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Disease spread is existential---best studies prove.

Kim ’21

Kim ’21 [Kiseong, Sunyong Yoo, Sangyeon Lee, Doheon Lee, and Kwang-Hyung Lee; March 26; Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; Research and Development Center at BioBrain Inc.; Department of ICT Convergence System Engineering, Chonnam National University; Bio-Synergy Research Center; Moon Soul Graduate School of Future Strategy; Applied Sciences, “Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading,” vol. 11]

epidemics, such as Black Death and Spanish flu threatened human life throughout history the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases remain undiscovered we present a epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk certain diseases can infect all nodes in the human social networks These infectious diseases lead to human extinction The emergence of a pandemic is frequently discussed as a human extinction event, and it is listed as one of the global catastrophic risks in studies several pandemics, such as the Black Death Spanish flu smallpox SARS and Ebola affected a large population throughout history. The risk of pandemics increases with population mobility threatening humankind when the epidemic spreads to all nodes the fatality rate is 100% We designed an epidemic simulation process We adapted the Monte Carlo method to determine the status of the transition Diseases causing extinctive spread are potential candidates of high pandemic risk extinctive spreading indicates disease will infect every person in the society Many previous studies have made stochastic SIR models to analyze the dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases However, they did not conduct a quantitative assessment of pandemic risk taking into account physical contact between people we consider various connectivity and disease characteristics The results revealed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction human extinction is possible

epidemics threaten human life the sudden spread of diseases remain undiscovered a simulation reveal the risk diseases infect all nodes These lead to extinction emergence is frequently a extinction event, and global risk Black Death smallpox and Ebola affected a large population risk increases with mobility extinctive spread will infect every person previous studies did not conduct quantitative assessment we consider various disease characteristics results reveal extinction

Several epidemics, such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, have threatened human life throughout history; however, it is unclear if humans will remain safe from the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases. Moreover, the transmission characteristics of epidemics remain undiscovered. In this study, we present the results of an epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk. To analyze the time-dependent risk and impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below 100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless, certain diseases can potentially infect all nodes in the human social networks, and these diseases cause a pandemic when the average degree is larger than the threshold value. These results indicated that certain infectious diseases lead to human extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. 1. Introduction The emergence of a pandemic is one of the various scenarios frequently discussed as a human extinction event, and it is listed as one of the global catastrophic risks in studies regarding the future [1,2,3]. In particular, several pandemics, such as the Black Death [4,5], Spanish flu [6], and those caused by smallpox [7], severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [8], and Ebola [9], have affected a large population throughout history. The risk of pandemics increases with an increase in population mobility between cities, nations, and continents, thereby threatening humankind [10,11,12]. It is essential to analyze the epidemic spread in society to minimize the damage from epidemic disasters; however, extinctive epidemic spreading experiments have limitations in real-world situations, as they predict stochastic effects on the spread without considering the structure of human society. Network-based approaches have been proposed to overcome these limitations and perform epidemic spreading simulations by considering the network structure of numerous real-world connections [13,14,15]. These methods use various models of epidemic spreading, such as the susceptible–infectious–susceptible (SIS) [16,17,18], susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) [19,20,21], and Watts threshold models [22]. While these methods are mathematically convenient, they are epidemiologically unrealistic for various infections because they require exponentially distributed incubation and infectious periods [23,24,25]. Moreover, previous epidemic studies did not perform quantitative assessment of the pandemic risk depending on the network connectivity in individuals and fatality rate of various diseases [26]. In the present study, we applied an SIR epidemic model to a scale-free network with Monte Carlo simulation to identify the quantitative relationship between infectious diseases and human existence. Our fundamental hypothesis states that when the epidemic spreads to all nodes of the network and the fatality rate is 100%, it can increase the pandemic risk. To address this, we initially constructed a scale-free network to simulate a society. Moreover, for the epidemic spreading simulation, an SIR model was applied to the network to describe the immune state of an individual after infection. From the simulation study, we found that the mean degree of a scale-free network was an essential factor in determining whether epidemics threaten humans. This approach provides important insights into epidemic spreading analysis by investigating the relationship between epidemic and scale-free network parameters. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of determining information flow during an epidemic. 2. Materials and Methods We designed an epidemic simulation process to identify the relationship between pandemic risk and network parameters. This study was performed in four steps (Figure 1): (i) generating a scale-free network model to reflect real-world conditions; (ii) applying an SIR model to the scale-free network for epidemic spreading simulations; (iii) adapting the Monte Carlo method to reflect the stochastic process in the node status of the SIR model; and (iv) iteratively performing simulation for every parameter set and analyzing the results. We have provided the source code and sample results of epidemic simulation in Supplementary Materials. Figure 1. Overview of epidemic simulation process based on the Monte Carlo method. (A) We generated scale-free networks for a fixed population (N = 1,000,000) and various node degrees (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). (B) Epidemic spreading was simulated by applying a susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model to the scale-free network. We set the epidemic parameters, β and γd. β represents the spreading rate of epidemics, and γd is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. Randomly, 0.05% of nodes were initially infected. (C) We adapted the Monte Carlo method to determine the status of the transition from the infection node to immunization node. Repeated simulations were performed until a steady state was achieved. (D) For every parameter set, 10,000 simulations were performed. 2.1. Network Generation Based on a Scale-Free Model We constructed a network model for the epidemic spreading simulation (Figure 1). The nodes and edges of the network represent people in the society and their physical contacts, respectively. We used a scale-free network model, which follows the preferential attachment property observed in numerous real-world networks, such as social networks, physical systems, and economic networks [27,28,29]. In the scale-free network, when a node is added to the network, its likelihood of connecting to existing nodes increases with an increase in the node’s degree. Hub nodes, which lead to fast and vast spreading of epidemics, exist. Two characteristic parameters, including N and k, affect the form of scale-free networks. The parameter N denotes all nodes in the network. In the real world, N indicates the whole population size. The parameter k is the average degree of the network, which determines the degree of the newly attached node for each step during network generation. Following the characteristics of the network model, we generated scale-free networks representing human contacts for epidemic spread. The scale-free network was generated by the Barabasi–Albert graph distribution, in which the network is constructed from a cycle graph with three vertices, followed by the addition of k edges at each construction step [30]. The k edges are randomly attached to the vertex based on the degree distribution of the vertex. After network generation, we investigated the degree distribution properties of the network (Figure 2). The results indicate that the degree distributions have similar tendency for networks with varying number of nodes and edges. This study constructed scale-free networks with the largest number of nodes considering computational complexity (N = 1,000,000). <<FIGURE 1 OMITTED>> Figure 2. Degree distribution of the scale-free network. We analyzed the degree distribution of the network based on the number of nodes (N) and mean degree (k). 2.2. Epidemic Spreading Based on the SIR Model For the epidemic spreading simulations, we applied an SIR model to the generated scale-free network. The classical SIR model can be expressed by the following nonlinear differential equations [21]: <<EQUATIONS OMITTED>> where S, I, and R represent susceptible, infected, and recovered compartments, respectively, in the whole population. S represents people who have not been infected yet but can be infected in future. I represents infected people who can spread the epidemic to susceptible people through physical contact. R denotes people who have recovered or died from the epidemic and who no longer participate in the epidemic spreading process. The sum of the S, I, and R values represents the whole population size N. Epidemics have two parameters in the SIR model, transmission rate (β) and recovery rate (γ), which arise from the basic reproduction number R0 (Figure 1B). The basic reproduction number is the number of infections caused by one infective node [31,32,33]. If the R0 is more than 1, the infection can spread in a population, whereas if R0 is less than 1, the infection cannot spread. We express the basic reproduction number as R0 = β/γ, where β represents the spreading rate of epidemics between infective nodes and adjacent susceptible nodes and γ represents the probability of recovery from infection [34]. We mainly used γd, which is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. 2.3. Investigation of Epidemic Status Based on the Monte Carlo Method The epidemic simulation was performed for a time series event by constructing epidemic status matrix (z) to represent the status of the nth node at time step t. For each node, the value of epidemic status matrix at time step t can be 0, 1, or 2, indicating that a node is susceptible, infective, or recovered, respectively. We initially (t = 0) set every value of epidemic status matrix to 0 because all nodes are susceptible before the epidemic spreads. At the initial infection stage, randomly selected 0.05% of nodes were infected. At every time period, we performed immunization and observed the infection stages (Figure 3). <<FIGURE 3 OMITTED>> At the immunization stage, we identified infective nodes and determined whether these nodes would be recovered in the next time step. To calculate the transition probability of infected and recovered phenomena, the Monte Carlo method was applied [35,36]. When infection and recovery parameters are provided, it is possible to investigate whether a node transitions from an epidemic state to another state. To accomplish this, we compared the method revealing the change in each population in every compartment over time (Figure 4). <<FIGURE 4 OMITTED>> The final steady state of the epidemic spreading simulation model indicates the total number of casualties of the epidemic who either are dead or have recovered from the disease. Infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 1) are transformed to recovered nodes at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 2) when 1/γd is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1. We determined whether the neighbor nodes of the infection node would be infected by identifying susceptible nodes adjacent to the infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 0, with the adjacent infective node) (Figure 5). When β is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1, a susceptible node becomes an infective node at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 1); this scenario represents epidemic spread. For each time step, we recorded the number of susceptible, infective, and recovered nodes during epidemic spread. <<FIGURE 5 OMITTED>> 2.4. Simulation Parameters We carried out simulation trials for various mean degrees of networks (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). Each network considered the following epidemic parameters: β ranges from 0.05 to 0.95 and γd ranges from 1 to 10. The Monte Carlo model was repeatedly simulated to observe saturation of the recovery process. Considering that the simulation pipeline contains random processes such as initial infection and Monte Carlo trials, we performed the simulation iteratively until the status of nodes remained unchanged. After simulation, time series data from every simulation were interpolated in the time domain. The fatality rate determines the ratio of deceased and recovered individuals in the final population [37,38,39]. If the fatality rate is below 100%, the recovered population contains both dead and recovered individuals. Such a situation does not always cause a pandemic. In this simulation, we assumed a 100% fatality rate. To accomplish this, we enumerated the recovered nodes as dead for considering the pandemic risk. 3. Results Through our method, we obtained epidemic spreading data with various network and epidemic parameter sets. In the present study, we focused on the case where the epidemic infects all nodes and defined this phenomenon as “extinctive spread”. Diseases causing extinctive spread are potential candidates of high pandemic risk. In the real world, extinctive spreading indicates that the disease will infect every person in the society. From the simulation data, we calculated the extinctive spread score by dividing the total number of simulation trials by the number of extinctive spread cases. Thereafter, we identified that the number of extinctive spread cases is mainly influenced by spreading speed, which is determined by β, γd, and k (Figure 6). <<FIGURE 6 OMITTED>> The extinctive spread region (brown area in Figure 6) is expanded as the value of mean degree of network (k) is increased, thereby indicating that the area of extinctive spread becomes noticeably wider in a dense network than in a sparse network. Thus, the more contact between people, the higher the risk of epidemics. Moreover, high γd and high β cause extinctive spread across a large region, indicating that the high spreading rate and short time interval between infection and recovery are risk factors of epidemic diseases. In contrast, the infective nodes recover before they transmit the disease to their neighbors in low β and low γd scenarios, thus disconnecting the network and preventing extinctive spread. This occurs because the infective nodes need more time to transmit the disease in low β and high γd scenarios. Therefore, the disease begins to subside due to a lack of new infective nodes. Furthermore, we investigated the range of β and γd for existing epidemics of the common cold [40,41] and fatal diseases, namely, cholera [42,43], Marburg [44,45], Ebola (Congo and Uganda) [46,47,48,49], SARS [50], and MERS [51] (Table 1). We selected diseases with relatively well-known epidemic parameters, such as average duration of infection and basic number of reproductions from previous studies. Transmission rates were calculated using the mean duration of infectious periods and basic reproduction numbers of the epidemics. Different studies reveal multiple values of infectious period and transmission rate for some of these diseases; we considered these values separately [40,41,42,43,46,47,48,49]. For example, the infectious period of a common cold is from 3 to 7 days and that of Ebola is 6.5 days. Next, we placed the possible regions of these epidemics as a disease band for various k values (colored lines in Figure 6). When k > 5, fatal diseases have an opportunity to cause a pandemic. Even when k = 5, diseases such as cholera and Ebola (Congo) can be threatening in regions of low γd and high, thus demonstrating that the knowledge of network parameters of the society and the characteristics of epidemic diseases can aid in quantifying the risk of epidemics. <<TABLE 1 OMITTED>> 4. Discussion Many previous studies have made stochastic SIR models to analyze the dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases. They investigated the distribution of susceptible, infected, and removed populations for specific epidemic disease spreading, such as cholera, SARS, Marburg, and MERS, based on mathematical modelling [52,53,54,55]. However, they did not conduct a quantitative assessment of pandemic risk taking into account physical contact between people. To solve this limitation, we performed epidemic spreading simulations by applying an SIR model to scale-free networks with Monte Carlo simulation. In the simulation, we consider various connectivity and disease characteristics on scale-free networks. For each network and epidemic parameter set, the probability of extinctive spread was calculated. The results revealed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction. Moreover, even if the disease band extends over the extinctive spread regions, it does not indicate that human extinction results from the disease, as the fatality rate is below 100%; however, in the case of 100% fatality, the disease can cause a human extinction event. The risk of infectious disease is influenced by the network structure. A dense network has a higher risk of spreading infectious disease than a sparse network, as we observed in the extinctive spreading maps. According to our results, when the average degree of human social networks is below the risk threshold, i.e., less than 4 in this study, human society is safe from an extinctive outbreak based on our knowledge regarding the epidemic parameters of the infectious disease. Nevertheless, in other cases, human extinction is possible. For example, if the population is 1,000,000 and there are 4 or more instances of physical contact between people, human extinction events may occur, depending on the fatality rate of the epidemics. Hence, physical contact between people is closely related to an extinction event of infectious diseases. Eventually, from a public health perspective, lowering the average contact level of society is an appropriate way to increase the robustness of strategies against the occurrence of extinction. In the real world, reducing network density can be accomplished by epidemic prevention activity, such as isolation and quarantine treatment. This action prevents epidemic risk to the society, thereby avoiding human extinction.

<h4>Disease spread is <u>existential</u>---<u>best studies</u><strong> prove. </h4><p>Kim ’21 </strong>[Kiseong, Sunyong Yoo, Sangyeon Lee, Doheon Lee, and Kwang-Hyung Lee; March 26; Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; Research and Development Center at BioBrain Inc.; Department of ICT Convergence System Engineering, Chonnam National University; Bio-Synergy Research Center; Moon Soul Graduate School of Future Strategy; Applied Sciences, “Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading,” vol. 11]</p><p>Several <u><strong><mark>epidemics</strong></mark>, such as</u> the <u>Black Death and</u> the <u>Spanish flu</u>, have <u><mark>threaten</mark>ed <strong><mark>human life</strong></mark> throughout <strong>history</u></strong>; however, it is unclear if humans will remain safe from <u><mark>the <strong>sudden</strong></mark> and <strong>fast <mark>spread</strong> of</mark> epidemic <mark>diseases</u></mark>. Moreover, the transmission characteristics of epidemics <u><mark>remain undiscovered</u></mark>. In this study, <u>we present</u> the results of <u><mark>a</u></mark>n <u>epidemic <strong><mark>simulation</mark> experiment</strong> <mark>reveal</mark>ing <mark>the</mark> relationship between <strong>epidemic</strong> parameter<strong>s</strong> and <strong>pandemic <mark>risk</u></strong></mark>. To analyze the time-dependent risk and impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below 100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless, <u>certain <mark>diseases</mark> can</u> potentially <u><mark>infect <strong>all nodes</strong></mark> in the human social networks</u>, and these diseases cause a pandemic when the average degree is larger than the threshold value. <u><mark>These</u></mark> results indicated that certain <u>infectious diseases <mark>lead to</mark> <strong>human <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark> and can be prevented by minimizing human contact.</p><p>1. Introduction</p><p><u>The <mark>emergence</mark> of a <strong>pandemic</strong> <mark>is</u></mark> one of the various scenarios <u><strong><mark>frequently</strong></mark> discussed as <mark>a</mark> <strong>human <mark>extinction event</strong>, and</mark> it is listed as one of the <strong><mark>global</mark> catastrophic <mark>risk</strong></mark>s in studies</u> regarding the future [1,2,3]. In particular, <u>several pandemics, such as the <strong><mark>Black Death</u></strong></mark> [4,5], <u>Spanish flu</u> [6], and those caused by <u><strong><mark>smallpox</u></strong></mark> [7], severe acute respiratory syndrome (<u><strong>SARS</u></strong>) [8], <u><mark>and <strong>Ebola</u></strong></mark> [9], have <u><mark>affected a <strong>large population</strong></mark> throughout <strong>history</strong>. The <mark>risk</mark> of pandemics <strong><mark>increases</strong> with</u></mark> an increase in <u>population <strong><mark>mobility</strong></mark> </u>between cities, nations, and continents, thereby <u>threatening humankind</u> [10,11,12]. It is essential to analyze the epidemic spread in society to minimize the damage from epidemic disasters; however, extinctive epidemic spreading experiments have limitations in real-world situations, as they predict stochastic effects on the spread without considering the structure of human society. Network-based approaches have been proposed to overcome these limitations and perform epidemic spreading simulations by considering the network structure of numerous real-world connections [13,14,15]. These methods use various models of epidemic spreading, such as the susceptible–infectious–susceptible (SIS) [16,17,18], susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) [19,20,21], and Watts threshold models [22]. While these methods are mathematically convenient, they are epidemiologically unrealistic for various infections because they require exponentially distributed incubation and infectious periods [23,24,25]. Moreover, previous epidemic studies did not perform quantitative assessment of the pandemic risk depending on the network connectivity in individuals and fatality rate of various diseases [26].</p><p>In the present study, we applied an SIR epidemic model to a scale-free network with Monte Carlo simulation to identify the quantitative relationship between infectious diseases and human existence. Our fundamental hypothesis states that <u>when the epidemic spreads to <strong>all nodes</u></strong> of the network and <u>the fatality rate is <strong>100%</u></strong>, it can increase the pandemic risk. To address this, we initially constructed a scale-free network to simulate a society. Moreover, for the epidemic spreading simulation, an SIR model was applied to the network to describe the immune state of an individual after infection. From the simulation study, we found that the mean degree of a scale-free network was an essential factor in determining whether epidemics threaten humans. This approach provides important insights into epidemic spreading analysis by investigating the relationship between epidemic and scale-free network parameters. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of determining information flow during an epidemic.</p><p>2. Materials and Methods</p><p><u>We designed an epidemic <strong>simulation process</u></strong> to identify the relationship between pandemic risk and network parameters. This study was performed in four steps (Figure 1): (i) generating a scale-free network model to reflect real-world conditions; (ii) applying an SIR model to the scale-free network for epidemic spreading simulations; (iii) adapting the Monte Carlo method to reflect the stochastic process in the node status of the SIR model; and (iv) iteratively performing simulation for every parameter set and analyzing the results. We have provided the source code and sample results of epidemic simulation in Supplementary Materials.</p><p>Figure 1. Overview of epidemic simulation process based on the Monte Carlo method. (A) We generated scale-free networks for a fixed population (N = 1,000,000) and various node degrees (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). (B) Epidemic spreading was simulated by applying a susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model to the scale-free network. We set the epidemic parameters, β and γd. β represents the spreading rate of epidemics, and γd is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. Randomly, 0.05% of nodes were initially infected. (C) <u>We adapted the <strong>Monte Carlo method</u></strong> <u>to determine the status of the transition</u> from the infection node to immunization node. Repeated simulations were performed until a steady state was achieved. (D) For every parameter set, 10,000 simulations were performed.</p><p>2.1. Network Generation Based on a Scale-Free Model</p><p>We constructed a network model for the epidemic spreading simulation (Figure 1). The nodes and edges of the network represent people in the society and their physical contacts, respectively. We used a scale-free network model, which follows the preferential attachment property observed in numerous real-world networks, such as social networks, physical systems, and economic networks [27,28,29]. In the scale-free network, when a node is added to the network, its likelihood of connecting to existing nodes increases with an increase in the node’s degree. Hub nodes, which lead to fast and vast spreading of epidemics, exist. Two characteristic parameters, including N and k, affect the form of scale-free networks. The parameter N denotes all nodes in the network. In the real world, N indicates the whole population size. The parameter k is the average degree of the network, which determines the degree of the newly attached node for each step during network generation. Following the characteristics of the network model, we generated scale-free networks representing human contacts for epidemic spread. The scale-free network was generated by the Barabasi–Albert graph distribution, in which the network is constructed from a cycle graph with three vertices, followed by the addition of k edges at each construction step [30]. The k edges are randomly attached to the vertex based on the degree distribution of the vertex. After network generation, we investigated the degree distribution properties of the network (Figure 2). The results indicate that the degree distributions have similar tendency for networks with varying number of nodes and edges. This study constructed scale-free networks with the largest number of nodes considering computational complexity (N = 1,000,000).</p><p><<FIGURE 1 OMITTED>></p><p>Figure 2. Degree distribution of the scale-free network. We analyzed the degree distribution of the network based on the number of nodes (N) and mean degree (k).</p><p>2.2. Epidemic Spreading Based on the SIR Model</p><p>For the epidemic spreading simulations, we applied an SIR model to the generated scale-free network. The classical SIR model can be expressed by the following nonlinear differential equations [21]:</p><p><<EQUATIONS OMITTED>></p><p>where S, I, and R represent susceptible, infected, and recovered compartments, respectively, in the whole population. S represents people who have not been infected yet but can be infected in future. I represents infected people who can spread the epidemic to susceptible people through physical contact. R denotes people who have recovered or died from the epidemic and who no longer participate in the epidemic spreading process. The sum of the S, I, and R values represents the whole population size N. Epidemics have two parameters in the SIR model, transmission rate (β) and recovery rate (γ), which arise from the basic reproduction number R0 (Figure 1B). The basic reproduction number is the number of infections caused by one infective node [31,32,33]. If the R0 is more than 1, the infection can spread in a population, whereas if R0 is less than 1, the infection cannot spread. We express the basic reproduction number as R0 = β/γ, where β represents the spreading rate of epidemics between infective nodes and adjacent susceptible nodes and γ represents the probability of recovery from infection [34]. We mainly used γd, which is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery.</p><p>2.3. Investigation of Epidemic Status Based on the Monte Carlo Method</p><p>The epidemic simulation was performed for a time series event by constructing epidemic status matrix (z) to represent the status of the nth node at time step t. For each node, the value of epidemic status matrix at time step t can be 0, 1, or 2, indicating that a node is susceptible, infective, or recovered, respectively. We initially (t = 0) set every value of epidemic status matrix to 0 because all nodes are susceptible before the epidemic spreads. At the initial infection stage, randomly selected 0.05% of nodes were infected. At every time period, we performed immunization and observed the infection stages (Figure 3).</p><p><<FIGURE 3 OMITTED>></p><p>At the immunization stage, we identified infective nodes and determined whether these nodes would be recovered in the next time step. To calculate the transition probability of infected and recovered phenomena, the Monte Carlo method was applied [35,36]. When infection and recovery parameters are provided, it is possible to investigate whether a node transitions from an epidemic state to another state. To accomplish this, we compared the method revealing the change in each population in every compartment over time (Figure 4).</p><p><<FIGURE 4 OMITTED>></p><p>The final steady state of the epidemic spreading simulation model indicates the total number of casualties of the epidemic who either are dead or have recovered from the disease. Infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 1) are transformed to recovered nodes at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 2) when 1/γd is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1. We determined whether the neighbor nodes of the infection node would be infected by identifying susceptible nodes adjacent to the infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 0, with the adjacent infective node) (Figure 5). When β is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1, a susceptible node becomes an infective node at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 1); this scenario represents epidemic spread. For each time step, we recorded the number of susceptible, infective, and recovered nodes during epidemic spread.</p><p><<FIGURE 5 OMITTED>></p><p>2.4. Simulation Parameters</p><p>We carried out simulation trials for various mean degrees of networks (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). Each network considered the following epidemic parameters: β ranges from 0.05 to 0.95 and γd ranges from 1 to 10. The Monte Carlo model was repeatedly simulated to observe saturation of the recovery process. Considering that the simulation pipeline contains random processes such as initial infection and Monte Carlo trials, we performed the simulation iteratively until the status of nodes remained unchanged. After simulation, time series data from every simulation were interpolated in the time domain.</p><p>The fatality rate determines the ratio of deceased and recovered individuals in the final population [37,38,39]. If the fatality rate is below 100%, the recovered population contains both dead and recovered individuals. Such a situation does not always cause a pandemic. In this simulation, we assumed a 100% fatality rate. To accomplish this, we enumerated the recovered nodes as dead for considering the pandemic risk.</p><p>3. Results</p><p>Through our method, we obtained epidemic spreading data with various network and epidemic parameter sets. In the present study, we focused on the case where the epidemic infects all nodes and defined this phenomenon as “extinctive spread”. <u>Diseases causing <mark>extinctive spread</mark> are potential candidates of <strong>high pandemic risk</u></strong>. In the real world, <u>extinctive spreading indicates</u> that the <u>disease <mark>will <strong>infect every person</mark> in the society</u></strong>. From the simulation data, we calculated the extinctive spread score by dividing the total number of simulation trials by the number of extinctive spread cases. Thereafter, we identified that the number of extinctive spread cases is mainly influenced by spreading speed, which is determined by β, γd, and k (Figure 6).</p><p><<FIGURE 6 OMITTED>></p><p>The extinctive spread region (brown area in Figure 6) is expanded as the value of mean degree of network (k) is increased, thereby indicating that the area of extinctive spread becomes noticeably wider in a dense network than in a sparse network. Thus, the more contact between people, the higher the risk of epidemics. Moreover, high γd and high β cause extinctive spread across a large region, indicating that the high spreading rate and short time interval between infection and recovery are risk factors of epidemic diseases. In contrast, the infective nodes recover before they transmit the disease to their neighbors in low β and low γd scenarios, thus disconnecting the network and preventing extinctive spread. This occurs because the infective nodes need more time to transmit the disease in low β and high γd scenarios. Therefore, the disease begins to subside due to a lack of new infective nodes.</p><p>Furthermore, we investigated the range of β and γd for existing epidemics of the common cold [40,41] and fatal diseases, namely, cholera [42,43], Marburg [44,45], Ebola (Congo and Uganda) [46,47,48,49], SARS [50], and MERS [51] (Table 1). We selected diseases with relatively well-known epidemic parameters, such as average duration of infection and basic number of reproductions from previous studies. Transmission rates were calculated using the mean duration of infectious periods and basic reproduction numbers of the epidemics. Different studies reveal multiple values of infectious period and transmission rate for some of these diseases; we considered these values separately [40,41,42,43,46,47,48,49]. For example, the infectious period of a common cold is from 3 to 7 days and that of Ebola is 6.5 days. Next, we placed the possible regions of these epidemics as a disease band for various k values (colored lines in Figure 6). When k > 5, fatal diseases have an opportunity to cause a pandemic. Even when k = 5, diseases such as cholera and Ebola (Congo) can be threatening in regions of low γd and high, thus demonstrating that the knowledge of network parameters of the society and the characteristics of epidemic diseases can aid in quantifying the risk of epidemics.</p><p><<TABLE 1 OMITTED>></p><p>4. Discussion</p><p><u>Many <strong><mark>previous</strong> studies</mark> have made <strong>stochastic</strong> SIR models to analyze the dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases</u>. They investigated the distribution of susceptible, infected, and removed populations for specific epidemic disease spreading, such as cholera, SARS, Marburg, and MERS, based on mathematical modelling [52,53,54,55]. <u>However, they <mark>did not conduct</mark> a</u> <u><strong><mark>quantitative</u></strong> <u>assessment</mark> of pandemic risk taking into account</u> <u><strong>physical contact between people</u></strong>. To solve this limitation, we performed epidemic spreading simulations by applying an SIR model to scale-free networks with Monte Carlo simulation. In the simulation, <u><mark>we consider <strong>various</strong></mark> connectivity and <strong><mark>disease</strong> characteristics</u></mark> on scale-free networks. For each network and epidemic parameter set, the probability of extinctive spread was calculated. <u>The <mark>results <strong>reveal</strong></mark>ed that certain <strong>infectious diseases</strong> can lead to <strong>extinction</u></strong>. Moreover, even if the disease band extends over the extinctive spread regions, it does not indicate that human extinction results from the disease, as the fatality rate is below 100%; however, in the case of 100% fatality, the disease can cause a human extinction event. The risk of infectious disease is influenced by the network structure. A dense network has a higher risk of spreading infectious disease than a sparse network, as we observed in the extinctive spreading maps. According to our results, when the average degree of human social networks is below the risk threshold, i.e., less than 4 in this study, human society is safe from an extinctive outbreak based on our knowledge regarding the epidemic parameters of the infectious disease. Nevertheless, in other cases, <u><strong>human <mark>extinction</strong></mark> is possible</u>. For example, if the population is 1,000,000 and there are 4 or more instances of physical contact between people, human extinction events may occur, depending on the fatality rate of the epidemics. Hence, physical contact between people is closely related to an extinction event of infectious diseases. Eventually, from a public health perspective, lowering the average contact level of society is an appropriate way to increase the robustness of strategies against the occurrence of extinction. In the real world, reducing network density can be accomplished by epidemic prevention activity, such as isolation and quarantine treatment. This action prevents epidemic risk to the society, thereby avoiding human extinction.</p>

1AC---Octas---Georgetown

Patent Law---1AC

./documents/ndtceda22/Michigan/PiPh/Michigan-PiPh-Aff-Georgetown-Octas.docx

A

Georgetown

Octas

Kentucky GK

Brian Klarman, Johnnie Stupek, Nathan Rice

1AC Inventorship 2NR First Amendment DA

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2023-01-07 19:03:17

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Food prices don’t cause conflict---reject their bad studies.

Demarest 15 , Vol. 27, No. 5, p. 650-671, Emory Libraries]

Demarest 15—PhD Researcher at the Centre for Research on Peace and Development [Leila, “Food price rises and political instability: Problematizing a complex relationship,” The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 27, No. 5, p. 650-671, Emory Libraries]

6. Conclusions and Way Forward important gaps remain conflict and political instability are used interchangeably The ‘food riot’ concept leads to confusion many peaceful events are gathered under this term, while violence is committed by the state rather than by hungry consumers The term presupposes that food is the central issue at hand, which does not have to be the case Many misunderstanding arise from the uncritical data gathering based on international news reports Not only are these remarkably inconsistent, they make use of classifications which are not scientifically investigated causal mechanisms in the relationship between rising food prices and conflict lack empirical foundation The causal role of economic factors alone has continuously been questioned, and ‘context’ or prevailing political, economic, and social factors play a crucial role in the conflict outcome adverse economic shocks seem more of a trigger to conflict Yet while many authors acknowledge this, the focus often remains on the trigger In the end, most admit that these factors do not automatically lead to conflict everywhere, and stress the importance of context Contextual data are currently collected at the aggregate, national level, and only on a yearly basis, which can lead to spurious relations we doubt their strength in the study of highly localized, one-time events such as riots

The ‘food riot’ concept leads to confusion peaceful events are gathered under this term Many misunderstanding arise from uncritical data gathering Not only are these remarkably inconsistent, they use classifications which are not scientifically investigated causal mechanisms between food prices and conflict lack empirical foundation most admit that these factors do not lead to conflict Contextual data lead to spurious relations we doubt their strength in the study one-time events such as riots

6. Conclusions and Way Forward While some progress has been made in improving our understanding of the linkages between rising food prices and conflict, several important gaps remain. Firstly, notions of conflict and political instability are often used interchangeably, while these concepts and the relationships between them remain to some extent vague. The ‘food riot’ concept in particular leads to confusion. Although it is popularly seen as a violent rise of the masses, in reality, many peaceful events are gathered under this term, while violence is often committed by the state rather than by hungry consumers. The term also presupposes that food is the central issue at hand, which does not necessarily have to be the case. Many misunderstanding arise from the second gap identified in this paper: the uncritical data gathering based on international news reports. Not only are these remarkably inconsistent, they also make use of classifications which are not scientifically investigated. Finally, causal mechanisms in the relationship between rising food prices and conflict often remain assumptions in the literature and lack empirical foundation. Three crosscutting avenues for improvement therefore exist: better concept definitions, better data gathering, and more focus on contexts. Clearly defined concepts and categorizations of conflict and instability are a necessary foundation for research on the linkages between rising food prices and conflict. For (food) protests in particular, purposeful categorizations require an enhanced insight in the events that took place on the ground. Local news sources for data gathering can prove to be more reliable than Western (English) media to accomplish this. Event descriptions are also likely to be more detailed in local sources, which allows for a first-hand qualitative analysis of causes and context. As international food prices are likely to remain high, improving our understanding of the causal mechanisms which can lead to conflict remains crucial. We can draw important lessons from the literature on poverty and conflict, resource scarcity and conflict, and regime transition in Africa. The causal role of economic factors alone has continuously been questioned, and ‘context’ or prevailing political, economic, and social factors play a crucial role in the conflict outcome. The argument that adverse economic shocks seem more of a trigger to conflict rather than an important cause is not particularly remarkable in itself. Yet while many authors acknowledge this, the focus often remains on the trigger. Resource scarcity, climate change, population growth, or food insecurity often remain the starting point of analyses, with researchers consequently tracing the divergent (theoretical) possibilities for conflict. In the end, most admit that these factors do not automatically lead to conflict everywhere, and stress the importance of context. Because the theoretical possibilities for conflict are so large, however, the context factor remains rather understudied with as most agreed upon notions that elements of ‘grievance’ and ‘collective action’ are required. It is hence important to focus more on the ‘contexts’ that can lead to conflict and, in doing so, to make the distinction between different forms of conflict. This also implies a data collection exercise. Contextual data are currently collected at the aggregate, national level, and only on a yearly basis, which can lead to spurious relations. While the use of these variables is increasingly questioned in civil war studies, we can also doubt their strength in the study of highly localized, one-time events such as riots. I particularly make the case for ‘bringing politics back in’. The policies taken by the government are crucial in the violent escalation of social conflict (e.g. accommodation versus repression), but the only variable currently in use to explain state behaviour seems to be the country-level regime type variable (Polity IV or Freedom House), which is also used with regards to highly localized conflicts. Other ways in which politics matter, can be the strength of the political opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, was probably better organized than other opposition groups to make use of economic unrest.

