patients in possession of their rational
+197
+Practical Ethics
+faculties and free from vomiting, nausea, or other distressing
+side-effects. Unfortunately only a minority of dying patients now
+receive this kind of care. Nor is physical pain the only problem.
+There can also be other distressing conditions, like bones so
+fragile they fracture at sudden movements, uncontrollable nausea
+and vomiting, slow starvation due to a cancerous growth,
+inability to control one's bowels or bladder, difficulty in breathing,
+and so on.
+Dr Timothy Quill, a doctor from Rochester, New York, has
+described how he prescribed barbiturate sleeping pills for 'Diane',
+a patient with a severe form of leukaemia, knowing that
+she wanted the tablets in order to be able to end her life. Dr
+Quill had known Diane for many years, and admired her courage
+in dealing with previous serious illnesses. In an article in
+the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr Quill wrote:
+It was extraordinarily important to Diane to maintain control of
+herself and her own dignity during the time remaining to her.
+When this was no longer possible, she clearly wanted to die. As
+a former director of a hospice program, I know how to use pain
+medicines to keep patients comfortable and lessen suffering. I
+explained the philosophy of comfort care, which I strongly believe
+in. Although Diane understood and appreciated this, she
+had known of people lingering in what was called relative comfort,
+and she wanted no part of it. When the time came, she
+wanted to take her life in the least painful way possible. Knowing
+of her desire for independence and her decision to stay in control,
+I thought this request made perfect sense .... In our discussion
+it became clear that preoccupation with her fear of a lingering
+death would interfere with Diane's getting the most out of the
+time she had left until she found a safe way to ensure her death.
+Not all dying patients who wish to die are fortunate enough
+to have a doctor like Timothy Quill. Betty Rollin has described,
+in her moving book Last Wish, how her mother developed ovarian
+cancer that spread to other parts of her body. One morning
+her mother said to her:
+198
+Taking Life: Humans
+I've had a wonderful life, but now it's over, or it should be. I'm
+not afraid to die, but I am afraid of this illness, what it's doing
+to me .... There's never any relief from it now. Nothing but
+nausea and this pain .... There won't be any more chemotherapy.
+There's no treatment anymore. So what happens to me
+now? I know what happens. I'll die slowly .... I don't want
+that. ... Who does it benefit if I die slowly? If it benefits my
+children I'd be willing. But it's not going to do you any
+good .... There's no point in a slow death, none. I've never liked
+doing things with no point. I've got to end this.
+Betty Rollin found it very difficult to help her mother to carry
+out her desire: 'Physician after physician turned down our pleas
+for help (How many pills? What kind?).' After her book about
+her mother'S death was published, she received hundreds of
+letters, many from people, or close relatives of people, who had
+tried to die, failed, and suffered even more. Many of these people
+were denied help from doctors, because although suicide is legal
+in most jurisdictions, assisted suicide is not.
+Perhaps one day it will be possible to treat all terminally ill
+and incurable patients in such a way that no one requests euthanasia
+and the subject becomes a non-issue; but this is now
+just a utopian ideal, and no reason at all to deny euthanasia to
+those who must live and die in far less comfortable conditions.
+It is, in any case, highly paternalistic to tell dying patients that
+they are now so well looked after that they need not be offered
+the option of euthanasia. It would be more in keeping with
+respect for individual freedom and autonomy to legalise euthanasia
+and let patients decide whether their situation is
+bearable.
+Do these arguments for voluntary euthanasia perhaps give
+too much weight to individual freedom and autonomy? After
+all, we do not allow people free choices on matters like, for
+instance, the taking of heroin. This is a restriction of freedom
+but, in the view of many, one that can be justified on paternalistic
+grounds. If preventing people from becoming heroin
+199
+Pradical Ethics
+addicts is justifiable paternalism, why isn't preventing people
+from having themselves killed?
+The question is a reasonable one, because respect for individual
+freedom can be carried too far. John Stuart Mill thought
+that the state should never interfere with the individual except
+to prevent harm to others. The individual's own good, Mill
+thought, is not a proper reason for state intervention. But Mill
+may have had too high an opinion of the rationality of a human
+being. It may occasionally be right to prevent people from making
+choices that are obviously not rationally based and that we
+can be sure they will later regret. The prohibition of voluntary
+euthanasia cannot be justified on paternalistic grounds, however,
+for voluntary euthanasia is an act for which good reasons
+exist. Voluntary euthanasia occurs only when, to the best of
+medical knowledge, a person is suffering from an incurable and
+painful or extremely distressing condition. In these circumstances
+one cannot say that to choose to die quickly is obviously
+irrational. The strength of the case for voluntary euthanasia lies
+in this combination of respect for the preferences, or autonomy,
+of those who decide for euthanasia; and the clear rational basis
+of the decision itself.
+NOT JUSTIFYING INVOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
+Involuntary euthanasia resembles voluntary euthanasia in that
+it involves the killing of those capable of consenting to their
+own death. It differs in that they do not consent. This difference
+is crucial, as the argument of the preceding section shows. All
+the four reasons against killing self-conscious beings apply when
+the person killed does not choose to die.
+Would it ever be possible to justify involuntary euthanasia
+on paternalistic grounds, to save someone extreme agony? It
+might be possible to imagine a case in which the agony was so
+great, and so certain, that the weight of utilitarian considerations
+favouring euthanasia override all four reasons against killing
+200
+Taking Life: Humans
+self-conscious beings. Yet to make this decision one would have
+to be confident that one can judge when a person's life is so
+bad as to be not worth living, better than that person can judge
+herself. It is not clear that we are ever justified in having much
+confidence in our judgments about whether the life of another
+person is, to that person, worth living. That the other person
+wishes to go on living is good evidence that her life is worth
+living. What better evidence could there be?
+The only kind of case in which the paternalistic argument
+is at all plausible is one in which the person to be killed
+does not realise what agony she will suffer in future, and if
+she is not killed now she will have to live through to the
+very end. On these grounds one might kill a person who has
+- though she does not yet realise it - fallen into the hands
+of homicidal sadists who will torture her to death. These cases
+are, fortunately, more commonly encountered in fiction than
+reality.
+If in real life we are unlikely ever to encounter a case of
+justifiable involuntary euthanasia, then it may be best to dismiss
+from our minds the fanciful cases in which one might imagine
+defending it, and treat the rule against involuntary euthanasia
+as, for all practical purposes, absolute. Here Hare's distinction
+between critical and intuitive levels of moral reasoning (see
+Chapter 4), is again relevant. The case described in the preceding
+paragraph is one in which, if we were reasoning at the critical
+level, we might consider involuntary euthanasia justifiable; but
+at the intuitive level, the level of moral reasoning we apply in
+our daily lives, we can simply say that euthanasia is only justifiable
+if those killed either
+lack the ability to consent to death, because they lack the
+capacity to understand the choice between their own continued
+existence or non-existence; or
+2 have the capacity to choose between their own continued life
+or death and to make an informed, voluntary, and settled
+decision to die.
+201
+Practical Ethics
+ACTIVE AND PASSIVE EUTHANASIA
+The conclusions we have reached in this chapter will shock a
+large number of readers, for they violate one of the most fundamental
+tenets of Western ethics - the wrongness of killing
+innocent human beings. I have already made one attempt to
+show that my conclusions are, at least in the area of disabled
+infants, a less radical departure from existing practice than one
+might suppose. I pointed out that many societies allow a pregnant
+woman to kill a fetus at a late stage of pregnancy if there
+is a significant risk of it being disabled; and since the line between
+a developed fetus and a newborn infant is not a crucial
+moral divide, it is difficult to see why it is worse to kill a newborn
+infant known to be disabled. In this section I shall argue that
+there is another area of accepted medical practice that is not
+intrinsically different from the practices that the arguments of
+this chapter would allow.
+I have already referred to the birth defect known as spina
+bifida, in which the infant is born with an opening in the back,
+exposing the spinal cord. Until 1957, most of these infants died
+young, but in that year doctors began using a new kind of valve,
+to drain off the excess fluid that otherwise accumulates in the
+head with this condition. In some hospitals it then became
+standard practice to make vigorous efforts to save every spina
+bifida infant. The result was that few such infants died - but of
+those who survived, many were severely disabled, with gross
+paralysis, multiple deformities.- of the legs and spine, and no
+control of bowel or bladder. Intellectual disabilities were also
+common. In short, the existence of these children caused great
+difficulty for their families and was often a misery for the children
+themselves.
+After studying the results of this policy of active treatment a
+British doctor, John Lorber, proposed that instead of treating
+all cases of spina bifida, only those who have the defect in a
+mild form should be selected for treatment. (He proposed that
+202
+,
+I ,
+I
+I
+I
+Taking Life: Humans
+the final decision should be up to the parents, but parents nearly
+always accept the recommendations of the doctors.) This principle
+of selective treatment has now been widely accepted in
+many countries and in Britain has been recognised as legitimate
+by the Department of Health and Social Security. The result is
+that fewer spina bifida children survive beyond infancy, but
+those who do survive are, by and large, the ones whose physical
+and mental disabilities are relatively minor.
+The policy of selection, then, appears to be a desirable one:
+but what happens to those disabled infants not selected for
+treatment? Lorber does not disguise the fact that in these cases
+the hope is that the infant will die soon and without suffering.
+It is to achieve this objective that surgical operations and other
+forms of active treatment are not undertaken, although pain
+and discomfort are as far as possible relieved. If the infant happens
+to get an infection, the kind of infection that in a normal
+infant would be swiftly cleared up with antibiotics, no antibiotics
+are given. Since the survival of the infant is not desired, no steps
+are taken to prevent a condition, easily curable by ordinary
+medical techniques, proving fatal.
+All this is, as I have said, accepted medical practice. In articles
+in medical journals, doctors have described cases in which they
+have allowed infants to die. These cases are not limited to spina
+bifida, but include, for instance, babies born with Down's syndrome
+and other complications. In 1982, the 'Baby Doe' case
+brought this practice to the attention of the American public.
+'Baby Doe' was the legal pseudonym of a baby born in Bloomington,
+Indiana, with Down's syndrome and some additional
+problems. The most serious of these was that the passage from
+the mouth to the stomach - the oesophagus - was not properly
+formed. This meant that Baby Doe could not receive nourishment
+by mouth. The problem could have been repaired by surgery
+- but in this case the parents, after discussing the situation
+with their obstetrician, refused permission for surgery. Without
+surgery, Baby Doe would soon die. Baby Doe's father later said
+203
+Practical Ethics
+that as a schoolteacher he had worked closely with Down's
+syndrome children, and that he and his wife had decided that
+it was in the best interests of Baby Doe, and of their family as
+a whole (they had two other children), to refuse consent for
+the operation. The hospital authorities, uncertain of their legal
+position, took the matter to court. Both the local county court
+and the Indiana State Supreme Court upheld the parents' right
+to refuse consent to surgery. The case attracted national media
+attention, and an attempt was made to take it to the U.S. Supreme
+Court, but before this could happen, Baby Doe died.
+One result ofthe Baby Doe case was that the U.S. government,
+headed at the time by President Ronald Reagan, who had come
+to power with the backing of the right-wing religious 'Moral
+Majority', issued a regulation directing that all infants are to be
+given necessary life-saving treatment, irrespective of disability.
+But the new regulations were strongly resisted by the American
+Medical Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics.
+In court hearings on the regulations, even Dr C. Everett Koop,
+Reagan's surgeon-general and the driving force behind the attempt
+to ensure that all infants should be treated, had to admit
+that there were some cases in which he would not provide lifesustaining
+treatment. Dr Koop mentioned three conditions in
+which, he said, life-sustaining treatment was not appropriate:
+anencephalic infants (infants born without a brain); infants who
+had, usually as a result of extreme prematurity, suffered such
+severe bleeding in the brain that they would never be able to
+breathe without a respirator and would never be able even to
+recognise another person; and infants lacking a major part of
+their digestive tract, who could only be kept alive by means of
+a drip providing nourishment directly into the bloodstream.
+The regulations were eventually accepted only in a watereddown
+form, allowing some flexibility to doctors. Even so, a
+subsequent survey of American paediatricians specialising in the
+care of newborn infants showed that 76 percent thought that
+the regulations were not necessary, 66 percent considered the
+204
+Taking Life: Humans
+regulations interfered with parents' right to determine what
+course of action was in the best interests of their children, and
+60 percent believed that the regulations did not allow adequate
+consideration of infants' suffering.
+In a series of British cases, the courts have accepted the view
+that the quality of a child's life is a relevant consideration in
+deciding whether life-sustaining treatment should be provided.
+In a case called In re B, concerning a baby like Baby Doe, with
+Down's syndrome and an intestinal obstruction, the court said
+that surgery should be carried out, because the infant's life
+would not be 'demonstrably awful'. In another case, Re C, where
+the baby had a poorly formed brain combined with severe physical
+handicaps, the court authorised the paediatric team to refrain
+from giving life-prolonging treatment. This was also the
+course taken in the case of Re Baby J: this infant was born
+extremely prematurely, and was blind and deaf and would probably
+never have been able to speak.
+Thus, though many would disagree with Baby Doe's parents
+about allowing a Down's syndrome infant to die (because people
+with Down's syndrome can live enjoyable lives and be warm
+and loving individuals), virtually everyone recognises that in
+more severe conditions, allowing an infant to die is the only
+humane and ethically acceptable course to take. The question
+is: if it is right to allow infants to die, why is it wrong to kill
+them?
+This question has not escaped the notice of the doctors involved.
+Frequently they answer it by a pious reference to the
+nineteenth-century poet, Arthur Clough, who wrote:
+Thou shalt not kill; but need'st not strive
+Officiously to keep alive.
+Unfortunately for those who appeal to Clough's immortal
+lines as an authoritative ethical pronouncement, they come
+from a biting satire - 'The Latest Decalogue' - the intent of
+205
+Practical Ethics
+which is to mock the attitudes described. The opening lines, for
+example, are:
+Thou shalt have one god only; who
+Would be at the expense of two.
+No graven images may be
+Worshipped except the currency.
+So Clough cannot be numbered on the side of those who
+think it wrong to kill, but right not to try too hard to keep alive.
+Is there, nonetheless, something to be said for this idea? The
+view that there is something to be said for it is often termed
+'the acts and omissions doctrine'. It holds that there is an important
+moral distinction between performing an act that has
+certain consequences - say, the death of a disabled child - and
+omitting to do something that has the same consequences. If
+this doctrine is correct, the doctor who gives the child a lethal
+injection does wrong; the doctor who omits to give the child
+antibiotics, knowing full well that without antibiotics the child
+will die, does not.
+What grounds are there for accepting the acts and omissions
+doctrine? Few champion the doctrine for its own sake, as an
+important ethical first principle. It is, rather, an implication of
+one view of ethics, of a view that holds that as long as we do
+not violate specified moral rules that place determinate moral
+obligations upon us, we do all that morality demands of us.
+These rules are of the kind made familiar by the Ten Commandments
+and similar moral codes: Do not kill, Do not lie,
+Do not steal, and so on. Characteristically they are formulated
+in the negative, so that to obey them it is necessary only to
+abstain from the actions they prohibit. Hence obedience can be
+demanded of every member of the community.
+An ethic consisting of specific duties, prescribed by moral rules
+that everyone can be expected to obey, must make a sharp moral
+distinction between acts and omissions. Take, for example, the
+rule: 'Do not kill.' If this rule is interpreted, as it has been in
+206
+Taking Life: Humans
+the Western tradition, as prohibiting only the taking of innocent
+human life, it is not too difficult to avoid overt acts in violation
+of it. Few of us are murderers. It is not so easy to avoid letting
+innocent humans die. Many people die because of insufficient
+food, or poor medical facilities. If we could assist some of them,
+but do not do so, we are letting them die. Taking the rule against
+killing to apply to omissions would make living in accordance
+with it a mark of saintliness or moral heroism, rather than a
+minimum required of every morally decent person.
+An ethic that judges acts according to whether they do or do
+not violate specific moral rules must, therefore, place moral
+weight on the distinction between acts and omissions. An ethic
+that judges acts by their consequences will not do so, for the
+consequences of an act and an omission will often be, in all
+significant respects, indistinguishable. For instance, omitting to
+give antibiotics to a child with pneumonia may have consequences
+no less fatal than giving the child a lethal injection.
+Which approach is right? I have argued for a consequentialist
+approach to ethics. The acts/omissions issue poses the choice
+between these two basic approaches in an unusually clear and
+direct way. What we need to do is imagine two parallel situations
+differing only in that in one a person performs an act
+resulting in the death of another human being, while in the
+other she omits to do something, with the same result. Here is
+a description of a relatively common situation, taken from an
+essay by Sir Gustav Nossal, an eminent Australian medical
+researcher:
+An old lady of 83 has been admitted [to a nursing home for the
+aged) because her increasing degree of mental confusion has
+made it impossible for her to stay in her own home, and there
+is no one willing and able to look after h~r. Over three years,
+her condition deteriorates. She loses the ability to speak, requires
+to be fed, and becomes incontinent. Finally, she cannot sit in an
+armchair any longer, and is confined permanently to bed. One
+day, she contracts pneumonia.
+207
+Pradical Ethics
+In a patient who was enjoying a reasonable quality of life, pneumonia
+would be routinely treated with antibiotics. Should this
+patient be given antibiotics? Nossal continues:
+The relatives are contacted, and the matron of the nursing home
+tells them that she and the doctor she uses most frequently have
+worked out a loose arrangement for cases of this type. With
+advanced senile dementia, they treat the first three infections
+with antibiotics, and after that, mindful of the adage that 'pneumonia
+is the old person's friend', they let nature take its course.
+The matron emphasises that if the relatives desire, all infections
+can be vigorously treated. The relatives agree with the rule of
+thumb. The patient dies of a urinary tract infection six months
+later.
+This patient died when she did as a result of a deliberate omission.
+Many people would think that this omission was welljustified.
+They might question whether it would not have been
+better to omit treatment even for the initial occurrence of pneumonia.
+There is, after all, no moral magic about the number
+three. Would it also have been justifiable, at the time of the
+omission, to give an injection that would bring about the patient's
+death in a peaceful way?
+Comparing these two possible ways of bringing about a patient's
+death at a particular time, is it reasonable to hold that
+the doctor who gives the injection is a murderer who deserves
+to go to jail, while the doctor who decides not to administer
+antibiotics is practising good and compassionate medicine? That
+may be what courts of law would say, but surely it is an untenable
+distinction. In both cases, the outcome is the death of
+the patient. In both cases, the doctor knows that this will be
+the result, and decides what she will do on the basis of this
+knowledge, because she judges this result to be better than the
+alternative. In both cases the doctor must take responsibility for
+her decision - it would not be correct for the doctor who decided
+not to provide antibiotics to say that she was not responsible
+for the patient's death because she did nothing. Doing nothing
+208
+r
+I
+I
+Taking Life: Humans
+in this situation is itself a deliberate choice and one cannot
+escape responsibility for its consequences.
+One might say, of course, that the doctor who withholds
+antibiotics does not kill the patient, she merely allows the patient
+to die; but one must then answer the further question why
+killing is wrong, and letting die is not. The answer that most
+advocates of the distinction give is simply that there is a moral
+rule against killing innocent human beings and none against
+allowing them to die. This answer treats a conventionally accepted
+moral rule as if it were beyond questioning; it does not
+go on to ask whether we should have a moral rule against killing
+(but not against allowing to die). But we have already seen that
+the conventionally accepted principle of the sanctity of human
+life is untenable. The moral rules that prohibit killing, but accept
+'letting die' cannot be taken for granted either.
+Reflecting on these cases leads us to the conclusion that there
+is no intrinsic moral difference between killing and allowing to
+die. That is, there is no difference which depends solely on the
+distinction between an act and an omission. (This does not mean
+that all cases of allowing to die are morally equivalent to killing.
+Other factors - extrinsic factors - will sometimes be relevant.
+This will be discussed further in Chapter 8.) Allowing to die -
+sometimes called 'passive euthanasia' - is already accepted as
+a humane and proper course of action in certain cases. If there
+is no intrinsic moral difference between killing and allowing to
+die, active euthanasia should also be accepted as humane and
+proper in certain circumstances.
+Others have suggested that the difference between withholding
+treatment necessary to prolong life, and giving a lethal injection,
+lies in the intention with which the two are done. Those
+who take this view resort to the 'doctrine of double effect', a
+doctrine widely held among Roman Catholic moral theologians
+and moral philosophers, to argue that one action (for example,
+refraining from life-sustaining treatment) may have two effects
+(in this case, not causing additional suffering to the patient, and
+209
+Practical Ethics
+shortening the patient's life). They then argue that as long as
+the directly intended effect is the beneficial one that does not
+violate an absolute moral rule, the action is permissible. Though
+we foresee that our action (or omission) will result in the death
+of the patient, this is merely an unwanted side-effect. But the
+distinction between directly intended effect and side-effect is a
+contrived one. We cannot avoid responsibility simply by directing
+our intention to one effect rather than another. If we
+foresee both effects, we must take responsibility for the foreseen
+effects of what we do. We often want to do something, but
+cannot do it because of its other, unwanted consequences. For
+example, a chemical company might want to get rid of toxic
+waste in the most economical manner, by dumping it in the
+nearest river. Would we allow the executives of the company
+to say that all they directly intended was to improve the efficiency
+of the factory, thus promoting employment and keeping
+down the cost of living? Would we regard the pollution as
+excusable because it is merely an unwanted side-effect of furthering
+these worthy objectives?
+Obviously the defenders of the doctrine of double effect would
+not accept such an excuse. In rejecting it, however, they would
+have to rely upon a judgment that the cost - the polluted river
+- is disproportionate to the gains. Here a consequentialist judgment
+lurks behind the doctrine of double effect. The same is
+true when the doctrine is used in medical care. Normally, saving
+life takes precedence over relieving pain. If in the case of a
+particular patient it does not, this can only be because we have
+judged that the patient's prospects for a future life of acceptable
+quality are so poor that in this case relieving suffering can take
+precedence. This is, in other words, not a decision based on
+acceptance of the sanctity of human life, but a decision based
+on a disguised quality of life judgment.
+Equally unsatisfactory is the common appeal to a distinction
+between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' means of treatment,
+coupled with the belief that it is not obligatory to provide ex-
+210
+Taking Life: Humans
+traordinary means. Together with my colleague, Helga Kuhse,
+I carried out a survey of paediatricians and obstetricians in Australia
+and found that they had remarkable ideas about what
+constituted 'ordinary' and what 'extraordinary' means. Some
+even thought that the use of antibiotics - the cheapest, simplest,
+and most common medical procedure - could be extraordinary.
+The reason for this range of views is easy to find. When one
+looks at the justifications given by moral theologians and philosophers
+for the distinction, it turns out that what is 'ordinary'
+in one situation can become 'extraordinary' in another. For
+example, in the famous case of Karen Ann Quinlan, the young
+New Jersey woman who was in a coma for ten years before
+she died, a Roman Catholic bishop testified that the use of a
+respirator was 'extraordinary' and hence optional because Quinlan
+had no hope of recovery from the coma. Obviously, if doctors
+had thought that Quinlan was likely to recover, the use of the
+respirator would not have been optional, and would have been
+declared 'ordinary'. Again, it is the quality of life of the patient
+(and where resources are limited and could be used more effectively
+to save lives elsewhere, the cost of the treatment) that
+is determining whether a given form of treatment is ordinary
+or extraordinary, and therefore is to be provided or not. Those
+who appeal to this distinction are cloaking their consequentialist
+views in the robe of an absolutist ethic; but the robe is worn
+out, and the disguise is now transparent.
+So it is not possible to appeal to either the doctrine of double
+effect or the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
+means in order to show that allowing a patient to die is morally
+different from actively helping a patient to die. Indeed, because
+of extrinsic differences - especially differences in the time it
+takes for death to occur - active euthanasia may be the only
+humane and morally proper course. Passive euthanasia can be
+a slow process. In an article in the British Medical Journal, John
+Lorber has charted the fate of twenty-five infants born with
+spina bifida on whom it had been decided, in view of the poor
+211
+Practical Ethics
+prospects for a worthwhile life, not to operate. It will be recalled
+that Lorber freely grants that the object of not treating infants
+is that they should die soon and painlessly. Yet of the twentyfive
+untreated infants, fourteen were still alive after one month,
+and seven after three months. In Lorber's sample, all the infants
+died within nine months, but this cannot be guaranteed, or at
+least, cannot be guaranteed without stepping over the fine line
+between active and passive euthanasia. (Lorber's opponents
+have claimed that the untreated infants under his care all die
+because they are given sedatives and fed only on demand. Sleepy
+babies do not have healthy appetites.) An Australian clinic following
+Lorber's approach to spina bifida found that of seventynine
+untreated infants, five survived for more than two years.
+For both the infants, and their families, this must be a longdrawn
+out ordeal. It is also (although in a society with a reasonable
+level of affluence this should not be the primary consideration)
+a considerable burden on the hospital staff and the
+community's medical resources.
+Consider, to take another example, infants born with Down's
+syndrome and a blockage in the digestive system which, if not
+removed, will make it impossible for the baby to eat. Like 'Baby
+Doe', these infants may be allowed to die. Yet the blockage can
+be removed and has nothing to do with the degree of intellectual
+disability the child will have. Moreover, the death resulting from
+the failure to operate in these circumstances is, though sure,
+neither swift nor painless. The infant dies from dehydration or
+hunger. Baby Doe took about five days to die, and in other
+recorded instances of this practice, it has taken up to two weeks
+for death to come.
+It is interesting, in this context, to think again of our earlier
+argument that membership of the species Homo sapiens does
+not entitle a being to better treatment than a being at a similar
+mental level who is a member of a different species. We could
+also have said - except that it seemed too obvious to need saying
+- that membership of the species Homo sapiens is not a reason
+212
+I,
+I
+I
+Taking Life: Humans
+for giving a being worse treatment than a member of a different
+species. Yet in respect of euthanasia, this needs to be said. We
+do not doubt that it is right to shoot badly injured or sick animals
+if they are in pain and their chances of recovery are negligible.
+To 'allow nature to take its course', withholding treatment but
+refusing to kill, would obviously be wrong. It is only our misplaced
+respect for the doctrine of the sanctity of human life that
+prevents us from seeing that what it is obviously wrong to do
+to a horse, it is equally wrong to do to a disabled infant.
+To summarise: passive ways of ending life result in a drawnout
+death. They introduce irrelevant factors (a blockage in the
+intestine, or an easily curable infection) into the selection of
+those who shall die. If we are able to admit that our objective
+is a swift and painless death we should not leave it up to chance
+to determine whether this objective is achieved. Having chosen
+death we should ensure that it comes in the best possible way.
+THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: FROM EUTHANASIA
+TO GENO~IDE?
+Before we leave this topic we must consider an objection that
+looms so large in the anti-euthanasia literature that it merits a
+section to itself. It is, for instance, the reason why John Lorber
+rejects active euthanasia. Lorber has written:
+I wholly disagree with euthanasia. Though it is fully logical, and
+in expert and conscientious hands it could be the most humane
+way of dealing with such a situation, legalizing euthanasia would
+be a most dangerous weapon in the hands of the State or ignorant
+or unscrupulous individuals. One does not have to go far back
+in history to know what crimes can be committed if euthanasia
+were legalized.
+Would euthanasia be the first step down a slippery slope? In
+the absence of prominent moral footholds to check our descent,
+would we slide all the way down into the abyss of state terror
+and mass murder? The experience of Nazism, to which Lorber
+213
+Practical Ethics
+no doubt is referring, has often been used as an illustration of
+what could follow acceptance of euthanasia. Here is a more
+specific example, from an article by another doctor, Leo
+Alexander:
+Whatever proportions [Nazi) crimes finally assumed, it became
+evident to all who investigated them that they had started from
+small beginnings. The beginnings at first were merely a subtle
+shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of the physicians. It started
+with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia movement,
+that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived.
+This attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the
+severely and chronically sick. Gradually the sphere of those to
+be included in the category was enlarged to encompass the socially
+unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted
+and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize
+that the infinitely small wedged-in lever from which this entire
+trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward the
+nonrehabilitable sick.
+Alexander singles out the Nazis' so-called euthanasia program
+as the root of all the horrendous crimes the Nazis later committed,
+because that program implied 'that there is such a thing
+as life not worthy to be lived'. Lorber could hardly agree with
+Alexander on this, since his recommended procedure of not
+treating selected infants is based on exactly this judgment. Although
+people sometimes talk as if we should never judge a
+human life to be not worth living, there are times when such
+a judgment is obviously correct. A life of physical suffering,
+unredeemed by any form of pleasure or by a minimal level of
+self-consciousness, is not worth living. Surveys undertaken by
+health care economists in which people are asked how much
+they value being alive in certain states of health, regularly find
+that people give some states a negative value - that is, they
+indicate that they would prefer to be dead than to survive in
+that condition. Apparently, the life of the elderly woman described
+by Sir Gustav Nossal was, in the opinion of the matron
+of the nursing home, the doctor, and the relatives, not worth
+214
+Taking Life: Humans
+living. If we can set criteria for deciding who is to be allowed
+to die and who is to be given treatment, then why should it be
+wrong to set criteria, perhaps the same criteria, for deciding
+who should be killed?
+So it is not the attitude that some lives are not worth living
+that marks out the Nazis from normal people who do not commit
+mass murder. What then is it? Is it that they went beyond
+passive euthanasia, and practised active euthanasia? Many,
+like Lorber, worry about the power that a program of active
+euthanasia could place in the hands of an unscrupulous government.
+This worry is not negligible, but should not be
+exaggerated. Unscrupulous governments already have within
+their power more plausible means of getting rid of their opponents
+than euthanasia administered by doctors on medical
+grounds. 'Suicides' can be arranged. 'Accidents' can occur. If
+necessary, assassins can be hired. Our best defence against such
+possibilities is to do everything possible to keep our government
+democratic, open, and in the hands of people who would not
+seriously wish to kill their opponents. Once the wish is serious
+enough, governments will find a way, whether euthanasia is
+legal or not.
+In fact the Nazis did not have a euthanasia program, in the
+proper sense of the word. Their so-called euthanasia program
+was not motivated by concern for the suffering of those killed.
+If it had been, why would the Nazis have kept their operations
+secret, deceived relatives about the cause of death ofthose killed,
+and exempted from the program certain privileged classes, such
+as veterans of the armed services, or relatives of the euthanasia
+staff? Nazi 'euthanasia' was never voluntary, and often was
+involuntary rather than non-voluntary. 'Doing away with useless
+mouths' - a phrase used by those in charge - gives a better
+idea ofthe objectives of the program than 'mercy-killing'. Both
+racial origin and ability to work were among the factors considered
+in the selection of patients to be killed. It was the Nazi
+belief in the importance of maintaining a pure Aryan Yolk - a
+215
+Practical Ethics
+somewhat mystical entity that was thought of as more important
+than mere individuals lives - that made both the so-called euthanasia
+program and later the entire holocaust possible. Proposals
+for the legalisation of euthanasia, in contrast, are based
+on respect for autonomy and the goal of avoiding pointless
+suffering.
+This essential difference in the aims of Nazi 'euthanasia' and
+modem proposals may be granted, but the slippery slope argument
+could still be defended as a way of suggesting that the
+present strict rule against the direct killing of innocent human
+beings serves a useful purpose. However arbitrary and unjustifiable
+the distinctions between human and non-human, fetus
+and infant, killing and allowing to die may be, the rule against
+direct killing of innocent humans at least marks a workable line.
+The distinction between an infant whose life may be worth
+living, and one whose life definitely is not, is much more difficult
+to draw. Perhaps people who see that certain kinds of human
+beings are killed in certain circumstances may go on to conclude
+that it is not wrong to kill others not very different from the
+first kind. So will the boundary of acceptable killing be pushed
+gradually back? In the absence of any logical stopping place,
+will the outcome be the loss of all respect for human life?
+If our laws were altered so that anyone could carry out an
+act of euthanasia, the absence of a clear line between those who
+might justifiably be killed and those who might not would pose
+a real danger; but that is not what advocates of euthanasia
+propose. If acts of euthanasia could only be carried out by a
+member of the medical profession, with the concurrence of a
+second doctor, it is not likely that the propensity to kill would
+spread unchecked throughout the community. Doctors already
+have a good deal of power over life and death, through their
+ability to withhold treatment. There has been no suggestion that
+doctors who begin by allowing severely disabled infants to die
+from pneumonia will move on to withhold antibiotics from
+racial minorities or political extremists. In fact legalising eu-
+216
+Taking Life: Humans
+thanasia might well act as a check on the power of doctors since
+it would bring into the open and under the scrutiny of another
+doctor what some doctors now do on their own initiative and
+in secret.
+There is, anyway, little historical evidence to suggest that a
+permissive attitude towards the killing of one category of human
+beings leads to a breakdown of restrictions against killing other
+humans. Ancient Greeks regularly killed or exposed infants, but
+appear to have been at least as scrupulous about taking the lives
+of their fellow-citizens as medieval Christians or modem Americans.
+In traditional Eskimo societies it was the custom for a
+man to kill his elderly parents, but the murder of a normal
+healthy adult was almost unheard of. I mention these practices
+not to suggest that they should be imitated, but only to indicate
+that lines can be drawn at places different from where we now
+draw them. If these societies could separate human beings into
+different categories without transferring their attitudes from one
+group to another, we with our more sophisticated legal systems
+and greater medical knowledge should be able to do the same.
+All of this is not to deny that departing from the traditional
+sanctity-of-life ethic carries with it a very small but nevertheless
+finite risk of unwanted consequences. Against this risk we must
+balance the tangible harm to which the traditional ethic gives
+rise - harm to those whose misery is needlessly prolonged. We
+must also ask if the widespread acceptance of abortion and
+passive euthanasia has not already revealed flaws in the traditional
+ethic that make it a weak defence against those who
+lack respect for individual lives. A sounder, if less clear-cut,
+ethic may in the long run provide a firmer ground for resisting
+unjustifiable killing.
+217
+8
+RICH AND POOR
+SOME FACTS ABOUT POVERTY
+I N the discussion of euthanasia in Chapter 7, we questioned
+the distinction between killing and allowing to die, concluding
+that it is of no intrinsic ethical significance. This conclusion
+has implications that go far beyond euthanasia.
+Consider these facts: by the most cautious estimates, 400
+million people lack the calories, protein, vitamins and minerals
+needed to sustain their bodies and minds in a healthy state.
+Millions are constantly hungry; others suffer from deficiency
+diseases and from infections they would be able to resist on a
+better diet. Children are the worst affected. According to one
+study, 14 million children under five die every year from the
+combined effects of malnutrition and infection. In some districts
+half the children born can be expected to die before their fifth
+birthday.
+Nor is lack of food the only hardship of the poor. To give a
+broader picture, Robert McNamara, when president of the
+World Bank, suggested the term 'absolute poverty'. The poverty
+we are familiar with in industrialised nations is relative poverty
+- meaning that some citizens are poor, relative to the wealth
+enjoyed by their neighbours. People living in relative poverty
+in Australia might be quite comfortably off by comparison with
+pensioners in Britain, and British pensioners are not poor in
+comparison with the poverty that exists in Mali or Ethiopia.
+Absolute poverty, on the other hand, is poverty by any standard.
+In McNamara's words:
+218
+I
+I ,
+Rich and Poor
+Poverty at the absolute level ... is life at the very margin of existence.
+The absolute poor are severely deprived human beings
+struggling to survive in a set of squalid and degraded circumstances
+almost beyond the power of our sophisticated imaginations
+and privileged circumstances to conceive.
+Compared to those fortunate enough to live in developed countries,
+individuals in the poorest nations have:
+An infant mortality rate eight times higher
+A life expectancy one-third lower
+An adult literacy rate 60 per cent less
+A nutritional level, for one out of every two in the population,
+below acceptable standards;
+And for millions of infants, less protein than is sufficient to permit
+optimum development of the brain.
+McNamara has summed up absolute poverty as 'a condition of
+life so characterised by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid
+surroundings, high infant mortality and low life expectancy as
+to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency'.
+Absolute poverty is, as McNamara has said, responsible for
+the loss of countless lives, especially among infants and young
+children. When absolute poverty does not cause death, it still
+causes misery of a kind not often seen in the affluent nations.
+Malnutrition in young children stunts both physical and mental
+development. According to the United Nations Development
+Programme, 180 million children under the age of five suffer
+from serious malnutrition. Millions of people on poor diets suffer
+from deficiency diseases, like goitre, or blindness caused by
+a lack of vitamin A. The food value of what the poor eat is
+further reduced by parasites such as hookworm and ringworm,
+which are endemic in conditions of poor sanitation and health
+education.
+Death and disease apart, absolute poverty remains a miserable
+condition of life, with inadequate food, shelter, clothing, sanitation,
+health services and education. The Worldwatch Institute
+219
+Practical Ethics
+estimates that as many as 1.2 billion people - or 23 per cent of
+the world's population - live in absolute poverty. For the purposes
+of this estimate, absolute poverty is defined as "the lack
+of sufficient income in cash or kind to meet the most basic
+biological needs for food, clothing, and shelter." Absolute poverty
+is probably the principal cause of human misery today.
+SOME FACTS ABOUT WEALTH
+This is the background situation, the situation that prevails
+on our planet all the time. It does not make headlines. People
+died from malnutrition and related diseases yesterday, and
+more will die tomorrow. The occasional droughts, cyclones,
+earthquakes, and floods that take the lives of tens of thousands
+in one place and at one time are more newsworthy. They add
+greatly to the total amount of human suffering; but it is wrong
+to assume that when there are no major calamities reported,
+all is well.
+The problem is not that the world cannot produce enough to
+feed and shelter its people. People in the poor countries consume,
+on average, 180 kilos of grain a year, while North Americans
+average around 900 kilos. The difference is caused by the
+fact that in the rich countries we feed most of our grain to
+animals, converting it into meat, milk, and eggs. Because this
+is a highly inefficient process, people in rich countries are responsible
+for the consumption of far more food than those in
+poor countries who eat few animal products. If we stopped
+feeding animals on grains and soybeans, the amount of food
+saved would - if distributed to those who need it - be more
+than enough to end hunger throughout the world.
+These facts about animal food do not mean that we can easily
+solve the world food problem by cutting down on animal products,
+but they show that the problem is essentially one of distribution
+rather than production. The world does produce
+enough food. Moreover, the poorer nations themselves could
+220
+Rich and Poor
+produce far more if they made more use of improved agricultural
+techniques.
+So why are people hungry? Poor people cannot afford to buy
+grain grown by farmers in the richer nations. Poor farmers cannot
+afford to buy improved seeds, or fertilisers, or the machinery
+needed for drilling wells and pumping water. Only by transferring
+some of the wealth of the rich nations to the poor can
+the situation be changed.
