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by analogy is considered as an indispensable accompaniment of scientifi
c thought as far as induction forms the basic scientifi c method.
In early Greek philosophy, analogy is a pattern of thought that underlies
the fi rst attempts for an explanation of the cosmos. This is initially found
in the Milesians thinkers Thales ( fl . c. 585 bce ) and Anaximenes ( fl . c. 546
bce ). Thales argued that “ as a piece of wood fl oats on a pond, so the whole
earth fl oats on water ” (DK 11A14; cf., DK 11A12). According to Aristotle:
Others say that the earth rests on water. For this is the most ancient
account we have received, which they say was given by Thales the Milesian,
that it stays in place through fl oating like a log or some other such thing (for
none of these rests by nature on air, but on water) – as though the same argument
did not apply to the water supporting the earth as to the earth itself.
(Aristotle B13, 294a28)
Thales ’ inductive reasoning refl ects an argument by analogy: if two
things have certain properties in common on a small scale, then they have
the same properties in common on a cosmic scale:
Small scale: a piece of wood fl oats on a pond.
Large scale: the Earth fl oats on Okeanos.
Likewise, Anaximenes claims an analogy between human soul and the
cosmos:
As our soul, which is air, maintain us, so breath and air surround the whole
world. (DK, 13B2)
Anaximenes offers an argument by analogy:
Small scale: the human soul (human breath) maintains the single individual
organism (microcosm).
Large scale: the soul of the cosmos (universal breath) surrounds and
maintains the whole universe.
Analogy as a pattern of thought seems to underlie Anaximenes ’ inductive
thinking used for rhetorical, metaphoric, and explanatory purposes. This is
evident in some of his extant fragments and testimonies ( Die Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker ):
182 Giannis Stamatellos
The stars move around the earth, just as turban winds round our head.
[A7]
The universe whirls like a mill - stone. [A12]
The stars are fi xed in the crystalline in the manner of nails. [A14]
The sun is fl at like a leaf. [A15]
In the above examples, analogy is used by Anaximenes to explain macrocosm
through common observation. Thales ’ and Anaximenes ’ arguments
by analogy are considered as one of the fi rst incidences of inductive reasoning.
The relationship between microcosm (small scale) and macrocosm
(cosmic scale) refl ects Thales ’ hylozoism and mathematical expertise
(e.g., measurement of the pyramids and predictions of the eclipses) and
Anaximenes ’ natural philosophy and cosmological discoveries. Early Greek
philosophical argumentation by analogy, as a form of induction, marks the
beginning of scientifi c explanation and thought.
47
Quine ’ s Epistemology
Naturalized
Robert Sinclair
Quine , W. V. “ Epistemology Naturalized , ” in Ontological Relativity and
Other Essays , 69 – 90 . New York : Columbia University Press , 1969 .
Gregory , Paul . Quine ’ s Naturalism: Language, Theory and the Knowing
Subject . New York : Continuum , 2008 .
Roth , Paul . “ The Epistemology of ‘ Epistemology Naturalized ’ . ” Dialectica
53 ( 1999 ): 87 – 109 .
In his highly infl uential article “ Epistemology Naturalized, ” W. V. Quine
argued that the problems found in the history of modern empiricism should
lead us to rethink the overall aims of contemporary epistemology. More
specifi cally, he offered a historical reconstruction of post - Humean empiricism,
highlighting where attempts to support or to justify our knowledge
of the world through sensory experience fell into insurmountable problems
and suggesting further the need to locate the grounds of knowledge within
science itself. On his view, epistemology should then be “ naturalized ” in
the sense that it becomes a scientifi c project where philosophers must use
the resources of science to explain, to describe, and to justify our knowledge
of the world.
His basic argument appeals to an analogy between studies in the foundations
of mathematical knowledge and the empiricist attempt to provide a
sensory foundation for scientifi c knowledge. The project in the philosophy
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
184 Robert Sinclair
of mathematics that is Quine ’ s focus is known as “ logicism, ” which held
that mathematical truths could be defi ned in terms of a more basic logical
language. Here, on what Quine calls the “ conceptual ” side, mathematical
concepts could be rewritten and, in that sense, reduced to what was thought
to be a more certain and obviously true logical vocabulary. This would also
help deal with a further “ doctrinal ” concern over the justifi cation of mathematical
truths, since they could be restated as basic logical truths with a
similar degree of logical certainty. Unfortunately, this project cannot be
completed, since the proposed reduction of mathematical concepts requires
set theory, which contains its own logical paradoxes and does not then have
the same obviousness or certainty assumed to be had within logic. Moreover,
G ö del ’ s famous incompleteness theorems undermine the doctrinal aim,
since they demonstrate that no logical rendering of all the truths of mathematics
is possible.
With this as background, Quine proceeds to develop further his analogy
between logicism and empiricism. Like logicism, the empiricist attempt to
validate scientifi c truths within sensory experience contains a conceptual
side focused on defi ning concepts in sensory terms and a doctrinal side that
seeks to justify truths of nature through sensory experience. However, these
two aims cannot be met. The conceptual side falters because of “ holism, ”
the view that terms and sentences have implications for experience only
through their interconnections and never by themselves in isolation. What
this suggests is that, in general, no concept or theoretical claim has its own
consequences for experience, and thus no single concept or statement could
then be assigned to or reduced to its own specifi c element of experience.
The doctrinal aim fails because of what Quine calls “ Hume ’ s problem, ”

by analogy is considered as an indispensable accompaniment of scientifi

c thought as far as induction forms the basic scientifi c method.

