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Those go nuclear

Adler 8

Adler 8 – David Gray, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, “The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique”, 6-1, http://www.freerangethought.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=6&Itemid=41

The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse of power, misguided policies, irrational action, and unaccountable behavior As a fundamental matter, emphasis on joint policymaking permits the airing of sundry political, social, and economic values and concerns. Such a structure wisely ensures that the ultimate policies will not merely reflect the private preferences or the short-term political interests of the President Of course, this arrangement has come under fire in the postwar period it has been asserted that quick action and a single, authoritative voice are necessary to deal with an increasingly complex, interdependent, and technologically linked world capable of almost instantaneous massive destruction. Extollers of presidential dominance also have contended that only the President has the qualitative information, the expertise, and the capacity to act with the necessary dispatch to conduct U.S. foreign These policy arguments have been reviewed, and discredited, elsewhere; space limitations here permit only a brief commentary the implications of U.S. power in the twentieth century have brought about an even greater need for institutional accountability and collective judgment than existed two hundred years ago. The devastating, incomprehensible destruction of nuclear war and the extermination of the human race demonstrate the need for joint participation in any decision to initiate war most of the disputes at stake between the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs have virtually nothing to do with the need for rapid response to crisis. they are concerned only with routine policy formulation and execution joint functions have been fused by the executive branch and have become increasingly unilateral, secretive, insulated from public debate, and hence unaccountable In the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and the Iran-contra scandal, unilateral executive behavior has become ever more difficult to defend. Scholarly appraisals have destroyed arguments about intrinsic executive expertise and wisdom in foreign affairs and the alleged superiority of information available to the President the inattentiveness of presidents to important details and the effects of "groupthink" that have dramatized and exacerbated the relative inexperience of various presidents in international relations have also devalued the extollers' arguments The assumption of foreign affairs powers by recent presidents represents a fundamental alteration of the Constitution that is both imprudent and dangerous

shared powers deter abuse misguided policies, irrational action, and unaccountable behavior joint policymaking ensures policies will not reflect private preferences or short-term political interests devastating nuclear war and extermination of the human race demonstrate need for joint participation most disputes have virtually nothing to do with rapid response executive have become unilateral, secretive, insulated and unaccountable In the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and Iran-contra effects of "groupthink" exacerbated the inexperience of presidents

{11} The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter abuse of power, misguided policies, irrational action, and unaccountable behavior.[31] As a fundamental matter, emphasis on joint policymaking permits the airing of sundry political, social, and economic values and concerns. Such a structure wisely ensures that the ultimate policies will not merely reflect the private preferences or the short-term political interests of the President.[32] {12} Of course, this arrangement has come under fire in the postwar period on a number of policy grounds. Some have argued, for example, that fundamental political and technological changes in the character of international relations and the position of the United States in the world have rendered obsolete an eighteenth century document designed for a peripheral, small state in the European system of diplomatic relations. Moreover, it has been asserted that quick action and a single, authoritative voice are necessary to deal with an increasingly complex, interdependent, and technologically linked world capable of almost instantaneous massive destruction. Extollers of presidential dominance also have contended that only the President has the qualitative information, the expertise, and the capacity to act with the necessary dispatch to conduct U.S. foreign policy.[33] {13} These policy arguments have been reviewed, and discredited, elsewhere; space limitations here permit only a brief commentary.[34] Above all else, the implications of U.S. power and action in the twentieth century have brought about an even greater need for institutional accountability and collective judgment than existed two hundred years ago. The devastating, incomprehensible destruction of nuclear war and the possible extermination of the human race demonstrate the need for joint participation in any decision to initiate war. Moreover, most of the disputes at stake between the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs have virtually nothing to do with the need for rapid response to crisis. Rather, they are concerned only with routine policy formulation and execution, a classic example of the authority exercised under the separation of powers doctrine.[35] {14} Nevertheless, these joint functions have been fused by the executive branch and have become increasingly unilateral, secretive, insulated from public debate, and hence unaccountable.[36] In the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and the Iran-contra scandal, unilateral executive behavior has become ever more difficult to defend. Scholarly appraisals have destroyed arguments about intrinsic executive expertise and wisdom in foreign affairs and the alleged superiority of information available to the President.[37] Moreover, the inattentiveness of presidents to important details and the effects of "groupthink" that have dramatized and exacerbated the relative inexperience of various presidents in international relations have also devalued the extollers' arguments. Finally, foreign policies, like domestic policies, are reflections of values. Against the strength of democratic principles, recent occupants of the White House have failed to demonstrate the superiority of their values in comparison to those of the American people and their representatives in Congress. {15} The assumption of foreign affairs powers by recent presidents represents a fundamental alteration of the Constitution that is both imprudent and dangerous. We turn now to an examination of the judiciary's contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.

<h4>Those go nuclear </h4><p><strong>Adler 8</strong> – David Gray, Professor of Political Science at Idaho State University, “The Judiciary and Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs: A Critique”, 6-1, http://www.freerangethought.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=6&Itemid=41</p><p>{11} <u>The structure of <mark>shared powers</mark> in foreign relations serves to <strong><mark>deter abuse</mark> of power</strong>, <strong><mark>misguided policies</strong>, <strong>irrational action</strong>, and <strong>unaccountable behavior</u></strong></mark>.[31] <u>As a fundamental matter, emphasis on <mark>joint policymaking</mark> permits the airing of sundry political, social, and economic values and concerns. Such a structure wisely <mark>ensures</mark> that the ultimate <mark>policies will not</mark> merely <mark>reflect</mark> the <strong><mark>private preferences</strong> or</mark> the <strong><mark>short-term political interests</strong></mark> of the President</u>.[32] {12} <u>Of course, this arrangement has come under fire in the postwar period</u> on a number of policy grounds. Some have argued, for example, that fundamental political and technological changes in the character of international relations and the position of the United States in the world have rendered obsolete an eighteenth century document designed for a peripheral, small state in the European system of diplomatic relations. Moreover, <u>it has been asserted that quick action and a single, authoritative voice are necessary to deal with an increasingly complex, interdependent, and technologically linked world capable of almost instantaneous massive destruction. Extollers of presidential dominance also have contended that only the President has the qualitative information, the expertise, and the capacity to act with the necessary dispatch to conduct U.S. foreign</u> policy.[33] {13} <u>These policy arguments have been reviewed, and <strong>discredited</strong>, elsewhere; space limitations here permit only a brief commentary</u>.[34] Above all else, <u>the implications of U.S. power</u> and action <u>in the twentieth century have brought about an even greater need for <strong>institutional accountability</strong> and <strong>collective judgment</strong> than existed two hundred years ago. The <mark>devastating</mark>, incomprehensible destruction of <strong><mark>nuclear war</strong> and</mark> the</u> possible <u><strong><mark>extermination of the human race</strong> demonstrate</mark> the <mark>need for <strong>joint participation</strong></mark> in <strong>any decision</strong> to initiate war</u>. Moreover, <u><mark>most</mark> of the <mark>disputes</mark> at stake between the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs <mark>have <strong>virtually nothing</strong> to do with</mark> the need for <mark>rapid response</mark> to crisis.</u> Rather, <u>they are concerned only with routine policy formulation and execution</u>, a classic example of the authority exercised under the separation of powers doctrine.[35] {14} Nevertheless, these <u>joint functions have been fused by the <mark>executive</mark> branch and <mark>have become</mark> increasingly <strong><mark>unilateral</strong>, <strong>secretive</strong>, <strong>insulated</mark> from public debate</strong>, <mark>and</mark> hence <strong><mark>unaccountable</u></strong></mark>.[36] <u><mark>In the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and</mark> the <mark>Iran-contra</mark> scandal, unilateral executive behavior has become ever more difficult to defend. Scholarly appraisals have <strong>destroyed</strong> arguments about intrinsic executive expertise and wisdom in foreign affairs and the alleged superiority of information available to the President</u>.[37] Moreover, <u>the <strong>inattentiveness</strong> of presidents to important details and the <mark>effects of <strong>"groupthink"</strong></mark> that have dramatized and <mark>exacerbated the</mark> relative <strong><mark>inexperience</strong> of</mark> various <mark>presidents</mark> in international relations have also devalued the extollers' arguments</u>. Finally, foreign policies, like domestic policies, are reflections of values. Against the strength of democratic principles, recent occupants of the White House have failed to demonstrate the superiority of their values in comparison to those of the American people and their representatives in Congress. {15} <u>The assumption of foreign affairs powers by recent presidents represents a fundamental alteration of the Constitution that is both imprudent and <strong>dangerous</u></strong>. We turn now to an examination of the judiciary's contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.</p>

1AC – Districts 3

Congress – 1AC

./documents/ndtceda18/MichiganState/SeGr/Michigan%20State-Serrins-Grossman-Aff-districts-Round6.docx

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1ac - accidents - trump - congress 2nr - adv cp - legislative veto da

ndtceda18/MichiganState/SeGr/Michigan%20State-Serrins-Grossman-Aff-districts-Round6.docx

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Economic downturn solves war—best data.

Clary 15

Clary 15—Christopher Clary, PhD in Political Science from MIT, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 25th, Available Online via SSRN Subscription, AIvackovic)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy This paper provides new evidence economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals For states that view each other as military threats biggest step toward cooperation is to terminate rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads 67 of which terminated evidence suggests rivalries twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than during periods of economic normalcy This is true controlling for all main alternative explanations for peaceful relations democratic status nuclear weapons possession capability imbalance common enemies international systemic changes This research questions theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five channels Economic crises lead to austerity pressures which incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment so leaders can argue to their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state This lead to threat deflation where elites downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation Leaders seek foreign aid enhanced trade and increased investment from abroad search is made easier if tensions are reduced during crises elites more prone to select leaders perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties permitting emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views these make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies

new ev Drawing data from 109 distinct dyads suggests rivalries twice as likely to terminate during downturns than normalcy controlling for all alternative explanations This questions downturns associated with diversionary war and instead argues peace result from troubles Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior austerity pressures incent cut defense expenditures strategic reassessment lead to threat deflation downplay seriousness of the threat crises increase benefit from cooperation Leaders seek aid trade and investment search made easier if tensions are reduced during crises elites prone to select leaders capable of resolving difficulties permitting leaders who hold heterodox fo po views

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 19i9 50, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

<h4>Economic downturn <u>solves</u> war—best data.</h4><p><strong>Clary 15</strong>—Christopher Clary, PhD in Political Science from MIT, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2015 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 25th, Available Online via SSRN Subscription, AIvackovic<u>)</p><p>Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? </p><p>Or might downturns</u> <u>encourage</u> <u>austerity</u> <u>and economizing behavior in foreign policy</u>? <u>This paper provides</u> <u><strong><mark>new ev</mark>idence</u></strong> that <u>economic stress is associated with <strong>conciliatory policies</strong> between strategic rivals</u>. <u>For states that view each other as <strong>military threats</u></strong>, the <u>biggest step</u> possible <u>toward</u> bilateral <u>cooperation is to terminate</u> the <u>rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition</u>. <u><mark>Drawing</mark> on <mark>data from</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>109</mark> <mark>distinct</mark> rival <mark>dyads</u></strong></mark> since 19i9 50, <u><strong>67</u></strong> <u>of which terminated</u>, the <u>evidence <mark>suggests</mark> <mark>rivalries</u></mark> were approximately <u><strong><mark>twice as likely to terminate</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>during</u></mark> <u><strong>economic <mark>downturns</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>than</u></mark> they were <u>during periods of economic <strong><mark>normalcy</u></strong></mark>. <u>This is true <mark>controlling for</mark> <strong><mark>all</u></strong></mark> of the <u><strong>main <mark>alternative explanations</u></strong></mark> <u>for</u> <u>peaceful relations</u> between foes (<u><strong>democratic status</u></strong>, <u><strong>nuclear weapons possession</u></strong>, <u><strong>capability imbalance</u></strong>, <u><strong>common enemies</u></strong>, and <u><strong>international systemic changes</u></strong>), as well as many other possible confounding variables. <u><mark>This</u></mark> <u>research <mark>questions</u></mark> existing <u>theories claiming that economic <mark>downturns</mark> are <mark>associated with <strong>diversionary war</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u> <u>instead</mark> <mark>argues</mark> that in certain circumstances <strong><mark>peace</strong></mark> may <strong><mark>result from</mark> economic <mark>troubles</u></strong></mark>. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. </p><p><u><mark>Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior</u></mark> <u>through</u> <u>five</u> primary <u>channels</u>. (1) <u>Economic crises lead to <strong><mark>austerity pressures</u></strong></mark>, <u>which</u> in turn <u><mark>incent</mark> leaders to search for ways to <strong><mark>cut defense expenditures</u></strong></mark>. (2) <u>Economic crises also encourage <strong><mark>strategic reassessment</u></strong></mark>, <u>so</u> that <u>leaders can argue to</u> <u>their</u> peers and their <u>publics</u> <u>that <strong>defense spending can be arrested</u></strong> <u><strong>without endangering the state</u></strong>. <u>This</u> can <u><mark>lead to <strong>threat deflation</u></strong></mark>, <u>where</u> <u>elites</u> attempt to <u><strong><mark>downplay</mark> the <mark>seriousness of the threat</u></strong></mark> <u>posed by a former rival</u>. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic <u><mark>crises increase</mark> the <strong>political</strong> and <strong>economic <mark>benefit</strong> from</mark> <strong>international economic <mark>cooperation</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Leaders seek <strong></mark>foreign <mark>aid</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>enhanced <mark>trade</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>increased <mark>investment</u></strong></mark> <u>from</u> <u>abroad</u> during periods of economic trouble. This <u><mark>search</mark> is <strong><mark>made easier if tensions</mark> <mark>are</mark> <mark>reduced</u></strong></mark> with historic rivals. (5) Finally, <u><mark>during crises</u></mark>, <u><mark>elites</u></mark> are <u>more <mark>prone to <strong>select leaders</u></strong></mark> who are <u>perceived as <mark>capable of <strong>resolving</mark> economic <mark>difficulties</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>permitting</u></mark> the <u>emergence of <mark>leaders who hold <strong>heterodox</mark> <mark>fo</mark>reign <mark>po</mark>licy <mark>views</u></strong></mark>. Collectively, <u>these</u> mechanisms <u>make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies</u> compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.</p>

DeDev

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Maintaining military primacy solves great-power war – otherwise, extinction.

Brands and Edel, 19

Brands and Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 5: The Contemporary Amnesia; Published by Yale University Press)

American primacy acted as a powerful deterrent to great-power conflict by creating enormous disincentives for Russia, China, or other actors to incur the “focused enmity” of the United States the U.S. security blanket smothered potential instability in regions such as Eastern Europe, while removing any possibility of revanchism by keeping countries tightly lashed to Washington American intervention helped extinguish bloody conflicts in the Balkans U.S. military pressure kept aggressive tyrannies such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea bottled up and helped slow the spread of nuclear weapons America crucially assisted the advance of globalization and the broad prosperity that came with it by promoting pro-market policies and providing the necessary climate of reassurance and stability

American primacy acted as a powerful deterrent to great-power conflict by creating enormous disincentives for actors to incur the “ enmity” of the U S the U.S. security blanket smothered instability in Europe, while removing revanchism by keeping countries tightly lashed to Washington military pressure kept Iraq, Iran, and No Ko bottled up and helped slow the spread of nuclear weapons America crucially assisted globalization by promoting pro-market policies and providing the necessary climate of reassurance and stability

As William Wohlforth has noted, American primacy and activism acted as a powerful deterrent to great-power conflict by creating enormous disincentives for Russia, China, or other actors to incur the “focused enmity” of the United States.11 The persistence and even extension of the U.S. security blanket smothered potential instability in unsettled regions such as Eastern Europe, while removing any possibility of German or Japanese revanchism—a prospect much feared in the early 1990s—by keeping those countries tightly lashed to Washington. American intervention helped extinguish bloody conflicts in the Balkans before they could spread to neighboring countries; U.S. diplomatic and military pressure kept aggressive tyrannies such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea bottled up and helped slow the spread of nuclear weapons. U.S. support helped democratic forces triumph in countries from Haiti to Poland, as the number of democracies rose from 76 in 1990 to 120 in 2000; America crucially assisted the advance of globalization and the broad prosperity that came with it by promoting pro-market policies and providing the necessary climate of reassurance and stability.12

<h4>Maintaining military primacy solves <u>great-power war</u> – otherwise, extinction.</h4><p><strong>Brands and Edel, 19</strong> — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 5: The Contemporary Amnesia; Published by Yale University Press)</p><p>As William Wohlforth has noted, <u><strong><mark>American primacy</u></strong></mark> and activism <u><mark>acted as a <strong>powerful deterrent to great-power conflict</strong> by creating <strong>enormous disincentives</strong> for</mark> Russia, China, or other <mark>actors to incur the “</mark>focused <mark>enmity” of the <strong>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>.11 The persistence and even extension of <u><mark>the U.S. security blanket<strong> smothered</mark> potential <mark>instability</strong> in</mark> </u>unsettled<u> regions such as <strong>Eastern <mark>Europe</strong>, while removing</mark> any possibility of</u> German or Japanese <u><strong><mark>revanchism</u></strong></mark>—a prospect much feared in the early 1990s—<u><mark>by keeping</u></mark> those <u><mark>countries</u> <u><strong>tightly lashed</u></strong> <u>to Washington</u></mark>. <u>American intervention helped <strong>extinguish bloody conflicts</strong> in the <strong>Balkans</u></strong> before they could spread to neighboring countries; <u>U.S.</u> diplomatic and <u><strong><mark>military pressure</u></strong> <u>kept</mark> <strong>aggressive tyrannies</strong> such as <strong><mark>Iraq, Iran</strong>, and <strong>No</mark>rth <mark>Ko</mark>rea <mark>bottled up a</strong>nd helped <strong>slow the spread</strong> of <strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. U.S. support helped democratic forces triumph in countries from Haiti to Poland, as the number of democracies rose from 76 in 1990 to 120 in 2000; <u><mark>America <strong>crucially assisted</strong></mark> the advance of <strong><mark>globalization</strong></mark> and the broad prosperity that came with it <mark>by promoting <strong>pro-market policies</strong> and providing the <strong>necessary climate</strong> of <strong>reassurance</strong> and <strong>stability</u></strong></mark>.12</p>

Meadows r6 v Northwood Independent FF

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2 – DIB DA

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1ac - taiwan 1nc - deterrence dib suspend cp consult japan 2nr - suspend dib

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US leadership is key to global action

Sutter 10/30 John D. Sutter, 10-30-2020, "Americans, your vote matters for the planet's survival," KCTV Kansas City, https://www.kctv5.com/americans-your-vote-matters-for-the-planets-survival/article_2de34de2-bbc1-538a-a97d-748d4d1fb8bc.html, SJBE

Sutter 10/30 John D. Sutter, 10-30-2020, "Americans, your vote matters for the planet's survival," KCTV Kansas City, https://www.kctv5.com/americans-your-vote-matters-for-the-planets-survival/article_2de34de2-bbc1-538a-a97d-748d4d1fb8bc.html, SJBE

No country can "fix" the climate crisis on its own; however, the United States is cumulatively the largest historical polluter of the atmosphere (US emissions fell an estimated 2% in 2019 but that was largely because of coal's decline, according to energy analysts). What this country does matters not just within these borders but also in the global, moral context. The Paris Agreement, after all, is an international experiment in peer pressure. Donald Trump started the process of withdrawing the United States from that climate accord, which makes it easier for countries like China, India and Brazil to shirk responsibility. There's only so much one administration in one country can do. But, as someone who covered the Paris talks, I can tell you that it's difficult to overstate US leadership on this issue Emissions today stay in the atmosphere for generations to come. Our actions today, then, matter for hundreds of years.

What this country does matters in the global context The Paris Agreement is an international experiment in peer pressure Trump makes it easier for countries like China, India and Brazil to shirk responsibility it's difficult to overstate US leadership Our actions today matter for hundreds of years

No country can "fix" the climate crisis on its own; however, the United States is cumulatively the largest historical polluter of the atmosphere (US emissions fell an estimated 2% in 2019 but that was largely because of coal's decline, according to energy analysts). What this country does matters not just within these borders but also in the global, moral context. The Paris Agreement, after all, is an international experiment in peer pressure. Donald Trump started the process of withdrawing the United States from that climate accord, which makes it easier for countries like China, India and Brazil to shirk responsibility. Biden would re-pledge US support, helping to re-up the ante. There's only so much one administration in one country can do. But, as someone who covered the Paris talks, I can tell you that it's difficult to overstate US leadership on this issue. Biden also will need to win support in Congress if he hopes to make lasting change. Executive orders can move policy in a certain direction, but they're subject to reversal and legal challenge. There are ways in which climate must be dealt with outside of the four-year horse race that is US politics. Electing climate-hawks in the House and Senate could help ensure success. Inside Climate News has a detailed analysis of which Senate races are key for climate policy, focusing particularly on Mississippi, Alaska, Maine, Colorado, Arizona, Alabama, Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Iowa and Kentucky. Those races matter. As does the presidential race -- hugely so. Emissions today stay in the atmosphere for generations to come. Our actions today, then, matter for hundreds of years.

<h4>US leadership is key to global action</h4><p><strong>Sutter 10/30</strong> <u><strong>John D. Sutter, 10-30-2020, "Americans, your vote matters for the planet's survival," KCTV Kansas City, https://www.kctv5.com/americans-your-vote-matters-for-the-planets-survival/article_2de34de2-bbc1-538a-a97d-748d4d1fb8bc.html, SJBE</p><p>No country can "fix" the climate crisis on its own; however, the United States is cumulatively the largest historical polluter of the atmosphere (US emissions fell an estimated 2% in 2019 but that was largely because of coal's decline, according to energy analysts). <mark>What this country does matters</mark> not just within these borders but also <mark>in the global</mark>, moral <mark>context</mark>. <mark>The Paris Agreement</mark>, after all, <mark>is an international experiment in peer pressure</mark>. Donald <mark>Trump</mark> started the process of withdrawing the United States from that climate accord, which <mark>makes it easier for countries like China, India and Brazil to shirk responsibility</mark>.</u></strong> Biden would re-pledge US support, helping to re-up the ante. <u><strong>There's only so much one administration in one country can do. But, as someone who covered the Paris talks, I can tell you that <mark>it's difficult to overstate US leadership</mark> on this issue</u></strong>. Biden also will need to win support in Congress if he hopes to make lasting change. Executive orders can move policy in a certain direction, but they're subject to reversal and legal challenge. There are ways in which climate must be dealt with outside of the four-year horse race that is US politics. Electing climate-hawks in the House and Senate could help ensure success. Inside Climate News has a detailed analysis of which Senate races are key for climate policy, focusing particularly on Mississippi, Alaska, Maine, Colorado, Arizona, Alabama, Kansas, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Iowa and Kentucky. Those races matter. As does the presidential race -- hugely so. <u><strong>Emissions today stay in the atmosphere for generations to come. <mark>Our actions today</mark>, then, <mark>matter for hundreds of years</mark>. </p></u></strong>

1AC

‘Advantage 1: Climate Change

./documents/hsld20/WestRanch/ve/West%20Ranch-venkatasuramanian-Aff-Isidore%20Newman-Doubles.docx

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Leaving nuclear control with humans is disastrous – structural quirks of psychology

King 19 , 12 Feb. 2019, www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/02/12/what_do_cognitive_biases_mean_for_deterrence_114182.html.

King 19 King, Iain. Iain King CBE is Defence Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington D.C. "What Do Cognitive Biases Mean for Deterrence?" RealClearDefense, 12 Feb. 2019, www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/02/12/what_do_cognitive_biases_mean_for_deterrence_114182.html.

Humans make poor decisions not just sometimes, but systematically insights into these cognitive biases have implications for deterrence One might think people take in all the available information and make the best decisions; we tend not to. We make bad decisions for many reasons thinking takes time and effort, and so we often go for heuristic short-cuts.[ like pack animals, we follow the herd , we regularly misunderstand the world in systematic ways. We have deep-rooted attachments to what we already own, even when we can have something better.[5] These traits have helped us to adapt and stay alive, and we have inherited them from our ancestors who survived because of them There are at least fifty of these proven quirks that warp our decision making confirmation bias, optimism bias normalcy bias, reactance some of the most profound impacts are on deterrence. Proof that cognitive biases are real means several of the assumptions underpinning traditional deterrence theory are wrong Thomas Schellin , who led U.S. thinking on nuclear deterrence , simply applied a standard hypothesis from economics at the tim Only in the 1970s, with the so-called third wave of deterrence theory, was psychology understood in enough detail to begin to grasp how people make systematic errors.[ In military matters even though the stakes are usually much higher, cognitive errors are still rife history is packed with examples of wars that might have been deterred were it not for strong cognitive biases affecting decision makers Nuclear conflict has been deterred for more than seven decades, p We still need to watch for normalcy bias, though. No nuclear weapons have been used in war since 1945, but it is folly to presume that will always be the case.

Humans make poor decisions systematically insights have implications for deterrence We make bad decisions for many reasons thinking takes time we go for short-cuts we follow the herd regularly misunderstand the world have deep-rooted attachments to what we own There are at least fifty of these quirks that warp decision making confirmation bias, optimism bias, normalcy bias reactance cognitive biases means the assumptions underpinning deterrence theory are wrong thinking on nuclear deterrence simply applied a hypothesis from economi cognitive errors are still history is packed with wars that might have been deterred were it not for cognitive biases watch for normalcy bias No nuclear weapons have been used but it is folly to presume that will always be the case.

Humans make poor decisions—not just sometimes, but systematically—and new insights into these cognitive biases have implications for deterrence. To illustrate just how important these can be, consider the curious case of Abraham Wald, a respected Columbia academic who, in 1943, was selected by the U.S. War Department for an important task.[1] The United States Army Air Forces were losing too many bombers over Europe to anti-aircraft fire and were considering adding armour plating to the aircraft, but the extra metal made the aircraft heavier, reducing performance and bomb loads. So, armouring the whole plane was impossible. Where could extra armour be placed effectively? Abraham Wald and his study of aircraft armor (Slideshare) Wald researched where the bombers frequently suffered the most damage. After an extensive survey of the squadrons returning to base, Wald discovered most of the damage was to the wings and fuselage, whereas the engines and cockpits seemed to be hit much less. Initially, the War Department assumed the armour plating should protect the wings and fuselage, but Wald explained how they were completely wrong. Armour placement was needed where there was no damage since bombers hit there never returned home to be studied. On Wald’s advice, the armour plating was duly placed around the cockpit and engines. Wald demonstrated that the War Department was making a common mistake now known as survivorship bias.[2] By looking at a skewed sample—in this case, only those bombers surviving enemy fire—the War Department’s logic went awry. Survivorship bias is one of many deep-rooted and systematic flaws in the way humans process information. One might think people take in all the available information and make the best decisions; in fact, however, we tend not to. We make bad decisions for many reasons. For one, thinking takes time and effort, and so we often go for heuristic short-cuts.[3] For another, like pack animals, we follow the herd.[4] Furthermore, we regularly misunderstand the world in systematic ways. We have deep-rooted attachments to what we already own, even when we can have something better.[5] These traits have helped us to adapt and stay alive, and we have inherited them from our ancestors who survived because of them.[6] There are at least fifty of these proven quirks that warp our decision making.[7] One of these is confirmation bias, where we tend to underrate new information that challenges what we already believe. There is also optimism bias, which makes us overestimate our chances of getting away with something.[8] Next to these we have normalcy bias, where we refuse to plan for a disaster that has never occurred.[9] Then there is reactance, a phenomenon is which we do the opposite of what someone wants us to do just to defy a perceived constraint on our freedom of choice.[10] These biases can influence life in many ways, from who we marry to bad budgeting choices. But some of the most profound impacts are on deterrence. Promoted Content Mgid To understand the effect of these systematic mistakes on how we deter unwelcome behaviour, consider one of the oldest forms of deterrence, the threat of jail time to discourage theft. In a rationale calculation, a substantial prison sentence should be enough to deter almost anyone from stealing, but cognitive biases mean this is not necessarily so. Reactance spurs rebellious criminals to steal simply because stealing is outlawed. The normalcy effect makes the ruinous impact of a prison sentence just too hard to contemplate, so it does not factor properly in the criminal mind. Criminals who plan a clever theft and escape tune out ways they might be caught because of confirmation bias. Criminals who know successful thieves and none of the many others who are caught and locked up will suffer from survivorship bias if they calculate their own chances of getting away with crime. And some will suffer from and optimism bias if they just guess. So, every day punishments are in place that should deter every right-thinking individual in the world, but people still try their luck. Every prisoner is proof deterrence can and does fail. These biases affect us all—not just criminals—and they affect us much more than we realise. Almost all of us suffer from a bias blind spot: the proven tendency for people to recognise biases in others more readily than in themselves.[11] Thomas Schelling (EconLib) Proof that cognitive biases are real means several of the assumptions underpinning traditional deterrence theory are wrong. Academics like Thomas Schelling, who led U.S. thinking on nuclear deterrence in the 1950s and 1960s and who was a contemporary of Abraham Wald, simply applied a standard hypothesis from economics at the time: that people knew how to behave in their own best interests.[12] People might make mistakes, went the theory, but they’d soon learn how to correct their behaviour because they would benefit from doing so. Only in the 1970s, with the so-called third wave of deterrence theory, was psychology understood in enough detail to begin to grasp how people make systematic errors.[13] Kremlinology, the study of key figures in the Soviet system and how they behave and interact, became a key part of the West’s approach to nuclear deterrence. People, not weapons, became the central focus of Western defence. The science of cognitive bias has advanced considerably since then. We now know people consistently behave in ways that go against their best interests in almost every field.[14] Indeed, in the last decade many governments have set up so-called nudge units, playing on these behavioural quirks to achieve policy goals, from increasing pension contributions to enforcing traffic laws.[15] In military matters, even though the stakes are usually much higher, cognitive errors are still rife. Indeed, history is packed with examples of wars that might have been deterred were it not for strong cognitive biases affecting decision makers. Consider Argentina in 1982, which might not have invaded the Falkland Islands if it had a less distorted view of the United Kingdom’s resolve and capacity to respond. Or consider France in 1870, where military groupthink tipped Napoleon III into a disastrous war with Prussia. And Europe in the summer of 1914 was a cauldron of cognitive biases, as countries—Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Russia, Germany, France, and Britain—made a succession of poor judgments about the deterrence posture of rivals, rivals who, in turn, provided misleading signals themselves, ultimately leading to a catastrophe that spread around the world.[16] Mgid Signals Of Lung Cancer Learn More→ According to one study, the weaker power initiates conflict in some 33% of observations, suggesting military might fails to deter as much as a third of the time.[17] Perhaps the attackers suffered from restraint bias—the tendency for people and groups to underestimate how easily they succumb to temptation? Perhaps groupthink infected the highest levels of combatants’ government and armed forces? Perhaps the parties to conflict missed important signals from an enemy because confirmation bias meant they were not looking for them? Whatever the reason, chances are cognitive biases were involved. These tragic examples of conventional wars contrast with a much better record in nuclear matters where deterrence has, so far, been entirely successful. Nuclear conflict has been deterred for more than seven decades, partly because cognitive bias has been almost entirely squeezed out of it. This suggests the calculus governing our nuclear deterrent, and the strategic weapons of those who may oppose us, is as protected from human shortcomings as it can be, thus keeping the world safe. We still need to watch for normalcy bias, though. No nuclear weapons have been used in war since 1945, but it is folly to presume that will always be the case.

<h4>Leaving nuclear control with humans is <u>disastrous</u> – <u>structural</u> quirks of <u>psychology</u> </h4><p><strong>King 19</strong> King, Iain. Iain King CBE is Defence Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington D.C. "What Do Cognitive Biases Mean for Deterrence?" RealClearDefense<u><strong>, 12 Feb. 2019, www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/02/12/what_do_cognitive_biases_mean_for_deterrence_114182.html.</p><p></strong><mark>Humans make poor decisions</u></mark>—<u><strong>not just sometimes, but <mark>systematically</u></strong></mark>—and new <u><mark>insights</u></mark> <u>into these cognitive biases <mark>have implications for deterrence</u></mark>. To illustrate just how important these can be, consider the curious case of Abraham Wald, a respected Columbia academic who, in 1943, was selected by the U.S. War Department for an important task.[1] The United States Army Air Forces were losing too many bombers over Europe to anti-aircraft fire and were considering adding armour plating to the aircraft, but the extra metal made the aircraft heavier, reducing performance and bomb loads. So, armouring the whole plane was impossible. Where could extra armour be placed effectively? Abraham Wald and his study of aircraft armor (Slideshare) Wald researched where the bombers frequently suffered the most damage. After an extensive survey of the squadrons returning to base, Wald discovered most of the damage was to the wings and fuselage, whereas the engines and cockpits seemed to be hit much less. Initially, the War Department assumed the armour plating should protect the wings and fuselage, but Wald explained how they were completely wrong. Armour placement was needed where there was no damage since bombers hit there never returned home to be studied. On Wald’s advice, the armour plating was duly placed around the cockpit and engines. Wald demonstrated that the War Department was making a common mistake now known as survivorship bias.[2] By looking at a skewed sample—in this case, only those bombers surviving enemy fire—the War Department’s logic went awry. Survivorship bias is one of many deep-rooted and systematic flaws in the way humans process information. <u>One might think people take in all the available information and make the best decisions; </u>in fact, however, <u><strong>we tend not </strong>to. <mark>We make bad decisions for many reasons</u></mark>. For one, <u><mark>thinking</mark> <mark>takes time</mark> and effort,</u> <u>and so <mark>we</mark> often <mark>go for</mark> <strong>heuristic <mark>short-cuts</mark>.</strong>[</u>3] For another, <u>like pack animals,</u> <u><mark>we follow the herd</u></mark>.[4] Furthermore<u>, we <mark>regularly</mark> <mark>misunderstand the world</mark> in systematic ways. We <mark>have deep-rooted attachments</mark> <mark>to what we</mark> already <mark>own</mark>, even when we can have something better.[5] These traits have helped us to adapt and stay alive, and we have inherited them from our ancestors who survived because of them</u>.[6] <u><strong><mark>There are at least fifty of these</mark> proven <mark>quirks</mark> <mark>that warp</mark> our <mark>decision making</u></strong></mark>.[7] One of these is <u><mark>confirmation bias,</mark> </u>where we tend to underrate new information that challenges what we already believe. There is also <u><mark>optimism bias</u>,</mark> which makes us overestimate our chances of getting away with something.[8] Next to these we have <u><mark>normalcy bias</mark>,</u> where we refuse to plan for a disaster that has never occurred.[9] Then there is <u><mark>reactance</u></mark>, a phenomenon is which we do the opposite of what someone wants us to do just to defy a perceived constraint on our freedom of choice.[10] These biases can influence life in many ways, from who we marry to bad budgeting choices. But <u>some</u> <u>of the <strong>most profound impacts are on deterrence. </u></strong>Promoted Content Mgid To understand the effect of these systematic mistakes on how we deter unwelcome behaviour, consider one of the oldest forms of deterrence, the threat of jail time to discourage theft. In a rationale calculation, a substantial prison sentence should be enough to deter almost anyone from stealing, but cognitive biases mean this is not necessarily so. Reactance spurs rebellious criminals to steal simply because stealing is outlawed. The normalcy effect makes the ruinous impact of a prison sentence just too hard to contemplate, so it does not factor properly in the criminal mind. Criminals who plan a clever theft and escape tune out ways they might be caught because of confirmation bias. Criminals who know successful thieves and none of the many others who are caught and locked up will suffer from survivorship bias if they calculate their own chances of getting away with crime. And some will suffer from and optimism bias if they just guess. So, every day punishments are in place that should deter every right-thinking individual in the world, but people still try their luck. Every prisoner is proof deterrence can and does fail. These biases affect us all—not just criminals—and they affect us much more than we realise. Almost all of us suffer from a bias blind spot: the proven tendency for people to recognise biases in others more readily than in themselves.[11] Thomas Schelling (EconLib) <u>Proof that <mark>cognitive biases</mark> are real <mark>means</mark> <strong>several of <mark>the assumptions</mark> <mark>underpinning</mark> traditional <mark>deterrence theory are wrong</u></strong></mark>. Academics like <u>Thomas Schellin</u>g<u>, who led U.S. <mark>thinking on nuclear deterrence</u></mark> in the 1950s and 1960s and who was a contemporary of Abraham Wald<u>, <mark>simply applied a</mark> standard <mark>hypothesis from economi</mark>cs at the tim</u>e: that people knew how to behave in their own best interests.[12] People might make mistakes, went the theory, but they’d soon learn how to correct their behaviour because they would benefit from doing so. <u>Only in the 1970s, with the so-called third wave of deterrence theory, was psychology understood in enough detail to begin to grasp how people make systematic errors.[</u>13] Kremlinology, the study of key figures in the Soviet system and how they behave and interact, became a key part of the West’s approach to nuclear deterrence. People, not weapons, became the central focus of Western defence. The science of cognitive bias has advanced considerably since then. We now know people consistently behave in ways that go against their best interests in almost every field.[14] Indeed, in the last decade many governments have set up so-called nudge units, playing on these behavioural quirks to achieve policy goals, from increasing pension contributions to enforcing traffic laws.[15] <u>In military matters</u>, <u>even though the stakes are usually much higher<strong>, <mark>cognitive errors are</mark> <mark>still</mark> rife</u></strong>. Indeed, <u><mark>history is packed</mark> <mark>with</mark> examples of <mark>wars</mark> <mark>that</mark> <mark>might have been deterred were it <strong>not for</mark> strong <mark>cognitive biases</mark> affecting decision make</strong>rs</u>. Consider Argentina in 1982, which might not have invaded the Falkland Islands if it had a less distorted view of the United Kingdom’s resolve and capacity to respond. Or consider France in 1870, where military groupthink tipped Napoleon III into a disastrous war with Prussia. And Europe in the summer of 1914 was a cauldron of cognitive biases, as countries—Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Russia, Germany, France, and Britain—made a succession of poor judgments about the deterrence posture of rivals, rivals who, in turn, provided misleading signals themselves, ultimately leading to a catastrophe that spread around the world.[16] Mgid Signals Of Lung Cancer Learn More→ According to one study, the weaker power initiates conflict in some 33% of observations, suggesting military might fails to deter as much as a third of the time.[17] Perhaps the attackers suffered from restraint bias—the tendency for people and groups to underestimate how easily they succumb to temptation? Perhaps groupthink infected the highest levels of combatants’ government and armed forces? Perhaps the parties to conflict missed important signals from an enemy because confirmation bias meant they were not looking for them? Whatever the reason, chances are cognitive biases were involved. These tragic examples of conventional wars contrast with a much better record in nuclear matters where deterrence has, so far, been entirely successful. <u>Nuclear conflict has been deterred for more than seven decades, p</u>artly because cognitive bias has been almost entirely squeezed out of it. This suggests the calculus governing our nuclear deterrent, and the strategic weapons of those who may oppose us, is as protected from human shortcomings as it can be, thus keeping the world safe. <u>We still need to <strong><mark>watch for normalcy bias</strong></mark>, though. <mark>No nuclear weapons have been used</mark> in war since 1945, <mark>but <strong>it is folly to presume that will always be the case.</p></u></strong></mark>

NC

Case

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But even if it isn’t, the chance of it going nuclear is 0.38%

Rodriguez 19

Luisa Rodriguez 19, research fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research, she also researched nuclear war at Rethink Priorities and as a visiting researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute, holds an M.A. from The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University, “How likely is a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia?”, https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/PAYa6on5gJKwAywrF/how-likely-is-a-nuclear-exchange-between-the-us-and-russia

I get a rough sense of how probable a nuclear war might be by looking at historical evidence the views of experts and predictions made by forecasters I find that, if we aggregate those perspectives that the chances of a nuclear war between the US and Russia, in particular, are around 0.38%

I get a sense of how probable a nuclear war might be by looking at historical evidence, views of experts and predictions made by forecasters if we aggregate those perspectives the chances of a nuclear war between the US and Russia, are around 0.38%

My previous posts address how bad a nuclear war is likely to be, conditional on there being a nuclear war (see this post on the deaths caused directly by a US-Russia nuclear exchange, and this post on the deaths caused by a nuclear famine), but they don’t consider the likelihood that we actually see a US-Russia nuclear exchange unfold in the first place. In this post, I get a rough sense of how probable a nuclear war might be by looking at historical evidence, the views of experts, and predictions made by forecasters. I find that, if we aggregate those perspectives, there’s about a 1.1% chance of nuclear war each year, and that the chances of a nuclear war between the US and Russia, in particular, are around 0.38% per year.

<h4>But even if it isn’t, the chance of it going nuclear is <u>0.38%</h4><p></u>Luisa <strong>Rodriguez 19</strong>, research fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research, she also researched nuclear war at Rethink Priorities and as a visiting researcher at the Future of Humanity Institute, holds an M.A. from The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University, “How likely is a nuclear exchange between the US and Russia?”, https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/PAYa6on5gJKwAywrF/how-likely-is-a-nuclear-exchange-between-the-us-and-russia</p><p>My previous posts address how bad a nuclear war is likely to be, conditional on there being a nuclear war (see this post on the deaths caused directly by a US-Russia nuclear exchange, and this post on the deaths caused by a nuclear famine), but they don’t consider the likelihood that we actually see a US-Russia nuclear exchange unfold in the first place. In this post, <u><mark>I get a</mark> rough <mark>sense of how <strong>probable a nuclear war might be</strong> by looking at <strong>historical evidence</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong>the <mark>views of experts</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>predictions made by forecasters</u></strong></mark>. <u>I find that, <mark>if we <strong>aggregate those perspectives</u></strong></mark>, there’s about a 1.1% chance of nuclear war each year, and <u>that <mark>the chances of a <strong>nuclear war between the US and Russia</strong>,</mark> in particular, <strong><mark>are around 0.38%</u></strong></mark> per year. </p>

1NC---Round 5

BALTICS

1NC---AT: Baltics

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4. ‘Reduce’ modifies ‘alliance commitments’, which are written agreements with allies.

Deni 16

Dr. John R. Deni 16, Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, Political Advisor for the European headquarters of the US Army, Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, p. Google Books

Snyder defines dependence as a function of the net security benefit the ally receives from the alliance Commitment is defined as an "arrangement of values that disposes one to act in a certain way," arising from the nature of contract or agreement between allies

Commitment is defined as an "arrangement to act a certain way," arising from the contract or agreement between allies

Snyder defines dependence as a function of the net security benefit the ally receives from the alliance. Commitment is defined as an "arrangement of values that disposes one to act in a certain way," arising from the nature of the contract or agreement between the allies, as well as a state's interest in aiding an ally that exists apart from the promise spelled out in the agreement establishing the alliance.9 Finally, Snyder defines a country's interest in an object of bargaining as the value it places on that object. In Snyder's conceptualization, the interest component of the bargaining equation is what an ally stands to gain, while the commitment and dependence elements represent what an ally stands to lose. Of course, much of this is subjective, and Snyder acknowledges as much when he notes that assessments of interest, commitment, and dependence are all subject to various interpretations and perceptions (especially those of the decision-makers involved). Nonetheless, one can at least assume that policymakers have a good idea of the various interests, commitments, and dependency levels of their own countries.

