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No impact to warming – impacts are centuries away, and current mitigation solves – plus their ev doesn’t assume adaptation

Mendelsohn 9

Mendelsohn 9

The debate about climate change give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society These statements are alarmist and misleading society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences science and economics is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences severe impacts require a century (or two of no mitigation predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks

debate give the impression that climate change is an immediate threat to society These statements are alarmist and misleading immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences science and economics is clear that emissions over the next decades will lead to mild consequences severe impacts require a century (or two of no mitigation predicted impacts assume there will be no adaptation many of these ” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not apparent that immediate policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks

Robert O., the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

<h4>No impact to warming – impacts are centuries away, and current mitigation solves – plus their ev doesn’t assume adaptation</h4><p><strong>Mendelsohn 9</p><p></strong>Robert O., the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf</p><p><u><strong>The</u></strong> heart of the <u><strong><mark>debate</mark> about climate change</u></strong> comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that <u><strong><mark>give the impression that</mark> human-induced <mark>climate change is an immediate threat to society</u></strong></mark> (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006). <u><strong><mark>These statements are</u></strong> </mark>largely <u><strong><mark>alarmist and misleading</u></strong></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u><strong>society’s <mark>immediate behavior has an</u></strong> <u><strong>extremely low probability</u></strong> <u><strong>of leading to</u></strong> <u><strong>catastrophic consequences</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>science and economics</u></strong></mark> of climate change <u><strong><mark>is</mark> quite <mark>clear that emissions over the next </mark>few <mark>decades will lead to </mark>only</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>mild consequences</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>severe impacts</u></strong> </mark>predicted by alarmists <u><strong><mark>require a century (or two</u></strong> </mark>in the case of Stern 2006) <u><strong><mark>of no mitigation</u></strong></mark>. Many of the <u><strong><mark>predicted impacts assume there will be no </mark>or little <mark>adaptation</u></strong></mark>. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of <u><strong>the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and <mark>many of these</u></strong></mark> “<u><strong>potential<mark>” impacts</u></strong> <u><strong>will never occur because people will adapt</u></strong>. <u><strong>It is not</mark> at all <mark>apparent that immediate</mark> and dramatic <mark>policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks</u></strong></mark>. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.</p>

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Warming

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./documents/ndtceda16/Wyoming/HeCu/Wyoming-Henman-Culver-Neg-Mukai-Round1.docx

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Kansas State Ford-Smith

Cooper

1ac - Smart Grids - a1 warming - oceans gen extinction and methane emissions a2 grid - blackouts meltdowns econ 1nc - States CP Elections DA T - must restrict emissions grid DA on case 2nc - CP case -- including grid DA 1nr - elections 2nr - Elections DA and case d no grid DA

ndtceda16/Wyoming/HeCu/Wyoming-Henman-Culver-Neg-Mukai-Round1.docx

HeCu

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ndtceda16

NDT/CEDA 2016-17

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This is the greatest existential risk---even if it doesn’t escalate or provoke retaliation.

PND 16

PND 16. People for Nuclear Disarmament / Human Survival Project, internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf

the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized, or intentional nuclear detonations the actual RISK of not just one or two nuclear explosions, but of a major nuclear conflict is arguably as great as it was during some of the tensest periods of the cold war to reduce the risk of accidental (or deliberate, but based on misinformation or miscalculation) use of nuclear weapons Six minutes is around the time that a commander of missile forces, a defense minister, or a President, has to decide whether or not to launch as early warning systems indicate likely incorrectly that the other 'side' has launched a major factor in considering the likelihood of an inadvertent nuclear 'exchange' is the extremely compressed time-frames within which decisions have to be made by senior military and/or heads of state Given the in-minutes/seconds time-frames currently involved, it is hard to see how rational decision-making can be achieved at all. This factor alone ought to be enough to make nonsense out of theories of deterrence, which assume, without any factual foundation whatsoever, that 'rational' decision-making is always possible, and that decision makers always have access to correct data. In fact neither is likely ever to be the case In China, which has traditionally kept its missiles off high alert, relying on dispersion and concealment in the 'underground great wall' for survival, is now talking about placing its modest nuclear forces on high alert Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke will still make the rest of the world uninhabitable inducing global famine lasting decades Toon and Robock note resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the U S and China would decline most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 'Minimizing the Risk of Human Extinction' gives topmost ranking to lowering the alert level of nuclear weapons systems The 'mere' destruction of the information-based techno-structure and the complete disappearance of the global financial system could be accomplished with a very few large warheads (such as the Chinese DF5 exploded in space, with the effects of Electromagnetic Pulse EMP Studies by the US Congress indicate that in either event (High altitude/outer space nuclear explosion(s) up to 90% of US citizens could starve to death, as all delivery systems failed The drastic effects of EMP, even without a single city being directly destroyed, show just how vulnerable civilization now is quite independently a civilizational risk that warrants both study and action I have depended very much on the highly numerate risk analysis provided by Seth Baum of the GCRI (Global Catastrophic Risk Institute) and Martin Hellman of Stanford Seth Baum in a 2015 NPT presentation noted that nuclear risks have been drastically underestimated. Prof Martin Hellman at Stanford, using quite different statistical techniques, came to similar conclusions the risk of accidental nuclear war is not simply a function of the probability of a given event, but is a function of probability times consequences even if the probability of a global nuclear exchange is relatively low, the potential consequences are so grave that only a probability of zero or very close thereto, can be acceptable Even if the probability of an accidental apocalypse seems reasonably low in any given year, if this is taken over an indefinitely large number of years, the risk approaches asymptotically to 100 per cent Nuclear risk has palpably increased in the last two-three years amid a spate of dire warnings by everyone from former defense secretaries to former heads of nuclear missile forces of the U S and Russia as to the danger of inadvertent nuclear war When we call these dangers existential, that is exactly what we mean: They threaten the very existence of civilization and therefore should be the first order of business a series of articles on nuclear war risks and nuclear deterrence arguing that nuclear war risks now are actually higher than during the cold war nuclear risks right now are at an absolutely unacceptable level There have already been too many 'near misses'. Deterrence depends on the absolute impossibility of mistakes. Under deterrence theory, decision-making is presumed to be absolutely rational and informed by perfect data and mistakes and malfunctions never happen. Yet precisely the opposite is what we in fact observe to be the case. Mistake, miscalculation and malfunction seem to be the rule not the exception with the compressed decision-making time-frames earlier referred to, rational decision-making would seem to be all but impossible Statistically we probably already shouldn't be here. A study of those near misses conclude that the only reason we are here is by miracle Obvious 'near miss' incidents include a number of sub incidents during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which WW-III was nearly initiated by a wandering bear that activated a B-52 scramble-alarm; incidents with computer tapes for 'doomsday' in 1979 (resulting in panic and with a malfunctioning computer chip in 1980 and 1981 (it happened three times On the Russian side there was Petrov the Able Archer war scare and the Norwegian Weather Research Rocket incident NPT panel presentations lists in some detail incident after incident in which a nuclear exchange is narrowly averted. From time to time further incidents keep surfacing, notably one in which cruise missile operators in Okinawa during the Cuban Missile Crisis were inadvertently ordered to launch, and an incident in which an order to launch was inadvertently and unknowingly sent out to all US nuclear forces by someone who literally didn't realize what they were doing cyberspace attacks on nuclear command and control systems Jason Fritz addresses the problem in Hacking Nuclear Command and Control the hacking of nuclear weapon command-and-control systems could result in the unauthorized launch and detonation of nuclear weapons and cause unparalleled catastrophes to rescind launch-on-warning policies, stand down nuclear weapons from high operational readiness and extend the decision-making time for nuclear-weapon use in order to prevent unauthorized activation and deployment of nuclear weapon systems could be literally worldsaving

in extremely compressed time-frames deterrence assume, without factual foundation 'rational' decision-making and correct data neither likely In China Even if the 'other' does NOT launch will still make the world uninhabitable inducing global famine lasting decades resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan produce smoke and u v radiation Recent studies predict ag production in the U S and China would decline most likely cause the deaths of all humans and other species with immediacy that climate change does not gives topmost ranking to lowering alert level with very few warheads such as the Chinese EMP Studies indicate 90% starve to death, as all delivery systems failed risks have been drastically underestimated different statistical techniques, came to similar conclusions even if probability is low over years approaches 100 per cent palpably increased in the last two-three dire warnings from former defense secretaries heads of nuclear forces risks now are higher than the cold war already too many 'near misses' Mistake miscalc and malfunction the rule not the exception Statistically we shouldn't be here operators inadvertently ordered to launch cyber attacks hacking c and-c could launch

Ambit nuclear risk and the Open-ended Working Group 1. The Open-ended Working Group is mandated to consider not only a path to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons a goal of existential importance but another closely related goal also of existential importance, namely measures to reduce and eliminate the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized, or intentional nuclear detonations. (Panel 2 (b)) Particularly in the current context, the actual RISK of not just one or two nuclear explosions, but of a major nuclear conflict is arguably as great as it was during some of the tensest periods of the cold war. This makes the work of Panel 2(b) of critical importance. In addition, it is important to note that measures taken to reduce the risk of accidental (or deliberate, but based on misinformation or miscalculation) use of nuclear weapons take the world to a position in which the elimination of nuclear weapons become much easier. Interim steps of short-term nuclear risk reduction are in themselves steps to abolition. The time factor 2. Six minutes (varying from zero minutes to 10) is around the time that a commander of missile forces, a defense minister, or a President, has to decide, after a 30 second briefing (for US and Russian Presidents,) whether or not to launch about 2000 nuclear warheads, as early warning systems indicate likely incorrectly that the other 'side' has launched. 3. It is thus unsurprising that a major factor in considering the likelihood of an inadvertent nuclear 'exchange' is the extremely compressed time-frames within which decisions have to be made by senior military and/or heads of state or government. Indeed, much of the discussion on the likelihood or otherwise of an accidental 'apocalypse', and of measures to make such an event less likely turn around giving decision-makers more time to think over decisions involving the launch of large numbers of nuclear weapons. 4. Given the in-minutes/seconds time-frames currently involved, it is hard to see how rational decision-making can be achieved at all. This factor alone ought to be enough to make nonsense out of theories of deterrence, which assume, without any factual foundation whatsoever, that 'rational' decision-making is always possible, and that decision makers always have access to correct data. In fact neither is likely ever to be the case. 5. Simply giving decision-makers more time to take decisions whose consequences are likely to be apocalyptic would achieve a major reduction in the risk of inadvertent nuclear conflict. Hence recommendations for lowering the risks of accidental nuclear war frequently revolve around this question of decision-making time. 6. In the US and Russia, around 900 missile-mounted warheads are on alert in silos or mobile launchers and able to be fired, in some cases in less than a minute. In addition there are submarine-based warheads that can be launched in less than 10 minutes. China, which has traditionally kept its missiles off high alert, relying on dispersion and concealment in the 'underground great wall' for survival, is now talking about placing its modest nuclear forces on high alert. 7. Just how the compressed time-frames put decision-makers under impossible pressures is illustrated by the following anecdote concerning a 1979 false alarm, told by former Carter national security adviser Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Council of Foreign Relations in April 2012: “….. I remember being woken up one night at 3:00 a.m. to be told by my military assistant that we are under nuclear attack. It obviously didn't happen, since we're all here. (Laughter.) There would have been... 85 million Americans and Soviets dead six hours later.... "Part of my job was to coordinate the response, if something like that happened, to notify the President. I had three minutes in which to notify him. During those three minutes, I had to confirm it in a variety of ways. And then he would have four minutes to decide how to respond. And then 28 minutes later, some of us would be dead and we'd be living in a different age... I got a message from my military assistant, a general, who simply woke me up at 3:00 a.m. at night on the red phone and said, "Sorry to wake you up. We're under nuclear attack." (Scattered laughter.) That kind of wakes you up.... And, he adds, 30 seconds ago 200 Soviet missiles have been fired at the United States... 8. But there were subsequent confirmations and clearly within--well, within actually almost two minutes prior to me calling him on the third minute--it was clear that this was a false alarm. So I did nothing. I went back to sleep. (Laughter)" 9. But then came the real punch line. The interviewer asked, "And if the confirmation had been a little late, could we have had a problem?" Brzezinski's answer: "We might have had." ...Oops! 10. If it is indeed true that the other 'side' (Soviet Union in the '70s and '80s, Russian now, Indian or Pakistani) actually has launched, then it is indeed the end of what 'we' know as 'the world'. 11. If (as is quite probable) the incoming missiles are merely a computer glitch (as in Brzezinski's anecdote above) and 'our' side launches anyway, it will just as surely be the “end of the world” as the ‘other side’ (if acting in accordance with “deterrence” theory) will launch in response, making 'our' belief (whether 'we' are USA or Russian Federation, India or Pakistan) that the 'end of the world' has arrived, self-fulfilling. (It is noteworthy that at the conclusion of the war-game, filmed by the BBC, participants in fact violated the 'rules' of deterrence by refusing to instruct United Kingdom trident submarine crews to incinerate Russia).[Inside the War Room, BBC] Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well. 17. A seminal BAS (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) article of October 2008 entitled 'Minimizing the Risk of Human Extinction' places two nuclear-weapons-related actions at the very top of its rather consequential 'to-do' list. It gives topmost ranking to lowering the alert level of nuclear weapons systems, and next to top ranking to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Consequences electromagnetic pulse 18. The 'mere' destruction of the information-based techno-structure and the complete disappearance of the global financial system (and just about everything else technologically dependent) could be accomplished with a very few large warheads (such as the Chinese DF5, of 5Mt) exploded in space, with the effects of Electromagnetic Pulse. (In fact results of EMP can also be duplicated by a very large coronal mass ejection such as the 'Carrington Event' that took place in 1859. 19. Studies by the US Congress (2004, 2008) indicate that in either event (High altitude/outer space nuclear explosion(s) or 'Carrington Event') up to 90% of US citizens could starve to death, as all delivery systems failed. This, without the destruction of a single city. Most studies (including the 2004 and 2008 Congressional ones) say that electronic systems in the entire continental US could be crippled by a single large warhead exploded about 100-400Km out in space. 5 x 5Mt warheads exploded in space above continental landmasses would be enough to take global civilization back to medieval times. 20. The drastic effects of EMP, even without a single city being directly destroyed, show just how vulnerable civilization now is, not only to nuclear weapons use, but potentially to geomagnetic phenomena also. This is quite independently a civilizational risk that warrants both study and action. The apocalypse 'lite' South Asia 21. Even a 'mini' India/Pakistan nuclear exchange, involving 100-200 Hiroshima-sized warheads, could put up to 2 billion people worldwide at risk from famine, in part as a result of drastic declines in production of corn, winter wheat, rice, and soy production in the US, India, and China. [Mr. Ira Helfand—‘Nuclear Famine- A Billion People at Risk’] 22. Such scenario-building depends critically on what assumptions are input to the study. Critical assumptions in Mr. Ira's Helfand's study are how many warheads get to be used (he chose 50 on each side a number that is probably too low by a factor of two), and targeting he assumed, probably correctly, that cities would be primary targets. Ira's assumptions, if anything, probably underestimate, rather than overestimate, the impact, as at least double the numbers of warheads he assumes, look most likely to be used. Nuclear risk factors 23. So just how likely really is such a scenario? Is it just science fiction with which NGOs frighten roomfuls of diplomats? How likely really is a completely catastrophic event-sequence, between India and Pakistan or between NATO and the Russian Federation? 24. Some common-sense things can be said about catastrophic nuclear risk, without too much mathematical complexity. I have depended very much on the highly numerate risk analysis provided by Seth Baum of the GCRI (Global Catastrophic Risk Institute) and Martin Hellman of Stanford. 25. Seth Baum in a NY 2015 NPT presentation, and a subsequent masterly presentation at the Vienna Conference on Humanitarian Consequences, noted that nuclear risks have been drastically underestimated. Prof Martin Hellman at Stanford, using quite different statistical techniques, came to similar conclusions. Hellman called for a US National Academy of Science study to be carried out on the risk of accidental nuclear war. 26. Risk is not simply a function of the probability of a given event, but is a function of probability times consequences, or 'r= p X c'. 27. This means that even if the probability of a global nuclear exchange is relatively low, the potential consequences are so grave (as we see from the above) that only a probability of zero or very close thereto, can be acceptable. 28. Even if the probability of an accidental apocalypse seems reasonably low (say, 0.1 per cent-1 per cent) in any given year, if this is taken over an indefinitely large number of years, the risk approaches asymptotically to 100 per cent. 29. Nuclear risk has palpably increased in the last two-three years, with the most obvious signs being the movement of the hands of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 'Doomsday Clock' from five minutes to three minutes to midnight. 30. Most recently, the annual Bulletin Doomsday Clock Symposium has retained the position of the hands at three minutes to midnight, amid a spate of dire warnings by everyone from former defense secretaries to former heads of nuclear missile forces of the United States of America and the Russian Federation as to the danger of inadvertent nuclear war. 31. In the Doomsday Clock's own words: “Three minutes is too close. Far too close. We, the members of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, want to be clear about our decision not to move the hands of the Doomsday Clock in 2016: That decision is not good news, but an expression of dismay that world leaders continue to fail to focus their efforts and the world’s attention on reducing the extreme danger posed by nuclear weapons and climate change. When we call these dangers existential, that is exactly what we mean: They threaten the very existence of civilization and therefore should be the first order of business for leaders who care about their constituents and their countries.” [Doomsday Clock/BAS announcement of 22 Jan 2016] 32. There has been a series of articles on nuclear war risks and nuclear deterrence in Der Spiegel (arguing that nuclear war risks now are actually higher than during the cold war), The Guardian, Foreign Affairs, The Economist, and others. Most recently there have been warnings from former Russian foreign minister Mr. Sergei Lavrov. 33. The Open-ended Working Group delegates should also, if they have not already seen it, view the aforementioned BBC's recent documentary in which cameras are placed in a normally classified NATO war-game involving prominent decision-makers, some of whom may even be right here. The results are chilling as a crisis in the Baltic States escalates by what one might call a 'WW-I type escalation sequence', into WW-III. [Google 'Inside the War Room BBC']. 34. The clearest driver of increased risk (as Inside the War Room illustrates) is of course, the current crisis in Ukraine, with the associated nuclear threats, and the wider deterioration in NATO-Russian Federation relationships. Even to make nuclear threats in and of itself considerably increases risk. 35. Part of this increased risk has been a rising incidence of confrontations between NATO and Russian military forces. Snap Russian (and NATO) exercises, notably in the Baltics (around which the BBC war-game doco revolved) with nuclear-armed forces in close proximity increase the risks hair-raisingly. 36. According to the European Leadership Network: “Since the Russian Federation annexation of Crimea, the intensity and gravity of incidents involving Russian and Western militaries and security agencies has visibly increased. This ELN Policy Brief provides details of almost 40 specific incidents that have occurred over the last eight months... These events add up to a highly disturbing picture of violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea, simulated attack runs and other dangerous actions happening on a regular basis over a very wide geographical area.” And “To perpetuate a volatile stand-off between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance and its partners in the circumstances described in this paper is risky at best. It could prove catastrophic at worst.” 37. A 'mock' attack on what seems to have been a peace festival(!!) on the Danish island of Bornholm underlines this ELN statement. 38. Even more worrying is a recent (1April) statement by NATO's Philip Breedlove: “We are prepared to fight and win if we have to… our forces will expand from assurance to deterrence, including measures that vastly improve our overall readiness,” 39. A statement that will surely simply invite a Russian counter- escalation. According to Russian Federation's NATO representative, Aleksandr Grushko: “We are not passive observers, we consistently take all the military measures we consider necessary in order to counterbalance this reinforced presence that is not justified by anything…Certainly, we’ll respond totally asymmetrically.” 40. Grushko did not elaborate on his statement, but said Russia Federation’s actions would correspond to its “understanding of the extent of the military threat, would not be extremely expensive, but also highly effective” 41. All this ratchets up both the likelihood and the consequences, of a European, NATO/Russia clash, now being openly spoken of by Breedlove. 42. Meanwhile, minuteman missile forces and Russian Federation strategic rocket forces (as well as Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces) rehearse the 'apocalypse' on a regular basis. It's not imaginary for them. It's what they do. 43. Missiles are fired from test sites, from missile silos, and from mobile launchers and submarines, a number of times a year by both the USA and the Russian federation. In the past these exercises have been routine. Most recently, they have become increasingly public and threatening: almost a form of political theater. The most recent USA firings from Vandenberg airbase, done in the immediate aftermath of a DPRK space launch that was condemned as ICBM development, involved two launches of what did not pretend to be anything other than an ICBM, in a single week. 44. According to Ian Kearns (himself a participant in Inside the War Room) of the European Leadership Network: "A dangerous game of military brinkmanship is now being Played in Europe.” “If one commander or one pilot makes a mistake or a bad decision in this situation, we may have casualties and a high-stakes cycle of escalation that is difficult to stop." 45. Most recently, (1 April) Ian Kearns wrote: '...(a) Between March 2014 and March 2015 alone, we logged over 60 dangerous incidents in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are pleased that this work is profiled in the newly released Munich Security Conference Report 2016, (b) because our contention has been and remains that, against the backdrop of wider mistrust and tension in the NATO-Russian Federation relationship, the ongoing incidents have the potential to trigger a major crisis between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance. More specifically, if additional crisis avoidance mechanisms are not put in place, more recent assertive Russian military activities, coupled with reassurance measures adopted by NATO in response, will increase the risks to stability in Europe.' 46. A somewhat different story to that of purely Russian aggression is recounted by Mr Christoff Lehman of Global Research, according to whom on 7 April 2015, a NATO (USA) reconnaissance plane was intercepted approaching Russian territory over the Baltic Sea and forced to turn back by SU27's. It seems that (as NATO accuses Russia of doing) the planes transponder had been turned off. It seems both sides, (not just Russia), play these risky games. 47. Mr. Theodore Postol, a USA physicist, recently warned at a conference on nuclear risk last February in NY that Russian and USA nuclear forces have now created a danger of accidental nuclear war that is 'comparable to that of some of the most tense periods during the Cold War.' 48. It is clear from this that nuclear risks right now are at an absolutely unacceptable level. And, whether Russia, the USA/NATO or both (most likely) are to 'blame', those rights and wrongs and mutual blaming pale into insignificance in comparison to what, potentially, is at stake. Absurdities of deterrence 49. It is a fatal paradox of deterrence as routinely conceived that in order to maintain 'strategic stability' we have to (incredibly but really) threaten the 'end of the world'. In order to keep the end of the world 'off' the agenda (i.e., to frighten our potential adversaries into not doing anything we don't like) we have to keep the end of the world 'on' the agenda (so they are frightened enough). But that means that the end of the world is indeed, really, 'on' the agenda…an absurd and fatal paradox. These NATO and Russian exercises along the borders of the Baltic States should give rise to very deep concern. 50. There have already been too many 'near misses'. Deterrence depends on the absolute impossibility of mistakes. Under deterrence theory, decision-making is presumed to be absolutely rational and informed by perfect data and mistakes and malfunctions never happen. Yet precisely the opposite is what we in fact observe to be the case. Mistake, miscalculation and malfunction seem to be the rule not the exception. Indeed with the compressed decision-making time-frames earlier referred to, rational decision-making would seem to be all but impossible. When does the miracle supply run out? 51. Statistically speaking we probably already shouldn't be here. A study of those near misses leads one to conclude that the only reason we are here is by what General Lee Butler terms 'Divine Providence'. Without committing to any particular theology, we might well profitably ask, 'just when does our miracle supply run out?' 52. Are we, right now, tempting fate or the Deity just a little too much? Or is 'Divine Intervention' infinite and never-ending? Should we find out? If so, this is an experiment that can be done only once (especially if it fails!) 53. Obvious 'near miss' incidents include a number of sub incidents during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in one of which WW-III was nearly initiated by a wandering bear that activated a B-52 scramble-alarm; incidents with computer tapes for 'doomsday' in 1979 (resulting in what a Congressional committee who happened to be present at the time called 'blind panic') and with a malfunctioning computer chip in 1980 and 1981 (it happened three times). On the Russian side there was the famous incident involving Col. Stan Petrov of September 26, 1983; the Able Archer war scare just over a month later, and the Norwegian Weather Research Rocket incident of 1995, in which we are reputed to owe our existence to An unknown adviser who said ‘excuse me Mr President, let’s wait another minute’. 54. Some of these incidents are described in greater detail in the Chatham House publication 'Too Close for Comfort', as well as in a number of my own NPT panel presentations. Chatham House lists in some detail incident after incident in which a nuclear exchange is narrowly averted. From time to time further incidents keep surfacing, notably one in which cruise missile operators in Okinawa during the Cuban Missile Crisis (the cruise missiles were equipped with 5Mt warheads) were inadvertently (it seems) ordered to launch, and an incident in which an order to launch was inadvertently and unknowingly sent out to all US nuclear forces by someone who literally didn't realize what they were doing.(!) Cyberspace 55. In recent years, greater attention has been given to the possibility of cyberspace attacks on nuclear command and control systems. The Vienna conference was addressed on that subject by Camille Francoise, and Jason Fritz addresses the problem in Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, written for the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). The issue of cyberspace risks is addressed by a resolution adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), whose membership includes members of parliaments of both nuclear-armed states and those involved in 'extended deterrence' relationships. 56. The IPU Assembly adopted a final resolution, which, among other things: Noted that: "...military ICT systems for the deployment and use of force are susceptible to acts of cyber warfare that could lead to third parties intercepting and deploying such systems to cause unauthorized, illegal and destructive use of force…and was especially concerned that the hacking of nuclear weapon command-and-control systems could result in the unauthorized launch and detonation of nuclear weapons and cause unparalleled catastrophes;' 57. The IPU also expressed concern about: the suggestion by military planners that nuclear deterrence be maintained as an option for dealing with the existential threat of a cyberattack, 58. The IPU recommended that: '...Parliaments from nuclear-weapon States call on their governments to rescind launch-on-warning policies, stand down nuclear weapons from high operational readiness and extend the decision-making time for nuclear-weapon use in order to prevent unauthorized activation and deployment of nuclear weapon systems, pursuant to the negotiation of agreements to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and achieve their elimination.' 59. In the current context of nuclear risk this IPU resolution could be literally worldsaving.

<h4>This is the <u>greatest existential risk</u>---even if it doesn’t escalate or provoke retaliation. </h4><p><strong>PND 16</strong>. People for Nuclear Disarmament / Human Survival Project, internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf</p><p>Ambit nuclear risk and the Open-ended Working Group 1. The Open-ended Working Group is mandated to consider not only a path to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons a goal of existential importance but another closely related goal also of existential importance, namely measures to reduce and eliminate <u>the risk of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized, or intentional nuclear detonations</u>. (Panel 2 (b)) Particularly in the current context, <u>the actual RISK of not just one or two nuclear explosions, but of a major nuclear conflict is arguably as great as it was during some of the tensest periods of the cold war</u>. This makes the work of Panel 2(b) of critical importance. In addition, it is important to note that measures taken <u>to reduce the risk of accidental (or deliberate, but based on misinformation or miscalculation) use of nuclear weapons</u> take the world to a position in which the elimination of nuclear weapons become much easier. Interim steps of short-term nuclear risk reduction are in themselves steps to abolition. The time factor 2. <u><strong>Six minutes</u></strong> (varying from zero minutes to 10) <u>is around the time that a commander of missile forces, a defense minister, or a President, has to decide</u>, after a 30 second briefing (for US and Russian Presidents,) <u>whether or not to launch</u> about 2000 nuclear warheads, <u>as early warning systems indicate likely incorrectly that the other 'side' has launched</u>. 3. It is thus unsurprising that <u>a major factor <mark>in</mark> considering the likelihood of an inadvertent nuclear 'exchange' is the <strong><mark>extremely compressed time-frames</strong></mark> within which decisions have to be made by senior military and/or heads of state</u> or government. Indeed, much of the discussion on the likelihood or otherwise of an accidental 'apocalypse', and of measures to make such an event less likely turn around giving decision-makers more time to think over decisions involving the launch of large numbers of nuclear weapons. 4. <u>Given the in-minutes/seconds time-frames currently involved, it is hard to see how rational decision-making can be achieved at all. This factor alone ought to be enough to make nonsense out of theories of <mark>deterrence</mark>, which <mark>assume, without</mark> any <mark>factual foundation</mark> whatsoever, that <strong><mark>'rational' decision-making</strong></mark> is always possible, <mark>and</mark> that decision makers always have <strong>access to <mark>correct data</strong></mark>. In fact <strong><mark>neither</mark> is <mark>likely</strong></mark> ever to be the case</u>. 5. Simply giving decision-makers more time to take decisions whose consequences are likely to be apocalyptic would achieve a major reduction in the risk of inadvertent nuclear conflict. Hence recommendations for lowering the risks of accidental nuclear war frequently revolve around this question of decision-making time. 6. <u><mark>In</u></mark> the US and Russia, around 900 missile-mounted warheads are on alert in silos or mobile launchers and able to be fired, in some cases in less than a minute. In addition there are submarine-based warheads that can be launched in less than 10 minutes. <u><strong><mark>China</strong></mark>, which has traditionally kept its missiles off high alert, relying on dispersion and concealment in the 'underground great wall' for survival, is now talking about placing its modest nuclear forces on high alert</u>. 7. Just how the compressed time-frames put decision-makers under impossible pressures is illustrated by the following anecdote concerning a 1979 false alarm, told by former Carter national security adviser Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Council of Foreign Relations in April 2012: “….. I remember being woken up one night at 3:00 a.m. to be told by my military assistant that we are under nuclear attack. It obviously didn't happen, since we're all here. (Laughter.) There would have been... 85 million Americans and Soviets dead six hours later.... "Part of my job was to coordinate the response, if something like that happened, to notify the President. I had three minutes in which to notify him. During those three minutes, I had to confirm it in a variety of ways. And then he would have four minutes to decide how to respond. And then 28 minutes later, some of us would be dead and we'd be living in a different age... I got a message from my military assistant, a general, who simply woke me up at 3:00 a.m. at night on the red phone and said, "Sorry to wake you up. We're under nuclear attack." (Scattered laughter.) That kind of wakes you up.... And, he adds, 30 seconds ago 200 Soviet missiles have been fired at the United States... 8. But there were subsequent confirmations and clearly within--well, within actually almost two minutes prior to me calling him on the third minute--it was clear that this was a false alarm. So I did nothing. I went back to sleep. (Laughter)" 9. But then came the real punch line. The interviewer asked, "And if the confirmation had been a little late, could we have had a problem?" Brzezinski's answer: "We might have had." ...Oops! 10. If it is indeed true that the other 'side' (Soviet Union in the '70s and '80s, Russian now, Indian or Pakistani) actually has launched, then it is indeed the end of what 'we' know as 'the world'. 11. If (as is quite probable) the incoming missiles are merely a computer glitch (as in Brzezinski's anecdote above) and 'our' side launches anyway, it will just as surely be the “end of the world” as the ‘other side’ (if acting in accordance with “deterrence” theory) will launch in response, making 'our' belief (whether 'we' are USA or Russian Federation, India or Pakistan) that the 'end of the world' has arrived, self-fulfilling. (It is noteworthy that at the conclusion of the war-game, filmed by the BBC, participants in fact violated the 'rules' of deterrence by refusing to instruct United Kingdom trident submarine crews to incinerate Russia).[Inside the War Room, BBC] Consequences human survival 12. <u><mark>Even if the 'other'</mark> side <mark>does NOT launch</mark> in response the smoke</u> from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') <u><mark>will still make</u></mark> 'our' country (and <u>the rest of <mark>the world</u></mark>) <u><strong><mark>uninhabitable</u></strong></mark>, potentially <u><mark>inducing global famine lasting</u></mark> up to <u><strong><mark>decades</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Toon and Robock</strong> note</u> in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, <u><mark>resulting in <strong>self assured destruction</strong>. Even a 'small' nuclear war between <strong>India</strong> and <strong>Pakistan</u></strong></mark>, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, <u>could <mark>produce</mark> so much <mark>smoke</mark> that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age</u> of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, <u>shortening the growing season around the world <mark>and</mark> threatening the global food supply</u>. Furthermore, there would be <u>massive ozone depletion, allowing more <strong><mark>u</mark>ltra<mark>v</mark>iolet</strong> <mark>radiation</u></mark> to reach Earth's surface. <u><strong><mark>Recent studies</strong> predict</mark> that <mark>ag</mark>ricultural <mark>production in</mark> parts of <mark>the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>and <strong>China</strong> would decline</u></mark> by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would <u><mark>most likely cause the deaths of</mark> most/nearly all/<strong><mark>all humans</strong></mark> (<mark>and</mark> severely impact/extinguish <strong><mark>other species</strong></mark>) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades</u>. 15. <u>Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic</u>, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. <u><strong>Gareth Evans</strong>’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that</u> at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially <u><strong>threatens human survival <mark>with</mark> an <mark>immediacy that</mark> even <mark>climate change does not</u></strong></mark>, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well. 17. A seminal BAS (<u><strong>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</u></strong>) article of October 2008 entitled <u>'Minimizing the Risk of Human Extinction'</u> places two nuclear-weapons-related actions at the very top of its rather consequential 'to-do' list. It <u><mark>gives <strong>topmost ranking</strong> to <strong>lowering</mark> the <mark>alert level</strong></mark> of nuclear weapons systems</u>, and next to top ranking to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Consequences electromagnetic pulse 18. <u>The 'mere' destruction of the information-based techno-structure and the complete disappearance of the global financial system</u> (and just about everything else technologically dependent) <u>could be accomplished <mark>with</mark> <strong>a <mark>very few</mark> large <mark>warheads</strong></mark> (<strong><mark>such as the Chinese</strong></mark> DF5</u>, of 5Mt) <u><strong>exploded</strong> in space, with the effects of Electromagnetic Pulse</u>. (In fact results of <u><strong><mark>EMP</u></strong></mark> can also be duplicated by a very large coronal mass ejection such as the 'Carrington Event' that took place in 1859. 19. <u><strong><mark>Studies</strong></mark> by the US Congress</u> (2004, 2008) <u><mark>indicate</mark> that in either event (High altitude/outer space nuclear explosion(s)</u> or 'Carrington Event') <u>up to <mark>90%</mark> of US citizens could <mark>starve to death, as all delivery systems failed</u></mark>. This, without the destruction of a single city. Most studies (including the 2004 and 2008 Congressional ones) say that electronic systems in the entire continental US could be crippled by a single large warhead exploded about 100-400Km out in space. 5 x 5Mt warheads exploded in space above continental landmasses would be enough to take global civilization back to medieval times. 20. <u>The drastic effects of EMP, even without a single city being directly destroyed, show just how vulnerable civilization now is</u>, not only to nuclear weapons use, but potentially to geomagnetic phenomena also. This is <u>quite independently a civilizational risk that warrants both study and action</u>. The apocalypse 'lite' South Asia 21. Even a 'mini' India/Pakistan nuclear exchange, involving 100-200 Hiroshima-sized warheads, could put up to 2 billion people worldwide at risk from famine, in part as a result of drastic declines in production of corn, winter wheat, rice, and soy production in the US, India, and China. [Mr. Ira Helfand—‘Nuclear Famine- A Billion People at Risk’] 22. Such scenario-building depends critically on what assumptions are input to the study. Critical assumptions in Mr. Ira's Helfand's study are how many warheads get to be used (he chose 50 on each side a number that is probably too low by a factor of two), and targeting he assumed, probably correctly, that cities would be primary targets. Ira's assumptions, if anything, probably underestimate, rather than overestimate, the impact, as at least double the numbers of warheads he assumes, look most likely to be used. Nuclear risk factors 23. So just how likely really is such a scenario? Is it just science fiction with which NGOs frighten roomfuls of diplomats? How likely really is a completely catastrophic event-sequence, between India and Pakistan or between NATO and the Russian Federation? 24. Some common-sense things can be said about catastrophic nuclear risk, without too much mathematical complexity. <u>I have depended very much on the <strong>highly numerate risk analysis</strong> provided by <strong>Seth Baum</strong> of the GCRI (Global Catastrophic Risk Institute) and <strong>Martin Hellman</strong> of Stanford</u>. 25. <u>Seth Baum in a</u> NY <u>2015 NPT presentation</u>, and a subsequent masterly presentation at the Vienna Conference on Humanitarian Consequences, <u>noted that nuclear <mark>risks have been <strong>drastically underestimated</strong></mark>. Prof Martin Hellman at Stanford, using quite <strong><mark>different statistical techniques</strong>, came to <strong>similar conclusions</u></strong></mark>. Hellman called for a US National Academy of Science study to be carried out on <u>the <strong>risk of accidental nuclear war</u></strong>. 26. Risk <u>is not simply a function of the probability of a given event, but is a function of probability times consequences</u>, or 'r= p X c'. 27. This means that <u><strong><mark>even if</mark> the <mark>probability</mark> of a global nuclear exchange <mark>is</mark> relatively <mark>low</strong></mark>, the potential consequences are so grave</u> (as we see from the above) <u>that only a probability of zero or very close thereto, can be acceptable</u>. 28. <u>Even if the probability of an accidental apocalypse seems reasonably low</u> (say, 0.1 per cent-1 per cent) <u>in any given year, if this is taken <mark>over</mark> an indefinitely large number of <mark>years</mark>, the <strong>risk <mark>approaches</mark> asymptotically to <mark>100 per cent</u></strong></mark>. 29. <u>Nuclear risk has <strong><mark>palpably increased</strong> in the last <strong>two-three</strong></mark> years</u>, with the most obvious signs being the movement of the hands of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 'Doomsday Clock' from five minutes to three minutes to midnight. 30. Most recently, the annual Bulletin Doomsday Clock Symposium has retained the position of the hands at three minutes to midnight, <u>amid a <strong>spate of <mark>dire warnings</strong></mark> by everyone <mark>from <strong>former defense secretaries</strong></mark> to <strong>former <mark>heads of nuclear</mark> missile <mark>forces</strong></mark> of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates of America <u>and</u> the <u>Russia</u>n Federation <u>as to the danger of <strong>inadvertent nuclear war</u></strong>. 31. In the Doomsday Clock's own words: “Three minutes is too close. Far too close. We, the members of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, want to be clear about our decision not to move the hands of the Doomsday Clock in 2016: That decision is not good news, but an expression of dismay that world leaders continue to fail to focus their efforts and the world’s attention on reducing the extreme danger posed by nuclear weapons and climate change. <u>When we call these dangers <strong>existential</strong>, that is <strong>exactly what we mean</strong>: They <strong>threaten the very existence of civilization</strong> and therefore should be the first order of business</u> for leaders who care about their constituents and their countries.” [Doomsday Clock/BAS announcement of 22 Jan 2016] 32. There has been <u>a series of articles on nuclear war risks and nuclear deterrence</u> in Der Spiegel (<u>arguing that <strong>nuclear war <mark>risks now are</strong></mark> actually <strong><mark>higher than</mark> during <mark>the cold war</u></strong></mark>), The Guardian, Foreign Affairs, The Economist, and others. Most recently there have been warnings from former Russian foreign minister Mr. Sergei Lavrov. 33. The Open-ended Working Group delegates should also, if they have not already seen it, view the aforementioned BBC's recent documentary in which cameras are placed in a normally classified NATO war-game involving prominent decision-makers, some of whom may even be right here. The results are chilling as a crisis in the Baltic States escalates by what one might call a 'WW-I type escalation sequence', into WW-III. [Google 'Inside the War Room BBC']. 34. The clearest driver of increased risk (as Inside the War Room illustrates) is of course, the current crisis in Ukraine, with the associated nuclear threats, and the wider deterioration in NATO-Russian Federation relationships. Even to make nuclear threats in and of itself considerably increases risk. 35. Part of this increased risk has been a rising incidence of confrontations between NATO and Russian military forces. Snap Russian (and NATO) exercises, notably in the Baltics (around which the BBC war-game doco revolved) with nuclear-armed forces in close proximity increase the risks hair-raisingly. 36. According to the European Leadership Network: “Since the Russian Federation annexation of Crimea, the intensity and gravity of incidents involving Russian and Western militaries and security agencies has visibly increased. This ELN Policy Brief provides details of almost 40 specific incidents that have occurred over the last eight months... These events add up to a highly disturbing picture of violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea, simulated attack runs and other dangerous actions happening on a regular basis over a very wide geographical area.” And “To perpetuate a volatile stand-off between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance and its partners in the circumstances described in this paper is risky at best. It could prove catastrophic at worst.” 37. A 'mock' attack on what seems to have been a peace festival(!!) on the Danish island of Bornholm underlines this ELN statement. 38. Even more worrying is a recent (1April) statement by NATO's Philip Breedlove: “We are prepared to fight and win if we have to… our forces will expand from assurance to deterrence, including measures that vastly improve our overall readiness,” 39. A statement that will surely simply invite a Russian counter- escalation. According to Russian Federation's NATO representative, Aleksandr Grushko: “We are not passive observers, we consistently take all the military measures we consider necessary in order to counterbalance this reinforced presence that is not justified by anything…Certainly, we’ll respond totally asymmetrically.” 40. Grushko did not elaborate on his statement, but said Russia Federation’s actions would correspond to its “understanding of the extent of the military threat, would not be extremely expensive, but also highly effective” 41. All this ratchets up both the likelihood and the consequences, of a European, NATO/Russia clash, now being openly spoken of by Breedlove. 42. Meanwhile, minuteman missile forces and Russian Federation strategic rocket forces (as well as Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces) rehearse the 'apocalypse' on a regular basis. It's not imaginary for them. It's what they do. 43. Missiles are fired from test sites, from missile silos, and from mobile launchers and submarines, a number of times a year by both the USA and the Russian federation. In the past these exercises have been routine. Most recently, they have become increasingly public and threatening: almost a form of political theater. The most recent USA firings from Vandenberg airbase, done in the immediate aftermath of a DPRK space launch that was condemned as ICBM development, involved two launches of what did not pretend to be anything other than an ICBM, in a single week. 44. According to Ian Kearns (himself a participant in Inside the War Room) of the European Leadership Network: "A dangerous game of military brinkmanship is now being Played in Europe.” “If one commander or one pilot makes a mistake or a bad decision in this situation, we may have casualties and a high-stakes cycle of escalation that is difficult to stop." 45. Most recently, (1 April) Ian Kearns wrote: '...(a) Between March 2014 and March 2015 alone, we logged over 60 dangerous incidents in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are pleased that this work is profiled in the newly released Munich Security Conference Report 2016, (b) because our contention has been and remains that, against the backdrop of wider mistrust and tension in the NATO-Russian Federation relationship, the ongoing incidents have the potential to trigger a major crisis between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance. More specifically, if additional crisis avoidance mechanisms are not put in place, more recent assertive Russian military activities, coupled with reassurance measures adopted by NATO in response, will increase the risks to stability in Europe.' 46. A somewhat different story to that of purely Russian aggression is recounted by Mr Christoff Lehman of Global Research, according to whom on 7 April 2015, a NATO (USA) reconnaissance plane was intercepted approaching Russian territory over the Baltic Sea and forced to turn back by SU27's. It seems that (as NATO accuses Russia of doing) the planes transponder had been turned off. It seems both sides, (not just Russia), play these risky games. 47. Mr. Theodore Postol, a USA physicist, recently warned at a conference on nuclear risk last February in NY that Russian and USA nuclear forces have now created a danger of accidental nuclear war that is 'comparable to that of some of the most tense periods during the Cold War.' 48. It is clear from this that <u>nuclear risks right now are at an absolutely unacceptable level</u>. And, whether Russia, the USA/NATO or both (most likely) are to 'blame', those rights and wrongs and mutual blaming pale into insignificance in comparison to what, potentially, is at stake. Absurdities of deterrence 49. It is a fatal paradox of deterrence as routinely conceived that in order to maintain 'strategic stability' we have to (incredibly but really) threaten the 'end of the world'. In order to keep the end of the world 'off' the agenda (i.e., to frighten our potential adversaries into not doing anything we don't like) we have to keep the end of the world 'on' the agenda (so they are frightened enough). But that means that the end of the world is indeed, really, 'on' the agenda…an absurd and fatal paradox. These NATO and Russian exercises along the borders of the Baltic States should give rise to very deep concern. 50. <u>There have <strong><mark>already</mark> been <mark>too many 'near misses'</strong></mark>. Deterrence depends on the absolute impossibility of mistakes. Under deterrence theory, decision-making is presumed to be absolutely rational and informed by perfect data and mistakes and malfunctions never happen. Yet precisely the opposite is what we in fact observe to be the case. <strong><mark>Mistake</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>miscalc</mark>ulation</strong> <mark>and <strong>malfunction</strong></mark> seem to be <mark>the <strong>rule not the exception</u></strong></mark>. Indeed <u>with the <strong>compressed decision-making time-frames</strong> earlier referred to, <strong>rational decision-making</strong> would seem to be all but <strong>impossible</u></strong>. When does the miracle supply run out? 51. <u><strong><mark>Statistically</u></strong></mark> speaking <u><mark>we</mark> probably <strong>already <mark>shouldn't be here</strong></mark>. A study of those near misses</u> leads one to <u>conclude that the only reason we are here is by</u> what General Lee Butler terms 'Divine Providence'. Without committing to any particular theology, we might well profitably ask, 'just when does our <u>miracle</u> supply run out?' 52. Are we, right now, tempting fate or the Deity just a little too much? Or is 'Divine Intervention' infinite and never-ending? Should we find out? If so, this is an experiment that can be done only once (especially if it fails!) 53. <u>Obvious <strong>'near miss' incidents</strong> include a number of sub incidents during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in</u> one of <u>which WW-III was nearly initiated by a <strong>wandering bear</strong> that activated a B-52 scramble-alarm; incidents with <strong>computer tapes</strong> for 'doomsday' in 1979 (resulting in</u> what a Congressional committee who happened to be present at the time called 'blind <u>panic</u>') <u>and with a <strong>malfunctioning computer chip</strong> in 1980 and 1981 (it <strong>happened three times</u></strong>). <u>On the Russian side there was</u> the famous incident involving Col. Stan <u>Petrov</u> of September 26, 1983; <u>the <strong>Able Archer</strong> war scare</u> just over a month later, <u>and the <strong>Norwegian Weather Research Rocket</strong> incident</u> of 1995, in which we are reputed to owe our existence to An unknown adviser who said ‘excuse me Mr President, let’s wait another minute’. 54. Some of these incidents are described in greater detail in the Chatham House publication 'Too Close for Comfort', as well as in a number of my own <u>NPT panel presentations</u>. Chatham House <u>lists in some detail incident after incident in which a <strong>nuclear exchange</strong> is <strong>narrowly averted</strong>. From time to time further incidents keep surfacing, notably one in which cruise missile <mark>operators</mark> in Okinawa during the Cuban Missile Crisis</u> (the cruise missiles were equipped with 5Mt warheads) <u>were <strong><mark>inadvertently</u></strong></mark> (it seems) <u><strong><mark>ordered to launch</strong></mark>, and an incident in which an order to launch was inadvertently and <strong>unknowingly sent out to all US nuclear forces</strong> by someone who literally didn't realize what they were doing</u>.(!) Cyberspace 55. In recent years, greater attention has been given to the possibility of <u><strong><mark>cyber</mark>space <mark>attacks</strong></mark> on nuclear command and control systems</u>. The Vienna conference was addressed on that subject by Camille Francoise, and <u>Jason Fritz addresses the problem in Hacking Nuclear Command and Control</u>, written for the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). The issue of cyberspace risks is addressed by a resolution adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), whose membership includes members of parliaments of both nuclear-armed states and those involved in 'extended deterrence' relationships. 56. The IPU Assembly adopted a final resolution, which, among other things: Noted that: "...military ICT systems for the deployment and use of force are susceptible to acts of cyber warfare that could lead to third parties intercepting and deploying such systems to cause unauthorized, illegal and destructive use of force…and was especially concerned that <u>the <strong><mark>hacking</strong></mark> of nuclear weapon <strong><mark>c</strong></mark>ommand-<strong><mark>and-c</strong></mark>ontrol systems <mark>could</mark> result in the unauthorized <mark>launch</mark> and detonation of nuclear weapons and cause unparalleled catastrophes</u>;' 57. The IPU also expressed concern about: the suggestion by military planners that nuclear deterrence be maintained as an option for dealing with the existential threat of a cyberattack, 58. The IPU recommended that: '...Parliaments from nuclear-weapon States call on their governments <u>to <strong>rescind launch-on-warning</strong> policies, stand down nuclear weapons from high operational readiness and extend the decision-making time for nuclear-weapon use in order to prevent unauthorized activation and deployment of nuclear weapon systems</u>, pursuant to the negotiation of agreements to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and achieve their elimination.' 59. In the current context of nuclear risk this IPU resolution <u>could be <strong>literally worldsaving</u></strong>.</p>

1AC

Chain of Command---1AC

./documents/ndtceda18/Kentucky/BaTr/Kentucky-Bannister-Trufanov-Aff-Kentucky-Round7.docx

A

Kentucky

7

Harvard CM

Kohli, Vikram

1AC Rule of Two 1NC T Restrict Advantage CP Courts CP ESR CP Zivotovsky DA Deterrence DA Midterms DA 2NR Deterrence DA Random ESR Planks

ndtceda18/Kentucky/BaTr/Kentucky-Bannister-Trufanov-Aff-Kentucky-Round7.docx

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ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

Scrapping ICBMs makes asteroid deflection impossible – they’re the only thing that can do it

Buchanan 16, Assistant Astronomer @ Primland, "Is Blowing up an Asteroid with a Bomb Really a Good Idea?", Futurism, https://futurism.com/blowing-asteroid-bomb-really-good-idea

Amanda Buchanan 16, Assistant Astronomer @ Primland, "Is Blowing up an Asteroid with a Bomb Really a Good Idea?", Futurism, https://futurism.com/blowing-asteroid-bomb-really-good-idea

ICBMs are the long-range nukes that the USSR and USA had pointed at each other during the Cold War they still have some pointed at each other scientists argue that typical rockets are not good candidates for seizing asteroids because they require too much lead time to meet an asteroid that might be detected only days before impact And true enough, typical payload rockets take several days to fuel. On the other hand, ICBMs can be launched at a moment’s notice.