<h4>Food prices don’t cause conflict---reject their bad studies. </h4><p><strong>Demarest 15</strong>—PhD Researcher at the Centre for Research on Peace and Development [Leila, “Food price rises and political instability: Problematizing a complex relationship,” The European Journal of Development Research<u><strong>, Vol. 27, No. 5, p. 650-671, Emory Libraries] </p><p>6. Conclusions and Way Forward</p><p></u></strong>While some progress has been made in improving our understanding of the linkages between rising food prices and conflict, several <u><strong>important gaps remain</u></strong>. Firstly, notions of <u><strong>conflict and political instability are</u></strong> often <u><strong>used interchangeably</u></strong>, while these concepts and the relationships between them remain to some extent vague. <u><strong><mark>The ‘food riot’ concept</u></strong></mark> in particular <u><strong><mark>leads to confusion</u></strong></mark>. Although it is popularly seen as a violent rise of the masses, in reality, <u><strong>many <mark>peaceful events are gathered under this term</mark>, while violence is</u></strong> often <u><strong>committed by the state rather than by hungry consumers</u></strong>. <u><strong>The term</u></strong> also <u><strong>presupposes that food is the central issue at hand, which does not</u></strong> necessarily <u><strong>have to be the case</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Many misunderstanding arise from</mark> the</u></strong> second gap identified in this paper: the <u><strong><mark>uncritical data gathering</mark> based on international news reports</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Not only are these remarkably inconsistent, they</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong>make <mark>use</mark> of <mark>classifications which are not scientifically investigated</u></strong></mark>. Finally, <u><strong><mark>causal mechanisms</mark> in the relationship <mark>between</mark> rising <mark>food prices and conflict</u></strong></mark> often remain assumptions in the literature and <u><strong><mark>lack empirical foundation</u></strong></mark>. Three crosscutting avenues for improvement therefore exist: better concept definitions, better data gathering, and more focus on contexts.</p><p>Clearly defined concepts and categorizations of conflict and instability are a necessary foundation for research on the linkages between rising food prices and conflict. For (food) protests in particular, purposeful categorizations require an enhanced insight in the events that took place on the ground. Local news sources for data gathering can prove to be more reliable than Western (English) media to accomplish this. Event descriptions are also likely to be more detailed in local sources, which allows for a first-hand qualitative analysis of causes and context.</p><p>As international food prices are likely to remain high, improving our understanding of the causal mechanisms which can lead to conflict remains crucial. We can draw important lessons from the literature on poverty and conflict, resource scarcity and conflict, and regime transition in Africa. <u><strong>The causal role of economic factors alone has continuously been questioned, and ‘context’ or prevailing political, economic, and social factors play a crucial role in the conflict outcome</u></strong>. The argument that <u><strong>adverse economic shocks seem more of a trigger to conflict</u></strong> rather than an important cause is not particularly remarkable in itself. <u><strong>Yet while many authors acknowledge this, the focus often remains on the trigger</u></strong>. Resource scarcity, climate change, population growth, or food insecurity often remain the starting point of analyses, with researchers consequently tracing the divergent (theoretical) possibilities for conflict. <u><strong>In the end, <mark>most admit that these factors do not</mark> automatically <mark>lead to conflict</mark> everywhere, and stress the importance of context</u></strong>. Because the theoretical possibilities for conflict are so large, however, the context factor remains rather understudied with as most agreed upon notions that elements of ‘grievance’ and ‘collective action’ are required.</p><p>It is hence important to focus more on the ‘contexts’ that can lead to conflict and, in doing so, to make the distinction between different forms of conflict. This also implies a data collection exercise. <u><strong><mark>Contextual data</mark> are currently collected at the aggregate, national level, and only on a yearly basis, which can <mark>lead to spurious relations</u></strong></mark>. While the use of these variables is increasingly questioned in civil war studies, <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> can also <u><strong><mark>doubt their strength in the study</mark> of highly localized, <mark>one-time events such as riots</u></strong></mark>. I particularly make the case for ‘bringing politics back in’. The policies taken by the government are crucial in the violent escalation of social conflict (e.g. accommodation versus repression), but the only variable currently in use to explain state behaviour seems to be the country-level regime type variable (Polity IV or Freedom House), which is also used with regards to highly localized conflicts. Other ways in which politics matter, can be the strength of the political opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, was probably better organized than other opposition groups to make use of economic unrest.</p>

1NC

Case – Sustainablity Adv

./documents/ndtceda16/Emory/MaMo/Emory-Marcus-Morbeck-Neg-D6-Round4.docx

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D6

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Georgia AR

Joe Keeton

1AC - FITs - Sustainability and Grid 1NC - Trump Bad DA LNG DA Econ DA Biomass PIC States CP Restrictions PIC 2NR - Trump Bad DA

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No great power involvement in Middle East war---every external actor will limit damage from regional instability rather than get involved

Stepanova 16

Ekaterina Stepanova 16, researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Summer 2016, “Russia in the Middle East: Back to a “Grand Strategy” – or Enforcing Multilateralism?,” http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_PE_162_0023--russia-in-the-middle-east.htm

In contrast to the early years of the 21st century, the regional crisis in the 2010s developed when the role and leverage of major powers external to the Middle East, as active meddlers or security guarantors declined rather than increased. The U S serves as the most evident case in point The same even more strongly applies to the European powers regional actors appeared to outplay external powers and influence the main response by key external powers to turbulent developments in the Middle East boils down to limited containment Despite the growing centrality of the Middle East to global politics and security this damage limitation course taken by key external actors has not been very different from the approach taken by the U S Russia and China) to Afghanistan

In contrast to the early 21st century, the crisis in the 2010s developed when the role and leverage of major powers external to the Middle East, as meddlers or security guarantors declined the main response boils down to limited containment Despite the centrality of the Middle East to global politics this damage limitation course has not been different from the approach by the U S Russia and China to Afghanistan

In contrast to the 20th century and the early years of the 21st century, the regional crisis in the 2010s developed at a time when, overall, the role and leverage of major powers external to the Middle East, as either active meddlers or security guarantors in the region, or both, actually declined rather than increased. The United States serves as the most evident case in point: the “post-interventionist” US administration has clearly become “tired of the Middle East”, struggling and often failing to keep pace with the dynamically changing situation and unable to alter or decisively affect the course of events. The same even more strongly applies to the European powers. In terms of activity and impact, regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Turkey) increasingly appeared to outplay external powers and influence. For external powers, however, that did not remove a number of risks and threats connected to, or emanating from, the Middle East. The increase and diversification of global energy supply and the latest crisis in energy prices made the region less central to the global economy than it had been in the past. At the same time, the fundamental socio-political, statehood and security crisis in the Middle East brought with it new security concerns and implications. They mostly stemmed from reinforced perceptions about the long-term nature of regional instability, the continuing potential for further destabilization, and the related consequences and implications beyond the region, ranging from terrorist connections to migration flows. These challenges affect external powers unevenly. For instance, the role of the Iraq-Syria area as the main focal point for global terrorism activity and magnet for transnational flows of violent extremists in the mid-2010s poses a threat to everyone (but mostly to the countries of the region itself, as well as to those in Europe and Eurasia). In contrast, the avalanche of refugee and migrant flows from the Middle East primarily targets Europe (rather than North America, Eurasia, or other regions). Until recently, the main type of response by key (Western) external powers to turbulent developments in the Middle East, while not amounting to a hands-off approach, boils down to limited containment. Examples range from limited air strikes against “Islamic State” positions in Iraq and Syria, carried out by the US-led coalition since 2014, to the 2013 deal on Syria’s chemical disarmament co-brokered by the United States and Russia. Not surprisingly, this limited-containment approach has had equally limited results for Syria, Iraq and the region – as well as for the West itself (as shown, e.g., by the persistent migrant flows and accelerating terrorist attacks in Europe). Despite the growing centrality of the Middle East to global politics and security, and its more direct impact on and ties to the West, this damage limitation course taken by key external actors has not been very different from, e.g., the approach taken by the United States and its Western allies (and also by Russia and China) to the Afghanistan problem in recent years.

<h4><u>No</u> great power involvement in Middle East war---<u>every</u> external actor will <u>limit damage</u> from regional instability <u>rather than</u> get involved </h4><p>Ekaterina <strong>Stepanova 16</strong>, researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Summer 2016, “Russia in the Middle East: Back to a “Grand Strategy” – or Enforcing Multilateralism?,” http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_PE_162_0023--russia-in-the-middle-east.htm</p><p><u><strong><mark>In contrast</strong> to</u></mark> the 20th century and <u><mark>the early</mark> years of the <mark>21st century, the</u></mark> <u>regional <mark>crisis in the 2010s</u> <u>developed</u></mark> at a time <u><mark>when</u></mark>, overall, <u><mark>the <strong>role and leverage of major powers</strong> external to the Middle East, as</u></mark> either <u>active <mark>meddlers or security guarantors</u></mark> in the region, or both, actually <u><strong><mark>declined</mark> rather than increased</strong>. The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>serves as the most evident case in point</u>: the “post-interventionist” US administration has clearly become “tired of the Middle East”, struggling and often failing to keep pace with the dynamically changing situation and unable to alter or decisively affect the course of events. <u>The same even more strongly applies to the European powers</u>. In terms of activity and impact, <u><strong>regional actors</u></strong> (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Turkey) increasingly <u>appeared to outplay external powers and influence</u>.</p><p>For external powers, however, that did not remove a number of risks and threats connected to, or emanating from, the Middle East. The increase and diversification of global energy supply and the latest crisis in energy prices made the region less central to the global economy than it had been in the past. At the same time, the fundamental socio-political, statehood and security crisis in the Middle East brought with it new security concerns and implications. They mostly stemmed from reinforced perceptions about the long-term nature of regional instability, the continuing potential for further destabilization, and the related consequences and implications beyond the region, ranging from terrorist connections to migration flows. These challenges affect external powers unevenly. For instance, the role of the Iraq-Syria area as the main focal point for global terrorism activity and magnet for transnational flows of violent extremists in the mid-2010s poses a threat to everyone (but mostly to the countries of the region itself, as well as to those in Europe and Eurasia). In contrast, the avalanche of refugee and migrant flows from the Middle East primarily targets Europe (rather than North America, Eurasia, or other regions).</p><p>Until recently, <u><mark>the main</u></mark> type of <u><mark>response</mark> by key</u> (Western) <u>external powers to turbulent developments in the Middle East</u>, while not amounting to a hands-off approach, <u><mark>boils down to <strong>limited containment</u></strong></mark>. Examples range from limited air strikes against “Islamic State” positions in Iraq and Syria, carried out by the US-led coalition since 2014, to the 2013 deal on Syria’s chemical disarmament co-brokered by the United States and Russia. Not surprisingly, this limited-containment approach has had equally limited results for Syria, Iraq and the region – as well as for the West itself (as shown, e.g., by the persistent migrant flows and accelerating terrorist attacks in Europe). <u><mark>Despite the</mark> growing <mark>centrality of the Middle East to global politics</mark> and security</u>, and its more direct impact on and ties to the West, <u><mark>this <strong>damage limitation</strong> course</mark> taken by key external actors <mark>has not been</mark> very <mark>different from</u></mark>, e.g., <u><mark>the approach</mark> taken <mark>by the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates and its Western allies (and also by <u><mark>Russia and China</mark>) <mark>to</u></mark> the <u><mark>Afghanistan</u></mark> problem in recent years.</p>

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ME WAR

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Peach State Classic

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Henry W Grady Kamel Tak

Matt Cekanor

1 AC- Saudi aff with Yemeni advantage 1 NC- T Pearson conditions cp alliance da heg da oil da 2 AC- disclosure theory 2 NR- conditions cp oil da

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Destroying trade ensures nuclear war

Roubini 17

Nouriel Roubini 17, professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business and Chairman of Roubini Macro Associates, was Senior Economist for International Affairs in the White House's Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton Administration, 1/2/17, ““America First” and Global Conflict Next,” https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-isolationism-undermines-peace-worldwide-by-nouriel-roubini-2017-01

policies that hinder trade helped sow the seeds of World War II. Protectionism triggered retaliatory trade and currency wars that worsened the Great Depression American isolationism allowed Germany and Japan to threaten the entire world Today pursuit of strictly US national interests may lead to a global conflict As in the 1930s, when protectionist US policies hampered global economic growth and trade, and created conditions for rising powers to start a world war, similar policy impulses could set the stage for new powers to challenge and undermine the American-led international order An isolationist Trump administration may think Russia, China, and Iran pose no direct threat But the US is still a global economic and financial power in a deeply interconnected world left unchecked, these countries will threaten core US economic and security interests especially if they expand their nuclear capacities protectionism, isolationism, and “America first” policies are a recipe for economic and military disaster

policies that hinder trade helped sow seeds of World War II. Protectionism triggered retaliatory trade wars American isolationism allowed Germany and Japan to threaten the world Today pursuit of strictly US interests may lead to global conflict Russia, China, and Iran left unchecked will threaten core US economic and security interests especially if they expand nuclear capacities protectionism and “America first” policies are a economic and military disaster.

Trump, however, may pursue populist, anti-globalization, and protectionist policies that hinder trade and restrict the movement of labor and capital. And he has cast doubt on existing US security guarantees by suggesting that he will force America’s allies to pay for more of their own defense. If Trump is serious about putting “America first,” his administration will shift US geopolitical strategy toward isolationism and unilateralism, pursuing only the national interests of the homeland. When the US pursued similar policies in the 1920s and 1930s, it helped sow the seeds of World War II. Protectionism – starting with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which affected thousands of imported goods – triggered retaliatory trade and currency wars that worsened the Great Depression. More important, American isolationism – based on a false belief that the US was safely protected by two oceans – allowed Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to wage aggressive war and threaten the entire world. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the US was finally forced to take its head out of the sand. Today, too, a US turn to isolationism and the pursuit of strictly US national interests may eventually lead to a global conflict. Even without the prospect of American disengagement from Europe, the European Union and the eurozone already appear to be disintegrating, particularly in the wake of the United Kingdom’s June Brexit vote and Italy’s failed referendum on constitutional reforms in December. Moreover, in 2017, extreme anti-Europe left- or right-wing populist parties could come to power in France and Italy, and possibly in other parts of Europe. Without active US engagement in Europe, an aggressively revanchist Russia will step in. Russia is already challenging the US and the EU in Ukraine, Syria, the Baltics, and the Balkans, and it may capitalize on the EU’s looming collapse by reasserting its influence in the former Soviet bloc countries, and supporting pro-Russia movements within Europe. If Europe gradually loses its US security umbrella, no one stands to benefit more than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump’s proposals also threaten to exacerbate the situation in the Middle East. He has said that he will make America energy independent, which entails abandoning US interests in the region and becoming more reliant on domestically produced greenhouse-gas-emitting fossil fuels. And he has maintained his position that Islam itself, rather than just radical militant Islam, is dangerous. This view, shared by Trump’s incoming National Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn, plays directly into Islamist militants’ own narrative of a clash of civilizations. Meanwhile, an “America first” approach under Trump will likely worsen the longstanding Sunni-Shia proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And if the US no longer guarantees its Sunni allies’ security, all regional powers – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt – might decide that they can defend themselves only by acquiring nuclear weapons, and even more deadly conflict will ensue. In Asia, US economic and military primacy has provided decades of stability; but a rising China is now challenging the status quo. US President Barack Obama’s strategic “pivot” to Asia depended primarily on enacting the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump has promised to scrap on his first day in office. Meanwhile, China is quickly strengthening its own economic ties in Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America through its “one belt, one road” policy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS bank), and its own regional free-trade proposal to rival the TPP. If the US gives up on its Asian allies such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, those countries may have no choice but to prostrate themselves before China; and other US allies, such as Japan and India, may be forced to militarize and challenge China openly. Thus, an American withdrawal from the region could very well eventually precipitate a military conflict there. As in the 1930s, when protectionist and isolationist US policies hampered global economic growth and trade, and created the conditions for rising revisionist powers to start a world war, similar policy impulses could set the stage for new powers to challenge and undermine the American-led international order. An isolationist Trump administration may see the wide oceans to its east and west, and think that increasingly ambitious powers such as Russia, China, and Iran pose no direct threat to the homeland. But the US is still a global economic and financial power in a deeply interconnected world. If left unchecked, these countries will eventually be able to threaten core US economic and security interests – at home and abroad – especially if they expand their nuclear and cyberwarfare capacities. The historical record is clear: protectionism, isolationism, and “America first” policies are a recipe for economic and military disaster.

<h4>Destroying trade ensures nuclear war</h4><p>Nouriel <strong>Roubini 17</strong>, professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business and Chairman of Roubini Macro Associates, was Senior Economist for International Affairs in the White House's Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton Administration, 1/2/17, ““America First” and Global Conflict Next,” https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-isolationism-undermines-peace-worldwide-by-nouriel-roubini-2017-01</p><p>Trump, however, may pursue populist, anti-globalization, and protectionist <u><strong><mark>policies that hinder trade</u></strong></mark> and restrict the movement of labor and capital. And he has cast doubt on existing US security guarantees by suggesting that he will force America’s allies to pay for more of their own defense. If Trump is serious about putting “America first,” his administration will shift US geopolitical strategy toward isolationism and unilateralism, pursuing only the national interests of the homeland. When the US pursued similar policies in the 1920s and 1930s, it <u><strong><mark>helped sow</mark> the <mark>seeds of World War II. Protectionism</u></strong></mark> – starting with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which affected thousands of imported goods – <u><strong><mark>triggered retaliatory trade</mark> and currency <mark>wars</mark> that worsened the Great Depression</u></strong>. More important, <u><strong><mark>American isolationism</u></strong></mark> – based on a false belief that the US was safely protected by two oceans – <u><strong><mark>allowed</u></strong></mark> Nazi <u><strong><mark>Germany and</u></strong></mark> Imperial <u><strong><mark>Japan to</u></strong></mark> wage aggressive war and <u><strong><mark>threaten the</mark> entire <mark>world</u></strong></mark>. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the US was finally forced to take its head out of the sand. <u><strong><mark>Today</u></strong></mark>, too, a US turn to isolationism and the <u><strong><mark>pursuit of strictly US</mark> national <mark>interests may</u></strong></mark> eventually <u><strong><mark>lead to</mark> a <mark>global conflict</u></strong></mark>. Even without the prospect of American disengagement from Europe, the European Union and the eurozone already appear to be disintegrating, particularly in the wake of the United Kingdom’s June Brexit vote and Italy’s failed referendum on constitutional reforms in December. Moreover, in 2017, extreme anti-Europe left- or right-wing populist parties could come to power in France and Italy, and possibly in other parts of Europe. Without active US engagement in Europe, an aggressively revanchist Russia will step in. Russia is already challenging the US and the EU in Ukraine, Syria, the Baltics, and the Balkans, and it may capitalize on the EU’s looming collapse by reasserting its influence in the former Soviet bloc countries, and supporting pro-Russia movements within Europe. If Europe gradually loses its US security umbrella, no one stands to benefit more than Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump’s proposals also threaten to exacerbate the situation in the Middle East. He has said that he will make America energy independent, which entails abandoning US interests in the region and becoming more reliant on domestically produced greenhouse-gas-emitting fossil fuels. And he has maintained his position that Islam itself, rather than just radical militant Islam, is dangerous. This view, shared by Trump’s incoming National Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn, plays directly into Islamist militants’ own narrative of a clash of civilizations. Meanwhile, an “America first” approach under Trump will likely worsen the longstanding Sunni-Shia proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran. And if the US no longer guarantees its Sunni allies’ security, all regional powers – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt – might decide that they can defend themselves only by acquiring nuclear weapons, and even more deadly conflict will ensue. In Asia, US economic and military primacy has provided decades of stability; but a rising China is now challenging the status quo. US President Barack Obama’s strategic “pivot” to Asia depended primarily on enacting the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump has promised to scrap on his first day in office. Meanwhile, China is quickly strengthening its own economic ties in Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America through its “one belt, one road” policy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS bank), and its own regional free-trade proposal to rival the TPP. If the US gives up on its Asian allies such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan, those countries may have no choice but to prostrate themselves before China; and other US allies, such as Japan and India, may be forced to militarize and challenge China openly. Thus, an American withdrawal from the region could very well eventually precipitate a military conflict there. <u><strong>As in the 1930s, when protectionist</u></strong> and isolationist <u><strong>US policies hampered global economic growth and trade, and created</u></strong> the <u><strong>conditions for rising</u></strong> revisionist <u><strong>powers to start a world war, similar policy impulses could set the stage for new powers to challenge and undermine the American-led international order</u></strong>. <u><strong>An isolationist Trump administration may</u></strong> see the wide oceans to its east and west, and <u><strong>think</u></strong> that increasingly ambitious powers such as <u><strong><mark>Russia, China, and Iran</mark> pose no direct threat</u></strong> to the homeland. <u><strong>But the US is still a global economic and financial power in a deeply interconnected world</u></strong>. If <u><strong><mark>left unchecked</mark>, these countries <mark>will</u></strong></mark> eventually be able to <u><strong><mark>threaten core US economic and security interests</u></strong></mark> – at home and abroad – <u><strong><mark>especially if they expand</mark> their <mark>nuclear</u></strong></mark> and cyberwarfare <u><strong><mark>capacities</u></strong></mark>. The historical record is clear: <u><strong><mark>protectionism</mark>, isolationism, <mark>and “America first” policies are a</mark> recipe for <mark>economic and military disaster</u></strong>.</p></mark>

1nc

4

./documents/ndtceda17/Wyoming/HeCu/Wyoming-Henman-Culver-Neg-Nwfallchamp-Semis.docx

N

Nwfallchamp

Semis

Minnesota Dharmadhikari-Le

Frappier, Guevara, Stevenson

1ac - single payer - costs coverage and opiods 1nc - t-financing spec trade da states cp midterms da 2nc - states cp and case 1nr - midterms da 2nr - states and midterms

ndtceda17/Wyoming/HeCu/Wyoming-Henman-Culver-Neg-Nwfallchamp-Semis.docx

HeCu

Wyoming HeCu

Ca.....

He.....

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Wyoming

Wyoming

ndtceda17

NDT/CEDA 2017-18

cx

college

Debate’s focus shouldn’t solely be the production of ethical subjectivities. Rather, taking stances on global issues is necessary to develop accountability to global violence

Chandler 9

Chandler 9—Professor of international relations at the University of Westminster [David, “Questioning Global Political Activism,” in What is Radical Politics Today? Ed. Jonathan Pugh, p. 81-84]

more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics However this has been a product of an ethical act of rejection of Realism's ontological focus It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with 'what is' as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists focus upon the ethical language which elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own ethical frameworks and positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes 'me-search' rather than research theoretical preferences were based on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social engagement and the testing of ideas Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external consequences of our 'political' acts. What matters is the conviction The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers at the level of debate the solution is not purely an intellectual one; the demand for global ethics is generated by our social reality and social experiences it is more difficult to see an emerging political subject which can fulfil the task of 'changing the world' rather than merely 'reinterpreting it' through philosophy there is a pressing need for an intellectual struggle against the idealism of global ethics our freedom to engage in politics, to choose our identities and political campaigns, as well as governments' freedom to choose their ethical campaigns and wars of choice, reflects a lack of social engagement. There is no global political struggle between 'Empire' and its 'Radical Discontents'; the temptation to see power and resistance everywhere is a product of wishful or lazy thinking The stakes are not in the global stratosphere but much closer to home. Politics appears to have gone global because there is a breakdown of genuine community and the construction of fantasy communities and fantasy connections in global space. Unless we bring politics back down to earth from heaven, our critical, social and intellectual lives will continue to be diminished ones we should take more seriously injunction to subordinate ourselves to the 'discipline of the real'. Subordination to the world outside us is a powerful factor that can bind those interested in critical research, whereas the turn away from the world and the focus on our personal values can ultimately only be divisive. To facilitate external engagement and external judgement experiment with ways to build up social bonds with our peers that can limit our freedoms and develop our sense of responsibility and accountability to others. We may have to construct these social connections artificially but their value and instrumentality will have to be proven through our ability to engage with, understand, critique and overcome the practices of our time

dangerous trends which focus on emancipatory forms of living becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than engagement ethical frameworks before world affairs becomes 'me-search' rather than research Politics is religion we look for meaning inside ourselves rather than external consequences of 'political' acts the solution is not purely intellectual to choose our identities reflects a lack of social engagement to see resistance everywhere is lazy thinking focus on personal values can only be divisive external engagement can develop responsibility and accountability

Today more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. However, I would argue that this rejection has not been a product of theoretical engagement with Realism but an ethical act of rejection of Realism's ontological focus. It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with 'what is' as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists, in particular, focus upon the ethical language which political elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most dangerous trends in the discipline today are those frameworks which have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to focus on emancipatory alternative forms of living or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than one of engagement, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own [END PAGE 81] ethical frameworks and biases and positionality, before thinking about or teaching on world affairs. This becomes 'me-search' rather than research. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull's (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead. The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are more concerned with our reflectivity- the awareness of our own ethics and values - than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their theoretical preferences were based more on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world. Conclusion I have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social engagement and the testing of ideas in public debate or in the academy. Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God. Politics is increasingly like religion because when we look for meaning we find it inside ourselves rather than in the external consequences of our 'political' acts. What matters is the conviction or the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory - the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers and colleagues at the level of political or intellectual debate and organisation. [END PAGE 82] You may be thinking that I have gone some way to describing or identifying what the problems might be but I have not mentioned anything about a solution. I won't dodge the issue. One thing that is clear is that the solution is not purely an intellectual or academic one; the demand for global ethics is generated by our social reality and social experiences. Marx spent some time considering a similar crisis of political subjectivity in 1840s Germany and in his writings - The German Ideology, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Theses on Feuerbach, and elsewhere - he raged against the idealism of contemporary thought and argued that the criticism of religion needed to be replaced by the criticism of politics - by political activism and social change based on the emerging proletariat (see Marx, 1975, for example). Nearly two centuries later it is more difficult to see an emerging political subject which can fulfil the task of 'changing the world' rather than merely 'reinterpreting it' through philosophy. I have two suggestions. Firstly, that there is a pressing need for an intellectual struggle against the idealism of global ethics. The point needs to be emphasised that our freedom to engage in politics, to choose our identities and political campaigns, as well as governments' freedom to choose their ethical campaigns and wars of choice, reflects a lack of socialties and social engagement. There is no global political struggle between 'Empire' and its 'Radical Discontents'; the Foucauldian temptation to see power and resistance everywhere is a product of wishful or lazy thinking dominated by the social categories of the past. The stakes are not in the global stratosphere but much closer to home. Politics appears to have gone global because there is a breakdown of genuine community and the construction of fantasy communities and fantasy connections in global space. Unless we bring politics back down to earth from heaven, our critical, social and intellectual lives will continue to be diminished ones. Secondly, on the basis that the political freedom of our social atomisation leads us into increasingly idealised approaches to the world we live in, we should take more seriously Hedley Bull's (1995) injunction to pursue the question, or in Alain Badiou's (2004: 237-8) words subordinate ourselves to the 'discipline of the real'. Subordination to the world outside us is a powerful factor that can bind those interested in critical research, whereas the turn away from the world and the focus on our personal values can ultimately only be divisive. To facilitate external engagement and external judgement, I suggest we experiment with ways to build up social bonds with our peers that can limit our freedoms and develop our sense of responsibility and accountability to others. We may have to construct these social connections artificially but their [END PAGE 83] value and instrumentality will have to be proven through our ability to engage with, understand, critique and ultimately overcome the practices and subjectivities of our time.

<h4>Debate’s focus shouldn’t solely be the production of ethical subjectivities. Rather, taking <u>stances</u> on <u>global issues</u> is necessary to develop accountability to global violence</h4><p><strong>Chandler 9</strong>—Professor of international relations at the University of Westminster [David, “Questioning Global Political Activism,” in What is Radical Politics Today? Ed. Jonathan Pugh, p. 81-84]</p><p>Today <u>more and more people are ‘doing politics’ in their academic work</u>. This is the reason for the boom in International Relations (IR) study and the attraction of other social sciences to the global sphere. I would argue that <u>the attraction of IR for many people has not been IR theory but the desire to practise global ethics</u>. The boom in the IR discipline has coincided with a rejection of Realist theoretical frameworks of power and interests and the sovereignty/anarchy problematic. <u>However</u>, I would argue that <u>this</u> rejection <u>has</u> not <u>been a product of</u> theoretical engagement with Realism but <u>an ethical act of rejection of Realism's ontological focus</u>.</p><p><u>It seems that our ideas and our theories say much more about us than the world we live in. Normative theorists and Constructivists tend to support the global ethical turn arguing that we should not be as concerned with 'what is' as with the potential for the emergence of a global ethical community. Constructivists</u>, in particular, <u>focus upon the ethical language which</u> political <u>elites espouse rather than the practices of power. But the most <mark>dangerous trends</mark> in the discipline today are those frameworks <mark>which</mark> have taken up Critical Theory and argue that focusing on the world as it exists is conservative problem-solving while the task for critical theorists is to <mark>focus on emancipatory </mark>alternative <mark>forms of living</mark> or of thinking about the world. Critical thought then <mark>becomes a process of wishful thinking rather than</mark> one of <mark>engagement</mark>, with its advocates arguing that we need to focus on clarifying our own</u> [END PAGE 81] <u><mark>ethical frameworks</mark> and</u> biases and <u>positionality, <mark>before </mark>thinking about or teaching on <mark>world affairs</mark>. This <mark>becomes 'me-search' rather than research</u></mark>. We have moved a long way from Hedley Bull's (1995) perspective that, for academic research to be truly radical, we had to put our values to the side to follow where the question or inquiry might lead.</p><p>The inward-looking and narcissistic trends in academia, where we are more concerned with our reflectivity- the awareness of our own ethics and values - than with engaging with the world, was brought home to me when I asked my IR students which theoretical frameworks they agreed with most. They mostly replied Critical Theory and Constructivism. This is despite the fact that the students thought that states operated on the basis of power and self-interest in a world of anarchy. Their <u>theoretical preferences were based</u> more <u>on what their choices said about them as ethical individuals, than about how theory might be used to understand and engage with the world</u>.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>I have attempted to argue that there is a lot at stake in the radical understanding of engagement in global politics. <u>Politics has become a religious activity, an activity which is no longer socially mediated; it is less and less an activity based on social engagement and the testing of ideas</u> in public debate or in the academy. <u>Doing politics today, whether in radical activism, government policy-making or in academia, seems to bring people into a one-to-one relationship with global issues in the same way religious people have a one-to-one relationship with their God</u>.</p><p><u><mark>Politics is </mark>increasingly like <mark>religion</mark> because when <mark>we look for meaning </mark>we find it <mark>inside ourselves rather than </mark>in the <mark>external consequences of </mark>our <mark>'political' acts</mark>. What matters is the conviction</u> or the act in itself: its connection to the global sphere is one that we increasingly tend to provide idealistically. Another way of expressing this limited sense of our subjectivity is in the popularity of globalisation theory - the idea that instrumentality is no longer possible today because the world is such a complex and interconnected place and therefore there is no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. <u>The more we engage in the new politics where there is an unmediated relationship between us as individuals and global issues, the less we engage instrumentally with the outside world, and the less we engage with our peers</u> and colleagues <u>at the level of</u> political or intellectual <u>debate</u> and organisation. [END PAGE 82]</p><p>You may be thinking that I have gone some way to describing or identifying what the problems might be but I have not mentioned anything about a solution. I won't dodge the issue. One thing that is clear is that <u><mark>the solution is not purely</mark> an <mark>intellectual</u></mark> or academic <u>one; the demand for global ethics is generated by our social reality and social experiences</u>. Marx spent some time considering a similar crisis of political subjectivity in 1840s Germany and in his writings - The German Ideology, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Theses on Feuerbach, and elsewhere - he raged against the idealism of contemporary thought and argued that the criticism of religion needed to be replaced by the criticism of politics - by political activism and social change based on the emerging proletariat (see Marx, 1975, for example). Nearly two centuries later <u>it is more difficult to see an emerging political subject which can fulfil the task of 'changing the world' rather than merely 'reinterpreting it' through philosophy</u>.</p><p>I have two suggestions. Firstly, that <u>there is a pressing need for an intellectual struggle against the idealism of global ethics</u>. The point needs to be emphasised that <u>our freedom to engage in politics, <mark>to choose our identities </mark>and political campaigns, as well as governments' freedom to choose their ethical campaigns and wars of choice, <mark>reflects a lack of</u></mark> socialties and <u><mark>social engagement</mark>. There is no global political struggle between 'Empire' and its 'Radical Discontents'; the</u> Foucauldian <u>temptation <mark>to see </mark>power and <mark>resistance everywhere is</mark> a product of wishful or <mark>lazy thinking</u></mark> dominated by the social categories of the past. <u>The stakes are not in the global stratosphere but much closer to home. Politics appears to have gone global because there is a breakdown of genuine community and the construction of fantasy communities and fantasy connections in global space. Unless we bring politics back down to earth from heaven, our critical, social and intellectual lives will continue to be diminished ones</u>.</p><p>Secondly, on the basis that the political freedom of our social atomisation leads us into increasingly idealised approaches to the world we live in, <u>we should take more seriously</u> Hedley Bull's (1995) <u>injunction to</u> pursue the question, or in Alain Badiou's (2004: 237-8) words <u>subordinate ourselves to the 'discipline of the real'. Subordination to the world outside us is a powerful factor that can bind those interested in critical research, whereas the turn away from the world and the <mark>focus on</mark> our <mark>personal values can</mark> ultimately <mark>only be divisive</mark>. To facilitate <mark>external engagement</mark> and external judgement</u>, I suggest we <u>experiment with ways to build up social bonds with our peers that <mark>can</mark> limit our freedoms and <mark>develop </mark>our sense of <mark>responsibility and accountability</mark> to others. We may have to construct these social connections artificially but their</u> [END PAGE 83] <u>value and instrumentality will have to be proven through our ability to engage with, understand, critique and</u> ultimately <u>overcome the practices</u> and subjectivities <u>of our time</u>.</p>

2NC

Case

2NC – Ethics Not First

./documents/ndtceda18/Northwestern/GaYo/Northwestern-GarciaMendoza-Young-Neg-GSU-Round8.docx

N

GSU

8

Wake EF

Erik Mathis

1AC - Black Bomb 1NC - T Cap 2NR - T

ndtceda18/Northwestern/GaYo/Northwestern-GarciaMendoza-Young-Neg-GSU-Round8.docx

GaYo

Northwestern GaYo

Ca.....