<h4>4. ‘Reduce’ modifies ‘alliance commitments’, which are <u>written agreements</u> with allies.</h4><p>Dr. John R. <strong>Deni 16</strong>, Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute, Political Advisor for the European headquarters of the US Army, Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, p. Google Books</p><p><u>Snyder defines dependence as a function of the net security benefit the ally receives from the alliance</u>. <u><strong><mark>Commitment</strong> is <strong>defined</strong> as an "arrangement</mark> of values that disposes one <mark>to act</mark> in <mark>a certain way," arising from the</mark> nature of</u> the <u><strong><mark>contract</strong> or <strong>agreement</strong> between</u></mark> the <u><mark>allies</u></mark>, as well as a state's interest in aiding an ally that exists apart from the promise spelled out in the agreement establishing the alliance.9 Finally, Snyder defines a country's interest in an object of bargaining as the value it places on that object. In Snyder's conceptualization, the interest component of the bargaining equation is what an ally stands to gain, while the commitment and dependence elements represent what an ally stands to lose. Of course, much of this is subjective, and Snyder acknowledges as much when he notes that assessments of interest, commitment, and dependence are all subject to various interpretations and perceptions (especially those of the decision-makers involved). Nonetheless, one can at least assume that policymakers have a good idea of the various interests, commitments, and dependency levels of their own countries. </p>

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A] The normative supervenes on the natural – natural facts like whether brains develop to permit rationality or subjectivity determine whether non naturalist moral facts can be premised on things like capacity for reason

Lutz and Lenman 18.

Lutz and Lenman 18. Lutz, Matthew and Lenman, James, "Moral Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/naturalism-moral/>. //Massa

The normative supervenes on the natural; in all possible worlds in which the natural facts are the same as the actual world, the moral facts are the same This has been called the “least controversial thesis in metaethics” it is very widely accepted. For naturalists the moral facts just are natural facts, so when we consider worlds that are naturally the same we will ipso facto be considering worlds that are morally the same it seems impossible for a non-naturalist to explain how the moral supervenes on the natural.

normative supervenes the natural the “least controversial thesis in metaethics” is widely accepted the moral facts are natural facts, so worlds naturally the same will ipso facto be worlds morally the same impossible for a non-naturalist to explain how the moral supervenes the natural.

The first argument against normative non-naturalism concerns normative supervenience. The normative supervenes on the natural; in all metaphysically possible worlds in which the natural facts are the same as they are in the actual world, the moral facts are the same as well. This claim has been called the “least controversial thesis in metaethics” (Rosen forthcoming); it is very widely accepted. But it is also a striking fact that stands in need of some explanation. For naturalists, such an explanation is easy to provide: the moral facts just are natural facts, so when we consider worlds that are naturally the same as the actual world, we will ipso facto be considering worlds that are morally the same as the actual world. But for the non-naturalist, no such explanation seems available. In fact, it seems to be in principle impossible for a non-naturalist to explain how the moral supervenes on the natural. And if the non-naturalist can offer no explanation of this phenomenon that demands explanation, this is a heavy mark against non-naturalism (McPherson 2012).

<h4>A] The normative supervenes on the natural – natural facts like whether brains develop to permit rationality or subjectivity determine whether non naturalist moral facts can be premised on things like capacity for reason</h4><p><u><strong>Lutz and Lenman 18.</u></strong> Lutz, Matthew and Lenman, James, "Moral Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/naturalism-moral/>. //Massa</p><p>The first argument against normative non-naturalism concerns normative supervenience. <u><strong>The <mark>normative supervenes</mark> on <mark>the natural</mark>; in all</u></strong> metaphysically <u><strong>possible worlds in which the natural facts are the same as</u></strong> they are in <u><strong>the actual world, the moral facts are the same</u></strong> as well. <u><strong>This</u></strong> claim <u><strong>has been called <mark>the “least controversial thesis in metaethics”</u></strong></mark> (Rosen forthcoming); <u><strong>it <mark>is</mark> very <mark>widely accepted</mark>.</u></strong> But it is also a striking fact that stands in need of some explanation. <u><strong>For naturalists</u></strong>, such an explanation is easy to provide: <u><strong><mark>the moral facts</mark> just <mark>are natural facts, so </mark>when we consider <mark>worlds </mark>that are <mark>naturally the same</u></strong></mark> as the actual world, <u><strong>we <mark>will ipso facto be </mark>considering <mark>worlds</mark> that are <mark>morally the same</mark> </u></strong>as the actual world. But for the non-naturalist, no such explanation seems available. In fact, <u><strong>it seems</u></strong> to be in principle <u><strong><mark>impossible for a non-naturalist to explain how the moral supervenes </mark>on <mark>the natural.</u></strong></mark> And if the non-naturalist can offer no explanation of this phenomenon that demands explanation, this is a heavy mark against non-naturalism (McPherson 2012).</p>

FW

./documents/hsld22/SouthlakeCarroll/AdSh/SouthlakeCarroll-AdSh-Neg-37th-Annual-Stanford-Invitational-Round-3.docx

N

37th Annual Stanford Invitational

3

Cary RL

Edwards

1ac- fem ir 1nc- util, cap k, case 1ar- all 2nr- all 2ar- all

hsld22/SouthlakeCarroll/AdSh/SouthlakeCarroll-AdSh-Neg-37th-Annual-Stanford-Invitational-Round-3.docx

2023-02-11 23:28:54

AdSh

Southlake Carroll AdSh

Please contact me for docs from other tournaments/rounds I may have forgotten to put on my wiki. Also, please contact me at least 30 minutes pre-round for any interps you want me to meet otherwise it's an automatic I-meet. Email is: [email protected] **STATE- My rd1 and 2 os is freezing, but I have the round report up. If you need the doc, email me or go to one of my teammate's wiki's https://docs.google.com/document/d/17aXHbX_Y7dEIuhjLWoIq_cTcne4mqsfog9JF97TDrko/edit?usp=sharing Evidence of my wiki not letting me open source^^ **Note for Stanford and Colleyville- my rounds 1, 2, 4, and 5 for Stanford and round 2 & 4 for Colleyville keep freezing when I try to publish anything. Please email me if you need the docs from these rounds and I will get them to you immediately (aff docs for all these rounds were schengen) **Cites- My cites are messed up and it won't let me fix them but if you need anything specific from them, lmk and I'll send them

Ad.....

Sh.....

SouthlakeCarroll

Southlake Carroll

TX

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Using the government as a heuristic is better pragmatically and forces us to truly investigate political structures in search of ways to improve instead of using abstract solutions for concrete impacts.

Zannoti ’13 -

Zannoti ’13 - Zannoti, Laura, associate professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech., Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2008 and joined the Purdue University faculty in 2009. “Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World”, originally published online 30 December 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413512098, P. Sage Publications MC

Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain an immanent ideal social order. It is found in struggles constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of liberal political rationalities and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. ’’ These alternative formulations foster an ethics of political engagement, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’ Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come . Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices.

Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain an immanent ideal social order. It is found in struggles constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of liberal political rationalities and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. ’’ These alternative formulations foster an ethics of political engagement, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’ Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come . Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices.

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.

<h4><strong>Using the government as a heuristic is better pragmatically and forces us to truly investigate political structures in search of ways to improve instead of using abstract solutions for concrete impacts.</h4><p>Zannoti ’13 - </strong>Zannoti, Laura, associate professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech., Ph.D. from the University of Washington in 2008 and joined the Purdue University faculty in 2009. “Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World”, originally published online 30 December 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413512098, P. Sage Publications MC</p><p>By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations.<u><strong><mark> Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain </u></strong></mark>a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or<u><strong><mark> an immanent ideal social order. It is found </u></strong></mark>instead<u><strong><mark> in </u></strong></mark>multifarious and contingent<u><strong><mark> struggles </u></strong></mark>that are<u><strong><mark> constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications </u></strong></mark>of the complexities<u><strong><mark> of liberal political rationalities and </u></strong></mark>of their interactions with non-liberal political players and<u><strong><mark> nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. </mark>International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with</p><p><mark> Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. </u></strong></mark>It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.<u><strong><mark>’’ </u></strong></mark>More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion.<u><strong><mark> These alternative formulations </u></strong></mark>also<u><strong><mark> foster an ethics of political engagement, </p><p></u></strong></mark>to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices,<u><strong><mark> that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’</u></strong></mark>83<u><strong><mark> Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come </u></strong></mark>or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained<u><strong><mark>. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. </u></strong></mark>To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.</p>

PS AC

Framework

./documents/hsld22/Marlborough/PeSt/Marlborough-PeSt-Aff-Stanford-Round-3.docx

A

Stanford

3

West Des Moines Valley JS

Aashril Shazar

ac - africa nc - contractualism/truth-testing + abolish borders cp 1ar - all nr - truth-testing and abolish borders 2ar - all

hsld22/Marlborough/PeSt/Marlborough-PeSt-Aff-Stanford-Round-3.docx

2023-02-11 22:41:26

PeSt

Marlborough PeSt

Pe.....

St.....

Marlborough

Marlborough

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

AMR is an existential threat, nonlinear, and has an invisible tipping point—its systematically ignored by pharma now.

Silverman ’16

Silverman ’16 (Rachel Silverman – MPhil with Distinction in Public Health @ the University of Cambridge, Senior Policy Analyst and Assistant Director of Global Health Policy @ the Center for Global Development, focusing on global health financing and incentive structures, “Confronting Antimicrobial Resistance: Can We Get to Collective Action?” 19 April 2016, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/confronting-antimicrobial-resistance-can-we-get-collective-action)

Dr. Chan issued a serious warning about the AMR threat everyone will be affected if we do not address this problem AMR is already responsible for 700,000 global deaths each year few new antimicrobial drugs are in the development pipeline According to the latest review AMR could cause 10 million deaths each year by 2050 with knock-on effects draining many trillions from the global economy. Summers suggested that AMR and potential pandemics represent existential threats to life on earth as we know it the worst-case scenario implies the end of modern medicine Summers suggested that AMR seems like a quintessential non-linear phenomenon and therefore more dangerous Year by year the effects are small and mostly invisible But at some point in the future they could suddenly become catastrophic like a “levee that doesn’t hold and unleashes a flood the tipping point is not predictable because microbes are invisible We don’t know when they’re going to make the switch to become resistant why don’t pharmaceutical companies invest in new antibiotics? “It does not pay” for them to do so, Pharmaceutical companies want to invest in technologies that will make a lot of money as other antibiotics remain the market for new options will be tiny and unprofitable

AMR could cause 10 million each year by 2050 draining trillions from the economy. represent existential threats to life on earth non-linear effects are small and invisible at some point could suddenly become catastrophic the tipping point is not predictable why don’t companies invest in new antibiotics? It does not pay as other s remain

Antimicrobial resistance is already causing huge harm – and the worst is yet to come.To open the panel, Dr. Chan issued a serious warning about the size and scope of the AMR threat: “everyone will be affected if we do not address this problem.” AMR is already responsible for an estimated 700,000 global deaths each year, 50,000 of which take place in the US and Europe. Extensively drug-resistant (XDR) tuberculosis—cases where the most effective first- and second-line drugs are rendered useless—infected an estimated 47,000 people worldwide in 2014, only one ‘last-line’ antimicrobial is available to reliably treat gonorrhea, and few new antimicrobial drugs are in the development pipeline. According to the latest review, AMR could cause 10 million deaths each year by 2050, with knock-on effects draining many trillions from the global economy. Summers suggested that AMR and potential pandemics, alongside climate change and nuclear proliferation, represent the top three existential threats to life on earth as we know it. And as Dr. Chan explained, the worst-case scenario implies the end of modern medicine as we know it. Even worse, Summers suggested that AMR seems like a “quintessential non-linear phenomenon, and therefore more dangerous.” Year by year the effects are small and mostly invisible. But at some point in the future they could suddenly become catastrophic, like a “levee that doesn’t hold and unleashes a flood.” Dr. Chan concurred that “the tipping point is not predictable because…microbes are invisible. We don’t even know when they’re going to make the switch” to become resistant to existing drugs. Antimicrobial efficacy is a global public good threatened by serious market failures. In response to this huge threat, why don’t pharmaceutical companies invest in new antibiotics? “It does not pay” for them to do so, explained Osborne. Pharmaceutical companies want to invest in technologies that will make a lot of money, and soon; so long as other antibiotics remain effective, the market for new options will be tiny and unprofitable.

<h4>AMR is an <u>existential threat</u>, <u>nonlinear</u>, and has an <u>invisible</u> tipping point—its <u>systematically ignored</u> by pharma now.</h4><p><strong>Silverman ’16</strong> (Rachel Silverman – MPhil with Distinction in Public Health @ the University of Cambridge, Senior Policy Analyst and Assistant Director of Global Health Policy @ the Center for Global Development, focusing on global health financing and incentive structures, “Confronting Antimicrobial Resistance: Can We Get to Collective Action?” 19 April 2016, <u>https://www.cgdev.org/blog/confronting-antimicrobial-resistance-can-we-get-collective-action</u>) </p><p>Antimicrobial resistance is already causing huge harm – and the worst is yet to come.To open the panel, <u>Dr. Chan issued a serious warning</u> <u>about</u> the size and scope of <u>the AMR threat</u>: “<u>everyone will be affected if we do not address this problem</u>.” <u>AMR is already responsible for</u> an estimated <u><strong>700,000 global deaths each year</u></strong>, 50,000 of which take place in the US and Europe. Extensively drug-resistant (XDR) tuberculosis—cases where the most effective first- and second-line drugs are rendered useless—infected an estimated 47,000 people worldwide in 2014, only one ‘last-line’ antimicrobial is available to reliably treat gonorrhea, and <u>few new antimicrobial drugs are in the development pipeline</u>. <u>According to the latest review</u>, <u><strong><mark>AMR could cause 10 million </mark>deaths <mark>each year by 2050</u></strong></mark>, <u>with</u> <u><strong>knock-on effects</u></strong> <u><mark>draining</mark> many</u> <u><strong><mark>trillions from the </mark>global <mark>economy</strong>.</u></mark> <u>Summers suggested</u> <u>that</u> <u>AMR and potential pandemics</u>, alongside climate change and nuclear proliferation, <u><mark>represent</u></mark> the top three <u><strong><mark>existential threats to life on earth</u></strong></mark> <u>as we know it</u>. And as Dr. Chan explained, <u>the worst-case scenario implies</u> <u><strong>the end of modern medicine</u></strong> as we know it. Even worse, <u>Summers suggested that</u> <u>AMR seems like a</u> “<u><strong>quintessential <mark>non-linear </mark>phenomenon</u></strong>, <u>and therefore more dangerous</u>.” <u>Year by year the <mark>effects are small</mark> <mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>mostly <mark>invisible</u></strong></mark>. <u>But</u> <u><mark>at some point</mark> in the future they <mark>could <strong>suddenly become catastrophic</u></strong></mark>, <u>like a “levee that doesn’t hold and unleashes a flood</u>.” Dr. Chan concurred that “<u><strong><mark>the tipping point is not predictable</u></strong></mark> <u>because</u>…<u>microbes are invisible</u>. <u>We don’t</u> even <u>know when they’re going to make the switch</u>” <u>to become resistant</u> to existing drugs. Antimicrobial efficacy is a global public good threatened by serious market failures. In response to this huge threat, <u><mark>why don’t</mark> pharmaceutical <mark>companies invest in new antibiotics?</u></mark> <u>“<mark>It does not pay</mark>”</u> <u>for them to do so,</u> explained Osborne. <u>Pharmaceutical companies want to invest in technologies that will make a lot of money</u>, and soon; so long <u><strong><mark>as other </strong></mark>antibiotic<strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>remain</u></strong></mark> effective, <u>the market for new options will be tiny and unprofitable</u>. </p>

Navy KR 1AC

Innovation ADV

./documents/ndtceda21/Navy/RoKo/Navy-Rock-Korlacki-Aff-Minnesota-Round5.docx

A

Minnesota

5

Minnesota FM

Zach Homeijer

1AC - Pharma 1NC - T ETS Marx K States CP Overstretch DA Floodgates DA 2NR Overstretch DA States CP

ndtceda21/Navy/RoKo/Navy-Rock-Korlacki-Aff-Minnesota-Round5.docx

RoKo

Navy RoKo

Ka.....

Ro.....

An.....

Ko.....

Navy

Navy

ndtceda21

NDT/CEDA 2021-22

cx

college

Extinction

Greene 19

Sherrell R. Greene 19, B.S. and M.S. Degrees in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Tennessee, Recognized Subject Matter Expert in Nuclear Reactor Safety, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies, and Advanced Reactor Concept Development. Mr. Greene is widely acclaimed for his systems analysis, team building, innovation, knowledge organization, presentation, and technical communication skills. Mr. Greene worked at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for over three decades. During his career at ORNL, he served as Director of Research Reactor Development Programs and Director of Nuclear Technology Programs. "Enhancing Electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and Societal Resilience with Resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs)." https://ans.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00295450.2018.1505357?needAccess=true

nations are examples of large-scale, complex social-physical systems societal resilience can be defined as the ability of a nation to anticipate and prepare for major stressors or calamities and then to absorb, adapt to, recover from, and restore normal functions A nation’s dependence on its Critical Infrastructure and the resilience of those systems, are therefore major components of national and societal resilience There are a variety of events that could deal crippling blows to a nation’s Grid Critical Infrastructure, and social fabric catastrophes are “very bad day” scenarios that might result from severe GMDs induced by solar CMEs HEMP cyber such an event could “kill up to 90 percent of the national population through starvation disease and societal collapse these consequences are either direct or indirect impacts of the predicted collapse of virtually the entire U.S Critical Infrastructure system cyber threats are likely to grow in number and sophistication posing a growing threat These three “very bad day” scenarios are not creations of overzealous science fiction writers

nations are complex systems societal resilience can be ability to anticipate and prepare for stressors or calamities and recover dependence on Critical Infrastructure are major components of societal resilience events deal crippling blows to a Grid and social fabric catastrophes are scenarios by CMEs, HEMP cyber an event could “kill 90 percent through starvation, disease, and societal collapse cyber threats are a growing threat These are not creations of overzealous writers

Societies and nations are examples of large-scale, complex social-physical systems. Thus, societal resilience can be defined as the ability of a nation, population, or society to anticipate and prepare for major stressors or calamities and then to absorb, adapt to, recover from, and restore normal functions in the wake of such events when they occur. A nation’s dependence on its Critical Infrastructure systems, and the resilience of those systems, are therefore major components of national and societal resilience. There are a variety of events that could deal crippling blows to a nation’s Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and social fabric. The types of catastrophes under consideration here are “very bad day” scenarios <<Marked>> that might result from severe GMDs induced by solar CMEs, HEMP attacks, cyber attacks, etc.5 As briefly discussed in Sec. III.C, the probability of a GMD of the magnitude of the 1859 Carrington Event is now believed to be on the order of 1%/year. The Earth narrowly missed (by only several days) intercepting a CME stream in July 2012 that would have created a GMD equal to or larger than the Carrington Event.41 Lloyd’s, in its 2013 report, “Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid,” 42 stated the following: “A Carrington-level, extreme geomagnetic storm is almost inevitable in the future…The total U.S. population at risk of extended power outage from a Carrington-level storm is between 20-40 million, with durations of 16 days to 1-2 years…The total economic cost for such a scenario is estimated at $0.6-2.6 trillion USD.” Analyses conducted subsequent to the Lloyd’s assessment indicated the geographical area impacted by the CME would be larger than that estimated in Lloyd’s analysis (extending farther northward along the New England coast of the United States and in the state of Minnesota),43 and that the actual consequences of such an event could actually be greater than estimated by Lloyd’s. Based on “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructures” to Congress in 2008 (Ref. 39), a HEMP attack over the Central U.S. could impact virtually the entire North American continent. The consequences of such an event are difficult to quantify with confidence. Experts affiliated with the aforementioned Commission and others familiar with the details of the Commission’s work have stated in Congressional testimony that such an event could “kill up to 90 percent of the national population through starvation, disease, and societal collapse.” 44,45 Most of these consequences are either direct or indirect impacts of the predicted collapse of virtually the entire U.S. Critical Infrastructure system in the wake of the attack. Last, recent analyses by both the U.S. Department of Energy46 and the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine47 have concluded that cyber threats to the U.S. Grid from both state-level and substatelevel entities are likely to grow in number and sophistication in the coming years, posing a growing threat to the U.S. Grid. These three “very bad day” scenarios are not creations of overzealous science fiction writers. A variety of mitigating actions to reduce both the vulnerability and the consequences of these events has been identified, and some are being implemented. However, the fact remains that events such as those described here have the potential to change life as we know it in the United States and other developed nations in the 21st century, whether the events occur individually, or simultaneously, and with or without coordinated physical attacks on Critical Infrastructure assets.

<h4>Extinction</h4><p>Sherrell R. <strong>Greene 19</strong>, B.S. and M.S. Degrees in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Tennessee, Recognized Subject Matter Expert in Nuclear Reactor Safety, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies, and Advanced Reactor Concept Development. Mr. Greene is widely acclaimed for his systems analysis, team building, innovation, knowledge organization, presentation, and technical communication skills. Mr. Greene worked at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for over three decades. During his career at ORNL, he served as Director of Research Reactor Development Programs and Director of Nuclear Technology Programs. "Enhancing Electric Grid, Critical Infrastructure, and Societal Resilience with Resilient Nuclear Power Plants (rNPPs)." https://ans.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00295450.2018.1505357?needAccess=true</p><p>Societies and <u><mark>nations are</mark> examples of large-scale,</u> <u><strong><mark>complex</mark> social-physical <mark>systems</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><strong><mark>societal resilience</u></strong> <u>can be</mark> defined as the <mark>ability</mark> of a nation</u>, population, or society <u><mark>to <strong>anticipate</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>prepare</u></strong> <u>for</mark> major <strong><mark>stressors</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>calamities</u></strong> <u>and</mark> then to absorb, adapt to, <strong><mark>recover</strong></mark> from, and restore normal functions</u> in the wake of such events when they occur. <u>A nation’s <mark>dependence on</mark> its <strong><mark>Critical Infrastructure</u></strong></mark> systems, <u>and the resilience of those systems, <mark>are</mark> therefore <strong><mark>major components</u></strong> <u>of</mark> national and <strong><mark>societal resilience</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u>There are a variety of <mark>events</mark> that could <mark>deal <strong>crippling blows </strong>to a</mark> nation’s <strong><mark>Grid</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>Critical Infrastructure</strong>, <mark>and</u> <u><strong>social fabric</u></strong></mark>. The types of <u><mark>catastrophes</u></mark> under consideration here <u><mark>are</mark> “<strong>very bad day” <mark>scenarios</u></mark> </p><p><<Marked>></p><p><u></strong>that might result from severe GMDs induced <mark>by</mark> solar</u> <u><strong><mark>CMEs</u></strong>, <u><strong>HEMP</u></strong></mark> attacks, <u><strong><mark>cyber</u></strong></mark> attacks, etc.5</p><p>As briefly discussed in Sec. III.C, the probability of a GMD of the magnitude of the 1859 Carrington Event is now believed to be on the order of 1%/year. The Earth narrowly missed (by only several days) intercepting a CME stream in July 2012 that would have created a GMD equal to or larger than the Carrington Event.41 Lloyd’s, in its 2013 report, “Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid,” 42 stated the following: “A Carrington-level, extreme geomagnetic storm is almost inevitable in the future…The total U.S. population at risk of extended power outage from a Carrington-level storm is between 20-40 million, with durations of 16 days to 1-2 years…The total economic cost for such a scenario is estimated at $0.6-2.6 trillion USD.” Analyses conducted subsequent to the Lloyd’s assessment indicated the geographical area impacted by the CME would be larger than that estimated in Lloyd’s analysis (extending farther northward along the New England coast of the United States and in the state of Minnesota),43 and that the actual consequences of such an event could actually be greater than estimated by Lloyd’s.</p><p>Based on “Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructures” to Congress in 2008 (Ref. 39), a HEMP attack over the Central U.S. could impact virtually the entire North American continent. The consequences of such an event are difficult to quantify with confidence. Experts affiliated with the aforementioned Commission and others familiar with the details of the Commission’s work have stated in Congressional testimony that <u>such <mark>an event could “kill</mark> up to</u> <u><strong><mark>90 percent</mark> of the national population</u></strong> <u><mark>through</u> <u><strong>starvation</u></strong>, <u><strong>disease</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>societal collapse</u></strong></mark>.” 44,45 Most of <u>these consequences are either <strong>direct</strong> or <strong>indirect impacts</u></strong> <u>of the <strong>predicted collapse</u></strong> <u>of virtually the entire U.S</u>. <u><strong>Critical Infrastructure system</u></strong> in the wake of the attack.</p><p>Last, recent analyses by both the U.S. Department of Energy46 and the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine47 have concluded that <u><strong><mark>cyber threats</u></strong></mark> to the U.S. Grid from both state-level and substatelevel entities <u><mark>are</mark> likely to grow in number and sophistication</u> in the coming years, <u>posing <mark>a</u> <u><strong>growing threat</u></strong></mark> to the U.S. Grid.</p><p><u><mark>These</mark> three “very bad day” scenarios <mark>are not</u> <u><strong>creations</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>overzealous</mark> science fiction <mark>writers</u></strong></mark>. A variety of mitigating actions to reduce both the vulnerability and the consequences of these events has been identified, and some are being implemented. However, the fact remains that events such as those described here have the potential to change life as we know it in the United States and other developed nations in the 21st century, whether the events occur individually, or simultaneously, and with or without coordinated physical attacks on Critical Infrastructure assets.</p>

1NR

Infrastructure DA

Impact---Grid---2NC

./documents/ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-Northwestern-Round4.docx

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Northwestern

4

Emory BW

Nathan Rothenbaum

1AC---Worker Welfare Standard 1NC---Infrastructure DA T-Increase States CP Memo CP Spillover DA Regneg CP DOJ Tradeoff DA Advantage CP 2NR---Infrastructure DA Memo CP

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college

That trades off with privacy enforcement.

Mcginnis & Sun 20

John Mcginnis & Linda Sun 20, (John Mcginnis is a professor of Law at Northwestern University, Linda Sun works closely with Mcginnis 8-7-2020, 1-3-2022, Northwestern Public Law Research, < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3669087 > Blucas

The FTC needs resources to adequately address the nation’s growing privacy concerns the FTC oversees both consumer protection—encompassing privacy—and antitrust The agency has long-standing experience in enforcing privacy statutes2 and also has special privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality tech forensics To adequately address privacy concerns, the FTC needs resources The agency has been explicit that it needs more power to police tech companies. In requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire additional staff and bring more privacy cases Without more lawyers, investigators, and technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, forgo them altogether the FT C’s resources are spread thin across multiple missions, to the detriment of its privacy efforts Removing antitrust reallocate resources from the antitrust department to privacy free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee this essential effort

FTC needs resources to address privacy concerns FTC oversees privacy—and antitrust FTC needs to police tech companies requesting increased funding Without FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and forgo altogether FT C’s resources spread thin across multiple missions, to detriment of privacy efforts. Removing antitrust reallocate resources to privacy free up scarce time

The FTC needs more resources to adequately address the nation’s growing privacy concerns. Currently, the FTC oversees both consumer protection—encompassing privacy—and antitrust,249 making the FTC the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement250 and the nation’s de-facto privacy agency.251 The agency has long-standing experience in enforcing privacy statutes252 and also has special privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality tech forensics to track invasions of privacy.253 The FTC, however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern technology. Very few Americans feel confident in the privacy of their information in the digital age.254 According to a 2019 study, over 80% of Americans feel that they have little to no control over the data collected on them by companies and the government.255 To adequately address privacy concerns, the FTC needs more resources.256 The agency has been explicit that it needs more manpower to police tech companies. In requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director Joseph Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire additional staff and bring more privacy cases.257 A former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which houses the privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully understaffed.”258 As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees dedicated to privacy and data security, compared to 500 and 110 employees at comparable agencies in the UK. and Ireland, respectively.259 Without more lawyers, investigators, and technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, forgo them altogether.260 Currently, the FT C’s resources are spread thin across multiple missions, to the detriment of its privacy efforts. Removing the agency’s antitrust responsibilities would reallocate resources from the antitrust department to its privacy unit and other areas of consumer protection. Further, it would free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee this essential effort.261

<h4><strong>That <u>trades off</u> with privacy enforcement.</h4><p></strong>John <strong>Mcginnis &</strong> Linda <strong>Sun 20</strong>, (John Mcginnis is a professor of Law at Northwestern University, Linda Sun works closely with Mcginnis 8-7-2020, 1-3-2022, Northwestern Public Law Research, < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3669087 > Blucas</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>FTC needs</u></strong></mark> more <u><strong><mark>resources</u></strong> <u><strong>to</mark> adequately <mark>address</mark> the nation’s growing <mark>privacy concerns</u></strong></mark>. Currently, <u><strong>the <mark>FTC oversees</mark> both consumer protection—encompassing <mark>privacy—and</mark> <mark>antitrust</u></strong></mark>,249 making the FTC the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement250 and the nation’s de-facto privacy agency.251 <u><strong>The agency has long-standing experience in enforcing privacy statutes2</u></strong>52 <u><strong>and also has special privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality tech forensics</u></strong> to track invasions of privacy.253 The FTC, however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern technology. Very few Americans feel confident in the privacy of their information in the digital age.254 According to a 2019 study, over 80% of Americans feel that they have little to no control over the data collected on them by companies and the government.255 <u><strong>To adequately address privacy concerns, the <mark>FTC needs</u></strong></mark> more <u><strong>resources</u></strong>.256 <u><strong>The agency has been explicit that it needs more</u></strong> man<u><strong>power</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>to police tech</mark> <mark>companies</mark>. In <mark>requesting increased funding</mark> from Congress, FTC Director</u></strong> Joseph <u><strong>Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire additional staff and bring more privacy cases</u></strong>.257 A former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which houses the privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully understaffed.”258 As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees dedicated to privacy and data security, compared to 500 and 110 employees at comparable agencies in the UK. and Ireland, respectively.259 <u><strong><mark>Without</mark> more lawyers, investigators, and technologists, the <mark>FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and </mark>in some cases, <mark>forgo </mark>them <mark>altogether</u></strong></mark>.260 Currently, <u><strong>the <mark>FT C’s resources </mark>are <mark>spread thin across multiple missions, to </mark>the <mark>detriment of </mark>its <mark>privacy efforts</u></strong>. <u><strong>Removing</u></strong></mark> the agency’s <u><strong><mark>antitrust</u></strong></mark> responsibilities would <u><strong><mark>reallocate resources</mark> from the antitrust department <mark>to</u></strong></mark> its <u><strong><mark>privacy</u></strong></mark> unit and other areas of consumer protection. Further, it would <u><strong><mark>free</mark> <mark>up </mark>the <mark>scarce time </mark>of the commissioners to oversee this essential effort</u>.261</p></strong>

1NC

OFF

OFF

./documents/ndtceda21/MissouriState/HaWo/Missouri%20State-Hartter-Woodall-Neg-Indiana-Round3.docx

N

Indiana

3

Mary WashingtonMinnesota DM

Lee Quinn

1AC - Blockchain 1NC - T Subsets CP States DA BizCon CP Memo DA FTC CP Advantage 2NR - T Subsets

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--Food shocks cause extinction.

Cribb 19

Cribb 19—(Principal of Julian Cribb & Associates, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, former Director of National Awareness at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation). Julian Cribb. October 3, 2019. Food or War. “Food as an Existential Risk”.

in the twenty-first century with world resources of food, land and water under growing stress, nothing can be ruled out chemical weapons have frequently been deployed in the Syrian civil war, which had drought ag failure and hunger among its early drivers nuclear conflict remains a distinct possibility in South Asia and the Middle East as these regions are stressed in terms of food, land and water, and their nuclear firepower is multiplying panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of Food insecurity that, as the hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, is the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species

with food under stress, nothing can be ruled out chem weapons in Syria had hunger among its drivers nuclear conflict remains possibil in South Asia and Mid East regions are stressed in food and firepower is multiplying panicking regimes in Russia, US or France would deploy atomic weapons to quell refugees, fleeing famine Food insecurity is the most likely scenario for termination of the species

Although there may at first glance appear to be no close linkage between weapons of mass destruction and food, in the twenty-first century with world resources of food, land and water under growing stress, nothing can be ruled out. Indeed, chemical weapons have frequently been deployed in the Syrian civil war, which had drought, agricultural failure and hunger among its early drivers. And nuclear conflict remains a distinct possibility in South Asia and the Middle East, especially, as these regions are already stressed in terms of food, land and water, and their nuclear firepower or access to nuclear materials is multiplying. It remains an open question whether panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would be ruthless enough to deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by tens of millions of desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos in their own homelands – but the possibility ought not to be ignored. That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of global warming’. 15 Food insecurity is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited. A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it unwinnable for either. And that, as the mute hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, is also the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species. Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology, materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9).

<h4>--<u>Food shocks</u> cause extinction. </h4><p><u><strong>Cribb 19</u></strong>—(Principal of Julian Cribb & Associates, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, former Director of National Awareness at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation). Julian Cribb. October 3, 2019. Food or War. “Food as an Existential Risk”. </p><p>Although there may at first glance appear to be no close linkage between weapons of mass destruction and food, <u><strong>in the twenty-first century <mark>with</mark> world resources of <mark>food</mark>, land and water <mark>under</mark> growing <mark>stress, nothing can be ruled out</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>chem</mark>ical <mark>weapons</mark> have</u></strong> <u><strong>frequently</u></strong> <u><strong>been deployed <mark>in</mark> the <mark>Syria</mark>n civil war, which <mark>had</mark> drought</u></strong>, <u><strong>ag</u></strong>ricultural <u><strong>failure</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>hunger among its</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>early <mark>drivers</u></strong></mark>. And <u><strong><mark>nuclear conflict remains</mark> a</u></strong> <u><strong>distinct <mark>possibil</mark>ity <mark>in South Asia</u></strong> <u><strong>and</mark> the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Mid</mark>dle <mark>East</u></strong></mark>, especially, <u><strong>as these <mark>regions are</u></strong></mark> already <u><strong><mark>stressed in</mark> terms of <mark>food</mark>, land and water, <mark>and</mark> their</u></strong> <u><strong>nuclear <mark>firepower</u></strong></mark> or access to nuclear materials <u><strong><mark>is multiplying</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>It remains an open question whether <u><strong><mark>panicking regimes</u></strong> <u><strong>in</u></strong> <u><strong>Russia,</mark> the <mark>US</mark>A <mark>or</mark> even <mark>France would</u></strong></mark> be ruthless enough to <u><strong><mark>deploy atomic weapons</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>in an attempt <mark>to</u></strong> <u><strong>quell</mark> invasion by</u></strong> tens of millions of <u><strong>desperate <mark>refugees, fleeing</u></strong> <u><strong>famine</mark> and climate chaos</u></strong> in their own homelands – but the possibility ought not to be ignored.</p><p>That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even <u><strong>nuclear war</u></strong> <u><strong>cannot be excluded as a political consequence</u></strong> <u><strong>of</u></strong> global warming’. 15 <u><strong><mark>Food insecurity</u></strong></mark> is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited.</p><p>A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it unwinnable for either. And <u><strong>that, as the</u></strong> mute <u><strong>hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, <mark>is</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>most likely scenario for</mark> the</u></strong> <u><strong>premature <mark>termination of the</mark> human <mark>species</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology, materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9).</p>

1NR

Adv 2

M: OV—2NC

./documents/ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-Texas%20Open-Round3.docx

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Texas Open

3

Michigan HK

Allison Harper

1AC - Extraterritoritality 1NC - T Devo CP Itc cp Ftc floodgates Block - T Devo Floodgates 2NR - Floodgates

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The plan costs political capital—trades off.

Carstensen 21

Carstensen 21—(Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School). Peter C. Carstensen. February 2021. “THE “OUGHT” AND “IS LIKELY” OF BIDEN ANTITRUST.” https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2021/on-topic/the-new-us-antitrust-administration-en.

despite bipart murmurs about competitive issues, the potential that any major initiatives will survive is limited at best. the challenge is how the Biden administration will rank its commitments. If it were to make reform of competition law a major and primary commitment, it would have to trade off other goals . the new administration, like the Obama administration’s abandonment of the pro-competitive rules proposed under the PSA, would elect to give up stricter competition rules in order to achieve other legislative priorities. this is a pessimistic prognostication for the likely Biden antitrust enforcement agenda. There is much that ought to be done. But this requires a willingness to take major enforcement risks, to invest significant political capital in the legislative process the new administration will be no more committed to robust competition policy than the Obama administration

despite bipart murmurs the challenge is how the Biden administration will rank commitments. If it make reform of competition law a major commitment, it would have to trade off other goals . the new administration would give up stricter competition rules to achieve other legislative priorities. antitrust requires a willingness to invest significant political capital

14. Similarly, despite bipartisan murmurs about competitive issues, the potential in a closely divided Congress that any major initiatives will survive is limited at best. In part the challenge here is how the Biden administration will rank its commitments. If it were to make reform of competition law a major and primary commitment, it would have to trade off other goals, which might include health care reform or increases in the minimum wage. It is likely in this circumstance the new administration, like the Obama administration’s abandonment of the pro-competitive rules proposed under the PSA, would elect to give up stricter competition rules in order to achieve other legislative priorities. 15. Another key to a robust commitment to workable competition is the choice of cabinet and other key administrative positions. Here as well, the early signs are not entirely encouraging. In selecting Tom Vilsack to return as secretary of agriculture, the president has embraced a friend of the large corporate interests dominating agriculture who has spent the last four years in a highly lucrative position advancing their interests. Given the desperate need for pro-competitive rules to implement the PSA and control exploitation of dairy farmers through milk-market orders, the return of Vilsack is not good news. Who will head the FTC and who will be the attorney general and assistant attorney general for antitrust is still unknown, but if those picks are also centrists with strong links to corporate America the hope for robust enforcement of competition law will further attenuate! 16. In sum, this is a pessimistic prognostication for the likely Biden antitrust enforcement agenda. There is much that ought to be done. But this requires a willingness to take major enforcement risks, to invest significant political capital in the legislative process, and to select leaders who are committed to advancing the public interest in fair, efficient and dynamically competitive markets. The early signs are that the new administration will be no more committed to robust competition policy than the Obama administration. Events may force a more vigorous policy—I will cling to that hope as the Biden administration takes shape.

<h4>The plan costs <u>political capital</u>—trades off.</h4><p><u><strong>Carstensen 21</u></strong>—(Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School). Peter C. Carstensen. February 2021. “THE “OUGHT” AND “IS LIKELY” OF BIDEN ANTITRUST.” https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2021/on-topic/the-new-us-antitrust-administration-en. </p><p>14. Similarly, <u><strong><mark>despite bipart</u></strong></mark>isan <u><strong><mark>murmurs</mark> about competitive issues, the potential </u></strong>in a closely divided Congress <u><strong>that any major initiatives will survive is limited at best.</u></strong> In part <u><strong><mark>the challenge</u></strong></mark> here <u><strong><mark>is how the Biden administration will rank</mark> its <mark>commitments. If it </mark>were to <mark>make reform of competition law a major</mark> and primary <mark>commitment, it would have to trade off other goals</u></strong></mark>, which might include health care reform or increases in the minimum wage<u><strong><mark>.</u></strong></mark> It is likely in this circumstance <u><strong><mark>the new administration</mark>, like the Obama administration’s abandonment of the pro-competitive rules proposed under the PSA, <mark>would</mark> elect to <mark>give up stricter competition rules</mark> in order <mark>to achieve other legislative priorities.</p><p></u></strong></mark>15. Another key to a robust commitment to workable competition is the choice of cabinet and other key administrative positions. Here as well, the early signs are not entirely encouraging. In selecting Tom Vilsack to return as secretary of agriculture, the president has embraced a friend of the large corporate interests dominating agriculture who has spent the last four years in a highly lucrative position advancing their interests. Given the desperate need for pro-competitive rules to implement the PSA and control exploitation of dairy farmers through milk-market orders, the return of Vilsack is not good news. Who will head the FTC and who will be the attorney general and assistant attorney general for antitrust is still unknown, but if those picks are also centrists with strong links to corporate America the hope for robust enforcement of competition law will further attenuate!</p><p>16. In sum, <u><strong>this is a pessimistic prognostication for the likely Biden <mark>antitrust</mark> enforcement agenda. There is much that ought to be done. But this <mark>requires a willingness to</mark> take major enforcement risks, to <mark>invest significant political capital </mark>in the legislative process</u></strong>, and to select leaders who are committed to advancing the public interest in fair, efficient and dynamically competitive markets. The early signs are that <u><strong>the new administration will be no more committed</u></strong> <u><strong>to robust competition policy than the Obama administration</u></strong>. Events may force a more vigorous policy—I will cling to that hope as the Biden administration takes shape.</p>

1NC

BBB DA

./documents/ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-UMN-Round5.docx

N

UMN

5

Kansas PS

Shunta Jordan

1AC - Shipping 1NC - T Subs States CP WTO CP Chilling DA Floodgates DA BBB DA 2NR - BBB DA

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Water protection drains finite EPA resources

Heminger 15

Heminger 15, Trial Attorney Environmental Defense Section U.S. Department of Justice, GULF RESTORATION NETWORK, et al., Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-00677-JCZ-DEK v. Section “A,” Division 3 GINA MCCARTHY, Administrator of Hon. Jay C. Zainey, District Judge the United States Environmental, Hon. Daniel E. Knowles, III, Magistrate Judge Protection Agency, and the UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Defendants, https://www.nacwa.org/docs/default-source/clean-water-current-pdf/19-feb-16/2016-01-08gulf-msj-remand-(epa).pdf)//BB

EPA considered the limited resources available to implement federal water quality standards EPA also considered the limited resources available to the Agency to undertake the “unprecedented and complex rulemakings to promulgate federal nutrient criteria] for the entire country the request that EPA use its powers to control pollution EPA considered not just the resources required to make the necessity determinations themselves also the intensive resources that would be required for the Agency to complete the regulatory task criteria for “all navigable waters in all 50 states ‘[t]he development would be highly resource and time intensive such an effort would “involve the EPA staff across the entire Agency EPA described as “a task of substantial magnitude in light of the need for thorough review and analysis of water quality EPA also predicted that to complete rulemaking, it would face “a daunting management challenge” because of the complexity of the technical issues the “large volume of comments that EPA expected to receive, and the need for the Agency to respond to EPA concluded that finite resources would not be put to their best use by rulemaking

EPA considered limited resources available to implement federal water standards intensive resources required ‘[t]he development would be highly resource and time intensive such an effort would “involve EPA staff across the entire Agency EPA rulemaking would face “a daunting management challenge” because of EPA concluded that finite resources would not be put to their best use by rulemaking

EPA considered the limited resources available to the Agency to develop and implement federal water quality standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1313. In evaluating Gulf Restoration’s petition, EPA also considered the limited resources available to the Agency to undertake the “unprecedented and complex set of rulemakings to promulgate federal [numeric nutrient criteria] for a large region (or even the entire country),” as requested by Gulf Restoration. EPA Ex. 2, AR 4, EPA Decision. As EPA recognized, if it made the necessity determinations requested by Gulf Restoration, then under section 1313(c), the Agency would need to “promptly” promulgate corresponding federal numeric nutrient criteria. Indeed, as discussed above in Background Section B.2., Gulf Restoration’s petition focused on its request that EPA promulgate numeric nutrient criteria across the country, not on the threshold necessity determinations that would precede those regulations. See EPA Ex. 1, AR 4, Petition (requesting that EPA “use its powers to control nitrogen and phosphorus pollution”); id. at AR 78. Thus, EPA considered not just the resources required to make the necessity determinations themselves, but also the intensive resources that would be required for the Agency to complete the regulatory task under section 1313(c)(4)(B). After developing numeric nutrient criteria for waters in a single State (Florida), id. at AR 5, EPA was well-positioned to assess the enormous resources that would be required to develop such criteria for “all navigable waters in all 50 states” where such criteria did not already exist. Id. at AR 1. As EPA explained, if it made the requested necessity determinations, ‘[t]he development of [numeric Case 2:12-cv-00677-JCZ-DEK Document 201-1 Filed 11/20/15 Page 32 of 38 27 nutrient criteria] for 50, 31, or 10 states at one time would be highly resource and time intensive.” Id. at AR 4. EPA anticipated that such an effort would “involve the EPA staff across the entire Agency, as well as support from technical experts outside the Agency.” Id. EPA then detailed the many steps that it would need to take to conduct a federal rulemaking for each State. Id. This included “develop[ing] a technical record for each affected state”—what EPA described as “a task of substantial magnitude in light of the need for thorough review and analysis of state water quality data and the frequency and severity of nutrient-related impacts.” Id. at AR 4. EPA also predicted that to complete the rulemaking, it would face “a daunting management challenge” because of (1) “the complexity of the technical issues,” (2) the “large volume of comments from stakeholders and local governments” that EPA expected to receive, and (3) “the need for the Agency to respond to the array of comments filed.” Id. As discussed above in Argument Point II.B., EPA may consider its resources when responding to a rulemaking petition. And here, EPA concluded that those finite resources would not be put to their best use by exercising its rulemaking authority under section 1313(c)(4)(B).