+That this wealth exists is clear. Against the picture of absolute
+poverty that McNamara has painted, one might pose a picture
+of 'absolute affluence'. Those who are absolutely affluent are
+not necessarily affluent by comparison with their neighbours,
+but they are affluent by any reasonable definition of human
+needs. This means that they have more income than they need
+to provide themselves adequately with all the basic necessities
+of life. After buying (either directly or through their taxes) food,
+shelter, clothing, basic health services, and education, the absolutely
+affluent are still able to spend money on luxuries. The
+absolutely affluent choose their food for the pleasures of the
+palate, not to stop hunger; they buy new clothes to look good,
+not to keep warm; they move house to be in a better neighbourhood
+or have a playroom for the children, not to keep out
+the rain; and after all this there is still money to spend on stereo
+systems, video-cameras, and overseas holidays.
+At this stage I am making no ethical judgments about absolute
+affluence, merely pointing out that it exists. Its defining characteristic
+is a significant amount of income above the level necessary
+to provide for the basic human needs of oneself and one's
+dependents. By this standard, the majority of citizens of Western
+Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the
+oil-rich Middle Eastern states are all absolutely affluent. To
+quote McNamara once more:
+'The average citizen of a developed country enjoys wealth beyond
+the wildest dreams of the one billion people in countries with
+221
+Practical Ethics
+per capita incomes under $200: These, therefore, are the countries
+- and individuals - who have wealth that they could, without
+threatening their own basic welfare, transfer to the absolutely
+poor.
+At present, very little is being transferred. Only Sweden, the
+Netherlands, Norway, and some of the oil-exporting Arab states
+have reached the modest target, set by the United Nations, of
+0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP). Britain gives 0.31
+per cent of its GNP in official development assistance and a
+small additional amount in unofficial aid from voluntary organisations.
+The total comes to about £2 per month per person,
+and compares with 5.5 per cent of GNP spent on alcohol. and
+3 per cent on tobacco. Other, even wealthier nations, give little
+more: Germany gives 0.41 per cent and Japan 0.32 per cent.
+The United States gives a mere 0.15 per cent of its GNP.
+THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF MURDER?
+If these are the facts, we cannot avoid concluding that by not
+giving more than we do, people in rich countries are allowing
+those in poor countries to suffer from absolute poverty, with
+consequent malnutrition, ill health, and death. This is not a
+conclusion that applies only to governments. It applies to each
+absolutely affluent individual. for each of us has the opportunity
+to do something about the situation; for instance, to give our
+time or money to voluntary organisations like Oxfam, Care,
+War on Want, Freedom from Hunger, Community Aid Abroad,
+and so on. If, then, allowing someone to die is not intrinsically
+different from killing someone, it would seem that we are all
+murderers.
+Is this verdict too harsh? Many will reject it as self-evidently
+absurd. They would sooner take it as showing that allowing to
+die cannot be equivalent to killing than as showing that living
+in an affluent style without contributing to an overseas aid
+agency is ethically equivalent to going over to Ethiopia and
+222
+I,
+Rich and Poor
+shooting a few peasants. And no doubt. put as bluntly as that.
+the verdict is too harsh.
+There are several significant differences between spending
+money on luxuries instead of using it to save lives, and deliberately
+shooting people.
+First, the motivation will normally be different. Those who
+deliberately shoot others go out of their way to kill; they presumably
+want their victims dead, from malice, sadism, or some
+equally unpleasant motive. A person who buys a new stereo
+system presumably wants to enhance her enjoyment of music
+- not in itself a terrible thing. At worst, spending money on
+luxuries instead of giving it away indicates selfishness and.indifference
+to the sufferings of others, characteristics that may
+be undesirable but are not comparable with actual malice or
+similar motives.
+Second, it is not difficult for most of us to act in accordance
+with a rule against killing people: it is, on the other hand, very
+difficult to obey a rule that commands us to save all the lives
+we can. To live a comfortable, or even luxurious life it is not
+necessary to kill anyone; but it is necessary to allow some to
+die whom we might have saved, for the money that we need
+to live comfortably could have been given away. Thus the duty
+to avoid killing is much easier to discharge completely than the
+duty to save. Saving every life we could would mean cutting
+our standard of living down to the bare essentials needed to
+keep us alive. l To discharge this duty completely would require
+a degree of moral heroism utterly different from that required
+by mere avoidance of killing.
+Strictly, we would need to cut down to the minimum level compatible with
+earning the income which, after providing for our needs, left us most to give
+away. Thus if my present position earns me, say, $40,000 a year, but requires
+me to spend $5,000 a year on dressing respectably and maintaining a car, I
+cannot save more people by giving away the car and clothes if that will mean
+taking a job that, although it does not involve me in these expenses, earns
+me only $20,000.
+223
+Practical Ethics
+A third difference is the greater certainty of the outcome of
+shooting when compared with not giving aid. If I point a loaded
+gun at someone at close range and pull the trigger, it is virtually
+certain that the person will be killed; whereas the money that
+I could give might be spent on a project that turns out to be
+unsuccessful and helps no one.
+Fourth, when people are shot there are identifiable individuals
+who have been harmed. We can point to them and to their
+grieving families. When I buy my stereo system, I cannot know
+who my money would have saved if I had given it away. In a
+time of famine I may see dead bodies and grieving families on
+television reports, and I might not doubt that my money would
+have saved some of them; even then it is impossible to point
+to a body and say that had I not bought the stereo, that person
+would have survived.
+Fifth, it might be said that the plight of the hungry is not my
+doing, and so I cannot be held responsible for it. The starving
+would have been starving if I had never existed. If I kill, however,
+I am responsible for my victims' deaths, for those people
+would not have died if I had not killed them.
+These differences need not shake our previous conclusion that
+there is no intrinsic difference between killing and allowing to
+die. They are extrinsic differences, that is, differences normally
+but not necessarily associated with the distinction between killing
+and allowing to die. We can imagine cases in which someone
+allows another to die for malicious or sadistic reasons; we can
+imagine a world in which there are so few people needing
+assistance, and they are so easy to assist, that our duty not to
+allow people to die is as easily discharged as our duty not to
+kill; we can imagine situations in which the outcome of not
+helping is as sure as shooting; we can imagine cases in which
+we can identify the person we allow to die. We can even imagine
+a case of allowing to die in which, if I had not existed, the
+person would not have died - for instance, a case in which if
+I had not been in a position to help (though I don't help)
+224
+Rich and Poor
+someone else would have been in my position and would have
+helped.
+Our previous discussion of euthanasia illustrates the extrinsic
+nature of these differences, for they do not provide a basis for
+distinguishing active from passive euthanasia. If a doctor decides,
+in consultation with the parents, not to operate on - and
+thus to allow to die - a Down's syndrome infant with an intestinal
+blockage, her motivation will be similar to that of a
+doctor who gives a lethal injection rather than allow the infant
+to die. No extraordinary sacrifice or moral heroism will be required
+in either case. Not operating will just as certainly end in
+death as administering the injection. Allowing to die does have
+an identifiable victim. Finally, it may well be that the doctor is
+personally responsible for the death of the infant she decides
+not to operate upon, since she may know that if she had not
+taken this case, other doctors in the hospital would have
+operated.
+Nevertheless, euthanasia is a special case, and very different
+from allowing people to starve to death. (The major difference
+being that when euthanasia is justifiable, death is a good thing.)
+The extrinsic differences that normally mark off killing and allowing
+to die do explain why we normally regard killing as much
+worse than allowing to die.
+To explain our conventional ethical attitudes is not to justify
+them. Do the five differences not only explain, but also justify,
+our attitudes? Let us consider them one by one:
+1. Take the lack of an identifiable victim first. Suppose that
+I am a travelling salesperson, selling tinned food, and I learn
+that a batch of tins contains a contaminant, the known effect
+of which, when consumed, is to double the risk that the consumer
+will die from stomach cancer. Suppose I continue to sell
+the tins. My decision may have no identifiable victims. Some
+of those who eat the food will die from cancer. The proportion
+of consumers dying in this way will be twice that of the community
+at large, but who among the consumers died because
+225
+Practical Ethics
+they ate what I sold, and who would have contracted the disease
+anyway? It is impossible to tell; but surely this impossibility
+makes my decision no less reprehensible than it would have
+been had the contaminant had more readily detectable, though
+equally fatal, effects.
+2. The lack of certainty that by giving money I could save a
+life does reduce the wrongness of not giving, by comparison
+with deliberate killing; but it is insufficient to show that not
+giving is acceptable conduct. The motorist who speeds through
+pedestrian crossings, heedless of anyone who might be on them,
+is not a murderer. She may never actually hit a pedestrian; yet
+what she does is very wrong indeed.
+3. The notion of responsibility for acts rather than omissions
+is more puzzling. On the one hand, we feel ourselves to be
+under a greater obligation to help those whose misfortunes we
+have caused. (It is for this reason that advocates of overseas aid
+often argue that Western nations have created the poverty of
+third world nations, through forms of economic exploitation
+that go back to the colonial system.) On the other hand, any
+consequentialist would insist that we are responsible for all the
+consequences of our actions, and if a consequence of my spending
+money on a luxury item is that someone dies, I am responsible
+for that death. It is true that the person would have
+died even if I had never existed, but what is the relevance of
+that? The fact is that I do exist, and the consequentialist will
+say that our responsibilities derive from the world as it is, not
+as it might have been.
+One way of making sense of the non-consequentialist view
+of responsibility is by basing it on a theory of rights of the kind
+proposed by John Locke or, more recently, Robert Nozick. If
+everyone l:J.as a right to life, and this right is a right against others
+who might threaten my life, but not a right to assistance from
+others when my life is in danger, then we can understand the
+feeling that we are responsible for acting to kill but not for
+226
+Rich and Poor
+omitting to save. The former violates the rights of others, the
+latter does not.
+Should we accept such a theory of rights? If we build up our
+theory of rights by imagining, as Locke and Nozick do, individuals
+living independently from each other in a 'state of nature',
+it may seem natural to adopt a conception of rights in which
+as long as each leaves the other alone, no rights are violated. I
+might, on this view, quite properly have maintained my independent
+existence if I had wished to do so. So if I do not make
+you any worse off than you would have been if I had had
+nothing at all to do with you, how can I have violated your
+rights? But why start from such an unhistorical, abstract and
+ultimately inexplicable idea as an independent individual? Our
+ancestors were - like other primates - social beings long before
+they were human beings, and could not have developed the
+abilities and capacities of human beings if they had not been
+social beings first. In any case, we are not, now, isolated individuals.
+So why should we assume that rights must be restricted
+to rights against interference? We might, instead, adopt the view
+that taking rights to life seriously is incompatible with standing
+by and watching people die when one could easily save them.
+4. What of the difference in motivation? That a person does
+not positively wish for the death of another lessens the severity
+of the blame she deserves; but not by as much as our present
+attitudes to giving aid suggest. The behaviour of the speeding
+motorist is again comparable, for such motorists usually have
+no desire at all to kill anyone. They merely enjoy speeding and
+are indifferent to the consequences. Despite their lack of malice,
+those who kill with cars deserve not only blame but also severe
+punishment.
+5. Finally, the fact that to avoid killing people is normally not
+difficult, whereas to save all one possibly could save is heroic,
+must make an important difference to our attitude to failure to
+do what the respective principles demand. Not to kill is a min-
+227
+Practical Ethics
+imum standard of acceptable conduct we can require of everyone;
+to save all one possibly could is not something that can
+realistically be required, especially not in societies accustomed
+to giving as little as ours do. Given the generally accepted standards,
+people who give, say, $1,000 a year to an overseas aid
+organisation are more aptly praised for above average generosity
+than blamed for giving less than they might. The appropriateness
+of praise and blame is, however, a separate issue from the rightness
+or wrongness of actions. The former evaluates the agent:
+the latter evaluates the action. Perhaps many people who give
+$1,000 really ought to give at least $5,000, but to blame them
+for not giving more could be counterproductive. It might make
+them feel that what is required is too demanding, and if one is
+going to be blamed anyway, one might as well not give anything
+at all.
+(That an ethic that put saving all one possibly can on the
+same footing as not killing would be an ethic for saints or heroes
+should not lead us to assume that the alternative must be an
+ethic that makes it obligatory not to kill, but puts us under no
+obligation to save anyone. There are positions in between these
+extremes, as we shall soon see.)
+Here is a summary of the five differences that normally exist
+between killing and allowing to die, in the context of absolute
+poverty and overseas aid. The lack of an identifiable victim is
+of no moral significance, though it may play an important role
+in explaining our attitudes. The idea that we are directly responsible
+for those we kill, but not for those we do not help,
+depends on a questionable notion of responsibility and may
+need to be based on a controversial theory of rights. Differences
+in certainty and motivation are ethically significant, and show
+that not aiding the poor is not to be condemned as murdering
+them; it could, however, be on a par with killing someone as
+a result of reckless driving, which is serious enough. Finally the
+difficulty of completely discharging the duty of saving all one
+possibly can makes it inappropriate to blame those who fall
+228
+Rich and Poor
+short of this target as we blame those who kill; but this does
+not show that the act itself is less serious. Nor does it indicate
+anything about those who, far from saving all they possibly can,
+make no effort to save anyone.
+These conclusions suggest a new approach. Instead of attempting
+to deal with the contrast between affluence and poverty
+by comparing not saving with deliberate killing, let us
+consider afresh whether we have an obligation to assist those
+whose lives are in danger, and if so, how this obligation applies
+to the present world situation.
+THE OBLIGATION TO ASSIST
+The Argument for an Obligation to Assist
+The path from the library at my university to the humanities
+lecture theatre passes a shallow ornamental pond. Suppose that
+on my way to give a lecture I notice that a small child has fallen
+in and is in danger of drowning. Would anyone deny that I
+ought to wade in and pull the child out? This will mean getting
+my clothes muddy and either cancelling my lecture or delaying
+it until I can find something dry to change into; but compared
+with the avoidable death of a child this is insignificant.
+A plausible principle that would support the judgment that I
+ought to pull the child out is this: if it is in our power to prevent
+something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing
+anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it.
+This principle seems uncontroversial. It will obviously win the
+assent of consequentialists; but non-consequentialists should
+accept it too, because the injunction to prevent what is bad
+applies only when nothing comparably significant is at stake.
+Thus the principle cannot lead to the kinds of actions of which
+non-consequentialists strongly disapprove - serious violations
+of individual rights, injustice, broken promises, and so on. If
+non-consequentialists regard any of these as comparable in
+229
+Practical Ethics
+moral significance to the bad thing that is to be prevented, they
+will automatically regard the principle as not applying in those
+cases in which the bad thing can only be prevented by violating
+rights, doing injustice, breaking promises, or whatever else is
+at stake. Most non-consequentialists hold that we ought to prevent
+what is bad and promote what is good. Their dispute with
+consequentialists lies in their insistence that this is not the sole
+ultimate ethical principle: that it is an ethical principle is not
+denied by any plausible ethical theory.
+Nevertheless the uncontroversial appearance of the principle
+that we ought to prevent what is bad when we can do so without
+sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance is deceptive.
+If it were taken seriously and acted upon, our lives and
+our world would be fundamentally changed. For the principle
+applies, not just to rare situations in which one can save a child
+from a pond, but to the everyday situation in which we can
+assist those living in absolute poverty. In saying this I assume
+that absolute poverty, with its hunger and malnutrition, lack of
+shelter, illiteracy, disease, high infant mortality, and low life
+expectancy, is a bad thing. And I assume that it is within the
+power of the affluent to reduce absolute poverty, without sacrificing
+anything of comparable moral significance. If these two
+assumptions and the principle we have been discussing are correct,
+we have an obligation to help those in absolute poverty
+that is no less strong than our obligation to rescue a drowning
+child from a pond. Not to help would be wrong, whether or
+not it is intrinsically equivalent to killing. Helping is not, as
+conventionally thought, a charitable act that it is praiseworthy
+to do, but not wrong to omit; it is something that everyone
+ought to do.
+This is the argument for an obligation to assist. Set out more
+formally, it would look like this.
+First premise: If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing
+anything of comparable significance, we ought to do it.
+230
+Rich and Poor
+Second premise: Absolute poverty is bad.
+Third premise: There is some absolute poverty we can prevent
+without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance.
+Conclusion: We ought to prevent some absolute poverty.
+The first premise is the substantive moral premise on which
+the argument rests, and I have tried to show that it can be
+accepted by people who hold a variety of ethical positions.
+The second premise is unlikely to be challenged. Absolute
+poverty is, as McNamara put it, 'beneath any reasonable definition
+of human decency' and it would be hard to find a plausible
+ethical view that did not regard it as a bad thing.
+The third premise is more controversial, even though it is
+cautiously framed. It claims only that some absolute poverty
+can be prevented without the sacrifice of anything of comparable
+moral significance. It thus avoids the objection that any aid I
+can give is just 'drops in the ocean' for the point is not whether
+my personal contribution will make any noticeable impression
+on world poverty as a whole (of course it won't) but whether
+it will prevent some poverty. This is all the argument needs to
+sustain its conclusion, since the second premise says that any
+absolute poverty is bad, and not merely the total amount of
+absolute poverty. If without sacrificing anything of comparable
+moral significance we can provide just one family with the
+means to raise itself out of absolute poverty, the third premise
+is vindicated.
+I have left the notion of moral significance unexamined in
+order to show that the argument does not depend on any specific
+values or ethical principles. I think the third premise is true for
+most people living in industrialised nations, on any defensible
+view of what is morally significant. Our affluence means that
+we have income we can dispose of without giving up the basic
+necessities of life, and we can use this income to reduce absolute
+poverty. Just how much we will think ourselves obliged to give
+up will depend on what we consider to be of comparable moral
+231
+Practical Ethics
+significance to the poverty we could prevent: stylish clothes,
+expensive dinners, a sophisticated stereo system, overseas holidays,
+a (second?) car, a larger house, private schools for our
+children, and so on. For a utilitarian, none of these is likely to
+be of comparable significance to the reduction of absolute poverty;
+and those who are not utilitarians surely must, if they
+subscribe to the principle of universalisability, accept that at
+least some of these things are of far less moral significance than
+the absolute poverty that could be prevented by the money they
+cost. So the third premise seems to be true on any plausible
+ethical view - although the precise amount of absolute poverty
+that can be prevented before anything of moral significance is
+sacrificed will vary according to the ethical view one accepts.
+Objections to the Argument
+Taking care of our own. Anyone who has worked to increase
+overseas aid will have come across the argument that we should
+look after those near us, our families, and then the poor in our
+own country, before we think about poverty in distant places.
+No doubt we do instinctively prefer to help those who are
+close to us. Few could stand by and watch a child drown; many
+can ignore a famine in Mrica. But the question is not what we
+usually do, but what we ought to do, and it is difficult to see
+any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or
+community membership, makes a crucial difference to our
+obligations.
+Consider, for instance, racial affinities. Should people of European
+origin help poor Europeans before helping poor Africans?
+Most of us would reject such a suggestion out of hand,
+and our discussion of the principle of equal consideration of
+interests in Chapter 2 has shown why we should reject it: people's
+need for food has nothing to do with their race, and if
+Mricans need food more than Europeans, it would be a violation
+232
+Rich and Poor
+of the principle of equal consideration to give preference to
+Europeans.
+The same point applies to citizenship or nationhood .. Every
+affluent nation has some relatively poor citizens, but absolute
+poverty is limited largely to the poor nations. Those living on
+the streets of Calcutta, or in the drought-prone Sahel region of
+Mrica, are experiencing poverty unknown in the West. Under
+these circumstances it would be wrong to decide that only those
+fortunate enough to be citizens of our own community will
+share our abundance.
+We feel obligations of kinship more strongly than those of
+citizenship. Which parents could give away their last bowl of
+rice if their own children were starving? To do so would seem
+unnatural, contrary to our nature as biologically evolved beings
+- although whether it would be wrong is another question
+altogether. In any case, we are not faced with that situation,
+but with one in which our own children are well-fed, wellclothed,
+well-educated, and would now like new bikes, a stereo
+set, or their own car. In these circumstances any special obligations
+we might have to our children have been fulfilled, and
+the needs of strangers make a stronger claim upon us.
+The element of truth in the view that we should first take
+care of our own, lies in the advantage of a recognised system
+of responsibilities. When families and local communities look
+after their own poorer members, ties of affection and personal
+relationships achieve ends that would otherwise require a large,
+impersonal bureaucracy. Hence it would be absurd to propose
+that from now on we all regard ourselves as equally responsible
+for the welfare of everyone in the world; but the argument for
+an obligation to assist does not propose that. It applies only
+when some are in absolute poverty, and others can help without
+sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance. To allow
+one's own kin to sink into absolute poverty would be to sacrifice
+something of comparable significance; and before that point had
+been reached, the breakdown of the system of family and com-
+233
+Practical Ethics
+munity responsibility would be a factor to weigh the balance
+in favour of a small degree of preference for family and community.
+This small degree of preference is, however, decisively
+outweighed by existing discrepancies in wealth and property.
+Property rights. Do people have a right to private property, a
+right that contradicts the view that they are under an obligation
+to give some of their wealth away to those in absolute poverty?
+According to some theories of rights (for instance, Robert Nozick's),
+provided one has acquired one's property without the
+use of unjust means like force and fraud, one may be entitled
+to enormous wealth while others starve. This individualistic
+conception of rights is in contrast to other views, like the early
+Christian doctrine to be found in the works of Thomas Aquinas,
+which holds that since property exists for the satisfaction of
+human needs, 'whatever a man has in superabundance is owed,
+of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance'. A socialist
+would also, of course, see wealth as belonging to the community
+rather than the individual, while utilitarians, whether socialist
+or not, would be prepared to override property rights to prevent
+great evils.
+Does the argument for an obligation to assist others therefore
+presuppose one of these other theories of property rights, and
+not an individualistic theory like Nozick's? Not necessarily. A
+theory of property rights can insist on our right to retain wealth
+without pronouncing on whether the rich ought to give to the
+poor. Nozick, for example, rejects the use of compulsory means
+like taxation to redistribute income, but suggests that we can
+achieve the ends we deem morally desirable by voluntary
+means. So Nozick would reject the claim that rich people have
+an 'obligation' to give to the poor, in so far as this implies that
+the poor have a right to our aid, but might accept that giving
+is something we ought to do and failing to give, though within
+one's rights, is wrong - for there is more to an ethical life than
+respecting the rights of others.
+234
+Rich and Poor
+The argument for an obligation to assist can survive, with
+only minor modifications, even if we accept an individualistic
+theory of property rights. In any cci.e, however, I do not think
+we should accept such a theory. It leaves too much to chance
+to be an acceptable ethical view. For instance, those whose
+forefathers happened to inhabit some sandy wastes around the
+Persian Gulf are now fabulously wealthy, because oil lay under
+those sands; while those whose forefathers settled on better land
+south of the Sahara live in absolute poverty, because of drought
+and bad harvests. Can this distribution be acceptable from an
+impartial point of view? If we imagine ourselves about to begin
+life as a citizen of either Bahrein or Chad - but we do not know
+which - would we accept the principle that citizens of Bahrein
+are under no obligation to assist people living in Chad?
+Population and the ethics of triage. Perhaps the most serious objection
+to the argument that we have an obligation to assist is
+that since the major cause of absolute poverty is overpopulation,
+helping those now in poverty will only ensure that yet more
+people are born to live in poverty in the future.
+In its most extreme form, this objection is taken to show that
+we should adopt a policy of 'triage'. The term comes from medical
+policies adopted in wartime. With too few doctors to cope
+with all the casualties, the wounded were divided into three
+categories: those wl).O would probably survive without medical
+assistance, those who might survive if they received assistance,
+but otherwise probably would not, and those who even with
+medical assistance probably would not survive. Only those in
+the middle category were given medical assistance. The idea, of
+course, was to use limited medical resources as effectively as
+possible. For those in the first category, medical treatment was
+not strictly necessary; for those in the third category, it was
+likely to be useless. It has been suggested that we should apply
+the same policies to countries, according to their prospects of
+becoming self-sustaining. We would not aid countries that even
+235
+Practical Ethics
+without our help will soon be able to feed their populations.
+We would not aid countries th~t, even with our help, will not
+be able to limit their population to a level they can feed. We
+would aid those countries where our help might make the difference
+between success and failure in bringing food and population
+into balance.
+Advocates of this theory are understandably reluctant to give
+a complete list of the countries they would place into the 'hopeless'
+category; Bangladesh has been cited as an example, and
+so have some of the countries of the Sahel region of Africa.
+Adopting the policy of triage would, then, mean cutting off
+assistance to these countries and allowing famine, disease, and
+natural disasters to reduce the population of those countries to
+the level at which they can provide adequately for all.
+In support of this view Garrett Hardin has offered a metaphor:
+we in the rich nations are like the occupants of a crowded
+lifeboat adrift in a sea full of drowning people. If we try to save
+the drowning by bringing them aboard, our boat will be overloaded
+and we shall all drown. Since it is better that some
+survive than none, we should leave the others to drown. In the
+world today, according to Hardin, 'lifeboat ethics' apply. The
+rich should leave the poor to starve, for otherwise the poor will
+drag the rich down with them.
+Against this view, some writers have argued that overpopulation
+is a myth. The world produces ample food to feed its
+population, and could, according to some estimates, feed ten
+times as many. People are hungry not because there are too
+many but because of inequitable land distribution, the manipulation
+of third world economies by the developed nations,
+wastage of food in the West, and so on.
+Putting aside the controversial issue of the extent to which
+food production might one day be increased, it is true, as we
+have already seen, that the world now produces enough to feed
+its inhabitants - the amount lost by being fed to animals itself
+being enough to meet existing grain shortages. Nevertheless
+236
+Rich and Poor
+population growth calillot be ignored. Bangladesh could, with
+land reform and using better techniques, feed its present population
+of 115 million; but by the year 2000, according to United
+Nations Population Division estiniates, its population will be
+150 million. The enormous effort that will have to go into feeding
+an extra 35 million people, all added to the population
+within a decade, means that Bangladesh must develop at full
+speed ~o stay where it is. Other low-income countries are in
+similar situations. By the end of the century, Ethiopia's population
+is expected to rise from 49 to 66 million; Somalia's from
+7 to 9 million, India's from 853 to 1041 million, Zaire's from
+35 to 49 million.2
+What will happen if the world population continues to grow?
+It cannot do so indefinitely. It will be checked by a decline in
+birth rates or a rise in death rates. Those who advocate triage
+are proposing that we allow the population growth of some
+countries to be checked by a rise in death rates - that is, by
+increased malnutrition, and related diseases; by widespread famines;
+by increased infant mortality; and by epidemics of infectious
+diseases.
+The consequences of triage on this scale are so horrible that
+we are inclined to reject it without further argument. How could
+we sit by our television sets, watching millions starve while we
+do nothing? Would not that be the end of all notions of human
+equality and re,spect for human life? (Those who attack the
+proposals for legalising euthanasia discussed in Chapter 7, saying
+that these proposals will weaken respect for human life,
+would surely do better to object to the idea that we should
+reduce or end our overseas aid programs, for that proposal, if
+2 Ominously, in the twelve years that have passed between editions of this
+book, the signs are that the situation is becoming even worse than was then
+predicted. In 1979 Bangladesh had a population of 80 million and it was
+predicted that by 2000 its population would reach 146 million; Ethiopia's
+was only 29 million, and was predicted to reach 54 million; and India's was
+620 million and predicted to reach 958 million.
+237
+Practical Ethics
+implemented, would be responsible for a far greater loss of
+human life.) Don't people have a right to our assistance, irrespective
+of the consequences?
+Anyone whose initial reaction to triage was not one of repugnance
+would be an unpleasant sort of person. Yet initial
+reactions based on strong feelings are not always reliable guides.
+Advocates of triage are rightly concerned with the long-term
+consequences of our actions. They say that helping the poor
+and starving now merely ensures more poor and starving in the
+future. When our capacity to help is finally unable to cope - as
+one day it must be - the suffering will be greater than it would
+be if we stopped helping now. If this is correct, there is nothing
+we can do to prevent absolute starvation and poverty, in the
+long run, and so we have no obligation to assist. Nor does it
+seem reasonable to hold that under these circumstances people
+have a right to our assistance. If we do accept such a right,
+irrespective of the consequences, we are saying that, in Hardin's
+metaphor, we should continue to haul the drowning into our
+lifeboat until the boat sinks and we all drown.
+If triage is to be rejected it must be tackled on its own ground,
+within the framework of consequentialist ethics. Here it is vulnerable.
+Any consequentialist ethics must take probability of
+outcome into account. A course of action that will certainly
+produce some benefit is to be preferred to an alternative course
+that may lead to a slightly larger benefit, but is equally likely
+to result in no benefit at all. Only if the greater magnitude of
+the uncertain benefit outweighs its uncertainty should we
+choose it. Better one certain unit of benefit than a 10 per cent
+chance of five units; but better a 50 per cent chance of three
+units than a single certain unit. The same principle applies when
+we are trying to avoid evils.
+The policy of triage involves a certain, very great evil: population
+control by famine and disease. Tens of millions would
+die slowly. Hundreds of millions would continue to live in absolute
+poverty, at the very margin of existence. Against this
+238
+Rich and Poor
+prospect, advocates of the policy place a possible evil that is
+greater still: the same process offamine and disease, taking place
+in, say, fifty years' time, when tpe world's popUlation may be
+three times its present level, and the number who will die from
+famine, or struggle on in absolute poverty, will be that much
+greater. The question is: how probable is this forecast that continued
+assistance now will lead to greater disasters in the future?
+Forecasts of population growth are notoriously fallible, and
+theories about the factors that affect it remain speculative. One
+theory, at least as plausible as any other, is that countries pass
+through a 'demographic transition' as their standard of living
+rises. When people are very poor and have no access to modem
+medicine their fertility is high, but population is kept in check
+by high death rates. The introduction of sanitation, modem
+medical techniques, and other improvements reduces the death
+rate, but initially has little effect on the birth rate. Then population
+grows rapidly. Some poor countries, especially in subSaharan
+Africa, are now in this phase. If standards of living
+continue to rise, however, couples begin to realise that to have
+the same number of children surviving to maturity as in the
+past, they do not need to give birth to as many children as their
+parents did. The need for children to provide economic support
+in old age diminishes. Improved education and the emancipation
+and employment of women also reduce the birth-rate, and
+so population growth begins to level off. Most rich nations have
+reached this stage, and their populations are growing only very
+slowly, if at all.
+If this theory is right, there is an alternative to the disasters
+accepted as inevitable by supporters of triage. We can assist poor
+countries to raise the living standards of the poorest members
+of their population. We can encourage the governments of these
+countries to enact land reform measures, improve education,
+and liberate women from a purely child-bearing role. We can
+also help other countries to make contraception and sterilisation
+widely available. There is a fair chance that these measures will
+239
+Practical Ethics
+hasten the onset of the demographic transition and bring population
+growth down to a manageable level. According to
+United Nations estimates, in 1965 the average woman in the
+third world gave birth to six children, and only 8 per cent were
+using some form of contraception; by 1991 the average number
+of children had dropped to just below four, and more than half
+the women in the third world were taking contraceptive measures.
+Notable successes in encouraging the use of contraception
+had occurred in Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil,
+and Bangladesh. This achievement reflected a relatively low
+expenditure in developing countries - considering the size and
+significance of the problem - of $3 billion annually, with only
+20 per cent of this sum coming from developed nations. So
+expenditure in this area seems likely to be highly cost-effective.
+Success cannot be guaranteed; but the evidence suggests that
+we can reduce population growth by improving economic security
+and education, and making contraceptives more widely
+available. This prospect makes triage ethically unacceptable. We
+cannot allow millions to die from starvation and disease when
+there is a reasonable probability that population can be brought
+under control without such horrors.
+Population growth is therefore not a reason against giving
+overseas aid, although it should make us think about the kind
+of aid to give. Instead of food handouts, it may be better to give
+aid that leads to a slowing of population growth. This may mean
+agricultural assistance for the rural poor, or assistance with education,
+or the provision of contraceptive services. Whatever
+kind of aid proves most effective in specific circumstances, the
+obligation to assist is not reduced.
+One awkward question remains. What should we do about
+a poor and already overpopulated country that, for religious or
+nationalistic reasons, restricts the use of contraceptives and refuses
+to slow its population growth? Should we nevertheless
+offer development assistance? Or should we make our offer
+conditional on effective steps being taken to reduce the birth-
+240
+Rich and Poor
+rate? To the latter course, some would object that putting conditions
+on aid is an attempt to impose our own ideas on
+independent sovereign nations. So it is - but is this imposition
+unjustifiable? If the argument for an\Jbligation to assist is sound,
+we have an obligation to reduce absolute poverty; but we have
+no obligation to make sacrifices that, to the best of our knowledge,
+have no prospect of reducing poverty in the long run.
+Hence we have no obligation to assist countries whose governments
+have policies that will make our aid ineffective. This could
+be very harsh on poor citizens of these countries - for they may
+have no say in the government's policies - but we will help
+more people in the long run by using our resources where they
+are most effective. (The same principles may apply, incidentally,
+to countries that refuse to take other steps that could make
+assistance effective - like refusing to reform systems of land
+holding that impose intolerable burdens on poor tenant
+farmers.)
+Leaving it to the government. We often hear that overseas aid
+should be a government responsibility, not left to privately run
+charities. Giving privately, it is said, allows the government to
+escape its responsibilities.
+Since increasing government aid is the surest way of making
+a significant increase to the total amount of aid given, I would
+agree that the governments of affluent nations should give much
+more genuine, no-string~-attached, aid than they give now. Less
+than one-sixth of one per cent of GNP is a scandalously small
+amount for a nation as wealthy as the United States to give.
+Even the official UN target of 0.7 per cent seems much less than
+affluent nations can and should give - though it is a target few
+have reached. But is this a reason against each of us giving what
+we can privately, through voluntary agencies? To believe that
+it is seems to assume that the more people there are who give
+through voluntary agencies, the less likely it is that the government
+will do its part. Is this plausible? The opposite view - that
+241
+Practical Ethics
+if no one gives voluntarily the government will assume that its
+citizens are not in favour of overseas aid, and will cut its programme
+accordingly - is more reasonable. In any case, unless
+there is a definite probability that by refusing to give we would
+be helping to bring about an increase in government assistance,
+refusing to give privately is wrong for the same reason that triage
+is wrong: it is a refusal to prevent a definite evil for the sake of
+a very uncertain gain. The onus of showing how a refusal to
+give privately will make the government give more is on those
+who refuse to give.
+This is not to say that giving privately is enough. Certainly
+we should campaign for entirely new standards for both public
+and private overseas aid. We should also work for fairer trading
+arrangements between rich and poor countries, and less domination
+of the economies of poor countries by multinational
+corporations more concerned about producing profits for shareholders
+back home than food for the local poor. Perhaps it is
+more important to be politically active in the interests of the
+poor than to give to them oneself - but why not do both?
+Unfortunately, many use the view that overseas aid is the government's
+responsibility as a reason against giving, but not as
+a reason for being politically active.
+Too high a standard? The final objection to the argument for an
+obligation to assist is that it sets a standard so high that none
+but a saint could attain it. This objection comes in at least three
+versions. The first maintains that, human nature being what it
+is, we cannot achieve so high a standard, and since it is absurd
+to say that we ought to do what we cannot do, we must reject
+the claim that we ought to give so much. The second version
+asserts that even if we could achieve so high a standard, to do
+so would be undesirable. The third version of the objection is
+that to set so high a standard is undesirable because it will be
+perceived as too difficult to reach, and will discourage many
+from even attempting to do so.
+242
+Rich and Poor
+Those who put forward the first version of the objection are
+often influenced by the fact that we have evolved from a natural
+process in which those with a high degree of concern for their
+own interests, or the interests of their offspring and kin, can be
+expected to leave more descendants in futJre generations, and
+eventually to completely replace any who are entirely altruistic.
+Thus the biologist Garrett Hardin has argued, in support of his
+'lifeboat ethics', that altruism can only exist 'on a small scale,
+over the short term, and within small, intimate groups'; while
+Richard Dawkins has written, in his provocative book The Selfish
+Gene: 'Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal
+love and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts
+which simply do not make evolutionary sense: I have already
+noted, in discussing the objection that we should first take care
+of our own, the very strong tendency for partiality in human
+beings. We naturally have a stronger desire to further our own
+interests, and those of our close kin, than we have to further
+the interests of strangers. What this means is that we would be
+foolish to expect widespread conformity to a standard that demands
+impartial concern, and for that reason it would scarcely
+be appropriate or feasible to condemn all those who fail to reach
+such a standard. Yet to act impartially, though it might be very
+difficult, is not impossible; The commonly quoted assertion that
+'ought' implies 'can' is a reason for rejecting such moral judgments
+as 'You ought to have saved all the people from the
+sinking ship', when in fact if you had taken one more person
+into the lifeboat, it would have sunk and you would not have
+saved any. In that situation, it is absurd to say that you ought
+to have done what you could not possibly do. When we have
+money to spend on luxuries and others are starving, however,
+it is clear that we can all give much more than we do give, and
+we can therefore all come closer to the impartial standard proposed
+in this chapter. Nor is there, as we approach closer to this
+standard, any barrier beyond which we cannot go. For that
+reason there is no basis for saying that the impartial standard
+243
+Practical Ethics
+is mistaken because 'ought' implies 'can' and we cannot be
+impartial.
+The second version of the objection has been put by several
+philosophers during the past decade, among them Susan Wolf
+in a forceful article entitled 'Moral Saints'. Wolf argues that if
+we all took the kind of moral stance defended in this chapter,
+we would have to do without a great deal that makes life interesting:
+opera, gourmet cooking, elegant clothes, and professional
+sport, for a start. The kind of life we come to see as
+ethically required of us would be a single-minded pursuit of the
+overall good, lacking that broad diversity of interests and activities
+that, on a less demanding view, can be part of our ideal of
+a good life for a human being. To this, however, one can respond
+that while the rich and varied life that Wolf upholds as an ideal
+may be the most desirable form of life for a human being in a
+world of plenty, it is wrong to assume that it remains a good
+life in a world in which buying luxuries for oneself means accepting
+the continued avoidable suffering of others. A doctor
+faced with hundreds of injured victims of a train crash can
+scarcely think it defensible to treat fifty of them and then go to
+the opera, on the grounds that going to the opera is part of a
+well-rounded human life. The life-or-death needs of others must
+take priority. Perhaps we are like the doctor in that we live in
+a time when we all have an opportunity to help to mitigate a
+disaster.
