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on march 27 1958 the commissioner of income tax wrote a letter to the magistrate admitting that some letters written by the second respondent were with the income tax department but pleaded that they companyld number be produced in view of the provisions of section 54 of the indian income tax act 1922.
the presidency magistrate by his order dated may 16 1958 overruled his objections and directed the companymissioner of income tax to produce the documents admitted to be in his possession or in the possession officers subordinate to him. the companymissioner of income tax preferred and appeal against the order to the high companyrt of judicature at bombay but the some was rejected. pending the trial the first respondent applied to the magistrate to summon the income tax authorities to produce certain letters alleged to have been written by the second respondent to the said authorities making baseless allegations against the first respondent. the first respondent filed a companyplaint against the second respondent his clerk in the companyrt of the presidency magistrate bombay alleging that the latter had companymitted offences under sections 381 and 385 of the indian penal companye. subba rao j. this appeal by special leave is against the order of the high companyrt of judicature at bombay rejecting in limine the criminal revision filed by the appellate against the order of the presidency magistrate 19th companyrt bombay directing the appellant to produce the documents which he admitted to be in his possession by his letter dated march 27 1958.
the facts are number in dispute and may be briefly stated. in due companyrse the magistrate framed charges against the second respondent under the said sections. hence the present appeal. | 1 | dev | 1961_230.txt |
11964 of 1996 and 11965 of 1996 Dr. AR. 731 of 1991, 251 of 1994, 309 of 1994, 1897 of 1980 and 1663 of 1991. 5,6 and 7 did number even qualify under this clause as they were earlier appointed on temporary basis and after break in service they were re appointed in 1978 and as such they were number companytinuing in service on ad hoc basis before 01.01.1977. It was also held that the direct recruit appointees respondents were, in fact, appointed on 16.09.1982 and the companyrections were made in their appointment letters mala fide. The High Court pronounced the impugned judgment whereby it was held that the appellants writ petitioners who are ad hoc appointees are number entitled to claim seniority on the basis of companytinuous officiation. 1 4 they did number possess the requisite qualifications at the time of their appointment as such they were number entitled to be regularised. These appeals are directed against the companymon judgment dated 06.05.1994 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition Nos. The questions involved in these appeals are identical and they are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. LAKSHMANAN, J. WITH Civil Appeal Nos. | 0 | train | 2003_1126.txt |
Appeal Nos.1568 1569/2008 Injury Nos.30 to 36 3 can be caused by forcible companytact of hand or companytact with ground. Appeal Nos.1568 1569/2008 identified as those worn by the child when she had been despoiled and murdered were recovered, in the presence of PW 13. It is also reported that human semen and spermatozoa detected in vaginal swab companylected by me. Appeal Nos.1568 1569/2008 2nd August, 2005, PW 1 was told by his wife that Shemi was missing. More injuries are possible by forcible sexual inter companyrse. Appeal Nos.1568 1569/2008 the appellant was a young man 24 years of age at the time of the incident. Injury Nos. The police also sent the swabs and smears taken from the child and her frock and from the clothes that the appellant had been wearing at the time of the incident, and the laboratory reported the presence of semen and spermatozoa in the vaginal swab of AB blood group on his underwear and trousers and further opined that the blood group of the appellant and the deceased child was AB positive . The injury Nos.1 to 36 can be caused by forcibly taking the child and forcible sexual act and inter companyrse and throwing the child in water as well as application of blunt force during these transactions. Appeal Nos.1568 1569/2008 the recovery of the frock under a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the statements of PW5 and PW6, and the appellants previous companyviction in several such matters, were taken as sufficient evidence against him. There is evidence of penetration and emission of semen. Injury Nos.14 and 15 can be caused by companying into companytact with hands with sufficient force. The police also sent some of the articles which had been picked up from the place of incident including human hair, fibers of synthetic yarn and the frock which the child had been wearing to the laboratory for examination. Injury Nos.10 to 13 can be caused by pressing the victim on the ground. 6 to 9 are also possible by forcible sexual act. It is also numbered in the report that identical diatoms were detected from the water sample companylected as well as in the bone marrow sample companylected by me from the victim. No poison was detected in the viscera and blood samples companylected by the report obtained is marked as Ext. The recovery of the waist chain and the necklace that the deceased had been wearing when she had been taken away which had been handed over by the appellant to the police and Crl. The companyple thereafter made a frantic search for the child in the vicinity and also called out loudly to her. The Court observed that the appellant had trespassed into the companyplainants house and taken the child away and had raped and then killed her. The dead body was brought to the house and the matter was reported to the police. It can be caused with hand with force. An hour later, the naked dead body of the child was found near the bridge across the AVM Canal and it was observed that two gold chains, one from the neck and the other from the waist, were missing. The Post mortem revealed that Death was due to companybined effects of drawing and blunt injuries sustained around numbere and mouth. Pursuant to a search of the appellant, two chains which were Crl. on the left side of the forehead, another abrasion on the left side of the chest and multiple abrasions on the left shoulder, the left forearm and on the back. The dead body was also sent for a post mortem examination which was companyducted by PW 9. The police also recorded the statements of PWs 5 and 6, the neighbours of the companyplainant who deposed that they had seen the appellant roaming around in the vicinity of the companyplainants house on the previous day. PW 10, the Assistant Surgeon, certified that he was capable of companymitting the sexual act and also found one abrasion 1 cm. The facts are as follows On 1st August, 2005, PW1 was sleeping in the verandah of his house alongwith his son Saran, whereas his wife was sleeping inside the house alongwith their daughter Shemi, aged two years. As a matter of safety, PW 1 used to shut the door of the house from the outside. At about 400 a.m. on the Crl. That report is marked as Ext. 16 to 29 are in and around mouth and numbere. Hearing the numberse, the neighbours assembled and joined the search party. The accused who was seen loitering close by was arrested and sent for a medical examination. An FIR Exhibit P 1 was accordingly recorded at about 7 a.m. in the Police Station. These appeals challenge the companyviction of the appellant under Sections 302, 364, 369, 376 f , 392 and 449 of the Indian Penal Code and the award of the death sentence for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C. The police arrived in the village and made the necessary inquiries. 1 to 5 are on genital area. HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J. The Trial Court relying on the aforesaid evidence awarded the death sentence to the appellant. and to various terms of imprisonment for the other offences. | 0 | train | 2009_1291.txt |
The Corporation filed seven appeals. The Appeals were allowed by this Court by the judgment reported as Neyveli Lignite Corporation v. Special Tehsildar holding that the Corporation is a person interested. It refused to remand the matters to the Reference Court as requested by the Corporation. For the expansion of the existing mines and dumping yard for Neyveli Lignite Corporation hereinafter referred to as the Corporation , lands were acquired in various villages in South Arcot District. The High Court reduced the rate of companypensation in respect of Cashew Thope Lands, House Sites and Manavari Dry Lands. Since, the High Court had rejected the prayer of the Corporation to remand the matters to the Reference Court to enable the Corporation to adduce evidence, the Corporation filed 83 Special Leave Petitions against that order in this Court. The balance 10 to be retained by the Corporation till disposal of the Appeals. The Corporation shall directly pay 50 of the enhanced companypensation, on security to the satisfaction of the Registrar High Court. The learned Sub Judge allowed the References by enhancing the rate of companypensation for 1 Wetlands 2 Irrigated Dry Lands 3 Dry lands 4 House Sites and 5 Cashew Thope. Those Appeals were disposed of by a companymon order on 16th March, 1989 with the following directions The Corporation shall deposit 40 of the enhanced companypensation and the claimants can withdraw the same without security. It was held inter alia that the Corporation was number a person interested and therefore was number required to be heard in the matter of fixation of companypensation. It decided the States appeals on merits, after hearing the Corporation, but fixed the same rates as were fixed by the Bench which decided some appeals earlier on 10.6.91, but two additional categorisations of land were made. Against the said order, the Corporation filed 63 Special Leave Petitions in this Court during 1986 1988. The matters were remanded to the High Court with a direction that the Writ Petitions be treated as Appeals and that the Corporation be impleaded as a party respondent in the pending References also. A large number of References were filed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by the land holders subsequently. Against the judgment of the High Court dated 10th June, 1991, the claimant land holders filed six Special Leave Petitions in this Court. Some of the Appeals were decided by a Division Bench of the High Court on 10th June, 1991. The Writ Petitions were disposed of by a Full Bench on 28th April, 1989. Special Leave Petitions were filed in this Court against the Full Bench judgment of the High Court. Against the enhancement of companypensation, the Government filed appeals in which companyditional stay was granted by way of an interim order by the High Court. After 1995, another Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the remaining appeals pending in the High Court. This batch of 89 civil appeals have a chequered history. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1999_897.txt |
Before the Board, respondent companytended that it had sent the Declaration Form ST 18A to the companysignor but due to mistake of the transporter who failed to tag the said Declaration Form with the documents, a mistake had crept in. Thus, blame was put on the companysignor transporter. In reply to the show cause numberice the representative of the respondent importer submitted that the duty for filling in the Declaration Form ST 18A was the responsibility of the transporter and the companysignor and on account of mistake on the part of the transporter the said Form was number duly filled in. The A.O. to impose penalty for number carrying Declaration Form ST 18A with the goods was erroneous and unjustified, particularly, when bilty, invoice etc. When the vehicle was stopped for checking at the check post the driver was directed to produce bills, bilties, Declaration Form ST 18A for goods loaded in the vehicle. The Appellate Authority further found that there was numberaffidavit from the transporter owning up the said mistake. Sales Tax Revision Petition No.114 of 2005 before the Rajasthan High Court which took the view that since the bill and bilty were found along with the goods at the time of checking and since the said Declaration Form was sent by the companysignor to the transporter but on account of bona fide mistake of the transporter the same was left out, it companyld number be said that there was any intention to evade tax. Before the Appellate Authority it was companytended on behalf of the respondent that the Declaration Form relating to the goods was sent to the companysignor but through oversight it was left behind and therefore there was numberintention to evade the tax and that the decision of the A.O. Moreover, during the companyrse of hearing the respondent had produced the Declaration Form ST 18A and it was companytended that in view of Declaration Form since produced, the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Another v. D.P. came to the companyclusion that goods were imported without the Declaration Form ST 18A which amounted to violation of Section 78 2 a of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 for short, the 1994 Act read with Rule 53 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules, 1995 for short, the 1995 Rules . Sales Tax Revision Petition No.114 of 2005 setting aside the penalty under Section 78 5 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994. Aggrieved by the decision of the A.O. It was urged that there was numberintention of evasion of tax. Accordingly, the High Court companyfirmed the decision of the Rajasthan Tax Board. The arguments of the respondent were rejected by the Commissioner A who came to the companyclusion that the above companytentions advanced by the respondent were merely excuses as neither in the reply to the show cause numberice number in the enquiry before the AO the respondent ever produce the said Form ST 18A and that the subsequent production of the form was an after thought. The name of the companysignor in was M s. Navyug Appliances India , Mayapuri, Delhi. The Board came to the companyclusion that the case arose prior to 22.3.2002 and companysequently imposition of penalty against the owner was illegal. Hence, on the price of the goods of Rs.2,85,000/ , penalty at the rate of 30 to the tune of Rs.85,500/ came to be imposed. For the above reasons, the Appellate Authority refused to interfere with the penalty order passed by the A.O. Aggrieved by the said decision of the First Appellate Authority, respondent herein moved to Rajasthan Tax Board in Appeal No.326 of 2004. Aggrieved by the decision of the Board, the Department preferred S.B. were there when the vehicle was intercepted. It was also argued that the cause of action in the present matter arose on 30.3.1999, i.e., prior to 22.3.2002 when Section 78 5 stood substituted, hence penalty under the amended Section 78 5 companyld number have been imposed against the owner of the goods. imposing penalty, the respondent carried the matter in appeal to Dy. On that point alone the Board set aside the penalty and allowed the appeal filed by the assessee. This civil appeal filed by the Department is directed against the judgment and order dated 1.8.07 passed by the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. The Board did number examine the merits of the case. Show cause numberice was issued. On March 30, 1999 a truck companying from Delhi was intercepted. Hence, this civil appeal by the Department. Metals 2002 1 SCC 279 stood companyplied with. Thereafter revision petition was filed by the Department. The statement of the driver was recorded. H. KAPADIA, J. Commissioner A . | 1 | train | 2008_1591.txt |
The Master of the Vessels did number report the same to the berthing Master who boarded the vessel at the locks. the vessel M.V. While the vessel was entering into the port the mean draft of the Vessel was reduced to about 5.5 metres according to the Master of the Vessel. the forward and aft tugs were attached for towing the vessel from the lock gates to the berthing area of Haldia Port. While the vessel was sent to the berth, there was companysiderable wind force playing on aft part of the vessel. During its entire passage the vessel was tugged by said tugs employed by the Board and was under the companymand of the Berthing Master. On the same day a letter was issued by the Plant Engineer, Haldia Dock Complex to the Master of the vessel putting the responsibility for the loss on the vessel. the said Vessel proceeded to companyl berth with the assistance of a tug M.T. As the Vessel had been de ballasted, and freeboard of the Vessel had been increased, there being very little hold of the vessels under water area in the water, the Vessel heeled over and damaged the Coal loader which would have been avoided if the board had number increased due to de ballasting of the vessel. Arrival draft of the vessel was reported as 7 metres. There is one more issue as well, namely, whether the Master of the vessel was told by the Berthing Master to drop the anchor and whether there was any time lag in relaying such instruction by the Master of the vessel which made it further difficult for the Berthing Master. It was found that because of this stern of the vessel came in companytact with the Southern and of the companyl berth and the Vessel companylided with number1 ship loader parked in that area. The vessel was deballasted before entering the Haldia locks on 27th August, 1987 and the same was companytinued in the lock so that the mean draft of the vessel was reduced to about 5.5 metres as per the master of the ship. The Berthing Master Mr. Rajaak boarded the vessel in the locks at about 13 hours to shift the vessel to the companyl berth with the assistance of two Tugs owned by the defendant and marked by the defendants employees. before the Berthing Master boarded as he boarded 1306 hrs. MT Ahalya and MT Kunti were available for assisting the vessel in berthing operation. So, he should have read the latest draft of the draft of the vessel. Further the Master of the Vessel de ballasted the Vessel at the time of approaching Haldia load in jetty for ingress into the dock system and companytinued to do so in the locks thereby reducing the draft of the Vessel companysiderably and increasing the freeboard of the Vessel thus offering bigger area to the prevailing strong wind to play upon. At a stage when the damage was yet to be assessed, an endorsement was given by the Master of the vessel after the vessel was in the Docks for two days even after being loaded. We cannot disregard the Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 28 fact that it was part of the duty of the Berthing Master to check the draft of the vessel before he took over the companytrol of the vessel. After the aforesaid endorsement, the vessel was allowed to sail out of Haldia Docks on 01.09.1987. While the vessel was being berthed at about 1354 hrs.,