<h4>Water protection drains finite EPA resources</h4><p><strong>Heminger 15</strong>, Trial Attorney Environmental Defense Section U.S. Department of Justice, GULF RESTORATION NETWORK, et al., Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-00677-JCZ-DEK v. Section “A,” Division 3 GINA MCCARTHY, Administrator of Hon. Jay C. Zainey, District Judge the United States Environmental, Hon. Daniel E. Knowles, III, Magistrate Judge Protection Agency, and the UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Defendants, https://www.nacwa.org/docs/default-source/clean-water-current-pdf/19-feb-16/2016-01-08gulf-msj-remand-(epa).pdf)//BB</p><p><u><mark>EPA considered</mark> the <strong><mark>limited resources</strong> available to</u></mark> the Agency to develop and <u><mark>implement</mark> <mark>federal</mark> <mark>water</mark> quality <mark>standards</u></mark>, 33 U.S.C. § 1313. In evaluating Gulf Restoration’s petition, <u>EPA also considered the limited resources available to the Agency to undertake the “unprecedented and complex</u> set of <u>rulemakings to promulgate federal</u> [numeric <u>nutrient criteria] for</u> a large region (or even <u>the entire country</u>),” as requested by Gulf Restoration. EPA Ex. 2, AR 4, EPA Decision. As EPA recognized, if it made the necessity determinations requested by Gulf Restoration, then under section 1313(c), <u>the</u> Agency would need to “promptly” promulgate corresponding federal numeric nutrient criteria. Indeed, as discussed above in Background Section B.2., Gulf Restoration’s petition focused on its <u>request that EPA </u>promulgate numeric nutrient criteria across the country, not on the threshold necessity determinations that would precede those regulations. See EPA Ex. 1, AR 4, Petition (requesting that EPA “<u>use its powers to control</u> nitrogen and phosphorus <u>pollution</u>”); id. at AR 78. Thus, <u>EPA</u> <u>considered not just the resources required to make the necessity determinations themselves</u>, but <u>also the <strong><mark>intensive resources</strong></mark> that would be <mark>required</mark> for the Agency to complete the <strong>regulat</strong>ory task</u> under section 1313(c)(4)(B). After developing numeric nutrient criteria for waters in a single State (Florida), id. at AR 5, EPA was well-positioned to assess the enormous resources that would be required to develop such <u>criteria for “<strong>all navigable waters in all 50 states</u></strong>” where such criteria did not already exist. Id. at AR 1. As EPA explained, if it made the requested necessity determinations, <u><strong><mark>‘[t]he development</u></strong></mark> of [numeric Case 2:12-cv-00677-JCZ-DEK Document 201-1 Filed 11/20/15 Page 32 of 38 27 nutrient criteria] for 50, 31, or 10 states at one time <u><strong><mark>would be highly resource and time intensive</u></strong></mark>.” Id. at AR 4. EPA anticipated that <u><mark>such an effort would “involve</mark> the <mark>EPA staff <strong>across the entire Agency</u></strong></mark>, as well as support from technical experts outside the Agency.” Id. EPA then detailed the many steps that it would need to take to conduct a federal rulemaking for each State. Id. This included “develop[ing] a technical record for each affected state”—what <u>EPA described as “a task of substantial magnitude in light of the need for thorough review and analysis of</u> state <u>water quality</u> data and the frequency and severity of nutrient-related impacts.” Id. at AR 4. <u><mark>EPA</mark> also predicted that to complete</u> the <u><mark>rulemaking</mark>, it <mark>would face “a daunting management challenge” because of</u></mark> (1) “<u>the complexity of the <strong>technical issues</u></strong>,” (2) <u>the “large volume of <strong>comments</u></strong> from stakeholders and local governments” <u>that EPA expected to receive, and</u> (3) “<u>the</u> <u>need for the Agency to respond to</u> the array of comments filed.” Id. As discussed above in Argument Point II.B., EPA may consider its resources when responding to a rulemaking petition. And here, <u><mark>EPA concluded that</mark> </u>those<u> <strong><mark>finite resources</strong> would not be put to their best</mark> <mark>use by</u></mark> exercising its <u><mark>rulemaking</u></mark> authority under section 1313(c)(4)(B).</p>

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b] Natural facts control access to a priori truths - disproves causal closure

Papineau

Papineau [David [Professor of Philosophy King's College London], First published Thu Feb 22, 2007; substantive revision Tue Mar 31, 2020 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/#MorFac]

any non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties If all physical effects are due to a limited range of physically-grounded natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world But it has awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them. The traditional non-naturalist answer to this problem is to posit a non-natural faculty of “moral intuition” that gives us some kind of direct access to the moral realm causal closure once more makes it difficult to make good sense of this suggestion. Presumably at some point the posited intuitive faculty will need to make a causal difference in the physical world (by affecting what people say and do, for example). And at this point the causal closure argument will bite once more, to show that a non-natural intuitive faculty would implausibly imply that some of our actions are strongly overdetermined by two metaphysically independent antecedents. In light of the difficulties facing moral non-naturalism, most contemporary moral philosophers opt instead for some species of naturalist view there is no principled barrier to inferring moral facts a priori from the non-moral natural facts the constitution of moral facts by non-moral natural facts is an a posteriori matter, akin to the relation between water and H2O, and that therefore Moore’s openness only points to a conceptual gap, not a metaphysical one

any non-naturalist morality faces difficulties if facts never make difference to the physical world it has consequences knowledge is mediated by physical processes . If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have knowledge of them answer of intuition causal closure makes it difficult to make sense causal closure argument show that a non-natural faculty would implausibly imply actions are overdetermined by metaphysically independent antecedents. there is barrier to inferring facts a priori from the natural the constitution of moral facts is an a posteriori matter

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts constitute a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of physically-grounded natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don’t have any physical effects). But it has awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them. The traditional non-naturalist answer to this problem is to posit a non-natural faculty of “moral intuition” that gives us some kind of direct access to the moral realm (as explained in Ridge 2014: Section 3). However, causal closure once more makes it difficult to make good sense of this suggestion. Presumably at some point the posited intuitive faculty will need to make a causal difference in the physical world (by affecting what people say and do, for example). And at this point the causal closure argument will bite once more, to show that a non-natural intuitive faculty would implausibly imply that some of our actions are strongly overdetermined by two metaphysically independent antecedents. Moral non-naturalism has had something of a revival in recent years, with defenders including Russ Shaffer-Landau (2003), Ralph Wedgwood (2007), Derek Parfit (2011) and David Enoch (2011). Still, the challenge of accounting for our access to non-natural moral facts remains, and it is debatable whether any of these writers has found a satisfactory alternative to a causally problematic faculty of intuition. Perhaps the most developed suggestion is Enoch’s (2011) appeal to the indispensability of non-natural moral facts to moral reasoning, a line of argument that is analogous to Hilary Putnam’s case for non-natural mathematical objects, to be discussed in the next section below. But Enoch’s appeal arguably faces many of the same general objections as Putnam’s argument, as well as objections specific to the moral realm (see Leng 2016). In light of the difficulties facing moral non-naturalism, most contemporary moral philosophers opt instead for some species of naturalist view. We can divide the naturalist options here into two broad categories: irrealist and realist. Irrealist moral naturalists aim to account for moral discourse by offering naturalist accounts of the social and linguistic and practices that govern it, but without supposing that moral utterances report on moral facts with a substantial independent existence (Joyce 2015). By contrast, naturalist moral realists agree with moral non-naturalists that substantial moral facts exist, but seek to locate them in the natural realm rather than in some sui generis non-natural realm (Lenman 2014). Both these broad categories have further sub-divisions. Among the irrealists, we can distinguish explicitly non-cognitivist views like emotivism and prescriptivism which deny that moral judgements express beliefs (Hare 1952, Blackburn 1993, Gibbard 2003) from cognitivist views that accept that moral judgements do express beliefs but deny a substantial reality to the putative facts to which they answer; and among the latter cognitivist views we can distinguish error-theoretic fictionalist options which view moral judgements as simply false (Mackie 1977, Kalderon 2005) from projectivist options which hold that moral discourse is sufficiently disciplined for its judgements to qualify for a species of truth even though they do not report on independently existing causally significant facts (Wright 1992, Price 2011). Naturalist moral realism also comes in different varieties. In recent debates two versions have figured prominently; “Cornell realism”, which includes moral facts among the causally significant facts but resists their type-reducibility to non-moral facts (Sturgeon 1985, Boyd 1988), and “moral functionalism” which is happy to equate moral facts with straightforwardly descriptive facts (Jackson 1998). Any kind of moral naturalist realist needs to reject Moore’s open question argument. There are two alternatives here. One is to insist that Moore’s posited openness is relatively superficial, and that there is no principled barrier to inferring moral facts a priori from the non-moral natural facts, even if such inferences will sometimes require a significant amount of information and reflection. The other is to argue that the constitution of moral facts by non-moral natural facts is an a posteriori matter, akin to the relation between water and H2O, and that therefore Moore’s openness only points to a conceptual gap, not a metaphysical one (Ridge 2014: Section 2).

<h4>b] Natural facts control access to a priori truths - disproves causal closure</h4><p><strong>Papineau </strong>[David [Professor of Philosophy King's College London], First published Thu Feb 22, 2007; substantive revision Tue Mar 31, 2020 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/#MorFac]</p><p>Moore took this argument to show that moral facts constitute a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, <u><strong><mark>any</u></strong></mark> such <u><mark>non-naturalist </mark>view of <mark>morality faces</mark> immediate <mark>difficulties</u></mark>, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. <u>If all physical effects are due to a limited range of physically-grounded natural causes, and <mark>if</mark> moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral <mark>facts</mark> can <mark>never make</mark> any <mark>difference to</mark> what happens in <mark>the physical world</u></mark> (Harman 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don’t have any physical effects). <u>But <mark>it has</mark> awkward epistemological <mark>consequences</mark>. For beings like us, <mark>knowledge </mark>of the spatiotemporal world <mark>is <strong>mediated</strong> by <strong>physical processes</strong></mark> involving our <strong>sense organs</strong> and <strong>cognitive systems</strong><mark>. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is <strong>hard to see</strong> how we can have</mark> any <strong><mark>knowledge</strong> of them</mark>. The traditional non-naturalist <mark>answer</mark> to this problem is to posit a non-natural faculty <mark>of</mark> “moral <mark>intuition</mark>” that gives us some kind of direct access to the moral realm</u> (as explained in Ridge 2014: Section 3). However, <u><mark>causal closure</mark> once more <mark>makes it difficult to make</mark> good <mark>sense</mark> of this suggestion. Presumably at some point the posited intuitive faculty will need to make a causal difference in the physical world (by affecting what people say and do, for example). And at this point the <mark>causal closure argument</mark> will bite once more, to <mark>show that a non-natural</mark> intuitive <mark>faculty would implausibly imply</mark> that some of our <mark>actions are</mark> strongly <mark>overdetermined by</mark> two <mark>metaphysically independent antecedents.</mark> </u>Moral non-naturalism has had something of a revival in recent years, with defenders including Russ Shaffer-Landau (2003), Ralph Wedgwood (2007), Derek Parfit (2011) and David Enoch (2011). Still, the challenge of accounting for our access to non-natural moral facts remains, and it is debatable whether any of these writers has found a satisfactory alternative to a causally problematic faculty of intuition. Perhaps the most developed suggestion is Enoch’s (2011) appeal to the indispensability of non-natural moral facts to moral reasoning, a line of argument that is analogous to Hilary Putnam’s case for non-natural mathematical objects, to be discussed in the next section below. But Enoch’s appeal arguably faces many of the same general objections as Putnam’s argument, as well as objections specific to the moral realm (see Leng 2016). <u>In light of the difficulties facing moral non-naturalism, most contemporary moral philosophers opt instead for some species of naturalist view</u>. We can divide the naturalist options here into two broad categories: irrealist and realist. Irrealist moral naturalists aim to account for moral discourse by offering naturalist accounts of the social and linguistic and practices that govern it, but without supposing that moral utterances report on moral facts with a substantial independent existence (Joyce 2015). By contrast, naturalist moral realists agree with moral non-naturalists that substantial moral facts exist, but seek to locate them in the natural realm rather than in some sui generis non-natural realm (Lenman 2014). Both these broad categories have further sub-divisions. Among the irrealists, we can distinguish explicitly non-cognitivist views like emotivism and prescriptivism which deny that moral judgements express beliefs (Hare 1952, Blackburn 1993, Gibbard 2003) from cognitivist views that accept that moral judgements do express beliefs but deny a substantial reality to the putative facts to which they answer; and among the latter cognitivist views we can distinguish error-theoretic fictionalist options which view moral judgements as simply false (Mackie 1977, Kalderon 2005) from projectivist options which hold that moral discourse is sufficiently disciplined for its judgements to qualify for a species of truth even though they do not report on independently existing causally significant facts (Wright 1992, Price 2011). Naturalist moral realism also comes in different varieties. In recent debates two versions have figured prominently; “Cornell realism”, which includes moral facts among the causally significant facts but resists their type-reducibility to non-moral facts (Sturgeon 1985, Boyd 1988), and “moral functionalism” which is happy to equate moral facts with straightforwardly descriptive facts (Jackson 1998). Any kind of moral naturalist realist needs to reject Moore’s open question argument. There are two alternatives here. One is to insist that Moore’s posited openness is relatively superficial, and that <u><mark>there is</mark> no principled <mark>barrier to inferring </mark>moral <mark>facts a priori from the</mark> non-moral <mark>natural</mark> facts</u>, even if such inferences will sometimes require a significant amount of information and reflection. The other is to argue that <u><mark>the constitution of moral facts</mark> by non-moral natural facts <mark>is an a posteriori matter</mark>, akin to the relation between water and H2O, and that therefore Moore’s openness only points to a conceptual gap, not a metaphysical one</u> (Ridge 2014: Section 2).</p>

Policy

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Durham SA

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Err on the side of political possibility --- their totalizing frame naturalizes violence and dooms blackness to a constant state of suspension.

KLINE 17

David KLINE 17. Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Religion at Rice University. “The Pragmatics of Resistance: Framing Anti-Blackness and the Limits of Political Ontology.” Critical Philosophy of Race 5(1): 51-69. Emory Libraries.

Wilderson’s description of anti-Black antagonism shows a powerful macropolitical sedimentation of Black suffering in which Black bodies are ontologically frozen into (non-) beings Locating the reality of anti-Blackness within this political ontology does provide effective analysis of its violence However, in terms of a general structure Wilderson’s ontology remain tied in form to Agamben’s even as it seemingly discounts it and remains bound to the limitations that beset such a formal structure Wilderson keeps the basic contours of Agamben’s ontological structure in place, maintaining a formal political ontology that expands the bottom end of the binary structure so as to locate an absolute zero-point of political abjection within Black social death the absolute prioritization of a formal ontological framework of autonomous and irreconcilable spheres of positionality in terms of ontology and anti-Blackness ends up limiting a whole range of possible avenues of analysis Wilderson and Afro-pessimism privilege the macropolitical field in which Blackness is always already sedimented into a political onto-logical position that prohibits movement and the possibility of what Moten calls “fugitivity.” The absolute privileging of the macropolitical tends to bracket the fact that “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics The micropolitical field is where movement and resistance happens against or in excess of the macropolitical in ways not reducible to the kind of formal binary organization that Wilderson’s political ontology prioritizes within this contingency is also the possibility of creative lines and deterritorializations that provide possible means of positive escape from macropolitical molarisations prioritization of a political onto-logical structure in which the law relegates Black being into the singular position of social death happens short-circuits an analysis of power that might reveal not only how the practices and apparatuses of anti-Black racism have historically developed, changed, and reassembled in relation to state power, national identity, philosophical political discourse, and so on—changes that have implications for how racial positioning is both thought and resisted in differing historical and socio-political contexts. To the extent that Blackness equals a singular ontological position within a macropolitical structure of antagonism, there is almost no room to bring in the spectrum and flow of social difference and contingency that no doubt spans across Black identity as a legitimate issue of analysis and as a site/sight for the possibility of a range of resisting practices Wilderson flattens out the social difference within, and even the possibility of, a micropolitical social field of 35 million Black people living in the U S Such a flattening reduces the optic of anti-Black racism as well as Black sociality to the frame of political ontology where Blackness remains stuck in a singular position of abjection. The result is a severe analytical limitation in terms of the way Blackness exists across an extremely wide field of sociality that is comprised of differing intensities of forces and relational modes between various institutional, political, socio-economic, religious, sexual, and other social conjunctures. Within Wilderson’s political ontological frame, it seems that these conjunctures are excluded as having any bearing at all on how anti-Black power functions and is resisted across highly differentiated contexts. There is only the binary ontological distinction of Black and Human being; only a macropolitics of sedimented abjection such a flattening of the social field of Blackness rigidly delimits what counts as legitimate political resistance. If the framework for thinking resistance and the possibility of creating another world is reduced to rigid ontological positions and if Black existence is ontologically fixed at social death then there is not much room for strategizing or even imagining resistance to anti-Blackness that is not wholly limited to expressions and events of radically apocalyptic political violence: the law is either destroyed entirely, or there is no freedom there might be other and more pragmatically oriented practices of resistance that do not necessarily have the absolute destruction of the law as their immediate aim that should count as genuine resistance to anti-Blackness. anything less than an absolute overturning of the order of things, the violent annihilation of the full structure of antagonisms, is deemed as “[having nothing] to do with Black liberation” Of course the arrival of a new world in which “Blacks do not magnetize bullets” should be absolutely affirmed The question however is how the insistence on the absolute priority of framing this world within a rigid structure of formal ontological positions can only revert to what amounts to a kind of negative eschatological blank horizon in which actually existing social sites and modes of resisting praxis are displaced and devalued by notions of whatever it is that might arrive from beyond LaCapra points out nihilism generates utterly blank utopianism not limited by the constraints of the past or by normative structures of any sort With life’s ontological reduction to social death, the only possible way out seems an empty utopianism of pure, unlimited possibility The result is a discounting and devaluing of other more pragmatic and less eschatological, practices of resistance. With the “all or nothing” approach that posits anything less than the absolute suspension of the current state of things as unable to address the violence there is not much left in which to appeal than a kind of apocalyptic future space defined by whatever this world is not

Locating anti-Blackness within ontology does provide effective analysis of its violence Wilderson’s absolute prioritization of a ontological framework ends up limiting analysis the macropolitical field in which Blackness is always already sedimented prohibits movement and tends to bracket the fact that “every politics is simultaneously macro and micro prioritization of onto-logical structure short-circuits an analysis that might reveal how the practices and apparatuses of anti-Black racism have historically developed, changed, and reassembled in relation to state power, national identity, philosophical political discourse To the extent that Blackness equals a ontological position there is no room to bring in the flow of social difference and contingency that spans across Black identity as a range of resisting practices Wilderson flattens social difference within 35 million Black people living in the U S Such reduces Black sociality to a singular position There is only binary ontological distinction such rigidly delimits legitimate political resistance there is not room for resistance that is not wholly limited to radically apocalyptic political violence there might be pragmatically oriented practices of resistance that do not have the absolute destruction of the law that should count as genuine resistance to anti-Blackness the absolute framing can only revert to a negative eschatological blank horizon in which actually existing resisting praxis are displaced and devalued by notions of whatever might arrive from beyond With the “all or nothing” approach there is not much left than a apocalyptic future space defined by whatever this world is not

Wilderson’s critique of Agamben is certainly correct within the specific framework of a political ontology of racial positioning. His description of anti-Black antagonism shows a powerful macropolitical sedimentation of [End Page 56] Black suffering in which Black bodies are ontologically frozen into (non-) beings that stand in absolute political distinction from those “who do not magnetize bullets” (Wilderson 2010, 80). In the same framework, Jared Sexton, whose work is very close to Wilderson’s, is also right when he shows how biopolitical thought—specifically the Agambenian form centered on questions of sovereignty—and its variant of “necropolitics” found in Mbembe has so often run aground on the figure of the slave (see Sexton 2010).5 Locating the reality of anti-Blackness wholly within this account of political ontology does provide an undeniably effective analysis of its violence and sedimentation over the modern world as a whole. However, in terms of a general structure, I understand Wilderson’s (and Sexton’s) political ontology to remain tied in form to Agamben’s even as it seemingly discounts it and therefore remains bound to some of the problems and limitations that beset such a formal structure, as I’ll discuss in a moment. Despite the critique of Agamben’s ontological blind spots regarding the extent to which Black suffering is non-analogous to non-black suffering, as I’ve tried to show, Wilderson keeps the basic contours of Agamben’s ontological structure in place, maintaining a formal political ontology that expands the bottom end of the binary structure so as to locate an absolute zero-point of political abjection within Black social death. To be clear, this is not to say that the difference between the content and historicity of Wilderson’s social death and Agamben’s bare life does not have profound implications for how political ontology is conceived or how questions of suffering and freedom are posed. Nor is it to say that a congruence of formal structure linking Agamben and Wilderson should mean that their respective projects are not radically differentiated and perhaps even opposed in terms of their broader implications and revelations. Rather, what I want to focus on is how the absolute prioritization of a formal ontological framework of autonomous and irreconcilable spheres of positionality—however descriptively or epistemologically accurate in terms of a regime of ontology and its corresponding macropolitics of anti-Blackness—ends up limiting a whole range of possible avenues of analysis that have their proper site within what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the micropolitical. The issue here is the distinction between the macropolitical (molar) and the micropolitical (molecular) fields of organization and becoming. Wilderson and Afro-pessimism in general privilege the macropolitical field in which Blackness is always already sedimented and rigidified into a political onto-logical position that prohibits movement and the possibility of what Fred Moten calls “fugitivity.” The absolute privileging of the macropolitical as [End Page 57] the frame of analysis tends to bracket or overshadow the fact that “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 213). Where the macropolitical is structured around a politics of molarisation that immunizes itself from the threat of contingency and disruption, the micropolitical names the field in which local and singular points of connection produce the conditions for “lines of flight, which are molecular” (ibid., 216). The micropolitical field is where movement and resistance happens against or in excess of the macropolitical in ways not reducible to the kind of formal binary organization that Agamben and Wilderson’s political ontology prioritizes. Such resistance is not necessarily positive or emancipatory, as lines of flight name a contingency that always poses the risk that whatever develops can become “capable of the worst” (ibid., 205). However, within this contingency is also the possibility of creative lines and deterritorializations that provide possible means of positive escape from macropolitical molarisations. Focusing on Wilderson, his absolute prioritization of a political onto-logical structure in which the law relegates Black being into the singular position of social death happens, I contend, at the expense of two significant things that I am hesitant to bracket for the sake of prioritizing political ontology as the sole frame of reference for both analyzing anti-Black racism and thinking resistance within the racialized world. First, it short-circuits an analysis of power that might reveal not only how the practices, forms, and apparatuses of anti-Black racism have historically developed, changed, and reassembled/reterritorialized in relation to state power, national identity, philosophical discourse, biological discourse, political discourse, and so on—changes that, despite Wilderson’s claim that focusing on these things only “mystify” the question of ontology (Wilderson 2010, 10), surely have implications for how racial positioning is both thought and resisted in differing historical and socio-political contexts. To the extent that Blackness equals a singular ontological position within a macropolitical structure of antagonism, there is almost no room to bring in the spectrum and flow of social difference and contingency that no doubt spans across Black identity as a legitimate issue of analysis and as a site/sight for the possibility of a range of resisting practices. This bracketing of difference leads him to make some rather sweeping and opaquely abstract claims. For example, discussing a main character’s abortion in a prison cell in the 1976 film Bush Mama, Wilderson says, “Dorothy will abort her baby at the clinic or on the floor of her prison cell, not because she fights for—and either wins [End Page 58] or loses—the right to do so, but because she is one of 35 million accumulated and fungible (owned and exchangeable) objects living among 230 million subjects—which is to say, her will is always already subsumed by the will of civil society” (Wilderson 2010, 128, italics mine). What I want to press here is how Wilderson’s statement, made in the sole frame of a totalizing political ontology overshadowing all other levels of sociality, flattens out the social difference within, and even the possibility of, a micropolitical social field of 35 million Black people living in the United States. Such a flattening reduces the optic of anti-Black racism as well as Black sociality to the frame of political ontology where Blackness remains stuck in a singular position of abjection. The result is a severe analytical limitation in terms of the way Blackness (as well as other racial positions) exists across an extremely wide field of sociality that is comprised of differing intensities of forces and relational modes between various institutional, political, socio-economic, religious, sexual, and other social conjunctures. Within Wilderson’s political ontological frame, it seems that these conjunctures are excluded—or at least bracketed—as having any bearing at all on how anti-Black power functions and is resisted across highly differentiated contexts. There is only the binary ontological distinction of Black and Human being; only a macropolitics of sedimented abjection. Furthermore, arriving at the second analytical expense of Wilderson’s prioritization of political ontology, I suggest that such a flattening of the social field of Blackness rigidly delimits what counts as legitimate political resistance. If the framework for thinking resistance and the possibility of creating another world is reduced to rigid ontological positions defined by the absolute power of the law, and if Black existence is understood only as ontologically fixed at the extreme zero point of social death without recourse to anything within its own position qua Blackness, then there is not much room for strategizing or even imagining resistance to anti-Blackness that is not wholly limited to expressions and events of radically apocalyptic political violence: the law is either destroyed entirely, or there is no freedom. This is not to say that I am necessarily against radical political violence or its use as an effective tactic. Nor is to say that I think the law should be left unchallenged in its total operation, but rather that there might be other and more pragmatically oriented practices of resistance that do not necessarily have the absolute destruction of the law as their immediate aim that should count as genuine resistance to anti-Blackness. For Wilderson, like Agamben, anything less than an absolute overturning [End Page 59] of the order of things, the violent destruction and annihilation of the full structure of antagonisms, is deemed as “[having nothing] to do with Black liberation” (quoted in Zug 2010). Of course, the desire for the absolute overturning of the currently existing world, the decisive end of the existing world and the arrival of a new world in which “Blacks do not magnetize bullets” should be absolutely affirmed. Further, the severity and gratuitous nature of the macropolitics of anti-Blackness in relation to the possibility of a movement towards freedom should not be bracketed or displaced for the sake of appealing to any non-Black grammar of exploitation or alienation (Wilderson 2010, 142). The question I want to pose, however, is how the insistence on the absolute priority of framing this world within a rigid structure of formal ontological positions can only revert to what amounts to a kind of negative theological and eschatological blank horizon in which actually existing social sites and modes of resisting praxis are displaced and devalued by notions of whatever it is that might arrive from beyond. It seems that Wilderson, again, is close to Agamben on this point, whose ontological structure also severely delimits what might count as genuine resistance to the regime of sovereignty. As Dominick LaCapra points out regarding the possibility of liberation outside of Agamben’s formal ontological structure of bare life and sovereignty, A further enigmatic conjunction in Agamben is between pure possibility and the reduction of being to mere or naked life, for it is the emergence of mere naked life in accomplished nihilism that simultaneously generates, as a kind of miraculous antibody or creation ex nihilo, pure possibility or utterly blank utopianism not limited by the constraints of the past or by normative structures of any sort. (LaCapra 2009, 168) With life’s ontological reduction to the abjection of bare life or social death, the only possible way out, it seems, is the impossible possibility of what Agamben refers to as the “suspension of the suspension,” the laying aside of the distinction between bare life and political life, the “Shabbat of both animal and man” (Agamben 2003, 92). It is in this sense that Agamben offers, again in the words of LaCapra, a “negative theology in extremis . . . an empty utopianism of pure, unlimited possibility” (LaCapra 2009, 166). The result is a discounting and devaluing of other, perhaps more pragmatic and less eschatological, practices of resistance. With the “all or nothing” [End Page 60] approach that posits anything less than the absolute suspension of the current state of things as unable to address the violence and abjection of bare life, there is not much left in which to appeal than a kind of apocalyptic, messianic, and contentless eschatological future space defined by whatever this world is not.

<h4>Err on the side of <u>political possibility</u> --- their totalizing frame <u>naturalizes violence</u> and <u>dooms blackness</u> to a constant state of suspension. </h4><p>David <strong>KLINE 17</strong>. Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Religion at Rice University. “The Pragmatics of Resistance: Framing Anti-Blackness and the Limits of Political Ontology.” Critical Philosophy of Race 5(1): 51-69. Emory Libraries. </p><p><u>Wilderson’s</u> critique of Agamben is certainly correct within the specific framework of a political ontology of racial positioning. His <u>description of anti-Black antagonism shows a powerful macropolitical sedimentation of</u> [End Page 56] <u>Black suffering in which Black bodies are ontologically frozen into (non-) beings</u> that stand in absolute political distinction from those “who do not magnetize bullets” (Wilderson 2010, 80). In the same framework, Jared Sexton, whose work is very close to Wilderson’s, is also right when he shows how biopolitical thought—specifically the Agambenian form centered on questions of sovereignty—and its variant of “necropolitics” found in Mbembe has so often run aground on the figure of the slave (see Sexton 2010).5 <u><mark>Locating</mark> the reality of <mark>anti-Blackness</u></mark> wholly <u><mark>within</mark> this</u> account of <u>political <mark>ontology does provide</u></mark> an undeniably <u><mark>effective analysis of its violence</u></mark> and sedimentation over the modern world as a whole. <u>However, in terms of a general structure</u>, I understand <u><mark>Wilderson’s</u></mark> (and Sexton’s) political <u>ontology</u> to <u>remain <strong>tied in form</strong> to Agamben’s even as it seemingly discounts it and</u> therefore <u>remains bound to</u> some of <u>the</u> problems and <u>limitations that beset such a formal structure</u>, as I’ll discuss in a moment. Despite the critique of Agamben’s ontological blind spots regarding the extent to which Black suffering is non-analogous to non-black suffering, as I’ve tried to show, <u>Wilderson keeps the basic contours of Agamben’s ontological structure in place, maintaining a formal political ontology that expands the bottom end of the binary structure so as to locate an absolute zero-point of political abjection within Black social death</u>. To be clear, this is not to say that the difference between the content and historicity of Wilderson’s social death and Agamben’s bare life does not have profound implications for how political ontology is conceived or how questions of suffering and freedom are posed. Nor is it to say that a congruence of formal structure linking Agamben and Wilderson should mean that their respective projects are not radically differentiated and perhaps even opposed in terms of their broader implications and revelations. Rather, what I want to focus on is how <u>the <mark>absolute prioritization of a</mark> formal <mark>ontological framework</mark> of autonomous and irreconcilable spheres of positionality</u>—however descriptively or epistemologically accurate <u>in terms of</u> a regime of <u>ontology and</u> its corresponding macropolitics of <u>anti-Blackness</u>—<u><mark>ends up <strong>limiting</strong></mark> a whole range of possible avenues of <mark>analysis</u></mark> that have their proper site within what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the micropolitical. The issue here is the distinction between the macropolitical (molar) and the micropolitical (molecular) fields of organization and becoming. <u>Wilderson and Afro-pessimism</u> in general <u>privilege <mark>the macropolitical field in which Blackness is <strong>always already sedimented</u></strong></mark> and rigidified <u>into a political onto-logical position that <strong><mark>prohibits movement</strong> and</mark> the possibility of what</u> Fred <u>Moten calls “fugitivity.” The absolute privileging of the macropolitical</u> as [End Page 57] the frame of analysis <u><mark>tends to bracket</u></mark> or overshadow <u><mark>the fact that “every politics is simultaneously</mark> a <mark>macro</mark>politics <mark>and</mark> a <mark>micro</mark>politics</u> (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 213). Where the macropolitical is structured around a politics of molarisation that immunizes itself from the threat of contingency and disruption, the micropolitical names the field in which local and singular points of connection produce the conditions for “lines of flight, which are molecular” (ibid., 216). <u>The micropolitical field is where movement and resistance happens against or in excess of the macropolitical in ways not reducible to the kind of formal binary organization that</u> Agamben and <u>Wilderson’s political ontology prioritizes</u>. Such resistance is not necessarily positive or emancipatory, as lines of flight name a contingency that always poses the risk that whatever develops can become “capable of the worst” (ibid., 205). However, <u>within this contingency is also the possibility of creative lines and deterritorializations that provide possible means of positive escape from macropolitical molarisations</u>.</p><p>Focusing on Wilderson, his absolute <u><mark>prioritization of</mark> a political <mark>onto-logical structure</mark> in which the law relegates Black being into the singular position of social death happens</u>, I contend, at the expense of two significant things that I am hesitant to bracket for the sake of prioritizing political ontology as the sole frame of reference for both analyzing anti-Black racism and thinking resistance within the racialized world. First, it <u><strong><mark>short-circuits</strong> an analysis</mark> of power <mark>that might reveal</mark> not only <mark>how the practices</u></mark>, forms, <u><mark>and apparatuses of anti-Black racism have historically developed, changed, and reassembled</u></mark>/reterritorialized <u><mark>in relation to state power, national identity, philosophical</u></mark> discourse, biological discourse, <u><mark>political discourse</mark>, and so on—changes that</u>, despite Wilderson’s claim that focusing on these things only “mystify” the question of ontology (Wilderson 2010, 10), surely <u>have implications for how racial positioning is both thought and resisted in differing historical and socio-political contexts. <mark>To the extent that Blackness equals a</mark> singular <mark>ontological position</mark> within a macropolitical structure of antagonism, <mark>there is</mark> almost <strong><mark>no room</strong></mark> <mark>to bring in the</mark> spectrum and <mark>flow of <strong>social difference and contingency</strong> that</mark> no doubt <mark>spans across Black identity as a</mark> legitimate issue of analysis and as a site/sight for the possibility of a <strong><mark>range of resisting practices</u></strong></mark>. This bracketing of difference leads him to make some rather sweeping and opaquely abstract claims. For example, discussing a main character’s abortion in a prison cell in the 1976 film Bush Mama, Wilderson says, “Dorothy will abort her baby at the clinic or on the floor of her prison cell, not because she fights for—and either wins [End Page 58] or loses—the right to do so, but because she is one of 35 million accumulated and fungible (owned and exchangeable) objects living among 230 million subjects—which is to say, her will is always already subsumed by the will of civil society” (Wilderson 2010, 128, italics mine). What I want to press here is how <u><mark>Wilderson</u></mark>’s statement, made in the sole frame of a totalizing political ontology overshadowing all other levels of sociality, <u><mark>flattens</mark> out the <mark>social difference within</mark>, and even the possibility of, a micropolitical social field of <mark>35 million Black people living in the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. <u><mark>Such</mark> a flattening <mark>reduces</mark> the optic of anti-Black racism as well as <mark>Black sociality to</mark> the frame of political ontology where Blackness remains <strong>stuck in <mark>a singular position</strong></mark> of abjection. The result is a severe analytical limitation in terms of the way Blackness</u> (as well as other racial positions) <u>exists across an <strong>extremely wide field of sociality</strong> that is comprised of differing intensities of forces and relational modes between various institutional, political, socio-economic, religious, sexual, and other social conjunctures. Within Wilderson’s political ontological frame, it seems that these conjunctures are excluded</u>—or at least bracketed—<u>as having any bearing at all on how anti-Black power functions and is resisted across highly differentiated contexts. <mark>There is only</mark> the <mark>binary ontological distinction</mark> of Black and Human being; only a macropolitics of sedimented abjection</u>.</p><p>Furthermore, arriving at the second analytical expense of Wilderson’s prioritization of political ontology, I suggest that <u><mark>such</mark> a flattening of the social field of Blackness <strong><mark>rigidly delimits</strong></mark> what counts as <strong><mark>legitimate political resistance</strong></mark>. If the framework for thinking resistance and the possibility of creating another world is reduced to rigid ontological positions</u> defined by the absolute power of the law, <u>and if Black existence is</u> understood only as <u>ontologically fixed at</u> the extreme zero point of <u>social death</u> without recourse to anything within its own position qua Blackness, <u>then <mark>there is not</mark> much <mark>room for</mark> strategizing or even imagining <mark>resistance</mark> to anti-Blackness <mark>that is not <strong>wholly limited to</strong></mark> expressions and events of <strong><mark>radically apocalyptic political violence</strong></mark>: the law is either destroyed entirely, or there is no freedom</u>. This is not to say that I am necessarily against radical political violence or its use as an effective tactic. Nor is to say that I think the law should be left unchallenged in its total operation, but rather that <u><mark>there might be</mark> other and more <strong><mark>pragmatically oriented practices of resistance</strong> that do not</mark> necessarily <mark>have the absolute destruction of the law</mark> as their immediate aim <mark>that <strong>should count as genuine</strong> resistance to anti-Blackness</mark>.</u> For Wilderson, like Agamben, <u>anything less than an absolute overturning</u> [End Page 59] <u>of the order of things, the violent </u>destruction and <u>annihilation of the full structure of antagonisms, is deemed as “[having nothing] to do with Black liberation”</u> (quoted in Zug 2010). <u>Of course</u>, the desire for the absolute overturning of the currently existing world, the decisive end of the existing world and <u>the arrival of a new world in which “Blacks do not magnetize bullets” should be absolutely affirmed</u>. Further, the severity and gratuitous nature of the macropolitics of anti-Blackness in relation to the possibility of a movement towards freedom should not be bracketed or displaced for the sake of appealing to any non-Black grammar of exploitation or alienation (Wilderson 2010, 142). <u>The question</u> I want to pose, <u>however</u>, <u>is how the <strong>insistence</strong> on <mark>the absolute</mark> priority of <mark>framing</mark> this world within a rigid structure of formal ontological positions <mark>can only revert to</mark> what amounts to <mark>a</mark> kind of <mark>negative</u></mark> theological and <u><strong><mark>eschatological blank horizon</strong> in which <strong>actually existing</strong></mark> social sites and modes of <strong><mark>resisting praxis</strong> are <strong>displaced</strong> and <strong>devalued</strong> by notions of whatever</mark> it is that <mark>might arrive from beyond</u></mark>.</p><p>It seems that Wilderson, again, is close to Agamben on this point, whose ontological structure also severely delimits what might count as genuine resistance to the regime of sovereignty. As Dominick <u>LaCapra points out</u> regarding the possibility of liberation outside of Agamben’s formal ontological structure of bare life and sovereignty,</p><p>A further enigmatic conjunction in Agamben is between pure possibility and the reduction of being to mere or naked life, for it is the emergence of mere naked life in accomplished <u>nihilism</u> that simultaneously <u>generates</u>, as a kind of miraculous antibody or creation ex nihilo, pure possibility or <u>utterly blank utopianism not limited by the constraints of the past or by normative structures of any sort</u>. (LaCapra 2009, 168)</p><p><u>With life’s ontological reduction to</u> the abjection of bare life or <u>social death, the only possible way out</u>, it <u>seems</u>, is the impossible possibility of what Agamben refers to as the “suspension of the suspension,” the laying aside of the distinction between bare life and political life, the “Shabbat of both animal and man” (Agamben 2003, 92). It is in this sense that Agamben offers, again in the words of LaCapra, a “negative theology in extremis . . . <u>an empty utopianism of pure, unlimited possibility</u>” (LaCapra 2009, 166). <u>The result is a discounting and devaluing of other</u>, perhaps <u>more pragmatic and less eschatological, practices of resistance. <mark>With the “all or nothing”</u></mark> [End Page 60] <u><mark>approach</mark> that posits anything less than the absolute suspension of the current state of things as unable to address the violence</u> and abjection of bare life, <u><mark>there is not much left</mark> in which to appeal <mark>than a</mark> kind of <strong><mark>apocalyptic</u></strong></mark>, messianic, and contentless eschatological <u><strong><mark>future space defined by whatever this world is not</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1NC – Case

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wake

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gmu hl

david herman

1ac- blackterial infection 1nc- cap k single payer cp t

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No China war

Kausikan 16

Bilahari Kausikan 16, Ambassador-at-large and policy adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Institute of Policy Studies' 2015/16 S R Nathan Fellow for the Study of Singapore, “War is unlikely but distrust runs deep,” Feb 27 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/war-is-unlikely-but-distrust-runs-deep

US-China relations is certainly not "a Clash of Civilisations". China could not have succeeded without the US. Before too long, China will reach a more symmetrical military equation with the US in East Asia While military planners cannot ignore any contingency, war is not a very probable scenario. Neither the US nor China is looking for trouble or spoiling for a fight. The essential priorities of both are internal, not external. The most vital of all Chinese interests is the preservation of CCP) rule. Chinese leaders sometimes talk tough. But they are not reckless no American president can ignore the national mood, which is not for more wars of choice war between the US and China is highly improbable There will almost certainly be tense episodes. But I do not think this is appropriate to understand the US-China dynamic the parameters within which the US and China seek accommodation are narrower than we have been led to expect by sensationalist analysis

US-China relations is not "a Clash of Civilisations". war is not probable Neither the US nor China is spoiling for a fight priorities are internal, interest is preservation of rule. Chinese leaders talk tough. But are not reckless There will be tense episodes. But narrower than sensationalist analysis

This is not a question that should lend itself to facile answers. US-China relations defy simple characterisation. But it is certainly not "a Clash of Civilisations".¶ China could not have succeeded without the US. China's success is, in a very fundamental way, also an American success, albeit a not entirely comfortable one for America. This perhaps adds in no small part to the complexity of the strategic adjustments that are under way between the US and China. But whether it admits it or not, the US too has begun to adapt. There can be no "Clash of Civilisations" because we are now all hybrids.¶ The inevitably irregular rhythms of economic growth ought to make us cautious about accepting simplistic characterisations of US-China relations as some variant of a contrast between a rising China and a declining US. This posits a false dichotomy. China is certainly rising but the US is not in decline. All who have underestimated American creativity and resilience have come to regret it. The changes in the distribution of power are relative, not absolute. The US is still pre-eminent in most indices of power and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.¶ This is most obvious in the military realm. Before too long, China will reach a more symmetrical military equation with the US in East Asia. This will have very important implications for the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While military planners cannot ignore any contingency, war is not a very probable scenario. Neither the US nor China is looking for trouble or spoiling for a fight. The essential priorities of both are internal, not external. The most vital of all Chinese interests is the preservation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. Chinese leaders sometimes talk tough. But they are not reckless.¶ As the sole global power, the US cannot retreat into complete isolationism. Like it or not, the world will intrude and in East Asia specifically, there has been a fundamental consistency in US policy over the last 40 years or more that I expect will be maintained.¶ But the political mood that has sustained contenders Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in their unlikely presidential campaigns is disillusionment with globalisation and working- and middle-class insecurity about their future in an increasingly unfamiliar and uncertain world. Whoever next occupies the White House will talk and even act tougher. But no American president can ignore the national mood, which is not for more wars of choice.¶ If war between the US and China is highly improbable, is there or will there be a "new Cold War" between the two? There will almost certainly be tense episodes. But I do not think this is an appropriate metaphor to understand the US-China dynamic.¶ So where does all this leave us? I do not think it makes the strategic adjustments any easier. But it does imply that the parameters within which the US and China must seek a new accommodation are narrower than what we might have been led to expect by the media or the more sensationalist sort of academic analysis.