ICBMs are long-range nukes scientists argue that typical rockets are not good candidates for seizing asteroids they require too much lead time to meet an asteroid that might be detected only days before impact typical payload rockets take days to fuel ICBMs can be launched at a moment’s notice.

To clarify, ICBMs are the long-range nukes that the USSR and USA had pointed at each other during the Cold War (in fact, they still have some pointed at each other). Russian scientists argue that typical rockets are not good candidates for seizing asteroids because they require too much lead time to meet an asteroid that might be detected only days before impact. And true enough, typical payload rockets take several days to fuel. On the other hand, ICBMs can be launched at a moment’s notice.

<h4>Scrapping ICBMs makes asteroid deflection impossible – they’re the <u>only thing</u> that can do it</h4><p>Amanda <strong>Buchanan 16<u><mark>, Assistant Astronomer @ Primland, "Is Blowing up an Asteroid with a Bomb Really a Good Idea?", Futurism, https://futurism.com/blowing-asteroid-bomb-really-good-idea</p><p></u></strong></mark>To clarify, <u><strong><mark>ICBMs are</mark> the <mark>long-range nukes</mark> that the USSR and USA had pointed at each other during the Cold War</u></strong> (in fact, <u><strong>they still have some pointed at each other</u></strong>). Russian <u><strong><mark>scientists argue</u></strong> <u><strong>that typical rockets are not good candidates for seizing asteroids</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>because <mark>they require too much lead time to meet an asteroid that might be detected only days before impact</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>And true enough, <mark>typical payload rockets take</mark> several <mark>days to fuel</mark>. On the other hand, <mark>ICBMs can be launched at a moment’s notice.</p></u></strong></mark>

CP

./documents/hsld19/HarvardWestlake/Mc/Harvard%20Westlake-McLoughlin-Neg-Stanford-Round6.docx

N

Stanford

6

Lynbrook SK

Nathan Fleming

1AC Baudrillard 1NC T - Forget Fem K Asteroids PIC Fracking PIC case 1AR all 2NR Fracking PIC case 2AR vi on the K case PIC

hsld19/HarvardWestlake/Mc/Harvard%20Westlake-McLoughlin-Neg-Stanford-Round6.docx

SaMc

Harvard Westlake SaMc

Sa.....

Mc.....

HarvardWestlake

Harvard Westlake

CA

hsld19

HS LD 2019-20

ld

hs

Share estimation is feasible.

Hastings and Williams ’19

Justine S. Hastings,Professor of Economics and International and Public Affairs at Brown University and and Michael A. Williams Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. t Competition Economics, LLC, ’19, “Market Share Liability: Lessons from New Hampshire v. Exxon Mobil,” 34 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 219, 252

Applying market share liability in the context of orbital debris specific methods of assigning market share liability in potential orbital debris litigation have yet to be developed A major challenge in the orbital debris context relates to determining each launching party's share in the existing problematic debris Estimating the total mass of orbital debris through statistical and mathematical methods is feasible the shares of the total mass of debris that can be tracked back to specific parties could be used to assign shares of the remaining, untraceable debris Untraceable debris is composed of pieces of debris generated in collisions and explosions of larger pieces of debris smaller pieces of debris are the products of larger pieces of debris. Therefore, if a percentage of large pieces of traceable debris belongs to a certain party, it can be inferred that approximately the same percentage of smaller, untraceable debris likely belongs to the same party he contribution indices associated with the United States, Russia, and China were 32.0% [thirty two], 35.7 [thirty five point seven]%, and 21.2 [twenty one point two]% [percent] respectivel The remaining 11.1% was attributable to other countries including France, Japan, and India The dollar amount of each party's damages could be calculated by multiplying the total damages amount by the share of the party's traceable debris

total mass can be tracked back to specific parties to assign shares of debris. Untraceable debris is composed of debris generated in collisions if a percent of large pieces belongs to a certain party, it can be inferred the same percent of untraceable debris belongs to the same party indices associated with the U S Russia, and China were thirty two thirty five point seven and twenty one point two percent respectively

Growth in the amount of orbital debris has resulted in numerous collisions. 2 15 Given the rate of increase in the volume of debris, the increasing costs of collisions are likely to adversely affect the growth of the satellite industry.2 16 Applying market share liability in the context of orbital debris has been suggested, but specific methods of assigning market share liability in potential orbital debris litigation have yet to be developed.2 17 A major challenge with applying market share liability in the orbital debris context relates to determining each launching party's share in the existing problematic debris. 218 Estimating the total mass of orbital debris through statistical and mathematical methods is feasible.219 However, determining the percentage of the total mass attributable to a given party is difficult.220 In principle, the shares of the total mass of debris that can be tracked back to specific parties could be used to assign shares of the remaining, untraceable debris.221 Untraceable debris is composed primarily of pieces of debris generated in collisions and explosions of larger pieces of debris.222 Thus, smaller pieces of debris are the products of larger pieces of debris. Therefore, if a percentage of large pieces of traceable debris belongs to a certain party, it can be inferred that approximately the same percentage of smaller, untraceable debris likely belongs to the same party.223 According to NASA, there were 17,817 identified objects in Earth orbit as of October 4, 2016.224 Of this total, 5699 objects belonged to the United States, 6354 to Russia, and 3782 to China.225 This means that the contribution indices associated with the United States, Russia, and China were 32.0% [thirty two], 35.7 [thirty five point seven]%, and 21.2 [twenty one point two]% [percent] respectively. The remaining 11.1% was attributable to other countries including France, Japan, and India.2 26 The dollar amount of each party's damages could be calculated by multiplying the total damages amount by the share of the party's traceable debris. 227

<h4>Share estimation is feasible. </h4><p>Justine S.<strong> Hastings</strong>,Professor of Economics and International and Public Affairs at Brown University and <strong>and</strong> Michael A. <strong>Williams </strong>Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. t Competition Economics, LLC, <strong>’19</strong>, “Market Share Liability: Lessons from New Hampshire v. Exxon Mobil,” 34 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 219, 252 </p><p>Growth in the amount of orbital debris has resulted in numerous collisions. 2 15 Given the rate of increase in the volume of debris, the increasing costs of collisions are likely to adversely affect the growth of the satellite industry.2 16</p><p><u>Applying market share liability in the context of orbital debris</u> has been suggested, but <u>specific methods of assigning market share liability in potential orbital debris litigation have yet to be developed</u>.2 17 <u>A major challenge</u> with applying market share liability <u>in the orbital debris context relates to determining each launching party's share in the existing problematic debris</u>. 218 <u><strong>Estimating the total mass of orbital debris through statistical and mathematical methods is feasible</u></strong>.219 However, determining the percentage of the total mass attributable to a given party is difficult.220</p><p>In principle, <u>the shares of the <mark>total mass </mark>of debris that <mark>can be tracked back to specific parties </mark>could be used <mark>to assign shares of </mark>the remaining, untraceable <mark>debris</u>.</mark>221 <u><mark>Untraceable debris is composed</u></mark> primarily <u>of pieces <mark>of debris generated in collisions</mark> and explosions of larger pieces of debris</u>.222 Thus, <u>smaller pieces of debris are the products of larger pieces of debris. Therefore, <mark>if a percent</mark>age<mark> of large pieces</mark> of traceable debris <mark>belongs to a certain party, it can be inferred</mark> that approximately <mark>the same percent</mark>age <mark>of</mark> smaller, <mark>untraceable debris</mark> likely <mark>belongs to the same party</u></mark>.223</p><p>According to NASA, there were 17,817 identified objects in Earth orbit as of October 4, 2016.224 Of this total, 5699 objects belonged to the United States, 6354 to Russia, and 3782 to China.225 This means that t<u>he contribution <mark>indices associated with the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, <mark>Russia, and China were</mark> 32.0% [<mark>thirty two</mark>], 35.7 [<mark>thirty five point seven</mark>]%, <mark>and</mark> 21.2 [<mark>twenty one point two</mark>]% [<mark>percent</mark>] <mark>respectivel</u>y</mark>. <u>The remaining 11.1% was attributable to other countries including France, Japan, and India</u>.2 26 <u>The dollar amount of each party's damages could be calculated by multiplying the total damages amount by the share of the party's traceable debris</u>. 227</p>

1AC

1AC — Wake

1AC — Debris

./documents/ndtceda19/Dartmouth/KaSh/Dartmouth-Kadin-Shankar-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

Navy GR

Dan Bannister

1AC - Share Liability 1NC - T-Cooperation NDAA DA Consult Japan CP Advantage CP Japan DA 2NR - Japan DA

ndtceda19/Dartmouth/KaSh/Dartmouth-Kadin-Shankar-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

KaSh

Dartmouth KaSh

Ha.....

Ka.....

Ar.....

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Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda19

NDT/CEDA 2019-20

cx

college

Collision risk is infinitesimally small

Fange 17

Fange 17 Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler_syndrome_is_over_hyped/

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait and the problem would be over High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here imagine a worst case scenario An evil alien chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death spread evenly Is humanity cut off from space? the world has launched 10,000 tons of satellites total I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites currently in High LEO then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes there would be one cube per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000

four regions. Low LEO Things burn up High LEO most junk orbits Mid Orbit - sat s travel here volume is so huge, and number of sat s so few we don’t worry sat s moving the same speed one per 1000km not a problem worst case scenario odds of hitting are tiny

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.

<h4>Collision risk is <u>infinitesimally small</h4><p></u><strong>Fange 17</strong> Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler_syndrome_is_over_hyped/</p><p><u><strong>The orbital area around earth can be broken down into <mark>four regions.</mark> <mark>Low LEO</mark> - Up to about 400km. <mark>Things</mark> that orbit here <mark>burn up</mark> in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years</u></strong>. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. <u><strong>For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait</u></strong> a year and a half, <u><strong>and the problem would be over</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>High LEO</mark> - 400km to 2000km. This where <mark>most</mark> heavy satellites and most space <mark>junk orbits</u></strong></mark>. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. <u><strong>It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Mid Orbit - </mark>GPS satellites and other navigation <mark>sat</mark>ellite<mark>s travel here</mark> in lonely, long lives. The <mark>volume</mark> of space <mark>is so huge, and</mark> the <mark>number of sat</mark>ellite<mark>s so few</mark>, that <mark>we don’t</mark> need to <mark>worry</mark> about Kessler here</u></strong>. <u><strong>GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it</u></strong>. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, <u><strong>GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all</u></strong> the <u><strong><mark>sat</mark>ellite<mark>s</mark> here are <mark>moving the same</mark> direction at the same <mark>speed</mark> - debris doesn’t get free velocity</u></strong> from the speed of the satellites. <u><strong>Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about <mark>one</mark> satellite <mark>per 1000km</mark> of the ring. Kessler is <mark>not a problem</mark> here</u></strong>. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s <u><strong>imagine a <mark>worst case scenario</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>An evil alien</u></strong> intelligence <u><strong>chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death</u></strong> orbiting at 1000km, <u><strong>spread</u></strong> as <u><strong>evenly</u></strong> across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. <u><strong>Is humanity cut off from space? </u></strong>I’m guessing <u><strong>the world has launched</u></strong> about <u><strong>10,000 tons of satellites total</u></strong>. For guessing purposes, <u><strong>I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites</u></strong> and junk <u><strong>currently in High LEO</u></strong>. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, <u><strong>then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes</u></strong>. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So <u><strong>there would be one cube</u></strong> of junk <u><strong>per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its <mark>odds of hitting</mark> that cube <mark>are tiny </mark>- less than 1 in 10,000</u></strong>.</p>

1NC

2

Debris

./documents/hsld21/Sage/Pe/Sage-Perin-Neg-Cal-Quarters.docx

N

Cal

Quarters

Southlake Carroll PK

Emmiee Malyugina, Indu Pandey, Truman Le

ac constellations nc t appropriation precision ag da asian weather pic kant nc 1ar all condo pics 2nr theory weather pic 2ar condo

hsld21/Sage/Pe/Sage-Perin-Neg-Cal-Quarters.docx

MaPe

Sage MaPe

Ma.....

Pe.....

Sage

Sage

CA

hsld21

HS LD 2021-22

ld

hs

No resource wars

Koubi 14

Koubi 14 — Vally Koubi (Senior Scientist and Professor at the Center for Comparative and International Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and professor at the Institute of Economics at the University of Bern); Gabriele Spilker, (ETH Zurich); Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex & ETH Zurich); Thomas Bernauer (ETH Zurich), “Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict?” Journal of Peace Research March 2014 vol. 51 no. 2 227-243

empirical work on the resource scarcity–conflict nexus relies on qualitative studies of specific countries or regions This research identifies various cases in which resource scarcity seems to have contributed to violent conflict However conditions vary considerably between areas of the world. Case studies of specific countries can hardly account for these different conditions, and it is therefore difficult to generalize their results with regard to interstate conflict quantitative Empirical analyses suggest that states tend to cooperate rather than fight and that institutionalized agreements can reduce dispute risk Furthermore, side-payments, issue linkages, or economic and political ties between countries also prevent interstate conflict if conflict materializes then it occurs in the form of disputes and political tensions, but not in the form of armed hostilities

empirical work on the scarcity–conflict nexus relies on qualitative studies of specific countries This identifies cases in which scarcity seems to contribute to conflict However conditions vary it is difficult to generalize with regard to conflict quantitative Empirical analyses suggest states cooperate rather than fight and institutionalized agreements reduce risk side-payments, issue linkages, or economic and political ties prevent conflict conflict occurs in disputes not hostilities

Much of the existing empirical work on the resource scarcity–conflict nexus relies on qualitative studies of specific countries or regions (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1994, 1999; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998; Bächler et al., 1996; Kahl, 2008; Brown, 2010). This research identifies various cases in which resource scarcity seems to have contributed to violent conflict, mostly at local or national levels. However, social, economic, and political conditions, which may also affect conflict besides resource scarcity, vary considerably between different types of resources as well as areas of the world. Case studies of specific countries or regions can hardly account for these different conditions, and it is therefore difficult to generalize their results. Hence, we concentrate on the recent large-N research in the remainder of this section, and structure the discussion according to conflict types, that is, interstate vs. intrastate conflict and the kind of resource under study. First, with regard to interstate conflict, extant quantitative work almost exclusively focuses on one specific type of renewable resource, namely water. Empirical analyses in this context suggest that states tend to cooperate rather than fight over shared water resources (Dinar et al., 2007; Brochmann, 2012) and that institutionalized agreements can reduce dispute risk (Zawahri & Mitchell, 2011; Tir & Stinnett, 2012). The theoretical underpinning of much of this research is that joint democracy and/or international water management institutions facilitate cooperative solutions to water problems even in situations of scarcity. Furthermore, side-payments, issue linkages, or economic and political ties between countries also prevent interstate conflict over water. While scholars do not fully rule out conflict over scarce water resources, they find that if conflict materializes then it occurs in the form of disputes and political tensions, but not in the form of armed hostilities or even ‘water wars’ (e.g. Gledisch & Hegre, 2000; Gleditsch et al., 2006; Hensel, Mitchell & Sowers, 2006; Brochmann & Hensel, 2009; Dinar, 2009).

<h4>No resource wars</h4><p><strong>Koubi 14</strong> — Vally Koubi (Senior Scientist and Professor at the Center for Comparative and International Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and professor at the Institute of Economics at the University of Bern); Gabriele Spilker, (ETH Zurich); Tobias Böhmelt (University of Essex & ETH Zurich); Thomas Bernauer (ETH Zurich), “Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict?” Journal of Peace Research March 2014 vol. 51 no. 2 227-243 </p><p>Much of the existing <u><mark>empirical work on the</mark> resource <strong><mark>scarcity–conflict nexus</strong> relies on <strong>qualitative studies</strong> of specific countries </mark>or regions</u> (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1994, 1999; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998; Bächler et al., 1996; Kahl, 2008; Brown, 2010). <u><mark>This</mark> research <mark>identifies</mark> various <mark>cases in which</mark> resource <mark>scarcity <strong>seems</strong> to </mark>have <strong><mark>contribute</strong></mark>d <mark>to</mark> violent <mark>conflict</u></mark>, mostly at local or national levels. <u><mark>However</u></mark>, social, economic, and political <u><mark>conditions</u></mark>, which may also affect conflict besides resource scarcity, <u><strong><mark>vary</mark> considerably</u></strong> <u>between</u> different types of resources as well as <u>areas of the world. Case studies of <strong>specific countries</u></strong> or regions <u>can <strong>hardly account</u></strong> <u>for these different conditions, and <mark>it is</mark> therefore <strong><mark>difficult to generalize</strong></mark> their results</u>. Hence, we concentrate on the recent large-N research in the remainder of this section, and structure the discussion according to conflict types, that is, interstate vs. intrastate conflict and the kind of resource under study. First, <u><mark>with regard to</mark> <strong>interstate <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark>, extant<u> <strong><mark>quantitative</strong></mark> </u>work almost exclusively focuses on one specific type of renewable resource, namely water. <u><strong><mark>Empirical analyses</u></strong></mark> in this context <u><mark>suggest</mark> that <mark>states</mark> tend to <strong><mark>cooperate rather than fight</strong></mark> </u>over shared water resources (Dinar et al., 2007; Brochmann, 2012) <u><mark>and</mark> that <mark>institutionalized agreements</mark> can <strong><mark>reduce</mark> dispute <mark>risk</u></strong></mark> (Zawahri & Mitchell, 2011; Tir & Stinnett, 2012). The theoretical underpinning of much of this research is that joint democracy and/or international water management institutions facilitate cooperative solutions to water problems even in situations of scarcity. <u>Furthermore, <mark>side-payments, issue linkages, or economic and political ties</mark> between countries also <mark>prevent</mark> interstate <mark>conflict</mark> </u>over water. While scholars do not fully rule out conflict over scarce water resources, they find that <u>if <mark>conflict</mark> materializes then it <mark>occurs in</mark> the form of <mark>disputes</mark> and political tensions, but <strong><mark>not</mark> in the form of armed <mark>hostilities</u></strong></mark> or even ‘water wars’ (e.g. Gledisch & Hegre, 2000; Gleditsch et al., 2006; Hensel, Mitchell & Sowers, 2006; Brochmann & Hensel, 2009; Dinar, 2009).</p>

2ac

Spark

2ac – AT resource wars

./documents/hspolicy19/WashburnRural/KePe/Washburn%20Rural-Kessler-Peter-Aff-BVSW-Semis.docx

A

BVSW

Semis

eisenhower hj

jamie welch, parker mitchell, david kingston

1ac - ukraine 1nc - spark t subs climate offsets baudrillard 2nr - baudrillard

hspolicy19/WashburnRural/KePe/Washburn%20Rural-Kessler-Peter-Aff-BVSW-Semis.docx

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HS Policy 2019-20

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Human oversight doesn’t solve – they will mess up, dogmatically follow computer programs, or misunderstand

Horowitz 19

Horowitz et al 19 [Michael C. Horowitz is Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Paul Scharre is Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Alexander Velez-Green is a defense analyst based in Washington, DC. "A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence." https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1912/1912.05291.pdf]

One model is to eschew automation entirely, which forgoes its potential benefits Another model is to retain humans either “in the loop or on the loop,” overseeing the system in a supervisory capacity Human-machine teaming is no panacea Even if automated systems have little “autonomy and humans remain in control the human users could fall victim to automation bias leading them to cede judgment to the machine. Appropriately determining when to intervene is not sufficient to ensure safe operation Human users may lack the ability to effectively intervene and take control if their skills have atrophied due to relying on automation or if they do not sufficiently understand the automation

overseeing the system is no panacea Even if systems have little “autonomy humans remain in control fall victim to automation bias leading them to cede judgment to the machine Appropriately determining to intervene is not sufficient to ensure safe operation Human users the ability to take control if their skills have atrophied due to relying on automation or if they do not understand

There are many models for coping with these risks. One model is to eschew automation entirely, which forgoes its potential benefits. Another model is to retain humans either “in the loop” of automation, requiring positive human input, or “on the loop,” overseeing the system in a supervisory capacity. Human-machine teaming is no panacea for these risks. Even if automated systems have little “autonomy” and humans remain in control, the human users could fall victim to automation bias, leading them to cede judgment to the machine. Appropriately determining when to intervene is not sufficient to ensure safe operation. Human users may lack the ability to effectively intervene and take control if their skills have atrophied due to relying on automation or if they do not sufficiently understand the automation.39 Properly integrating humans and machines into effective and reliable joint cognitive systems that harness the advantages of each requires proper design, testing, training, leadership, and culture, which is not straightforward to achieve.40

<h4>Human oversight <u>doesn’t solve</u> – they will <u>mess up</u>, <u>dogmatically</u> follow computer programs, or <u>misunderstand</u> </h4><p><strong>Horowitz</strong> et al <strong>19</strong> [Michael C. Horowitz is Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Paul Scharre is Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Alexander Velez-Green is a defense analyst based in Washington, DC. "A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact of Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence." https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1912/1912.05291.pdf]</p><p>There are many models for coping with these risks. <u>One model is to <strong>eschew automation</u></strong> <u>entirely, which forgoes its potential benefits</u>. <u>Another model is to retain humans either “<strong>in the loop</u></strong>” of automation, requiring positive human input, <u>or</u> “<u>on the loop,” <mark>overseeing the system</mark> in a <strong>supervisory capacity</u></strong>. <u>Human-machine <strong>teaming</strong> <mark>is no <strong>panacea</strong></mark> </u>for these risks. <u><mark>Even if</mark> automated <mark>systems have little “<strong>autonomy</u></strong></mark>” <u>and <mark>humans remain in <strong>control</u></strong></mark>, <u>the human users could <mark>fall victim to <strong>automation bias</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>leading them to cede judgment to the machine</mark>. <mark>Appropriately determining</mark> when <mark>to intervene is not <strong>sufficient</strong> to ensure <strong>safe operation</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Human users</mark> may lack <mark>the <strong>ability</strong> to</mark> effectively intervene and</u> <u><strong><mark>take control</u></strong> <u>if their skills have <strong>atrophied</strong> due to relying on <strong>automation</u></strong> <u>or if they do not</mark> sufficiently <strong><mark>understand</strong></mark> the automation</u>.39 Properly integrating humans and machines into effective and reliable joint cognitive systems that harness the advantages of each requires proper design, testing, training, leadership, and culture, which is not straightforward to achieve.40</p>

1NC

NC – AT: Human in the Loop

./documents/hsld20/Harker/Ma/Harker-Manglik-Neg-Emory-Round1.docx

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Emory

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Mission San Jose SS

Vikram Balasubramanian

1AC - Nuclear AI 1NC - nebel vs states v2 overwatch CP deterrence CT v2 nuclear accidents CT cyber CT automation bias CT 1AR - sunsets CP bad all 2NR - CP deterrence CT 2AR - sunsets CP bad

hsld20/Harker/Ma/Harker-Manglik-Neg-Emory-Round1.docx

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Adaptation is inevitable, but it won’t matter if we’re too late – improving green infrastructure is key to renewable shift

Gimon 7/9 , a platform for innovative thinking and collaboration on policy solutions for clean, reliable, and affordable electric power in the U.S. More specifically, Eric works on questions of renewable energy integration both in the context of today’s challenges as well as for future pathways. Eric also acts as an adviser for non-profits and foundations interested in these questions and broader climate and energy issues. Eric holds B.S. and M.S. degrees from Stanford University in mathematics and physics, as well as a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California in Santa Barbara. He has a 15-year active career as a researcher in quantum gravity and high energy physics in some of the world’s top research institutions), 7-9-2020, "Why Advocates of 100% Clean Energy Must Overcome the ‘Resource Adequacy’ Challenge," Green Tech Media, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-100-clean-energy-advocates-must-overcome-the-resource-adequacy-challenge, SJBE

Gimon 7/9 Eric Gimon (consults as a technical expert, research scholar, and policy adviser with Energy Innovation. He is a main contributor to America’s Power Plan, a platform for innovative thinking and collaboration on policy solutions for clean, reliable, and affordable electric power in the U.S. More specifically, Eric works on questions of renewable energy integration both in the context of today’s challenges as well as for future pathways. Eric also acts as an adviser for non-profits and foundations interested in these questions and broader climate and energy issues. Eric holds B.S. and M.S. degrees from Stanford University in mathematics and physics, as well as a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California in Santa Barbara. He has a 15-year active career as a researcher in quantum gravity and high energy physics in some of the world’s top research institutions), 7-9-2020, "Why Advocates of 100% Clean Energy Must Overcome the ‘Resource Adequacy’ Challenge," Green Tech Media, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-100-clean-energy-advocates-must-overcome-the-resource-adequacy-challenge, SJBE

As renewable energy capacity continues to edge out fossil fuels, the clean energy revolution seems inevitable. But this clean future could be hamstrung unless we overcome “resource adequacy” challenges. With renewables now cheaper than new fossil capacity, the clean energy industry anticipates a renewables majority by 2030. Unfortunately, transitioning to 100 percent clean power is more complicated than adding renewables and storage. But adding variable, fuel-free resources to the grid also requires major changes in power system planning to ensure reliability — what grid operators call “resource adequacy.” Failing to address outdated resource-adequacy models — ensuring grid operators always have energy resources available to balance supply and demand — puts the clean-energy transformation at risk. Incumbent fossil fuel generators, no longer the cheapest option available in many parts of the U.S., have defined “resource adequacy” in ways that leave out innovative new market entrants in order to maintain market share. On a moment-by-moment basis, grid operators match electricity supply with demand by managing generation resources they can dispatch. To avoid outages, operators must have enough resources at their disposal to match demand at any given time, especially when demand peaks unexpectedly due to weather extremes. As cheap clean energy pushes more coal plants offline, more power supply is composed of intermittent resources that cannot always be dispatched at will. Planners have used the “planning reserve margin” metric to decide whether a generation fleet will be adequate to meet future demand. PRM considers total available capacity likely to be available to meet anticipated peak demand, with the PRM representing the anticipated percentage of extra capacity over load. PRM also values peak capacity more than flexibility. While the challenges renewables pose to resource-adequacy planning are real, incumbent generators exploit them to delay the clean energy transition. Challenges are mischaracterized as fundamental reliability threats rather than problems that are solvable through new metrics, models, planning design and technology advances such as longer-duration storage and demand response. Decarbonization requires building a larger, cleaner electricity grid without sacrificing reliability. Resource-adequacy concerns threaten to slow the transition. The clean energy industry must prioritize changing policymakers’ perceptions of resource adequacy and the development of new planning models that allow all technologies capable of providing reliable service to compete on equal footing. Ignoring the resource-adequacy problem by expecting falling solar and wind prices to simply displace fossil fuel power sources will unnecessarily delay the transition.

the clean energy revolution seems inevitable But could be hamstrung more complicated than renewables adding resources to the grid requires changes in power system planning to ensure grid operators always have resources available Incumbent fossil fuel generators have defined “resource adequacy” that leave out innovative market entrants As clean energy pushes coal plants offline more power supply cannot be dispatched at will incumbent generators delay the clean energy transition Decarbonization requires building a larger, cleaner electricity grid Resource-adequacy concerns slow the transition The clean energy industry must develop new models the resource-adequacy problem will unnecessarily delay the transition.

As renewable energy capacity continues to edge out fossil fuels, the clean energy revolution seems inevitable. But this clean future could be hamstrung unless we overcome “resource adequacy” challenges. For the first time in 130 years, renewables surpassed coal as a U.S. energy source, and the trend is projected to persist as solar and wind prices plummet. With renewables now cheaper than new fossil capacity, the clean energy industry anticipates a renewables majority by 2030. Unfortunately, transitioning to 100 percent clean power is more complicated than adding renewables and storage. Solar and wind are transforming how we power our economy, creating sustainable jobs and improving public health. But adding variable, fuel-free resources to the grid also requires major changes in power system planning to ensure reliability — what grid operators call “resource adequacy.” Failing to address outdated resource-adequacy models — ensuring grid operators always have energy resources available to balance supply and demand — puts the clean-energy transformation at risk. This isn’t just a problem in states dominated by fossil fuels. In California, these concerns spurred new rules giving the state’s biggest utilities control over power-plant procurement, undermining clean energy and storage investments that could otherwise meet resource-adequacy requirements. Incumbent fossil fuel generators, no longer the cheapest option available in many parts of the U.S., have defined “resource adequacy” in ways that leave out innovative new market entrants in order to maintain market share. Defining resource adequacy, and why it matters for renewables On a moment-by-moment basis, grid operators match electricity supply with demand by managing generation resources they can dispatch. To avoid outages, operators must have enough resources at their disposal to match demand at any given time, especially when demand peaks unexpectedly due to weather extremes. As cheap clean energy pushes more coal plants offline, more power supply is composed of intermittent resources that cannot always be dispatched at will. Meanwhile, more distributed energy resources (DERs), such as rooftop solar and energy efficiency, complicate planning for future electricity demand and open up possibilities for customers to get cheaper, cleaner electricity. Renewable energy challenges resource adequacy in two primary ways. First, renewables’ increasing ability to offer lower prices than the marginal cost of baseload resources such as coal and nuclear steadily push these resources off the system, along with the resource-adequacy value they provided. Historically, these resources were a mostly reliable presence during peak periods, while renewables varied based on local weather factors. Second, the inflexibility of many fossil resources — needing to commit well ahead of time, minimum run rates and limited ramp rates — threatens resource adequacy as variable resources become a larger share of the grid mix. Because wind and solar are often the cheapest source of real-time energy, maximizing their use for economic reasons can drive more system variation. This means conventional resources may be called upon to ramp output more often or become available with less advance notice. Why "reserve margin" is not the metric it used to be Traditional resource-adequacy planning has been based on two ideas: One, power plants can be called on at will, provided they are ready in advance to provide electricity. And two, real-time fuel costs dominate calculations of the most cost-effective resources to run at any given time and which new resources to plan for. This model also treats demand as an independent input into the moment-by-moment challenge of running the grid. Planners have used the “planning reserve margin” metric to decide whether a generation fleet will be adequate to meet future demand. PRM considers total available capacity likely to be available to meet anticipated peak demand, with the PRM representing the anticipated percentage of extra capacity over load. To determine how much any single plant contributes to PRM accounting, planners assign each resource a capacity value, which is a percentage of peak megawatts based on historical patterns with an applied discount to account for planned and unplanned outages. PRM accounting reduces the probabilistic distribution of production outcomes to a single number and blinds planners to challenges for traditional resources operating in a more variable world. Capacity value is a particularly reductive metric when it comes to assessing renewables, which have broader distributions of possible production outcomes. PRM also values peak capacity more than flexibility. Battery storage systems have limited peak output durations (requiring a portfolio of resources with different duration abilities for meeting peak demand) but can nimbly come online and offline in quick bursts and instantly switch from absorbing to producing power. This means PRM is no longer an effective catch-all metric. The wrong resource mix can leave more than enough on hand for anticipated peaks but still face reliability challenges at other times. An over-reliance on the traditional planning mindset can lead to a failure to plan holistically for a least-cost solution using a broader portfolio of resources. Incumbent generators exaggerate challenges for DERs While the challenges renewables pose to resource-adequacy planning are real, incumbent generators exploit them to delay the clean energy transition. Challenges are mischaracterized as fundamental reliability threats rather than problems that are solvable through new metrics, models, planning design and technology advances such as longer-duration storage and demand response. Exaggerating technical issues as “insurmountable barriers” and pointing to immediate job losses or reliability considerations often compel regulators and legislators to pay attention to one party's preferred solution. Incumbents also use existing rules to shut out competitors, for instance by intervening in commission proceedings to prevent DERs from counting toward local reserve capacity in dense urban pockets served via transmission lines from faraway generation sources. Or, as is the case in PJM, they can require energy storage to sustain maximum output for up to 10 hours, when most objective analyses of large grids show that storage can deliver significant resource-adequacy value with much shorter durations. Decarbonization requires building a larger, cleaner electricity grid without sacrificing reliability. Resource-adequacy concerns threaten to slow the transition. The clean energy industry must prioritize changing policymakers’ perceptions of resource adequacy and the development of new planning models that allow all technologies capable of providing reliable service to compete on equal footing. Ignoring the resource-adequacy problem by expecting falling solar and wind prices to simply displace fossil fuel power sources will unnecessarily delay the transition.

<h4>Adaptation is inevitable, but it won’t matter if we’re too late – improving green infrastructure is key to renewable shift</h4><p><u><strong>Gimon 7/9</u></strong> Eric Gimon (consults as a technical expert, research scholar, and policy adviser with Energy Innovation. He is a main contributor to America’s Power Plan<u><strong>, a platform for innovative thinking and collaboration on policy solutions for clean, reliable, and affordable electric power in the U.S. More specifically, Eric works on questions of renewable energy integration both in the context of today’s challenges as well as for future pathways. Eric also acts as an adviser for non-profits and foundations interested in these questions and broader climate and energy issues. Eric holds B.S. and M.S. degrees from Stanford University in mathematics and physics, as well as a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California in Santa Barbara. He has a 15-year active career as a researcher in quantum gravity and high energy physics in some of the world’s top research institutions), 7-9-2020, "Why Advocates of 100% Clean Energy Must Overcome the ‘Resource Adequacy’ Challenge," Green Tech Media, https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-100-clean-energy-advocates-must-overcome-the-resource-adequacy-challenge, SJBE</p><p>As renewable energy capacity continues to edge out fossil fuels, <mark>the clean energy revolution seems inevitable</mark>. <mark>But</mark> this clean future <mark>could be hamstrung </mark>unless we overcome “resource adequacy” challenges. </u></strong>For the first time in 130 years, renewables surpassed coal as a U.S. energy source, and the trend is projected to persist as solar and wind prices plummet. <u><strong>With renewables now cheaper than new fossil capacity, the clean energy industry anticipates a renewables majority by 2030. Unfortunately, transitioning to 100 percent clean power is <mark>more complicated than </mark>adding <mark>renewables</mark> and storage.</u></strong> Solar and wind are transforming how we power our economy, creating sustainable jobs and improving public health. <u><strong>But <mark>adding</mark> variable, fuel-free <mark>resources to the grid</mark> also <mark>requires</mark> major <mark>changes in power system planning to ensure </mark>reliability — what grid operators call “resource adequacy.” Failing to address outdated resource-adequacy models — ensuring<mark> grid operators always have </mark>energy <mark>resources available</mark> to balance supply and demand — puts the clean-energy transformation at risk.</u></strong> This isn’t just a problem in states dominated by fossil fuels. In California, these concerns spurred new rules giving the state’s biggest utilities control over power-plant procurement, undermining clean energy and storage investments that could otherwise meet resource-adequacy requirements. <u><strong><mark>Incumbent fossil fuel generators</mark>, no longer the cheapest option available in many parts of the U.S., <mark>have defined “resource adequacy” </mark>in ways <mark>that leave out innovative</mark> new <mark>market entrants</mark> in order to maintain market share. </u></strong>Defining resource adequacy, and why it matters for renewables <u><strong>On a moment-by-moment basis, grid operators match electricity supply with demand by managing generation resources they can dispatch. To avoid outages, operators must have enough resources at their disposal to match demand at any given time, especially when demand peaks unexpectedly due to weather extremes. <mark>As </mark>cheap <mark>clean energy pushes</mark> more <mark>coal plants offline</mark>, <mark>more power supply</mark> is composed of intermittent resources that <mark>cannot</mark> always <mark>be dispatched at will</mark>. </u></strong>Meanwhile, more distributed energy resources (DERs), such as rooftop solar and energy efficiency, complicate planning for future electricity demand and open up possibilities for customers to get cheaper, cleaner electricity. Renewable energy challenges resource adequacy in two primary ways. First, renewables’ increasing ability to offer lower prices than the marginal cost of baseload resources such as coal and nuclear steadily push these resources off the system, along with the resource-adequacy value they provided. Historically, these resources were a mostly reliable presence during peak periods, while renewables varied based on local weather factors. Second, the inflexibility of many fossil resources — needing to commit well ahead of time, minimum run rates and limited ramp rates — threatens resource adequacy as variable resources become a larger share of the grid mix. Because wind and solar are often the cheapest source of real-time energy, maximizing their use for economic reasons can drive more system variation. This means conventional resources may be called upon to ramp output more often or become available with less advance notice. Why "reserve margin" is not the metric it used to be Traditional resource-adequacy planning has been based on two ideas: One, power plants can be called on at will, provided they are ready in advance to provide electricity. And two, real-time fuel costs dominate calculations of the most cost-effective resources to run at any given time and which new resources to plan for. This model also treats demand as an independent input into the moment-by-moment challenge of running the grid. <u><strong>Planners have used the “planning reserve margin” metric to decide whether a generation fleet will be adequate to meet future demand. PRM considers total available capacity likely to be available to meet anticipated peak demand, with the PRM representing the anticipated percentage of extra capacity over load.</u></strong> To determine how much any single plant contributes to PRM accounting, planners assign each resource a capacity value, which is a percentage of peak megawatts based on historical patterns with an applied discount to account for planned and unplanned outages. PRM accounting reduces the probabilistic distribution of production outcomes to a single number and blinds planners to challenges for traditional resources operating in a more variable world. Capacity value is a particularly reductive metric when it comes to assessing renewables, which have broader distributions of possible production outcomes. <u><strong>PRM also values peak capacity more than flexibility. </u></strong>Battery storage systems have limited peak output durations (requiring a portfolio of resources with different duration abilities for meeting peak demand) but can nimbly come online and offline in quick bursts and instantly switch from absorbing to producing power. This means PRM is no longer an effective catch-all metric. The wrong resource mix can leave more than enough on hand for anticipated peaks but still face reliability challenges at other times. An over-reliance on the traditional planning mindset can lead to a failure to plan holistically for a least-cost solution using a broader portfolio of resources. Incumbent generators exaggerate challenges for DERs <u><strong>While the challenges renewables pose to resource-adequacy planning are real, <mark>incumbent generators </mark>exploit them to <mark>delay the clean energy transition</mark>. Challenges are mischaracterized as fundamental reliability threats rather than problems that are solvable through new metrics, models, planning design and technology advances such as longer-duration storage and demand response.</u></strong> Exaggerating technical issues as “insurmountable barriers” and pointing to immediate job losses or reliability considerations often compel regulators and legislators to pay attention to one party's preferred solution. Incumbents also use existing rules to shut out competitors, for instance by intervening in commission proceedings to prevent DERs from counting toward local reserve capacity in dense urban pockets served via transmission lines from faraway generation sources. Or, as is the case in PJM, they can require energy storage to sustain maximum output for up to 10 hours, when most objective analyses of large grids show that storage can deliver significant resource-adequacy value with much shorter durations. <u><strong><mark>Decarbonization requires building a larger, cleaner electricity grid</mark> without sacrificing reliability. <mark>Resource-adequacy concerns</mark> threaten to <mark>slow the transition</mark>. <mark>The clean energy industry must</mark> prioritize changing policymakers’ perceptions of resource adequacy and the <mark>develop</mark>ment of <mark>new</mark> planning <mark>models</mark> that allow all technologies capable of providing reliable service to compete on equal footing. Ignoring <mark>the resource-adequacy problem</mark> by expecting falling solar and wind prices to simply displace fossil fuel power sources <mark>will unnecessarily delay the transition. </p></u></strong></mark>

Underview

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Apple Valley

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Millard North SL

Joanne Park

1ac-Pettit v3 1nc-K Wilderson - Case 1ar-Case - K - Non black pess 2nr-All 2ar-Non black pess

hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Su/Strake%20Jesuit-Sun-Aff-Apple%20Valley-Round5.docx

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Consensus of the best theoretical and empirical research concludes US deep engagement deters conventional conflict and nuclear proliferation cascades that cause extinction – nuclear optimism is phony baloney

Brooks and Wohlforth ’16

Brooks and Wohlforth ’16 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD from Yale University Stephen Brooks, William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from the World (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 103-110.