+Associated with this second version of the objection is the
+claim that an impartial ethic of the kind advocated here makes
+it impossible to have serious personal relationships based on
+love and friendship; these relationships are, of their nature,
+partial. We put the interests of our loved ones, our family, and
+our friends ahead of those of strangers; if we did not do so,
+would these relationships survive? I have already indicated, in
+the response I gave when considering the objection that we
+should first take care of our own, that there is a place, within
+an impartially grounded moral framework, for recognising some
+244
+Rich and Poor
+degree of partiality for kin, and the same can be said for other
+close personal relationships. Clearly, for most people, personal
+relationships are among the necessities of a flourishing life, and
+to give them up would be to sacrifice something of great moral
+significance. Hence no such sacrifice is required by the principle
+for which I am here arguing.
+The third version of the objection asks: might it not be counterproductive
+to demand that people give up so much? Might
+not people say: 'As I can't do what is morally required anyway,
+I won't bother to give at all: If, however, we were to set a more
+realistic standard, people might make a genuine effort to reach
+it. Thus setting a lower standard might actually result in more
+aid being given.
+It is important to get the status of this third version of the
+objection clear. Its accuracy as a prediction of human behaviour
+is quite compatible with the argument that we are obliged to
+give to the point at which by giving more we sacrifice something
+of comparable moral significance. What would follow from the
+objection is that public advocacy of this standard of giving is
+undesirable. It would mean that in order to do the maximum
+to reduce absolute poverty, we should advocate a standard
+lower than the amount we think people really ought to give.
+Of course we ourselves - those of us who accept the original
+argument, with its hig1;ler standard - would know that we ought
+to do more than we publicly propose people ought to do, and
+we might actually give more than we urge others to give. There
+is no inconsistency here, since in both our private and our public
+behaviour we are trying to do what will most reduce absolute
+poverty.
+For a consequentialist, this apparent conflict between public
+and private morality is always a possibility, and not in itself an
+indication that the underlying principle is wrong. The consequences
+of a principle are one thing, the consequences of publicly
+advocating it another. A variant of this idea is already
+acknowledged by the distinction between the intuitive and crit-
+245
+Practical Ethics
+icallevels of morality, of which I have made use in previous
+chapters. If we think of principles that are suitable for the intuitive
+level of morality as those that should be generally advocated,
+these are the principles that, when advocated, will give
+rise to the best consequences. Where overseas aid is concerned,
+those will be the principles that le-ad to largest amount being
+given by the affluent to the poor.
+Is it true that the standard set by our argument is so high as
+to be counterproductive? There is not much evidence to go by,
+but discussions of the argument, with students and others have
+led me to think it might be. Yet, the conventionally accepted
+standard - a few coins in a collection tin when one is waved
+under your nose - is obviously far too low. What level should
+we advocate? Any figure will be arbitrary, but there may be
+something to be said for a round percentage of one's income
+like, say, 10 per cent - more than a token donation, yet not so
+high as to be beyond all but saints. (This figure has the additional
+advantage of being reminiscent of the ancient tithe, or tenth,
+that was traditionally given to the church, whose responsibilities
+included care of the poor in one's local community. Perhaps
+the idea can be revived and applied to the global community.)
+Some families, of course, will find 10 per cent a considerable
+strain on their finances. Others may be able to give more without
+difficulty. No figure should be advocated as a rigid minimum
+or maximum; but it seems safe to advocate that those earning
+average or above average incomes in affluent societies, unless
+they have an unusually large number of dependents or other
+special needs, oUght to give a tenth of their income to reducing
+absolute poverty. By any reasonable ethical standards this is the
+minimum we ought to do, and we do wrong if we do less.
+246
+9
+INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS
+THE SHELTER
+I T is February 2002, and the world is taking stock of the
+damage done by the nuclear war in the Middle East towards
+the close of the previous year. The global level of radioactivity
+now and for about eight years to come is so high that only those
+living in fallout shelters can be confident of surviving in reasonable
+health. For the rest, who must breathe unfiltered air
+and consume food and water with high levels of radiation, the
+prospects are grim. Probably 10 per cent will die of radiation
+sickness within the next two months; another 30 per cent are
+expected to develop fatal forms of cancer within five years; and
+even the remainder will have rates of cancer ten times higher
+than normal, while the risk that their children will be malformed
+is fifty times greater than before the war.
+The fortunate ones, of course, are those who were far-sighted
+enough to buy a share in tl;le fallout shelters built by real-estate
+speculators as international tensions rose in the late 1990s. Most
+of these shelters were designed as underground villages, each
+with enough accommodation and supplies to provide for the
+needs of 10,000 people for twenty years. The villages are selfgoverning,
+with democratic constitutions that were agreed to
+in advance. They also have sophisticated security systems that
+enable them to admit to the shelter whoever they decide to
+admit, and keep out all others.
+The news that it will not be necessary to stay in the shelters
+for much more than eight years has naturally been greeted with
+247
+Practical Ethics
+joy by the members of an underground community called Fairhaven.
+But it has also led to the first serious friction among
+them. For above the shaft that leads down to Fairhaven, there
+are thousands of people who are not investors in a shelter. These
+people can be seen, and heard, through television cameras installed
+at the entrance. They are pleading to be admitted. They
+know that ifthey can get into a shelter quickly, they will escape
+most of the consequences of exposure to radiation. At first,
+before it was known how long it would be until it was safe to
+return to the outside, these pleas had virtually no support from
+within the shelter. Now, however, the case for admitting at least
+some of them has become much stronger. Since the supplies
+need last only eight years, they will stretch to more than double
+the number of people at present in the shelters. Accommodation
+presents only slightly greater problems: Fairhaven was designed
+to function as a luxury retreat when not needed for a real emergency,
+and it is equipped with tennis courts, swimming pools,
+and a large gymnasium. If everyone were to consent to keep fit
+by doing aerobics in their own living rooms, it would be possible
+to provide primitive but adequate sleeping space for all those
+whom the supplies can stretch to feed.
+So those outside are now not lacking advocates on the inside.
+The most extreme, labelled 'bleeding hearts' by their opponents,
+propose that the shelter should admit an additional 10,000 people
+- as many as it can reasonably expect to feed and house
+until it is safe to return to the outside. This will mean giving up
+all luxury in food and facilities; but the bleeding hearts point
+out that the fate for those who remain on the outside will be
+far worse.
+The bleeding hearts are opposed by some who urge that
+these outsiders generally are an inferior kind of person, for they
+were either not sufficiently far-sighted, or else not sufficiently
+wealthy, to invest in a shelter; hence, it is said, they will cause
+social problems in the shelter, placing an additional strain on
+health, welfare, and educational services and contributing to an
+248
+Insiders and Outsiders
+increase in crime and juvenile delinquency. The opposition to
+admitting outsiders is also supported by a small group who say
+that it would be an injustice to those who have paid for their
+share of the shelter if others who have not paid benefit by it.
+These opponents of admitting others are articulate, but few;
+their numbers are bolstered considerably, however, by many
+who say only that they really enjoy tennis and swimming and
+don't want to give it up.
+Between the bleeding hearts and those who oppose admitting
+any outsiders, stands a middle group: those who think that, as
+an exceptional act of benevolence and charity, some outsiders
+should be admitted, but not so many as to make a significant
+difference to the quality of life within the shelter. They propose
+converting a quarter of the tennis courts to sleeping accommodation,
+and giving up a small public open space that has
+attracted little use anyway. By these means, an extra 500 people
+could be accommodated, which the self-styled 'moderates' think
+would be a sensible figure, sufficient to show that Fairhaven is
+not insensitive to the plight of those less fortunate than its own
+members.
+A referendum is held. There are three proposals: to admit
+10,000 outsiders; to admit 500 outsiders; and to admit no outsiders.
+For which would you vote?
+THE REAL WORLD
+Like the issue of overseas aid, the situation of refugees today
+raises an ethical question about the boundaries of our moral
+community - not, as in earlier chapters, on grounds of species,
+stage of development, or intellectual capacities, but on nationality.
+The great majority of the approximately 15 million refugees
+in the world today are receiving refuge, at least temporarily,
+in the poorer and less developed countries of the world. More
+than 12 million refugees are in the less developed countries of
+Africa, Asia and Latin America. The effect on a poor country of
+249
+Practical Ethics
+receiving a sudden influx of millions of refugees can be gauged
+from the experience of Pakistan during the 1980s, when it was
+home to 2.8 million Afghan refugees - mainly living in the
+North West Frontier province. Although Pakistan did get some
+outside assistance to feed its refugees, the effects of bearing the
+burden of this refugee population for seven years was easily
+seen around refugee villages. Whole hillsides were denuded of
+trees as a result of the collection of wood for fuel for the refugees.
+According to Article 14 of the 1948 United Nations Declaration
+of Human Rights, 'Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy
+in other countries asylum from persecution.' The United
+Nations High Commission for Refugees was established in 1950
+and the commissioner entrusted with the protection of any
+person who is outside the country of his nationality because of a
+well founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion,
+nationality or political opinion, and is unwilling or unable to
+avail himself of the protection of his own government'. This definition
+was originally designed to meet the dislocation caused
+by the Second World War in Europe. It is a narrow one, demanding
+that claims to refugee status be investigated case by case. It
+has failed to cover the large-scale movements of people in times
+of war, famine, or civil disturbance that have occurred since.
+Less than generous responses to refugees are usually justified
+by blaming the victim. It has become common to distinguish
+'genuine refugees' from 'economic refugees' and to claim that
+the latter should receive no assistance. This distinction is dubious,
+for most refugees leave their countries at great risk and
+peril to their lives - crossing seas in leaky boats under attack
+from pirates, or making long journeys over armed borders, to
+arrive penniless in refugee camps. To distinguish between someone
+fleeing from political persecution and someone who flees
+from a land made uninhabitable by prolonged drought is difficult
+to justify when they are in equal need of a refuge. The
+UN definition, which would not classify the latter as a refugee,
+defines away the problem.
+250
+Insiders and Outsiders
+What are the possible durable solutions for refugees in the
+world today? The main option~ are: voluntary repatriation, local
+integration in the country they first flee to, and reiettlement.
+Probably the best and most humane solution for refugees
+would be to return home. Unfortunately for the majority, voluntary
+repatriation is not possible because the conditions that
+caused them to flee have not changed sufficiently. Local settlement,
+where refugees can remain and rebuild their lives in
+neighbouring countries, is too often impossible because of the
+inability of poor, economically struggling - and politically unstable
+- countries to absorb a new population when their indigenous
+people face a daily struggle for survival. This option
+works best where ethnic and tribal links cross national frontiers.
+The difficulty of achieving either voluntary repatriation or
+local settlement leaves resettlement in a more remote country
+as the only remaining option. With the number of refugees
+needing resettlement reaching dimensions never before experienced,
+the main response of the industrialised countries has
+been to institute deterrent policies and close their doors as tight
+as they can. Admittedly, resettlement can never solve the problems
+that make refugees leave their homes. Nor is it, of itself,
+a solution to the world refugee problem. Only about 2 per cent
+of the world's refugees are permanently resettled. Nevertheless,
+the resettlement option is a significant one. It provides markedly
+better lives for a considerable number of individuals, even if not
+for a large proportion of the total number of refugees.
+Resettlement also affects the policies of those countries to
+which refugees first flee. If such countries have no hope that
+refugees will be resettled, they know that their burden will grow
+with every refugee who enters their country. And countries of
+first refuge are among those least able to support additional
+people. When the resettlement option tightens, the countries to
+which refugees first go adopt policies to try to discourage
+potential refugees from leaving their country. This policy will
+include turning people back at the border, making the camps
+251
+Practical Ethics
+as unattractive as possible, and screening the refugees as they
+cross the border.
+Resettlement is the only s.olution for those who cannot return
+to their own countries in the foreseeable future and are only
+welcome temporarily in the country to which they have fled;
+in other words for those who have nowhere to go. There are
+millions who would choose this option if there were countries
+who would take them. For these refugees, resettlement may
+mean the difference between life and death. It certainly is their
+only hope for a decent existence.
+THE EX GRATIA APPROACH
+A widely held attitude is that we are under no moral or legal
+obligation to accept any refugees at all; and if we do accept
+some, it is an indication of our generous and humanitarian
+character. Though popular, this view is not self-evidently morally
+sound. Indeed, it appears to conflict with other attitudes
+that are, if we can judge from what people say, at least as widely
+held, including the belief in the equality of all human beings,
+and the rejection of principles that discriminate on the basis of
+race or national origin.
+All developed nations safeguard the welfare of their residents
+in many ways - protecting their legal rights, educating their
+children, and providing sodal security payments and access to
+medical care, either universally or for those who fall. below a
+defined level of poverty. Refugees receive none of these benefits
+unless they are accepted into the country. Since the overwhelming
+majority of them are not accepted, the overwhelming majority
+will not receive these benefits. But is this distinction in
+the way in which we treat residents and nomesidents ethically
+defensible?
+Very few moral philosophers have given any attention to the
+issue of refugees, even though it is clearly one of the major
+moral issues of our time and raises significant moral questions
+252
+Insiders and Outsiders
+about who is a member of our moral community. Take, for
+example, John Rawls, the Harvard philosopher whose book, A
+Theory of Justice, has been the most widely discussed artount of
+justice since its publication in 1971. This 500-page volume deals
+exclusively with justice within a society, thus ignoring all the
+hard questions about the principles that ought to govern how
+wealthy societies respond to the claims of poorer nations, or of
+outsiders in need.
+One of the few philosophers who has addressed this issue is
+another American, Michael Walzer. His Spheres of Justice opens
+with a chapter entitled 'The Distribution of Membership' in
+which he asks how we constitute the community within which
+distribution takes place. In the course of this chapter Walzer
+seeks to justify something close to the present situation with
+regard to refugee policy. The first question Walzer addresses is:
+do countries have the right to close their borders to potential
+immigrants? His answer is that they do, because without such
+closure, or at least the power to close borders if desired, distinct
+communities cannot exist.
+Given that the decision to close borders can rightfully be
+made, Walzer then goes on to consider how it should be exercised.
+He compares the political community with a club, and
+with a family. Clubs are examples of the ex gratia approach:
+'Individuals may be able to give good reason why they should
+be selected, but no one on the outside has a right to be inside:
+But Walzer considers the analogy imperfect, because states are
+also a bit like families. They are morally bound to open the
+doors of their country - not to anyone who wants to come in,
+perhaps, but to a particular group of outsiders, recognised as
+national or ethnic 'relatives: In this way Walzer uses the analogy
+of a family to justify the principle of family reunion as a
+basis for immigration policy.
+As far as refugees are concerned, however, this is not much
+help. Does a political community have the right to exclude
+destitute, persecuted, and stateless men and women simply be-
+253
+Practical Ethics
+cause they are foreigners? In Walzer's view the community is
+bound by a prindple of mutual aid and he rightly notes that
+this prindple may have wider effects when applied to a community
+than when applied to an individual, because so many
+benevolent actions are open to a community that will only
+marginally affect its members. To take a stranger into one's
+family is something that we might consider goes beyond the
+requirement of mutual aid; but to take a stranger, or even many
+strangers, into the community is far less burdensome.
+In Walzer's view, a nation with vast unoccupied lands - he
+takes Australia as his example, though by assumption rather
+than by any examination of Australia's water and soil resources
+- may indeed have an obligation in mutual aid to take in people
+from densely populated, famine-stricken lands of Southeast
+Asia. The choice for the Australian community would then be
+to give up whatever homogeneity their sodety possessed, or to
+retreat to a small portion of the land they occupied, yielding
+the remainder to those who needed it.
+Although not accepting any general obligation on affluent
+nations to admit refugees, Walzer does uphold the popular prindple
+of asylum. In accordance with this prindple, any refugee
+who manages to reach the shores of another country can claim
+asylum and cannot be deported back to a country in which he
+may be persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or
+political opinion. It is interesting that this prindple is so widely
+supported, while the obligation to accept refugees is not. The
+distinction drawn may reflect some of the prindples discussed
+in previous chapters of this book. The prindple of proximity
+clearly plays a role - the person seeking asylum is just physically
+closer to us than those in other countries. Perhaps our stronger
+support for asylum rests in part on the distinction between an
+act (deporting a refugee who has arrived here) and an omission
+(not offering a place to a refugee in a distant camp). It could
+also be an instance of the difference between doing something
+to an identifiable individual, and doing something that we know
+254
+Insiders and Outsiders·
+will have the same effect on someone, but we will never be
+able to tell on whom it has this effect. A further factor is probably
+the relatively small number of people who are actually able to
+arrive in order to seek asylum, in contrast to the much larger
+number of refugees of whose existence we are aware, although
+they are far from us. This is the 'drops in the ocean' argument
+that was discussed in connection with overseas aid. We can,
+perhaps, cope with all the asylum seekers, but no matter how
+many refugees we admit, the problem will still be there. As in
+the case of the parallel argument against giving overseas aid,
+this overlooks the fact that in admitting refugees, we enable
+spedfic individuals to live decent lives and thus are doing something
+that is worthwhile, no matter how many other refugees
+remain whom we are unable to help.
+Moderately liberal governments, prepared to heed at least
+some humanitarian sentiments, act much as Walzer suggests
+they should. They hold that communities have a right to dedde
+whom they will admit; the claims of family reunion come first,
+and those of outsiders from the national ethnic group - should
+the state have an ethnic identity - next. The admission of those
+in need is an ex gratia act. The right of asylum is usually respected,
+as long as the numbers are relatively small. Refugees,
+unless they can appeal to some spedal sense of political affinity,
+have no real claim to be accepted, and have to throw themselves
+on the charity of the receiving country. All of this is in general
+agreement with immigration policy in the Western democrades.
+As far as refugees are concerned, the ex gratia approach is the
+current orthodoxy.
+THE FALLACY OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
+The current orthodoxy rests on vague and usually unargued
+assumptions about the community's right to determine its membership.
+A consequentialist would hold, instead, that immigration
+policy should be based squarely on the interests of all those
+255
+Practical Ethics
+affected. Where the interests of different parties conflict, we
+should be giving equal consideration to all interests, which
+would mean that more pressing or more fundamental interests
+take precedence over less fundamental interests. The first step
+in applying the principle of equal consideration of interests is
+to identify those whose interests are affected. The first and most
+obvious group is the refugees themselves. Their most pressing
+and fundamental interests are clearly at stake. Life in a refugee
+camp offers little prospect of anything more than a bare subsistence,
+and sometimes hardly even that. Here is one observer's
+impression of a camp on the Thai-Cambodian border in 1986.
+At the time the camp was home for 144,000 people:
+The visit of a foreigner causes a ripple of excitement. People
+gather round and ask eamestly about the progress of their case
+for resettlement, or share their great despair at continual rejection
+by the selection bodies for the various countries which will accept
+refugees .... People wept as they spoke, most had an air of quiet
+desperation .... On rice distribution day, thousands of girls and
+women mill in the distribution area, receiving the weekly rations
+for their family. From the bamboo observation tower the ground
+below was just a swirling sea of black hair and bags of rice hoisted
+onto heads for the walk home. A proud, largely farming people,
+forced to become dependent on UN rations of water, tinned fish
+and broken rice, just to survive.
+Most of these people could hope for no significant change in
+their lives for many years to come. Yet I, along with the others
+from outside, could get into a car and drive out of the camp,
+return to Taphraya or Aran, drink iced water, eat rice or noodles
+at the roadside restaurant at the comer, and observe life passing
+by. Those simplest parts of life were invested with a freedom I'd
+never valued so highly.
+At the same time, refugees accepted into another country have
+a good chance of establishing themselves and leading a life as
+satisfactory and fulfilling as most of us. Sometimes the interests
+of the refugees in being accepted are as basic as the interest in
+life itself. In other cases the situation may not be one of life or
+256
+Insiders and Outsiders
+death, but it will still profoundly affect the whole course of a
+person's life.
+The next most directly affected group is the residents of the
+recipient nation. How much they will be affected will vary according
+to how many refugees are taken, how well they will fit
+into the community, the current state of the national economy,
+and so on. Some residents will be more affected than others:
+some will find themselves competing with the refugees for jobs,
+and others will not; some will find themselves in a neighborhood
+with a high population of refugees, and others will not;
+and this list could be continued indefinitely, too.
+We should not assume that residents of the recipient nation
+will be affected for the worse: the economy may receive a boost
+from a substantial intake of refugees, and many residents may
+find business opportunities in providing for their needs. Others
+may enjoy the more cosmopolitan atmosphere created by new
+arrivals from other countries: the exotic food shops and restaurants
+that spring up, and in the long run, the benefits of different
+ideas and ways of living. One could argue that in many ways
+refugees make the best immigrants. They have nowhere else to
+go and must commit themselves totally to their new country,
+unlike immigrants who can go home when or if they please.
+The fact that they have survived and escaped from hardship
+suggests stamina, initiative, and resources that would be of great
+benefit to any receiving country. Certainly some refugee groups,
+for instance the Indo-Chinese, have displayed great entrepreneurial
+vigour when resettled in countries like Australia or the
+United States.
+There are also some other possible and more diffuse consequences
+that we at least need to think about. For example, it
+has been argued that to take large numbers of refugees from
+poor countries into affluent ones will simply encourage the flow
+of refugees in the future. If poor and over-populated countries
+can get rid of their surplus people to other countries, they will
+have a reduced incentive to do something about the root causes
+257
+Practical Ethics
+of the poverty of their people, and to slow population growth.
+The end result could be just as much suffering as if we had
+never taken the refugees in the first place.
+Consequences also arise from not taking significant numbers
+of refugees. Economic stability and world peace depend on international
+co-operation based on some measure of respect and
+trust; but the resource-rich and not over-populated countries
+of the world cannot expect to win the respect or trust of the
+poorest and most crowded countries if they leave them to cope
+with most of the refugee problem as best they can.
+So we have a complex mix of interests - some definite, some
+highly speculative - to be considered. Equal interests are to be
+given equal weight, but which way does the balance lie? Consider
+a reasonably affluent nation that is not desperately overcrowded,
+like Australia (I take Australia merely as an example
+of a country with which I am familiar; one could, with minor
+modifications, substitute other affluent nations.) In the early
+1990s Australia is admitting about 12,000 refugees a year, at a
+time when there are several million refugees in refugee camps
+around the world, many of whom have no hope of returning
+to their previous country and are seeking resettlement in a country
+like Australia. Now let us imagine that Australia decides to
+accept twice as many refugees each year as it has in fact been
+doing. What can we say are the definite consequences of such
+a decision, and what are the possible consequences?
+The first definite consequence would be that each year 12,000
+more refugees would have been out of the refugee camps and
+settled in Australia, where they could expect, after a few years
+of struggle, to share in the material comforts, civil rights, and
+political security of that country. So 12,000 people would have
+been very much better off.
+The second definite consequence would have been that each
+year Australia would have had 12,000 more immigrants, and
+that these additional immigrants would not have been selected
+258
+Insiders and Outsiders
+on the basis of possessing skills needed in the Australian economy.
+They would therefore place an additional demand on welfare
+services. Some long-term residents of Australia may be
+disconcerted by the changes that take place in their neighborhood,
+as significant numbers of people from a very different
+culture move in. More refugees would make some impact on
+initial post-arrival services such as the provision of English language
+classes, housing in the first few months, job placement,
+and retraining. But the differences would be minor - after all,
+a decade earlier, Australia had accepted approximately 22,000
+refugees a year. There were no marked adverse effects from this
+larger intake.
+At this point, if we are considering the definite consequences
+of a doubled refugee intake, in terms of having a significant
+impact on the interests of others, we come to a halt. We may
+wonder if the increased numbers will lead to a revival of racist
+feeling in the community. We could debate the impact on the
+Australian environment. We might guess that a larger intake of
+refugees will encourage others, in the country from which the
+refugees came, to become refugees themselves in order to better
+their economic condition. Or we could refer hopefully to the
+contribution towards international goodwill that may flow from
+a country like Australia easing the burden ofless well-off nations
+in supporting refugees. But all of these consequences are highly
+speculative.
+Consider the environmental impact of an extra 12,000 refugees.
+Certainly, more people will put some additional pressure
+on the environment. This means that the increased number of
+refugees accepted will be just one item in a long list of factors
+that includes the natural rate of reproduction; the government's
+desire to increase exports by encouraging an industry based on
+converting virgin forests to wood-chips; the subdivision of rural
+land in scenic areas for holiday houses; the spurt in popularity
+of vehicles suitable for off-road use; the development of ski
+259
+Practical Ethics
+resorts in sensitive alpine areas; the use of no-deposit bottles
+and other containers that increase litter - the list could be prolonged
+indefinitely.
+If as a community we allow these other factors to have their
+impact on the environment, while appealing to the need to
+protect our environment as a reason for restricting our intake
+of refugees to its present leveL we are implicitly giving less
+weight to the interests of refugees in coming to Australia than
+we give to the interests of Australian residents in having holiday
+houses, roaring around the countryside in four-wheeldrive
+vehicles, going skiing, and throwing away their drink
+containers without bothering to return them for recycling. Such
+a weighting is surely morally outrageous, so flagrant a violation
+of the principle of equal consideration of interests that I
+trust it has only to be exposed in order to be seen as indefensible.
+The other arguments are even more problematical. No one
+can really say whether doubling Australia's intake of refugees
+would have any effect at all on the numbers who might consider
+fleeing their own homes; nor is it possible to predict the consequences
+in terms of international relations. As with the similar
+argument linking overseas aid with increased population, in a
+situation in which the definite consequences of the proposed
+additional intake of refugees are positive, it would be wrong to
+decide against the larger intake on such speculative grounds,
+especially since the speculative factors point in different directions.
+So there is a strong case for Australia to double its refugee
+intake. But there was nothing in the argument that relied on
+the specific level of refugees now being taken by Australia. If
+this argument goes through, it would also seem to follow that
+Australia should be taking not an extra 12,000 refugees, but an
+extra 24,000 refugees a year. Now the argument seems to be
+going too far, for it can then be reapplied to this new level:
+should Australia be taking 48,000 refugees? We can double and
+260
+Insiders and Outsiders
+redouble the intakes of all the major nations of the developed
+world, and the refugee camps around the world will still not
+be empty. Indeed, the number of refugees who would seek
+resettlement in the developed countries is not fixed, and probably
+there is some truth in the claim that if all those now in
+refugee camps were to be accepted, more refugees would arrive
+to take their places. Since the interests of the refugees in resettlement
+in a more prosperous country will always be greater
+than the conflicting interests of the residents of those countries
+it would seem that the principle of equal consideration of in~
+terests points to a world in which all countries continue to accept
+refugees until they are reduced to the same standard of poverty
+and overcrowding as the third world countries from which the
+refugees are seeking to flee.
+Is this a reason for rejecting the original argument? Does it
+mean that if we follow the original argument through it leads
+to consequences that we cannot possibly accept; and therefore
+there must be a flaw in the argument that has led us to such
+an absurd conclusion? This does not follow. The argument
+we put forward for doubling Australia'S refugee intake does
+not really imply that the doubled intake should then be redoubled,
+and redoubled again, ad infinitum. At some point in
+this process - perhaps when the refugee intake is four times
+what it now is, or perhaps when it is sixty-four times its
+present level - the adverse consequences that are now only
+speculative possibilities would become probabilities or virtual
+certainties.
+There would come a point at which, for instance, the resident
+community had eliminated all luxuries that imperilled the environment,
+and yet the basic needs of the expanding population
+were putting such pressure on fragile ecological systems that a
+further expansion would do irreparable harm. Or there might
+come a point at which tolerance in a multicultural society was
+breaking down because of resentment among the resident community,
+whose members believed that their children were un-
+261
+Pradical Ethics
+able to get jobs because of competition from the hard-working
+new arrivals; and this loss of tolerance might reach the point
+at which it was a serious danger to the peace and security of
+all previously accepted refugees and other imI:p.igrants from different
+cultures. When any such point had been reached, the
+balance of interests would have swung against a further increase
+in the intake of refugees.
+The present refugee intake might increase quite dramatically
+before any consequences like those mentioned above were
+reached; and some may take this as a consequence sufficiently
+unacceptable to support the rejection of our line of argument.
+Certainly anyone starting from the assumption that the status
+quo must be roughly right will be likely to take that view.
+But the status quo is the outcome of a system of national
+selfishness and political expediency, and not the result of a
+considered attempt to work out the moral obligations of the
+developed nations in a world with 15 million refugees.
+It would not be difficult for the nations of the developed world
+to move closer towards fulfilling their moral obligations to refugees.
+There is no objective evidence to show that doubling
+their refugee intake would cause them any harm whatsoever.
+Much present evidence, as well as past experience, points the
+other way, suggesting that they and their present population
+would probably benefit.
+But, the leaders will cry, what is moral is not what is
+politically acceptable! This is a spurious excuse for inaction.
+In many policy areas, presidents and prime ministers are quite
+happy to try to convince the electorate of what is right - of
+the need to tighten belts in order to balance budgets, or to
+desist from drinking and driving. They could just as easily
+gradually increase their refugee intakes, monitoring the effects
+of the increase through careful research. In this way they
+would fulfill their moral and geopolitical obligations and still
+benefit their own communities.
+262
+Insiders and Outsiders
+SHELTERS AND REFUGES
+How would you have voted, in the referendum conducted in
+Fairhaven in 1998? I think most people would have been prepared
+to sacrifice not just a quarter, but all of the tennis courts
+to the greater need of those outside. But if you would have
+voted with the 'bleeding hearts' in that situation, it is difficult
+to see how you can disagree with the conclusion that affluent
+nations should be taking far, far more refugees than they are
+taking today. For the situation of refugees is scarcely better than
+that of the outsiders in peril from nuclear radiation; and the
+luxuries that we would have to sacrifice are surely no greater.
+263
+10
+THE ENVIRONMENT
+A river tumbles through forested ravines and rocky gorges towards
+the sea. The state hydro-electricity commission sees the
+falling water as untapped energy. Building a dam across one of
+the gorges would provide three years of employment for a thousand
+people, and longer-term employment for twenty or thirty.
+The dam would store enough water to ensure that the state could
+economically meet its energy needs for the next decade. This
+would encourage the establishment of energy-intensive industry
+thus further contributing to employment and economic growth.
+The rough terrain of the river valley makes it accessible only to
+the reasonably fit, but it is nevertheless a favoured spot for bushwalking.
+The river itself attracts the more daring whitewater
+rafters. Deep in the sheltered valleys are stands of rare Huon
+Pine, many of the trees being over a thousand years old. The
+valleys and gorges are home to many birds and animals, including
+an endangered species of marsupial mouse that has seldom
+been found outside the valley. There may be other rare plants
+and animals as well, but no one knows, for scientists are yet to
+investigate the region fully.
+S ~ 0 U L.D the dam be built? This is one example of a situation
+m WhICh we must choose between very different sets of
+values. The description is loosely based on a proposed dam on
+the Franklin River, in the southwest of Australia's island state,
+Tasmania - an account of the outcome can be found in Chapter
+II, but I have deliberately altered some details, and the above
+description should be treated as a hypothetical case. Many other
+examples would have posed the choice between values equally
+well: logging virgin forests, building a paper mill that will release
+pollutants into coastal waters, or opening a new mine on the
+264
+The Environment
+edge of a national park. A different set of examples would raise
+related, but slightly different, issues: the use of products that
+contribute to the depletion of the ozone layer, or to the greenhouse
+effect; building more nuclear power stations; and so on.
+In this chapter I explore the values that underlie debates about
+these decisions, and the example I have presented can serve as
+a point of reference to these debates. I shall focus particularly
+on the values at issue in controversies about the preservation
+of wilderness because here the fundamentally different values
+ofthe two parties are most apparent. When we are talking about
+flooding a river valley, the choice before us is starkly clear.
+In general we can say that those who favour building the
+dam are valuing employment and a higher per capita income
+for the state above the preservation of wilderness, of plants and
+animals (both common ones and members of an endangered
+species), and of opportunities for outdoor recreational activities.
+Before we begin to scrutinise the values of those who would
+have the dam build'and those who would not, however, let us
+briefly investigate the origins of modern attitudes towards the
+natural world.
+THE WESTERN TRADITION
+Western attitudes to nature grew out of a blend of those of the
+Hebrew people, as represented in the early books of the Bible,
+and the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, particularly that of
+Aristotle. In contrast to some other ancient traditions, for example,
+those of India, both the Hebrew and the Greek traditions
+made human beings the centre of the moral universe - indeed
+not merely the centre, but very often, the entirety of the morally
+significant features of this world.
+The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the
+Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine
+plan:
+265
+Practical Ethics
+And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness:
+and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and
+over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every
+creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.
+So God created man in his own image, in the image of God
+created he him; male and female created he them.
+And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful,
+and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have
+dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air,
+and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.
+Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion';
+and those concerned about the environment claim that
+it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other
+living things, but rather as a directive to look after them, on
+God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which
+we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text
+itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set
+when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to
+punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that
+people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing
+worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition
+of the grant of dominion in more ominous language: 'And the
+fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of
+the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth
+upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your
+hands are they delivered:
+The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and
+dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper;
+it is, in fact, in accordance with a God-given decree.
+The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts
+about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God
+care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an
+Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but
+it was only a rhetorical question - he took it for granted that
+the answer must be negative, and the command was to be
+explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared
+266
+The Environment
+this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament
+in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs
+to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended
+to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals
+and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'.
+When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also
+absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural
+world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy
+by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas
+Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology
+with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a
+hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for
+the sake of those with more:
+Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake
+of man - domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or
+at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life,
+such as clothing and various tools.
+Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably
+true that she has made all animals for the sake of man.
+In his own major work, the Summa Theologica, Aquinas followed
+this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding
+that the position accords with God's command, as given in
+Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for
+sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility
+of sinning against non-human animals, or against the
+natural world.
+This was the thinking of mainstream Christianity for at least
+its first eighteen centuries. There we!e gentler spirits, certainly,
+like Basil, John Chrysostom, and Francis of Assisi, but for most
+of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the
+dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising the major
+features of this dominant Western tradition, because these features
+can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different
+views of the natural environment.
+According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural
+267
+Practical Ethics
+world exists for the benefit of human beings. God gave human
+beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care
+how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important
+members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and
+the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful. unless
+by this destruction we harm human beings.
+Harsh as this tradition is, it does not rule out concern for the
+preservation of nature, as long as that concern can be related
+to human well-being. Often, of course, it can be. One could,
+entirely within the limits of the dominant Western tradition,
+oppose nuclear power on the grounds that nuclear fuel. whether
+in bombs or power stations, is so hazardous to human life that
+the uranium is better left in the ground. Similarly, many arguments
+against pollution, the use of gases harmful to the ozone
+layer, the burning of fossil fuels, and the destruction of forests,
+could be couched in terms of the harm to human health and
+welfare from the pollutants, or the changes to the climate that
+will occur as a result of the use of fossil fuels and the loss of
+forest. The greenhouse effect - to take just one danger to our
+environment - threatens to bring about a rise in sea level that
+will inundate low-lying coastal areas. This includes the fertile
+and densely populated Nile delta in Egypt. and the Bengal delta
+region, which covers 80 per cent of Bangladesh and is already
+subject to violent seasonal storms that cause disastrous floods.
+The homes and livelihood of 46 million people are at risk in
+these two deltas alone. A rise in sea level could also wipe out
+entire island nations such as the Maldives, none of which is
+more than a metre or two above sea level. So it is obvious that
+even within a human-centred moral framework, the preservation
+of our environment is a value of the greatest possible
+importance.
+From the standpoint of a form of civilisation based on growing
+crops and grazing animals, wilderness may seem to be a wasteland,
+a useless area that needs clearing in order to render it
+productive and valuable. There was a time when villages sur-
+268
+The Environment
+rounded by farmland seemed like oases of cultivation amongst
+the deserts of forest or rough mountain slopes. Now, however,
+a different metaphor is more appropriate: the remnants of true
+wilderness left to us are like islands amidst a sea of human
+activity that threatens to engulf them. This gives wilderness a
+scarcity value that provides the basis for a strong argument for
+preservation, even within the terms of a human-centred ethic.
+That argument becomes much stronger still when we take a
+long-term view. To this immensely important aspect of environmental
+values we shall now tum.
+FUTURE GENERATIONS
+A virgin forest is the product of all the millions of years that
+have passed since the beginning of our planet. If it is cut down,
+another forest may grow up, but the continuity has been broken.
+The disruption in the natural life cycles of the plants and animals
+means that the forest will never again be as it would have been,
+had it not been cut. The gains made from cutting the forest -
+employment. profits for business, export earnings, and cheaper
+cardboard and paper for packaging - are short-term benefits.
+Even if the forest is not cut. but drowned to build a dam to
+create electricity, it is likely that the benefits will last for only a
+generation or two: after that new technology will render such
+methods of generating power obsolete. Once the forest is cut or
+drowned, however, the link with the past has gone for ever.
+That is a cost that will be borne by every generation that succeeds
+us on this planet. It is for that reason that environmentalists are
+right to speak of wilderness as a 'world heritage'. It is something
+that we have inherited from our ancestors, and that we must
+preserve for our descendants, if they are to have it at all.
+In contrast to many more stable, tradition-oriented human
+societies, our modem political and cultural ethos has great difficulty
+in recognising long-term values. Politicians are notorious
+for not looking beyond the next election; but even if they do,
+269
+Pradical Ethics
+they will find their economic advisers telling them that anything
+to be gained in the future should be discounted to such a degree
+as to make it easy to disregard the long-term future altogether.
+Economists have been taught to apply a discount rate to all
+future goods. In other words, a million dollars in twenty years
+is not worth a million dollars today, even when we allow for
+inflation. Economists will discount the value of the million dollars
+by a certain percentage, usually corresponding to the real
+long-term interest rates. This makes economic sense, because if
+I had a thousand dollars today I could invest it so that it would
+be worth more, in real terms, in twenty years. But the use of a
+discount rate means that values gained one hundred years hence
+rank very low, in comparison with values gained today; and
+values gained one thousand years in the future scarcely count
+at all. This is not because of any uncertainty about whether
+there will be human beings or other sentient creatures inhabiting
+this planet at that time, but merely because of the cumulative
+effect of the rate of return on money invested now. From the
+standpoint of the priceless and timeless values of wilderness,
+however, applying a discount rate gives us the wrong answer.
+There are some things that, once lost, no amount of money can
+regain. Thus to justify the destruction of an ancient forest on
+the grounds that it will earn us substantial export income is
+unsound, even if we could invest that income and increase its
+value from year to year; for no matter how much we increased
+its value, it could never buy back the link with the past represented
+by the forest.
+This argument does not show that there can be no justification
+for cutting any virgin forests, but it does mean that any such
+justification must take full account of the value of the forests to
+the generations to come in the more remote future, as well as
+in the more immediate future. This value will obviously be
+related to the particular scenic or biological significance of the
+forest; but as the proportion of true wilderness on the earth
+dwindles, every part of it becomes significant) because the op-
+270
+The Environment
+portunities for experiencing wilderness become scarce, and the
+likelihood of a reasonable selection of the major forms of wilderness
+being preserved is reduced.