<h4>No China war</h4><p>Bilahari <strong>Kausikan 16</strong>, Ambassador-at-large and policy adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Institute of Policy Studies' 2015/16 S R Nathan Fellow for the Study of Singapore, “War is unlikely but distrust runs deep,” Feb 27 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/war-is-unlikely-but-distrust-runs-deep</p><p>This is not a question that should lend itself to facile answers. <u><mark>US-China relations</u></mark> defy simple characterisation. But it <u><mark>is</mark> certainly <strong><mark>not "a Clash of Civilisations".</u></strong></mark>¶ <u>China could not have succeeded without the US.</u> China's success is, in a very fundamental way, also an American success, albeit a not entirely comfortable one for America. This perhaps adds in no small part to the complexity of the strategic adjustments that are under way between the US and China. But whether it admits it or not, the US too has begun to adapt. There can be no "Clash of Civilisations" because we are now all hybrids.¶ The inevitably irregular rhythms of economic growth ought to make us cautious about accepting simplistic characterisations of US-China relations as some variant of a contrast between a rising China and a declining US. This posits a false dichotomy. China is certainly rising but the US is not in decline. All who have underestimated American creativity and resilience have come to regret it. The changes in the distribution of power are relative, not absolute. The US is still pre-eminent in most indices of power and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.¶ This is most obvious in the military realm. <u>Before too long, China will reach a more symmetrical military equation with the US in East Asia</u>. This will have very important implications for the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. <u>While military planners cannot ignore any contingency, <strong><mark>war is not</strong></mark> a <strong>very <mark>probable</strong></mark> scenario.</u> <u><strong><mark>Neither the US nor China is </mark>looking for trouble or <mark>spoiling for a fight</mark>.</u></strong> <u>The essential <mark>priorities </mark>of both <mark>are <strong>internal, </mark>not external</strong>. The most vital of all Chinese <mark>interest</mark>s <mark>is</mark> the <strong><mark>preservation of</u></strong></mark> Chinese Communist Party (<u><strong>CCP) <mark>rule.</u></strong> <u>Chinese leaders</mark> sometimes <strong><mark>talk tough. But </mark>they <mark>are not reckless</u></strong></mark>.¶ As the sole global power, the US cannot retreat into complete isolationism. Like it or not, the world will intrude and in East Asia specifically, there has been a fundamental consistency in US policy over the last 40 years or more that I expect will be maintained.¶ But the political mood that has sustained contenders Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in their unlikely presidential campaigns is disillusionment with globalisation and working- and middle-class insecurity about their future in an increasingly unfamiliar and uncertain world. Whoever next occupies the White House will talk and even act tougher. But <u>no American president can ignore the national mood, which is <strong>not for more wars of choice</u></strong>.¶ If <u>war between the US and China is <strong>highly improbable</u></strong>, is there or will there be a "new Cold War" between the two? <u><strong><mark>There will</strong></mark> almost <strong>certainly <mark>be tense episodes. But</strong> </mark>I <strong>do not think this is</u></strong> an <u>appropriate</u> metaphor <u>to understand the US-China dynamic</u>.¶ So where does all this leave us? I do not think it makes the strategic adjustments any easier. But it does imply that <u>the parameters within which the US and China</u> must <u>seek</u> a new <u>accommodation are <strong><mark>narrower than</u></strong></mark> what <u>we</u> might <u>have been led to expect by</u> the media or the more <u><strong><mark>sensationalist</u></strong></mark> sort of academic <u><strong><mark>analysis</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1NC

Energy Advantage

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UC Berkeley Wimsatt-Gray

Campbell

1AC - Algae Biofuels 1NC - Offshore Drilling DA - T Restriction - RIN PIC - Gradualism CP 2NC - RIN PIC 1NR - Drilling DA 2NR - DA

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The “new normal” for cost growth is not sustainable and will outpace the rest of the economy

HRI, 17

HRI, 17 (Health Research Institute, Kelly Barnes, Alexander Gaffney, Benjamin Isgur, Laura McLaughlin, Trine Tsouderos, Rebecca Murphy, Sarah Haflett, Jack Rodgers, PhD, Ben Comer, Kristen Bernie, June 2017, Accessed: 9-15-2017, “Medical Cost Trend: Behind the Numbers 2018” Price Waterhouse Coopers, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/health-research-institute/behind-the-numbers/reports/hri-behind-the-numbers-2018.pdf)

The New Health Economy is settling into a “new normal,” characterized by a hung between 6 and 7 percent, seeming to settle into a “new normal.” H R I anticipates a 6.5 percent growth rate half a percentage point higher than in 2017. Even with medical cost trend between 6 and 7 percent, health spending continues to outpace the economy. This gap erodes consumers’ ability to pay for other goods and services, including housing, food and transportation. Nationally, as medical costs are projected to continue to grow faster than (GDP), healthcare will continue to take up a greater share of the economy. This could lead to larger budget deficits or less spending Even the “new normal” is not sustainable.

The Health Economy is settling into a “new normal,” a 7 percent growth rate spending continues to outpace the economy This gap erodes ability to pay for other goods as medical costs are projected to grow faster than (GDP), healthcare will continue to take up a greater share of the economy the “new normal” is not sustainable.

The Heart Of The Matter The era of volatile swings and double-digit growth in employer medical costs appears to be ending. With medical cost trend hovering in the single digits for several years, the industry has been waiting for the inflection point when spending will take off. But that spike appears unlikely to happen. The New Health Economy is settling into a “new normal,” typically characterized by more attenuated fluctuations and a single-digit trend. For four years, medical cost trend has hung between 6 and 7 percent, seeming to settle into a “new normal.” PwC’s Health Research Institute (HRI) anticipates a 6.5 percent growth rate for calendar year 2018, half a percentage point higher than in 2017. After likely changes in benefit plan design, such as changes to co-pays and network size, the net growth rate is expected to be 1 percentage point lower, at 5.5 percent. HRI’s analysis measures anticipated spending growth in the employerbased market, which covers about half of all Americans.¹ Changes to government health insurance, including Medicare, Medicaid and plans sold on the public exchanges created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), are not within this analysis’ purview. HRI’s research found that three factors will put upward pressure on medical cost trend in 2018. • Rising general inflation impacts healthcare. An upswing in the US economy, now in its third-longest expansion in American history, is gaining strength, and higher general inflation rates will affect the labor-intensive health sector, driving up wages and medical prices. ² • Movement to high-deductible health plans loses steam. After shifting healthcare costs to employees for years, employers are starting to ease off. Growth in high-deductible employer-based health plans is slowing, leaving less opportunity to stem increases in the use of healthcare services. ³ • Fewer branded drugs come off patent. With fewer branded, small molecule drugs coming off patent, employers will have fewer opportunities to encourage employees to buy cost-saving generics, another strategy they’ve employed historically to keep costs down.4 Two forces may partially offset these health spending increases. • Political and public scrutiny puts pressure on drug prices. Heightened political and public attention could pressure drug companies to hold price hikes in check. • Employers target right people with right treatments to minimize waste. In an effort to ensure employee access to care while minimizing waste, employers are learning to better manage and deploy new treatments, technologies and information. In addition to these new and emerging issues in 2018, there also are forces that perennially influence healthcare costs. These include economywide drivers, such as demographics and American lifestyle trends, as well as sector-specific influences, such as hospital consolidation and changes in payment models. In 2018, these recurring factors will place upward and downward pressure on cost trend. Even with medical cost trend between 6 and 7 percent, health spending continues to outpace the economy. From 2011 to 2016, the average health premium for family coverage purchased through an employer rose 20 percent.5 In the same period, wages increased just 11 percent.6 This gap erodes consumers’ ability to pay for other goods and services, including housing, food and transportation. Nationally, as medical costs are projected to continue to grow faster than gross domestic product (GDP), healthcare will continue to take up a greater share of the economy.7 This could lead to larger budget deficits or less spending in areas such as education, infrastructure and defense. Even the “new normal” is not sustainable.

<h4>The “new normal” for cost growth is <u>not sustainable</u> and will <u>outpace the rest</u> of the economy </h4><p><strong>HRI, 17</strong> <u>(Health Research Institute, Kelly Barnes, Alexander Gaffney, Benjamin Isgur, Laura McLaughlin, Trine Tsouderos, Rebecca Murphy, Sarah Haflett, Jack Rodgers, PhD, Ben Comer, Kristen Bernie, June 2017, Accessed: 9-15-2017, “Medical Cost Trend: Behind the Numbers 2018” Price Waterhouse Coopers, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/health-research-institute/behind-the-numbers/reports/hri-behind-the-numbers-2018.pdf)</p><p></u>The Heart Of The Matter The era of volatile swings and double-digit growth in employer medical costs appears to be ending. With medical cost trend hovering in the single digits for several years, the industry has been waiting for the inflection point when spending will take off. But that spike appears unlikely to happen. <u><mark>The</mark> <strong>New <mark>Health Economy</strong> is settling into a <strong>“new normal,”</u></strong></mark> typically <u>characterized by</u> more attenuated fluctuations and <u><mark>a</mark> </u>single-digit trend. For four years, medical cost trend has <u>hung between <strong>6 and <mark>7 percent</strong></mark>, seeming to settle into a “new normal.”</u> PwC’s <u><strong>H</u></strong>ealth <u><strong>R</u></strong>esearch <u><strong>I</u></strong>nstitute (HRI) <u>anticipates a 6.5 percent <mark>growth rate</u></mark> for calendar year 2018, <u><strong>half a percentage point higher</strong> than in 2017. </u>After likely changes in benefit plan design, such as changes to co-pays and network size, the net growth rate is expected to be 1 percentage point lower, at 5.5 percent. HRI’s analysis measures anticipated spending growth in the employerbased market, which covers about half of all Americans.¹ Changes to government health insurance, including Medicare, Medicaid and plans sold on the public exchanges created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), are not within this analysis’ purview. HRI’s research found that three factors will put upward pressure on medical cost trend in 2018. • Rising general inflation impacts healthcare. An upswing in the US economy, now in its third-longest expansion in American history, is gaining strength, and higher general inflation rates will affect the labor-intensive health sector, driving up wages and medical prices. ² • Movement to high-deductible health plans loses steam. After shifting healthcare costs to employees for years, employers are starting to ease off. Growth in high-deductible employer-based health plans is slowing, leaving less opportunity to stem increases in the use of healthcare services. ³ • Fewer branded drugs come off patent. With fewer branded, small molecule drugs coming off patent, employers will have fewer opportunities to encourage employees to buy cost-saving generics, another strategy they’ve employed historically to keep costs down.4 Two forces may partially offset these health spending increases. • Political and public scrutiny puts pressure on drug prices. Heightened political and public attention could pressure drug companies to hold price hikes in check. • Employers target right people with right treatments to minimize waste. In an effort to ensure employee access to care while minimizing waste, employers are learning to better manage and deploy new treatments, technologies and information. In addition to these new and emerging issues in 2018, there also are forces that perennially influence healthcare costs. These include economywide drivers, such as demographics and American lifestyle trends, as well as sector-specific influences, such as hospital consolidation and changes in payment models. In 2018, these recurring factors will place upward and downward pressure on cost trend. <u>Even with <strong>medical cost trend</strong> between 6 and 7 percent, health <mark>spending continues to <strong>outpace the economy</strong></mark>.</u> From 2011 to 2016, the average health premium for family coverage purchased through an employer rose 20 percent.5 In the same period, wages increased just 11 percent.6 <u><mark>This gap <strong>erodes</strong> </mark>consumers’ <mark>ability to pay for other <strong>goods</mark> and services</strong>, including housing, food and transportation. Nationally, <mark>as medical costs are <strong>projected to</mark> continue to <mark>grow faster</strong> than</mark> </u>gross domestic product <u><mark>(GDP), healthcare will continue to take up a <strong>greater share of the economy</strong></mark>.</u>7 <u>This could lead to <strong>larger budget deficits</strong> or <strong>less spending</u></strong> in areas such as education, infrastructure and defense. <u>Even <mark>the <strong>“new normal” is not sustainable</strong>.</p></u></mark>

1ac Octas Wake vs Harvard

1ac Wake – Economy

./documents/ndtceda17/Georgia/StRi/Georgia-Stupek-Rice-Aff-Wake%20Forest-Octas.docx

A

Wake Forest

Octas

Harvard MS

Buntin, Jeff Justice, Jacob Repko, Will Harrigan, Casey Arnett, Dave

1AC Single Payer (Economy Pandemics) 1NC Europe Populism DA States CP Advantage CP Equity Markets DA on case Pensions DA on case EHR Hacks DA on case 2NR Pensions DA Stock Market DA Fund Military plank CP

ndtceda17/Georgia/StRi/Georgia-Stupek-Rice-Aff-Wake%20Forest-Octas.docx

StRi

Georgia StRi

Jo.....

St.....

Na.....

Ri.....

Georgia

Georgia

ndtceda17

NDT/CEDA 2017-18

cx

college

Solves the case

Jackel 17

Jackel 17 (February 4th, 2017, Robert Jackel is an attorney based in Philadelphia; Alex Green is a research associate at Harvard Business School, How Treaties Between States Could Keep Obamacare Alive, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/interstate-compacts-save-obamacare/515604/)

progressives have recourse at the state level A widely used form of treaty between states could allow them to bond together and set up their own multistate health-care programs to fill the gaps created by the federal government interstate compacts could be a tool to enact nationwide agenda California has the resources and population to run its exchange and could even fund Medicaid expansion less populous states would struggle to do the same without comparably sized economies But if they join together in an interstate compact they could reap economy of scale saving on costs through size of the enrollment pool and bargaining power compacts allow states to maintain consistency in their laws by coordinating on a multistate level. While they may not rival the power of the federal government, compacts may be a next-best option for states facing cutbacks from Washington States could use them to create new systems from scratch. There are currently over 200 active interstate compacts, many of which are regional. Twenty-two are national Agencies that monitor compacts have authority, delegated from the states, to generate revenue and engage in rule-making There are constitutional limitations But states can largely work around those constraints states have regularly entered into these agreements without lawmakers’ approval the Supreme Court has supported them curbing federal involvement when states enact programs they each could have done on their own, congressional approval is not necessary. Congressional consent is not a legal judgment, it’s a political one Congress rarely says no to states that want to enter into them it’s dangerous politically to not respect the will of the states Agreements that are backed by Congress carry the force of federal law, and once granted, Congress cannot take back its consent. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative has been operating for years without congressional approval interstate health-care exchanges could be operable without lawmakers’ consent under the Supreme Court’s holding in U.S. Steel they might even get congressional approval there’s appetite for honoring states’ health-care decisions, which could include interstate agreements. governor of Vermont ran on a platform promising to merge Vermont’s exchange with that of another state nine states put forward their own Health Care Compact to get around health-care law. The proposal promised to let the participating states use federal funds to run health-care programs, while allowing each member state to define priorities and administer programs at the state level When they choose to act, they may see fit to take matters into their own hands, but do so together.

multistate health-care compacts could enact nationwide agenda California has the resources if they join a compact they could reap economy of scale compacts allow consistency in laws States could create new systems from scratch There are over 200 active compacts Twenty-two are national Agencies have authority to generate revenue and engage in rule-making states regularly entered agreements without lawmakers’ approval Supreme Court supported them congressional approval is not necessary

Across the country, Democrats have vowed to fight efforts from congressional Republicans and the White House to repeal the Affordable Care Act—a task that grows more complicated by the day. Yet even if the law is repealed, with or without a replacement, progressives could still have recourse at the state level. A widely used form of treaty between states could allow them to bond together and set up their own multistate health-care programs to fill the gaps created by the federal government. In an age of retreating federal programs, interstate compacts could be a tool for progressive states to enact a regional or even nationwide agenda. Large states would have little trouble replacing the ACA, often called Obamacare, with a state-run program on their own. California has the resources and population to run its state health-care exchange, Covered California, from Sacramento, and could even fund the Medicaid expansion it implemented under the ACA. To the north, less populous states like Oregon and Washington would struggle to do the same without comparably sized economies. But if they join together with California in an interstate compact, they could potentially reap the benefits of the economy of scale—saving on costs through the sheer size of the enrollment pool and bargaining power. Interstate compacts allow individual states to maintain consistency in their laws by coordinating on a multistate level. While they may not rival the power of the federal government, compacts may be a next-best option for states facing sudden cutbacks in support from Washington, D.C. States could use them to preserve ACA-initiated programs, or create new systems from scratch. There are currently over 200 active interstate compacts, many of which are regional. Twenty-two agreements are national in scope, and each one addresses a different issue facing the states. The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, for example, oversees the transfer of parole and probation between states. And the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission is one of roughly two dozen water-related compacts that govern everything from fish stocks to the fair use of river basins by adjoining states. Agencies that monitor compacts have authority, delegated from the states, to generate revenue and engage in rule-making—that is, they can create regulations to enforce the powers granted by a given compact. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Delaware River Port Authority, and the Washington Metro Area Transit Authority are all interstate-compact agencies that run rapid-transit systems. There are constitutional limitations on these agreements, even though some actually predate the Constitution and were used to settle land disputes between the colonies. But states can largely work around those constraints. The Compacts Clause of the Constitution—Article I, Section 10—says, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” Despite that limiting language, states have regularly entered into these agreements without lawmakers’ approval at all, and the Supreme Court has supported them, curbing the scope of federal involvement in the process. In 1893, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government’s authority to approve such agreements was only applicable when an agreement “may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” It was not completely clear what constraints this left on the states. Nearly a century later, the Court took up the issue again, building on their earlier ruling in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission in 1978. The Court found that the commission’s policies, which were intended to reform state taxation of multistate businesses, could have been enacted individually by each state. As a result, the Court ruled that the Multistate Tax Compact did not require the consent of Congress. To date, the test for when states need approval remains murky, but in general, when states enact programs they each could have done on their own, congressional approval is not necessary. “Congressional consent is not necessarily a legal judgment, it’s a political one,” said Colmon Elridge, director of the National Center for Interstate Compacts, a division of the nonpartisan Council of State Governments that provides information and assistance on how to establish and run compacts. So the standard for lawmakers deliberating whether they should approve a compact is usually, as Elridge put it, “Is this in my political best interest?” Moreover, Congress rarely says no to states that want to enter into them. “When it gets to that level,” he said, referring to agreements that are ready for congressional review, “especially in this climate, it’s more dangerous politically to not respect the will of the states.” Congressional approval can confer advantages, too, even if it’s not necessarily required for compacts to take effect. Agreements that are backed by Congress carry the force of federal law, and once granted, Congress cannot take back its consent. But there can be drawbacks for states that decide to enter into compacts without congressional approval. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Northeast’s auction-based cap-and-trade program for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, has been operating for years without congressional approval. Nine states are currently members of the compact: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. As a mandatory program, the RGGI has claimed reductions in lifetime energy bills of $4.67 billion for 4.6 million residences. However, because it lacks congressional consent, the compact does not have the force of law that prevents state governments from interfering from term to term. The program relies instead on individual states for regulation, and their general willingness to continue to participate. Any dispute between states in a congressionally approved compact is brought directly to the Supreme Court of the United States, as part of the Court’s original jurisdiction. But compacts that have not sought congressional approval have no easy mechanism to resolve disagreements. This has exposed the RGGI to the whims of changing state governments. In 2011, for example, a dissatisfied New Jersey Governor Chris Christie withdrew from the compact, claiming that “it doesn’t make any sense environmentally or economically.” Even though the state legislature voted to bring New Jersey back into the program, Christie then vetoed the bills to rejoin the agreement. The states considering compacts in recent years have been red states looking to dodge Obamacare—not blue states. While at this point only New Jersey has left—and will likely return after Christie leaves office—the ability of states to leave congressionally unapproved compacts creates vulnerabilities and makes long-term planning harder. As other states, including California, continue to build regional, and even international, climate initiatives without congressional support, New Jersey’s example casts a shadow over their efforts. Given the ACA’s origins as a state-level initiative in Massachusetts, interstate health-care exchanges could be operable without lawmakers’ consent under the Supreme Court’s holding in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission, though they would be exposed to the same vulnerabilities as the RGGI. But given Republican support for states’ rights, they might even get congressional approval. A recent Republican plan to replace Obamacare would permit states to “keep the Affordable Care Act if it is working for their residents,” as Senator Susan Collins described. While its future is unclear, the plan is a sign that there’s appetite for honoring states’ health-care decisions, which could include interstate agreements. Elridge is not even certain that multistate exchanges would be seen as controversial as interstate compacts go, despite the charged political climate. “If Kentucky and Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia said, ‘We understand the health challenges in these states, we’re going to develop some kind of interstate compact that works in terms of expanding access to care, making it quality, and making it affordable,’ they can absolutely do that,’” he said. Phil Scott, the new Republican governor of Vermont, has already suggested as much. Scott ran on a platform promising to merge Vermont’s exchange with that of another state, possibly New Hampshire, to save money on maintenance and operating costs. This could be the first step toward creating regional health-care exchanges that build on the ACA. Even with congressional approval, there could still be some limitations on multistate exchanges. The Constitution puts limits on the ability of individual states to hamper interstate commerce or discriminate against out-of-state economic interests. For instance, a climate compact that bans the importation of electricity from a state outside the compact could violate the Constitution. State legislatures may also be wary of approving expenditures that are tied to the actions of other states, even if they isolate their own revenue, as is done with RGGI. Administrative agencies that oversee enforcement of the compacts may also fall prey to political meddling and corruption, because appointees who run them are often friends of elected officials and there can be lax oversight of their activities. Governor Christie’s own woes involving the New York-New Jersey Port Authority’s links to the Bridgegate scandal point to such a reality. Like all legislation, compacts appear likely to succeed where participants are eager to join. On health care, the first states to consider them in recent years have been red states looking to dodge Obamacare—not blue states. In 2014, nine largely conservative states put forward their own Health Care Compact to get around the health-care law. The proposal promised to let the participating states use federal funds to run health-care programs, while allowing each member state to define priorities and administer programs at the state level. It stalled because of the unclear language of the legislation and the wariness of governors to give up states’ rights. Elridge sees new state leaders taking up health-care compacts again, but not before they know more about what a Trump administration plans to do. For now, he said, they seem to be “taking a wait-and-see approach.” When they choose to act, they may see fit to take matters into their own hands, but do so together.

<h4>Solves the case</h4><p><strong>Jackel 17</strong> (February 4th, 2017, Robert Jackel is an attorney based in Philadelphia; Alex Green<u> is a research associate at Harvard Business School, How Treaties Between States Could Keep Obamacare Alive, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/interstate-compacts-save-obamacare/515604/)</p><p></u>Across the country, Democrats have vowed to fight efforts from congressional Republicans and the White House to repeal the Affordable Care Act—a task that grows more complicated by the day. Yet even if the law is repealed, with or without a replacement, <u>progressives</u> could still <u>have recourse at the state level</u>. <u>A <strong>widely used</strong> form of treaty between states could allow them to bond together and set up their own <mark>multistate health-care</mark> programs to fill the <strong>gaps created by the federal government</u></strong>. In an age of retreating federal programs, <u>interstate <mark>compacts could</mark> be a tool </u>for progressive states <u>to <mark>enact</u></mark> a regional or even <u><strong><mark>nationwide</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>agenda</u></strong></mark>. Large states would have little trouble replacing the ACA, often called Obamacare, with a state-run program on their own. <u><strong><mark>California</strong> has the resources </mark>and population to run its</u> state health-care <u>exchange</u>, Covered California, from Sacramento, <u>and could even fund</u> the <u>Medicaid</u> <u>expansion</u> it implemented under the ACA. To the north, <u>less populous states</u> like Oregon and Washington <u>would struggle to do the same without comparably sized economies</u>. <u><strong>But <mark>if they join</mark> together</u></strong> with California <u><strong>in <mark>a</mark>n interstate <mark>compact</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>they could</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><strong><mark>reap</u></strong></mark> the benefits of the <u><strong><mark>economy of scale</u></strong></mark>—<u>saving on costs through</u> the sheer <u>size of the enrollment pool and bargaining power</u>. Interstate <u><mark>compacts allow</u></mark> individual <u>states to maintain <strong><mark>consistency</strong> in</mark> their <mark>laws</mark> by coordinating on a multistate level.</u> <u>While they may not rival the power of the federal government, compacts may be a next-best option for states facing </u>sudden <u>cutbacks</u> in support <u>from</u> <u>Washington</u>, D.C. <u><mark>States could</mark> use them to</u> preserve ACA-initiated programs, or <u><strong><mark>create new systems from scratch</mark>.</u></strong> <u><mark>There are</mark> currently <mark>over 200 active</mark> interstate <mark>compacts</mark>, many of which are regional. <strong><mark>Twenty-two</u></strong></mark> agreements <u><strong><mark>are national</u></strong></mark> in scope, and each one addresses a different issue facing the states. The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, for example, oversees the transfer of parole and probation between states. And the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission is one of roughly two dozen water-related compacts that govern everything from fish stocks to the fair use of river basins by adjoining states. <u><strong><mark>Agencies</u></strong></mark> <u>that monitor compacts <mark>have authority</mark>, delegated from the states, <mark>to <strong>generate revenue and engage in rule-making</u></strong></mark>—that is, they can create regulations to enforce the powers granted by a given compact. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Delaware River Port Authority, and the Washington Metro Area Transit Authority are all interstate-compact agencies that run rapid-transit systems. <u>There are constitutional limitations</u> on these agreements, even though some actually predate the Constitution and were used to settle land disputes between the colonies. <u>But states can largely work around those constraints</u>. The Compacts Clause of the Constitution—Article I, Section 10—says, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” Despite that limiting language, <u><mark>states</mark> have <strong><mark>regularly</strong> entered</mark> into these <mark>agreements <strong>without</strong></mark> <mark>lawmakers’ <strong>approval</strong></mark> </u>at all, and <u><strong>the <mark>Supreme Court</mark> has <mark>supported them</u></strong></mark>, <u>curbing</u> the scope of <u>federal involvement</u> in the process. In 1893, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government’s authority to approve such agreements was only applicable when an agreement “may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” It was not completely clear what constraints this left on the states. Nearly a century later, the Court took up the issue again, building on their earlier ruling in U.S. Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission in 1978. The Court found that the commission’s policies, which were intended to reform state taxation of multistate businesses, could have been enacted individually by each state. As a result, the Court ruled that the Multistate Tax Compact did not require the consent of Congress. To date, the test for when states need approval remains murky, but in general, <u>when states enact programs they each could have done on their own, <mark>congressional approval is <strong>not necessary</strong></mark>. </u>“<u>Congressional consent is not</u> necessarily <u>a legal judgment, it’s a political one</u>,” said Colmon Elridge, director of the National Center for Interstate Compacts, a division of the nonpartisan Council of State Governments that provides information and assistance on how to establish and run compacts. So the standard for lawmakers deliberating whether they should approve a compact is usually, as Elridge put it, “Is this in my political best interest?” Moreover, <u>Congress rarely says no to states that want to enter into them</u>. “When it gets to that level,” he said, referring to agreements that are ready for congressional review, “especially in this climate, <u><strong>it’s</u></strong> more <u><strong>dangerous politically to not respect the will of the states</u></strong>.” Congressional approval can confer advantages, too, even if it’s not necessarily required for compacts to take effect. <u>Agreements that are backed by Congress carry the force of federal law, and once granted, Congress cannot take back its consent. </u>But there can be drawbacks for states that decide to enter into compacts without congressional approval. <u>The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative</u>, the Northeast’s auction-based cap-and-trade program for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, <u>has been operating for years without congressional approval</u>. Nine states are currently members of the compact: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. As a mandatory program, the RGGI has claimed reductions in lifetime energy bills of $4.67 billion for 4.6 million residences. However, because it lacks congressional consent, the compact does not have the force of law that prevents state governments from interfering from term to term. The program relies instead on individual states for regulation, and their general willingness to continue to participate. Any dispute between states in a congressionally approved compact is brought directly to the Supreme Court of the United States, as part of the Court’s original jurisdiction. But compacts that have not sought congressional approval have no easy mechanism to resolve disagreements. This has exposed the RGGI to the whims of changing state governments. In 2011, for example, a dissatisfied New Jersey Governor Chris Christie withdrew from the compact, claiming that “it doesn’t make any sense environmentally or economically.” Even though the state legislature voted to bring New Jersey back into the program, Christie then vetoed the bills to rejoin the agreement. The states considering compacts in recent years have been red states looking to dodge Obamacare—not blue states. While at this point only New Jersey has left—and will likely return after Christie leaves office—the ability of states to leave congressionally unapproved compacts creates vulnerabilities and makes long-term planning harder. As other states, including California, continue to build regional, and even international, climate initiatives without congressional support, New Jersey’s example casts a shadow over their efforts. Given the ACA’s origins as a state-level initiative in Massachusetts, <u>interstate health-care exchanges could be operable without lawmakers’ consent under the Supreme Court’s holding in U.S. Steel</u> Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission, though they would be exposed to the same vulnerabilities as the RGGI. But given Republican support for states’ rights, <u><strong>they might even get congressional approval</u></strong>. A recent Republican plan to replace Obamacare would permit states to “keep the Affordable Care Act if it is working for their residents,” as Senator Susan Collins described. While its future is unclear, the plan is a sign that <u>there’s appetite for honoring states’ health-care decisions, which could include interstate agreements. </u>Elridge is not even certain that multistate exchanges would be seen as controversial as interstate compacts go, despite the charged political climate. “If Kentucky and Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia said, ‘We understand the health challenges in these states, we’re going to develop some kind of interstate compact that works in terms of expanding access to care, making it quality, and making it affordable,’ they can absolutely do that,’” he said. Phil Scott, the new Republican <u>governor of Vermont</u>, has already suggested as much. Scott <u>ran on a platform promising to merge Vermont’s exchange with that of another state</u>, possibly New Hampshire, to save money on maintenance and operating costs. This could be the first step toward creating regional health-care exchanges that build on the ACA. Even with congressional approval, there could still be some limitations on multistate exchanges. The Constitution puts limits on the ability of individual states to hamper interstate commerce or discriminate against out-of-state economic interests. For instance, a climate compact that bans the importation of electricity from a state outside the compact could violate the Constitution. State legislatures may also be wary of approving expenditures that are tied to the actions of other states, even if they isolate their own revenue, as is done with RGGI. Administrative agencies that oversee enforcement of the compacts may also fall prey to political meddling and corruption, because appointees who run them are often friends of elected officials and there can be lax oversight of their activities. Governor Christie’s own woes involving the New York-New Jersey Port Authority’s links to the Bridgegate scandal point to such a reality. Like all legislation, compacts appear likely to succeed where participants are eager to join. On health care, the first states to consider them in recent years have been red states looking to dodge Obamacare—not blue states. In 2014, <u>nine</u> largely conservative <u>states put forward their own Health Care Compact to get around</u> the <u>health-care law. The proposal promised to let the participating states use federal funds to run health-care programs, while allowing each member state to define priorities and administer programs at the state level</u>. It stalled because of the unclear language of the legislation and the wariness of governors to give up states’ rights. Elridge sees new state leaders taking up health-care compacts again, but not before they know more about what a Trump administration plans to do. For now, he said, they seem to be “taking a wait-and-see approach.” <u>When they choose to act, they may see fit to take matters into their own hands, but <strong>do so together</strong>.</p></u>

Neg Doc—NDT Round 6

States CP

1NC

./documents/ndtceda17/Georgia/StRi/Georgia-Stupek-Rice-Neg-Ndtatwichitastate-Round6.docx

N

Ndtatwichitastate

6

Minnesota Asirvatham-Leburu

Moczulski, Saiedian, Taylor

1ac - single payer econ disease opioids 1nc - biotech da rural hospital da states cp wag the dog stabilization cp part E cp - turns on case

ndtceda17/Georgia/StRi/Georgia-Stupek-Rice-Neg-Ndtatwichitastate-Round6.docx

StRi

Georgia StRi

Jo.....

St.....

Na.....

Ri.....

Georgia

Georgia

ndtceda17

NDT/CEDA 2017-18

cx

college

Successful movement organizing is analogous to mainstream politics – it requires skilled organization, strategic flexibility, effective management, and proto-institutionalism – sacrificing debate as training in favor of being a revolutionary for a weekend ensures failure

Heller 17

Heller 17 [Nathan Heller began contributing to The New Yorker in 2011, and joined the magazine as a staff writer in 2013. He has written on a range of subjects, including online education and the TED Conference. He is also a film and television critic, and a contributing editor, at Vogue. Previously, he was a columnist for Slate, where he was a finalist for a National Magazine Award for essays and criticism. Is There Any Point to Protesting? August 21, 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/is-there-any-point-to-protesting]

Tufekci’s conclusions about the civil-rights movement are unsettling movements that succeed are actually proto-institutional: highly organized; strategically flexible, due to sinewy management structures; and chummy with the sorts of people we now call élites The Montgomery N.A.A.C.P. worked with Durr whose brother-in-law Hugo Black was a Supreme Court Justice organizers of the March on Washington turned to Bobby Kennedy when Rustin’s prized sound system was sabotaged the day before the protest. Kennedy enlisted the Army Signal Corps to fix it Far from speaking truth to power, successful protests seem to speak truth through power The principle holds for such successful post-sixties movements as ACT UP with its structure of caucuses and expert working groups real results come to those with the same old privileges—time, money, infrastructure, an ability to call in favors—that shape mainline politics this realization irks the Jacobins Hardt and Negri, as well as Srnicek and Williams, rail at length against “neoliberalism”: a fashionable bugaboo on the left According to them, neoliberalism lurks everywhere that power resides, beckoning friendly passersby into its drippy gingerbread house. Hardt and Negri dismiss “participating in government, because, they say, “reformism in this form has proven to be impossible and the social benefits it promises are an illusion They favor antagonistic pressure, leading to a revolution with no central authority (a plan perhaps more promising in theory than in practice What comes undone here is the dream of protest as an expression of personal politics Those of us whose days are filled with chores and meetings may be deluding ourselves to think that we can rise as “revolutionaries-for-a-weekend” recent studies make it clear that protest results don’t follow the laws of life: eighty per cent isn’t just showing up Instead, logistics reign and then constrain Outcomes rely on how you coördinate your efforts and on the skill with which you use existing influence as help If that seems deflating it only goes to show how entrenched self-expressive protest has become in political identity the social threshold for protest-joining is low The age of movement politics is over, at least for now. We need no more marchers. We need more mayors Folk politics, tracing a fifty-year anti-establishmentarian trend, flatters a certain idea of heroism: the system, we think, must be fought by authentic people Self-government remains a messy, fussy, slow, frustrating business. We do well to remind those working its gears and levers that the public—not just the appalled me but the conjoined us whom the elected serve—is watching and aware More than two centuries after our country took its shaky first steps the union is miles from perfection. But it is still on its feet, sometimes striding, frequently stumbling

Tufekci’s conclusions about civil-rights are unsettling movements that succeed are proto-institutional organized strategically flexible due to sinewy management structures; and chummy with élites Montgomery N.A.A.C.P. worked with Durr whose brother-in-law was a Supreme Court Justice the March on Washington turned to Bobby Kennedy when Rustin’s sound system was sabotaged Kennedy enlisted the Army Corps to fix it Far from speaking truth to power, successful protests speak truth through power The principle holds for ACT UP, with its expert working groups real results come to those with privileges time money infrastructure ability to call in favors that shape mainline politics this irks the Jacobins Hardt and Negri dismiss “participating in government because reformism has proven impossible and social benefits an illusion.” They favor antagonistic pressure leading to revolution with no authority (a plan more promising in theory than practice What comes undone is protest as personal politics Those whose days are filled with meetings think we can rise as “revolutionaries-for-a-weekend recent studies make it clear protest results don’t follow the laws of life: eighty per cent isn’t showing up logistics reign and constrain Outcomes rely on how you coördinate efforts, and on skill with which you use existing influence If that seems deflating it only goes to show how entrenched self-expressive protest has become We need more mayors.” Folk politics, tracing a anti-establishmentarian trend, flatters heroism: the system must be fought by authentic people Self-government remains messy slow frustrating More than two centuries after our country took first steps, the union is miles from perfection it is on its feet, sometimes striding, frequently stumbling

Tufekci’s conclusions about the civil-rights movement are unsettling because of what they imply. People such as Kauffman portray direct democracy as a scrappy, passionate enterprise: the underrepresented, the oppressed, and the dissatisfied get together and, strengthened by numbers, force change. Tufekci suggests that the movements that succeed are actually proto-institutional: highly organized; strategically flexible, due to sinewy management structures; and chummy with the sorts of people we now call élites. The Montgomery N.A.A.C.P. worked with Clifford Durr, a patrician lawyer whom Franklin Roosevelt had appointed to the F.C.C., and whose brother-in-law Hugo Black was a Supreme Court Justice when Browder v. Gayle was heard. The organizers of the March on Washington turned to Bobby Kennedy—the U.S. Attorney General and the brother of the sitting President—when Rustin’s prized sound system was sabotaged the day before the protest. Kennedy enlisted the Army Signal Corps to fix it. You can’t get much cozier with the Man than that. Far from speaking truth to power, successful protests seem to speak truth through power. (The principle holds for such successful post-sixties movements as ACT UP, with its structure of caucuses and expert working groups. And it forces one to reassess the rise of well-funded “Astroturf” movements such as the Tea Party: successful grassroots lawns, it turns out, have a bit of plastic in them, too.) Democratizing technology may now give the voiceless a means to cry in the streets, but real results come to those with the same old privileges—time, money, infrastructure, an ability to call in favors—that shape mainline politics. Unsurprisingly, this realization irks the Jacobins. Hardt and Negri, as well as Srnicek and Williams, rail at length against “neoliberalism”: a fashionable bugaboo on the left, and thus, unfortunately, a term more often flaunted than defined. (Neoliberalism can broadly refer to any program that involves market-liberal policies—privatization, deregulation, etc.—and so includes everything from Thatcher’s social-expenditure reductions to Obama’s global-trade policies. A moratorium on its use would help solidify a lot of gaseous debate.) According to them, neoliberalism lurks everywhere that power resides, beckoning friendly passersby into its drippy gingerbread house. Hardt and Negri dismiss “participating in government, respecting capitalist discipline, and creating structures for labor and business to collaborate,” because, they say, “reformism in this form has proven to be impossible and the social benefits it promises are an illusion.” They favor antagonistic pressure, leading to a revolution with no central authority (a plan perhaps more promising in theory than in practice). Srnicek and Williams don’t reject working with politicians, though they think that real transformation comes from shifts in social expectation, in school curricula, and in the sorts of things that reasonable people discuss on TV (the so-called Overton window). It’s an ambitious approach but not an outlandish one: Bernie Sanders ran a popular campaign, and suddenly socialist projects were on the prime-time docket. Change does arrive through mainstream power, but this just means that your movement should be threaded through the culture’s institutional eye. The question, then, is what protest is for. Srnicek and Williams, even after all their criticism, aren’t ready to let it go—they describe it as “necessary but insufficient.” Yet they strain to say just how it fits with the idea of class struggle in a postindustrial, smartphone-linked world. “If there is no workplace to disrupt, what can be done?” they wonder. Possibly their telescope is pointing the wrong way round. Much of their book attempts to match the challenges of current life—a shrinking manufacturing sphere, a global labor surplus, a mire of race-inflected socioeconomic traps—with Marx’s quite specific precepts about the nineteenth-century European economy. They define the proletariat as “that group of people who must sell their labor powers to live.” It must be noted that this group—now comprising Olive Garden waiters, coders based in Bangalore, janitors, YouTube stars, twenty-two-year-olds at Goldman Sachs—is really very broad. A truly modern left, one cannot help but think, would be at liberty to shed a manufacturing-era, deterministic framework like Marxism, allegorized and hyperextended far beyond its time. Still, to date no better paradigm for labor economics and uprising has emerged. What comes undone here is the dream of protest as an expression of personal politics. Those of us whose days are filled with chores and meetings may be deluding ourselves to think that we can rise as “revolutionaries-for-a-weekend”—Norman Mailer’s phrase for his own bizarre foray, in 1967, as described in “The Armies of the Night.” Yet that’s not to say the twenty-four-year-old who quits his job and sleeps in a tent to affirm his commitment does more. The recent studies make it clear that protest results don’t follow the laws of life: eighty per cent isn’t just showing up. Instead, logistics reign and then constrain. Outcomes rely on how you coördinate your efforts, and on the skill with which you use existing influence as help. If that seems a deflating idea, it only goes to show how entrenched self-expressive protest has become in political identity. In one survey, half of Occupy Wall Street allies turned out to be fully employed: even that putatively radical economic movement was largely middle class. (Also, as many noted, it was largely white.) That may be because even the privileged echelons of working America are mad as hell and won’t take it anymore. But it may also be because the social threshold for protest-joining is low. A running joke in “The Armies of the Night” is that many of the people who went off to demonstrate were affluent egghead types—unsure, self-obsessed, squeamish, and, in many ways, pretty conservative. “There was an air of Ivy League intimacy to the quiet conversations on this walk—it could not really be called a March,” Mailer says. Writing of himself: “He found a friendly face. It was Gordon Rogoff, an old friend from Actors Studio, now teaching at the Yale Drama School; they talked idly about theatrical matters for a while.” This has been the cultural expectation since the late sixties, even as tactical protest has left mainstream power behind. As citizens, we get two chips—one for the ballot box, the other for the soapbox. Many of us feel compelled to make use of them both. Would casual activists be better off deploying their best skills toward change (teachers teaching, coders coding, celebrities celebritizing) and leaving direct action in the hands of organizational pros? That seems sad, and a good recipe for lax, unchecked, uncoördinated effort. Should they work indirectly—writing letters, calling senators, and politely nagging congresspeople on Twitter? That involves no cool attire or clever signs, and no friends who’ll cheer at every turn. But there’s reason to believe that it works, because even bad legislators pander to their electorates. In a new book, “The Once and Future Liberal” (Harper), Mark Lilla urges a turn back toward governmental process. “The role of social movements in American history, while important, has been seriously inflated by left-leaning activists and historians,” he writes. “The age of movement politics is over, at least for now. We need no more marchers. We need more mayors.” Folk politics, tracing a fifty-year anti-establishmentarian trend, flatters a certain idea of heroism: the system, we think, must be fought by authentic people. Yet that outlook is so widely held now that it occupies the highest offices of government. Maybe, in the end, the system is the powerless person’s best bet. Or maybe direct action is something to value independent of its results. No specific demands were made at the Women’s March, in January. The protest produced no concrete outcomes, and it held no legislators to account. And yet the march, which encompassed millions of people on every continent, including Antarctica, cannot be called a failure. At a time when identity is presumed to be clannish and insular, it offered solidarity on a vast scale. What was the Women’s March about? Empowerment, human rights, discontent—you know. Why did it matter? Because we were there. Self-government remains a messy, fussy, slow, frustrating business. We do well to remind those working its gears and levers that the public—not just the appalled me but the conjoined us whom the elected serve—is watching and aware. More than two centuries after our country took its shaky first steps, the union is miles from perfection. But it is still on its feet, sometimes striding, frequently stumbling. The march goes on, and someday, not just in our dreams, we’ll make it home.