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments shape the strategic environment But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms assurance and deterrence—and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them. This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence If the theoretical arguments are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two bodies are most important general empirical findings and regionally focused research. General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions have received the most extensive analysis do alliances actually deter war and increase security? does security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? does limiting proliferation actually increase security? Deterrence Effectiveness some relevant results receive broad support: Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect In a study spanning nearly two centuries They conclude alliances lower the probability of international conflict formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits Forward-deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence The most important finding from voluminous research is alliances especially with nuclear U S actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. alliances work in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy. if the U S is interested in deterring military challenges relying only on latent military capabilities is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it these findings clearly cast doubt on retrenchment proponents. The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.”8 These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists.9 Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges findings are decidedly mixed alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. Bearing challenges in mind, the most relevant findings are: The most recent statistical analysis concludes security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. Multiple studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own have never acquired the bomb U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds states proliferate when there is an intense security rivalry the prospective state does not have a security guarantee the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War ultiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter-proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation is this a net contributor to global security? “nuclear optimists” like Waltz contend deterrence solves the security problem This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism they see major security downsides The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil-military pathologies will turn one of the “near misses” into actual nuclear use powerful reasons to question optimists emerge even if one assumes that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use The more such relationships the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear-armed states the more the opportunities for risk-taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. for nuclear weapons to deter there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack the farther the issue is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible with the ideally stable nuclear posture optimism presupposes Following the “threat that leaves something to chance,” it may face incentives to create a quasi-doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally. nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary States choose nuclear postures Some choose dangerous and vulnerable nuclear postures many may not be able to create truly survivable forces even if they wanted to. there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate: Nuclear weapons are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack the only nuclear posture that has any effect on conventional conflict initiation and escalation is a destabilizing “asymmetrical escalatory” force, a doomsday posture designed to create intense incentives for early use, nuclear spread is a Hobson’s choice: it will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more Add to this the risk that states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states many of the other dangers noted including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage to dangerous, undeterrable nonstate actors

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence US security commitments shape the strategic environment This chapter moves beyond theory to examine empirical findings relevant results receive broad support: In a study spanning nearly two centuries They conclude alliances lower the probability of conflict The most important finding from voluminous research is alliances actually work relying only on latent capabilities is far less effective than an overseas military posture findings clearly cast doubt on retrenchment The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Bearing challenges in mind, the most relevant findings are: statistical analysis concludes security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity complexity of motivations cannot be reduced to security Multiple studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances explain decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation “nuclear pessimists” see major downsides The more nuclear states the higher the probability pathologies will turn one of the “near misses” into actual nuclear use. even if one assumes states are rational deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. The more nuclear-armed states the more the opportunities for risk-taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack the only nuclear posture that has any effect is a destabilizing doomsday posture to create intense incentives for early use

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence—and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them. This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research. General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security? Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire.1 Many quantitative findings, meanwhile, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support: • Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.”2 Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits.3 • The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key.4 • Forward-deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies.5 • Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence.6 • Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.7 The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances—especially with nuclear-armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer—and protégés to seek—alliance relationships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy. More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents. The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.”8 These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists.9 Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed.10 Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above-average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are: • The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.”11 In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states.12 • Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter.13 • Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program.14 As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S.  security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.”15 • Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment.16 In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks.17 • Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur.18 But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear-armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program.19 In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.”20 Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter-proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear-armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.22 The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil-military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.”23 Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.24 If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.”25 Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.26 As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?”27 The more nuclear-armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk-taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. It is also the case that for nuclear weapons to deter a given level of conflict, there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict. For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack. Highly controlled and reliable assured-retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as newer research shows, the farther the issue in question is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible with the type of ideally stable nuclear posture whose existence proliferation optimism presupposes.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. Following Schelling’s logic about the “threat that leaves something to chance,” it may face incentives to create a quasi-doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally. Key here is that nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary:  “You have ‘em or you don’t.” States can choose the kind of nuclear postures they build. Some states may choose to build dangerous and vulnerable nuclear postures. And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, many states may not be able to create truly survivable forces (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) even if they wanted to. The links between nuclear possession and conflict are hard to assess empirically. Still, there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate: • Nuclear weapons are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict— threats to a state’s core territorial security—that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time. Both quantitative and case study research validates the claim that territorial conquest is rarely an issue in armed conflicts in the present era. Yet states that are bullish on their prospects for territorial survival as sovereign units still have plenty of security concerns and also often find plenty of reasons to use force and plenty of ways to use force other than by conquering other states.29 • Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition. Though the United States and Soviet Union did not fight each other during the Cold War, their nuclear arsenals did not prevent them from engaging in one of history’s most costly rivalries, complete with intense arms racing and dangerous crises that raised the specter of nuclear war. • Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures to attempt to deter various levels of conflict.30 • The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack, as both India and Israel discovered. • In both statistical and case study tests, Vipin Narang finds that the only nuclear posture that has any effect on conventional conflict initiation and escalation is a destabilizing “asymmetrical escalatory” force, a doomsday posture designed to create intense incentives for early use, such as that constructed by Pakistan in the 1990s.31 In short, nuclear spread is a Hobson’s choice: it will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more. Add to this the risk that states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism. That is, some subset of new nuclear-armed states may not be led by rational leaders, may not prove able to overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, may not pursue security as the only major state preference, and may not be risk-averse. The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces (making them susceptible to a first-strike attack and thus creating incentives for early first use)—are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage to dangerous, undeterrable nonstate actors, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. And all of these concerns emerge independently of other reasons the United States is generally better off in a world with fewer nuclear states, notably increased US freedom of action.

<h4>Consensus of the best theoretical and empirical research concludes US deep engagement deters conventional conflict and nuclear proliferation cascades that cause extinction – nuclear optimism is phony baloney </h4><p><u><strong>Brooks and Wohlforth ’16 </u></strong>– Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD from Yale University</p><p>Stephen Brooks, William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from the World (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016):<u><strong> 103-110.</p><p><mark>Consistency with influential</mark> <mark>relevant theories lends credence</mark> to the expectation that <mark>US security commitments</mark> </u></strong>actually can <u><strong><mark>shape the strategic environment</u></strong></mark> as deep engagement presupposes. <u><strong>But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed</u></strong> in chapter 5. <u><strong>These theories make strong assumptions</u></strong> <u><strong>that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security</u></strong>. <u><strong>Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects.</u></strong> <u><strong>And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms</u></strong>— <u><strong>assurance and deterrence—and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them.</p><p><mark>This chapter moves beyond theory to examine </mark>patterns of evidence</u></strong>. <u><strong>If the theoretical arguments</u></strong> about the security effects of deep engagement <u><strong>are right, what sort of evidence should we see?</u></strong> <u><strong>Two</u></strong> major <u><strong>bodies</u></strong> of evidence <u><strong>are most important</u></strong>: <u><strong>general <mark>empirical findings</u></strong></mark> concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms <u><strong>and regionally focused research.</p><p>General Patterns of Evidence</p><p>Three key questions</u></strong> about US security provision <u><strong>have received the most extensive analysis</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>do alliances</u></strong> such as those sustained by the United States <u><strong>actually deter war and increase security?</u></strong> Second, <u><strong>does</u></strong> such <u><strong>security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation?</u></strong> And third, <u><strong>does limiting proliferation actually increase security?</p><p>Deterrence Effectiveness</p><p></u></strong>The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire.1 Many quantitative findings, meanwhile, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But <u><strong>some <mark>relevant results receive broad support:</p><p></u></strong></mark>• <u><strong>Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>In a study spanning nearly two centuries</u></strong></mark>, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” <u><strong><mark>They conclude</u></strong></mark> that “defensive <u><strong><mark>alliances</mark> <mark>lower the probability of</mark> international <mark>conflict</u></strong></mark> and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.”2 Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that <u><strong>formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits</u></strong>.3 </p><p>• The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key.4 </p><p>• <u><strong>Forward-deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances</u></strong> with overseas allies.5 </p><p>• <u><strong>Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence</u></strong>.6 </p><p>• Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.7</p><p><u><strong><mark>The most important finding</u></strong></mark> to emerge <u><strong><mark>from</u></strong></mark> this <u><strong><mark>voluminous research is</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>alliances</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>especially with</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear</u></strong>-armed allies like the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates— <u><strong><mark>actually work </mark>in deterring conflict.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it.</u></strong> The United States is more inclined to offer—and protégés to seek—alliance relationships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that <u><strong>alliances work</u></strong> to deter conflict <u><strong>in precisely the</u></strong> <u><strong>situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy.</p><p></u></strong>More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that <u><strong>if the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>is interested in deterring military challenges</u></strong> to the status quo in key regions, <u><strong><mark>relying only on latent</mark> military <mark>capabilities</u></strong></mark> in the US homeland <u><strong><mark>is</mark> likely to be <mark>far less effective than</mark> having <mark>an overseas military posture</u></strong></mark>. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that <u><strong>a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it</u></strong>, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of <u><strong>these <mark>findings</mark> <mark>clearly</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>cast</u></strong></mark>s<mark> <u><strong>doubt on</u></strong></mark> the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by <u><strong><mark>retrenchment</mark> proponents.</p><p><mark>The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation</p><p></mark>Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.”8 These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists.9</p><p>Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons?</u></strong> <u><strong>The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges</u></strong> as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, <u><strong>findings are decidedly mixed</u></strong>.10 Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above-average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, <u><strong>alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped.</p><p><mark>Bearing</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong><mark>challenges in mind, the most relevant findings</u></strong></mark> that emerge from this literature <u><strong><mark>are:</p><p></u></strong></mark>• <u><strong>The most recent <mark>statistical analysis</u></strong></mark> of the precise question at issue <u><strong><mark>concludes</u></strong></mark> that “<u><strong><mark>security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity</mark> among their recipients</u></strong>.”11 In addition, <u><strong>states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material</u></strong> and technology to other nonnuclear states.12 </p><p>• Case study research underscores that <u><strong>the <mark>complexity</mark> <mark>of motivations</mark> for acquiring nuclear weapons <mark>cannot be reduced to security</mark>: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter.</u></strong>13 </p><p>• <u><strong><mark>Multiple</u></strong></mark> independently conceived and executed recent case <u><strong><mark>studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances</mark> help <mark>explain</mark> numerous allied <mark>decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver</mark> of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program</u></strong>.14 As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “<u><strong>States whose security goals are subsumed</u></strong> <u><strong>by their sponsors’ own</u></strong> aims <u><strong>have never acquired the bomb</u></strong>. … This finding highlights the role of U.S.  security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: <u><strong>U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals</u></strong>.”15 </p><p>• <u><strong>Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment.</u></strong>16 In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks.17 </p><p>• <u><strong><mark>Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades</u></strong>. </mark>To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur.18 But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. <u><strong><mark>The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>states</u></strong> are more likely to <u><strong>proliferate</u></strong> in response to neighbors <u><strong>when</u></strong> three conditions are met: (1) <u><strong>there is an</u></strong> <u><strong>intense security rivalry</u></strong> between the two countries; (2) <u><strong>the prospective</u></strong> proliferating <u><strong>state does not have a security guarantee</u></strong> from a nuclear-armed patron; and (3) <u><strong>the potential</u></strong> <u><strong>proliferator</u></strong> <u><strong>has the industrial and technical capacity</u></strong> to launch an indigenous nuclear program.19</p><p>In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “<u><strong>the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War</u></strong> in 1989.”20 Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using m<u><strong>ultiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter-proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why.</p><p><mark>The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation</p><p></u></strong></mark>General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But <u><strong>is this a net contributor to global security?</u></strong> Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, <u><strong>“nuclear optimists” like</u></strong> Kenneth <u><strong>Waltz</u></strong> <u><strong>contend</u></strong> that <u><strong>deterrence</u></strong> essentially <u><strong>solves the security problem</u></strong> for all nuclear-armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security.</p><p><u><strong>This perspective is countered by <mark>“nuclear pessimists”</mark> such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism</u></strong> to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, <u><strong>they <mark>see major</mark> security <mark>downsides</u></strong></mark> from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.22 <u><strong><mark>The more nuclear states</mark> there are, <mark>the higher the probability</mark> that the organizational, psychological, and civil-military <mark>pathologies</u></strong></mark> Sagan identifies <u><strong><mark>will</u></strong> <u><strong>turn</u></strong></mark> an episode like <u><strong><mark>one of the</u></strong></mark> numerous <u><strong><mark>“near misses”</u></strong></mark> he uncovers <u><strong><mark>into actual nuclear use</u></strong>. </mark>As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.”23</p><p>Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that <u><strong>powerful reasons</u></strong> <u><strong>to question</u></strong> the assessment of proliferation <u><strong>optimists</u></strong> also <u><strong>emerge <mark>even if one assumes</u></strong></mark>, as they do, <u><strong>that <mark>states are rational</mark> and seek only to maximize their security</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>nuclear <mark>deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war</u></strong>.</mark> For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.24 If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that <u><strong>every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use</u></strong>. <u><strong>The more such relationships</u></strong> there are, <u><strong>the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.</p><p></u></strong>Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. <u><strong>Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.”</u></strong>25 Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.26 As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. <u><strong>The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?”</u></strong>27 <u><strong><mark>The more nuclear-armed states</u></strong></mark> there are, <u><strong><mark>the more the opportunities for</u></strong></mark> such <u><strong><mark>risk-taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>It is also the case that <u><strong>for nuclear weapons to deter</u></strong> a given level of conflict, <u><strong>there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict</u></strong>. <u><strong>For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack</u></strong>. Highly controlled and reliable assured-retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as newer research shows, <u><strong>the farther the issue</u></strong> in question <u><strong>is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible</u></strong> <u><strong>with</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong> type of <u><strong>ideally stable nuclear posture</u></strong> whose existence proliferation <u><strong>optimism presupposes</u></strong>.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. <u><strong>Following</u></strong> Schelling’s logic about <u><strong>the “threat that leaves something to chance,” it may face incentives to create a quasi-doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally.</p><p></u></strong>Key here is that <u><strong>nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary</u></strong>:  “You have ‘em or you don’t.” <u><strong>States</u></strong> can <u><strong>choose</u></strong> the kind of <u><strong>nuclear postures</u></strong> they build. <u><strong>Some</u></strong> states may <u><strong>choose</u></strong> to build <u><strong>dangerous and vulnerable</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear postures</u></strong>. And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, <u><strong>many</u></strong> states <u><strong>may not be able to create truly survivable forces</u></strong> (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) <u><strong>even if they wanted to.</p><p></u></strong>The links between nuclear possession and conflict are hard to assess empirically. Still, <u><strong>there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate:</p><p></u></strong>• <u><strong>Nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u><strong>are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict</u></strong>— threats to a state’s core territorial security—<u><strong>that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time</u></strong>. Both quantitative and case study research validates the claim that territorial conquest is rarely an issue in armed conflicts in the present era. Yet states that are bullish on their prospects for territorial survival as sovereign units still have plenty of security concerns and also often find plenty of reasons to use force and plenty of ways to use force other than by conquering other states.29 </p><p>• <u><strong>Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition</u></strong>. Though the United States and Soviet Union did not fight each other during the Cold War, their nuclear arsenals did not prevent them from engaging in one of history’s most costly rivalries, complete with intense arms racing and dangerous crises that raised the specter of nuclear war. </p><p>• <u><strong>Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures </u></strong>to attempt to deter various levels of conflict.30 </p><p>• <u><strong><mark>The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack</u></strong></mark>, as both India and Israel discovered. </p><p>• In both statistical and case study tests, Vipin Narang finds that <u><strong><mark>the only nuclear posture that has any effect </mark>on conventional conflict initiation and escalation <mark>is a destabilizing </mark>“asymmetrical escalatory” force, a <mark>doomsday posture </mark>designed <mark>to create intense incentives for early use</mark>,</u></strong> such as that constructed by Pakistan in the 1990s.31</p><p>In short, <u><strong>nuclear spread is a Hobson’s choice: it will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more</u></strong>. <u><strong>Add to this the risk that states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism</u></strong>. That is, some subset of new nuclear-armed states may not be led by rational leaders, may not prove able to overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, may not pursue security as the only major state preference, and may not be risk-averse. <u><strong>The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states</u></strong>. In addition, <u><strong>many of the other dangers noted </u></strong>by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—<u><strong>including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces</u></strong> (making them susceptible to a first-strike attack and thus creating incentives for early first use)—<u><strong>are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong>the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher</u></strong> as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add <u><strong>to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage to dangerous, undeterrable nonstate actors</u></strong>, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. And all of these concerns emerge independently of other reasons the United States is generally better off in a world with fewer nuclear states, notably increased US freedom of action.</p>

1AC—Advantage: Civic Engagement

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[2] But they solve nuclear war---it’s likely now.

Posen 20 . DOA: 9/2/2020. SIR.

Barry. R. Posen 20. Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program. 4/23/2020. “Do Pandemics Promote Peace?” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace. DOA: 9/2/2020. SIR.

COVID-19 is weakening all of the great and middle powers more or less equally. None is likely to gain a meaningful advantage over the others. All will have ample reason to be pessimistic about military capabilities and overall readiness for war probably for years afterward, the odds of a war between major powers will go down, not up. PAX EPIDEMICA? A cursory survey of the scholarly literature on war and disease appears to confirm that pessimism is conducive to peace. Scholars have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well as civilians in the fought-over territories That sickness slows the march to war is partly due to the fact that war depends on people. When people fall ill, they can’t be counted on in combat pandemics still threaten military units hundreds of whom tested positive for COVID-19, know well. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable airmen are at risk, since they must take refuge from air attacks in bunkers, where the virus could also spread rapidly. Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times an abundance of caution is likely to persist for some time after it comes into use. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. The most important reason disease inhibits war is economic. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide phenomenon. All great and middle powers appear to be adversely affected, and all have reason to be pessimistic about their military prospects. Their economies are shrinking fast, and there is great uncertainty about when and how quickly they will start growing again. Even China, which has slowed the spread of the disease and begun to reopen its economy, will be hurting for years to come Even after a vaccine is developed and made widely available, economic troubles may linger for years. States will emerge from this crisis with enormous debts Drained treasuries will give them one more reason to be pessimistic about their military might. LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION Citizens will be less inclined to support adventures abroad. The result will probably be diminished trade trade has not helped improve relations between states but rather fueled resentment. Less trade could mean less friction between major powers, thereby reducing the intensity of their rivalries. the risk of escalation to a nuclear confrontation is simply too great. COVID-19 does a great deal to feed their reasonable pessimism about the likely outcome of even a conventional war.

COVID is weakening powers equally pessimistic about readiness for war odds of war go down PAX EPIDEMICA A survey of lit on war and disease confirm pessimism is conducive to peace sickness slows the march to war When people fall ill, they can’t be in combat pandemics threaten units soldiers at risk Ground campaigns pose dangers in pandemic caution likely outbreaks damage economies the source of military power. disease inhibits war All powers have reason to be pessimistic about military prospects economies shrinking great uncertainty hurting for years after a vaccine troubles linger Drained treasuries give reason to be pessimistic about might. LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION Citizens less support adventures trade fueled resentment. Less trade less friction between powers the risk of nuclear confrontation is great. COVID feed pessimism about outcome of war.

What these analysts miss is that COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, is weakening all of the great and middle powers more or less equally. None is likely to gain a meaningful advantage over the others. All will have ample reason to be pessimistic about their military capabilities and their overall readiness for war. For the duration of the pandemic, at least, and probably for years afterward, the odds of a war between major powers will go down, not up. PAX EPIDEMICA? A cursory survey of the scholarly literature on war and disease appears to confirm Blainey’s observation that pessimism is conducive to peace. Scholars have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well as civilians in the fought-over territories. But one seldom finds any discussion of epidemics causing wars or of wars deliberately started in the middle of widespread outbreaks of infectious disease. (The diseases that European colonists carried to the New World did weaken indigenous populations to the point that they were more vulnerable to conquest; in addition, some localized conflicts were fought during the influenza pandemic of 1919–21, but these were occasioned by major shifts in regional balances of power following the destruction of four empires in World War I.) That sickness slows the march to war is partly due to the fact that war depends on people. When people fall ill, they can’t be counted on to perform well in combat. Military medicine made enormous strides in the years leading up to World War I, prior to which armies suffered higher numbers of casualties from disease than from combat. But pandemics still threaten military units, as those onboard U.S. and French aircraft carriers, hundreds of whom tested positive for COVID-19, know well. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most vulnerable because they are packed together. But even airmen are at risk, since they must take refuge from air attacks in bunkers, where the virus could also spread rapidly. Ground campaigns in urban areas pose still greater dangers in pandemic times. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected. A vaccine may eventually solve these problems, but an abundance of caution is likely to persist for some time after it comes into use. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. The most important reason disease inhibits war is economic. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide phenomenon. All great and middle powers appear to be adversely affected, and all have reason to be pessimistic about their military prospects. Their economies are shrinking fast, and there is great uncertainty about when and how quickly they will start growing again. Even China, which has slowed the spread of the disease and begun to reopen its economy, will be hurting for years to come. It took an enormous hit to GDP in the first quarter of 2020, ending 40 years of steady growth. And its trading partners, burned by their dependence on China for much of the equipment needed to fight COVID-19, will surely scale back their imports. An export-dependent China will have to rely more on its domestic market, something it has been attempting for years with only limited success. It is little wonder, then, that the International Monetary Fund forecasts slower growth in China this year than at any time since the 1970s. Even after a vaccine is developed and made widely available, economic troubles may linger for years. States will emerge from this crisis with enormous debts. They will spend years paying for the bailout and stimulus packages they used to protect citizens and businesses from the economic consequences of social distancing. Drained treasuries will give them one more reason to be pessimistic about their military might. LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION How long is the pacifying effect of pessimism likely to last? If a vaccine is developed quickly, enabling a relatively swift economic recovery, the mood may prove short-lived. But it is equally likely that the coronavirus crisis will last long enough to change the world in important ways, some of which will likely dampen the appetite for conflict for some time—perhaps up to five or ten years. After all, the world is experiencing both the biggest pandemic and the biggest economic downturn in a century. Most governments have not covered themselves with glory managing the pandemic, and even the most autocratic worry about popular support. Over the next few years, people will want evidence that their governments are working to protect them from disease and economic dislocation. Citizens will see themselves as dependent on the state, and they will be less inclined to support adventures abroad. At the same time, governments and businesses will likely try to reduce their reliance on imports of critical materials, having watched global supply chains break down during the pandemic. The result will probably be diminished trade, something liberal internationalists see as a bad thing. But for the last five years or so, trade has not helped improve relations between states but rather fueled resentment. Less trade could mean less friction between major powers, thereby reducing the intensity of their rivalries. In the Chinese context, less international trade could have positive knock-on effects. Focused on growing the domestic economy, and burdened by hefty bills from fighting the virus, Beijing could be forced to table the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious trade and investment project that has unnerved the foreign policy establishments of great and middle powers. The suspension of the BRI would soothe the fears of those who see it as an instrument of Chinese world domination. Interstate wars have become relatively rare since the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a four-decade Cold War, which included an intense nuclear and conventional arms race, but they never fought each other directly, even with conventional weapons. Theorists debate the reasons behind the continued rarity of great-power conflict. I am inclined to believe that the risk of escalation to a nuclear confrontation is simply too great. COVID-19 does nothing to mitigate such risks for world leaders—and a great deal to feed their reasonable pessimism about the likely outcome of even a conventional war.

<h4>[2] But they solve nuclear war---it’s likely now.</h4><p>Barry. R. <strong>Posen 20</strong>. Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program. 4/23/2020. “Do Pandemics Promote Peace?” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace<u><strong>. DOA: 9/2/2020. SIR.</p><p></u></strong>What these analysts miss is that <u><strong><mark>COVID</mark>-19</u></strong>, the disease caused by the coronavirus,<u> <mark>is <strong>weakening</strong></mark> all of the <strong>great</strong> and <strong>middle <mark>powers</strong></mark> more or less <strong><mark>equally</strong></mark>. None is likely to gain a <strong>meaningful advantage</strong> over the others. All will have ample reason to be <strong><mark>pessimistic</strong> about</u></mark> their <u><strong>military capabilities</strong> and</u> their<u> <strong>overall <mark>readiness for war</u></strong></mark>. For the duration of the pandemic, at least, and <u>probably <strong>for years afterward</strong>, the <strong><mark>odds of</mark> a <mark>war</strong></mark> between <strong>major powers will <mark>go down</strong></mark>, not up. <strong><mark>PAX EPIDEMICA</mark>? </strong><mark>A</mark> <strong>cursory <mark>survey</strong> of </mark>the <strong>scholarly <mark>lit</strong></mark>erature <mark>on <strong>war and disease</strong></mark> appears to <mark>confirm</u></mark> Blainey’s observation <u>that <strong><mark>pessimism is conducive to peace</strong></mark>. Scholars have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well as civilians in the fought-over territories</u>. But one seldom finds any discussion of epidemics causing wars or of wars deliberately started in the middle of widespread outbreaks of infectious disease. (The diseases that European colonists carried to the New World did weaken indigenous populations to the point that they were more vulnerable to conquest; in addition, some localized conflicts were fought during the influenza pandemic of 1919–21, but these were occasioned by major shifts in regional balances of power following the destruction of four empires in World War I.) <u>That <strong><mark>sickness slows the march to war</strong></mark> is partly due to the fact that war <strong>depends on people</strong>. <mark>When people fall ill, they can’t be</mark> <strong>counted on</u></strong> to perform well <u><mark>in combat</u></mark>. Military medicine made enormous strides in the years leading up to World War I, prior to which armies suffered higher numbers of casualties from disease than from combat. But <u><mark>pandemics</mark> still <strong><mark>threaten</mark> military <mark>units</u></strong></mark>, as those onboard U.S. and French aircraft carriers,<u> <strong>hundreds</strong> of whom <strong>tested positive for COVID-19</strong>, know well. Sailors and <mark>soldiers</mark> in the field are among the <strong>most vulnerable</u></strong> because they are packed together. But even <u><strong>airmen are <mark>at risk</strong></mark>, since they must take refuge from air attacks in bunkers, where <strong>the virus</strong> could <strong>also spread rapidly</strong>. <mark>Ground campaigns</mark> in urban areas <mark>pose </mark>still <strong>greater <mark>dangers</strong> in <strong>pandemic</mark> times</u></strong>. Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected. A vaccine may eventually solve these problems, but<u> an <strong>abundance of <mark>caution</strong></mark> is <strong><mark>likely</mark> to persist</strong> for some time after it comes into use. Major <mark>outbreaks damage</mark> <strong>national <mark>economies</strong></mark>, which are <mark>the <strong>source of military power.</strong> </mark>The most important reason <strong><mark>disease inhibits war</strong></mark> is economic. Major outbreaks damage national economies, which are the source of military power. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide phenomenon. <mark>All</mark> great and middle <mark>powers </mark>appear to be adversely affected, and all <mark>have reason to be pessimistic about</mark> their <strong><mark>military prospects</strong></mark>. Their <mark>economies</mark> are <mark>shrinking</mark> fast, and <strong>there is <mark>great uncertainty</strong></mark> about when and how quickly they will start growing again. Even China, which has slowed the spread of the disease and begun to reopen its economy, will be <mark>hurting for years </mark> to come</u>. It took an enormous hit to GDP in the first quarter of 2020, ending 40 years of steady growth. And its trading partners, burned by their dependence on China for much of the equipment needed to fight COVID-19, will surely scale back their imports. An export-dependent China will have to rely more on its domestic market, something it has been attempting for years with only limited success. It is little wonder, then, that the International Monetary Fund forecasts slower growth in China this year than at any time since the 1970s. <u>Even <strong><mark>after a vaccine</strong></mark> is developed and made widely available, <strong>economic <mark>troubles</mark> may <mark>linger</strong></mark> for years. States will emerge from this crisis with <strong>enormous debts</u></strong>. They will spend years paying for the bailout and stimulus packages they used to protect citizens and businesses from the economic consequences of social distancing. <u><mark>Drained treasuries</mark> will <mark>give</mark> them one more <mark>reason to be <strong>pessimistic</strong> about</mark> their military <mark>might. <strong>LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION</mark> </u></strong>How long is the pacifying effect of pessimism likely to last? If a vaccine is developed quickly, enabling a relatively swift economic recovery, the mood may prove short-lived. But it is equally likely that the coronavirus crisis will last long enough to change the world in important ways, some of which will likely dampen the appetite for conflict for some time—perhaps up to five or ten years. After all, the world is experiencing both the biggest pandemic and the biggest economic downturn in a century. Most governments have not covered themselves with glory managing the pandemic, and even the most autocratic worry about popular support. Over the next few years, people will want evidence that their governments are working to protect them from disease and economic dislocation. <u><mark>Citizens</u></mark> will see themselves as dependent on the state, and they <u>will be <strong><mark>less </mark>inclined</strong> to <strong><mark>support adventures</mark> abroad</strong>. </u>At the same time, governments and businesses will likely try to reduce their reliance on imports of critical materials, having watched global supply chains break down during the pandemic. <u>The result will probably be <strong>diminished trade</u></strong>, something liberal internationalists see as a bad thing. But for the last five years or so, <u><mark>trade </mark>has not helped <strong>improve relations</strong> between states but <strong>rather <mark>fueled resentment</strong>. Less trade</mark> could mean <strong><mark>less friction</strong> between </mark>major <mark>powers</mark>, thereby reducing the <strong>intensity of their rivalries</strong>. </u>In the Chinese context, less international trade could have positive knock-on effects. Focused on growing the domestic economy, and burdened by hefty bills from fighting the virus, Beijing could be forced to table the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious trade and investment project that has unnerved the foreign policy establishments of great and middle powers. The suspension of the BRI would soothe the fears of those who see it as an instrument of Chinese world domination. Interstate wars have become relatively rare since the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a four-decade Cold War, which included an intense nuclear and conventional arms race, but they never fought each other directly, even with conventional weapons. Theorists debate the reasons behind the continued rarity of great-power conflict. I am inclined to believe that <u><mark>the risk of </mark>escalation to a <strong><mark>nuclear confrontation</strong> is</mark> simply too <mark>great. COVID</mark>-19 does</u> nothing to mitigate such risks for world leaders—and <u>a great deal to <mark>feed</mark> their reasonable <strong><mark>pessimism</strong> about</mark> the <strong>likely <mark>outcome</strong> of</mark> even a <strong>conventional <mark>war.</p></u></strong></mark>

Neg v Mitty DR

1NC v Archbishop Mitty DR

Terror

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1AC - Homeland Security 1NC - T-Enact Logos of Justice K States CP Reg Neg CP Adv CP Manchin DA DeDev CT Disease Good CT 2NR - DeDev CT Disease Good CT

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Asian American subject-formation is defined by a status of incomplete assimilation – an epistemic violence in which the racial signification homogenizes the body at a metaphysical level. And yet, something is missing… a haunting – if you will. A feeling of melancholy created by ontological gap between the real and the symbolic that could never be bridged. We are reduced to whatever stereotype thrown at us entails and our identities act to justify all social structures. That means only our theory of power can explain yours.

Kim 09 [he’s asian]

Kim 09 [he’s asian] (Chang-Hee Kim, The Fantasy of Asian America: Identity, Ideology, and Desire) 2009 klmd recut/tagged Nato

Asian American Identity The question of how Asian Americans are perceived as ‘permanent aliens’ in the U.S. is a common topic in Asian American studies where are you from” is a question anyone with an Asian face is continuously asked in the U.S. In his essay “Where Are You Really From,” he mentions that Asian Americans’ being mistaken for a foreigner has become their routine experience to the extent that they cannot be a real American In everyday life in the United States, affect Asians and Asian Americans deeply, placing them in the status of permanent, yet never complete assimilation postcolonial studies in academia, the misrecognition of the Other has become a constant point of reference to support oppositional positions of “minoritized” in opposition to so-called epistemic violence9; our identities are constituted, exchanged, and recognized by the hegemonic social order justifying the legitimacy of existing arbitrary social structures. Given how the cognitive knowledge of ‘who we are’ is predetermined, we are subject to the pre-existing system Spivak theorizes the notion of “epistemic violence” in her renowned article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 31 of signs that creates a kind of epistemological gap between our knowledge of ourselves and how we are referred to. The recognition of ones’ identity as Asian, for instance, takes place when the public eye sees something in them that does not fully belong to them. It ascribes to their being a kind of fantasy that makes them “typical” Asians in terms of racial identification. Parts of their bodily appearances become determinants of their racial identity, functioning as an abstract sign that automatically refers to some concept of “Asian,” and their ontological being has its meaning only in relation to the conceptualized. Their subjectivity thus becomes regulated by, and subject to, the pre established system of racial identification insofar as it certifies “who they are.” “Who they are,” indicates, an ideological subject that the contingent and arbitrary rule of social agreements, however biased, constitutes particular parts of “what they are made of”—hair color, the shape of eyes, facial features—become the universal referent of “who they are.” represent but also substitute for the imagined totality of their ontological being their identitarian self has its ontological meaning reduced to the conceptual formality of what it means to be Asian American. The process of racial identification occurs beyond their control and will in figuring out their self-identity. and defying their basic desire to differentiate their individual self from that of others. Essential to an understanding of how racial identification takes place is obviously such an uncontrollability of representations Asian American identity exists as an abstract sign that makes sense in the context of the conceptual Asian like Charlie Chan—for example, the imagined as well as hegemonic system of Asian stereotypes. the hegemonic authority of public gaze defines “who they are” as typical of Asian Americans. That is, it comes out of the ontological inconsistency and contradiction of the representational system of Asian American identity vis-à-vis the totalitarian authority to recognize them “as such” in accordance with the pre-ontological formality of the conceptual Asian American Asian Americans’ bodies superfluously signify something excessive, more than “who they are,” an elusive meaning that is not always clear and definable vis-à-vis their racial identity. The discrepancy between the formalistic meaning of Asian American identity and the self-reflective or self-referential meaning of their subjective self consists in an indefinable dimension, or an ontological gap, within the identity This apparition keeps haunting them, evoking others’ temptation to recognize the former as symbolic of the conceptual Asian. Given this, that Asian Americans’ distinctive subjectivity negates any given identity in terms of, say, race, can be seen as an antagonistic gesture of political resistance to U.S. culture, i.e., the public eye that 33 produces the stereotype of Asians as a fixed form of truth stereotype rather turns Asian Americans into an appendix to the symbolic apparition or uncanny double that reifies their identity in the typical formality of “Asian”—that is, racial fantasy. Asian Americans become a puppet-like agent of Charlie Chan’s apparitional power evoking something in themselves more than themselves, which is projected upon their identity. It creates a division within the system of “commonsensical” representation—the conceptual (fantasy) vs. the original (imagination). The apparitional power of fantasy—invisible but effective to the public eye—is what combines the two for the sake of the communicative exchange of their identity as a cognitive sign. At the same time, the apparitional fantasy remains elusive and unidentifiable, making the gap between “who they are” and “who they are seen as. the former is the real of them whose subjectivity remains neither fully symbolized nor properly interpellated, an unfathomable dimension of Asian American identity that resists their being completely identified as a typical Asian as a whole. On the contrary, the latter refers to the symbolic figure of the Asian American that the public eye recognizes as one of Charlie Chan Asians. Although it is our fate to be social subjects dictated by the representational system that constitutes our identitarian position, the gap of the subject between real and symbolic never comes to a closure. The identitarian system of representation can maintain itself through social agreements for the communication between self and other

where are you from Asian continuously asked Where Are You Really From Asian Americans’ cannot be a real American , placing the status of never complete assimilation our identities are constituted by the order justifying existing structures. recognition of identity as Asian takes place when public sees something in them that does not belong to them bodily appearances determin racial identity, that automatically refers to concept of “Asian,” and their ontological being has meaning only in relation to the conceptualized. subjectivity becomes regulated by the system ontological meaning reduced to the conceptual formality of Asian American. Asian bodies signify more than “who they are,” the identity consists in an ontological gap, within the identity Asian Americans’ distinctive subjectivity negates any identity stereotype turns Asian Americans into puppet-like agent an unfathomable dimension of Asian American identity resists being identified it is our fate to be social subjects dictated by the system that constitutes our identitarian position, the gap never comes to a closure

Fantasy of Asian American Identity The question of how Asian Americans are perceived as ‘permanent aliens’ in the U.S. is a common topic in Asian American studies. Frank H. Wu states that “where are you from” is a question anyone with an Asian face is continuously asked in the U.S. In his essay “Where Are You Really From,” he mentions that Asian Americans’ being mistaken for a foreigner has become their routine experience to the extent that they cannot be a real American. In everyday life in the United States, such awkward situations happen casually and regularly, and affect Asians and Asian Americans deeply, placing them in the status of permanent, yet never complete assimilation. Due to the popular circulation of knowledge informed by postcolonial studies in academia, the misrecognition of the Other has become a constant point of reference to support oppositional positions of “minoritized” in opposition to so-called epistemic violence9; our identities are constituted, exchanged, and recognized by the hegemonic social order justifying the legitimacy of existing arbitrary social structures. Given how the cognitive knowledge of ‘who we are’ is predetermined, we are subject to the pre-existing system 8 Who Killed Vincent Chin? is a 1987 documentary film directed by Christine Choy and produced by Renee Tajima-Pena about the death of Vincent Chin. It was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. 9 Gayatri C. Spivak theorizes the notion of “epistemic violence” in her renowned article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 31 of signs that creates a kind of epistemological gap between our knowledge of ourselves and how we are referred to. The recognition of ones’ identity as Asian, for instance, takes place when the public eye sees something in them that does not fully belong to them. It ascribes to their being a kind of fantasy that makes them “typical” Asians in terms of racial identification. Parts of their bodily appearances become determinants of their racial identity, functioning as an abstract sign that automatically refers to some concept of “Asian,” and their ontological being has its meaning only in relation to the conceptualized. Their subjectivity thus becomes regulated by, and subject to, the pre established system of racial identification insofar as it certifies “who they are.” It refers to the way in which any Asian American happens to be recognized as Charlie Chan. “Who they are,” in this sense, indicates, as Louis Althusser might put it, an ideological subject that the contingent and arbitrary rule of social agreements, however biased, constitutes. It is no wonder that Michael Omi and Howard Winant define racial formation as a “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (RFUS 55). It is interesting to see the way in which particular parts of “what they are made of”—hair color, the shape of eyes, facial features—become the universal referent of “who they are.” They not only represent but also substitute for the imagined totality of their ontological being. In other words, their identitarian self has its ontological meaning reduced to the conceptual formality of what it means to be Asian American. The process of racial identification, as a result, occurs beyond their control and will in figuring out their self-identity. It keeps escaping and defying their basic desire to 32 differentiate their individual self from that of others. Essential to an understanding of how racial identification takes place is obviously such an uncontrollability of representations. Asian American identity exists as an abstract sign that makes sense in the context of the conceptual Asian like Charlie Chan—for example, the imagined as well as hegemonic system of Asian stereotypes. Within the discursive formality of the identity are imaginary elements that seem both extraneous and intrinsic to Asian American ontology. This epistemological difference in their self-identity stands for the gap. Fundamentally, the gap emerges when the hegemonic authority of public gaze defines “who they are” as typical of Asian Americans. That is, it comes out of the ontological inconsistency and contradiction of the representational system of Asian American identity vis-à-vis the totalitarian authority to recognize them “as such” in accordance with the pre-ontological formality of the conceptual Asian American. Nonetheless, Asian Americans’ bodies superfluously signify something excessive, more than “who they are,” an elusive meaning that is not always clear and definable vis-à-vis their racial identity. The discrepancy between the formalistic meaning of Asian American identity and the self-reflective or self-referential meaning of their subjective self consists in an indefinable dimension, or an ontological gap, within the identity. Metaphorically, it works as Charlie Chan’s apparitional power encompassing Asian Americans’ distinctive individualities within themselves. This apparition keeps haunting them, evoking others’ temptation to recognize the former as symbolic of the conceptual Asian. Given this, that Asian Americans’ distinctive subjectivity negates any given identity in terms of, say, race, can be seen as an antagonistic gesture of political resistance to U.S. culture, i.e., the public eye that 33 produces the stereotype of Asians as a fixed form of truth. Constituted as a cognitive system of knowledge that falls within the realm of common sense, stereotype rather turns Asian Americans into an appendix to the symbolic apparition or uncanny double that reifies their identity in the typical formality of “Asian”—that is, racial fantasy. Asian Americans become a puppet-like agent of Charlie Chan’s apparitional power evoking something in themselves more than themselves, which is projected upon their identity. It creates a division within the system of “commonsensical” representation—the conceptual (fantasy) vs. the original (imagination). The apparitional power of fantasy—invisible but effective to the public eye—is what combines the two for the sake of the communicative exchange of their identity as a cognitive sign. At the same time, the apparitional fantasy remains elusive and unidentifiable, making the gap between “who they are” and “who they are seen as.” Simply put, the former is the real of them whose subjectivity remains neither fully symbolized nor properly interpellated, an unfathomable dimension of Asian American identity that resists their being completely identified as a typical Asian as a whole. On the contrary, the latter refers to the symbolic figure of the Asian American that the public eye recognizes as one of Charlie Chan Asians. Although it is our fate to be social subjects dictated by the representational system that constitutes our identitarian position, the gap of the subject between real and symbolic never comes to a closure. The identitarian system of representation can maintain itself through social agreements for the communication between self and other. At stake in the system is the uncontrollability of representations intrinsic to the nature of the agreements making for the idealistic achievement of universal communication in 34 totality, yet it always remains incomplete. W. J. T. Mitchell observes, “Representation is that by which we make our will known and, simultaneously, that which alienates our will from ourselves in both the aesthetic and political spheres” (21). The system of representation, such as languages and bodily appearances, is a social construct making possible the communicative process of identification and, simultaneously, creating an epistemological void that prevents the communication from being fully accomplished. This gap is where fantasy with a spectral power operates in the process of identification and fills up the gap, and thus secures the discursive certainty of a community in which the ideological transparency of a hegemonic discourse comes true.