+Can we be sure that future generations will appreciate wilderness?
+Perhaps they will be happier sitting in air-conditioned
+shopping malls, playing computer games more sophisticated
+than any we can imagine? That is possible. But there are
+several reasons why we should not give this possibility too
+much weight. First, the trend has been in the opposite direction:
+the appreciation of wilderness has never been higher
+than it is today, especially among those nations that have
+overcome the problems of poverty and hunger and have relatively
+little wilderness left. Wilderness is valued as something
+of immense beauty, as a reservoir of scientific knowledge still
+to be gained, for the recreational opportunities that it provides,
+and because many people just like to know that something
+natural is still there, relatively untouched by modem civilisation.
+If, as we all hope, future generations are able to provide
+for the basic needs of most people, we can expect that for
+centuries to come, they, too, will value wilderness for the
+same reasons that we value it.
+Arguments for preservation based on the beauty of wilderness
+are sometimes treated as if they were of little weight because
+they are 'merely aesthetic'. That is a mistake. We go to great
+lengths to preserve the artistic treasures of earlier human civilisations.
+It is difficult to imagine any economic gain that we
+would be prepared to accept as adequate compensation for, for
+instance, the destruction of the paintings in the Louvre. How
+should we compare the aesthetic value of wilderness with that
+of the paintings in the Louvre? Here, perhaps, judgment does
+become inescapably subjective; so I shall report my own experiences.
+I have looked at the paintings in the Louvre, and in
+many of the other great galleries of Europe and the United
+States. I think I have a reasonable sense of appreciation of the
+271
+Practical Ethics
+fine arts; yet I have not had, in any museum, experiences that
+have filled my aesthetic senses in the way that they are filled
+when I walk in a natural setting and pause to survey the view
+from a rocky peak overlooking a forested valley, or sit by a
+stream tumbling over moss-covered boulders set amongst tall
+tree-ferns, growing in the shade of the forest canopy. I do not
+think I am alone in this; for many people, wilderness is the
+source of the greatest feelings of aesthetic appreciation, rising
+to an almost spiritual intensity.
+It may nevertheless be true that this appreciation of nature
+will not be shared by people living a century or two hence. But
+if wilderness can be the source of such deep joy and satisfaction,
+that would be a great loss. To some extent, whether future
+generations value wilderness is up to us; it is, at least, a decision
+we can influence. By our preservation of areas of wilderness,
+we provide an opportunity for generations to come, and by the
+books and films we produce, we create a culture that can be
+handed on to our children and their children. If we feel that a
+walk in the forest, with senses attuned to the appreciation of
+such an experience, is a more deeply rewarding way to spend
+a day than playing computer games, or if we feel that to carry
+one's food and shelter in a backpack for a week while hiking
+through an unspoiled natural environment will do more to develop
+character than watching television for an equivalent period,
+then we ought to encourage future generations to have a
+feeling for nature; if they end up preferring computer games,
+we shall have failed.
+Finally, if we preserve intact the amount of wilderness that
+exists now, future generations will at least have the choice of
+getting up from their computer games and going to see a world
+that has not been created by human beings. If we destroy the
+wilderness, that choice is gone forever. Just as we rightly spend
+large sums to preserve cities like Venice, even though future
+generations conceivably may not be interested in such architectural
+treasures, so we should preserve wilderness even
+272
+I
+I
+I:
+The Environment
+though it is possible that future generations will care little for
+it. Thus we will not wrong future generations, as we have been
+wronged by members of past generations whose thoughtless
+actions have deprived us of the possibility of seeing such animals
+as the dodo, Steller's sea cow, or the thylacine, the Tasmanian
+marsupial 'tiger'. We must take care not to inflict equally irreparable
+losses on the generations to follow us.
+Here, too, the effort to mitigate the greenhouse effect deserves
+the highest priority. For if by 'wilderness' we mean that part of
+our planet that is unaffected by human activity, perhaps it is
+already too late: there may be no wilderness left anywhere on
+our planet. Bill McKibben has argued that by depleting the
+ozone layer and increasing the amount of carbon dioxide in the
+atmosphere, we have already brought about the change encapsulated
+in the title of his book - The End of Nature: 'By changing
+the weather, we make every spot on earth man-made and artificial.
+We have deprived nature of its independence, and that
+is fatal to its meaning. Nature's independence is its meaning;
+without it there is nothing but us.'
+This is a profoundly disturbing thought. Yet McKibben does
+not develop it in order to suggest that we may as well give up
+our efforts to reverse the trend. It is true that in one sense of
+the term, 'nature' is finished. We have passed a watershed in
+the history of our planet. As McKibben says, 'we live in a postnatural
+world'. Nothing can undo that; the climate of our planet
+is under our influence. We still have, however, much that we
+value in nature, and it may still b,e possible to save what is left.
+Thus a human-centred ethic can be the basis of powerful
+arguments for what we may call 'environmental values'. Such
+an ethic does not imply that economic growth is more important
+than the preservation of wilderness; on the contrary, it is quite
+compatible with a human-centred ethic to see economic growth
+based on the exploitation of irreplaceable resources as something
+that brings gains to the present generation, and possibly
+the next generation or two, but at a price that will be paid by
+273
+Practical Ethics
+every generation to come. But in the light of our discussion of
+speciesism in Chapter 3, it should also be clear that it is wrong
+to limit ourselves to a human-centred ethic. We now need to
+consider more fundamental challenges to this traditional Western
+appro~.s;h to environmental issues.
+IS THERE VALUE BEYOND SENTIENT BEINGS?
+Although some debates about significant environmental issues
+can be conducted by appealing only to the long-term interests
+of our own species, in any serious exploration of environmental
+values a central issue will be the question of intrinsic value. We
+have already seen that it is arbitrary to hold that only human
+beings are of intrinsic value. If we find value in human conscious
+experiences, we cannot deny that there is value in at least some
+experiences of non-human beings. How far does intrinsic value
+extend? To all, but only, sentient beings? Or beyond the boundary
+of sentience?
+To explore this question a few remarks on the notion of'intrinsic
+value' will be helpful. Something is of intrinsic value if
+it is good or desirable in itself; the contrast is with 'instrumental
+value', that is, value as a means to some other end or purpose.
+Our own happiness, for example, is of intrinsic value, at least
+to most of us, in that we desire it for its own sake. Money, on
+the other hand, is only of instrumental value to us. We want it
+because of the things we can buy with it, but if we were marooned
+on a desert island, we would not want it. (Whereas
+happiness would be just as important to us on a desert island
+as anywhere else.)
+Now consider again for a moment the issue of damming the
+river described at the beginning of this chapter. If the decision
+were to be made on the basis of human interests alone, we
+would balance the economic benefits of the dam for the citizens
+of the state against the loss for bushwalkers, scientists, and
+others, now and in the future, who value the preservation of
+274
+The Environment
+the river in its natural state. We have already seen that because
+this calculation includes an indefinite number of future generations,
+the loss of the wild river is a much greater cost than
+we might at first imagine. Even so, once we broaden the basis
+of our decision beyond the interests of human beings, we have
+much more to set against the economic benefits of building the
+dam. Into the calculations must now go the interests of all the
+non-human animals who live in the area that will be flooded.
+A few may be able to move to a neighboring area that is suitable,
+but wilderness is not full of vacant niches awaiting an occupant;
+if there is territory that can sustain a native animaL it is most
+likely already occupied. Thus most of the animals living in the
+flooded area will die: either they will be drowned, or they will
+starve. Neither drowning nor starvation are easy ways to die,
+and the suffering involved in these deaths should, as we have
+seen, be given no less weight than we would give to an equivalent
+amount of suffering experienced by human beings. This
+will significantly increase the weight of considerations against
+building the dam.
+What of the fact that the animals will die, apart from the
+suffering that will occur in the course of dying? As we have
+seen, one can, without being guilty of arbitrary discrimination
+on the basis of species, regard the death of a non-human animal
+who is not a person as less significant than the death of a person,
+since humans are capable of foresight and forward planning in
+ways that non-human animals are not. This difference between
+causing death to a person and to a being who is not a person
+does not mean that the death of an animal who is not a person
+should be treated as being of no account. On the contrary,
+utilitarians will take into account the loss that death inflicts on
+the animals - the loss of all their future existence, and the
+experiences that their future lives would have contained. When
+a proposed dam would flood a valley and kill thousands, perhaps
+millions, of sentient creatures, these deaths should be given
+great importance in any assessment of the costs and benefits of
+275
+Practical Ethics
+building the dam. For those utilitarians who accept the total
+view discussed in Chapter 4, moreover, if the dam destroys the
+habitat in which the animals lived, then it is relevant that this
+loss is a continuing one. If the dam is not built, animals will
+presumably continue to live in the valley for thousands of years,
+experiencing their own distinctive pleasures and pains. One
+might question whether life for animals in a natural environment
+yields a surplus of pleasure over pain, or of satisfaction
+over frustration of preferences. At this point the idea of calculating
+benefits becomes almost absurd; but that does not mean
+that the loss of future animal lives should be dismissed from
+our decision making.
+That, however, may not be all. Should we also give weight,
+not only to the suffering and death of individual animals, but
+to the fact that an entire species may disappear? What of the
+loss of trees that have stood for thousands of years? How much
+- if any - weight should we give to the preservation of the
+animals, the species, the trees and the valley's ecosystem, independently
+of the interests of human beings - whether economic,
+recreational, or scientific - in their preservation?
+Here we have a fundamental moral disagreement: a disagreement
+about what kinds of beings ought to be considered in
+our moral deliberations. Let us look at what has been said on
+behalf of extending ethics beyond sentient beings.
+REvERENCE FOR LIFE
+The ethical position developed in this book is an extension of
+the ethic of the dominant Western tradition. This extended
+ethic draws the boundary of moral consideration around all
+sentient creatures, but leaves other living things outside that
+boundary. The drowning of the ancient forests, the possible
+loss of an entire species, the destruction of several complex
+ecosystems, the blockage of the wild river itself, and the loss
+of those rocky gorges are factors to be taken into account only
+276
+The Environment
+in so far as they adversely affect sentient creatures. Is a more
+radical break with the traditional position possible? Can some
+or all of these aspects of the flooding of the valley be shown
+to have intrinsic value, so that they must be taken into account
+independently of their effects on human beings or non-human
+animals?
+To extend an ethic in a plausible way beyond sentient beings
+is a difficult task. An ethic based on the interests of sentient
+creatures is on familiar ground. Sentient creatures have wants
+and desires. The question: 'What is it like to be a possum
+drowning?' at least makes sense, even if it is impossible for
+us to give a more precise answer than 'It must be horrible'.
+In reaching moral decisions affecting sentient creatures, we
+can attempt to add up the effects of different actions on all
+the sentient creatures affected by the alternative actions open
+to us. This provides us with at least some rough guide to what
+might be the right thing to do. But there is nothing that corresponds
+to what it is like to be a tree dying because its roots
+have been flooded. Once we abandon the interests of sentient
+creatures as our source of value, where do we find value?
+What is good or bad for nonsentient creatures, and why does
+it matter?
+It might be thought that as long as we limit ourselves to living
+things, the answer is not too difficult to find. We know what
+is good or bad for the plants in our garden: water, sunlight, and
+compost are good; extremes of heat or cold are bad. The same
+applies to plants in any forest or wilderness, so why not regard
+their flourishing as good in itself, independently of its usefulness
+to sentient creatures?
+One problem here is that without conscious interests to guide
+us, we have no way of assessing the relative weights to be given
+to the flourishing of different forms of life. Is a two-thousandyear-
+old Huon pine more worthy of preservation than a tussock
+of grass? Most people will say that it is, but such a judgment
+seems to have more to do with our feelings of awe for the age,
+277
+Practical Ethics
+size, and beauty of the tree, or with the length of time it would
+take to replace it, than with our perception of some intrinsic
+value in the flourishing of an old tree that is not possessed by
+a young grass tussock.
+If we cease talking in terms of sentience, the boundary
+between living and inanimate natural objects becomes more
+difficult to defend. Would it really be worse to cut down an
+old tree than to destroy a beautiful stalactite that has taken
+even longer to grow? On what grounds could such a judgment
+be made? Probably the best known defence of an ethic that
+extends to all living things is that of Albert Schweitzer. The
+phrase he used, 'reverence for life', is often quoted; the arguments
+he offered in support of such a position are less wellknown.
+Here is one of the few passages in which he defended
+his ethic:
+True philosophy must commence with the most immediate and
+comprehensive facts of consciousness. And this may be formulated
+as follows: 'I am life which wills to live, and 1 exist in the
+midst of life which wills to live: ... Just as in my own will-tolive
+there is a yearning for more life, and for that mysterious
+exaltation of the will which is called pleasure, and terror in face
+of annihilation and that injury to the will-to-live which is called
+pain; so the same obtains in all the will-to-live around me,
+equally whether it can express itself to my comprehension or
+whether it remains unvoiced.
+Ethics thus consists in this, that I experience the necessity of
+practising the same reverence for life toward all will-to-live, as
+toward my own. Therein I have already the needed fundamental
+principle of morality. It is good to maintain and cherish life; it
+is evil to destroy and to check life. A man is really ethical only
+when he obeys the constraint laid on him to help all life which
+he is able to succour, and when he goes out of his way to avoid
+injuring anything living. He does not ask how far this or that
+life deserves sympathy as valuable in itself. nor how far it is
+capable of feeling. To him life as such is sacred. He shatters no
+ice crystal that sparkles in the sun, tears no leaf from its tree,
+breaks off no flower, and is careful not to crush any insect as he
+278
+The Environment
+walks. If he works by lamplight on a summer evening he prefers
+to keep the window shut and to breathe stifling air, rather than
+to see insect after insect fall on his table with singed and sinking
+wings.
+A similar view has been defended recently by the contemporary
+American philosopher Paul Taylor. In his book Respect for
+Nature, Taylor argues that every living thing is 'pursuing its
+own good in its own unique way.' Once we see this, we can
+see all living things 'as we see ourselves' and therefore 'we
+are ready to place the same value on their existence as we
+do on our own'.
+It is not clear how we should interpret Schweitzer's position.
+The reference to the ice crystal is especially puzzling, for an ice
+crystal is not alive at all. Putting this aside, however, the problem
+with the defences offered by both Schweitzer and Taylor for
+their ethical views is that they use language metaphorically and
+then argue as if what they had said was literally true. We may
+often talk about plants 'seeking' water or light so that they can
+survive, and this way of thinking about plants makes it easier
+to accept talk of their 'will to live', or of them 'pursuing' their
+own good. But once we stop to reflect on the fact that plants
+are not conscious and cannot engage in any intentional behaviour,
+it is clear that all this language is metaphorical; one might
+just as well say that a river is pursuing its own good and striving
+to reach the sea, or Jhat the' good' of a guided missile is to blow
+itself up along with its target. It is misleading of Schweitzer to
+attempt to sway us towards an ethic of reverence for all life
+by referring to 'yearning', 'exaltation', 'pleasure', and 'terror'.
+Plants experience none of these.
+Moreover, in the case of plants, rivers, and guided missiles,
+it is possible to give a purely physical explanation of what is
+happening; and in the absence of consciousness, there is no
+good reason why we should have greater respect for the physical
+processes that govern the growth and decay of living things than
+we have for those that govern non-living things. This being so,
+279
+Practical Ethics
+it is at least not obvious why we should have greater reverence
+for a tree than for a stalactite, or for a Single-celled organism
+than for a mountain.
+DEEP ECOLOGY
+More than forty years ago the American ecologist AIdo Leopold
+wrote that there was a need for a 'new ethic', an 'ethic dealing
+with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which
+grow upon it'. His proposed 'land ethic' would enlarge 'the
+boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants,
+and animals, or collectively, the land'. The rise of ecological
+concern in the early 1970s led to a revival of interest in this
+attitude. The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess wrote a brief
+but influential article distinguishing between 'shallow' and
+'deep' strands in the ecological movement. Shallow ecological
+thinking was limited to the traditional moral framework; those
+who thought in this way were anxious to avoid pollution to
+our water supply so that we could have safe water to drink,
+and they sought to preserve wilderness so that people could
+continue to enjoy walking through it. Deep ecologists, on the
+other hand, wanted to preserve the integrity of the biosphere
+for its own sake, irrespective of the possible benefits to humans
+that might flow from so doing. Subsequently several other writers
+have attempted to develop some form of 'deep' environmental
+theory.
+Where the reverence for life ethic emphasises individual living
+organisms, proposals for deep ecology ethics tend to take something
+larger as the object of value: species, ecological systems,
+even the biosphere as a whole. Leopold summed up the basis
+of his new land ethic thus: 'A thing is right when it tends to
+preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.
+It is wrong when it tends otherwise: In a paper published
+in 1984, Arne Naess and George Sessions, an American
+philosopher involved in the deep ecology movement, set out
+280
+The Environment
+several principles for a deep ecological ethic, beginning with the
+following:
+The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human Life
+on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value,
+inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness
+of the non-human world for human purposes.
+2 Richness and diversity oflife forms contribute to the realisation
+of these values and are also values in themselves.
+3 Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity
+except to satisfy vital needs.
+Although these principles refer only to life, in the same paper
+Naess and Sessions say that deep ecology uses the term 'biosphere'
+in a more comprehensive way, to refer also to nonliving
+things such as rivers (watersheds), landscapes, and
+ecosystems. Two Australians working at the deep end of environmental
+ethics, Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood, also
+extend their ethic beyond living things, including in it an obligation
+'not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or
+systems without good reason'.
+In the previous section I quoted Paul Taylor's remark to the
+effect that we should be ready not merely to respect every living
+thing, but to place the same value on the life of every living
+thing as we place on our own. This is a common theme among
+deep ecologists, often extended beyond living things. In Deep
+Ecology Bill Devall and George Sessions defend a form of 'biocentric
+egalitarianism':
+The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere
+have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their
+own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation within the
+larger Self-realisation. This basic intuition is that all organisms
+and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole,
+are equal in intrinsic worth.
+If, as this quotation appears to suggest. this biocentric equality
+rests on a 'basic intuition', it is up against some strong intuitions
+that point in the opposite direction - for example, the intuition
+281
+Practical Ethics
+that the rights to 'live and blossom' of normal adult humans
+ought to be preferred over those of yeasts, and the rights of
+gorillas over those of grasses. If, however, the point is that
+humans, gorillas, yeasts, and grasses are all parts of an interrelated
+whole, then it can still be asked how this establishes that
+they are equal in intrinsic worth. Is it because every living thing
+plays its role in an ecosystem on which all depend for their
+survival? But, firstly, even if this showed that there is intrinsic
+worth in micro-organisms and plants as a whole, it says nothing
+at all about the value of individual micro-organisms or plants,
+since no individual is necessary for the survival of the ecosystem
+as a whole. Secondly, the fact that all organisms are part of an
+interrelated whole does not suggest that they are all of intrinsic
+worth, let alone of equal intrinsic worth. They may be of worth
+only because they are needed for the existence of the whole,
+and the whole may be of worth only because it supports the
+existence of conscious beings.
+The ethics of deep ecology thus fail to yield persuasive answers
+to questions about the value of the lives of individual living
+beings. Perhaps, though, this is the wrong kind of question to
+ask. As the science of ecology looks at systems rather than
+individual organisms, so ecological ethics might be more plausible
+if applied at a higher level, perhaps at the level of species
+and ecosystems. Behind many attempts to derive values from
+ecological ethics at this level lies some form of holism - some
+sense that the species or ecosystem is not just a collection of
+individuals, but really an entity in its own right. This holism is
+made explicit in Lawrence Johnson's A Morally Deep World.
+Johnson is quite prepared to talk about the interests of a species,
+in a sense that is distinct from the sum of the interests of each
+member of the species, and to argue that the interests of a
+species, or an ecosystem, ought to be taken into account, alongside
+individual interests, in our moral deliberations. In The Ecological
+Self, Freya Mathews contends that any 'self-realising
+system' has intrinsic value in that it seeks to maintain or preserve
+282
+The Environment
+itself. While living organisms are paradigm examples of selfrealising
+systems, Mathews, like Johnson, includes species and
+ecosystems as holistic entities or selves with their own form of
+realisation. She even includes the entire global ecosystem, following
+James Lovelock in referring to it by the name of the
+Greek goddess of the earth, Gaia. On this basis she defends her
+own form of biocentric egalitarianism.
+There is, of course, a real philosophical question about
+whether a species or an ecosystem can be considered as the sort
+of individual that can have interests, or a 'self' to be realised;
+and even if it can, the deep ecology ethic will face problems
+similar to those we identified in considering the idea of reverence
+for life. For it is necessary, not merely that trees, species,
+and ecosystems can properly be said to have interests, but that
+they have morally significant interests. If they are to be regarded
+as 'selves' it will need to be shown that the survival or realisation
+of that kind of self has moral value, independently of the value
+it has because of its importance in sustaining conscious life.
+We saw in discussing the ethic of reverence for life that one
+way of establishing that an interest is morally significant is to
+ask what it is like for the entity affected to have that interest
+unsatisfied. The same question can be asked about selfrealisation:
+what is it like for the self to remain unrealised? Such
+questions yield intelligible answers when asked of sentient
+beings, but not when asked of trees, species, or ecosystems. The
+fact that, as James Lovelock points out in Gaia: A New Look at
+Life on Earth, the biosphere can respond to events in ways that
+resemble a self-maintaining system, does not in itself show that
+the biosphere consciously desires to maintain itself. Calling the
+global ecosystem by the name of a Greek goddess seems a nice
+idea, but it may not be the best way of helping us to think
+clearly about its nature. Similarly, on a smaller scale, there is
+nothing that corresponds to what it feels like to be an ecosystem
+flooded by a dam, because there is no such feeling. In this respect
+trees, ecosystems, and species are more like rocks than they are
+283
+Practical Ethics
+like sentient beings; so the divide between sentient and nonsentient
+creatures is to that extent a firmer basis for a morally
+important boundary than the divide between living and nonliving
+things, or between holistic entities and any other entities
+that we might not regard as holistic. (Whatever these other
+entities could be: even a single atom is, when seen from the
+appropriate level, a complex system that 'seeks' to maintain
+itself.)
+This rejection of the ethical basis for a deep ecology ethic does
+not mean that the case for the preservation of wilderness is not
+strong. All it means is that one kind of argument - the argument
+from the intrinsic value of the plants, species, or ecosystems -
+is, at best, problematic. Unless it can be placed on a different,
+and firmer footing, we should confine ourselves to arguments
+based on the interests of sentient creatures, present and future,
+human and non-human. These arguments are quite sufficient
+to show that, at least in a society where no one needs to destroy
+wilderness in order to obtain food for survival or materials for
+shelter from the elements, the value of preserving the remaining
+significant areas of wilderness greatly exceeds the economic
+values gained by its destruction.
+DEVELOPING AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC
+In the long run, the set of ethical virtues praised and the set of
+ethical prohibitions adopted by the ethic of specific societies will
+always reflect the conditions under which they must live and
+work in order to survive. That statement is close to being a
+tautology, because if a society's ethic did not take into account
+whatever was needed for survival, the society would cease to
+exist. Many of the ethical standards that we accept today can
+be explained in these terms. Some are universal and can be
+expected to be beneficial to the community in virtually any
+conditions in which humans live. Obviously a society in which
+members of the community are permitted to kill each other with
+284
+The Environment
+impunity would not last long. Conversely, the parental virtues
+of caring for children, and other virtues like honesty, or loyalty
+to the group, would foster a stable and lasting community. Other
+prohibitions may reflect specific conditions: the practice among
+the Eskimo of killing elderly parents no longer able to fend for
+themselves, is often cited as a necessary response to life in a
+very harsh climate. No doubt the slow pace of changing climatic
+conditions, or of migration to different regions, allowed time
+for systems of ethics to make the necessary adjustment.
+Now we face a new threat to our survival. The proliferation
+of human beings, coupled with the by-products of economic
+growth, is just as capable as the old threats of wiping out our
+society - and every other society as well. No ethic has yet developed
+to cope with this threat. Some ethical principles that
+we do have are exactly the opposite of what we need. The
+problem is that, as we have already seen, ethical principles
+change slowly and the time we have left to develop a new
+environmental ethic is short. Such an ethic would regard every
+action that is harmful to the environment as ethically dubious,
+and those that are unnecessarily harmful as plainly wrong. That
+is the serious point behind my remark in the first chapter that
+the moral issues raised by driving a car are more serious than
+those raised by sexnal behaviour. An environmental ethic would
+find virtue in saving and recycling resources, and vice in extravagance
+and unnecessary consumption. To take just one example:
+from the perspective of an environmental ethic, our
+choice of recreation is not ethically neutral. At present we see
+the choice between motor car racing or cycling, between water
+skiing or windsurfing, as merely a matter of taste. Yet there is
+an essential difference: motor car racing and water skiing require
+the consumption of fossil fuels and the discharge of carbon
+dioxide into the atmosphere. Cycling and windsurfing do not.
+Once we take the need to preserve our environment seriously,
+motor racing and water skiing will no more be an acceptable
+form of entertainment than bear-baiting is today.
+285
+Practical Ethics
+The broad outlines of a truly environmental ethic are easy to
+discern. At its most fundamental level, such an ethic fosters
+consideration for the interests of all sentient creatures, including
+subsequent generations stretching into the far future. It is accompanied
+by an aesthetic of appreciation for wild places and
+unspoiled nature. At a more detailed level, applicable to the
+lives of dwellers in cities and towns, it discourages large families.
+(Here it forms a sharp contrast to some existing ethical beliefs
+that are relics of an age in which the earth was far more lightly
+populated; it also offers a counterweight to the implication of
+the 'total' version of utilitarianism discussed in Chapter 4.) An
+environmental ethic rejects the ideals of a materialist society in
+which success is gauged by the number of consumer goods one
+can accumulate. Instead it judges success in terms of the development
+of one's abilities and the achievement of real fulfilment
+and satisfaction. It promotes frugality, in so far as that is
+necessary for minimising pollution and ensuring that everything
+that can be re-used is re-used. Carelessly to throw out material
+that can be recycled is a form of vandalism or the theft of our
+common property in the resources of the world. Thus the various
+'green consumer' guides and books about things we can
+do to save our planet - recycling what we use and buying the
+most environmentally friendly products available - are part of
+the new ethic that is required. Even they may prove to be only
+an interim solution, a stepping-stone to an ethic in which the
+very idea of consuming unnecessary products is questioned.
+Wind-surfing may be better than water-skiing, but if we keep
+on buying new boards in order to be up to date with the latest
+trends in board and sail designs, the difference is only marginal.
+We must re-assess our notion of extravagance. In a world
+under pressure, this concept is not confined to chauffeured limousines
+and Dom Perignon champagne. Timber that has come
+from a rainforest is extravagant, because the long-term value
+of the rainforest is far greater than the uses to which the timber
+is put. Disposable paper products are extravagant, because an-
+286
+The Environment
+cient hardwood forests are being converted into wood-chips
+and sold to paper manufacturers. 'Going for a drive in the country'
+is an extravagant use of fossil fuels that contributes to the
+greenhouse effect. During the Second World War, when petrol
+was scarce, posters asked: 'Is your journey really necessary?'
+The appeal to national solidarity against a visible and immediate
+danger was highly effective. The danger to our environment is
+less immediate and much harder to see, but the need to cut out
+unnecessary journeys and other forms of unnecessary consumption
+is just as great.
+As far as food is concerned, the great extravagance is not
+caviar or truffles, but beef, pork, and poultry. Some 38 per cent
+of the world's grain crop is now fed to animals, as well as large
+quantities of soybeans. There are three times as many domestic
+animals on this planet as there are human beings. The combined
+weight of the world's 1.28 billion cattle alone exceeds that of
+the human population. While we look darkly at the number of
+babies being born in poorer parts of the world, we ignore the
+over-population of farm animals, to which we ourselves contribute.
+The prodigious waste of grain that is fed to intensively
+farmed animals has already been mentioned in Chapters 3 and
+8. That, howe~er, is only part of the damage done by the animals
+we deliberately breed. The energy-intensive factory farming
+methods of the industrialised nations are responsible for the
+consumption of huge amounts of fossil fuels. Chemical fertilisers,
+used to grow the feed crops for cattle in feedlots and pigs
+and chickens kept indoors in sheds, produce nitrous oxide, another
+greenhouse gas. Then there is the loss of forests. Everywhere,
+forest dwellers, both human and non-human, are being
+pushed out. Since 1960, 25 per cent of the forests of Central
+America have been cleared for cattle. Once cleared, the poor
+soils will support grazing for a few years; then the graziers must
+move on. Scrub takes over the abandoned pasture, but the forest
+does not return. When the forests are cleared so that cattle can
+graze, billions of tons of carbon dioxide are released into the
+287
+Pradical Ethics
+atmosphere. Finally, the world's cattle are thought to produce
+about 20 per cent of the methane released into the atmosphere,
+and methane traps twenty-five times as much heat from the
+sun as carbon dioxide. Factory farm manure also produces
+methane because, unlike manured dropped naturally in the
+fields, it does not decompose in the presence of oxygen. All of
+this amounts to a compelling reason, additional to that developed
+in Chapter 3, for a largely plant-based diet.
+The emphasis on frugality and a simple life does not mean
+that an environmental ethic frowns upon pleasure, but that the
+pleasures it values do not come from conspicuous consumption.
+They come, instead, from warm personal and sexual relationships,
+from being close to children and friends, from conversation,
+from sports and recreations that are in harmony with
+our environment instead of being harmful to it; from food that
+is not based on the exploitation of sentient creatures and does
+not cost the earth; from creative activity and work of all kinds;
+and (with due care so as not to ruin precisely what is valued)
+from appreciating the unspoiled places in the world in which
+we live.
+288
+II
+ENDS AND MEANS
+WE have examined a number of ethical issues. We have
+seen that many accepted practices are open to serious
+objections. What ought we to do about it? This, too, is an ethical
+issue. Here are four actual cases to consider.
+Oskar Schindler was a German industrialist. During the war
+he ran a factory near Cracow, in Poland. At a time when Polish
+Jews were being sent to death camps, he assembled a labour
+force of Jewish inmates from concentration camps and the
+ghetto, considerably larger than his factory needed, and used
+several illegal strategems, including bribing members of the SS
+and other offi~ials, to protect them. He spent his own money
+to buy food on the black market to supplement the inadequate
+official rations he obtained for his workers. By these methods
+he was able to save the lives of about 1,200 people.
+In 1984 Dr Thomas Gennarelli directed a Head Injury
+Laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia.
+Members of an underground organisation called the Animal
+Liberation Front knew that Gennarelli inflicted head injuries
+on monkeys there and had been told that the monkeys underwent
+the experiments without being properly anaesthetised.
+They also knew that Gennarelli and his collaborators videotaped
+their experiments, to provide a record of what happened
+during and after the injuries they inflicted. They tried to obtain
+further information through official channels but were unsuccessful.
+In May 1984, they broke into the laboratory at
+289
+Practical Ethics
+night and found thirty-four videotapes. They then systematically
+destroyed laboratory equipment before leaving with the
+tapes. The tapes clearly showed conscious monkeys struggling
+as they were being strapped to an operating table where head
+injuries were inflicted; they also showed experimenters mocking
+and laughing at frightened animals about to be used in
+experiments. When an edited version of the tapes was released
+to the public, it produced widespread revulsion. Nevertheless,
+it took a further year of protests, culminating in a sitin
+at the headquarters of the government organisation that
+was funding Gennarelli's experiments, before the u.s. Secretary
+of Health and Human Services ordered the experiments
+stopped.
+In 1986 Joan Andrews entered an abortion clinic in Pensacola,
+Florida, and damaged a suction abortion apparatus. She refused
+to be represented in court, on the grounds that 'the true
+defendants, the pre-born children, received none, and were
+killed without due process'. Andrews was a supporter of Operation
+Rescue, an American organisation that takes its name,
+and its authority to act, from the biblical injunction to 'rescue
+those who are drawn toward death and hold back those stumbling
+to the slaughter'. Operation Rescue uses civil disobedience
+to shut down abortion clinics, thus, in its view, 'sparing
+the lives of unborn babies whom the Rescuers are morally
+pledged to defend'. Participants block the doors of the clinics
+to prevent physicians and pregnant women seeking abortion
+from entering. They attempt to dissuade pregnant women from
+approaching the clinic by 'sidewalk counselling' on the nature
+of abortion. Gary Leber, an Operation Rescue director, has
+said that, between 1987 and 1989 alone, as a direct result of
+such 'rescue missions', at least 421 women changed their
+minds about having abortions, and the children of these
+women, who would have been killed, are alive today.
+290
+Ends and Means
+In 1976 Bob Brown, then a young medical practitioner, rafted
+down the Franklin river, in Tasmania's southwest. The wild
+beauty of the river and the peace of the undisturbed forests
+around it impressed him deeply. Then, around a bend on the
+lower reaches of the river, he came across workers for the
+Hydro-Electric Commission, studying the feasibility of building
+a dam across the river. Brown gave up his medical practice
+and founded the Tasmanian Wilderness Society, with the object
+of protecting the state's remaining wilderness areas. Despite
+vigorous campaigning, the Hydro-Electric Commission recommended
+the building of the dam, and after some vacillation the
+state government, with support both from the business community
+and the labour unions, decided to go ahead. The Tasmanian
+Wilderness Society organized a non-violent blockade
+of the road being built to the dam site. In 1982, Brown, along
+with many others, was arrested and jailed for four days for
+trespassing on land controlled by the Hydro-Electric Commission.
+But the blockade became a focus of national attention,
+and although the Australian federal government was not direcdy
+responsible for the dam, it became an issue in the federal
+election that was then due. The Australian Labor Party, in opposition
+before the election, pledged to explore constitutional
+means of preventing the dam from going ahead. The election
+saw the Labor party elected to office, and legislation passed to
+stop the dam. Though challenged by the Tasmanian government,
+the legislation was upheld by a narrow majority of the
+High Court of Australia on the grounds that the Tasmanian
+southwest was a World Heritage area, and the federal government
+had constitutional powers to uphold the international
+treaty creating the World Heritage Commission. Today the
+Franklin still runs free.
+Do we have an overriding obligation to obey the law? Oskar
+Schindler, the members of the Animal Liberation Front who
+291
+Practical Ethics
+took Gennarelli's videotapes, Joan Andrews of Operation Rescue,
+and Bob Brown and those who joined him in front of the
+bulldozers in Tasmania's southwest were all breaking the law.
+Were they all acting wrongly?
+The question cannot be dealt with by invoking the simplistic
+formula: 'the end never justifies the means'. For all but the
+strictest adherent of an ethic of rules, the end sometimes does
+justify the means. Most people think that lying is wrong, other
+things being equal, yet think it right to lie in order to avoid
+causing unnecessary offence or embarrassment - for instance,
+when a well-meaning relative gives you a hideous vase for your
+birthday, and then asks if you really like it. If this relatively
+trivial end can justify lying, it is even more obvious that some
+important end - preventing a murder, or saving animals from
+great suffering - can justify lying. Thus the principle that the
+end cannot justify the means is easily breached. The difficult
+issue is not whether the end can ever justify the means, but
+which means are justified by which ends.
+INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW
+There are many people who are opposed to damming wild
+rivers, to the exploitation of animals, or to abortion, but who
+do not break the law in order to stop these activities. No doubt
+some members of the more conventional conservation, animal
+liberation, and anti-abortion organizations do not commit illegal
+acts because they do not wish to be fined or imprisoned; but
+others would be prepared to take the consequences of illegal
+acts. They refrain only because they respect and obey the moral
+authority of the law.
+Who is right in this ethical disagreement? Are we under any
+moral obligation to obey the law, if the law protects and sanctions
+things we hold utterly wrong? A clear-cut answer to this
+question was given by the nineteenth-century American radical,
+292
+Ends and Means
+Henry Thoreau. In his essay entitled 'Civil Disobedience' - perhaps
+the first use of this now-familiar phrase - he wrote:
+Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign
+his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience,
+then? I think we should be men first and subjects afterwards. It
+is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for
+the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume, is
+to do at any time what I think right.
+The American philosopher Robert Paul Wolff has written in
+similar vein:
+The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The
+primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled,
+It would seem, then, that there can be no resolution of the conflict
+between the autonomy of the individual and the putative authority
+of the state. Insofar as a man fulfills his obligation to
+make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist the state's
+claim to have authority over him.
+Thoreau and Wolff resolve the conflict between individual and
+society in favour of the individual. We should do as our conscience
+dIctates, as we autonomously decide we ought to do:
+not as the law directs. Anything else would be a denial of our
+capacity for ethical choice.
+Thus stated, the issue looks straightforward and the ThoreauWolff
+answer obviously right. So Oskar Schindler, the Animal
+Liberation Front, Joan Andrews, and Bob Brown were fully
+justified in doing what they saw to be right, rather than what
+the state laid down as lawful. But is it that simple? There is a
+sense in which it is undeniable that, as Thoreau says, we ought
+to do what we think right; or, as Wolff puts it, make ourselves
+the authors of our decisions. Faced with a choice between doing
+what we think right and what we think wrong, of course we
+ought to do what we think right. But this, though true, is not
+much help. What we need to know is not whether we should
+do what we decide to be right, but how we should decide what
+is right.
+293
+Practical Ethics
+Think about the difference of opinion between members of
+groups like the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and more lawabiding
+members of an organization like Britain's Royal Society
+for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA): ALF members
+think inflicting pain on animals is, unless justified by extraordinary
+circumstances, wrong, and if the best way to stop
+it is by breaking the law then they think that breaking the law
+is right. RSPCA members - let us assume - also think that
+inflicting pain on animals is normally wrong, but they think
+breaking the law is wrong, too, and they think that the wrongness
+of breaking the law cannot be justified by the goal of stopping
+the unjustifiable infliction of pain on animals. Now suppose
+there are people opposed to inflicting pain on animals who are
+uncertain whether they should join the militant lawbreakers or
+the more orthodox animal welfare group. How does telling these
+people to do what they think right, or to be the author of their
+own decisions, resolve their uncertainty? The uncertainty is an
+uncertainty about what is the right thing to do, not about
+whether to do what one has decided to be right.
+This point can be obscured by talk of 'following one's conscience'
+irrespective of what the law commands. Some who talk
+of 'following conscience' mean no more than doing what, on
+reflection, one thinks right - and this may, as in the case of our
+imagined RSPCA members, depend on what the law commands.