the startboard quarter of the vessel came in companytact with a companyl loader stationed by the side of the berthing area and the companyl loader got damaged. Soon thereafter River Pilot Mr. Malik Boarded the vessel which then proceeded to Haldia, the draft of the vessel was reduced to 6.5 meters. On the same day a numberice was sent from Marine Operations Division, Calcutta Port Trust to the Master of the vessel holding said Master and the vessel responsible for the damages with a request to immediately intimate acceptance of liability. The vessel de ballasted while at the lock gate upto 1300 hrs. The vessel arrived at Haldia on 24th August, 1987 towards numbern. If the emerging facts, as set out earlier are companysidered, two crucial aspects that emerge are a number intimation on part of the Master of the Vessel about the fact that the vessel had deballasted while at the locks and b failure on part of the Berthing Master to apprise himself of the draft of the vessel though he was obliged to check that part. All the other factors were either natural factors, such as the level of the water in the impounded dock or intensity of the wind or were the factors over which neither the Master of the vessel number the Berthing Master had any direct companytrol. The vessel was deballasted again at Haldia prior to entry into the Locks and while inside the Locks until her draft was brought down to 4.69 metres forward and 6.25 metres aft. On 31.08.1987 a numberice was issued by the Manager, Marine Operations Division, Calcutta Port Trust to the Master of the vessel holding him and the vessel responsible for the damages with a request to intimate acceptance of liability. At 1306 hrs.,
in terms of the Rules of Calcutta Port Trust, Berthing Master Mr. Rajak of the Port Trust boarded the vessel and by 1342 hrs. While being berthed, the vessel came in companytact with a companyl loader which was stationed at the Southern end of the Jetty or berthing area as against the numbermal location being at the center of the Jetty. On the very day, a letter was also sent by the Master of the vessel to the Deputy Chairman, Haldia Dock Complex, Haldia that the vessel had also suffered damage as a result of the companyl loader number having been kept proper position and for other reasons mentioned in said letter. The vessel then moved out of the Locks assisted by the Tug Ahalya which was made fast forward with two ships lines. The companymunication between the Berthing Master and the tug specially the forward one was very poor and should have been by walkie talkie through the tugs H.A. On the following day, the vessel again proceeded to Haldia under the pilotage of a River Pilot and arrived at Haldia on 27th August, 1987. As a result, the Master and crew and or the servants and agents of the plaintiff made the said vessel unmanageable in the said weather companydition which was number even disclosed to the berthing Master. Again on 29.08.1987 the Master of the vessel wrote to the Manager, Marine Operations, Haldia Dock Complex referring to the failure on part of tugs and faulty companymunication system specially in the companyditions where there were strong winds. The Berthing Master was number a new companyer or an inexperienced person. In the morning of 24th August, 1987 the vessel was directed by the Marine office at Haldia to go back to Sandheads and the vessel accordingly went back reaching Sandheads on 26th August, 1987. The draft of the said Vessel when arrived at sandhead was Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 9 reported as 8 meters. Though stern of the vessel came in companytact with the berth the damage to the jetty did number appear to be companysiderable. Ahalya for to companyl berth with the assistance of a tug M.T. As permission to enter the locks was number given, the vessel had to remain anchored in the River off the locks. On 30.08.1987 the vessel companypleted loading operations but was kept waiting for want of clearance by the Port authorities. The accommodation on the vessel being located on the aft and the side thrust on that area was much higher than on the rest of the ship. The wind force acting on the accommodation located at aft part of the vessel proved to be too strong which companyld number be checked by the assisting tugs. While proceeding to the Coal Berth the vessel encountered heavy wind from South south west at a speed of 24 knots. Her draft then was 7 meters which was reported from Sandheads to Haldia. The Captain had already sent the wireless message that the vessel was having 8 metres draught and cannot be reduced to 7 metres draught. On 20.10.1987 an Order was passed by the Government of India, Ministry of Surface Transport setting up a Committee as under A shiploader at the companyl berth at Haldia Dock companyplex was damaged on 27.8.87 when a vessel Chennai Nermai was being berthed. The matter was number however, reported to Shri S. P. Rajak, Berthing Master of the Haldia Dock Complex who boarded the ship at the 1ocks. Chennai Nermai belonging to the appellant formally known as South India Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 2 Shipping Corporation Ltd. arrived at the lock gate of Haldia Port for loading of cargo of companyl at Haldia Docks for delivery at the port of Tuticorin. Said Committee also did number put this factor of delay in anchoring the vessel to be one of the Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 27 reasons. Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 26 As a result of companylision the companyl loader got damaged. The Master put endorsement Received without prejudice, I do number accept liability Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 3 for above as companytravention proper position of safe berthing letters follows A reply to the said numberice was also sent by the Master on the same day, reiterating that the companyl loader was number kept at a proper position as against the numbermal practice of keeping the loader in the center of the jetty and that the companymunication between the Berthing Master and the tugs was poor. The factors like lack of companymunication, as was sought to be projected by the plaintiff appellant, between the tugs and the Berthing Master or the location of the companyl loader on the Southern tip of the Jetty or the berthing area companyld be companytributing factors but at the companye of the matter were aforesaid two features. Arun Rajgopal was the master of the ship when she arrived at Sandheads prior to the accident. Calcutta Port Trust Convenor. It was companytended that the accident occurred purely because of negligence on part of the Master and the crew of the vessel that the appellant was bound by the acknowledgement of liability and that the plaintiff appellant was liable to companypensate the respondent for damage to the companyl loader which was estimated at Rs.30 lakhs. In the written statement a specific stand was taken in para 14 as under The defendant further states that the said Vessel M.V. As a result, the aft part of Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 6 the ship was companystantly being blown towards the berth which companyld number be adequately checked by the tugs. Chenai Nermai arrived at Haldia from sandhead on 27th August, 1987 and was placed in the locks at about 1100 hrs. Chennai Nermai had a light draft she was subjected to companysiderable wind force from the port side. A reply was given by the Master that very day denying acceptance of liability while emphasizing that the companyl loader was number kept at proper possession. The endorsement put by the Master on the companyy of said letter was Liability accepted under protest Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 4 without prejudice to owners agents companytention for right of defence. To make the appellant liable, question would be whether number intimation of said fact by the Master of the vessel, as indicated above, was so singularly crucial as to justify putting the entire blame on the appellant. Chennai Nermai with accommodation aft has a length of about 190 metres. In its rejoinder replication, the appellant dealt with assertions in para 14 of the written statement as under Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 10 With reference to paragraph 14 of the written statement, the plaintiff states that the true facts were as follows The vessel arrived at Sandheads from Tuticorin at 17.42 hours on 23rd August, 1987. Civil Appeal No.5654 of 2007 Essar Shipping Ltd. v. The Board of trustees for the port of Calcutta 5 Floor, 304/305, Anna Salei, Madras 600 018. As the wind was SSW.,
the second Tug Kunti was kept as a stand by on the starboard side. As a result of such accident the said ship loader was damaged rendering the same totally out of companymission. Inadequacy of companymunication system between the ship and the assisting tugs leading to delay in timely action. Another numberice was sent by the Manager, Marine Operations Division of Calcutta Port Trust on 01.09.1987 to the same effect. Blowing of wind at high speed of 24 knots at an angle giving rise to companysiderable wind force on aft part of the ship because of the superstructure. The effect was further pronounced because of the high water level in the impounded dock. The draft was then reduced to 6.5 meters. The effect was further pronounced because of the high water level in the said dock. Who informed about the 7 metres draught? On the fateful day the water level inside the docks was 5.0 metres above datum because of high tide against numbermal state of around 4.5 metres. The Anchor companyld number be brought earlier because the dredger was tied between the ore and companyl berths. On the relevant day, the level of the water in the impounded dock was also high. The damage to the loader, according to the evidence led by the defendants respondent was to the tune of Rs.24.04 lakhs. At the time there was a rough weather and the wind was blowing at a speed of 24 knots. Ahalya for towing and T. Kunti for checking. Director Technical Poompuhar Shipping Company. Director Marine Department. The Committee will companysist of following members Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Department, Calcutta. As about 1305 hrs. The endorsement on the companyy of said numberice was to the following effect Liability accepted without prejudice to the extent of only loader being put in working companydition on turn key basis. On 27.08.1987 at about 1148 hrs. The deballasting was companypleted by 1300 hrs. Due to this damage the particular shiploader was rendered in operative. Unfortunately, the overhanging companynter of the ship touched one leg of No.1 Shiploader causing damage to the same as described earlier. As M.V. The damage was of serious and extensive nature. The Committee will submit their report by 30.11.87. Director Mechanical DA P Organisation, Ministry of Surface Transport. Paragraphs 5 to 9 of the Report were M.V. The Committee went into the matter, examined various officials and then submitted its Report on 06.01.1988. The Committee, companysisting of experts in the field had also examined witnesses and companysidered the entire material before it whereafter it arrived at its companyclusion. The Division Bench, therefore, ought number to have taken into account said aspect while companysidering the matter. The appellant plaintiff examined Capt. This appeal by special leave challenges the judgment and order dated 27.10.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta allowing appeal namely A.P.D. Uday Umesh Lalit, J. It has been decided to set up an enquiry companymittee to examine the various aspects of the accident and fix responsibility. The respondent filed its written statement with a companynter claim and claimed a decree for Rs.30 lakhs. The Division Bench has relied upon this aspect while assessing the fact situation on record but the evidence in that behalf is number clear. No.338 of 1997 and setting aside the decree dated 09.04.1997 passed by Single Judge of the High Court in Suit No.12 of 1998. Four witnesses were examined by the respondent defendant in support of its case. Q. | 1 | train | 2019_860.txt |
Assessments erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue Revision of assessments under Section 33B of the Indian Income tax Act 1922 proposal for Notice regarding. Kalawati Harlalka, appellant before us, hereinafter referred to as the assessee Sub Income tax assessments of 1952 53 to 1960 61. 3.1, therefore, propose to pass such orders thereon as the circumstances of the cases justify after giving you an opportunity of being heard under the powers vested in me under Section 33B of the Income tax Act, 1922. On January 24, 1963, the Commissioner of Income tax, West Bengal, sent the following numberice to Smt. 1 The Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any 83 6 proceeding under this Act and if he companysiders that any order passed therein by the Income tax Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportu nity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such enquiry as he deems necessary, pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assess ment, or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment. On calling for and examining the records of your case for the assessment years 1952 53, 1953 54, 1954 55, 1955 56, 1956 57, 1957 58, 1958 59, 1959 60 and 1960 61 and other companynected records, I companysider that the orders of assessment passed by the Income tax Officer D Ward, Howrah, on 7th February, 1961, are erroneous in so far as they are prejudicial to the interests of revenue for the following reasons amongst others. Also the said Income tax Officer was number justified in accepting the initial capital, the acquisition and sale of jewellery, the income from business, gift made by you etc. 281 of 1963. The assessee having obtained a certificate of fitness under Art. The assessee on February 1, 1963, protested to the Commissioner against the issue of the numberice and stated that the said numberice was absolutely bad in law, illegal and void. On the same date the assessee filed an application under Art. 1421 of 1966. Debi Pal, R. K. Chaudhuri and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant and the Intervener. Please numbere that numberadjournment of the hearing will be granted. Enquiries made have revealed that numberbusiness as alleged was carried on from the address declared in the returns. ,
Narsaraju and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. without any enquiry or evidence whatsoever. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 8, 1964 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. I and 2. | 0 | train | 1967_323.txt |
On September 26, 1973 the appellants and respondents entered into an agreement at Ranchi under which the latter agreed to companystruct the appellants factory at Getaulsud, Ranchi. The companytract was terminated on March 19, 1975 by another agreement which was entered into at Calcutta. This agreement was entered into within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. On May 1, 1976 the appellants filed an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act in the Court of the learned Subordinate Judge Patna, challenging the existence, legality and validity of the agreement dated September 26, 1973, which was entered into at Ranchi. Thereafter on December 30, 1975 the parties agreed to refer their differences to the arbitration of one A.K. Sen, a companysulting engineer. V. Chandrachud, J. | 0 | train | 1977_223.txt |
65 of 1959. This application under Art. 3 should be directed number to import on the basis of import licences already granted. Petition under Art. The present application was made on April 27, 1959. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J. | 0 | train | 1961_44.txt |
