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3,900 | ention and focus. As a result, DLA currently finds itself without some of the capabilities that it needs to ensure that its mix of IT investments best meets the agency’s mission and business priorities. To its credit, DLA now recognizes the need to strengthen its IT investment management and has taken positive steps to begin doing so. However, several critical IT investment management capabilities need to be enhanced before DLA can have reasonable assurance that it is maximizing the value of its IT investme |
3,901 | nt dollar and minimizing the associated risks. Moreover, DLA does not yet have a process improvement plan that is endorsed and supported by agency leadership. The absence of such a plan limits DLA’s prospects for introducing the management capabilities necessary for making prudent decisions that maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of its IT investment. To strengthen DLA’s investment management capability and address the weaknesses discussed in this report, we recommend that the secretary of defense |
3,902 | direct the DLA director to designate the development and implementation of effective IT investment management processes as an agencywide priority. Further, we recommend that the secretary of defense have the DLA director do the following: Develop a plan, within 6 months, for implementing IT investment management process improvements that is based on GAO’s ITIM stage 2 and 3 critical processes. Ensure that the plan specifies measurable goals and time frames, defines a management structure for directing and |
3,903 | controlling the improvements, and establishes review milestones. Ensure that the plan focuses first on correcting the weakness in the ITIM stage 2 critical processes, because these processes collectively provide the foundation for building a mature IT investment management process. Specifically: Develop and issue guidance covering the scope and operations of DLA’s investment review boards. Such guidance should include, at a minimum, specific definitions of the roles and responsibilities within the IT invest |
3,904 | ment process; an outline of the significant events and decision points within the processes; an identification of the external and environmental factors that will influence the processes (for example, legal constraints, the behavior of key suppliers or customers, or industry norms), and the manner in which IT investment-related processes will be coordinated with other organization plans and processes. Develop and issue policies and procedures for maintaining DLA’s IT projects inventory for investment manage |
3,905 | ment purposes. Finalize and issue policies and procedures (including the use of information from the IT systems and project inventory) for the PEO Review Board’s oversight of IT projects. Develop and issue similar policies and procedures for the other investment boards. Finalize and issue guidance supporting the identification of business needs and implementing management controls to ensure that proposals submitted to DLA for review clearly identify and define business requirements. Develop and issue guidan |
3,906 | ce for the proposal selection process in such a way that the criteria for selection are clearly set forth, including formally assigning responsibility for managing the proposal selection process and establishing management controls to ensure that the proposal selection process is working effectively. Ensure that the plan next focuses on stage 3 critical processes, which are necessary for portfolio management, because along with the stage 2 foundational processes, these processes are necessary for effective |
3,907 | management of IT investments. Implement the approved plan and report on progress made against the plan’s goals and time frames to the secretary of defense every 6 months. DOD provided what it termed “official oral comments” from the director for acquisition resources and analysis on a draft of this report. In its comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations and described efforts under way and planned to implement them. However, it recommended that two report captions be changed to more accurately reflec |
3,908 | t, in DOD’s view, the contents of the report and to eliminate false impressions. Specifically, DOD recommended that we change one caption from “DLA’s Capabilities to Effectively Manage IT Investments Are Limited” to “DLA’s Capabilities to Effectively Manage IT Investments Should Be Improved.” DOD stated that this change is needed to recognize the fact that DLA has completed about 75 percent of the practices associated with stage 2 critical processes. We do not agree. As stated in our report, to effectively |
3,909 | manage IT investments an agency should (1) have basic, project-level control and selection practices in place (stage 2 processes) and (2) manage its projects as a portfolio of investments (stage 3 processes). Although DLA has executed most of the key practices associated with stage 2 processes, the agency acknowledges that it has not implemented any of the stage 3 processes. Therefore, our caption as written describes DLA’s IT investment management capabilities appropriately. In addition, DOD recommended th |
3,910 | at we change the caption “DLA Lacks a Plan to Guide Improvement Efforts” to “DLA Lacks a Published Plan to Guide Improvement Efforts.” DOD stated that this change is needed because DLA has developed some elements of an implementation plan. We do not agree. Our point is that DLA did not have a complete process improvement plan, not that it has yet to publish the plan that it has. As we describe in the report, a complete plan should, at a minimum, (1) be based on a full assessment of process strengths and wea |