<h4>Asian American subject-formation is defined by a status of incomplete assimilation – an epistemic violence in which the racial signification homogenizes the body at a metaphysical level. And yet, something is missing… a haunting – if you will. A feeling of melancholy created by ontological gap between the real and the symbolic that could never be bridged. We are reduced to whatever stereotype thrown at us entails and our identities act to justify all social structures. That means only our theory of power can explain yours.</h4><p><strong>Kim 09 [he’s asian]<u></strong> (Chang-Hee Kim, The Fantasy of Asian America: Identity, Ideology, and Desire) 2009 klmd recut/tagged Nato</p><p></u>Fantasy of <u>Asian American Identity The question of how Asian Americans are perceived as ‘permanent aliens’ in the U.S. is a common topic in Asian American studies</u>. Frank H. Wu states that “<u><strong><mark>where are you from</strong></mark>” is a question anyone with an <strong><mark>Asian</strong></mark> face is <strong><mark>continuously asked</strong></mark> in the U.S. In his essay “<strong><mark>Where Are You Really From</strong></mark>,” he mentions that <mark>Asian Americans’</mark> being mistaken for a foreigner has become their routine experience to the extent that they <strong><mark>cannot be a real American</u></strong></mark>. <u>In everyday life in the United States,</u> such awkward situations happen casually and regularly, and <u>affect Asians and Asian Americans deeply<mark>, <strong>placing</mark> them in <mark>the status of</mark> permanent, yet <mark>never complete assimilation</u></strong></mark>. Due to the popular circulation of knowledge informed by <u>postcolonial studies in academia, the misrecognition of the Other has become a constant point of reference to support oppositional positions of “minoritized” in opposition to so-called epistemic violence9; <strong><mark>our identities are constituted</strong></mark>, exchanged, and recognized <strong><mark>by the</strong></mark> hegemonic social <strong><mark>order justifying</strong></mark> the legitimacy of <strong><mark>existing</strong></mark> arbitrary social <strong><mark>structures.</strong></mark> Given how the cognitive knowledge of ‘who we are’ is predetermined, we are subject to the pre-existing system</u> 8 Who Killed Vincent Chin? is a 1987 documentary film directed by Christine Choy and produced by Renee Tajima-Pena about the death of Vincent Chin. It was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. 9 Gayatri C. <u>Spivak theorizes the notion of “epistemic violence” in her renowned article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 31 of signs that creates a kind of epistemological gap between our knowledge of ourselves and how we are referred to. The <strong><mark>recognition of</strong></mark> ones’ <strong><mark>identity as Asian</strong></mark>, for instance, <strong><mark>takes place when</strong></mark> the <strong><mark>public</strong></mark> eye <strong><mark>sees something in them that does not</strong></mark> fully <strong><mark>belong to them</strong></mark>. It ascribes to their being a kind of fantasy that makes them “typical” Asians in terms of racial identification. Parts of their <strong><mark>bodily appearances</strong></mark> become <strong><mark>determin</strong></mark>ants of their <strong><mark>racial identity,</strong></mark> functioning as an abstract</u> <u>sign <strong><mark>that automatically refers to</strong></mark> some<strong> <mark>concept of “Asian,” and their ontological being has</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>meaning only in relation to the conceptualized</strong>.</mark> Their <strong><mark>subjectivity</strong></mark> thus <strong><mark>becomes regulated by</strong></mark>, and subject to, <strong><mark>the</strong></mark> pre established <strong><mark>system</strong></mark> of racial identification insofar as it certifies “who they are.”</u> It refers to the way in which any Asian American happens to be recognized as Charlie Chan. <u>“Who they are,”</u> in this sense, <u>indicates,</u> as Louis Althusser might put it, <u>an ideological subject that the contingent and arbitrary rule of social agreements, however biased, constitutes</u>. It is no wonder that Michael Omi and Howard Winant define racial formation as a “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (RFUS 55). It is interesting to see the way in which <u>particular parts of “what they are made of”—hair color, the shape of eyes, facial features—become the universal referent of “who they are.”</u> They not only <u>represent but also substitute for the imagined totality of their ontological being</u>. In other words, <u>their identitarian self has its <strong><mark>ontological meaning reduced to the conceptual formality of</strong></mark> what it means to be <strong><mark>Asian American</strong>.</mark> The process of racial identification</u>, as a result, <u>occurs beyond their control and will in figuring out their self-identity.</u> It keeps escaping <u>and defying their basic desire to</u> 32 <u>differentiate their individual self from that of others. Essential to an understanding of how racial identification takes place is obviously such an uncontrollability of representations</u>. <u>Asian American identity exists as an abstract sign that makes sense in the context of the conceptual Asian like Charlie Chan—for example, the imagined as well as hegemonic system of Asian stereotypes.</u> Within the discursive formality of the identity are imaginary elements that seem both extraneous and intrinsic to Asian American ontology. This epistemological difference in their self-identity stands for the gap. Fundamentally, the gap emerges when <u><strong>the hegemonic authority of public gaze defines “who they are” as typical of Asian Americans.</strong> That is, it comes out of the ontological inconsistency and contradiction of the representational system of Asian American identity vis-à-vis the totalitarian authority to recognize them “as such” in accordance with the pre-ontological formality of the conceptual Asian American</u>. Nonetheless, <u><strong><mark>Asian</mark> </strong>Americans’ <strong><mark>bodies</strong></mark> superfluously <strong><mark>signify</strong></mark> something excessive, <strong><mark>more than “who they are,”</strong></mark> an elusive meaning that is not always clear and definable vis-à-vis their racial identity.</u> <u>The discrepancy between <strong><mark>the</mark> </strong>formalistic meaning of Asian American <strong><mark>identity</strong></mark> and the self-reflective or self-referential meaning of their subjective self <strong><mark>consists in</strong> </mark>an indefinable dimension, or <strong><mark>an ontological gap, within the identity</u></strong></mark>. Metaphorically, it works as Charlie Chan’s apparitional power encompassing Asian Americans’ distinctive individualities within themselves. <u>This apparition keeps haunting them, evoking others’ temptation to recognize the former as symbolic of the conceptual Asian. Given this, that <strong><mark>Asian Americans’ distinctive subjectivity negates any</strong></mark> given <strong><mark>identity</strong></mark> in terms of, say, race, can be seen as an antagonistic gesture of political resistance to U.S. culture, i.e., the public eye that 33 produces the stereotype of Asians as a fixed form of truth</u>. Constituted as a cognitive system of knowledge that falls within the realm of common sense, <u><strong><mark>stereotype</strong></mark> rather <strong><mark>turns Asian Americans into</strong></mark> an appendix to the symbolic apparition or uncanny double that reifies their identity in the typical formality of “Asian”—that is, racial fantasy. Asian Americans become a <strong><mark>puppet-like agent</strong></mark> of Charlie Chan’s apparitional power evoking something in themselves more than themselves, which is projected upon their identity. It creates a division within the system of “commonsensical” representation—the conceptual (fantasy) vs. the original (imagination). The apparitional power of fantasy—invisible but effective to the public eye—is what combines the two for the sake of the communicative exchange of their identity as a cognitive sign. At the same time, the apparitional fantasy remains elusive and unidentifiable, making the gap between “who they are” and “who they are seen as.</u>” Simply put, <u>the former is the real of them whose subjectivity remains neither fully symbolized nor properly interpellated, <strong><mark>an unfathomable dimension of Asian American identity</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>resists</strong></mark> their <strong><mark>being</strong></mark> completely <strong><mark>identified</strong></mark> as a typical Asian as a whole. On the contrary, the latter refers to the symbolic figure of the Asian American that the public eye recognizes as one of Charlie Chan Asians. Although <strong><mark>it is our fate to be social subjects dictated by the</strong></mark> representational <strong><mark>system that constitutes our identitarian position, the gap</mark> of the subject between real and symbolic <mark>never comes to a closure</strong></mark>. The identitarian system of representation can maintain itself through social agreements for the communication between self and other</u>. At stake in the system is the uncontrollability of representations intrinsic to the nature of the agreements making for the idealistic achievement of universal communication in 34 totality, yet it always remains incomplete. W. J. T. Mitchell observes, “Representation is that by which we make our will known and, simultaneously, that which alienates our will from ourselves in both the aesthetic and political spheres” (21). <strong>The system of representation, such as languages and bodily appearances, is a social construct making possible the communicative process of identification and, simultaneously, creating an epistemological void that prevents the communication from being fully accomplished. This gap is where fantasy with a spectral power operates in the process of identification and fills up the gap, and thus secures the discursive certainty of a community in which the ideological transparency of a hegemonic discourse comes true. </p></strong>

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Your ballot/ROB symbolizes an answer to the question of whether work can be used as the solution to social ills. The plan doesn’t “happen,” and you are conditioned to valorize work – vote neg to interrogate these ideological assumptions.

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/ What is postwork?

How can a ‘postwork’ approach contribute to resolving these issues? postwork have emerged building on a long intellectual tradition of Marxist, anarchist, and feminist theory The critique of work targets work in a fundamental sense, not only its conditions or exploitation. It is aimed at the centrality of work in modern ‘work society’ as a pivotal point for the provision of livelihoods through monetary income, on which grounds unemployed persons and unpaid activities are excluded from recognition, welfare provision and trade union support. the crucial role of waged work in the functioning of the welfare state and the modern industrialised economy is part of this critique ( This critique of the structures and social relations of work society is accompanied by the critique of its cultural foundation the work ethic an ideological commitment to work and productivism as ends in themselves, moral obligations, and as intrinsically good, regardless of what is done and at what cost Postwork is not only a critical stance Criticising work implies the potential for an emancipatory transformation of industrial society. The focus is thereby not necessarily on abolishing work tout-court, but rather on pointing out and questioning its relentless centrality and asking what a more desirable, free and sustainable society might look like in which work is no longer the pivotal point of social organisation and ideological orientation, Some drawing on the classical ‘end-of-work’ argument assume an imminent technology-induced massive rise in unemployment. Others emphasise that technological development has not challenged the centrality of work in modern lives, work has become more central to modern societies. postwork may enrich sustainability debates our focus is again on ecological concerns postwork offers a much needed change in focus in sustainability debates away from narrow critiques of individual consumption and the overemphasis on ‘green jobs’, towards understanding work as one central cause of sustained societal unsustainability Postwork directs the focus towards crucial overlooked issues e.g. the ways in which work is ecologically harmful, or which problems arise due to the social and cultural significance of modern-day work including existential dependencies on it. Postwork seeks to re-politicise work recognising that its conception and societal organisation are social constructs and therefore political, and must accordingly be open to debate This opens conceptual space and enables open-minded debates about the meaning, value and purpose of work: what kind of work is, for individuals, society and the biosphere as a whole, meaningful, pointless, or outright harmful debates and enhanced understanding about the means and ends of work, In ecological regard it facilitates the ecologically necessary, substantial reduction of work, production and consumption From an ecological perspective, reducing work would reduce the dependency on a commodity-intensive mode of living Reducing work would also help mitigate all other work-induced environmental pressures A postwork approach facilitates debate on the politics of ecological work reduction which entails difficult question which industries and fields of employment are to be phased out? Which kinds of work in which sectors are socially important and should therefore be organised differently These questions are decisive for future (un-)sustainability, and yet serious attempts at a solution are presently forestalled by the unquestioned sanctity that work, ‘jobs’ or ‘full employment’ enjoy (Frayne 2015b). Postwork is also conducive to rethinking the organisation of work. There are plausible arguments in favour of new institutions of democratic control over the economy, This is urgent and necessary to distribute a very tight remaining carbon budget fairly and wisely to gain public sovereignty over fundamental economic decisions that are pivotal for (un-)sustainable trajectories An obstacle to this is one institution in particular which is rarely under close scrutiny the labour market, a social construct linked to the advent of modern work in form of the commodity of labour It is an undemocratic mechanism characterised by high levels of unfreedom and coercion that allocates waged work in a competitive mode as an artificially scarce, ‘fictitious’ commodity It does so according to availability of money and motives of gain on the part of employers, and appears therefore inappropriate for distributing labour according to sustainability criteria and related societal needs As long as unsustainable and/or unnecessary jobs are profitable they will continue to exist just as ‘green jobs’ must follow these same criteria in order to be created. An ecological postwork perspective allows to question this on ecological grounds, and it links to debates on different modes of organising socially necessary work, production and provisioning in a de-commodified, democratic and sustainable mode. postwork is helpful for ecological reasons because it criticises the cultural glorification of ‘hard work’, and productivism, and the moral assumption that laziness and inaction are intrinsically bad Postwork is about a different mindset which problematises prevailing productivist attitudes and allows the idea that being lazy or unproductive can be something inherently valuable Idleness is conducive to an ecological agenda as nothing is evidently more carbon-neutral and environment-sparing than being absolutely unproductive the biosphere also needs idle time for regeneration ecological leisure’, can be regarded as supremely ecofriendly states of being that would help mitigate ecological pressures postwork traces which changes in attitudes have brought modern work culture and modern time regimes into being in the first place modern-day work is a central cause for unsustainability and should therefore be transformed to advance towards sustainability One of the analytical advantages of this approach is that it avoids the mystification of work through indirect measures of economic activity ), as in the numerous analyses of the conflict between sustainability and economic growth in general. Our second substantial contribution consists in combining these ecological impacts of work with an analysis of the various structural dependencies on work in modern society, which spells out clearly what the recurring jobs-environment-dilemma actually implies, and why it is so difficult to overcome. While this dilemma is often vaguely referred to, this has been the first more detailed analysis of the different dimensions that essentially constitute it. Reviewing the literature in environmental sociology and sustainability research more generally, we also found the work-environment-dilemma and the role of work itself are not sufficiently addressed and remain major unresolved issues. problematising modern-day work, through the approach of postwork or critiques of work postwork arguments can contribute to pointing out and understanding them, and to opening up new perspectives to advance sustainability debates Besides being ecologically beneficial, it may also serve emancipatory purposes to ‘raise broader questions about the place of work in our lives and spark the imagination of a life no longer so subordinate to it’ In order to inspire such ‘postwork imagination’ and show that postwork ideas are not as detached from reality as they may sound, in this last section we briefly outline examples of existing postwork politics and practices. The most obvious example is the reduction of working hours As concerns about climate change are rising, there is also renewed awareness about the ecological benefits of worktime reduction, Public debates are therefore increasingly receptive to issues such as industries’ responsibility for climate change, coercive ‘workfare’ policies, meaningless ‘bullshit jobs’, shorter hours, overwork and burnout; topics ‘that will not go away’ and question the organisation of work society more fundamentally UBI would break the existential dependency of livelihoods on paid work and serve as a new kind of social contract to entitle people to social security regardless of paid economic activity refusal of work also takes place both within the sphere of wage labour and outside it. the notions of absenteeism, tardiness, shirking, theft, or sabotage have a long tradition, dating back to early struggles against work and industrialisation and common until today deliberate ‘workplace resistance’ is that the ability to resist meaningless work and the internalised norms of work society, and be idle and useless while at work, can be recognised and successfully practised there is a growing interest in productive practices, and the commons outside the sphere of wage labour and market relations, for example in community-supported agriculture This initiates ways of organising work and the economy to satisfy material needs otherwise than by means of commodity consumption inspiration could be drawn from the forms of ‘work’ that are prevalent in the global South in the so-called informal sector and in non-industrial crafts and peasantry, neither of which resemble the cultural phenomenon of modern-day work This contradicts the global development paradigm, under which industrialisation, ‘economic upgrading’, global market integration and ‘structural transformation’ are pursued Modern work is supposed to help ‘the poor’ to escape their misery Many of these other forms of livelihood provisioning and associated ways of life are thus disregarded denigrated or destroyed as underdeveloped backward, poor, and lazy and drawn into the formal system of waged work as cheap labour in capitalist markets improved living conditions’ as measured in formal pecuniary income There are indications that these transformations create structural poverty, highly vulnerable jobs and an imposed dependence on wage labour There is also clear evidence of numerous struggles against capitalist development and for traditional livelihood protection and environmental justice These are aspects where a postwork orientation is relevant as it puts a focus on the modern phenomenon ‘work’ itself and the conditions that led to its predominance, as it questions the common narrative that ‘jobs’ are an end in themselves and justify all kinds of problematic development, and as it allows to ask which alternative, postcolonial critiques and conceptualisations of ‘work’ exist and should be preserved. Waged work continues to be normalised, alternatives beyond niches appear quite impractical for generalisation. Powerful economic interests, including trade unions, seek to perpetuate the status-quo Job creation are central policy goals of all political parties, and presently popular progressive debates on a Green New Deal tend to exhibit a rather productivist stance. There is one particular aspect that appears hopeful the present socio-economic system is unsustainable in the literal sense that it is physically impossible to be sustained in the long run the powerful cosmos of the modern economic order will be determining with overwhelming force until the last bit of fossil fuel is burnt this needs to happen soon to avert catastrophic climate change This is the battlefield of sustainability, and lately there has been renewed urgency and momentum for more profound social change where it might be realised that a different societal trajectory beyond work and productivism for their own sake is more sustainable and desirable for the future.

unemployed persons and unpaid activities are excluded from recognition and union support. Postwork implies emancipatory transformation of industrial society not abolishing work but questioning its relentless centrality asking what sustainable society might look like; in which work is no longer pivotal postwork offers change in sustainability away from overemphasis on ‘green jobs’, towards understanding work as one central cause of sustained societal unsustainability including existential dependencies on it. These questions are decisive fo sustainability yet attempts at a solution are forestalled by unquestioned sanctity that , ‘jobs’ enjoy There are arguments in favour of democratic control over the economy As long as unnecessary jobs are profitable they will continue to exist ‘green jobs’ must follow these same criteria ecological postwork allows debates on different modes of organising socially necessary work, in a de-commodified, democratic and sustainable mode. nothing is more carbon-neutral than being a unproductive debates are receptive to industries’ responsibility for climate change b s jobs’ overwork and burnout UBI would break existential dependency shirking or sabotage deliberate ‘workplace resistance’ can be successfully practised inspiration could be drawn from work’ prevalent in the global South non-industrial crafts contradicts the global development paradigm cheap labour in capitalist markets create structural poverty, highly vulnerable jobs and an imposed dependence on wage labour Powerful economic interests, including trade unions, seek to perpetuate the status-quo Job creation exhibit a the present socio-economic system is physically impossible in the long run this needs to happen soon to avert catastrophic climate change This is the battlefield of sustainability there has been renewed urgency and momentum for more profound social change,

How can a ‘postwork’ approach contribute to resolving these issues? The notions critique of work (Frayne 2015a, 2015b) or postwork (Weeks 2011) have emerged in recent years in social science research and popular culture, building on a long intellectual tradition of (autonomist and neo-)Marxist, anarchist, and feminist theory (Seyferth 2019; Weeks 2011). The critique of work targets work in a fundamental sense, not only its conditions or exploitation. It is aimed at the centrality of work in modern ‘work society’ as a pivotal point for the provision of livelihoods through monetary income, the granting of social security, social inclusion, and personal identity construction, on which grounds unemployed persons and unpaid activities are excluded from recognition, welfare provision and trade union support. Moreover, the crucial role of waged work in the functioning of the welfare state and the modern industrialised economy is part of this critique (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015b; Paulsen 2017). Although commonly taken as naturally given, this kind of societal order and its institutions such as the wage relation, labour markets, unemployment, or abstract time are historically and culturally exceptional modes of human coexistence (Applebaum 1992; Graeber 2018; Gorz 1989; Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Thompson 1967). This critique of the structures and social relations of work society is accompanied by the critique of its cultural foundation, the work ethic; an ideological commitment to work and productivism as ends in themselves, moral obligations, and as intrinsically good, regardless of what is done and at what cost (Gorz 1982; Weber 1992 [1905]; Weeks 2001). Postwork, however, is not only a critical stance. Criticising work and work society, aware of their historical contingency, implies the potential for an emancipatory transformation of industrial society. The focus is thereby not necessarily on abolishing work tout-court, but rather on pointing out and questioning its relentless centrality and asking what a more desirable, free and sustainable society might look like; a society in which work is no longer the pivotal point of social organisation and ideological orientation, including all questions and debates around this objective (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015a; Weeks 2011). As a relatively new and dynamically developing approach, postwork is, despite similar political claims, not uniform in its reasoning. Some, drawing on the classical ‘end-of-work’ argument (Frayne 2016), assume an imminent technology-induced massive rise in unemployment. This is welcomed as an opportunity to reduce and ultimately abolish work to liberate humankind (Srnicek and Williams 2015). Others emphasise the remarkable fact that throughout the past two centuries technological development has not challenged the centrality of work in modern lives, despite the prospect that technological change would allow for much shorter working hours (e.g., Keynes 1930). This has not materialised due to the requirements of a work-centred, work-dependent society. On the contrary, work has become more central to modern societies. These deeper structural and cultural aspects and dependencies seem to remain unaffected by technological trends (Paulsen 2017; Weeks 2011). The ecological case for postwork The perspective of postwork/critiques of work may enrich sustainability debates in many ways; here, our focus is again on ecological concerns. First, postwork offers a much needed change in focus in sustainability debates, away from narrow critiques of individual consumption and the overemphasis on ‘green jobs’, towards understanding work as one central cause of sustained societal unsustainability. Postwork directs the focus towards crucial overlooked issues, e.g. the ways in which work is ecologically harmful, or which problems arise due to the social and cultural significance of modern-day work, including existential dependencies on it. Postwork seeks to re-politicise work, recognising that its conception and societal organisation are social constructs and therefore political, and must accordingly be open to debate (Weeks 2011). This opens conceptual space and enables open-minded debates about the meaning, value and purpose of work: what kind of work is, for individuals, society and the biosphere as a whole, meaningful, pointless, or outright harmful (Graeber 2018)? Such debates and enhanced understanding about the means and ends of work, and the range of problems associated with it, would be important in several regards. In ecological regard it facilitates the ecologically necessary, substantial reduction of work, production and consumption (Frey 2019; Haberl et al. 2009). Reducing work/working hours is one of the key premises of postwork, aiming at de-centring and de-normalising work, and releasing time, energy and creativity for purposes other than work (Coote 2013). From an ecological perspective, reducing the amount of work would reduce the dependency on a commodity-intensive mode of living, and allow space for more sustainable practices (Frayne 2016). Reducing work would also help mitigate all other work-induced environmental pressures described above, especially the ‘Scale factor’ (Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), i.e. the amount of resources and energy consumed, and waste, including emissions, created through work. A postwork approach facilitates debate on the politics of ecological work reduction which entails difficult questions: for example, which industries and fields of employment are to be phased out? Which fields will need to be favoured and upon what grounds? Which kinds of work in which sectors are socially important and should therefore be organised differently, especially when altering the energy basis of work due to climate change mitigation which implies decentralised, locally specific, intermittent and less concentrated energy sources (Malm 2013)? These questions are decisive for future (un-)sustainability, and yet serious attempts at a solution are presently forestalled by the unquestioned sanctity that work, ‘jobs’ or ‘full employment’ enjoy (Frayne 2015b). Postwork is also conducive to rethinking the organisation of work. There are plausible arguments in favour of new institutions of democratic control over the economy, i.e. economic democracy (Johanisova and Wolf 2012). This is urgent and necessary to distribute a very tight remaining carbon budget fairly and wisely (IPCC 2018), to keep economic power in check, and to gain public sovereignty over fundamental economic decisions that are pivotal for (un-)sustainable trajectories (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004). An obstacle to this is one institution in particular which is rarely under close scrutiny: the labour market, a social construct linked to the advent of modern work in form of the commodity of labour (Applebaum 1992). It is an undemocratic mechanism, usually characterised by high levels of unfreedom and coercion (Anderson 2017; Graeber 2018; Paulsen 2015) that allocates waged work in a competitive mode as an artificially scarce, ‘fictitious’ commodity (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). 4 It does so according to availability of money and motives of gain on the part of employers, and appears therefore inappropriate for distributing labour according to sustainability criteria and related societal needs. As long as unsustainable and/or unnecessary jobs are profitable and/or (well-)paid, they will continue to exist (Gorz 1989), just as ‘green jobs’ must follow these same criteria in order to be created. An ecological postwork perspective allows to question this on ecological grounds, and it links to debates on different modes of organising socially necessary work, production and provisioning in a de-commodified, democratic and sustainable mode. Finally, postwork is helpful for ecological reasons because it criticises the cultural glorification of ‘hard work’, merit and productivism, and the moral assumption that laziness and inaction are intrinsically bad, regardless the circumstances. Postwork is about a different mindset which problematises prevailing productivist attitudes and allows the idea that being lazy or unproductive can be something inherently valuable. Idleness is conducive to an ecological agenda as nothing is evidently more carbon-neutral and environment-sparing than being absolutely unproductive. As time-use studies indicate, leisure, recreation and socialising have very low ecological impacts, with rest and sleep having virtually none (Druckman et al. 2012). Apart from humans, the biosphere also needs idle time for regeneration. In this sense, laziness or ‘ecological leisure’, ideally sleep, can be regarded as supremely ecofriendly states of being that would help mitigate ecological pressures. Moreover, as postwork traces which changes in attitudes towards time, efficiency and laziness have brought modern work culture and modern time regimes into being in the first place and have dominated ever since (Thompson 1967; Weber 1992 [1905]), it provides crucial knowledge for understanding and potentially changing this historically peculiar construction. It can thereby take inspiration from longstanding traditions throughout human history, where leisure has usually been a high social ideal and regarded as vital for realising genuine freedom and quality of life (Applebaum 1992; Gorz 1989). Conclusions: postwork politics and practices We argued that modern-day work is a central cause for unsustainability, and should therefore be transformed to advance towards sustainability. We have contributed to this field of research, firstly, by developing a systematisation of the ecological harms associated with work – comprising the factors Scale, Time, Income, and Work-induced Mobility, Infrastructure, and Consumption – taking those studies one step further which investigate the ecological impacts of working hours quantitatively. One of the analytical advantages of this approach is that it avoids the mystification of work through indirect measures of economic activity (such as per capita GDP), as in the numerous analyses of the conflict between sustainability and economic growth in general. Our second substantial contribution consists in combining these ecological impacts of work with an analysis of the various structural dependencies on work in modern society, which spells out clearly what the recurring jobs-environment-dilemma actually implies, and why it is so difficult to overcome. While this dilemma is often vaguely referred to, this has been the first more detailed analysis of the different dimensions that essentially constitute it. Reviewing the literature in environmental sociology and sustainability research more generally, we also found the work-environment-dilemma and the role of work itself are not sufficiently addressed and remain major unresolved issues. We proposed the field would benefit from taking up the long intellectual tradition of problematising modern-day work, through the approach of postwork or critiques of work. While the described problems of unsustainability and entrenched dependencies cannot easily be resolved, we discussed how postwork arguments can contribute to pointing out and understanding them, and to opening up new perspectives to advance sustainability debates. A third contribution is therefore to have introduced the concept of postwork/critiques of work into sustainability research and the work-environment debate, and to have conducted an initial analysis of the ways in which postwork may be helpful for tackling ecological problems. Besides being ecologically beneficial, it may also serve emancipatory purposes to ‘raise broader questions about the place of work in our lives and spark the imagination of a life no longer so subordinate to it’ (Weeks 2011, 33). In order to inspire such ‘postwork imagination’ (Weeks 2011, 35, 110) and show that postwork ideas are not as detached from reality as they may sound, in this last section we briefly outline examples of existing postwork politics and practices. The most obvious example is the reduction of working hours during the 19th and 20th centuries. These reforms were essential to the early labour movement, and the notion that increasing productivity entails shorter working hours has never been nearly as ‘radical’ as today (Paulsen 2017). As concerns about climate change are rising, there is also renewed awareness about the ecological benefits of worktime reduction, besides a whole range of other social and economic advantages (Coote 2013; Frey 2019). Worktime reduction is usually taken up positively in public debate. Carlsson (2015, 184) sees a ‘growing minority of people’ who engage in practices other than waged work to support themselves and make meaningful contributions to society. Frayne (2015b) describes the practical refusal of work by average people who wish to live more independently of the treadmill of work. Across society, the disaffection with work is no marginal phenomenon (Graeber 2018; Cederström and Fleming 2012; Paulsen 2014, 2015; Weeks 2011); many start to realise the ‘dissonance between the mythical sanctity of work on the one hand, and the troubling realities of people’s actual experiences on the other’ (Frayne 2015b, 228). Public debates are therefore increasingly receptive to issues such as industries’ responsibility for climate change, coercive ‘workfare’ policies, meaningless ‘bullshit jobs’, or ‘work-life-balance’, shorter hours, overwork and burnout; topics ‘that will not go away’ (Coote 2013, xix) and question the organisation of work society more fundamentally. 5 The debate about an unconditional basic income (UBI) will also remain. UBI would break the existential dependency of livelihoods on paid work and serve as a new kind of social contract to entitle people to social security regardless of paid economic activity. In addition to countless models in theory, examples of UBI schemes exist in practice, either currently implemented or planned as ‘experiments’ (Srnicek and Williams 2015). The critique and refusal of work also takes place both within the sphere of wage labour and outside it. Within, the notions of absenteeism, tardiness, shirking, theft, or sabotage (Pouget 1913 [1898]; Seyferth 2019) have a long tradition, dating back to early struggles against work and industrialisation (Thompson 1967), and common until today (Paulsen 2014). The idea of such deliberate ‘workplace resistance’ is that the ability to resist meaningless work and the internalised norms of work society, and be idle and useless while at work, can be recognised and successfully practised (Campagna 2013; Scott 2012). Similarly, there is a growing interest in productive practices, social relations, and the commons outside the sphere of wage labour and market relations, for example in community-supported agriculture. This initiates ways of organising work and the economy to satisfy material needs otherwise than by means of commodity consumption (Chamberlain 2018; Helfrich and Bollier 2015). For such modes of organising productive social relations in more varied ways, inspiration could be drawn from the forms of ‘work’ that are prevalent in the global South in the so-called informal sector and in non-industrial crafts and peasantry, neither of which resemble the cultural phenomenon of modern-day work with its origins in the colonial North (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987; Thompson 1967). This, however, contradicts the global development paradigm, under which industrialisation, ‘economic upgrading’, global (labour) market integration and ‘structural transformation’ are pursued. Modern work, especially industrial factory jobs and ideally in cities, is supposed to help ‘the poor’ to escape their misery (Banerjee and Duflo 2012; UNDP 2015). Many of these other forms of livelihood provisioning and associated ways of life are thus disregarded, denigrated or destroyed as underdeveloped, backward, poor, and lazy (Thompson 1967), and drawn into the formal system of waged work as cheap labour in capitalist markets and global supply chains – ‘improved living conditions’ as measured in formal pecuniary income (Rosling 2018; Comaroff and Comaroff 1987). There are indications that these transformations create structural poverty, highly vulnerable jobs and an imposed dependence on wage labour (while few viable wage labour structures exist) (Hickel 2017; Srnicek and Williams 2015). There is also clear evidence of numerous struggles against capitalist development and for traditional livelihood protection and environmental justice (Anguelovski 2015). These are aspects where a postwork orientation is relevant beyond the industrialised societies of the global North, as it puts a focus on the modern phenomenon ‘work’ itself and the conditions that led to its predominance, as it questions the common narrative that ‘jobs’ are an end in themselves and justify all kinds of problematic development, and as it allows to ask which alternative, postcolonial critiques and conceptualisations of ‘work’ exist and should be preserved. To conclude, we clearly find traces of postwork organisation and politics in the present. However, these ideas are contested; they concern the roots of modern culture, society and industrial-capitalist economies. Waged work continues to be normalised, alternatives beyond niches appear quite impractical for generalisation. Powerful economic interests, including trade unions, seek to perpetuate the status-quo (Lundström, Räthzel, and Uzzell 2015). Job creation and (global) labour market integration (regardless of what kind) are central policy goals of all political parties, and presently popular progressive debates on a Green New Deal tend to exhibit a rather productivist stance. There is one particular aspect that appears hopeful: the present socio-economic system is unsustainable in the literal sense that it is physically impossible to be sustained in the long run. It was Weber (1992[1905]) who predicted that the powerful cosmos of the modern economic order will be determining with overwhelming force until the last bit of fossil fuel is burnt – and exactly this needs to happen soon to avert catastrophic climate change. 6 This is the battlefield of sustainability, and lately there has been renewed urgency and momentum for more profound social change, where it might be realised that a different societal trajectory beyond work and productivism for their own sake is more sustainable and desirable for the future.

<h4>Your ballot/ROB symbolizes an answer to the question of whether work can be used as the solution to social ills. The plan doesn’t “happen,” and you are conditioned to valorize work – vote neg to interrogate these ideological assumptions.</h4><p><strong>Hoffmann, 20<u> (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/</p><p>What is postwork?</p><p></strong>How can a ‘postwork’ approach contribute to resolving these issues?</u> The notions critique of work (Frayne 2015a, 2015b) or <u>postwork</u> (Weeks 2011) <u>have emerged</u> in recent years in social science research and popular culture, <u>building on a long intellectual tradition of</u> (autonomist and neo-)<u>Marxist, anarchist, and feminist theory</u> (Seyferth 2019; Weeks 2011). <u>The critique of work targets <strong>work in a fundamental sense,</strong> not only its conditions or exploitation. It is aimed at the centrality of work in modern ‘work society’ as a pivotal point for the provision of livelihoods through <strong>monetary income,</u></strong> the granting of social security, social inclusion, and personal identity construction, <u>on which grounds <mark>unemployed persons and unpaid activities are <strong>excluded from recognition</strong></mark>, welfare provision <mark>and</mark> trade <mark>union support.</u></mark> Moreover, <u>the crucial role of waged work in the functioning of the welfare state and the modern industrialised economy is part of this critique (</u>Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015b; Paulsen 2017). Although commonly taken as naturally given, this kind of societal order and its institutions such as the wage relation, labour markets, unemployment, or abstract time are historically and culturally exceptional modes of human coexistence (Applebaum 1992; Graeber 2018; Gorz 1989; Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Thompson 1967). <u>This critique of the structures and social relations of work society is accompanied by the critique of its <strong>cultural foundation</u></strong>, <u><strong>the work ethic</u></strong>; <u>an ideological commitment to work and productivism as ends in themselves, moral obligations, and as intrinsically good, regardless of what is done and at what cost</u> (Gorz 1982; Weber 1992 [1905]; Weeks 2001).</p><p><u><mark>Postwork</u></mark>, however, <u>is not only a critical stance</u>. <u>Criticising work </u>and work society, aware of their historical contingency, <u><mark>implies</mark> the potential for an <strong><mark>emancipatory transformation of industrial society</strong></mark>. The focus is thereby <strong><mark>not </mark>necessarily on <mark>abolishing work</strong></mark> tout-court, <mark>but</mark> rather on pointing out and <strong><mark>questioning its relentless centrality</u></strong></mark> <u>and <mark>asking</mark> <mark>what </mark>a more desirable, free and <strong><mark>sustainable society might look like</u></strong>;</mark> a society <u><mark>in which work is <strong>no longer </mark>the <mark>pivotal </mark>point of social organisation and ideological orientation,</u></strong> including all questions and debates around this objective (Chamberlain 2018; Frayne 2015a; Weeks 2011).</p><p>As a relatively new and dynamically developing approach, postwork is, despite similar political claims, not uniform in its reasoning. <u>Some</u>, <u>drawing on the classical ‘end-of-work’ argument</u> (Frayne 2016), <u>assume an imminent technology-induced massive rise in unemployment.</u> This is welcomed as an opportunity to reduce and ultimately abolish work to liberate humankind (Srnicek and Williams 2015). <u>Others emphasise </u>the remarkable fact <u>that</u> throughout the past two centuries <u>technological development has not challenged the centrality of work in modern lives,</u> despite the prospect that technological change would allow for much shorter working hours (e.g., Keynes 1930). This has not materialised due to the requirements of a work-centred, work-dependent society. On the contrary, <u>work has become more central to modern societies.</u> These deeper structural and cultural aspects and dependencies seem to remain unaffected by technological trends (Paulsen 2017; Weeks 2011).</p><p>The ecological case for postwork</p><p>The perspective of <u>postwork</u>/critiques of work <u>may enrich sustainability debates </u>in many ways; here, <u>our focus is again on ecological concerns</u>. First, <u><mark>postwork offers</mark> a much needed <strong><mark>change in </mark>focus in <mark>sustainability </mark>debates</u></strong>, <u><mark>away from</mark> narrow critiques of individual consumption <strong>and the <mark>overemphasis on ‘green jobs’,</u></strong> <u>towards understanding work as one central cause of sustained societal unsustainability</u></mark>. <u>Postwork directs the focus towards <strong>crucial overlooked issues</u></strong>, <u>e.g. the ways in which work is ecologically harmful, or which problems arise due to the social and cultural significance of modern-day work</u>, <u><strong><mark>including existential dependencies on it.</u></strong></mark> <u>Postwork seeks to <strong>re-politicise work</u></strong>, <u>recognising that its conception and societal organisation are social constructs and therefore political, and must accordingly be open to debate</u> (Weeks 2011). <u>This opens conceptual space and enables open-minded debates</u> <u>about the meaning, value and purpose of work: what kind of work is, for individuals, society and the biosphere as a whole, meaningful, pointless, or outright harmful</u> (Graeber 2018)?</p><p>Such <u>debates and enhanced understanding about the means and ends of work,</u> and the range of problems associated with it, would be important in several regards. <u>In ecological regard it facilitates the ecologically necessary, substantial reduction of work, production and consumption </u>(Frey 2019; Haberl et al. 2009). Reducing work/working hours is one of the key premises of postwork, aiming at de-centring and de-normalising work, and releasing time, energy and creativity for purposes other than work (Coote 2013). <u>From an ecological perspective, reducing</u> the amount of <u>work would reduce the dependency on a commodity-intensive mode of living</u>, and allow space for more sustainable practices (Frayne 2016). <u>Reducing work would also help mitigate all other work-induced environmental pressures</u> described above, especially the ‘Scale factor’ (Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), i.e. the amount of resources and energy consumed, and waste, including emissions, created through work. <u>A postwork approach facilitates debate on the politics of ecological</u> <u>work reduction which entails difficult question</u>s: for example, <u>which industries and fields of employment are to be phased out?</u> Which fields will need to be favoured and upon what grounds? <u>Which kinds of work in which sectors are socially important and should therefore be organised differently</u>, especially when altering the energy basis of work due to climate change mitigation which implies decentralised, locally specific, intermittent and less concentrated energy sources (Malm 2013)? <u><mark>These questions are decisive fo</mark>r future (un-)<mark>sustainability</mark>, and <mark>yet</mark> serious <mark>attempts at a solution are</mark> presently <mark>forestalled by</mark> the <strong><mark>unquestioned sanctity that</mark> work<mark>, ‘jobs’</mark> or ‘full employment’ <mark>enjoy</mark> (Frayne 2015b).</p><p></strong>Postwork is also conducive to rethinking the organisation of work. <mark>There are</mark> plausible <mark>arguments in favour of</mark> new institutions of <strong><mark>democratic control over the economy</strong></mark>,</u> i.e. economic democracy (Johanisova and Wolf 2012). <u>This is urgent and necessary to distribute a very tight remaining carbon budget fairly and wisely</u> (IPCC 2018), to keep economic power in check, and <u>to gain public sovereignty over fundamental economic decisions that are pivotal for (un-)sustainable trajectories</u> (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004). <u>An obstacle to this is one institution in particular which is <strong>rarely under close scrutiny</u></strong>: <u>the labour market, a social construct linked to the advent of modern work in form of the commodity of labour</u> (Applebaum 1992). <u>It is an <strong>undemocratic mechanism</u></strong>, usually <u>characterised by high levels of <strong>unfreedom and coercion</u></strong> (Anderson 2017; Graeber 2018; Paulsen 2015) <u>that allocates waged work in a <strong>competitive mode as an artificially scarce, ‘fictitious’ commodity</u></strong> (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). 4 <u>It does so according to availability of money and motives of gain on the part of employers, and appears therefore inappropriate for distributing labour according to <strong>sustainability criteria and related societal needs</u></strong>. <u><mark>As long as <strong></mark>unsustainable and/or <mark>unnecessary jobs are profitable</mark> </u></strong>and/or (well-)paid, <u><strong><mark>they will continue to exist</u></strong></mark> (Gorz 1989), <u><strong>just as <mark>‘green jobs’ must follow these same criteria </mark>in order to be created.</u></strong> <u>An<mark> <strong>ecological postwork</strong> </mark>perspective <mark>allows </mark>to <strong>question this on ecological grounds</strong>, and it links to<mark> <strong>debates</strong> on <strong>different modes of organising socially necessary work</strong>, </mark>production and <strong>provisioning <mark>in a de-commodified, democratic and sustainable mode.</p><p></u></strong></mark>Finally, <u>postwork is helpful for ecological reasons because it <strong>criticises the cultural glorification of ‘hard work’,</u></strong> merit <u>and productivism, and the moral assumption that laziness and inaction are intrinsically bad</u>, regardless the circumstances. <u>Postwork is about a different mindset which <strong>problematises prevailing productivist attitudes</u></strong> <u>and allows the idea that being lazy or unproductive can be something inherently valuable</u>. <u>Idleness is conducive to an ecological agenda as <strong><mark>nothing is</mark> evidently <mark>more</mark> <mark>carbon-neutral</mark> and environment-sparing <mark>than being a</mark>bsolutely <mark>unproductive</u></strong></mark>. As time-use studies indicate, leisure, recreation and socialising have very low ecological impacts, with rest and sleep having virtually none (Druckman et al. 2012). Apart from humans, <u>the biosphere also needs idle time for regeneration</u>. In this sense, laziness or ‘<u>ecological leisure’,</u> ideally sleep, <u>can be regarded as supremely ecofriendly states of being that would help mitigate ecological pressures</u>. Moreover, as <u>postwork traces which changes in attitudes</u> towards time, efficiency and laziness <u>have brought modern work culture and modern time regimes into being in the first place</u> and have dominated ever since (Thompson 1967; Weber 1992 [1905]), it provides crucial knowledge for understanding and potentially changing this historically peculiar construction. It can thereby take inspiration from longstanding traditions throughout human history, where leisure has usually been a high social ideal and regarded as vital for realising genuine freedom and quality of life (Applebaum 1992; Gorz 1989).</p><p>Conclusions: postwork politics and practices</p><p>We argued that <u>modern-day work is a central cause for unsustainability</u>, <u>and should therefore be transformed to advance towards sustainability</u>. We have contributed to this field of research, firstly, by developing a systematisation of the ecological harms associated with work – comprising the factors Scale, Time, Income, and Work-induced Mobility, Infrastructure, and Consumption – taking those studies one step further which investigate the ecological impacts of working hours quantitatively. <u>One of the analytical advantages of this approach is that it avoids the mystification of work through indirect measures of economic activity</u> (such as per capita GDP<u>), as in the numerous analyses of the conflict between sustainability and economic growth in general. Our second substantial contribution consists in combining these ecological impacts of work with an analysis of the various structural dependencies on work in modern society, which spells out clearly what the recurring jobs-environment-dilemma actually implies, and why it is so difficult to overcome. While this dilemma is often vaguely referred to, this has been the first more detailed analysis of the different dimensions that essentially constitute it. Reviewing the literature in environmental sociology and sustainability research more generally, we also found the work-environment-dilemma and the role of work itself are not sufficiently addressed and remain major unresolved issues.</p><p></u>We proposed the field would benefit from taking up the long intellectual tradition of <u>problematising modern-day work, through the approach of postwork or critiques of work</u>. While the described problems of unsustainability and entrenched dependencies cannot easily be resolved, we discussed how <u>postwork arguments can contribute to pointing out and understanding them, and to opening up new perspectives to advance sustainability debates</u>. A third contribution is therefore to have introduced the concept of postwork/critiques of work into sustainability research and the work-environment debate, and to have conducted an initial analysis of the ways in which postwork may be helpful for tackling ecological problems. <u>Besides being ecologically beneficial, it may also serve <strong>emancipatory purposes to ‘raise broader questions about the place of work in our lives and spark the imagination of a life no longer so subordinate to it’</u></strong> (Weeks 2011, 33). <u>In order to inspire such ‘postwork imagination’</u> (Weeks 2011, 35, 110) <u>and show that postwork ideas are not as detached from reality as they may sound, in this last section we briefly outline examples of existing postwork politics and practices.</p><p>The most obvious example is the reduction of working hours</u> during the 19th and 20th centuries. These reforms were essential to the early labour movement, and the notion that increasing productivity entails shorter working hours has never been nearly as ‘radical’ as today (Paulsen 2017). <u>As concerns about <strong>climate change are rising</strong>, there is also renewed awareness about the <strong>ecological benefits of worktime reduction,</u></strong> besides a whole range of other social and economic advantages (Coote 2013; Frey 2019).</p><p>Worktime reduction is usually taken up positively in public debate. Carlsson (2015, 184) sees a ‘growing minority of people’ who engage in practices other than waged work to support themselves and make meaningful contributions to society. Frayne (2015b) describes the practical refusal of work by average people who wish to live more independently of the treadmill of work. Across society, the disaffection with work is no marginal phenomenon (Graeber 2018; Cederström and Fleming 2012; Paulsen 2014, 2015; Weeks 2011); many start to realise the ‘dissonance between the mythical sanctity of work on the one hand, and the troubling realities of people’s actual experiences on the other’ (Frayne 2015b, 228). <u>Public <mark>debates are</mark> therefore increasingly <mark>receptive to</mark> issues such as <mark>industries’ responsibility for climate change</mark>, coercive ‘workfare’ policies, meaningless ‘<strong><mark>b</strong></mark>ull<strong><mark>s</strong></mark>hit <mark>jobs’</mark>, </u>or ‘work-life-balance’, <u>shorter hours, <mark>overwork and burnout</mark>; topics ‘that will not go away’</u> (Coote 2013, xix) <u>and question the organisation of work society more fundamentally</u>. 5</p><p>The debate about an unconditional basic income (UBI) will also remain. <u><mark>UBI would break</mark> the <mark>existential dependency</mark> of livelihoods on paid work and serve as a new kind of social contract to entitle people to social security regardless of paid economic activity</u>. In addition to countless models in theory, examples of UBI schemes exist in practice, either currently implemented or planned as ‘experiments’ (Srnicek and Williams 2015).</p><p>The critique and <u>refusal of work also takes place both within the sphere of wage labour and outside it. </u>Within, <u>the notions of absenteeism, tardiness, <mark>shirking</mark>, theft, <mark>or</mark> <mark>sabotage</u></mark> (Pouget 1913 [1898]; Seyferth 2019) <u>have a long tradition, dating back to early struggles against work and industrialisation</u> (Thompson 1967), <u>and common until today</u> (Paulsen 2014). The idea of such <u><strong><mark>deliberate ‘workplace resistance’</strong></mark> is that the ability to resist meaningless work and the internalised norms of work society, and be idle and useless while at work, <mark>can be</mark> <strong>recognised</strong> and <strong><mark>successfully practised</mark> </u></strong>(Campagna 2013; Scott 2012). Similarly, <u>there is a growing interest in productive practices,</u> social relations, <u>and the commons outside the sphere of wage labour and market relations, for example in community-supported agriculture</u>. <u><strong>This initiates ways of organising work and the economy to satisfy material needs otherwise than by means of commodity consumption</u></strong> (Chamberlain 2018; Helfrich and Bollier 2015).</p><p>For such modes of organising productive social relations in more varied ways, <u><mark>inspiration could be drawn from</mark> the forms of ‘<mark>work’</mark> that are <strong><mark>prevalent in the global South</u></strong></mark> <u>in the so-called <strong>informal sector</u></strong> <u>and in <mark>non-industrial crafts</mark> and peasantry, neither of which resemble the cultural phenomenon of modern-day work</u> with its origins in the colonial North (Comaroff and Comaroff 1987; Thompson 1967). <u>This</u>, however, <u><mark>contradicts the global development paradigm</mark>, under which industrialisation, ‘economic upgrading’, global</u> (labour) <u>market integration and ‘structural transformation’ are pursued</u>. <u>Modern work</u>, especially industrial factory jobs and ideally in cities, <u>is supposed to help ‘the poor’ to escape their misery</u> (Banerjee and Duflo 2012; UNDP 2015). <u>Many of these other forms of <strong>livelihood provisioning</strong> and <strong>associated ways of life are thus disregarded</u></strong>, <u><strong>denigrated</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>destroyed</u></strong> <u>as</u> <u><strong>underdeveloped</u></strong>, <u><strong>backward, poor, and lazy</u></strong> (Thompson 1967), <u>and drawn into the formal system of waged work as <mark>cheap labour in capitalist markets</u></mark> and global supply chains – ‘<u>improved living conditions’ as measured in formal pecuniary income</u> (Rosling 2018; Comaroff and Comaroff 1987). <u>There are indications that these transformations <strong><mark>create structural poverty, highly vulnerable jobs and an imposed dependence on wage labour</u></strong></mark> (while few viable wage labour structures exist) (Hickel 2017; Srnicek and Williams 2015). <u>There is also clear evidence of numerous struggles against capitalist development and for traditional livelihood protection and environmental justice</u> (Anguelovski 2015). <u>These are aspects where <strong>a postwork orientation is relevant</u></strong> beyond the industrialised societies of the global North, <u>as it puts a focus on the modern phenomenon ‘work’ itself and the conditions that led to its predominance,<strong> as it questions the common narrative that ‘jobs’ are an end in themselves and justify all kinds of problematic development, and as it allows to ask which alternative, postcolonial critiques and conceptualisations of ‘work’ exist and should be preserved.</p><p></u></strong>To conclude, we clearly find traces of postwork organisation and politics in the present. However, these ideas are contested; they concern the roots of modern culture, society and industrial-capitalist economies. <u>Waged work continues to be normalised, alternatives beyond niches appear quite impractical for generalisation<strong>. <mark>Powerful economic interests, including trade unions, seek to perpetuate the status-quo</u></strong></mark> (Lundström, Räthzel, and Uzzell 2015). <u><strong><mark>Job creation</mark> </u></strong>and (global) labour market integration (regardless of what kind) <u>are central policy goals of all political parties, and presently <strong>popular progressive debates on a Green New Deal tend to <mark>exhibit a</mark> rather productivist stance.</p><p></strong>There is one particular aspect that appears hopeful</u>: <u><strong><mark>the present socio-economic system is </mark>unsustainable in the literal sense that it is <mark>physically impossible </mark>to be sustained <mark>in the long run</u></strong></mark>. It was Weber (1992[1905]) who predicted that <u>the powerful cosmos of the modern economic order will be determining with overwhelming force <strong>until the last bit of fossil fuel is burnt</u></strong> – and exactly <u><mark>this needs to happen <strong>soon to avert catastrophic climate change</u></strong></mark>. 6 <u><mark>This is the <strong>battlefield of sustainability</strong></mark>,</u> <u>and lately <mark>there has been <strong>renewed urgency and momentum for more profound social change</u></strong>,</mark> <u>where it might be realised that a <strong>different societal trajectory beyond work and productivism for their own sake is more sustainable and desirable for the future.</p></u></strong>

K

NC Shell

./documents/hsld21/Marlborough/Sa/Marlborough-Salkin-Neg-Alta-Round3.docx

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Alta

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Interlake KK

Justin Fang

AC - US Democracy Inequality w Nuc War NC - T All K Turns 1AR - Inequality Neg NR - K esp climate impact 2AR - All

hsld21/Marlborough/Sa/Marlborough-Salkin-Neg-Alta-Round3.docx

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HS LD 2021-22

ld

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Extinction

Klare 19

Klare 19, *Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)

another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets All major powers have developed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems such as power grids financial systems and transportation networks Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands economic attacks of this sort could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict Others include efforts by third parties such as proxy states or terrorist organizations to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing early-warning systems to generate false readings of missile launches they do provide a clear indication of the severity of the threat the dangers of unintended or accidental escalation can only grow more severe.

pathway to escalation could arise from counterstrikes against national infrastructure All major powers developed cyberweapons such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation economic attacks lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against vital elements of critical infrastructure, producing chaos and harm leading to kinetic attacks risking nuclear conflict proxy states or terrorist organizations provoke a global crisis by causing false readings dangers of accidental escalation grow more severe

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13 The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14 These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by third parties, such as proxy states or terrorist organizations, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing early-warning systems to generate false readings (“spoofing”) of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a clear indication of the severity of the threat. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the dangers of unintended or accidental escalation can only grow more severe.