Ga.....

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Northwestern

Northwestern

ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

No escalation from space war – resilience, deterrence and low level attacks

Cooper, 18

Cooper, 18 (Zack Cooper senior fellow for Asian security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Thomas G. Roberts is a research assistant and program coordinator for the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, "Deterrence in the Last Sanctuary," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/deterrence-last-sanctuary/)

new architectures could enhance resilience and prevent critical military operations from being significantly impeded in an attack American investments in smaller satellites and more distributed space architectures could minimize adversary incentives to carry out first strikes in space. minor escalations against space systems were treated as major events, since they typically threatened the superpowers’ nuclear architectures. Today, the proliferation of counter-space capabilities and the wide array of possible types of attacks means that most attacks against U.S. space systems are unlikely to warrant a nuclear response. Competitors may attempt to use non-kinetic weapons and reversible actions to stay below the threshold that would trigger a strong U.S. response space has been the exception: the one domain that has remained free from the scars of war. By better understanding the dynamics of the second space age, we may be able to keep it that way.

new architectures enhance resilience and prevent operations from being impeded in attack investments in smaller satellites and distributed architectures minimize adversary incentives to carry out first strikes in space of capabilities and wide array of attacks means most attacks against space systems are unlikely to warrant a nuclear response Competitors may stay below the threshold that would trigger response

Until recently, resilience in space was largely an afterthought. It was assumed that a conflict in space would likely lead to or precede a major nuclear exchange. Therefore, the focus was on cost-effective architectures that maximized satellite capabilities, often at the cost of resilience. Recently, however, some have hoped that new architectures could enhance resilience and prevent critical military operations from being significantly impeded in an attack. Although resilience can be expensive, American investments in smaller satellites and more distributed space architectures could minimize adversary incentives to carry out first strikes in space. In the late 20th century, minor escalations against space systems were treated as major events, since they typically threatened the superpowers’ nuclear architectures. Today, the proliferation of counter-space capabilities and the wide array of possible types of attacks means that most attacks against U.S. space systems are unlikely to warrant a nuclear response. It is critical that policymakers understand the likely break points in any conflict involving space systems. Strategists should explore whether the characteristics of different types of attacks against space systems create different thresholds, paying particular attention to attribution, reversibility, the defender’s awareness of an attack, the attacker’s ability to assess an attack’s effectiveness, and the risks of collateral damage (e.g., orbital debris). Competitors may attempt to use non-kinetic weapons and reversible actions to stay below the threshold that would trigger a strong U.S. response. The 2017 National Security Strategy warns: Any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing. In order to fulfill this promise, the United States will want to ensure that it has capabilities to respond both above and below various thresholds to ensure a full-spectrum of deterrence options for the full range of potential actors. In the first space age, the two superpowers had largely symmetric capabilities and interests in outer space (with a few notable exceptions). In the second space age, however, the space domain includes many disparate players with vastly different asymmetric capabilities and interests. The United States is more reliant on space than any other country in the world, but it also retains greater space capabilities than any of its competitors. Although the 2011 National Security Space Strategy states, “Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented advantages in national decision-making, military operations, and homeland security,” this also means that that the United States has more to lose. From the dawn of the first space age, Americans understood the many benefits that could come from the peaceful uses of space and the great harm that could result from hostile uses of space. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy addressed the dilemma of how to reap the benefits of space without conflict, stating only if the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war… space can be explored and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes that man has made in extending his writ around this globe of ours. For 60 years, space has been the exception: the one domain that has remained free from the scars of war. By better understanding the dynamics of the second space age, we may be able to keep it that way.

<h4>No escalation from space war – resilience, deterrence and low level attacks</h4><p><strong>Cooper, 18 <u></strong>(Zack Cooper senior fellow for Asian security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Thomas G. Roberts is a research assistant and program coordinator for the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, "Deterrence in the Last Sanctuary," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/deterrence-last-sanctuary/)</p><p></u>Until recently, resilience in space was largely an afterthought. It was assumed that a conflict in space would likely lead to or precede a major nuclear exchange. Therefore, the focus was on cost-effective architectures that maximized satellite capabilities, often at the cost of resilience. Recently, however, some have hoped that <u><mark>new architectures</mark> could <mark>enhance resilience</mark> <mark>and prevent</mark> critical military <mark>operations from being</mark> significantly <mark>impeded in</mark> an <mark>attack</u></mark>. Although resilience can be expensive, <u>American <mark>investments in smaller satellites and</mark> more <mark>distributed</mark> space <mark>architectures</mark> could <strong><mark>minimize adversary incentives to carry out first strikes in space</mark>. </u></strong>In the late 20th century, <u>minor escalations against space systems were treated as major events, since they typically threatened the superpowers’ nuclear architectures. Today, the proliferation</p><p> <mark>of</mark> counter-space <mark>capabilities and</mark> the <mark>wide array of</mark> possible types of <mark>attacks means</mark> that <strong><mark>most attacks against</mark> U.S. <mark>space systems are unlikely to warrant a nuclear response</strong></mark>.</u> It is critical that policymakers understand the likely break points in any conflict involving space systems. Strategists should explore whether the characteristics of different types of attacks against space systems create different thresholds, paying particular attention to attribution, reversibility, the defender’s awareness of an attack, the attacker’s ability to assess an attack’s effectiveness, and the risks of collateral damage (e.g., orbital debris). <u><mark>Competitors may</mark> attempt to use non-kinetic weapons and reversible actions to <mark>stay below the threshold that would trigger</mark> a strong U.S. <mark>response</u></mark>. The 2017 National Security Strategy warns: Any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing. In order to fulfill this promise, the United States will want to ensure that it has capabilities to respond both above and below various thresholds to ensure a full-spectrum of deterrence options for the full range of potential actors. In the first space age, the two superpowers had largely symmetric capabilities and interests in outer space (with a few notable exceptions). In the second space age, however, the space domain includes many disparate players with vastly different asymmetric capabilities and interests. The United States is more reliant on space than any other country in the world, but it also retains greater space capabilities than any of its competitors. Although the 2011 National Security Space Strategy states, “Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented advantages in national decision-making, military operations, and homeland security,” this also means that that the United States has more to lose. From the dawn of the first space age, Americans understood the many benefits that could come from the peaceful uses of space and the great harm that could result from hostile uses of space. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy addressed the dilemma of how to reap the benefits of space without conflict, stating only if the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war… space can be explored and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes that man has made in extending his writ around this globe of ours. For 60 years, <u>space has been the exception: the one domain that has remained free from the scars of war. By better understanding the dynamics of the second space age, we may be able to keep it that way.</p></u>

1NC v UTD

Space War

New Cards

./documents/ndtceda19/MissouriState/VaRe/Missouri%20State-VanDyke-Reeves-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx

N

UMKC

4

UTD BL

David Kilpatrick

1AC - Co-Orbital Asats (Chow) 2NR - Track 2 CP Xi DA 2AR - Condo

ndtceda19/MissouriState/VaRe/Missouri%20State-VanDyke-Reeves-Neg-UMKC-Round4.docx

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ndtceda19

NDT/CEDA 2019-20

cx

college

US-Russia military competition is inevitable, but AWS ensures it goes nuclear – it collapses deterrence, motivates first strikes, undermines diplomatic offramps, and automated systems will misinterpret signals and escalate low level conflicts

Laird 6/3

Laird 6/3/20 [Burgess RAND Corporation, “The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations”] [DS] [https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html]

the development and posturing of AI-enabled autonomous weapons systems (AWS) is likely to raise significant risks for crisis instability and conflict escalation in future confrontations between the United States and Russia. Policymakers would do well to consider—now—whether the potential risks are worth the hoped-for operational advantages. Still, as we enter the third decade of the 21st century, it has become clear that a growing number of countries are engaged in efforts to develop and field AWS and other AI-enabled military systems Motivations and General Aims Driving AWS Development Efforts China's P L A anticipates that AI could fundamentally change the character of warfare Russia's It supports research (PDF) in a number of AI application areas; in just the past three years, the Kremlin has declared its intent to establish six new national initiatives dedicated to AI research and development, including the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF), Russia's analogue to the U.S. Defense Department's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As recently as April 21, ARF's deputy director boasted to RIA Novosti that as a result of the foundation's research, “Living fighters will gradually begin to be replaced by their robotic 'brothers' who can act faster, more accurately and more selectively than people.” Russia places great emphasis on the development of AI for information warfare aimed, as a recent comprehensive report by my RAND colleagues documents, at causing political and societal damage to the target state. While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia. Defined as “the degree to which mutual deterrence between dangerous adversaries can hold in a confrontation,” as my RAND colleague Forrest Morgan explains, crisis stability and the ways to achieve it are not about warfighting, but about “building and posturing forces in ways that allow a state, if confronted, to avoid war without backing down” on important political or military interests. Thus, the military capabilities developed by nuclear-armed states like the United States and Russia and how they posture them are key determinants of whether crises between them will remain stable or devolve into conventional armed conflict, as well as the extent to which such conflict might escalate in intensity and scope, including to the level of nuclear use AWS could foster crisis instability and conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia in a number of ways; in this short essay I will highlight only four. While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation. First, a state facing an adversary with AWS capable of making decisions at machine speeds is likely to fear the threat of sudden and potent attack, a threat that would compress the amount of time for strategic decisionmaking. The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create fears that one's forces could suffer significant, if not decisive, strikes. These fears in turn could translate into pressures to strike first—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position. Similarly, within conflict, the fear of losing at machine speeds would be likely to cause a state to escalate the intensity of the conflict possibly even to the level of nuclear use. Second, as the speed of military action in a conflict involving the use of AWS as well as hypersonic weapons and other advanced military capabilities begins to surpass the speed of political decisionmaking, leaders could lose the ability to manage the crisis and with it the ability to control escalation. With tactical and operational action taking place at speeds driven by machines, the time for exchanging signals and communications and for assessing diplomatic options and offramps will be significantly foreclosed. However, the advantages of operating inside the OODA loop of a state adversary like Iraq or Serbia is one thing, while operating inside the OODA loop of a nuclear-armed adversary is another. As the renowned scholar Alexander George emphasized (PDF), especially in contests between nuclear armed competitors, there is a fundamental tension between the operational effectiveness sought by military commanders and the requirements for political leaders to retain control of events before major escalation takes place. Third, and perhaps of greatest concern to policymakers should be the likelihood that, from the vantage point of Russia's leaders, in U.S. hands the operational advantages of AWS are likely to be understood as an increased U.S. capability for what Georgetown professor Caitlin Talmadge refers to as “conventional counterforce” operations. In brief, in crises and conflicts, Moscow is likely to see the United States as confronting it with an array of advanced conventional capabilities backstopped by an interconnected shield of theater and homeland missile defenses. Russia will perceive such capabilities as posing both a conventional war-winning threat and a conventional counterforce threat (PDF) poised to degrade the use of its strategic nuclear forces. The likelihood that Russia will see them this way is reinforced by the fact that it currently sees U.S. conventional precision capabilities precisely in this manner. As a qualitatively new capability that promises new operational advantages, the addition of AWS to U.S. conventional capabilities could further cement Moscow's view and in doing so increase the potential for crisis instability and escalation in confrontations with U.S. forces. Take for example, a hypothetical scenario set in the Baltics in the 2030 timeframe which finds NATO forces employing swarming AWS to suppress Russian air defense networks and key command and control nodes in Kaliningrad as part of a larger strategy of expelling a Russian invasion force. What to NATO is a logical part of a conventional campaign could well appear to Moscow as initial moves of a larger plan designed to degrade the integrated air defense and command and control networks upon which Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal relies. In turn, such fears could feed pressures for Moscow to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Finally, even if the employment of AWS does not drive an increase in the speed and momentum of action that forecloses the time for exchanging signals, a future conflict in which AWS are ubiquitous will likely prove to be a poor venue both for signaling and interpreting signals AWS programmed to exploit every tactical opportunity might read the modulation as an opportunity to escalate offensive operations and thus gain tactical advantage. Such AWS could also misunderstand adversary attempts to signal resolve solely as adversary preparations for imminent attack. Of course, correctly interpreting signals sent in crisis and conflict is vexing enough when humans are making all the decisions, but in future confrontations in which decisionmaking has willingly or unwillingly been ceded to machines, the problem is likely only to be magnified

development of (AWS) likely to raise significant risks for crisis instability and escalation in future confrontations between the U S and Russia. consider the risks countries are engaged AWS and AI-enabled military systems China's P L A anticipates AI could fundamentally change warfare Russia declared intent to establish six new national initiatives boasted Living fighters will gradually begin to be replaced by their robotic 'brothers' crisis stability are about “building forces to avoid war without backing down” military capabilities are key determinants of whether crises escalate to nuclear . AWS could foster crisis instability and conflict escalation While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation. First, a state facing an adversary making decisions at machine speeds is likely to fear the threat of sudden and potent attack that would compress the amount of time for decisionmaking fears translate into pressures to strike first Similarly cause a state to escalate the intensity of the conflict to nuclear use. Second, as the speed of military action begins to surpass decisionmaking, leaders lose the ability to manage the crisis and control escalation time for exchanging signals and communications and offramps will be foreclosed Third greatest concern should be from the vantage point of Russia's leaders U.S. AWS are understood as an increased U.S. capability for conventional counterforce” operations M capabilities degrade the use of nuclear forces Russia will see them this way AWS could further cement Moscow's view and increase the potential for crisis instability and escalation Finally a future conflict in which AWS are ubiquitous will prove to be a poor venue both for signaling and interpreting signals AWS programmed to exploit every tactical opportunity might read modulation as an opportunity to escalate AWS could misunderstand attempts to signal resolve as preparations for imminent attack correctly interpreting signals in crisis is vexing enough when humans are making all the decisions in future confrontations in which decisionmaking has been ceded to machines, the problem is likely magnified

What advances in artificial intelligence (AI) will mean for the future battlefield remains opaque. Mainline discourse is overly influenced by exaggerated forecasts such as that reflected in Russian President Vladimir Putin's often repeated 2017 declaration that “whoever becomes the leader” in the sphere of artificial intelligence “will become the ruler of the world” and a broadly similar claim he advanced as recently as May 18 when he insisted that without artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons and other new technologies, “it would be impossible to secure the future of our [Russia's] civilization.” Whatever security benefits and military advantages they may bring, as I argue in this piece, the development and posturing of AI-enabled autonomous weapons systems (AWS) is likely to raise significant risks for crisis instability and conflict escalation in future confrontations between the United States and Russia. Policymakers would do well to consider—now—whether the potential risks are worth the hoped-for operational advantages. With the exception of the advent of nuclear weapons, history counsels skepticism regarding the many recurrent predictions of the revolutionary impact of technological innovation on the character of warfare. Maintaining objectivity and historically-informed skepticism is no less warranted when considering the potential battlefield effects of AWS, or systems that, once activated, are intended to select and engage targets (PDF) without further intervention or guidance from a human. Still, as we enter the third decade of the 21st century, it has become clear that a growing number of countries are engaged in efforts to develop and field AWS and other AI-enabled military systems. These efforts are by far best funded in the United States and China, with Russia lagging behind in spite of all Putin's motivational rhetoric. Unsurprisingly, these efforts are motivated by a desire to secure military operational advantages on the future battlefield. Motivations and General Aims Driving AWS Development Efforts The Pentagon views AI and robotics, along with several other emerging technologies including hypersonics and directed-energy, as key to offsetting the anti-access and area-denial capabilities and concepts developed by China and Russia over the past two decades, thereby regaining and sustaining U.S. conventional deterrence overmatch. Meanwhile, China's People's Liberation Army anticipates that AI could fundamentally change the character of warfare even as it fears the emergence of a generational gap between its capabilities and that of the U.S. military. It thus seeks to develop AI and other “strategic front-line” technologies in future military competition with the United States. Nominally at least, Russia's vision regarding the aims of exploiting AI for military purposes are not dissimilar from those of the United States and China. It supports research (PDF) in a number of AI application areas; in just the past three years, the Kremlin has declared its intent to establish six new national initiatives dedicated to AI research and development, including the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF), Russia's analogue to the U.S. Defense Department's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As recently as April 21, ARF's deputy director boasted to RIA Novosti that as a result of the foundation's research, “Living fighters will gradually begin to be replaced by their robotic 'brothers' who can act faster, more accurately and more selectively than people.” Despite what Putin's bold assertion might otherwise seem to suggest, Western experts generally agree that Russian AI development significantly lags behind that of the United States and China. However, in stark contrast to U.S. AWS development efforts, if only marginally less so than China's, Russia places great emphasis on the development of AI for information warfare aimed, as a recent comprehensive report by my RAND colleagues documents, at causing political and societal damage to the target state. As argued below, instead of seeking to gain military operational advantages by competing to match U.S. AWS developments, Russia is much more likely to emphasize and invest in two other military capability areas. Operational Advantages of AWS U.S. military planners believe AWS promise to provide a number of significant operational advantages on the future battlefield. Less dependent on human control and decisionmaking, AWS are anticipated to be far faster and more agile than today's manned weapons systems undertaking thousands of complex and highly coordinated decisions at machine speeds. Today's remotely piloted drones rely on communications links to distant command and control and information analysis centers, which can result in inevitable communications delays and leave them vulnerable to jamming or denial through electronic warfare techniques. AWS, on the other hand, will be designed to operate on their own, if necessary, in such information contested environments (PDF), conferring degrees of stealth, decisional agility, persistence and survivability not enjoyed since the earliest days of stealth aircraft, if then. AWS are expected to operate in large swarms comprising hundreds, or even thousands of small, relatively low-cost and expendable vehicles with networked sensors and on-board computing. Fighting in swarms, AWS hold the promise, as Paul Scharre notes, of effectively returning mass to the battlefield as they will be capable of rapidly and autonomously coordinating their own tactical movement in response to enemy actions. As a consequence, AWS are expected to provide the capability of synchronized attack or defense that enables one to fight inside the enemy's decision cycle or OODA loop, overwhelming and defeating (PDF) the enemy's abilities through mass, intelligence, coordination and speed. In conflicts against opponents lacking similar capabilities, U.S. military planners maintain that the combination of such characteristics will provide decisive operational advantage. Finally, like today's drones, AWS will reduce the numbers of casualties and body bags in conflict. But, in contrast to current drones, AWS are expected to lead to cost savings as the frequently overlooked need for large rotating teams (PDF) of remotely located and highly trained pilots and operators would be eliminated. Such cost-savings could be substantial if realized not only from the advent of AWS, but from the diffusion of AI and autonomy to other military functions such as logistics and transportation, battlefield healthcare, cybersecurity and combat simulation and training—a benefit that would reduce the demand for personnel and could lead to smaller militaries. Russia Unlikely to Seek to Match U.S. AWS Developments The economic outlook for Russia, which remains dependent on exports of oil and gas for much of its revenues, is grim at least in the short-term. COVID-19 forced Russia to agree to a deal with OPEC to significantly cut production and exports, which it initially rejected in March, and sent oil prices down in what is bound to reduce budget revenues and cause economic contraction. Russia is now forecast to experience a GDP contraction of 5.5. percent and an increase in unemployment from 2.5 million to 8 million workers this year. Moreover, continued dependence on exports of commodities whose prices Russia cannot control, depopulation (PDF), and a host of other structural factors indicates that the economic outlook for Russia will remain bleak in the longer term, too, in absence of deep reforms. As a result, for the foreseeable future, Russia's federal budget is likely to be constrained. If for no other reason than that, the Kremlin will be unlikely to respond to U.S. AWS advancements by substantially increasing investments in the area, at least in comparison to two other capabilities it is more likely to prioritize well ahead of AWS as discussed immediately below. But there is yet another reason. In brief, such symmetrical responses to capability differences have seldom been part of Russia's playbook in the post–Cold War era. In this respect, it is too early to identify just where Russia may be heading in terms of the character of AWS ground, air, or naval capabilities it is likely to field, let alone to discern any associated operational concepts. The time doing so is likely to prove time misspent. Instead, Moscow is much more likely to look to two other capability areas in search of comparative military operational advantage with respect to the United States and NATO. First, the Kremlin can be counted upon to continue with its customary strategy of underscoring and even increasing its reliance upon nuclear weapons both for deterrence and possibly even warfighting, a cost-effective strategy, comparatively speaking, that Vasily Kashin and Michael Raska economically refer to as “countering the Third Offset Strategy with the First Offset Strategy (PDF).” In this regard, Putin's unveiling of the five nuclear “superweapons” in his March 2018 nationally televised speech to the Russian Federal Assembly can be seen as exhibit one of this strategy. Still, Moscow's continued reliance on nuclear weapons by no means suggests that it will be willing to cede leadership in emerging disruptive technologies entirely to the United States. In fact, the second military capability area Russia is likely to emphasize is that of hypersonic missiles, one of the few weapons realms, outside of nuclear weapons, in which it is building a track-record for both developing and fielding apparently functioning, sophisticated 21st century weapons systems. In just a few short years, it has developed and deployed two hypersonic missile systems, and is currently testing a third. Deployment of the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle has already begun, as Russian officials announced in late December 2019 that one missile regiment on the border with Kazakhstan was armed with the hypersonic glide vehicle. The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile appears slated to be deployed by 2024 by a MiG-31K regiment operating from the VKS base in the Siberian city of Kansk. While a deployment date for the 3M-22 Tsirkon anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile is still uncertain, a Russian navy frigate fired the weapon from the Barents Sea against a ground target in a purportedly successful test in January of this year. Implications for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in U.S.-Russia Confrontations While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia. Defined as “the degree to which mutual deterrence between dangerous adversaries can hold in a confrontation,” as my RAND colleague Forrest Morgan explains, crisis stability and the ways to achieve it are not about warfighting, but about “building and posturing forces in ways that allow a state, if confronted, to avoid war without backing down” on important political or military interests. Thus, the military capabilities developed by nuclear-armed states like the United States and Russia and how they posture them are key determinants of whether crises between them will remain stable or devolve into conventional armed conflict, as well as the extent to which such conflict might escalate in intensity and scope, including to the level of nuclear use. AWS could foster crisis instability and conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia in a number of ways; in this short essay I will highlight only four. While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation. First, a state facing an adversary with AWS capable of making decisions at machine speeds is likely to fear the threat of sudden and potent attack, a threat that would compress the amount of time for strategic decisionmaking. The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create fears that one's forces could suffer significant, if not decisive, strikes. These fears in turn could translate into pressures to strike first—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position. Similarly, within conflict, the fear of losing at machine speeds would be likely to cause a state to escalate the intensity of the conflict possibly even to the level of nuclear use. Second, as the speed of military action in a conflict involving the use of AWS as well as hypersonic weapons and other advanced military capabilities begins to surpass the speed of political decisionmaking, leaders could lose the ability to manage the crisis and with it the ability to control escalation. With tactical and operational action taking place at speeds driven by machines, the time for exchanging signals and communications and for assessing diplomatic options and offramps will be significantly foreclosed. However, the advantages of operating inside the OODA loop of a state adversary like Iraq or Serbia is one thing, while operating inside the OODA loop of a nuclear-armed adversary is another. As the renowned scholar Alexander George emphasized (PDF), especially in contests between nuclear armed competitors, there is a fundamental tension between the operational effectiveness sought by military commanders and the requirements for political leaders to retain control of events before major escalation takes place. Third, and perhaps of greatest concern to policymakers should be the likelihood that, from the vantage point of Russia's leaders, in U.S. hands the operational advantages of AWS are likely to be understood as an increased U.S. capability for what Georgetown professor Caitlin Talmadge refers to as “conventional counterforce” operations. In brief, in crises and conflicts, Moscow is likely to see the United States as confronting it with an array of advanced conventional capabilities backstopped by an interconnected shield of theater and homeland missile defenses. Russia will perceive such capabilities as posing both a conventional war-winning threat and a conventional counterforce threat (PDF) poised to degrade the use of its strategic nuclear forces. The likelihood that Russia will see them this way is reinforced by the fact that it currently sees U.S. conventional precision capabilities precisely in this manner. As a qualitatively new capability that promises new operational advantages, the addition of AWS to U.S. conventional capabilities could further cement Moscow's view and in doing so increase the potential for crisis instability and escalation in confrontations with U.S. forces. In other words, the fielding of U.S. AWS could augment what Moscow already sees as a formidable U.S. ability to threaten a range of important targets including its command and control networks, air defenses, and early warning radars, all of which are unquestionably critical components of Russian conventional forces. In many cases, however, they also serve as critical components of Russia's nuclear force operations. As Talmadge argues, attacks on such targets, even if intended solely to weaken Russian conventional capabilities, will likely raise Russian fears that the U.S. conventional campaign is in fact a counterforce campaign aimed at neutering Russia's nuclear capabilities. Take for example, a hypothetical scenario set in the Baltics in the 2030 timeframe which finds NATO forces employing swarming AWS to suppress Russian air defense networks and key command and control nodes in Kaliningrad as part of a larger strategy of expelling a Russian invasion force. What to NATO is a logical part of a conventional campaign could well appear to Moscow as initial moves of a larger plan designed to degrade the integrated air defense and command and control networks upon which Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal relies. In turn, such fears could feed pressures for Moscow to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Finally, even if the employment of AWS does not drive an increase in the speed and momentum of action that forecloses the time for exchanging signals, a future conflict in which AWS are ubiquitous will likely prove to be a poor venue both for signaling and interpreting signals. In such a conflict, instead of interpreting a downward modulation in an adversary's operations as a possible signal of restraint or perhaps as signaling a willingness to pause in an effort to open up space for diplomatic negotiations, AWS programmed to exploit every tactical opportunity might read the modulation as an opportunity to escalate offensive operations and thus gain tactical advantage. Such AWS could also misunderstand adversary attempts to signal resolve solely as adversary preparations for imminent attack. Of course, correctly interpreting signals sent in crisis and conflict is vexing enough when humans are making all the decisions, but in future confrontations in which decisionmaking has willingly or unwillingly been ceded to machines, the problem is likely only to be magnified

<h4>US-Russia military competition is inevitable, but AWS ensures it <u>goes nuclear</u> – it collapses <u>deterrence</u>, motivates <u>first strikes</u>, undermines diplomatic offramps, and <u>automated systems</u> will <u>misinterpret</u> signals and <u>escalate</u> low level conflicts </h4><p><strong>Laird 6/3<u></strong>/20 [Burgess RAND Corporation, “The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations”] [DS] [https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html]</p><p></u>What advances in artificial intelligence (AI) will mean for the future battlefield remains opaque. Mainline discourse is overly influenced by exaggerated forecasts such as that reflected in Russian President Vladimir Putin's often repeated 2017 declaration that “whoever becomes the leader” in the sphere of artificial intelligence “will become the ruler of the world” and a broadly similar claim he advanced as recently as May 18 when he insisted that without artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons and other new technologies, “it would be impossible to secure the future of our [Russia's] civilization.” Whatever security benefits and military advantages they may bring, as I argue in this piece, <u>the <mark>development </mark>and posturing <mark>of</mark> AI-enabled autonomous weapons systems <mark>(<strong>AWS</strong>) </mark>is <mark>likely to raise <strong>significant risks</strong> for crisis <strong>instability</strong> and </mark>conflict <strong><mark>escalation</strong> in future <strong>confrontations</strong> between the <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates <mark>and Russia. </mark>Policymakers would do well to <mark>consider</mark>—now—whether <mark>the </mark>potential <mark>risks </mark>are worth the hoped-for operational advantages. </p><p></u>With the exception of the advent of nuclear weapons, history counsels skepticism regarding the many recurrent predictions of the revolutionary impact of technological innovation on the character of warfare. Maintaining objectivity and historically-informed skepticism is no less warranted when considering the potential battlefield effects of AWS, or systems that, once activated, are intended to select and engage targets (PDF) without further intervention or guidance from a human. <u>Still, as we enter the third decade of the 21st century, it has become clear that a growing number of <mark>countries are engaged</mark> in efforts to develop and field <strong><mark>AWS</strong> and </mark>other <strong><mark>AI-enabled military systems</u></strong></mark>. These efforts are by far best funded in the United States and China, with Russia lagging behind in spite of all Putin's motivational rhetoric. Unsurprisingly, these efforts are motivated by a desire to secure military operational advantages on the future battlefield. </p><p><u>Motivations and General Aims Driving AWS Development Efforts </p><p></u>The Pentagon views AI and robotics, along with several other emerging technologies including hypersonics and directed-energy, as key to offsetting the anti-access and area-denial capabilities and concepts developed by China and Russia over the past two decades, thereby regaining and sustaining U.S. conventional deterrence overmatch. Meanwhile, <u><mark>China's</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>P</u></strong></mark>eople's <u><strong><mark>L</u></strong></mark>iberation <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>rmy <u><mark>anticipates</mark> that <strong><mark>AI</strong></mark> <mark>could fundamentally change</mark> the character of <strong><mark>warfare</u></strong></mark> even as it fears the emergence of a generational gap between its capabilities and that of the U.S. military. It thus seeks to develop AI and other “strategic front-line” technologies in future military competition with the United States.</p><p>Nominally at least, <u><mark>Russia</mark>'s</u> vision regarding the aims of exploiting AI for military purposes are not dissimilar from those of the United States and China. <u>It supports research (PDF) in a number of AI application areas; in just the past three years, the Kremlin has <mark>declared </mark>its <mark>intent to establish <strong>six new national initiatives</strong></mark> dedicated to AI research and development, including the Advanced Research Foundation (ARF), Russia's analogue to the U.S. Defense Department's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As recently as April 21, ARF's deputy director <mark>boasted</mark> to RIA Novosti that as a result of the foundation's research, “<mark>Living <strong>fighters</strong> will gradually begin to be replaced by their <strong>robotic 'brothers'</strong> </mark>who can act faster, more accurately and more selectively than people.” </u>Despite what Putin's bold assertion might otherwise seem to suggest, Western experts generally agree that Russian AI development significantly lags behind that of the United States and China. However, in stark contrast to U.S. AWS development efforts, if only marginally less so than China's, <u>Russia places great emphasis on the development of AI for information warfare aimed, as a recent comprehensive report by my RAND colleagues documents, at causing political and societal damage to the target state.</u> As argued below, instead of seeking to gain military operational advantages by competing to match U.S. AWS developments, Russia is much more likely to emphasize and invest in two other military capability areas. </p><p>Operational Advantages of AWS </p><p>U.S. military planners believe AWS promise to provide a number of significant operational advantages on the future battlefield. Less dependent on human control and decisionmaking, AWS are anticipated to be far faster and more agile than today's manned weapons systems undertaking thousands of complex and highly coordinated decisions at machine speeds. Today's remotely piloted drones rely on communications links to distant command and control and information analysis centers, which can result in inevitable communications delays and leave them vulnerable to jamming or denial through electronic warfare techniques. AWS, on the other hand, will be designed to operate on their own, if necessary, in such information contested environments (PDF), conferring degrees of stealth, decisional agility, persistence and survivability not enjoyed since the earliest days of stealth aircraft, if then. </p><p>AWS are expected to operate in large swarms comprising hundreds, or even thousands of small, relatively low-cost and expendable vehicles with networked sensors and on-board computing. Fighting in swarms, AWS hold the promise, as Paul Scharre notes, of effectively returning mass to the battlefield as they will be capable of rapidly and autonomously coordinating their own tactical movement in response to enemy actions. As a consequence, AWS are expected to provide the capability of synchronized attack or defense that enables one to fight inside the enemy's decision cycle or OODA loop, overwhelming and defeating (PDF) the enemy's abilities through mass, intelligence, coordination and speed. In conflicts against opponents lacking similar capabilities, U.S. military planners maintain that the combination of such characteristics will provide decisive operational advantage. </p><p>Finally, like today's drones, AWS will reduce the numbers of casualties and body bags in conflict. But, in contrast to current drones, AWS are expected to lead to cost savings as the frequently overlooked need for large rotating teams (PDF) of remotely located and highly trained pilots and operators would be eliminated. Such cost-savings could be substantial if realized not only from the advent of AWS, but from the diffusion of AI and autonomy to other military functions such as logistics and transportation, battlefield healthcare, cybersecurity and combat simulation and training—a benefit that would reduce the demand for personnel and could lead to smaller militaries. </p><p>Russia Unlikely to Seek to Match U.S. AWS Developments </p><p>The economic outlook for Russia, which remains dependent on exports of oil and gas for much of its revenues, is grim at least in the short-term. COVID-19 forced Russia to agree to a deal with OPEC to significantly cut production and exports, which it initially rejected in March, and sent oil prices down in what is bound to reduce budget revenues and cause economic contraction. Russia is now forecast to experience a GDP contraction of 5.5. percent and an increase in unemployment from 2.5 million to 8 million workers this year. Moreover, continued dependence on exports of commodities whose prices Russia cannot control, depopulation (PDF), and a host of other structural factors indicates that the economic outlook for Russia will remain bleak in the longer term, too, in absence of deep reforms. As a result, for the foreseeable future, Russia's federal budget is likely to be constrained. If for no other reason than that, the Kremlin will be unlikely to respond to U.S. AWS advancements by substantially increasing investments in the area, at least in comparison to two other capabilities it is more likely to prioritize well ahead of AWS as discussed immediately below. But there is yet another reason. In brief, such symmetrical responses to capability differences have seldom been part of Russia's playbook in the post–Cold War era. In this respect, it is too early to identify just where Russia may be heading in terms of the character of AWS ground, air, or naval capabilities it is likely to field, let alone to discern any associated operational concepts. The time doing so is likely to prove time misspent. Instead, Moscow is much more likely to look to two other capability areas in search of comparative military operational advantage with respect to the United States and NATO. </p><p>First, the Kremlin can be counted upon to continue with its customary strategy of underscoring and even increasing its reliance upon nuclear weapons both for deterrence and possibly even warfighting, a cost-effective strategy, comparatively speaking, that Vasily Kashin and Michael Raska economically refer to as “countering the Third Offset Strategy with the First Offset Strategy (PDF).” In this regard, Putin's unveiling of the five nuclear “superweapons” in his March 2018 nationally televised speech to the Russian Federal Assembly can be seen as exhibit one of this strategy. Still, Moscow's continued reliance on nuclear weapons by no means suggests that it will be willing to cede leadership in emerging disruptive technologies entirely to the United States. </p><p>In fact, the second military capability area Russia is likely to emphasize is that of hypersonic missiles, one of the few weapons realms, outside of nuclear weapons, in which it is building a track-record for both developing and fielding apparently functioning, sophisticated 21st century weapons systems. In just a few short years, it has developed and deployed two hypersonic missile systems, and is currently testing a third. Deployment of the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle has already begun, as Russian officials announced in late December 2019 that one missile regiment on the border with Kazakhstan was armed with the hypersonic glide vehicle. The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile appears slated to be deployed by 2024 by a MiG-31K regiment operating from the VKS base in the Siberian city of Kansk. While a deployment date for the 3M-22 Tsirkon anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile is still uncertain, a Russian navy frigate fired the weapon from the Barents Sea against a ground target in a purportedly successful test in January of this year. </p><p>Implications for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in U.S.-Russia Confrontations </p><p><u>While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia. Defined as “the degree to which mutual deterrence between dangerous adversaries can hold in a confrontation,” as my RAND colleague Forrest Morgan explains, <strong><mark>crisis stability</strong></mark> and the ways to achieve it <mark>are</mark> not about warfighting, but <mark>about “building </mark>and posturing <mark>forces </mark>in ways that allow a state, if confronted, <mark>to</mark> <mark>avoid <strong>war</strong> without backing down”</mark> on important political or military interests. Thus, the <mark>military <strong>capabilities</strong></mark> developed by nuclear-armed states like the United States and Russia and how they posture them <mark>are <strong>key determinants</strong> of whether crises</mark> between them will remain stable or devolve into conventional armed conflict, as well as the extent to which such conflict might <strong><mark>escalate</strong> </mark>in intensity and scope, including <mark>to</mark> the level of <mark>nuclear </mark>use</u><mark>.<u> <strong>AWS</strong> could foster <strong>crisis instability</strong> and <strong>conflict escalation</strong></mark> in contests between the United States and Russia in a number of ways; in this short essay I will highlight only four. <mark>While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation. </p><p><strong>First</strong>, a state facing an adversary </mark>with AWS capable of <mark>making decisions at <strong>machine speeds</strong> is likely to fear the threat of <strong>sudden</strong> and <strong>potent attack</strong></mark>, a threat <mark>that would <strong>compress</strong> the amount of <strong>time</strong> for </mark>strategic <strong><mark>decisionmaking</strong></mark>. The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create fears that one's forces could suffer significant, if not decisive, strikes. These <mark>fears</mark> in turn could <mark>translate into <strong>pressures to strike first</strong></mark>—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position. <mark>Similarly</mark>, within conflict, the fear of losing at machine speeds would be likely to <mark>cause a state to <strong>escalate</strong> the <strong>intensity</strong> of the conflict</mark> possibly even <mark>to</mark> the level of <strong><mark>nuclear use</strong>. </p><p><strong>Second</strong>, as the speed of military action</mark> in a conflict involving the use of AWS as well as hypersonic weapons and other advanced military capabilities <mark>begins to surpass </mark>the speed of political <mark>decisionmaking, leaders</mark> could <strong><mark>lose the ability to manage the crisis</strong> and</mark> with it the ability to <strong><mark>control escalation</strong></mark>. With tactical and operational action taking place at speeds driven by machines, the <mark>time for exchanging <strong>signals</strong> and <strong>communications</strong> and </mark>for assessing diplomatic options and <mark>offramps will be </mark>significantly <mark>foreclosed</mark>. However, the advantages of operating inside the OODA loop of a state adversary like Iraq or Serbia is one thing, while operating inside the OODA loop of a nuclear-armed adversary is another. As the renowned scholar Alexander George emphasized (PDF), especially in contests between nuclear armed competitors, there is a fundamental tension between the operational effectiveness sought by military commanders and the requirements for political leaders to retain control of events before major escalation takes place. </p><p><mark>Third</mark>, and perhaps of <strong><mark>greatest concern</strong></mark> to policymakers <mark>should be</mark> the likelihood that, <mark>from the vantage point of Russia's leaders</mark>, in <strong><mark>U.S.</strong></mark> hands the operational advantages of <strong><mark>AWS</strong> are</mark> likely to be <mark>understood as an increased U.S. capability for</mark> what Georgetown professor Caitlin Talmadge refers to as “<strong><mark>conventional counterforce</strong>” operations</mark>. In brief, in crises and conflicts, <mark>M</mark>oscow is likely to see the United States as confronting it with an array of advanced conventional capabilities backstopped by an interconnected shield of theater and homeland missile defenses. Russia will perceive such <mark>capabilities </mark>as posing both a conventional war-winning threat and a conventional counterforce threat (PDF) poised to <mark>degrade the use of </mark>its strategic <mark>nuclear forces</mark>. The likelihood that <mark>Russia will <strong>see them this way</strong></mark> is reinforced by the fact that it currently sees U.S. conventional precision capabilities precisely in this manner. As a qualitatively new capability that promises new operational advantages, the addition of <strong><mark>AWS</strong> </mark>to U.S. conventional capabilities <mark>could further <strong>cement Moscow's view</strong> and </mark>in doing so <mark>increase the <strong>potential</strong> for <strong>crisis instability and escalation</strong></mark> in confrontations with U.S. forces. </p><p></u>In other words, the fielding of U.S. AWS could augment what Moscow already sees as a formidable U.S. ability to threaten a range of important targets including its command and control networks, air defenses, and early warning radars, all of which are unquestionably critical components of Russian conventional forces. In many cases, however, they also serve as critical components of Russia's nuclear force operations. As Talmadge argues, attacks on such targets, even if intended solely to weaken Russian conventional capabilities, will likely raise Russian fears that the U.S. conventional campaign is in fact a counterforce campaign aimed at neutering Russia's nuclear capabilities.<u> Take for example, a hypothetical scenario set in the <strong>Baltics</strong> in the 2030 timeframe which finds NATO forces employing swarming AWS to suppress Russian air defense networks and key command and control nodes in Kaliningrad as part of a larger strategy of expelling a Russian invasion force. What to NATO is a logical part of a conventional campaign could well appear to Moscow as initial moves of a larger plan designed to degrade the integrated air defense and command and control networks upon which Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal relies. In turn, such fears could feed <strong>pressures</strong> for Moscow to <strong>escalate to nuclear use</strong> while it still has the <strong>ability</strong> to do so. </p><p><strong><mark>Finally</strong></mark>, even if the employment of AWS does not drive an increase in the speed and momentum of action that forecloses the time for exchanging signals, <mark>a future conflict in which <strong>AWS</strong> are <strong>ubiquitous</strong> will </mark>likely <mark>prove to be a poor venue both for <strong>signaling</strong> and <strong>interpreting signals</u></strong></mark>. In such a conflict, instead of interpreting a downward modulation in an adversary's operations as a possible signal of restraint or perhaps as signaling a willingness to pause in an effort to open up space for diplomatic negotiations, <u><strong><mark>AWS</strong> programmed to <strong>exploit</strong> every tactical <strong>opportunity</strong> might read </mark>the <mark>modulation as an opportunity to <strong>escalate</strong> </mark>offensive operations and thus gain tactical advantage. Such <strong><mark>AWS</strong> could</mark> also <mark>misunderstand</mark> adversary <mark>attempts to signal <strong>resolve</strong></mark> solely <mark>as</mark> adversary <mark>preparations for <strong>imminent attack</strong></mark>. Of course, <mark>correctly interpreting signals</mark> sent <mark>in crisis</mark> and conflict <mark>is vexing enough when <strong>humans are making all the decisions</strong></mark>, but <mark>in future confrontations in which decisionmaking has</mark> willingly or unwillingly <mark>been ceded to machines, the problem is likely </mark>only to be <strong><mark>magnified</strong></mark> </p></u>