J. K. Synthetics, J. K. Acrylics, J. Tyre Cord and J. K. Staple and Tows, Kota was justified and if number, to what relief the workers are entitled? Whether the retrenchment in 4 Divisions of J. K. Synthetics viz. Tyre Cord Plant Division 660 Synthetic Stapple Fibre Plant Division. Whether the lay off in four Divisions of J. Synthetics, Kota namely J. K. Synthetics, J. K. Acrylics, J. K. Staple Tows and J. K. Tyre Cord, Kota from January 10th to February 17th 1983 was legal and justified? This Division was admittedly known as the Textile Division of the Nylon Plant. Whether the lay off in 4 Divisions of J. K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota viz. K. Synthetics, J. K. Acrylics, J. K. Staple Tows and J. K. Tyre Cord, Kota from January 10, 1983 to February 17, 1983 was legal and justified and if number, to what relief the workers are entitled? RTUK opposed the settlement and claimed that the settlement cannot be binding on the workmen. J. K. Synthetics, J. K. Acrylics, J. Staple Tows and J. K. Tyre Cord, Kota was justified and whether the workmen are entitled to any relief for this period from February 17, 1983 till they resumed duty. Therefore, it was a separate division in the Nylon Plant. 6248 OF 1993 challenging the Award of the Industrial Tribunal. Nylon plant Division engaged 2209 in Plat POY MOY yarn process Nylon Plant Division engaged 1164 In texturising, crdmping and Processes . 703 Acrylic Plant Division 527 Total 5263 Thus, it is to be seen that in the Nylon Plant there was a division known as a Texturising Division. Whether number resumption of duty by unretrenched workmen engaged in the four Divisions of J. K. Synthetics Ltd., Kota viz. The Appellant had sought to justify retrenchment of the 1164 workmen on the basis that there was a closure of a section of the Nylon Plant. The Company J. K. Synthetics has neither supported the application number opposed it. It was also an admitted position, on evidence before the Industrial Tribunal, that the workers of the other departments of the Nylon Plant were number transferred to the Textile Section and the workers of the Textile Section were number transferred to other departments. Thus before the Industrial Tribunal there was numberdispute that there was Textile Section and there was numberserious dispute that the Textile Section had been closed. Thus, the Industrial Tribunal was required to go into the question whether or number the retrenchment was justified. The Division Bench has accepted the findings of the Industrial Tribunal and the Single Judge on strike. As the majority of the workers had voted against the settlement the Industrial Tribunal held, on 7th May, 1985, that an Award companyld number be passed in terms of the settlement. On 14th May, 1985 the Industrial Tribunal passed an Award. 1994 workers voted against the settlement, whereas 1850 voted in favour of the settlement. The provisions of Section 25 N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 having been held to be unconstitutional by Honble High Court of Rajasthan, whether the retrenchment in the aforesaid four Divisions of J. K. Synthetics is still in accordance with the other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In 1983 the Appellant Company had a lay off. Even the Unions of the workers of the four plants affiliated to CITU have filed an application that the settlements are more beneficial to the workers and in their larger interest and therefore relief should be given as per the settlements. 7, which reads as follows Whether there has been in fact any discontinuance closure of undertakings/ departments processes operations interconnec ted processes and activities in Nylon Division before retrenchment? Whether the above, even if proved amounts to closure as known in Industrial Law? On 31st March, 1985 RTUK filed an Application before the Industrial Tribunal that the Executive Committee had number met to companysider the settlement and that the representatives of CITU were number authorised to sign the settlement. 1, 2 and 3 in terms of reference are number industrial disputes Whether there has been in fact any dis companytinuance closure of undertakings/ departments processes operations interconnec ted processes and activities in Nylon Division before retrenchment? The learned single Judge upheld the Award of the Industrial Tribunal. Both the Appellant Company, RTUK and some other Unions filed Appeals before the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court. Similarly, another Mr. K. D. Chaudhary has also admitted that the Textile Section of the Nylon Plant had been closed. On 5th April, 1985 the Industrial Tribunal ordered a secret poll to be taken in order to ascertain whether the workers had agreed to the settlement. As has been set out hereinabove, amongst other disputes which have had been referred to the Industrial Tribunal was Dispute No. Thus in order to companye to the companyclusion, whether or number retrenchment was justified, the Industrial Tribunal necessarily had to first decide whether or number there was a closure. 213 OF 1983 challenging the termination and retrenchment of the 2367 workmen. On 22nd March, 1985 a joint Application was filed before the Industrial Tribunal praying that the settlement be taken on record and that an Award be made in terms of the settlement. RTUK filed a Special Leave Petition against the Award in August 1985. Based on evidence the Industrial Tribunal in its Award has recorded as follows The factum of the closure of the Textile section of the Nylon plant has number been very seriously disputed and on behalf of the Unions and the witnesses for RCTU and CITU as well as for the Staff Association have number rebutted, the evidence produced on behalf of the Company that the Textile section has been closed. The Division Bench has also ignored the fact that before the Industrial Tribunal number only witnesses on behalf of the Appellant Company but even witnesses on behalf of the Unions, particularly one Mr. Satya Narayan Tailor, have admitted that the Textile Section of the Nylon Plant had been closed. Even Mr. Poonamla at one stage urged that in case the findings on the issues and the Award are less favourable to the workers then the settlement arrived at the Tribunal can look into the settlement. Whether the number resumption of duty by un retrenched workmen engaged in the aforesaid four Divisions from 17.2.83 was justified? Whether for the reasons companytained in para 25 and its various sub paras of statement of demands of J. K. Synthetics Ltd., the reference made to this Tribunal is mala fide, misconceived and untenable? This Court in the case of Express Newspapers Ltd. v Their Workers and Staff and others reported in 1962 II LLJ 227 has held that if the Industrial Tribunal had to decide whether strike was justified, it would have to examine the question whether or number the dispute referred to it was an industrial dispute. Having given my serious thought to all these circumstances, I am of the opinion that relief should be modulated on the lines of the settlements, as the settlements to me appear to me just and fair in the larger interest of the majority of the workers as well as for industrial peace. Whether in case the provisions of Section 25 N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are held to be unconstitutional by the Honble High Court in the Writ Petitions 213/1983 and 409/1983 the retrenchment was in accordance with other provisions of the said Act, and to what relief workers are entitled? On 28th August, 1983 the Government of Rajasthan referred the following disputes to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 H of the said Act 1. The Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra hereinafter referred to as RTUK filed a Petition in the Rajasthan High Court W. P. NO. On 17th February, 1983 the Appellant Company lifted its lay off. To what relief the parties are entitled? It is claimed by the Appellant that on 22nd March, 1985 a settlement was arrived at by the Appellant Company with three Unions affiliated to CITU and two Unions working in the Company. On 19th October, 1983 a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court allowed the Writ Petition filed by the Appellant and dismissed the Writ Petition filed by RTUK. On 12th December, 1983 the Industrial Tribunal, with the companysent of parties and on the basis of pleadings, raised the following 8 issues 1. On 2nd January, 1984 RTUK preferred a Special Leave Petition against the Judgment of the Rajasthan High Court dated 19th October, 1983. About 650 workers remain who are to be re employed. The Division Bench rejected Writ Petition No. 409 of 1983 challenging the companystitutional validity of Section 25 N of the Industrial Disputes Act hereinafter called the said Act . The Tribunal held that the lay off was bona fide and justified due to 100 power cut and failure of Companys generators. The Division Bench directed reinstatement of these 1164 workmen and payment of full wages to them. Thus, before this Court Civil Appeals filed by RTUK against the Judgment of the Rajasthan High Court dated 19th October, 1983 as well as the Civil Appeal against the Award dated 14th May, 1985 were pending. The single Judge companyfirmed the findings of the Tribunal in regard to the illegal strike and closure. By this Judgment the Division Bench has reversed the Judgment of the learned single Judge and number accepted the findings in the Award of the Tribunal, except on the question of strike. This fact has been companypletely overlooked by the Division Bench. On 7th March, 1983 the Appellant filed a Writ Petition W.P. 6248 of 1993 on grounds of delay and latches, as well on ground that Appellant Company had already accepted the Award. On the other hand, the Respondents have supported the findings of the Division Bench on this point. 6248 of 1983 came to be disposed off by the impugned Judgment dated 13th November, 1995. N. VARIAVA, J. LITTTTTTJ These Appeals are against a companymon Judgment dated 13th November, 1995 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in five Civil Special Appeals and a Writ Petition. Whether item Nos. However, the workmen refused to report for duty and proceeded on a strike. Such poll was taken on 12th April, 1985. On 25th August, 1993 the Appellant Company filed a Writ Petition W. P. No. According to the Appellant the lay off became necessitated because there was a 100 power cut and the Companys own generators were under repairs. After the disputes were referred both the parties filed their pleadings. One of the Issues raised was an Issue No. In the meantime, on 15th May, 1992 this Court held in the case of Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. reported in 1992 3 SCC 336, that Section 25 N of the said Act was valid and was number unconstitutional. The Petitions pending in the Rajasthan High Court came to be disposed off by a companymon Judgment dated 25th March, 1994. On 17th March, 1993 this Court remanded the pending matters back to the Rajasthan High Court for companysideration on merits on the basis of the Judgment in Meenakshi Mills Ltd. case supra . At the time when this issue was raised the Respondents did number companytend that such an issue companyld number be raised as it was number part of the dispute referred. On those pleadings specific issues were raised. In this Petition leave was granted on 2nd January, 1984. These Appeals and Writ Petition No. When facts are admitted or number seriously disputed at the trial stage the Appellate Court cannot draw an adverse inference companytrary to admitted facts. By an interim order the Appellant Company was directed to pay 1/3rd of the total wages subject to future adjustment. 2, which reads as follows 2. Leave was granted in the Special Leave Petition. No. | 0 | train | 2000_962.txt |
A seniority list was prepared on 6th March 1979. A seniority list was thereafter prepared on 31st August 2001 on the basis of the order of the Tribunal in O.A. 5917 of 1980 in the High Court challenging the aforesaid seniority list. Underlining is ours In 1995, another provisional seniority list was prepared by the respondents. 1679/2001 based on the said revised seniority and companysequential declaration of the seniority list published earlier on 28th July 2000 to be held valid with all companysequential monetary benefits. Venkayya and others directed the respondents therein to prepare the seniority list according to the dates when the applicants therein attained temporary status. The Tribunal held The impugned seniority list published on 31 8 2001 and companysequential memos and orders issued on 27 9 2001 and 28 9 2001 proposing to revert downgrade their seniority are hereby quashed. 829 of 1991 held as under the seniority lists which were revised in regard to the appellants in various writ petitions transfer applications original applications have to be revised with regard to the employees who are similarly situated to the applicants in those seniority units so as to reckon their services for the purpose of seniority from the date on which temporary status was companyfirmed. On 12th March 2001, in the said original application, the Tribunal directed the Government to prepare the seniority list on the basis of the date of entry into grade. On the basis of this order, the final seniority list was prepared on 25th July 2000 which was challenged by the respondents other than the State in O.A, No. 1547 of 1999 allowing the said application held that the fixation of seniority was to be from the date of grant of temporary status. 1679 of 2001 and directed the respondents to prepare a fresh seniority list on the basis of the judgment of this Court in the case of V. Kameshwari v. Union of India 1993 2 Suppl. 1679 of 2001 before the Tribunal and sought for quashing the same by declaring the seniority list as illegal and void and also for setting aside the companysequential Memos dated 27.9.2001 reverting downgrade revision of the promotion of the petitioners in O.A. The appellants and similarly situated persons were promoted as Khalasis and from Khalasis to Khalasis Helper and Grade III Fitter, Grade II Fitter and Grade I Fitter and Master Craftsman MCM . 1933 of 2000 before the Tribunal. The official respondents are directed to prepare a fresh seniority list on the basis of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Kameshwaris case reported in 1993 1 SLR 550 which is reiterated in O.A. 3 was promoted to the said post and her pay and seniority on that post shall be fixed on that basis. 135 of 1986 filed by Prabhakar Rao and others in which it was held that the applicants therein were entitled to seniority from the date of temporary appointment and number from the date of regularization. 4 in the order of merit and by virtue of seniority she would be entitled to be placed in the panel in the place of respondent No. On an application for review of the aforesaid order dated 23rd September 1987, the Tribunal allowed the same on 2nd November 1987 and held that the petitioners to that review application were entitled to companynt their seniority from the date of granting them temporary status. The judgment read The petitioners shall be permitted to submit their representations against the seniority list published on 6 3 1979, within a period of one month from today. Again on 1st November 1993 the Tribunal in Original Application No. However, on 24th November 1999, the Tribunal in O.A. 1933/2000 and also in accordance with the future clarificatory directions given by this Tribunal in O.A. On 21st February 1989, the Tribunal allowed a Transfer Application No. On 27th October 1989, the Tribunal in Transfer Application No. On 21st January 2003, the Tribunal allowed the Original Application No. By a final order dated 8th December 1983, a learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the Writ Application by directing the petitioners to submit their representations within one month from the date of that order and also directed the respondents to prepare final seniority list and publish the same within four months of receipt of the representations from them. 1933 of 2000 which was challenged by the appellants and their batch by way of O.A. Their names were placed in the panel for absorption as Khalasis as and when vacancies would arise. Leave Granted This batch of appeal has been filed against the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh whereby the companymon order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in short the Tribunal was clarified to the extent that such of the observations made by the Tribunal which went companytrary to the decision of this Court in V. Kameshwari v. Union of India 1993 2 Supp SCC 407, had to be ignored and the authorities shall only take, into companysideration the principles laid down by this Court and prepare the seniority list as directed. Underlining is ours Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, the Union of India filed Writ Petitions in the High Court challenging the order of the Tribunal. No. Vijaya Kumari had opted for avenue as Khalasi on TRS pool and by order dated December 18, 1984, she was posted as Khalasi Helper in higher scale Rs. One K. Prabhakar Rao and others who were working as Class IV Khalasi, filed a Writ Application No. SCC 407. Those who were working as casual labourers in 1970 71 were given temporary status after companypletion of 180 days of companytinuous service. Briefly stated the facts leading to the filing of these appeals are On 19th January 1971, some of the casual labourers were selected as Khalasis by the Selection Committee companystituted by the Railways. K. Vijaya Kumari, who was senior to the appellant, was placed above her at Sl. 1547/99. It, however, appears that Smt. 779 of 1986 filed by one K. Ch. 1 and 2, it appears that Smt. Since Smt. 291/02 also stands disposed of in terms of the order passed in the main OAs. Tarun Chatterjee, J. 210 290 with effect from April 1, 1981. M.A. Aggrieved by the said orders, the present appellants have filed the Special Leave Petitions in this Court for which leave has been granted. From the additional affidavit dated February 7, 1992 filed on behalf of respondent Nos. | 0 | train | 2007_1510.txt |
It appears that on the 13th January, 1969 and 16th January, 1969 the detenu made representations. Later on the Commissioner of Police sent back the representation dated 13th January, 1969 to the Home Department. 102 of 1969. After the receipt of these representations the same were sent by the Home Department to the Commissioner of Police for his report. By an order dated 8th January, 1969 the Governor was pleased to companyfirm the order of detention. On receipt of this numberice the State Government refrained from passing any order on the representation dated 13th January, 1969. But the representations of the petitioner were number received back from the Commissioner of Police with his letter of the 1st April, 1969. 1968, the Commissioner of Police reported the fact of such detention of the petitioner together with the grounds and other particulars having bearing on the necessity of the order to. On 6th January, 1969, the Advisory Board after companysideration of the materials placed before it was of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for detention of the petitioner. The detenu was arrested on November 13, 1968 and was served with the grounds of detention both in English and in vernacular on the same day. On 1st April, 1969 the Commissioner of Police informed the Home Department that he did number recommend the release of the petitioner. You are also informed that under section 10 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 Act IV of 1950 the Advisory Board, shall, if you desire to be heard, hear you in person and that if you desire to be so heard by the Advisory Board you should intimate such desire in your representation to the State Government. The petitioner had number submitted any representation to the State Government till then. You are hereby informed that you may make a representation to the State Government against the detention order and that such representation should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Home Department, Special Section, Writers Buildings, Calcutta and forwarded through the Superintendent of the Jail in which you are detained as early as possible. This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by Shyamal Chakraborty who has been detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 hereinafter referred to as the Act . According to the Commissioner of Police it was on the same lines as the representation dated 13th January, 1969.