<h4><u>Extinction</h4><p></u><strong>Klare 19</strong>, *Michael T. Klare<u> is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association; (November 19th, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation”, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)</p><p></u>Yet <u>another <mark>pathway to escalation could arise from</mark> a cascading series of <strong>cyberstrikes</strong> and <strong><mark>counterstrikes</strong> against</mark> <strong>vital <mark>national infrastructure</strong></mark> rather than on military targets</u>. <u><mark>All major powers</u></mark>, along with Iran and North Korea, <u>have <mark>developed</u></mark> and deployed <u><mark>cyberweapons</mark> designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key <strong>economic systems</u></strong>, <u><mark>such as <strong>power grids</u></strong>, <u><strong>financial systems</u></strong>, <u>and <strong>transportation</mark> networks</u></strong>. As noted, <u>Russia has <strong>infiltrated</strong> the U.S. <strong>electrical grid</u></strong>, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 <u>The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus</u>,” <u>intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands</u> or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13 The danger here is that <u><strong><mark>economic attacks</strong></mark> of this sort</u>, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, <u>could <mark>lead to an <strong>escalating series</strong> of <strong>tit-for-tat attacks</strong> against</mark> ever more <strong><mark>vital elements</strong> of</mark> an adversary’s <mark>critical infrastructure</u>, <u>producing</mark> <strong>widespread <mark>chaos</strong> and <strong>harm</strong></mark> and eventually <mark>leading </mark>one side <mark>to</mark> initiate <strong><mark>kinetic attacks</strong></mark> on <strong>critical</strong> military <strong>targets</u></strong>, <u><mark>risking</mark> the <strong>slippery slope</strong> to <strong><mark>nuclear conflict</u></strong></mark>. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14 These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. <u>Others include efforts by <strong>third parties</u></strong>, <u>such as <strong><mark>proxy states</strong> or <strong>terrorist organizations</u></strong></mark>, <u>to <mark>provoke a global</mark> nuclear <mark>crisis by causing</mark> <strong>early-warning systems</strong> to generate <strong><mark>false readings</u></strong></mark> (“spoofing”) <u>of missile launches</u>. Yet, <u>they do provide a <strong>clear indication</strong> of the <strong>severity</strong> of the <strong>threat</u></strong>. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful,<u> the <strong><mark>dangers</strong> of</mark> <strong>unintended</strong> or <strong><mark>accidental escalation</strong></mark> can only <mark>grow more <strong>severe</strong></mark>.</p></u>

OFF

OFF

./documents/ndtceda22/WichitaState/BaBa/WichitaState-BaBa-Neg-Wake-Round-2.docx

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Michigan State BK

Gabriel Morbeck

1ac- llc 1nc- p flaw, rights pic, cil cp, ai t, courts t, cyber da, adv cp, fp da, demo bad 2nr- demo bad

ndtceda22/WichitaState/BaBa/WichitaState-BaBa-Neg-Wake-Round-2.docx

2022-11-12 19:24:35

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Wichita State BaBa

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NDT/CEDA College 2022-23

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No water shortages. Water is reducible, renewable, and recyclable.

Biswas 19

Asit K. Biswas 19, universally acknowledged as one of the world's leading authorities on water, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of the National University of Singapore, and Cecilia Tortajada, Professor in Practice at University of Glasgow’s School of Interdisciplinary Studies and Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Water Policy at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, “Water crisis and water wars: myths and realities,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 35(5), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2019.1636502, Stras

frightening statistics repeated ad nauseam by academics, water professionals and international organizations without any serious scrutiny of the validity of their underlying assumptions, the methodology of their estimates, or the national and international data-sets taken with a very big pinch of salt water is a renewable resource wastewater can be treated and reused this process can continue indefinitely how much renewable water a country has is not a meaningful metric In terms of industrial water use corporations are leading the way to reduce their water footprints very significantly Agricultural water use is more efficient. Globally, water used by agriculture, as a percentage of total water use, has been steadily declining for over a decade China successfully decoupl its economy from water use China reduced its water consumption per RMB 10,000 by 30%, while increasing industrial value by 52.9% water use is likely to decrease even more dramatically compared to the past More and more countries are being forced to improve their water management practices, since they have no real alternative The general public is aware of the value and the cost of water and climate change

stat s repeated without any scrutiny of methodology or data water is renewable indefinitely In terms of industrial water corp s lead to reduce water footprints Ag use is efficient. Globally ag as a percent water use declin for a decade water use decrease more More countries improve management

These are frightening statistics that have been repeated ad nauseam by academics, water professionals, political figures and international organizations without any serious scrutiny of the validity of their underlying assumptions, the methodology of their estimates, or the national and international data-sets available and their quality. The fundamental question that arises is, are such frightening forecasts correct, or should they be taken with a very big pinch of salt? Probabilities are, it is likely to be the latter. First, as every school kid knows, water is a renewable resource. It is not like oil, natural gas or coal, which after being used break down into different components and cannot be used again. Water, by contrast, can be used, and the wastewater generated can be treated and reused. Properly managed, this process can continue indefinitely. Thus, how much renewable water a country has is not a meaningful metric. When the World Commission on Water started its work, one of the first decisions it made was that no attempt would be made to estimate how much water a country, or the world, had that could be used, because it is not a meaningful number. How much water is available for use will depend primarily on how well this resource is managed. Yet most international and national institutions have decided that if a country has less than 1700 m3 per person of renewable freshwater, it is suffering from water stress. If this figure falls below 1000 m3 per person, it is facing scarcity. This muddled thinking explains, to a significant extent, the absurdity of WRI’s ranking Singapore as one of the world’s seven most water-scarce countries. By the current widely accepted standard, Singapore has only about 110 m3 of freshwater per person, which, according to WRI, makes it as water-scarce as the other six most water-scarce countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, San Marino, United Arab Emirates and Palestine. However, if one asks any Singaporean citizen if he/she has seen any sign of water scarcity, the answer will most definitely be no. Singapore did have serious water problems when it became independent in 1965. By improving its water management practices very significantly, it has not had a water problem since about 1980, even though its population has more than tripled, from 1.89 million in 1965 to 5.86 million in 2019. Equally, its per capita GDP has increased during the same period, from USD 516 to USD 55,600, an astronomical 108-fold increase. Yet, in spite of this phenomenal growth, and very low freshwater availability, Singaporeans do not feel any signs of water stress, let alone scarcity. By 2061, Singapore’s water demand is expected to double, and the water currently being imported from Malaysia, accounting for 50% of supply, will stop completely. Yet, with good planning and management Singapore does not anticipate any serious water problem before or after 2061. Compare Singapore and Qatar, two countries WRI considers to be facing the most serious water scarcity problems. Singapore’s domestic water use is 143 litres per capita per day (lpcd), and unaccounted-for losses are 5%. Thus, Singapore has to produce 150 litres so that an average Singaporean receives 143 litres at home. In contrast, an average Qatari national uses 1200 lpcd, with unaccounted-for losses conservatively estimated at 35%. This means Qatar has to produce 1620 litres so that an average Qatari receives 1200 litres at home. Thus, Qatar has to produce nearly 11 times as much water per person as Singapore does. In addition, a Qatari national does not pay for water. In Singapore, the domestic rate is fixed at the marginal cost of producing the water. With additional new policy instruments, we expect Singapore’s water use to be well below 100 lpcd by 2040. Already several Belgian cities are using less than 70 lpcd. In terms of industrial water use, which is increasing the most in terms of total percentage in global use, major multinational corporations like Unilever and Nestlé are leading the way to reduce their water footprints very significantly. Unilever reduced total water abstraction for its factories by 44% between 2008 and 2018. It reduced its total water abstraction in 2018 by 7.2% compared to 2017. It has saved 22 billion litres of water compared to 2008, with very significant increases in production. Unilever’s average payback time for measures to increase water use efficiency has been just over two years. Reduced water consumption has also reduced its energy costs, since less water had to be pumped and heated, and less wastewater had to be treated. Between 2008 and 2017, water conservation reduced Unilever’s annual energy bills by €105 million. Similarly, Nestlé reduced its water withdrawals per tonne of product, for every product category, by 29.6% between 2010 and 2018. Its most innovative idea has been zero-water factories. By installing condensate recovery units for milk, which is 88% water, it made its plant in Lagos de Moreno, Mexico, a zero-water factory. The plant does not abstract water from outside sources. Similar total water savings have been achieved, or soon will be achieved, in six plants in Brazil, and one each in China, India, Pakistan, South Africa and California (Biswas & Tortajada, 2019). Many other industries are now following the footsteps of Unilever and Nestlé, and increasingly more corporations are likely to go this route. Agricultural water use, the largest user of water in the world at 70%, is also becoming more efficient. Globally, water used by agriculture, as a percentage of total water use, has been steadily declining for over a decade. China dramatically reduced its agricultural water abstraction per hectare of irrigated land, by 20%, between 1990 and 2012 (Doczi, Calow, & d’Alançon, 2014). The emphasis on improving agricultural water use efficiency has increased very significantly since then. Importantly, food production since 1990 has continued to grow steadily, as have its economic activities. China is successfully decoupling its economy from water use. Between 2012 and 2017, China reduced its water consumption per RMB 10,000 by 30%, while increasing industrial value added by 52.9% (Wang, 2019). With the increasing emphasis on water conservation and pollution at China’s highest political levels, by 2030, water use is likely to decrease even more dramatically compared to what has been witnessed in the past. More and more countries are being forced to improve their water management practices, since they have no real alternative. Industries are realizing they can survive and thrive only by steadily improving their water efficiency. The general public is becoming aware of the value and the cost of water and of the uncertainties posed by climate change to all related sectors. Cumulatively, all these developments will ensure that the global water scene by 2030 will be very different from the present. A by-product of all these changes is likely to be that the present misguided focus on scarcity due to physical lack of water will move to considering how best water management practices and processes can be improved so that significantly more can be done with the same quantum of water and its regular reuse.

<h4>No water shortages. Water is <u>reducible</u>, <u>renewable</u>, and <u>recyclable</u>.</h4><p>Asit K. <strong>Biswas 19</strong>, universally acknowledged as one of the world's leading authorities on water, Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of the National University of Singapore, and Cecilia Tortajada, Professor in Practice at University of Glasgow’s School of Interdisciplinary Studies and Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Water Policy at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, “Water crisis and water wars: myths and realities,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 35(5), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2019.1636502, Stras</p><p>These are <u><strong>frightening <mark>stat</mark>istic<mark>s</u></strong></mark> that have been <u><strong><mark>repeated</mark> ad nauseam</strong> by academics, water professionals</u>, political figures <u>and international organizations <mark>without <strong>any</mark> serious <mark>scrutiny</strong> of</mark> the <strong>validity</strong> of their <strong>underlying assumptions</strong>, the <strong><mark>methodology</mark> of their estimates</strong>, <mark>or</mark> <strong>the national</strong> and <strong>international <mark>data</mark>-sets</u></strong> available and their quality.</p><p>The fundamental question that arises is, are such frightening forecasts correct, or should they be <u>taken with a <strong>very big pinch of salt</u></strong>? Probabilities are, it is likely to be the latter.</p><p>First, as every school kid knows, <u><mark>water is</mark> a <strong><mark>renewable</mark> resource</u></strong>. It is not like oil, natural gas or coal, which after being used break down into different components and cannot be used again. Water, by contrast, can be used, and the <u>wastewater</u> generated <u>can be <strong>treated and reused</u></strong>. Properly managed, <u>this process can <strong>continue <mark>indefinitely</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u>how much renewable water a country has is <strong>not a meaningful metric</u></strong>. When the World Commission on Water started its work, one of the first decisions it made was that no attempt would be made to estimate how much water a country, or the world, had that could be used, because it is not a meaningful number. How much water is available for use will depend primarily on how well this resource is managed.</p><p>Yet most international and national institutions have decided that if a country has less than 1700 m3 per person of renewable freshwater, it is suffering from water stress. If this figure falls below 1000 m3 per person, it is facing scarcity.</p><p>This muddled thinking explains, to a significant extent, the absurdity of WRI’s ranking Singapore as one of the world’s seven most water-scarce countries. By the current widely accepted standard, Singapore has only about 110 m3 of freshwater per person, which, according to WRI, makes it as water-scarce as the other six most water-scarce countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, San Marino, United Arab Emirates and Palestine. However, if one asks any Singaporean citizen if he/she has seen any sign of water scarcity, the answer will most definitely be no.</p><p>Singapore did have serious water problems when it became independent in 1965. By improving its water management practices very significantly, it has not had a water problem since about 1980, even though its population has more than tripled, from 1.89 million in 1965 to 5.86 million in 2019. Equally, its per capita GDP has increased during the same period, from USD 516 to USD 55,600, an astronomical 108-fold increase. Yet, in spite of this phenomenal growth, and very low freshwater availability, Singaporeans do not feel any signs of water stress, let alone scarcity. By 2061, Singapore’s water demand is expected to double, and the water currently being imported from Malaysia, accounting for 50% of supply, will stop completely. Yet, with good planning and management Singapore does not anticipate any serious water problem before or after 2061.</p><p>Compare Singapore and Qatar, two countries WRI considers to be facing the most serious water scarcity problems. Singapore’s domestic water use is 143 litres per capita per day (lpcd), and unaccounted-for losses are 5%. Thus, Singapore has to produce 150 litres so that an average Singaporean receives 143 litres at home.</p><p>In contrast, an average Qatari national uses 1200 lpcd, with unaccounted-for losses conservatively estimated at 35%. This means Qatar has to produce 1620 litres so that an average Qatari receives 1200 litres at home. Thus, Qatar has to produce nearly 11 times as much water per person as Singapore does. In addition, a Qatari national does not pay for water. In Singapore, the domestic rate is fixed at the marginal cost of producing the water.</p><p>With additional new policy instruments, we expect Singapore’s water use to be well below 100 lpcd by 2040. Already several Belgian cities are using less than 70 lpcd.</p><p><u><mark>In terms of <strong>industrial water</mark> use</u></strong>, which is increasing the most in terms of total percentage in global use, major multinational <u><strong><mark>corp</mark>oration<mark>s</u></strong></mark> like Unilever and Nestlé <u>are <strong><mark>lead</mark>ing the way</strong> <mark>to reduce</mark> <strong>their <mark>water footprints</mark> very significantly</u></strong>. Unilever reduced total water abstraction for its factories by 44% between 2008 and 2018. It reduced its total water abstraction in 2018 by 7.2% compared to 2017. It has saved 22 billion litres of water compared to 2008, with very significant increases in production.</p><p>Unilever’s average payback time for measures to increase water use efficiency has been just over two years. Reduced water consumption has also reduced its energy costs, since less water had to be pumped and heated, and less wastewater had to be treated. Between 2008 and 2017, water conservation reduced Unilever’s annual energy bills by €105 million.</p><p>Similarly, Nestlé reduced its water withdrawals per tonne of product, for every product category, by 29.6% between 2010 and 2018. Its most innovative idea has been zero-water factories. By installing condensate recovery units for milk, which is 88% water, it made its plant in Lagos de Moreno, Mexico, a zero-water factory. The plant does not abstract water from outside sources. Similar total water savings have been achieved, or soon will be achieved, in six plants in Brazil, and one each in China, India, Pakistan, South Africa and California (Biswas & Tortajada, 2019).</p><p>Many other industries are now following the footsteps of Unilever and Nestlé, and increasingly more corporations are likely to go this route.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Ag</mark>ricultural water <mark>use</u></strong></mark>, the largest user of water in the world at 70%, <u><mark>is</u></mark> also becoming <u><strong>more <mark>efficient</strong>. Globally</mark>, water used by<mark> ag</mark>riculture, <mark>as a <strong>percent</mark>age of total <mark>water use</strong></mark>, has been <strong>steadily <mark>declin</mark>ing</strong> <mark>for</mark> <strong>over <mark>a decade</u></strong></mark>. China dramatically reduced its agricultural water abstraction per hectare of irrigated land, by 20%, between 1990 and 2012 (Doczi, Calow, & d’Alançon, 2014). The emphasis on improving agricultural water use efficiency has increased very significantly since then. Importantly, food production since 1990 has continued to grow steadily, as have its economic activities. <u>China</u> is <u><strong>successfully decoupl</u></strong>ing <u>its economy from water use</u>. Between 2012 and 2017, <u>China reduced its water consumption <strong>per RMB 10,000 by 30%</strong>, while increasing <strong>industrial value</u></strong> added <u>by 52.9%</u> (Wang, 2019).</p><p>With the increasing emphasis on water conservation and pollution at China’s highest political levels, by 2030, <u><mark>water use</mark> is likely to <strong><mark>decrease</mark> even <mark>more</mark> dramatically</strong> compared to</u> what has been witnessed in <u>the past</u>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>More</mark> and more <mark>countries</strong></mark> are being forced to <mark>improve</mark> their <strong>water <mark>management</mark> practices</strong>, since they have <strong>no real alternative</u></strong>. Industries are realizing they can survive and thrive only by steadily improving their water efficiency. <u><strong>The general public</strong> is</u> becoming <u>aware of <strong>the value and the cost</strong> of water and</u> of the uncertainties posed by <u>climate change</u> to all related sectors. Cumulatively, all these developments will ensure that the global water scene by 2030 will be very different from the present. A by-product of all these changes is likely to be that the present misguided focus on scarcity due to physical lack of water will move to considering how best water management practices and processes can be improved so that significantly more can be done with the same quantum of water and its regular reuse.</p>

Case

Shortages

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04 - Meadows

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Peninsula BY

Allie Chase

1AC - Water Markets 1NC - T Regulation T Its Infra DA EPA DA Set Col K States CP 2NR - Infra DA

hspolicy21/Gunn/VaSh/Gunn-Valame-Shirts-Neg-04%20-%20Meadows-Round4.docx

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Protection means regulations that shield water resources from loss, destruction, or injury beyond a de minimis level. This is distinct from mitigation, maintenance, development, and restoration. Topical plans must mandate protection, not fix the problem after breaches

Ryan 10

Ryan 10 — Melissa M. Ryan, Member of the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals, 2010 (Columbia Riverkeeper et al. vs. Clatsop County and Bradwood Landing LLC and Northernstar Energy LLC, Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals Case Number 2009-100, April 12th, Available Online at https://www.oregon.gov/LUBA/docs/opinions/2010/04-10/09100.pdf, Accessed 07-05-2021, p. 15-19)

As described above, a portion of the site consists of estuarine shoreland adjacent to the Columbia River and the site is part of the Columbia River Estuary planning area identified in the CCCP. One aspect of the development proposal is a zone change for an approximately 46-acre submerged portion of land from Aquatic Conservation-2 (AC-2) to Aquatic Development (AD), in order to allow dredging of the river in that location. Clatsop LWDUO 5.412(1) requires that the proposed zone change must be consistent with comprehensive plan policies. Those policies include a requirement that “[t]raditional fishing areas shall be protected when dredging, filling, pile driving or when other potentially disruptive activities occur” (CCCP Policy 20.2(1)) and a requirement that “[e]ndangered or threatened species habitat shall be protected from incompatible development” (CCCP Policy 20.8). (Emphases added.) The county found, and there is no dispute, that the area sought to be rezoned to AD to be dredged for a channel, turning basin and docking facility is located in a “traditional fishing area,” the Clifton Channel of the Columbia River. In Bradwood I, we remanded the decision to the county in part because we agreed with petitioners that the county erred in using a dictionary definition of the word “protect” in determining whether the proposed zone change to AD was consistent with CCCP Policy 20.2(1) and Policy 20.8. We held that LWDUO 5.412(1) required that the county apply the definition of “protect” found in the Statewide Planning Goals. “Protect” is defined in the Goals as “save or shield from loss, destruction, or injury or for future intended use.” We suggested that the county’s view of “protect” as being satisfied by attempts to protect, an intent to protect, or measures that merely reduce harm to the resources was not consistent with the Goal definition: “‘Protect’ as defined by LCDC and as used by the County and acknowledged by LCDC in the County planning documents does not require that absolutely no disturbance occurs. Protection is provided by avoiding those areas to the extent possible and making development sensitive to the environment where it does in fact occur, so that estuarine and coastal shoreline values are maintained.” Record 25. it is reasonable to conclude that the word “protect” in those CCCP policies is used in the same way as the word “protect” is used in Statewide Planning Goal 16 (Estuarine Resources). The county’s interpretation of the meaning of “protect” appears to conclude that protection of specific resources can be accomplished through use of some measures that either reduce harm to general estuarine values or attempt to reduce harm to the specified resources. However, we do not see much of a distinction between the county’s interpretation of “protect” as defined in the dictionary, which in Bradwood I we found improperly imported the concepts of “attempts” to protect or an “intent” to protect into the definition, and the county’s interpretation of the Goal definition of “protect” in the present appeal as satisfied through measures that merely reduce harm. The definition of “protect” contains stringent language: “save or shield from loss, destruction, or injury * * *.” “Save” has many definitions, including to preserve or guard from injury, destruction or loss.” “Shield” is defined as “to protect with or as if with a shield.” Id. at 2094. Context for interpreting the goal definition of “protect” is provided by considering its use within the text of Goal 16. The goal itself provides that its purpose is: To recognize and protect the unique environmental, economic, and social values of each estuary and associated wetlands; and To protect, maintain, where appropriate develop, and where appropriate restore the long-term environmental, economic, and social values, diversity and benefits of Oregon’s estuaries.” (Emphases added.) The goal sets out a hierarchy of priorities for management and use of estuarine resources, placing in first priority “[u]ses which maintain the integrity of the estuarine ecosystem.” Within the remaining text of Goal 16, the word “protect” appears almost exclusively in the Goal text describing the “natural management unit” designation. That designation is the most protective classification of Goal 16 resources, and includes “areas designated to assure the protection of significant fish and wildlife habitats .” Thus, the most protective classification in Goal 16 allows only activities that are sufficient to protect the identified resources. The Goal language describing the other designations also provides context for the meaning of “protect.” The description of the “conservation management unit,” does not include the word “protect.” The description of the “development management unit,” also does not use the word “protect.” Taken together, the uses of the word “protect” within Goal 16 itself indicate that the definition is not equivocal in requiring that identified resources are “saved” or “shielded” from more than de minimis damaging impacts. Although we agree with the county that the Goal definition of “protect” does not require that estuarine resources identified for protection be completely or absolutely protected from any “loss, destruction, or injury” whatsoever, the county has made a planning decision to “protect” as opposed to a decision to “maintain,” “develop,” or “restore” traditional fishing areas and endangered or threatened species habitat. Having made that “protect” planning decision, the local program to protect those estuarine resources must not allow “loss, destruction, or injury” beyond a de minimis level. Thus, the development that is to be allowed by the disputed rezone is not consistent with the Goal definition of “protect” unless the measures proposed in seeking to rezone the property are sufficient to reduce harm to such a degree that there is at most a de minimis or insignificant impact on the resources that those policies require to be protected.

“Protect” is defined as “save or shield from loss, destruction, or injury or for future intended use.” the view of “protect” as being satisfied by attempts to protect, an intent to protect, or measures that merely reduce harm to resources was not consistent with the definition the definition is not equivocal in requiring that identified resources are “saved” or “shielded” Although “protect” does not require that resources be completely or absolutely protected from any injury whatsoever, the decision to “protect” as opposed to “maintain,” “develop,” or “restore” must not allow “loss, destruction, or injury” beyond a de minimis level.

Second Assignment of Error As described above, a portion of the site consists of estuarine shoreland adjacent to the Columbia River and the site is part of the Columbia River Estuary planning area identified in the CCCP. One aspect of the development proposal is a zone change for an approximately 46-acre submerged portion of land from Aquatic Conservation-2 (AC-2) to Aquatic Development (AD), in order to allow dredging of the river in that location. Clatsop LWDUO 5.412(1) requires that the proposed zone change must be consistent with comprehensive plan policies. Those policies include a requirement that “[t]raditional fishing areas shall be protected when dredging, filling, pile driving or when other potentially disruptive activities occur” (CCCP Policy 20.2(1)) and a requirement that “[e]ndangered or threatened species habitat shall be protected from incompatible development” (CCCP Policy 20.8). (Emphases added.) The county found, and there is no dispute, that the area sought to be rezoned to AD to be dredged for a channel, turning basin and docking facility is located in a “traditional fishing area,” the Clifton Channel of the Columbia River. In Bradwood I, we remanded the decision to the county in part because we agreed with petitioners that the county erred in using a dictionary definition of the word “protect” in determining whether the proposed zone change to AD was consistent with CCCP Policy 20.2(1) and Policy 20.8. We held that LWDUO 5.412(1) required that the county apply the [end page 15] definition of “protect” found in the Statewide Planning Goals. “Protect” is defined in the Goals as “save or shield from loss, destruction, or injury or for future intended use.” We suggested that the county’s view of “protect” as being satisfied by attempts to protect, an intent to protect, or measures that merely reduce harm to the resources was not consistent with the Goal definition: “* * * [T]he county proceeded to the fourth source of definitions listed LWDUO 1.035, a legal dictionary, and chose a different definition of ‘protect’ that introduces an element of intent. Under the county’s interpretation, as long as intervenors ‘attempt’ to preserve a resource it has ‘protected’ that resource. It is not entirely clear what the county means by ‘attempt,’ but the county apparently understands it to mean using measures that are intended to ‘minimize’ impacts, even if those measures fail to shield the resource from loss and significant adverse impacts on the resource still occur. That view may be consistent with the law dictionary definition the county relies upon, but it is not at all clear to us that it is consistent with the statewide planning goal definition.” Id. at 219. A. Meaning of “Protect” The county interpreted the meaning of “protect” as defined in the Goals as: “‘Protect’ as defined by LCDC and as used by the County and acknowledged by LCDC in the County planning documents does not require that absolutely no disturbance occurs. Protection is provided by avoiding those areas to the extent possible and making development sensitive to the environment where it does in fact occur, so that estuarine and coastal shoreline values are maintained.” Record 25. As noted in Bradwood I, CCCP Policy 20.2(1) and Policy 20.8 implement Goal 16, and it is reasonable to conclude that the word “protect” in those CCCP policies is used in the same way as the word “protect” is used in Statewide Planning Goal 16 (Estuarine Resources). The county’s interpretation of the word “protect” as defined in the Goals is an interpretation of state law and, as such, is not entitled to any particular deference on appeal. Kenagy v. Benton County, 115 Or App 131, 838 P2d 1076 (1992). The county’s interpretation of the meaning of “protect” appears to conclude that protection of specific resources can be accomplished through use of some measures that either reduce harm to general estuarine [end page 16] values or attempt to reduce harm to the specified resources.6 However, we do not see much of a distinction between the county’s interpretation of “protect” as defined in the dictionary, which in Bradwood I we found improperly imported the concepts of “attempts” to protect or an “intent” to protect into the definition, and the county’s interpretation of the Goal definition of “protect” in the present appeal as satisfied through measures that merely reduce harm. The definition of “protect” contains stringent language: “save or shield from loss, destruction, or injury * * *.” “Save” has many definitions, including “1:f: to preserve or guard from injury, destruction or loss.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2019 (1981). “Shield” is defined as “to protect with or as if with a shield.” Id. at 2094. Context for interpreting the goal definition of “protect” is provided by considering its use within the text of Goal 16. The goal itself provides that its purpose is: “To recognize and protect the unique environmental, economic, and social values of each estuary and associated wetlands; and “To protect, maintain, where appropriate develop, and where appropriate restore the long-term environmental, economic, and social values, diversity and benefits of Oregon’s estuaries.” (Emphases added.) Goal 16 requires protection of the environmental, economic, and social values, diversity and benefits of estuaries, and allows estuarine development and restoration only “where appropriate.” The goal sets out a hierarchy of priorities for management and use of estuarine resources, placing in first priority “[u]ses which maintain the integrity of the estuarine ecosystem.” Within the remaining text of Goal 16, the word “protect” appears almost exclusively in the Goal text describing the “natural management unit” designation. That designation is the most protective classification of Goal 16 resources, and includes “areas [end page 17] * * * designated to assure the protection of significant fish and wildlife habitats * * *.” The natural management unit allows uses and activities that allow the resources of the estuary to “continue to function in a manner to protect significant wildlife habitats, natural biological productivity, and values for scientific research and education.” Thus, the most protective classification in Goal 16, the natural management unit designation, allows only activities that are sufficient to protect the identified resources. The Goal language describing the other designations also provides context for the meaning of “protect.” The description of the “conservation management unit,” which is the current management designation of the subject property, does not include the word “protect.”7 The description of the “development management unit,” the proposed designation of the property, also does not use the word “protect.” Taken together, the uses of the word “protect” within Goal 16 itself indicate that the definition is not equivocal in requiring that identified resources are “saved” or “shielded” from more than de minimis damaging impacts. Although we agree with the county that the Goal definition of “protect” does not require that estuarine resources identified for protection be completely or absolutely protected from any “loss, destruction, or injury” whatsoever, the county has made a planning decision under the CCCP policies at issue that implement Goal 16 and the scheme set forth in the second paragraph of Goal 16, quoted above, to “protect” as opposed to a decision to “maintain,” “develop,” or “restore” traditional fishing areas and endangered or threatened species habitat. Having made that “protect” planning decision, the local program to protect those estuarine resources must not allow “loss, destruction, or injury” beyond a de minimis level. Thus, the development that is to be allowed by the disputed rezone is not consistent [end page 18] with the Goal definition of “protect” unless the measures proposed in seeking to rezone the property are sufficient to reduce harm to such a degree that there is at most a de minimis or insignificant impact on the resources that those policies require to be protected. —— Footnotes —— 6. The county’s generalized findings regarding the meaning of “protect” contain various examples of these types of measures. For example, the county concluded that intervenors have designed the dredge footprint to “maximize efficient use of the current basin, minimize the amount of dredging and reduce impacts to fisheries, thereby reducing the area impacted and protecting the habitat as a whole.” Record 25 (emphases added). 7. The conservation management unit includes references to management of estuarine resources in order to “conserve” those resources. “Conserve” is defined in the Statewide Planning Goals as “[t]o manage in a manner which avoids wasteful or destructive uses and provides for future availability.”

<h4><strong>Protection means <u>regulations</u> that shield water resources from loss, destruction, or injury beyond a de minimis level. This is <u>distinct</u> from mitigation, maintenance, development, and restoration. Topical plans must <u>mandate</u> protection, not fix the problem after breaches</h4><p>Ryan 10</strong> — Melissa M. Ryan, Member of the Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals, 2010 (Columbia Riverkeeper et al. vs. Clatsop County and Bradwood Landing LLC and Northernstar Energy LLC, Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals Case Number 2009-100, April 12th, Available Online at https://www.oregon.gov/LUBA/docs/opinions/2010/04-10/09100.pdf, Accessed 07-05-2021, p. 15-19)</p><p>Second Assignment of Error</p><p><u>As described above, a portion of the site consists of estuarine shoreland adjacent to the Columbia River and the site is part of the Columbia River Estuary planning area identified in the CCCP. One aspect of the development proposal is a zone change for an approximately 46-acre submerged portion of land from Aquatic Conservation-2 (AC-2) to Aquatic Development (AD), in order to allow dredging of the river in that location. Clatsop LWDUO 5.412(1) requires that the proposed zone change must be consistent with comprehensive plan policies. Those policies include a requirement that “[t]raditional fishing areas shall be protected when dredging, filling, pile driving or when other potentially disruptive activities occur” (CCCP Policy 20.2(1)) and a requirement that “[e]ndangered or threatened species habitat shall be protected from incompatible development” (CCCP Policy 20.8). (Emphases added.) The county found, and there is no dispute, that the area sought to be rezoned to AD to be dredged for a channel, turning basin and docking facility is located in a “traditional fishing area,” the Clifton Channel of the Columbia River.</p><p>In Bradwood I, we remanded the decision to the county in part because we agreed with petitioners that the county erred in using a dictionary definition of the word “protect” in determining whether the proposed zone change to AD was consistent with CCCP Policy 20.2(1) and Policy 20.8. We held that LWDUO 5.412(1) required that the county apply the</u> [end page 15] <u>definition of “protect” found in the Statewide Planning Goals. <mark>“Protect” is defined</mark> in the Goals <mark>as “<strong>save or shield from loss, destruction, or injury or for future intended use</strong>.”</mark> We suggested that <mark>the</mark> county’s <mark>view of “protect” as being satisfied by <strong>attempts</strong> to protect, an <strong>intent</strong> to protect, or measures that <strong>merely reduce harm</strong> to</mark> the <mark>resources was <strong>not consistent</strong> with the</mark> Goal <mark>definition</mark>:</p><p></u>“* * * [T]he county proceeded to the fourth source of definitions listed LWDUO 1.035, a legal dictionary, and chose a different definition of ‘protect’ that introduces an element of intent. Under the county’s interpretation, as long as intervenors ‘attempt’ to preserve a resource it has ‘protected’ that resource. It is not entirely clear what the county means by ‘attempt,’ but the county apparently understands it to mean using measures that are intended to ‘minimize’ impacts, even if those measures fail to shield the resource from loss and significant adverse impacts on the resource still occur. That view may be consistent with the law dictionary definition the county relies upon, but it is not at all clear to us that it is consistent with the statewide planning goal definition.” Id. at 219.</p><p>A. Meaning of “Protect”</p><p>The county interpreted the meaning of “protect” as defined in the Goals as:</p><p><u>“‘Protect’ as defined by LCDC and as used by the County and acknowledged by LCDC in the County planning documents does not require that absolutely no disturbance occurs. Protection is provided by avoiding those areas to the extent possible and making development sensitive to the environment where it does in fact occur, so that estuarine and coastal shoreline values are maintained.” Record 25.</p><p></u>As noted in Bradwood I, CCCP Policy 20.2(1) and Policy 20.8 implement Goal 16, and <u>it is reasonable to conclude that the word “protect” in those CCCP policies is used in the same way as the word “protect” is used in Statewide Planning Goal 16 (Estuarine Resources).</u> The county’s interpretation of the word “protect” as defined in the Goals is an interpretation of state law and, as such, is not entitled to any particular deference on appeal. Kenagy v. Benton County, 115 Or App 131, 838 P2d 1076 (1992). <u>The county’s interpretation of the meaning of “protect” appears to conclude that protection of specific resources can be accomplished through use of some measures that either reduce harm to general estuarine</u> [end page 16] <u>values or attempt to reduce harm to the specified resources.</u>6 <u>However, we do not see much of a distinction between the county’s interpretation of “protect” as defined in the dictionary, which in Bradwood I we found improperly imported the concepts of “attempts” to protect or an “intent” to protect into the definition, and the county’s interpretation of the Goal definition of “protect” in the present appeal as satisfied through measures that merely reduce harm.</p><p><strong>The definition of “protect” contains stringent language</strong>: “save or shield from loss, destruction, or injury * * *.” “<strong>Save</strong>” has many definitions, including</u> “1:f: <u>to preserve or guard from injury, destruction or loss.”</u> Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2019 (1981). <u>“<strong>Shield</strong>” is defined as “to protect with or as if with a shield.” Id. at 2094.</p><p>Context for interpreting the goal definition of “protect” is provided by considering its use within the text of Goal 16. The goal itself provides that its purpose is:</p><p></u>“<u>To recognize and protect the unique environmental, economic, and social values of each estuary and associated wetlands; and</p><p></u>“<u>To protect, maintain, where appropriate develop, and where appropriate restore the long-term environmental, economic, and social values, diversity and benefits of Oregon’s estuaries.” (Emphases added.)</p><p></u>Goal 16 requires protection of the environmental, economic, and social values, diversity and benefits of estuaries, and allows estuarine development and restoration only “where appropriate.” <u>The goal sets out a hierarchy of priorities for management and use of estuarine resources, placing in first priority “[u]ses which maintain the integrity of the estuarine ecosystem.” Within the remaining text of Goal 16, the word “protect” appears almost exclusively in the Goal text describing the “natural management unit” designation. That designation is the most protective classification of Goal 16 resources, and includes “areas</u> [end page 17] * * * <u>designated to assure the protection of significant fish and wildlife habitats</u> * * *<u>.”</u> The natural management unit allows uses and activities that allow the resources of the estuary to “continue to function in a manner to protect significant wildlife habitats, natural biological productivity, and values for scientific research and education.” <u>Thus, the most protective classification in Goal 16</u>, the natural management unit designation, <u>allows <strong>only activities that are sufficient to protect the identified resources.</p><p></strong>The Goal language describing the other designations also provides context for the meaning of “protect.” The description of the “<strong>conservation</strong> management unit,”</u> which is the current management designation of the subject property, <u>does not include the word “protect.”</u>7 <u>The description of the “<strong>development</strong> management unit,”</u> the proposed designation of the property, <u>also does not use the word “protect.” Taken together, the uses of the word “protect” within Goal 16 itself indicate that <strong><mark>the definition is not equivocal in requiring that identified resources are “saved” or “shielded”</mark> from more than de minimis damaging impacts.</p><p></strong><mark>Although</mark> we agree with the county that the Goal definition of <mark>“protect” does not require that</mark> estuarine <mark>resources</mark> identified for protection <mark>be <strong>completely</strong> or <strong>absolutely</strong> protected from any</mark> “loss, destruction, or <mark>injury</mark>” <strong><mark>whatsoever</strong>, the</mark> county has made a planning <mark>decision</u></mark> under the CCCP policies at issue that implement Goal 16 and the scheme set forth in the second paragraph of Goal 16, quoted above, <u><mark>to “protect” <strong>as opposed to</strong></mark> a decision to <mark>“<strong>maintain</strong>,” “<strong>develop</strong>,” or “<strong>restore</strong>”</mark> traditional fishing areas and endangered or threatened species habitat. <strong>Having made that “protect” planning decision</strong>, the local program to protect those estuarine resources <strong><mark>must not allow “loss, destruction, or injury” beyond a de minimis level</strong>.</mark> Thus, the development that is to be allowed by the disputed rezone is not consistent</u> [end page 18] <u><strong>with the Goal definition of “protect” unless the measures proposed in seeking to rezone the property are sufficient to reduce harm to such a degree that there is at most a de minimis or insignificant impact on the resources that those policies require to be protected.</p><p></u>—— Footnotes ——</p><p></strong>6. The county’s generalized findings regarding the meaning of “protect” contain various examples of these types of measures. For example, the county concluded that intervenors have designed the dredge footprint to “maximize efficient use of the current basin, minimize the amount of dredging and reduce impacts to fisheries, thereby reducing the area impacted and protecting the habitat as a whole.” Record 25 (emphases added).</p><p>7. The conservation management unit includes references to management of estuarine resources in order to “conserve” those resources. “Conserve” is defined in the Statewide Planning Goals as “[t]o manage in a manner which avoids wasteful or destructive uses and provides for future availability.”</p>

1NC — Topicality “Protection”

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unregulated commercialization triples debris and renders satellites unusable.