<h4><strong>Successful movement organizing is <u>analogous</u> to <u>mainstream politics</u> – it requires <u>skilled organization</u>, strategic <u>flexibility</u>, effective <u>management</u>, and <u>proto-institutionalism</u> – sacrificing <u>debate as training</u> in favor of being a <u>revolutionary for a weekend</u> ensures failure</h4><p>Heller 17</strong> [Nathan Heller began contributing to The New Yorker in 2011, and joined the magazine as a staff writer in 2013. He has written on a range of subjects, including online education and the TED Conference. He is also a film and television critic, and a contributing editor, at Vogue. Previously, he was a columnist for Slate, where he was a finalist for a National Magazine Award for essays and criticism. Is There Any Point to Protesting? August 21, 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/is-there-any-point-to-protesting]</p><p><u><mark>Tufekci’s conclusions about</mark> the <mark>civil-rights</mark> movement <mark>are <strong>unsettling</u></strong></mark> because of what they imply. People such as Kauffman portray direct democracy as a scrappy, passionate enterprise: the underrepresented, the oppressed, and the dissatisfied get together and, strengthened by numbers, force change. Tufekci suggests that the <u><strong><mark>movements that succeed</strong> are</mark> actually <strong><mark>proto-institutional</strong></mark>: highly <strong><mark>organized</strong></mark>; <strong><mark>strategically flexible</strong></mark>, <mark>due to sinewy <strong>management structures</strong>; and <strong>chummy</strong> with</mark> the sorts of people we now call <strong><mark>élites</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <mark>Montgomery</mark> <mark>N.A.A.C.P. worked with</u></mark> Clifford <u><mark>Durr</u></mark>, a patrician lawyer whom Franklin Roosevelt had appointed to the F.C.C., and <u><mark>whose brother-in-law</mark> Hugo Black <mark>was a Supreme Court Justice</u></mark> when Browder v. Gayle was heard. The <u>organizers of <mark>the <strong>March on Washington</strong> turned to Bobby Kennedy</u></mark>—the U.S. Attorney General and the brother of the sitting President—<u><mark>when Rustin’s</mark> prized <mark>sound system was sabotaged</mark> the day before the protest. <mark>Kennedy enlisted the Army</mark> Signal <mark>Corps to fix it</u></mark>. You can’t get much cozier with the Man than that. <u><mark>Far from speaking truth <strong>to power</strong>, <strong>successful protests</strong></mark> seem to <mark>speak truth<strong> through power</u></strong></mark>. (<u><mark>The principle holds for</mark> such successful post-sixties movements as <strong><mark>ACT UP</u></strong>, <u>with its</mark> structure of caucuses and <mark>expert working groups</u></mark>. And it forces one to reassess the rise of well-funded “Astroturf” movements such as the Tea Party: successful grassroots lawns, it turns out, have a bit of plastic in them, too.) Democratizing technology may now give the voiceless a means to cry in the streets, but <u><strong><mark>real results</strong> come to those with</mark> the same old <mark>privileges</mark>—<strong><mark>time</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>money</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>infrastructure</strong></mark>, an <mark>ability to <strong>call in favors</strong></mark>—<mark>that shape <strong>mainline politics</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Unsurprisingly, <u><mark>this</mark> realization <strong><mark>irks the Jacobins</u></strong></mark>. <u>Hardt and Negri, as well as Srnicek and Williams, rail at length against “neoliberalism”: a fashionable <strong>bugaboo</strong> on the left</u>, and thus, unfortunately, a term more often flaunted than defined. (Neoliberalism can broadly refer to any program that involves market-liberal policies—privatization, deregulation, etc.—and so includes everything from Thatcher’s social-expenditure reductions to Obama’s global-trade policies. A moratorium on its use would help solidify a lot of gaseous debate.) <u>According to them, neoliberalism lurks everywhere that power resides, beckoning friendly passersby into its drippy gingerbread house. <mark>Hardt and Negri <strong>dismiss</strong> “participating in <strong>government</strong></mark>,</u> respecting capitalist discipline, and creating structures for labor and business to collaborate,” <u><mark>because</mark>, they say, “<strong><mark>reformism</strong></mark> in this form <mark>has proven</mark> to be <strong><mark>impossible</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>social benefits</strong></mark> it promises are <mark>an <strong>illusion</u></strong>.” <u>They</mark> <mark>favor <strong>antagonistic pressure</strong></mark>, <mark>leading to</mark> a <strong><mark>revolution</strong> with <strong>no</mark> central <mark>authority</strong> (a plan</mark> perhaps <strong><mark>more promising</strong> in <strong>theory</strong> than</mark> in <strong><mark>practice</u></strong></mark>). Srnicek and Williams don’t reject working with politicians, though they think that real transformation comes from shifts in social expectation, in school curricula, and in the sorts of things that reasonable people discuss on TV (the so-called Overton window). It’s an ambitious approach but not an outlandish one: Bernie Sanders ran a popular campaign, and suddenly socialist projects were on the prime-time docket. Change does arrive through mainstream power, but this just means that your movement should be threaded through the culture’s institutional eye.</p><p>The question, then, is what protest is for. Srnicek and Williams, even after all their criticism, aren’t ready to let it go—they describe it as “necessary but insufficient.” Yet they strain to say just how it fits with the idea of class struggle in a postindustrial, smartphone-linked world. “If there is no workplace to disrupt, what can be done?” they wonder. Possibly their telescope is pointing the wrong way round. Much of their book attempts to match the challenges of current life—a shrinking manufacturing sphere, a global labor surplus, a mire of race-inflected socioeconomic traps—with Marx’s quite specific precepts about the nineteenth-century European economy. They define the proletariat as “that group of people who must sell their labor powers to live.” It must be noted that this group—now comprising Olive Garden waiters, coders based in Bangalore, janitors, YouTube stars, twenty-two-year-olds at Goldman Sachs—is really very broad. A truly modern left, one cannot help but think, would be at liberty to shed a manufacturing-era, deterministic framework like Marxism, allegorized and hyperextended far beyond its time. Still, to date no better paradigm for labor economics and uprising has emerged.</p><p><u><mark>What comes <strong>undone</strong></mark> here <mark>is</mark> the dream of <strong><mark>protest</strong> as</mark> an expression of <strong><mark>personal politics</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Those</mark> of us <mark>whose days are filled with</mark> chores and <mark>meetings</mark> may be deluding ourselves to <mark>think</mark> that <mark>we can rise as “<strong>revolutionaries-for-a-weekend</strong></mark>”</u>—Norman Mailer’s phrase for his own bizarre foray, in 1967, as described in “The Armies of the Night.” Yet that’s not to say the twenty-four-year-old who quits his job and sleeps in a tent to affirm his commitment does more. The <u><strong><mark>recent studies</strong> make it clear</mark> that <strong><mark>protest results</strong> don’t follow the laws of life:</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>eighty per cent isn’t</mark> just <mark>showing up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Instead, <strong><mark>logistics</strong> reign and</mark> then <mark>constrain</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Outcomes</strong> rely on how you <strong>coördinate</strong></mark> your <mark>efforts</u>, <u>and on</mark> the <strong><mark>skill</strong> with which you use <strong>existing influence</strong></mark> as help</u>.</p><p><u><mark>If that seems</u></mark> a <u><strong><mark>deflating</u></strong></mark> idea, <u><mark>it <strong>only goes to show</strong> how entrenched <strong>self-expressive</strong> protest has become</mark> in <strong>political identity</u></strong>. In one survey, half of Occupy Wall Street allies turned out to be fully employed: even that putatively radical economic movement was largely middle class. (Also, as many noted, it was largely white.) That may be because even the privileged echelons of working America are mad as hell and won’t take it anymore. But it may also be because <u>the <strong>social threshold</strong> for protest-joining is <strong>low</u></strong>. A running joke in “The Armies of the Night” is that many of the people who went off to demonstrate were affluent egghead types—unsure, self-obsessed, squeamish, and, in many ways, pretty conservative. “There was an air of Ivy League intimacy to the quiet conversations on this walk—it could not really be called a March,” Mailer says. Writing of himself: “He found a friendly face. It was Gordon Rogoff, an old friend from Actors Studio, now teaching at the Yale Drama School; they talked idly about theatrical matters for a while.” This has been the cultural expectation since the late sixties, even as tactical protest has left mainstream power behind. As citizens, we get two chips—one for the ballot box, the other for the soapbox. Many of us feel compelled to make use of them both.</p><p>Would casual activists be better off deploying their best skills toward change (teachers teaching, coders coding, celebrities celebritizing) and leaving direct action in the hands of organizational pros? That seems sad, and a good recipe for lax, unchecked, uncoördinated effort. Should they work indirectly—writing letters, calling senators, and politely nagging congresspeople on Twitter? That involves no cool attire or clever signs, and no friends who’ll cheer at every turn. But there’s reason to believe that it works, because even bad legislators pander to their electorates. In a new book, “The Once and Future Liberal” (Harper), Mark Lilla urges a turn back toward governmental process. “The role of social movements in American history, while important, has been seriously inflated by left-leaning activists and historians,” he writes. “<u>The age of movement politics is over, at least for now. We need no more marchers. <mark>We need <strong>more mayors</u></strong>.”</mark> <u><mark>Folk politics, tracing a</mark> fifty-year <strong><mark>anti-establishmentarian</strong> trend, flatters</mark> a certain idea of <strong><mark>heroism</strong>: the system</mark>, we think, <mark>must be</mark> <mark>fought by <strong>authentic people</u></strong></mark>. Yet that outlook is so widely held now that it occupies the highest offices of government. Maybe, in the end, the system is the powerless person’s best bet.</p><p>Or maybe direct action is something to value independent of its results. No specific demands were made at the Women’s March, in January. The protest produced no concrete outcomes, and it held no legislators to account. And yet the march, which encompassed millions of people on every continent, including Antarctica, cannot be called a failure. At a time when identity is presumed to be clannish and insular, it offered solidarity on a vast scale.</p><p>What was the Women’s March about? Empowerment, human rights, discontent—you know. Why did it matter? Because we were there. <u><mark>Self-government remains</mark> a <strong><mark>messy</strong></mark>, <strong>fussy</strong>, <strong><mark>slow</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>frustrating</strong></mark> business. We do well to <strong>remind</strong> those working its gears and levers that the public—not just the appalled me but the conjoined us whom the elected serve—is <strong>watching</strong> and <strong>aware</u></strong>. <u><mark>More than two centuries after our country took</mark> its <strong>shaky <mark>first steps</u></strong>, <u>the union is <strong>miles from perfection</strong></mark>. But <mark>it is</mark> still <mark>on its feet,</mark> <mark>sometimes <strong>striding</strong>,</mark> <mark>frequently <strong>stumbling</u></mark>. The march goes on, and someday, not just in our dreams, we’ll make it home. </p></strong>

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Ikenberry 18

G. John Ikenberry 18, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Carnegie Ethics and International Affairs, https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/why_the_liberal_world_order_will_survive.pdf

. Power transition theories see a tight link between international order— and the rise and fall of great powers. although America’s hegemonic position may be declining the liberal international characteristics of order—openness, rules, multilateral cooperation—are deeply rooted and likely to persist. This is true even though the orientation and actions of the Trump administration have raised serious questions about the U.S. commitment to liberal internationalism. Just as importantly, rising states (led by China) are not engaged in a frontal attack on the American-led order. While struggles do exist over orientations, agendas, and leadership, the non-Western developing countries remain tied to the architecture and principles of a liberal-oriented global orde even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can do. Wealth and power is diffusing, spreading outward and away from Europe and the United States. The rapid growth that marked the non-Western rising states in the last decade may have ended, and even China’s rapid economic ascendency has slowed the overall pattern of change remains: the “rest” are gaining ground on the “West.” hegemonic realists argue that international order is a by-product of the concentration of power The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order? But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact But there may be even deeper sources of continuity in the existing system. power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American power. international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. T These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony.

although hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international characteristics of order are deeply rooted and likely to persist even though Trump raised questions rising states are not engaged in a frontal attack there may be deeper continuity power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing order does not depend on American power rules and institutions have a more complex and contingent relationship governing institutions regimes and so forth separat hegemony from relationships

In this essay I look at the evolving encounters between rising states and the post-war Western international order. My starting point is the classic “power transition” perspective. Power transition theories see a tight link between international order—its emergence, stability, and decline—and the rise and fall of great powers. It is a perspective that sees history as a sequence of cycles in which powerful or hegemonic states rise up and build order and dominate the global system until their power declines, leading to a new cycle of crisis and order building. In contrast, I offer a more evolutionary perspective, emphasizing the lineages and continuities in modern international order. More specifically, I argue that although America’s hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international characteristics of order—openness, rules, multilateral cooperation—are deeply rooted and likely to persist. This is true even though the orientation and actions of the Trump administration have raised serious questions about the U.S. commitment to liberal internationalism. Just as importantly, rising states (led by China) are not engaged in a frontal attack on the American-led order. While struggles do exist over orientations, agendas, and leadership, the non-Western developing countries remain tied to the architecture and principles of a liberal-oriented global order. And even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can do. Power Transitions and International Order There is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a long-term global power transition. Wealth and power is diffusing, spreading outward and away from Europe and the United States. The rapid growth that marked the non-Western rising states in the last decade may have ended, and even China’s rapid economic ascendency has slowed. But the overall pattern of change remains: the “rest” are gaining ground on the “West.” While there is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a global power transition, there is less agreement on the consequences of power shifts for international order. The classic view is advanced by realist scholars, such as E. H. Carr, Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and William Wohlforth, who make sweeping arguments about power and order. These hegemonic realists argue that international order is a by-product of the concentration of power. Order is created by a powerful state, and when that state declines and power diffuses, international order weakens or breaks apart. Out of these dynamic circumstances, a rising state emerges as the new dominant state, and it seeks to reorganize the international system to suit its own purposes. In this view, world politics from ancient times to the modern era can be seen as a series of repeated cycles of rise and decline. War, protectionism, depression, political upheaval—various sorts of crises and disruptions may push the cycle forward. This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica, the nineteenth-century hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order? Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China, beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the lurking questions of the power transition perspective. But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership. Here one would note that there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order. Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact. But there may be even deeper sources of continuity in the existing system. This would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might be that the power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American power. In fact, international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power. The rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power. This is true in two respects. First, international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions. There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions, starting with the United Nations. There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise, they do not simply confront an American-led order; they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states. The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization. But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others. Generally speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the Responsibility to Protect. Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. The struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority. That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations. These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition. Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others. Moreover, stepping back, the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order. The British-led order that Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders. It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms. There are also both regional and global domains of governance. This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony.

<h4>No heg impact</h4><p>G. John <strong>Ikenberry 18</strong>, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Carnegie Ethics and International Affairs, https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/why_the_liberal_world_order_will_survive.pdf<u><strong> </p><p></u></strong>In this essay I look at the evolving encounters between rising states and the post-war Western international order. My starting point is the classic “power transition” perspective<u>. Power transition theories see a tight link between international order—</u>its emergence, stability, and decline—<u>and the rise and fall of great powers. </u>It is a perspective that sees history as a sequence of cycles in which powerful or hegemonic states rise up and build order and dominate the global system until their power declines, leading to a new cycle of crisis and order building. In contrast, I offer a more evolutionary perspective, emphasizing the lineages and continuities in modern international order. More specifically, I argue that <u><mark>although</mark> America’s <mark>hegemonic position may be declining</u>, <u><strong>the liberal international characteristics of order</mark>—openness, rules, multilateral cooperation—<mark>are deeply rooted and likely to persist</mark>.</u></strong> <u>This is true <mark>ev<strong>en though</mark> the orientation and actions of the <mark>Trump</mark> administration</strong> have <mark>raised </mark>serious <mark>questions</mark> about the U.S. commitment to liberal internationalism. Just as importantly, <mark>rising states</mark> (led by <strong>China</strong>) <strong><mark>are not engaged in a frontal attack</strong></mark> on the American-led order.</u> <u>While struggles do exist over orientations, agendas, and leadership, <strong>the non-Western developing countries remain tied</strong> to the architecture and principles of a liberal-oriented global orde</u>r. And <u>even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, <strong>there are stubborn limits on what it can do. </u></strong>Power Transitions and International Order There is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a long-term global power transition. <u>Wealth and power is diffusing, spreading outward and away from Europe and the United States.</u> <u>The rapid growth that marked the non-Western rising states in the last decade may have ended, and even China’s rapid economic ascendency has slowed</u>. But <u>the overall pattern of change remains: the “rest” are gaining ground on the “West.” </u>While there is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a global power transition, there is less agreement on the consequences of power shifts for international order. The classic view is advanced by realist scholars, such as E. H. Carr, Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and William Wohlforth, who make sweeping arguments about power and order. These <u>hegemonic realists argue that international order is a by-product of the concentration of power</u>. Order is created by a powerful state, and when that state declines and power diffuses, international order weakens or breaks apart. Out of these dynamic circumstances, a rising state emerges as the new dominant state, and it seeks to reorganize the international system to suit its own purposes. In this view, world politics from ancient times to the modern era can be seen as a series of repeated cycles of rise and decline. War, protectionism, depression, political upheaval—various sorts of crises and disruptions may push the cycle forward. This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. <u>The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica</u>, the nineteenth-century hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. <u>For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order?</u> Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China, beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the lurking questions of the power transition perspective. <u><strong>But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order?</u></strong> <u>Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership</u>. Here one would note that <u>there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order</u>. <u>Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact</u>. <u><strong>But <mark>there may</mark> <mark>be</mark> even <mark>deeper</mark> sources of <mark>continuity</mark> in the existing system.</u></strong> This would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might be that the <u><strong><mark>power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing</mark> post-war international <mark>order does not depend on</mark> the concentration of <mark>American power</mark>. </u></strong>In fact, <u>international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power</u>. The <u><strong><mark>rules and institutions</mark> that make up international order <mark>have a more complex and contingent relationship</mark> with the rise and fall of state power</u></strong>. This is true in two respects. First, <u>international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state</u>. <u>International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions</u>. <u><strong>There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are <mark>governing institutions</u></strong></mark>, starting with the United Nations. <u><strong>There is a sprawling array of international institutions, <mark>regimes</mark>, treaties, agreements, protocols, <mark>and so forth</u></strong></mark>. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. <u>Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise</u>, they do not simply confront an American-led order; <u>they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced<strong>. By <mark>separat</mark>ing “American <mark>hegemony</mark>” <mark>from</mark> “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of <mark>relationships</mark>. </strong>The United States <strong>does not embody the international order;</strong> it has a relationship with it, as do rising states</u>. <u>The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions</u>, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization. <u>But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements.</u> <u>China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others</u>. Generally speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the Responsibility to Protect. <u>Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. T</u>he struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority. That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations. <u>These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition</u>. <u><strong>Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order.</u></strong> <u>The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others</u>. Moreover, stepping back, <u>the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order</u>. The British-led order that Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. <u>The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders</u>. <u><strong>It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms</u></strong>. There are also both regional and global domains of governance. <u><strong>This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions</u></strong>. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, <u>change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. <strong>The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony. </p></u></strong>

1nc

LIO

1nc – heg

./documents/hspolicy19/HenryWGrady/NkWa/Henry%20W%20Grady-Nkosi-Wakefield-Neg-Greenhill-Round2.docx

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Greenhill

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St Marx TA

Austen Yorko

1ac - Human Rights 1nc - cp refugees - cp reg neg - da zivotofsky - da usmca 2nr - cp reg neg - da usmca

hspolicy19/HenryWGrady/NkWa/Henry%20W%20Grady-Nkosi-Wakefield-Neg-Greenhill-Round2.docx

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Should requires certainty and immediacy

Nieto 9

Nieto 9. Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

Should conveys duty or obligation not discretion Court interpreted should as synonymous with must” and rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury may have been misled by the court’s use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature’s or commission’s use of the word “should” is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures “should” be allocated for the purpose of parents’ federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

Should duty or obligation not discretion Court interpreted should as synonymous with must

“Should” is “used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense. A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word “should” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word “must” and rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury may have been misled by the court’s use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature’s or commission’s use of the word “should” is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures “should” be allocated for the purpose of parents’ federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

<h4>Should requires <u>certainty</u> and <u>immediacy</h4><p></u><strong>Nieto 9</strong>. Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)</p><p>“<u><mark>Should</u></mark>” is “used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense. A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word <u>conveys</u> to the jury a sense of <u><strong><mark>duty</strong> or <strong>obligation</u></strong></mark> and <u><strong><mark>not discretion</u></strong></mark>. In Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme <u><mark>Court interpreted</u></mark> the word “<u><mark>should</u></mark>” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence <u><mark>as synonymous with</u></mark> the word “<u><strong><mark>must</strong></mark>” and rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury may have been misled by the court’s use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature’s or commission’s use of the word “should” is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures “should” be allocated for the purpose of parents’ federal tax exemption to be mandatory).</p></u>

LASA DW – Long Beach – RD 1 – Open Source

Block

Consult Japan

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Jack Howe Memorial Invitational

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April Ma

1AC – AI subs 1NC – T A5, Cap K, Consult Japan, Turkey PIC 2NC – Cap K; 1NR – Cap K, Consult Japan 2NR – Cap K

hspolicy22/LiberalArtsAndScienceAcademy/WiDo/LiberalArtsAndScienceAcademy-WiDo-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-2.docx

2022-09-25 04:55:04

WiDo

Liberal Arts And Science Academy WiDo

For docs, contact only: [email protected] For chains, put both: [email protected] [email protected] Gideon Witchel (he/him) - 2A Jack Dollinger (he/him) - 2N

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We don’t make a claim about whether or not the state is good or bad. The aff merely makes a value judgement on a certain state action – that operates independently of state legitimacy – that turns the kritik.

Newman 10

Newman 10 [Newman, Saul. [Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, University of London] Theory & Event, Volume 13, Issue 2, 2010.] SHS ZS

making certain demands on the state does not mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy demands are made from a position outside the political order they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between state practices

making demands on the state does not mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy demands are made from outside the political order they exceed the question of the implementation The call into question the legitimacy of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between state practices

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does not necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure. They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them

<h4>We don’t make a claim about whether or not the state is good or bad. The aff merely makes a value judgement on a certain state action – that operates independently of state legitimacy – that turns the kritik.</h4><p><strong>Newman 10</strong> [Newman, Saul. [Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, University of London] Theory & Event, Volume 13, Issue 2, 2010.] SHS ZS</p><p>There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: <u><strong><mark>making</mark> certain <mark>demands on the state</u></strong></mark> – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands <u><strong><mark>does not</u></strong></mark> necessarily <u><strong><mark>mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy</u></strong></mark>. On the contrary, <u><strong><mark>demands are made from</mark> a position <mark>outside the political order</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>they</mark> often <mark>exceed the question of the implementation</mark> of this or that specific measure</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark>y implicitly <mark>call into question the legitimacy</mark> and even the sovereignty <mark>of the state by highlighting fundamental</mark> <mark>inconsistencies between</u></strong></mark>, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and <u><strong><mark>state practices</u></strong></mark> which in reality violate and deny them</p>

Lake v University KO

Method

./documents/hsld19/Lexington/Ko/Lexington-Kodumuru-Aff-Lakeland-Round1.docx

A

Lakeland

1

University KO

Jorman Antigua

AC- Indo Pak NC- Afro pess 1AR- Perm Both NC- Afro Pess 2AR- Perm Both

hsld19/Lexington/Ko/Lexington-Kodumuru-Aff-Lakeland-Round1.docx

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A is an generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf

Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf

the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations. may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to.

While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not expresses what he calls “moral necessity. it is, a statement about some social¶ norm it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations. may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to

*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars French, then, expresses the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before. Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), expresses what he calls “moral necessity.”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; it is, rather, a statement about some social¶ norm. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to. For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?

<h4>A is an<strong> generic indefinite singular. Cohen 01 </h4><p></strong>Ariel Cohen (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev), “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” Journal of Semantics 18:3, 2001 <strong>https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/188590876.pdf</p><p>*IS generic = Indefinite Singulars</p><p></strong>French, then, expresses <u>the two types of reading differently. In English, on¶ the other hand, generic BPs are ambiguous between inductivist and normative¶ readings. But even in English there is one type of generic that can express only¶ one of these readings, and this is the IS generic. <mark>While BPs are ambiguous¶ between the inductivist and the rules and regulations readings, ISs are not</mark>. In¶ the supermarket scenario discussed above, only (44.b) is true:¶ (44) a. A banana sells for $.49/lb.¶ b. A banana sells for $1.00/lb.¶ The normative force of the generic IS has been noted before.</u> Burton-Roberts¶ (1977) considers the following minimal pair:¶ (45) a. Gentlemen open doors for ladies.¶ b. <u>A gentleman opens doors for ladies.¶ He notes that (45.b), but not (45.a), <mark>expresses what he calls “moral necessity.</mark>”7¶ Burton-Roberts observes that if Emile does not as a rule open doors for ladies, his mother could utter [(45.b)] and thereby successfully imply that Emile was not, or was¶ not being, a gentleman</u>. Notice that, if she were to utter. . . [(45.a)] she¶ might achieve the same effect (that of getting Emile to open doors for¶ ladies) but would do so by different means. . . For [(45.a)] merely makes a¶ generalisation about gentlemen (p. 188).¶ <u>Sentence (45.b), then, unlike (45.a), does not have a reading where it makes¶ a generalization about gentlemen; <mark>it is, </mark>rather, <mark>a statement about some social¶ norm</mark>. It is true just in case this norm is in effect, i.e. <mark>it is a member of a set of¶ socially accepted rules and regulations.</u></mark>¶ An IS that, in the null context, cannot be read generically, <u><mark>may receive a¶ generic reading in a context that makes it clear that a rule or a regulation is¶ referred to</mark>.</u> For example, Greenberg (1998) notes that, out of the blue, (46.a)¶ and (46.b) do not have a generic reading:¶ (46) a. A Norwegian student whose name ends with ‘s’ or ‘j’ wears green¶ thick socks.¶ b. A tall, left-handed, brown haired neurologist in Hadassa hospital¶ earns more than $50,000 a year.¶ However, Greenberg points out that in the context of (47.a) and (47.b),¶ respectively, the generic readings of the IS subject are quite natural:¶ (47) a. You know, there are very interesting traditions in Norway, concerning the connection between name, profession, and clothing. For¶ example, a Norwegian student. . .¶ b. The new Hadassa manager has some very funny paying criteria. For¶ example, a left-handed. . .¶ Even IS sentences that were claimed above to lack a generic reading, such¶ as (3.b) and (4.b), may, in the appropriate context, receive such a reading:¶ (48) a. Sire, please don’t send her to the axe. Remember, a king is generous!¶ b. How dare you build me such a room? Don’t you know a room is¶ square?</p>

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Extinction

DiEuliis 19

Diane DiEuliis 19, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., USA; Andrew D. Ellington, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA; Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, USA; Michael J. Imperiale, Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA. 2019. “Does Biotechnology Pose New Catastrophic Risks?” Global Catastrophic Biological Risks, edited by Thomas V. Inglesby and Amesh A. Adalja, Springer International Publishing, pp. 107–119. Springer Link, doi:10.1007/82_2019_177.

In addition to recreating or resurrecting viruses, synthetic biology facilitates the introduction of new traits onto viral genomes the same techniques used to introduce therapeutic genes into viruses may also be used to introduce genes that encode harmful proteins or toxins some viruses, especially large DNA viruses, can accommodate extra genetic “payloads” without sacrificing pathogenicity or replication a malicious actor could “mix and match” genes from different viruses to produce a more virulent pathogen producing a chimeric virus that exhibits enhanced virulence would be difficult. However, synthetic biology affords an actor the possibility to interrogate a large amount of sequence space without any preconceived notion of what will work, i.e., to try many options at once Such an approach could present a significant biodefense problem The advent of synthetic biology has added to previous biosecurity concerns about laboratory manipulations for example, introducing a b r Synthetic biology has provided a more facile route which are challenging to mount defenses against The ability to mix and match characteristics has become known in the past, trying to express a toxin gene in a heterologous bacterial strain would have proven challenging. Now, there are tools to help: Expression cassettes and constructs have been widely introduced burgeoning capabilities of large DNA synthesis make possible not only serial expansion of biothreats, but parallel expansion, as well. The design— build—test cycle that is at the heart of synthetic biology practice relies on the notion that design need not be overly precise, as many constructs can be made and tested at the outset, allowing repetition to hone many different constructs could be made and released in parallel, letting natural selection determine infection and spread. This may mean multiple pathogens could be released plague, smallpox, and flu outbreaks decimated human populations demonstrate the lethal consequences of the spread of infectious disease. With a densely interconnected population and increased connectivity through transport the adverse effects of even a small event are more likely Disease may spread rapidly globally, becoming a catastrophic event that outpaces ability to respond

recreating or resurrecting viruses introduction of new traits a malicious actor could “mix and match” to produce enhanced virulence introducing a b r many constructs released in parallel, let natural selection determine outbreaks decimated human populations With a connected population and transport a small event rapidly globally, becoming catastrophic

4 Modifying Viral and Bacterial Genomes In addition to recreating or resurrecting viruses, synthetic biology facilitates the introduction of new traits onto viral genomes. For example, a significant amount of effort is underway in the gene therapy field to produce viruses that target specific cells or tissues through modifications of their receptor tropism (Asokan and Samulski 2013; Goins et al. 2016). Unfortunately, the same techniques used to introduce therapeutic genes (transgenes) into viruses may also be used to introduce genes that encode harmful proteins or toxins. For gene therapy, transgenes are usually expressed from viruses that have been engineered to be replication-defective, non-pathogenic, or both. However, some viruses, especially large DNA viruses, can accommodate extra genetic “payloads” without sacrificing pathogenicity or replication ability. The fitness of these viruses in the wild would not be tested and so may not be effective—and it might not be a legitimate biomedical research activity. Another potential biosecurity consideration is the possibility that a malicious actor could “mix and match” genes from different viruses to produce a more virulent pathogen. The largest constraint on this approach is that viral genome size and organization have been finely tuned through evolutionary processes. A telling demonstration of this is the finding that simply switching the order of the genes of vesicular stomatitis virus results in a greatly attenuated virus (Wertz et al. 1998). Thus, producing a chimeric virus that exhibits enhanced virulence—particularly virulence that could be predicted by its designer—would be extremely difficult. However, synthetic biology affords an actor the possibility to interrogate a large amount of sequence space without any preconceived notion of what will work, i.e., to try many options at once (as long as an appropriate selection for the desired trait can be developed and there is sufficient access to resources). Such an approach could present a significant biodefense problem if expertly applied. The advent of synthetic biology has added to previous biosecurity concerns about laboratory manipulations of pathogens, for example, introducing antibiotic resistance to bacteria, a longtime biodefense concern. Synthetic biology has provided a more facile route to the diversification of threats, which are challenging to mount defenses against. Manipulating bacterial genomes to introduce new features has been generally technically more straightforward than manipulating viruses, without synthetic biology. For example, transformation using plasmids is a routine laboratory technique and may be used to either introduce resistance to clinically useful antibiotics or introduce genetic pathways encoding the synthesis of toxic products. Single-cell eukaryotic organisms may also be modified by introduction of foreign DNA. As the understanding of biosynthetic pathways and the ability to engineer enzymatic functions grow, however, these capabilities will become technically more straightforward to achieve. This is one of the areas that the NASEM report deemed to be of highest relative concern, namely using an organism to deliver a toxic product in situ, for example, by introducing the organism into the host microbiome. The ability to mix and match (or, in the parlance of synthetic biology, “plug and play”) the pathogenic characteristics of known species has expanded as an understanding of gene expression across a wide range of bacteria (or “chassis”) has become known. For example, in the past, trying to express a toxin gene in a heterologous bacterial strain would have proven challenging. Now, there are tools to help: Expression cassettes and constructs have been widely introduced across species, and tools such as T7 RNA polymerase have been adapted to function across multiple platforms. Secretion systems are better characterized, and the movement of genes not only within but between otherwise distantly related bacterial species (i.e., between Gram-negative and Gram-positive species) is commonplace. Thus, a toxin “payload” may not be restricted to a single type of bacteria, but could be introduced into virtually any species, including ones that are thought to be harmless. This allows for the manipulation of pathogenesis characteristics, including host range, tropism, and transmission frequency and mode. The effect of these multitudinous changes to the fitness of the resulting chimera may be unknown, but also may be unimportant for some weaponization or terrorism purposes. Synthetic biology has also brought about the ability to make very large pieces of DNA and put them into organisms—including multiple genes encoding synthetic pathways for complex small molecules. This could be used to make weapons that were not possible before. In the past, the idea that any organism other than Aspergillus could make aflatoxin would have seemed fantastical, but the production of this toxin (and many others) is enabled with synthetic biology tools. More complex misuse of these tools could be binary biological weapons or complex pathogenic responses following biological signals (e.g., signals present following a successful infection using quorum sensing or products of human physiology). The burgeoning capabilities of large DNA synthesis make possible not only serial expansion of biothreats, but their parallel expansion, as well. The design— build—test cycle that is at the heart of synthetic biology practice relies on the notion that design need not be overly precise, as many different constructs can be made and tested at the outset, allowing repetition to hone toward optimal design. There is still the question of whether a weapon would be effective—but it is possible that many different constructs could be made and released in parallel, letting natural selection determine which construct has the greatest capability for infection and spread. This may mean that multiple potential pathogens could be released earlier in the development cycle, a very different model than was exploited by biological weaponeers in the past. Finally, synthetic biology’s contribution to biothreats is to redefine what a biothreat is, from an organism to DNA. In the past, the organism was the unit of replication. Now, DNA vectors on their own can potentially provide a means of spread, either as broad-host-range vectors or as phages. Just as the use of P1 transduction and lambda lysogeny were essential tools for the early development of molecular biology, the engineering of transmission between bacterial strains and even species is becoming a signature of synthetic biology efforts to move beyond a single organism and into the realm of the microbiome as a whole (e.g., the discovery and engineering of highly transmissible integrative and conjugative elements (ICEs) in Gram-positive bacteria). This may allow the possibility of deliberately introduced “commensal DNA,” which spreads throughout a microbiome, and then to others’ microbiomes. The original bacteria may be gone by the time such an engineered construct is triggered or before a person shows symptoms. The microbiome is an area of active research, and there is some suggestion that the composition of the microbiome affects human disease states that are both obvious (diabetes) and much less obvious (schizophrenia). This could be amenable to weaponization for which current biodefense systems are not prepared. The targeting and spread of this kind of threat would be difficult, because the composition of the microbiome seems to be most effectively regulated by human behavior. However, as the adaptive mechanisms of microbes to the gut and other reservoirs (dermal, nasopharyngeal, oral, vaginal) are better delineated, possibilities for engineering will become available. This brings up the longer-term possibility of a sophisticated adversary introducing self-replicating DNA molecules (again, broad-host-range vectors, phage) that subtly impact the microbiome, leading to greater overall incidences of disease or dysfunction that are extremely difficult to detect or attribute (a horizontally transmitted element might be expected to be a chimera, while an organism with foreign DNA is far more suspect). Thankfully, the subtlety of such an attack would seemingly place it out of bounds for many types of adversaries. 5 The Role of Synthetic Biology in Response to Global Catastrophic Events Historical records of plague, smallpox, and influenza outbreaks that decimated human populations demonstrate the lethal consequences of the spread of infectious disease. With a densely interconnected population and increased connectivity through modern transportation, the adverse effects of even a relatively small event are more likely than a century ago. Disease may spread much more rapidly globally, becoming a catastrophic event that outpaces the ability to respond.

<h4>Extinction</h4><p>Diane <strong>DiEuliis 19</strong>, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., USA; Andrew D. Ellington, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA; Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, USA; Michael J. Imperiale, Department of Microbiology and Immunology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA. 2019. “Does Biotechnology Pose New Catastrophic Risks?” Global Catastrophic Biological Risks, edited by Thomas V. Inglesby and Amesh A. Adalja, Springer International Publishing, pp. 107–119. Springer Link, doi:10.1007/82_2019_177.</p><p>4 Modifying Viral and Bacterial Genomes</p><p><u>In addition to</u> <u><strong><mark>recreating</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>resurrecting viruses</strong></mark>, synthetic biology facilitates the <strong><mark>introduction of new traits</u></strong></mark> <u>onto viral genomes</u>. For example, a significant amount of effort is underway in the gene therapy field to produce viruses that target specific cells or tissues through modifications of their receptor tropism (Asokan and Samulski 2013; Goins et al. 2016). Unfortunately, <u>the</u> <u><strong>same techniques</u></strong> <u>used to introduce</u> <u><strong>therapeutic</u></strong> <u>genes</u> (transgenes) <u>into viruses may also be used to introduce genes that encode <strong>harmful proteins</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>toxins</u></strong>. For gene therapy, transgenes are usually expressed from viruses that have been engineered to be replication-defective, non-pathogenic, or both. However, <u>some viruses, especially <strong>large DNA viruses</strong>, can <strong>accommodate extra genetic “payloads” without sacrificing pathogenicity</u></strong> <u>or</u> <u><strong>replication</u></strong> ability. The fitness of these viruses in the wild would not be tested and so may not be effective—and it might not be a legitimate biomedical research activity.</p><p>Another potential biosecurity consideration is the possibility that <u><mark>a malicious actor could</u> <u><strong>“mix and match”</mark> genes</u></strong> <u>from</u> <u><strong>different viruses</u></strong> <u><mark>to produce</mark> a</u> <u><strong>more virulent pathogen</u></strong>. The largest constraint on this approach is that viral genome size and organization have been finely tuned through evolutionary processes. A telling demonstration of this is the finding that simply switching the order of the genes of vesicular stomatitis virus results in a greatly attenuated virus (Wertz et al. 1998). Thus, <u>producing a chimeric virus that exhibits <strong><mark>enhanced virulence</u></strong></mark>—particularly virulence that could be predicted by its designer—<u>would be</u> extremely <u><strong>difficult</strong>. However, synthetic biology affords an actor the possibility to interrogate a</u> <u><strong>large amount of sequence space</u></strong> <u>without</u> <u><strong>any preconceived notion</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>what will work</strong>, i.e., to try many options at once</u> (as long as an appropriate selection for the desired trait can be developed and there is sufficient access to resources). <u>Such an approach could present a</u> <u><strong>significant biodefense problem</u></strong> if expertly applied.</p><p><u>The advent of synthetic biology has added to previous biosecurity concerns about <strong>laboratory manipulations</u></strong> of pathogens, <u>for example, <strong><mark>introducing a</u></strong></mark>nti<u><strong><mark>b</u></strong></mark>iotic <u><strong><mark>r</u></strong></mark>esistance to bacteria, a longtime biodefense concern. <u>Synthetic biology has provided a</u> <u>more</u> <u><strong>facile route</u></strong> to the diversification of threats, <u>which are challenging to mount defenses against</u>. Manipulating bacterial genomes to introduce new features has been generally technically more straightforward than manipulating viruses, without synthetic biology. For example, transformation using plasmids is a routine laboratory technique and may be used to either introduce resistance to clinically useful antibiotics or introduce genetic pathways encoding the synthesis of toxic products. Single-cell eukaryotic organisms may also be modified by introduction of foreign DNA. As the understanding of biosynthetic pathways and the ability to engineer enzymatic functions grow, however, these capabilities will become technically more straightforward to achieve. This is one of the areas that the NASEM report deemed to be of highest relative concern, namely using an organism to deliver a toxic product in situ, for example, by introducing the organism into the host microbiome.</p><p><u>The ability to <strong>mix and match</u></strong> (or, in the parlance of synthetic biology, “plug and play”) the pathogenic <u><strong>characteristics</u></strong> of known species has expanded as an understanding of gene expression across a wide range of bacteria (or “chassis”) <u>has <strong>become known</u></strong>. For example, <u>in the past, trying to express a toxin gene in a heterologous bacterial strain would have proven challenging. Now, there are <strong>tools to help</strong>: Expression cassettes and constructs have been</u> <u><strong>widely introduced</u></strong> across species, and tools such as T7 RNA polymerase have been adapted to function across multiple platforms. Secretion systems are better characterized, and the movement of genes not only within but between otherwise distantly related bacterial species (i.e., between Gram-negative and Gram-positive species) is commonplace. Thus, a toxin “payload” may not be restricted to a single type of bacteria, but could be introduced into virtually any species, including ones that are thought to be harmless. This allows for the manipulation of pathogenesis characteristics, including host range, tropism, and transmission frequency and mode. The effect of these multitudinous changes to the fitness of the resulting chimera may be unknown, but also may be unimportant for some weaponization or terrorism purposes.</p><p>Synthetic biology has also brought about the ability to make very large pieces of DNA and put them into organisms—including multiple genes encoding synthetic pathways for complex small molecules. This could be used to make weapons that were not possible before. In the past, the idea that any organism other than Aspergillus could make aflatoxin would have seemed fantastical, but the production of this toxin (and many others) is enabled with synthetic biology tools. More complex misuse of these tools could be binary biological weapons or complex pathogenic responses following biological signals (e.g., signals present following a successful infection using quorum sensing or products of human physiology).</p><p>The <u>burgeoning capabilities of large DNA synthesis make possible <strong>not only serial</u></strong> <u>expansion of biothreats, but</u> their <u><strong>parallel</u></strong> <u>expansion, as well. The design— build—test cycle that is at the heart of synthetic biology practice</u> <u><strong>relies</u></strong> <u>on the notion that design need not be</u> <u><strong>overly precise</strong>, as</u> <u><strong>many</u></strong> different <u><strong>constructs</u></strong> <u>can be made and tested at the outset, allowing</u> <u><strong>repetition</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>hone</u></strong> toward optimal design. There is still the question of whether a weapon would be effective—but it is possible that <u><mark>many</u></mark> <u><strong>different <mark>constructs</u></strong></mark> <u>could be</u> <u><strong>made and <mark>released in parallel</strong>, <strong>let</strong></mark>ting</u> <u><strong><mark>natural selection</u></strong> <u>determine</u></mark> which construct has the greatest capability for <u>infection and spread. This may mean</u> that <u><strong>multiple</u></strong> potential <u><strong>pathogens</u></strong> <u>could be released</u> earlier in the development cycle, a very different model than was exploited by biological weaponeers in the past.</p><p>Finally, synthetic biology’s contribution to biothreats is to redefine what a biothreat is, from an organism to DNA. In the past, the organism was the unit of replication. Now, DNA vectors on their own can potentially provide a means of spread, either as broad-host-range vectors or as phages. Just as the use of P1 transduction and lambda lysogeny were essential tools for the early development of molecular biology, the engineering of transmission between bacterial strains and even species is becoming a signature of synthetic biology efforts to move beyond a single organism and into the realm of the microbiome as a whole (e.g., the discovery and engineering of highly transmissible integrative and conjugative elements (ICEs) in Gram-positive bacteria). This may allow the possibility of deliberately introduced “commensal DNA,” which spreads throughout a microbiome, and then to others’ microbiomes. The original bacteria may be gone by the time such an engineered construct is triggered or before a person shows symptoms.</p><p>The microbiome is an area of active research, and there is some suggestion that the composition of the microbiome affects human disease states that are both obvious (diabetes) and much less obvious (schizophrenia). This could be amenable to weaponization for which current biodefense systems are not prepared. The targeting and spread of this kind of threat would be difficult, because the composition of the microbiome seems to be most effectively regulated by human behavior. However, as the adaptive mechanisms of microbes to the gut and other reservoirs (dermal, nasopharyngeal, oral, vaginal) are better delineated, possibilities for engineering will become available. This brings up the longer-term possibility of a sophisticated adversary introducing self-replicating DNA molecules (again, broad-host-range vectors, phage) that subtly impact the microbiome, leading to greater overall incidences of disease or dysfunction that are extremely difficult to detect or attribute (a horizontally transmitted element might be expected to be a chimera, while an organism with foreign DNA is far more suspect). Thankfully, the subtlety of such an attack would seemingly place it out of bounds for many types of adversaries.</p><p>5 The Role of Synthetic Biology in Response to Global Catastrophic Events</p><p>Historical records of <u><strong>plague</strong>, <strong>smallpox</strong>, and</u> in<u><strong>flu</u></strong>enza <u><mark>outbreaks</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>decimated human populations</u></strong></mark> <u>demonstrate the</u> <u><strong>lethal consequences</u></strong> <u>of the spread of infectious disease. <mark>With a</u></mark> <u><strong>densely inter<mark>connected population</u></strong> <u>and</u></mark> <u><strong>increased connectivity</u></strong> <u>through</u> modern <u><strong><mark>transport</u></strong></mark>ation, <u>the adverse effects of even <mark>a</u></mark> relatively <u><strong><mark>small event</u></strong></mark> <u>are <strong>more likely</u></strong> than a century ago. <u>Disease may</u> <u><strong>spread</u></strong> much more <u><strong><mark>rapidly globally</strong>, becoming</mark> a</u> <u><strong><mark>catastrophic</mark> event</u></strong> <u>that</u> <u><strong>outpaces</u></strong> the <u><strong>ability to respond</u></strong>.</p>

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Innovations solve infinite extinction risks.