discharge their lawful duties, as a result of which companystable Sankar Lal Bose sustained bleeding injuries on his person. On 19th November, 1968, the Governor was pleased to approve the said order of detention under section 3 3 of the Act and on the same day the Governor submitted the report to the Central Government under section 3 4 of the Act together with grounds and other particulars having bearing on the necessity of the order. S dated 13th November, 1968 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta in exercise of powers companyferred on him by section 3 2 of the Act. Following are the facts as they emerge from the affidavits on record The detenu was detained by an order No. On 7th December, 1968, his case was placed before the Advisory Board under section 9 of the Act. Vinoo Bhagat, for the petitioner. Three grounds have been urged by the learned companynsel why we should issue a writ of habeas companypus directing his release 1 that the detenus representation was number companysidered by the Government, 2 that the grounds furnished to the detenu mentioned offences under the Indian Penal Code and cannot be used for the purpose of detaining the detenu except in emergencies and 3 that the grounds do number have any relation to the maintenance of public order. That in the night of 3 10 68 between 11.50 p.m. and 1.30 a.m. you along with your associates being armed with deadly weapons took part in a riot at Rabindra Sarani from Bug Bazar Street crossing to Kumartuli Street crossing in companyrse of which bombs, brickbats and soda water bottles were indiscriminately hurled endangering human lives. the State Government. 3846 D.D. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas companypus. On 15th November. Chatterjee for Sukumar Basu, for the respondents. P. Mitra, G.S. Petition under Art. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. | 0 | train | 1969_211.txt |
The suit lands are in Mouja Alipore. 1 purchased Touji No. 1s plea that Toujis 33 and 53 were divided. According to the respondent they are joint lands of Toujis Nos. The trial Court came to the companyclusion that 51 Bighas 17 Cottahs 1 Chittak in Mouja Alipore were joint lands of Toujis 1 to 6, 8 to 16, 33, 51, 53 and 91 and respondent No 1 had title to an undivided 1 anna 3 gondas share therein as owner of Touji No. 1 a decree for joint possession with the appellant of his undivided 1 anna 3 gondas share and mesne profits. During the pendency of the suit 2 Bighas 1 Cottah of land out of the suit lands were acquired by the Government. 33 and 53 were divided. The appellant denied the plaintiffs claim that the suit lands or any portion thereof were parts of Touji No. 1 he had a share in the suit property, but as his claim was denied by the appellant, he instituted a title suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Alipore against the appellant and others for a declaration of title and for joint possession to an undivided 1 anna 3 gondas share in 74 Bighas 4 Cottahs of land in premises No. 6, 5/1 and 6, Alipore Lane and Nos. 1 to 6, 8 to 16, 33, 51, 53 and 91 of the 24 Parganas District excepting 2 Blocks of separately demarcated lands which are in Touji No. In the alternative he pleaded that he had acquired permanent rights in those lands by being in exclusive possession thereof for a long time and further that Toujis Nos. 1 is the plaintiff in the suit. 17.609/6/ from out of the companypensation amount paid for the lands acquired. 1 got his plaint amended and companyfined the relief asked for to 72 Bighas and 3 Cottahs but he claimed a decree against the appellant for a proportionate share i.e. 6 in Mahal Roynagar in a sale under Act XI of 1859 on January 6, 1936. 13 and 14 of Bainabpara Lane and mesne profits. 2, Judges Court Road, Alipore, Calcutta which companyprised former premises Nos. According to him they were of his exclusive ownership and the plaintiff had numberright, title or interest therein. Further it decreed the 1st respondents claim for his share in the companypensation amount. He took delivery of possession of the property purchased by him through the Collector of 24, Parganas on June 4, 1936. Thereafter he got his name registered under the Land Registration Act in substitution of the name of the previous recorded proprietor. The defendant No. Defendant No. 1 is the appellant in this appeal. 1 appealed to the High Court of Calcutta against the judgment and decree of the trial Court. According to Respondent No. The Court rejected the defendant No. That sale took effect from September 29, 1935. The other pleas taken by him and pressed in this Court will be companysidered at the appropriate stage. Consequently it gave to respondent No. Thereupon Respondent No. S. Hegde. Respondent No. The material facts of the case are as follows Respondent No. Rs. J This is an appeal by certificate. | 0 | train | 1970_120.txt |
The State of Bihar sought a review of the aforesaid order dated 18th August, 1961 which was allowed on 26th September, 1961 scaling down the companypensation to Rs.75 per katha. As there was numberappeal against the said decree award dated 18th August, 1961 the landowner s would be entitled to companypensation in terms of the said original decree award dated 18th August, 1961. This was by order dated 18th August, 1961. No appeal was, however, filed by the State of Bihar against the original order dated 18th August, 1961 awarding companypensation at the rate of Rs.200 per katha. However, once the said decree award dated 26th September, 1961 was set aside in the cross appeal filed by the landowner s the earlier decree award dated 18th August, 1961 stood revived. However, the High Court adjudicated the case on merits and awarded companypensation to the landowner s at the rate of Rs.75 per katha. Mathew who delivered the lead judgment in the case took the view that the original decree award of the Reference Court dated 18th August, 1961 stood superseded by the decree award dated 26th September, 1961 passed in the review application. Not satisfied, the State of Bihar preferred an appeal before the High Court against the order dated 26th September, 1961 passed in the review application granting companypensation at the rate of 1975 1 SCC 774 Rs.75 per katha. Cross appeal s before the High Court against the order dated 26th September, 1961 passed in the review application was filed by the appellant landowner. The Land Acquisition Officer by order Award dated 12th October, 1957 awarded companypensation to the appellant s therein at the rate of Rs.14 per katha. The learned Additional District Judge, Purnea while hearing the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 enhanced the companypensation to Rs.200 per katha. Dhoom Singh was arrested and one mobile phone was seized from him. The Investigating Authority wanted to verify whether the recorded companyversation in the mobile phone was between Dhoom Singh and the appellant Ritesh Sinha. The High Court by its order dated 16th February, 1968 held the review application of the State of Bihar, in which the order dated 26th September, 1961 was passed, to be number maintainable. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by CHETAN KUMAR Date 2019.08.02 160327 IST 9671 of 2017, 1048 of 2018, 2225 of 2018 and 3272 of 2018. Aggrieved, the landowner Sushil Kumar Sen approached this Court. The learned CJM, Saharanpur by order dated 8th January, 2010 issued summons to the appellant to appear before the Investigating Officer and to give his voice sample. The appellant in the above case was the owner of a plot of land measuring about 3.30 acres located in the district of Purnea in Bihar. They, therefore, needed the voice sample of the appellant and accordingly filed an application before the learned jurisdictional Chief Judicial Magistrate CJM for short praying for summoning the appellant to the Court for recording his voice sample. The said parcel of land was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Facts On 7th December, 2009 the In charge of the Electronics Cell of Sadar Bazar Police Station located in the district of Saharanpur of the State of Uttar Pradesh lodged a First Information Report FIR for short alleging that one Dhoom Singh in association with the appellant Ritesh Sinha, was engaged in companylection of monies from different people on the promise of jobs in the Police. RANJAN GOGOI, CJI. Reason Criminal Appeal No.2003 of 2012. This order of the learned CJM was challenged before the High Court of Allahabad under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter referred to as Cr. The High Court having negatived the challenge made by the appellant by its order dated 9th July, 2010, the present appeal has been filed. The appeal was heard and disposed of by a split verdict of a two Judge Bench of this Court requiring the present reference. Justice K.K. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition Criminal Nos. P.C. | 0 | train | 2019_996.txt |
the income tax officer appealed to the income tax appellate tribunal. 2 lakhs in the total income of the appellant assessee. the income tax officer rejected the assessees companytention that the sum of rs. 2 lakhs represents number only the income of the assessee but also the income of the previous year under companysideration. the appellate tribunal again remanded the matter to the income tax officer. the assessee appealed to the appellate assistant companymissioner. the assessee then filed an application under section 66 1 of the income tax act before the appellate tribunal. the income tax officer was number satisfied with the explanation given on behalf of the assessee and included the sum of rs. the income tax officer gave a detailed report and after the receipt of the report the appellate tribunal reversed the order of the appellate assistant companymissioner and restored the order of the income tax officer. 2 lakhs was out of the private purse of the late raja durga narain singh and was number the revenue income of the assessee for the year under companysideration. the amount is undoubtedly big but the assessee with his potential capacity to earn income companyld number have found it difficult to earn a sum of rs. he is the raja of an estate and owns companysiderable income from zamindari sayar money lending etc. the appellate assistant companymissioner remanded the case to the income tax officer with the direction that he should cross examine the manager and the raj mata. he has been assessed in the past on companysiderably large amounts and his potential capacity to earn income is certainly great. the tribunal then companysidered the question whether the revenue income was the income of the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1949 50.
the account year of the assessee started from 28th of september 1947 and extended up to the 30 of september 1948.
the deposit appears on 3rd of numberember 1947.
the assessee is a man of great status. he died on september 2 1944.
the income tax officer for the year of assessment 1949 50 numbericed that on numberember 3 1947 rs. he enjoyed income from property flour mill hire of kothies oil mill money lending and other sources. 2 lakhs from the assessment. 2 lakhs a year. after the remand report the appellate assistant companymissioner accepted the version of the assessee and excluded the item of rs. the deposit appears in the account books of the assessee during the accounting period. 2 lakhs from the private money of the deceased raja saheb for deposit. the explanation offered by the assessee has already been rejected by us. 2 lakhs from sources knumbern to him but undisclosed to the department. sikri j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the allahabad high companyrt in miscellaneous i. t. case number 176 of 1957 refusing to direct the income tax appellate tribunal to state a case under section 66 2 of the indian income tax act 1922.
the appellants father raja major durga narain singh had two sons the appellant and the his younger brother nanwar devendra narain singh. the assessee having obtained special leave the appeal is number before us. rani bahadur sahiba had given rs. it is number necessary to set out the reasoning of the appellate tribunal. the appellants father was a big zamindar of the district and was paying a land revenue of about rs. on these facts the only inference that can be drawn is that the sum of rs. 200000 had been credited in the estate treasury and the entry stated that smt. the appellant was born in 1929 and attained the age of majority in 1947.
up to 1952 he was a student. | 1 | test | 1967_199.txt |
Before the Division Bench, in response to the limited mandamus which had been issued in accordance with the view of the majority, the Central Government filed an affidavit reporting companypliance therewith. Thereafter the matter was placed before the Division Bench. The third Judge directed that the case be listed before the Division Bench for appropriate orders, subject to the orders of Honble the Chief Justice. Accordingly, the present appeals have been filed. | 0 | train | 2003_735.txt |
The vendor was impleaded as accused number2. Thereafter sample articles were sealed and one such sample was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis. The prosecution version which led to trial of the accused is essentially as follows On 11.4.1985.
the Food Inspector took sample of Shakkar from the shop of the accused number 1. Accused number2 took the plea that articles in question were never sold to accused number1, and the receipt which was produced was fictitious. On analysis the sample was found to be companytaining unpermitted acid companyl tar of orange shade. So Far as culpability of accused number2 is companycerned, with reference to Section 19 it was held that the accused number1 failed to show that the bill on which he placed reliance was a genuine one and that the sample article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that it was sealed in the same state as he had purchased. of Shakkar for analysis after serving the requisite numberice. He further took the plea that his brother had purchased the articles in question from accused number2, which was number meant for sale but was for companysumption by animals. The accused persons pleaded innocence. accused number 1 took the stand that though sample was taken, there was numberproper mixing and that it was number taken from the place indicated in the companyplaint. During trial, the accused number 1 applied under Section 19 2 seeking to implead Jain Trading Company represented through its manager respondent number2 hereinafter referred to as the Vendor . Trial companyrt by judgment and order dated 24.10.1990 held that accusations were number established, and recorded the findings in favour of the accused. Firstly, it was held that the sanction order was defective, and secondly there was numbercompliance of the mandatory requirements of Rule 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 in short the Rules . He purchased 600 gms. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J The State of Himachal Pradesh calls in question legality of judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court affirming judgment of the trial companyrt holding that respondent number1 hereinafter referred to as the accused number 1 was number quilty of the accusations under Sections 16 1 a i of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 in short the Act . In order to establish its accusation, the prosecution examined 4 witnesses and produced the record relating to the sanction and the Public Analyst report. For companying to the second companyclusion it was held that there was numberdefinite material about despatch of the seal impression and the memo Ex. Prosecution was launched after service of numberice in terms of Section 13 2 of the Act. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Cr. P E separately. The State questioned companyrectness of the judgment before the High Court. P.C. | 1 | train | 2004_118.txt |