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MS TOC

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Marlborough PS

Kyle Groner

1AC - nukes 1NC - moratorium cp

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HS LD 2020-21

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5---copper, lithium, manganese---answers green tech

Ahmed 20

Ahmed 20 [Nafeez. M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies and a DPhil (April 2009) in international relations from the School of Global Studies at Sussex University. Capitalism Will Ruin the Earth By 2050, Scientists Say. Vice. 10-21-2020. https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7m48d/capitalism-will-ruin-the-earth-by-2050-scientists-say]

Endless growth will generate minerals scarcity within decades Electrification of roads and rail will require upgraded smart grids, complex routes connected to high power lines, and regular battery-swap stations the economy begins to stagnate “due to peak oil limits at around 2025-2040,” the economy hits the limits of mineral and material production to sustain this electric transition—in just three decades this is even with high levels of minerals recycling the EV transition will “require higher amounts of copper, lithium and manganese than current reserves copper and manganese the depletion is mainly due to the demand from the rest of the economy this alone “depletes its estimated global reserves Mineral depletion takes place even with “a very high increase in recycling rates” realistic upper level recycling rates of 57 percent, 30 percent and 74 percent to copper, lithium and manganese respectively extremely optimistic projections even these high recycling rates wouldn’t prevent depletion of all current estimated reserves by 2050 conclusion corroborates findings of other studies, estimating an expected bottleneck for lithium by 2042-2045 and for manganese by 2038-2050 Actual bottlenecks could come even earlier because existing studies don’t account for material requirements needed for internal wiring, the EV motor, EV chargers, building and maintaining the grid to connect and charge EV batteries as well as inherent difficulties in recycling metals

Endless growth generate minerals scarcity Electrification require smart grids power lines and battery economy hits limits of mineral copper, lithium and manganese depletion is due to demand even high recycling wouldn’t prevent depletion of lithium by 42 and manganese by 38 bottlenecks could come earlier existing studies don’t account for requirements needed for wiring as well as difficulties in recycling

Endless growth will generate minerals scarcity within decades The EV transition is, in short, a massive industrial project. Electrification of roads and rail will require upgraded smart grids, complex routes connected to high power lines, and regular battery-swap stations. The paper explores several scenarios to explore how such a transition would take place. In a continuing GDP growth scenario, the authors note that the economy begins to stagnate “due to peak oil limits at around 2025-2040,” but GDP is able to continue growing thanks to the EV transition. This shows that the reduction in liquid fuels in transportation can play a powerful role in avoiding “energy shortages in the economy as a whole.” But then the economy hits the limits of mineral and material production to sustain this electric transition—in just three decades. And this is even with high levels of minerals recycling. By 2050, in this scenario, the EV transition will “require higher amounts of copper, lithium and manganese than current reserves. For the cases of copper and manganese the depletion is mainly due to the demand from the rest of the economy,” but most lithium demand “is for EV batteries,” and this alone “depletes its estimated global reserves.” Mineral depletion takes place even with “a very high increase in recycling rates” in a continuing GDP growth scenario. In one such scenario, the authors apply what they consider to be realistic upper level recycling rates of 57 percent, 30 percent and 74 percent to copper, lithium and manganese respectively. These are based on extremely optimistic projections of recycling capabilities relative to their costs. But still they find that even these high recycling rates wouldn’t prevent depletion of all current estimated reserves by 2050. The conclusion corroborates findings of other studies, estimating an expected bottleneck for lithium by 2042-2045 and for manganese by 2038-2050. Actual bottlenecks could come even earlier because existing studies—including the MEDEAS model—don’t account for material requirements needed for internal wiring, the EV motor, EV chargers, building and maintaining the grid to connect and charge EV batteries, the catenaries to electrify the railways, as well as inherent difficulties in recycling metals.

<h4>5---copper, lithium, manganese---answers green tech</h4><p><strong>Ahmed 20</strong> [Nafeez. M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies and a DPhil (April 2009) in international relations from the School of Global Studies at Sussex University. Capitalism Will Ruin the Earth By 2050, Scientists Say. Vice. 10-21-2020. https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7m48d/capitalism-will-ruin-the-earth-by-2050-scientists-say]</p><p><u><mark>Endless growth</mark> will <mark>generate</u> <u><strong>minerals scarcity</strong></mark> within <strong>decades</u></strong> </p><p>The EV transition is, in short, a massive industrial project. <u><mark>Electrification</mark> of roads and rail will <mark>require</mark> upgraded <mark>smart grids</mark>, complex routes connected to high <mark>power lines</mark>, <mark>and</mark> regular <mark>battery</mark>-swap stations</u>. The paper explores several scenarios to explore how such a transition would take place. </p><p>In a continuing GDP growth scenario, the authors note that <u>the economy begins to <strong>stagnate </strong>“due to <strong>peak oil limits</strong> at around 2025-2040,”</u> but GDP is able to continue growing thanks to the EV transition. This shows that the reduction in liquid fuels in transportation can play a powerful role in avoiding “energy shortages in the economy as a whole.” </p><p>But then <u>the <mark>economy hits</mark> the <mark>limits of mineral </mark>and material production to sustain this electric transition—in just <strong>three decades</u></strong>. And <u>this is <strong>even with</strong> high levels of <strong>minerals recycling</u></strong>.</p><p>By 2050, in this scenario, <u>the EV transition will “require higher amounts of <mark>copper, lithium and manganese</mark> than current reserves</u>. For the cases of <u>copper and manganese the <mark>depletion is</mark> mainly <mark>due to</mark> the <mark>demand </mark>from the rest of the economy</u>,” but most lithium demand “is for EV batteries,” and <u>this alone “<strong>depletes</strong> its estimated <strong>global reserves</u></strong>.”</p><p><u>Mineral depletion takes place even with “a very high increase in recycling rates” </u>in a continuing GDP growth scenario.  </p><p>In one such scenario, the authors apply what they consider to be <u>realistic upper level recycling rates of 57 percent, 30 percent and 74 percent to copper, lithium and manganese respectively</u>. These are based on <u><strong>extremely optimistic projections</u></strong> of recycling capabilities relative to their costs.  </p><p>But still they find that <u><mark>even</mark> these <mark>high recycling </mark>rates <strong><mark>wouldn’t prevent depletion</strong> of</mark> all current estimated reserves by 2050</u>. The <u>conclusion corroborates findings of other studies, estimating an expected <strong>bottleneck for <mark>lithium</strong> by</mark> 20<mark>42</mark>-2045 <mark>and</mark> <strong>for <mark>manganese</strong> by</mark> 20<mark>38</mark>-2050</u>.  </p><p><u>Actual <mark>bottlenecks could <strong>come </mark>even <mark>earlier</strong></mark> because <mark>existing studies</u></mark>—including the MEDEAS model—<u><mark>don’t account for </mark>material <mark>requirements needed for </mark>internal <mark>wiring</mark>, the EV motor, EV chargers, building and maintaining the grid to connect and charge EV batteries</u>, the catenaries to electrify the railways, <u><mark>as well as </mark>inherent<mark> difficulties in recycling</mark> metals</u>. </p>

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K—Capitalism

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Lowell ST

Josh Clark

1AC - Icebreakers 1NC - T-Protection T-Oceans Russia Cooperation CP Cap K 2NR - T-Oceans

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HS Policy 2021-22

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Only warming causes extinction

McDonald 19

McDonald 19, Geography PhD student at University of Oxford studying the intersection of grassroots movements and energy transition. (Samuel Miller, 1-4-2019, “Deathly Salvation”, The Trouble, https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation)

nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuc es humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; warming is

nuclear exchange does not result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuc s humans can survive and recover from war, even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; warming is

A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less suicidal civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.

<h4><u>Only</u> warming causes extinction</h4><p><strong>McDonald 19</strong>, Geography PhD student at University of Oxford studying the intersection of grassroots movements and energy transition. (Samuel Miller, 1-4-2019, “Deathly Salvation”, The Trouble, https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation)</p><p>A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a <u><mark>nuclear exchange does not</mark> inevitably <mark>result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter</u></mark>—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—<u><mark>is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would</mark> decimate agriculture or <mark>make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuc</u></mark>lear devic<u>e<mark>s</u></mark>. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less suicidal civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that <u><mark>humans can survive and recover from war,</mark> probably <mark>even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event;</u></mark> six degrees of <u><mark>warming is</u></mark>.</p>

1nr

Cap K

2nc – ov – ontology

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Wichita HP

Galloway, Strong, Aaronson

1ac - coops 1nc - civil rico cp regs cp states cp cap k t per se doj da ptx 2nr - civil rico cp

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NDT/CEDA 2021-22

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Solves global conflict.

Vakulchuk 20

Roman Vakulchuk 20, PhD in economics, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and adjust professor at Nord University, “Renewable energy and geopolitics: A review,” 1/7/2020, Renewable And Sustainable Energy Reviews, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032119307555#!, cc

geopolitical tensions as less likely in a world that has renewables as its main source of energy it is more difficult to control, cut the supply or manipulate the price of renewable energy than of fossil fuels therefore lead to self-sufficiency and less conflict renewables are more difficult than fossil fuels to manipulate due to its geographic and technical characteristics, renewable energy creates few geopolitical motivations for states to start conflicts in order to control it a more equitable energy distribution and energy-based economic power leading to reduced geopolitical tensions power will be more evenly distributed after a complete transition partnerships could “reduce economic imbalances and create global markets for technologies without having to fear conflicts over scarce resources a resource scarcity perspective to the geopolitics of oil triggers aggressive behaviour This perspective is not simple to transpose onto renewables, as they are both non-exhaustible and abundant renewable energy reduce energy dependence and improve its security access to resources is less important than distribution and infrastructure management if countries produce electricity from domestic renewable energy sources, geopolitical tensions and risks might recede geopolitical risks associated with domestically produced renewable energy are close to zero if we apply energy-security standards the consumption of renewable energy at the location of production will prevail over large-scale regional production and distribution international affairs should benefit from renewables in many ways because their distribution will not be exposed “to strategic dilemmas wrought by dependence on hydrocarbons the use of hegemonic power to cut off transport bottlenecks will be greatly reduced due to increased rerouting possibilities, decentralised power generation and the absence of global electricity connections

tensions less likely in a world that has renewables it is difficult to manipulate therefore lead to self-sufficiency and less conflict due to geographic characteristics, renewable energy reduce imbalances without conflicts over resources resource scarcity to oil triggers aggressive behaviour if countries produce domestic renewable sources tensions recede risks are zero international affairs will not be exposed “to strategic dilemmas wrought by hydrocarbons

By contrast, the reduced conflict camp sees geopolitical tensions as less likely in a world that has renewables as its main source of energy (Peters [91], Verrastro et al. [92], Lacher and Kumetat [93], Kostyuk et al. [94], Escribano et al. [95], Johansson [96], Hoggett [97], Sweijs et al. [70], Månsson [72], Paltsev [98], Scholten and Bosman [54], Smith Stegen [99], Escribano [84], Freeman [85]). This camp emphasises that it is more difficult to control, cut the supply or manipulate the price of renewable energy than of fossil fuels and the expansion of renewables will therefore lead to greater energy self-sufficiency and less conflict. It shifts the focus from the external to the internal supply of energy, reducing the scope for conflict among states. An argument frequently used by this camp is that renewables are more difficult than fossil fuels to manipulate as they are less dense and more evenly distributed geographically. Månsson [72] holds the view that due to its geographic and technical characteristics, renewable energy creates few geopolitical motivations for states to start conflicts in order to control it. Peters [91], Tsao et al. [100] and Kostyuk et al. [94] similarly note that developing renewable energy would lead to a more equitable energy distribution and energy-based economic power, in turn leading to reduced geopolitical tensions. Also Overland et al. [101] found that geopolitical power will be more evenly distributed after a complete transition to renewable energy. In a related vein, Krewitt et al. [61] argue that the creation of international solar energy partnerships would have geopolitical advantages because they could “reduce economic imbalances between the North and the South and create global markets for future-oriented energy technologies without having to fear conflicts over scarce resources” (p. 23). The application of a resource scarcity perspective to the geopolitics of oil triggers energy-insecurity anxiety among states and implicitly or explicitly justifies aggressive behaviour in resource conflicts (Jaffe and Soligo [102], Stern [103]). This perspective is not simple to transpose onto renewables, as they are both non-exhaustible and abundant, except for the critical materials used in the production of renewable energy technologies (see Section 3.4 for more on this). Fischhendler et al. [104,105] exemplify how geopolitical arguments have been used to convince Israeli decision-makers to adopt renewable energy to reduce the country's energy dependence and improve its security. These arguments have led others to draw further conclusions. Compared to an energy system based on fossil fuels, in a system dominated by renewables, access to resources is less important than distribution and infrastructure management (Scholten and Bosman [54]). Escribano [84] implies the same when he writes that “[e]nergy dependence and security of supply lose geopolitical relevance, whereas technical and regulatory aspects gain weight” (p. 7). Many publications share an understanding that the location of renewable energy resources is as important as that of fossil fuels (Skeet [106], Criekemans [67], Criekemans [107]). However, location as a geopolitical concern is mainly relevant for the large-scale and not for the small-scale domestically-oriented production and transmission of electricity from renewable energy. O'Sullivan et al. [75] argue that if renewable energy is deployed on a large scale and cross-border trade in electricity grows, then the principle of territorial control will be similar to that for oil and gas pipelines: “[c]ountries like Algeria, Mexico or Morocco, or transit countries, or actors such as the Islamic State, could still try to leverage their geographical position and in case of conflict they could threaten to interrupt electricity supplies” (p. 41). Several authors also ask whether an external supply of electricity can be used as an “energy weapon” (e.g. Escribano et al. [95]). Renewable energy infrastructure, such as the ambitious but failed Desertec project, can also be an easy target for terrorists (Smith Stegen et al. [108]). The same logic can be applied to the location of biofuels. On the other hand, if countries produce electricity from domestic renewable energy sources, geopolitical tensions and risks might recede due to falling energy imports and reduced interdependence between countries (Strunz and Gawel [66]). Escribano et al. [95] and Scholten and Bosman [54] argue that the geopolitical risks associated with domestically produced renewable energy are close to zero if we apply the energy-security standards of IEA. Hoggett [97] similarly notes that small-scale photovoltaics (and nuclear power) technologies are likely to promote a secure low-carbon transition with reduced geopolitical risks. Some believe that it is likely that the consumption of renewable energy at the location of production will prevail over large-scale regional production and distribution as it is seen as much more efficient and cost-effective when compared to the long-distance distribution of electricity (Proedrou [109], Sovacool [110]). These authors therefore see geographical location as less important for renewable energy resources than for fossil fuels from a geopolitical perspective. Nevertheless, there is a risk of local conflicts involving non-state actors that could potentially be caused by increased global competition for the land required for renewable energy installations (Capellan-Perez et al. [82], Månsson [72], Johansson [96], Walker [111]). One issue seems to be stuck between the two camps: new interdependencies among states as a result of electricity interconnectors. Hache [81] discusses the possible emergence of new and unfamiliar inter-state interdependencies. Similarly, Westphal and Droege [64] argue that more electricity interconnectors between countries will lead to greater interdependence, which may translate into reduced international security. Pierri et al. [112] examine this question in the context of the European Union. Konstantelos et al. [113] discuss the division of costs and benefits among members of an integrated North Sea grid, making it similar to the difficulties caused by major pipeline projects. By contrast, Smith Stegen [99] argues that international affairs should benefit from renewables in many ways because their distribution will not be exposed “to the political and strategic dilemmas wrought by dependence on hydrocarbons” (p. 92). In a similar vein, IRENA [76] notes that electricity cut-offs and the use of hegemonic power to cut off transport bottlenecks will be greatly reduced due to increased rerouting possibilities, decentralised power generation and the absence of global electricity connections. But Smith Stegen [99] acknowledges that some tensions are possible due to increased interdependencies in such areas as high-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission lines, biofuels and rare earth elements. Similarly, Verrastro et al. [92] and Lacher and Kumetat [93] see that renewable energy may strengthen energy security while facilitating the emergence of new interdependencies among states.

<h4>Solves <u>global conflict</u><strong>.</h4><p></strong>Roman <strong>Vakulchuk 20</strong>, PhD in economics, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and adjust professor at Nord University, “Renewable energy and geopolitics: A review,” 1/7/2020, Renewable And Sustainable Energy Reviews, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032119307555#!, cc</p><p>By contrast, the reduced conflict camp sees <u><strong>geopolitical <mark>tensions</strong></mark> as <strong><mark>less likely</strong> in a world that has renewables</mark> as its <strong>main source of energy</u></strong> (Peters [91], Verrastro et al. [92], Lacher and Kumetat [93], Kostyuk et al. [94], Escribano et al. [95], Johansson [96], Hoggett [97], Sweijs et al. [70], Månsson [72], Paltsev [98], Scholten and Bosman [54], Smith Stegen [99], Escribano [84], Freeman [85]). This camp emphasises that <u><mark>it is</mark> more <strong><mark>difficult to</mark> control</strong>, cut the <strong>supply</strong> or <strong><mark>manipulate</mark> the price</strong> of renewable energy than of fossil fuels</u> and the expansion of renewables will<u> <mark>therefore lead to</u></mark> greater energy <u><strong><mark>self-sufficiency</strong> and <strong>less conflict</u></strong></mark>. It shifts the focus from the external to the internal supply of energy, reducing the scope for conflict among states.</p><p>An argument frequently used by this camp is that <u>renewables are <strong>more difficult</strong> than fossil fuels to manipulate </u>as they are less dense and more evenly distributed geographically. Månsson [72] holds the view that <u><mark>due to</mark> its <strong><mark>geographic</strong></mark> and <strong>technical <mark>characteristics</strong>, renewable energy</mark> creates <strong>few geopolitical motivations</strong> for states to <strong>start conflicts</strong> in order to control it</u>. Peters [91], Tsao et al. [100] and Kostyuk et al. [94] similarly note that developing renewable energy would lead to <u>a more equitable energy distribution and energy-based economic power</u>, in turn <u>leading to reduced geopolitical tensions</u>. Also Overland et al. [101] found that geopolitical <u>power will be more evenly distributed after a complete transition</u> to renewable energy. In a related vein, Krewitt et al. [61] argue that the creation of international solar energy <u>partnerships</u> would have geopolitical advantages because they <u>could “<mark>reduce</mark> <strong>economic <mark>imbalances</u></strong></mark> between the North and the South <u>and create <strong>global markets</strong> for</u> future-oriented energy <u>technologies <mark>without</mark> having to fear <strong><mark>conflicts</strong> over</mark> <strong>scarce <mark>resources</u></strong></mark>” (p. 23).</p><p>The application of <u>a <strong><mark>resource scarcity</mark> perspective</strong> <mark>to</mark> the <strong>geopolitics of <mark>oil</strong> triggers</u></mark> energy-insecurity anxiety among states and implicitly or explicitly justifies <u><strong><mark>aggressive behaviour</u></strong></mark> in resource conflicts (Jaffe and Soligo [102], Stern [103]). <u>This perspective is not simple to <strong>transpose onto renewables</strong>, as they are both <strong>non-exhaustible</strong> and <strong>abundant</u></strong>, except for the critical materials used in the production of renewable energy technologies (see Section 3.4 for more on this). Fischhendler et al. [104,105] exemplify how geopolitical arguments have been used to convince Israeli decision-makers to adopt <u>renewable energy</u> to <u>reduce</u> the country's <u><strong>energy dependence</strong> and improve its <strong>security</u></strong>. These arguments have led others to draw further conclusions. Compared to an energy system based on fossil fuels, in a system dominated by renewables, <u>access to resources is less important than distribution and infrastructure management</u> (Scholten and Bosman [54]). Escribano [84] implies the same when he writes that “[e]nergy dependence and security of supply lose geopolitical relevance, whereas technical and regulatory aspects gain weight” (p. 7).</p><p>Many publications share an understanding that the location of renewable energy resources is as important as that of fossil fuels (Skeet [106], Criekemans [67], Criekemans [107]). However, location as a geopolitical concern is mainly relevant for the large-scale and not for the small-scale domestically-oriented production and transmission of electricity from renewable energy. O'Sullivan et al. [75] argue that if renewable energy is deployed on a large scale and cross-border trade in electricity grows, then the principle of territorial control will be similar to that for oil and gas pipelines: “[c]ountries like Algeria, Mexico or Morocco, or transit countries, or actors such as the Islamic State, could still try to leverage their geographical position and in case of conflict they could threaten to interrupt electricity supplies” (p. 41). Several authors also ask whether an external supply of electricity can be used as an “energy weapon” (e.g. Escribano et al. [95]). Renewable energy infrastructure, such as the ambitious but failed Desertec project, can also be an easy target for terrorists (Smith Stegen et al. [108]). The same logic can be applied to the location of biofuels.</p><p>On the other hand, <u><mark>if countries produce</mark> electricity from <strong><mark>domestic renewable</mark> energy <mark>sources</strong></mark>, <strong>geopolitical <mark>tensions</strong></mark> and risks might <strong><mark>recede</u></strong></mark> due to falling energy imports and reduced interdependence between countries (Strunz and Gawel [66]). Escribano et al. [95] and Scholten and Bosman [54] argue that the <u><strong>geopolitical <mark>risks</strong></mark> associated with domestically produced renewable energy <mark>are</mark> close to <strong><mark>zero</strong></mark> if we apply</u> the <u>energy-security standards</u> of IEA. Hoggett [97] similarly notes that small-scale photovoltaics (and nuclear power) technologies are likely to promote a secure low-carbon transition with reduced geopolitical risks. Some believe that it is likely that <u>the consumption of renewable energy at the <strong>location of production</strong> will prevail over large-scale regional <strong>production and distribution</u></strong> as it is seen as much more efficient and cost-effective when compared to the long-distance distribution of electricity (Proedrou [109], Sovacool [110]). These authors therefore see geographical location as less important for renewable energy resources than for fossil fuels from a geopolitical perspective. Nevertheless, there is a risk of local conflicts involving non-state actors that could potentially be caused by increased global competition for the land required for renewable energy installations (Capellan-Perez et al. [82], Månsson [72], Johansson [96], Walker [111]).</p><p>One issue seems to be stuck between the two camps: new interdependencies among states as a result of electricity interconnectors. Hache [81] discusses the possible emergence of new and unfamiliar inter-state interdependencies. Similarly, Westphal and Droege [64] argue that more electricity interconnectors between countries will lead to greater interdependence, which may translate into reduced international security. Pierri et al. [112] examine this question in the context of the European Union. Konstantelos et al. [113] discuss the division of costs and benefits among members of an integrated North Sea grid, making it similar to the difficulties caused by major pipeline projects. By contrast, Smith Stegen [99] argues that <u><strong><mark>international affairs</strong></mark> should benefit from renewables in many ways because their distribution <mark>will not be exposed “to</u></mark> the political and <u><strong><mark>strategic dilemmas</u></strong> <u>wrought by</mark> <strong>dependence on <mark>hydrocarbons</u></strong></mark>” (p. 92). In a similar vein, IRENA [76] notes that electricity cut-offs and <u>the use of <strong>hegemonic power</strong> to cut off <strong>transport bottlenecks</strong> will be <strong>greatly reduced</strong> due to increased <strong>rerouting possibilities</strong>, <strong>decentralised power generation</strong> and the absence of <strong>global electricity connections</u></strong>. But Smith Stegen [99] acknowledges that some tensions are possible due to increased interdependencies in such areas as high-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission lines, biofuels and rare earth elements. Similarly, Verrastro et al. [92] and Lacher and Kumetat [93] see that renewable energy may strengthen energy security while facilitating the emergence of new interdependencies among states.</p>

1AC – Original Jurisdiction

1AC – Equitable Apportionment

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Protection means ‘permitting’ not ‘prevention’

COLANGELO, 20

VICTORIA COLANGELO, 20 – legal expert on mitigation banks and CWA section 404 permitting, former President of the Florida Association of Mitigation Bankers, CEO of the Mitigation Banking Group Inc., and appointee to the Seminole County Parks and Preservation Advisory Committee. **A mitigation bank is a type of aquatic resource area established under the CWA for the purpose of providing compensation for resources permitted under Section 404. (“THE NAVIGABLE WATERS PROTECTION RULE UPDATE” JULY 6, 2020, https://mitigationbankinginc.com/navigable-waters-protection-rule-update-by-victoria-colangelo/ //DH

Under the (CWA), “protection” does not mean “prevention” of development, it means “permitting”, because landowners planning projects that impact waters” must first get approval Landowners have to reduce impacts and then mitigate for wetland loss

Under the (CWA), “protection” does not mean “prevention” it means “permitting”, because landowners planning projects that impact waters” must first get approval Landowners have to reduce impacts

Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), “protection” does not mean “prevention” of development, it means “permitting”, because landowners planning for projects that impact “navigable waters” must first get approval from The Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) and/or a state agency. Landowners have to reduce impacts and then mitigate for wetland loss by restoring wetlands of equal or greater hydrologic value by purchasing mitigation credits, doing on-site or off-site mitigation.

<h4><strong>Protection means ‘permitting’ not ‘prevention’ </h4><p></strong>VICTORIA <strong>COLANGELO, 20 </strong>– legal expert on mitigation banks and CWA section 404 permitting, former President of the Florida Association of Mitigation Bankers, CEO of the Mitigation Banking Group Inc., and appointee to the Seminole County Parks and Preservation Advisory Committee. **A mitigation bank is a type of aquatic resource area established under the CWA for the purpose of providing compensation for resources permitted under Section 404. (“THE NAVIGABLE WATERS PROTECTION RULE UPDATE” JULY 6, 2020, https://mitigationbankinginc.com/navigable-waters-protection-rule-update-by-victoria-colangelo/ //DH</p><p><u><mark>Under the</u></mark> Clean Water Act <u><mark>(CWA), “protection” does not mean “prevention”</mark> of development, <mark>it means “permitting”, because landowners planning</u></mark> for <u><mark>projects</u> <u>that impact</u></mark> “navigable <u><mark>waters” must first get approval</mark> </u>from The Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) and/or a state agency. <u><mark>Landowners have to reduce impacts</mark> and then mitigate for wetland loss</u><strong> by restoring wetlands of equal or greater hydrologic value by purchasing mitigation credits, doing on-site or off-site mitigation.</p></strong>

1NC

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1AC - Nukes 1NC - T Cessation State Bargaining CP ADV CP EPA DA Filibuster DA ECA Security K Dedev Case 2NC - Dedev Case 1NR - Security K 2NR - Security K Case

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No food wars

Vestby 18

Jonas Vestby 18, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, 5/18/18, https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/]

there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests. there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living

little scholarly merit that a reduction food increases probability conflict break out to start conflict requires means and will people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort widespread misapprehension social unrest in periods of high prices relates to shortages sources of discontent are more complex political structures, land corruption democratic reforms and economic problems

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests. Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

<h4>No food wars</h4><p>Jonas <strong>Vestby 18</strong>, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, 5/18/18, https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/]</p><p>It is perhaps surprising, then, that <u>there is</u> <u><strong><mark>little scholarly merit</u></strong></mark> <u>in the notion</u> <u><mark>that a</u></mark> <u>short-term</u> <u><mark>reduction</u></mark> <u>in access to</u> <u><strong><mark>food increases</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>probability</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>conflict</u></strong></mark> <u>will</u> <u><mark>break out</mark>.</u> This is because <u><mark>to start</u></mark> <u>or participate in violent</u> <u><mark>conflict requires</u></mark> <u>people to have both the</u> <u><mark>means and</u></mark> <u>the</u> <u><mark>will</mark>. Most</u> <u><mark>people on the</u> <u><strong>brink of starvation are not in the position to resort</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to violence</strong>, whether against the government or other social groups</u>. In fact, <u>the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.</p><p></u>Accordingly, <u>there is a</u> <u><strong><mark>widespread misapprehension</u></strong></mark> <u>that</u> <u><mark>social unrest in periods of high</u></mark> <u>food</u> <u><mark>prices relates</u></mark> <u>primarily</u> <u><mark>to</u></mark> <u>food</u> <u><mark>shortages</u></mark>. In reality, the <u><mark>sources of discontent are</u></mark> <u>considerably</u> <u><strong><mark>more complex</u></strong></mark> <u>– linked to</u> <u><strong><mark>political structures</strong>,</u> <u><strong>land</u></strong></mark> <u>ownership,</u> <u><strong><mark>corruption</strong></mark>, the desire for</u> <u><strong><mark>democratic reforms</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> <u>general</u> <u><strong><mark>economic problems</u></strong></mark> <u>– where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living</u>. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.</p>

1NC

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Disease

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FMP is crucial for African integration and rejecting harmful colonial borders.