3,911 | knesses, (2) specify measurable goals, objectives, milestones, and needed resources, (3) clearly assign responsibility and accountability for accomplishing well- defined tasks, and (4) be documented and approved by agency leadership. In contrast, DLA’s planning document was based on a preliminary assessment of only stage 2 critical processes and lacked several of the critical attributes listed above. Moreover, DOD stated in its comments that DLA has not completed a formally documented and prioritized implem |
3,912 | entation plan to resolve stage 2 and 3 practice weaknesses and has yet to complete the self-assessment and gap analysis necessary to define planned action items. Accordingly, it is clear that DLA has not satisfied the tenets of a complete plan, and thus our caption is accurate as written. DOD provided additional comments that we have incorporated as appropriate in the report. We are sending copies of this report to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee on |
3,913 | Appropriations; the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services; the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations; and the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services. We are also sending copies to the director, Office of Management and Budget; the secretary of defense; the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics; the deputy under secretary of defense for logistics and materiel readiness; and the |
3,914 | director, Defense Logistics Agency. Copies will be made available to others upon request. If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact us at (202) 512-3439 and (202) 512-7351, respectively, or by e-mail at [email protected] and [email protected]. An additional GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix II. In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this report were Barbara Collier, Lester Diamond, Gregory Donnellon, Sabine Paul, and Eric Trout. |
3,915 | Since 2005, DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing delays in making personnel security clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements for DOD’s initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within an average of 120 days. In December of 2008, we conducted an analysis to assess whether DOD and OPM were meeting the current timelines requirements in IRTPA and examined the fastest 80 pe |
3,916 | rcent of initial clearance decisions for military, DOD civilian, and DOD industry personnel. We found that these clearance decisions were completed within 87 days, on average, and well within IRTPA’s requirements. IRTPA further requires that by December 2009, a plan be implemented in which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions are made within 60 days, on average. We also analyzed the executive branch’s 2009 annual report to Congress, which presented an average of the fastest 90 |
3,917 | percent of initial clearance decisions in anticipation of IRTPA’s December 2009 requirements. The report stated that the average time for completing the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for military and DOD civilians in fiscal year 2008 was 124 days. The report also stated that the average time for completing the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances for private industry personnel working on DOD contracts in fiscal year 2008 was 129 days. DOD and OMB officials have noted that the existing cleara |
3,918 | nce process is not likely to allow DOD and other agencies to meet the timeliness requirements that will take effect in December 2009 under IRTPA. IRTPA requires that the executive branch report annually on the progress made during the preceding year toward meeting statutory requirements for security clearances, including timeliness, and also provides broad discretion to the executive branch to report any additional information considered appropriate. Under the timeliness requirements in IRTPA, the executive |
3,919 | branch can exclude the slowest clearances and then calculate the average of the remaining clearances. Using this approach and anticipating IRTPA’s requirement that by December 2009, a plan be implemented under which, to the extent practical, 90 percent of initial clearance decisions are made within an average of 60 days, the executive branch’s 2009 report cited as its sole metric for timeliness the average of the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances. We conducted an independent analysis of all initial |
3,920 | clearance decisions that DOD made in fiscal year 2008 that more fully reflects the time spent making clearance decisions. Without excluding any portion of the data or taking an average, we analyzed 100 percent of 450,000 initial DOD clearances decisions made in fiscal year 2008 for military, DOD civilian, and DOD industry personnel. Figure 2 shows the full range of time it took DOD and OPM to make clearance decisions in fiscal year 2008. As you can see, our independent analysis of all of the initial clearan |
3,921 | ces revealed that 39 percent of the clearance decisions took more than 120 days to complete. In addition, 11 percent of the initial clearance eligibility decisions took more than 300 days to complete. By limiting its reporting on timeliness to the average of the fastest 90 percent of the initial clearance decisions made in fiscal year 2008 and excluding mention of the slowest clearances, the executive branch did not provide congressional decision makers with visibility over the full range of time it takes t |
3,922 | o make all initial clearance decisions and the reasons why delays continue to exist. In our recent report, we recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at OMB (who is responsible for submitting the annual report) include comprehensive data on the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process in future versions of the IRTPA-required annual report to Congress. In oral comments in response to our recommendation, OMB concurred, recognized the need for timeliness, and underscored the importanc |