+Others mean by 'conscience' not something dependent
+on critical reflective judgment, but a kind of internal voice that
+tells us that something is wrong and may continue to tell us
+this despite our careful reflective decision, based on all the relevant
+ethical considerations, that the action is not wrong. In
+this sense of 'conscience' an unmarried woman brought up as
+a strict Roman Catholic to believe that sex outside marriage is
+always wrong may abandon her religion and come to hold that
+there is no sound basis for restricting sex to marriage - yet
+continue to feel guilty when she has sex. She may refer to these
+294
+Ends and Means
+guilt feelings as her 'conscience' but if that is her conscience,
+should she follow it?
+To say that we should follow our conscience is unobjectionable
+- and unhelpful - when 'following conscience' means
+doing what, on reflection, one thinks right. When 'following
+conscience' means doing as one's 'internal voice' prompts one
+to do, however, to follow one's conscience is to abdicate one's
+responsibility as a rational agent, to fail to take all the relevant
+factors into account and act on one's best judgment of the rights
+and wrongs of the situation. The 'internal voice' is more likely
+to be a product of one's upbringing and education than a source
+of genuine ethical insight.
+Presumably neither Thoreau nor Wolff wish to suggest that
+we should always follow our conscience in the 'internal voice'
+sense. They must mean, if their views are to be at all plausible,
+that we should follow our judgment about what we ought to
+do. In this case the most that can be said for their recommendations
+is that they remind us that decisions about obeying the
+law are'ethical decisions that the law itself cannot settle for us.
+We should not assume, without reflection, that if the law prohibits,
+say, stealing videotapes from laboratories, it is always
+wrong to do so - any more than we should assume that if the
+law prohibits hiding Jews from the Nazis, it is wrong to do so.
+Law and ethics are distinct. At the same time, this does not
+mean that the law carries no moral weight. It does not mean
+that any action that would have been right if it had been legal
+must be right although it is in fact illegal. That an action is illegal
+may be of ethicaL as well as legaL significance. Whether it really
+is ethically significant is a separate question.
+LA W AND ORDER
+If we think that a practice is seriously wrong, and if we have
+the courage and ability to disrupt this practice by breaking the
+295
+Practical Ethics
+law, how could the illegality of this action provide an ethical
+reason against it? To answer a question as specific as this, we
+should first ask a more general one: why have laws at all?
+Human beings are social in nature, but not so social that we
+do not need to protect ourselves against the risk of being assaulted
+or killed by our fellow humans. We might try to do this
+by forming vigilante organizations to prevent assaults and punish
+those who commit them; but the results would be haphazard
+and liable to grow into gang warfare. Thus it is desirable to
+have, as John Locke said long ago, 'an established, settled,
+known law', interpreted by an authoritative judge and backed
+with sufficient power to carry out the judge's decisions.
+If people voluntarily refrained from assaulting others, or acting
+in other ways inimical to a harmonious and happy social existence,
+we might manage without judges and sanctions. We
+would still need law-like conventions about such matters as
+which side of the road one drives on. Even an anarchist utopia
+would have some settled principles of cooperation. So we would
+have something rather like law. In reality, not everyone is going
+to voluntarily refrain from behaviour, like assaults, that others
+cannot tolerate. Nor is it only the danger of individual acts like
+assaults that make law necessary. In any society there will be disputes:
+about how much water farmers may take from the river to
+irrigate their crops, about the ownership of land, or the custody
+of a child, about the control of pollution, and the level of taxation.
+Some settled decision-procedure is necessary for resolving
+such disputes economically and speedily, or else the parties to the
+dispute are likely to resort to force. Almost any established decision-
+procedure is better than a resort to force, for when force is
+used people get hurt. Moreover, most decision-procedures produce
+results at least as beneficial and just as a resort to force.
+So laws and a settled decision-procedure to generate them
+are a good thing. This gives rise to one important reason for
+obeying the law. By obeying the law, I can contribute to the
+296
+Ends and Means
+respect in which the established decision-procedure and the
+laws are held. By disobeying I set an example to others that
+may lead them to disobey too. The effect may multiply and
+contribute to a decline in law and order. In an extreme case it
+may lead to civil war.
+A second reason for obedience follows immediately from this
+first. If law is to be effective - outside the anarchist's utopia -
+there must be some machinery for detecting and penalizing lawbreakers.
+This machinery will cost something to maintain and
+operate, and the cost will have to be met by the community. If
+I break the law the community will be put to the expense of
+enforcement.
+These two reasons for obeying the law are neither universally
+applicable nor conclusive. They are not, for instance, applicable
+to breaches of the law that remain secret. If, late at night when
+the streets are deserted, I cross the road against the red light,
+there is no one to be led into disobedience by my example, and
+no one to enforce the law against so crossing. But this is not
+the kind of illegality we are interested in.
+Where they are applicable, these two reasons for obedience
+are not conclusive, because there are times when the reasons
+against obeying a particular law are more important than the
+risks of encouraging others to disobey or the costs to the community
+of enforcing the law. They are genuine reasons for obeying,
+and in the absence of reasons for disobeying, are sufficient
+to resolve the issue in favour of obedience; but where there are
+conflicting reasons, we must assess each case on its merits in
+order to see if the reasons for disobeying outweigh these reasons
+for obedience. If, for instance, illegal acts were the only way of
+preventing many painful experiments on animals, of saving significant
+areas of wilderness, or of prodding governments into
+increasing overseas aid, the importance of the ends would justify
+running some risk of contributing to a general decline in obedience
+to law.
+297
+Practical Ethics
+DEMOCRACY
+At this point some will say: the difference between Oskar Schindler's
+heroic deeds and the indefensible illegal actions of the
+Animal Liberation Front, Operation Rescue, and the opponents
+of the Franklin dam is that in Nazi Germany there were no legal
+channels that Schindler could use to bring about change. In a
+democracy there are legal means of ending abuses. The existence
+of legal procedures for changing the law makes the use of illegal
+means unjustifiable.
+It is true that in democratic societies there are legal procedures
+that can be used by those seeking reforms; but this in itself does
+not show that the use of illegal means is wrong. Legal channels
+may exist, but the prospects of using them to bring about change
+in the foreseeable future may be very poor. While one makes
+slow and painful progress - or perhaps no progress at all -
+through these legal channels, the indefensible wrongs one is
+trying to stop will be continuing. Prior to the successful struggle
+to save the Franklin River, an earlier political campaign had
+been fought against another dam proposed by the Tasmanian
+Hydro-Electric Commission. This dam was opposed because it
+would flood a pristine alpine lake, Lake Peddar, situated in a
+national park. This campaign employed more orthodox political
+tactics. It failed, and Lake Peddar disappeared under the waters
+of the dam. Dr Thomas Gennarelli's laboratory had carried out
+experiments for several years before the Animal Liberation Front
+raided it. Without the evidence ofthe stolen videotapes, it would
+probably still be functioning today. Similarly, Operation Rescue
+was founded after fourteen years of more conventional political
+action had failed to reverse the permissive legal situation regarding
+abortion that has existed in the United States since the
+Supreme Court declared restrictive abortion laws unconstitutional
+in 1973. During that period, according to Operation Rescue's
+Gary Leber, 'twenty-five million Americans have been
+"legally" killed'. From this perspective it is easy to see why the
+298
+Ends and Means
+existence of legal channels for change does not solve the moral
+dilemma. An extremely remote possibility of legal change is not
+a strong reason against using means more likely to succeed. The
+most that can follow from the mere existence oflegitimate channels
+is that, since we cannot know whether they will prove
+successful until we have tried them, their existence is a reason
+for postponing illegal acts until legal means have been tried and
+have failed.
+Here the upholder of democratic laws can try another tack:
+if legal means fail to bring about reform, it shows that the
+proposed reform does not have the approval of the majority of
+the electorate; and to attempt to implement the reform by illegal
+means against the wishes of the majority would be a violation
+of the central principle of democracy, majority rule.
+The militant can challenge this argument on two grounds,
+one factual and the other philosophical. The factual claim in
+the democrat's argument is that a reform that cannot be implemented
+by legal means lacks the approval of the majority of
+the electorate. Perhaps this would hold in a direct democracy,
+in which the whole electorate voted on each issue; but it is
+certainly not always true of modem representative democracies.
+There is no way of ensuring that on any given issue a majority
+of representatives will take the same view as a majority of their
+constituents. One can be reasonably confident that a majority
+of those Americans who saw, on television, excerpts from Gennarelli's
+videotapes would not have supported the experiments.
+But that is not how decisions are made in a democracy. In
+choosing between representatives - or in choosing between political
+parties - voters elect to take one 'package deal' in preference
+to other package deals on offer. It will often happen that
+in order to vote for policies they favour, voters must go along
+with other policies they are not keen on. It will also happen
+that policies voters favour are not offered by any major party.
+In the case of abortion in the United States, the crucial decision
+was not made by a majority of voters, but by the Supreme Court.
+299
+Practical Ethics
+It cannot be overturned by a simple majority of the electors, but
+only by the Court itself, or by the complicated procedure of a
+constitutional amendment, which can be thwarted by a minority
+of the electorate.
+What if a majority did approve of the wrong that the militants
+wish to stop? Would it then be wrong to use illegal means?
+Here we have the philosophical claim underlying the democratic
+argument for obedience, the claim that we ought to accept the
+majority decision.
+The case for majority rule should not be overstated. No sensible
+democrat would claim that the majority is always right. If
+49 per cent of the population can be wrong, so can 51 per cent.
+Whether the majority supports the views of the Animal Liberation
+Front or of Operation Rescue does not settle the question
+whether these views are morally sound. Perhaps the fact that
+these groups are in a minority - if they are - means that they
+should reconsider their means. With a majority behind them,
+they could claim to be acting with democratic principles on their
+side, using illegal means to overcome flaws in the democratic
+machinery. Without that majority, all the weight of democratic
+tradition is against them and it is they who appear as coercers,
+trying to force the majority into accepting something against its
+will. But how much moral weight should we give to democratic
+principles?
+Thoreau, as we might expect, was not impressed by majority
+decision making. 'All voting: he wrote, 'is a sort of gaming,
+like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a
+playing with right and wrong, with moral questions: In a sense
+Thoreau was right. If we reject, as we must, the doctrine that
+the majority is always right, to submit moral issues to the vote
+is to gamble that what we believe to be right will come out of
+the ballot with more votes behind it than what we believe to
+be wrong; and that is a gamble we will often lose.
+Nevertheless we should not be too contemptuous about voting,
+or gambling either. Cowboys who agree to play poker to
+300
+Ends and Means
+decide matters of honour do better than cowboys who continue
+to settle such matters in the traditional Western manner. A
+society that decides its controversial issues by ballots does better
+than one that uses bullets. To some extent this is a point we
+have already encountered, under the heading 'law and order'.
+It applies to any society with an established, peaceful method
+of resolving disputes; but in a democracy there is a subtle difference
+that gives added weight to the outcome of the decisionprocedure.
+A method of settling disputes in which no one has
+greater ultimate power than anyone else is a method that can
+be recommended to all as a fair compromise between competing
+claims to power. Any other method must give greater power to
+some than to others and thereby invites opposition from those
+who have less. That, at least, is true in the egalitarian age in
+which we live. In a feudal society in which people accept as
+natural and proper their status as lord or vassal there is no
+challenge to the feudal lord and no compromise would be
+needed. (I am thinking of an ideal feudal system, as I am thinking
+of an ideal democracy.) Those times, however, seem to be
+gone forever. The breakdown of traditional authority created a
+need for political compromise. Among possible compromises,
+giving one vote to each person is uniquely acceptable to all. As
+such, in the absence of any agreed procedure for deciding on
+some other distribution of power, it offers, in principle, the
+firmest possible basis for a peaceful method of settling disputes.
+To reject majority rule, therefore, is to reject the best possible
+basis for the peaceful ordering of society in an egalitarian age.
+Where else should one tum? To a meritocratic franchise, with
+extra votes for the more intelligent or better educated, as John
+Stuart Mill once proposed? But could we agree on who merits
+extra votes? To a benevolent despot? Many would accept that
+- if they could choose the despot. In practice the likely outcome
+of abandoning majority rule is none of these: it is the rule of
+those who command the greatest force.
+So the principle of majority rule does carry substantial moral
+301
+Pradical Ethics
+weight. Disobedience is easier to justify in a dictatorship like
+Nazi Germany than in a democracy like those of North America,
+Europe, India, Japan, or Australia today. In a democracy we
+should be reluctant to take any action that amounts to an attempt
+to coerce the majority, for such attempts imply the rejection
+of majority rule and there is no acceptable alternative
+to that. There may, of course, be cases where the majority decision
+is so appalling that coercion is justified, whatever the risk.
+The obligation to obey a genuine majority decision is not absolute.
+We show our respect for the principle not by blind obedience
+to the majority, but by regarding ourselves as justified
+in disobeying only in extreme circumstances.
+DISOBEDIENCE, CIVIL OR OTHERWISE
+If we draw together our conclusions on the use of illegal means
+to achieve laudable ends, we shall find that: (1) there are reasons
+why we should normally accept the verdict of an established
+peaceful method of settling disputes; (2) these reasons are particularly
+strong when the decision-procedure is democratic and
+the verdict represents a genuine majority view; but (3) there
+are still situations in which the use of illegal means can be
+justified.
+We have seen that there are two distinct ways in which one
+might try to justify the use of illegal means in a society that is
+democratic (even if imperfectly so, as, to varying degrees, existing
+democracies are). The first is on the grounds that the
+decision one is objecting to is not a genuine expression of majority
+opinion. The second is that although the decision is a
+genuine expression of the majority view, this view is so seriously
+wrong that action against the majority is justified.
+It is disobedience on the first ground that best merits the name
+'civil disobedience'. Here the use of illegal means can be regarded
+as an extension of the use of legal means to secure a
+302
+Ends and Means
+genuinely democratic decision. The extension may be necessary
+because the normal channels for securing reform are not working
+properly. On some issues parliamentary representatives are
+overly influenced by skilled and well-paid special interests. On
+others the public is unaware of what is happening. Perhaps the
+abuse requires administrative, rather than legislative change,
+and the bureaucrats of the civil service have refused to be inconvenienced.
+Perhaps the legitimate interests of a minority are
+being ignored by prejudiced officials. In all these cases, the nowstandard
+forms of civil disobedience - passive resistance,
+marches, or sit-ins - are appropriate. The blockade of the HydroElectric
+Commission's road into the site ofthe proposed Franklin
+river dam was a classic case of civil disobedience in this sense.
+In these situations disobeying the law is not an attempt to
+coerce the majority. Instead disobedience attempts to inform the
+majority; or to persuade parliamentarians that large numbers
+of electors feel very strongly about the issue; or to draw national
+attention to an issue previously left to bureaucrats; or to appeal
+for reconsideration of a decision too hastily made. Civil disobedience
+is an appropriate means to these ends when legal
+means have failed, because, although it is illegal. it does not
+threaten the majority or attempt to coerce them (though it will
+usually impose some extra costs on them, for example for law
+enforcement). By not resisting the force ofthe law, by remaining
+non-violent and by accepting the legal penalty for their actions,
+civil disobedients make manifest both the sincerity of their protest
+and their respect for the rule of law and the fundamental
+principles of democracy.
+So conceived, civil disobedience is not difficult to justify. The
+justification does not have to be strong enough to override the
+obligation to obey a democratic decision, since disobedience is
+an attempt to restore, rather than frustrate, the process of democratic
+decision making. Disobedience of this kind could be
+justified by, for instance, the aim of making the public aware
+303
+Practical Ethics
+of the loss of irreplaceable wilderness caused by the construction
+of a dam, or of how animals are treated in the laboratories and
+factory farms that few people ever see.
+The use of illegal means to prevent action undeniably in accordance
+with the majority view is harder - but not impossible
+- to justify. We may think it unlikely that a Nazi-style policy
+of genocide could ever be approved by a majority vote, but if
+that were to happen it would be carrying respect for majority
+rule to absurd lengths to regard oneself as bound to accept the
+majority decision. To oppose evils of that magnitude, we are
+justified in using virtually any means likely to be effective.
+Genocide is an extreme case. To grant that it justifies the use
+of illegal means even against a majority concedes very little in
+terms of practical political action. Yet admitting even one exception
+to the obligation to abide by democratic decisions raises
+further questions: where is the line to be drawn between evils
+like genocide, where the obligation is clearly overridden, and
+less serious issues, where it is not? And who is to decide on
+which side of this imaginary line a particular issue falls? Gary
+Leber, of Operation Rescue, has written that in the United States
+alone, since 1973, 'We've already destroyed four times the number
+of people that Hitler did: Ronnie Lee, one of the British
+founders of the Animal Liberation Front, has also used the Nazi
+metaphor for what we do to animals, saying: 'Although we are
+only one species among many on earth, we've set up a Reich
+totally dominating the other animals, even enslaving them: It
+is not surprising then, that these activists consider their disobedience
+well justified. But do they have the right to take this
+decision themselves? If not, who is to decide when an issue is
+so serious that, even in a democracy, the obligation to obey the
+law is overridden?
+The only answer this question can have is: we must decide
+for ourselves on which side of the line particular cases fall. There
+is no other way of deciding, since the society's method of settling
+304
+Ends and Means
+issues has already made its decision. The majority cannot be
+judge in its own case. If we think the majority decision wrong,
+we must make up our own minds about how gravely it is wrong.
+This does not mean that any decision we make on such an
+issue is subjective or arbitrary. In this book, I have offered arguments
+about a number of moral issues. If we apply these
+arguments to the four cases with which this chapter began, they
+lead to specific conclusions. The racist Nazi policy of murdering
+Jews was obviously an atrocity, and Oskar Schindler was entirely
+right to do what he could to save some Jews from falling
+victim to it. (Given the personal risks he ran, he was also morally
+heroic to do so.) On the basis of the arguments put forward in
+Chapter 3 of this book, the experiments that Gennarelli conducted
+on monkeys were wrong, because they treated sentient
+creatures as mere things to be used as research tools. To stop
+such experiments is a desirable goal, and if breaking in to Gennarelli's
+laboratory and stealing his videotapes was the only way
+to achieve it, that seems to me justifiable. Similarly, for reasons
+explored in Chapter 10, to drown the Franklin valley in order
+to generate a relatively small amount of electricity could only
+have been based on values that were unjustifiable both for taking
+a short-term perspective, and for being overly humancentred.
+Civil disobedience was an appropriate means of testifying
+to the importance of the values that had been overlooked
+by those who favoured the dam.
+At the same time, the arguments that lie behind Operation
+Rescue's activities were found to be flawed when they were
+examined in Chapter 6. The human fetus is not entitled to the
+same sort of protection as older human beings, and so those
+who think of abortion as morally equivalent to murder are
+wrong. On this basis, Operation Rescue's campaign of civil disobedience
+against abortion is not justifiable. But it is important
+to realise that the mistake lies in Operation Rescue's moral
+reasoning about abortion, not in their moral reasoning about
+305
+Practical Ethics
+civil disobedience. If abortion really were morally equivalent to
+murder, we all ought to be out there blocking the doors to the
+abortion clinics.
+This makes life difficult, of course. It is not likely that members
+of Operation Rescue will be convinced by the arguments in this
+book. Their reliance on biblical quotations does not augur well
+for their openness to moral reasoning on non-religious grounds.
+So there is no easy way of convincing them that their civil
+disobedience is unjustified. We may regret this, but there is
+nothing to be done about it. There is no simple moral rule that
+will enable us to declare when disobedience is justifiable and
+when it is not, without going into the rights and wrongs of the
+target of the disobedience.
+When we are convinced that we are trying to stop something
+that really is a serious moral wrong, we still have other moral
+questions to ask ourselves. We must balance the magnitude of
+the evil we are trying to stop against the possibility that our
+actions will lead to a drastic decline in respect for law and for
+democracy. We must also take into account the likelihood that
+our actions will fail in their objective and provoke a reaction
+that will reduce the chances of success by other means. (As, for
+instance, terrorist attacks on an oppressive regime provide the
+government with an ideal excuse to lock up its more moderate
+political opponents, or violent attacks on experimenters enable
+the research establishment to brand all critics of animal experimentation
+as terrorists.)
+One result of a consequentialist approach to this issue that
+may at first seem odd is that the more deeply ingrained the habit
+of obedience to democratic rule, the more easily disobedience
+can be defended. There is no paradox here, however, merely
+another instance of the homely truth that while young plants
+need to be cosseted, well-established specimens can take
+rougher treatment. Thus on a given issue disobedience might
+be justifiable in Britain or the United States but not in Cambodia
+306
+Ends and Means
+or Russia during the period when these countries seek to establish
+democratic systems of government.
+These issues cannot be settled in general terms. Every case
+differs. When the evils to be stopped are neither utterly horrendous
+(like genocide) nor relatively harmless (like the design
+for a new national flag), reasonable people will differ on the
+justifiability of attempting to thwart the implementation of a
+considered decision democratically reached. Where illegal
+means are used with this aim, an important step has been taken,
+for disobedience then ceases to be 'civil disobedience', if by that
+term is meant disobedience that is justified by an appeal to
+principles that the community itself accepts as the proper way
+of running its affairs. It may still be best for such obedience to
+be civil in the other sense of the term, which makes a contrast
+with the use of violence or the tactics of terrorism.
+VIOLENCE
+As we have seen, civil disobedience intended as a means of
+attracting publicity or persuading the majority to reconsider is
+much easier to justify than disobedience intended to coerce the
+majority. Violence is obviously harder still to defend. Some go
+so far as to say that the use of violence as a means, particularly
+violence against people, is never justified, no matter how good
+the end.
+Opposition to the use of violence can be on the basis of an
+absolute rule, or an assessment of its consequences. Pacifists
+have usually regarded the use of violence as absolutely wrong,
+irrespective of its consequences. This, like other 'no matter what'
+prohibitions, assumes the validity of the distinction between
+acts and omissions. Without this distinction, pacifists who refuse
+to use violence when it is the only means of preventing greater
+violence would be responsible for the greater violence they fail
+to prevent.
+307
+Practical Ethics
+Suppose we have an opportunity to assassinate a tyrant who
+is systematically murdering his opponents and anyone else he
+dislikes. We know that if the tyrant dies he will be replaced by
+a popular opposition leader, now in exile, who will restore the
+rule of law. If we say that violence is always wrong, and refuse
+to carry out the assassination, mustn't we bear some responsibility
+for the tyrant's future murders?
+If the objections made to the acts and omissions distinction
+in Chapter 7 were sound, those who do not use violence to
+prevent greater violence have to take responsibility for the violence
+they could have prevented, Thus the rejection of the acts
+and omissions distinction makes a crucial difference to the discussion
+of violence, for it opens the door to a plausible argument
+in defence of violence.
+Marxists have often used this argument to rebut attacks on
+their doctrine of the need for violent revolution. In his classic
+indictment of the social effects of nineteenth -century capitalism,
+The Condition of the Working Class in England, Engels wrote:
+If one individual inflicts a bodily injury upon another which
+leads to the death of the person attacked we call it manslaughter;
+on the other hand, if the attacker knows beforehand that the
+blow will be fatal we call it murder. Murder has also been committed
+if society places hundreds of workers in such a position
+that they inevitably come to premature and unnatural ends. Their
+death is as violent as if they had been stabbed or shot .... Murder
+has been committed if thousands of workers have been deprived
+ofthe necessities oflife or if they have been forced into a situation
+in which it is impossible for them to survive .... Murder has been
+committed if society knows perfectly well that thousands of
+workers cannot avoid being sacrificed so long as these conditions
+are allowed to continue. Murder of this sort is just as culpable
+as the murder committed by an individual. At first sight it does
+not appear to be murder at all because responsibility for the death
+ofthe victim cannot be pinned on any individual assailant. Everyone
+is responsible and yet no one is responsible, because it appears
+as if the victim has died from natural causes. If a worker
+dies no one places the responsibility for his death on society,
+308
+Ends and Means
+though some would realize that society has failed to take steps
+to prevent the victim from dying. But it is murder all the same.
+One might object to Engels's use of the term 'murder'. The
+objection would resemble the arguments discussed in Chapter
+8, when we considered whether our failure to aid the starving
+makes us murderers. We saw that there is no intrinsic significance
+in the distinction between acts and omissions; but from
+the point 'of view of motivation and the appropriateness of
+blame, most cases of failing to prevent death are not equivalent
+to murder. The same would apply to the cases Engels describes.
+Engels tries to pin the blame on 'society', but 'society' is not a
+person or a moral agent, and cannot be held responsible in the
+wayan individual can.
+Still, this is nit-picking. Whether or not 'murder' is the right
+term, whether or not we are prepared to describe as 'violent'
+the deaths of malnourished workers in unhealthy and unsafe
+factories, Engels's fundamental point stands. These deaths are
+a wrong of the same order of magnitude as the deaths of
+hundreds of people in a terrorist bombing would be. It would
+be one-sided to say that violent revolution is always absolutely
+wrong, without taking account of the evils that the revolutionaries
+are trying to stop. If violent means had been the only way
+of changing the conditions Engels describes, those who opposed
+the use of violent means would have been responsible for the
+continuation of those conditions.
+Some of the practices we have been discussing in this book
+are violent, either directly or by omission. In the case of nonhuman
+animals, our treatment is often violent by any description.
+Those who regard the human fetus as a moral subject will
+obviously consider abortion to be a violent act against it. In the
+case of humans at or after birth, what are we to say of an
+avoidable situation in which some countries have infant mortality
+rates eight times higher than others, and a person born
+in one country can expect to live twenty years more than someone
+born in another country? Is this violence? Again, it doesn't
+309
+Practical Ethics
+really matter whether we call it violence or not. In its effects it
+is as terrible as violence.
+Absolutist condemnations of violence stand or fall with the
+distinction between acts and omissions. Therefore they fall.
+There are, however, strong consequentialist objections to the
+use of violence. We have been premising our discussion on the
+assumption that violence might be the only means of changing
+things for the better. Absolutists have no interest in challenging
+this assumption because they reject violence whether the assumption
+is true or false. Consequentialists must ask whether
+violence ever is the only means to an important end, or, if not
+the only means, the swiftest means. They must also ask about
+the long-term effects of pursuing change by violent means.
+Could one defend, on consequentialist grounds, a condemnation
+of violence that is in practice, if not in principle, as allencompassing
+as that of the absolute pacifist? One might attempt
+to do so by emphasising the hardening effect that the use
+of violence has, how committing one murder, no matter how
+'necessary' or 'justified' it may seem, lessens the resistance to
+committing further murders. Is it likely that people who have
+become inured to acting violently will be able to create a better
+society? This is a question on which the historical record is
+relevant. The course taken by the Russian Revolution must
+shake the belief that a burning desire for social justice provides
+immunity to the corrupting effects of violence. There are, admittedly,
+other examples that may be read the other way; but
+it would take a considerable number of examples to outweigh
+the legacy of Lenin and Stalin.
+The consequentialist pacifist can use another argument - the
+argument I urged against the suggestion that we should allow
+starvation to reduce the populations of the poorest nations to
+the level at which they could feed themselves. Like this policy,
+violence involves certain harm, said to be justified by the prospects
+of future benefits. But the future benefits can never be
+certain, and even in the few cases where violence does bring
+310
+Ends and Means
+about desirable ends, we can rarely be sure that the ends could
+not have been achieved equally soon by non-violent means.
+What, for instance, has been achieved by the thousands of
+deaths and injuries caused by more than twenty years of the
+Irish Republican Army bombings in Northern Ireland? Only
+counter-terrorism by extremist Protestant groups. Or think of
+the wasted death and suffering caused by the Baader-Meinhoff
+gang in Germany, or the Red Brigade in Italy. What did the
+Palestinian Liberation Organization gain from terrorism, other
+than a less compromising, more ruthless Israel than the one
+against which they began their struggle? One may sympathize
+with the ends some of these groups are fighting for, but the
+means they are using hold no promise of gaining their ends.
+Using these means therefore indicates callous disregard of the
+interests of their victims. These consequentialist arguments add
+up to a strong case against the use of violence as a means,
+particularly when the violence is indiscriminately directed
+against ordinary members of the public, as terrorist violence
+often is. In practical terms, that kind of violence would seem
+never justified.
+There are other kinds of violence that cannot be ruled out so
+convincingly. There is, for instance, the assassination of a murderous
+tyrant. Here, provided the murderous policies are an
+expression of the tyrant's personality rather than part of the
+institutions he commands, the violence is strictly limited, the
+aim is the end of much greater violence, success from a single
+violent act may be highly probable, and there may be no other
+way of ending the tyrant's rule. It would be implausible for a
+consequentialist to maintain that committing violence in these
+circumstances would have a corrupting effect, or that more,
+rather than less, violence would result from the assassination.
+Violence may be limited in a different way. The cases we have
+been considering have involved violence against people. These
+are the standard cases that come to mind when we discuss
+violence, but there are other kinds of violence. Animal Liber-
+311
+Practical Ethics
+ation Front members have damaged laboratories, cages, and
+equipment used to confine, hurt, or kill animals, but they avoid
+violent acts against any animaL human or non-human. (Other
+organizations claiming to be acting on behalf of animals have,
+however, injured at least two people by explosive devices. These
+actions have been condemned by every well-known animal
+liberation organization, including the Animal Liberation Front.)
+Earth First!, a radical American environmentalist organization,
+advocates 'monkeywrenching' or 'ecotage' - secret acts designed
+to stop or slow down processes that are harmful to the
+environment. Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood of Earth First!
+have co-edited Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching, a
+book that describes techniques for disabling computers, wrecking
+machinery, and blocking sewerage systems. In their view:
+Monkeywrenching is a non-violent resistance to the destruction
+of natural diversity and wildemess. It is not aimed toward harming
+human beings or other forms of life. ft is aimed at inanimate
+machines and tools .... Monkeywrenchers are very conscious of
+the gravity of what they do. They are deliberate about taking
+such a serious step .... They remember that they are engaged in
+the most moral of all actions: protecting life, defending the Earth.
+A more controversial technique is 'spiking' trees in forests that
+are to be logged. Putting metal spikes in a few trees in a forest
+makes it dangerous to saw timber from the forest, because the
+workers at the sawmill can never know when the saw might
+hit a spike, breaking the saw and sending sharp pieces of metal
+flying around the working area. Ecological activists who support
+spiking say that they warn the tiniber companies that trees in
+a certain area have been spiked, and if they go ahead and log
+the forests, any injuries that occur are the responsibility of the
+timber company managers who made that decision. But it is
+the workers who will be hurt, not the managers. Can the activists
+really shed their responsibility in this way? More orthodox
+environmental activists reject such tactics.
+Damage to property is not as serious a matter as injuring or
+312
+Ends and Means
+killing; hence it may be justified on grounds that would not
+justify anything that caused harm to sentient beings. This does
+not mean that violence to property is of no significance. Property
+means a great deal to some people, and one would need to
+have strong reasons to justify destroying it. But such reasons
+may exist. The justification might not be anything so epochmaking
+as transforming society. As in the case of the raid on
+Gennarelli's laboratory, it might be the specific and short-term
+goal of saving a number of animals from a painful experiment,
+performed on animals only because of society's speciesist bias.
+Again, whether such an action would really be justifiable from
+a consequentialist point of view would depend on the details
+of the actual situation. Someone lacking expertise could easily
+be mistaken about the value of an experiment or the degree of
+suffering it involved. And will not the result of damaging equipment
+and liberating one lot of animals simply be that more
+equipment is bought and more animals are bred? What is to be
+done with the liberated animals? Will illegal acts mean that the
+government will resist moves to reform the law relating to animal
+experiments, arguing that it must not appear to be yielding
+to violence? All these questions would need to be answered
+satisfactorily before one could come to a decision in favour of,
+say, damaging a laboratory. A related set of questions must also
+be answered before one can justify damaging a bulldozer that
+is being used to clear an old-growth forest.
+Violence is not easy to justify, even if it is violence against
+property rather than against sentient beings, or violence against
+a dictator rather than indiscriminate violence against the general
+public. Nevertheless, the differences between kinds of violence
+are important, because only by observing them can we condemn
+one kind of violence - the terrorist kind - in virtually absolute
+terms. The differences are blurred by sweeping condemnations
+of everything that falls under the general heading 'violence'.
+313
+12
+WHY ACT MORALLY?
+PREVIOUS chapters of this book have discussed what we
+ought, morally, to do about several practical issues and what
+means we are justified in adopting to achieve our ethical goals.
+The nature of our conclusions about these issues - the demands
+they make upon us - raises a further, more fundamental question:
+why should we act morally?
+Take our conclusions about the use of animals for food, or
+the aid the rich should give the poor. Some readers may accept
+these conclusions, become vegetarians, and do what they can
+to reduce absolute poverty. Others may disagree with our conclusions,
+maintaining that there is nothing wrong with eating
+animals and that they are under no moral obligation to do
+anything about reducing absolute poverty. There is also, however,
+likely to be a third group, consisting of readers who find
+no fault with the ethical arguments of these chapters, yet do
+not change their diets or their contributions to overseas aid. Of
+this third group, some will just be weak-willed, but others may
+want an answer to a further practical question. If the conclusions
+of ethics require so much of us, they may ask, should we bother
+about ethics at all?
+UNDERSTANDING THE QUESTION
+'Why should I act morally?' is a different type of question from
+those that we have been discussing up to now. Questions like
+'Why should I treat people of different ethnic groups equally?'
+or 'Why is abortion justifiable?' seek ethical reasons for acting
+314
+Why Act Morally?
+in a certain way. These are questions within ethics. They presuppose
+the ethical point of view. 'Why should I act morally?'
+is on another level. It is not a question within ethics, but a
+question about ethics.
+'Why should I act morally?' is therefore a question aboutsomething
+normally presupposed. Such questions are perplexing.
+Some philosophers have found this particular question so
+perplexing that they have rejected it as logically improper, as
+an attempt to ask something that cannot properly be asked.
+One ground for this rejection is the claim that our ethical
+principles are, by definition, the principles we take as overridingly
+important. This means that whatever principles are
+overriding for a particular person are necessarily that person's
+ethical principles, and a person who accepts as an ethical principle
+that she ought to give her wealth to help the poor must,
+by definition, have actually decided to give away her wealth.
+On this definition of ethics once a person has made an ethical
+decision no further practical question can arise. Hence it is impossible
+to make sense of the question: 'Why should I act
+morally?'
+It might be thought a good reason for accepting the definition
+of ethics as overriding that it allows us to dismiss as meaningless
+an otherwise troublesome question. Adopting this definition
+cannot solve real problems, however, for it leads to correspondingly
+greater difficulties in establishing any ethical conclusion.
+Take, for example, the conclusion that the rich ought to aid the
+poor. We were able to argue for this in Chapter 8 only because
+we assumed that, as suggested in the first two chapters of this
+book, the universalisability of ethical judgments requires us to
+go beyond thinking only about our own interests, and leads us
+to take a point of view from which we must give equal consideration
+to the interests of all affected by our actions. We cannot
+hold that ethical judgments must be universalisable and at the
+same time define a person's ethical principles as whatever principles
+that person takes as overridingly important - for what if
+315
+Practical Ethics
+I take as overridingly important some non-universalisable principle
+like 'I ought to do whatever benefits me'? If we define
+ethical principles as whatever principles one takes as overriding,
+then anything whatever may count as an ethical principle, for
+one may take any principle whatever as overridingly important.
+Thus what we gain by being able to dismiss the question:'Why
+should I act morally?' we lose by being unable to use the universalisability
+of ethical judgments - or any other feature of
+ethics - to argue for particular conclusions about what is morally
+right. Taking ethics as in some sense necessarily involving a
+universal point of view seems to me a more natural and less
+confusing way of discussing these issues.
+Other philosophers have rejected 'Why should I act morally?'
+for a different reason. They think it must be rejected for the
+same reason that we must reject another question, 'Why should
+I be rational?' which like 'Why should I act morally?' also
+questions something - in this case rationality - normally presupposed.
+'Why should I be rational?' really is logically improper
+because in answering it we would be giving reasons for
+being rational. Thus we would presuppose rationality in our
+attempt to justify rationality. The resulting justification of rationality
+would be circular - which shows, not that rationality
+lacks a necessary justification, but that it needs no justification,
+because it cannot intelligibly be questioned unless it is already
+presupposed.
+Is 'Why should I act morally?' like 'Why should I be rational?'
+in that it presupposes the very point of view it questions? It
+would be, if we interpreted the 'should' as a moral 'should'.
+Then the question would ask for moral reasons for being moral.
+This would be absurd. Once we have decided that an action is
+morally obligatory, there is no further moral question to ask. It
+is redundant to ask why I should, morally, do the action that I
+morally should do.
+There is, however, no need to interpret the question as a
+request for an ethical justification of ethics. 'Should' need not
+316
+Why Act Morally?
+mean 'should, morally'. It could simply be a way of asking for
+reasons for action, without any specification about the kind of
+reasons wanted. We sometimes want to ask a general practical
+question, from no particular point of view. Faced with a difficult
+choice, we ask a close friend for advice. Morally, he says, we
+ought to do A, but B would be more in our interests, while
+etiquette demands C and only D would display a real sense of
+style. This answer may not satisfy us. We want advice on which
+of these standpoints to adopt. If it is possible to ask such a
+question we must ask it from a position of neutrality between
+all these points of view, not of commitment to anyone of them.
+'Why should I act morally?' is this sort of question. If it is
+not possible to ask practical questions without presupposing a
+point of view, we are unable to say anything intelligible about
+the most ultimate practical choices. Whether to act according
+to considerations of ethics, self-interest, etiquette, or aesthetics
+would be a choice 'beyond reason' - in a sense, an arbitrary
+choice. Before we resign ourselves to this conclusion we should
+at least attempt to interpret the question so that the mere asking
+of it does not commit us to any particular point of view.
+We can now formulate the question more precisely. It is a
+question about the ethical point of view, asked from a position
+outside it. But what is 'the ethical point of view'? I have suggested
+that a distinguishing feature of ethics is that ethical judgments
+are universalisable. Ethics requires us to go beyond our
+own personal point of view to a standpoint like that of the
+impartial spectator who takes a universal point of view.
+Given this conception of ethics, 'Why should I act morally?'
+is a question that may properly be asked by anyone wondering
+whether to act only on grounds that would be acceptable from
+this universal point of view. It is, after all, possible to act - and
+some people do act - without thinking of anything except one's
+own interests. The question asks for reasons for going beyond
+this personal basis of action and acting only on judgments one
+is prepared to prescribe universally.
+317
+Practical Ethics
+REASON AND ETHICS
+There is an ancient line of philosophical thought that attempts
+to demonstrate that to act rationally is to act ethically. The
+argument is today associated with Kant and is mainly found in
+the writings of modern Kantians, though it goes back as least
+as far as the Stoics. The form in which the argument is presented
+varies, but the common structure is as follows:
+Some requirement of universalisability or impartiality is essential
+to ethics.