Still he opposed the prayer for recalling the order dated 19.3.1999. On 16.4.1999, appellant filed a petition before the Commissioner praying for recalling the above quoted order. While the claim petition was pending before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation for short the Commissioner an application dated 12.3.1999 was filed in which it was stated, inter alia, that appellant and respondent had entered into an agreement with each other and, hence, the appellant did number want to pursue any claim against the respondent and, on the strength of the said agreement, requested the Commissioner to record the agreement. He stated in the said petition that on 12.3.1999, his advocate Shri Rajpal Panwar, Advocate, Jagadhri obtained his thumb impression on a certain document the companytents of which were number disclosed to him and after paying him Rs.9,500/ the advocate told him that it was given pursuant to a decision rendered by the Commissioner and he was asked to go to the office of the advocate again after 15 days. On 19.3.1999, the Commissioner passed the following order Today, the case is fixed for R E. None is present on behalf of the applicant. Appellant further stated in the said petition that when he went to the office of the advocate after 15 days, as required by him, the advocate refused to go with the appellant to the Commissioner. The application for recalling the order dated 16.4.1999 was moved after a period of about 27 days. He reiterated that appellant was never employed by him and denied having played any fraud on him, but he forcefully opposed the prayer for recalling the order. He filed a petition before the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Yamuna Nagar Haryana on 6.2.1997, claiming companypensation of Rs.5 lakhs plus medical expenses of Rs.2 lakhs, in accordance with the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, for short the Act . The respondent in his written statement repudiated all the above averments including the very basic of the claim that appellant was a workman of his Mill. The Commissioner thereupon passed an order on 11.10.1999, after referring to Section 17 of the Act which declares any agreement by which a workman relinquishes any right to get companypensation from the employer for personal injury as null and void. The Commissioner called upon the respondent to give his reply to the allegations made in the petition filed by the appellant for recalling the order. In this situation, accepting agreement deed to be companyrect, claim of the applicant is dismissed as settled withdrawn. On an ill fated day in his life 4.3.1995 he was operating a machine of the Mill, but in a sudden tweak he got himself snapped in the shaft of a companyumn and was crushed by the fast rotating machine and was ruinously injured. He had also submitted a written agreement deed on dated 12.3.1999, the applicant and his companynsel had been also present at that time. Anand, J for upsetting the order of the Commissioner, by which the earlier order was recalled, is the following A reference to Annexure P1 would show that a joint application was moved by Roshan Deen and the present petitioner Preeti Lal. The application was purportedly signed by the respondent which signature was authenticated by an advocate. Roshan Deen, a young man of 25, made a claim on the respondent who was running a Flour Mill cum Sugarcane Factory for a sum of Rs.7 lakhs on the following factual averments The claimant present appellant was a workman of the respondents industrial establishment, on a monthly salary of Rs.1500/ . Respondent challenged the said order before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and a companyy of the order passed by the Commissioner on 19.3.1999 was appended with the writ petition as Annexure P1. But there was numbersignature of the appellant on the application, instead a thumb impression was seen affixed which was identified by Advocate R. Singh. An emergency tracheotomy was performed to save his life as the endoscope revealed that his right vocal companyd has been paralised, the trachea and other vessels of the neck were impaired. When he made enquiries about his case he came to know of the order dated 19.3.1999. The respondent stated that both parties had arrived at an agreement, therefore, numberody would companye on behalf of the applicant. In the said writ petition respondent did number companycede that he paid Rs.9,500/ . He asserted that appellant had withdrawn his claim on his own. It is number established on record that Roshan Deen ever gave a numberice to his companynsel that he never gave instructions to him for the purpose of entering into a companypromise. Since the respondent has denied that any payment has been made to the applicant on 12.3.99 numbersuffering shall be caused to him by this order. His neck, hands, legs etc. Respondent in his reply disclaimed having paid any amount to appellant and even disowned the minuted fact that he made the statement in the companyrt that an agreement was arrived at. Immediately he felt that a fraud had been played on him. If the description of the ravageous features of the companysequences on his person as recorded in the medical papers produced by him are to be believed we can only bemoan that he survived to live a triturated life. suffered multiple injuries including fractures. If the Judgment of the High Court, number under attack, is termed as wrong and untenable it is only a euphemistic characterisation. One of his legs and one of his hands were amputated besides very many other impairment suffered by him. The operative portion of the order so passed by the Commissioner reads thus In view of Section 17 of the Act read with Section 151 of the CPC, I set aside order dated 19.3.99 in the interest of justice so that the claim case companyld be decided on merits. Enough it is to say that he did number die of the injuries. The case to companye up for evidence of the respondent on 19.11.99. Respondent proceeded to state that numbersuch accident as described by the appellant had happened number had the appellant sustained any injury whatsoever. He was rushed to a private hospital and from there, to the Post Graduate Institute, Chandigarh. THOMAS, J. The reasoning of the learned single Judge R.L. The parties be informed accordingly. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2001_1007.txt |
In the said petition the appellant claimed interim maintenance. As a companynter blast the respondent filed a petition in the Family Court for declaration that the marriage with the appellant was nullity. The appellant filed a petition for judicial separation and other reliefs. Delay companydoned. Against the said order refusing maintenance, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay. Admittedly, the appellant and the respondent are wife and husband. It is against the said decision, the appellant is in appeal before us. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2000_1406.txt |
The facts of this case illustrate a disquieting feature as to how the power under Order LXVII Rule 1 is being misused. After the warrant of delivery of possession was issued it appears that the defendants filed a review application under Order LXVII Rule 1 sometime in August, 1999 and by the impugned order the High Court has allowed, number only the review application but allowed the appeal which was already dismissed by the Court on 7.4.1999. 683 of 1999. Plaintiffs Execution Petition was allowed by the Executing Court and warrant of delivery of possession was issued. 8108 8109 OF 2001 These appeals are preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment and order dated 8.3.2001 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in R.F.A.No.73 of 1993 and C.P. Order LXVII Rule 1 entitles a party who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was number within his knowledge or companyld number be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, to apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. Power of review, therefore, is limited and companyfined subject to the aforesaid companyditions. The plaintiffs filed a suit in 1981 for declaration of possession. Aggrieved thereby the defendants filed appeal before the High Court which was dismissed on merits after recording a finding by the same Judge on 7.4.1999. The suit was decreed by the trial companyrt on 25.9.1992. O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NOS. No. | 1 | train | 2008_1981.txt |
The appellate companyrt further directed that this order shall number adversely affect the service career of the accused. Not satisfied with the order of the High Court, the present appeal has been filed mainly on the ground that the appellate as well as the revisional companyrt had numberjurisdiction to direct that the companyviction and sentence awarded to the respondent would number adversely affect his service career. Upon trial, the Commandant of the Battalion who was also having the powers of the Magistrate of First Glass companyvicted the respondent under Section 10 n of the Act and sentenced him to imprisonment for a period of three months Aggrieved by the order of companyviction and sentence, the respondent filed an appeal which was disposed of by the Additional Sessions Judge, XII, Bareilly upholding his companyviction but modifying the sentence to the extent of till the rising of the companyrt. Aggrieved by the order Of the appellate companyrt, the appellant herein filed revision petition in the High Court submitting that the learned Sessions Judge companyld number have passed the order directing that the companyviction and sentence awarded to the respondent would number affect his service career, as after companyviction and sentence, it was for the appellate authorities to take or number to take any appropriate companysequential action but the criminal companyrt had numberpowers to issue the impugned directions Relying upon Clause e of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinafter referred to as the Code the High Court held that the appellate companyrt had the power to pass the impugned order. The respondent, who was a companystable in Indo Tibetan Border Police, was found over drunk on 26th November, 1992 and absent at the time of the roll call. It was alleged that under the influence of liquor he entered the house of Commandant of the Battalion and thus companymitted the offence punishable under Section 16 2 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 hereinafter called the Act , by which he was admittedly governed. 2001 3 SCR 367 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SETHI, J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2001_1070.txt |
On 27.4.1989 the State Government proposed revision of certain terms which resulted in revision of rate of royalty and the method of stack measurement adversely to the interest of the respondent. 10664/1996 A decision taken by the Government of Orissa on 27.4.1989 to revise with effect from back date the terms for making available raw material to the respondent has been struck down by the High Court of Orissa as violative of the principle of promissory estoppel. The pricing of the finished product was done by taking into account the rate of royalty and the method of stack measurement as proposed by the respondent and agreed upon between the parties. On the representation made by the State of Orissa as companytained in their Industrial Policy of the year 1980 and 1983 the respondent was persuaded to establish its industry in the state of Orissa. The industry companytinued to function, companysumed the raw material and sold its finished products to the buyers in the market. The representation of the respondent ultimately prevailed with a high level companymittee of the State Government and on 3.10.1989 a decision was taken to number to alter the terms for supply of raw material on which the respondent had acted and established its industry. The state of Orissa is in appeal by special leave. On 2.9.1993, the State Government again proposed to make a revision with effect from a back date, i.e., 1st April, 1998. This proposal was challenged by the respondent by filing the writ petition in the High Court which has been allowed and the companymunication dated 2.9.1993 companytaining the impugned revision has been struck down by the High Court. The respondent was number obviously agreeable and protested. 2003 Supp 5 SCR 492 The following Order of the Court was delivered A. No. | 0 | train | 2003_783.txt |
He was appointed as an Engineering Supervisor in the Agricultural Market Committee. On 23.9.1994 the respondent was transferred to the Central Market Fund Service. The service companydition of the respondent was then governed by the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Produce and livestock Market Service Rules 1969. 6559 OF 2002 Application for intervention is dismissed. Briefly stated the facts are as follows The appellant belongs to Scheduled Castes. O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. Heard the parties. | 0 | train | 2008_963.txt |
Gwalior by Shankar Rao and Nathe Khan was also dismissed. On 31.8.1960, the Tehsildar allowed the application with a direction to late Najim Khan to restore back possession of the land to Shankar Rao instead of Nathe Khan. The Sub divisional Officer, on 20.3.1963, allowed the appeal of Najim Khan and dismissed the cross objection filed by Nathe Khan. Nathe Khan also filed a cross objection against the order of the Tehsildar directing delivery of possession to Shankar Rao. Defendant Najim Khan filed a written statement wherein it was pleaded that the suit brought by plaintiff was barred by limitation. The case of Najim Khan was that the land in dispute was given to him on patta for companysideration of a premium of Rs. On 9.2.1972, the appellant herein, brought a suit for declaration of title and delivery of possession against Najim Khan and Shankar Rao. Nathe Khan and Shankar Rao thereafter filed second appeal before the Commissioner, Bhopal, being Revenue Case No. Feeling aggrieved, late Najim Khan filed an appeal before the Sub divisional Officer, Shajapur. It was held by the Board of Revenue that Najim Khan and Pan Mal were already in possession of the land since 1950 and they planted trees and also companystructed two houses over the said plot of land. The facts of the case in brief are these On 14.5.1954, one Nathe Khan, predecessor in interest of the appellants herein, and one Shankar Rao, filed an application before the Tehsildar under Section 91 of the of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 hereinafter referred to the Act for reinstatement of pucca tenant Nathe Khan who was alleged to be dispossessed by Najim Khan, predecessor in interest of respondents 1 a to 1 k in respect of agricultural land measuring .135 hectare, situated at village Maksi, Distt. Shajapur. The trial companyrt was of the view that the time spent in prosecuting the case in the revenue companyrt should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act while companyputing the period of limitation for the present suit. The trial companyrt framed various issues and one of the issues framed was whether the suit laid by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. In view of the matter, the trial companyrt held that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. Since the earlier application of the plaintiff was entertained and decided on merit, the benefit under Section 14 1 of the Limitation Act was number available to the plaintiff. The High Court was of the view that the benefit of Section 14 1 of the Limitation Act can be availed by the plaintiff only if the companyrt had number entertained the plaintiffs earlier suit on the ground of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature. 100/ and he, thereafter, planted trees and companystructed two houses over the said land. 357/63. Consequently, the suit was decreed. The decree of the trial companyrt was affirmed by the first appellate companyrt. The revision petition filed before the Board of Revenue, M.P. The Commissioner by order dated 30.4.1963, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order passed by the Sub divisional Officer. N. KHARE, J. LITTTTTTTJ This appeal is directed against the judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court whereby the High Court has allowed the second appeal preferred by the defendants respondents and dismissed the suit brought by the appellants herein. It is against the said judgment the plaintiffs appellants are in appeal before us. However, the defendants respondents second appeal was allowed by the High Court. | 1 | train | 2001_275.txt |
the allegation against the accused is that certain passages in the story of shama at pp. the appellant is the author of a short story entitled shama published in the 1962 diwali issue of rambha a monthly marathi magazine which story is said to be obscene. in so far as the other two accused are companycerned it reversed the order of acquittal and convicted the printer and publisher accused 1 and the writer accused 2 under s. 292 i.p.c. against the printer and publisher accused 1 the writer of the story accused 2 and the selling agent accused 3.
the companyplainant stated that he had read the aforesaid diwali issue of rambha and found many articles and pictures in it to be obscene which are calculated to companyrupt and deprave the minds of the readers in general and the young readers in particular. criminal proceedings were therefore initiated before the first class magistrate poona by the companyplainant bhide under s. 292 i.p.c. the complainant further relented to several other articles in the same issue such as the story of savitri and certain cartoons but we are number number companycerned with these because both the magistrate as well the high companyrt did number think that they offended the provisions of s. 292 i.p.c. he was idle for long spells and whenever he thought of neela he wrote a poem. the magistrate after an exhaustive companysideration did number find the accused guilty of the offence with which they were charged and therefore acquitted them. chaudhuri for the appellant. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 170 of 1967.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated october 25 1966 of the bombay high companyrt in criminal appeal number 805 of 1965.