Naam 13 Innovation Could Save the Planet."

Ramez Naam 13. Fellow of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, former Microsoft executive. 2013. "How Innovation Could Save the Planet." World Future Society, The Futurist, 2013 Issues of The Futurist, March-April 2013 (Vol. 47, No. 2), www.wfs.org/futurist/2013-issues-futurist/march-april-2013-vol-47-no-2/how-innovation-could-save-planet

there are reasons to fear that we’re headed toward a dystopia In many ways, this is the age of the greatest human prosperity, freedom, and potential that has ever been on the face of this planet. But in other ways, we are facing some of the largest risks ever. At its peak, the ancient Mayan city of Tikal was a metropolis, a city of 200,000 people inside of a civilization of about 20 million people. Now, if you walk around any Mayan city, you see mounds of dirt. That’s because these structures were all abandoned The Mayan civilization grew too large. It overpopulated. To feed themselves, they had to convert forest into farmland. They chopped down all of the forest. That, in turn, led to soil erosion. It also worsened drought, because trees, among other things, trap moisture and create a precipitation cycle. the Mayans found they didn’t have enough food. That in turn led to more violence in their society and ultimately to a complete collapse. The greatest energy source for human civilization today none is more important than oil We haven’t hit a peak; oil production around the world is still rising a little bit. It’s certainly not declining, but we do appear to be near a plateau; supply is definitely rising more slowly than demand Water is another resource that is incredibly precious The predominant way in which we use water is through the food that we eat: 70% of the freshwater that humanity uses goes into agriculture. The Ogallala Aquifer refill time is somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 years from normal rainfall. Since 1960, we’ve drained between a third and a half of the water in this body, some areas, the water table is dropping about three feet per year. in the north Texas area, wells are starting to fail already, and farms are being abandoned in some cases, because they can’t get to the water that they once did. Perhaps the largest risk of all is climate change. We’ve increased the temperature of the planet by about 2°F in the last 130 years, and that rate is accelerating. This is primarily because of the carbon dioxide we’ve put into the atmosphere CO2 levels, now at over 390 parts per million, are the highest they’ve been in about 15 million years we’ve actually never existed as human beings while CO2 levels have been this high. glaciers have disappeared As these glaciers melt, they produce water that goes into the seas and helps to raise sea levels. Over the next century, the seas are expected to rise about 3 to 6 feet. there’s a more severe problem with climate change: its impact on the weather and on agriculture. 2012 was the worst drought in the United States since the Dust Bowl—the corn crop shrank by 20%. So that’s the big risk the world faces: that radical weather will change how we grow food, which is still our most important energy source—even more important than fossil fuels. We see demand rising for everything—water, food, energy—and that demand is rising in the developing world. This is the area that will create all of the increased demand for physical resources. The best-selling environmental book of all time, Limits to Growth showed that economic growth would inevitably lead to more pollution and more consumption of finite resources, which would in turn take us beyond the limits and lead ultimately to collapse. If you look at the vast majority of the numbers that the researchers predict in this model, they’re not coming true. Why did they get these things wrong? forecasters underestimate the power of new ideas to expand resources, or to expand wealth while using fewer resources. Ideas have done tremendous things for us. Let’s start with food. what’s happened is that we’ve doubled population since 1960, and we’ve nearly tripled the food supply in total. Before the advent of agriculture, an acre of land could feed less than a thousandth of a person. Today it’s about three people, on average, who can be fed by one acre of land. it’s because we’ve changed the productivity of the resource by innovation in farming—and then thousands of innovations on top of that to increase it even more. the reason we have the forests that we have on the planet is because we were able to handle a doubling of the population since 1960 without increasing farmland by more than about 10%. If we had to have doubled our farmland, we would have chopped down all the remaining forests on the planet. Ideas can reduce resource use In the United States, the amount of energy used on farms per calorie grown has actually dropped by about half since the 1970s. That’s in part because we now only use about a tenth of the energy to create synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, which is an important input. The amount of food that you can grow per drop of water has roughly doubled since the 1980s. In wheat, it’s actually more than tripled since 1960. The amount of water that we use in the United States per person has dropped by about a third since the 1970s, after rising for decades Ideas can also find substitutes for scarce resources The sperm whale was almost hunted into extinction Sperm whale oil—spermaceti—was the premier source of lighting the demand for it led to huge hunting of the sperm whales. In a period of about 30 years, we killed off about a third of the sperm whales on the planet. That led to a phenomenon of “peak sperm-whale oil Demand rose as supply dropped, and the prices skyrocketed. So it looked a little bit like the situation with oil now. Gesner discovered kerosene. He found that, if he took coal, heated it up, captured the fumes, and distilled them, he could create this fluid that burned very clear. And he could create it in quantities thousands of times greater than the sperm whales ever could have given up. Gesner was motivated by scientific curiosity and by the huge business opportunity of going after this lighting market. What he did was dramatically lower the cost of lighting while saving the sperm whales from extinction. ideas can do is transform waste into value. In places like Germany and Japan, people are mining landfills. Japan estimates that its landfills alone contain 10-year supplies of gold and rare-earth minerals for the world market. Alcoa estimates that the world’s landfills contain a 15-year supply of aluminum. So there’s tremendous value. in some cases, the concentration of these resources in our landfills is actually higher than it was in our mines. What it takes is energy and technology to get that resource back out and put it back into circulation. Is there a population limit? Yes, there certainly is, but it doesn’t look like we’re going to hit that. Projections right now are that, by the middle of this century, world population will peak between 9 billion and 10 billion, and then start to decline. In fact, we’ll be talking much more about the graying of civilization, and perhaps underpopulation—too-low birthrates on a current trend. Are there limits to physical resource use on this planet? Absolutely. It really is a finite planet. . These problems aren’t solved yet We don’t have the tech for these problems today The trend lines look very good, but the next 10 years of those trend lines demand lots of bright people, lots of bright ideas, and lots of R&D

we’re headed toward a dystopia we are facing largest risks ever The Mayan civilization grew too large. It overpopulated That in turn led to violence and ultimately collapse Water is incredibly precious CO2 levels are the highest they’ve been in million years We see demand rising for —water, food, energy— . Ideas can reduce resource use amount of energy used per calorie grown has dropped Ideas can find substitutes for scarce resources Gesner discovered kerosene there limits to physical resource on this planet? These problems aren’t solved yet We don’t have the tech for these problems today trend lines look good, but the next 10 years demand lots of people ideas and R&D.

The Best of Times: Unprecedented Prosperity There are many ways in which we are living in the most wonderful age ever. We can imagine we are heading toward a sort of science-fiction utopia, where we are incredibly rich and incredibly prosperous, and the planet is healthy. But there are other reasons to fear that we’re headed toward a dystopia of sorts. Ramez Naam spoke at WorldFuture 2013, the annual conference of the World Future Society in Chicago, in July of 2013. On the positive side, life expectancy has been rising for the last 150 years, and faster since the early part of the twentieth century in the developing world than it has in the rich world. Along with that has come a massive reduction in poverty. The most fundamental empowerer of humans—education—has also soared, not just in the rich world, but throughout the world. Another great empowerer of humanity is connectivity: Access to information and access to communication both have soared. The number of mobile phones on the planet was effectively zero in the early 1990s, and now it’s in excess of 4 billion. More than three-quarters of humanity, in the span of one generation, have gotten access to connectivity that, as my friend Peter Diamandis likes to say, is greater than any president before 1995 had. A reasonably well-off person in India or in Nigeria has better access to information than Ronald Reagan did during most of his career. With increased connectivity has come an increase in democracy. As people have gotten richer, more educated, more able to access information, and more able to communicate, they have demanded more control over the places where they live. The fraction of nations that are functional democracies is at an all-time high in this world—more than double what it was in the 1970s—with the collapse of the Soviet Union.* Economically, the world is a more equal place than it has been in decades. In the West, and especially in the United States, we hear a lot about growing inequality, but on a global scale, the opposite is true. As billions are rising out of poverty around the world, the global middle classes are catching up with the global rich. In many ways, this is the age of the greatest human prosperity, freedom, and potential that has ever been on the face of this planet. But in other ways, we are facing some of the largest risks ever. The Worst of Times: The Greatest Risks At its peak, the ancient Mayan city of Tikal was a metropolis, a city of 200,000 people inside of a civilization of about 20 million people. Now, if you walk around any Mayan city, you see mounds of dirt. That’s because these structures were all abandoned by about the mid-900s AD. We know now what happened: The Mayan civilization grew too large. It overpopulated. To feed themselves, they had to convert forest into farmland. They chopped down all of the forest. That, in turn, led to soil erosion. It also worsened drought, because trees, among other things, trap moisture and create a precipitation cycle. When that happened, and was met by some normal (not human-caused) climate change, the Mayans found they didn’t have enough food. They exhausted their primary energy supply, which is food. That in turn led to more violence in their society and ultimately to a complete collapse. The greatest energy source for human civilization today is fossil fuels. Among those, none is more important than oil. In 1956, M. King Hubbert looked at production in individual oil fields and predicted that the United States would see the peak of its oil production in 1970 or so, and then drop. His prediction largely came true: Oil production went up but did peak in the 1970s, then plummeted. Oil production has recently gone up in the United States a little bit, but it’s still just barely more than half of what it was in its peak in the 1970s. Hubbert also predicted that the global oil market would peak in about 2000, and for a long time he looked very foolish. But it now has basically plateaued. Since 2004, oil production has increased by about 4%, whereas in the 1950s it rose by about 4% every three months. We haven’t hit a peak; oil production around the world is still rising a little bit. It’s certainly not declining, but we do appear to be near a plateau; supply is definitely rising more slowly than demand. Though there’s plenty of oil in the ground, the oil that remains is in smaller fields, further from shore, under lower pressure, and harder to pump out. Water is another resource that is incredibly precious to us. The predominant way in which we use water is through the food that we eat: 70% of the freshwater that humanity uses goes into agriculture. The Ogallala Aquifer, the giant body of freshwater under the surface of the Earth in the Great Plains of the United States, is fossil water left from the melting and the retreat of glaciers in the end of the last Ice Age, 12,000–14,000 years ago. Its refill time is somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 years from normal rainfall. Since 1960, we’ve drained between a third and a half of the water in this body, depending on what estimate you look at. In some areas, the water table is dropping about three feet per year. If this was a surface lake in the United States or Canada, and people saw that happening, they’d stop it. But because it’s out of sight, it’s just considered a resource that we can tap. And indeed, in the north Texas area, wells are starting to fail already, and farms are being abandoned in some cases, because they can’t get to the water that they once did. Perhaps the largest risk of all is climate change. We’ve increased the temperature of the planet by about 2°F in the last 130 years, and that rate is accelerating. This is primarily because of the carbon dioxide we’ve put into the atmosphere, along with methane and nitrous oxide. CO2 levels, now at over 390 parts per million, are the highest they’ve been in about 15 million years. Ice cores go back at least a million years, and we know that they’re the highest they’ve been in that time. Historically, when CO2 levels are high, temperature is also high. But also, historically, in the lifetime of our species, we’ve actually never existed as human beings while CO2 levels have been this high. For example, glaciers such as the Bear and Pedersen in Alaska have disappeared just since 1920. As these glaciers melt, they produce water that goes into the seas and helps to raise sea levels. Over the next century, the seas are expected to rise about 3 to 6 feet. Most of that actually will not be melting glaciers; it’s thermal expansion: As the ocean gets warmer, it gets a little bit bigger. But 3 to 6 feet over a century doesn’t sound like that big a deal to us, so we think of that as a distant problem. The reality is that there’s a more severe problem with climate change: its impact on the weather and on agriculture. In 2003, Europe went through its worst heat wave since 1540. Ukraine lost 75% of its wheat crop. In 2009, China had a once-in-a-century level drought; in 2010 they had another once-in-a-century level drought. That’s twice. Wells that had given water continuously since the fifteenth century ran dry. When those rains returned, when the water that was soaked up by the atmosphere came back down, it came down on Pakistan, and half of Pakistan was under water in the floods of 2010. An area larger than Germany was under water. Warmer air carries more water. Every degree Celsius that you increase the temperature value of air, it carries 7% more water. But it doesn’t carry that water uniformly. It can suck water away from one place and then deliver it in a deluge in another place. So both the droughts are up and flooding is up simultaneously, as precipitation becomes more lumpy and more concentrated. In Russia’s 2010 heat wave, 55,000 people died, 11,000 of them in Moscow alone. In 2011, the United States had the driest 10-month period ever in the American South, and Texas saw its worst wildfires ever. And 2012 was the worst drought in the United States since the Dust Bowl—the corn crop shrank by 20%. So that’s the big risk the world faces: that radical weather will change how we grow food, which is still our most important energy source—even more important than fossil fuels. A number of people in the environmentalist movement are saying that we have to just stop growing. For instance, in his book Peak Everything: Waking Up to the Century of Declines, Richard Heinberg of the Post-Carbon Institute says that the Earth is full. Get used to it, and get ready for a world where you live with less wealth, and where your children live with less wealth, than any before. I don’t think this idea of stopping growth is realistic, because there are a top billion people who live pretty well and there are another 6 billion who don’t and are hungry for it. We see demand rising for everything—water, food, energy—and that demand is rising not in the United States or Europe or Canada or Australia. It’s rising in the developing world. This is the area that will create all of the increased demand for physical resources. Even if we could, by some chance, say That’s enough, sorry, we’re not going to let you use these resources, which is doubtful, it wouldn’t be just, because the West got rich by using those natural resources. So we need to find a different way. Ideas as a Resource Expander, Resource Preserver, and Waste Reducer The best-selling environmental book of all time, Limits to Growth, was based on computer modeling. It was a simple model with only about eight variables of what would happen in the world. It showed that economic growth, more wealth, would inevitably lead to more pollution and more consumption of finite resources, which would in turn take us beyond the limits and lead ultimately to collapse. While it’s been widely reported recently that its predictions are coming true, that’s actually not the case. If you look at the vast majority of the numbers that the researchers predict in this model, they’re not coming true. Why did they get these things wrong? The most important thing that the forecasters did was underestimate the power of new ideas to expand resources, or to expand wealth while using fewer resources. Ideas have done tremendous things for us. Let’s start with food. In The Population Bomb (1968), Paul Ehrlich predicted that food supply could not support the population, just as Malthus did. But what’s happened is that we’ve doubled population since 1960, and we’ve nearly tripled the food supply in total. We’ve increased by 30%–40% the food supply per person since the 1960s. Let’s look at this on a very long time scale. How many people can you feed with an acre of land? Before the advent of agriculture, an acre of land could feed less than a thousandth of a person. Today it’s about three people, on average, who can be fed by one acre of land. Pre-agriculture, it took 3,000 acres for one person to stay alive through hunting and gathering. With agriculture, that footprint has shrunk from 3,000 acres to one-third of one acre. That’s not because there’s any more sunlight, which is ultimately what food is; it’s because we’ve changed the productivity of the resource by innovation in farming—and then thousands of innovations on top of that to increase it even more. In fact, the reason we have the forests that we have on the planet is because we were able to handle a doubling of the population since 1960 without increasing farmland by more than about 10%. If we had to have doubled our farmland, we would have chopped down all the remaining forests on the planet. Ideas can reduce resource use. I can give you many other examples. In the United States, the amount of energy used on farms per calorie grown has actually dropped by about half since the 1970s. That’s in part because we now only use about a tenth of the energy to create synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, which is an important input. The amount of food that you can grow per drop of water has roughly doubled since the 1980s. In wheat, it’s actually more than tripled since 1960. The amount of water that we use in the United States per person has dropped by about a third since the 1970s, after rising for decades. As agriculture has gotten more efficient, we’re using less water per person. So, again, ideas can reduce resource use. Ideas can also find substitutes for scarce resources. We’re at risk of running out of many things, right? Well, let’s think about some things that have happened in the past. The sperm whale was almost hunted into extinction. Sperm whales were, in the mid-1800s, the best source of illumination. Sperm whale oil—spermaceti—was the premier source of lighting. It burned without smoke, giving a clear, steady light, and the demand for it led to huge hunting of the sperm whales. In a period of about 30 years, we killed off about a third of the sperm whales on the planet. That led to a phenomenon of “peak sperm-whale oil”: The number of sperm whales that the fleet could bring in dropped over time as the sperm whales became more scarce and more afraid of human hunters. Demand rose as supply dropped, and the prices skyrocketed. So it looked a little bit like the situation with oil now. That was solved not by the discovery of more sperm whales, nor by giving up on this thing of lighting. Rather, Abraham Gesner, a Canadian, discovered this thing called kerosene. He found that, if he took coal, heated it up, captured the fumes, and distilled them, he could create this fluid that burned very clear. And he could create it in quantities thousands of times greater than the sperm whales ever could have given up. We have no information suggesting that Gesner was an environmentalist or that he cared about sperm whales at all. He was motivated by scientific curiosity and by the huge business opportunity of going after this lighting market. What he did was dramatically lower the cost of lighting while saving the sperm whales from extinction. One more thing that ideas can do is transform waste into value. In places like Germany and Japan, people are mining landfills. Japan estimates that its landfills alone contain 10-year supplies of gold and rare-earth minerals for the world market. Alcoa estimates that the world’s landfills contain a 15-year supply of aluminum. So there’s tremendous value. When we throw things away, they’re not destroyed. If we “consume” things like aluminum, we’re not really consuming it, we’re rearranging it. We’re changing where it’s located. And in some cases, the concentration of these resources in our landfills is actually higher than it was in our mines. What it takes is energy and technology to get that resource back out and put it back into circulation. Ideas for Stretching the Limits So ideas can reduce resource use, can find substitutes for scarce resources, and can transform waste into value. In that context, what are the limits to growth? Is there a population limit? Yes, there certainly is, but it doesn’t look like we’re going to hit that. Projections right now are that, by the middle of this century, world population will peak between 9 billion and 10 billion, and then start to decline. In fact, we’ll be talking much more about the graying of civilization, and perhaps underpopulation—too-low birthrates on a current trend. What about physical resources? Are there limits to physical resource use on this planet? Absolutely. It really is a finite planet. But where are those limits? To illustrate, let’s start with energy. This is the most important resource that we use, in many ways. But when we consider all the fossil fuels that humanity uses today—all the oil, coal, natural gas, and so on—it pales in comparison to a much larger resource, all around us, which is the amount of energy coming in from our Sun every day. The amount of energy from sunlight that strikes the top of the atmosphere is about 10,000 times as much as the energy that we use from fossil fuels on a daily basis. Ten seconds of sunlight hitting the Earth is as much energy as humanity uses in an entire day; one hour of sunlight hitting the Earth provides as much energy to the planet as a whole as humanity uses from all sources combined in one year. This is an incredibly abundant resource. It manifests in many ways. It heats the atmosphere differentially, creating winds that we can capture for wind power. It evaporates water, which leads to precipitation elsewhere, which turns into things like rivers and waterfalls, which we can capture as hydropower. But by far the largest fraction of it—more than half—is photons hitting the surface of the Earth. Those are so abundant that, with one-third of 1% of the Earth’s land area, using current technology of about 14%-efficient solar cells, we could capture enough electricity to power all of current human needs. The problem is not the abundance of the energy; the problem is cost. Our technology is primitive. Our technology for building solar cells is similar to our technology for manufacturing computer chips. They’re built on silicon wafers in clean rooms at high temperatures, and so they’re very, very expensive. But innovation has been dropping that cost tremendously. Over the last 30 years, we’ve gone from a watt of solar power costing $20 to about $1. That’s a factor of 20. We roughly drop the cost of solar by one-half every decade, more or less. That means that, in the sunniest parts of the world today, solar is now basically at parity in cost, without subsidies, with coal and natural gas. Over the next 12–15 years, that will spread to most of the planet. That’s incredibly good news for us. Of course, we don’t just use energy while the Sun is shining. We use energy at night to power our cities; we use energy in things like vehicles that have to move and that have high energy densities. Both of these need storage, and today’s storage is actually a bigger challenge than capturing energy. But there’s reason to believe that we can tackle the storage problem, as well. For example, consider lithium ion batteries—the batteries that are in your laptop, your cell phone, and so on. The demand to have longer-lasting devices drove tremendous innovations in these batteries in the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. Between 1991 and 2005, the cost of storage in lithium ion batteries dropped by about a factor of nine, and the density of storage—how much energy you can store in an ounce of battery—increased by a little over double in that time. If we do that again, we would be at the point where grid-scale storage is affordable and we can store that energy overnight. Our electric vehicles have ranges similar to the range you can get in a gasoline-powered vehicle. This is a tall order. This represents perhaps tens of billions of dollars in R&D, but it is something that is possible and for which there is precedent. Another approach being taken is turning energy into fuel. When you use a fuel such as gasoline, it’s not really an energy source. It’s an energy carrier, an energy storage system, if you will. You can store a lot of energy in a very small amount. Today, two pioneers in genome sequencing—Craig Venter and George Church—both have founded companies to create next-generation biofuels. What they’re both leveraging is that gene-sequencing cost is the fastest quantitative area of progress on the planet. What they’re trying to do is engineer microorganisms that consume CO2, sunlight, and sugar and actually excrete fuel as a byproduct. If we could do this, maybe just 1% of the Earth’s surface—or a thirtieth of what we use for agriculture—could provide all the liquid fuels that we need. We would conveniently grow algae on saltwater and waste water, so biofuel production wouldn’t compete for freshwater. And the possible yields are vast if we can get there. If we can crack energy, we can crack everything else: • Water. Water is life. We live in a water world, but only about a tenth of a percent of the water in the world is freshwater that’s accessible to us in some way. Ninety-seven percent of the world’s water is in the oceans and is salty. It used to be that desalination meant boiling water and then catching the steam and letting it condense. Between the times of the ancient Greeks and 1960, desalination technology didn’t really change. But then, it did. People started to create membranes modeled on what cells do, which is allow some things through but not others. They used plastics to force water through and get only the fresh and not the salty. As a result, the amount of energy it takes to desalinate a liter of water has dropped by about a factor of nine in that time. Now, in the world’s largest desalination plants, the price of desalinated water is about a tenth of a cent per gallon. The technology has gotten to the point where it is starting to become a realistic option as an alternative to using up scarce freshwater resources. • Food. Can we grow enough food? Between now and 2050, we have to increase food yield by about 70%. Is that possible? I think it is. In industrialized nations, food yields are already twice what they are in the world as a whole. That’s because we have irrigation, tractors, better pesticides, and so on. Given such energy and wealth, we already know that we can grow enough food to feed the planet. Another option that’s probably cheaper would be to leverage some things that nature’s already produced. What most people don’t know is that the yield of corn per acre and in calories is about 70% higher than the yield of wheat. Corn is a C 4 photosynthesis crop: It uses a different way of turning sunlight and CO2 into sugars that evolved only 30 million years ago. Now, scientists around the world are working on taking these C 4 genes from crops like corn and transplanting them into wheat and rice, which could right away increase the yield of those staple grains by more than 50%. Physical limits do exist, but they are extremely distant. We cannot grow exponentially in our physical resource use forever, but that point is still at least centuries in the future. It’s something we have to address eventually, but it’s not a problem that’s pressing right now. • Wealth. One thing that people don’t appreciate very much is that wealth has been decoupling from physical resource use on this planet. Energy use per capita is going up, CO2 emissions per capita have been going up a little bit, but they are both widely outstripped by the amount of wealth that we’re creating. That’s because we can be more efficient in everything—using less energy per unit of food grown, and so on. This again might sound extremely counterintuitive, but let me give you one concrete example of how that happens. Compare the ENIAC—which in the 1940s was the first digital computer ever created—to an iPhone. An iPhone is billions of times smaller, uses billions of times less energy, and has billions of times more computing power than ENIAC. If you tried to create an iPhone using ENIAC technology, it would be a cube a mile on the side, and it would use more electricity than the state of California. And it wouldn’t have access to the Internet, because you’d have to invent that, as well. This is what I mean when I say ideas are the ultimate resource. The difference between an ENIAC and an iPhone is that the iPhone is embodied knowledge that allows you to do more with less resources. That phenomenon is not limited to high tech. It’s everywhere around us. So ideas are the ultimate resource. They’re the only resource that accumulates over time. Our store of knowledge is actually larger than in the past, as opposed to all physical resources. Challenges Ahead for Innovation Today we are seeing a race between our rate of consumption and our rate of innovation, and there are multiple challenges. One challenge is the Darwinian process, survival of the fittest. In areas like green tech, there will be hundreds and even thousands of companies founded, and 99% of them will go under. That is how innovation happens. The other problem is scale. Just as an example, one of the world’s largest solar arrays is at Nellis Air Force Base in California, and we would need about 10 million of these in order to meet the world’s electricity needs. We have the land, we have the solar energy coming in, but there’s a lot of industrial production that has to happen before we get to that point. Innovation is incredibly powerful, but the pace of innovation compared to the pace of consumption is very important. One thing we can do to increase the pace of innovation is to address the biggest challenge, which is market failure. In 1967, you could stick your hand into the Cuyahoga River, in Ohio, and come up covered in muck and oil. At that time, the river was lined with businesses and factories, and for them the river was a free resource. It was cheaper to pump their waste into the river than it was to pay for disposal at some other sort of facility. The river was a commons that anybody could use or abuse, and the waste they were producing was an externality. To that business or factory, there was no cost to pumping waste into this river. But to the people who depended upon the river, there was a high cost overall. That’s what I mean by a market externality and a market failure, because this was an important resource to all of us. But no one owned it, no one bought or sold it, and so it was treated badly in a way that things with a price are not. That ultimately culminated when, in June 1969, a railway car passing on a bridge threw a spark; the spark hit a slick of oil a mile long on the river, and the river burst into flames. The story made the cover of Time magazine. In many ways, the environmental movement was born of this event as much as it was of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. In the following three years, the United States created the Environmental Protection Agency and passed the Clean Water and Clean Air acts. Almost every environmental problem on the planet is an issue of the commons, whether it’s chopping down forests that no one owns, draining lakes that no one owns, using up fish in the ocean that no one owns, or polluting the atmosphere because no one owns it, or heating up the planet. They’re all issues of the commons. They’re all issues where there is no cost to an individual entity to deplete something and no cost to overconsume something, but there is a greater cost that’s externalized and pushed on everybody else who shares this. Now let’s come back again to what Limits to Growth said, which was that economic growth always led to more pollution and more consumption, put us beyond limits, and ends with collapse. So if that’s the case, all those things we just talked about should be getting worse. But as the condition of the Cuyahoga River today illustrates, that is not the case. GDP in the United States is three times what it was when the Cuyahoga River caught on fire, so shouldn’t it be more polluted? It’s not. Instead, it’s the cleanest it’s been in decades. That’s not because we stopped growth. It’s because we made intelligent choices about managing that commons. Another example: In the 1970s, we discovered that the ozone layer was thinning to such an extent that it literally could drive the extinction of all land species on Earth. But it’s actually getting better. It’s turned a corner, it’s improving ahead of schedule, and it’s on track to being the healthiest it’s been in a century. That’s because we’ve reduced the emissions of CFCs, which destroy ozone; we’ve dropped the amount of them that we emit into the atmosphere basically to zero. And yet industry has not ground to a halt because of this, either. Economic growth has not faltered. And one last example: Acid rain—which is primarily produced by sulfur dioxide emitted by coal-burning power plants—is mostly gone as an issue. Emissions of sulfur dioxide are down by about a factor of two. That’s in part because we created a strategy called cap and trade: It capped the amount of SO2 that you could emit, then allowed you to swap and buy emission credits from others to find the optimal way to do that. The cost, interestingly enough, has always been lower than projected. In each of these cases, industry has said, This will end things. Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff said the economy would grind to a halt, and the EPA would come in with lower cost estimates. But the EPA has always been wrong: The EPA cost estimate has always been too high. Analysis of all of these efforts in the past shows that reducing emissions is always cheaper than you expect, but cleaning up the mess afterwards is always more expensive than you’d guess. Today, the biggest commons issue is that of climate change, with the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that we’re pumping into the atmosphere. A logical thing to do would be to put a price on these. If you pollute, if you’re pumping CO2 into the atmosphere and it’s warming the planet, so you’re causing harm to other people in a very diffuse way. Therefore, you should be paying in proportion to that harm you’re doing to offset it. But if we do that, won’t that have a massive impact on the economy? This all relates to energy, which drives a huge fraction of the economy. Manufacturing depends on it. Transport depends on it. So wouldn’t it be a huge problem if we were to actually put a price on these carbon emissions? Well, there has been innovative thinking about that, as well. One thing that economists have always told us is that, if you’re going to tax, tax the bad, not the good. Whatever it is that you tax, you will get less of it. So tax the bad, not the good. The model that would be the ideal for putting a price on pollution is what we call a revenue-neutral model. Revenue-neutral carbon tax, revenue-neutral cap and trade. Let’s model it as a tax: Today, a country makes a certain amount of revenue for its government in income tax, let’s say. If you want to tax pollution, the way to do this without impacting the economy is to increase your pollution tax in the same manner that you decrease the income tax. The government then is capturing the same amount of money from the economy as a whole, so there’s no economic slowdown as a result of this. This has a positive effect on the environment because it tips the scales of price. Now, if you’re shopping for energy, and you’re looking at solar versus coal or natural gas, the carbon price has increased the price of coal and natural gas to you, but not the cost of solar. It shifts customer behavior from one to the other while having no net impact on the economy, and probably a net benefit on the economy in the long run as more investment in green energy drives the price down. Toward a Wealthier, Cleaner Future The number-one thing I want you to take away is that pollution and overconsumption are not inevitable outcomes of growth. While tripling the wealth of North America, for instance, we’ve gone from an ozone layer that was rapidly deteriorating to one that is bouncing back. The fundamental issue is not one of limits to growth; it’s one of the policy we choose, and it’s one of how we structure our economy to value all the things we depend upon and not just those things that are owned privately. What can we do, each of us? Four things: First is to communicate. These issues are divisive, but we know that beliefs and attitudes on issues like this spread word of mouth. They spread person to person, from person you trust to person you trust. So talk about it. Many of us have friends or colleagues or family on the other side of these issues, but talk about it. You’re better able to persuade them than anyone else is. Second is to participate. By that I mean politically. Local governments, state and province governments, and national governments are responsive when they hear from their constituents about these issues. It changes their attitudes. Because so few constituents actually make a call to the office of their legislator, or write a letter, a few can make a very large impact. Third is to innovate. These problems aren’t solved yet. We don’t have the technologies for these problems today. The trend lines look very good, but the next 10 years of those trend lines demand lots of bright people, lots of bright ideas, and lots of R&D. So if you’re thinking about a career change, or if you know any young people trying to figure out what their career is now, these are careers that (A) will be very important to us in the future and (B) will probably be quite lucrative for them.