In early Greek philosophy, analogy is a pattern of thought that underlies

the fi rst attempts for an explanation of the cosmos. This is initially found

in the Milesians thinkers Thales ( fl . c. 585 bce ) and Anaximenes ( fl . c. 546

bce ). Thales argued that “ as a piece of wood fl oats on a pond, so the whole

earth fl oats on water ” (DK 11A14; cf., DK 11A12). According to Aristotle:

Others say that the earth rests on water. For this is the most ancient

account we have received, which they say was given by Thales the Milesian,

that it stays in place through fl oating like a log or some other such thing (for

none of these rests by nature on air, but on water) – as though the same argument

did not apply to the water supporting the earth as to the earth itself.

(Aristotle B13, 294a28)

Thales ’ inductive reasoning refl ects an argument by analogy: if two

things have certain properties in common on a small scale, then they have

the same properties in common on a cosmic scale:

Small scale: a piece of wood fl oats on a pond.

Large scale: the Earth fl oats on Okeanos.

Likewise, Anaximenes claims an analogy between human soul and the

cosmos:

As our soul, which is air, maintain us, so breath and air surround the whole

world. (DK, 13B2)

Anaximenes offers an argument by analogy:

Small scale: the human soul (human breath) maintains the single individual

organism (microcosm).

Large scale: the soul of the cosmos (universal breath) surrounds and

maintains the whole universe.

Analogy as a pattern of thought seems to underlie Anaximenes ’ inductive

thinking used for rhetorical, metaphoric, and explanatory purposes. This is

evident in some of his extant fragments and testimonies ( Die Fragmente der

Vorsokratiker ):

182 Giannis Stamatellos

The stars move around the earth, just as turban winds round our head.

[A7]

The universe whirls like a mill - stone. [A12]

The stars are fi xed in the crystalline in the manner of nails. [A14]

The sun is fl at like a leaf. [A15]

In the above examples, analogy is used by Anaximenes to explain macrocosm

through common observation. Thales ’ and Anaximenes ’ arguments

by analogy are considered as one of the fi rst incidences of inductive reasoning.

The relationship between microcosm (small scale) and macrocosm

(cosmic scale) refl ects Thales ’ hylozoism and mathematical expertise

(e.g., measurement of the pyramids and predictions of the eclipses) and

Anaximenes ’ natural philosophy and cosmological discoveries. Early Greek

philosophical argumentation by analogy, as a form of induction, marks the

beginning of scientifi c explanation and thought.

47

Quine ’ s Epistemology

Naturalized

Robert Sinclair

Quine , W. V. “ Epistemology Naturalized , ” in Ontological Relativity and

Other Essays , 69 – 90 . New York : Columbia University Press , 1969 .

Gregory , Paul . Quine ’ s Naturalism: Language, Theory and the Knowing

Subject . New York : Continuum , 2008 .

Roth , Paul . “ The Epistemology of ‘ Epistemology Naturalized ’ . ” Dialectica

53 ( 1999 ): 87 – 109 .

In his highly infl uential article “ Epistemology Naturalized, ” W. V. Quine

argued that the problems found in the history of modern empiricism should

lead us to rethink the overall aims of contemporary epistemology. More

specifi cally, he offered a historical reconstruction of post - Humean empiricism,

highlighting where attempts to support or to justify our knowledge

of the world through sensory experience fell into insurmountable problems

and suggesting further the need to locate the grounds of knowledge within

science itself. On his view, epistemology should then be “ naturalized ” in

the sense that it becomes a scientifi c project where philosophers must use

the resources of science to explain, to describe, and to justify our knowledge

of the world.

His basic argument appeals to an analogy between studies in the foundations

of mathematical knowledge and the empiricist attempt to provide a

sensory foundation for scientifi c knowledge. The project in the philosophy

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

184 Robert Sinclair

of mathematics that is Quine ’ s focus is known as “ logicism, ” which held

that mathematical truths could be defi ned in terms of a more basic logical

language. Here, on what Quine calls the “ conceptual ” side, mathematical

concepts could be rewritten and, in that sense, reduced to what was thought

to be a more certain and obviously true logical vocabulary. This would also

help deal with a further “ doctrinal ” concern over the justifi cation of mathematical

truths, since they could be restated as basic logical truths with a

similar degree of logical certainty. Unfortunately, this project cannot be

completed, since the proposed reduction of mathematical concepts requires

set theory, which contains its own logical paradoxes and does not then have

the same obviousness or certainty assumed to be had within logic. Moreover,

G ö del ’ s famous incompleteness theorems undermine the doctrinal aim,

since they demonstrate that no logical rendering of all the truths of mathematics

is possible.

With this as background, Quine proceeds to develop further his analogy

between logicism and empiricism. Like logicism, the empiricist attempt to

validate scientifi c truths within sensory experience contains a conceptual

side focused on defi ning concepts in sensory terms and a doctrinal side that

seeks to justify truths of nature through sensory experience. However, these

two aims cannot be met. The conceptual side falters because of “ holism, ”

the view that terms and sentences have implications for experience only

through their interconnections and never by themselves in isolation. What

this suggests is that, in general, no concept or theoretical claim has its own

consequences for experience, and thus no single concept or statement could

then be assigned to or reduced to its own specifi c element of experience.

The doctrinal aim fails because of what Quine calls “ Hume ’ s problem, ”