3,923 | e of reporting on the full range of time to complete all initial clearances. We note, Mr. Chairman, that you previously submitted an amendment to expand IRTPA’s provision on reporting on clearance timeliness. While IRTPA contains no requirement for the executive branch to report any information on quality, the act grants the executive branch broad latitude to include any appropriate information in its reports. The executive branch’s 2006 through 2009 IRTPA-required reports to Congress on the clearance proce |
3,924 | ss provided congressional decision makers with little information on quality—a measure that could include topics such as the completeness of the clearance documentation of clearance decisions. The 2006 and 2008 reports did not contain any mention of quality, and the 2007 report mentioned a single quality measure—the frequency with which adjudicating agencies returned OPM’s investigative reports because of quality deficiencies. The 2009 report does not contain any data on quality but proposes two measures of |
3,925 | investigative report quality and identifies plans to measure adjudicative quality. Specifically, the discussion of these measures is included in the Joint Reform Team’s December 2008 report, Security and Suitability Process Reform, which was included in the executive branch’s 2009 report. We have previously reported that information on timeliness alone does not communicate a complete picture of the clearance process, and we have emphasized the importance of ensuring quality in all phases of the clearance p |
3,926 | rocess. For example, we recently estimated that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports and some DOD adjudicative files. We independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing required documentation, and the documentation most often missing was employment verification. Incomplete documentation may lead to increases in both th |
3,927 | e time needed to complete the clearance process and in overall process costs and may reduce the assurance that appropriate safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to untrustworthy individuals. Because the executive branch has not sufficiently addressed quality in its reports, it has missed opportunities to provide congressional decision makers with greater visibility over the clearance process. In our most recent report, we recommended that the Deputy Director for Management at OMB i |
3,928 | nclude measures of quality in future versions of the IRTPA-required annual reports. In oral comments, OMB concurred with our recommendation and emphasized the importance of providing Congress more transparency about quality in the clearance process. Initial joint reform efforts partially reflect key practices for organizational transformation that we have identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but reports issued by the Joint Reform Team do not provide a strategi |
3,929 | c framework that contains important elements of successful transformation, including long-term goals with related outcome-focused performance measures to show progress, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. Consistent with some of the key practices for organizational transformation, a June 2008 Executive Order established the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council, commonly known as the Performance Accountability Council, as the head of th |
3,930 | e governmentwide governance structure responsible for achieving clearance reform goals and driving and overseeing the implementation of reform efforts. The Deputy Director for Management at OMB—who was confirmed in June 2009—serves as the Chair of the Council, and the Order also designated the Director of OPM and the Director of National Intelligence as Executive Agents for Suitability and Security, respectively. Membership on the council currently includes senior executive leaders from 11 federal agencies. |
3,931 | In addition to high-level leadership of the Performance Accountability Council, the reform effort has benefited from a dedicated, multi-agency implementation team—the Joint Reform Team—to manage the transformation process from the beginning. The Joint Reform Team, while not formally part of the governance structure established by Executive Order 13467, works under the Council to provide progress reports to the President, recommend research priorities, and oversee the development and implementation of an in |
3,932 | formation technology strategy, among other things. In addition to the key practices, the three reports issued by the Joint Reform Team have begun to address essential factors for reforming the security clearance process that we identified in prior work and that are also found in IRTPA. These factors include (1) developing a sound requirements determination process, (2) engaging in governmentwide reciprocity, (3) building quality into every step of the process, (4) consolidating information technology, and ( |
3,933 | 5) identifying and reporting long-term funding requirements. While the personnel security clearance joint reform reports, which we reviewed collectively, begin to address essential factors for reforming the security clearance process, which represents positive steps, the Joint Reform Team’s information technology strategy does not yet define roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability that is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. GAO’s prior work on key collabora |
3,934 | tion practices has stressed the importance of defining these roles and responsibilities when initiating cross-agency initiatives. In addition, the Joint Reform Team’s reports do not contain any information on initiatives that will require funding, determine how much they will cost, or identify potential funding sources. Without long-term funding requirements, decision makers in both the executive and legislative branches will lack important information for comparing and prioritizing proposals for reforming |
3,935 | the clearance processes. The reform effort’s success will be dependent upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward. Although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from previous efforts, it is difficult to gauge progress of reform, or determine if corrective action is needed, because the council, through the Joint Reform Team, has not established a method for evaluating the progress of the re |