+2 Reason is universally or objectively valid. If, for example, itfollows
+from the premises 'All humans are mortal' and 'Socrates
+is human' that Socrates is mortal, then this inference
+must follow universally. It cannot be valid for me and invalid
+for you. This is a general point about reason, whether theoretical
+or practical.
+Therefore:
+3 Only a judgment that satisfies the requirement described in
+( 1) as a necessary condition of an ethical judgment will be an
+objectively rational judgment in accordance with (2). For I
+cannot expect any other rational agents to accept as valid for
+them a judgment that I would not accept if I were in their
+place; and iftwo rational agents could not accept each other's
+judgments, they could not be rational judgments, for the reason
+given in (2). To say that I would accept the judgment I
+make, even if I were in someone else's position and they in
+mine is, however, simply to say that my judgment is one I
+can prescribe from a universal point of view. Ethics and reason
+both require us to rise above our own particular point of view
+and take a perspective from which our own personal identity
+- the role we happen to occupy - is unimportant. Thus reason
+requires us to act on universalisable judgments and, to that
+extent, to act ethically.
+Is this argument valid? I have already indicated that I accept
+the first point, that ethics involves universalisability. The second
+318
+Why Act Morally?
+point also seems undeniable. Reason must be universal. Does
+the conclusion therefore follow? Here is the flaw in the argument.
+The conclusion appears to follow directly from the premises;
+but this move involves a slide from the limited sense in
+which it is true that a rational judgment must be universally
+valid, to a stronger sense of 'universally valid' that is equivalent
+to universalisability. The difference between these two senses
+can be seen by considering a non-universalisable imperative,
+like the purely egoistic: 'Let everyone do what is in my interests:
+This differs from the imperative of universalisable egoism - 'Let
+everyone do what is in her or his own interests' - because it
+contains an ineliminable reference to a particular person. It
+therefore cannot be an ethical imperative. Does it also lack the
+universality required if it is to be a rational basis for action?
+Surely not. Every rational agent could accept that the purely
+egoistic activity of other rational agents is rationally justifiable.
+Pure egoism could be rationally adopted by everyone.
+Let us look at this more closely. It must be conceded that
+there is a sense in which one purely egoistic rational agent -
+call him Jack - could not accept the practical judgments of
+another purely egoistic rational agent - call her Jill. Assuming
+Jill's interests differ from Jack's, Jill may be acting rationally in
+urging Jack to do A, while Jack is also acting rationally in
+deciding against doing A.
+This disagreement is, however, compatible with all rational
+agents accepting pure egoism. Though they accept pure egoism,
+it points them in different directions because they start from
+different places. When Jack adopts pure egoism, it leads him to
+further his interests and when Jill adopts pure egoism it leads
+her to further her interests. Hence the disagreement over what
+to do. On the other hand - and this is the sense in which pure
+egoism could be accepted as valid by all rational agents - if we
+were to ask Jill (off the record and promising not to tell Jack)
+what she thinks it would be rational for Jack to do, she would,
+319
+Practical Ethics
+if truthful, have to reply that it would be rational for Jack to
+do what is in his own interests, rather than what is in her
+interests.
+So when purely egoistic rational agents oppose each other's
+acts, it does not indicate disagreement over the rationality of
+pure egoism. Pure egoism, though not a universalisable principle,
+could be accepted as a rational basis of action by all rational
+agents. The sense in which rational judgments must be
+universally acceptable is weaker than the sense in which ethical
+judgements must be. That an action will benefit me rather than
+anyone else could be a valid reason for doing it, though it could
+not be an ethical reason for doing it.
+A consequence of this conclusion is that rational agents may
+rationally try to prevent each other from doing what they admit
+the other is rationally justified in doing. There is, unfortunately,
+nothing paradoxical about this. Two salespeople competing for
+an important sale will accept each other's conduct as rational,
+though each aims to thwart the other. The same holds of two
+soldiers meeting in battle, or two footballers vying for the ball.
+Accordingly, this attempted demonstration of a link between
+reason and ethics fails. There may be other ways of forging this
+link, but it is difficult to see any that hold greater promise of
+success. The chief obstacle to be overcome is the nature of practical
+reason. Long ago David Hume argued that reason in action
+applies only to means, not to ends. The ends must be given by
+our wants and desires. Hume unflinchingly drew out the implications
+of this view:
+'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole
+world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason
+for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness
+of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little
+contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser
+good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the
+former than the latter.
+320
+Why Ad Morally?
+Extreme as it is, Hume's view of practical reason has stood up
+to criticism remarkably well. His central claim - that in practical
+reasoning we start from something wanted - is difficult to refute;
+yet it must be refuted if any argument is to succeed in showing
+that it is rational for all of us to act ethically irrespective of what
+we want.
+Nor is the refutation of Hume all that is needed for a demonstration
+of the rational necessity of acting ethically. In The
+Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel has argued forcefully that
+not to take one's own future desires into account in one's practical
+deliberations - irrespective of whether one now happens
+to desire the satisfaction of those future desires - would indicate
+a failure to see oneself as a person existing over time, the present
+being merely one time among others in one's life. So it is my
+conception of myself as a person that makes it rational for me
+to consider my long-term interests. This holds true even ifI have
+'a more ardent affection' for something that I acknowledge is
+not really, all things considered, in my own interest.
+Whether Nagel's argument succeeds in vindicating the rationality
+of prudence is one question: whether a similar argument
+can also be used in favour of a form of altruism based on
+taking the desires of others into account is another question
+altogether. Nagel attempts this analogous argument. The role
+occupied by 'seeing the present as merely one time among others'
+is, in the argument for altruism, taken by 'seeing oneself as
+merely one person among others'. But whereas it would be
+extremely difficult for most of us to cease conceiving of ourselves
+as existing over time, with the present merely one time among
+others that we will live through, the way we see ourselves as
+a person among others is quite different. Henry Sidgwick's observation
+on this point seems to me exactly right:
+It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction
+between anyone individual and any other is real and
+fundamental, and that consequently T am concerned with the
+321
+Practical Ethics
+quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally
+important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the
+existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see
+how it can be proved that this distinction is not to be taken as
+fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action
+for an individual.
+So it is not only Hume's view of practical reason that stands in
+the way of attempts to show that to act rationally is to act
+ethically; we might succeed in overthrowing that barrier, only
+to find our way blocked by the commonsense distinction between
+self and others. Taken together, these are formidable
+obstacles and I know of no way of overcoming them.
+ETHICS AND SELF-INTEREST
+If practical reasoning begins with something wanted, to show
+that it is rational to act morally would involve showing that in
+acting morally we achieve something we want. If, agreeing with
+Sidgwick rather than Hume, we hold that it is rational to act
+in our long-term interests irrespective of what we happen to
+want at the present moment, we could show that it is rational
+to act morally by showing that it is in our long-term interests
+to do so. There have been many attempts to argue along these
+lines, ever since Plato, in The Republic, portrayed Socrates as
+arguing that to be virtuous is to have the different elements of
+one's personality ordered in a harmonious manner. and this is
+necessary for happiness. We shall look at these arguments
+shortly; but first it is necessary to assess an objection to this
+whole approach to 'Why should I act morally?'
+People often say that to defend morality by appealing to selfinterest
+is to misunderstand what ethics is all about. F. H. Bradley
+stated this eloquently:
+What answer can we give when the question Why should I be
+Moral?, in the sense of What will it advantage Me?, is put to
+us? Here we shall do well, I think, to avoid all praises of the
+322
+Why Act Morally?
+pleasantness of virtue. We may believe that it transcends all
+possible delights of vice, but it would be well to remember that
+we desert a moral point of view, that we degrade and prostitute
+virtue, when to those who do not love her for herself we bring
+ourselves to recommend her for the sake of her pleasures.
+In other words, we can never get people to act morally by
+providing reasons of self-interest. because if they accept what
+we say and act on the reasons given, they will only be acting
+self-interestedly, not morally.
+One reply to this objection would be that the substance of
+the action, what is actually done, is more important than the
+motive. People might give money to famine relief because their
+friends will think better of them, or they might give the same
+amount because they think it their duty. Those saved from starvation
+by the gift will benefit to the same extent either way.
+This is true but crude. It can be made more sophisticated if
+it is combined with an appropriate account of the nature and
+\ function of ethics. Ethics, though not consciously created, is a
+product of social life that has the function of promoting values
+common to the members of the society. Ethical judgments do
+this by praising and encouraging actions in accordance with
+these values. Ethical judgments are concerned with motives
+because this is a good indication of the tendency of an action
+to promote good or evil, but also because it is here that praise
+and blame may be effective in altering the tendency of a person's
+actions. Conscientiousness (that is, acting for the sake of doing
+what is right) is a particularly useful motive, from the community's
+point of view. People who are conscientious will, if
+they accept the values of their society (and if most people did
+not accept these values they would not be the values of the
+society) always tend to promote what the society values. They
+may have no generous or sympathetic inclinations, but if they
+think it their duty to give famine relief. they will do so. Moreover,
+those motivated by the desire to do what is right can be
+relied upon to act as they think right in all circumstances,
+323
+Practical Ethics
+whereas those who act from some other motive, like selfinterest,
+will only do what they think right when they believe
+it will also be in their interest. Conscientiousness is thus a kind
+of multipurpose gap-filler that can be used to motivate people
+towards whatever is valued, even if the natural virtues normally
+associated with action in accordance with those values (generosity,
+sympathy, honesty, tolerance, humility, and so on) are
+lacking. (This needs some qualification: a conscientious mother
+may provide as well for her children as a mother who loves
+them, but she cannot love them because it is the right thing to
+do. Sometimes conscientiousness is a poor substitute for the real
+thing.)
+On this view of ethics it is still results, not motives, that really
+matter. Conscientiousness is of value because of its consequences.
+Yet, unlike, say, benevolence, conscientiousness can
+be praised and encouraged only for its own sake. To praise a
+conscientious act for its consequences would be to praise not
+conscientiousn~ss, but something else altogether. If we appeal
+to sympathy or self-interest as a reason for doing one's duty,
+then we are not encouraging people to do their duty for its own
+sake. If conscientiousness is to be encouraged, it must be thought
+of as good for its own sake.
+It is different in the case of an act done from a motive that
+people act upon irrespective of praise and encouragement. The
+use of ethical language is then inappropriate. We do not normally
+say that people ought to do, or that it is their duty to do,
+whatever gives them the greatest pleasure, for most people are
+sufficiently motivated to do this anyway. So, whereas we praise
+good acts done for the sake of doing what is right, we withhold
+our praise when we believe the act was done from some motive
+like self-interest.
+This emphasis on motives and on the moral worth of doing
+right for its own sake is now embedded in our notion of ethics.
+To the extent that it is so embedded, we will feel that to provide
+324
+Why Act Morally?
+considerations of self-interest for doing what is right is to empty
+the action of its moral worth.
+My suggestion is that our notion of ethics has become misleading
+to the extent that moral worth is attributed only to action
+done because it is right, without any ulterior motive. It is understandable,
+and from the point of view of society perhaps
+even desirable, that this attitude should prevail; nevertheless,
+those who accept this view of ethics, and are led by it to do
+what is right because it is right, without asking for any further
+reason, are falling victim to a kind of confidence trick - though
+not, of course, a consciously perpetrated one.
+That this view of ethics is unjustifiable has already been indicated
+by the failure of the argument discussed earlier in this
+chapter for a rational justification of ethics. In the history of
+Western philosophy, no one has urged more strongly than Kant
+that our ordinary moral consciousness finds moral worth only
+when duty is done for duty'S sake. Yet Kant himself saw that
+without a rational justification this common conception of ethics
+would be 'a mere phantom of the brain'. And this is indeed the
+case. If we reject - as in general terms we have done - the
+Kantian justification of the rationality of ethics, but try to retain
+the Kantian conception of ethics, ethics is left hanging without
+support. It becomes a closed system, a system that cannot be
+questioned because its first premise - that only action done
+because it is right has any moral worth - rules out the only
+remaining possible justification for accepting this very premise.
+Morality is, on this view, no more rational an end than any
+other allegedly self-justifying practice, like etiquette or the kind
+of religious faith that comes only to those who first set aside all
+sceptical doubts.
+Taken as a view of ethics as a whole, we should abandon this
+Kantian notion of ethics. This does not mean, however, that
+we should never do what we see to be right simply because we
+see it to be right, without further reasons. Here we need to
+325
+Practical Ethics
+appeal to the distinction Hare has made between intuitive and
+critical thinking. When I stand back from my day-to-day ethical
+decisions and ask why I should act ethically, I should seek
+reasons in the broadest sense, and not allow Kantian preconceptions
+to deter me from considering self-interested reasons
+for living an ethical life. If my search is successful it will provide
+me with reasons for taking up the ethical point of view as a
+settled policy, a way of living. I would not then ask, in my dayto-
+day ethical decision making, whether each particular right
+action is in my interests. Instead I do it because I see myself as
+an ethical person. In everyday situations, I will simply assume
+that doing what is right is in my interests, and once I have
+decided what is right, I will go ahead and do it, without thinking
+about further reasons for doing what is right. To deliberate over
+the ultimate reasons for doing what is right in each case would
+impossibly complicate my life; it would also be inadvisable because
+in particular situations I might be too greatly influenced
+by strong but temporary desires and inclinations and so make
+decisions I would later regret.
+That, at least, is how a justification of ethics in terms of selfinterest
+might work, without defeating its own aim. We can
+now ask if such a justification exists. There is a daunting list of
+those who, following Plato's lead, have offered one: Aristotle,
+Aquinas, Spinoza, Butler, Hegel, even - for all his strictures
+against prostituting virtue - Bradley. Like Plato, these philosophers
+made broad claims about human nature and the conditions
+under which human beings can be happy. Some were
+also able to fall back on a belief that virtue will be rewarded
+and wicketlness punished in a life after our bodily death. Philosophers
+cannot use this argument if they want to carry conviction
+nowadays; nor can they adopt sweeping psychological
+theories on the basis of their own general experience of their
+fellows, as philosophers used to do when psychology was a
+branch of philosophy.
+It might be said that since philosophers are not empirical
+326
+Why Act Morally?
+scientists, discussion of the connection between acting ethically
+and living a fulfilled and happy life should be left to psychologists,
+sociologists, and other appropriate experts. The question
+is not, however, dealt with by any other single discipline and
+its relevance to practical ethics is reason enough for our looking
+into it.
+What facts about human nature could show that ethics and
+self- interest coincide? One theory is that we all have benevolent
+or sympathetic inclinations that make us concerned about the
+welfare of others. Another relies on a natural conscience that
+gives rise to guilt feelings when we do what we know to be
+wrong. But how strong are these benevolent desires or feelings
+of guilt? Is it possible to suppress them? If so, isn't it possible
+that in a world in which humans and other animals are suffering
+in great numbers, suppressing one's conscience and sympathy
+for others is the surest way to happiness?
+To meet this objection those who would link ethics and happiness
+must assert that we cannot be happy if these elements
+of our nature are suppressed. Benevolence and sympathy, they
+might argue, are tied up with the capacity to take part in friendly
+or loving relations with others, and there can be no real happiness
+without such relationships. For the same reason it is
+necessary to take at least some ethical standards seriously, and
+to be open and honest in living by them - for a life of deception
+and dishonesty is a furtive life, in which the possibility of discovery
+always clouds the horizon. Genuine acceptance of ethica~
+standards is likely to mean that we feel some gUilt - or at least
+that we are less pleased with ourselves than we otherwise would
+be - when we do not live up to them.
+These claims about the connection between our character and
+our prospects of happiness are no more than hypotheses. Attempts
+to confirm them by detailed research are sparse and
+inadequate. A. H. Maslow, an American psychologist, asserted
+that human beings have a need for self-actualisation that involves
+growing towards courage, kindness, knowledge, love,
+327
+Practical Ethics
+honesty, and unselfishness. When we fulfil this need, we feel
+serene, joyful, filled with zest, sometimes euphoric, and generally
+happy. When we act contrary to our need for selfactualisation,
+we experience anxiety, despair, boredom, shame,
+emptiness and are generally unable to enjoy ourselves. It would
+be nice if Maslow should tum out to be right; unfortunately,
+the data Maslow produced in support of his theory consisted of
+limited studies of selected people and cannot be considered
+anything more than suggestive.
+Human nature is so diverse that one may doubt if any generalisation
+about the kind of character that leads to happiness
+could hold for all human beings. What, for instance, of those
+we call 'psychopaths'? Psychiatrists use this term as a label for
+a person who is asocial, impulsive, egocentric, unemotional,
+lacking in feelings of remorse, shame, or guilt, and apparently
+unable to form deep and enduring personal relationships. Psychopaths
+are certainly abnormal, but whether it is proper to say
+that they are mentally ill is another matter. At least on the
+surface, they do not suffer from their condition, and it is not
+obvious that it is in their interest to be 'cured'. Hervey Cleckley,
+the author of a classic study of psychopathy entitled The Mask
+of Sanity, notes that since his book was first published he has
+received countless letters from people desperate for help - but
+they are from the parents, spouses, and other relatives of psychopaths,
+almost never from the psychopaths themselves. This
+is not surprising, for while psychopaths are asocial and indifferent
+to the welfare of others, they seem to enjoy life. Psychopaths
+often appear to be charming, intelligent people, with no
+delusions or other signs of irrational thinking. When interviewed
+they say things like: 'A lot has happened to me, a lot
+more will happen. But I enjoy living and I am always looking
+forward to each day. I like laughing and I've done a lot. I am
+essentially a clown at heart - but a happy one. I always take
+the bad with the good.' There is no effective therapy for psychopathy,
+which may be explained by the fact that psychopaths
+328
+Why Act Morally?
+see nothing wrong with their behaviour and often find it extremely
+rewarding, at least in the short term. Of course their
+impulsive nature and lack of a sense of shame or guilt means
+that some psychopaths end up in prison, though it is hard to
+tell how many do not, since those who avoid prison are also
+more likely to avoid contact with psychiatrists. Studies have
+shown that a surprisingly large number of psychopaths are able
+to avoid prison despite grossly antisocial behaviour, probably
+because of their well-known ability to convince others that they
+are truly repentant, that it will never happen again, that they
+deserve another chance, and so forth.
+The existence of psychopathic people counts against the contention
+that benevolence, sympathy, and feelings of guilt are
+present in everyone. It also appears to count against attempts
+to link happiness with the possession of these inclinations. But
+let us pause before we accept this latter conclusion. Must we
+accept psychopaths' own evaluations of their happiness? They
+are, after all, notoriously persuasive liars. Moreover, even if they
+are telling the truth as they see it, are they qualified to say that
+they are really happy, when they seem unable to experience
+the emotional states that play such a large part in the happiness
+and fulfilment of more normal people? Admittedly, a psychopath
+could use the same argument against us: how can we say
+that we are truly happy when we have not experienced the
+excitement and freedom that comes from complete irresponsibility?
+Since we cannot enter into the subjective states of psychopathic
+people, nor they into ours, the dispute is not easy to
+resolve.
+Cleckley suggests that the psychopaths' behaviour can be explained
+as a response to the meaninglessness of their lives. It is
+characteristic of psychopaths to work for a while at a job and
+then just when their ability and charm have taken them to the
+crest of success, commit some petty and easily detectable crime.
+A similar pattern occurs in their personal relationships. (There
+is support to be found here for Thomas Nagel's account of im-
+329
+Practical Ethics
+prudence as rational only if one fails to see oneself as a person
+existing over time, with the present merely one among other
+times one will live through. Certainly psychopathic people live
+largely in the present and lack any coherent life plan.)
+Cleckley explains this erratic and to us inadequately motivated
+behaviour by likening the psychopath's life to that of
+children forced to sit through a performance of King Lear. Children
+are restless and misbehave under these conditions because
+they cannot enjoy the playas adults do. They act to relieve
+boredom. Similarly, Cleckley says, psychopaths are bored because
+their emotional poverty means that they cannot take interest
+in, or gain satisfaction from, what for others are the most
+important things in life: love, family, success in business or
+professional life, and the like. These things simply do not matter
+to them. Their unpredictable and antisocial behaviour is an
+attempt to relieve what would otherwise be a tedious existence.
+These claims are speculative and Cleckley admits that they may
+not be possible to establish scientifically. They do suggest, however,
+an aspect of the psychopath's life that undermines the
+otherwise attractive nature of the psychopath's free-wheeling
+life. Most reflective people, at some time or other, want their
+life to have some kind of meaning. Few of us could deliberately
+choose a way of life that we regarded as utterly meaningless.
+For this reason most of us would not choose to live a psychopathic
+life, however enjoyable it might be.
+Yet there is something paradoxical about criticising the psychopath's
+life for its meaninglessness. Don't we have to accept,
+in the absence of religious belief, that life really is meaningless,
+not just for the psychopath but for all of us? And if this is so,
+why should we not choose - if it were in our power to choose
+our personality - the life of a psychopath? But is it true that,
+religion aside, life is meaningless? Now our pursuit of reasons
+for acting morally has led us to what is often regarded as the
+ultimate philosophical question.
+330
+Why Act Morally?
+HAS LIFE A MEANING?
+In what sense does rejection of belief in a god imply rejection
+of the view that life has any meaning? If this world had been
+created by some divine being with a particular goal in mind, it
+could be said to have a meaning, at least for that divine being.
+If we could know what the divine being's purpose in creating
+us was, we could then know what the meaning of our life was
+for our creator. If we accepted our creator's purpose (though
+why we should do that would need to be explained) we could
+claim to know the meaning of life.
+When we reject belief in a god we must give up the idea that
+life on this planet has some preordained meaning. Life as a whole
+has no meaning. Life began, as the best available theories tell
+us, in a chance combination of molecules; it then evolved
+through random mutations and natural selection. All this just
+happened; it did not happen for any overall purpose. Now that
+it has resulted in the existence of beings who prefer some states
+of affairs to others, however, it may be possible for particular
+lives to be meaningful. In this sense atheists can find meaning
+in life.
+Let us return to the comparison between the life of a psychopath
+and that of a more normal person. Why should the
+psychopath's life not be meaningful? We have seen that psychopaths
+are egocentric to an extreme: neither other people,
+nor worldly success, nor anything else really matters to them.
+But why is their own enjoyment of life not sufficient to give
+meaning to their lives?
+Most of us would not be able to find happiness by deliberately
+setting out to enjoy ourselves without caring about anyone or
+anything else. The pleasures we obtained in that way would
+seem empty and would soon pall. We seek a meaning for our
+lives beyond our own pleasures and find fulfilment and happiness
+in doing what we see to be meaningful. If our life has
+331
+Practical Ethics
+no meaning other than our own happiness, we are likely to find
+that when we have obtained what we think we need to be
+happy, happiness itself still eludes us.
+That those who aim at happiness for happiness's sake often
+fail to find it, while others find happiness in pursuing altogether
+different goals, has been called 'the paradox of hedonism'. It is
+not, of course, a logical paradox but a claim about the way in
+which we come to be happy. Like other generalisations on this
+subject, it lacks empirical confirmation. Yet it matches our everyday
+observations and is consistent with our nature as evolved,
+purposive beings. Human beings survive and reproduce themselves
+through purposive action. We obtain happiness and fulfilment
+by working towards and achieving our goals. In
+evolutionary terms we could say that happiness functions as an
+internal reward for our achievements. Subjectively, we regard
+achieving the goal (or progressing towards it) as a reason for
+happiness. Our own happiness, therefore, is a by-product of
+aiming at something else, and not to be obtained by setting our
+sights on happiness alone.
+The psychopath's life can now be seen to be meaningless in
+a way that a normal life is not. It is meaningless because it looks
+inward to the pleasures of the present moment and not outward
+to anything more long-term or far-reaching. More normal lives
+have meaning because they are lived to some larger purpose.
+All this is speculative. You may accept or reject it to the extent
+that it agrees with your own observation and introspection. My
+next - and final - suggestion is more speculative still. It is that
+to find an enduring meaning in our lives it is not enough to go
+beyond psychopaths who have no long-term commitments or
+life plans; we must also go beyond more prudent egoists who
+have long term plans concerned only with their own interests.
+The prudent egoists may find meaning in their lives for a time,
+for they have the purpose of furthering their own interests; but
+what, in the end, does that amount to? When everything in
+our interests has been achieved, do we just sit back and be
+332
+Why Act Morally?
+happy? Could we be happy in this way? Or would we decide
+that we had still not quite reached our target, that there was
+something else we needed before we could sit back and enjoy
+it all? Most materially successful egoists take the latter route,
+thus escaping the necessity of admitting that they cannot find
+happiness in permanent holidaying. People who slaved to establish
+small businesses, telling themselves they would do it
+only until they had made enough to live comfortably, keep
+working long after they have passed their original target. Their
+material 'needs' expand just fast enough to keep ahead of their
+income.
+The 1980s, the' decade of greed', provided plenty of examples
+of the insatiable nature of the desire for wealth. In 1985 Dennis
+Levine was a highly successful Wall Street banker with the
+fastest-growing and most talked-about Wall Street firm, Drexel
+Burnham Lambert. But Levine was not satisfied:
+When I was earning $20,000 a year, I thought, I can make
+$100,000. When I was eaming $100,000 a year, I thought, I can
+make $200,000. When I was making $1 million, I thought, I can
+make $3 million. There was always somebody one rung higher
+on the ladder, and I could never stop wondering: Is he really
+twice as good as I am.
+Levine decided to take matters into his own hands and arranged
+with friends at other Wall Street firms to exchange confidential
+information that would allow them to profit by buying shares
+in companies that were about to become takeover targets. By
+this method Levine made an additional $11 million, on top of
+what he earned in salary and bonuses. He also ended up bringing
+about his own ruin, and spending time in prison. That, however,
+is not the relevant point here. No doubt some who use inside
+information to make millions of dollars do not get caught. What
+is less certain, however, is that they really find satisfaction and
+fulfilment in having more money.
+Now we begin to see where ethics comes into the problem
+of living a meaningful life. If we are looking for a purpose
+333
+Practical Ethics
+broader than our own interests, something that will allow us
+to see our lives as possessing significance beyond the narrow
+confines of our own conscious states, one obvious solution is
+to take up the ethical point of view. The ethical point of view
+does, as we have seen, require us to go beyond a personal point
+of view to the standpoint of an impartial spectator. Thus looking
+at things ethically is a way of transcending our inward-looking
+concerns and identifying ourselves with the most objective point
+of view possible - with, as Sidgwick put it, 'the point of view
+of the universe'.
+The point of view of the universe is a lofty standpoint. In the
+rarefied air that surrounds it we may get carried away into
+talking, as Kant does, of the moral point of view, 'inevitably'
+humbling all who compare their own limited nature with it. I
+do not want to suggest anything as sweeping as this. Earlier in
+this chapter, in rejecting Thomas Nagel's argument for the rationality
+of altruism, I said that there is nothing irrational about
+being concerned with the quality of one's own existence in a
+way that one is not concerned with the quality of existence of
+other individuals. Without going back on this, I am now suggesting
+that rationality, in the broad sense that includes selfawareness
+and reflection on the nature and point of our own
+existence, may push us towards concerns broader than the quality
+of our own existence; but the process is not a necessary one
+and those who do not take part in it - or, who in taking part,
+do not follow it all the way to the ethical point of view - are
+neither irrational nor in error. Psychopaths, for all I know, may
+simply be unable to obtain as much happiness through caring
+about others as they obtain by antisocial acts. Other people find
+collecting stamps an entirely adequate way of giving purpose
+to their lives. There is nothing irrational about that; but others
+again grow out of stamp collecting as they become more aware
+of their situation in the world and more reflective about their
+purposes. To this third group the ethical point of view offers a
+meaning and purpose in life that one does not grow out of.
+334
+Why Act Morally?
+(At least, one cannot grow out of the ethical point of view
+until all ethical tasks have been accomplished. If that utopia
+were ever achieved, our purposive nature might well leave us
+dissatisfied, much as egoists might be dissatisfied when they
+have everything they need to be happy. There is nothing paradoxical
+about this, for we should not expect evolution to have
+equipped us, in advance, with the ability to enjoy a situation
+that has never previously occurred. Nor is this going to be a
+practical problem in the near future.)
+'Why act morally?' cannot be given an answer that will provide
+everyone with overwhelming reasons for acting morally.
+Ethically indefensible behaviour is not always irrational. We
+will probably always need the sanctions of the law and social
+pressure to provide additional reasons against serious violations
+of ethical standards. At the same time, those reflective enough
+to ask the question we have been discussing in this chapter are
+also those most likely to appreciate the reasons that can be
+offered for taking the ethical point of view.
+335
+APPENDIX: ON BEING SILENCED
+IN GERMANY
+Some scenes from academic life in Germany and Austria today:
+For the 1989/1990 winter semester, Dr. Hartmut Kliemt. a professor
+of philosophy at the University of Duisburg, a small town
+in the north of Germany, offered a course in which my book
+Practical Ethics was the principal text assigned to the class. First
+published in English in 1979, this book has been widely used
+in philosophy courses in North America, the United Kingdom,
+and Australia and has been translated into German, Italian,
+Spanish, and Swedish. I Until Kliemt announced his course, it
+had never evoked anything more than lively discussion. Kliemt's
+course, however, was subjected to organized and repeated disruption
+by protesters objecting to the use of the book on the
+grounds that in one of its ten chapters it advocates active euthanasia
+for severely disabled newborn infants. When after several
+weeks the disruptions showed no sign of abating, Kliemt
+was compelled to abandon the course.
+The European society for the Philosophy of Medicine and
+Health Care is a learned society that does just what one would
+expect an organization with that name to do: it promotes the
+study of the philosophy of medicine and health care. In 1990
+it planned its fourth annual conference, to be held in Bochum,
+Reprinted with Permission from the New York Review of Books, August 15. 1991.
+1 Cambridge University Press. 1979; German translation. Praktische Ethik
+(Stuttgart: Reclam. 1984); Spanish translation. Etica Practica (Barcelona: Ariel.
+1984); Italian translation, Etica Pratica (Naples: Liguori. 1989); Swedish
+translation, Praktisk Ethik (Stockholm: Thales. 1990).
+337
+Appendix
+Germany, in June. The intended theme of the conference was
+'Consensus Formation and Moral Judgment in Health Care'.
+During the days leading up to the conference, literature was
+distributed in Bochum and elsewhere in Germany by the 'AntiEuthanasia
+Forum', stating that 'under the cover of tolerance
+and the cry of democracy and liberalism, extermination strategies
+will be discussed. On these grounds we will attempt to
+prevent the Bochum Congress taking place: On June 5, scholars
+who were about to attend the conference received a letter from
+the secretary of the society notifying them that it was being
+moved to Maastricht, in the Netherlands, because the German
+organizers (two professors from the Center for Medical Ethics
+at the Ruhr University in Bochum) had been confronted with
+'anti-bioethics agitation, threats and intimidation', and could
+not guarantee the safety of the participants.
+In October 1990, Dr. Helga Kuhse, senior research fellow at
+the Centre for Human Bioethics at Monash University in Australia
+and author of The Sanctity-ofLife Doctrine in Medicine: A
+Critique,2 was invited to give a lecture at the Institute for Anatomy
+of the University of Vienna. A group calling itself the
+'Forum of Groups for the Crippled and Disabled' announced
+that it would protest against the lecture, stating that 'academic
+freedom has ethical limits, and we expect the medical faculty
+to declare that human life is inviolable'. The lecture was then
+canceled by the faculty of medicine. The dean of the faculty,
+referring to Dr. Kuhse, told the press, 'We didn't know at all
+who that was:3
+The Institute for Philosophy at the University of Hamburg
+decided, with the agreement of faculty members and a student
+representative, to appoint a professor in the field of applied
+ethics. The list of candidates was narrowed down to six. At this
+point in selecting a professor in Germany, the standard proce-
+2 Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press, 1987.
+3 Der Standard (Vienna), October 10, 1990.
+338
+Appendix
+dure is to invite each of the candidates to give a lecture. The
+lectures were announced but did not take place. Students and
+protesters from outside the university objected to the advertising
+of a chair in applied ethics on the grounds that this field raised
+questions about whether some human lives were worth living.
+The protesters blocked the entrances to the lecture theaters and
+blew whistles to drown out any attempts by the speakers to
+lecture. The university canceled the lectures. A few weeks later,
+a new list of candidates was announced. Two philosophers active
+in the field of applied ethics were no longer in consideration;
+they were replaced by philosophers who have done relatively
+little work in applied ethics; one, for example, is best known
+for his work in aesthetics. One of those dropped from the short
+list was Dr. Anton Leist, author of a book that offers ethical
+arguments in defense ofthe right to abortion,4 and also a coeditor
+of Analyse & Kritik; one of the few German journals publishing
+philosophy in the mode practiced in English-speaking
+countries. Ironically, a recent special issue of the journal was
+devoted to Practical Ethics and the issue of academic freedom in
+Germany. 5
+In February 1991 around-table discussion was to be held in
+Frankfurt, organized jointly by the adult education sections of
+both the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches. The theme
+was 'Aid in Dying: and among the participants was Norbert
+Hoerster, a highly respected German professor of jurisprudence,
+who has written in support of the principle of euthanasia. As
+the meeting was about to get underway, a group of people
+challenged the organizers, accusing them of giving a platform
+to a 'fascist' and an 'advocate of modem mass extermination'.
+They distributed leaflets headed 'No Discussion about Life and
+Death'. The meeting had to be abandoned.
+4 Eine Frage des Lebens: Ethik der Abtreibung and Kunstlichen Befruchtung (Frankfurt:
+Campus, 1990).
+5 Analyse & Kritik, December 12, 1990.
+339
+Appendix
+The International Wittgenstein Symposium, held annually at
+Kirchberg, in Austria, has established itself as one of the principal
+philosophical conferences on the continent of Europe. The
+fifteenth International Wittgenstein Conference was to have
+been held in August 1991, on the theme' Applied Ethics'. Arrangements
+for the program were made by philosophers from
+the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Salzburg. Among
+those invited to speak were Professor Georg Meggle, of the
+University of Saarbriicken, Professor R. M. Hare, former White's
+Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and
+now a professor of philosophy at the University of Florida,
+Gainesville, and myself. When the names of those invited became
+known, threats were made to the president of the Austrian
+Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Dr. Adolf Hubner, that the symposium
+would be disrupted unless the invitations to Professor
+Meggle and me were withdrawn. In other public discussions
+with opponents of the program, the boycott threat was extended
+to include several other invited professors: Hare, Kliemt, Hoerster,
+and Professor Dietrich Birnbacher of the department of
+philosophy at the Gesamthochschule in Essen.6
+Dr. Hubner is not a philosopher; he is a retired agricultural
+veterinarian, so he read Practical Ethics only after the protest
+arose. On reading it, however, he formed the opinion that-as
+he wrote in an Austrian newspaper-the protests were 'entirely
+justified,.7 In a long letter to the board of directors of the Austrian
+Ludwig Wittgenstein Society he wrote that 'as a result of the
+invitations to philosophers who hold the view that ethics can
+be grounded and carried out in the manner of an objective
+critical science, an existential crisis has arisen for the Austrian
+6 During the period when opposition to the Wittgenstein Symposium was being
+stirred up, these philosophers were all described, in terms calculated to arouse
+a hostile response, in a special 'euthanasia issue' of the Austrian journal
+erziehung heute (education today) (Innsbruck, 1991), p. 37.
+7 Adolf Hubner, 'Euthanasie diskussion im Geiste Ludwig Wittgenstein?' Der
+Standard (Vienna), May 21, 1991.
+340
+Appendix
+Wittgenstein Symposium and the Wittgenstein Society'. 8 The
+reference to the 'objective critical science' is striking, since Hare,
+in particular, has devoted much of his life to insisting on the
+differences between ethical judgments and statements to which
+notions of objective truth or falsity are standardly applied.
+According to some reports, opposition groups threatened to
+stage a display on 'Kirchberg under the Nazis' if the invitations
+were not withdrawn. This threat proved so potent that innkeepers
+in Kirchberg were said to have stated that they would
+refuse to serve philosophers during the symposium.9 To its considerable
+credit, the organizing committee resisted Dr. Hubner's
+proposal to withdraw the invitations from those philosophers
+against whom the protests were directed. Instead, it recommended
+that the entire symposium be canceled, since Dr. Hubner's
+public intervention in the debate had made it unlikely that
+it could be held without disruption. This recommendation was
+accepted by the committee ofthe Austrian Wittgenstein Society,
+against the will of Dr. Hubner himself. There will be no Wittgenstein
+Symposium in 1991.
+For those who believe that there is a strong consensus throughout
+Western Europe supporting freedom of thought and discussion
+in general. and academic freedom in particular, these
+scenes come as a shock. How they have come about, however,
+is not so difficult to explain. The story has its beginnings in
+events in which I was directly involved. It stems from an invitation
+I received to speak, in June 1989, at a European Symposium
+on 'Bioengineering, Ethics, and Mental Disability',
+organized jointly by Lebenshilfe, the major German organization
+for parents of intellectually disabled infants, and the Bishop
+8 'Die krisenhafte Situation der Osterreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft,
+ausgelost durch die Einladungspraxis zum Thema "Angewandte
+Ethik" , (unpublished typescript).
+9 Martin Sturzinger, 'Ein Totungshelfer mit faschistischem Gedankengut?' Die
+Weltwoche (Zurich), May 23, 1991, p. 83.
+341
+Appendix
+Bekkers Institute, a Dutch organization in the same field. The
+symposium was to be held in Marburg, a German university
+town, under the auspices of the International League of Societies
+for Persons with Mental Handicap, and the International Association
+for the Scientific Study of Mental Deficiency. The program
+looked impressive; after an opening speec,h from the
+German minister of family affairs, the conference was to be
+addressed by leading geneticists, bioethicists, theologians, and
+health-care lawyers from the United States, Canada, the Netherlands,
+England, France, and, of course, Germany. I accepted
+the invitation; and since I was going to be in Germany anyway,
+I also accepted an invitation from Professor Christoph Anst6tz,
+professor of special education at the University of Dortmund,
+to give a lecture a few days later on the subject 'Do severely
+disabled newborn infants have a right to life?'
+My intention in these lectures was to defend a view for which
+I have argued in several previously published works: that the
+parents of severely disabled newborn infants should be able to
+decide, together with their physician, whether their infant
+should live or die. If the parents and their medical adviser are
+in agreement that the infant's life will be so miserable or so
+devoid of minimal satisfactions that it would be inhumane or
+futile to prolong life, then they should be allowed to ensure that
+death comes about speedily and without suffering. Such a decision
+might reasonably be reached, if, for instance, an infant
+was born with anencephaly (the term means 'no brain' and
+infants with this condition have no prospect of ever gaining
+consciousness); or with a major chromosomal disorder such as
+trisomy 18, in which there are abnormalities of the nervous
+system, internal organs, and external features, and death always
+occurs within a few months, or at most two years; or in very
+severe forms of spina bifida where an exposed spinal cord leads
+to paralysis from the waist down, incontinence of bladder and
+bowel, a build-up of fluid on the brain, and, often, mental
+342
+Appendix
+retardation. (Were these conditions to be detected in prenatal
+examinations, many mothers would choose to have abortions
+and their decisions would be widely seen as understandable.)