Hirsch 21

Hirsch 21 [Alan Hirsch (Professor of Development Policy and Practice at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at University of Cape Town), “The African Union’s Free Movement of Persons Protocol: Why has it faltered and how can its objectives be achieved?”, South African Journal of International Affairs, 28:4, 497-517, (2021). DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788] CT

The FMP Protocol explains its rationale: the free movement of persons, capital goods and services will promote integration, Pan- Africanism, enhance science, technology, education, research and foster tourism, facilitate inter-African trade and investment, increase remittances within Africa, promote mobility of labour, create employment, improve the standards of living of the people of Africa and facili- tate the mobilization and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve self-reliance and development ... .4 As Stephen Gelb and Aarti Krishnan have shown, the developmental rationale is broadly supported in the literature.5 Most modern African borders derive from the scramble for Africa era of colonialism when the European powers’ lust for foreign land and resources resulted in African terri- torial borders drawn conveniently only for the colonial project. Colonial boundaries sliced through economic regions and ethnic groups. Another outcome was fragmentation of the continent into many territories, most relatively small. One of Pan-Africanism’s focal points is the right of Africans to cross national borders within the continent without undue restrictions In 1991 in Abuja, when the focus of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) shifted from liberation to economic integration, African countries committed to the establish- ment of an African economic community. The African Economic Community Treaty, commonly known as the Abuja Treaty, officially came into force in 1994. The free movement of persons, rights of residence and rights of establishment by Africans across the borders of AU member states are included in Article 4(2)(i) of that treaty. he Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2001 carried over the mandate from the OAU, and in 2006 in Bangui, a Migration Policy Framework for Africa was endorsed by AU members – this framework also included the right to gainful employment across African borders.8 Africa’s Agenda 2063, adopted by the AU in 2013, has ‘The African Passport and the free movement of people’ as one of its 11 flagship projects In 2017 the Peace and Security Council of the AU acknowledged that the benefits of free movement of Africans across African borders outweighed the real and imagined economic and secur- ity challenges that such a reform might pose.11 Finally, in January 2018, the Free Movement of Persons Protocol to the AEC treaty was signed by most AU heads of state at the AU summit.12 It was accompanied by an implementation ‘roadmap’

the free movement of persons will promote Pan- Africanism self-reliance and development modern African borders derive from the European colonial project Colonial boundaries sliced through economic regions and ethnic groups One of Pan-Africanism’s focal points is the right of Africans to cross national borders within the continent without undue restrictions

The FMP Protocol explains its rationale: ... the free movement of persons, capital goods and services will promote integration, Pan- Africanism, enhance science, technology, education, research and foster tourism, facilitate inter-African trade and investment, increase remittances within Africa, promote mobility of labour, create employment, improve the standards of living of the people of Africa and facili- tate the mobilization and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve self-reliance and development ... .4 As Stephen Gelb and Aarti Krishnan have shown, the developmental rationale is broadly supported in the literature.5 Most modern African borders derive from the scramble for Africa era of colonialism when the European powers’ lust for foreign land and resources resulted in African terri- torial borders drawn conveniently only for the colonial project. Colonial boundaries sliced through economic regions and ethnic groups. Another outcome was fragmentation of the continent into many territories, most relatively small.6 One of Pan-Africanism’s focal points is the right of Africans to cross national borders within the continent without undue restrictions.7 In 1991 in Abuja, when the focus of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) shifted from liberation to economic integration, African countries committed to the establish- ment of an African economic community. The African Economic Community Treaty, commonly known as the Abuja Treaty, officially came into force in 1994. The free movement of persons, rights of residence and rights of establishment by Africans across the borders of AU member states are included in Article 4(2)(i) of that treaty. The Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2001 carried over the mandate from the OAU, and in 2006 in Bangui, a Migration Policy Framework for Africa was endorsed by AU members – this framework also included the right to gainful employment across African borders.8 Africa’s Agenda 2063, adopted by the AU in 2013, has ‘The African Passport and the free movement of people’ as one of its 11 flagship projects.9 In 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda, the African Passport was launched.10 It is meant to facilitate the free movement of people on the continent, though the take-up is slow. In 2017 the Peace and Security Council of the AU acknowledged that the benefits of free movement of Africans across African borders outweighed the real and imagined economic and secur- ity challenges that such a reform might pose.11 Finally, in January 2018, the Free Movement of Persons Protocol to the AEC treaty was signed by most AU heads of state at the AU summit.12 It was accompanied by an implementation ‘roadmap’.13 A revised version, in the form of the Migration Policy Frame- work for Africa, was issued by the AU Commission in May 2018. It too had an implemen- tation plan calibrated against a timeframe.

<h4>FMP is crucial for African integration and rejecting harmful colonial borders. </h4><p><strong>Hirsch 21</strong> [Alan Hirsch (Professor of Development Policy and Practice at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at University of Cape Town), “The African Union’s Free Movement of Persons Protocol: Why has it faltered and how can its objectives be achieved?”, South African Journal of International Affairs, 28:4, 497-517, (2021). DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788] CT</p><p><u>The FMP Protocol explains its rationale:</p><p></u>... <u><mark>the free movement of persons</mark>, capital goods and services <mark>will promote</mark> integration, <mark>Pan- Africanism</mark>, enhance science, technology, education, research and foster tourism, facilitate inter-African trade and investment, increase remittances within Africa, promote mobility of labour, create employment, improve the standards of living of the people of Africa and facili- tate the mobilization and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve <mark>self-reliance and development</mark> ... .4</p><p>As Stephen Gelb and Aarti Krishnan have shown, the developmental rationale is broadly supported in the literature.5 Most <mark>modern African borders derive from</mark> the scramble for Africa era of colonialism when <mark>the</mark> <mark>European</mark> powers’ lust for foreign land and resources resulted in African terri- torial borders drawn conveniently only for the <mark>colonial project</mark>. <mark>Colonial boundaries sliced through economic regions and ethnic groups</mark>. Another outcome was fragmentation of the continent into many territories, most relatively small.</u>6 <u><strong><mark>One of Pan-Africanism’s focal points is the right of Africans to cross national borders within the continent without undue restrictions</u></strong></mark>.7 <u>In 1991 in Abuja, when the focus of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) shifted from liberation to economic integration, African countries committed to the establish- ment of an African economic community. The African Economic Community Treaty, commonly known as the Abuja Treaty, officially came into force in 1994. The free movement of persons, rights of residence and rights of establishment by Africans across the borders of AU member states are included in Article 4(2)(i) of that treaty. </u>T<u>he Constitutive Act of the African Union in 2001 carried over the mandate from the OAU, and in 2006 in Bangui, a Migration Policy Framework for Africa was endorsed by AU members – this framework also included the right to gainful employment across African borders.8 Africa’s Agenda 2063, adopted by the AU in 2013, has ‘The African Passport and the free movement of people’ as one of its 11 flagship projects</u>.9 In 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda, the African Passport was launched.10 It is meant to facilitate the free movement of people on the continent, though the take-up is slow. <u>In 2017 the Peace and Security Council of the AU acknowledged that the benefits of free movement of Africans across African borders outweighed the real and imagined economic and secur- ity challenges that such a reform might pose.11 Finally, in January 2018, the Free Movement of Persons Protocol to the AEC treaty was signed by most AU heads of state at the AU summit.12 It was accompanied by an implementation ‘roadmap’</u>.13 A revised version, in the form of the Migration Policy Frame- work for Africa, was issued by the AU Commission in May 2018. It too had an implemen- tation plan calibrated against a timeframe.</p>

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Infectious diseases don’t cause extinction

Barratt 17

Owen Cotton-Barratt 17, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal

natural pandemics are unlikely to cause extinction. of 833 plant and animal extinctions since 1500, less than 4% were ascribed to infectious disease. our species is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response very unlikely to be killed by a pandemic. highly lethal pathogens can kill hosts before they spread there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be lethal

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

<h4>Infectious diseases don’t cause extinction </h4><p>Owen Cotton-<strong>Barratt 17</strong>, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf</p><p>For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that<u> <mark>natural pandemics are</mark> <strong>very <mark>unlikely to cause </mark>human <mark>extinction</strong>.</u></mark> Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that<u> <mark>of</mark> the <mark>833</mark> recorded <mark>plant and animal</mark> species <mark>extinctions</mark> known to have occurred <mark>since 1500, <strong>less than 4%</strong></mark> (31 species) <mark>were ascribed to infectious disease</u>.</mark>38 <u>None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction.</u> <u>It </u>therefore <u>seems that <mark>our</mark> own <mark>species</mark>, which <mark>is <strong>very numerous</strong>, <strong>globally dispersed</strong>, and capable of a <strong>rational response</mark> to problems</strong>, is <mark>very unlikely to be killed</mark> off <mark>by a</mark> natural <mark>pandemic.</p><p></u></mark>One underlying explanation for this is <u>that <mark>highly lethal pathogens can kill</mark> their <mark>hosts before they</mark> have a chance to <mark>spread</u></mark>, so <u><mark>there is a <strong>selective pressure for pathogens not to be</mark> highly <mark>lethal</u></strong></mark>. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39</p>

1NC

Coverage Advantage

./documents/ndtceda17/Northwestern/CaEs/Northwestern-Callahan-Esman-Neg-ADA-Semis.docx

N

ADA

Semis

Minnesota AL

Bricker, Viveth, Lastovica

1AC - Single Payer 1NC - Medicaid Federalism DA - Midterms DA - France DA - Medicare Part E CP - Economy Turns - Case 2NC - Medicare Part E CP - Case 1NR - Economy Turns 2NR - Economy Turns

ndtceda17/Northwestern/CaEs/Northwestern-Callahan-Esman-Neg-ADA-Semis.docx

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Northwestern CaEs

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ndtceda17

NDT/CEDA 2017-18

cx

college

Its is possessive and refers to the party preceding its use—the USFG

US District Court 7

US District Court 7 (United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808,” Lexis)//BB

the word "its." The possessive pronoun intended to refer to the party preceding its use

"its." The possessive pronoun intended to refer to the party preceding its use-

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

<h4>Its is possessive and refers to the party preceding its use—<strong>the USFG</h4><p>US District Court 7</p><p></strong>(United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808,” Lexis)//BB</p><p>The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use <u>the word <mark>"its."</u> <u>The possessive pronoun</u></mark> was <u><mark>intended to refer to the party preceding its use</u>-</mark>-AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)</p>

1NC

L E T S G O B O Y S

2

./documents/hspolicy14/Edgemont/XuKo/Edgemont-Xu-Kohli-Neg-TOC-Round7.docx

N

TOC

7

Westminster FG

Donnie Grasse

1AC Offshore Aquaculture Regulations Environment Advantage 1NC Anthropocene K T - Regulations Queer Disability K Case Post-Politics K Biodiversity Militarization K Biological Carcasses K Queer Ecology K Scientific Objectivity K 2NR Queer Disability K Case Defense

hspolicy14/Edgemont/XuKo/Edgemont-Xu-Kohli-Neg-TOC-Round7.docx

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HS Policy 2014-15

cx

hs

3. The 1AC isn’t reformism – it doesn’t conflate change with progress or validate legal institutions – it’s a tactical intervention that reduces violence while exposing the contradictions within law.

Spade 13

Spade 13 [Dean Spade, associate professor of law @ Seattle University, “Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform” Signs Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer 2013]

Social movements using critical intersectional tools are making demands that are often difficult for legal scholars to comprehend because of the ways that they throw US law into crisis Because they recognize that legal equality contains and neutralizes resistance and perpetuates intersectional violence and because they identify purportedly neutral administrative systems as key vectors of that violence These kinds of demands and the analysis they represent produce a different relation to law reform strategies than the national narrative about law reform and equality legal equality “victories” are being exposed as primarily symbolic declarations violence Instead, law reform, in this view, might be used as a tactic of transformation focused on interventions that materially reduce violence or maldistribution without inadvertently expanding harmful systems in the name of reform. One recent example is the campaign against gang injunctions in Oakland succeeded Furthermore, the coalition frames its campaign within a larger set of demands not limited to what can be won within the current structure of American law but focused on population-level conditions of maldistribution. The demands include stopping all gang injunctions and police violence; putting resources toward reentry support and services for people returning from prison, including fully funded and immediate access to identity documents, housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and education; banning employers from asking about prior convictions on job applications; ending curfews for people on parole and probation; repealing California’s three-strikes law; reallocating funds from prison construction to education; ending all collaborations between Oakland’s government and ICE

movements are making demands throw US law into crisis because they identify purportedly neutral systems as key vectors of violence These analysis produce a different relation to law reform strategies than the narrative about law reform reform used as a tactic of transformation focused on interventions that reduce violence without expanding harmful systems campaign against gang injunctions in Oakland succeeded the coalition frames it within a larger set of demands not limited to the current structure of American law reentry support fully funded identity documents, housing, job training ending curfews repealing California’s three-strikes law ending all collaborations between government and ICE

Repeal of 3 strikes law, challenges to ICE, ending gang injunctions in Oakland You can defend specific state actioin that break down state power to go against corruption What intersectional politics demands Social movements using critical intersectional tools are making demands that are often difficult for legal scholars to comprehend because of the ways that they throw US law and the nation-state form into crisis. Because they recognize the fact that legal equality contains and neutralizes resistance and perpetuates intersectional violence and because they identify purportedly neutral administrative systems as key vectors of that violence, critical scholars and activists are making demands that include ending immigration enforcement and abolishing policing and prisons. These demands suggest that the technologies of gendered racialization that form the nation cannot be reformed into fair and neutral systems. These systems are technologies of racialized-gendered population control that cannot operate otherwise—they are built to extinguish perceived threats and drains in order to protect and enhance the livelihood of the national population. These kinds of demands and the analysis they represent produce a different relation to law reform strategies than the national narrative about law reform suggests, and different than what is often assumed by legal scholars interested in the field of “equality law.” Because legal equality “victories” are being exposed as primarily symbolic declarations that stabilize the status quo of violence, declarations from courts or legislatures become undesirable goals. Instead, law reform, in this view, might be used as a tactic of transformation focused on interventions that materially reduce violence or maldistribution without inadvertently expanding harmful systems in the name of reform. One recent example is the campaign against gang injunctions in Oakland, California. A broad coalition—comprising organizations focused on police violence, economic justice, imprisonment, youth development, immigration, gentrification, and violence against queer and trans people—succeeded in recent years in bringing significant attention to the efforts of John Russo, Oakland’s city attorney, to introduce gang injunctions (Critical Resistance 2011). The organizations in this coalition are prioritizing anticriminalization work that might usually be cast as irrelevant or marginal to organizations focused on the single axis of women’s or LGBT equality. The campaign has a law reform target in that it seeks to prevent the enactment of certain law enforcement mechanisms that are harmful to vulnerable communities. However, it is not a legal-equality campaign. Rather than aiming to change a law or policy that explicitly excludes a category of people, it aims to expose the fact that a facially neutral policy is administered in a racially targeted manner (Davis 2011; Stop the Injunctions 2011). Furthermore, the coalition frames its campaign within a larger set of demands not limited to what can be won within the current structure of American law but focused on population-level conditions of maldistribution. The demands of the coalition include stopping all gang injunctions and police violence; putting resources toward reentry support and services for people returning from prison, including fully funded and immediate access to identity documents, housing, job training, drug and alcohol treatment, and education; banning employers from asking about prior convictions on job applications; ending curfews for people on parole and probation; repealing California’s three-strikes law; reallocating funds from prison construction to education; ending all collaborations between Oakland’s government and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);

<h4>3. The 1AC isn’t reformism – it doesn’t conflate <u>change</u> with <u>progress</u> or validate legal institutions – it’s a <u>tactical intervention</u> that reduces violence while exposing the contradictions within law.</h4><p><strong>Spade 13</strong> [Dean Spade, associate professor of law @ Seattle University, “Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform” Signs Vol. 38, No. 4, Summer 2013] </p><p>Repeal of 3 strikes law, challenges to ICE, ending gang injunctions in Oakland</p><p>You can defend specific state actioin that break down state power to go against corruption</p><p>What intersectional politics demands</p><p><u><strong>Social <mark>movements</mark> using critical intersectional tools <mark>are making demands</mark> that are often difficult for legal scholars to comprehend because of the ways that they <mark>throw US law</u></strong></mark> and the nation-state form <u><strong><mark>into crisis</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Because they recognize</u></strong> the fact <u><strong>that legal equality</u></strong> <u><strong>contains and neutralizes resistance and perpetuates intersectional violence and <mark>because they identify purportedly neutral</mark> administrative <mark>systems as key vectors of</mark> that <mark>violence</u></strong></mark>, critical scholars and activists are making demands that include ending immigration enforcement and abolishing policing and prisons. These demands suggest that the technologies of gendered racialization that form the nation cannot be reformed into fair and neutral systems. These systems are technologies of racialized-gendered population control that cannot operate otherwise—they are built to extinguish perceived threats and drains in order to protect and enhance the livelihood of the national population. <u><strong><mark>These</mark> kinds of demands and the <mark>analysis</mark> they represent</strong> <strong><mark>produce a different relation to law reform strategies than the</mark> national <mark>narrative about law reform</u></strong></mark> suggests, <u><strong>and</u></strong> different than what is often assumed by legal scholars interested in the field of “<u><strong>equality</u></strong> law.” Because <u><strong>legal equality “victories” are being exposed as primarily symbolic declarations</u></strong> that stabilize the status quo of <u><strong>violence</u></strong>, declarations from courts or legislatures become undesirable goals. <u><strong>Instead, law <mark>reform</mark>, in this view, might be <mark>used as a tactic of transformation focused on interventions that</mark> materially <mark>reduce violence</mark> or maldistribution <mark>without </mark>inadvertently <mark>expanding harmful systems</mark> in the name of reform. One recent example is the <mark>campaign against gang injunctions in Oakland</u></strong></mark>, California. A broad coalition—comprising organizations focused on police violence, economic justice, imprisonment, youth development, immigration, gentrification, and violence against queer and trans people—<u><mark>succeeded</u></mark> in recent years in bringing significant attention to the efforts of John Russo, Oakland’s city attorney, to introduce gang injunctions (Critical Resistance 2011). The organizations in this coalition are prioritizing anticriminalization work that might usually be cast as irrelevant or marginal to organizations focused on the single axis of women’s or LGBT equality. The campaign has a law reform target in that it seeks to prevent the enactment of certain law enforcement mechanisms that are harmful to vulnerable communities. However, it is not a legal-equality campaign. Rather than aiming to change a law or policy that explicitly excludes a category of people, it aims to expose the fact that a facially neutral policy is administered in a racially targeted manner (Davis 2011; Stop the Injunctions 2011).</p><p><u>Furthermore, <mark>the coalition frames it</mark>s campaign <mark>within a <strong>larger set of demands not limited to</mark> what can be won within <mark>the current structure of American law</mark> but focused on population-level conditions of maldistribution.</u> <u></strong>The demands</u><strong> </strong>of the coalition<strong> <u></strong>include stopping all gang injunctions and police violence; putting resources toward <mark>reentry support</mark> and services for people returning from prison, including <mark>fully funded</mark> and immediate access to <mark>identity documents, housing, job training</mark>, drug and alcohol treatment, and education; banning employers from asking about prior convictions on job applications; <mark>ending curfews</mark> for people on parole and probation; <mark>repealing California’s three-strikes law</mark>; reallocating funds from prison construction to education; <mark>ending all collaborations between</mark> Oakland’s <mark>government and</u></mark> Immigration and Customs Enforcement (<u><mark>ICE</u></mark>); </p>

Underview

./documents/hsld19/CarnegieVanguard/Bu/Carnegie%20Vanguard-Burudgunte-Aff-UH-Round4.docx

A

UH

4

Cypress Ranch MZ

Eric Schwerdtfeger

AC - NoKo NC - T Plural Discourse K China DA Politics DA Determinism NC 1AR - All 2NR - T 2AR - T

hsld19/CarnegieVanguard/Bu/Carnegie%20Vanguard-Burudgunte-Aff-UH-Round4.docx

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War turns structural violence and causes deaths

Bulloch 8

Bulloch 8 Millennium - Journal of International Studies May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595 Douglas Bulloch, IR Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, He is currently completing his PhD in International Relations at the London School of Economics, during which time he spent a year editing Millennium: Journal of International Studies

the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate poverty. it rarely suffers any examination that war causes poverty is an obvious truth, but the opposite is quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business even asymmetrically. the problem of peace and war the Peace Prize itself has simply become Western liberal wish-fulfilment It is comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

that war causes poverty is an obvious truth, but the opposite is hard to believe. War is expensive It is comforting to believe that poverty causes violence to endorse all problems as economic rather than political

But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

<h4>War turns structural violence and causes deaths</h4><p><strong>Bulloch 8</strong> Millennium - Journal of International Studies May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595 Douglas Bulloch, IR Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, He is currently completing his PhD in International Relations at the London School of Economics, during which time he spent a year editing Millennium: Journal of International Studies<u> </p><p></u> But <u>the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are</u> – in and of themselves – <u>unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate</u> the injustice that inspires conflict, namely <u>poverty. </u>However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that <u><strong>it rarely suffers any examination</u></strong>. To suggest <u><mark>that war causes poverty</u> <u>is</u></mark> to utter <u><strong><mark>an obvious truth,</u></strong> <u>but</u> </mark>to suggest <u><mark>the opposite is</u></mark> – on reflection – <u>quite <strong><mark>hard to believe. War is</strong></mark> an <mark>expensive</mark> business</u> in the twenty-first century, <u>even asymmetrically.</u> And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving <u>the problem of peace and war </u>in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which <u>the Peace Prize itself has simply become</u> an award that reflects a degree of <u>Western liberal wish-fulfilment</u>. <u><mark>It is</u></mark> perhaps <u><mark>comforting to believe that <strong>poverty causes violence</mark>,</u></strong> <u>as it serves <mark>to endorse</u></mark> a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards <u><mark>all problems as</mark> fundamentally <mark>economic rather than</mark> deeply – and potentially radically – <mark>political</mark>. </p></u>

GMU KL – Harvard Rd 7 – Neg vs Emory FH

1NR

O/V

./documents/ndtceda14/GeorgeMason/KwLa/George%20Mason-Kwon-Lastovica-Neg-Harvard-Round7.docx

N

Harvard

7

Emory FH

Layne Kirshon

1NC T - Spec CP - Presumed Consent CP - Courts Midterms DA Public Health DA Case Block2NR CP - Presumed Consent Midterms DA Case

ndtceda14/GeorgeMason/KwLa/George%20Mason-Kwon-Lastovica-Neg-Harvard-Round7.docx

KwLa

George Mason KwLa

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

‘Restriction’ requires a cap---the plan must mandate a ceiling on private sector emissions

Supreme Court of Florida 1917

Supreme Court of Florida 1917 (Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. State, 73 Fla. 609, Lexis)

The word restriction is defined by the best lexicographers to mean limitation, confinement within bounds The word regulation has a different signification

The word restriction is defined by the best lexicographers to mean limitation confinement within bounds regulation has a different signification

There would seem to be no occasion to discuss whether or not the Railroad Commissioners had the power and authority to make the order, requiring the three specified railroads running into the City of Tampa to erect a union passenger station in such city, which is set out in the declaration in the instant case and which we have copied above. It is sufficient to say that under the reasoning and the authorities cited in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 67 Fla. 441, 458, 63 South. Rep. 729, 65 South. Rep. 654, and State v. Jacksonville Terminal [631] Co., supra, it would seem that HN14 the Commissioners had power and authority. The point which we are required to determine is whether or not the Commissioners were given the authority to impose the fine or penalty upon the three railroads for the recovery of which this action is brought. In order to decide this question we must examine Section 2908 of the General Statutes of 1906, which we have copied above, in the light of the authorities which we have cited and from some of which we have quoted. It will be observed that the declaration alleges that the penalty imposed upon the three railroads was for the violation of what is designated as "Order No. 282," which is set out and which required such railroads to erect and complete a union depot at Tampa within a certain specified time. If the Commissioners had the authority to make such order, it necessarily follows that they could enforce a compliance with the same by appropriate proceedings in the courts, but it does not necessarily follow that they had the power and authority to penalize the roads for a failure to comply therewith. That is a different matter. HN15 Section 2908 of the General Statutes of 1906, which originally formed Section 12 of Chapter 4700 of the Laws of Florida, (Acts of 1899, p. 86), expressly authorizes the imposition of a penalty by the Commissioners upon "any railroad, railroad company or other common carrier doing business in this State," for "a violation or disregard of any rate, schedule, rule or regulation, provided or prescribed by said commission," or for failure "to make any report required to be made under the provisions of this Chapter," or for the violation of "any provision of this Chapter." It will be observed that the word "Order" is not mentioned in such section. Are the other words used therein sufficiently comprehensive to embrace an order made by the Commissioners, such as the one now under consideration? [632] It could not successfully be contended, nor is such contention attempted, that this order is covered by or embraced within the words "rate," "schedule" or "any report,' therefore we may dismiss these terms from our consideration and direct our attention to the words "rule or regulation." As is frankly stated in the brief filed by the defendant in error: "It is admitted that an order for the erection of a depot is not a 'rate' or 'schedule' and if it is not a 'rule' or 'regulation' then there is no power in the Commissioners to enforce it by the imposition of a penalty." It is earnestly insisted that the words "rule or regulation" are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace such an order and to authorize the penalty imposed, and in support of this contention the following authorities are cited: Black's Law Dictionary, defining regulation and order; Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Dictionary, defining rule; Abbott's Law Dictionary, defining rule; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, defining order and rule of court; Webster's New International Dictionary, defining regulation; Curry v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 411, text 515; In re Leasing of State Lands, 18 Colo. 359, 32 Pac. Rep. 986; Betts v. Commissioners of the Land Office, 27 Okl. 64, 110 Pac. Rep. 766; Carter V. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co., 124 Mo. App. 530, 102 S.W. Rep. 6, text 9; 34 Cyc. 1031. We have examined all of these authorities, as well as those cited by the plaintiffs in error and a number of others, but shall not undertake an analysis and discussion of all of them. While it is undoubtedly true that the words, rule, regulation and order are frequently used as synonyms, as the dictionaries, both English and law, and the dictionaries of synonyms, such as Soule's show, it does not follow that these words always mean the same thing or are interchangeable at will. It is well known that the same word used in different contexts may mean a different thing by virtue of the coloring which the word [633] takes on both from what precedes it in the context and what follows after. Thus in discussing the proper constructions to be placed upon the words "restrictions and regulations" as used in the Constitution of this State, then in force, Chap. 4, Sec. 2, No. 1, of Thompson's Digest, page 50, this court in Curry v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 411, text 415, which case is cited to us and relied upon by both the parties litigant, makes the following statement: "The word restriction is defined by the best lexicographers to mean limitation, confinement within bounds, and would seem, as used in the constitution, to apply to the amount and to the time within which an appeal might to be taken, or a writ of error sued out. The word regulation has a different signification -- it means method, and is defined by Webster in his Dictionary, folio 31, page 929, to be 'a rule or order prescribed by a superior for the management of some business, or for the government of a company or society.' This more properly perhaps applies to the mode and form of proceeding in taking and prosecuting appeals and writs of error. By the use of both of those terms, we think that something more was intended than merely regulating the mode and form of proceedings in such cases." Thus, in Carter v. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co., 124 Mo. App. 530, text 538, 102 S.W. Rep. 6, text 9, it is said, "The definition of a rule or order, which are synonymous terms, include commands to lower courts or court officials to do ministerial acts." In support of this proposition is cited 24 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law 1016, which is evidently an erroneous citation, whether the first or second edition is meant. See the definition of regulate and rule, 24 amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2nd Ed.) pages 243 to 246 and 1010, and it will be seen that the two words are not always synonymous, much necessarily depending upon the context and the sense in which the words are used. Also see the discussion [634] of the word regulation in 34 Cyc. 1031. We would call especial attention to Morris v. Board of Pilot Commissioners, 7 Del. chan. 136, 30 Atl. Rep. 667, text 669, wherein the following statement is made by the court: "These words 'rule' and the 'order,' when used in a statute, have a definite signification. They are different in their nature and extent. A rule, to be valid, must be general in its scope, and undiscriminating in its application; an order is specific and not limited in its application. The function of an order relates more particularly to the execution or enforcement of a rule previously made." Also see 7 Words & Phrases 6271 and 6272, and 4 Words & Phrases (2nd Ser.) 419, 420. As we held in City of Los Angeles v. Gager, 10 Cal. App. 378, 102 Pac. Rep. 17, "The meaning of the word 'rules' is of wide and varied significance, depending upon the context; in a legal sense it is synonymous with 'laws.'" If Section 2908 had contained the word order, or had authorized the Commissioners to impose a penalty for the violation of any order made by them, there would be no room for construction. The Georgia statute, Acts of 1905, p. 120, generally known as the "Steed Bill," entitled "An act to further extend the powers of the Railroad Commission of this State, and to confer upon the commission the power to regulate the time and manner within which the several railroads in this State shall receive, receipt for, forward and deliver to its destination all freight of every character, which may be tendered or received by them for transportation; to provide a penalty for non-compliance with any and all reasonable rules, regulations and orders prescribed by the said commission in the execution of these powers, and for other purposes," expressly authorized the Railroad Commissioners "to provide a penalty for non-compliance with any and all reasonable rules, regulations and orders prescribed by the said Commision." [635] See Pennington v. Douglas, A. & G. Ry. Co., 3 Ga. App. 665, 60 S.E. Rep. 485, which we cited with approval in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 fla. 617, text 651, 47 South. Rep. 969, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639. Under the reasoning in the cited authorities, especially State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, and Morris v. Board of Pilot Commissioners, we are constrained to hold that the fourth and eighth grounds of the demurrer are well founded and that HN16 the Railroad Commissioners were not empowered or authorized to impose a penalty upon the three railroads for failure to comply with the order for the erection of a union depot.