3,936 | form efforts. Without a strategic framework that fully addresses the long-standing security clearance problems and incorporates key practices for transformation—including the ability to demonstrate progress leading to desired results—the Joint Reform Team is not in a position to demonstrate to decision makers the extent of progress that it is making toward achieving its desired outcomes, and the effort is at risk of losing momentum and not being fully implemented. In our May 2009 report, we recommended that |
3,937 | OMB’s Deputy Director of Management, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, ensure that the appropriate entities—such as the Performance Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team— establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include (1) a mission statement and strategic goals; (2) outcome-focused performance measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform effort toward meeting its goals and addressing long-standing problem |
3,938 | s with the security clearance process; (3) a formal, comprehensive communication strategy that includes consistency of message and encourages two-way communication between the Performance Accountability Council and key stakeholders; (4) a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the information technology strategy among all agencies responsible for developing and implementing components of the information technology strategy; and (5) long-term funding requirements for securi |
3,939 | ty clearance reform, including estimates of potential cost savings from the reformed process and provide them to decision makers in Congress and the executive branch. In oral comments on our report, OMB stated that it partially concurred with our recommendation to establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort. Further, in written agency comments provided to us jointly by DOD and ODNI, they also partially concurred with our recommendation. Additionally, DOD and ODNI commented on the specific el |
3,940 | ements of the strategic framework that we included as part of our recommendation. For example, in the comments, DOD and ODNI agreed that the reform effort must contain outcome-focused performance measures, but added that these metrics must evolve as the process improvements and new capabilities are developed and implemented because the effort is iterative and in phased development. We continue to believe that outcome-focused performance measures are a critical tool that can be used to guide the reform effor |
3,941 | t and allow overseers to determine when the reform effort has accomplished it goals and purpose. In addition, DOD and ODNI asserted that considerable work has already been done on information technology for the reform effort, but added that even clearer roles and responsibilities will be identified moving forward. Regarding our finding that, at present, no single database exists in accordance with IRTPA’s requirement that OPM establish an integrated database that tracks investigations and adjudication infor |
3,942 | mation, DOD and ODNI stated that the reform effort continues its iterative implementation of improvements to systems that improve access to information that agencies need. DOD and ODNI also acknowledged that more work needs to be done to identify long-term funding requirements. Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by reiterating that DOD and OPM are meeting current IRTPA timeliness requirements, which means that 80 percent of initial clearance decisions are made within 120 days, on average. This represents sign |
3,943 | ificant and noteworthy progress from our finding in 2007, when we reported that industry personnel waited more than 1 year, on average, to receive a top secret clearance. I would also like to emphasize that, although the high-level leadership and governance structure of the current reform effort distinguish it from previous attempts at clearance reform, it is imperative that OMB’s newly appointed Deputy Director for Management continue in the crucial role as chair of the Performance Accountability Council i |
3,944 | n deciding (1) how to implement the recommendations contained in our most recent reports, (2) what types of actions are necessary for developing a corrective action plan, and (3) how the corrective measures will be implemented. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time. For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-3604 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations |
3,945 | and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are David E. Moser, Assistant Director; James D. Ashley; Lori Atkinson; Joseph M. Capuano; Sara Cradic; Mae Jones; Shvetal Khanna; James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; and Gregory Marchand. DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, D.C.: |
3,946 | May 19, 2009. Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. GAO-09-488 Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2009. DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness and Quality. GAO-09-261R. Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008. Personnel Security Clearance: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance |
3,947 | Eligibility Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008. Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008. Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008. Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008. DOD |
3,948 | Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008. DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007. DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record Followin |
3,949 | g the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Progr |
3,950 | am, but Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. |