Fabian 19

Fabian 19 (Christopher; January 2019; B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a M.S. from the University of North Dakota, approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee and in coordination with Dr. Michael Dodge, David Kugler, and Brian Urlacher; University of North Dakota Scholarly Commons, “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy,” https://commons.und.edu/theses/2455/)

The ubiquity of space technology yielded the negative externality of overcrowding the space domain. Despite its size, there are a limited number of useful earth-centric orbits to optimize terrestrial coverage there are over 300,000 medium objects capable of causing catastrophic failure of a satellite upon collision in orbit 20,000 are actively tracked by the comparatively robust space surveillance network of the Air Force, only 1,000 are active and even fewer have maneuver capability Recent trends indicate that orbital congestion will only worsen in decades as barriers to entry are reduced. Launch cost is rapidly decreasing due to service providers and technology revolutions the miniaturization and simplification of payloads reduces the cost and infrastructure This is evidenced by near doubling of state satellites coupled with total space objects accumulation of space debris is a vital concern to sustainable development of space due to the increased probability of conjunction between active payloads and other objects from crowded orbits increase in collision occurs proportionally to the number of objects in orbital domain. The tripling of debris projected to occur in the century, due to routine use and accumulation alone, would cause a tenfold increase in collision. In the event of collision between objects, the resulting debris cloud could cause a cascading effect. Each successive collision increases probability of another a given orbit until an instability threshold is reached debris removal due to decay would be negligible compared to debris created by collisions. As propagation continues, the cost of a satellite would outweigh the benefits due to the probability of that asset being destroyed by errant debris rendering the orbit unusable Kessler asserts unstable regions of low orbit exist and barring addition of debris collision would occur every 10-20 years are on the order of centuries, it is widely accepted the current rate of accumulation will render critical orbits unusable unless immediate measures are taken to return stability There is universal acceptance of the danger debris presents, yet little action has been taken Current debris models show that earth orbiting domains are finite Continued development may preclude future usage, making orbits rivalrous goods domains are made non-excludable by the OST space succumbs to the tragedy of the commons where the beneficial strategy of space utilization differs significantly from the optimal strategy promoting stability most analysis focused on solving orbital instability by addressing the market failure if actors creating debris internalize the cost of their actions, a solution can arise This analysis is useful under nominal conditions, but there is an underlying problem that needs to be addressed before any solutions can be enacted

ubiquity of tech yielded overcrowding there are 300,000 objects capable of failure congestion will worsen evidenced by doubling of satellites increase in collision occurs proportionally tripling of debris would tenfold increase the cloud could cascad until a threshold is reached cost of a sat would outweigh benefits due to being destroyed accumulation will render orbits unusable orbits rivalrous

b. Defect/Defect The ubiquity of space technology has also yielded the negative externality of overcrowding the space domain. Despite its seemingly unlimited size, there are a limited number of useful earth-centric orbits to optimize terrestrial coverage. It is projected that there are over 300,000 medium sized objects capable of causing catastrophic failure of a satellite upon collision currently in earth’s orbit.159 Of these objects, 20,000 are actively tracked by the comparatively robust space surveillance network (SSN) of the United States Air Force, only 1,000 are active payloads, and even fewer have maneuver capability.160 Recent trends indicate that the problem of orbital congestion will only worsen in the coming decades as the barriers to entry are reduced. Launch service cost is rapidly decreasing due to an increased number of service providers and technology revolutions such as reusable rockets. Also, the miniaturization and simplification of satellite payloads further reduces the cost and infrastructure needed to be a spacefairing nation.161 This is evidenced by the near doubling of state operated satellites from 27 in 2000 to over 50 in 2012, coupled with a near doubling in total space objects from 1997 to 2007.162 The accumulation of space debris is a vital concern to the sustainable development of the space environment due to the increased probability of conjunction between active payloads and all other objects that results from crowded orbits. This increase in collision probability occurs proportionally to the number of objects in a given orbital domain. The tripling of orbital debris projected to occur in the next century, due to routine use and accumulation alone, would cause a tenfold increase in the probability of collision. In the event of a catastrophic collision between two objects, the resulting debris cloud could cause a cascading effect. Each successive collision increases the probability of another occurrence in a given orbit until an instability threshold is reached. At this threshold, debris removal due to decay would be negligible compared to debris created by subsequent collisions. As the propagation of debris continues, the cost of launching a satellite would eventually outweigh the benefits received due to the probability of that asset being destroyed by errant debris, effectively rendering the given orbit unusable. This debris propagation model and the dangers associated with it are colloquially referred to as the Kessler Syndrome. Kessler asserts unstable regions of low earth orbit (LEO) currently exist and that, barring the addition of more debris, a major collision would occur once every 10-20 years. If debris doubles, as it has in the last decade, the collision rate would increase to 2.5 years. Although most models’ time scales are on the order of centuries, it is widely accepted that the current rate of debris accumulation will render critical orbits unusable unless immediate measures are taken to return stability.163 There is near universal acceptance of the danger space debris presents, yet little substantive action has been taken to solve the problem. Current debris accumulation and propagation models show that earth orbiting domains are finite resources. Continued unsustainable development moving forward may preclude future usage, making earth orbits rivalrous goods.164 Furthermore, orbital domains are made a non-excludable good by the OST which states, “Outer space… shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind.”165 As a non-excludable public good, space succumbs to the tragedy of the commons where the privately beneficial strategy of space utilization differs significantly from the socially optimal strategy promoting orbital stability.166 Understandably, most analysis has focused on solving the problem of orbital instability by addressing the market failure responsible for debris creation. The current reasoning suggests that if actors creating space debris internalize the cost of their actions, a solution can arise. Proposed solutions run the gamut of ideologies from free market tax incentives, to command and control legislation, to restructuring orbital property rights. Scientific solutions have also been proposed, but technological feasibility and cost remain major problems. Furthermore, analogous environments susceptible to the tragedy of the commons have been examined in hopes that they may prove applicable to the problem of orbit instability.167 This analysis is ultimately useful if the problem is to be solved under nominal conditions, but there is an underlying problem that needs to be addressed before any of these proposed solutions can realistically be enacted.

<h4>unregulated commercialization triples debris and renders satellites unusable. </h4><p><strong>Fabian 19 </strong>(Christopher; January 2019; B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a M.S. from the University of North Dakota, approved by the Faculty Advisory Committee and in coordination with Dr. Michael Dodge, David Kugler, and Brian Urlacher; University of North Dakota Scholarly Commons, “A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy,” https://commons.und.edu/theses/2455/)</p><p>b. Defect/Defect <u><strong>The <mark>ubiquity of</mark> space <mark>tech</mark>nology</u></strong> has also <u><strong><mark>yielded</mark> the negative externality of <mark>overcrowding</mark> the space domain. Despite its</u></strong> seemingly unlimited <u><strong>size, there are a limited number of useful earth-centric orbits to optimize terrestrial coverage</u></strong>. It is projected that <u><strong><mark>there are</mark> over <mark>300,000</mark> medium</u></strong> sized <u><strong><mark>objects capable of</mark> causing catastrophic <mark>failure</mark> of a satellite upon collision</u></strong> currently <u><strong>in</u></strong> earth’s <u><strong>orbit</u></strong>.159 Of these objects, <u><strong>20,000 are actively tracked by the comparatively robust space surveillance network</u></strong> (SSN) <u><strong>of the</u></strong> United States <u><strong>Air Force, only 1,000 are active</u></strong> payloads, <u><strong>and even fewer have maneuver capability</u></strong>.160 <u><strong>Recent trends indicate that</u></strong> the problem of <u><strong>orbital <mark>congestion will</mark> only <mark>worsen</mark> in</u></strong> the coming <u><strong>decades as</u></strong> the <u><strong>barriers to entry are reduced. Launch</u></strong> service <u><strong>cost is rapidly decreasing due to</u></strong> an increased number of <u><strong>service providers and technology revolutions</u></strong> such as reusable rockets. Also, <u><strong>the miniaturization and simplification of</u></strong> satellite <u><strong>payloads</u></strong> further <u><strong>reduces the cost and infrastructure</u></strong> needed to be a spacefairing nation.161 <u><strong>This is <mark>evidenced by</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>near <mark>doubling of</mark> state</u></strong> operated <u><strong><mark>satellites</u></strong></mark> from 27 in 2000 to over 50 in 2012, <u><strong>coupled with</u></strong> a near doubling in <u><strong>total space objects</u></strong> from 1997 to 2007.162 The <u><strong>accumulation of space debris is a vital concern to</u></strong> the <u><strong>sustainable development of</u></strong> the <u><strong>space</u></strong> environment <u><strong>due to the increased probability of conjunction between active payloads and</u></strong> all <u><strong>other objects</u></strong> that results <u><strong>from crowded orbits</u></strong>. This <u><strong><mark>increase in collision</u></strong></mark> probability <u><strong><mark>occurs proportionally</mark> to the number of objects in</u></strong> a given <u><strong>orbital domain. The <mark>tripling of</u></strong></mark> orbital <u><strong><mark>debris</mark> projected to occur in the</u></strong> next <u><strong>century, due to routine use and accumulation alone, <mark>would</mark> cause a <mark>tenfold increase</mark> in</u></strong> the probability of <u><strong>collision. In the event of</u></strong> a catastrophic <u><strong>collision between</u></strong> two <u><strong>objects, <mark>the</mark> resulting debris <mark>cloud could</mark> cause a <mark>cascad</mark>ing effect. Each successive collision increases</u></strong> the <u><strong>probability of another</u></strong> occurrence in <u><strong>a given orbit <mark>until a</mark>n instability <mark>threshold is reached</u></strong></mark>. At this threshold, <u><strong>debris removal due to decay would be negligible compared to debris created by</u></strong> subsequent <u><strong>collisions. As</u></strong> the <u><strong>propagation</u></strong> of debris <u><strong>continues, the <mark>cost of</u></strong></mark> launching <u><strong><mark>a sat</mark>ellite <mark>would</u></strong></mark> eventually <u><strong><mark>outweigh</mark> the <mark>benefits</u></strong></mark> received <u><strong><mark>due to</mark> the probability of that asset <mark>being destroyed</mark> by errant debris</u></strong>, effectively <u><strong>rendering the</u></strong> given <u><strong>orbit unusable</u></strong>. This debris propagation model and the dangers associated with it are colloquially referred to as the Kessler Syndrome. <u><strong>Kessler asserts unstable regions of low</u></strong> earth <u><strong>orbit</u></strong> (LEO) currently <u><strong>exist and</u></strong> that, <u><strong>barring</u></strong> the <u><strong>addition of</u></strong> more <u><strong>debris</u></strong>, a major <u><strong>collision would occur</u></strong> once <u><strong>every 10-20 years</u></strong>. If debris doubles, as it has in the last decade, the collision rate would increase to 2.5 years. Although most models’ time scales <u><strong>are on the order of centuries, it is widely accepted</u></strong> that <u><strong>the current rate of</u></strong> debris <u><strong><mark>accumulation will render</mark> critical <mark>orbits unusable</mark> unless immediate measures are taken to return stability</u></strong>.163 <u><strong>There is</u></strong> near <u><strong>universal acceptance of the danger</u></strong> space <u><strong>debris presents, yet little</u></strong> substantive <u><strong>action has been taken</u></strong> to solve the problem. <u><strong>Current debris</u></strong> accumulation and propagation <u><strong>models show that earth orbiting domains are finite</u></strong> resources. <u><strong>Continued</u></strong> unsustainable <u><strong>development</u></strong> moving forward <u><strong>may preclude future usage, making</u></strong> earth <u><strong><mark>orbits rivalrous</mark> goods</u></strong>.164 Furthermore, orbital <u><strong>domains are made</u></strong> a <u><strong>non-excludable</u></strong> good <u><strong>by the OST</u></strong> which states, “Outer space… shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind.”165 As a non-excludable public good, <u><strong>space succumbs to the tragedy of the commons where the</u></strong> privately <u><strong>beneficial strategy of space utilization differs significantly from the</u></strong> socially <u><strong>optimal strategy promoting</u></strong> orbital <u><strong>stability</u></strong>.166 Understandably, <u><strong>most analysis</u></strong> has <u><strong>focused on solving</u></strong> the problem of <u><strong>orbital instability by addressing the market failure</u></strong> responsible for debris creation. The current reasoning suggests that <u><strong>if actors creating</u></strong> space <u><strong>debris internalize the cost of their actions, a solution can arise</u></strong>. Proposed solutions run the gamut of ideologies from free market tax incentives, to command and control legislation, to restructuring orbital property rights. Scientific solutions have also been proposed, but technological feasibility and cost remain major problems. Furthermore, analogous environments susceptible to the tragedy of the commons have been examined in hopes that they may prove applicable to the problem of orbit instability.167 <u><strong>This analysis is</u></strong> ultimately <u><strong>useful</u></strong> if the problem is to be solved <u><strong>under nominal conditions, but there is an underlying problem that needs to be addressed before any</u></strong> of these proposed <u><strong>solutions can</u></strong> realistically <u><strong>be enacted</u></strong>.</p>

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Avoiding tipping points is key to minimizing existential risks

Sprat 19

Sprat 19 [David Spratt is a Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action, and Ian T. Dunlop is a member of the Club of Rome, formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading, “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” BT Policy Paper, September 5, May 2019-2020]

there is broad scientific acceptance that  tipping-points for the  Ice Sheet permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised greenhouse emissions are still significant seas may  rise by more than 25 metres. global populations subject to lethal heat conditions beyond the threshold of human survivability with slowing of the Gulf Stream is impinging on life support systems America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation water flows are severely reduced Glacial loss reaches 70 percent and rainfall falls by half Aridification emerges over  30 percent of the world’s  surface Desertification is severe A number of ecosystems collapse rainforest and Arctic poorer nations become unviable Deadly heat conditions persist contributes to  a billion people being displaced. Water availability decreases sharply affecting two billion Agriculture becomes nonviable Most regions see a drop in food production including heat waves, floods and storms. food prices skyrocket a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to ​massive nonlinear societal events nations around the world will be ​overwhelmed by the scale of  challenges, such as pandemic disease internal cohesion will be under great stress as a result of migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water flooding around the world has the potential to challenge regional identities Armed conflict between nations over resources is likely and nuclear war is possible

tipping-points for the Ice Sheet permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought seas may rise by 25 metres populations subject to lethal heat conditions beyond threshold of human survivability Glacial loss reaches 70 percent Desertification is severe ecosystems collapse a billion people displaced Agriculture becomes nonviable food prices skyrocket nations will be ​overwhelmed by disease flooding Armed conflict is likely and nuclear war is possible

By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant.20 While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global populations, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: A number of ecosystems collapse, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, become unviable. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land degradation21 and rising sea levels contributes to perhaps a billion people being displaced. Water availability decreases sharply in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about two billion people worldwide. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. According to the Global Challenges Foundation’s Global Catastrophic Risks 2018 report, even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated due to sea-level rise, and In high-end scenarios “the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end”.22 National security consequences: For pragmatic reasons associated with providing only a sketch of this scenario, we take the conclusion of the ​Age of Consequences ‘Severe’ 3°C scenario developed by a group of senior US national-security figures in 2007 as appropriate for our scenario too: Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to ​massive nonlinear societal events​. In this scenario, nations around the world will be ​overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities.​ Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to ​outright chaos​. In this scenario, climate change provokes ​a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature​’.23 (emphasis added)

<h4><strong><mark>Avoiding tipping points is key to minimizing existential risks</h4><p>Sprat 19</strong> </mark>[David Spratt is a Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action, and Ian T. Dunlop is a member of the Club of Rome, formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading, “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” BT Policy Paper, September 5, May 2019-2020]</p><p>By 2050, <u>there is broad scientific acceptance that </u>system<u> <strong><mark>tipping-points</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>for the</mark> </u>West Antarctic<u> <mark>Ice Sheet</mark> </u>and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C<strong> </strong>of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread <u><strong><mark>permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought</u></strong></mark> and dieback by 2.5°C. <u>The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised</u>, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human <u>greenhouse emissions are still significant</u>.20 While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that <u><mark>seas may</mark> </u>eventually<u> <mark>rise by </mark>more than <mark>25</mark> <mark>metres</mark>. </u>Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the <u><strong>global <mark>populations</u></strong></mark>, are <u><strong><mark>subject to</u></strong></mark> more than 20 days a year of <u><strong><mark>lethal heat conditions</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>beyond</mark> the <mark>threshold of human survivability</u></mark>. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together <u>with</u> the further <u>slowing of the Gulf Stream</u>, <u>is impinging on life support systems</u> in Europe. North <u>America suffers from <strong>devastating weather extremes</u></strong> <u>including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation</u>. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and <u>water flows</u> into the great rivers of Asia <u>are severely reduced</u> by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. <u><strong><mark>Glacial loss reaches 70 percent</u></strong></mark> in the Andes, <u>and rainfall</u> in Mexico and central America <u>falls by half</u>. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. <u>Aridification emerges over </u>more than<u> 30 percent of the world’s </u>land<u> surface</u>. <u><strong><mark>Desertification is severe</u></strong></mark> in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: <u><strong>A number of <mark>ecosystems</mark> <mark>collapse</u></strong></mark>, including coral reef systems, the Amazon <u>rainforest and</u> in the <u>Arctic</u>. Some <u>poorer nations</u> and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, <u>become unviable</u>. <u><strong>Deadly heat conditions persist</u></strong> for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land degradation21 and rising sea levels <u>contributes to </u>perhaps<u> <strong><mark>a billion people </mark>being<mark> displaced</mark>.</strong> Water availability decreases sharply</u> in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), <u>affecting</u> about <u>two billion</u> people worldwide. <u><strong><mark>Agriculture becomes nonviable</u></strong></mark> in the dry subtropics. <u>Most regions</u> in the world <u>see</u> <u>a</u> significant <u>drop in food production</u> and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, <u><strong>including heat waves, floods and storms.</u></strong> Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and <u><strong><mark>food prices skyrocket</u></strong></mark>, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, <u>a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages</u>, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. According to the Global Challenges Foundation’s Global Catastrophic Risks 2018 report, <u>even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated</u> due to sea-level rise, and In high-end scenarios “<u><strong>the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model</u></strong>, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end”.22 National security consequences: For pragmatic reasons associated with providing only a sketch of this scenario, we take the conclusion of the ​Age of Consequences ‘Severe’ 3°C scenario developed by a group of senior US national-security figures in 2007 as appropriate for our scenario too: <u>Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to ​massive nonlinear societal events</u>​. In this scenario, <u><mark>nations</mark> around the world <strong><mark>will be ​overwhelmed</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>by</mark> the scale of </u>change and pernicious<u> challenges, <strong>such as pandemic <mark>disease</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong>internal cohesion</u></strong> of nations <u><strong>will be under great stress</u></strong>, including in the United States, both <u>as a result of</u> a dramatic rise in <u>migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water </u>availability. The <u><strong><mark>flooding</u></strong></mark> of coastal communities <u><strong>around the world</u></strong>, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, <u>has the potential to challenge regional</u> and even national <u>identities</u>.​ <u><strong><mark>Armed conflict</mark> between nations over resources</u></strong>, such as the Nile and its tributaries, <u><strong><mark>is likely and nuclear war is possible</u></strong></mark>. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to ​outright chaos​. In this scenario, climate change provokes ​a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature​’.23 (emphasis added) </p>

Advantages

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Resolved.

Words and Phrases ‘64

Words and Phrases ‘64, Permanent Edition

Definition of “resolve,” is “to establish by law”.

“resolve,” is “to establish by law”.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

<h4><u>Resolved</u>. </h4><p><strong>Words and Phrases ‘64<u></strong>, Permanent Edition</p><p>Definition of</u> the word <u><mark>“resolve,”</u></mark> given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It <u><mark>is</u> </mark>of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning <u><mark>“to establish by law”.</p></u></mark>

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Calculation is good, inevitable and ethical

Livermore 08

Richard L. Revesz, Professor, Law, NYU and Michael A. Livermore, Executive Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH, 2008, p. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are fundamentally different from personal decisions they affect people in the aggregate governmental decisionmaking can seem to ignore what makes individuals it is a prerequisite for the compassion needed Cost-benefit analysis can seem harsh But such an approach is necessary Saving the most lives requires us to step back . Failing to use these tools amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, we exercise compassion by recognizing numbers represent: living human beings, Calamities result from the failure to use reason.

Governmental decisions are fundamentally different from personal decisions they affect people in the aggregate governmental decisionmaking can seem to ignore what makes individuals it is a prerequisite for the compassion needed Cost-benefit analysis can seem harsh But such an approach is necessary Saving the most lives requires us to step back Failing to use these tools amounts to abandoning our duties to one another we exercise compassion by recognizing numbers represent: living human beings Calamities result from the failure to use reason.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

<h4>Calculation is good, inevitable and ethical</h4><p>Richard L. Revesz, Professor, Law, NYU and Michael A. <u><strong>Livermore</u></strong>, Executive Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH, 20<u><strong>08</u></strong>, p. 1-4.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Governmental decisions are</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>fundamentally different from personal decisions</mark> </u></strong>in that<u><strong> <mark>they</mark> </u></strong>often <u><strong><mark>affect people in the aggregate</u></strong></mark>. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of<u><strong> <mark>governmental decisionmaking can seem to</u></strong></mark>—and to a certain extent does—<u><strong><mark>ignore what makes individuals </u></strong></mark>unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> </u></strong>also <u><strong><mark>a prerequisite for the</mark> </u></strong>kind of<u><strong> <mark>compassion</mark> </u></strong>that is<u><strong> <mark>needed</mark> </u></strong>in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. <u><strong><mark>Cost-benefit analysis</u></strong></mark>—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—<u><strong><mark>can seem harsh</mark> </u></strong>and impersonal. <u><strong><mark>But such an approach is</mark> </u></strong>also <u><strong><mark>necessary</mark> </u></strong>to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. <u><strong><mark>Saving the most lives</u></strong></mark>, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—<u><strong><mark>requires us to step back</mark> </u></strong>and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible<u><strong>. <mark>Failing to use these tools</u></strong></mark>, which<u><strong> <mark>amounts to abandoning our duties to one another</mark>, </u></strong>is not a legitimate response. Rather,<u><strong> <mark>we</mark> </u></strong>must <u><strong><mark>exercise</mark> </u></strong>statistical <u><strong><mark>compassion by recognizing</mark> </u></strong>what <u><strong><mark>numbers</mark> </u></strong>of lives saved<u><strong> <mark>represent: living </u></strong></mark>and breathing <u><strong><mark>human beings</mark>, </u></strong>unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. <u><strong><mark>Calamities</mark> </u></strong>can <u><strong><mark>result from the failure to use</u></strong></mark> either emotion or <u><strong><mark>reason.</u></strong></mark> Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world. </p>

1NC

Case

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1AC actuarialism 1NC Trumpwashing DA Econ T Midterms States 2NR Trumpwashing

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We’re overdue---timeframe is fast

Gupta 17

Gupta 17 (Dr. Sanjay Gupta, Associate Chief of the Neurosurgery Service at Grady Memorial Hospital, Chief Medical Correspondent for CNN, Assistant Professor of Neurosurgery at the Emory University School of Medicine, MD from the University of Michigan, “The Big One is Coming, and It's Going to be a Flu Pandemic”, CNN, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/health/flu-pandemic-sanjay-gupta/)

Experts say we are "due" for one. When it happens it will probably have a greater impact on humanity than anything else currently happening in the world a highly lethal flu pandemic will affect every human Geographical boundaries are meaningless, and it can circle the globe within hours Pandemic flu is a different and you should understand the difference pandemic flu spreads easily throughout the world This virus can emerge directly from animal reservoirs or be the result of a dramatic series of mutations A vaccine is our only real hope The Spanish Flu of 1918 was an unprecedented catastrophe. We are overdue outbreaks are inevitable. But, pandemics can be optional

we are "due" for one it will have a greater impact on humanity than anything else a highly lethal flu pandemic will affect every human it can circle the globe within hours flu spreads easily virus can emerge from animal reservoirs or be the result of mutations outbreaks are inevitable. But pandemics can be optional

Experts say we are "due" for one. When it happens, they tell us, it will probably have a greater impact on humanity than anything else currently happening in the world. And yet, like with most people, it is probably something you haven't spent much time thinking about. After all, it is human nature to avoid being consumed by hypotheticals until they are staring us squarely in the face. Such is the case with a highly lethal flu pandemic. And when it comes, it will affect every human alive today. Pandemic flu is apolitical and does not discriminate between rich and poor. Geographical boundaries are meaningless, and it can circle the globe within hours. In terms of potential impact on mankind, the only thing that comes close is climate change. And, like climate change, pandemic flu is so vast, it can be challenging to wrap your head around it. When most people hear "flu," they typically think of seasonal flu. No doubt, seasonal flu can be deadly, especially for the very young and old, as well as those with compromised immune systems. For most people, however, the seasonal flu virus, which mutates just a little bit every year, is not particularly severe because our immune systems have already probably seen a similar flu virus and thus know how to fight it. It's called native immunity or protection, and almost all of us have some degree of it. Babies are more vulnerable because they haven't been exposed to the seasonal flu and older people because their immune systems may not be functioning as well. Pandemic flu is a different animal, and you should understand the difference. Panˈdemik/: pan means "all"; demic (or demographic) means "people." It is well-named, because pandemic flu spreads easily throughout the world. Unlike seasonal flu, pandemics occur when a completely new or novel virus emerges. This sort of virus can emerge directly from animal reservoirs or be the result of a dramatic series of mutations -- so-called reassortment events -- in previously circulating viruses. In either case, the result is something mankind has never seen before: a pathogen that can spread easily from person to defenseless person, our immune systems never primed to launch any sort of defense. Our only hope With pandemic flu, we cannot solely rely on our bodies' ability to fight. A vaccine is our only real hope. That fact is part of the reason the number 24 has been stuck in my head the past few months as I have been working on the CNN original film "Unseen Enemy." I have become convinced that if we can develop and deploy a pandemic flu vaccine just 24 weeks faster than is currently projected, the impact could change the course of human history. Twenty-four weeks faster could mean the difference between 20,000 people dying in the next flu pandemic or more than 20 million people dying. In the 20th century alone, we experienced serious flu pandemics. The Spanish Flu of 1918 was an unprecedented catastrophe. Experts' best estimates (before there was more formal census and record-keeping) were that 20% to 40% of the world became ill and more than 50 million people died. In the United States alone, approximately 675,000 people died in just the eight months between September 1918 and April 1919. Some people died the same day they became ill, and others died within a few days from complications of the flu, such as pneumonia or meningitis. Forty years later, the Asian flu of 1958 and 1959 had a global death toll as high as 2 million and an estimated 70,000 of those in the US alone. Early in 1968, the year before I was born, the Hong Kong flu began. By September, it made its way around the world, including the United States, and became widespread by December. It is believed that the number of those infected peaked during the fall, when kids were at school, transmitting the virus more freely. Still, as many as a million people died, 34,000 in the US alone between September 1968 and March 1969. We are overdue We have learned a lot over the past 100 years and are better prepared because of it. In the developed world, at least, we have the ability to ease suffering with antivirals, breathing machines and antibiotics for secondary bacterial infections. Experts can also more quickly characterize pathogens causing outbreaks. Although it took several years to identify the virus causing AIDS, for example, it took only a few weeks to identify the SARS virus. We are also much faster at developing vaccines. According to research compiled by the science publication Mosaic, a typhoid vaccine was first tested in 1896 but only developed into a safe and effective vaccine nearly a hundred years later, in 1994. It took just 12 years, however, to develop a safe and effective Ebola vaccine (2003 to 2015). And, last week, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases announced initiation of a phase II trial for a Zika vaccine that started in August with the hope it may be ready for emergency use by 2018. Most important, our production capabilities have increased tremendously around the world. In 2006, according to the World Health Organization, we had the ability to make only 350 million doses of flu vaccine, but now, in theory, we could make 5.4 billion doses of flu vaccine if we harnessed and aligned manufacturing facilities all over the world. 24 weeks faster? Would it ever be possible, however, to create and distribute a vaccine 24 weeks faster -- in six weeks instead of 30 weeks -- and save more than 20 million lives? For starters, the way we typically make flu vaccine is still pretty antiquated and hasn't changed much in nearly 70 years. We rely largely on hens' eggs to incubate and replicate the virus, which is too slow of a process to respond rapidly to pandemic flu. Richard Hatchett, CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, told me that recent scientific advances, however, are fully transforming the speed at which vaccines can be developed and approved. Genomic techniques can be used to map the DNA or RNA of a new pathogen, genetically to engineer and mass-produce the same DNA or RNA and then inject it into the human body, leading to the production of antibodies to fight the virus. This method results in a new type of vaccine, a DNA vaccine. Faster development and production is one critical step to shortening the vaccine process by 24 weeks. Another is more robust surveillance systems everywhere in the world. As we were reminded with Ebola and Zika, an infection anywhere can be an infection everywhere. The first time an ill patient shows up at a hospital anywhere on the planet with a novel virus, the clock starts ticking. Improved surveillance means that hospital staff has to be astute enough to recognize that the patient doesn't fit the normal patterns we were taught in medical school and start to investigate further After that, there has to be speedy and accurate identification of the virus, purification and sequencing of the genetic material and then immediate sharing of the knowledge (via the cloud) enabling researchers everywhere to get to work on the development of new vaccines. After this genetically engineered vaccine is developed, it would have to be manufactured in the billions and then distributed to every city in the world. Join the conversation See the latest news and share your comments with CNN Health on Facebook and Twitter. To make this a reality, it will take unprecedented partnerships between governments, even those at odds with each other. It will take the public and private sector working together every step of the way to ensure that the newly created vaccine can be distributed, trusted and administered. It will take research and development money, as it always does, to bolster the techniques and infrastructure I described and make them available everywhere. And it will take accepting that a pandemic of flu is likely in our lifetime. But with preparation and imagination, it need not be as nearly catastrophic as it was 50 or 100 years ago. Make no mistake, outbreaks -- sudden, unexpected and localized eruptions of infection -- are inevitable. But, as epidemiologist Larry Brilliant (who spearheaded the effort to eradicate Small Pox), puts it: pandemics can be optional. This is how.

<h4>We’re overdue---timeframe is fast</h4><p><strong>Gupta 17</strong> (Dr. Sanjay Gupta, Associate Chief of the Neurosurgery Service at Grady Memorial Hospital, Chief Medical Correspondent for CNN, Assistant Professor of Neurosurgery at the Emory University School of Medicine, MD from the University of Michigan, “The Big One is Coming, and It's Going to be a Flu Pandemic”, CNN, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/health/flu-pandemic-sanjay-gupta/)</p><p><u><strong>Experts say <mark>we are "due" for one</strong></mark>. When it happens</u>, they tell us, <u><mark>it will</mark> probably <mark>have a <strong>greater impact on humanity than anything else</strong></mark> currently happening in the world</u>. And yet, like with most people, it is probably something you haven't spent much time thinking about. After all, it is human nature to avoid being consumed by hypotheticals until they are staring us squarely in the face. Such is the case with <u><strong><mark>a highly lethal flu pandemic</u></strong></mark>. And when it comes, it <u><strong><mark>will affect every human</u></strong></mark> alive today. Pandemic flu is apolitical and does not discriminate between rich and poor. <u>Geographical boundaries are meaningless, and <mark>it can circle the globe <strong>within hours</u></strong></mark>. In terms of potential impact on mankind, the only thing that comes close is climate change. And, like climate change, pandemic flu is so vast, it can be challenging to wrap your head around it. When most people hear "flu," they typically think of seasonal flu. No doubt, seasonal flu can be deadly, especially for the very young and old, as well as those with compromised immune systems. For most people, however, the seasonal flu virus, which mutates just a little bit every year, is not particularly severe because our immune systems have already probably seen a similar flu virus and thus know how to fight it. It's called native immunity or protection, and almost all of us have some degree of it. Babies are more vulnerable because they haven't been exposed to the seasonal flu and older people because their immune systems may not be functioning as well. <u>Pandemic flu is a different</u> animal, <u>and you should understand the difference</u>. Panˈdemik/: pan means "all"; demic (or demographic) means "people." It is well-named, because <u>pandemic <mark>flu <strong>spreads easily</strong></mark> throughout the world</u>. Unlike seasonal flu, pandemics occur when a completely new or novel virus emerges. <u>This</u> sort of <u><mark>virus can emerge</mark> directly <mark>from animal reservoirs or be the result of</mark> a dramatic series of <mark>mutations</u></mark> -- so-called reassortment events -- in previously circulating viruses. In either case, the result is something mankind has never seen before: a pathogen that can spread easily from person to defenseless person, our immune systems never primed to launch any sort of defense. Our only hope With pandemic flu, we cannot solely rely on our bodies' ability to fight. <u>A vaccine is our <strong>only real hope</u></strong>. That fact is part of the reason the number 24 has been stuck in my head the past few months as I have been working on the CNN original film "Unseen Enemy." I have become convinced that if we can develop and deploy a pandemic flu vaccine just 24 weeks faster than is currently projected, the impact could change the course of human history. Twenty-four weeks faster could mean the difference between 20,000 people dying in the next flu pandemic or more than 20 million people dying. In the 20th century alone, we experienced serious flu pandemics. <u>The Spanish Flu of 1918 was an unprecedented catastrophe.</u> Experts' best estimates (before there was more formal census and record-keeping) were that 20% to 40% of the world became ill and more than 50 million people died. In the United States alone, approximately 675,000 people died in just the eight months between September 1918 and April 1919. Some people died the same day they became ill, and others died within a few days from complications of the flu, such as pneumonia or meningitis. Forty years later, the Asian flu of 1958 and 1959 had a global death toll as high as 2 million and an estimated 70,000 of those in the US alone. Early in 1968, the year before I was born, the Hong Kong flu began. By September, it made its way around the world, including the United States, and became widespread by December. It is believed that the number of those infected peaked during the fall, when kids were at school, transmitting the virus more freely. Still, as many as a million people died, 34,000 in the US alone between September 1968 and March 1969. <u><strong>We are overdue </u></strong>We have learned a lot over the past 100 years and are better prepared because of it. In the developed world, at least, we have the ability to ease suffering with antivirals, breathing machines and antibiotics for secondary bacterial infections. Experts can also more quickly characterize pathogens causing outbreaks. Although it took several years to identify the virus causing AIDS, for example, it took only a few weeks to identify the SARS virus. We are also much faster at developing vaccines. According to research compiled by the science publication Mosaic, a typhoid vaccine was first tested in 1896 but only developed into a safe and effective vaccine nearly a hundred years later, in 1994. It took just 12 years, however, to develop a safe and effective Ebola vaccine (2003 to 2015). And, last week, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases announced initiation of a phase II trial for a Zika vaccine that started in August with the hope it may be ready for emergency use by 2018. Most important, our production capabilities have increased tremendously around the world. In 2006, according to the World Health Organization, we had the ability to make only 350 million doses of flu vaccine, but now, in theory, we could make 5.4 billion doses of flu vaccine if we harnessed and aligned manufacturing facilities all over the world. 24 weeks faster? Would it ever be possible, however, to create and distribute a vaccine 24 weeks faster -- in six weeks instead of 30 weeks -- and save more than 20 million lives? For starters, the way we typically make flu vaccine is still pretty antiquated and hasn't changed much in nearly 70 years. We rely largely on hens' eggs to incubate and replicate the virus, which is too slow of a process to respond rapidly to pandemic flu. Richard Hatchett, CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, told me that recent scientific advances, however, are fully transforming the speed at which vaccines can be developed and approved. Genomic techniques can be used to map the DNA or RNA of a new pathogen, genetically to engineer and mass-produce the same DNA or RNA and then inject it into the human body, leading to the production of antibodies to fight the virus. This method results in a new type of vaccine, a DNA vaccine. Faster development and production is one critical step to shortening the vaccine process by 24 weeks. Another is more robust surveillance systems everywhere in the world. As we were reminded with Ebola and Zika, an infection anywhere can be an infection everywhere. The first time an ill patient shows up at a hospital anywhere on the planet with a novel virus, the clock starts ticking. Improved surveillance means that hospital staff has to be astute enough to recognize that the patient doesn't fit the normal patterns we were taught in medical school and start to investigate further After that, there has to be speedy and accurate identification of the virus, purification and sequencing of the genetic material and then immediate sharing of the knowledge (via the cloud) enabling researchers everywhere to get to work on the development of new vaccines. After this genetically engineered vaccine is developed, it would have to be manufactured in the billions and then distributed to every city in the world. Join the conversation See the latest news and share your comments with CNN Health on Facebook and Twitter. To make this a reality, it will take unprecedented partnerships between governments, even those at odds with each other. It will take the public and private sector working together every step of the way to ensure that the newly created vaccine can be distributed, trusted and administered. It will take research and development money, as it always does, to bolster the techniques and infrastructure I described and make them available everywhere. And it will take accepting that a pandemic of flu is likely in our lifetime. But with preparation and imagination, it need not be as nearly catastrophic as it was 50 or 100 years ago. Make no mistake, <u><strong><mark>outbreaks</u></strong></mark> -- sudden, unexpected and localized eruptions of infection -- <u><strong><mark>are inevitable</strong>. But</mark>,</u> as epidemiologist Larry Brilliant (who spearheaded the effort to eradicate Small Pox), puts it: <u><mark>pandemics can be <strong>optional</u></strong></mark>. This is how.</p>

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1AC---Pandemics and Framing 2NR---Security K turned into Case Turns

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Mutual checkmating prevents the impact.

Hinnebusch 15

Hinnebusch 15—Professor of IR and Director of Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St. Andrews [Raymond, “Chapter 8: Structure over Agency: The Arab Uprising and the Regional Struggle for Power,” in S. N. Litsas & A. Tziampiris eds. The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, p. 129-131]

Global Competitive Interference: Mutual Checkmating∂ Even where pro-Western presidents were toppled (Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen), the countries were too economically dependent to go over to the resistance axis and the West benefited from the relative empowerment of the GCC within inter-Arab politics as a result of the Uprising. economic collapses made regional states more economically vulnerable which severely limited the policy options a failed state was more cost effective than another Iraq type effort at “nation-building,” Russia and China saw the norm of sovereignty and the authority of the UN Security Council as key to constraining such Western expansion Conclusion: The Resilience of Structure∂ Three years into the Arab Uprising the regional order remained resilient and the power bids of movements and regimes had largely checkmated each other. deep states and external dependencies were left standing as the high tide of mass peaceful protest receded, notably in Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. The power balance between the two opposing pre-uprising alliances was not decisively upset and soft power but still survived Bahrain and Syria, had not changed sides; Egypt and Iraq, although loosened from their American moorings, avoided full alignment with either side. The traditional Arab powers, Egypt and Syria were debilitated, Sunni Turkey, initially expected to fill the gap, was checked by Iranian/ Hezbollah balancing in Syria and also, despite a potent synthesis of Islam and democracy congruent with rising Islamist movements, Thus, power balancing, entrenched state apparatuses and increasing fragmentation made it very hard for any regional power to sweep the board. Rival outside powers also found management of the region’s conflicts intractable, and settled for preventing victory by the other side. Deep structure appeared to have defeated agency.

Even where presidents were toppled countries were too economically dependent to go over to the resistance a failed state was more cost effective than “nation-building,” the regional order remained resilient and power bids of movements checkmated each other power balancing, entrenched state apparatuses and increasing fragmentation made it very hard for any power to sweep the board Rival outside powers found management of conflicts intractable, and settled for preventing victory

∂ Global Competitive Interference: Mutual Checkmating∂ The Uprising provoked a “New Cold War” among global great powers. After its failed attempt under George W. Bush to impose a Pax Americana on the region, US power appeared by mid-2000s, to be receding as the invasion of Iraq inadvertently empowered Iran and fatigue at highly costly interventions led the Obama’s administration to retreat to off-shore balancing. In parallel, Russia and China developed regional stakes in arms sales, energy and trade. The loss of Mubarak, a key Western client and later the empowerment of Al Qaeda in failed states were further challenges to the West.∂ Yet no further rollback of the West in the region was in the cards. Even where pro-Western presidents were toppled (Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen), the countries were too economically dependent to go over to the resistance axis and the West benefited from the relative empowerment of the GCC within inter-Arab politics as a result of the Uprising. The Uprising, insofar as it was a revolt against global neo-liberalism, was a threat to the West but because the economic collapses accompanying it made regional states more economically vulnerable, Western dominated IFIs and cash rich Gulf states combined to further pry open regional economies to global finance capital, which severely limited the policy options of dependent states (Hanieh, 2012). The Uprising in Libya presented an opportunity to demonstrate the utility of US military force after the costly failure in Iraq and that in Syria to debilitate the Resistance axis. However, the result of the Libya intervention, a failed state, empowered Al Qaeda in North Africa. For the US (and Israel), a failed state in Syria where Hezbollah and Al Qaeda wore each other down, was more cost effective than another Iraq type effort at “nation-building,” but the spread of jihadism and the spillover of Syria’s conflict to its neighbors (Iraq and Lebanon) showed the costs of such neglect.∂ The West saw the Uprising as an opportunity to roll back the regional influence of Russia and China as their clients in Libya and Syria came under pressure. Russia and China saw the norm of sovereignty and the authority of the UN Security Council as key to constraining such Western expansion into MENA (Blank, 2011); thus, after the West used a UN humanitarian intervention to effect regime change in Libya, Russia blocked a similar intervention in Syria. Their opposition to international intervention in Syria cost Russia and China standing in the region, but the West was unable to capitalize on this as long as its economic troubles constrained its interventionist impulse.∂ Conclusion: The Resilience of Structure∂ Three years into the Arab Uprising the regional order, although under unprecedented strain, remained resilient and the power bids of movements and regimes had largely checkmated each other. The Uprisings had unleashed street politics and sectarian conflicts that weakened states, which in several cases lost control of their territory and borders (Syria, Libya) to armed trans-state movements, which attained unprecedented agency (Hezbollah, ISIS). Yet, deep states and external dependencies were left standing as the high tide of mass peaceful protest receded, notably in Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. The power balance between the two opposing pre-uprising alliances was not decisively upset: the Iran-led Resistance axis had lost key allies (Qatar, Turkey, Hamas) and soft power but still survived. The weak spots of the opposing axes, Bahrain and Syria, had not changed sides; Egypt and Iraq, although loosened from their American moorings, avoided full alignment with either side. The traditional Arab powers, Egypt and Syria (and earlier Iraq) were debilitated, yet aspirant non-Arab regional hegemon, Sunni Turkey, initially expected to fill the gap, was checked by Iranian/ Hezbollah balancing in Syria and also, despite a potent synthesis of Islam and democracy congruent with rising Islamist movements, foundered on the rocks of deep state establishments, exemplified in Egypt. The GCC was empowered by the debilitation of the republics and its money and media power penetrated every Uprising state; but this provoked reactions and possible blowback and its cohesion unraveled. Thus, power balancing, entrenched state apparatuses and increasing fragmentation made it very hard for any regional power to sweep the board. Rival outside powers also found management of the region’s conflicts intractable, and settled for preventing victory by the other side. Deep structure appeared to have defeated agency.