+Parents may not always be able to make an unbiased decision
+concerning the future of their infant, and their decisions may
+not be defensible. In some cases - Down's syndrome perhaps
+- the outlook for the child might be for a life without suffering,
+but the child would need much more care and attention, over
+a longer period, than a normal child would require. Some couples,
+feeling that they were not in a position to provide the care
+required, or that it would be harmful for their already existing
+family for them to try to do so, might oppose sustaining the
+infant's life. There may, however, be other couples willing to
+give the child an adequate home; or the community may be in
+a position to take over the responsibility of providing medical
+care and for ensuring that the child has reasonably good conditions
+for living a satisfying life and developing his or her potential.
+In these circumstances, given that the child will not be
+living a life of unredeemed misery, and the parents will not be
+coerced into rearing that child, they can no longer insist upon
+having the major role in life or death decisions for their child. 10
+This position is, of course, at odds with the conventional
+doctrine of the sanctity of human life; but there are well-known
+difficulties in defending that doctrine in secular terms, without
+its traditional religious underpinnings. (Why, for example, if
+not because human beings are made in the image of God, should
+the boundary of sacrosanct life match the boundary of our species?)
+Among philosophers and bioethicists, the view that I was
+to defend is by no means extraordinary; if it has not quite
+10 There is a brief account of my reasons for holding this position in Practical
+Ethics, Chapter 7; and a much more detailed one in Helga Kuhse and Peter
+Singer, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford University Press, 1985). See also Peter
+Singer and Helga Kuhse, 'The Future of Baby Doe', The New York Review
+(March l, 1984), pp. l7-22.
+343
+Appendix
+reached the level of orthodoxy, it, or at least something akin to
+it, is widely held, and by some of the most respected scholars
+in the fields of both bioethics and applied ethics. II
+Just a day or two before I was due to leave for Germany, my
+invitation to speak at the Marburg conference was abruptly
+withdrawn. The reason given was that, by agreeing to lecture
+at the University of Dortmund, I had allowed opponents of my
+views to argue that Lebenshilfe was providing the means for
+me to promote my views on euthanasia in Germany. The letter
+withdrawing the invitation drew a distinction between my discussing
+these views 'behind closed doors with critical scientists
+who want to convince you that your attitude infringes human
+rights' and my promoting my position 'in public'. A postscript
+added that several organizations of handicapped persons were
+planning protest demonstrations in Marburg and Dortmund
+against me, and against Lebenshilfe for having invited me. (Although
+organizations for the disabled were prominent among
+the protesters, these groups were strongly supported and encouraged
+by various coalitions against genetic engineering and
+reproductive technology, and also by organizations on the left
+that had, apparently, nothing to do with the issue of euthanasia.
+The 'Anti-Atom Bureau', for instance, joined the protests, presumably
+neither knowing nor caring about my opposition to
+uranium mining and nuclear power.)
+The protests soon found their way into the popular press. Der
+Spiegel, which has a position in Germany not unlike that of Time
+11 Here is a selection; many more could be added: H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.,
+The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 1986); R. G. Frey,
+Rights, Killing and SUffering (Blackwell, 1983); Jonathan Glover, Causing
+Deaths and Saving Lives (Penguin, 1977); John Harris, The Value of Life
+(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1985); James Rachels, The End of Life
+(Oxford University Press, 1986); and Created from Animals (Oxford University
+Press, 1991); Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infantidde (Oxford University
+Press, 1983); and the book by Helga Kuhse to which I have already referred,
+The Sanctity·ofLife Doctrine in Medidne: A Critique.
+344
+Appendix
+and Newsweek in the United States, published a vehement attack
+on me written by Franz Christoph, the leader of the self-styled
+'Cripples Movement', a militant organization of disabled people.
+12 The article was illustrated with photographs of the transportation
+of 'euthanasia victims' in the Third Reich, and of
+Hitler's 'Euthanasia Order'. The article gave readers no idea at
+all of the ethical basis on which I advocated euthanasia, and it
+quoted spokespeople for groups of the disabled who appeared
+to believe that I questioned their right to life. I sent a brief reply
+in which I pointed out that I was advocating euthanasia not for
+anyone like themselves, but for severely disabled newborn infants,
+and that it was crucial to my defense of euthanasia that
+these infants would never have been capable of grasping that
+they are living beings with a past and a future. Hence my views
+cannot be a threat to anyone who is capable of wanting to go
+on living, or even of understanding that his or her life might
+be threatened. After a long delay, I received a letter from Der
+Spiegel telling me that, for reasons of space, they had been unable
+to publish my reply. Shortly afterward, however, Der Spiegel
+found space for a further highly critical account of my position
+on euthanasia, together with an interview, spread over four
+pages, with one of my leading opponents - and again, the same
+photograph of the Nazi transport vehicles. 13
+If Lebenshilfe had thought that they could pacify their critics
+by withdrawing my invitation to speak at Marburg, they had
+underestimated the storm that had broken loose. The protesters
+continued their opposition to what they were now calling the
+'Euthanasia Congress'. Shortly before the symposium was due
+to open, Lebenshilfe and the Bishop Bekkers Institute canceled
+the entire event. Soon after the Faculty of Special Education at
+12 Franz Christoph, '(K)ein Diskurs iiber "lebensunwertes Leben" " Der Spie·
+gel, No. 23/1989 (June 5, 1989).
+13 'Bizarre Verquickung' and 'Wenn Mitleid tOdlich wird', Der Spiegel, No. 341
+1989 (August 21, 1989), pp. 171-6.
+345
+Appendix
+the University of Dortmund decided not to proceed with my
+scheduled lecture there.
+This was not quite the end of my experiences in Germany that
+summer. Dr. Georg Meggle, professor of philosophy at the University
+of Saarbriicken, invited me to lecture at his university
+in order to show that it was possible to discuss the ethics of
+euthanasia rationally in Germany. I hoped to use this opportunity
+to say that, while I understood and strongly supported
+every effort to prevent the resurgence of Nazi ideas, my own
+views about euthanasia had nothing whatsoever to do with
+what the Nazis did. In contrast to the Nazi ideology that the
+state should decide who was worthy of life, my view was designed
+to reduce the power of the state and allow parents to
+make crucial life and death decisions, both for themselves and,
+in consultation with their doctors, for their newborn infants.
+Those who argued that it is always wrong to decide that a
+human life is not worth living would, to be consistent, have to
+say that we should use all the techniques of modern medical
+care in order to extend to the greatest possible extent the life
+of every infant, no matter how hopeless the infant's prospects
+might be and no matter how painful his or her existence. This
+was surely too cruel for any humane person to support.
+Making this obvious point proved more difficult than I had
+expected. When I rose to speak in Saarbriicken I was greeted
+by a chorus of whistles and shouts from a minority of the audience
+determined to prevent me from speaking. Professor Meggle
+offered the protesters the opportunity to state why they
+thought I should not speak. This showed how completely they
+had misunderstood my position. Many obviously believed that
+I was politically on the far right. Another suggested that I lacked
+the experience with Nazism that Germans had had; he and
+others in the audience were taken aback when I told them that
+I was the child of Austrian-Jewish refugees, and that three of
+my grandparents had died in Nazi concentration camps. Some
+346
+Appendix
+seemed to think that I was opposed to all measures that would
+advance the position of the disabled in society, whereas in fact,
+while I hold that some lives are so severely blighted from the
+beginning that they are better not continued, I also believe that
+once a life has been allowed to develop, then in every case
+everything should be done to make that life as satisfying and
+rich as possible. This should include the best possible education,
+adjusted to the needs of the child, to bring out to the maximum
+the particular abilities of the disabled person.
+Another chance comment revealed a still deeper ignorance
+about my position. One protester quoted from a passage in
+which I compare the capacities of intellectually disabled humans
+and nonhuman animals. The way in which he left the quotation
+hanging, as if it were in itself enough to condemn me, made
+me realize that he thought that I was urging that we should
+treat disabled humans in the way we now treat nonhuman
+animals. He had no idea that my views about how we should
+treat animals are utterly different from those conventionally
+accepted in Western society. When I replied that, for me, to
+compare a human being to a nonhuman animal was not to say
+that the human being should be treated with less consideration,
+but that the animal should be treated with more, this person
+asked why I did not use my talents to write about the morality
+of our treatment of animals, rather than about euthanasia. Naturally
+I replied that I had done that, and that it was, indeed,
+precisely for my views about the suffering of animals raised on
+commercial farms, and used in medical and psychological research,
+and the need for animal liberation that I was best known
+in English-speaking countries; but I could see that a large part
+of the audience simply did not believe that I could be known
+anywhere as anything other than an advocate of euthanasia. 14
+14 My Animal Liberation (Random House, 1975; second revised edition, New
+York ReviewlRandom House, 1990) had been published in Germany under
+the title Befreiung der Tiere (Munich: F. Hinhammer, 1982) but it is not
+widely known. Nevenheless, Practical Ethics contains two chapters sum-
+347
+Appendix
+Allowing these misconceptions to be stated did, at least, provide
+an opportunity for reply. Someone else came to the platform
+and said that he agreed that it was not necessary to use
+intensive care medicine to prolong every life, but allowing an
+infant to die was different from taking active steps to end the
+infant's life. That led to further discussion, and so in the end
+we had a long and not entirely fruitless debate. Some of that
+audience, at least, went away better informed than they had
+been when they arrived. 15
+The events of the summer of 1989 have had continuing repercussions
+on German intellectual life. On the positive side, those
+who had sought to stifle the controversy over euthanasia soon
+found that, as so often happens, the attempt to suppress ideas
+only ensures that the ideas gain a wider audience. Germany's
+leading liberal weekly newspaper, Die Zeit, published two articles
+that gave a fair account of the arguments for euthanasia,
+and also discussed the taboo that had prevented open discussion
+of the topic in Germany. For this courageous piece of journalism,
+Die Zeit also became the target of protests, with Franz Christoph,
+the leader of the 'Cripples Movement', chaining his wheelchair
+to the door of the newspaper's editorial offices. The editors of
+Die Zeit then invited Christoph to take part in a tape-recorded
+discussion with the editors of the newspaper and one or two
+others about whether the paper was right to discuss the topic
+of euthanasia. Christoph accepted, and the transcript was published
+in a further extensive article. Predictably, as in Saarbriicken,
+what began as a conversation about whether or not
+marising my views on animals, so the response did indicate that most of
+the protesters had not read the book on which they based their opposition
+to my invitation to speak.
+15 For this reason one of the protesters, reporting on the events in a student
+publication, made it clear that to enter into the discussion with me was a
+tactical error. See Holger Dorff, 'Singer in Saarbriicken: Unirevue (Wintersemester,
+1989/90), p. 47.
+348
+Appendix
+euthanasia should be discussed very soon turned into a debate
+on euthanasia itself.
+From this point the euthanasia debate was picked up by both
+German and Austrian television. The outcome was that instead
+of a few hundred people hearing my views at lectures in Marburg
+and Dortmund, several million read about them or listened
+to them on television. The Deutsche Arzteblatt - the major German
+medical journal - published an article by Helga Kuhse
+entitled 'Why the discussion of euthanasia is unavoidable in
+Germany too', which led to an extensive debate in subsequent
+issues. 16 In philosophical circles the discussion of applied ethics
+in general, and euthanasia in particular, is much livelier now
+than it was before 1989 - as is indicated by the special issue of
+Analyse & Kritik to which I have already referred. In journals of
+special education, as well, ethical issues are now being discussed
+far more frequently than they were two years ago.
+The protest also revived the flagging sales of the German
+edition of Practical Ethics. The book sold more copies in the year
+after June 1989 than it had in all the five years it had previously
+been available in Germany. Now everyone involved in the debate
+in Germany seems to be rushing to publish a book on
+euthanasia. With the exception of two books by Anstotz and
+Leist, which contain genuine ethical arguments, those published
+so far are of some interest for those wishing to study the thinking
+of Germans opposed to free speech, but not for any other
+reason. 17 For the most part each of the books appears to have
+been written to a formula that goes something like this:
+16 Helga Kuhse, 'Warum Fragen der Euthanasie auch in Deutschland unvermeidlich
+sind'. Deutsche iirz(eblatt, No. 16 (April 19, 1990), pp. 1243-9;
+readers' letters, and a response by Kuhse, are to be found in No. 37 (September
+13, 1990), pp.2696-704 and No. 38 (September 20, 1990),
+pp.2792-6.
+17 The list of books published between January 1990 and June 1991 devoted
+to this theme includes: C. Anstotz, Ethik und Behinderung (Berlin: Edition
+Marhold, 1990); T. Bastian, editor, Denken, Schreiben, Toten (Stuttgart: HirzeL
+1990); T. Bruns, U. Panselin, and U. Sierck, TOdliche Ethik (Hamburg:
+349
+Appendix
+Quote a few passages from Practical Ethics selected so as to
+distort the book's meaning.
+2 Express horror that anyone can say such things.
+3 Make a sneering jibe at the idea that this could pass for
+philosophy.
+4 Draw a parallel between what has been quoted and what the
+Nazis thought or did.
+But it is also essential to observe one negative aspect of the
+formula:
+5 Avoid discussing any of the following dangerous questions:
+Is human life to be preserved to the maximum extent possible?
+If not, in cases in which the patient cannot and never has
+been able to express a preference, how are decisions to discontinue
+treatment to be made, without an evaluation of the
+patient's quality of life? What is the moral significance of the
+distinction between bringing about a patient's death by withdrawing
+treatment necessary to prolong life and bringing it
+about by active intervention? Why is advocacy of euthanasia
+for severely disabled infants so much worse than advocacy of
+abortion on request that the same people can oppose the right
+even to discuss the former, while themselves advocating the
+latter?
+The irony about the recent pUblications, of course, is that
+even those who are highly critical of my own position do, by
+publishing their books and articles, foster a climate of debate
+about the topic. Even Franz Christoph, despite chaining his
+wheelchair to the offices of Die Zeit because they published
+reports of my views on euthanasia, has now published his
+own book on the topic. At the outset he protests vigorously
+Verlag Libertare Assoziation, 1990); Franz Christoph, Todlicher Zeitgeist (Cologne:
+Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1990); E. Klee, Durch Zyankali Erlost (Frankfurt:
+Fischer, 1990); A. Leist, editor, Urn Leben und Tod (Frankfurt:
+Suhrkamp, 1990); and o. Tolmein, Geschiitzles Leben (Hamburg: Konkret
+Literatur Verlag, 1990). They will soon be joined by what is likely to be the
+best book on the current German debate: R. Hegselmann and R. Merkel,
+editors, Zur Debatte uber Euthanasie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, expected September
+1991).
+350
+Appendix
+that his book is not a contribution to the debate about euthanasia,
+but a book against this debate; it is self-evident,
+though, that one cannot publish a book on whether or not
+to have a debate on euthanasia without stimulating thought
+among one's readers and reviewers about the issue of euthanasia
+itself. 18
+The negative aspects ofthese events are, unfortunately, probably
+more weighty. Most threatening of all are the incidents described
+at the beginning of this essay, and the atmosphere of
+repression and intimidation that they have evoked. Anyone who
+offers a course based on Practical Ethics in Germany now risks
+the same protests and personal attacks that Professor Kliemt
+faced in Duisburg. One Berlin philosopher told me recently that
+it is not possible to offer a course in applied ethics in that city
+- whether or not it makes reference to my book - because such
+a course would be bound to be disrupted.
+A sinister aspect of this atmosphere is a kind of self-censorship
+among German publishers. It has proven extraordinarily difficult
+to find a publisher to undertake a German edition of Should
+the Baby Live? the updated and more comprehensive account of
+my views (and those of my co-author Helga Kuhse) on the
+treatment of severely disabled newborn infants. In view of the
+current controversy, there seems no doubt that a German edition
+of the book would have good commercial prospects. Yet one
+after another, German publishers have declined to publish it,
+18 See, for instance, the way in which Rudi Tarneden, a reviewer from an
+association for the disabled, and very sympathetic to Christoph's position,
+is drawn in the course of his review to raise such questions as: 'Aren't there
+in fact extreme situations of human suffering, limits to what is bearable?
+Am I really guilty of contempt for humanity ['Menschenverachtung: a term
+often used in Germany to describe what I am supposed to be guilty ofPSI
+if I try to take this into account?' Rudi Tarneden, 'Wo alles richtig ist,
+kann es auch keine Schuld mehr geben' (a review of Franz Christoph,
+Todlicher Zeitgeist and Christoph Anstotz, Ethik und Behinderung), Zeitschrift
+fur Heilpiidagogik Vol. 42, No.4 (1991), p. 246.
+351
+Appendix
+even after it had been recommended by editors whose advice
+they normally accept without hesitation.
+For those interested in studying or teaching bioethics or applied
+ethics in Germany, the consequences are much more serious
+still. Because he had invited me to lecture at the University
+of Dortmund, Professor Christoph Anstotz became the target of
+a hostile campaign aimed at having him dismissed from his
+teaching duties. Petitions were circulated and letters written to
+the minister of science and research for the state of NordrheinWestfalen,
+in which Dortmund is situated. These letters were
+signed by both teachers and students in special education. Although
+Professor Anstotz has a tenured position from which it
+would scarcely be possible for him to be dismissed, the government
+took the complaints seriously enough to ask him to explain
+why he had invited me, and what implications he drew from
+my ethical position for his work in special education.
+Throughout this campaign, the rector of the University of
+Dortmund and his office remained silent. The highest officers
+of the university took no action to indicate their concern that
+threats of protest had forced an academic lecture to be canceled;
+nor did they come to the defense of one of their professors when
+he was under attack for inviting a colleague to give a lecture
+on the campus ofthe university. That was typical ofthe reaction
+of German professors. There was no strong reaction among them
+on behalf of academic freedom. With a handful of exceptions,
+Anstotz's colleagues in special education either joined the campaign
+against him, or remained silent. A number of philosophers
+signed declarations of support for the principle of free debate,
+and one of these was published in the Berlin newspaper taz. 19
+At Professor Meggle's instigation, 180 members ofthe German
+Philosophical Association signed a similar declaration, but the
+association has since failed to publish the list of the signers,
+despite giving an undertaking to do so.
+19 taz (Berlin), January 10. 1990.
+352
+Appendix
+All this does not augur well for the future of rational discussion
+of controversial new ethical issues in Germany and Austria.
+Outside the German-speaking nations, study and discussion of
+bioethics is expanding rapidly, in response to the recognition
+of the need for ethical consideration of the many new issues
+raised by developments in medicine and the biological sciences.
+Other fields of applied ethics, such as the status of animals,
+questions of global justice and resource distribution, environmental
+ethics and business ethics, are also getting much attention.
+In Germany and Austria, however, it now takes real
+courage to do work in applied ethics, and even more courage
+to publish something that is likely to come under the hostile
+scrutiny of those who want to stop debate. Academics who do
+not have a permanent university position must fear not merely
+personal attack, but also the diminished opportunity to pursue
+an academic career. The events in Hamburg cast a cloud over
+the prospects of university posts opening up in these fields. If
+there are no posts to be obtained, graduate students will avoid
+working on questions of applied ethics, for there is no sense in
+studying matters that offer no prospect of employment. There
+is even a danger that in order to avoid controversy, analytic
+philosophy as a whole will suffer a setback. At the present time,
+a large number of new university positions are being created in
+the universities of the former German Democratic Republic.
+Philosophers interested in analytic philosophy are concerned
+that these positions may all go to philosophers working on less
+sensitive subjects, for example, to those who concentrate on
+historical studies, or to followers of Habermas who have generally
+kept quiet about these sensitive ethical issues and about
+the obstacles to debating them in Germany today.
+Germans of course are still struggling to deal with their past,
+and the German past is one which comes close to defying rational
+understanding. There is, however, a peculiar tone of fanaticism
+about some sections of the German debate over
+353
+Appendix
+euthanasia that goes beyond normal opposition to Nazism, and
+instead begins to seem like the very mentality that made Nazism
+possible. To see this attitude at work, let us look not at euthanasia,
+but at an issue that is, for the Germans, closely related
+to it and just as firmly taboo: the issue of eugenics. Because the
+Nazis practiced eugenics, anything in any way related to genetic
+engineering in Germany is now smeared with Nazi associations.
+This attack embraces the rejection of prenatal diagnosis, when
+followed by selective abortion of fetuses with Down's syndrome,
+spina bifida, or other defects, and even leads to criticism of
+genetic counseling designed to avoid the conception of children
+with genetic defects. It has also led to the German parliament
+unanimously passing a law that prohibits all non-therapeutic
+experimentation on the human embryo. The British parliament,
+by contrast, recently passed by substantial majorities in both
+chambers a law that allows nontherapeutic embryo experimentation
+up to fourteen days after fertilization.
+To understand how bizarre this situation is, readers in
+English-speaking countries must remind themselves that this
+opposition comes not, as it would in our countries, from rightwing
+conservative and religious groups, but from the left. Since
+women's organizations are prominent among the opposition to
+anything that smacks of eugenics, and also are in the forefront
+of the movement to defend the right to abortion, the issue of
+prenatal diagnosis gives rise to an obvious problem in German
+feminist circles. The accepted solution seems to be that a woman
+should have the right to an abortion, but not to an abortion
+based on accurate information about the future life-prospects
+of the fetus she is carrying. 20
+20 Gennan feminists who read Franz Christoph's recent book (see note 17,
+above) may reconsider their support for his position; for he leaves no doubt
+that he is opposed to granting women a right to decide about abortion. For
+Christoph, 'Abortion decisions are always decisions about whether a life is
+worthy of being lived; the child does not fit into the woman's present life-
+354
+Appendix
+The rationale for this view is, at least, consistent with the
+rationale for opposition to euthanasia: it is the idea that no one
+should ever judge one life to be less worth living than another.
+To accept prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion, or even to
+select genetic counseling aimed at avoiding the conception of
+infants with extreme genetic abnormalities, is seen as judging
+that some lives are less worth living than others. To this the
+more militant groups of disabled people take offense; it suggests,
+they maintain, that they should not have been allowed to come
+into existence, and thus denies their right to life.
+This is, of course, a fallacy. It is one thing to hold that we
+may justifiably take steps to ensure that 'the children we bring
+into the world do not face appalling obstacles to living a minimally
+decent life, and a quite different thing to deny to a living
+person who wants to go on living the right to do just that. If
+the suggestion, on the other hand, is that whenever we seek to
+avoid having severely disabled children, we are improperly
+judging one kind of life to be worse than another, we can reply
+that such judgments are both necessary and proper. To argue
+otherwise would seem to suggest that if we break a leg, we
+should not get it mended, because in doing so we judge the
+plans. Or: the social situation is unsatisfactory. Or: the woman holds that
+she is only able to bear a healthy child. Whether one likes it or not: with
+the last example, the woman who wants an abortion confinns an objectively
+negative social value judgment against the handicapped' (p. 13), There is
+more along these lines, all in a style well-suited for quotation in the pamphlets
+of the anti· abortion movement.
+This is, at least, more honest than the evasive maneuvering of Oliver
+Tolmein, who states in the foreword to his Geschiitztes Leben that to discuss
+the significance of the feminist concept of self-detennination in the context
+of prenatal diagnosis and abortion would take him 'by far' beyond the
+bounds of his theme (p. 9). Odd, since the crux of his vitriolic attack on all
+who advocate euthanasia (an attack that includes, on the very first page of
+the book, a statement that it is necessary to disrupt seminars on the issue)
+is that those who advocate euthanasia are committed to valuing some human
+lives as not worth living,
+355
+Appendix
+lives of those with crippled legs to be less worth living than our
+own.21 For people to believe such a fallacious argument is bad
+enough; what is really frightening, however, is that people believe
+in it with such fanaticism that they are prepared to use
+force to suppress any attempt to discuss it.
+If this is the case with attempts to discuss practices like genetic
+counseling and prenatal diagnosis, which are today very widely
+accepted in most developed countries, it is easy to imagine that
+the shadow of Nazism prevents any rational discussion of anything
+that relates to euthanasia. It avails little to point out that
+what the Nazis called 'euthanasia' had nothing to do with compassion
+or concern for those who were killed, but was simply
+the murder of people considered unworthy of living from the
+racist viewpoint of the German Valko Such distinctions are altogether
+too subtle for those who are convinced that they alone
+know what will prevent a revival of Nazi-like barbarism.
+Can anything be done? In May this year, in Zurich, I had one
+of the most unpleasant experiences yet in this unhappy story;
+but it gave, at the same time, a glimmer of hope that there may
+be a remedy.
+I was invited by the Zoological Institute of the University of
+Zurich to give a lecture on 'Animal Rights'. On the following
+day, the philosophy department had organized a colloquium
+for twenty-five invited philosophers, theologians, special educationalists,
+zoologists, and other academics to discuss the implications
+for both humans and animals of an ethic that would
+reject the view that the boundary of our species marks a moral
+boundary of great intrinsic significance, and holds that nonhuman
+animals have no rights.
+The lecture on animal rights did not take place. Before it
+began, a group of disabled people in wheelchairs, who had been
+21 R. M. Hare makes a similar point in a letter published in Die Zeit. August
+11, 1989.
+356
+Appendix
+admitted to the flat area at the front of the lecture theater, staged
+a brief protest in which they said that, while it was all the same
+to them whether or not I lectured on the topic of animal rights,
+they objected to the fact that the University of Zurich had invited
+such a notorious advocate of euthanasia to discuss ethical issues
+that also concerned the disabled. At the end of this protest,
+when I rose to speak, a section of the audience - perhaps a
+quarter or a third - began to chant: "Singer raus! Singer raus!"
+As I heard this chanted, in German, by people so lacking in
+respect for the tradition of reasoned debate that they were unwilling
+even to allow me to make a response to what had just
+been said about me, I had an overwhelming feeling that this
+was what it must have been like to attempt to reason against
+the rising tide of Nazism in the declining days of the Weimar
+Republic. The difference was that the chant would have been,
+not 'Singer raus', but 'Juden raus'. An overhead projector was
+still functioning, and I began to write on it, to point out this
+parallel that I was feeling so strongly. At that point one of the
+protesters came up behind me and tore my glasses from my
+face, throwing them on the floor and breaking them.
+My host wisely decided to abandon the lecture; there was
+nothing else that could be done. But from this distressing affair
+came one good sign; it was clear that the disabled people who
+had made the initial protest were distressed with what had
+happened afterward. Several said that they had not intended
+that the lecture should be disrupted; they had, in fact, prepared
+questions to ask during the discussion period that would have
+followed the lecture. Even while the chanting was going on,
+some attempted to begin a discussion with me; at which point
+some of the able-bodied demonstrators (presumably well aware
+of the way in which in Saarbriicken a discussion had broken
+through the initial hostility toward me) urgently remonstrated
+with them not to talk to me. The disabled, however, clearly had
+no power to do anything about the chanting.
+As already noted, my views in no way threaten anyone who
+357
+Appendix
+is, or ever has been, even minimally aware of the fact that he
+or she has a possible future life that could be threatened. But
+there are some who have a political interest in preventing this
+elementary fact from becoming known. These people are now
+playing on the anxieties of the disabled in order to use them as
+a political front for different purposes. In Zurich, for instance,
+prominent among the nondisabled people chanting 'Singer raus'
+were the Autonomen, or 'Autonomists', a group that affects an
+anarchist, style but disdains any interest in anarchist theory. For
+these nondisabled political groups, preventing Singer from
+speaking, no matter what the topic, has become an end in itself,
+a way of rallying the faithful and striking at the entire system
+in which rational debate takes place. Disabled people have nothing
+to gain, and much to lose, by allowing themselves to be
+used by such nihilistic groups. If they can be brought to see that
+their interests are better served by an open discussion with those
+whose views they oppose, it may be possible to begin a process
+in which both bioethicists and the disabled address the proper
+concerns of the other side, and move to a dialogue that is constructive
+rather than destructive.
+Such a dialogue would be only a beginning. To heal the damage
+done to bioethics and applied ethics in Germany will take much
+longer. There is a real danger that the atmosphere of intimidation
+and intolerance which has spread from the issue of euthanasia
+to all of bioethics, and with the events in Hamburg, to
+applied ethics in general, will continue to broaden. It is essential
+that the minority that is actively opposing the free discussion
+of academic ideas be isolated. Here too, what happened in Zurich
+may serve as an example for other German-speaking countries
+to follow. In sharp contrast to the silence of the rector of
+the University of Dortmund, or the fatuous claim that "We
+didn't know at all who that was" of the dean of medicine at
+the University of Vienna, Professor H. H. Schmid, rector of the
+University of Zurich, issued a statement expressing the univer-
+358
+Appendix
+sity's 'outrage over this grave violation of academic freedom of
+speech,.22 The professors of the Zoological Institute and the dean
+of the Faculty of Science have also unequivocally condemned
+the disruption, and the major German-language newspapers in
+Zurich gave objective coverage to the events and to my views.23
+Meanwhile Germans and Austrians, both in academic life and
+in the press, have shown themselves sadly lacking in the commitment
+exemplified by the celebrated utterance attributed to
+Voltaire: 'I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the
+death your right to say it'. No one has, as yet, been asked to
+risk death in order to defend my right to discuss euthanasia in
+Germany, but it is important that many more should be prepared
+to risk a little hostility from the minority that is trying to silence
+a debate on central ethical questions.
+22 'Zur Sprengung einer Vortragsveranstaltung an der Universitat', Unipresse
+Dienst, Universitat Zurich, May 31, 1991.
+23 See, for example, 'Mit Trillerpfeifen gegen einen Philosophen', and 'Diese
+Probleme kann and soil man besprechen', both in Tages-Anzeiger, May 29,
+1991; 'Niedergeschrien', Neue Zurcher Zeitung, May 27, 1991; and (despite
+the pejorative headline) 'Ein Totungshelfer mit faschistischem Gedankengut?'
+Die Weltwoche, May 23, 1991.
+359
+Preface
+NOTES, REFERENCES, AND
+FURTHER READING
+The quotation on comparing humans and animals is from Ethische
+Grundaussagen (Ethical foundational statements) by the Board of the
+Federal Association Lebenshilfe fiir geistig Behinderte e.V., published
+in the journal of the association, Geistige Behinderung, vol. 29 no. 4
+(1990): 256.
+Chapter 1: About ethics
+The issues discussed in the first section - relativism, subjectivism, and
+the alleged dependence of ethics on religion - are dealt with in several
+textbooks. R. B. Brandt's Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959)
+is more thorough than most. See also the articles on these topics by
+David Wong, James Rachels, and Jonathan Berg, respectively, in P.
+Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Oxford, 1991). Plato's argument
+against defining 'good' as 'what the gods approve' is in his Euthyphro.
+Engels's discussion of the Marxist view of morality, and his reference
+to a 'really human morality' is in his Herr Eugen Diihring's Revolution
+in Science, chap. 9. For a discussion of Marx's critique of morality, see
+Allen Wood, 'Marx against Morality' in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion
+to Ethics. C. L. Stevenson's emotivist theory is most fully expounded
+in his Ethics and Language (New Haven, 1944). R. M. Hare's basic
+position is to be found in The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952); Freedom
+and Reason (Oxford, 1963), and Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981).
+For a summary statement, see Hare's essay 'Universal Prescriptivism'
+in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. J. L. Mackie's Ethics: Inventing
+Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1977) defends a version
+of subjectivism.
+The more important formulations of the universalisability principle
+referred to in the second section are in I. Kant, Groundwork of the
+360
+Notes and References
+Metaphysic of Morals, Section II (various translations and editions); R.
+M. ,Hare, Freedom and Reason and Moral Thinking; R. Firth, 'Ethical
+Absolutism and the Ideal Observer', Philosophy and Phenomenological
+Research, vol. 12 (1951-2); J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism,
+For and Against (Cambridge, 1973); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
+(Oxford, 1972); J. P. Sartre, 'Existentialism Is a Humanism', in W.
+Kaufmann (ed.), Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, 2d ed. (New
+York, 1975); and Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (trans. T.
+McCarthy, London 1976), pt. Ill, chaps. 2-4.
+The tentative argument for a utilitarianism based on interests or
+preferences owes most to Hare, although it does not go as far as the
+argument to be found in Moral Thinking.
+Chapter 2: Equality and its implications
+Rawls's argument that equality can be based on the natural characteristics
+of human beings is to be found in sec. 77 of A Theory of Justice.
+The principal arguments in favour of a link between IQ and race
+can be found in A. R. Jensen, Genetics and Education (London, 1972)
+and Educability and Group Differences (London, 1973); and in H. J.
+Eysenck's Race, Intelligence and Education (London, 1971). A variety of
+objections are collected in K. Richardson and D. Spears (eds.), Race,
+Culture and Intelligence (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1972). See also
+N. J. Block and G. Dworkin, The IQ Controversy (New York, 1976).
+Thomas Jefferson's comment on the irrelevance of intelligence to the
+issue of rights was made in a letter to Henri Gregoire, 25 February
+1809.
+The debate over the nature and origin of psychological differences
+between the sexes is soberly and comprehensively surveyed in E. Maccoby
+and C. Jacklin, The Psychology of Sex Differences (Stanford, 1974).
+Corinne Hutt, in Males and Females (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,
+1972), states the case for a biological basis for sex differences. Steven
+Goldberg's The Inevitability of Patriarchy (New York, 1973) is a polemic
+against feminist views like those in Kate Millett's Sexual Politics (New
+York, 1971) or Juliet Mitchell's Women's Estate (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,
+1971). A different view is presented in A. H. Eagly, Sex Differences
+in Social Behavior: A Social Role Interpretation (Hillsdale, N.J., 1987). For
+recent confirmation of the existence of sex differences, see Eleanor E.
+Maccoby, 'Gender and Relationships: A Developmental Account',
+American Psychologist, 1990, pp. 513-20; and for a popular report,
+361
+Notes and References
+Christine Gorman 'Sizing Up the Sexes', Time, 20 January 1992,
+pp.30-7.
+For a typical defence of equality of opportunity as the only justifiable
+form of equality, see Daniel Bell, 'A "Just" Equality', Dialogue (Washington,
+D.C.), vol. 8, no. 2 (1975). The quotation on pp. 38-9 is from
+Jeffrey Gray, 'Why Should Society Reward Intelligence?' The Times
+(London), 8 September 1972. For an acute statement of the dilemmas
+raised by equal opportunity, see J. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity
+and the Family (New Haven, 1983).
+The leading case on reverse discrimination in the United States,
+Regents of the University of California v Allan Bakke, was decided by the
+U.S. Supreme Court on 5 July 1978. M. Cohen, T. Nagel, and T. Scanlon
+have brought together some relevant essays on this topic in their anthology,
+Equality and Preferential Treatment (Princeton, 1976). See also
+Bernard Boxill, 'Equality, Discrimination and Preferential Treatment',
+in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics and the same author's Blacks
+and Social Justice (Totowa, N.J., 1983).
+Chapter 3: Equality for animals
+My views on animals first appeared in The New York Review of Books,
+S April 1973, under the title 'Animal Liberation'. This article was a
+review of R. and S. Godlovitch and J. Harris (eds.), Animals, Men and
+Morals (London,_ 1972). A more complete statement was published as
+Animal Liberation, 2d ed. (New York, 1990). Richard Ryder charts the
+history of changing attitudes towards speciesism in Animal Revolution
+(Oxford, 1989).
+Among other works arguing for a drastic revision in our present
+attitudes to animals are Stephen Clark, The Moral Status of Animals
+(Oxford, 1977); and Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley,
+1983). Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 2d ed., edited by T. Regan
+and P. Singer (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1989) is a collection of essays,
+old and new, both for and against attributing rights to animals or duties
+to humans in respect of animals. P. Singer (ed.), In Defence of Animals
+(Oxford, 1985), collects essays by both activists and theorists involved
+with the animal liberation movement. Steve Sapontzis, Morals, Reason
+and Animals (Philadelphia, 1987), is a detailed and sympathetic philosophical
+analysis of arguments about animal liberation, while R. G.
+Frey, Rights, Killing and Suffering (Oxford, 1983), and Michael Leahy,
+Against Liberation (London, 1991), offer philosophical critiques of the
+animal liberation position. Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter
+362
+Notes and References
+(Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983), is a readable and often penetrating
+account of these issues. James Rachels, Created from Animals (Oxford,
+1990), draws the moral implications of the Darwinian revolution
+in our thinking about our place among the animals. Finally, Lori
+Gruen's 'Animals' in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, explores
+the predominant recent approaches to the issue.
+Bentham's defence of animals, quoted in the section 'Racism and
+Speciesism' is from his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
+chap. 18, sec. I, n.
+A more detailed description of modem farming conditions can be
+found in Animal Liberation, chap. 3; and in James Mason and Peter
+Singer, Animal Factories, 2d ed. (New York, 1990). Similarly, Animal
+Liberation, chap. 2, contains a fuller discussion of the use of animals
+in research than is possible in this book, but see also Richard Ryder,
+Victims of Science, 2d ed. (Fontwell, Sussex, 1983). Publication details
+of the experiment on rhesus monkeys carried out at the U.S. Armed
+Forces Radiobiology Institute are: Carol Frantz, 'Effects of Mixed Neutron-
+gamma Total-body Irradiation on Physical Activity Performance
+of Rhesus Monkeys', Radiation Research, vol. lOl (1985): 434-41. The
+experiments at Princeton University on starving rats, and those by H.
+F. Harlow on isolating monkeys, referred to in the sub-section 'Experimenting
+on Animals', were originally published in Journal of Comparative
+and Physiological Psychology, vol. 78 (1972): 202, Proceedings of
+the National Academy of Science, vol. 54 (1965): 90, and Engineering and
+Science, vol. 33, no. 6 (April 1970) : 8. On the continuation of Harlow's
+work, see Animal Liberation, 2d ed., pp. 34-5.
+Among the objections, the claim that animals are incapable of feeling
+pain has standardly been associated with Descartes. But Descartes' view
+is less clear (and less consistent) than most have assumed. See John
+Cottingham, 'A Brute to the Brutes?: Descartes' Treatment of Animals',
+Philosophy, vol. 53 (1978): 551. In The Unheeded Cry (Oxford, 1989),
+Bernard Rollin describes and criticises more recent ideologies that have
+denied the reality of animal pain.
+The source for the anecdote about Benjamin Franklin is his Autobiography
+(New York, 1950), p. 41. The same objection has been more
+seriously considered by John Benson in 'Duty and the Beast', Philosophy,
+vol. 53 (1978): 545-7.