3,951 | The SDB program in various forms has been in existence for the past 14 years. While criteria to qualify as an SDB remained essentially the same during this period, a Supreme Court decision in 1995—Adarand v. Pena— resulted in the federal government examining how it implemented “affirmative action” programs, including certain procurement preference programs. Subsequently, the federal government established a program to certify SDBs as eligible for preferences when being considered for federal prime and subco |
3,952 | ntracting opportunities. The SDB program was established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, and applies to the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the U. S. Coast Guard. The implementing regulations define SDBs as small business concerns that are owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias and who have limited capital and credit opportu |
3,953 | nities. African, Asian, Hispanic, and Native Americans are presumed by regulation to be socially disadvantaged. An individual who is not a member of a designated group presumed to be socially disadvantaged had to establish individual social disadvantage on the basis of clear and convincing evidence which, according to the SBA's OIG audit report, is a difficult standard to meet. Under this standard, an applicant must produce evidence to show that it is highly probable that the applicant is a socially disadva |
3,954 | ntaged business concern. The regulations further specify that to qualify as an SDB, a small business concern had to (1) be at least 51 percent owned and controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual or individuals; (2) meet the SBA-established size standard based on the business' primary industry as established by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code; and (3) have principals who have a personal net worth, excluding the value of the business and personal home, less than $750 |
3,955 | ,000. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) expanded the program to all federal agencies. In addition to the governmentwide programs, various other federal laws contain provisions designed to assist SDBs that are applicable to specific executive departments or independent agencies. For example, the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 required the Department of Transportation to expend not less than 10 percent of federal highway and transit funds with disadv |
3,956 | antaged business enterprises. Amendments in 1987 and 1992 to the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 imposed similar requirements with regard to airport programs. Other statutes contain provisions to encourage contracting with SDBs by various departments and agencies, including the Department of Energy, the Department of State, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Prior to the recent changes in the SDB program, small business concerns could self-certify |
3,957 | that they were small and disadvantaged. According to an SBA official, unless otherwise challenged by an interested party, the contracting agency accepted the self-representation to be accurate. Between 1987 and the Adarand decision, self-certified SDBs were eligible to receive two main benefits: (1) a 10 percent evaluation preference in competitive DOD acquisitions where that award was based on price and price-related factors and (2) the ability to compete for contracts set-aside for SDBs for certain DOD ac |
3,958 | quisitions where agency officials believed that there was a reasonable expectation that offers would be received from at least two responsible SDBs. Though FASA extended the authority to implement these benefits to all federal agencies, because of the 1995 Adarand decision and the effort to reform federal affirmative action programs in light of the decision, regulations to implement the authority were delayed. In the 1995 Adarand decision, the Supreme Court held that all federal affirmative action programs |
3,959 | that use racial classifications are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. To meet this standard, a program must be shown to meet a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. The Court questioned whether the program at issue in the Adarand case, which involved highway contracts at the Department of Transportation, met that test. The Court decision resulted in the federal government's examining all affirmative action programs, including procurement preference programs |
3,960 | . One issue that was addressed following the Supreme Court decision was the government's policy that allowed firms to self-certify as SDBs. The Supreme Court decision in Adarand resulted in the administration having to make changes to the SDB program. Tasked by the administration, the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a review of affirmative action in federal procurement programs. DOD, one of the largest contracting agencies, was the focus of the initial post-Adarand compliance actions by the federal go |
3,961 | vernment. DOJ reviewed the procurement mechanisms used by DOD, including set-asides, direct competitive awards, and price evaluations. On May 23, 1996, DOJ issued a proposed structure to reform affirmative action in federal procurement to ensure compliance with the tests of constitutionality established in the Adarand decision. The DOJ proposal included a 2-year ban on DOD's use of set-aside programs for SDBs and the elimination of the SDB set-asides for civilian agencies, allowing only bidding and evaluati |
3,962 | on credits. The proposal also included standards by which a firm could apply to be certified as an SDB. This proposal also reduced the burden of proof from “clear and convincing evidence” to a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. This lesser evidentiary standard requires that applicants show that they are more likely than not to meet the criteria for social disadvantage. Because of its experience in certifying 8(a) businesses and resolving protests in connection with both the 8(a) and the previous SDB |