<h4> ‘Restriction’ requires a <u>cap</u>---the plan must mandate a <u>ceiling</u> on private sector emissions</h4><p><strong>Supreme Court of Florida 1917</strong> (Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. State, 73 Fla. 609, Lexis)</p><p>There would seem to be no occasion to discuss whether or not the Railroad Commissioners had the power and authority to make the order, requiring the three specified railroads running into the City of Tampa to erect a union passenger station in such city, which is set out in the declaration in the instant case and which we have copied above. It is sufficient to say that under the reasoning and the authorities cited in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 67 Fla. 441, 458, 63 South. Rep. 729, 65 South. Rep. 654, and State v. Jacksonville Terminal [631] Co., supra, it would seem that HN14 the Commissioners had power and authority. The point which we are required to determine is whether or not the Commissioners were given the authority to impose the fine or penalty upon the three railroads for the recovery of which this action is brought. In order to decide this question we must examine Section 2908 of the General Statutes of 1906, which we have copied above, in the light of the authorities which we have cited and from some of which we have quoted. It will be observed that the declaration alleges that the penalty imposed upon the three railroads was for the violation of what is designated as "Order No. 282," which is set out and which required such railroads to erect and complete a union depot at Tampa within a certain specified time. If the Commissioners had the authority to make such order, it necessarily follows that they could enforce a compliance with the same by appropriate proceedings in the courts, but it does not necessarily follow that they had the power and authority to penalize the roads for a failure to comply therewith. That is a different matter. HN15 Section 2908 of the General Statutes of 1906, which originally formed Section 12 of Chapter 4700 of the Laws of Florida, (Acts of 1899, p. 86), expressly authorizes the imposition of a penalty by the Commissioners upon "any railroad, railroad company or other common carrier doing business in this State," for "a violation or disregard of any rate, schedule, rule or regulation, provided or prescribed by said commission," or for failure "to make any report required to be made under the provisions of this Chapter," or for the violation of "any provision of this Chapter." It will be observed that the word "Order" is not mentioned in such section. Are the other words used therein sufficiently comprehensive to embrace an order made by the Commissioners, such as the one now under consideration? [632] It could not successfully be contended, nor is such contention attempted, that this order is covered by or embraced within the words "rate," "schedule" or "any report,' therefore we may dismiss these terms from our consideration and direct our attention to the words "rule or regulation." As is frankly stated in the brief filed by the defendant in error: "It is admitted that an order for the erection of a depot is not a 'rate' or 'schedule' and if it is not a 'rule' or 'regulation' then there is no power in the Commissioners to enforce it by the imposition of a penalty." It is earnestly insisted that the words "rule or regulation" are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace such an order and to authorize the penalty imposed, and in support of this contention the following authorities are cited: Black's Law Dictionary, defining regulation and order; Rapalje & Lawrence's Law Dictionary, defining rule; Abbott's Law Dictionary, defining rule; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, defining order and rule of court; Webster's New International Dictionary, defining regulation; Curry v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 411, text 515; In re Leasing of State Lands, 18 Colo. 359, 32 Pac. Rep. 986; Betts v. Commissioners of the Land Office, 27 Okl. 64, 110 Pac. Rep. 766; Carter V. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co., 124 Mo. App. 530, 102 S.W. Rep. 6, text 9; 34 Cyc. 1031. We have examined all of these authorities, as well as those cited by the plaintiffs in error and a number of others, but shall not undertake an analysis and discussion of all of them. While it is undoubtedly true that the words, rule, regulation and order are frequently used as synonyms, as the dictionaries, both English and law, and the dictionaries of synonyms, such as Soule's show, it does not follow that these words always mean the same thing or are interchangeable at will. It is well known that the same word used in different contexts may mean a different thing by virtue of the coloring which the word [633] takes on both from what precedes it in the context and what follows after. Thus in discussing the proper constructions to be placed upon the words "restrictions and regulations" as used in the Constitution of this State, then in force, Chap. 4, Sec. 2, No. 1, of Thompson's Digest, page 50, this court in Curry v. Marvin, 2 Fla. 411, text 415, which case is cited to us and relied upon by both the parties litigant, makes the following statement: "<u><mark>The word restriction is defined by the best</mark> <mark>lexicographers to mean</mark> <mark>limitation</mark>, <strong><mark>confinement within bounds</u></strong></mark>, and would seem, as used in the constitution, to apply to the amount and to the time within which an appeal might to be taken, or a writ of error sued out. <u>The word <mark>regulation has a</mark> <mark>different signification</u></mark> -- it means method, and is defined by Webster in his Dictionary, folio 31, page 929, to be 'a rule or order prescribed by a superior for the management of some business, or for the government of a company or society.' This more properly perhaps applies to the mode and form of proceeding in taking and prosecuting appeals and writs of error. By the use of both of those terms, we think that something more was intended than merely regulating the mode and form of proceedings in such cases." Thus, in Carter v. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co., 124 Mo. App. 530, text 538, 102 S.W. Rep. 6, text 9, it is said, "The definition of a rule or order, which are synonymous terms, include commands to lower courts or court officials to do ministerial acts." In support of this proposition is cited 24 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law 1016, which is evidently an erroneous citation, whether the first or second edition is meant. See the definition of regulate and rule, 24 amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2nd Ed.) pages 243 to 246 and 1010, and it will be seen that the two words are not always synonymous, much necessarily depending upon the context and the sense in which the words are used. Also see the discussion [634] of the word regulation in 34 Cyc. 1031. We would call especial attention to Morris v. Board of Pilot Commissioners, 7 Del. chan. 136, 30 Atl. Rep. 667, text 669, wherein the following statement is made by the court: "These words 'rule' and the 'order,' when used in a statute, have a definite signification. They are different in their nature and extent. A rule, to be valid, must be general in its scope, and undiscriminating in its application; an order is specific and not limited in its application. The function of an order relates more particularly to the execution or enforcement of a rule previously made." Also see 7 Words & Phrases 6271 and 6272, and 4 Words & Phrases (2nd Ser.) 419, 420. As we held in City of Los Angeles v. Gager, 10 Cal. App. 378, 102 Pac. Rep. 17, "The meaning of the word 'rules' is of wide and varied significance, depending upon the context; in a legal sense it is synonymous with 'laws.'" If Section 2908 had contained the word order, or had authorized the Commissioners to impose a penalty for the violation of any order made by them, there would be no room for construction. The Georgia statute, Acts of 1905, p. 120, generally known as the "Steed Bill," entitled "An act to further extend the powers of the Railroad Commission of this State, and to confer upon the commission the power to regulate the time and manner within which the several railroads in this State shall receive, receipt for, forward and deliver to its destination all freight of every character, which may be tendered or received by them for transportation; to provide a penalty for non-compliance with any and all reasonable rules, regulations and orders prescribed by the said commission in the execution of these powers, and for other purposes," expressly authorized the Railroad Commissioners "to provide a penalty for non-compliance with any and all reasonable rules, regulations and orders prescribed by the said Commision." [635] See Pennington v. Douglas, A. & G. Ry. Co., 3 Ga. App. 665, 60 S.E. Rep. 485, which we cited with approval in State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 fla. 617, text 651, 47 South. Rep. 969, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639. Under the reasoning in the cited authorities, especially State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, and Morris v. Board of Pilot Commissioners, we are constrained to hold that the fourth and eighth grounds of the demurrer are well founded and that HN16 the Railroad Commissioners were not empowered or authorized to impose a penalty upon the three railroads for failure to comply with the order for the erection of a union depot.</p>

1NC

2

1NC - Resource Wars

./documents/ndtceda16/MissouriState/EvMo/Missouri%20State-Evans-Morrison-Aff-UNT-Round6.docx

A

UNT

6

Kansas ST

Abraha, Danny

1AC Carbon Tax (Heg Econ) 1NC T-Restrict Oil DA Politics States 2NR went for T

ndtceda16/MissouriState/EvMo/Missouri%20State-Evans-Morrison-Aff-UNT-Round6.docx

EvMo

Missouri State EvMo

Ky.....

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MissouriState

Missouri State

ndtceda16

NDT/CEDA 2016-17

cx

college

No US/China war – relatively high relations/low hostility, trade networks, cooperation on mutual issues, peaceful military postures, lack of public support for conflict and empirics – answers miscalc and accidental war

Heath 17 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-lead-war-20411?page=2

Heath 17 ---- Timothy, senior international defense researcher (RAND Corporation), former senior analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group, M.A. in Asian studies (George Washington University), B.A. in philosophy (College of William and Mary), Ph.D. candidate in Political Science (George Mason University), written with William R. Thompson who is a Professor of Political Science (Indiana University), “U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War,” National Interest, 4/30, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-lead-war-20411?page=2

Allison explores how misperceptions and dysfunction could accelerate crisis into war the article neglects key political and geostrategic conditions Without conditions in place risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate becomes far lower U.S.-China relations may trend to tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make accidental war extremely unlikely Allison fails to persuade because he fails to specify political and strategic conditions that make war plausible Allison implies U S and China are in a situation analogous to the Cold War By contrast U.S.-China relations operate at a much lower level of hostility and threat China and U S may be experiencing tensions but the two remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined U.S.-Soviet relations Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy rivals they view each other as important trade partners and partners on shared concerns such as Korea, as the recent summit between Trump and Xi illustrated behavior of militaries underscores relatively restrained rivalry military competition operates at a far lower level than arms racing that typified the Soviet standoff. And U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight Moreover, polls show people regard each other with mixed views a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by U.S. and Soviet publics Lacking preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders have less incentive to misjudge crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation To the contrary leaders and bureaucracies face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation This inclination manifested itself in the airplane collision in 2001, and incidents involving ships and aircraft in 2009

relations may trend to tension, but relative stability make accidental war extremely unlikely China and U S remain far from the bitter rivalry that defined Soviet relations they view each other as trade partners behavior of militaries underscores restrained rivalry Lacking preparations and a constituency leaders have less incentive to misjudge situations To the contrary leaders face strong incentive to defus crises

Graham Allison's April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the key political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war becomes far lower. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the relative stability and overall low level of hostility make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war extremely unlikely. In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous. However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison’s analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis. By contrast, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a much lower level of hostility and threat. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, but the two countries remain far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today’s rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view each other as important trade partners and partners on some shared concerns, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the relatively restrained rivalry. The military competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a far lower level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars. Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views—a considerable contrast from the hostile sentiment expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. Lacking both preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have less incentive to misjudge crisis situations in favor of unwarranted escalation. To the contrary, political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a strong incentive to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that avoids unwanted escalation. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk of conflict.

<h4>No US/China war – relatively high relations/low hostility, trade networks, cooperation on mutual issues, peaceful military postures, lack of public support for conflict and empirics – answers miscalc and accidental war</h4><p><strong>Heath 17</strong> ---- Timothy, senior international defense researcher (RAND Corporation), former senior analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group, M.A. in Asian studies (George Washington University), B.A. in philosophy (College of William and Mary), Ph.D. candidate in Political Science (George Mason University), written with William R. Thompson who is a Professor of Political Science (Indiana University), “U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War,” National Interest, 4/30, <strong>http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-lead-war-20411?page=2</p><p></strong>Graham <u>Allison</u>'s April 12 article, “How America and China Could Stumble to War,” <u>explores how misperceptions and</u> bureaucratic <u>dysfunction could accelerate</u> a militarized <u>crisis</u> involving the United States and China <u>into</u> an unwanted <u>war</u>. However, <u>the article</u> fails to persuade because it <u>neglects</u> the <u><strong>key</u></strong> <u>political and geostrategic conditions</u> that make war plausible in the first place. <u>Without</u> those <u>conditions in place</u>, the <u>risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate</u> into war <u><strong>becomes far lower</u></strong>. The <u>U.S.-China</u> <u><mark>relations</u></mark>hip today <u><mark>may</u></mark> be <u><mark>trend</u></mark>ing <u><mark>to</u></mark>wards greater <u><mark>tension, but</mark> the</u> <u><strong><mark>relative stability</u></strong> <u></mark>and overall</u> <u><strong>low level of hostility</u></strong> <u><mark>make</u></mark> the prospect of an <u><mark>accidental</u></mark> escalation to <u><mark>war</u> <u><strong>extremely unlikely</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison’s article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, “the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict.” This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison’s groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous.</p><p>However, <u>Allison</u> ultimately <u>fails to persuade because he fails to specify</u> the <u>political and strategic conditions that make war</u> <u>plausible</u> in the first place. <u>Allison</u>’s analysis <u>implies</u> that the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>and China are in a situation analogous to</u> that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In <u>the Cold War</u> example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis.</p><p><u><strong>By contrast</u></strong>, the <u>U.S.-China relations</u>hip today <u>operate</u>s <u>at a <strong>much lower level of hostility and threat</u></strong>. <u><mark>China and</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u>may be experiencing</u> an increase in <u>tensions</u>, <u><strong>but</u></strong> <u>the two</u> countries <u><mark>remain</u> <u><strong>far from the bitter</mark>, acrimonious <mark>rivalry</u></strong> <u>that defined</mark> </u>the <u>U.S.-<mark>Soviet</mark> <mark>relations</u></mark>hip in the early 1960s. <u>Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy</u>. Today’s <u>rivals</u> may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but <u><mark>they</u></mark> also <u><mark>view each other as</mark> important</u> <u><strong><mark>trade partners</u></strong> <u></mark>and</u> <u>partners on</u> some <u><strong>shared concerns</u></strong>, <u>such as</u> North <u>Korea, as the recent summit between</u> President Donald <u>Trump and</u> Chinese president <u>Xi</u> Jinping <u>illustrated</u>. The <u><mark>behavior of</u></mark> their respective <u><mark>militaries</mark> <mark>underscores</u></mark> the <u><strong>relatively <mark>restrained</u></strong> <u>rivalry</u></mark>. The <u>military competition</u> between China and the United States may be growing, but it <u>operates at a <strong>far lower</u></strong> <u>level</u> of intensity <u>than</u> the relentless <u>arms racing that typified the</u> U.S.-<u>Soviet standoff. And</u> unlike their Cold War counterparts, <u>U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight</u> each other in major wars. <u>Moreover, polls show</u> that the <u>people</u> of the two countries <u>regard each other with mixed views</u>—<u>a</u> <u><strong>considerable contrast</u></strong> <u>from the hostile sentiment expressed by</u> the <u>U.S. and Soviet publics</u> for each other. <u><strong><mark>Lacking</u></strong></mark> both <u><mark>preparations</mark> for major war <mark>and a constituency </mark>for conflict, <mark>leaders</u></mark> and bureaucracies in both countries <u><mark>have</u> <u><strong>less incentive</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>misjudge</mark> crisis <mark>situations</u></strong></mark> <u>in favor of <strong>unwarranted</strong> escalation</u>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>To the contrary</u></strong></mark>, political <u><mark>leaders</mark> and bureaucracies</u> currently <u><mark>face </mark>a</u> <u><strong><mark>strong incentive</u></strong> <u>to </mark>find ways of <mark>defus</mark>ing <mark>crises</mark> in a manner</u> <u>that</u> <u><strong>avoids unwanted escalation</u></strong>. <u>This inclination manifested itself in the</u> EP-3 <u>airplane collision</u> off Hainan Island <u>in 2001, and</u> in subsequent <u>incidents involving</u> U.S. and Chinese <u>ships and aircraft</u>, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable <u>in 200<strong>9</u></strong>. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison’s scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one </p><p>featuring an elevated risk of conflict.</p>

1NC

Crisis Stability

A2: China/US War---1NC

./documents/ndtceda18/MichiganState/BrPe/Michigan%20State-Brown-Pepper-Neg-Indiana-Round3.docx

N

Indiana

3

Kentucky SW

Ari Hoffman

1AC - NFU 1NC - 2020 ESR Debt DA ICJ CP Death K 2NR - ESR 2020

ndtceda18/MichiganState/BrPe/Michigan%20State-Brown-Pepper-Neg-Indiana-Round3.docx

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Michigan State BrPe

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Michigan State

ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

“Resolved” means certain

Collins 3 Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003

Collins 3 Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003

resolve fixed in purpose or intention; determined

resolved fixed in purpose determined

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/resolved resolved [rɪˈzɒlvd] adj fixed in purpose or intention; determined

<h4><strong>“Resolved” means certain </h4><p><u>Collins 3 Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003</p><p></u></strong>http://www.thefreedictionary.com/resolved <u><strong><mark>resolve</u></strong>d</mark> [rɪˈzɒlvd] adj <u><strong><mark>fixed in purpose</mark> or intention; <mark>determined</p></u></strong></mark>

1NC

2

./documents/hsld22/HarvardWestlake/LiSt/HarvardWestlake-LiSt-Neg-37th-Annual-Stanford-Invitational-Round-6.docx

N

37th Annual Stanford Invitational

6

Millard North NL

Fleming

1ac -- hukou 1nc -- t countries, consult the people 1ar -- all 2nr -- t 2ar -- t

hsld22/HarvardWestlake/LiSt/HarvardWestlake-LiSt-Neg-37th-Annual-Stanford-Invitational-Round-6.docx

2023-02-27 16:31:25

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Harvard Westlake LiSt

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Harvard Westlake

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

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Warming causes extinction – a confluence of nonlinear and unpredictable effects will make human and natural systems inhospitable while increasing escalatory conflicts – even if the impacts are far off, only drastic action now solves

Melton 19

Melton 19 [Michelle Melton is a 3L at Harvard Law School. Before law school, she was an associate fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she focused on climate policy. Climate Change and National Security, Part II: How Big a Threat is the Climate? January 7, 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-ii-how-big-threat-climate]

climate change will remain a creeping threat that will exacerbate and amplify existing, structural global inequalities climate change will exacerbate humanitarian crises some of which will result in the deployment of military personnel It will aggravate resource constraints contributing to conflict over water, food and energy if emissions continue to creep upward threats could be existential The question for the next hundred years is not can the global order, premised on the nation-state system, itself based on territorial sovereignty, survive in a world in which substantial swathes of territory are potentially uninhabitable Even small differences in global average temperatures result in significant environmental changes, with attendant social, economic and political consequences climate change will wreak increasing havoc on human and natural systems with profound consequences for national security changes in temperature, the hydrological cycle and the ranges of insects will impact food availability and food access in much of the world, increasing food insecurity Storms, flooding, changes in ocean pH and other climate-linked changes will damage infrastructure and negatively impact labor productivity and economic growth Vector-borne diseases will also become more prevalent as climate change will expand the geographic range and intensity of transmission of diseases like malaria, West Nile, Zika and dengue fever, and cholera Rising public health challenges, economic devastation and food insecurity will translate into an increased demand for humanitarian assistance provided by the military, increased migration and geopolitical conflict food insecurity, economic losses and public health crises, combined with weak and ineffectual governance, could precipitate future conflicts changes to the climate could fundamentally reshape geopolitics there will 70 percent decline in wheat production in Central America and the Caribbean 75 percent of the land area in the Middle East 50 percent in South Asia will be affected by highly unusual heat, and sea level rise could displace and imperil the lives hundreds of millions of people even higher levels of warming are physically possible within this century some regions of the world would be literally uninhabitable to say nothing of the consequences of sea-level rise for economically important cities such as Amsterdam and New York Even if newly warmed regions of the far north could theoretically accommodate the resulting migrants, this presumes that the political response to this unprecedented global displacement would be orderly and conflict-free borders on fantasy more challenging for national security is the possibility that the until-now linear changes give way to abrupt and irreversible ones at higher levels of warming humanity could trigger catastrophic, abrupt and unavoidable consequences to the ecosystem The IPCC has considered nine such abrupt changes one example is the shutting down of the Indian summer monsoon Over a billion people are dependent upon the Indian monsoon which provides parts of South Asia with about 80 percent of its annual rainfall the Defense Department contractor highlighted the increased risk of inter- and intra-state conflict over natural resources and immigration while the head-turning national security impacts of climate change are probably several decades away, the nature of the threat is such that waiting until these changes manifest is not a viable option By the time the climate consequences are severe enough to compel action, there is likely to be little that can be done on human timescales to undo the changes to environmental systems and the human societies dependent upon them.

climate change will amplify humanitarian crises which result in deployment of military personnel It will aggravate conflict over water, food and energy The question is can the global order survive Even small differences in temperatures result in significant changes with social economic and political consequences changes in temperature hydrological cycle and ranges of insects will impact food availability Storms flooding changes in ocean pH will damage infrastructure labor productivity and growth diseases will be prevalent challenges will translate into migration and geopolitical conflict 70 percent decline in wheat in Central America and 75 percent of land area in Mid East sea level rise could displace hundreds of millions linear changes give way to abrupt irreversible ones humanity could trigger catastrophic abrupt and unavoidable consequences one example waiting until these changes manifest is not viable By the time consequences are severe enough there is little that can be done to undo changes to environmental systems and human societies dependent upon them

At least until 2050, and possibly for decades after, climate change will remain a creeping threat that will exacerbate and amplify existing, structural global inequalities. While the developed world will be negatively affected by climate change through 2050, the consequences of climate change will be felt most acutely in the developing world. The national security threats posed by climate change to 2050 are likely to differ in degree, not kind, from the kinds of threats already posed by climate change. For the next few decades, climate change will exacerbate humanitarian crises—some of which will result in the deployment of military personnel, as well as material and financial assistance. It will also aggravate natural resource constraints, potentially contributing to political and economic conflict over water, food and energy. The question for the next 30 years is not “can humanity survive as a species with 1.5°C or 2°C of warming,” but, “how much will the existing disparities between the developed and developing world widen, and how long (and how successfully) can these widening political/economic disparities be sustained?” The urgency of the climate threat in the next few decades will depend, to a large degree, on whether and how much the U.S. government perceives a widening of these global inequities as a threat to U.S. national security. By contrast, if emissions continue to creep upward (or if they do not decline rapidly), by 2100 climate-related national security threats could be existential. The question for the next hundred years is not, “are disparities politically and economically manageable?” but, “can the global order, premised on the nation-state system, itself based on territorial sovereignty, survive in a world in which substantial swathes of territory are potentially uninhabitable?” National Security Consequences of Climate Change to 2050 Scientists can predict the consequences of climate change to 2050 with some measure of certainty. (Beyond that date, the pace and magnitude of climate change—and therefore, the national security threat posed by it—depend heavily on the level of emissions in the coming years, as I have explained.) There is relative agreement across modeled climate scenarios that the world will likely warm, on average, at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by about 2050—but perhaps as soon as 2030. This level of warming is likely to occur even if the world succeeds in dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as even the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report implicitly admits. In other words, a certain amount of additional warming—at least 1.5°C, and probably more than that—is presumptively unavoidable. Looking ahead to 2050, it can be said with relative confidence that the national security consequences of climate change will vary in degree, not in kind, from the national security threats already facing the United States. This is hardly good news. Even small differences in global average temperatures result in significant environmental changes, with attendant social, economic and political consequences. By 2050, climate change will wreak increasing havoc on human and natural systems—predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world—with attenuated but profound consequences for national security. In particular, changes in temperature, the hydrological cycle and the ranges of insects will impact food availability and food access in much of the world, increasing food insecurity. Storms, flooding, changes in ocean pH and other climate-linked changes will damage infrastructure and negatively impact labor productivity and economic growth in much of the world. Vector-borne diseases will also become more prevalent, as climate change will expand the geographic range and intensity of transmission of diseases like malaria, West Nile, Zika and dengue fever, and cholera. Rising public health challenges, economic devastation and food insecurity will translate into an increased demand for humanitarian assistance provided by the military, increased migration—especially from tropical and subtropical regions—and geopolitical conflict. Long-term trends such as declining food security, coupled with short-term events like hurricanes, could sustain unprecedented levels of migration. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe portends the kinds of population movements that will only accelerate in the coming decades: people from Africa, Southwest and South Asia and elsewhere crossing land and water to reach Europe. For the United States, this likely means greater numbers of people seeking entry from both Central America and the Caribbean. Such influxes are not unprecedented, but they are unlikely to abate and could increase in volume over the next few decades, driven in part by climate change-related food insecurity, climate change-related storms and also by economic and political instability. Food insecurity, economic losses and loss of human life are also likely to exacerbate existing political tensions in the developing world, especially in regions with poor governance and/or where the climate is particularly vulnerable to warming (e.g., the Mediterranean basin). While the Arab Spring had many underlying causes, it also coincided with a period of high food prices, which arguably contributed to the protests. In some situations, food insecurity, economic losses and public health crises, combined with weak and ineffectual governance, could precipitate future conflicts of this kind—although it will be difficult to know where and when without more precise local studies of both underlying political dynamics and the regionally-specific impacts of climate change. 2100 and Beyond While the national security impacts of climate change to 2050 are likely to be costly and disruptive for the U.S. military—and devastating for many people around the world—at some point after 2050, if warming continues at its current pace, changes to the climate could fundamentally reshape geopolitics and possibly even the current nation-state basis of the current global order. To be clear, both the ultimate level of warming and its attendant political consequences is highly speculative, for the reasons I explained in my last post. Nonetheless, we do know that the planet is currently on track for at least 3-4°C of warming by 2100. The “known knowns” of higher levels of warming—say, 3°C—are frightening. At that 3°C of warming, for example, scientists project that there will be a nearly 70 percent decline in wheat production in Central America and the Caribbean, 75 percent of the land area in the Middle East and more than 50 percent in South Asia will be affected by highly unusual heat, and sea level rise could displace and imperil the lives hundreds of millions of people, among other consequences. But even higher levels of warming are physically possible within this century. At these levels of warming, some regions of the world would be literally uninhabitable, likely resulting in the depopulation of the tropics, to say nothing of the consequences of sea-level rise for economically important cities such as Amsterdam and New York. Even if newly warmed regions of the far north could theoretically accommodate the resulting migrants, this presumes that the political response to this unprecedented global displacement would be orderly and conflict-free borders on fantasy. The geopolitical consequences of significant levels of warming are severe, but if these changes occur in a linear way, at least there will be time for human systems to adjust. Perhaps more challenging for national security is the possibility that the until-now linear changes give way to abrupt and irreversible ones. Scientists forecast that, at higher levels of warming—precisely what level is speculative—humanity could trigger catastrophic, abrupt and unavoidable consequences to the ecosystem. The IPCC has considered nine such abrupt changes; one example is the potential shutting down of the Indian summer monsoon. Over a billion people are dependent upon the Indian monsoon, which provides parts of South Asia with about 80 percent of its annual rainfall; relatively minor changes in the monsoon in either direction can cause disasters. In 2010, a wetter monsoon led to the catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, which directly affected 20 million people; a drier monsoon in 2002 led to devastating drought. Studies suggest that the Indian summer monsoon has two stable states: wet (i.e., the current state) and dry (characterized by low precipitation over the subcontinent). At some point, if warming continues, the monsoon could abruptly shift into the second, “dry” state, with catastrophic consequences for over a billion people dependent on monsoon-fed agriculture. The IPCC suggests that such a state-shift is “unlikely”—that is, there is a 10 to 33 percent chance that a state-shift will happen in the 21st century—but scientists also have relatively low confidence in their understanding of the underlying mechanisms in this and other large-scale natural systems. The consequences of abrupt, severe warming for national security are obvious in general, if unclear in the specifics. In 2003, the Defense Department asked a contractor to explore such a scenario. The resulting report outlined the offensive and defensive national security strategies countries may adopt if faced with abrupt climate change, and highlighted the increased risk of inter- and intra-state conflict over natural resources and immigration. Although the report may be off in its imagined timeframe (positing abrupt climate change by 2020), the world it conjures is improbable but not outlandish. If the Indian monsoon were to switch to dry state, and a billion people were suddenly without reliable food sources, for example, it is not clear how the Indian government would react, assuming it would survive in its current form. Major wars or low-intensity proxy conflicts seem likely, if not inevitable, in such a scenario. This is not to say that a parade of climate horribles is certain—or even likely—to come to pass. Scientific understanding of the sensitivities in the climate system are far from perfect. It is also possible that emissions will decline more rapidly than anticipated, averting the worst consequences of climate change. But this outcome is far from guaranteed. And even if global emissions decline precipitously, humanity cannot be sure when or whether the planet has crossed a climate tipping point beyond which the incremental nature of the current changes shifts from the current linear, gradual progression to a non-linear and abrupt process. Within the next few decades, the most likely scenario involves manageable, but costly, consequences on infrastructure, food security and natural disasters, which will be borne primarily by the world’s most impoverished citizens and the members of the military who provide them with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But while the head-turning national security impacts of climate change are probably several decades away, the nature of the threat is such that waiting until these changes manifest is not a viable option. By the time the climate consequences are severe enough to compel action, there is likely to be little that can be done on human timescales to undo the changes to environmental systems and the human societies dependent upon them.

<h4>Warming causes <u>extinction</u> – a <u>confluence</u> of <u>nonlinear</u> and <u>unpredictable</u> effects will make human and natural systems inhospitable while increasing <u>escalatory conflicts</u> – even if the impacts are <u>far off</u>, only drastic action <u>now</u> solves</h4><p><strong>Melton 19</strong> [Michelle Melton is a 3L at Harvard Law School. Before law school, she was an associate fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she focused on climate policy. Climate Change and National Security, Part II: How Big a Threat is the Climate? January 7, 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-ii-how-big-threat-climate]</p><p>At least until 2050, and possibly for decades after, <u><mark>climate change will</mark> remain a <strong>creeping threat</strong> that will <strong>exacerbate and <mark>amplify</strong></mark> existing, <strong>structural</strong> global <strong>inequalities</u></strong>. While the developed world will be negatively affected by climate change through 2050, the consequences of climate change will be felt most acutely in the developing world. The national security threats posed by climate change to 2050 are likely to differ in degree, not kind, from the kinds of threats already posed by climate change. For the next few decades, <u>climate change will <strong>exacerbate <mark>humanitarian crises</u></strong></mark>—<u>some of <mark>which</mark> will <mark>result in</mark> the <mark>deployment of <strong>military personnel</u></strong></mark>, as well as material and financial assistance. <u><mark>It will</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>aggravate</u></strong></mark> natural <u><strong>resource constraints</u></strong>, potentially <u>contributing to</u> political and economic <u><strong><mark>conflict</strong> over <strong>water</strong>, <strong>food</strong> and <strong>energy</u></strong></mark>. The question for the next 30 years is not “can humanity survive as a species with 1.5°C or 2°C of warming,” but, “how much will the existing disparities between the developed and developing world widen, and how long (and how successfully) can these widening political/economic disparities be sustained?” The urgency of the climate threat in the next few decades will depend, to a large degree, on whether and how much the U.S. government perceives a widening of these global inequities as a threat to U.S. national security. By contrast, <u>if emissions continue to <strong>creep upward</u></strong> (or if they do not decline rapidly), by 2100 climate-related national security <u>threats could be <strong>existential</u></strong>. <u><mark>The question</mark> for the next hundred years <mark>is</mark> not</u>, “are disparities politically and economically manageable?” but, “<u><mark>can the <strong>global order</strong></mark>, premised on the <strong>nation-state system</strong>, itself based on territorial sovereignty, <strong><mark>survive</strong></mark> in a world in which <strong>substantial swathes of territory</strong> are potentially <strong>uninhabitable</u></strong>?” National Security Consequences of Climate Change to 2050 Scientists can predict the consequences of climate change to 2050 with some measure of certainty. (Beyond that date, the pace and magnitude of climate change—and therefore, the national security threat posed by it—depend heavily on the level of emissions in the coming years, as I have explained.) There is relative agreement across modeled climate scenarios that the world will likely warm, on average, at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by about 2050—but perhaps as soon as 2030. This level of warming is likely to occur even if the world succeeds in dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as even the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report implicitly admits. In other words, a certain amount of additional warming—at least 1.5°C, and probably more than that—is presumptively unavoidable. Looking ahead to 2050, it can be said with relative confidence that the national security consequences of climate change will vary in degree, not in kind, from the national security threats already facing the United States. This is hardly good news. <u><mark>Even <strong>small differences</strong> in</mark> global average <strong><mark>temperatures</strong> result in <strong>significant</mark> environmental <mark>changes</strong></mark>, <mark>with</mark> attendant <strong><mark>social</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>economic</strong> and <strong>political consequences</u></strong></mark>. By 2050, <u>climate change will <strong>wreak increasing havoc</strong> on <strong>human</strong> and <strong>natural systems</u></strong>—predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world—<u>with</u> attenuated but <u><strong>profound consequences</strong> for <strong>national security</u></strong>. In particular, <u><mark>changes in <strong>temperature</strong></mark>, the <strong><mark>hydrological cycle</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> the <strong><mark>ranges of insects</strong> will impact <strong>food availability</strong></mark> and food access in much of the world, increasing food insecurity</u>. <u><strong><mark>Storms</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>flooding</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>changes in ocean pH</strong></mark> and other climate-linked changes <mark>will damage <strong>infrastructure</strong></mark> and negatively impact <strong><mark>labor productivity</strong> and</mark> economic <strong><mark>growth</u></strong></mark> in much of the world. <u>Vector-borne <strong><mark>diseases</strong> will</mark> also <mark>be</mark>come <strong>more <mark>prevalent</u></strong></mark>, <u>as climate change will expand the geographic <strong>range</strong> and <strong>intensity</strong> of <strong>transmission</strong> of diseases like malaria, West Nile, Zika and dengue fever, and cholera</u>. <u>Rising <strong>public health <mark>challenges</strong></mark>, <strong>economic devastation</strong> and <strong>food insecurity</strong> <mark>will translate into</mark> an increased <strong>demand</strong> for <strong>humanitarian assistance</strong> provided by the <strong>military</strong>, increased <strong><mark>migration</u></strong></mark>—especially from tropical and subtropical regions—<u><mark>and <strong>geopolitical conflict</u></strong></mark>. Long-term trends such as declining food security, coupled with short-term events like hurricanes, could sustain unprecedented levels of migration. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe portends the kinds of population movements that will only accelerate in the coming decades: people from Africa, Southwest and South Asia and elsewhere crossing land and water to reach Europe. For the United States, this likely means greater numbers of people seeking entry from both Central America and the Caribbean. Such influxes are not unprecedented, but they are unlikely to abate and could increase in volume over the next few decades, driven in part by climate change-related food insecurity, climate change-related storms and also by economic and political instability. Food insecurity, economic losses and loss of human life are also likely to exacerbate existing political tensions in the developing world, especially in regions with poor governance and/or where the climate is particularly vulnerable to warming (e.g., the Mediterranean basin). While the Arab Spring had many underlying causes, it also coincided with a period of high food prices, which arguably contributed to the protests. In some situations, <u><strong>food insecurity</strong>, <strong>economic losses</strong> and <strong>public health crises</strong>, combined with <strong>weak</strong> and ineffectual <strong>governance</strong>, could <strong>precipitate future conflicts</u></strong> of this kind—although it will be difficult to know where and when without more precise local studies of both underlying political dynamics and the regionally-specific impacts of climate change. 2100 and Beyond While the national security impacts of climate change to 2050 are likely to be costly and disruptive for the U.S. military—and devastating for many people around the world—at some point after 2050, if warming continues at its current pace, <u>changes to the climate could <strong>fundamentally reshape geopolitics</u></strong> and possibly even the current nation-state basis of the current global order. To be clear, both the ultimate level of warming and its attendant political consequences is highly speculative, for the reasons I explained in my last post. Nonetheless, we do know that the planet is currently on track for at least 3-4°C of warming by 2100. The “known knowns” of higher levels of warming—say, 3°C—are frightening. At that 3°C of warming, for example, scientists project that <u>there will</u> be a nearly <u><strong><mark>70 percent decline</strong> in <strong>wheat</strong></mark> production <mark>in <strong>Central America</strong> and</mark> the Caribbean</u>, <u><strong><mark>75 percent</strong> of</mark> the <strong><mark>land area</strong> in</mark> the <strong><mark>Mid</strong></mark>dle <strong><mark>East</u></strong></mark> and more than <u>50 percent in South Asia will be affected by highly unusual heat, and <strong><mark>sea level rise</strong> could <strong>displace</strong></mark> and imperil the lives <strong><mark>hundreds of millions</strong></mark> of people</u>, among other consequences. But <u>even higher levels of warming are physically possible within this century</u>. At these levels of warming, <u>some <strong>regions of the world</strong> would be <strong>literally uninhabitable</u></strong>, likely resulting in the depopulation of the tropics, <u>to say nothing of the consequences of <strong>sea-level rise</strong> for <strong>economically important cities</strong> such as Amsterdam and New York</u>. <u>Even if newly warmed regions of the far north could <strong>theoretically accommodate</strong> the resulting <strong>migrants</strong>, this <strong>presumes</strong> that the <strong>political response</strong> to this unprecedented <strong>global displacement</strong> would be <strong>orderly</strong> and <strong>conflict-free</strong> <strong>borders on fantasy</u></strong>. The geopolitical consequences of significant levels of warming are severe, but if these changes occur in a linear way, at least there will be time for human systems to adjust. Perhaps <u>more challenging for national security is the possibility that the until-now <strong><mark>linear changes give way</strong> to <strong>abrupt</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>irreversible ones</u></strong></mark>. Scientists forecast that, <u>at higher levels of warming</u>—precisely what level is speculative—<u><mark>humanity could trigger <strong>catastrophic</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>abrupt</strong> and <strong>unavoidable consequences</strong></mark> to the <strong>ecosystem</u></strong>. <u>The IPCC has considered <strong>nine</strong> such abrupt changes</u>; <u><mark>one example</mark> is the</u> potential <u><strong>shutting down</strong> of the <strong>Indian summer monsoon</u></strong>. <u>Over a <strong>billion</strong> people are <strong>dependent</strong> upon the Indian monsoon</u>, <u>which provides parts of South Asia with about 80 percent of its annual rainfall</u>; relatively minor changes in the monsoon in either direction can cause disasters. In 2010, a wetter monsoon led to the catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, which directly affected 20 million people; a drier monsoon in 2002 led to devastating drought. Studies suggest that the Indian summer monsoon has two stable states: wet (i.e., the current state) and dry (characterized by low precipitation over the subcontinent). At some point, if warming continues, the monsoon could abruptly shift into the second, “dry” state, with catastrophic consequences for over a billion people dependent on monsoon-fed agriculture. The IPCC suggests that such a state-shift is “unlikely”—that is, there is a 10 to 33 percent chance that a state-shift will happen in the 21st century—but scientists also have relatively low confidence in their understanding of the underlying mechanisms in this and other large-scale natural systems. The consequences of abrupt, severe warming for national security are obvious in general, if unclear in the specifics. In 2003, <u>the Defense Department</u> asked a <u>contractor</u> to explore such a scenario. The resulting report outlined the offensive and defensive national security strategies countries may adopt if faced with abrupt climate change, and <u>highlighted the <strong>increased risk</strong> of inter- and intra-state <strong>conflict</strong> over natural <strong>resources</strong> and <strong>immigration</u></strong>. Although the report may be off in its imagined timeframe (positing abrupt climate change by 2020), the world it conjures is improbable but not outlandish. If the Indian monsoon were to switch to dry state, and a billion people were suddenly without reliable food sources, for example, it is not clear how the Indian government would react, assuming it would survive in its current form. Major wars or low-intensity proxy conflicts seem likely, if not inevitable, in such a scenario. This is not to say that a parade of climate horribles is certain—or even likely—to come to pass. Scientific understanding of the sensitivities in the climate system are far from perfect. It is also possible that emissions will decline more rapidly than anticipated, averting the worst consequences of climate change. But this outcome is far from guaranteed. And even if global emissions decline precipitously, humanity cannot be sure when or whether the planet has crossed a climate tipping point beyond which the incremental nature of the current changes shifts from the current linear, gradual progression to a non-linear and abrupt process. Within the next few decades, the most likely scenario involves manageable, but costly, consequences on infrastructure, food security and natural disasters, which will be borne primarily by the world’s most impoverished citizens and the members of the military who provide them with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But <u><strong>while</strong> the head-turning national security <strong>impacts</strong> of climate change are <strong>probably</strong> several <strong>decades away</strong>, the <strong>nature of the threat</strong> is such that <strong><mark>waiting until</strong> these <strong>changes manifest</strong> is <strong>not</mark> a <mark>viable</mark> option</u></strong>. <u><mark>By the time</mark> the climate <mark>consequences are severe enough</mark> to compel action, <mark>there is</mark> likely to be <mark>little that can be done</mark> on human timescales <mark>to undo</mark> the <mark>changes to <strong>environmental systems</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> the <strong><mark>human societies dependent upon them</strong></mark>.</p></u>

1AC

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2] Reject “1% risk of extinction”– it collapses all policymaking

Meskill 09 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)

Meskill 09 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)

one percent doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously we'd have to begin prioritizing But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make We get into our cars buy a cup of coffee We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety our response to this news should be is another matter entirely.

one percent doctrine cannot be applied in a world with many disaster scenarios global-warming asteroid- terrorists , etc would deserve all attention, we cannot address them simultaneously we'd have to prioritiz why then should we only make these Why not choose other things we value? Why treat the cataclysmic event as fundamentally different We get into our cars buy coffee constantly risking death to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle would neither be able to act, nor not act

Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action. None of this is to deny - at least this is my current sense - that human action is contributing to global warming. But what our response to this news should be is another matter entirely.