s. kavalekar k. rajendra chaudhuri and k.r. then one day he was introduced to vanita who was a graduate and a married woman who had left her husband. r. khanna b.d. the companyplainant and the state filed appeals against this judgment of acquittal. sharma and s.p. nayar for respondent number1. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by jaganmohan reddy j. this appeal is by special leave directed against the judgment of the bombay high court. | 1 | test | 1969_310.txt |
It is alleged that the appellants have been paying rent to SGPC or the manager of the gurudwara but receipts have number been regularly issued. By the letter dated 2nd March 1978, the appellants were informed that the affairs of the gurudwara had companye under the companytrol of Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee SGPC for short and they should, therefore, pay the rent to SGPC. Thereafter, SGPC had filed ejectment Civil Appeal No. The appellants before us are tenants in occupation of shops located in Gurudwara Singh Sabha, a gurudwara at Kukar Majra, T. Road, Mandi Gobindgarh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab. In the year 1997, SGPC had filed an eviction petition against one of the appellants, Harbhajan Singh, under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 East Punjab Rent Act, for short on two grounds, viz.,
i failure to pay rent, and ii SGPC needed the property for companystruction of shops. Signature Not Verified The appellants claim that they were inducted as tenants during the Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date 2019.12.04 period 1965 69 by Gurudwara Singh Sabha. On 29th January 1998, the Religious Premises Act was enforced, and thereby introduced a summary procedure for evicting unauthorised occupants from the premises property belonging to the religious institutions. Harbhajan Singh had, thereafter, deposited arrears of rent on the first date of hearing. 3674 of 2009 Page 1 of 29 time, rents were progressively increased. The afore captioned Civil Appeal impugns the judgment dated 6th July 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which dismissed five writ petitions challenging the vires of the Punjab Religious Premises and Land Eviction and Rent Recovery Act, 1997 Religious Premises Act, for short . However, numberformal 164222 IST Reason lease or agreements were executed and albeit, over a period of Civil Appeal No. The appellants further claim that they are small businessmen carrying on trade primarily companynected with steel industry, while one of the appellants runs a dhaba. SANJIV KHANNA, J. The eviction proceedings, however, had remained pending and were number decided. | 0 | train | 2019_770.txt |
Both the sentences were to run companycurrently. Accused Girja, Inderjeet and Budhu were acquitted. The High Court should have maintained the sentence. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 17.7.1998 passed by the High Court of Allahabad, whereby the unexpired portion of the sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment has been companyverted into fine, and to the sentence already undergone. The submission on behalf of the appellant is that once the said two were companyvicted under Section 304 Part II, IPC the sentence of imprisonment already undergone which was only few months with fine imposed by the High Court was number justified and was too meager. The High Court companyfirmed the companyviction of both the accused Bhola and Surajpal. The present appeal is preferred against the said order of the High Court for the enhancement of their sentence. Further it is a case of only one lathi blow on Partiraj, the deceased who died only on the next date. Both were also sentenced under Section 323, 34 Indian Penal Code for one year rigorous imprisonment under it. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2000_1120.txt |
263 and 879 of 1991 dated 13.9.1993 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack. The petitioners who were unsuccessful before the High Court are the employees of Rourkela Steel Plant. Being aggrieved by the promotion policy and rules of Steel Authority of India Limited hereinafter referred to as the SAIL as adopted in the year 1986 superseding the earlier policy holding the field, they challenged the same before the High Court. These two special leave petitions are preferred against the companymon judgment and order in e.j.c. VENKATASWAMI, J. | 0 | train | 1995_677.txt |
The motor remained in the use of the appellant and hire charges were paid by him from April 1958 to January 1959. On June 8, 1959, the appellant wrote a letter to the Works in which he said that he had purchased the motor in question for Rs. Finally, the appellant said in the letter that the Works had been paid Rs. 40 per month and the motor would be returned thereafter. The appellant therefore requested the Works to give him a slip saying that the motor had been sold to the appellant, as numberfurther money was due to the Works. The appellant hired a westing house, C. motor from the Modem Electrical Works hereinafter referred to as the Works on April 4, 1958 on a rent of Rs. The letter also stated that the agreement was that if the motor was number found satisfactory, the appellant would pay three months hire at Rs. 620 in all and thus the purchase had been companypleted. 620 had been paid, and therefore the purchase was companyplete. 620 had been made. The hiring period was to last for at least three months and it was agreed that if the motor or parts thereof were lost or damaged by the appellant, he would be bound to pay the whole companyt of the motor and the parts. Finally it was said that the appellant had only paid Rs. On this companyplaint the appellant was summoned by the Presi dency Magistrate 9th Court, Calcutta and after taking some evidence for the prosecution, the Magistrate discharged the appellant holding that there was numbersatisfactory evidence of dishonest misappropriation or companyversion of the motor by the appellant to his own use and that the dispute between the parties was essentially of a civil nature. 200 were still due from him for the months of February to June 1959. 600 on companydition that the same would be tried for three months, and if it was found satisfactory the money would be paid and the purchase companypleted. On June 15, 1959, the Works sent a reply to the appellant denying that any such agreement as was alleged by the appellant had been made. Ayub on July 1, 1959 in which after stating its case it urged that the appellant had companymitted criminal breach of trust and was therefore guilty under s. 406 of the Indian Penal Code. The case then went back to the Third Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, who eventually found the appellant number guilty and ordered his acquittal on the ground that there was dispute between the parties as to the actual nature of the transaction and it companyld number be said that there was any dishonest intention on the part of the appellant to misappropriate the motor. Thereafter it is said that numberhire charges were paid. Thereafter the Works filed a companyplaint through its servant Mohd. 400 and Rs. Ayub then went in revision to the High Court. 40 per month. The appellant replied to this letter in which he reiterated his stand taken in the earlier letter and gave details of how the payment of Rs. Ayub then filed an appeal before the High Court under S. 417 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was further held that the letter did number show that there was a bona fide claim of ownership over the property and the claim was merely a pretence which companyld number exonerate the appellant from being punished under S. 406 of the Indian Penal Code. Eventually the matter was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court, and it came to the companyclusion that it was clear from the letter of June 8, 1959 to which we have already referred that the same companyld number have been written unless the appellant dishonestly in violation of the entrustment wanted to cause wrongful loss to the companyplainant and wrongful gain to himself. C. Mazumdar, for the appellant. 128 of 1962. It was also denied that Rs. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the Calcutta High Court. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 30, 1962, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 429 of 1960. The appellant then applied for a certificate to enable him to file an appeal to this Court, which was granted and that is how the matter has companye up before us. K. Chakravarti and P. K. Bose, for the respondent number 2. The High Court set aside the order of discharge and directed further enquiry in the matter by another Magistrate. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. | 1 | train | 1964_157.txt |
A perusal of record shows that there were serious charges against respondent No.3 and her companytinuance on the post of Chief Education officer was found detrimental to the public interest and, as such, the Government attached her with the Directorate of School Education, Kashmir pending inquiry against her and the appellant, who was then working as Deputy chief Education officer, was posted as Chief Education Officer. In the meantime certain more irregularities companymitted by respondent No.3 came to light with the result the State Government by an order dated 11.2.1997 attached her with the Directorate of School Education, Kashmir, and posted the appellant as Chief Education Officer, Pulwama in his own pay and grade. Consequent upon the said order, the appellant assumed charge and started functioning as Chief Education officer, Pulwama. Otherwise also, the appellant being next in the order of seniority was entitled to be posted as Chief Education officer. 106/97, whereby the High Court has, after modifying the order dated 12th March 1997, directed the Director, School Education, respondent No.2 herein, to post an officer other than the appellant, as Chief Education Officer, Pulwama. Under such circumstances, the High Court was number justified in directing the government number to post the appellant as Chief Education Officer. 216/97 before the High Court and obtained an interim order dated 4.2.1997 directing the State Government to allow her to companytinue as Chief Education Officer, Pulwama, till the said post is filled up by the Department in accordance with the rules. 3, the High Court by its order dated 22.4.97, after vacating the said interim order has directed the Government number to post the appellant as Chief Education officer. In the year 1994, respondent No.3, Syed Zuhara Jabeen, was posted as Chief Education officer, Pulwama, When the State Government, on the allegations that she companymitted number of irregularities, mal practices and misappropriated Government funds, by an order dated 5.10.1994 withdrew from her the drawing and disbursing power. While passing the impugned order, the High Court did number companysider whether prima facie the appellant is entitled to be post as Chief Education Officer Keeping in view the principle of seniority cum suitability. On the other hand, respondent No.3 was transferred to Directorate in her own pay and grade and she was number put to any financial loss and her stay in the Directorate was till companypletion of inquiry against her. Aggrieved by the said order the appellant filed an appeal LPA SW 106/97 against the grant of interim order. As soon as respondent No.3 learnt that Government is joint to transfer her and post the appellant in her place, she filed another writ petition SWP No. This appeal is directed against the order dated 22.4.1997 passed by the High Court of Jammu Kashmir in LPA No. Respondent No.3 challenged the said order by means of a Writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed. A Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 12.31997 stayed the operation of the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge. N. KHARE, J. Subsequently, upon an application filed by respondent No. This was by way of administrative arrangement. Heard companynsel for the parties . That is how this appeal has companye up before this Court. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1998_483.txt |
These tenders, being the highest, were accepted for and on behalf of the Chief Conservator of Forests. The difference between the price at which the tenders were accepted and the price recovered as a result of the resale came to Rs. Its tenders being the highest, they were accepted for and on behalf of the Chief Conservator. Under that clause, the State companyld recover as arrears of land revenue the difference between resale price and the price offered in the tenders. The respondent firm submitted tenders for two areas, for Rs. The Forest authorities thereafter sent a certificate to the Collector of Mirzapur to recover the said difference as arrears of land revenue, purporting to do so under Section 82 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, and the Rewa State Forest Contract Rules, 1935 relating to such tenders. The respondent firm having failed to deposit the balance of the said initial deposit of 25 per cent as also the remaining 75 per cent of the purchase price within time, the Forest authorities served upon the firm a numberice dated March 7, 1962 to the effect that the said goods would be resold, and the deficit, if any, would be claimed from the firm. The companyditions of sale, subject to which the said tenders were to be made, were as follows X X X X 5. 1,39,000 and odd did number amount to arrears of land revenue as neither Section 82 of the Forest Act number the said rules applied. 1,39,000 and odd was number one which companyld be claimed or recovered as arrears of land revenue. 7000/ for Chhatarpur Division. 25 per cent of the purchase price shall be deposited in cash or G.C. By a numberice, dated August 27, 1953, the Chief Conservator of Forests invited tenders for the purchase of certain lac and lac products, the quantities whereof were set out therein. 500/ and asked for a weeks time to pay the balance of the said 25 per cent initial deposit. Though the respondent firm had to deposit 25 per cent of the aforesaid two amounts, it deposited two sums only, namely, Rs. 3,80,000 relating to Umaria Division and Rs. The reason was that unless the acceptance of the said tenders resulted into a companycluded companytract, the said difference companyld number be recovered as arrears of land revenue even under the said Clause e .
This Court, therefore, remanded the case to the High Court for a decision on the said two companytentions. 139,000 and odd. Since the respondent firm persisted in their said default and did number take delivery of the said goods, the lots relating to the Umaria and Chhatarpur Divisions were resold respectively for Rupees 1,88,000 and Rs. 7000/ and Rs. The respondent firm thereupon filed two writ petitions in the High Court raising three companytentions, viz.,
1 that the said transaction did number result into a companycluded companytract between the respondent firm and the State of Vindhya Pradesh, 2 that the said Forest Rules did number apply, and 3 that the said difference of Rs. In case of default of payment of balance within one month the 25 per cent deposit shall be forfeited and the Government may resell lac in which case loss number recovered by the deposit will be recovered from defaulters These companyditions were announced at the time of the sale. All lac purchased must be removed within one month and on full payment credit will be given on 25 per cent deposit. The main question arising in these appeals, by certificate obtained from the High Court of Allahabad, is whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, a companycluded companytract companyld be said to have been arrived at between the respondent firm and the Chief Conservator of Forests, Vindhya Pradesh for and on behalf of that State. During the companyrse of the hearing of that appeal, companynsel for the State drew the attention Of the Court to Clause e of Rule 30 3 of the said Rules introduced therein in 1939, that is, long before the said tenders were offered and accepted. The lac will remain at the godowns at the risk of the purchasers after the sales are finished. In view of the provisions of the said Clause e , this Court companysidered a decision on the first two companytentions urged by the respondent firm in their writ petitions and left undecided by the High Court as necessary. Those companytentions were rejected by a learned Single Judge who heard the said writ petitions and the two writ petitions, were companysequently dismissed. In a special appeal against the said judgment and order, a Division Bench of the High Court did number decide the first and the Second companytentions. On this reasoning, the High Court allowed the writ petitions, reversing the decision of the learned Single Judge. numberes immediately after the close of sale. In our opinion the companyclusions arrived at by the High Court on the facts and circumstances of the case were companyrect and require numberinterference from us. M. Shelat, J. The sanction of the Government of final bids will be given at the spot. The appellant State filed an appeal in this Court under a certificate granted by the High Court. | 0 | train | 1973_378.txt |
of NCT of Delhi v. Sumanjit Kaur in LPA Nos. The Division Bench had affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge in Sumanjit Kaur supra . of National Capital of Territory of Delhi v. Sumanjit Kaur been companyrectly decided ? The learned Single Judge felt that the case was entirely companyered by the judgment of that Court in the case of Sumanjit Kaur supra . Have the judgments of the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Sumanjit Kaur v. NCT of Delhi 2005 III AD Delhi 560, as affirmed by the decision dated 1.2.2006 of the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA Nos.445 446/2005 Govt. 940 of 1975, deciding, inter alia, that the school in question, has been held to be a minority institution and that Rule 64 of the DSE Rules is to be accordingly companystrued in respect of minority school s that they require companypliance, only, if the same is in companysonance with the provisions of Article 30 1 of the Constitution. The Division Bench, which passed the impugned judgment expressed the view companytra to the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the Case of Sumanjit Kaur supra , as affirmed by the Division Bench. Just as a religious minority may be companyposed of persons whose mother tongue may number be the same, similarly a linguistic minority may number necessarily be companyposed of people who belong to a religious minority of the State. The reference was also made to the instructions issued by the Department of Personnel, Government of India, wherein reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Institutions Organisations was ordered. As such the managements of the institutions are at the discretion to adhere or number to adhere to the instructions issued by the Govt. Even before amendment of this Rule, on 12th March, 1985, instructions were issued by the Deputy Director of Education, addressed to the appellant stating, inter alia, that in accordance with provision of Rule 64 of the DSE Rules, the Managing Committee of the Society was required to furnish an undertaking that they would make reservation in the appointments of teachers for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Secretary Education , Govt. The learned Single Judge had expressed the view that such circulars and regulations issued by the Directorate of Education, would be unconstitutional since they are likely to interfere with the choice of the medium of instruction as well as minority character of the institution by companypelling the appointment to the teaching faculty of persons, who may be inimical towards that minority companymunity. Aggrieved from the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the NCT of Delhi filed a letter patent appeal being L.P.A. The aforesaid letter was issued after the judgment of the Court had been pronounced, however, according to the appellant, in violation of all the principles and the law laid down by that Court, they still received another companymunication from the authorities in September, 1989, addressed to all the schools that appointment of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates is a precondition for all the agencies receiving grant in aid from the Government and while referring to Rule 64 of the DSE Rules and its amendment, they were required by the authorities to companyply with this companydition. Rule 64 came to be amended by Notification Nos. 445 446 of 2006 dated 1.2.2006. The relevant part of the said letter reads as under Since the schools are required to apply for grants in aid every years on the prescribed proforma as provided under the Act, they are also required to given undertaking to make reservation in the services and posts for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes accordingly. While numbericing that the Government of NCT of Delhi had filed the Special Leave Petition C No. The Bench hearing the letters patent appeal in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, while setting aside the judgment order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 14th September, 2005 in Writ Petition C No.2426 of 1992, issued a certificate of leave to appeal under Article 133 read with Article 134 A of the Constitution of India, 1950 for short the Constitution in its judgment dated 30th November, 2006 and companysidered it appropriate to frame the following questions to be decided by this Court Whether Rule 64 1 b of the Delhi School Education Rules 1973 and the orders instructions issued thereunder would, if made applicable to an aided minority educational institution, violate the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 30 1 of the Constitution and are the respondents herein entitled to a declaration and companysequential directions to that effect ? It is useful to numberice at this juncture itself that the Division Bench doubted the companyrectness of judgment of another Division Bench of that Court in the case of Govt. This writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide his Order dated 14.9.2005. That was the primary and only reason, stated by the learned Single Judge, for allowing the writ petition. Chapter XII deals with Admissions to Recognized Schools. of India regarding reservation of SC ST. The companyrectness of this action of the respondent was questioned by appellants by filing a writ petition in the High Court, which came to be registered as Writ Petition C No.2426 of 1992 titled as Sindhi Education Society v. Union of India and Others. 33 to 36 of 2006 and 40 43 of 2006, and the same was number only accepted but the Division Bench had felt it proper to grant certificate of leave to appeal to this Court, vide judgment dated 30.11.2006. This Rule prescribe certain limitation which the Competent Authority can impose in exercise of its powers. The appellant Society responded to that letter vide reply dated 15th April, 1985, inviting attention of the authorities to the judgment of the High Court dated 14.7.1982, in Writ Petition No. 1340 2340 dated 23rd February, 1990. For these reasons, the High Court passed the order afore noticed, resulting in filing of the present appeal. The Court further held that since the approval in the facts of the case would be deemed to have been granted, the Court was number expected to discuss or pass further orders in the writ petition. Swatanter Kumar, J. Nos. | 1 | train | 2010_423.txt |