3,963 | set-aside programs, SBA was chosen to pilot and administer a centralized program for SDB certification. In August 1998, SBA set up the Office of Small Disadvantage Business Certification and Eligibility to implement the DOJ proposal. According to an SBA official, SBA projected that by October 1999, an estimated 30,000 firms would apply to SBA for certification based, in large part, on the number of firms that self-certified as SDBs under the previous program. Under the SDBC program, small businesses seeking |
3,964 | to obtain SDB procurement opportunities must first demonstrate that they meet the eligibility criteria to qualify as an SDB. Effective October 1, 1998, small business concerns must receive certification from SBA that they qualify as an SDB for purposes of receiving a price evaluation adjustment when competing for a prime contract. As of January 1, 1999, monetary incentives became available for prime contractors that met and exceeded their subcontracting goals. Also, effective October 1, 1999, SDBs that wai |
3,965 | ved the price evaluation adjustment and large business prime contractors that used certified SDBs as subcontractors in certain industries were eligible for evaluation credits. While the SDB set-aside program was suspended, price and evaluation credits continued with the following three procurement mechanisms: (1) qualified SDBs are eligible for price evaluation adjustments of up to 10 percent when bidding on federal prime contracts in certain industries, (2) prime contractors may receive evaluation credits |
3,966 | for their plans to subcontract with SDBs in major authorized SIC groups, and (3) prime contractors that exceed specified targets for SDB subcontracting in the major authorized SIC groups can receive monetary incentives. Although on September 30, 2000, the initial pilot covering civilian agencies' authority to use price and evaluation credits expired, the administration is seeking a 3-year extension of the program as part of SBA's pending Reauthorization Bill. The DOD authority was extended for another 3 yea |
3,967 | rs. During this time, SBA, DOD, and the Department of Commerce are to evaluate the performance of the program and determine whether the program has benefited SDBs and whether the reinstitution of set-asides should be considered. As of August 24, 2000, according to SBA officials, 9,034 small business firms were certified as SDBs. Of these firms, 6,405 were grandfathered into the SDBC program due to their 8(a) status. The remaining 2,629, or 29 percent, were small business firms that applied to the program an |
3,968 | d were certified by SBA. According to SBA, 5,456 small business firms applied to the program, which was a significantly lower number than the 30,000 applications SBA anticipated. Of the 5,456 applications submitted for certification, SBA returned 1,990 applications as incomplete and denied 241 applications for SDB certification. Applicants withdrew 307 applications for unknown reasons. The remaining 289 applications were in various stages of screening and processing. Of the 9,034 certified SDBs, according t |
3,969 | o an SBA official, 6,405 firms, or 71 percent, were automatically grandfathered into the SDB program due to their 8(a) certification. Of those firms that were grandfathered, 5,689 firms were 8(a) business development firms, and 716 were firms that recently graduated from the 8(a) program but qualified as an SDB because they still met the ownership and personal wealth criteria, according to an SBA official. The official also reported that, as of August 24, 2000, SBA had certified 2,629 firms as SDBs—1,302 fi |
3,970 | rms were certified in the first year of the program from August 24, 1998, through August 23, 1999; and 1,327 firms were certified from August 24, 1999, through August 24, 2000. Table 1 shows the composition of the SDB certifications. According to SBA officials, 5,456 applications were submitted by small businesses for SDB certification from August 24, 1998, to August 24, 2000. Of the 5,456 applications, 3,377, or 62 percent, were determined to be complete and passed the screening phase of the certification |
3,971 | process. According to SBA officials, 1,990 applications, or 36 percent, were determined to be incomplete and subsequently returned to the applicant during this period, and 89, or 2 percent, were “in- screening,” meaning that the application was being reviewed by an analyst for completeness. Table 2 shows the status of the applications submitted to SBA by small business concerns for SDB certification. SBA certified 2,629, or 78 percent, of the 3,377 applications it considered complete from August 24, 1998, t |
3,972 | hrough August 24, 2000. SBA denied certification to 241 applicants, or 7 percent, according to SBA officials. The two primary reasons SBA officials gave for denying certification were either that (1) the designated group members exceeded the economic threshold, or that (2) the nondesignated group members did not meet the social disadvantaged standard. As for the remaining 507 complete applications, SBA officials also reported that applicants withdrew 307 applications for unknown reasons, and 200 were “in pr |
3,973 | ocess,” meaning they were being reviewed to determine whether or not the applicant met the eligibility criteria. Table 3 shows the status of all complete applications submitted to SBA as of August 24, 2000. The number of SDBs that have been certified through the SDBC program is significantly lower than the 30,000 projected by SBA, based on the number of firms that had self-certified as SDBs. Officials from SBA, two federal agencies' Offices of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, the U. S. Chamber |
3,974 | of Commerce, the Women's Business Enterprise National Council, the National Minority Supplier Development Council, and the National Small Business United cited four broad factors, which they believed, combine to likely explain the lower-than-anticipated number of SDB certification applications. These factors included, for some firms: (1) confusion about the program's implementation, (2) the administrative and financial burden of applying, (3) questions regarding the benefits of obtaining the SDB certificati |