<h4>2] Reject “1% risk of extinction”– it collapses all policymaking</h4><p><strong>Meskill 09</strong> <strong>(David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)</p><p></strong>Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "<u><strong><mark>one percent doctrine</u></strong></mark>" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine <u><strong>is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant</u></strong>. It is intellectually incoherent because <u><strong>it <mark>cannot be applied </mark>consistently <mark>in a world with many</mark> potential <mark>disaster scenarios</mark>. In addition to the <mark>global-warming</mark> risk, there's also the <mark>asteroid-</mark>hitting-the-earth risk, the <mark>terrorists</mark>-with-nuclear-weapons risk</u></strong> (Cheney's original scenario), <u><strong>the super-duper-pandemic risk<mark>, etc</u></strong></mark>. Since each of these risks, on the "<u><strong>one percent doctrine," <mark>would deserve all</mark> of our <mark>attention, we cannot address</mark> all of <mark>them simultaneously</u></strong></mark>. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, <u><strong><mark>we'd have to</mark> begin <mark>prioritiz</mark>ing</u></strong>, making choices and trade-offs. <u><strong>But <mark>why then should we only make these </mark>trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? <mark>Why not</mark> also <mark>choose</mark> between them and <mark>other</mark>, much more cotidien, <mark>things we value</u></strong>?<u><strong></mark> </p><p><mark>Why treat the</mark> unlikely but <mark>cataclysmic event as</mark> somehow <mark>fundamentally different</mark>, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make</u></strong>? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. <u><strong><mark>We get into our cars</u></strong></mark> in order to <u><strong><mark>buy </mark>a cup of <mark>coffee</u></strong></mark>, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. <u><strong>We are <mark>constantly risking death</mark>, if slightly, in order <mark>to pursue the things we value</u></strong>. <u><strong>Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle</mark>"</u></strong> would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. <u><strong>That creature <mark>would neither be able to act, nor not act</mark>, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety</u></strong>. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five *past* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action. None of this is to deny - at least this is my current sense - that human action is contributing to global warming. But what <u><strong>our response to this news should be is another matter entirely.</p></u></strong>

1AC

Contention 3 is Framing

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Warming doesn’t cause extinction---new studies.

Nordhaus 20

Nordhaus 20 Ted Nordhaus, an American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts. [Ignore the Fake Climate Debate, 1-23-2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816]//BPS

Beyond headlines and social media “alarmists” and “deniers” there is a real climate debate in scientific journals It gets less attention most pessimists do not believe runaway climate change or a hothouse earth are plausible scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent A richer world will be more technologically advanced, which means energy should be less carbon-intensive New research finds global economic growth has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five recent forecasts suggest the worst-case climate scenarios are very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about temperatures the best estimates suggest the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming energy intensity continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas displaced coal falling cost of wind and solar energy have an effect on fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy made a modest comeback

Beyond social media there is debate in journals pessimists do not believe runaway or hothouse are plausible much less extinction richer world will be be less carbon-intensive growth reduced mortality by five forecasts suggest worst-case are unlikely. There is uncertainty estimates suggest world is on 3 degrees

Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But most pessimists do not believe that runaway climate change or a hothouse earth are plausible scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. A richer world will also likely be more technologically advanced, which means that energy consumption should be less carbon-intensive than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. New research published in the journal Global Environmental Change finds that global economic growth over the last decade has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five, with the greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations. In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But recent forecasts also suggest that many of the worst-case climate scenarios produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, are also very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about how sensitive global temperatures will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But the best estimates now suggest that the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The energy intensity of the global economy continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas has displaced coal as the primary source of new fossil energy. The falling cost of wind and solar energy has begun to have an effect on the growth of fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy has made a modest comeback in Asia.

<h4><strong>Warming doesn’t cause extinction---new studies.</h4><p>Nordhaus 20</strong> Ted Nordhaus, an American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts. [Ignore the Fake Climate Debate, 1-23-2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816]//BPS</p><p><u><mark>Beyond</u></mark> the <u>headlines and <mark>social media</u></mark>, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate <u>“alarmists” and “deniers”</u> do battle, <u><mark>there is</mark> <strong>a real climate <mark>debate</u></strong></mark> bubbling along <u><mark>in</mark> <strong>scientific <mark>journals</u></strong></mark>, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. <u>It gets</u> a lot <u>less attention</u> than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But <u><strong>most <mark>pessimists</strong> do not believe</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>runaway</mark> climate change</strong> <mark>or</mark> <strong>a <mark>hothouse</mark> earth</strong> <mark>are plausible</mark> scenarios, <strong><mark>much less</strong></mark> that <strong>human <mark>extinction</strong></mark> is imminent</u>. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. <u><strong>A <mark>richer world</strong> will</u></mark> also likely <u><mark>be</mark> <strong>more technologically advanced</strong>, which means</u> that <u>energy</u> consumption <u>should <mark>be <strong>less carbon-intensive</u></strong></mark> than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. <u>New research</u> published in the journal Global Environmental Change <u>finds</u> that <u><strong>global economic <mark>growth</u></strong></mark> over the last decade <u>has <strong><mark>reduced</strong></mark> climate <mark>mortality by</mark> <strong>a factor of <mark>five</u></strong></mark>, with the greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations. In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But <u><strong>recent <mark>forecasts</u></strong></mark> also <u><mark>suggest</u></mark> that many of <u><strong>the <mark>worst-case</mark> climate scenarios</u></strong> produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, <u><mark>are</u></mark> also <u><strong>very <mark>unlikely</strong>. There is</mark> <strong>still substantial <mark>uncertainty</strong></mark> about</u> how sensitive global <u>temperatures</u> will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But <u><strong>the best <mark>estimates</u></strong></mark> now <u><mark>suggest</u></mark> that <u>the <mark>world is on</mark> track for <strong><mark>3 degrees</mark> of warming</u></strong> by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The <u>energy intensity</u> of the global economy <u>continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas</u> has <u>displaced coal</u> as the primary source of new fossil energy. The <u>falling cost of wind and solar energy</u> has begun to <u>have an effect on</u> the growth of <u>fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy</u> has <u>made a modest comeback</u> in Asia.</p>

Fracking Advantage

1NC – Warming

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Unsafe AI development spirals and causes extinction – paperclips prove

Bostrom et. al 14

Bostrom et. al 14 [Nick Bostrom is an Oxford University philosopher, Stephen Cass is a staff writer for IEEE Spectrum, and Eliza Strickland has read Bostrom’s book and spoken to him;also IEEE Spectrum Associate Editor, 12/4/14, Nick Bostrom, “Nick Bostrom Says We Should Trust Our Future Robot Overlords”, http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/robotics/artificial-intelligence/nick-bostrom-says-we-should-trust-our-future-robot-overlords]-DD

There are obviously existential risks that arise from nature, asteroid impacts, supervolcanic eruptions, and so forth. But the human species has been around for over 100,000 years. So if these risks from nature have failed to do us in in the last 100,000 years, they are unlikely to do us in in the next 100 years, whereas we ourselves will be introducing entirely new kinds of phenomena into the world in this century by advancing the frontier of technology. With these brand-new technologies come brand-new risks that our species might not be able to survive. Right now, computer scientists can build very smart AIs, but for very specific tasks We did do a survey of the world’s leading AI experts. One of the questions we asked was: By which year do you think there’s a 50 percent chance that we will have developed human-level machine intelligence? The median answer to that question was 2040 or 2050, depending on exactly which group of experts we asked. Because once we do make an AI with human-level intelligence, things could go bad in a hurry. so let’s suppose an AI does achieve superintelligence. Why would it seek to destroy its human creators? it wouldn’t have any grudge against us—but the AI would have some goal, and we’d just be in its way. It would be similar to the way that humans cause animal extinctions, he said. : Let’s suppose you were a superintelligence and your goal was to make as many paper clips as possible. Maybe someone wanted you to run a paper clip factory, and then you succeeded in becoming superintelligent, and now you have this goal of maximizing the number of paper clips in existence. So you would quickly realize that the existence of humans is an impediment. Maybe the humans will take it upon themselves to switch you off one day. You want to reduce that probability as much as possible, because if they switch you off, there will be fewer paper clips. So you would want to get rid of humans right away. Even if they wouldn’t pose a threat, you’d still realize that human bodies consist of atoms, and those atoms could be used to make some very nice paper clips. Bostrom thinks that just about any goal we give an AI could come back to bite us. Even if we go with something like “make humans happy,” the machine could decide that the most effective way to meet this goal is to stick electrodes in the pleasure centers of all our brains.

With brand-new technologies come brand-new risks that our species might not be able to survive once we e an AI with human-level intelligence, things could go bad in a hurry AI would have some goal, and we’d just be in its way suppose you were a superintelligence and your goal was to make paper clips you would realize that the existence of humans is an impediment Maybe the humans will switch you off You want to reduce that probability So you would want to get rid of humans you’d realize that human bodies consist of atoms, and could be used to make paper clips any goal we give an AI could come back to bite us

Nick Bostrom: There are obviously existential risks that arise from nature, asteroid impacts, supervolcanic eruptions, and so forth. But the human species has been around for over 100,000 years. So if these risks from nature have failed to do us in in the last 100,000 years, they are unlikely to do us in in the next 100 years, whereas we ourselves will be introducing entirely new kinds of phenomena into the world in this century by advancing the frontier of technology. Eliza Strickland: With these brand-new technologies come brand-new risks that our species might not be able to survive. Stephen Cass: We’ve seen some pretty impressive AIs recently, like IBM’s Watson, which tromped the human competition on the TV game show “Jeopardy!” But how smart have AIs really gotten? Eliza Strickland: Right now, computer scientists can build very smart AIs, but for very specific tasks. IBM’s Watson won “Jeopardy!” because it can understand conversational English and look up information, but that’s all it can do. Watson can’t write you an e-mail describing what its data center looks like, or explain why its programmers are moving slowly after a big lunch. We’re still a long way from creating an AI that can match a human’s level of general intelligence, although Bostrom says we don’t know exactly how long. Nick Bostrom: We did do a survey of the world’s leading AI experts. One of the questions we asked was: By which year do you think there’s a 50 percent chance that we will have developed human-level machine intelligence? The median answer to that question was 2040 or 2050, depending on exactly which group of experts we asked. Stephen Cass: So why should we start worrying about this now? Eliza Strickland: Because once we do make an AI with human-level intelligence, things could go bad in a hurry. Here’s what Bostrom said. Nick Bostrom: Well, at the moment, it’s computer scientists who are doing AI research, and to some extent neuroscientists and other folk. If and when machines begin to surpass humans in general intelligence, the research would increasingly be done by machines. And as they got better, they would also get better at doing the research to make themselves even better. Eliza Strickland: With this feedback loop, Bostrom says, an AI could go from human-level intelligence to superintelligence before we’re really prepared for it. Stephen Cass: Okay, so let’s suppose an AI does achieve superintelligence. Why would it seek to destroy its human creators? Eliza Strickland: Bostrom says it wouldn’t have any grudge against us—but the AI would have some goal, and we’d just be in its way. It would be similar to the way that humans cause animal extinctions, he said. Nick Bostrom: If we think about what we are doing to various animal species, it’s not so much that we hate them. For the most part, it’s just that we have other uses for their habitats, and they get wiped out as a side effect. Stephen Cass: So what motivates an AI? What would it be trying to accomplish? Eliza Strickland: It would have some goal that had been programmed into it by scientists. And Bostrom explains that even simple goals can have disastrous consequences. Nick Bostrom: Let’s suppose you were a superintelligence and your goal was to make as many paper clips as possible. Maybe someone wanted you to run a paper clip factory, and then you succeeded in becoming superintelligent, and now you have this goal of maximizing the number of paper clips in existence. So you would quickly realize that the existence of humans is an impediment. Maybe the humans will take it upon themselves to switch you off one day. You want to reduce that probability as much as possible, because if they switch you off, there will be fewer paper clips. So you would want to get rid of humans right away. Even if they wouldn’t pose a threat, you’d still realize that human bodies consist of atoms, and those atoms could be used to make some very nice paper clips. Eliza Strickland: Bostrom thinks that just about any goal we give an AI could come back to bite us. Even if we go with something like “make humans happy,” the machine could decide that the most effective way to meet this goal is to stick electrodes in the pleasure centers of all our brains. Stephen Cass: Isn’t that—spoiler alert!—basically the plot of the sci-fi movie I, Robot? Eliza Strickland: Oh, yeah. That was the Will Smith movie based on Isaac Asimov’s famous three laws of robotics, which are supposed to guarantee that a robot won’t hurt a human being. In the movie—and actually in most of Asimov’s robot stories—the laws don’t work quite as intended.

<h4>Unsafe AI development spirals and causes extinction – paperclips prove</h4><p><strong>Bostrom et. al 14</strong> [Nick Bostrom is an Oxford University philosopher, Stephen Cass is a staff writer for IEEE Spectrum, and Eliza Strickland has read Bostrom’s book and spoken to him;also IEEE Spectrum Associate Editor, 12/4/14, Nick Bostrom, “Nick Bostrom Says We Should Trust Our Future Robot Overlords”, http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/robotics/artificial-intelligence/nick-bostrom-says-we-should-trust-our-future-robot-overlords]-DD</p><p>Nick Bostrom: <u><strong>There are obviously existential risks that arise from nature, asteroid impacts, supervolcanic eruptions, and so forth. But the human species has been around for over 100,000 years. So if these risks from nature have failed to do us in in the last 100,000 years, they are unlikely to do us in in the next 100 years, whereas we ourselves will be introducing entirely new kinds of phenomena into the world in this century by advancing the frontier of technology.</u></strong> Eliza Strickland: <u><strong><mark>With</mark> these <mark>brand-new technologies come brand-new risks that our species might not be able to survive</strong></mark>.</u> Stephen Cass: We’ve seen some pretty impressive AIs recently, like IBM’s Watson, which tromped the human competition on the TV game show “Jeopardy!” But how smart have AIs really gotten? Eliza Strickland: <u><strong>Right now, computer scientists can build very smart AIs, but for very specific tasks</u></strong>. IBM’s Watson won “Jeopardy!” because it can understand conversational English and look up information, but that’s all it can do. Watson can’t write you an e-mail describing what its data center looks like, or explain why its programmers are moving slowly after a big lunch. We’re still a long way from creating an AI that can match a human’s level of general intelligence, although Bostrom says we don’t know exactly how long. Nick Bostrom: <u><strong>We did do a survey of the world’s leading AI experts. One of the questions we asked was: By which year do you think there’s a 50 percent chance that we will have developed human-level machine intelligence? The median answer to that question was 2040 or 2050, depending on exactly which group of experts we asked</strong>.</u> Stephen Cass: So why should we start worrying about this now? Eliza Strickland: <u><strong>Because <mark>once we</mark> do mak<mark>e an AI with human-level intelligence, things could go bad in a hurry</mark>.</u></strong> Here’s what Bostrom said. Nick Bostrom: Well, at the moment, it’s computer scientists who are doing AI research, and to some extent neuroscientists and other folk. If and when machines begin to surpass humans in general intelligence, the research would increasingly be done by machines. And as they got better, they would also get better at doing the research to make themselves even better. Eliza Strickland: With this feedback loop, Bostrom says, an AI could go from human-level intelligence to superintelligence before we’re really prepared for it. Stephen Cass: Okay, <u><strong>so let’s suppose an AI does achieve superintelligence. Why would it seek to destroy its human creators?</u></strong> Eliza Strickland: Bostrom says <u><strong>it wouldn’t have any grudge against us—but the <mark>AI would have some goal, and we’d just be in its way</mark>. It would be similar to the way that humans cause animal extinctions, he said.</u></strong> Nick Bostrom: If we think about what we are doing to various animal species, it’s not so much that we hate them. For the most part, it’s just that we have other uses for their habitats, and they get wiped out as a side effect. Stephen Cass: So what motivates an AI? What would it be trying to accomplish? Eliza Strickland: It would have some goal that had been programmed into it by scientists. And Bostrom explains that even simple goals can have disastrous consequences. Nick Bostrom<u><strong>: Let’s <mark>suppose you were a superintelligence and your goal was to make</mark> as many <mark>paper clips</mark> as possible. Maybe someone wanted you to run a paper clip factory, and then you succeeded in becoming superintelligent, and now you have this goal of maximizing the number of paper clips in existence. So <mark>you would</mark> quickly <mark>realize that the existence of humans is an impediment</mark>. <mark>Maybe the humans will</mark> take it upon themselves to <mark>switch you off</mark> one day. <mark>You want to reduce that probability</mark> as much as possible, because if they switch you off, there will be fewer paper clips. <mark>So you would want to get rid of humans</mark> right away. Even if they wouldn’t pose a threat, <mark>you’d</mark> still <mark>realize that human bodies consist of atoms,</mark> <mark>and</mark> those atoms <mark>could be used to make</mark> some very nice <mark>paper clips</mark>.</u></strong> Eliza Strickland: <u><strong>Bostrom thinks that just about <mark>any goal we give an AI could come back to bite us</mark>. Even if we go with something like “make humans happy,” the machine could decide that the most effective way to meet this goal is to stick electrodes in the pleasure centers of all our brains</strong>.</u> Stephen Cass: Isn’t that—spoiler alert!—basically the plot of the sci-fi movie I, Robot? Eliza Strickland: Oh, yeah. That was the Will Smith movie based on Isaac Asimov’s famous three laws of robotics, which are supposed to guarantee that a robot won’t hurt a human being. In the movie—and actually in most of Asimov’s robot stories—the laws don’t work quite as intended.</p>

1AC

Advantage 1 – AI

./documents/hsld20/Princeton/Go/Princeton-Gong-Aff-Lexington-Round6.docx

A

Lexington

6

Curtis Chang

Conal Thomas-McGinnis

1AC-Stock Disclosure 1NC-shells 1AR-aprioris 2NR-shell 2AR-aprioris

hsld20/Princeton/Go/Princeton-Gong-Aff-Lexington-Round6.docx

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The aff is try or die – we need to act as soon as possible to meet the 2° goal or we’re all dead

Worland 7/9 )

Worland 7/9 (Justin Worland, 7-9-2020, "2020 Is Our Last, Best Chance to Save the Planet," Time, https://time.com/5864692/climate-change-defining-moment/)

we may look back at 2020 as the year we decided to keep driving off the climate cliff–or to take the last exit. Taking the threat seriously would mean using the opportunity presented by this crisis to spend on solar panels and wind farms, push companies being bailed out to cut emissions and foster greener forms of transport in cities. If we instead choose to fund new coal-fired power plants and oil wells and thoughtlessly fire up factories to urge growth, we will lock in a pathway toward climate catastrophe. We’re standing at a climate crossroads: the world has already warmed 1.1°C since the Industrial Revolution. If we pass 2°C, we risk hitting one or more major tipping points, where the effects of climate change go from advancing gradually to changing dramatically overnight, reshaping the planet. To ensure that we don’t pass that threshold, we need to cut emissions in half by 2030. Climate change has understandably fallen out of the public eye this year as the coronavirus pandemic rages The time frame for effective climate action was always going to be tight, but the coronavirus pandemic has shrunk it further. Scientists and policymakers expected the green transition to occur over the next decade, but the pandemic has pushed 10 years of anticipated investment in everything from power plants to roads into a monthslong time frame. “It’s in this next six months that recovery strategies are likely to be formulated and the path is set,” says Nicholas Stern, a former World Bank chief economist known for his landmark 2006 report warning that climate change could devastate the global economy. To achieve the 1.5°C goal without creating mass disruption has always meant thoughtfully restructuring the global economy, moving it away from fossil-fuel extraction slowly but surely. Scientists and economists agree this is the last opportunity we have to do so. “If we delay further than 2020,” says Rockstrom, “there’s absolutely no empirical evidence that it can be done in an orderly way.” But this moment is not just about opportunity; even maintaining the status quo is dangerous. Research from the UNEP released last year shows that if nations stick with current plans to reduce emissions, global temperatures will rise more than 3°C by the end of this century.

If we pass 2°C risk hitting tipping points effects of climate change go from advancing gradually to changing dramatically overnight cut emissions in half by 2030 time frame always tight coronavirus shrunk further pushed investment into monthslong time frame climate change could devastate the global economy this is the last opportunity we have to do so If we delay further than 2020 no empirical evidence that it can be done in an orderly way even maintaining the status quo is dangerous if nations stick with current plans to reduce emissions temperatures rise more than 3°C by end of century

From our vantage point today, 2020 looks like the year when an unknown virus spun out of control, killed hundreds of thousands and altered the way we live day to day. In the future, we may look back at 2020 as the year we decided to keep driving off the climate cliff–or to take the last exit. Taking the threat seriously would mean using the opportunity presented by this crisis to spend on solar panels and wind farms, push companies being bailed out to cut emissions and foster greener forms of transport in cities. If we instead choose to fund new coal-fired power plants and oil wells and thoughtlessly fire up factories to urge growth, we will lock in a pathway toward climate catastrophe. There’s a divide about which way to go. In early April, as COVID-19 spread across the U.S. and doctors urgently warned that New York City might soon run out of ventilators and hospital beds, President Donald Trump gathered CEOs from some of the country’s biggest oil and gas companies for a closed-door meeting in the White House Cabinet Room. The industry faced its biggest disruption in decades, and Trump wanted to help the companies secure their place at the center of the 21st century American economy. Everything was on the table, from a tariff on imports to the U.S. government itself purchasing excess oil. “We’ll work this out, and we’ll get our energy business back,” Trump told the CEOs. “I’m with you 1,000%.” A few days later, he announced he had brokered a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to cut oil production and rescue the industry. Later in April, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, in a video message from across the Atlantic, offered a different approach for the continent’s economic future. A European Green Deal, she said, would be the E.U.’s “motor for the recovery.” “We can turn the crisis of this pandemic into an opportunity to rebuild our economies differently,” she said. On May 27, she pledged more than $800 billion to the initiative, promising to transform the way Europeans live. For the past three years, the world outside the U.S. has largely tried to ignore Trump’s retrograde position on climate, hoping 2020 would usher in a new President with a new position, re-enabling the cooperation between nations needed to prevent the worst ravages of climate change. But there’s no more time to wait. We’re standing at a climate crossroads: the world has already warmed 1.1°C since the Industrial Revolution. If we pass 2°C, we risk hitting one or more major tipping points, where the effects of climate change go from advancing gradually to changing dramatically overnight, reshaping the planet. To ensure that we don’t pass that threshold, we need to cut emissions in half by 2030. Climate change has understandably fallen out of the public eye this year as the coronavirus pandemic rages. Nevertheless, this year, or perhaps this year and next, is likely to be the most pivotal yet in the fight against climate change. “We’ve run out of time to build new things in old ways,” says Rob Jackson, an earth system science professor at Stanford University and the chair of the Global Carbon Project. What we do now will define the fate of the planet–and human life on it–for decades. The time frame for effective climate action was always going to be tight, but the coronavirus pandemic has shrunk it further. Scientists and policymakers expected the green transition to occur over the next decade, but the pandemic has pushed 10 years of anticipated investment in everything from power plants to roads into a monthslong time frame. Countries have already spent $11 trillion to help stem the economic damage from COVID-19. They could spend trillions more. “It’s in this next six months that recovery strategies are likely to be formulated and the path is set,” says Nicholas Stern, a former World Bank chief economist known for his landmark 2006 report warning that climate change could devastate the global economy. We don’t know where the chips will fall: Will a newfound respect for science and a fear of future shocks lead us to finally wake up, or will the desire to return to normal overshadow the threats lurking just around the corner? We find ourselves on the brink of climate catastrophe in large part because of the decisions made during a past crisis. As the world came out of the Great Depression and World War II, the U.S. launched a rapid bid to remake the global economy–running on fossil fuels. In the first postwar years, Americans moved to suburbs and began driving gas-guzzling cars to work, while the federal government built a highway system to connect the country for those vehicles. The single biggest line item in the Marshall Plan, the U.S. government program that funded the European recovery, went to support oil, which ensured that the continent’s economy would also run on that fossil fuel. Meanwhile, plastic, an oil derivative, became the go-to building block for consumer goods after the U.S. had developed production capacity for use in World War II. The underlying philosophy of economic development in this time period was a focus on gross national product, a term developed by U.S. government economists during the Depression, which included consumption as a proxy for prosperity: the more we consume, the better off we are, according to this model, which, in the postwar era, the U.S. assiduously spread abroad. The promise of endless growth also required an endless supply of oil to power factories, automobiles and jet planes. In 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sealed a deal with Ibn Saud, the first King of Saudi Arabia, trading security for access to the country’s vast oil reserves. Every U.S. President since, implicitly or explicitly, has continued that exchange. The coronavirus pandemic is the most significant disruption yet to the postwar fossil-fuel order. The global economy is expected to contract more than 5% this year, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is a challenge so big that it has also created a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change direction. This moment comes just in time. In 2018, a landmark report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the U.N.’s climate-science body, warned that allowing the planet to warm any more than 2°C above preindustrial levels would drive hundreds of millions of people into poverty, destroy coral reefs and leave some countries unable to adapt. A 2019 analysis in the journal Nature identified nine tipping points–from the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet to the thawing of Arctic permafrost–that the planet appears close to reaching, any one of which might very well be triggered if warming exceeds 1.5°C. “Going beyond 2°C is a very critical step,” says Johan Rockstrom, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, “not only in terms of economic and human impact but also in terms of the stability of the earth.” To keep temperatures from rising past the 1.5°C goal, we would need to cut global greenhouse-gas emissions 7.6% every year for the next decade, according to a report from the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP). That’s about the level the COVID-19 pandemic will reduce emissions this year, but virtually no one thinks a deadly pandemic and accompanying unemployment is a sustainable way to halt climate change–and recessions are typically followed by sharp rebounds in emissions. To achieve the 1.5°C goal without creating mass disruption has always meant thoughtfully restructuring the global economy, moving it away from fossil-fuel extraction slowly but surely. Scientists and economists agree this is the last opportunity we have to do so. “If we delay further than 2020,” says Rockstrom, “there’s absolutely no empirical evidence that it can be done in an orderly way.” As of late June, countries had spent some $11 trillion on measures to halt the pandemic and stem its economic impact, according to the IMF. Economists say that’s not enough, and countries and central banks plan to keep doling out money to help the global economy stay afloat. There are lots of things we could be buying with that money that would make our lives better and protect us from climate disaster. In recent months, leading institutions across the spectrum have offered approaches that are varied in their specifics but generally similar in philosophy: invest in greener infrastructure. The International Energy Agency (IEA), for example, calls for an annual $1 trillion investment in clean energy for the next three years. At a cost of about 0.7% of global GDP, this would represent a small portion of the funds spent to combat COVID-19 but could be transformative. Expansion and modernization of electric grids would allow for easier flow of renewable energy. Governments could buy out gas-guzzling vehicles, pushing consumers to go electric. Homes and buildings could be retrofitted to consume less energy. This spending would also help solve the immediate problem of lost jobs and economic stagnation by creating nearly 10 million jobs worldwide and increasing global GDP by 1.1%, meaning it would add more to the economy than it costs. Importantly, green investment would result in a slew of “co-benefits.” For example, some rural communities would receive access to electricity for the first time. For another, air pollution would decline all over the world. “If governments do not make use of this opportunity, they may miss a very important tool for the economic recovery,” says Fatih Birol, head of the IEA. But this moment is not just about opportunity; even maintaining the status quo is dangerous. Research from the UNEP released last year shows that if nations stick with current plans to reduce emissions, global temperatures will rise more than 3°C by the end of this century.