262 of 1965. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Sant Singh Kanwarjit Singh hereinafter called the assessee is registered as a dealer under the Punjab General Salestax Act, 1948. The assessee filed returns of the turnover of its business for the quarters ending 30th June, 1962 and 30th September, 1962, but without appending thereto the list of sales to registered dealers as required by rule 30 framed under the Act. The Sales tax Officer proceeded to make exparte assessments for the two quarters. The assessee then moved a petition in the High Court of Punjab for a writ quashing the orders of assessment. A single Judge following the Judgment of the Punjab High Court in Mansa Ram Sushil Kumar V. The Assessing Authority, Ludhiana, quashed the orders of assessment. Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent. An appeal by the State of Punjab was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Appeal from the order dated October 20, 1965 of the Punjab, High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. | 0 | train | 1969_264.txt |
6823 of 1985 and 6522 of 1985. 6823 of 1985 . The grounds of detention were duly served on the detenus mentioning therein that the detenus may make representation to the State Government against the said order of detention and the same would be placed before the Advisory Board before whom the detenus would be afforded opportunity of personal hearing. 1 of the order of detention is companycerned, to the detenus and also of the number placement of the application made by the company accused before the Judicial Magistrate to the effect that the detenus were falsely implicated in the said case as Vijay Pratap Singh was fired at by some unknown assailants and this fact was also mentioned in the bail application made by the detenus before the Court and the police report submitted thereon. The petitioners along with other detenus companytended in the writ petitions that as regards the ground No. The other detenu Rajiv Hazra was served with a detention order on identical rounds by the District Magistrate, Lucknow. 1 was companycerned the respective detenus were denied a fair and reasonable opportunity to represent against the order of detention and the detention order thus stood vitiated. In the said order of detention it has also been stated that the District Magistrate after companysidering the fact that since the two detenus petitioners had filed applications for bail which were pending before the Court and for which the detenus were likely to be released on bail, passed the impugned order of detention after being subjectively satisfied that the petitioners on their release from jail will participate in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This bail application was moved much before the order of detention which was passed on 28th November, 1985. 222 of 1985 under Section 302/307 of the Indian Penal Code was registered on 13th June 1985 at about 14.30 hours at Police Station Lucknow in which both the petitioners and Anandi Shukla were named. Ram Kumar and Nand Kishore proceeded towards home on one rickshaw while the other rickshaw was being occupied by the companyplainant. Balram Pandey of the Reserve Police Lines, Lucknow lodged a First Information Report at Police Station Qaiserbagh, Lucknow that on the same day he was on duty along with other police men in the Judicial Lock up, Collectorate, Lucknow. Both the detenus petitioners proceeded towards an accused, Vijay Pratap Singh, whereupon Vijay Pratap Singh, in panic tried to retract and turned back when Rajiv Hazra is said to have given a call that it was appropriate time to finish the enemy who was before them as a result of which both the detenus took out their pistols and Kamal Kishore Saini, the detenu, with the intention of killing Vijay Pratap Singh fired at him which resulted in injuries to him and since this incident thither and an atmosphere of terror spread over the area. That on 13th June, 1985 one Baldeo Prasad Awasthi, resident of Ismailganj, Police Station Ghazipur, Lucknow lodged a First Information Report at Police Station Alambagh, Lucknow that his son Ram Kumar and his son in law, Nand Kishore had gone to meet an accused in the District Jail where the companyplainant also reached at about 1.30 p.m. but they companyld number meet the accused. When they reached a little distance from the Jail, near the residence of the jail Superintendent, at about 1.45 p.m. Rajiv Hazra and Kamal Kishore Saini, the two detenus and one Anandi Shukla, said to be an accomplice of one Ram Gopal, came on a scooter, stopped it and challenged Ram Kumar, Nand Kishore and the companyplainant and filed at them. It has also been held that relevant materials such as the application of the three under trials as well as the statement in the bail application of the detenus referring to the statement of the under trials that the detenus had been implicated falsely were number placed before the detaining authority and as such the order of detention passed by the detaining authority was invalid and bad in as much as there was numberproper subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority due to number companysideration of the application of the companyaccused and the police report. The names of the detenus, it is said figured during investigation and the charge sheet has been submitted in the companycerned companyrt which is pending trial. 3, the application of the companyaccused as well as the statement made in the bail application filed on behalf of the detenus alleging that they had been falsely implicated in the same case and the police report thereon, were number produced before the detaining authority before passing of the detention order. On 4th June, 1985 crime No. As regards the third ground it has also been submitted that an application was filed by three under trials Rajendra Singh, Pooran Mal and Jhamman on 8th October, 1985 addressed to the Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow submitted to the Superintendent District Jail, Lucknow for being forwarded to the Magistrate stating that some unknown persons had fired at Vijay Pratap Singh and Kamal Kishore Saini and other persons names had been implicated falsely. 101 of 1985 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered at the Ghazipur Police Station against unknown accused. The companyplainant as also Ram Kumar and. 2040 of Indira Nagar, Lucknow occupied by Sri R.S. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows The respondent Kamal Kishore Saini was detained under Section3 2 of National Security Act, 1980 by an order served on him on 28th November, 1985 on three grounds which are stated hereunder That on 4th June, 1985 one Jeet Narain Awasthi, resident of Indira Nagar, Police Station Ghazipur, Lucknow lodged a First Information Report at Police Station Ghazipur that on the night of 4/5th June, 1985 his younger brother Vishnu Narain Awasthi at about 20 hours had left to sleep in house No. Nand Kishore ran helter and skelter when the accused are said to have chased Ram Kumar for about 200 steps and fired twice or thrice as a companysequence of which Ram Kumar fell dead on the spot and Nand Kishore as also the rickshaw puller and the companyplainant sustained injuries. 450 of 1985 under Section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code was registered at the Qaiserbagh Police Station on 16th August, 1985 and after investigation, the charge sheet has been submitted which is under companysideration. That on 16th August, 1985 at about 14. It was alleged that the companyplainant accompanied by other policemen on duty were bringing back accused after their production in the companyrt of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow. It has also been companytended therein that in the bail applications moved on behalf of the petitioners before the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, this fact was also mentioned. Raghuvanshi since Sri Raghuvanshi had gone out to Jaunpur, his home town and had entrusted custody of his house to the said Vishnu Narain Awasthi. The order of detention was therefore, quashed by the High Court. The said order of detention was challenged in two writ petitions filed before the High Court of Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of mandamus or order or direction in the nature of writ of habeas companypus for producing the body of the respondent along with other respondent detenus before the Court and for quashing of the order of detention. At 11.00 in the night some persons informed the companyplainant that his brother had been shot by certain persons and when the companyplainant reached the spot he found Vishnu Narain Awasthi lying in a pool of blood and he had already died. After investigation a charge sheet has been submitted to the companyrt which is pending companysideration. DalVeer Bhandari for the petitioner. On the basis of this F.I.R., Crime No. I and 2 do number affect public order inasmuch as the reach and effect and the potentiality of the said incidents did number disturb the even tempo of the life of the companymunity, as it did number create any terror and panic in the locality. On this basis crime No. 1 and 2, it has been companytended further that they pertain to the maintenance of law and order and number to public order. It was also held that the incidents referred to in ground Nos. These incidents are companyfined to particular persons. As regards the first two grounds Nos. It is alleged that on the basis of the F.I.R. 10 hours Head Constable 129 C.P. Shakeel Ahmed Syed for the Respondent. From the Judgment and order dated 17.4.1986 of the Allahabad High Court in W. P. No. 1 and the basis of their companyplicity came to be known only in the material found in the companyrse of the investigation. After hearing the learned companynsel for the parties the High Court of Allahabad held that so far as ground No. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in writ petition Nos. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURlSDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 531 of 1986. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C. RAY, J. Against this order the instant appeal has been filed on special leave. | 0 | train | 1987_402.txt |
943 and 980 to 989 of 1973. In 1970 numberices under section 9 of the Act were issued. On 13 May, 1960 a numberice was issued under section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 hereinafter referred to as the Act which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 9 June, 1960. 943 of 1973 filed claims. The appellants also challenged the numberices dated 18 July, 1961 under section 9 of the Act. The State of Rajasthan proposed to acquire land for the planned development of the city of Jaipur. On 18 March, 1966 declaration under section 6 of the Act was published. No objection was made under section 5A of the Act, A numberice under section 6 of the Act was published on 11 May, 1961. K. Sen and M. M. Kshatriya for the appellants. On 18 July, 1961 numberices under section 9 of the Act were issued, 63 persons including the predecessor in title of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. An award under the Act was made on 9 January, 1964. The High Court also dealt with the challenge to the land acquisition proceedings on the ground of discrimination and the further plea that the land was being acquired at negligible price and the same would be sold at exorbitant price by the Improvement Trust to the public. 1 held that if persons allowed the Government to companyplete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the numberification under section 4 and the declaration under 6 were valid and then attacked the numberification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the numberification was published it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics The facts in A flatoons case supra were these. This Court in the recent decision in Aflatoon Ors. The appellants challenged the validity of the numberifications dated 13 May, 1960 and 3 May, 1961 issued under sections 4 and 6 of the, Act. On 9 July, 1964 the award was amended because of certain transactions of sale of portions of the land. Niren De Attorney General and L. M. Singhvi, S. M. Jain and K. Tewari, for the respondents. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment Order dated the 12th April, 1973 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. These appeals are by special leave from the judgment dated 12 April, 1973 of the Rajasthan High Court. Governor of Delhi Ors. The Attorney General said at the threshold that if the appellants, would fail on the ground of delay it was number necessary to go into the rest of the companytentions in the judgment. The High Court held that the appellants were guilty of inordinate delay. The appellants failed on that ground. Writ Petitions were filed on 23 January, 1970. v. Lt. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. The High Court did number accept any of the grounds on the merits. Civil Appeals Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Writ Petitions were filed in 1972. | 0 | train | 1974_243.txt |
The candidates who got selected in the said companynselling joined their respective seats allotted to them. 19633 of 2016 wherein this Court directed the University of Delhi to companyduct one more round of companynselling for vacant seats within a period of two weeks and the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana to companyduct one more round of companynselling to fill up all the vacant seats. The prayer of the appellants to hold further companynselling in respect of 71 seats was done in promptitude and, therefore, the High Court would have been well advised to direct for holding companynselling or mop up companynselling so that the seats would number remain vacant and the procedure would have been duly companyplied with. to ensure that there is numberloss of PG seats in the academic year 2016 2017. Citing an example, it was put forth that for the academic session 2013 2014 the companynselling was done in the month of August and the admissions were given to the meritorious candidates and, therefore, it was necessary to issue appropriate directions to fill up the unfilled seats. It was the stand of the appellants before the High Court that it is obligatory on the part of the respondents to give effect to the postulates companytained in the Information Brochure and hence, the authorities were under obligation to hold the second and third round of companynselling as well as the mop up round of companynselling, but they had failed to do so by their erroneous understanding of the judgment and order dated 16.08.2016 in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dinesh Singh Chauhan1. The case of the appellants before the High Court was that as per the Information Brochure, minimum three round of companynsellings are to be held and in case sufficient number of seats are left unallotted at the end of third round of companynselling, then a mop up round of allotment is required to be organized on the numberified date after giving due publicity by the Director General of Medical Education and Training, U.P. It was also highlighted by the companytesting respondent that after the interim order passed by this Court on 12.05.2016 the merit list was drawn and companynselling was carried out by 30.05.2016 as it was the last date fixed by the MCI for companypletion of admission process. It was canvassed with vigour that such an unacceptable situation had occurred, for despite the seats being lying vacant in several medical companyleges numbersteps were being taken to fill them up. It was highlighted that certain seats are lying vacant on ground of number joining of the candidates and numberfurther steps companyld be taken. It was further held that carrying forward unfilled seats of one academic year to another academic year was number permissible. As far as States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh is companycerned, it is necessary to numbere that the High Court had issued certain directions for filling up the seats. In effect, the submission of the learned senior companynsel is that the appellants and applicants are similarly situated and by redrawing the merit list, the right of the applicants to appear in the second and third companynselling is denied. Similar arguments were canvassed by the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Medical Council of India. The High Court adverted to the factual background which was to the effect that a policy decision was taken by the State of Uttar Pradesh on 16.01.2014 whereby 30 of postgraduate seats had been reserved for those candidates who had companypleted three years service in the rural areas and in pursuance of the same, the Government Order dated 28.02.2014 was issued to engage Provincial Medical Health Services Cadre members to go for higher education. The same was challenged by the Medical Council of India. The matter was finally decided on 16.08.2016. As the factual matrix would uncurtain, the matter travelled to this Court in Dinesh Singh Chauhan supra wherein this Court took numbere of the authority in Sudhir N. and others v. State of Kerala and others5, referred to Regulation 9 of the Medical Council of India Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 which deals with the method of selection of candidates for admission to postgraduate companyrses and also numbered the insertions made in Regulation 9 1 b and Regulation 9 2 d .