3,975 | on, and (4) not qualifying as SDBs. SBA officials and officials from other organizations we interviewed agreed that businesses might not have applied for certification due to uncertainty about when or how the SDB certifications would be implemented. Criticisms and lack of buy-in from outside groups on the SDB certification process and changes to the program's implementation dates may have created confusion for some firms, while some others may have adopted a “wait-and-see attitude.” Officials from two of th |
3,976 | e seven organizations that we talked to said that, when developing the certification process, SBA did not solicit the support of small business advocacy organizations that represent the interests of small business concerns. The two officials also stated that some advocacy groups opposed the structure and criteria used to establish SDB certification as well as the onerous documentation requirements. Consequently, those groups have not encouraged their members to participate in the program because these issue |
3,977 | s are not resolved. One of the officials also believed that SDB owners were not educated about the process, which might have lead them to not apply for certification. Compounding the problem of conflicting or inadequate information about the certification requirements, according to SBA officials, was the shifting of implementation dates. The implementation date for the requirement that prime contractors use only certified SDBs in meeting their subcontracting goals and receive evaluation credits under the SD |
3,978 | B participation program also changed several times. For example, the implementation date for the program was originally January 1, 1999, then changed to July 1999 with a final extension to October 1999. Consequently, according to SBA and some of the advocacy group representatives, SDBs may have delayed applying for certification because of uncertainty as to actual deadlines and, in some cases, may have adopted a wait-and-see attitude regarding program requirements and criteria. Officials interviewed from si |
3,979 | x of the seven organizations agreed that another key factor explaining the lower-than-anticipated number of applicants was that small business owners view the application process as an administrative burden compared with self-certification. Officials from four of the seven organizations interviewed pointed out that the certification requirement was a financial burden compared with the self- certification process. Previously, firms only had to attest that they qualified as SDBs. To be certified as SDBs, firm |
3,980 | s have to complete and submit one of several different SDB applications, depending on the type of business to be certified. In addition to the administrative burden, businesses can incur significant expenses under the new certification procedures to ensure that their application package is complete and accurate. For example, businesses can go to a private certifier to help them complete their application, but this service can cost up to several thousand dollars, depending on the services performed. Accordin |
3,981 | g to one small business advocacy official, this expense can be prohibitive for a number of firms. Adding to the issues of confusion about the program's requirements and administrative burden, according to officials interviewed, is the view held by some small businesses and shared by several SBA officials that there is no real benefit to participating in the program. Officials gave different reasons for this view. Two officials we interviewed, as well as officials from SBA, said that some small businesses be |
3,982 | lieve that they are unlikely to receive federal contracts due to both real and perceived restrictions on agencies' use of price evaluation adjustments and therefore questioned the value of obtaining SDB certification. An SBA official pointed out, for example, that DOD, which accounts for about 67 percent of federal procurement dollars spent, is statutorily barred from using price evaluation adjustments once it exceeds its SDB contracting goal. Alternatively, two officials from other organizations we intervi |
3,983 | ewed said that other firms do not see the benefit to certification because they feel confident that they can receive contracts through open competition regardless of their certification status, particularly those that have established contracting relationships. Consequently, small businesses' view that the certification process is an administrative and financial burden combined with the low value placed on SDB certification are factors that may have discouraged small businesses from applying for certificati |
3,984 | on, according to these officials. Finally, an SBA official we interviewed pointed out that, in some cases, firms that had previously self-certified as SDBs might not currently qualify for SDB status. Although she did not have data that could show how many firms fit in this category, the SBA official believed that, based on her experience, exceeding the personal wealth threshold of $750,000 was one reason for firms to either not qualify or no longer qualify as an SDB. We provided a draft of this report to th |
3,985 | e Administrator of the Small Business Administration, for her review and comment. On December 19, 2000, we received oral comments from the Associate Administrator, Office of Planning and Liaison (formerly Associate Administrator, Office of Government Contracting and Minority Enterprise Development), and from the Assistant Administrator, Office of Outreach and Marketing (formerly Assistant Administrator, Office of Small Disadvantaged Business Certification and Eligibility). Both officials stated that they ge |