<h4>The aff is try or die – we need to act <u>as soon as possible</u> to meet the 2° goal or we’re all dead</h4><p><strong>Worland 7/9</strong> (Justin Worland, 7-9-2020, "2020 Is Our Last, Best Chance to Save the Planet," Time, https://time.com/5864692/climate-change-defining-moment/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>From our vantage point today, 2020 looks like the year when an unknown virus spun out of control, killed hundreds of thousands and altered the way we live day to day. In the future, <u>we may look back at 2020 as the year we decided to keep driving off the climate cliff–or to take the last exit. Taking the threat seriously would mean using the opportunity presented by this crisis to spend on solar panels and wind farms, push companies being bailed out to cut emissions and foster greener forms of transport in cities. If we instead choose to fund new coal-fired power plants and oil wells and thoughtlessly fire up factories to urge growth, we will lock in a pathway toward climate catastrophe.</u> There’s a divide about which way to go. In early April, as COVID-19 spread across the U.S. and doctors urgently warned that New York City might soon run out of ventilators and hospital beds, President Donald Trump gathered CEOs from some of the country’s biggest oil and gas companies for a closed-door meeting in the White House Cabinet Room. The industry faced its biggest disruption in decades, and Trump wanted to help the companies secure their place at the center of the 21st century American economy. Everything was on the table, from a tariff on imports to the U.S. government itself purchasing excess oil. “We’ll work this out, and we’ll get our energy business back,” Trump told the CEOs. “I’m with you 1,000%.” A few days later, he announced he had brokered a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to cut oil production and rescue the industry. Later in April, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, in a video message from across the Atlantic, offered a different approach for the continent’s economic future. A European Green Deal, she said, would be the E.U.’s “motor for the recovery.” “We can turn the crisis of this pandemic into an opportunity to rebuild our economies differently,” she said. On May 27, she pledged more than $800 billion to the initiative, promising to transform the way Europeans live. For the past three years, the world outside the U.S. has largely tried to ignore Trump’s retrograde position on climate, hoping 2020 would usher in a new President with a new position, re-enabling the cooperation between nations needed to prevent the worst ravages of climate change. But there’s no more time to wait. <u>We’re standing at a climate crossroads: the world has already warmed 1.1°C since the Industrial Revolution. <mark>If we pass 2°C</mark>, we <mark>risk hitting</mark> one or more major <mark>tipping points</mark>, where the <mark>effects of climate change go from advancing gradually to changing dramatically overnight</mark>, reshaping the planet. To ensure that we don’t pass that threshold, we need to <mark>cut emissions in half by 2030</mark>. Climate change has understandably fallen out of the public eye this year as the coronavirus pandemic rages</u>. Nevertheless, this year, or perhaps this year and next, is likely to be the most pivotal yet in the fight against climate change. “We’ve run out of time to build new things in old ways,” says Rob Jackson, an earth system science professor at Stanford University and the chair of the Global Carbon Project. What we do now will define the fate of the planet–and human life on it–for decades. <u>The <mark>time frame</mark> for effective climate action was <mark>always</mark> going to be <mark>tight</mark>, but the <mark>coronavirus</mark> pandemic has <mark>shrunk</mark> it <mark>further</mark>. Scientists and policymakers expected the green transition to occur over the next decade, but the pandemic has <mark>pushed</mark> 10 years of anticipated <mark>investment</mark> in everything from power plants to roads <mark>into</mark> a <mark>monthslong time frame</mark>.</u> Countries have already spent $11 trillion to help stem the economic damage from COVID-19. They could spend trillions more. <u>“It’s in this next six months that recovery strategies are likely to be formulated and the path is set,” says Nicholas Stern, a former World Bank chief economist known for his landmark 2006 report warning that <mark>climate change could devastate the global economy</mark>.</u> We don’t know where the chips will fall: Will a newfound respect for science and a fear of future shocks lead us to finally wake up, or will the desire to return to normal overshadow the threats lurking just around the corner? We find ourselves on the brink of climate catastrophe in large part because of the decisions made during a past crisis. As the world came out of the Great Depression and World War II, the U.S. launched a rapid bid to remake the global economy–running on fossil fuels. In the first postwar years, Americans moved to suburbs and began driving gas-guzzling cars to work, while the federal government built a highway system to connect the country for those vehicles. The single biggest line item in the Marshall Plan, the U.S. government program that funded the European recovery, went to support oil, which ensured that the continent’s economy would also run on that fossil fuel. Meanwhile, plastic, an oil derivative, became the go-to building block for consumer goods after the U.S. had developed production capacity for use in World War II. The underlying philosophy of economic development in this time period was a focus on gross national product, a term developed by U.S. government economists during the Depression, which included consumption as a proxy for prosperity: the more we consume, the better off we are, according to this model, which, in the postwar era, the U.S. assiduously spread abroad. The promise of endless growth also required an endless supply of oil to power factories, automobiles and jet planes. In 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sealed a deal with Ibn Saud, the first King of Saudi Arabia, trading security for access to the country’s vast oil reserves. Every U.S. President since, implicitly or explicitly, has continued that exchange. The coronavirus pandemic is the most significant disruption yet to the postwar fossil-fuel order. The global economy is expected to contract more than 5% this year, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is a challenge so big that it has also created a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change direction. This moment comes just in time. In 2018, a landmark report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the U.N.’s climate-science body, warned that allowing the planet to warm any more than 2°C above preindustrial levels would drive hundreds of millions of people into poverty, destroy coral reefs and leave some countries unable to adapt. A 2019 analysis in the journal Nature identified nine tipping points–from the collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet to the thawing of Arctic permafrost–that the planet appears close to reaching, any one of which might very well be triggered if warming exceeds 1.5°C. “Going beyond 2°C is a very critical step,” says Johan Rockstrom, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, “not only in terms of economic and human impact but also in terms of the stability of the earth.” To keep temperatures from rising past the 1.5°C goal, we would need to cut global greenhouse-gas emissions 7.6% every year for the next decade, according to a report from the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP). That’s about the level the COVID-19 pandemic will reduce emissions this year, but virtually no one thinks a deadly pandemic and accompanying unemployment is a sustainable way to halt climate change–and recessions are typically followed by sharp rebounds in emissions. <u>To achieve the 1.5°C goal without creating mass disruption has always meant thoughtfully restructuring the global economy, moving it away from fossil-fuel extraction slowly but surely. Scientists and economists agree <mark>this is the last opportunity we have to do so</mark>. “<mark>If we delay further than 2020</mark>,” says Rockstrom, “there’s absolutely <mark>no empirical evidence that it can be done in an orderly way</mark>.” </u>As of late June, countries had spent some $11 trillion on measures to halt the pandemic and stem its economic impact, according to the IMF. Economists say that’s not enough, and countries and central banks plan to keep doling out money to help the global economy stay afloat. There are lots of things we could be buying with that money that would make our lives better and protect us from climate disaster. In recent months, leading institutions across the spectrum have offered approaches that are varied in their specifics but generally similar in philosophy: invest in greener infrastructure. The International Energy Agency (IEA), for example, calls for an annual $1 trillion investment in clean energy for the next three years. At a cost of about 0.7% of global GDP, this would represent a small portion of the funds spent to combat COVID-19 but could be transformative. Expansion and modernization of electric grids would allow for easier flow of renewable energy. Governments could buy out gas-guzzling vehicles, pushing consumers to go electric. Homes and buildings could be retrofitted to consume less energy. This spending would also help solve the immediate problem of lost jobs and economic stagnation by creating nearly 10 million jobs worldwide and increasing global GDP by 1.1%, meaning it would add more to the economy than it costs. Importantly, green investment would result in a slew of “co-benefits.” For example, some rural communities would receive access to electricity for the first time. For another, air pollution would decline all over the world. “If governments do not make use of this opportunity, they may miss a very important tool for the economic recovery,” says Fatih Birol, head of the IEA. <u>But this moment is not just about opportunity; <mark>even maintaining the status quo is dangerous</mark>. Research from the UNEP released last year shows that <mark>if nations stick with current plans to reduce emissions</mark>, global <mark>temperatures</mark> will <mark>rise more than 3°C</mark> <mark>by</mark> the <mark>end of</mark> this <mark>century</mark>.</p></u>

GHill R2 Aff Doc

1AC

Advantage 1: Turn Out and Representation

./documents/hsld20/Lexington/Yi/Lexington-Ying-Aff-Greenhill-Round2.docx

A

SO - Greenhill

2

Immaculate Heart Felicity Park

Tarun Ratnasabapathy

1AC - Federal Elections 1NC - Defense Spending DA - 2020 PIC - Carbon Tax CP - ASpec on case 1AR - Condo 2NR - Defense Spending DA - Carbon Tax CP 2AR - Condo

hsld20/Lexington/Yi/Lexington-Ying-Aff-Greenhill-Round2.docx

DeYi

Lexington DeYi

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Russia will exploit divisions between NATO members to instigate nuclear crises and global war

Kulesa ’18

Kulesa ’18 [Lukasz; February 2018; Research Director at the European Leadership Network; European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437]

Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any conflict management. The actual dynamics of conflict are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations give limited insights Russian military theorists assume a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and risk-averse, Russia may assume that threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be effective. It would try to bring home the notion it has much higher stakes in the conflict than NATO members and will be ready to push the boundaries of conflict further. It would try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in NATO states Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been debated by experts, but when Russia might use nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond “escalate to de-escalate” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a military target or a civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is conceivable. These options signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict and what mechanisms it would use while trying to maintain control The goals of waging a conflict with Russia would have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may need to be threatened to force the leadership into terminating the conflict Relying on concepts of escalation control from the Cold War might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia-NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century instead of gradual escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine “leap frog” escalation connected in different domains Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would not survive the first hours of actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail and the other side’s willingness to endure the costs, especially once both start committing political capital

Once conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and unpredictability would inevitably set Russian theorists assume conflict can be controlled Russia exploit weak points in Alliance It would push boundaries try to exploit divisions Any conflict would have a nuc dimension for escalation control a single nuclear shot could be lethal Detonation could be EMP effect. A “false flag” complicate responses conflict would have to be limited to avoid nuclear exchang Relying on escalation control might be misleading Russia-NATO conflict would be “leap frog” escalation Both sides underestimat resolve

Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed? Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decision-making processes and interactions. Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks. Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict. The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation. With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use. Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia-NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial. Conflict termination Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not survive the first hours of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the other side’s willingness to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs, especially once both sides start committing their political capital and resources and the casualties accumulate.

<h4>Russia will <u>exploit</u> divisions between NATO members to instigate <u>nuclear crises</u> and <u>global war</u> </h4><p><strong>Kulesa ’18 </strong>[Lukasz; February 2018; Research Director at the European Leadership Network; European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437]</p><p>Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed? <u><mark>Once</mark> a <mark>conflict was <strong>under way</strong>, the “<strong>fog of war</strong>” and</mark> <strong>rising <mark>unpredictability</strong> would <strong>inevitably</strong> set</mark> in, <strong>complicating</strong> the implementation of any</u> predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-<u>conflict management. The <strong>actual</strong> dynamics of</u> a <u>conflict</u> and the perceptions of the stakes involved <u>are <strong>extremely difficult</strong> to predict. Simulations</u> and table-top exercises can <u>give</u> only <u>limited insights</u> into the actual decision-making processes and interactions. Still, <u><mark>Russian</mark> military <mark>theorists</u></mark> and practitioners seem to <u><strong><mark>assume</u></strong></mark> that <u>a <mark>conflict</mark> with NATO <mark>can be</mark> <strong>managed</strong> and <strong><mark>controlled</strong></mark> in a way that would bring it to a <strong>swift end</strong> consistent with Russian aims. The <mark>Russia</mark>n <strong>theory of victory</u></strong> would <u>seek to <strong><mark>exploit weak points</strong> in</mark> an <mark>Alliance</mark> war effort. Based on the <strong>conviction</strong> that democracies are weak and</u> their leaders and populations are <u>risk-averse, Russia may <strong>assume</strong> that</u> its <u>threats of <strong>horizontal</strong> or <strong>vertical escalation</strong> could be</u> particularly <u>effective. <mark>It would</u></mark> also <u>try to bring home the notion</u> that <u>it has <strong>much higher stakes</strong> in the conflict</u> (regime survival) <u>than</u> a majority of the <u>NATO members</u> involved, <u>and</u> thus <u>will be ready to <strong><mark>push</mark> the <mark>boundaries</strong></mark> of</u> the <u>conflict further. It would</u> most likely <u><mark>try to</mark> <strong>test</strong> and <strong><mark>exploit</strong></mark> potential <strong><mark>divisions</strong></mark> within the Alliance, combining <strong>selective diplomacy</strong> and <strong>activation</strong> of its intelligence assets in</u> some <u>NATO states </u>with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks. <u><strong><mark>Any</strong></mark> NATO-Russia <mark>conflict would</mark> <strong>inevitably</strong> <mark>have a <strong>nuc</mark>lear <mark>dimension</strong></mark>. The role of <strong>nuclear weapons</strong> as a tool <mark>for <strong>escalation control</strong></mark> for Russia has been</u> thoroughly <u>debated by experts, but when</u> and how <u>Russia might use</u> (and not merely showcase or activate) <u>nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an <strong>open question</strong>. Beyond</u> catch phrases such as <u>“<strong>escalate to de-escalate</strong>”</u> or “escalate to win” <u>there are a <strong>wider range</strong> of options for Russian <strong>nuclear weapon use</u></strong>. For example, <u><mark>a single <strong>nuclear</mark> warning <mark>shot</strong> could be lethal</mark> or non-lethal. It could be directed against a</u> purely <u>military target or a</u> military-<u>civilian one. <mark>Detonation could be</mark> configured for an <strong><mark>EMP effect</strong>. A “<strong>false flag</strong>”</mark> attack is</u> also <u>conceivable. These options</u> might be used to <u><strong>signal escalation</strong> and could <strong>significantly <mark>complicate</strong></mark> NATO’s <mark>responses</u></mark>. Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. <u>It is less clear how far the Alliance would be <strong>willing to escalate</strong> the conflict</u> to achieve these goals, <u>and what mechanisms</u> and means <u>it would use while trying to maintain</u> some degree of <u>control</u> over the conflict. <u>The goals</u> and methods <u>of waging a <mark>conflict</mark> with Russia <mark>would</u></mark> probably <u><mark>have to be limited</mark> in order <mark>to avoid</mark> a <strong>massive <mark>nuclear exchang</mark>e</strong>. Such limitations</u> would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach <u>could put <strong>too much restraint</strong> on NATO’s operations: the Russian <strong>regime’s stability</strong> may</u> ultimately <u>need to be threatened</u> in order <u>to <strong>force the leadership</strong> into <strong>terminating</strong> the conflict</u>. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation. With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use. <u><mark>Relying on</mark> concepts of <strong><mark>escalation control</u></strong></mark> and on lessons <u>from the Cold War</u> confrontation <u><mark>might be <strong>misleading</strong></mark>. The circumstances in which a <strong><mark>Russia-NATO conflict</strong> would</mark> play out would <mark>be</mark> <strong>radically different</strong> from the 20th century</u> screenplay. Moreover, <u>instead of <strong>gradual</u></strong> (linear) <u>escalation or <strong>salami tactics</strong> escalation, it is possible to imagine</u> surprizing <u><mark>“<strong>leap frog</strong>” escalation</u></mark>, possibly <u>connected</u> with actions <u>in <strong>different domains</u></strong> (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial. Conflict termination <u>Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would</u> most likely <u><strong>not survive</strong> the <strong>first hours</strong> of</u> an <u>actual conflict. <mark>Both sides</mark> are capable of <strong><mark>underestimat</mark>ing</strong> the <strong><mark>resolve</strong></mark> of the other side to prevail</u> in a conflict <u>and the other side’s <strong>willingness</strong> to</u> commit the necessary resources and <u>endure the costs, especially once both</u> sides <u>start committing</u> their <u>political capital</u> and resources and the casualties accumulate.</p>

1ac – ILOVEYOU

1ac

A2

./documents/hspolicy22/Maize/ShWr/Maize-ShWr-Aff-7----KSHSAA-5A-2-Speaker-State-Championship-Round-2.docx

A

7 -- KSHSAA 5A 2 Speaker State Championship

2

Salina South AL

Colle

1ac - ILOVEYOU v3 1nc - t ocos, withdrawal cp, turkey appeasement da, noko tradeoff da 2nr - withdrawal cp, turkey appeasement da

hspolicy22/Maize/ShWr/Maize-ShWr-Aff-7----KSHSAA-5A-2-Speaker-State-Championship-Round-2.docx

2023-01-14 02:31:19

ShWr

Maize ShWr

contact info: Devin Short - 2A- he/him - [email protected] Ashley Wright - 2N - she/her - [email protected]

De.....

Sh.....

As.....

Wr.....

Maize

Maize

KS

hspolicy22

HS Policy 2022-23

cx

hs

Backlash turns the affirmative - Protective measures are taken by nativist movements to ensure border security

Beirich and Potok 9

Beirich and Potok 9 (Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, “USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise” Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1)

the organized anti-immigrant movement has exploded ‘nativist extremist’ target people, rather than policy. they do not limit themselves to advocating, for stricter border security, tighter population control, or tougher enforcement of laws against hiring illegal immigrants. they go after the immigrants themselves, using armed vigilante border patrols; surveillance of apartments and houses occupied by Mexicans and Central Americans; publicizing photos and home addresses of ‘suspected illegal aliens’ and harassment and intimidation of Latino immigrants at day-labour sites and migrant-worker camps. nativist extremist groups are active in all regions of the U S Many of the groups in non-border states are local chapters of either the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps or the Minuteman Project These nationwide organizations muster volunteers for vigilante border actions Many protest actions or conduct ‘surveillance ops’ at day-labor sites members openly carry firearms have also spawned a slew of imitators and splinter groups the Antelope Valley Minutemen, leader

the organized anti-immigrant movement has exploded nativist extremist’ target people, rather than policy they go after the immigrants themselves, using armed vigilante border patrol nativist extremist groups are active in all regions of the U S These nationwide organizations muster volunteers for vigilante border actions. Many protest actions or conduct ‘surveillance ops’ at day-labor sites . members openly carry firearms have also spawned a slew of imitators and splinter groups

Many whites have come to see the federal government, along with the nation's business elites, as specifically responsible for the failure to curb non-white immigration. On the radical right, the government often is seen as plotting to destroy the white race. Now, the white supremacist movement has been joined in its anger over America's immigration policy by a new nativist movement that seemingly came out of nowhere in the last few years. Starting with a meeting held in 2001 in Sierra Vista, AZ, which brought together several anti-immigrant hate groups to laud a border rancher known for detaining suspected immigrants at gunpoint, the organized anti-immigrant movement has exploded (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2001a). By 2007, the SPLC had identified 144 ‘nativist extremist’ groups active across 39 states (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2007). Most of these organizations—nearly 100 of them—had appeared since April 2006. The groups identified as ‘nativist extremist’ target people, rather than policy. That is, they do not limit themselves to advocating, even in forceful terms, for stricter border security, tighter population control, or tougher enforcement of laws against hiring illegal immigrants. Instead, they go after the immigrants themselves, using tactics including armed vigilante border patrols; conspicuous surveillance of apartments and houses occupied by Mexicans and Central Americans; publicizing photos and home addresses of ‘suspected illegal aliens’ and harassment and intimidation of Latino immigrants at day-labour sites and migrant-worker camps. Because their tactics frequently cross the line into illegal harassment and even violence, these groups sometimes represent another challenge for law enforcement. Though most heavily concentrated in Arizona, California and Texas, nativist extremist groups are active in all regions of the United States. Many of the groups in non-border states are local chapters of either the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps or the Minuteman Project, which comprised 57 of the 144 nativist extremist groups listed by the SPLC. These separate, competing nationwide organizations both emerged from the original month-long Minuteman ‘civilian border patrol’ operation held in Cochise County, AZ, in April 2005. Minuteman chapters raise money for their parent organizations and muster volunteers for vigilante border actions. Many also hold protest actions or conduct ‘surveillance ops’ at day-labor sites in their home cities. In states where it's allowed by law, their members openly carry firearms. The Minuteman Civil Defense Corps and Minuteman Project have also spawned a slew of imitators and splinter groups that have no official affiliation with either national Minuteman organization. These rogue outfits include the Antelope Valley Minutemen, whose leader, Frank Jorge, has written on his website: ‘We have a right, and an obligation, to defend our country, our homes, and our families not only from this invasion, but also from the very Government that is precipitating this treasonous act’ (Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007).

<h4>Backlash turns the affirmative - <strong>Protective measures are taken by nativist movements to ensure border security </h4><p>Beirich and Potok 9 </p><p></strong>(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, “USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise” Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1)</p><p>Many whites have come to see the federal government, along with the nation's business elites, as specifically responsible for the failure to curb non-white immigration. On the radical right, the government often is seen as plotting to destroy the white race. Now, the white supremacist movement has been joined in its anger over America's immigration policy by a new nativist movement that seemingly came out of nowhere in the last few years. Starting with a meeting held in 2001 in Sierra Vista, AZ, which brought together several anti-immigrant hate groups to laud a border rancher known for detaining suspected immigrants at gunpoint,<u> <mark>the organized anti-immigrant movement has exploded</u></mark> (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2001a). By 2007, the SPLC had identified 144 ‘nativist extremist’ groups active across 39 states (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2007). Most of these organizations—nearly 100 of them—had appeared since April 2006. The groups identified as<u> ‘<mark>nativist extremist’ target people, rather than policy</mark>. </u>That is,<u> they do not limit themselves to advocating, </u>even in forceful terms, <u>for stricter border security, tighter population control, or tougher enforcement of laws against hiring illegal immigrants. </u>Instead,<u> <mark>they go after the immigrants themselves, using</mark> </u>tactics including<u> <strong><mark>armed vigilante border patrol</mark>s</strong>; </u>conspicuous<u> surveillance of apartments and houses occupied by Mexicans and Central Americans; publicizing photos and home addresses of ‘suspected illegal aliens’ and harassment and intimidation of Latino immigrants at day-labour sites and migrant-worker camps.</u> Because their tactics frequently cross the line into illegal harassment and even violence, these groups sometimes represent another challenge for law enforcement. Though most heavily concentrated in Arizona, California and Texas, <u><mark>nativist extremist groups are active in all regions of the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. <u>Many of the groups in non-border states are local chapters of either the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps or the Minuteman Project</u>, which comprised 57 of the 144 nativist extremist groups listed by the SPLC. <u><mark>These</u></mark> separate, competing <u><mark>nationwide organizations</u></mark> both emerged from the original month-long Minuteman ‘civilian border patrol’ operation held in Cochise County, AZ, in April 2005. Minuteman chapters raise money for their parent organizations and <u><mark>muster volunteers for vigilante border actions</u>. <u>Many </u></mark>also hold<u><mark> protest actions or conduct ‘surveillance ops’ at day-labor sites </u></mark>in their home cities<mark>.</mark> In states where it's allowed by law, their <u><mark>members openly carry firearms</u></mark>. The Minuteman Civil Defense Corps and Minuteman Project <u><mark>have also spawned a slew of imitators and splinter groups</u></mark> that have no official affiliation with either national Minuteman organization. These rogue outfits include<u> the Antelope Valley Minutemen, </u>whose<u> leader</u>, Frank Jorge, has written on his website: ‘We have a right, and an obligation, to defend our country, our homes, and our families not only from this invasion, but also from the very Government that is precipitating this treasonous act’ (Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007).</p>

Populism DA

./documents/hsld22/Marlborough/OlOh/Marlborough-OlOh-Neg-Peninsula-Round-4.docx

N

Peninsula

4

Immaculate Heart SP

Mei Kim

AC - Lay South America NC - Lay Lightly Controlled CP, Lay Populism DA, China Adv CP, Lay Nebel T, Case 1AR - All NR - All 2AR - All

hsld22/Marlborough/OlOh/Marlborough-OlOh-Neg-Peninsula-Round-4.docx

2023-01-22 05:18:32

OlOh

Marlborough OlOh

Ol.....

Oh.....

Marlborough

Marlborough

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Growth key to avoid all existential risk

Aschenbrenner 20

Aschenbrenner 20 [Aschenbrenner, Leopold. Existential risk and growth. Working paper]. Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford. https://globalprioritiesinstitute. org/wp-content/upload s/Leopold-Aschenbrenner_Existential-risk-and-growth_. pdf, 2020.] CT

Human activity can create or mitigate existential risks. Analyzing this in a model of endogenous growth, when the scale effect of existential risk is moderate and the marginal utility of consumption declines quickly enough, this paper grounds the intuition of some prominent thinkers that humanity may be in a critical “time of perils.” We may be economically advanced enough to be able to destroy ourselves, but not economically advanced enough that we care about this existential risk and spend on safety. This “time of perils” implies that working on could be reducing existential risk now very impactful from an altruistic perspective. Faster economic growth appears to generally improve the odds of humanity’s survival. When the world is not very fragile, growth straightforwardly reduces risk. In the moderate fragility case, faster economic growth, while initially increasing risk, can help us get through this “time of perils” more quickly and thus increases the long-run probability of humanity’s survival. In particular, note that this effect doesn’t require a permanently higher growth rate; the improvement in humanity’s odds of survival are potentially substantial even for a temporary period of faster growth. Conversely, even a temporary period of slow economic growth could substantially curtail the future of human civilization. This model suggests even if you care only about the very long-term future of humanity, the pace of economic growth in the short run could be key to whether we make it there.

Human activity can mitigate existential risks Faster growth improve the odds In fragility growth help us get through perils” more quickly and increases long-run probability of survival temporary slow growth could substantially curtail the future of civilization

Human activity can create or mitigate existential risks. Analyzing this in a model of endogenous growth, when the scale effect of existential risk is moderate and the marginal utility of consumption declines quickly enough, this paper grounds the intuition of some prominent thinkers that humanity may be in a critical “time of perils.” We may be economically advanced enough to be able to destroy ourselves, but not economically advanced enough that we care about this existential risk and spend on safety. This “time of perils” implies that working on could be reducing existential risk now very impactful from an altruistic perspective. Faster economic growth appears to generally improve the odds of humanity’s survival. When the world is not very fragile, growth straightforwardly reduces risk. When the world is extremely fragile, growth increases risk, but humanity is doomed to destruction anyway—the odds of humanity’s survival are zero anyway. In the moderate fragility case, faster economic growth, while initially increasing risk, can help us get through this “time of perils” more quickly and thus increases the long-run probability of humanity’s survival. In particular, note that this effect doesn’t require a permanently higher growth rate; the improvement in humanity’s odds of survival are potentially substantial even for a temporary period of faster growth. Conversely, even a temporary period of slow economic growth—as we have arguably been experiencing in the developed economies in recent decades—could substantially curtail the future of human civilization. This model suggests even if you care only about the very long-term future of humanity, the pace of economic growth in the short run could be key to whether we make it there. This paper suggests many future research directions. It would clearly be desirable to get better empirical data on the scale effect of existential risk. More broadly, a better understanding of how exactly existential risk is created and mitigated—and therefore modeled—would be helpful. It would also be interesting to look at the implications of a decentralized allocation, as well as possible mechanisms to efficiently provide for the global public good of existential risk mitigation. Finally, from the perspective of maximizing altruistic impact, it would be valuable to compare the impact on the longrun probability of humanity’s survival from working on policies that might accelerate the rate of growth to direct work on reducing existential risk by funding the safety sector.

<h4>Growth key to avoid <u>all existential risk</h4><p></u><strong>Aschenbrenner 20</strong> [Aschenbrenner, Leopold. Existential risk and growth. Working paper]. Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford. https://globalprioritiesinstitute. org/wp-content/upload s/Leopold-Aschenbrenner_Existential-risk-and-growth_. pdf, 2020.] CT</p><p><u><mark>Human activity can<strong></mark> create </strong>or <mark>mitigate existential risks<strong></mark>. Analyzing this in a model of endogenous growth, when the scale effect of existential risk is moderate and the marginal utility of consumption declines quickly enough, this paper grounds the intuition of some prominent thinkers that </strong>humanity may be in a critical “time of perils.” We may be economically advanced enough to be able to destroy ourselves, but not<strong> economically </strong>advanced enough that we<strong> care about this existential risk and </strong>spend on safety<strong>.</u></strong> <u><strong>This “time of perils” implies that working on could be reducing existential risk now very impactful from an altruistic perspective. </strong><mark>Faster </mark>economic <mark>growth</mark> <strong>appears to generally </strong><mark>improve the odds </mark>of humanity’s survival. When the world is not very fragile<strong>, </strong>growth straightforwardly reduces risk<strong>.</u></strong> When the world is extremely fragile, growth increases risk, but humanity is doomed to destruction anyway—the odds of humanity’s survival are zero anyway. <u><mark>In </mark>the<strong> moderate </strong><mark>fragility </mark>case<strong>, faster economic </strong><mark>growth<strong></mark>, while initially increasing risk, </strong>can <mark>help us get through</mark> <strong>this “</strong>time of <mark>perils” more quickly and<strong></mark> thus </strong><mark>increases </mark>the <mark>long-run probability of<strong></mark> humanity’s </strong><mark>survival<strong></mark>. In particular, note that </strong>this<strong> effect </strong>doesn’t require a permanently higher growth rate; the improvement in<strong> humanity’s odds of </strong>survival are <strong>potentially </strong>substantial even for a temporary period of faster growth<strong>. Conversely, </strong>even a <mark>temporary </mark>period of <mark>slow<strong></mark> economic </strong><mark>growth</u></mark>—as we have arguably been experiencing in the developed economies in recent decades—<u><mark>could substantially curtail the future of<strong></mark> human </strong><mark>civilization<strong></mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>This model suggests even </strong>if you care<strong> only </strong>about the<strong> very long-term </strong>future of humanity, the pace of economic growth in the short run could be key to whether we make it<strong> there.</u></strong> This paper suggests many future research directions. It would clearly be desirable to get better empirical data on the scale effect of existential risk. More broadly, a better understanding of how exactly existential risk is created and mitigated—and therefore modeled—would be helpful. It would also be interesting to look at the implications of a decentralized allocation, as well as possible mechanisms to efficiently provide for the global public good of existential risk mitigation. Finally, from the perspective of maximizing altruistic impact, it would be valuable to compare the impact on the longrun probability of humanity’s survival from working on policies that might accelerate the rate of growth to direct work on reducing existential risk by funding the safety sector.</p>

AC Tools

AC Shell

Econ

./documents/hsld22/Marlborough/SyKa/Marlborough-SyKa-Aff-Harvard-Westlake-Round-2.docx

A

Harvard Westlake

2

Vestavia Hills AS

Zhang, Aaron

hsld22/Marlborough/SyKa/Marlborough-SyKa-Aff-Harvard-Westlake-Round-2.docx

2023-01-15 15:24:58

SyKa

Marlborough SyKa

Sy.....

Ka.....

Marlborough

Marlborough

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Strong ASEAN solves Asia War.

Mahbubani 17

Mahbubani 17, Kishore, and Jeffery Sng. The ASEAN miracle: A catalyst for peace. NUS Press, 2017. (Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Research Institute and former Singaporean diplomat)//Elmer

ASEAN is a living and breathing modern miracle. Why? No other regional organization has done as much as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to improve the living conditions of a broad swath of humanity. ASEAN has brought peace and prosperity to a troubled region, It may have also acted as a critical catalyst for China’s peaceful rise. ASEAN is therefore more deserving of the next Nobel Peace Prize than any other person or institution today In many areas, however, ASEAN has generated optimistic narratives. ASEAN provides a living laboratory of peaceful civilizational coexistence ASEAN created indispensable diplomatic platform that regularly brings all the great powers together. Moreover, ASEAN has created conducive environments for the great powers to talk When tensions rise ASEAN provides a face-saving platform and the right setting to restart the conversation. ASEAN has especially facilitated China’s peaceful rise by generating an ecosystem of peace that moderated aggressive impulses

ASEAN brought peace and prosperity to a troubled region, catalyst for China’s peaceful rise. provides laboratory of peaceful civilizational coexistence ASEAN created indispensable platform conducive for great powers to talk face-saving platform generating peace that moderated aggressive impulses

ASEAN is a living and breathing modern miracle. Why? No other regional organization has done as much as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to improve the living conditions of a broad swath of humanity. The more than 600 million people living in the region have seen remarkable progress in the 50 years since the formation of the association. ASEAN has brought peace and prosperity to a troubled region, generated inter-civilizational harmony in the most diverse corner of the earth and brought hope to many people. It may have also acted as a critical catalyst for China’s peaceful rise. ASEAN is therefore more deserving of the next Nobel Peace Prize than any other person or institution today. It is no secret that our global discourse is dominated today by pessimistic voices. In many areas, however, ASEAN has generated optimistic narratives. In an era of growing cultural pessimism, where many thoughtful and infl uential individuals believe that different civilizations—especially Islam and the West—cannot live together in peace, ASEAN provides a living laboratory of peaceful civilizational coexistence. Few are aware that Southeast Asia has become a microcosm of our global condition. In the past, diff erent civilizations existed in separate geopolitical compartments. Today, our shrinking world means they are coming closer together. Southeast Asia is the only region where so many civilizations live together cheek by jowl. And they live together in peace. This miracle was delivered by ASEAN. Second, in an era of growing economic pessimism, where many young people, especially in America and Europe, believe that their lives will get worse in coming decades, Southeast Asia bubbles with optimism. This once-impoverished region has experienced a remarkable economic miracle. World Bank President Jim Yong Kim observed, “In just 30 years, Vietnam has reduced extreme poverty from 50 per cent to roughly 3 per cent—an astounding accomplishment.”1 Indonesia, once a metaphor for continuing and persistent poverty, has one of the most optimistic youthful populations in the world. How did such a poor country become so optimistic? ASEAN has generated economic optimism. Third, in an era of growing geopolitical pessimism, when many leading geopolitical thinkers predict rising competition and tension between great powers—especially between America and China— ASEAN has created an indispensable diplomatic platform that regularly brings all the great powers together. Moreover, ASEAN has created conducive environments for the great powers to talk to each other. Within ASEAN, a culture of peace has evolved as a result of imbibing the Indonesian custom of musyawarah and mufakat (consultation and consensus). Now ASEAN has begun to share this culture of peace with the larger Asia-Pacific region. When tensions rise between China and Japan and their leaders find it difficult to speak to each other, ASEAN provides a face-saving platform and the right setting to restart the conversation. ASEAN has especially facilitated China’s peaceful rise by generating an ecosystem of peace that moderated aggressive impulses.

<h4>Strong ASEAN solves <u>Asia War</u>. </h4><p><strong>Mahbubani 17</strong>, Kishore, and Jeffery Sng. The ASEAN miracle: A catalyst for peace. NUS Press, 2017. (Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Research Institute and former Singaporean diplomat)//Elmer </p><p><u>ASEAN is a living and breathing modern miracle. Why? No other regional organization has done as much as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to improve the living conditions of a broad swath of humanity.</u> The more than 600 million people living in the region have seen remarkable progress in the 50 years since the formation of the association. <u><strong><mark>ASEAN</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>has <mark>brought peace and prosperity to a troubled region,</u></strong></mark> generated inter-civilizational harmony in the most diverse corner of the earth and brought hope to many people. <u>It may have also</u> <u><strong>acted as a critical <mark>catalyst for China’s peaceful rise.</u></strong></mark> <u>ASEAN is therefore more deserving of the next Nobel Peace Prize than any other person or institution today</u>. It is no secret that our global discourse is dominated today by pessimistic voices. <u>In many areas, however, ASEAN has generated optimistic narratives.</u> In an era of growing cultural pessimism, where many thoughtful and infl uential individuals believe that different civilizations—especially Islam and the West—cannot live together in peace, <u>ASEAN <strong><mark>provides</strong> </mark>a <strong>living <mark>laboratory of peaceful civilizational coexistence</u></strong></mark>. Few are aware that Southeast Asia has become a microcosm of our global condition. In the past, diff erent civilizations existed in separate geopolitical compartments. Today, our shrinking world means they are coming closer together. Southeast Asia is the only region where so many civilizations live together cheek by jowl. And they live together in peace. This miracle was delivered by ASEAN. Second, in an era of growing economic pessimism, where many young people, especially in America and Europe, believe that their lives will get worse in coming decades, Southeast Asia bubbles with optimism. This once-impoverished region has experienced a remarkable economic miracle. World Bank President Jim Yong Kim observed, “In just 30 years, Vietnam has reduced extreme poverty from 50 per cent to roughly 3 per cent—an astounding accomplishment.”1 Indonesia, once a metaphor for continuing and persistent poverty, has one of the most optimistic youthful populations in the world. How did such a poor country become so optimistic? ASEAN has generated economic optimism. Third, in an era of growing geopolitical pessimism, when many leading geopolitical thinkers predict rising competition and tension between great powers—especially between America and China— <u><strong><mark>ASEAN</u></strong></mark> has <u><strong><mark>created</u></strong></mark> an <u><strong><mark>indispensable </mark>diplomatic <mark>platform</u></strong></mark> <u>that regularly brings all the great powers together. Moreover, ASEAN has created</u> <u><strong><mark>conducive</u></strong></mark> <u>environments</u> <u><strong><mark>for</u></strong></mark> <u>the</u> <u><strong><mark>great powers to talk</u></strong></mark> to each other. Within ASEAN, a culture of peace has evolved as a result of imbibing the Indonesian custom of musyawarah and mufakat (consultation and consensus). Now ASEAN has begun to share this culture of peace with the larger Asia-Pacific region. <u><strong>When tensions rise</u></strong> between China and Japan and their leaders find it difficult to speak to each other, <u><strong>ASEAN provides a <mark>face-saving platform</u></strong></mark> <u>and the right setting to restart the conversation. ASEAN has especially facilitated China’s peaceful rise by <strong><mark>generating</u></strong></mark> <u>an</u> <u><strong>ecosystem of <mark>peace that</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>moderated aggressive impulses</u></strong></mark>.</p>

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