<h4>Innovations solve infinite extinction risks. </h4><p>Ramez <strong>Naam 13</strong>. Fellow of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, former Microsoft executive. 2013. "How <u><strong><mark>Innovation Could Save the Planet</mark>."</u></strong> World Future Society, The Futurist, 2013 Issues of The Futurist, March-April 2013 (Vol. 47, No. 2), www.wfs.org/futurist/2013-issues-futurist/march-april-2013-vol-47-no-2/how-innovation-could-save-planet</p><p>The Best of Times: Unprecedented Prosperity There are many ways in which we are living in the most wonderful age ever. We can imagine we are heading toward a sort of science-fiction utopia, where we are incredibly rich and incredibly prosperous, and the planet is healthy. But <u>there are</u> other <u>reasons to fear that <mark>we’re headed toward a dystopia</u></mark> of sorts. Ramez Naam spoke at WorldFuture 2013, the annual conference of the World Future Society in Chicago, in July of 2013. On the positive side, life expectancy has been rising for the last 150 years, and faster since the early part of the twentieth century in the developing world than it has in the rich world. Along with that has come a massive reduction in poverty. The most fundamental empowerer of humans—education—has also soared, not just in the rich world, but throughout the world. Another great empowerer of humanity is connectivity: Access to information and access to communication both have soared. The number of mobile phones on the planet was effectively zero in the early 1990s, and now it’s in excess of 4 billion. More than three-quarters of humanity, in the span of one generation, have gotten access to connectivity that, as my friend Peter Diamandis likes to say, is greater than any president before 1995 had. A reasonably well-off person in India or in Nigeria has better access to information than Ronald Reagan did during most of his career. With increased connectivity has come an increase in democracy. As people have gotten richer, more educated, more able to access information, and more able to communicate, they have demanded more control over the places where they live. The fraction of nations that are functional democracies is at an all-time high in this world—more than double what it was in the 1970s—with the collapse of the Soviet Union.* Economically, the world is a more equal place than it has been in decades. In the West, and especially in the United States, we hear a lot about growing inequality, but on a global scale, the opposite is true. As billions are rising out of poverty around the world, the global middle classes are catching up with the global rich. <u>In many ways, this is the age of the greatest human prosperity, freedom, and potential that has ever been on the face of this planet. But in other ways, <mark>we are facing </mark>some of the <mark>largest risks ever</mark>. </u>The Worst of Times: The Greatest Risks <u>At its peak, the ancient Mayan city of Tikal was a metropolis, a city of 200,000 people inside of a civilization of about 20 million people. Now, if you walk around any Mayan city, you see mounds of dirt. That’s because these structures were all abandoned</u> by about the mid-900s AD. We know now what happened: <u><strong><mark>The Mayan civilization grew too large. It overpopulated</strong></mark>. To feed themselves, they had to convert forest into farmland. They chopped down all of the forest. That, in turn, led to soil erosion. It also worsened drought, because trees, among other things, trap moisture and create a precipitation cycle. </u>When that happened, and was met by some normal (not human-caused) climate change, <u>the Mayans found they didn’t have enough food.</u> They exhausted their primary energy supply, which is food. <u><mark>That in turn led to</mark> more <mark>violence</mark> in their society <mark>and ultimately</mark> to a complete <mark>collapse</mark>. The greatest energy source for human civilization today</u> is fossil fuels. Among those, <u>none is more important than oil</u>. In 1956, M. King Hubbert looked at production in individual oil fields and predicted that the United States would see the peak of its oil production in 1970 or so, and then drop. His prediction largely came true: Oil production went up but did peak in the 1970s, then plummeted. Oil production has recently gone up in the United States a little bit, but it’s still just barely more than half of what it was in its peak in the 1970s. Hubbert also predicted that the global oil market would peak in about 2000, and for a long time he looked very foolish. But it now has basically plateaued. Since 2004, oil production has increased by about 4%, whereas in the 1950s it rose by about 4% every three months. <u>We haven’t hit a peak; oil production around the world is still rising a little bit. It’s certainly not declining, but we do appear to be near a plateau; supply is definitely rising more slowly than demand</u>. Though there’s plenty of oil in the ground, the oil that remains is in smaller fields, further from shore, under lower pressure, and harder to pump out. <u><mark>Water</mark> <mark>is</mark> another resource that is <mark>incredibly</mark> <mark>precious</mark> </u>to us. <u>The predominant way in which we use water is through the food that we eat: 70% of the freshwater that humanity uses goes into agriculture. The Ogallala Aquifer</u>, the giant body of freshwater under the surface of the Earth in the Great Plains of the United States, is fossil water left from the melting and the retreat of glaciers in the end of the last Ice Age, 12,000–14,000 years ago. Its <u>refill time is somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 years from normal rainfall. Since 1960, we’ve drained between a third and a half of the water in this body,</u> depending on what estimate you look at. In <u>some areas, the water table is dropping about three feet per year. </u>If this was a surface lake in the United States or Canada, and people saw that happening, they’d stop it. But because it’s out of sight, it’s just considered a resource that we can tap. And indeed, <u>in the north Texas area, wells are starting to fail already, and farms are being abandoned in some cases, because they can’t get to the water that they once did. Perhaps the largest risk of all is climate change. We’ve increased the temperature of the planet by about 2°F in the last 130 years, and that rate is accelerating. This is primarily because of the carbon dioxide we’ve put into the atmosphere</u>, along with methane and nitrous oxide. <u><mark>CO2 levels</mark>, now at over 390 parts per million, <mark>are the highest they’ve been in </mark>about 15 <mark>million years</u></mark>. Ice cores go back at least a million years, and we know that they’re the highest they’ve been in that time. Historically, when CO2 levels are high, temperature is also high. But also, historically, in the lifetime of our species, <u>we’ve actually never existed as human beings while CO2 levels have been this high. </u>For example, <u>glaciers</u> such as the Bear and Pedersen in Alaska <u>have disappeared</u> just since 1920. <u>As these glaciers melt, they produce water that goes into the seas and helps to raise sea levels. Over the next century, the seas are expected to rise about 3 to 6 feet. </u>Most of that actually will not be melting glaciers; it’s thermal expansion: As the ocean gets warmer, it gets a little bit bigger. But 3 to 6 feet over a century doesn’t sound like that big a deal to us, so we think of that as a distant problem. The reality is that <u>there’s a more severe problem with climate change: its impact on the weather and on agriculture. </u>In 2003, Europe went through its worst heat wave since 1540. Ukraine lost 75% of its wheat crop. In 2009, China had a once-in-a-century level drought; in 2010 they had another once-in-a-century level drought. That’s twice. Wells that had given water continuously since the fifteenth century ran dry. When those rains returned, when the water that was soaked up by the atmosphere came back down, it came down on Pakistan, and half of Pakistan was under water in the floods of 2010. An area larger than Germany was under water. Warmer air carries more water. Every degree Celsius that you increase the temperature value of air, it carries 7% more water. But it doesn’t carry that water uniformly. It can suck water away from one place and then deliver it in a deluge in another place. So both the droughts are up and flooding is up simultaneously, as precipitation becomes more lumpy and more concentrated. In Russia’s 2010 heat wave, 55,000 people died, 11,000 of them in Moscow alone. In 2011, the United States had the driest 10-month period ever in the American South, and Texas saw its worst wildfires ever. And<u> 2012 was the worst drought in the United States since the Dust Bowl—the corn crop shrank by 20%. So that’s the big risk the world faces: that radical weather will change how we grow food, which is still our most important energy source—even more important than fossil fuels. </u>A number of people in the environmentalist movement are saying that we have to just stop growing. For instance, in his book Peak Everything: Waking Up to the Century of Declines, Richard Heinberg of the Post-Carbon Institute says that the Earth is full. Get used to it, and get ready for a world where you live with less wealth, and where your children live with less wealth, than any before. I don’t think this idea of stopping growth is realistic, because there are a top billion people who live pretty well and there are another 6 billion who don’t and are hungry for it. <u><mark>We see demand rising for </mark>everything<mark>—water, food, energy—</mark>and that demand is rising </u>not in the United States or Europe or Canada or Australia. It’s rising <u>in the developing world. This is the area that will create all of the increased demand for physical resources. </u>Even if we could, by some chance, say That’s enough, sorry, we’re not going to let you use these resources, which is doubtful, it wouldn’t be just, because the West got rich by using those natural resources. So we need to find a different way. Ideas as a Resource Expander, Resource Preserver, and Waste Reducer <u>The best-selling environmental book of all time, Limits to Growth</u>, was based on computer modeling. It was a simple model with only about eight variables of what would happen in the world. It <u>showed that economic growth</u>, more wealth, <u>would inevitably lead to more pollution and more consumption of finite resources, which would in turn take us beyond the limits and lead ultimately to collapse. </u>While it’s been widely reported recently that its predictions are coming true, that’s actually not the case. <u>If you look at the vast majority of the numbers that the researchers predict in this model, they’re not coming true. Why did they get these things wrong?</u> The most important thing that the <u>forecasters</u> did was <u>underestimate <strong>the power of new ideas to expand resources</strong>, or to expand wealth while using fewer resources. Ideas have done tremendous things for us. Let’s start with food. </u>In The Population Bomb (1968), Paul Ehrlich predicted that food supply could not support the population, just as Malthus did. But <u>what’s happened is that we’ve doubled population since 1960, and we’ve nearly tripled the food supply in total.</u> We’ve increased by 30%–40% the food supply per person since the 1960s. Let’s look at this on a very long time scale. How many people can you feed with an acre of land? <u>Before the advent of agriculture, an acre of land could feed less than a thousandth of a person. Today it’s about three people, on average, who can be fed by one acre of land.</u> Pre-agriculture, it took 3,000 acres for one person to stay alive through hunting and gathering. With agriculture, that footprint has shrunk from 3,000 acres to one-third of one acre. That’s not because there’s any more sunlight, which is ultimately what food is; <u>it’s because we’ve changed the productivity of the resource by innovation in farming—and then thousands of innovations on top of that to increase it even more. </u>In fact, <u>the reason we have the forests that we have on the planet is because we were able to handle a doubling of the population since 1960 without increasing farmland by more than about 10%. If we had to have doubled our farmland, we would have chopped down all the remaining forests on the planet<mark>. <strong>Ideas can reduce resource use</u></strong></mark>. I can give you many other examples. <u>In the United States, the <mark>amount of energy used </mark>on farms <mark>per calorie grown has</mark> actually <mark>dropped</mark> by about half since the 1970s. That’s in part because we now only use about a tenth of the energy to create synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, which is an important input. The amount of food that you can grow per drop of water has roughly doubled since the 1980s. In wheat, it’s actually more than tripled since 1960. The amount of water that we use in the United States per person has dropped by about a third since the 1970s, after rising for decades</u>. As agriculture has gotten more efficient, we’re using less water per person. So, again, ideas can reduce resource use. <u><strong><mark>Ideas can</mark> also <mark>find substitutes for scarce resources</u></strong></mark>. We’re at risk of running out of many things, right? Well, let’s think about some things that have happened in the past. <u>The sperm whale was almost hunted into extinction</u>. Sperm whales were, in the mid-1800s, the best source of illumination. <u>Sperm whale oil—spermaceti—was the premier source of lighting</u>. It burned without smoke, giving a clear, steady light, and <u>the demand for it led to huge hunting of the sperm whales. In a period of about 30 years, we killed off about a third of the sperm whales on the planet. That led to a phenomenon of “peak sperm-whale oil</u>”: The number of sperm whales that the fleet could bring in dropped over time as the sperm whales became more scarce and more afraid of human hunters. <u>Demand rose as supply dropped, and the prices skyrocketed. So it looked a little bit like the situation with oil now. </u>That was solved not by the discovery of more sperm whales, nor by giving up on this thing of lighting. Rather, Abraham <u><mark>Gesner</u></mark>, a Canadian, <u><mark>discovered</mark> </u>this thing called<u> <mark>kerosene</mark>. He found that, if he took coal, heated it up, captured the fumes, and distilled them, he could create this fluid that burned very clear. And he could create it in quantities thousands of times greater than the sperm whales ever could have given up. </u>We have no information suggesting that <u>Gesner</u> was an environmentalist or that he cared about sperm whales at all. He <u>was motivated by scientific curiosity and by the huge business opportunity of going after this lighting market. What he did was dramatically lower the cost of lighting while saving the sperm whales from extinction. </u>One more thing that <u><strong>ideas can do is transform waste into value</strong>. In places like Germany and Japan, people are mining landfills. Japan estimates that its landfills alone contain 10-year supplies of gold and rare-earth minerals for the world market. Alcoa estimates that the world’s landfills contain a 15-year supply of aluminum. So there’s tremendous value. </u>When we throw things away, they’re not destroyed. If we “consume” things like aluminum, we’re not really consuming it, we’re rearranging it. We’re changing where it’s located. And <u>in some cases, the concentration of these resources in our landfills is actually higher than it was in our mines. What it takes is energy and technology to get that resource back out and put it back into circulation. </u>Ideas for Stretching the Limits So ideas can reduce resource use, can find substitutes for scarce resources, and can transform waste into value. In that context, what are the limits to growth? <u>Is there a population limit? Yes, there certainly is, but it doesn’t look like we’re going to hit that. Projections right now are that, by the middle of this century, world population will peak between 9 billion and 10 billion, and then start to decline. In fact, we’ll be talking much more about the graying of civilization, and perhaps underpopulation—too-low birthrates on a current trend. </u>What about physical resources? <u>Are <mark>there limits to physical resource </mark>use <mark>on this planet? </mark>Absolutely. It really is a finite planet. </u>But where are those limits? To illustrate, let’s start with energy. This is the most important resource that we use, in many ways. But when we consider all the fossil fuels that humanity uses today—all the oil, coal, natural gas, and so on—it pales in comparison to a much larger resource, all around us, which is the amount of energy coming in from our Sun every day. The amount of energy from sunlight that strikes the top of the atmosphere is about 10,000 times as much as the energy that we use from fossil fuels on a daily basis. Ten seconds of sunlight hitting the Earth is as much energy as humanity uses in an entire day; one hour of sunlight hitting the Earth provides as much energy to the planet as a whole as humanity uses from all sources combined in one year. This is an incredibly abundant resource. It manifests in many ways. It heats the atmosphere differentially, creating winds that we can capture for wind power. It evaporates water, which leads to precipitation elsewhere, which turns into things like rivers and waterfalls, which we can capture as hydropower. But by far the largest fraction of it—more than half—is photons hitting the surface of the Earth. Those are so abundant that, with one-third of 1% of the Earth’s land area, using current technology of about 14%-efficient solar cells, we could capture enough electricity to power all of current human needs. The problem is not the abundance of the energy; the problem is cost. Our technology is primitive. Our technology for building solar cells is similar to our technology for manufacturing computer chips. They’re built on silicon wafers in clean rooms at high temperatures, and so they’re very, very expensive. But innovation has been dropping that cost tremendously. Over the last 30 years, we’ve gone from a watt of solar power costing $20 to about $1. That’s a factor of 20. We roughly drop the cost of solar by one-half every decade, more or less. That means that, in the sunniest parts of the world today, solar is now basically at parity in cost, without subsidies, with coal and natural gas. Over the next 12–15 years, that will spread to most of the planet. That’s incredibly good news for us. Of course, we don’t just use energy while the Sun is shining. We use energy at night to power our cities; we use energy in things like vehicles that have to move and that have high energy densities. Both of these need storage, and today’s storage is actually a bigger challenge than capturing energy. But there’s reason to believe that we can tackle the storage problem, as well. For example, consider lithium ion batteries—the batteries that are in your laptop, your cell phone, and so on. The demand to have longer-lasting devices drove tremendous innovations in these batteries in the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. Between 1991 and 2005, the cost of storage in lithium ion batteries dropped by about a factor of nine, and the density of storage—how much energy you can store in an ounce of battery—increased by a little over double in that time. If we do that again, we would be at the point where grid-scale storage is affordable and we can store that energy overnight. Our electric vehicles have ranges similar to the range you can get in a gasoline-powered vehicle. This is a tall order. This represents perhaps tens of billions of dollars in R&D, but it is something that is possible and for which there is precedent. Another approach being taken is turning energy into fuel. When you use a fuel such as gasoline, it’s not really an energy source. It’s an energy carrier, an energy storage system, if you will. You can store a lot of energy in a very small amount. Today, two pioneers in genome sequencing—Craig Venter and George Church—both have founded companies to create next-generation biofuels. What they’re both leveraging is that gene-sequencing cost is the fastest quantitative area of progress on the planet. What they’re trying to do is engineer microorganisms that consume CO2, sunlight, and sugar and actually excrete fuel as a byproduct. If we could do this, maybe just 1% of the Earth’s surface—or a thirtieth of what we use for agriculture—could provide all the liquid fuels that we need. We would conveniently grow algae on saltwater and waste water, so biofuel production wouldn’t compete for freshwater. And the possible yields are vast if we can get there. If we can crack energy, we can crack everything else: • Water. Water is life. We live in a water world, but only about a tenth of a percent of the water in the world is freshwater that’s accessible to us in some way. Ninety-seven percent of the world’s water is in the oceans and is salty. It used to be that desalination meant boiling water and then catching the steam and letting it condense. Between the times of the ancient Greeks and 1960, desalination technology didn’t really change. But then, it did. People started to create membranes modeled on what cells do, which is allow some things through but not others. They used plastics to force water through and get only the fresh and not the salty. As a result, the amount of energy it takes to desalinate a liter of water has dropped by about a factor of nine in that time. Now, in the world’s largest desalination plants, the price of desalinated water is about a tenth of a cent per gallon. The technology has gotten to the point where it is starting to become a realistic option as an alternative to using up scarce freshwater resources. • Food. Can we grow enough food? Between now and 2050, we have to increase food yield by about 70%. Is that possible? I think it is. In industrialized nations, food yields are already twice what they are in the world as a whole. That’s because we have irrigation, tractors, better pesticides, and so on. Given such energy and wealth, we already know that we can grow enough food to feed the planet. Another option that’s probably cheaper would be to leverage some things that nature’s already produced. What most people don’t know is that the yield of corn per acre and in calories is about 70% higher than the yield of wheat. Corn is a C 4 photosynthesis crop: It uses a different way of turning sunlight and CO2 into sugars that evolved only 30 million years ago. Now, scientists around the world are working on taking these C 4 genes from crops like corn and transplanting them into wheat and rice, which could right away increase the yield of those staple grains by more than 50%. Physical limits do exist, but they are extremely distant. We cannot grow exponentially in our physical resource use forever, but that point is still at least centuries in the future. It’s something we have to address eventually, but it’s not a problem that’s pressing right now. • Wealth. One thing that people don’t appreciate very much is that wealth has been decoupling from physical resource use on this planet. Energy use per capita is going up, CO2 emissions per capita have been going up a little bit, but they are both widely outstripped by the amount of wealth that we’re creating. That’s because we can be more efficient in everything—using less energy per unit of food grown, and so on. This again might sound extremely counterintuitive, but let me give you one concrete example of how that happens. Compare the ENIAC—which in the 1940s was the first digital computer ever created—to an iPhone. An iPhone is billions of times smaller, uses billions of times less energy, and has billions of times more computing power than ENIAC. If you tried to create an iPhone using ENIAC technology, it would be a cube a mile on the side, and it would use more electricity than the state of California. And it wouldn’t have access to the Internet, because you’d have to invent that, as well. This is what I mean when I say ideas are the ultimate resource. The difference between an ENIAC and an iPhone is that the iPhone is embodied knowledge that allows you to do more with less resources. That phenomenon is not limited to high tech. It’s everywhere around us. So ideas are the ultimate resource. They’re the only resource that accumulates over time. Our store of knowledge is actually larger than in the past, as opposed to all physical resources<u>. </u>Challenges Ahead for Innovation Today we are seeing a race between our rate of consumption and our rate of innovation, and there are multiple challenges. One challenge is the Darwinian process, survival of the fittest. In areas like green tech, there will be hundreds and even thousands of companies founded, and 99% of them will go under. That is how innovation happens. The other problem is scale. Just as an example, one of the world’s largest solar arrays is at Nellis Air Force Base in California, and we would need about 10 million of these in order to meet the world’s electricity needs. We have the land, we have the solar energy coming in, but there’s a lot of industrial production that has to happen before we get to that point. Innovation is incredibly powerful, but the pace of innovation compared to the pace of consumption is very important. One thing we can do to increase the pace of innovation is to address the biggest challenge, which is market failure. In 1967, you could stick your hand into the Cuyahoga River, in Ohio, and come up covered in muck and oil. At that time, the river was lined with businesses and factories, and for them the river was a free resource. It was cheaper to pump their waste into the river than it was to pay for disposal at some other sort of facility. The river was a commons that anybody could use or abuse, and the waste they were producing was an externality. To that business or factory, there was no cost to pumping waste into this river. But to the people who depended upon the river, there was a high cost overall. That’s what I mean by a market externality and a market failure, because this was an important resource to all of us. But no one owned it, no one bought or sold it, and so it was treated badly in a way that things with a price are not. That ultimately culminated when, in June 1969, a railway car passing on a bridge threw a spark; the spark hit a slick of oil a mile long on the river, and the river burst into flames. The story made the cover of Time magazine. In many ways, the environmental movement was born of this event as much as it was of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. In the following three years, the United States created the Environmental Protection Agency and passed the Clean Water and Clean Air acts. Almost every environmental problem on the planet is an issue of the commons, whether it’s chopping down forests that no one owns, draining lakes that no one owns, using up fish in the ocean that no one owns, or polluting the atmosphere because no one owns it, or heating up the planet. They’re all issues of the commons. They’re all issues where there is no cost to an individual entity to deplete something and no cost to overconsume something, but there is a greater cost that’s externalized and pushed on everybody else who shares this. Now let’s come back again to what Limits to Growth said, which was that economic growth always led to more pollution and more consumption, put us beyond limits, and ends with collapse. So if that’s the case, all those things we just talked about should be getting worse. But as the condition of the Cuyahoga River today illustrates, that is not the case. GDP in the United States is three times what it was when the Cuyahoga River caught on fire, so shouldn’t it be more polluted? It’s not. Instead, it’s the cleanest it’s been in decades. That’s not because we stopped growth. It’s because we made intelligent choices about managing that commons. Another example: In the 1970s, we discovered that the ozone layer was thinning to such an extent that it literally could drive the extinction of all land species on Earth. But it’s actually getting better. It’s turned a corner, it’s improving ahead of schedule, and it’s on track to being the healthiest it’s been in a century. That’s because we’ve reduced the emissions of CFCs, which destroy ozone; we’ve dropped the amount of them that we emit into the atmosphere basically to zero. And yet industry has not ground to a halt because of this, either. Economic growth has not faltered. And one last example: Acid rain—which is primarily produced by sulfur dioxide emitted by coal-burning power plants—is mostly gone as an issue. Emissions of sulfur dioxide are down by about a factor of two. That’s in part because we created a strategy called cap and trade: It capped the amount of SO2 that you could emit, then allowed you to swap and buy emission credits from others to find the optimal way to do that. The cost, interestingly enough, has always been lower than projected. In each of these cases, industry has said, This will end things. Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff said the economy would grind to a halt, and the EPA would come in with lower cost estimates. But the EPA has always been wrong: The EPA cost estimate has always been too high. Analysis of all of these efforts in the past shows that reducing emissions is always cheaper than you expect, but cleaning up the mess afterwards is always more expensive than you’d guess. Today, the biggest commons issue is that of climate change, with the CO2 and other greenhouse gases that we’re pumping into the atmosphere. A logical thing to do would be to put a price on these. If you pollute, if you’re pumping CO2 into the atmosphere and it’s warming the planet, so you’re causing harm to other people in a very diffuse way. Therefore, you should be paying in proportion to that harm you’re doing to offset it. But if we do that, won’t that have a massive impact on the economy? This all relates to energy, which drives a huge fraction of the economy. Manufacturing depends on it. Transport depends on it. So wouldn’t it be a huge problem if we were to actually put a price on these carbon emissions? Well, there has been innovative thinking about that, as well. One thing that economists have always told us is that, if you’re going to tax, tax the bad, not the good. Whatever it is that you tax, you will get less of it. So tax the bad, not the good. The model that would be the ideal for putting a price on pollution is what we call a revenue-neutral model. Revenue-neutral carbon tax, revenue-neutral cap and trade. Let’s model it as a tax: Today, a country makes a certain amount of revenue for its government in income tax, let’s say. If you want to tax pollution, the way to do this without impacting the economy is to increase your pollution tax in the same manner that you decrease the income tax. The government then is capturing the same amount of money from the economy as a whole, so there’s no economic slowdown as a result of this. This has a positive effect on the environment because it tips the scales of price. Now, if you’re shopping for energy, and you’re looking at solar versus coal or natural gas, the carbon price has increased the price of coal and natural gas to you, but not the cost of solar. It shifts customer behavior from one to the other while having no net impact on the economy, and probably a net benefit on the economy in the long run as more investment in green energy drives the price down. Toward a Wealthier, Cleaner Future The number-one thing I want you to take away is that pollution and overconsumption are not inevitable outcomes of growth. While tripling the wealth of North America, for instance, we’ve gone from an ozone layer that was rapidly deteriorating to one that is bouncing back. The fundamental issue is not one of limits to growth; it’s one of the policy we choose, and it’s one of how we structure our economy to value all the things we depend upon and not just those things that are owned privately. What can we do, each of us? Four things: First is to communicate. These issues are divisive, but we know that beliefs and attitudes on issues like this spread word of mouth. They spread person to person, from person you trust to person you trust. So talk about it. Many of us have friends or colleagues or family on the other side of these issues, but talk about it. You’re better able to persuade them than anyone else is. Second is to participate. By that I mean politically. Local governments, state and province governments, and national governments are responsive when they hear from their constituents about these issues. It changes their attitudes. Because so few constituents actually make a call to the office of their legislator, or write a letter, a few can make a very large impact. Third is to innovate. <u><strong><mark>These problems aren’t solved yet</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>We don’t have the tech</u></mark>nologies <u><mark>for these problems today</u></mark>. <u>The <mark>trend lines look</mark> very <mark>good, but the</mark> <mark>next 10 years</mark> of those trend lines <mark>demand lots of</mark> bright <mark>people</mark>, lots of bright <mark>ideas</mark>, <mark>and</mark> lots of <mark>R&D</u>.</mark> So if you’re thinking about a career change, or if you know any young people trying to figure out what their career is now, these are careers that (A) will be very important to us in the future and (B) will probably be quite lucrative for them.</p>

1AC – R1 – Saint Georges Invitational

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Verification measures get circumvented and states cheat – enforcement opens the floodgates to cyber espionage

Gibbs 19 ) | MU

Gibbs 19 (Noah, Gibbs, 04-25-2019, "Why Banning Autonomous Weapons Is More Dangerous Than Developing Them Responsibly," Polemics, http://www.polemics-magazine.com/opinion/banning-autonomous-weapons-more-dangerous-developing-responsibly) | MU

a ban on autonomous weapons is the wrong way to deal with the challenges related to the militarization of artificial intelligence Software is, by nature, impossible to observe unless you have access to the computer used to program the autonomous weapon verifying an autonomous weapons ban is exceedingly difficult because it requires states to give unprecedented access to their military facilities and software It is unlikely that any military would be willing to provide such access due to the risk of cyber espionage. An adversary that gains access to an autonomous weapon’s software could potentially train it so that the weapon would not recognize enemy targets they could trick the weapon into attacking friendly forces or civilians. The inability to observe a weapon’s software would make any autonomous weapons ban a risky proposition for the states entering into it States could easily cheat the treaty regime by developing autonomous software for weapon systems that are normally manned drones exemplify this problem A state could claim that all its drones are flown by humans while secretly developing an AI that could also fly the drone . It would be impossible for observers to tell who or what was flying the drone an autonomous weapons ban would inevitably give rise to highly secretive autonomous weapons programmes These programmes would be significantly more dangerous than current autonomous weapons programmes because their secrecy would inevitably result in the weapons being tested less than an unclassified weapons programme it is more likely that a secret autonomous weapon might behave unexpectedly when introduced to an actual battlefield an autonomous weapons ban may make the risk of a catastrophic loss of control of an autonomous weapon higher. states should rigorously and publicly test any autonomous weapon system before it is deployed into actual combat states should cooperate with each other to establish general guidelines for how autonomous weapons should interact with each other

a ban on autonomous weapons is the wrong way to deal with militarization of a i Software is impossible to observe unless states give access to software. It is unlikely that military would provide access due to risk of cyber espionage. they could trick the weapon into attacking friendly forces States could cheat claim drones are flown by humans while AI could It would be impossible to tell ban would give rise to secretive autonomous weapons programmes more dangerous because secret autonomous weapon might behave unexpectedly

In October 2012, a group of NGOs formed the “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” – the purpose of which is to promote an international ban on fully autonomous weapons. As of November 2018, 28 countries supported such a ban. Among these states, Austria is the only European nation in favor of a comprehensive autonomous weapons ban. While the objective of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is noble in that it seeks to prevent human suffering, a ban on autonomous weapons is the wrong way to deal with the challenges related to the militarization of artificial intelligence. One problem with a ban is that it is nearly impossible to define autonomous weapons in a way that is universally accepted. This is because weapons can have varying degrees of autonomy. For example, a heat-seeking air-to-air missile will fly towards a heat source within its field of view. Once the missile is fired, the human operator has little control over which heat source it might target. The missile ‘chooses’ what it will destroy. Despite this, few people would call a heat-seeking missile intelligent, even though it exhibits a degree of autonomous decision-making. Robots equipped with sophisticated AI are a different story. With the right AI, a robot may be capable of identifying a target as specific as a person’s face and deciding whether to engage all by itself. Weapons that display such behavior are said to be fully autonomous. Unfortunately, there is no clear dividing line between fully autonomous weapons and semi-autonomous weapons. Military drones provide an excellent example of this problem. Today, most military drones are flown remotely by a pilot sitting somewhere on the ground. Decisions to launch an attack from a drone are always made by the human pilot. AI could change this dynamic by allowing a commander to order a drone to attack anything that qualifies as a target within a given area. The drone could then loiter over an area searching for targets that it can then decide to attack by itself. Hardware wise, both types of drones are the same. The only thing that separates a drone flown by a human from a drone that can make decisions itself is software. Software is, by nature, impossible to observe unless you have access to the computer used to program the autonomous weapon. As such, verifying an autonomous weapons ban is exceedingly difficult because it requires states to give unprecedented access to their military facilities and software. It is unlikely that any military would be willing to provide such access due to the risk of cyber espionage. An adversary that gains access to an autonomous weapon’s software could potentially train it so that the weapon would not recognize enemy targets. Even worse, they could trick the weapon into attacking friendly forces or civilians. The inability to observe a weapon’s software would make any autonomous weapons ban a risky proposition for the states entering into it. States could easily cheat the treaty regime by developing autonomous software for weapon systems that are normally manned. Again, drones exemplify this problem. A state could claim that all its drones are flown by humans while secretly developing an AI that could also fly the drone . It would be impossible for observers to tell who or what was flying the drone. Given the ease of cheating, an autonomous weapons ban would inevitably give rise to highly secretive autonomous weapons programmes. These programmes would be significantly more dangerous than current autonomous weapons programmes because their secrecy would inevitably result in the weapons being tested less than an unclassified weapons programme. In turn, it is more likely that a secret autonomous weapon might behave unexpectedly when introduced to an actual battlefield. Rather perversely, an autonomous weapons ban may make the risk of a catastrophic loss of control of an autonomous weapon higher. Instead of a ban, states should rigorously and publicly test any autonomous weapon system before it is deployed into actual combat. Moreover, states should cooperate with each other to establish general guidelines for how autonomous weapons should interact with each other. These guidelines would help ensure that there is no unexpected escalation resulting from the interaction of two states’ autonomous weapons. Developing such guidelines will not be easy. Yet, the rules that military aircraft and ships follow when they encounter foreign forces are precedence for such guidelines. With a bit of effort and transparency, we can ensure autonomous weapons never escape human control.

<h4>Verification measures get circumvented and states cheat – enforcement opens the floodgates to cyber espionage </h4><p><u><strong>Gibbs 19</u></strong> (Noah, Gibbs, 04-25-2019, "Why Banning Autonomous Weapons Is More Dangerous Than Developing Them Responsibly," Polemics, http://www.polemics-magazine.com/opinion/banning-autonomous-weapons-more-dangerous-developing-responsibly<u><strong>) | MU</p><p></u></strong>In October 2012, a group of NGOs formed the “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots” – the purpose of which is to promote an international ban on fully autonomous weapons. As of November 2018, 28 countries supported such a ban. Among these states, Austria is the only European nation in favor of a comprehensive autonomous weapons ban. While the objective of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is noble in that it seeks to prevent human suffering,<u><strong> <mark>a ban on autonomous weapons is the wrong way to deal with</mark> the challenges related to the <mark>militarization of a</mark>rtificial <mark>i</mark>ntelligence</u></strong>. <strong>One problem with a ban is that it is nearly impossible to define autonomous weapons in a way that is universally accepted. This is because weapons can have varying degrees of autonomy. For example, a heat-seeking air-to-air missile will fly towards a heat source within its field of view. Once the missile is fired, the human operator has little control over which heat source it might target. The missile ‘chooses’ what it will destroy. Despite this, few people would call a heat-seeking missile intelligent, even though it exhibits a degree of autonomous decision-making. Robots equipped with sophisticated AI are a different story. With the right AI, a robot may be capable of identifying a target as specific as a person’s face and deciding whether to engage all by itself. Weapons that display such behavior are said to be fully autonomous. Unfortunately, there is no clear dividing line between fully autonomous weapons and semi-autonomous weapons. Military drones provide an excellent example of this problem. Today, most military drones are flown remotely by a pilot sitting somewhere on the ground. Decisions to launch an attack from a drone are always made by the human pilot. AI could change this dynamic by allowing a commander to order a drone to attack anything that qualifies as a target within a given area. The drone could then loiter over an area searching for targets that it can then decide to attack by itself. Hardware wise, both types of drones are the same. The only thing that separates a drone flown by a human from a drone that can make decisions itself is software</strong>. <u><strong><mark>Software is</mark>, by nature, <mark>impossible to observe unless </mark>you have access to the computer used to program the autonomous weapon</u></strong>. As such, <u><strong>verifying an autonomous weapons ban is exceedingly difficult because it requires <mark>states </mark>to <mark>give</mark> unprecedented <mark>access to</mark> their military facilities and <mark>software</u></strong>. <u><strong>It is unlikely that </mark>any <mark>military would</mark> be willing to <mark>provide</mark> such <mark>access due to</mark> the<mark> risk of cyber espionage.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>An adversary that gains access to an autonomous weapon’s software could potentially train it so that the weapon would not recognize enemy targets</u></strong>. Even worse, <u><strong><mark>they could trick the weapon into attacking friendly forces </mark>or civilians. The inability to observe a weapon’s software would make any autonomous weapons ban a risky proposition for the states entering into it</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>States could </mark>easily <mark>cheat</mark> the treaty regime by developing autonomous software for weapon systems that are normally manned</u></strong>. Again, <u><strong>drones exemplify this problem</u></strong>. <u><strong>A state could<mark> claim</mark> that all its <mark>drones are flown by humans while</mark> secretly developing an <mark>AI </mark>that <mark>could</mark> also fly the drone</p><p>. <mark>It would be impossible</mark> for observers <mark>to tell </mark>who or what was flying the drone</u></strong>. Given the ease of cheating, <u><strong>an autonomous weapons <mark>ban would </mark>inevitably <mark>give rise to</mark> highly <mark>secretive autonomous weapons programmes</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>These programmes would be significantly <mark>more dangerous</mark> than current autonomous weapons programmes <mark>because </mark>their secrecy would inevitably result in the weapons being tested less than an unclassified weapons programme</u></strong>. In turn, <u><strong>it is more likely that a <mark>secret autonomous weapon might behave unexpectedly</mark> when introduced to an actual battlefield</u></strong>. Rather perversely, <u><strong>an autonomous weapons ban may make the risk of a catastrophic loss of control of an autonomous weapon higher. </u></strong>Instead of a ban, <u><strong>states should rigorously and publicly test any autonomous weapon system before it is deployed into actual combat</u></strong>. Moreover, <u><strong>states should cooperate with each other to establish general guidelines for how autonomous weapons should interact with each other</u></strong>. These guidelines would help ensure that there is no unexpected escalation resulting from the interaction of two states’ autonomous weapons. Developing such guidelines will not be easy. Yet, the rules that military aircraft and ships follow when they encounter foreign forces are precedence for such guidelines. With a bit of effort and transparency, we can ensure autonomous weapons never escape human control.</p>

Case

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Expanding breadth of Pharma Innovation into neglected diseases results in global linkages that revitalizes global health diplomacy.

Hotez 16

Hotez 16, Peter J. Blue marble health: an innovative plan to fight diseases of the poor amid wealth. JHU Press, 2016. (Sabin Vaccine Institute and Texas Children’s Hospital Center for Vaccine Development, Departments of Pediatrics and Molecular Virology and Microbiology)//Elmer

an important research and development agenda for NTDs in the United States. There are no point-of-care diagnostic tests We also need new and improved treatments and vaccines Because the NTDs are poverty-related diseases, they often fly below the radar screen of the major pharmaceutical companies and are not prioritized Thus, the drugs used to treat these illnesses are not widely available In addition, many of these medicines were developed decades ago and produce a lot of side effects Currently, new innovations for NTDs like Chagas dis- multinational ease still rely on nonprofit PDPs Approximately 12 million Americans are infected with NTDs, led by toxocariasis and trichomoniasis—which disproportionately affect African Americans—and Chagas disease and cysticercosis—which disproportionately affect people of Hispanic origin Toxoplasmosis is another important NTD. Toxocariasis, cysticercosis, and toxocariasis exert important mental health effects on impoverished Americans. Many of these NTDs are transmitted within US borders There is an urgent need for new “control tools” for American NTDs, including diagnostics antiparasitic and antiviral drugs and vaccines Many of these products are being developed by nonprofit PDPs rather than pharmaceutical companies. nations need to take greater responsibility for their own neglected diseases and neglected populations. Doing so could result in the control or elimination of one-half or more of the planets NTDs with substantial gains made against HIV/AIDS, ТВ, and malaria the worlds richest countries need increasingly to recognize the hidden burden of neglected diseases expand extraordinary Could the scientific horsepower of states be partly redirected toward reducing endemic NTDs at home? International cooperation could result in important, positive health and economic gains Each of these activities represents examples of what some refer to as global health diplomacy. global health diplomacy could facilitate NTD activities an interagency initiative of the US government conducted in partnership with other nations is focused on preventing or reducing the impact of epidemics and pandemic potential US can scale-up of health technologies and strengthen and universal health coverage as an efficient mechanism to improve health as well as to provide “financial protection” can address disparities under global health diplomacy have opportunities to collaborate in new drugs, diagnostics, and vaccines codevelopment between scientists from nations with strained or evenly openly contentious international relations create new NTD technologies for the worst-off countries

r and d for NTDs in the U S need new treatments and vaccines NTDs fly below the radar of pharma companies and are not prioritized. Thus, drugs are not available the worlds richest need to recognize the burden expand extraordinary scientific horsepower toward reducing endemic NTDs could result in important global health diplomacy the US government in partnership with other nations can scale-up health tech and strengthen universal health coverage to provide “financial protection” codevelopment between scientists from nations with openly contentious relations create new NTD tech for the worst-off countries

We also need to better understand how these NTDs are actually transmitted within US borders, and I think it is extremely important to learn more about the links between these diseases and poverty. As I noted earlier, a drive through Houston’s Fifth Ward provides some insights, as one can quickly identify predisposing risk factors, including stray animals, dilapidated houses without window screens, standing water and discarded tires, and other evi- dence of environmental degradation, but we need to conduct careful epidemiological studies to really understand the links between poverty and NTDs, as well as animal reservoirs for illnesses such as Chagas disease and others. All of this presents an important research and development agenda for the NTDs in the United States. There are no point-of-care diagnostic tests available for most of the NTDs endemic to the nation, so blood from pa- tients must be sent to the CD С or other specialty research laboratories in order to establish a diagnosis for these conditions. As I sometimes point out to general audiences, when you go to your physician and get blood work done, there is no box to check off for toxocariasis or Chagas disease as there is for blood chemistries or other routine tests. We need diagnostic tests that are easily accessible to physicians and nurses. We also need new and improved treatments and vaccines. Because the NTDs are poverty-related diseases, they often fly below the radar screen of the major pharmaceutical companies and are not prioritized. Thus, the drugs used to treat these illnesses are not widely available, so typically the CDC has to be contacted in order to access them. In addition, many of these medicines were developed decades ago and produce a lot of side effects. For instance, the two medicines for Chagas disease—benznidazole and nifurtimox—cause skin rashes, diarrhea, and other unpleasant or even dangerous symptoms and illnesses. Patients using these medications have to interrupt their treatments up to 20% of the time. Moreover, these drugs cannot be used by pregnant women. Currently, new innovations for NTDs like Chagas dis- multinational ease still rely on nonprofit PDPs. The Geneva-based Drugs pharmaceutical for Neglected Diseases Initiative is leading efforts to de- companies have velop new and safer Chagas disease medicines [60], while shown little or modest at our National School of Tropical Medicine the Sab in interest in American Vaccine Institute and Texas Childrens Hospital Center for NTDs. As a result, new Vaccine Development (Sabin PDP) is working to develop products are being a therapeutic vaccine that could be used alongside exist- developed in the ing treatments [61]. These efforts rely on major philan- nonprofit sector. thropic donors. In our case at the Sabin PDP, they include the Kleberg Foundation, the Carlos Slim Foundation, the Southwest Electronic Energy Medical Research Institute, and Texas Childrens Hospital. Summary Points 1. In the United States, 45.3 million people live below the poverty line, roughly the same number of impoverished Americans alive during the early 1960s when Michael Harrington wrote The Other America. Approximately 20 million Americans now live in extreme poverty at one-half the US poverty level, and approximately 5 million are living on less than $2 per day 2. American poverty concentrates in specific areas, especially in southern states, with Texas having the largest numbers who live in poverty Important areas in the South include the Gulf Coast, border areas with Mexico, the Mississippi Delta, and Appalachia. 3. Approximately 12 million Americans are infected with NTDs, led by toxocariasis and trichomoniasis—which disproportionately affect African Americans—and Chagas disease (American trypanosomiasis) and cysticercosis—which disproportionately affect people of Hispanic origin. Toxoplasmosis is another important NTD. Toxocariasis, cysticercosis, and toxocariasis exert important mental health effects on impoverished Americans. Many of these NTDs are transmitted within US borders (autochthonous infections). 4. Arboviral infections are also important NTDs, led by dengue fever in Gulf Coastal areas and West Nile virus infection. WNV can cause chronic, persistent viral infections linked to chronic neurologic and renal disease. 5. There is an urgent need to promote awareness about the NTDs, especially for physicians and other health-care providers. 6. New policies are needed to expand surveillance for the NTDs affecting the United States. New legislation has been adopted in Texas, while additional bills are being introduced in the US Congress. Epidemiological studies are also needed to better understand how these diseases are transmitted and how they are linked to extreme poverty in the American South and elsewhere. 7. There is an urgent need for new “control tools” for American NTDs, including point-of-care diagnostics, antiparasitic and antiviral drugs, and vaccines. Many of these products are being developed by nonprofit PDPs rather than pharmaceutical companies. he G20 "A Theory of Justice" In his landmark 1971 book A Theory of Justice, the Harvard political philosopher John Rawls articulates two overriding principles of a just and fair society, namely, (1) “equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties” and (2) allowance of some social and economic inequalities, but only if they ultimately benefit “the least advantaged members of society” [1]. In terms of Rawls’s worldview, I believe that finding widespread NTDs among the extreme poor (and least-advantaged) who live amidst wealth—the central tenet of blue marble health—might represent one of the most jarring affronts to what he terms “justice as fairness” Because NTDs are now widespread among the leastadvantaged members of the worlds wealthiest economies, and they represent a major basis for thwarting their future growth, it is urgent for these nations, especially the G20 countries, to adopt strong internal policies to combat these diseases. I envision a three-pronged strategy to best address the G20 s (and Nigeria’s) poorest citizens afflicted by NTDs: 1. Each of the G20 nations and Nigeria has the capacity to fully understand the extent of these diseases within their own borders and then provide their own impoverished populations access to essential medicines used in mass drug administration to target helminth infections, in addition to trachoma, leprosy, yaws and scabies, and to provide treatments for other high-disease burden NTDs, including leishmaniasis and Chagas disease. The G20 countries and Nigeria Three major steps are required to effectively address blue marble health. 141 142 Blue Marble Health need to allocate resources and implement programs to achieve universal coverage for these diseases. 2. Each of the G20 nations and Nigeria has the capacity to conduct research and development for new NTD biotechnologies; they need to allocate resources toward this goal. 3. Both activities should be conducted within an overall framework of health system strengthening. Mass Drug Administration in the G20 A good place to revisit MDA among the G20 countries is to more closely examine the six G20 countries with positive worm indices—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa—in addition to Nigeria. Together these countries account for one-half of the worlds helminth infections [2]. An analysis of WHO s PCT database reveals that most of these nations are severely underachieving when it comes to providing MDA for people who require regular and periodic treatment for their intestinal helminth infections, schistosomiasis, and LF. Shown in table 11.1 is WHO’s estimate of the percentage that received treatment in 2013 [3-5]. Overall, the G20 nations affected by helminth infections and Nigeria perform poorly when it comes to treating their affected populations through MDA. In terms of specific countries in Latin America, Brazil is reaching only approximately one-third of its children and population at risk. And although Mexico provides complete coverage for intestinal worms, it—as previously mentioned—neither diagnoses nor treats hundreds of thousands (and possibly millions) of people with Chagas disease. In Africa, Nigeria’s MDA reaches less than 25% of its children at risk for helminth infections, and there is no information about schistosomiasis coverage in South Africa forthcoming from WHO. However, as Dr. Eyrun Kjetland (who works extensively in South Africa) has pointed out, female genital schistosomiasis remains widespread there, in part because praziquantel has been mostly unavailable in the country, owing to its drug importation laws. Schistosomiasis and other NTDs are still found among the poor in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The entire MENA region severely underdiagnoses most of its NTDs, including leishmaniasis. In Asia, Indonesia largely does not promote widespread deworming for its children, and only a small percentage of its population receives treatment for LF, while India does only marginally better. Indonesia also suffers from high rates of yaws, which can also be targeted by MDA using the antibiotic azithromycin. Similarly in India, the vast majority of its children do not have access to regular and periodic deworming, and only about one-half of the population receives MDA for LF. India also has the worlds largest numbers of leprosy cases. This disease can also be attacked through MDA using a multidrug therapy regimen. WHO does not present information on China, either because it has not been determined or is unavailable. However, China has made great strides in reducing its schistosomiasis prevalence since 1949, and it has eliminated LF. Similarly, Japan and South Korea have achieved significant success both in economic development and in reducing or eliminating its NTDs. 144 Blue Marble Health Key common factors for poor performance in meeting MDA targets are vast geographies, decentralization of health care, inadequate resource allocation, and lack of political will. Overall, the six G20 countries with positive worm indices, together with Nigeria, have the means and capacity to eliminate LF within their own borders, while greatly reducing the disease burdens of their intestinal helminth infections and schistosomiasis through MDA. Some of the key common factors for poor performance in meeting MDA targets are vast geographies, decentralization of health care that results in fragmentation of drug delivery, inadequate resource allocation, and lack of political will and commitment. What about G20 countries affected by NTDs but without a positive worm index? In the United States, the 12 million Americans infected and living with NTDs are largely unrecognized, undiagnosed, and untreated. The United States also does very little in terms of conducting active surveillance for Chagas disease (and other major NTDs), and only a tiny percentage of its population receives access to diagnosis and treatment—the same is true for Argentina. In both North America and Europe, toxocariasis and other parasitic zoonotic infections are seldom diagnosed and treated. Minimal information is available on eastern ------------------- Europeans, Turks, and Russians with intestinal worms or zoonotic NTDs or their access to diagnosis and treatment. NTDs remain widespread among Aboriginal Australians, including intestinal helminth infections and scabies—both of which can be targeted through MDA. Thus, the current status of access to essential medicines for people living in poverty and with NTDs among the G20 countries and Nigeria can be summarized as abysmal. The fact that so few are being treated through MDA programs is especially sad, given its low costs. As previ- ------------------- ously mentioned, there are approximately 1.07 billion treatments required among the populations at greatest risk in the G20 countries and Nigeria. At a cost of 50 cents per person per year, approximately $500 million would be required—that is, a dollar amount representing a tiny percentage (<0.001%) of the $65 trillion combined economy of these countries. The bottom line is that each of these nations has the internal capacity to provide these low-cost treatments to its impoverished populations. WHO has now launched a Universal Health Coverage (UHC) initiative that builds on its 1978 “Health for All” Alma-Ata declaration and the MillenThe current status of access to essential medicines for people living in poverty and with NTDs among the G20 countries and Nigeria can be summarized as abysmal. The G20 145 nium Development Goals, with a focus on protecting the health of the worlds most economically vulnerable populations. The activities highlighted here clearly fall within WHO s UHC mandate. Research and Development for New Control Tools and Biotechnologies For many of the leading NTDs—including vector-borne diseases such as dengue, leishmaniasis, Chagas disease, African sleeping sickness, and malaria, and also some helminth infections such as hookworm, schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis, and foodborne trematodiases—there are equally urgent needs to develop new drugs, diagnostics, and vaccines. Each year, the Australian policy group known as Policy Cures publishes an annual G-FINDER Report that measures the global investment in new technologies for neglected diseases, defining them broadly to include both the NTDs and the “big three” diseases: HIV/ AIDS, ТВ, and malaria [6]. For the year 2014, G-FINDER determined that approximately $3.37 billion was invested globally in neglected disease R&D technology, with most of that support going toward the big three diseases [6]. A look at total government support for neglected disease R&D, almost all of it from G20 countries, is also interesting. The public sector provided 64% of the total funding, and the United States provided two-thirds of that funding, mostly from the US National Institutes of Health [6]. In all, 71% of the total government funding for neglected diseases comes from the United States, European Commission, and United Kingdom. However, as the G-FINDER Report points out, these absolute numbers do not consider the GDPs of these nations. In terms of public funding relative to GDP ratios, countries such as Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and Argentina do particularly well in this regard [6]. Shown in table 11.2 are selected estimates from G-FINDER of the percentage of their GDP that various governments have devoted to R&D on Of government funding for neglected diseases R&D, a whopping 71% comes from the United States, European Commission, and United Kingdom. We need greater involvement and support from the remainder of the G20 countries, including positive worm index G20 countries— Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, in addition to Nigeria. 146 Blue Marble Health Although NTDs and other poverty-related diseases account for almost 14% of the global disease burden, they receive only a bit more than 1% of the global health-related R&D funds. neglected diseases. Using data from the G-FINDER Report combined with GDP information, I calculate that the world spends approximately 0.0028% of its GDP on neglected diseases R&D. Only three G20 countries—United States, United Kingdom, and Australia—match or exceed that percentage, ------------------- although India and France come close to it. The worstperforming countries were China and Japan. However, in 2013 the Japanese government, together with Japans major pharmaceutical companies and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, formed a partnership known as the Global Health Innovative Technology (GHIT) Fund for supporting PDPs and other entities to develop and shape new biotechnologies for neglected diseases, with an emphasis on NTDs [7, 8]. China is a different matter. The New York Times has reported that China paid out $86.3 billion in foreign investments in the year 2013 [9], with much of that spent in fragile nations where health systems are broken and NTDs are widespread. Clearly, China needs to allocate some of those funds to neglected diseases, either for MDA or new technologies. In addition, the nation of Brazil could easily increase its global contribution to NTD technologies by ю -fold in order to match higher-performing nations in this regard. Germany is now looking at supporting NTD technologies as part of an overarching G7 initiative on NTDs. In 2011, the German government launched a policy roadmap for neglected and poverty-related diseases [10]. Indeed, a recent analysis conducted by German investigators has found although NTDs ------------------- and other poverty-related diseases account for almost 14% of the global disease burden, they receive only a bit more than 1% of the global health-related R&D funds [11]. As shown in figure 11.1, by presenting R&D expenditures for a particular disease divided by the disability adjusted life years (DALYs) it is possible to get a sense of ------------------- diseases that are especially underfunded—even compared with other NTDS—such as the intestinal helminth infections and other neglected enteric diseases, as well as rheumatic fever [11]. Such data argue for the great urgency needed in addressing these health disparities by increasing R&D funding and support. Recently, the Dutch and German governments and the European Union (EU) have established important initiatives to support NTD R&D. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, has been a major partner in our human hookworm vaccine initiative, while the EU has an important Frameworks Program 7 (FP7) for supporting new technologies [12], including a HOOKVAC Consortium of partners organized through the Amster dam Institute of Global Health and Development [13]. Most recently, the EU has established an ambitious Horizon 2020 program for expanding R&D in Europe, including NTD R&D activities [14], on top of a European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) for clinically evaluating new NTD technologies [15]. New German government funding for NTD R&D funding was just announced. These Dutch, German, and EU initiatives represent an important advance for shaping the next generation of products to treat and prevent NTDs. Yet another aspect of blue marble health is the rise in comorbid conditions between the NTDs, the big three diseases, and the noncommunicable diseases. Impoverished and neglected populations in the G20 countries and Nigeria are facing a double hit resulting from the convergence of NTDs and NCDs. For instance, in Texas, Mexico, and India (but presumably elsewhere) they include both ТВ and diabetes interactions and, lately, dengue and diabetes interactions. In South Africa, HIV/AIDS now flourishes amidst the high prevalence of female genital schistosomiasis. Studying the pathogenesis and epidemiology of these comorbid interactions will also be an important theme in the coming years. Shaping a Policy for the G20 The G20 began meeting in 2008 in response to that years global recession and have since convened in a summit each year to discuss the major policy issues of the day [16]. At the 2015 G20 Summit held in Turkey, the major areas of broad emphasis included strengthening the global recovery and enhancing resilience, while ensuring sustainability [17]. Clearly, lifting the bottom segments of their populations out of poverty through NTD control and elimination could fall within the G20 remit. It is imperative that the six member nations with positive worm indices commit to providing total MDA coverage for their populations affected by the major helminth infections, and also that the four Western Hemispheric countries step up surveillance, diagnosis, and treatment for Chagas disease. Leishmaniasis, both kala-azar and the cutaneous form, also represent major NTDs affecting the G20, and these diseases need to be targeted for control and elimination. The US, Dutch, German, and Japanese governments, along with the EU, stand out for their contributions toward supporting product development to counter NTDs, 150 Blue Marble Health Equally important is the R&D agenda. There are some obvious underachievers among the G20 countries that must step up and contribute to R&D for new drug, diagnostic, and vaccine products to fight the neglected diseases [18]. Toward that aim, several investigators have proposed the establishment of R&D funds to support neglected disease research. They include a global vaccine development fund [19] and a general biomedical R&D fund focused on antimicrobial resistance, emerging infectious diseases, and neglected diseases [20]. Both proposals are thoughtful, have a lot of merit, and need to be considered, but I offer an alternative or complementary solution. In 2013, the World Health Assembly passed a resolution (66.22) that proposes a “strategic work plan” to achieve sustainable funding for health R&D that could emphasize NTDs. The plan commits the director-general of the World Health Organization to establish a global “observatory” in order to identify gaps and opportunities for health R&D related to neglected diseases [21]. Through a pooled fund managed by WHO-TDR (a special program on tropical disease research and training), several pilot projects are now being supported [22]. Given that todays neglected disease R&D support comes mostly from the United States—and indeed mostly from a single agency, the National Institutes of Health—it is difficult to envision how such a fund would be created without calling on the NIH yet again. Realistically, it is unlikely the NIH leadership or the well-established community of US scientists would be willing to cede control of NIH budgets to an international body. Instead, I think it is worth considering the possibility of having each of the G20 countries establish its own version of the Japanese GHIT Fund, which builds on indigenous scientists and academic institutions and their own pharmaceutical industries. A Chinese or South Korean version of GHIT for example could become a vital and important institution. Creating twenty separate innovation funds could achieve the same goals as a global fund, while simultaneously ensuring national ownership and capacity building for indigenous academic and industrial institutions. Many of them could develop and shape new biotechnologies in collaboration with the 16 international PDPs. This approach would be especially useful for the less developed G20 countries, including Brazil, Global funds for R&D are an option. An attractive alternative is to create national funds for product development R&D in each of the G20 countries and Nigeria—ones that resemble those put forward by the Dutch and Japanese governments. The G20 151 India, Indonesia, and Mexico. These nations have indigenous vaccine manufacturers, which are represented by the Developing Country Vaccine Manufacturers Network, and therefore have a level of sophistication for producing next-generation NTD vaccines. Still another option is for smaller groups of G20 countries to come together to support R&D investments. The EU’s programs for new NTD technologies highlighted above represent important examples. In addition, if institutions from China and India (both rivals and neighbors) collaborated in the area of neglected diseases [23], some important NTD problems affecting Asia could be solved in the coming years. The United States has potential to extend its outreach on NTDs by collaborating with other G20 nations in the Americas or other countries [24]. As a UN agency, WHO could certainly partner with one or more of these G20 NTD R&D investment funds, especially through its global health R&D observatory mechanism. Another key United Nations agency might include WIPO—the World Intellectual Property Organization. Through the Patent Cooperation Treaty mechanism, the Geneva-based WIPO represents one of the few revenue-generating UN agencies. In 2011, in collaboration with BIO Ventures for Global Health, it established WIPO Re:Search to facilitate the development of products to combat NTDs by bringing together major pharmaceutical companies and academic investigators working on these diseases [25]. As a revenue-generating UN agency under the charismatic leadership of Francis Gurry, WIPO has the potential to expand this remit to support NTD product R&D. Looking beyond the G20 The major NTDs linked to wealthy countries and blue marble health could also be addressed by nongovernmental organizations, including faith-based groups. For example, in 2011 the Pew Research Centers Forum on Religion and Public Life reported that the center of the worlds Christian-majority countries has shifted from Europe and North America to the Global South, meaning Africa, Asia, and Central and South America [26]. Thus, countries such as Brazil, Philippines, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Papua New Guinea now have some of the highest percentages of Christian populations. As shown in table 11.3, from an analysis published in PLOS NTDs I found that almost all of the world s Chagas disease cases and African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) can be found in Christian-majority countries, in addition to almost one-half of the schistosomiasis cases [26]. These findings suggest the possibility of bringing in new actors to combat NTDs. They could include the Vatican and Pope Francis, especially given the new popes renewed commitment to impoverished populations [19]. The Orthodox Christian Church also has opportunities to highlight NTDs in countries such as Ethiopia or those in the Middle East, as do many Christian faith-based organizations and universities. The G20 153 Summary Points 1. The six G20 countries with positive worm indices—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, together with Nigeria, have the means and capacity to eliminate LF within their own borders, while greatly reducing the disease burdens of their intestinal helminth infections and schistosomiasis through MDA. 2. G20 countries without classical worm indices, including the United States, also need to find mechanisms for promoting surveillance and access to essential medicine options for the poor living with NTDs within their own borders. 3. The G20 countries also have important biotechnology capabilities, which have yet to be adequately tapped for producing new NTD diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines. Beyond the United States, European nations, Australia, and Japan, they also include Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and South Korea. 4. Yet another aspect of blue marble health is the rise in comorbid conditions between the NTDs, the big three diseases, and the NCDs. 5. The EU and the Dutch and German governments have launched important NTD technology initiatives, as has the Japanese government and its partners through a new GHIT Fund. These activities support PDPs committed to NTDs as well as indigenous academic institutions and industrial organizations. 6. Large G20 economies such as Brazil and China must increase their global commitment to support new NTD technologies and R&D. 7. There are opportunities to link these new investments with parallel activities ongoing at two UN agencies, namely, WHO and WIPO. 8. These topics should be highlighted at future G20 summits. 9. Faith-based organizations could have a future role. For instance, the Vatican and related entities have opportunities to expand commitments to control those NTDs that are found to be prevalent among Christian-majority countries. Central to the blue marble health concept is that each of the G20 nations and Nigeria need to take greater responsibility for their own neglected diseases and neglected populations. Doing so could result in the control or elimination of one-half or more of the planets NTDs, with substantial gains made against HIV/AIDS, ТВ, and malaria. Thus, while programs of overseas development assistance devoted to health, such as PEPFAR, GFATM, PMI, and USAID’s NTD Program, in which the worlds richest countries provide support to the poorest nations for their neglected diseases, must continue and should even expand, we need increasingly to recognize the hidden burden of neglected diseases among the poor living in wealthy countries. As a first step, we must expand initiatives that raise awareness about the problem of NTDs within each of the G20 countries and Nigeria. The Global Network for NTDs linked to the Sabin Vaccine Institute has been working closely with the governments of India and Nigeria, respectively, in order to explain the opportunity for mass drug administration and its potential impact on health and economic development. MDA coverage rates are disappointingly low in these nations, especially for intestinal helminth infections and LF, as well as for schistosomiasis in the case of Nigeria. An extraordinary finding is that at least three nations with positive worm indices—India, Pakistan, and China—also maintain nuclear stockpiles [1]. Could the scientific horsepower of these nuclear states be partly redirected toward reducing endemic NTDs at home? 154 A Framework for Science and Vaccine Diplomacy 155 Outside of India and Nigeria, there is a need to promote NTD awareness in each of the G20 countries. For example, in the United States, our National School of Tropical Medicine has been highlighting the plight of some 12 million Americans living with NTDs. We have now worked with the Texas Legislature to enact a bill for NTD surveillance in suspected high-prevalence areas. However, similar initiatives need to be enacted across the G20 nations, including the European Union. In addition, international cooperation between the different G20 nations and Nigeria could be critical in achieving higher population coverage for MDA. For instance, China, despite its billions of dollars of business investments in sub-Saharan Africa, has not yet promoted NTD control efforts there. Yet China has tre- mendous expertise in MDA for NTDs and could provide Africa with valuable advice in this area. China was the first country to eliminate LF and has achieved successes in re- ducing its burden of schistosomiasis more than ю -fold since the 1949 revolution. China could also share its best practices with neighboring India, where NTDs remain practically ubiquitous [ 2]. Similarly, Japan and South Korea have made great gains toward eliminating intestinal helminth infections, while the former has also successfully eliminated LF and schistosomiasis. International cooperation between these three East Asian nations and Nigeria, or with the G20 countries with positive worm indices, especially India, Indonesia, and Brazil (where they are the highest), could result in important, positive health and economic gains. Each of these activities represents examples of what some refer to as global health diplomacy. Global Health Diplomacy My former colleague at Yale University, Ilona Kickbusch, currently the director of the Global Health Programme at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, has provided several working definitions of global health diplomacy, including efforts to “position health in foreign policy negotiations,” together with the establishment of global health governance initiatives [3]. Indeed, the creation of the GAVI Alliance, GFATM, UN AIDS, and other Geneva-based organizations might be considered vital examples of organizations created under the auspices of global health diplomacy, with the first two created following the 2000 Millennial Development Goals. The MDGs themselves represent an important framework for global health diplomacy, and arguably the most successful. Since 2005, several global health diplomacy initiatives have been enacted that could facilitate NTD activities among the G20 and Nigeria, although most of these actions are more focused on emerging viral infections of pandemic potential rather than the widespread chronic and debilitating NTDs. The International Health Regulations (IHR) were enacted in 2005 as a binding legal mechanism for all member states of WHO and focused on responses to acute public health emergencies [4]. IHR demands that countries report outbreaks and other public health events, while WHO responds with measures to uphold and enforce global health security [4]. IHR also establishes an emergency committee that advises the WHO director-general on whether an unexpected event should be considered a public health emergency. It also provides recommendations on initial steps for travel restrictions, surveillance, and infection control. With the possible exception of dengue fever, it is not clear how IHR will substantively address the NTDs or other blue marble health conditions. Moreover, even with IHR in place, the global response to the 2014 emergence of Ebola in West Africa was slow and inadequate and led to a catastrophic outbreak in the fall of that year [5]. This failure may require future revisions in the IHR, as recently recommended in a 2015 Lancet article by Lawrence Gostin and his colleagues at Georgetown University [6]. The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) is an interagency initiative of the US government conducted in partnership with other nations and international organizations, including WHO [7]. GHSA is also focused on preventing or reducing the impact of epidemics and outbreaks of pandemic potential, such as H7N9 influenza virus or MERS coronavirus, as well as detecting emerging threats and implementing rapid and effective responses. In some respects, GHSA represents the US component or response to IHR. It also covers intentional or accidental releases of dangerous infectious disease pathogens. Global Health 203s and The Lancet Commission were launched in 2013, coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of a landmark 1993 World Development Report that helped to ignite international efforts to link investments in health with economic development [8]. The Lancet Commission identifies four key messages and actions: (1) the substantial economic return on investing in health, which can be as much as 24% in low- and middle-income countries; (2) implementation of a “grand convergence” in global health through scale-up of health technologies and strengthening health systems by the year 2035; (3) fiscal policies such as taxation of tobacco and reduction of subsidies for fossil fuels, which represent powerful forces or “levers” for elected leaders; and (4) universal health coverage as an efficient mechanism to improve health as well as to provide “financial protection” [8]. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) is the product of the first of three international meetings for implementing the UN s 2015 Sustainable Development Goals. However, health is at present only a minor component of the AAAA. Indeed, the SDGs have been criticized because health is now only 1 of the 17 goals, whereas it was front and center among the 2000 MDGs. So far, the AAAAs recommendations have included the promotion of the health systems strengthening component of the GFATM and GAVI Alliance and the establishment of a Global Financing Facility (GFF) for womens and childrens health that would go hand-inhand with the UN secretary generals new Global Strategy for Every Woman Every Child [9]. The emphasis of these initiatives is to reduce preventable maternal, child, and adolescent deaths by 2030. Despite the evidence that hookworm infection and Chagas disease rank among the leading complications of pregnancy among women living in poverty in low- and middle-income countries, while female genital schistosomiasis is among sub-Saharan Africa’s most common gynecologic condition, there is not yet a specific mention of NTDs in the AAAA or GFF. Ultimately, the G20 nations can identify ways to address blue marble health disparities under the auspices of the SDGs or the global health diplomacy initiatives highlighted above. However, at present there is no specific mandate for them to do so. Vaccine Science Diplomacy Concurrently, the G20 nations have opportunities to collaborate in scientific activities leading to the development of new drugs, diagnostics, and vaccines. I have used the term “vaccine science diplomacy” to refer to inter- national scientific codevelopment of lifesaving vaccines between scientists of different nations, but particularly from nations with strained or evenly openly contentious international relations. The best historical example of vaccine science diplomacy is the codevelopment of the oral polio vaccine, led on the American side by Dr. Albert B. Sabin, and his Soviet virologist counterparts, including Dr. Mikhail Petrovich Chumakov [3]. In modern times there is potential interest in explor ing vaccine science diplomacy opportunities between the United States and some of the worlds Muslim-majority nations belonging to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation [10,11]. OIC countries include most of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as some highly populated Southeast Asian nations, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as most of central Asia. New estimates that we published in PLOS NTDs in 2015 indicate that the 30 most-populated OIC countries account for 35% of the worlds helminth infections comprising the global Worm Index, including 50% of the worlds children who require MDA for schistosomiasis [11]. Given that approximately 1.5 billion people live in OIC countries, or about 20% of the global population, helminth infections appear to disproportionately affect the health and economic development of Muslim-majority countries, as does leishmaniasis, trachoma, and possibly other NTDs [11]. As shown in figure 12.1, there is also tight inverse association between the worm index and human development index in the Muslim world [11]. OIC nations with strong infrastructures in science and biotechnology are potentially attractive candidates to pursue joint vaccine science diplomacy initiatives with the United States. Here the idea would be to promote scientific collaborations between US scientists and scientists from selected OIC countries in order to create new NTD technologies for some of the worst-off Muslim-majority countries. The “worst-off” might include OIC countries at the high end of the worm index, including Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as well as Nigeria [11].