<h4>Mutual checkmating prevents the impact. </h4><p><strong>Hinnebusch 15</strong>—Professor of IR and Director of Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St. Andrews [Raymond, “Chapter 8: Structure over Agency: The Arab Uprising and the Regional Struggle for Power,” in S. N. Litsas & A. Tziampiris eds. The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power<u>, p. 129-131] </p><p></u>∂ <u>Global Competitive Interference: Mutual Checkmating∂ </u>The Uprising provoked a “New Cold War” among global great powers. After its failed attempt under George W. Bush to impose a Pax Americana on the region, US power appeared by mid-2000s, to be receding as the invasion of Iraq inadvertently empowered Iran and fatigue at highly costly interventions led the Obama’s administration to retreat to off-shore balancing. In parallel, Russia and China developed regional stakes in arms sales, energy and trade. The loss of Mubarak, a key Western client and later the empowerment of Al Qaeda in failed states were further challenges to the West.∂ Yet no further rollback of the West in the region was in the cards. <u><mark>Even where</mark> pro-Western <mark>presidents were toppled</mark> (Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen), the <mark>countries were <strong>too economically dependent</strong> to go over to the resistance</mark> axis and the West benefited from the relative empowerment of the GCC within inter-Arab politics as a result of the Uprising.</u> The Uprising, insofar as it was a revolt against global neo-liberalism, was a threat to the West but because the <u>economic collapses</u> accompanying it <u>made regional states more economically vulnerable</u>, Western dominated IFIs and cash rich Gulf states combined to further pry open regional economies to global finance capital, <u>which severely limited the policy options</u> of dependent states (Hanieh, 2012). The Uprising in Libya presented an opportunity to demonstrate the utility of US military force after the costly failure in Iraq and that in Syria to debilitate the Resistance axis. However, the result of the Libya intervention, a failed state, empowered Al Qaeda in North Africa. For the US (and Israel), <u><mark>a failed state</u></mark> in Syria where Hezbollah and Al Qaeda wore each other down, <u><mark>was <strong>more cost effective</strong> than</mark> another Iraq type effort at <mark>“nation-building,”</u></mark> but the spread of jihadism and the spillover of Syria’s conflict to its neighbors (Iraq and Lebanon) showed the costs of such neglect.∂ The West saw the Uprising as an opportunity to roll back the regional influence of Russia and China as their clients in Libya and Syria came under pressure. <u>Russia and China saw the norm of sovereignty and the authority of the UN Security Council as key to constraining such Western expansion</u> into MENA (Blank, 2011); thus, after the West used a UN humanitarian intervention to effect regime change in Libya, Russia blocked a similar intervention in Syria. Their opposition to international intervention in Syria cost Russia and China standing in the region, but the West was unable to capitalize on this as long as its economic troubles constrained its interventionist impulse.∂ <u>Conclusion: The Resilience of Structure∂ Three years into the Arab Uprising <mark>the regional order</u></mark>, although under unprecedented strain, <u><mark>remained <strong>resilient</strong> and</mark> the <mark>power bids of movements</mark> and regimes had largely <strong><mark>checkmated each other</strong></mark>.</u> The Uprisings had unleashed street politics and sectarian conflicts that weakened states, which in several cases lost control of their territory and borders (Syria, Libya) to armed trans-state movements, which attained unprecedented agency (Hezbollah, ISIS). Yet, <u>deep states and external dependencies were left standing as the high tide of mass peaceful protest receded, notably in Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. The power balance between the two opposing pre-uprising alliances was not decisively upset</u>: the Iran-led Resistance axis had lost key allies (Qatar, Turkey, Hamas) <u>and soft power but still survived</u>. The weak spots of the opposing axes, <u>Bahrain and Syria, had not changed sides; Egypt and Iraq, although loosened from their American moorings, avoided full alignment with either side. The traditional Arab powers, Egypt and Syria</u> (and earlier Iraq) <u>were debilitated,</u> yet aspirant non-Arab regional hegemon, <u>Sunni Turkey, initially expected to fill the gap, was checked by Iranian/ Hezbollah balancing in Syria and also, despite a potent synthesis of Islam and democracy congruent with rising Islamist movements,</u> foundered on the rocks of deep state establishments, exemplified in Egypt. The GCC was empowered by the debilitation of the republics and its money and media power penetrated every Uprising state; but this provoked reactions and possible blowback and its cohesion unraveled. <u>Thus, <strong><mark>power balancing</strong>, <strong>entrenched state apparatuses</strong> and <strong>increasing fragmentation</strong> made it very hard for any </mark>regional <mark>power to sweep the board</mark>. <strong><mark>Rival outside powers</strong></mark> also <strong><mark>found management</strong> of</mark> the region’s <mark>conflicts <strong>intractable</strong>, and <strong>settled for preventing victory</strong></mark> by the other side. Deep structure appeared to have defeated agency.</p></u>

1NC Round 5

Case

Turkey

./documents/hspolicy19/RowlandHall/DoGu/Rowland%20Hall-Doctorman-Gushin-Neg-1%20-%20Greenhill-Round5.docx

N

1 - Greenhill

5

Westminster YL

Pujol, Allison

1AC - Emergency 1NC - - ESR CP - Saudi Alliance DA - T-Substantial - NFU CP - War Powers DA - DOD Sustainability CP 2NR - Saudi Alliance DA

hspolicy19/RowlandHall/DoGu/Rowland%20Hall-Doctorman-Gushin-Neg-1%20-%20Greenhill-Round5.docx

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cx

hs

ICBMs are key to asteroid deflection --- only they can do it

Saitgarayev 16

Saitgarayev 16 Sabit Saitgarayev, Leading researcher of the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau, “Russia's improved ballistic missiles to be tested as asteroid killers,” TASS. February 11, 2016. http://tass.ru/en/science/855968

Most rockets work on boiling fuel Their fueling begins 10 days before the launch and are unfit for destroying meteorites similar to the Chelyabinsk meteorite in diameter, which are detected several hours before coming close to the Earth intercontinental ballistic missiles can be used The improved missiles could be used as the killers of the Apophis asteroid

Most rockets work on boiling fuel. Their fueling begins 10 days before the launch and are unfit for destroying meteorites i c b m s can be used as the killers of the Apophis asteroid

"Most rockets work on boiling fuel. Their fueling begins 10 days before the launch and, therefore, they are unfit for destroying meteorites similar to the Chelyabinsk meteorite in diameter, which are detected several hours before coming close to the Earth. For this purpose, intercontinental ballistic missiles can be used, which requires their upgrade," the scientist said. The improved missiles could be used as the killers of the Apophis asteroid, "which will come dangerously close to the Earth in 2036," he added

<h4><strong>ICBMs are key to asteroid deflection --- only they can do it </h4><p>Saitgarayev 16 </p><p></strong>Sabit Saitgarayev, Leading researcher of the Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau, “Russia's improved ballistic missiles to be tested as asteroid killers,” TASS. February 11, 2016. http://tass.ru/en/science/855968</p><p>"<u><mark>Most rockets work on boiling fuel</u>.</mark> <u><mark>Their fueling begins 10 days before the launch and</u></mark>, therefore, they <u><strong><mark>are unfit for destroying</mark> <mark>meteorites</strong></mark> similar to the Chelyabinsk meteorite in diameter, which are detected several hours before coming close to the Earth</u>. For this purpose, <u><strong><mark>i</mark>nter<mark>c</mark>ontinental <mark>b</mark>allistic <mark>m</mark>issile<mark>s</mark> <mark>can be used</u></strong></mark>, which requires their upgrade," the scientist said.</p><p><u>The improved missiles could be used <mark>as the <strong>killers of the Apophis asteroid</u></mark>, "which will come dangerously close to the Earth in 2036," he added</p></strong>

2

./documents/hsld19/SageHill/Pe/Sage%20Hill-Perin-Neg-Stanford-Round4.docx

N

Stanford

4

Harker KMu

Amanda Yang

ac - whole rez nc - PTX cp asteroids security case 1ar - all 2nr - ptx cp case 2ar - K

hsld19/SageHill/Pe/Sage%20Hill-Perin-Neg-Stanford-Round4.docx

MaPe

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Disease is a non-linear, existential risk---encompasses AND outweighs other threats

Pamlin and Armstrong 15

Pamlin and Armstrong 15, Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation, and Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93, https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf

A pandemic is an epidemic of infectious disease that has spread through human populations across a large region for instance several continents, or even worldwide Infectious diseases have been one of the greatest causes of mortality in history. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a power law with a small exponent exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well then the majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the single largest pandemic such a highimpact epidemic will have a greater probability than usually assumed All the features of an extremely devastating disease already exist in nature: essentially incurable Ebola nearly always fatal rabies extremely infectious common cold and long incubation periods HIV If a pathogen were to emerge that combined these features and influenza has demonstrated antigenic shift, the ability to combine features from different viruses its death toll would be extreme. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research Set against this is the fact that modern transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more rapidly the ripple effect of fatalities and policy responses would include political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation and damage to the world’s trade network including the food trade Extinction risk is possible if the aftermath of the epidemic fragments and diminishes human society to the extent that recovery becomes impossible before humanity succumbs to other risks (such as climate change or further pandemics). important factors in estimating the probabilities and impacts of the challenge The capacity of modern international health systems to deal with an extreme pandemic

diseases have been the greatest cause of mortality in history the majority will die from the single largest pandemic such will have greater probability than usually assumed. All the features already exist in nature incurable fatal extremely infectious and long incubation periods If a pathogen combined these its death toll would be extreme the world have changed making past comparisons problematic modern transport and dense population allow infections to spread rapidly the ripple effect Extinction is possible

4 Global A pandemic (from Greek πᾶν, pan, “all”, and δῆμος demos, “people”) is an epidemic of infectious disease that has spread through human populations across a large region; for instance several continents, or even worldwide. Here only worldwide events are included. A widespread endemic disease that is stable in terms of how many people become sick from it is not a pandemic. 260 84 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 3.1 Current risks 3.1.4.1 Expected impact disaggregation 3.1.4.2 Probability Influenza subtypes266 Infectious diseases have been one of the greatest causes of mortality in history. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a power law with a small exponent: many plagues have been found to follow a power law with exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the single largest pandemic. Most epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that such a highimpact epidemic will have a greater probability than usually assumed. All the features of an extremely devastating disease already exist in nature: essentially incurable (Ebola268), nearly always fatal (rabies269), extremely infectious (common cold270), and long incubation periods (HIV271). If a pathogen were to emerge that somehow combined these features (and influenza has demonstrated antigenic shift, the ability to combine features from different viruses272), its death toll would be extreme. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that modern transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse would come from the ripple effect of the fatalities and the policy responses. These would include political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation and damage to the world’s trade network (including the food trade). Extinction risk is only possible if the aftermath of the epidemic fragments and diminishes human society to the extent that recovery becomes impossible277 before humanity succumbs to other risks (such as climate change or further pandemics). Five important factors in estimating the probabilities and impacts of the challenge: 1. What the true probability distribution for pandemics is, especially at the tail. 2. The capacity of modern international health systems to deal with an extreme pandemic. 3. How fast medical research can proceed in an emergency. 4. How mobility of goods and people, as well as population density, will affect pandemic transmission. 5. Whether humans can develop novel and effective anti-pandemic solutions.

<h4>Disease is a <u>non-linear</u>, <u>existential risk</u>---encompasses AND outweighs other threats</h4><p><strong>Pamlin and Armstrong 15</strong>, Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager Global Risks, Global Challenges Foundation, and Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, February 2015, “Global Challenges: 12 Risks that threaten human civilization: The case for a new risk category,” Global Challenges Foundation, p.30-93, https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf</p><p>4 Global <u>A pandemic</u> (from Greek πᾶν, pan, “all”, and δῆμος demos, “people”) <u>is an epidemic of infectious disease that has spread through human populations across a <strong>large region</u></strong>; <u>for instance <strong>several continents</strong>, or even <strong>worldwide</u></strong>. Here only worldwide events are included. A widespread endemic disease that is stable in terms of how many people become sick from it is not a pandemic. 260 84 Global Challenges – Twelve risks that threaten human civilisation – The case for a new category of risks 3.1 Current risks 3.1.4.1 Expected impact disaggregation 3.1.4.2 Probability Influenza subtypes266 <u>Infectious <mark>diseases</mark> <mark>have been</mark> one of <mark>the <strong>greatest cause</mark>s <mark>of mortality in history</strong></mark>. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a <strong>power law with a small exponent</u></strong>: many plagues have been found to follow a power law with <u>exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well</u>,265 <u>then <mark>the majority</mark> of people who <mark>will die</mark> from epidemics will likely die <mark>from the <strong>single largest pandemic</u></strong></mark>. Most epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that <u><mark>such</mark> a highimpact epidemic <mark>will have</mark> a <strong><mark>greater probability</strong> than <strong>usually assumed</u></strong>. <u>All the features</mark> of an extremely devastating disease <strong><mark>already exist in nature</strong></mark>:</u> <u>essentially</u> <u><strong><mark>incurable</u></strong></mark> (<u>Ebola</u>268), <u>nearly always <strong><mark>fatal</u></strong></mark> (<u>rabies</u>269), <u><strong><mark>extremely infectious</u></strong></mark> (<u>common cold</u>270), <u><mark>and</u> <u><strong>long incubation periods</u></strong></mark> (<u>HIV</u>271). <u><mark>If a pathogen</mark> were to emerge that</u> somehow <u><strong><mark>combined these</mark> features</u></strong> (<u>and influenza has demonstrated <strong>antigenic shift</strong>, the ability to combine features from different viruses</u>272), <u><mark>its death toll would be extreme</mark>.</u> <u>Many relevant features of <mark>the world have changed</mark> considerably, <mark>making past comparisons problematic</mark>. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research</u>, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 <u>Set against this is the fact that <strong><mark>modern transport</strong> and <strong>dense</mark> human <mark>population</strong> allow infections to spread</mark> much more <mark>rapidly</u></mark>274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse would come from <u><mark>the</u> <u><strong>ripple effect</u></strong></mark> <u>of</u> the <u>fatalities and</u> the <u>policy responses</u>. These <u>would include <strong>political and agricultural disruption</u></strong> <u>as well as <strong>economic dislocation</u></strong> <u>and damage to the world’s <strong>trade network</u></strong> (<u>including the food trade</u>). <u><strong><mark>Extinction</mark> risk</strong> <mark>is</u></mark> only <u><strong><mark>possible</strong></mark> if the aftermath of the epidemic <strong>fragments and diminishes human society</strong> to the extent that recovery becomes impossible</u>277 <u>before humanity succumbs to <strong>other risks</strong> (such as <strong>climate change</strong> or <strong>further pandemics</strong>).</u> Five <u>important factors in estimating the probabilities and impacts of the challenge</u>: 1. What the true probability distribution for pandemics is, especially at the tail. 2. <u>The capacity of modern international health systems to deal with an extreme pandemic</u>. 3. How fast medical research can proceed in an emergency. 4. How mobility of goods and people, as well as population density, will affect pandemic transmission. 5. Whether humans can develop novel and effective anti-pandemic solutions. </p>

2

./documents/hsld19/Needham/Lu/Needham-Lu-Neg-Emory-Round5.docx

N

Emory

5

North Allegheny AD

Chris Flowers

1ac - nuclear colonialism 1nc - deterrence cbw maintain cp modi politics case 1ar - all 2nr - cp cbw case 2ar - those things

hsld19/Needham/Lu/Needham-Lu-Neg-Emory-Round5.docx

ZaLu

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4. Existing collision detection solves.

Mosher ’19

Mosher ’19 [Dave; September 3rd; Journalist with more than a decade of experience reporting and writing stories about space, science, and technology; Business Insider, “Satellite collisions may trigger a space-junk disaster that could end human access to orbit. Here’s How,” https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_2_3.pdf; GR]

The Kessler syndrome an accidental space collision that type of a runaway space-junk catastrophe is unlikely I don't think we're close to that I don't see it ever becoming anytime soon an unmanageable problem space debris is monitored from Earth Our current plan is to manage the problem and not let it get that far I don't think that we're even close to needing to actively remove stuff at this point an unnecessary expense the Space Surveillance Network led by the US military uses 30 different systems around the world to identify track and share information about objects in space objects are tracked day and night via a network of around the globe one major debris-tracking company Exoanalytic uses about 150 small telescopes around the globe to detect, track, and report space debris to the SSN Telescopes in space track debris Far less is known about them they're likely top-secret military satellites Objects detected by government and companies get added to a catalog of space debris and checked against the orbits of other bits of space junk. New orbits are calculated with supercomputers to see if there's a chance of any collisions The SSN issues a emergency report to the public three days ahead of a 1-in-10,000 chance of a collision It then provides multiple updates until the risk of a collision passes Advanced emergency reports help satellite providers see collisions much more than three days ahead In 2017, we provided data for 308,984 events of which only 655 were emergency-reportable

an accidental collision of space-junk is unlikely I don't think we're close I don't see it ever becoming a problem I don't think we need to actively remove stuff the S S N uses 30 systems around the world to identify track and share info about objects objects are tracked day and night Exoanalytic uses 150 telescopes to report debris Objects get added to catalog and checked against other bits of space junk. New supercomputers see if there's a chance of collision SSN issues a report to the public three days ahead of a 1-in-10,000 chance of collision then provides updates until risk passes 2017, we provided data for 308,984 events only 655 were emergency

The Kessler syndrome plays center-stage in the movie "Gravity," in which an accidental space collision endangers a crew aboard a large space station. But Gossner said that type of a runaway space-junk catastrophe is unlikely. "Right now I don't think we're close to that," he said. "I'm not saying we couldn't get there, and I'm not saying we don't need to be smart and manage the problem. But I don't see it ever becoming, anytime soon, an unmanageable problem." There is no current system to remove old satellites or sweep up bits of debris in order to prevent a Kessler event. Instead, space debris is monitored from Earth, and new rules require satellites in low-Earth orbit be deorbited after 25 years so they don't wind up adding more space junk. "Our current plan is to manage the problem and not let it get that far," Gossner said. "I don't think that we're even close to needing to actively remove stuff. There's lots of research being done on that, and maybe some day that will happen, but I think that — at this point, and in my humble opinion — an unnecessary expense." A major part of the effort to prevent a Kessler event is the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The project, led by the US military, uses 30 different systems around the world to identify, track, and share information about objects in space. Many objects are tracked day and night via a network of radar observatories around the globe. Optical telescopes on the ground also keep an eye out, but they aren't always run by the government. "The commercial sector is actually putting up lots and lots of telescopes," Gossner said. The government pays for their debris-tracking services. Gossner said one major debris-tracking company is called Exoanalytic. It uses about 150 small telescopes set up around the globe to detect, track, and report space debris to the SSN. Telescopes in space track debris, too. Far less is known about them because they're likely top-secret military satellites. Objects detected by the government and companies get added to a catalog of space debris and checked against the orbits of other known bits of space junk. New orbits are calculated with supercomputers to see if there's a chance of any collisions. Diana McKissock, a flight lead with the US Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron, helps track space debris for the SSN. She said the surveillance network issues warnings to NASA, satellite companies, and other groups with spacecraft, based on two levels of emergency: basic and advanced. The SSN issues a basic emergency report to the public three days ahead of a 1-in-10,000 chance of a collision. It then provides multiple updates per day until the risk of a collision passes. To qualify for such reporting, a rogue object must come within a certain distance of another object. In low-Earth orbit, that distance must be less than 1 kilometer (0.62 mile); farther out in deep space, where the precision of orbits is less reliable, the distance is less than 5 kilometers (3.1 miles). Advanced emergency reports help satellite providers see possible collisions much more than three days ahead. "In 2017, we provided data for 308,984 events, of which only 655 were emergency-reportable," McKissock told Business Insider in an email. Of those, 579 events were in low-Earth orbit (where it's relatively crowded with satellites).

<h4>4. Existing collision detection solves.</h4><p><strong>Mosher ’19</strong> [Dave; September 3rd; Journalist with more than a decade of experience reporting and writing stories about space, science, and technology; Business Insider, “Satellite collisions may trigger a space-junk disaster that could end human access to orbit. Here’s How,” https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_2_3.pdf; GR]</p><p><u><strong>The Kessler syndrome</u></strong> plays center-stage in the movie "Gravity," in which <u><strong><mark>a</strong>n a<strong>ccidental </mark>space <mark>collision</u></strong></mark> endangers a crew aboard a large space station. But Gossner said <u><strong>that type <mark>of </mark>a runaway <mark>space-junk</mark> catastrophe <mark>is unlikely</u></strong></mark>. "Right now <u><strong><mark>I don't think we're close</mark> to that</u></strong>," he said. "I'm not saying we couldn't get there, and I'm not saying we don't need to be smart and manage the problem. But <u><strong><mark>I don't see it ever becoming</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>anytime soon</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>a</mark>n unmanageable <mark>problem</u></strong></mark>." There is no current system to remove old satellites or sweep up bits of debris in order to prevent a Kessler event. Instead, <u><strong>space debris is monitored from Earth</u></strong>, and new rules require satellites in low-Earth orbit be deorbited after 25 years so they don't wind up adding more space junk. "<u><strong>Our current plan is to manage the problem and not let it get that far</u></strong>," Gossner said. "<u><strong><mark>I don't think</mark> that <mark>we</mark>'re even close to <mark>need</mark>ing <mark>to actively remove stuff</u></strong></mark>. There's lots of research being done on that, and maybe some day that will happen, but I think that — <u><strong>at this point</u></strong>, and in my humble opinion — <u><strong>an unnecessary expense</u></strong>." A major part of the effort to prevent a Kessler event is <u><strong><mark>the S</mark>pace <mark>S</mark>urveillance <mark>N</mark>etwork</u></strong> (SSN). The project, <u><strong>led by the US military</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>uses 30</mark> different <mark>systems around the world to identify</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>track</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>and share info</mark>rmation <mark>about objects</mark> in space</u></strong>. Many <u><strong><mark>objects are tracked day and night</mark> via a network of</u></strong> radar observatories <u>around the globe</u>. Optical telescopes on the ground also keep an eye out, but they aren't always run by the government. "The commercial sector is actually putting up lots and lots of telescopes," Gossner said. The government pays for their debris-tracking services. Gossner said <u><strong>one major debris-tracking company</u></strong> is called <u><strong><mark>Exoanalytic</u></strong></mark>. It <u><strong><mark>uses</mark> about <mark>150</mark> small <mark>telescopes</u></strong></mark> set up <u><strong>around the globe <mark>to </mark>detect, track, and <mark>report</mark> space <mark>debris</mark> to the SSN</u></strong>. <u><strong>Telescopes in space track debris</u></strong>, too. <u><strong>Far less is known about them</u></strong> because <u><strong>they're likely top-secret military satellites</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Objects</mark> detected by</u></strong> the <u><strong>government and companies <mark>get added to</mark> a <mark>catalog</mark> of space debris <mark>and checked against</mark> the orbits of <mark>other</u></strong></mark> known <u><strong><mark>bits of space junk. New</mark> orbits are calculated with <mark>supercomputers</mark> to <mark>see if there's a chance of</mark> any <mark>collision</mark>s</u></strong>. Diana McKissock, a flight lead with the US Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron, helps track space debris for the SSN. She said the surveillance network issues warnings to NASA, satellite companies, and other groups with spacecraft, based on two levels of emergency: basic and advanced. <u><strong>The <mark>SSN issues a</mark> </u></strong>basic <u><strong>emergency <mark>report to the public three days ahead of a 1-in-10,000 chance of</mark> a <mark>collision</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It <mark>then provides </mark>multiple <mark>updates</u></strong></mark> per day <u><strong><mark>until</mark> the <mark>risk</mark> of a collision <mark>passes</u></strong></mark>. To qualify for such reporting, a rogue object must come within a certain distance of another object. In low-Earth orbit, that distance must be less than 1 kilometer (0.62 mile); farther out in deep space, where the precision of orbits is less reliable, the distance is less than 5 kilometers (3.1 miles). <u><strong>Advanced emergency reports help satellite providers see</u></strong> possible <u><strong>collisions much more than three days ahead</u></strong>. "<u><strong>In <mark>2017, we provided data for 308,984 events</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>of which <mark>only 655 were emergency</mark>-reportable</u>," McKissock told Business Insider in an email. Of those, 579 events were in low-Earth orbit (where it's relatively crowded with satellites).</p></strong>

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Iowa’s strategy is a form of horizontalist production of knowledge that fractures revolutionary organizing

Marcus 12

Marcus 12. associate book editor at Dissent Magazine (Fall, David, “The Horizontalists”, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-horizontalists)

an ethnographer encounters a fisherman who claims to know the source of all truth. “The world,” the fisherman explains, “rests upon the back of an elephant.” “But what does the elephant stand on?” the ethnographer asks. “A turtle.” “And the turtle?” “Another turtle.” “And it?” “Ah, friend,” smiles the fisherman, “it is turtles all the way down.” it is a parable that has a clear moral: that despite our ever-dialectical minds, we will never get to the bottom of things; that, in fact, there is nothing at the bottom of things. Since the early 1970s we have wondered—with increasing anxiety—why and if we know better. Social scientists, literary critics, philosophers, and jurists have all begun to turn from their particular disciplines to the more general question of interpretation. There has been an increasing uneasiness with universal categories of thought New analytical frameworks have begun to emerge, sensitive to both the pluralities and localities of life. the ascendance of human rights, freedom has increasingly become understood as an individual entitlement instead of a collective possibility. The once prevalent conviction that a handful of centripetal values could bind society together has transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude toward general statements of value. If it is, indeed, turtles all the way down, then decisions can take place only on a local scale and on a horizontal plane. There is no overarching platform from which to legislate; only a “local knowledge.” As Walzer argued “We have to start from where we are,” we can only ask, “what is the right thing for us to do?” Socialism, once the “name of our desire,” has all but disappeared; new desires have emerged in its place: situationism localism, communitarianism, environmentalism anti-globalism they have been more concerned with where and how politics happen than to what end they represent a shift in scale: from the large to the small, from the vertical to the horizontal Instead of society, there is now talk of communities and actor networks; instead of radical schemes to rework economic and political institutions, there is an emphasis on localized campaigns and everyday practices But Gone was the Left’s hope for class consciousness, a movement of the “people” seeking greater realms of freedom. Instead of challenging the structures of late capitalism, radicals now aspired to create —“spaces of freedom.” assemblies insisted that decision-making was an endless process. Who we are, what we do, what we want to be are categories of flexibility, and consensus is as much about repairing this sense of open-endedness as it is about agreeing Equally skeptical of corporate monopolies as the technocratic state, it was ultimately an insurgency against control For this reason, the movement did not fit neatly into right or left, On the one hand, it was sympathetic to the most classic of left aspirations: to dismantle governing hierarchies. Their aspiration was a society based on organic, decentralized circuits of exchange and deliberation—on voluntary associations, on local debate, on loose networks of affinity groups. activists wanted to re-politicize our everyday choices “The idea is essentially that “the system is not going to save us,” so “we’re going to have to save ourselves.” But direct action and horizontal democracy also tap into a longer tradition on the left: anarchism and autonomist Marxism If revolutionary socialism was a theory about ideal possibilities, then anarchism and autonomism often focused on the revolutionary practices themselves Its occupations and general assemblies, its flash mobs and street performances, its loose network of activists all suggest a bold new set of possibilities for the Left: a horizontalist ethos that believes that revolution will begin by transforming our everyday lives. horizontalism is, in many ways, a product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society; that it is a kind of free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the very culture it hopes to resist. one can also find in its anti-institutionalism an attempt to speak in today’s language for yesterday’s goals. If we must live in a society that neither trusts nor feels compelled by collectivist visions, then horizontalism offers us a leftism that attempts to be, at once, both individualist and egalitarian, anti-institutional and democratic, open to the possibilities of self-management and yet also concerned with the casualties born out of an age that has let capital manage itself for far too long by working outside structures of power one may circumvent coercive systems but one does not necessarily subvert them. Localizing politics does not go far enough. “Bubbles of freedom,” may create a larger variety of non-institutional life. But they will always neglect other crucial avenues of freedom: in particular, those social and economic rights that can only be protected from the top down the anti-institutionalism of horizontalism comes dangerously close to that of the libertarian Right. The turn to previous eras of social organization, the desire to locate and confine politics to a particular regional space, the deep skepticism toward all forms of institutional life not only mirror the aspirations of libertarianism but help cloak those hierarchies spawned from non-institutional forms of power and capital. This is a pointed irony for a political ideology that claims to be opposed to the injustices of a non-institutional market To only “try to create ‘spaces meant to back “down from the problem of politics “there is no such thing as a society without institutions.” This is—and will be—a problem for the horizontalist Left as it moves forward. , it is always in danger of becoming absorbed into the very ideological apparatus it seeks to dismantle. Structures, not only everyday practices, need to be reformed “the search of all-too-deep-lying turtles,” we have to be careful to not “lose touch with the hard surfaces of life—with the political, economic, stratificatory realities

critics have all begun to turn to the question of interpretation. There has been uneasiness with universal categories of thought analytical frameworks have begun to emerge, sensitive to localities values transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude decisions can take place only on a local scale and horizontal plane. There is no platform from which to legislate; only “local knowledge.” Socialism has disappeared; desires instead of radical schemes to rework economic and political institutions, there is an emphasis on everyday practices Gone was the Left’s hope for class consciousness, a movement seeking greater realms of freedom radicals aspired to create “spaces of freedom.” assemblies insisted that decision-making was an endless process. and consensus is about open-endedness as agreeing it was an insurgency against control Their aspiration was a society based on organic deliberation on local debate to re-politicize our everyday choices “the system is not going to save us,” If revolutionary socialism was about ideal possibilities, then autonomism focused on revolutionary practices themselves Its performances, all suggest a bold new ethos horizontalism is a free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the culture it hopes to resist. horizontalism attempts to be anti-institutional and democratic, by working outside structures one may circumvent coercive systems but not subvert them. Localizing does not go far enough they always neglect other crucial avenues the anti-institutionalism comes dangerously close to the libertarian Right. space, the skepticism toward institutional life mirror libertarianism but cloak those hierarchies to create ‘spaces meant to back “down from politics the Left becoming absorbed into the ideological apparatus it seeks to dismantle. Structures, not only everyday practices, need to be reformed we have to not “lose touch with the hard economic realities

There is a much-recycled and certainly apocryphal tale told of an ethnographer traveling in India. Journeying up and down the Ganges Delta, he encounters a fisherman who claims to know the source of all truth. “The world,” the fisherman explains, “rests upon the back of an elephant.” “But what does the elephant stand on?” the ethnographer asks. “A turtle.” “And the turtle?” “Another turtle.” “And it?” “Ah, friend,” smiles the fisherman, “it is turtles all the way down.” As with most well-circulated apocrypha, it is a parable that lacks a clear provenance, but has a clear moral: that despite our ever-dialectical minds, we will never get to the bottom of things; that, in fact, there is nothing at the bottom of things. What we define as society is nothing more than a set of locally constructed practices and norms, and what we define as history is nothing more than the passage of one set to the next. Although we might “find the picture of our universe as an infinite tower of tortoises rather ridiculous,” as one reteller admitted, it only raises the question, “Why do we think we know better?” Since the early 1970s we have wondered—with increasing anxiety—why and if we know better. Social scientists, literary critics, philosophers, and jurists have all begun to turn from their particular disciplines to the more general question of interpretation. There has been an increasing uneasiness with universal categories of thought; a whispered suspicion and then a commonly held belief that the sum—societies, histories, identities—never amounts to more than its parts. New analytical frameworks have begun to emerge, sensitive to both the pluralities and localities of life. “What we need,” as Clifford Geertz argued, “are not enormous ideas” but “ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities.” This growing anxiety over the precision of our interpretive powers has translated into a variety of political as well as epistemological concerns. Many have become uneasy with universal concepts of justice and equality. Simultaneous to—and in part because of—the ascendance of human rights, freedom has increasingly become understood as an individual entitlement instead of a collective possibility. The once prevalent conviction that a handful of centripetal values could bind society together has transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude toward general statements of value. If it is, indeed, turtles all the way down, then decisions can take place only on a local scale and on a horizontal plane. There is no overarching platform from which to legislate; only a “local knowledge.” As Michael Walzer argued in a 1985 lecture on social criticism, “We have to start from where we are,” we can only ask, “what is the right thing for us to do?” This shift in scale has had a significant impact on the Left over the past twenty to thirty years. Socialism, once the “name of our desire,” has all but disappeared; new desires have emerged in its place: situationism, autonomism, localism, communitarianism, environmentalism, anti-globalism. Often spatial in metaphor, they have been more concerned with where and how politics happen rather than at what pace and to what end. Often local in theory and in practice, they have come to represent a shift in scale: from the large to the small, from the vertical to the horizontal, and from—what Geertz has called—the “thin” to the “thick.” Class, race, and gender—those classic left themes—are, to be sure, still potent categories. But they have often been imagined as spectrums rather than binaries, varying shades rather than static lines of solidarity. Instead of society, there is now talk of communities and actor networks; instead of radical schemes to rework economic and political institutions, there is an emphasis on localized campaigns and everyday practices. The critique of capitalism—once heavily informed by intricate historical and social theories—has narrowed. The “ruthless criticism of all,” as Karl Marx once put it, has turned away from exploitative world systems to the pathologies of an over-regulated life. As post-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe declared in 1985, Left-wing thought today stands at a crossroads. The “evident truths” of the past—the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left’s struggles and objectives—have been seriously challenged….From Budapest to Prague and the Polish coup d’état, from Kabul to the sequels of Communist victory in Vietnam and Cambodia, a question-mark has fallen more and more heavily over the whole way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it. In many ways, the Left has just been keeping up with the times. Over the last quarter-century, there has been a general fracturing of our social and economic relations, a “multiplication of,” what one sociologist has called, “partial societies—grouped by age, sex, ethnicity, and proximity.” This has not necessarily been a bad thing. Even as the old Left—the vertical Left—frequently bemoaned the growing differentiation and individuation, these new categories did, in fact, open the door for marginalized voices and communities. They created a space for more diversity, tolerance, and inclusion. They signaled a turn toward the language of recognition: a politics more sensitive to difference. But this turn was also not without its disadvantages. Gone was the Left’s hope for an emerging class consciousness, a movement of the “people” seeking greater realms of freedom. Instead of challenging the top-down structures of late capitalism, radicals now aspired to create—what post-Marxists were frequently calling—“spaces of freedom.” If one of the explicit targets of the global justice movement of the late 1990s was the exploitative trade policies of the World Trade Organization, then its underlying critique was the alienating patterns of its bureaucracy: the erosion of spaces for self-determination and expression. The crisis of globalization was that it stripped individuals of their rights to participate, to act as free agents in a society that was increasingly becoming shaped by a set of global institutions. What most troubled leftists over the past three or four decades was not the increasingly unequal distribution of goods and services in capitalist societies but the increasingly unequal distribution of power. As one frequently sighted placard from the 1999 Seattle protests read, “No globalization without participation!” Occupy Wall Street has come to represent the latest turn in this movement toward local and more horizontal spaces of freedom. Occupation was, itself, a matter of recovering local space: a way to repoliticize the square. And in a moment characterized by foreclosure, it was also symbolically, and sometimes literally, an attempt to reclaim lost homes and abandoned properties. But there was also a deeper notion of space at work. Occupy Wall Street sought out not only new political spaces but also new ways to relate to them. By resisting the top-down management of representative democracy as well as the bottom-up ideals of labor movements, Occupiers hoped to create a new politics in which decisions moved neither up nor down but horizontally. While embracing the new reach of globalization—linking arms and webcams with their encamped comrades in Madrid, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Santiago—they were also rejecting its patterns of consolidation, its limits on personal freedom, its vertical and bureaucratic structures of decision-making. Time was also to be transformed. The general assemblies and general strikes were efforts to reconstruct, and make more autonomous, our experience of time as well as space. Seeking to escape from the Taylorist demands of productivity, the assemblies insisted that decision-making was an endless process. Who we are, what we do, what we want to be are categories of flexibility, and consensus is as much about repairing this sense of open-endedness as it is about agreeing on a particular set of demands. Life is a mystery, as one pop star fashionista has insisted, and Occupiers wanted to keep it that way. Likewise, general strikes were imagined as ways in which workers could take back time—regain those parts of life that had become routinized by work. Rather than attempts to achieve large-scale reforms, general strikes were improvisations, escapes from the daily calculations of production that demonstrated that we can still be happy, creative, even productive individuals without jobs. As one unfurled banner along New York’s Broadway read during this spring’s May Day protests, “Why work? Be happy.” In many ways, the Occupy movement was a rebellion against the institutionalized nature of twenty-first century capitalism and democracy. Equally skeptical of corporate monopolies as it was of the technocratic tendencies of the state, it was ultimately an insurgency against control, against the ways in which organized power and capital deprived the individual of the time and space needed to control his or her life. Just as the vertically inclined leftists of the twentieth century leveraged the public corporation—the welfare state—against the increasingly powerful number of private ones, so too were Occupy and, more generally, the horizontalist Left to embrace the age of the market: at the center of their politics was the anthropological “man” in both his forms—homo faber and homo ludens—who was capable of negotiating his interests outside the state. For this reason, the movement did not fit neatly into right or left, conservative or liberal, revolutionary or reformist categories. On the one hand, it was sympathetic to the most classic of left aspirations: to dismantle governing hierarchies. On the other, its language was imbued with a strident individualism: a politics of anti-institutionalism and personal freedom that has most often been affiliated with the Right. Seeking an alternative to the bureaucratic tendencies of capitalism and socialism, Occupiers were to frequently invoke the image of autonomy: of a world in which social and economic relations exist outside the institutions of the state. Their aspiration was a society based on organic, decentralized circuits of exchange and deliberation—on voluntary associations, on local debate, on loose networks of affinity groups. If political and economic life had become abstracted in the age of globalization and financialization, then Occupy activists wanted to re-politicize our everyday choices. As David Graeber, one of Occupy’s chief theoretical architects, explained two days after Zuccotti Park was occupied, “The idea is essentially that “the system is not going to save us,” so “we’re going to have to save ourselves.” Borrowing from the anarchist tradition, Graeber has called this work “direct action”: the practice of circumventing, even on occasion subverting, hierarchies through practical projects. Instead of attempting “to pressure the government to institute reforms” or “seize state power,” direct actions seek to “build a new society in the shell of the old.” By creating spaces in which individuals take control over their lives, it is a strategy of acting and thinking “as if one is already free.” Marina Sitrin, another prominent Occupier, has offered another name for this politics—“horizontalism”: “the use of direct democracy, the striving for consensus” and “processes in which everyone is heard and new relationships are created.” It is a politics that not only refuses institutionalization but also imagines a new subjectivity from which one can project the future into the present. Direct action and horizontal democracy are new names, of course, for old ideas. They descend—most directly—from the ideas and tactics of the global justice movement of the 1990s and 2000s. Direct Action Network was founded in 1999 to help coordinate the anti-WTO protests in Seattle; horizontalidad, as it was called in Argentina, emerged as a way for often unemployed workers to organize during the financial crisis of 2001. Both emerged out of the theories and practices of a movement that was learning as it went along. The ad hoc working groups, the all-night bull sessions, the daylong actions, the decentralized planning were all as much by necessity as they were by design. They were not necessarily intended at first. But what emerged out of anti-globalization was a new vision of globalization. Local and horizontal in practice, direct action and democracy were to become catchphrases for a movement that was attempting to resist the often autocratic tendencies of a fast-globalizing capitalism. But direct action and horizontal democracy also tap into a longer, if often neglected, tradition on the left: the anarchism, syndicalism, and autonomist Marxism that stretch from Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, and Rosa Luxemburg to C.L.R. James, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Antonio Negri. If revolutionary socialism was a theory about ideal possibilities, then anarchism and autonomism often focused on the revolutionary practices themselves. The way in which the revolution was organized was the primary act of revolution. Autonomy, as the Greco-French Castoriadis told Le Monde in 1977, demands not only “the elimination of dominant groups and of the institutions embodying and orchestrating that domination” but also new modes of what he calls “self-management and organization.” With direct action and horizontal democracy, the Occupy movement not only developed a set of new tactics but also a governing ideology, a theory of time and space that runs counter to many of the practices of earlier leftist movements. Unlike revolutionary socialism or evolutionary social democracy—Marx’s Esau and Jacob—Occupiers conceived of time as more cyclical than developmental, its understanding of space more local and horizontal than structural and vertical. The revolution was to come but only through everyday acts. It was to occur only through—what Castoriadis obliquely referred to as—“the self-institution of society.” The seemingly spontaneous movement that emerged after the first general assemblies in Zuccotti Park was not, then, sui generis but an elaboration of a much larger turn by the Left. As occupations spread across the country and as activists begin to exchange organizational tactics, it was easy to forget that what was happening was, in fact, a part of a much larger shift in the scale and plane of Western politics: a turn toward more local and horizontal patterns of life, a growing skepticism toward the institutions of the state, and an increasing desire to seek out greater realms of personal freedom. And although its hibernation over the summer has, perhaps, marked the end of the Occupy movement, OWS has also come to represent an important—and perhaps more lasting—break. In both its ideas and tactics, it has given us a new set of desires—autonomy, radical democracy, direct action—that look well beyond the ideological and tactical tropes of socialism. Its occupations and general assemblies, its flash mobs and street performances, its loose network of activists all suggest a bold new set of possibilities for the Left: a horizontalist ethos that believes that revolution will begin by transforming our everyday lives. It can be argued that horizontalism is, in many ways, a product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society; that it is a kind of free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the very culture it hopes to resist. For not only does it emphasize the agency of the individual, but it draws one of its central inspirations from a neoclassical image: that of the self-managing society—the polity that functions best when the state is absent from everyday decisions. But one can also find in its anti-institutionalism an attempt to speak in today’s language for yesterday’s goals. If we must live in a society that neither trusts nor feels compelled by collectivist visions, then horizontalism offers us a leftism that attempts to be, at once, both individualist and egalitarian, anti-institutional and democratic, open to the possibilities of self-management and yet also concerned with the casualties born out of an age that has let capital manage itself for far too long. Horizontalism has absorbed the crisis of knowledge—what we often call “postmodernism”—and the crisis of collectivism—what we often call “neoliberalism.” But instead of seeking to return to some golden age before our current moment of fracture, it seeks—for better and worse—to find a way to make leftist politics conform to our current age of anti-foundationalism and institutionalism. As Graeber argued in the prescriptive last pages of his anthropological epic, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, “Capitalism has transformed the world in many ways that are clearly irreversible” and we therefore need to give up “the false choice between state and market that [has] so monopolized political ideology for the last centuries that it made it difficult to argue about anything else.” We need, in other words, to stop thinking like leftists. But herein lies the problem. Not all possible forms of human existence and social interaction, no matter how removed they are from the institutions of power and capital, are good forms of social organization. Although it is easy to look enthusiastically to those societies—ancient or modern, Western or non-Western—that exist beyond the structures of the state, they, too, have their own patterns of hierarchy, their own embittered lines of inequality and injustice. More important, to select one form of social organization over the other is always an act of exclusion. Instituting and then protecting a particular way of life will always require a normative commitment in which not every value system is respected—in which, in other words, there is a moral hierarchy. More problematically, by working outside structures of power one may circumvent coercive systems but one does not necessarily subvert them. Localizing politics—stripping it of its larger institutional ambitions—has, to be sure, its advantages. But without a larger structural vision, it does not go far enough. “Bubbles of freedom,” as Graeber calls them, may create a larger variety of non-institutional life. But they will always neglect other crucial avenues of freedom: in particular, those social and economic rights that can only be protected from the top down. In this way, the anti-institutionalism of horizontalism comes dangerously close to that of the libertarian Right. The turn to previous eras of social organization, the desire to locate and confine politics to a particular regional space, the deep skepticism toward all forms of institutional life not only mirror the aspirations of libertarianism but help cloak those hierarchies spawned from non-institutional forms of power and capital. This is a particularly pointed irony for a political ideology that claims to be opposed to the many injustices of a non-institutional market—in particular, its unregulated financial schemes. Perhaps this is an irony deeply woven into the theoretical quilt of autonomy: a vision that, as a result of its anti-institutionalism, is drawn to all sites of individual liberation—even those that are to be found in the marketplace. As Graeber concludes in Debt, “Markets, when allowed to drift entirely free from their violent origins, invariably begin to grow into something different, into networks of honor, trust, and mutual connectedness,” whereas “the maintenance of systems of coercion constantly do the opposite: turn the products of human cooperation, creativity, devotion, love and trust back into numbers once again.” In many ways, this is the result of a set of political ideas that have lost touch with their origins. The desire for autonomy was born out of the socialist—if not also often the Marxist—tradition and there was always a guarded sympathy for the structures needed to oppose organized systems of capital and power. Large-scale institutions were, for thinkers such as Castoriadis, Negri, and C.L.R. James, still essential if every cook was truly to govern. To only “try to create ‘spaces of freedom’ ‘alongside’ of the State” meant, as Castoriadis was to argue later in his life, to back “down from the problem of politics.” In fact, this was, he believed, the failure of 1968: “the inability to set up new, different institutions” and recognize that “there is no such thing as a society without institutions.” This is—and will be—a problem for the horizontalist Left as it moves forward. As a leftism ready-made for an age in which all sides of the political spectrum are arrayed against the regulatory state, it is always in danger of becoming absorbed into the very ideological apparatus it seeks to dismantle. For it aspires to a decentralized and organic politics that, in both principle and practice, shares a lot in common with its central target. Both it and the “free market” are anti-institutional. And the latter will remain so without larger vertical measures. Structures, not only everyday practices, need to be reformed. The revolution cannot happen only on the ground; it must also happen from above. A direct democracy still needs its indirect structures, individual freedoms still need to be measured by their collective consequences, and notions of social and economic equality still need to stand next to the desire for greater political participation. Deregulation is another regulatory regime, and to replace it requires new regulations: institutions that will limit the excesses of the market. As Castoriadis insisted in the years after 1968, the Left’s task is not only to abolish old institutions but to discover “new kinds of relationship between society and its institutions.” Horizontalism has come to serve as an important break from the static strategies and categories of analysis that have slowed an aging and vertically inclined Left. OWS was to represent its fullest expression yet, though it has a much longer back story and still—one hopes—a promising future. But horizontalists such as Graeber and Sitrin will struggle to establish spaces of freedom if they cannot formulate a larger vision for a society. Their vision is not—as several on the vertical left have suggested—too utopian but not utopian enough: in seeking out local spaces of freedom, they have confined their ambitions; they have, in fact, come, at times, to mirror the very ideology they hope to resist. In his famous retelling of the turtle parable, Clifford Geertz warned that in “the search of all-too-deep-lying turtles,” we have to be careful to not “lose touch with the hard surfaces of life—with the political, economic, stratificatory realities within which men are everywhere contained.” This is an ever-present temptation, and one that, in our age of ever more stratification, we must resist.