3,986 | nerally concurred with the information included in the draft report, however, they provided clarifying technical information that we have included in this report as appropriate. To determine the number of businesses that SBA had certified as socially and economically disadvantaged since the implementation of the SDBC program, we met with and obtained information from SBA and reviewed data contained in the SBA Pro-Net database. In addition, we reviewed the SBA OIG's audit report on the SDB certification prog |
3,987 | ram, laws and regulations pertaining to SDBs, and a Supreme Court decision. We did not verify data provided by SBA. For our second objective, to obtain views on the reasons for the lower- than-expected SDB certifications, we interviewed officials from SBA, DOJ's Office of the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, as well as officials from the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, the Women's Business Enterprise National Council, the National Minority Supplier Development Council, and the National Small Business |
3,988 | United. Also, we sent letters to 30 representatives from federal agencies' Office of Small Disadvantaged Business Utilization requesting their view on reason for the lower-than- expected SDB certifications. Of the 30 federal agency representatives, we received views from Commerce and DOJ within the time frame specified in our letter, which we have included in this report. We did not validate the factors cited by these organizations for explaining the lower-than-expected certifications, nor was there empiri |
3,989 | cal evidence available to validate or refute these views. Also, we did not evaluate the performance and implementation of the SDB program to achieve the governmentwide goal or its effectiveness in certifying SDBs. We conducted our review in Washington, D.C., from July through September 2000 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report for 30 days. At that time |
3,990 | , we will send copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and interested Members of Congress. We will also send copies to the Honorable Aida Alvarez, Administrator, Small Business Administration; the Administrator, General Services Administration; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others on request. If you have questions regarding this report, please contact me on (202) 512- 8984. Major contributors to this assignment were Hilary Sull |
3,991 | ivan, Geraldine Beard, William Woods, and Sylvia Schatz. The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders by mail: U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 Orders by visiting: Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G |
3,992 | Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders by phone: (202) 512-6000 fax: (202) 512-6061 TDD (202) 512-2537 Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm e-mail: [email protected] 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering |
3,993 | system) |
3,994 | Holding federal elections in the United States is a massive enterprise, administered primarily at the local level. On federal Election Day, millions of voters across the country visit polling places, which are located in schools, recreation centers, churches, various government buildings, and even private homes. For the 2008 federal election, state and local election officials recruited and trained about 2 million poll workers across the country. Generally, each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, a |
3,995 | nd U.S. territories also play a role in elections, by establishing election laws and policies for their respective election jurisdictions. While federal elections are generally conducted under state laws and policies, several federal laws apply to voting and some provisions specifically address accessibility issues for voters with disabilities. These federal laws collectively address two issues that are essential to ensuring that voters with disabilities can go to polling places and cast their ballots indep |
3,996 | endently and privately as do nondisabled voters. These two issues are physical access and voting systems that enable people with disabilities to cast a private and independent vote. In 1984, Congress enacted VAEHA, which required political subdivisions responsible for conducting elections to ensure that all polling places for federal elections are accessible to elderly voters and voters with disabilities, with limited exceptions. One such exception occurs when the chief election officer of the state determi |
3,997 | nes that no accessible polling places are available in a political subdivision, and that officer ensures that any elderly voter or voter with a disability assigned to an inaccessible polling place will, upon advance request, either be assigned to an accessible polling place or will be provided with an alternative means to cast a ballot on the day of the election. Under the VAEHA, the definition of “accessible” is determined under guidelines established by the state’s chief election officer, but the law does |
3,998 | not specify standards or minimum requirements for those guidelines. Additionally, states are required to make available voting aids for elderly voters and voters with disabilities, including instructions printed in large type at each polling place and information by telecommunications devices for the deaf. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) also contains provisions that help increase the accessibility of voting for individuals with disabilities. Specifically, title II and its imp |
3,999 | lementing regulations require that people with disabilities have access to basic public services, including the right to vote. Although the ADA does not strictly require all polling places to be accessible, public entities must make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to avoid discrimination against people with disabilities. Moreover, no person with a disability may, by reason of disability, be excluded from participating in or be denied the benefits of any public program, service |
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