+Jane Goodall's observations of chimpanzees are engagingly recounted
+in In the Shadow of Man (Boston, 1971) and Through a Window
+(London, 1990); her own more scholarly account is The Chimpanzees
+of Gombe (Cambridge, Mass., 1986). For more information on the ca-
+363
+Notes and References
+pacities of the great apes, see Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds.),
+Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project (forthcoming). The 'argument
+from marginal cases' was thus christened by Jan Narveson,
+'Animal Rights', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 7 (1977). Of the
+objections to this argument discussed in the sub-section 'Differences
+between Humans and Animals', the first was made by Stanley Benn,
+'Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests', in J. Pennock
+and J. Chapman (eds.), Nomos IX: Equality (New York, 1967), pp. 62ff.;
+the second by John Benson, 'Duty and the Beast', Philosophy, vol. 53
+(the quotation from 'one reviewer of Animal Liberation' is from p. 536
+of this article) and related points are made by Bonnie Steinbock, 'Speciesism
+and the Idea of Equality', Philosophy, vol. 53 (1978): 255-6,
+and at greater length by Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman,
+'Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others', Philosophy, vol. 53
+(1978): 518-27. The third objection can be found in Philip Devine,
+'The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism', Philosophy, vol. 53 (19): 496-8.
+The quotation from Plato's Republic in the section 'Ethics and Reciprocity'
+is from Book 2, pp. 358-9. Later statements of a similar view
+include John Rawls, A Theory of Justice; J. L. Mackie, Ethics chap. 5;
+and David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, 1986). They exclude
+animals from the centre of morality, although they soften the impact
+of this exclusion in various ways (see, for example, A Theory of Justice,
+p. 512, and Ethics, pp. 193-5). Narveson also considers the reciprocity
+notion of ethics in 'Animal Rights'. My discussion of the looser version
+of the reciprocity view draws on Edward Johnson, Species and Morality,
+Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1976, University Microfilms International.
+Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1981, p. 145.
+Chapter 4: What's wrong with killing?
+Andrew Stinson's treatment is described by Robert and Peggy Stinson
+in The Long Dying of Baby Andrew (Boston, 1983).
+Joseph Fletcher'S article 'Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile
+of Man' appeared in The Hastings Center Report, vol. 2, no. 5 (1972).
+John Locke's definition of 'person' is taken from his Essay Concerning
+Human Understanding, bk. 1. chap. 9, par. 29. Aristotle's views on
+infanticide are in his Politics, bk. 7, p. 1335b; Plato's are in the Republic,
+bk. 5, p.460. Support for the claim that our present attitudes to infanticide
+are largely the effect of the influence of Christianity on our
+thought can be found in the historical material on infanticide cited in
+the notes on chap. 6, below. (See especially the article by W. L. Langer,
+364
+Notes and References
+pp. 353-5.) For Aquinas's statement that killing a human being offends
+against God as killing a slave offends against the master of the slave,
+see Summa Theologica, 2, ii, Question 64, article 5.
+Hare propounds and defends his two-level view of moral reasoning
+in Moral Thinking (Oxford, 1981).
+Michael Tooley's 'Abortion and Infanticide' was first published in
+Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 2 (1972) The passage quoted here is
+from a revised version in J. Feinberg (ed.), The Problem of Abortion
+(Belmont. 1973), p. 60. His book Abortion and Infanticide was published
+in Oxford in 1983.
+For further discussion of respect for autonomy as an objection to
+killing, see Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth,
+Middlesex, 1977), chap. 5. and H. J. McCloskey, 'The
+Right to Life', Mind, vol. 84 (1975).
+My discussion of the 'total' and 'prior existence' versions of utilitarianism
+owes much to Derek Parfit. I originally tried to defend the
+prior existence view in 'A Utilitarian Population Principle', in M. Bayles
+(ed.), Ethics and Population (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), but Parfit's reply,
+'On Doing the Best for Our Children', in the same volume, persuaded
+me to change my mind. Parfit's Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984) is
+required reading for anyone wishing to pursue this topic in depth. See
+also his short account of some of the issues in 'Overpopulation and
+the Quality of Life', in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford, 1986).
+Parfit uses the term 'person-affecting' where I use 'prior existence'. The
+reason for the change is that the view has no special reference to
+persons, as distinct from other sentient creatures.
+The distinction between the two versions of utilitarianism appears
+to have been first noticed by Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics
+(London, 1907), pp. 414-16. Later discussions include, in addition to
+those cited above, J. Narveson, 'Moral Problems of Population', The
+Monist, vol. 57 (1973); T. G. Roupas, The Value of Life', Philosophy
+and Public Affairs, vol. 7 (1978); and R.1. Sikora, 'Is It Wrong to Prevent
+the Existence of Future Generations', in B. Barry and R. Sikora (eds.),
+Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia, 1978).
+Mill's famous passage comparing Socrates and the fool appeared in
+his Utilitarianism (London, 1960; first published 1863), pp. 8-9.
+Chapter 5: Taking life: animals
+The break-through in talking to other species was first announced in
+R. and B. Gardner, 'Teaching Sign Language to a Chimpanzee', Science,
+365
+Notes and References
+vol. 165 (1969): 664-72. Since then the literature has multiplied rapidly.
+The information on language use in chimpanzees, gorillas and an
+orangutan in the section 'Can a Non-human Animal Be a Person?' is
+drawn from the articles by Roger and Deborah Fouts, Francine Patterson
+and Wendy Gordon, and H. Lyn Miles, in Paola Cavalieri and
+Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project (forthcoming).
+Erik Eckholm, 'Language Acquisition in Nonhuman Primates',
+in T. Regan and P. Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human
+Obligations, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1989), provides a brief popular
+account.
+The quotation in the same section from Stuart Hampshire is to be
+found in his Thought and Action (London, 1959), pp. 98-9. Others
+who have held related views are Anthony Kenny, in Will, Freedom and
+Power (Oxford, 1975); Donald Davidson, 'Thought and Talk', in S.
+Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (Oxford, 1975); and Michael
+Leahy, Against Liberation (London, 1991).
+Julia's problem-solving abilities were demonstrated by J. Dohl and
+B. Rensch; their work is described in Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees
+ofGombe, p. 31. Frans de Waal reports his observations of chimpanzees
+in Chimpanzee Politics (New York, 1983). Goodall's account of Figan's
+thoughtful manner of obtaining his banana is taken from p. 107 of In
+the Shadow of Man. Robert Mitchell assesses the evidence for selfconsciousness
+in apes in 'Humans, Nonhumans and Personhood', in
+Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The
+Great Ape Project. The anecdotal evidence of a sense of time in a guide
+dog comes from Sheila Hocken, Emma and I (London, 1978), p. 63;
+and the story of the feral cats is from the chapter on intelligence in
+Muriel Beadle, The Cat: History, Biology and Behaviour (London, 1977).
+lowe these last two references to Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They
+Matter (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983), p. 58.
+Goodall's estimate of the number of chimpanzees who die for every
+one to reach our shores alive is on p. 257 of In the Shadow of Man. See
+also Geza Teleki's account of the chimpanzee trade in Paola Cavalieri
+and Peter Singer (eds.), Toward a New Equality: The Great Ape Project.
+Leslie Stephen's claim that eating bacon is kind to pigs comes from
+his Social Rights and Duties (London, 1896) and is quoted by Henry Salt
+in 'The Logic of the Larder', which appeared in Salt's The Humanities
+of Diet (Manchester, 1914) and has been reprinted in the first edition
+of T. Regan and P. Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations
+(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976). Salt's reply is in the same article. My
+own earlier discussion of this issue is in Chapter 6 of the first edition
+366
+Notes and References
+of Animal Liberation (New York, 1975). For the example of the two
+women, see Derek Parfir, 'Rights, Interests and Possible People', in S.
+Gorovitz et al. (eds.), Moral Problems in Medicine (Englewood Cliffs,
+N.J., 1976); a variation expressed in terms of a choice between two
+different medical programs can be found in Parfir s Reasons and Persons
+(Oxford, 1984), p. 367. James Rachels's distinction between a biological
+and a biographical life comes from his The End of Life (Oxford,
+1987). Hart's discussion of this topic in his review of the first edition
+of this book was entitled 'Death and Utility' and appeared in The New
+York Review of Books, 15 May 1980. My initial response appeared as a
+letter in the same publication, 14 August 1980. I develop the metaphor
+of life as a journey in 'Life's Uncertain Voyage', in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan,
+and J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.
+J. C. Smart (Oxford, 1987).
+Chapter 6: Taking life: The embryo and fetus
+The most important sections of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
+in Roe v. Wade are reprinted in J.Feinberg (ed.), The Problem of Abortion.
+Robert Edwards's speculations about taking stem cells from embryos
+at around seventeen days after fertilisation are from his essay 'The case
+for studying human embryos and their constituent tissues in vitro', in
+R. G. Edwards and J. M. Purdy (eds.), Human Conception in Vitro (London,
+1982). The government committee referred to in the sub-section
+'Not the Law's Business?' - the Wolfenden Committee - issued the
+Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Command
+Paper 247 (London, 1957). The quotation is from p. 24. J. S. Mill's
+'very simple principle' is stated in the introductory chapter of On Liberty,
+3d ed. (London, 1864). Edwin Schur's Crimes without Victims was published
+in Englewood Cliffs, N.J., in 1965. Judith Jarvis Thomson's 'A
+Defense of Abortion' appeared in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. I
+(1971) and has been reprinted in P. Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics.
+Paul Ramsey uses the genetic uniqueness ofthe fetus as an argument
+against abortion in 'The Morality of Abortion', in D. H. Labby (ed.),
+Life or Death: Ethics and Options (London, 1968) and reprinted in J.
+Rachels (ed.), Moral Problems, 2d ed. (New York, 1975), p. 40.
+On scientific, ethical and legal aspects of embryo experimentation,
+see P. Singer, H. Kuhse, S. Buckle, K. Dawson, and P. Kasimba (eds.),
+Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge, England, 1990). lowe my speculations
+about the identity of the splitting embryo to Helga Kuhse, with
+whom I co-authored 'Individuals, Humans and Persons: The Issue of
+367
+Notes and References
+Moral Status', in that volume. We were both indebted to a remarkable
+book by a Roman Catholic theologian that challenges the view that
+conception marks the beginning of the human individual: Norman
+Ford, When Did I Begin? (Cambridge, 1988). The argument about potentiality
+in the context of IVF was first published in P. Singer and K.
+Dawson, :IVF T~chnology and the Argument from Potential', Philosophy
+and Publzc AffaIrs, vol. 17 (1988) and is reprinted in Embryo Experimentation.
+Stephen Buckle takes a different approach in 'Arguing from
+Potential', Bioethics, vol. 2 (1988) and reprinted in Embryo Experimentation.
+The quotation from John Noonan in the section 'The Status of
+the Embryo in the Laboratory' is from his 'An Almost Absolute Value
+in History', in John Noonan (ed.), The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge,
+Mass., 1970) pp. 56-7. On the feminist argument about IVF, see Beth
+Gaze and Karen Dawson, 'Who Is the Subject of Research?' and Mary
+Anne Warren, 'Is IVF Research a Threat to Women's Autonomy?' both
+in Embryo Experimentation.
+On the use of fetuses in research and potential clinical uses, see
+Karen Dawson 'Overview of Fetal Tissue Transplantation', in Lynn
+Gillam (ed.), The Fetus as Tissue Donor: Use or Abuse (Clayton, Victoria,
+1990). My account of the development of fetal sentience draws on
+research carried out by Susan Taiwa at the Centre for Human Bioethics,
+Monash University, and published as 'When Is the Capacity for Sentience
+Acquired during Human Fetal Development?' Journal of Maternal-
+Fetal Medicine, vol. 1 (1992). An earlier expert opinion came from
+the British government advisory group on fetal research, chaired by
+Sir John Peel, published as The Use of Fetuses and Fetal Materials for
+Research (London, 1972). See also Clifford Grobstein, Science and the
+Unborn (New York 1988).
+Bentham's reassuring comment on infanticide, quoted in the section
+:Abortion and Infanticide' is from his Theory of Legislation, p. 264, and
+IS quoted by E. Westermarck, The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas
+(London, 1924), vol. 1, p. 413n. In the final part of Abortion and Infanticide
+Michael Tooley discusses the available evidence on the development
+in the infant of the sense of being a continuing self.
+For historical material on the prevalence of infanticide see Maria
+Piers, Infanticide (New York, 1978); and W. L. Langer, 'Infanticide: A
+Historical Survey', History of Childhood Quarterly, vol. 1 (1974). An
+older, but still valuable survey is in Edward Westennarck, The Origin
+and Development of Moral Ideas, vol. 1, pp. 394-413. An interesting study
+of the use of infanticide as a form of family planning is Nakahara:
+Family Farming and Population in a Japanese Village, 1717-1830, by
+368
+Notes and References
+Thomas C. Smith (Palo Alto, Calif., 1977). References for Plato and
+Aristotle were given in the notes to Chapter 4. For Seneca, see De Ira,
+1, 15, cited by Westermarck, The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas,
+vol. 1, p. 419. Marvin Kohl (ed.), Infanticide and the Value of Life (Buffalo,
+N.Y., 1978) is a collection of essays on infanticide. A powerful
+argument on public policy grounds for birth as the place to draw the
+line, can be found (by readers of German) in Norbert Hoerster,
+'Kindstotung und das Lebensrecht von Personen', Analyse & Kritik, vol.
+12 (1990): 226-44.
+Further articles on abortion are collected in J. Feinberg (ed.), The
+Problem of Abortion, and in Robert Perkins (ed.), Abortion, Pro and Con
+(Cambridge, Mass., 1974). Articles with some affinity with the position
+I have taken include R. M. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule',
+Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 4 (1975); and Mary Anne Warren,
+'The Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', The Monist, vol. 57 (1973).
+Don Marquis restates the conservative position in 'Why Abortion Is
+Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86 (1989); but see also Alistair
+Norcross, 'Killing, Abortion and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis',
+Journal of Philosophy, vol. 87 (1990). A useful summary of the abortion
+issue is Mary Anne Warren's' Abortion' in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion
+to Ethics.
+Chapter 7: Taking life: Humans
+Derek Humphry's account of his wife's death, Jean's Way, was published
+in London in 1978. On the death of Janet Adkins, see New York
+Times, 14 December 1990; for Jack Kevorkian's own account, see J.
+Kevorkian, Prescription: Medicide (Buffalo, N.Y., 1991). For details of
+the Zygmaniak case, see Paige Mitchell, Act of Love (New York, 1976),
+or the New York Times,!, 3, and 6 November 1973. Louis Repouille's
+killing of his son was reported in the New York Times, 13 October 1939,
+and is cited by Yale Kamisar, 'Some Non-religious Views against Proposed
+Mercy Killing Legislation', Minnesota Law Review, vol. 42 (1958):
+1,021. Details of the Linares case are from the New York Times, 27 April
+1989 and the Hastings Center Report, July/August 1989.
+Robert Reid, My Children, My Children, is a fine introduction to the
+nature of some birth defects, including spina bifida and haemophilia.
+For evidence of high rates of divorce and severe marital difficulties
+among parents of spina bifida children, see p. 127. See also Helga Kuhse
+and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford, 1985), for more de-
+369
+Notes and References
+tailed infonnation and references regarding the entire topic of life and
+death decisions for infants.
+The numbers of patients in a persistent vegetative state and the
+duration of these states is reported in 'USA: Right to Live, or Right to
+Die?' Lancet, vol. 337 (12 January 1991).
+On euthanasia in the Netherlands, see J. K. Gevers, 'Legal Developments
+Concerning Active Euthanasia on Request in the Netherlands,
+Bioethics, vol. 1 (1987). The annual number of cases is given in 'Dutch
+Doctors Call for Legal Euthanasia', New Scientist, 12 October 1991,
+p. 17. Paul J. van der Maas et aI., 'Euthanasia and Other Medical
+Decisions Concerning the End of Life', Lancet, vol. 338 (14 September
+1991): 669-74, at 673, gives a figure of 1900 deaths due to euthanasia
+each year, but this is limited to reports from doctors in general practice.
+The quotation in the section 'Justifying Voluntary Euthanasia' about
+patients' desire for reassurance comes from this article, p. 673. The case
+of Diane is cited from Timothy E. Quill, 'Death and Dignity: A Case
+of Individualized Decision Making', New England Journal of Medicine,
+vol. 324, no. 10 (7 March 1991): 691-4, while Betty Rollins describes
+the death of her mother in Betty Rollins, Last Wish (Penguin, 1987).
+The passage quoted is from pp. 149-50. See also Betty Rollins's
+foreword to Derek Humphry, Final Exit: The Pradicalities of SelfDeliverance
+and Assisted Suicide (Eugene, Oreg., 1991), pp. 12-13.
+Yale Kamisar argues against voluntary as well as nonvoluntary euthanasia
+in the article cited above; he is answered by Robert Young,
+'Voluntary and Nonvoluntary Euthanasia', The Monist, vol. 59 (1976).
+The view of the Roman Catholic church was presented in Declaration
+on Euthanasia published by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine
+of the Faith, Vatican City, 1980. Other useful discussions are Jonathan
+Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, chaps. 14 and 15; D. Humphry
+and A. Wickett, The Right to Die: Understanding Euthanasia (New York,
+1986); and H. Kuhse, 'Euthanasia', in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to
+Ethics.
+The distinction between active and passive euthanasia is succinctly
+criticized by James Rachels, 'Active and Passive Euthanasia', New England
+Journal of Medicine, vol. 292 (1975): pp. 78-80, reprinted in P.
+Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics. See also Rachels's The End of Life; Kuhse
+and Singer, Should the Baby Live?, chap. 4; and for the most thorough
+and rigorous philosophical discussion, Helga Kuhse, The Sandity-ofLife
+Doctrine in Medicine - A Critique (Oxford, 1987), chap. 2. An account
+of the Baby Doe case is given in Chapter 1 of the same book. The
+survey of American paediatricians was published as Loretta M. Ko-
+370
+Notes and References
+pelman, Thomas G. Irons, and Arthur E. Kopelman, 'Neonatologists
+Judge the "Baby Doe" Regulations', New England Journal of Medicine,
+vol. 318, no. 11 (17 March 1988): 677-83. The British legal cases
+concerning such decisions are described in Derek Morgan, 'Letting
+Babies Die Legally', Institute of Medical Ethics Bulletin (May 1989),
+pp. 13-18; and in 'Withholding of Life-saving Treatment', Lancet, vol.
+336 (1991): 1121. A representative example of the pious misinterpretation
+of Arthur Clough's lines occurs in G. K. and E. D. Smith, 'Selection
+for Treatment in Spina Bifida Cystica', British Medical Journal,
+27 October 1973, at p. 197. The entire poem is included in Helen
+Gardner (ed.), The New Oxford Book of English Verse (Oxford, 1978).
+Sir Gustav Nossal's essay cited in the section 'Active and Passive
+Euthanasia' is 'The Right to Die: Do We Need New Legislation?' in
+Parliament of Victoria, Social Development Committee, First Report on
+Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity, p. 104. On the doctrine of
+double effect and the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
+means of treatment, see Helga Kuhse, 'Euthanasia', in P. Singer (ed.),
+A Companion to Ethics; and for a fuller account, H. Kuhse, The Sanctityof
+Life Doctrine in Medicine - A Critique, chaps. 3-4.
+The survey of Australian pediatricians and obstetricians referred to
+in the section 'Active and Passive Euthanasia' was published as P.
+Singer, H. Kuhse, and C. Singer, 'The Treatment of Newborn Infants
+with Major Handicaps', Medical Journal of Australia, 17 September 1983.
+The testimony of the Roman Catholic bishop, Lawrence Casey, in the
+Quinlan case is cited in the judgment, 'In the Matter of Karen Quinlan,
+An Alleged Incompetent', reprinted in B. Steinbock (ed.), Killing and
+Letting Die (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1980). John Lorber describes his
+practice of passive euthanasia for selected cases of spina bifida in 'Early
+Results of Selective Treatment of Spina Bifida Cystica', British Medical
+Journal, 27 October 1973, pp. 201-4. The statistics for survival of untreated
+spina bifida infants come from the articles by Lorber and G. K.
+and E. D. Smith, cited above. Different doctors report different figures.
+For further discussion of the treatment of infants with spina bifida, see
+Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live?, chap. 3.
+Lorber's objection to active euthanasia quoted at the start of the
+section 'The Slippery Slope' is from p. 204 of his British Medical Journal
+article cited above. The argument that Nazi crimes developed out of
+the euthanasia programme is quoted from Leo Alexander, 'Medical
+Science under Dictatorship', New England Journal of Medicine, vo1.241
+(14 July 1949): 39-47. Gitta Sereny, Into That Darkness: From Mercy
+Killing to Mass Murder (London, 1974) makes a similar claim in tracing
+371
+Notes and References
+the career of Franz Stangl from the euthanasia centres to the death
+camp at Treblinka; but in so doing she reveals how different the Nazi
+'euthanasia' programme was from what is now advocated (see especially
+pp. 51-5). For an example of a survey showing that people
+regularly evaluate some health states as worse than death, see G. W.
+Torrance, 'Utility Approach to Measuring Health-Related Quality of
+Life', Journal of Chronic Diseases, vol. 40 (1987): 6.
+On euthanasia among the Eskimo (and the rarity of homicide outside
+such special circumstances), see E. Westermarck, The Origin and
+Development of Moral Ideas, vol. 1, pp. 329-34, 387, n.l, and 392, nn.
+1-3.
+Chapter 8: Rich and poor
+The summary of world poverty was compiled from a number of sources,
+including Alan B. Durning, 'Ending Poverty' in the Worldwatch Institute
+report edited by Lester Brown et aI., State of the World 1990
+(Washington D.C., 1990); the United Nations Development Programme's
+Human Development Report 1991; and the report of the World
+Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future
+(Oxford, 1987). The first quotation from Robert McNamara in the
+section 'Some Facts about Poverty' is from the Summary Proceedings of
+the 1976 Annual Meeting of the World BankiIFCIIDA, p. 14; the following
+quotation is from the World Bank's World Development Report,
+1978 (New York 1978), p. iii.
+For the wastage involved in feeding crops to animals instead of
+directly to humans, see Francis Moore Lappe, Diet for a Small Planet
+(New York, 1971; 10th anniversary ed., 1982); A. Durning and H.
+Brough, Taking Stock, Worldwatch Paper 103 (Washington, D.C. 1991);
+and J. Rifkin, Beyond Beef (New York, 1991), chap. 23.
+On the difference - or lack of it - between killing and allowing to
+die, see (in addition to the previous references to active and passive
+euthanasia) Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, chap. 7;
+Richard Trammel, 'Saving Life and Taking Life', Journal of Philosophy,
+vol. 72 (1975); John Harris, 'The Marxist Conception of Violence',
+Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 3 (1974); John Harris, Violence and
+Responsibility (London, 1980); and S. Kagan, The Limits of Morality
+(Oxford, 1989).
+John Locke's view of rights is developed in his Second Treatise on Civil
+Government, and Robert Nozick's in Anarchy, State and Utopia (New
+372
+Notes and References
+York, 1974). Thomas Aquinas's quite different view is quoted from
+Summa Theologica, 2, ii, Question 66, article 7.
+Garrett Hardin proposed his 'lifeboat ethic' in 'Living on a Lifeboat',
+Bioscience, October 1974, another version of which has been reprinted
+in W. Aiken and H. La Follette (eds.), World Hunger and Moral Obligation
+(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977). Hardin elaborates on the argument in
+The Limits of Altruism (Bloomington, Indiana, 1977). An earlier argument
+against aid was voiced by W. and P. Paddock in their mistitled
+Famine 19751 (Boston 1967) but pride of place in the history of this
+view must go to Thomas Malthus for An Essay on the Principle of Population
+(London, 1798).
+Opposition to the view that the world is over-populated comes from
+Susan George, How the Other Half Dies, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,
+1977), chap. 2. See also T. Hayter The Creation of World Poverty
+(London, 1981). The estimates of population in various countries by the
+year 2000 are taken from the Human Development Report, 1991. For evidence
+that more equal distribution of income, better education, and better
+health facilities can reduce population growth, see John W. Ratcliffe,
+'Poverty, Politics and Fertility: The Anomaly of Kerala', Hastings Center
+Report, vol. 7 (1977); for a more general discussion of the idea of demographic
+transition, see William Rich, Smaller Families through Social and
+Economic Progress, Overseas Development Council Monograph no. 7
+(1973); and Julian Simon, The Effects of Income on Fertility, Carolina Population
+Center Monograph (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1974). On ethical issues
+relating to population control, see Robert Young, 'Population Policies,
+Coercion and Morality', in D. Mannison, R. Routley, and M. McRobbie
+(eds.), Environmental Philosophy (Canberra, 1979).
+The objection that a position such as mine poses too high a standard
+is put by Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79
+(1982): 419-39. See also the 'Symposium on Impartiality and Ethical
+Theory', Ethics, vol. 10 1 (July 1991): 4. For a forceful defence of impartialist
+ethics see S. Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford, 1989).
+For a summary of the issues, see Nigel Dower, 'World Poverty', in
+P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. A fuller account by the same
+author is World Poverty: Challenge and Response (York, 1983). For a
+rights approach, see H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S.
+Policy (Princeton, 1980); and for a Kantian approach, Onora O'Neill,
+Faces of Hunger (London, 1986). A useful general collection is W. Aiken
+and H. La Follette (eds.), World Hunger and MoralObligation (Englewood
+Cliffs, N.J., 1977). On the efficacy of overseas aid, see R. Riddell, Foreign
+Aid Reconsidered (Baltimore, 1987).
+373
+Notes and References
+Chapter 9: Insiders and outsiders
+Figures on refugee numbers are taken from New Internationalist, September
+1991, pp. 18-19. The United Nations High Commission for
+Refugees also publishes estimates of refugee numbers, in terms of its
+own narrow definition of a refugee, and of numbers resettled.
+Michael Walzer's views are presented in his Spheres of Justice (New
+York, 1983), pp. 9-22.
+The account of the visit to the refugee camp in the section 'The
+Fallacy of the Current Approach' comes from Rossi van der Borch,
+'Impressions of a Refugee Camp', quoted in Asia Bureau Australia Newsletter,
+no. 85 (October-December 1986).
+Michael Gibney (ed.), Open Borders? Closed Societies? (New York
+1988), is a valuable collection of essays on ethical and political aspects
+of the refugee issue.
+Chapter 10: The environment
+On the proposal to dam the Franklin River in southwest Tasmania,
+see James McQueen, The Franklin: Not Just a River (Ringwood, Victoria,
+1983).
+The first quotation in 'The Western Tradition' is from Genesis 1 :24-
+8 and the second from Genesis 9: 1-3. For attempts to soften the message
+of these passages, see, for instance, Robin Attfield, The Ethics of
+Environmental Concern (Oxford, 1983); and Andrew Linzey Christianity
+and the Rights of Animals (London 1987). The quotation from Paul
+comes from Corinthians 9:9-10, and that from Augustine is from his
+The Catholic and Manichean Ways of Life, trans. D. A. Gallagher and I.
+J. Gallagher (Boston, 1966), p. 102. For the cursing of the fig tree, see
+Mark 11:12-22, and for the drowning of the pigs, Mark 5:1-13. The
+passage from Aristotle is to be found in Politics (London, 1916), p. 16;
+for the views of Aquinas, see Summa Theologica, 1, ii, Question 64,
+article 1; 1, ii, Question 72, article 4.
+For details on the alternative Christian thinkers, see Keith Thomas,
+Man and the Natural World (London, 1983), pp. 152-3; and Attfield,
+The Ethics of Environmental Concern.
+For further information on the effects of global warming, see Lester
+Brown and others, State of the World 1990, Worldwatch Institute (Washington,
+D.C., 1990). The information on the effects of rising sea levels
+comes from Jodi 1. Jacobson's 'Holding Back the Sea' in that volume;
+she in tum draws on John D. Milliman and others, 'Environmental
+374
+Notes and References
+and Economic Implications of Rising Sea Level and Subsiding Deltas:
+The Nile and Bengal Examples', Ambio, vol. 18 (1989): 6; and United
+Nations Environment Program, Criteria for Assessing Vulnerability to SeaLevel
+Rise: A Global Inventory to High Risk Areas (Delft, Netherlands,
+1989). The quotations from Bill McKibben's The End of Nature (New
+York, 1989) are from pp. 58 and 60 of that book.
+Albert Schweitzer's most complete statement of his ethical stance is
+Civilisation and Ethics (Part 2 of The Philosophy of Civilisation), 2d ed.,
+trans. C. T. Campion (London, 1929). The quotation is from pp. 246-
+7. The quotations from Paul Taylor's Respectfor Nature (Princeton, 1986)
+are from pp. 45 and 128. For a critique of Taylor, see Gerald Paske:
+'The Life Principle: A (Metaethical) Rejection', Journal of Applied Philosophy,
+vol. 6 (1989).
+A. Leopold's proposal for a 'land ethic' can be found in his A Sand
+County Almanac, with Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York,
+1970; first published 1949,1953); the passages quoted are from pp. 238
+and 262. The classic text for the distinction between shallow and deep
+ecology is very brief: A. Naess, 'The Shallow and the Deep, LongRange
+Ecology Movement', Inquiry, vol. 16 (1973): 95-100. For later
+works on deep ecology, see, for example, A. Naess and G. Sessions,
+'Basic Principles of Deep Ecology', Ecophilosophy, vol. 6 (1984) (I first
+read the quoted passage in D. Bennet and R. Sylvan, 'Australian Perspectives
+on Environmental Ethics: A UNESCO Project' [unpublished,
+1989]); W. Devall and G. Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living As If Nature
+Mattered (Salt Lake City, 1985) (The passage quoted is from p. 67); 1.
+Johnson, A Morally Deep World (Cambrldge, 1990), F. Mathews, The
+Ecological Self (London, 1991); V. Plumwood, 'Ecofeminism: An Overview
+and Discussion of Positions and Arguments: Critical Review',
+Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 64 (1986): suppl.; and R. Sylvan,
+'Three Essays upon Deeper Environmental Ethics', Discussion Papers in
+Environmental Philosophy, vol. 13 (1986) (published by the Australian
+National University, Canberra). James Lovelock, Gaia: A New Look at
+Life on Earth, was published in Oxford in 1979. Christopher Stone's
+Earth and Other Ethics (New York, 1987) is a tentative exploration of
+ways in which nonsentient beings might be included in an ethical
+framework.
+The original Green Consumer Guide was by John Elkington and Julia
+Hailes (London 1988). Adaptations have since been published in several
+other countries, as have many similar guides. On the extravagance
+of animal production, see the references given in Chapter 8, above.
+Rifkin's Beyond Beef and Durning and Brough's Taking Stock both also
+375
+Notes and References
+contain information on the clearing of the rainforest and other environmental
+impacts of the animals we raise for food.
+Roderick Nash, The Rights of Nature (Madison, Wis., 1989) is a useful,
+but not always reliable, historical account of the development of environmental
+ethics. Some collections of essays on this topic are R. Elliot
+and A. Gare (eds.), Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings
+(S1. Lucia, Queensland, 1983); T. Regan, Earthbound: New Introductory
+Essays in Environmental Ethics (New York, 1984); and D. VandeVeer
+and C. Pierce (eds.), People, Penguins and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in
+Environmental Ethics (Belmont, Calif., 1986). Robert Elliot summarizes
+the issues in 'Environmental Ethics', in P. Singer (ed.), A Companion
+to Ethics.
+Chapter II: Ends and means
+The story of Oskar Schindler is brilliantly told by Thomas Kenneally
+in Schindler's Ark (London, 1982). The case of Joan Andrews and
+the work of Operation Rescue is described by Bernard Nathanson,
+'Operation Rescue: Domestic Terrorism or Legitimate Civil Rights
+Protest?' Hastings Center Report, NovemberlDecember 1989, pp. 28-
+32. The biblical passage quoted is from Proverbs 24: 11. The claim
+by Gary Leber about the number of children saved is in his essay
+'We Must Rescue Them', Hastings Center Report, NovemberlDecember
+1989, pp.26-7. On Gennarelli's experiments and the events surrounding
+them, see Lori Gruen and Peter Singer, Animal Liberation:
+A Graphic Guide (London, 1987). On the Animal Liberation Front,
+see also Philip Windeatt, 'They Clearly Now See the Link: Militant
+Voices', in P. Singer (ed.), In Defence of Animals (Oxford, 1985). The
+blockade of the Franklin River is vividly described by a participant
+in James McQueen, The Franklin: Not Just a River (Ringwood, Victoria,
+1983); on the unsuccessful earlier campaign to save Lake Peddar,
+see Kevin Kiernan, 'I Saw My Temple Ransacked', in Cassandra
+Pybus and Richard Flanagan (eds.), The Rest of the World Is Watching
+(Sydney, 1990).
+Henry Thoreau's 'Civil Disobedience' has been reprinted in several
+places, among them H. A. Bedau (ed.), Civil Disobedience: Theory and
+Practice (New York, 1969); the passage quoted is on p. 28 of this collection.
+The immediately following quotation is from p. 18 of R. P.
+Wolff's In Defense of Anarchism (New York, 1970). On the nature of
+conscience, see A. Campbell Garnett, 'Conscience and Conscientiousness',
+in J. Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts (Oxford, 1969).
+376
+Notes and References
+John Locke argued for the importance of settled law in his Second
+Treatise on Civil Government, especially sections 124-6.
+On the sorry history of attempts to reform the law on animal experimentation,
+see Richard Ryder, Victims of Science.
+Mill's proposal for multiple votes for the better educated occurs in
+Chapter 8 of his Representative Government. The quotation from Engels's
+Condition of the Working Class in England, trans. and ed. Henderson and
+Chaloner (Oxford, 1958), p. 108, lowe to John Harris, 'The Marxist
+Conception of Violence', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 3 (1974),
+which argues persuasively for regarding passive violence as a genuine
+form of violence. See also Harris's book, Violence and Responsibility (London,
+1980); and Ted Honderich, Three Essays on Political Violence (Oxford,
+1976). The quotation from Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood,
+Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching (Tucson, Ariz., 1987),
+appears on pp. 14 and 17.
+The issues dealt with in the first three sections of this chapter are
+more fully treated in my Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford, 1973).
+Probably the best collection of essays in this area is still J. G. Murphy
+(ed.), Civil Disobedience and Violence (Belmont, 1971), although the
+anthology edited by H. A. Bedau, referred to above, is valuable for its
+emphasis on the writings ofthose who practice civil disobedience rather
+than theorise about it from afar.
+Chapter 12: Why act morally?
+For attempts to reject the title question of this chapter as an improper
+question, see S. Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge,
+1961), p. 162; J. Hospers, Human Conduct (London, 1963), p. 194; and
+M. G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (London, 1963), pp. 319-27. D.
+H. Monro defines ethical judgments as overriding in Empiricism and
+Ethics (Cambridge, 1967); see, for instance, p. 127. R. M. Hare's prescriptivist
+view of ethics implies that a commitment to act is involved
+in accepting a moral jUdgment, but since only universalisable judgments
+count as moral judgments, this view does not have the consequence
+that whatever judgment we take to be overriding is necessarily
+our moral judgment. Hare's view therefore allows us to give sense to
+our question. On this general issue of the definition of moral terms
+and the consequences of different definitions, see my 'The Triviality of
+the Debate over "Is-Ought" and the Definition of "Moral"', American
+Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 10 (1973).
+The argument discussed in the second section is a distillation of such
+377
+Notes and References
+sources as Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, bk. 4, par. 4; I. Kant. Groundwork
+of the Metaphysic of Morals; H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative
+(London, 1963), pp.245-6; J. Hospers, Human Conduct (London,
+1963), pp. 584-93; and D. Gauthier, Practical Reasoning (Oxford, 1963),
+p.118.
+G. Carlson, 'Ethical Egoism Reconsidered', American Philosophical
+Quarterly, vol. 10 (1973), argues that egoism is irrational because the
+individual egoist cannot defend it publicly without inconsistency; but
+it is not clear why this should be a test ofrationality, since the egoist
+can still defend it to himself.
+Hume defends his view of practical reason in A Treatise of Human
+Nature, bk. 1, pt. iii, sec. 3. T. Nagel's objections to it are in The Possibility
+of Altruism (Oxford, 1970). For a more recent statement of Nagel's
+position, see his The View from Nowhere (New York, 1986). Sidgwick's
+observation on the rationality of egoism is on p. 498 of The Methods of
+Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907).
+Bradley's insistence on loving virtue for its own sake comes from
+his Ethical Studies (Oxford, 1876; repr. 1962), pp. 61-3. The same
+position can be found in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals,
+chap. 1, and in D. Z. Phillips, 'Does It Pay to Be Good?' Proceedings of
+the Aristotelian Society, vol. 64 (1964-5). Bradley and Kant are expounding
+what they take to be 'the common moral consciousness'
+rather than their own views. Kant himself adheres to the view of the
+common moral consciousness, but later in Ethical Studies Bradley supports
+a view of morality in which the subjective satisfaction involved
+in the moral life plays a prominent role.
+My account of why we believe that only actions done for the sake
+of morality have moral worth is similar to Hume's view in his Enquiry
+Concerning the Principles of Morals. See also P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics,
+pt. 3.
+Maslow presents some sketchy data in support of his theory of personality
+in 'Psychological Data and Value Theory', in A. H. Maslow
+(ed.), New Knowledge in Human Values (New York, 1959); see also A.
+H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York, 1954). Charles
+Hampden-Turner, Radical Man (New York, 1971) contains a hotchpotch
+of surveys and research linking certain humanistic values with
+an outlook on life that is subjectively rewarding; but the data are often
+only tangentially relevant to the conclusions drawn from them.
+On psychopaths, see H. Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity, 5th ed. (St.
+Louis, 1976). The remark about requests for help coming from relatives,
+not the psychopaths themselves, is on p. viii. The quotation from a
+378
+Notes and References
+happy psychopath is from W. and J. McCord, Psychopathy and Delinquency
+(New York, 1956), p. 6. On the ability of psychopaths to avoid
+prison, see R. D. Hare, Psychopathy (New York, 1970), pp. 111-12.
+The 'paradox of hedonism' is discussed by F. H. Bradley in the third
+essay of his Ethical Studies; for a psychotherapist's account. see V.
+Frankl. The Will to Meaning (London, 1971), pp. 33-4.
+On the relation between self-interest and ethics, see the concluding
+chapter of Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics; and for a useful anthology, D.
+Gauthier (ed.), Morality and Rational Self-Interest (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
+1970). On the more general issue of the nature of practical reasoning,
+see J. Raz (ed.), Practical Reasoning (Oxford, 1978).
+The quotation from Dennis Levine is from his Inside Out (New York,
+1991), p. 391.