<h4>Iowa’s strategy is a form of horizontalist production of knowledge that fractures revolutionary organizing </h4><p><strong>Marcus 12</strong>. associate book editor at Dissent Magazine (Fall, David, “The Horizontalists”, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-horizontalists)</p><p>There is a much-recycled and certainly apocryphal tale told of <u>an ethnographer</u> traveling in India. Journeying up and down the Ganges Delta, he <u>encounters a fisherman who claims to know the source of all truth. “The world,” the fisherman explains, “rests upon the back of an elephant.” “But what does the elephant stand on?” the ethnographer asks. “A turtle.” “And the turtle?” “Another turtle.” “And it?” “Ah, friend,”</u> <u>smiles the fisherman, “it is turtles all the way down.”</u> As with most well-circulated apocrypha, <u>it is a parable that</u> lacks a clear provenance, but <u>has a clear moral: that despite our ever-dialectical minds, we will never get to the bottom of things; that, in fact, <strong>there is nothing</strong> at the bottom of things.</u> What we define as society is nothing more than a set of locally constructed practices and norms, and what we define as history is nothing more than the passage of one set to the next. Although we might “find the picture of our universe as an infinite tower of tortoises rather ridiculous,” as one reteller admitted, it only raises the question, “Why do we think we know better?” <u>Since the early 1970s we have wondered—with increasing anxiety—why and if we know better. Social scientists, literary <mark>critics</mark>, philosophers, and jurists <mark>have all begun to turn </mark>from their particular disciplines <mark>to the </mark>more general <mark>question of interpretation. There has been </mark>an <strong>increasing <mark>uneasiness with universal categories of thought</u></strong></mark>; a whispered suspicion and then a commonly held belief that the sum—societies, histories, identities—never amounts to more than its parts. <u>New <mark>analytical frameworks have begun to emerge, sensitive to </mark>both the pluralities and <mark>localities</mark> of life. </u>“What we need,” as Clifford Geertz argued, “are not enormous ideas” but “ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities.” This growing anxiety over the precision of our interpretive powers has translated into a variety of political as well as epistemological concerns. Many have become uneasy with universal concepts of justice and equality. Simultaneous to—and in part because of—<u>the ascendance of human rights, freedom has increasingly become understood as an individual entitlement instead of a collective possibility. The once prevalent conviction that a handful of centripetal <mark>values </mark>could bind society together has <mark>transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude </mark>toward general statements of value. If it is, indeed, turtles all the way down, then <mark>decisions can take place only on a local scale and</mark> on a <mark>horizontal plane. There is no </mark>overarching <mark>platform from which to legislate; only </mark>a <mark>“local knowledge.”</u></mark> <u>As</u> Michael <u>Walzer argued</u> in a 1985 lecture on social criticism, <u>“We have to start from where we are,” we can only ask, “what is the right thing <strong>for us</strong> to do?” </u>This shift in scale has had a significant impact on the Left over the past twenty to thirty years. <u><mark>Socialism</mark>, once the “name of our desire,” <mark>has </mark>all but <mark>disappeared; </mark>new <mark>desires </mark>have emerged in its place:</u> <u>situationism</u>, autonomism, <u>localism, communitarianism, environmentalism</u>, <u>anti-globalism</u>. Often spatial in metaphor, <u>they have been more concerned with where and how politics happen</u> rather <u>than</u> at what pace and <u>to what end</u>. Often local in theory and in practice, <u>they</u> have come to <u>represent a shift in scale: from the large to the small, from the vertical to the horizontal</u>, and from—what Geertz has called—the “thin” to the “thick.” Class, race, and gender—those classic left themes—are, to be sure, still potent categories. But they have often been imagined as spectrums rather than binaries, varying shades rather than static lines of solidarity. <u>Instead of society, there is now talk of communities and actor networks; <strong><mark>instead of radical schemes to rework economic and political institutions, there is an emphasis on </mark>localized campaigns and <mark>everyday practices</u></strong></mark>. The critique of capitalism—once heavily informed by intricate historical and social theories—has narrowed. The “ruthless criticism of all,” as Karl Marx once put it, has turned away from exploitative world systems to the pathologies of an over-regulated life. As post-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe declared in 1985, Left-wing thought today stands at a crossroads. The “evident truths” of the past—the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left’s struggles and objectives—have been seriously challenged….From Budapest to Prague and the Polish coup d’état, from Kabul to the sequels of Communist victory in Vietnam and Cambodia, a question-mark has fallen more and more heavily over the whole way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it. In many ways, the Left has just been keeping up with the times. Over the last quarter-century, there has been a general fracturing of our social and economic relations, a “multiplication of,” what one sociologist has called, “partial societies—grouped by age, sex, ethnicity, and proximity.” This has not necessarily been a bad thing. Even as the old Left—the vertical Left—frequently bemoaned the growing differentiation and individuation, these new categories did, in fact, open the door for marginalized voices and communities. They created a space for more diversity, tolerance, and inclusion. They signaled a turn toward the language of recognition: a politics more sensitive to difference. <u>But</u> this turn was also not without its disadvantages. <u><mark>Gone was the Left’s hope for</u></mark> an emerging <u><mark>class consciousness, a movement </mark>of the “people” <mark>seeking greater realms of freedom</mark>. Instead of challenging the</u> top-down <u>structures of late capitalism, <mark>radicals </mark>now<mark> aspired to create</u></mark>—what post-Marxists were frequently calling<u>—<mark>“spaces of freedom.”</u></mark> If one of the explicit targets of the global justice movement of the late 1990s was the exploitative trade policies of the World Trade Organization, then its underlying critique was the alienating patterns of its bureaucracy: the erosion of spaces for self-determination and expression. The crisis of globalization was that it stripped individuals of their rights to participate, to act as free agents in a society that was increasingly becoming shaped by a set of global institutions. What most troubled leftists over the past three or four decades was not the increasingly unequal distribution of goods and services in capitalist societies but the increasingly unequal distribution of power. As one frequently sighted placard from the 1999 Seattle protests read, “No globalization without participation!” Occupy Wall Street has come to represent the latest turn in this movement toward local and more horizontal spaces of freedom. Occupation was, itself, a matter of recovering local space: a way to repoliticize the square. And in a moment characterized by foreclosure, it was also symbolically, and sometimes literally, an attempt to reclaim lost homes and abandoned properties. But there was also a deeper notion of space at work. Occupy Wall Street sought out not only new political spaces but also new ways to relate to them. By resisting the top-down management of representative democracy as well as the bottom-up ideals of labor movements, Occupiers hoped to create a new politics in which decisions moved neither up nor down but horizontally. While embracing the new reach of globalization—linking arms and webcams with their encamped comrades in Madrid, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Santiago—they were also rejecting its patterns of consolidation, its limits on personal freedom, its vertical and bureaucratic structures of decision-making. Time was also to be transformed. The general assemblies and general strikes were efforts to reconstruct, and make more autonomous, our experience of time as well as space. Seeking to escape from the Taylorist demands of productivity, the <u><mark>assemblies insisted that decision-making was an <strong>endless process.</u></strong></mark> <u>Who we are, what we do, what we want to be are categories of flexibility, <mark>and consensus is</mark> as much <mark>about </mark>repairing this sense of <mark>open-endedness as </mark>it is about <mark>agreeing</u></mark> on a particular set of demands. Life is a mystery, as one pop star fashionista has insisted, and Occupiers wanted to keep it that way. Likewise, general strikes were imagined as ways in which workers could take back time—regain those parts of life that had become routinized by work. Rather than attempts to achieve large-scale reforms, general strikes were improvisations, escapes from the daily calculations of production that demonstrated that we can still be happy, creative, even productive individuals without jobs. As one unfurled banner along New York’s Broadway read during this spring’s May Day protests, “Why work? Be happy.” In many ways, the Occupy movement was a rebellion against the institutionalized nature of twenty-first century capitalism and democracy. <u>Equally skeptical of corporate monopolies as</u> it was of <u>the technocratic</u> tendencies of the <u>state, <mark>it was</u></mark> <u>ultimately <mark>an insurgency against control</u></mark>, against the ways in which organized power and capital deprived the individual of the time and space needed to control his or her life. Just as the vertically inclined leftists of the twentieth century leveraged the public corporation—the welfare state—against the increasingly powerful number of private ones, so too were Occupy and, more generally, the horizontalist Left to embrace the age of the market: at the center of their politics was the anthropological “man” in both his forms—homo faber and homo ludens—who was capable of negotiating his interests outside the state. <u>For this reason, the movement did not fit neatly into right or left,</u> conservative or liberal, revolutionary or reformist categories. <u>On the one hand, it was sympathetic to the most classic of left aspirations: to dismantle governing hierarchies.</u> On the other, its language was imbued with a strident individualism: a politics of anti-institutionalism and personal freedom that has most often been affiliated with the Right. Seeking an alternative to the bureaucratic tendencies of capitalism and socialism, Occupiers were to frequently invoke the image of autonomy: of a world in which social and economic relations exist outside the institutions of the state. <u><strong><mark>Their aspiration was a society based on organic</mark>, decentralized circuits of exchange and <mark>deliberation</mark>—on voluntary associations, <mark>on local debate</strong></mark>, on loose networks of affinity groups. </u>If political and economic life had become abstracted in the age of globalization and financialization, then Occupy <u>activists wanted <mark>to re-politicize our everyday choices</u></mark>. As David Graeber, one of Occupy’s chief theoretical architects, explained two days after Zuccotti Park was occupied, <u>“The idea is essentially that <mark>“the system is not going to save us,”</mark> so “we’re going to have to save ourselves.” </u>Borrowing from the anarchist tradition, Graeber has called this work “direct action”: the practice of circumventing, even on occasion subverting, hierarchies through practical projects. Instead of attempting “to pressure the government to institute reforms” or “seize state power,” direct actions seek to “build a new society in the shell of the old.” By creating spaces in which individuals take control over their lives, it is a strategy of acting and thinking “as if one is already free.” Marina Sitrin, another prominent Occupier, has offered another name for this politics—“horizontalism”: “the use of direct democracy, the striving for consensus” and “processes in which everyone is heard and new relationships are created.” It is a politics that not only refuses institutionalization but also imagines a new subjectivity from which one can project the future into the present. Direct action and horizontal democracy are new names, of course, for old ideas. They descend—most directly—from the ideas and tactics of the global justice movement of the 1990s and 2000s. Direct Action Network was founded in 1999 to help coordinate the anti-WTO protests in Seattle; horizontalidad, as it was called in Argentina, emerged as a way for often unemployed workers to organize during the financial crisis of 2001. Both emerged out of the theories and practices of a movement that was learning as it went along. The ad hoc working groups, the all-night bull sessions, the daylong actions, the decentralized planning were all as much by necessity as they were by design. They were not necessarily intended at first. But what emerged out of anti-globalization was a new vision of globalization. Local and horizontal in practice, direct action and democracy were to become catchphrases for a movement that was attempting to resist the often autocratic tendencies of a fast-globalizing capitalism. <u>But direct action and horizontal democracy also tap into a longer</u>, if often neglected, <u>tradition on the left:</u> the <u>anarchism</u>, syndicalism, <u>and autonomist Marxism</u> that stretch from Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, and Rosa Luxemburg to C.L.R. James, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Antonio Negri. <u><mark>If revolutionary socialism was</mark> a theory <mark>about ideal possibilities, then </mark>anarchism and <mark>autonomism </mark>often <mark>focused on </mark>the <mark>revolutionary practices themselves</u></mark>. The way in which the revolution was organized was the primary act of revolution. Autonomy, as the Greco-French Castoriadis told Le Monde in 1977, demands not only “the elimination of dominant groups and of the institutions embodying and orchestrating that domination” but also new modes of what he calls “self-management and organization.” With direct action and horizontal democracy, the Occupy movement not only developed a set of new tactics but also a governing ideology, a theory of time and space that runs counter to many of the practices of earlier leftist movements. Unlike revolutionary socialism or evolutionary social democracy—Marx’s Esau and Jacob—Occupiers conceived of time as more cyclical than developmental, its understanding of space more local and horizontal than structural and vertical. The revolution was to come but only through everyday acts. It was to occur only through—what Castoriadis obliquely referred to as—“the self-institution of society.” The seemingly spontaneous movement that emerged after the first general assemblies in Zuccotti Park was not, then, sui generis but an elaboration of a much larger turn by the Left. As occupations spread across the country and as activists begin to exchange organizational tactics, it was easy to forget that what was happening was, in fact, a part of a much larger shift in the scale and plane of Western politics: a turn toward more local and horizontal patterns of life, a growing skepticism toward the institutions of the state, and an increasing desire to seek out greater realms of personal freedom. And although its hibernation over the summer has, perhaps, marked the end of the Occupy movement, OWS has also come to represent an important—and perhaps more lasting—break. In both its ideas and tactics, it has given us a new set of desires—autonomy, radical democracy, direct action—that look well beyond the ideological and tactical tropes of socialism. <u><mark>Its </mark>occupations and general assemblies, its flash mobs and street <mark>performances,</mark> its loose network of activists <mark>all suggest a bold new </mark>set of possibilities for the Left: a horizontalist <mark>ethos</mark> that believes that revolution will begin by transforming our everyday lives. </u>It can be argued that <u><mark>horizontalism is</mark>, in many ways,<mark> a </mark>product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society; that <strong>it is a kind of <mark>free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the </mark>very <mark>culture it hopes to resist.</u></strong></mark> For not only does it emphasize the agency of the individual, but it draws one of its central inspirations from a neoclassical image: that of the self-managing society—the polity that functions best when the state is absent from everyday decisions. But <u>one can also find in its anti-institutionalism an attempt to speak in today’s language for yesterday’s goals. If we must live in a society that neither trusts nor feels compelled by collectivist visions, then <mark>horizontalism </mark>offers us a leftism that <mark>attempts to be</mark>, at once, both individualist and egalitarian, <mark>anti-institutional and democratic, </mark>open to the possibilities of self-management and yet also concerned with the casualties born out of an age that has let capital manage itself for far too long</u>. Horizontalism has absorbed the crisis of knowledge—what we often call “postmodernism”—and the crisis of collectivism—what we often call “neoliberalism.” But instead of seeking to return to some golden age before our current moment of fracture, it seeks—for better and worse—to find a way to make leftist politics conform to our current age of anti-foundationalism and institutionalism. As Graeber argued in the prescriptive last pages of his anthropological epic, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, “Capitalism has transformed the world in many ways that are clearly irreversible” and we therefore need to give up “the false choice between state and market that [has] so monopolized political ideology for the last centuries that it made it difficult to argue about anything else.” We need, in other words, to stop thinking like leftists. But herein lies the problem. Not all possible forms of human existence and social interaction, no matter how removed they are from the institutions of power and capital, are good forms of social organization. Although it is easy to look enthusiastically to those societies—ancient or modern, Western or non-Western—that exist beyond the structures of the state, they, too, have their own patterns of hierarchy, their own embittered lines of inequality and injustice. More important, to select one form of social organization over the other is always an act of exclusion. Instituting and then protecting a particular way of life will always require a normative commitment in which not every value system is respected—in which, in other words, there is a moral hierarchy. More problematically, <u><mark>by working outside structures </mark>of power <strong><mark>one may circumvent coercive systems but </mark>one does <mark>not </mark>necessarily <mark>subvert them</strong>. Localizing </mark>politics</u>—stripping it of its larger institutional ambitions—has, to be sure, its advantages. But without a larger structural vision, it <u><mark>does not go far enough</mark>. “Bubbles of freedom,”</u> as Graeber calls them, <u>may create a larger variety of non-institutional life. But <mark>they </mark>will <mark>always neglect other crucial avenues</mark> of freedom: in particular, those social and economic rights that can only be protected from the top down</u>. In this way, <u><strong><mark>the anti-institutionalism </mark>of horizontalism <mark>comes dangerously close to </mark>that of <mark>the libertarian Right.</strong> </mark>The turn to previous eras of social organization, the desire to locate and confine politics to a particular regional <strong><mark>space, the </mark>deep <mark>skepticism toward </mark>all forms of <mark>institutional life </mark>not only <mark>mirror </mark>the aspirations of <mark>libertarianism but</strong></mark> help <strong><mark>cloak those hierarchies</strong></mark> spawned from non-institutional forms of power and capital. This is a</u> particularly <u>pointed irony for a political ideology that claims to be opposed to the</u> many <u>injustices</u> <u>of a non-institutional market</u>—in particular, its unregulated financial schemes. Perhaps this is an irony deeply woven into the theoretical quilt of autonomy: a vision that, as a result of its anti-institutionalism, is drawn to all sites of individual liberation—even those that are to be found in the marketplace. As Graeber concludes in Debt, “Markets, when allowed to drift entirely free from their violent origins, invariably begin to grow into something different, into networks of honor, trust, and mutual connectedness,” whereas “the maintenance of systems of coercion constantly do the opposite: turn the products of human cooperation, creativity, devotion, love and trust back into numbers once again.” In many ways, this is the result of a set of political ideas that have lost touch with their origins. The desire for autonomy was born out of the socialist—if not also often the Marxist—tradition and there was always a guarded sympathy for the structures needed to oppose organized systems of capital and power. Large-scale institutions were, for thinkers such as Castoriadis, Negri, and C.L.R. James, still essential if every cook was truly to govern. <u>To only “try <mark>to create ‘spaces</u></mark> of freedom’ ‘alongside’ of the State” <u><mark>meant</u></mark>, as Castoriadis was to argue later in his life, <u><mark>to back “down from </mark>the problem of <mark>politics</u></mark>.” In fact, this was, he believed, the failure of 1968: “the inability to set up new, different institutions” and recognize that <u>“there is no such thing as a society without institutions.” This is—and will be—a problem for <mark>the </mark>horizontalist <mark>Left </mark>as it moves forward.</u> As a leftism ready-made for an age in which all sides of the political spectrum are arrayed against the regulatory state<u>, it is always in danger of <strong><mark>becoming absorbed into the </mark>very <mark>ideological apparatus it seeks to dismantle.</u></strong></mark> For it aspires to a decentralized and organic politics that, in both principle and practice, shares a lot in common with its central target. Both it and the “free market” are anti-institutional. And the latter will remain so without larger vertical measures. <u><mark>Structures, not only everyday practices, need to be reformed</u></mark>. The revolution cannot happen only on the ground; it must also happen from above. A direct democracy still needs its indirect structures, individual freedoms still need to be measured by their collective consequences, and notions of social and economic equality still need to stand next to the desire for greater political participation. Deregulation is another regulatory regime, and to replace it requires new regulations: institutions that will limit the excesses of the market. As Castoriadis insisted in the years after 1968, the Left’s task is not only to abolish old institutions but to discover “new kinds of relationship between society and its institutions.” Horizontalism has come to serve as an important break from the static strategies and categories of analysis that have slowed an aging and vertically inclined Left. OWS was to represent its fullest expression yet, though it has a much longer back story and still—one hopes—a promising future. But horizontalists such as Graeber and Sitrin will struggle to establish spaces of freedom if they cannot formulate a larger vision for a society. Their vision is not—as several on the vertical left have suggested—too utopian but not utopian enough: in seeking out local spaces of freedom, they have confined their ambitions; they have, in fact, come, at times, to mirror the very ideology they hope to resist. In his famous retelling of the turtle parable, Clifford Geertz warned that in <u>“the search of all-too-deep-lying turtles,” <mark>we have </mark>to be careful <mark>to not “lose touch with the hard </mark>surfaces of life—with the political, <mark>economic</mark>, stratificatory <mark>realities</u></mark> within which men are everywhere contained.” This is an ever-present temptation, and one that, in our age of ever more stratification, we must resist.</p>

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Instability and humanitarian crisis continues despite Saudi withdrawal

Johnsen 18

Johnsen 18 (Gregory D. Johnsen, Resident Scholar at the Arabia Foundation, former Member of the Yemen Panel of Experts for the UN Security Council, holds an M.A. in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from Princeton University, 2018 (“Yemen’s Three Wars,” Lawfare, September 23rd, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/yemens-three-wars, Accessed 06-28-2019)

what we call the war in Yemen is actually three separate yet overlapping conflicts There is the U.S.-led war against AQAP and the Islamic State There is a regional conflict, pitting Saudi Arabia and the U A E against Iran. And there is a messy and multi-sided civil war, featuring the Houthis, what’s left of the Yemeni government, a southern secessionist movement, UAE proxy forces, and various different militias—some Salafi, some local, and some closer to criminal gangs—all vying to grab and hold as much territory as they can As distinct as these three wars are, each has porous borders, which bleed into one another Yemen is broken and probably will be for years to come. No one peace agreement, no matter how comprehensive, will be able to end each of these three wars. The most likely scenario which will not be easy is that a UN-sponsored deal will end the regional war, leading to the withdrawal of Saudi and UAE troops and the end of Iranian support to the Houthis, while the fighting on the ground in Yemen continues Yemen has been down this road before, with poor results much of the current fighting can be traced back to Yemen’s last national dialogue, which ended in 2014 and left many parties frustrated Within months of the dialogue’s conclusion, the Houthis moved out of Sadah, initiating the coup and subsequent civil war. The problem that prevented a conclusive agreement then is the same problem that prevents one today: There are too many armed groups in the country, none of which is strong enough to impose its will upon the entire country but all of which can act as spoilers anytime they don’t like a particular decision. Add a couple of terrorist groups to the mix and you have a recipe for the sort of disaster that can destroy multiple generations and unravel a nation

the war is three separate overlapping conflicts There is the war against AQAP There is a regional conflict And there is a multi-sided civil war Yemen is broken and will be for years No one peace agreement will end each war The most likely scenario is withdrawal of Saudi and UAE troops while fighting continues There are too many armed groups none strong enough but all spoilers Add terrorist groups and you have a disaster that can destroy multiple generations and unravel a nation

Last month, over the course of a few days in Yemen, one governor survived a roadside bomb while a second was denied entry through a checkpoint ostensibly run by his own government. At a military college in Aden, the government’s temporary capital, pro-secessionist soldiers opened fire on a graduation ceremony in response to the raising of the national flag. Three small security events—barely blips in Yemen’s daily catalogue of strikes that have already disappeared from the news. But each incident happened far from Yemen’s frontlines, and each, in its own way, is a reminder that what we call the war in Yemen is actually three separate yet overlapping conflicts. There is the U.S.-led war against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen. There is a regional conflict, pitting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Iran. And there is a messy and multi-sided civil war, featuring the Houthis, what’s left of the Yemeni government, a southern secessionist movement, UAE proxy forces, and various different militias—some Salafi, some local, and some closer to criminal gangs—all vying to grab and hold as much territory as they can. As distinct as these three wars are, each has porous borders, which bleed into one another. So the United States, which is fighting AQAP and the Islamic State, is also aiding Saudi Arabia and the UAE in its war against the Houthis, who are, in turn, themselves fighting AQAP and the Islamic State. UAE proxy forces, which were established to fight AQAP and the Houthis, also periodically clash with government troops loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who asked for the UAE’s military help in the first place. Salafi militias in Taizz fight the Houthis one day and government forces the next. Yemen, which only unified in 1990, is broken and probably will be for years to come. No one peace agreement, no matter how comprehensive, will be able to end each of these three wars. The most likely scenario—which itself will not be easy—is that a UN-sponsored deal will end the regional war, leading to the withdrawal of Saudi and UAE troops and the end of Iranian support to the Houthis, while the fighting on the ground in Yemen continues. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths has made clear his preference that the domestic future of Yemen, including the south, be discussed as part of a future national dialogue, not as part of UN-sponsored talks. Yemen has been down this road before, with poor results. Indeed, much of the current fighting in the country can be traced back to Yemen’s last national dialogue, which ended in 2014 and left many parties frustrated, most notably the Houthis. Within months of the dialogue’s conclusion, the Houthis moved out of Sadah, initiating the coup and subsequent civil war. The problem that prevented a conclusive agreement then is the same problem that prevents one today: There are too many armed groups in the country, none of which is strong enough to impose its will upon the entire country but all of which can act as spoilers anytime they don’t like a particular decision. Add a couple of terrorist groups to the mix and you have a recipe for the sort of disaster that can destroy multiple generations and unravel a nation.

<h4>Instability and humanitarian crisis continues despite Saudi withdrawal</h4><p><strong>Johnsen 18 </strong>(Gregory D. Johnsen, Resident Scholar at the Arabia Foundation, former Member of the Yemen Panel of Experts for the UN Security Council, holds an M.A. in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from Princeton University, 2018 (“Yemen’s Three Wars,” Lawfare, September 23rd, Available Online at https://www.lawfareblog.com/yemens-three-wars, Accessed 06-28-2019)</p><p>Last month, over the course of a few days in Yemen, one governor survived a roadside bomb while a second was denied entry through a checkpoint ostensibly run by his own government. At a military college in Aden, the government’s temporary capital, pro-secessionist soldiers opened fire on a graduation ceremony in response to the raising of the national flag. Three small security events—barely blips in Yemen’s daily catalogue of strikes that have already disappeared from the news. But each incident happened far from Yemen’s frontlines, and each, in its own way, is a reminder that <u>what we call <mark>the war</mark> in Yemen <mark>is</mark> actually <strong><mark>three separate</mark> yet <mark>overlapping conflicts</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>There is the</mark> U.S.-led <mark>war against</u></mark> al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (<u><mark>AQAP</u></mark>) <u>and the Islamic State</u> in Yemen. <u><mark>There is a regional conflict</mark>, pitting Saudi Arabia and the U</u>nited <u>A</u>rab <u>E</u>mirates <u>against Iran. <mark>And there is a</mark> messy and <mark>multi-sided civil war</mark>, featuring the Houthis, what’s left of the Yemeni government, a southern secessionist movement, UAE proxy forces, and various different militias—some Salafi, some local, and some closer to criminal gangs—all vying to grab and hold as much territory as they can</u>. <u>As distinct as these three wars are, each has porous borders, which bleed into one another</u>. So the United States, which is fighting AQAP and the Islamic State, is also aiding Saudi Arabia and the UAE in its war against the Houthis, who are, in turn, themselves fighting AQAP and the Islamic State. UAE proxy forces, which were established to fight AQAP and the Houthis, also periodically clash with government troops loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who asked for the UAE’s military help in the first place. Salafi militias in Taizz fight the Houthis one day and government forces the next. <u><mark>Yemen</u></mark>, which only unified in 1990, <u><mark>is broken and</mark> probably <mark>will be for years</mark> to come. <mark>No one peace agreement</mark>, no matter how comprehensive, <mark>will</mark> be able to <mark>end each</mark> of these three <mark>war</mark>s. <mark>The most likely scenario</u></mark>—<u>which</u> itself <u>will not be easy</u>—<u><mark>is</mark> that a UN-sponsored deal will end the regional war, leading to the <mark>withdrawal of Saudi and UAE troops</mark> and the end of Iranian support to the Houthis, <strong><mark>while</mark> the <mark>fighting</mark> on the ground in Yemen <mark>continues</u></strong></mark>. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths has made clear his preference that the domestic future of Yemen, including the south, be discussed as part of a future national dialogue, not as part of UN-sponsored talks. <u>Yemen has been down this road before, with poor results</u>. Indeed, <u>much of the current fighting</u> in the country <u>can be traced back to Yemen’s last national dialogue, which ended in 2014 and left many parties frustrated</u>, most notably the Houthis. <u>Within months of the dialogue’s conclusion, the Houthis moved out of Sadah, initiating the coup and subsequent civil war. The problem that prevented a conclusive agreement then is the same problem that prevents one today: <mark>There are too many armed groups</mark> in the country, <mark>none</mark> of which is <mark>strong enough</mark> to impose its will upon the entire country <mark>but all</mark> of which can act as <mark>spoilers</mark> anytime they don’t like a particular decision. <mark>Add</mark> a couple of <mark>terrorist groups</mark> to the mix <mark>and you have a</mark> recipe for the sort of <mark>disaster that can <strong>destroy multiple generations</strong> and <strong>unravel a nation</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1NC

Yemen

./documents/hspolicy19/MontgomeryBell/BaMe/Montgomery%20Bell-Barton-Meacham-Neg-Greenhill-Round1.docx

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Greenhill

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Peninsula FW

Matt Munday

1ac - saudi 1nc - t pearson militarism k uq cp thaad da relations da mbs da 2nr - cp relations da

hspolicy19/MontgomeryBell/BaMe/Montgomery%20Bell-Barton-Meacham-Neg-Greenhill-Round1.docx

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HS Policy 2019-20

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Nuclear war is existential – climate, mass starvation, Ice Age, and meltdowns

Starr 14 [Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility (www.psr.org) and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 5, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611]

Starr 14 [Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility (www.psr.org) and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 5, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611]

Nuclear war has no winner. several of the world’s leading climatologists published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of nuclear war fought with 1% of nuclear arsenals. even a small nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s ozone layer These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be negatively affected a global famine would result, which would cause 2 billion people to starve to death. peer-reviewed studies analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable an attack by either side could be suicidal nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would remain for at least a decade and destroy the protective ozone layer well as block warming sunlight creating Ice Age weather conditions temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day cold would completely eliminate growing seasons leading to a famine that would kill most humans and animal populations. E m p from high-altitude detonations would destroy integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices including those in commercial nuclear power plants Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make the US and Europe uninhabitable. survivors would be starving to death anyway. US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii]

leading climatologists evaluate consequences of nuclear war even a “small” nuclear war include disruptions of climate and destruction of ozone layer a global famine would cause 2 billion people to starve predict that a war would leave the Earth uninhabitable firestorms would produce smoke, which would remain for at least a decade, block sunlight creating Ice Age temperatures would fall below freezing eliminate growing seasons E m p would destroy all electronic devices including nuclear plants instant meltdown would releas long-lived radioactivity.

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii] These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii] Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds.

<h4>Nuclear war is existential – climate, mass starvation, Ice Age, and meltdowns</h4><p><strong>Starr</strong> <strong>14<u> [Steven, Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility (www.psr.org) and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, June 5, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear War has No Winner,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-lethality-of-nuclear-weapons-nuclear-war-has-no-winner/5385611]</p><p>Nuclear war has no winner.</u></strong> Beginning in 2006, <u><strong>several of the world’s <mark>leading climatologists</u></strong> </mark>(at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) <u><strong>published a series of studies that <mark>evaluate</mark>d the long-term environmental <mark>consequences of </u></strong></mark>a<u><strong><mark> nuclear war</u></strong></mark>, including baseline scenarios <u><strong>fought with</u></strong> merely <u><strong>1% of</u></strong> the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready <u><strong>nuclear arsenals.</u></strong> They concluded that the consequences of <u><strong><mark>even a</u></strong> “<u><strong>small</u></strong>” <u><strong>nuclear war </mark>would <mark>include </mark>catastrophic <mark>disruptions of </mark>global <mark>climate</u></strong></mark>[i] <u><strong><mark>and </mark>massive <mark>destruction of </mark>Earth’s</u></strong> protective <u><strong><mark>ozone layer</u></strong></mark>[ii]. <u><strong>These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be</u></strong> so <u><strong>negatively affected</u></strong> by such a war, <u><strong><mark>a global famine would </mark>result, which would <mark>cause</u></strong></mark> up to <u><strong><mark>2 billion people to starve </mark>to death.</u></strong> [iii] These <u><strong>peer-reviewed studies</u></strong> – which were <u><strong>analyzed by the best scientists in the world and</u></strong> <u><strong>found to be without error</u></strong> – also <u><strong><mark>predict that a war </mark>fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race</u></strong>.[iv] In other words, <u><strong>a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it <mark>would leave the Earth uninhabitable</u></strong> </mark>for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, <u><strong>an attack by either side could be suicidal</u></strong>, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that <u><strong>nuclear <mark>firestorms would produce </mark>millions of tons of <mark>smoke, which would</u></strong></mark> rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would <u><strong><mark>remain for at least a decade</u></strong>, <u><strong></mark>and</u></strong> it would act to <u><strong>destroy the protective ozone layer</u></strong> (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as <u><strong>well as <mark>block </mark>warming <mark>sunlight</u></strong></mark>, thus <u><strong><mark>creating Ice Age </mark>weather conditions</u></strong> that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, <u><strong><mark>temperatures </mark>in the central US and Eurasia <mark>would fall below freezing </mark>every day</u></strong> for one to three years; the intense <u><strong>cold would completely <mark>eliminate growing seasons</u></strong> </mark>for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, <u><strong>leading to a famine that would kill most humans and</u></strong> large <u><strong>animal populations. <mark>E</u></strong></mark>lectro<u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>agnetic <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>ulse <u><strong>from high-altitude</u></strong> nuclear <u><strong>detonations <mark>would destroy</u></strong> </mark>the <u><strong>integrated circuits in <mark>all</mark> modern <mark>electronic devices</u></strong></mark>[viii], <u><strong><mark>including</mark> those in commercial<mark> nuclear </mark>power<mark> plants</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Every nuclear reactor would almost <mark>instant</mark>ly <mark>meltdown</mark>; every nuclear spent fuel pool</u></strong> (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) <u><strong><mark>would</mark> boil-off, <mark>releas</mark>ing vast amounts of<mark> long-lived radioactivity. </mark>The fallout would make</u></strong> most of <u><strong>the US and Europe uninhabitable.</u></strong> Of course, the <u><strong>survivors</u></strong> of the nuclear war <u><strong>would be starving to death anyway.</u></strong> Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the <u><strong>US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii]</u></strong> Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds.</p>

1AC

Advantage

./documents/hsld19/Loyola/Ai/Loyola-Aimone-Aff-HWL-Round6.docx

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HWL

6

Peninsula VB

Brigitte Rodriguez

1AC - Crisis Stability 1NC - bioweapons NFU T 2NR - all 2AR - all

hsld19/Loyola/Ai/Loyola-Aimone-Aff-HWL-Round6.docx

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[3] COVID’s killing clean energy jobs and green infrastructure

REW 10/8 , 10-8-2020, "Clean energy sector down almost half a million jobs due to COVID," Renewable Energy World, https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2020/10/08/clean-energy-sector-down-almost-half-a-million-jobs-due-to-covid/#gref, SJBE

REW 10/8 Renewable Energy World (Content Team), 10-8-2020, "Clean energy sector down almost half a million jobs due to COVID," Renewable Energy World, https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2020/10/08/clean-energy-sector-down-almost-half-a-million-jobs-due-to-covid/#gref, SJBE

Most reports had predicted that the clean energy industry, which encompasses Energy Efficiency, Renewables, Clean Vehicles, Grid & Storage and Clean Fuels, would add more 175,000 jobs in 2020, but with the pandemic, the sector is now approaching the end of the year down 477,862 jobs as a stalled recovery plagues the sector. Despite growing two times faster than the overall economy since 2017, the clean energy sector has been particularly slow to rebound compared to the nation’s overall jobs recovery. Jobs in clean energy grew by less than half a percent for the third time in four months and just one out of every five clean energy jobs lost between March and May has come back, according to the monthly report. The slow growth is consistent nationwide; no state saw more than a 0.7% increase in employment in September, with 23 states and the District of Columbia adding fewer than 100 jobs each.

Most reports predicted that clean energy which encompasses , Renewables Grid & Storage would add 175,000 jobs in 2020, but with the pandemic, the sector is down 477,862 the clean energy sector has been slow to rebound compared to the nation’s overall jobs recovery one out of five has come back nationwide

Most reports had predicted that the clean energy industry, which encompasses Energy Efficiency, Renewables, Clean Vehicles, Grid & Storage and Clean Fuels, would add more 175,000 jobs in 2020, but with the pandemic, the sector is now approaching the end of the year down 477,862 jobs as a stalled recovery plagues the sector. The sector did add 12,500 jobs in September, however an analysis prepared for E2 (Environmental Entrepreneurs), E4TheFuture and the American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) by BW Research Partnership shows that 14% of the pre-covid workforce is still unemployed. Despite growing two times faster than the overall economy since 2017, the clean energy sector has been particularly slow to rebound compared to the nation’s overall jobs recovery. Jobs in clean energy grew by less than half a percent for the third time in four months and just one out of every five clean energy jobs lost between March and May has come back, according to the monthly report. The slow growth is consistent nationwide; no state saw more than a 0.7% increase in employment in September, with 23 states and the District of Columbia adding fewer than 100 jobs each.

<h4>[3] COVID’s killing clean energy jobs and green infrastructure</h4><p><strong>REW 10/8</strong> Renewable Energy World (Content Team)<u><strong>, 10-8-2020, "Clean energy sector down almost half a million jobs due to COVID," Renewable Energy World, https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2020/10/08/clean-energy-sector-down-almost-half-a-million-jobs-due-to-covid/#gref, SJBE</p><p><mark>Most reports</mark> had <mark>predicted that</mark> the <mark>clean energy</mark> industry, <mark>which encompasses</mark> Energy Efficiency<mark>, Renewables</mark>, Clean Vehicles, <mark>Grid & Storage</mark> and Clean Fuels, <mark>would add</mark> more <mark>175,000 jobs in 2020, but with the pandemic, the sector is</mark> now approaching the end of the year <mark>down 477,862</mark> jobs as a stalled recovery plagues the sector. </u></strong>The sector did add 12,500 jobs in September, however an analysis prepared for E2 (Environmental Entrepreneurs), E4TheFuture and the American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) by BW Research Partnership shows that 14% of the pre-covid workforce is still unemployed. <u><strong>Despite growing two times faster than the overall economy since 2017, <mark>the clean energy sector has been</mark> particularly <mark>slow to rebound compared to the nation’s overall jobs recovery</mark>. Jobs in clean energy grew by less than half a percent for the third time in four months and just <mark>one out of</mark> every <mark>five</mark> clean energy jobs lost between March and May <mark>has come back</mark>, according to the monthly report. The slow growth is consistent <mark>nationwide</mark>; no state saw more than a 0.7% increase in employment in September, with 23 states and the District of Columbia adding fewer than 100 jobs each. </p></u></strong>

1AC

Underview

./documents/hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Sh/Strake%20Jesuit-Shah-Aff-Apple%20Valley-Round1.docx

A

Apple Valley

1

Loyola DB

Mohsin, Samir

1AC- Pettit 1NC- Private Sectors DA Consult UN CPUtil EM Case 1AR- All Consult CPs Bad 2NR- All 2AR- Consult Cps Bad

hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Sh/Strake%20Jesuit-Shah-Aff-Apple%20Valley-Round1.docx

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Work necessitates material throughput and waste that destroys the environment, even when the jobs are ‘green’

Hoffmann, 20

Hoffmann, 20 (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/

quantitative studies researched the correlation of working hours and environmental impacts in terms of ecological footprint we develop a qualitative classification of ecological impacts of work all productive activity is based on material and energy throughputs which necessarily involves interference with the ecosphere The appropriation and exploitation of non-human animals, land, soil, water, biomass, raw materials, the atmosphere and all other elements of the biosphere always to some extent causes pollution, degradation, and destruction work is inherently both productive and destructive the greater the amount of work, the more ‘inputs’ are required which means more throughput of resources and resulting ecological impacts the larger the size of the economy, the more demands on the biosphere work is subject to certain integrally connected and mutually reinforcing conditions inherent in industrial economic structures, which aggravate ecological impacts These include the systematic externalisation of costs, and the use of fossil fuels as crucial energy basis, which combined with modern industrial technology enable continuously rising labour productivity independently of physical, spatial or temporal constraints , this leads to constantly spurred economic growth with a corresponding growth in material and energetic throughputs and the creation of massive amounts of waste The latter is not an adverse side-effect of modern work, but part of its purpose under the imperatives of growth, profitability, and constant innovation as evident in planned obsolescence or scrapping premium’, serving to stimulate growth and demand, These conditions and effects tend to be neglected when ‘green jobs’ are promised to resolve the ecological crisis disregarding that the systematically and continuously advanced scale of work and production has grown far beyond sustainable limits

all throughputs involves interference with the ecosphere work is inherently destructive the larger the economy, the more demands on the biosphere rising labour productivity independently of physical or temporal constraints leads to massive waste an adverse side-effect tend to be neglected when ‘green jobs’ are promised disregarding that the systematically advanced scale of work and production has grown far beyond sustainable limits

An ecological critique of work What is the problem with modern-day work from an environmental perspective? A number of quantitative studies have researched the correlation of working hours and environmental impacts in terms of ecological footprint, carbon footprint, greenhouse gas emissions, and energy consumption, both on micro/household and on macro/cross-national levels, and for both ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013; Nässén and Larsson 2015; Rosnick and Weisbrot 2007). Based on these findings, and going beyond them, we develop a qualitative classification of ecological impacts of work broadly (not working hours only), distinguishing four analytically distinct factors (Hoffmann 2017). Fundamentally, all productive activity is based on material and energy throughputs within wider ecological conditions, which necessarily involves interference with the ecosphere. The appropriation and exploitation of non-human animals, land, soil, water, biomass, raw materials, the atmosphere and all other elements of the biosphere always to some extent causes pollution, degradation, and destruction. Thus, work is inherently both productive and destructive. However, this biophysical basis alone need not make work unsustainable, and it has not always been so (Krausmann 2017). Contributing to its unsustainability is, firstly, the Scale factor: the greater the amount of work, the more ‘inputs’ are required and the more ‘outputs’ generated, which means more throughput of resources and energy, and resulting ecological impacts. In other words, the more work, the larger the size of the economy, the more demands on the biosphere (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013). Obviously, there are qualitative differences between different types of work and their respective environmental impacts. Moreover, besides the evident and direct impacts, indirect impacts matter also. The tertiary/service sector is therefore not exempt from this reasoning (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), not only due to its own (often ‘embodied’) materiality and energy requirements, but also because it administrates and supports industrial production processes in global supply chains (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Haberl et al. 2009; Paech 2012). Additionally, modern work is subject to certain integrally connected and mutually reinforcing conditions inherent in industrial economic structures, which aggravate ecological impacts by further increasing the Scale factor. These include the systematic externalisation of costs, and the use of fossil fuels as crucial energy basis, which combined with modern industrial technology enable continuously rising labour productivity independently of physical, spatial or temporal constraints (Malm 2013). Taken together, this leads to constantly spurred economic growth with a corresponding growth in material and energetic throughputs, and the creation of massive amounts of waste. The latter is not an adverse side-effect of modern work, but part of its purpose under the imperatives of growth, profitability, and constant innovation, as evident in phenomena such as planned obsolescence or the ‘scrapping premium’, serving to stimulate growth and demand, and hence, job creation (Gronemeyer 2012). These conditions and effects tend to be neglected when ‘green jobs’ are promised to resolve the ecological crisis (Paus 2018), disregarding that the systematically and continuously advanced scale of work and production has grown far beyond sustainable limits (Haberl et al. 2009).

<h4>Work necessitates material throughput and waste that destroys the environment, even when the jobs are ‘green’</h4><p><strong>Hoffmann, 20</strong> (Maja, "Resolving the ‘jobs-environment-dilemma’? The case for critiques of work in sustainability research. Taylor & Francis, 4-1-2020, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23251042.2020.1790718)//usc-br/</p><p>An ecological critique of work</p><p>What is the problem with modern-day work from an environmental perspective? A number of <u>quantitative studies</u> have <u>researched the correlation of working hours and environmental impacts in terms of ecological footprint</u>, carbon footprint, greenhouse gas emissions, and energy consumption, both on micro/household and on macro/cross-national levels, and for both ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013; Nässén and Larsson 2015; Rosnick and Weisbrot 2007). Based on these findings, and going beyond them, <u>we develop a qualitative classification of ecological impacts of work</u> broadly (not working hours only), distinguishing four analytically distinct factors (Hoffmann 2017).</p><p>Fundamentally, <u><strong><mark>all </mark>productive activity is based on material and energy <mark>throughputs</u></strong></mark> within wider ecological conditions, <u>which necessarily <mark>involves <strong>interference with the ecosphere</u></strong></mark>. <u>The appropriation and exploitation of non-human animals, land, soil, water, biomass, raw materials, the atmosphere and all other elements of the biosphere always to some extent causes pollution, degradation, and destruction</u>. Thus, <u><mark>work is <strong>inherently</strong></mark> both productive and</u> <u><strong><mark>destructive</u></strong></mark>. However, this biophysical basis alone need not make work unsustainable, and it has not always been so (Krausmann 2017).</p><p>Contributing to its unsustainability is, firstly, the Scale factor: <u>the greater the amount of work, the more ‘inputs’ are required</u> and the more ‘outputs’ generated, <u>which means more throughput of resources</u> and energy, <u>and resulting ecological impacts</u>. In other words, the more work, <u><strong><mark>the larger the</mark> size of the <mark>economy, the more demands on the biosphere</u></strong></mark> (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013). Obviously, there are qualitative differences between different types of work and their respective environmental impacts. Moreover, besides the evident and direct impacts, indirect impacts matter also. The tertiary/service sector is therefore not exempt from this reasoning (Hayden and Shandra 2009; Knight, Rosa, and Schor 2013), not only due to its own (often ‘embodied’) materiality and energy requirements, but also because it administrates and supports industrial production processes in global supply chains (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, and Clark 2015; Haberl et al. 2009; Paech 2012).</p><p>Additionally, modern <u>work is subject to certain integrally connected and mutually reinforcing conditions inherent in industrial economic structures, which aggravate ecological impacts </u>by further increasing the Scale factor. <u>These include the systematic externalisation of costs, and the use of <strong>fossil fuels as crucial energy basis</strong>,</u> <u>which combined with modern industrial technology enable continuously <mark>rising <strong>labour productivity independently of physical</mark>, spatial <mark>or temporal constraints</u></strong></mark> (Malm 2013). Taken together<u>, this <mark>leads to</mark> constantly spurred economic growth with a corresponding growth in material and energetic throughputs</u>, <u><strong>and the creation of <mark>massive</mark> amounts of <mark>waste</u></strong></mark>. <u>The latter is <strong>not <mark>an adverse side-effect</strong></mark> of modern work, but part of its <strong>purpose under the imperatives of growth, profitability, and constant innovation</u></strong>, <u>as evident in</u> phenomena such as <u>planned obsolescence or</u> the ‘<u>scrapping premium’, serving to stimulate growth and demand,</u> and hence, job creation (Gronemeyer 2012). <u>These conditions and effects <mark>tend to be <strong>neglected when ‘green jobs’ are promised </mark>to resolve the ecological crisis</strong> </u>(Paus 2018), <u><mark>disregarding that the <strong>systematically</mark> and continuously <mark>advanced scale of work and production has grown far beyond sustainable limits</u></strong></mark> (Haberl et al. 2009).</p>

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