<h4>Expanding breadth of Pharma Innovation into <u>neglected diseases</u> results in <u>global linkages</u> that revitalizes <u>global health diplomacy</u>.</h4><p><strong>Hotez 16</strong>, Peter J. Blue marble health: an innovative plan to fight diseases of the poor amid wealth. JHU Press, 2016. (Sabin Vaccine Institute and Texas Children’s Hospital Center for Vaccine Development, Departments of Pediatrics and Molecular Virology and Microbiology)//Elmer </p><p>We also need to better understand how these NTDs are actually transmitted within US borders, and I think it is extremely important to learn more about the links between these diseases and poverty. As I noted earlier, a drive through Houston’s Fifth Ward provides some insights, as one can quickly identify predisposing risk factors, including stray animals, dilapidated houses without window screens, standing water and discarded tires, and other evi- dence of environmental degradation, but we need to conduct careful epidemiological studies to really understand the links between poverty and NTDs, as well as animal reservoirs for illnesses such as Chagas disease and others. All of this presents <u>an <strong>important <mark>r</mark>esearch <mark>and d</mark>evelopment agenda</u></strong> <u><mark>for</u></mark> the <u><strong><mark>NTDs</strong> in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates. There are no <strong>point-of-care diagnostic tests</u></strong> available for most of the NTDs endemic to the nation, so blood from pa- tients must be sent to the CD С or other specialty research laboratories in order to establish a diagnosis for these conditions. As I sometimes point out to general audiences, when you go to your physician and get blood work done, there is no box to check off for toxocariasis or Chagas disease as there is for blood chemistries or other routine tests. We need diagnostic tests that are easily accessible to physicians and nurses. <u>We also <mark>need <strong>new</mark> and improved <mark>treatments and vaccines</u></strong></mark>. <u>Because the <mark>NTDs</mark> are poverty-related diseases, they often <strong><mark>fly below the radar</strong></mark> screen <mark>of</mark> the major <mark>pharma</mark>ceutical <mark>companies and are <strong>not prioritized</u></strong>. <u>Thus,</mark> the <mark>drugs</mark> used to treat these illnesses <mark>are <strong>not</mark> widely <mark>available</u></strong></mark>, so typically the CDC has to be contacted in order to access them. <u>In addition, many of these medicines were developed decades ago and produce a lot of <strong>side effects</u></strong>. For instance, the two medicines for Chagas disease—benznidazole and nifurtimox—cause skin rashes, diarrhea, and other unpleasant or even dangerous symptoms and illnesses. Patients using these medications have to interrupt their treatments up to 20% of the time. Moreover, these drugs cannot be used by pregnant women. <u>Currently, new innovations for NTDs like Chagas dis- multinational ease still rely on <strong>nonprofit PDPs</u></strong>. The Geneva-based Drugs pharmaceutical for Neglected Diseases Initiative is leading efforts to de- companies have velop new and safer Chagas disease medicines [60], while shown little or modest at our National School of Tropical Medicine the Sab in interest in American Vaccine Institute and Texas Childrens Hospital Center for NTDs. As a result, new Vaccine Development (Sabin PDP) is working to develop products are being a therapeutic vaccine that could be used alongside exist- developed in the ing treatments [61]. These efforts rely on major philan- nonprofit sector. thropic donors. In our case at the Sabin PDP, they include the Kleberg Foundation, the Carlos Slim Foundation, the Southwest Electronic Energy Medical Research Institute, and Texas Childrens Hospital. Summary Points 1. In the United States, 45.3 million people live below the poverty line, roughly the same number of impoverished Americans alive during the early 1960s when Michael Harrington wrote The Other America. Approximately 20 million Americans now live in extreme poverty at one-half the US poverty level, and approximately 5 million are living on less than $2 per day 2. American poverty concentrates in specific areas, especially in southern states, with Texas having the largest numbers who live in poverty Important areas in the South include the Gulf Coast, border areas with Mexico, the Mississippi Delta, and Appalachia. 3. <u>Approximately <strong>12 million Americans</strong> are infected with NTDs, led by <strong>toxocariasis</strong> and <strong>trichomoniasis</strong>—which disproportionately affect African Americans—and <strong>Chagas</strong> disease</u> (American trypanosomiasis) <u>and cysticercosis—which disproportionately affect people of Hispanic origin</u>. <u><strong>Toxoplasmosis</u></strong> <u>is another important NTD. Toxocariasis, cysticercosis, and toxocariasis exert important <strong>mental health effects</u></strong> <u>on impoverished Americans. Many of these NTDs are transmitted <strong>within US borders</u></strong> (autochthonous infections). 4. Arboviral infections are also important NTDs, led by dengue fever in Gulf Coastal areas and West Nile virus infection. WNV can cause chronic, persistent viral infections linked to chronic neurologic and renal disease. 5. There is an urgent need to promote awareness about the NTDs, especially for physicians and other health-care providers. 6. New policies are needed to expand surveillance for the NTDs affecting the United States. New legislation has been adopted in Texas, while additional bills are being introduced in the US Congress. Epidemiological studies are also needed to better understand how these diseases are transmitted and how they are linked to extreme poverty in the American South and elsewhere. 7. <u>There is an <strong>urgent need</u></strong> <u>for <strong>new “control tools” for American NTDs, </strong>including</u> point-of-care <u><strong>diagnostics</u></strong>, <u><strong>antiparasitic and antiviral drugs</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>vaccines</u></strong>. <u>Many of these products are being developed by <strong>nonprofit PDPs</strong> rather than <strong>pharmaceutical companies</strong>. </u>he G20 "A Theory of Justice" In his landmark 1971 book A Theory of Justice, the Harvard political philosopher John Rawls articulates two overriding principles of a just and fair society, namely, (1) “equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties” and (2) allowance of some social and economic inequalities, but only if they ultimately benefit “the least advantaged members of society” [1]. In terms of Rawls’s worldview, I believe that finding widespread NTDs among the extreme poor (and least-advantaged) who live amidst wealth—the central tenet of blue marble health—might represent one of the most jarring affronts to what he terms “justice as fairness” Because NTDs are now widespread among the leastadvantaged members of the worlds wealthiest economies, and they represent a major basis for thwarting their future growth, it is urgent for these nations, especially the G20 countries, to adopt strong internal policies to combat these diseases. I envision a three-pronged strategy to best address the G20 s (and Nigeria’s) poorest citizens afflicted by NTDs: 1. Each of the G20 nations and Nigeria has the capacity to fully understand the extent of these diseases within their own borders and then provide their own impoverished populations access to essential medicines used in mass drug administration to target helminth infections, in addition to trachoma, leprosy, yaws and scabies, and to provide treatments for other high-disease burden NTDs, including leishmaniasis and Chagas disease. The G20 countries and Nigeria Three major steps are required to effectively address blue marble health. 141 142 Blue Marble Health need to allocate resources and implement programs to achieve universal coverage for these diseases. 2. Each of the G20 nations and Nigeria has the capacity to conduct research and development for new NTD biotechnologies; they need to allocate resources toward this goal. 3. Both activities should be conducted within an overall framework of health system strengthening. Mass Drug Administration in the G20 A good place to revisit MDA among the G20 countries is to more closely examine the six G20 countries with positive worm indices—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa—in addition to Nigeria. Together these countries account for one-half of the worlds helminth infections [2]. An analysis of WHO s PCT database reveals that most of these nations are severely underachieving when it comes to providing MDA for people who require regular and periodic treatment for their intestinal helminth infections, schistosomiasis, and LF. Shown in table 11.1 is WHO’s estimate of the percentage that received treatment in 2013 [3-5]. Overall, the G20 nations affected by helminth infections and Nigeria perform poorly when it comes to treating their affected populations through MDA. In terms of specific countries in Latin America, Brazil is reaching only approximately one-third of its children and population at risk. And although Mexico provides complete coverage for intestinal worms, it—as previously mentioned—neither diagnoses nor treats hundreds of thousands (and possibly millions) of people with Chagas disease. In Africa, Nigeria’s MDA reaches less than 25% of its children at risk for helminth infections, and there is no information about schistosomiasis coverage in South Africa forthcoming from WHO. However, as Dr. Eyrun Kjetland (who works extensively in South Africa) has pointed out, female genital schistosomiasis remains widespread there, in part because praziquantel has been mostly unavailable in the country, owing to its drug importation laws. Schistosomiasis and other NTDs are still found among the poor in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The entire MENA region severely underdiagnoses most of its NTDs, including leishmaniasis. In Asia, Indonesia largely does not promote widespread deworming for its children, and only a small percentage of its population receives treatment for LF, while India does only marginally better. Indonesia also suffers from high rates of yaws, which can also be targeted by MDA using the antibiotic azithromycin. Similarly in India, the vast majority of its children do not have access to regular and periodic deworming, and only about one-half of the population receives MDA for LF. India also has the worlds largest numbers of leprosy cases. This disease can also be attacked through MDA using a multidrug therapy regimen. WHO does not present information on China, either because it has not been determined or is unavailable. However, China has made great strides in reducing its schistosomiasis prevalence since 1949, and it has eliminated LF. Similarly, Japan and South Korea have achieved significant success both in economic development and in reducing or eliminating its NTDs. 144 Blue Marble Health Key common factors for poor performance in meeting MDA targets are vast geographies, decentralization of health care, inadequate resource allocation, and lack of political will. Overall, the six G20 countries with positive worm indices, together with Nigeria, have the means and capacity to eliminate LF within their own borders, while greatly reducing the disease burdens of their intestinal helminth infections and schistosomiasis through MDA. Some of the key common factors for poor performance in meeting MDA targets are vast geographies, decentralization of health care that results in fragmentation of drug delivery, inadequate resource allocation, and lack of political will and commitment. What about G20 countries affected by NTDs but without a positive worm index? In the United States, the 12 million Americans infected and living with NTDs are largely unrecognized, undiagnosed, and untreated. The United States also does very little in terms of conducting active surveillance for Chagas disease (and other major NTDs), and only a tiny percentage of its population receives access to diagnosis and treatment—the same is true for Argentina. In both North America and Europe, toxocariasis and other parasitic zoonotic infections are seldom diagnosed and treated. Minimal information is available on eastern ------------------- Europeans, Turks, and Russians with intestinal worms or zoonotic NTDs or their access to diagnosis and treatment. NTDs remain widespread among Aboriginal Australians, including intestinal helminth infections and scabies—both of which can be targeted through MDA. Thus, the current status of access to essential medicines for people living in poverty and with NTDs among the G20 countries and Nigeria can be summarized as abysmal. The fact that so few are being treated through MDA programs is especially sad, given its low costs. As previ- ------------------- ously mentioned, there are approximately 1.07 billion treatments required among the populations at greatest risk in the G20 countries and Nigeria. At a cost of 50 cents per person per year, approximately $500 million would be required—that is, a dollar amount representing a tiny percentage (<0.001%) of the $65 trillion combined economy of these countries. The bottom line is that each of these nations has the internal capacity to provide these low-cost treatments to its impoverished populations. WHO has now launched a Universal Health Coverage (UHC) initiative that builds on its 1978 “Health for All” Alma-Ata declaration and the MillenThe current status of access to essential medicines for people living in poverty and with NTDs among the G20 countries and Nigeria can be summarized as abysmal. The G20 145 nium Development Goals, with a focus on protecting the health of the worlds most economically vulnerable populations. The activities highlighted here clearly fall within WHO s UHC mandate. Research and Development for New Control Tools and Biotechnologies For many of the leading NTDs—including vector-borne diseases such as dengue, leishmaniasis, Chagas disease, African sleeping sickness, and malaria, and also some helminth infections such as hookworm, schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis, and foodborne trematodiases—there are equally urgent needs to develop new drugs, diagnostics, and vaccines. Each year, the Australian policy group known as Policy Cures publishes an annual G-FINDER Report that measures the global investment in new technologies for neglected diseases, defining them broadly to include both the NTDs and the “big three” diseases: HIV/ AIDS, ТВ, and malaria [6]. For the year 2014, G-FINDER determined that approximately $3.37 billion was invested globally in neglected disease R&D technology, with most of that support going toward the big three diseases [6]. A look at total government support for neglected disease R&D, almost all of it from G20 countries, is also interesting. The public sector provided 64% of the total funding, and the United States provided two-thirds of that funding, mostly from the US National Institutes of Health [6]. In all, 71% of the total government funding for neglected diseases comes from the United States, European Commission, and United Kingdom. However, as the G-FINDER Report points out, these absolute numbers do not consider the GDPs of these nations. In terms of public funding relative to GDP ratios, countries such as Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and Argentina do particularly well in this regard [6]. Shown in table 11.2 are selected estimates from G-FINDER of the percentage of their GDP that various governments have devoted to R&D on Of government funding for neglected diseases R&D, a whopping 71% comes from the United States, European Commission, and United Kingdom. We need greater involvement and support from the remainder of the G20 countries, including positive worm index G20 countries— Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, in addition to Nigeria. 146 Blue Marble Health Although NTDs and other poverty-related diseases account for almost 14% of the global disease burden, they receive only a bit more than 1% of the global health-related R&D funds. neglected diseases. Using data from the G-FINDER Report combined with GDP information, I calculate that the world spends approximately 0.0028% of its GDP on neglected diseases R&D. Only three G20 countries—United States, United Kingdom, and Australia—match or exceed that percentage, ------------------- although India and France come close to it. The worstperforming countries were China and Japan. However, in 2013 the Japanese government, together with Japans major pharmaceutical companies and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, formed a partnership known as the Global Health Innovative Technology (GHIT) Fund for supporting PDPs and other entities to develop and shape new biotechnologies for neglected diseases, with an emphasis on NTDs [7, 8]. China is a different matter. The New York Times has reported that China paid out $86.3 billion in foreign investments in the year 2013 [9], with much of that spent in fragile nations where health systems are broken and NTDs are widespread. Clearly, China needs to allocate some of those funds to neglected diseases, either for MDA or new technologies. In addition, the nation of Brazil could easily increase its global contribution to NTD technologies by ю -fold in order to match higher-performing nations in this regard. Germany is now looking at supporting NTD technologies as part of an overarching G7 initiative on NTDs. In 2011, the German government launched a policy roadmap for neglected and poverty-related diseases [10]. Indeed, a recent analysis conducted by German investigators has found although NTDs ------------------- and other poverty-related diseases account for almost 14% of the global disease burden, they receive only a bit more than 1% of the global health-related R&D funds [11]. As shown in figure 11.1, by presenting R&D expenditures for a particular disease divided by the disability adjusted life years (DALYs) it is possible to get a sense of ------------------- diseases that are especially underfunded—even compared with other NTDS—such as the intestinal helminth infections and other neglected enteric diseases, as well as rheumatic fever [11]. Such data argue for the great urgency needed in addressing these health disparities by increasing R&D funding and support. Recently, the Dutch and German governments and the European Union (EU) have established important initiatives to support NTD R&D. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, has been a major partner in our human hookworm vaccine initiative, while the EU has an important Frameworks Program 7 (FP7) for supporting new technologies [12], including a HOOKVAC Consortium of partners organized through the Amster dam Institute of Global Health and Development [13]. Most recently, the EU has established an ambitious Horizon 2020 program for expanding R&D in Europe, including NTD R&D activities [14], on top of a European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP) for clinically evaluating new NTD technologies [15]. New German government funding for NTD R&D funding was just announced. These Dutch, German, and EU initiatives represent an important advance for shaping the next generation of products to treat and prevent NTDs. Yet another aspect of blue marble health is the rise in comorbid conditions between the NTDs, the big three diseases, and the noncommunicable diseases. Impoverished and neglected populations in the G20 countries and Nigeria are facing a double hit resulting from the convergence of NTDs and NCDs. For instance, in Texas, Mexico, and India (but presumably elsewhere) they include both ТВ and diabetes interactions and, lately, dengue and diabetes interactions. In South Africa, HIV/AIDS now flourishes amidst the high prevalence of female genital schistosomiasis. Studying the pathogenesis and epidemiology of these comorbid interactions will also be an important theme in the coming years. Shaping a Policy for the G20 The G20 began meeting in 2008 in response to that years global recession and have since convened in a summit each year to discuss the major policy issues of the day [16]. At the 2015 G20 Summit held in Turkey, the major areas of broad emphasis included strengthening the global recovery and enhancing resilience, while ensuring sustainability [17]. Clearly, lifting the bottom segments of their populations out of poverty through NTD control and elimination could fall within the G20 remit. It is imperative that the six member nations with positive worm indices commit to providing total MDA coverage for their populations affected by the major helminth infections, and also that the four Western Hemispheric countries step up surveillance, diagnosis, and treatment for Chagas disease. Leishmaniasis, both kala-azar and the cutaneous form, also represent major NTDs affecting the G20, and these diseases need to be targeted for control and elimination. The US, Dutch, German, and Japanese governments, along with the EU, stand out for their contributions toward supporting product development to counter NTDs, 150 Blue Marble Health Equally important is the R&D agenda. There are some obvious underachievers among the G20 countries that must step up and contribute to R&D for new drug, diagnostic, and vaccine products to fight the neglected diseases [18]. Toward that aim, several investigators have proposed the establishment of R&D funds to support neglected disease research. They include a global vaccine development fund [19] and a general biomedical R&D fund focused on antimicrobial resistance, emerging infectious diseases, and neglected diseases [20]. Both proposals are thoughtful, have a lot of merit, and need to be considered, but I offer an alternative or complementary solution. In 2013, the World Health Assembly passed a resolution (66.22) that proposes a “strategic work plan” to achieve sustainable funding for health R&D that could emphasize NTDs. The plan commits the director-general of the World Health Organization to establish a global “observatory” in order to identify gaps and opportunities for health R&D related to neglected diseases [21]. Through a pooled fund managed by WHO-TDR (a special program on tropical disease research and training), several pilot projects are now being supported [22]. Given that todays neglected disease R&D support comes mostly from the United States—and indeed mostly from a single agency, the National Institutes of Health—it is difficult to envision how such a fund would be created without calling on the NIH yet again. Realistically, it is unlikely the NIH leadership or the well-established community of US scientists would be willing to cede control of NIH budgets to an international body. Instead, I think it is worth considering the possibility of having each of the G20 countries establish its own version of the Japanese GHIT Fund, which builds on indigenous scientists and academic institutions and their own pharmaceutical industries. A Chinese or South Korean version of GHIT for example could become a vital and important institution. Creating twenty separate innovation funds could achieve the same goals as a global fund, while simultaneously ensuring national ownership and capacity building for indigenous academic and industrial institutions. Many of them could develop and shape new biotechnologies in collaboration with the 16 international PDPs. This approach would be especially useful for the less developed G20 countries, including Brazil, Global funds for R&D are an option. An attractive alternative is to create national funds for product development R&D in each of the G20 countries and Nigeria—ones that resemble those put forward by the Dutch and Japanese governments. The G20 151 India, Indonesia, and Mexico. These nations have indigenous vaccine manufacturers, which are represented by the Developing Country Vaccine Manufacturers Network, and therefore have a level of sophistication for producing next-generation NTD vaccines. Still another option is for smaller groups of G20 countries to come together to support R&D investments. The EU’s programs for new NTD technologies highlighted above represent important examples. In addition, if institutions from China and India (both rivals and neighbors) collaborated in the area of neglected diseases [23], some important NTD problems affecting Asia could be solved in the coming years. The United States has potential to extend its outreach on NTDs by collaborating with other G20 nations in the Americas or other countries [24]. As a UN agency, WHO could certainly partner with one or more of these G20 NTD R&D investment funds, especially through its global health R&D observatory mechanism. Another key United Nations agency might include WIPO—the World Intellectual Property Organization. Through the Patent Cooperation Treaty mechanism, the Geneva-based WIPO represents one of the few revenue-generating UN agencies. In 2011, in collaboration with BIO Ventures for Global Health, it established WIPO Re:Search to facilitate the development of products to combat NTDs by bringing together major pharmaceutical companies and academic investigators working on these diseases [25]. As a revenue-generating UN agency under the charismatic leadership of Francis Gurry, WIPO has the potential to expand this remit to support NTD product R&D. Looking beyond the G20 The major NTDs linked to wealthy countries and blue marble health could also be addressed by nongovernmental organizations, including faith-based groups. For example, in 2011 the Pew Research Centers Forum on Religion and Public Life reported that the center of the worlds Christian-majority countries has shifted from Europe and North America to the Global South, meaning Africa, Asia, and Central and South America [26]. Thus, countries such as Brazil, Philippines, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Papua New Guinea now have some of the highest percentages of Christian populations. As shown in table 11.3, from an analysis published in PLOS NTDs I found that almost all of the world s Chagas disease cases and African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) can be found in Christian-majority countries, in addition to almost one-half of the schistosomiasis cases [26]. These findings suggest the possibility of bringing in new actors to combat NTDs. They could include the Vatican and Pope Francis, especially given the new popes renewed commitment to impoverished populations [19]. The Orthodox Christian Church also has opportunities to highlight NTDs in countries such as Ethiopia or those in the Middle East, as do many Christian faith-based organizations and universities. The G20 153 Summary Points 1. The six G20 countries with positive worm indices—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, together with Nigeria, have the means and capacity to eliminate LF within their own borders, while greatly reducing the disease burdens of their intestinal helminth infections and schistosomiasis through MDA. 2. G20 countries without classical worm indices, including the United States, also need to find mechanisms for promoting surveillance and access to essential medicine options for the poor living with NTDs within their own borders. 3. The G20 countries also have important biotechnology capabilities, which have yet to be adequately tapped for producing new NTD diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines. Beyond the United States, European nations, Australia, and Japan, they also include Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and South Korea. 4. Yet another aspect of blue marble health is the rise in comorbid conditions between the NTDs, the big three diseases, and the NCDs. 5. The EU and the Dutch and German governments have launched important NTD technology initiatives, as has the Japanese government and its partners through a new GHIT Fund. These activities support PDPs committed to NTDs as well as indigenous academic institutions and industrial organizations. 6. Large G20 economies such as Brazil and China must increase their global commitment to support new NTD technologies and R&D. 7. There are opportunities to link these new investments with parallel activities ongoing at two UN agencies, namely, WHO and WIPO. 8. These topics should be highlighted at future G20 summits. 9. Faith-based organizations could have a future role. For instance, the Vatican and related entities have opportunities to expand commitments to control those NTDs that are found to be prevalent among Christian-majority countries. Central to the blue marble health concept is that each of the G20 <u>nations</u> and Nigeria <u>need to take <strong>greater responsibility</strong> for their <strong>own neglected diseases and neglected populations</strong>. Doing so could result in the control or elimination of <strong>one-half or more of the planets NTDs</u></strong>, <u>with substantial gains made against HIV/AIDS, ТВ, and malaria</u>. Thus, while programs of overseas development assistance devoted to health, such as PEPFAR, GFATM, PMI, and USAID’s NTD Program, in which <u><mark>the worlds richest</mark> countries</u> provide support to the poorest nations for their neglected diseases, must continue and should even expand, we <u><mark>need</mark> increasingly <mark>to recognize the</mark> hidden <mark>burden</mark> of neglected diseases</u> among the poor living in wealthy countries. As a first step, we must <u><mark>expand</u></mark> initiatives that raise awareness about the problem of NTDs within each of the G20 countries and Nigeria. The Global Network for NTDs linked to the Sabin Vaccine Institute has been working closely with the governments of India and Nigeria, respectively, in order to explain the opportunity for mass drug administration and its potential impact on health and economic development. MDA coverage rates are disappointingly low in these nations, especially for intestinal helminth infections and LF, as well as for schistosomiasis in the case of Nigeria. An <u><strong><mark>extraordinary</u></strong></mark> finding is that at least three nations with positive worm indices—India, Pakistan, and China—also maintain nuclear stockpiles [1]. <u>Could the <strong><mark>scientific horsepower</mark> of</u></strong> these nuclear <u><strong>states</u></strong> <u>be</u> <u><strong>partly redirected <mark>toward</mark> <mark>reducing endemic NTDs</mark> at home? </u></strong>154 A Framework for Science and Vaccine Diplomacy 155 Outside of India and Nigeria, there is a need to promote NTD awareness in each of the G20 countries. For example, in the United States, our National School of Tropical Medicine has been highlighting the plight of some 12 million Americans living with NTDs. We have now worked with the Texas Legislature to enact a bill for NTD surveillance in suspected high-prevalence areas. However, similar initiatives need to be enacted across the G20 nations, including the European Union. In addition, international cooperation between the different G20 nations and Nigeria could be critical in achieving higher population coverage for MDA. For instance, China, despite its billions of dollars of business investments in sub-Saharan Africa, has not yet promoted NTD control efforts there. Yet China has tre- mendous expertise in MDA for NTDs and could provide Africa with valuable advice in this area. China was the first country to eliminate LF and has achieved successes in re- ducing its burden of schistosomiasis more than ю -fold since the 1949 revolution. China could also share its best practices with neighboring India, where NTDs remain practically ubiquitous [ 2]. Similarly, Japan and South Korea have made great gains toward eliminating intestinal helminth infections, while the former has also successfully eliminated LF and schistosomiasis. <u><strong>International cooperation</u></strong> between these three East Asian nations and Nigeria, or with the G20 countries with positive worm indices, especially India, Indonesia, and Brazil (where they are the highest), <u><mark>could result in <strong>important</mark>, positive health and economic gains</u></strong>. <u>Each of these activities represents examples of what some refer to as <strong><mark>global health diplomacy</strong></mark>. </u>Global Health Diplomacy My former colleague at Yale University, Ilona Kickbusch, currently the director of the Global Health Programme at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, has provided several working definitions of global health diplomacy, including efforts to “position health in foreign policy negotiations,” together with the establishment of global health governance initiatives [3]. Indeed, the creation of the GAVI Alliance, GFATM, UN AIDS, and other Geneva-based organizations might be considered vital examples of organizations created under the auspices of global health diplomacy, with the first two created following the 2000 Millennial Development Goals. The MDGs themselves represent an important framework for global health diplomacy, and arguably the most successful. Since 2005, several <u>global health diplomacy</u> initiatives have been enacted that <u>could</u> <u><strong>facilitate NTD activities</u></strong> among the G20 and Nigeria, although most of these actions are more focused on emerging viral infections of pandemic potential rather than the widespread chronic and debilitating NTDs. The International Health Regulations (IHR) were enacted in 2005 as a binding legal mechanism for all member states of WHO and focused on responses to acute public health emergencies [4]. IHR demands that countries report outbreaks and other public health events, while WHO responds with measures to uphold and enforce global health security [4]. IHR also establishes an emergency committee that advises the WHO director-general on whether an unexpected event should be considered a public health emergency. It also provides recommendations on initial steps for travel restrictions, surveillance, and infection control. With the possible exception of dengue fever, it is not clear how IHR will substantively address the NTDs or other blue marble health conditions. Moreover, even with IHR in place, the global response to the 2014 emergence of Ebola in West Africa was slow and inadequate and led to a catastrophic outbreak in the fall of that year [5]. This failure may require future revisions in the IHR, as recently recommended in a 2015 Lancet article by Lawrence Gostin and his colleagues at Georgetown University [6]. The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) is <u>an</u> <u><strong>interagency initiative of <mark>the US government</u></strong></mark> <u>conducted <mark>in partnership with other nations</u></mark> and international organizations, including WHO [7]. GHSA <u>is</u> also <u>focused on preventing or reducing the impact of <strong>epidemics</u></strong> <u>and</u> outbreaks of <u><strong>pandemic potential</u></strong>, such as H7N9 influenza virus or MERS coronavirus, as well as detecting emerging threats and implementing rapid and effective responses. In some respects, GHSA represents the <u><strong>US</u></strong> component or response to IHR. It also covers intentional or accidental releases of dangerous infectious disease pathogens. Global Health 203s and The Lancet Commission were launched in 2013, coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of a landmark 1993 World Development Report that helped to ignite international efforts to link investments in health with economic development [8]. The Lancet Commission identifies four key messages and actions: (1) the substantial economic return on investing in health, which <u><mark>can</u></mark> be as much as 24% in low- and middle-income countries; (2) implementation of a “grand convergence” in global health through <u><strong><mark>scale-up</mark> of <mark>health tech</mark>nologies</u></strong> <u><mark>and <strong>strengthen</u></strong></mark>ing health systems by the year 2035; (3) fiscal policies such as taxation of tobacco and reduction of subsidies for fossil fuels, which represent powerful forces or “levers” for elected leaders; <u>and</u> (4) <u><strong><mark>universal health coverage</u></strong></mark> <u>as an efficient mechanism to improve health as well as <mark>to provide “financial protection”</u></mark> [8]. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) is the product of the first of three international meetings for implementing the UN s 2015 Sustainable Development Goals. However, health is at present only a minor component of the AAAA. Indeed, the SDGs have been criticized because health is now only 1 of the 17 goals, whereas it was front and center among the 2000 MDGs. So far, the AAAAs recommendations have included the promotion of the health systems strengthening component of the GFATM and GAVI Alliance and the establishment of a Global Financing Facility (GFF) for womens and childrens health that would go hand-inhand with the UN secretary generals new Global Strategy for Every Woman Every Child [9]. The emphasis of these initiatives is to reduce preventable maternal, child, and adolescent deaths by 2030. Despite the evidence that hookworm infection and Chagas disease rank among the leading complications of pregnancy among women living in poverty in low- and middle-income countries, while female genital schistosomiasis is among sub-Saharan Africa’s most common gynecologic condition, there is not yet a specific mention of NTDs in the AAAA or GFF. Ultimately, the G20 nations <u>can</u> identify ways to <u><strong>address</u></strong> blue marble health <u><strong>disparities</u></strong> <u>under</u> the auspices of the SDGs or the <u>global health diplomacy</u> initiatives highlighted above. However, at present there is no specific mandate for them to do so. Vaccine Science Diplomacy Concurrently, the G20 nations <u>have opportunities to collaborate in</u> scientific activities leading to the development of <u><strong>new drugs, diagnostics, and vaccines</u></strong>. I have used the term “vaccine science diplomacy” to refer to inter- national scientific <u><mark>codevelopment</u></mark> of lifesaving vaccines <u><mark>between scientists</u></mark> of different nations, but particularly <u><mark>from nations with</mark> <strong>strained or evenly <mark>openly contentious</mark> international <mark>relations</u></strong></mark>. The best historical example of vaccine science diplomacy is the codevelopment of the oral polio vaccine, led on the American side by Dr. Albert B. Sabin, and his Soviet virologist counterparts, including Dr. Mikhail Petrovich Chumakov [3]. In modern times there is potential interest in explor ing vaccine science diplomacy opportunities between the United States and some of the worlds Muslim-majority nations belonging to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation [10,11]. OIC countries include most of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as some highly populated Southeast Asian nations, including Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as most of central Asia. New estimates that we published in PLOS NTDs in 2015 indicate that the 30 most-populated OIC countries account for 35% of the worlds helminth infections comprising the global Worm Index, including 50% of the worlds children who require MDA for schistosomiasis [11]. Given that approximately 1.5 billion people live in OIC countries, or about 20% of the global population, helminth infections appear to disproportionately affect the health and economic development of Muslim-majority countries, as does leishmaniasis, trachoma, and possibly other NTDs [11]. As shown in figure 12.1, there is also tight inverse association between the worm index and human development index in the Muslim world [11]. OIC nations with strong infrastructures in science and biotechnology are potentially attractive candidates to pursue joint vaccine science diplomacy initiatives with the United States. Here the idea would be to promote scientific collaborations between US scientists and scientists from selected OIC countries in order to <u><mark>create</u> <u><strong>new NTD tech</mark>nologies</u></strong> <u><mark>for</u></mark> some of <u><mark>the</u> <u><strong>worst-off</mark> </u></strong>Muslim-majority <u><mark>countries</u></mark>. The “worst-off” might include OIC countries at the high end of the worm index, including Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as well as Nigeria [11].</p>

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