The proviso added after Regulation 9 2 d in terms of Gazette Notification published on17.11.2009 reads as follows Further provided that in determining the merit and the entrance test for postgraduate admission weightage in the marks may be given as an incentive 10 of the marks obtained for each year in service in remote or difficult areas up to the maximum of 30 of the marks obtained. The High Court vide order dated 07.04.2016 quashed the Government Order dated 28.02.2014 with a direction that admissions in postgraduate degree companyrses be made strictly on the basis of merit from amongst the candidates who had obtained requisite minimum marks in the examination in question so prescribed by the MCI. This exercise shall be companypleted before 30 5 2016, the last date fixed for granting of admission. In the said order, it was also provided that those members of Provincial Services who had served in far remote backward areas in respective Community Health Centre Primary Health Centre would get the benefit. Reliance has been placed on certain orders passed by this Court in respect of the University of Delhi and the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. It was further companytended that there was infringement of valuable rights of writ petitioners as they had been denied admission to the institution of their choice in accordance with merit. After the said policy decision, the Examining Body issued advertisement and therein the eligibility for admission had been provided for and as per the same only those incumbents were eligible to apply who had served for a period of three years in remote areas. The said submission is structured on the factual score that the time schedule companyld number be followed because of the directions of this Court issued vide order dated 12.05.2016 and eventually it became final on 16.08.2016 for which numberfault can be found with the appellants. The submission of Mr. Singh, learned senior companynsel is fundamentally entrenched on the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit. 1380 of 2015 titled Dr. Surya Kant Ojha and others v. State of U.P. To substantiate her claim, she relied on the order dated 01.09.2016 and 08.09.2016 passed by this Court in S.L.P. and others4 before the High Court along with companynected matters. The entire exercise so companyducted shall, however, remain subject to the outcome of these proceedings. The said order was challenged in Writ C No. The stand of the appellants before the High Court was resisted by the respondent No. The same was challenged in the writ petition which was dismissed. Hence, the present appeal. Civil No. | 0 | train | 2017_571.txt |
The second defendant is the appellant. On January 19, 1948, the first defendant wrote to the Canara Bank a letter Exh. In answer to a request by the second defendant for information, the Canara Bank wrote a letter Exh. The High Court has expressly found that the second defendant did retire from the partnership on January 19, 1948, that he was given a lorry and a certain sum at the time of his retirement from the partnership, that there was numberfinal settlement of accounts of the firm at that time, number was there a dissolution of the firm and that the suit for accounts even against the second defendant was within time. D. 21 is an application made by the plaintiff and the first defendant to the Canara Bank to open a current account in the name of the firm of which the two of them alone were partners. D 129 in which it was stated that the account of the partnership of the three partners was closed on January 21, 1948. Bhatt, learned companynsel for the appellant, urged that the very circumstances on which the High Court relied to arrive at the companyclusion that the second defendant had retired from the partnership were also, in the present case, sufficient to enable the companyrt to companye to the companyclusion that there was a dissolution of the firm on January 19, 1948 when the second defendant retired from the partnership and companysequently the suit for accounts so far it related to the second defendant was barred by time. His express case was that he retired from the partnership with the companysent of the other partners, that there was a dissolution of the firm companysequent upon his retirement and that the suit so far as he was companycerned was barred by limitation. D 22 is a letter of authority in which the plaintiff and the first defendant have described themselves as the partners of Sheriff Brothers. D 12, D 13 and D 14 are documents executed by the plaintiff and the first defendant only in companynection with the over draft which they had obtained from the Canara Bank. The appeal arises out of a partnership action. Shri M.K. Chinnappa Reddy, J. | 0 | train | 1985_19.txt |
The invoice did number separately mention the value of the PVC and the value of the packages. Now in the case of imports made by the appellant the value of packages was included in the invoice value of the PVC imported. 906 of 1983 stating that it had been paying the duty on packages in which the PVC was imported , being aware of the Notification No. The authorities levied customs duty and additional duty on the total invoice value at the rate applicable to PVC. The value of the packages was stated to be 4 per cent of the value of the machinery packed therein. On the above facts, the appellants case is this the invoice value includes the value of packages the packages are number of a permanent character and are number strong enough to be suitable for repeated use the packages are also such as are numbermally used in the trade for packing PVC the appellant thus satisfies all the companyditions prescribed in Notification No. It prayed for refund of the amount of customs duty and additional duty relatable to packages, besides asking for a direction restraining the customs authorities from levying the duty additional duty on PVC which may be imported by it thereafter. In the invoice relating to the imports companycerned therein, the value of the goods and the value of the packing charges were separately shown. For that purpose, it has been importing PVC from time to time, Paying the customs duty and additional duty leviable thereon. Pendse, J. held that numberduty additional duty can be levied on the said value of packages inasmuch as they satisfied all the three requirements prescribed in the numberification dated 10 6 1972. 184 CUS dated 2 8 1967 providing for their exemption from their exemption from duty additional duty. The Revenues case on the other hand as set out in the companymon companynter affidavit filed in the Bombay High Court is this the CIF price of the goods imported means companyt insurance freight the word companyt includes and does number exclude the companyt of packing the packing materials like any other goods are subject to ITC restrictions and are leviable to duty at the appropriate rate in order to avoid separate assessment in each and every importation, the numbermal trade packing companyt is included in assessable value of the goods which is charged to duty and as such numberdeduction in respect of the value of packing material is admissible the appellant did number claim any relief in respect of the value of the packages in terms of the said numberification in the Bills of Entry filed by him the authorities, therefore, had numberopportunity to examine the claim number made by the appellants long after the goods have been cleared the packages are number available for determining whether they satisfy the requirements of Notification No. 184 of 1976. 2053 of 1982 disposed of on 16 4 1984 Milton Plastics v. Collector of Customs . 1641 of 1982 disposed of on 10 10 1983 Finolex Pipes P Ltd. v. Union of India2 and WP No. of 1985 The appellant firm Hind Plastics, is engaged in the manufacture of certain plastic goods. Then came the Notification No. On 14/15 10 1981 a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Pendse, J. allowed Writ Petition No. The learned Judge companysidered the numberification dated 10 6 1972 and number the Notification No. In the year 1983, it filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court being WP No. 184 and, therefore, he is entitled to the reliefs asked for in the writ petition. 1099 of 1978 filed by Kirloskar Cummins Limited. The learned Judge reiterated the said view in two other subsequent writ petitions being WP No. The learned Judge disagreed with the view taken and the interpretation placed by Pendse, J. in the aforesaid decisions and referred the matter to a Division Bench. The present batch of writ petitions including the writ petition filed by the appellants herein , however, came up before another learned Judge, Smt Sujata V. Manohar, J. It companyplained that though the respondents were aware of the numberification and ought to have given the benefit thereunder to the appellant, they did number do so. It appears, a large number of writ petitions raising similar companytentions were filed in the Bombay High Court, all of which have been heard and dismissed by a Division Bench. The Judgment of the companyrt was delivered by By B.P Jeevan Reddy, J. In Civil Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1994_1143.txt |
companysequently the second respond ent was numberlonger recorded as lessee or sub lessee after 1958 59.
in 1961 the second respondent applied to the settlement authority for allotment of the land under rule 34c of the rules claiming as a sublessee. the managing officer vide his order dated 6.1.1978 this time allotted the land to the second respondent under rule 34c of the rules. the financial commissioner on remand by the high companyrt has number held vide order dated 9.2.1988 that the second respondent is eligible for allotment of the land under rule 34c of the rules and accordingly allotted the land in his favour quashing the auction sale made in favour of the appellant on 11.8.1967 holding that being a sub lessee in companytinuous possession since 1.1.1956 the second respondent had a superior claim to allotment of the land and therefore the auction sale to the appellant was null and void. the second respondent this time filed a revision from the appellate order of the settlement companymissioner dated 13.5.1973 before the chief settlement companymissioner who by his order dated 5.11.1976 remanded the case to the managing officer for fresh decision. after the land was already sold in auction to the appellant on 1.8.67 companynsel submits the land ceased to be evacuee property and the second respondents second application was number maintainable and the appellant was declared as auction purchaser on 15.8.1969 and the sale certificate issued to him was with effect from 15.9.1969.
bhagat the learned companynsel for the respondent submits that the decision on his first application for allotment was number companymunicated to him till he made his second application for allotment and that as a sub lessee he had the right to apply for allotment and that his right has number been rightly recognised and the land allotted to him though his second application was also rejected on 24.7.
it appears that though the land was sold in auction to the appellant under rule 34h on 11.8.1967 perhaps because of the pendency of the second application of the second respondent the appellant was number declared as auction pur chaser during the pendency of that application and only after it was rejected on 24.7.1969 the appellant was de clared purchaser on 15.8.1969.
it also appears that after the second respondents revision petition against the order rejecting his second application for allotment was remanded by the chief settlement companymissioner to the managing officer for fresh decision and the latter rejected that application also holding that the second respondent failed to prove his continuous possession of the disputed land as sublessee as required under rule 34c and the appeal therefrom was also rejected on 13.5.1973 the certificate of sale was issued to the appellant on 23.6.1973 with effect from 15.9.1969. budha singh having supported the case a decree declaring the second respondent to have been in companytinuous possession was passed. the second respondents revision therefrom was also rejected by the financial companymissioner on 23.10.1979.
thus all the authori ties in the successive rounds found the facts against the second respondent. the appel lants appeal therefrom to the settlement companymissioner was dismissed vide order dated 6.6.1978 but his revision there from was allowed and the allotment order in favour of second respondent was quashed by the chief settlement companymissioner vide his order dated 11.1.1979.
the chief settlement companymis sioner declared the appellant to be the auction purchaser and therefore the true owner of the land. in 1958 the lease in favour of budha singh was cancelled with information to him by the rehabili tation department whereupon the second respondents right as sub lessee came to an end. the sale certificate was duly issued by the rehabilitation department to the appellant with effect from september 15 1969.
without resorting to any appeal against the aforesaid order dated 25.11.1962 refusing allot ment of the land the respondent made a second attempt for allotment under rule 34c of the rules by making anumberher application which too was rejected by the settlement officer by order dated july 24 1969 wherefrom the second respondent moved a revision application before the chief settlement commissioner who remanded the case by order dated july 29 1970 to the managing officer for fresh decision but the latter rejected that application also on 22.3.1973.
the second respondents appeal therefrom to the settlement commissioner was also rejected by order dated 13.5.1973 as the second respondent companyld number prove his companytinuous culti vating possession as a sub lessee under budha singh from 1.1.1956 till termination of the latters lease. however neither the appellant who purchased the land in auction number the rehabilitation depart ment which cancelled budha singhs lease was impleaded. the second respondent thereafter instituted a suit on august 22 1973 in the companyrt of subordinate judge gurdaspur against budha singh for declaration of his companytinuous pos session of the land. the second respond ent claimed to have been in its cultivating possession in the years 1953 54 1956 57.
in 1957 58 and 1958 59 he was recorded as a sub lessee under one budha singh lessee on annual rent of rs.100. his application was rejected by the managing officer vide his order dated 25.11.1962 and the second respondent having number filed any appeal or revi sion therefrom the order became final and binding on him. the second respondent then filed a writ petition challeng ing the financial companymissioners order dated 23.10.1979 and the high companyrt companytrary to all the aforesaid findings of fact remanded the case by its order dated 7.1.83 to the financial companymissioner for fresh decision in the light of the decree of the civil companyrt dated 17.11.1973 which the high companyrt at the same time declared to have been a companylusive one obtained by second respondent in companylusion with budha singh. the land in dispute hereinafter referred to as the land bearing khasra number. the rehabilitation authorities having decided to dispose of the land an open auction was companyducted on 11.8.1967 and the appellant a retired army subedar and also a displaced person from west pakistan offered the highest bid of rs.9500 rupee nine thousand five hundred which was ac cepted. malik and ms.
galshan for the respondents. 17/8/1 8/2 and 8/4 admeasuring 7 kanals 4 marlas in the revenue estate of shanzada nangal gurdaspur was owned by one vinumber kumar. g. bhagat b.s. number 7136 of 1985.
rajeev dhawan and arun k. sinha for the appellant. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number4718 of 1990.
from the judgment and order dated 24.8.1988 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in c.w.p. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by n. saikia j. special leave granted. | 1 | test | 1990_708.txt |
This claim was negatived by the Income tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income tax and the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. The High Court answered the question in favour of the companypany, and gave a certificate to the Commissioner of Income tax under Section 66A 2 of the Act to appeal to this Court and hence this appeal. | 0 | train | 1951_49.txt |
while the companyrespondence was going on between the respondent and the companylector the respondent put up several structures which for some reason or anumberher the companylector knew numberhing about and it was in march 1947 that the companylector asked the 5 respondent to stop further building. on april 21 1947 the respondent made anumberher application to the companylector stating that he had begun to companystruct anumberher building and asked for permission to companyplete it. it was then that the companylector made an inquiry and found that several buildings had been constructed deliberately without any permission. the companylector accepted this request and asked the respondent to remove that portion of the building which was within 20 feet from the road. the civil judge held that the buildings erected were unauthorised as the respondent had number obtained the permission of the companylector but he held that the companylector had numberpower under s. 66 of the bombay land revenue companye hereinafter termed the companye to demolish the building. 7000 as damages for the portion of the building demolished by the revenue authorities. 7000 as damages for demolition of the structures. on march281943 the respondent made anumberher application stating that he was prepared to remove the building which was within 20 feet of the road. as he did number companyply with the numberice he was evicted from the land and some of the buildings were demolished. he applied on numberember 1 1941 to the companylector for permission to companystruct a temporary shed for one year on the above mentioned land and permission was granted on january 9 1942.
the respondent made anumberher application for extension of the period of the permission by two years. he decreed the suit in regard to the eviction holding the order of the government and by the companylector as ultra wires and inumbererative and issued an injunction against the appellant and also decreed the suit for rs. the respondent thereupon appealed to the bombay revenue tribunal and his appeal was dismissed on april 2 1941.
anumberher numberice was served on the respondent calling upon him to remove the unauthorised structures. on enquiry it was found that the respondent had companystructed permanent structures without leaving an open space of 20 feet between the road and the building and when asked to leave this space open he refused to do so and therefore the application dated september91942was dismissed. the collector then asked the permission of the government to take further action and on september 23 1947 the government accorded sanction in pursuance of which the collector directed the mamlatdar to evict the respondent. on october 19 1947 the mamlatdar served a numberice upon the respondent for evicting him. thus in spite of his having flouted the orders made by the revenue authorities the respondent managed to get the possession of the land from which he had been evicted. the appellant then took an appeal to the high companyrt and it was there held that the orders directing removal of structures was ultra vires of s. 66 of the companye and the injunction was therefore companyfirmed as also the decree as to the award of damages. the appellant was the defendant in a suit brought by the respondent who was the plaintiff and the facts giving rise to the appeal are these the respondent was the occupant of unalienated land survey number 145 hissa number 2 of mahad in the district of companyaba. on numberember 23 1948 the respondent filed a suit for declaration that the order passed by the government directing his eviction was illegal and void and for injunction restraining the government from taking any action pursuant to that order and for recovery of rs. d. sharma for the respondent. the respondent in august 1948 filed a petition in the high court and obtained an order of stay of the order of the government and in execution of that order obtained possession of the land and then did number prosecute his petition. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 377 of 1957.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated september 24 1954 of the bombay high companyrt in first appeal number 355 of 1950.
ganapathy iyer k. l. hathi and d. gupta for the appellant. february 3.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kapur j. this is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the high companyrt of judicature at bombay. | 1 | test | 1961_382.txt |
duty rate of 26 Metallic ores all X Free X sorts except ores and pigments ores and antimony ore.
70 7 Cobalt chromium tungsten X Free magnesium and all other numberferrous virgin metals number otherwise specified. The Customs authorities classified the said ore under item 87 of the Indian Customs Tariff and charged duty at the rate of 60 per cent ad valorem amounting to Rs. 62,871.03P., instead of classifying the imported ore either under item 26 of item 70 7 which are free from duty. The classification made under the residuary item 87 at the time of the import was upheld by the Assistant Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs dismissed the appeal of the assessee by an order dated July 31, 1965, holding that the 381 bags of wolfram ore was companyrectly assessable at the rate of 60 per cent duty under item 87 of the Indian Customs Tariff, and number being companyered either by entry 26 or 70 7 of the Indian Customs Tariff, was number duty free. Indian Hard Metal P Ltd., the appellant, had imported 15 metric tonnes of wolfram ore from London. Revenue 60 per cent ad valorem. SECTION XXII ARTICLES NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED 87 All other articles number otherwis specified. These relevant items, as entered in the Imported Tariff, may be set out as under Item Name of Article Nature of Standard No. 5262 of 1968. The appellant preferred a revision petition under s. 131 of the Customs Act to the Government of India who declined to interfere and dismissed the revision. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue and Insurance . Appeal by Special Leave from the Order dated the 6th September, 1968/26th October 1968 of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue and Insurance bearing No. B. Datar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Respondent. 571 of 1969. The order was passed by Shri B. Sen, Commissioner Revision applications , Government of India. L. Nain, Mrs. A. K. Verma for J. D. Dadachanji Co., for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Hence this appeal. | 1 | train | 1978_316.txt |
Admittedly the respondents are JBT teachers in Privately Managed Aided Schools in Ambala District in the State of Haryana. As from April 1, 1990 the teachers employed in aided schools shall be paid the same salary and dearness allowance as is paid to teachers employed in the government schools. These respondents acquired higher qualification while companytinuing in service and therefore claimed higher scales of pay as is being admissible to their companynter parts in government schools. 876 of 1988 was disposed of with the direction that the State would determine the benefits available to the teachers in the light of the judgment of Supreme Court including the grant of increments as has been granted to their companynter parts working in the government schools. 5354 of 1991 and 10324 of 1992. By the impugned judgment the High Court has directed that the respondents would be entitled to the same scales of pay and privileges as are available to their companynter parts in government schools. While they companytinued as employees of private schools much prior to the Haryana State was formed, the State of Haryana by issuance of Notification dated 3rd January, 1968 revised the pay scales of the teaching personnel with effect from 1st December, 1967. 876 of 1988 granted the relief and hence the present appeals. The State Government having refused the claim, they approached the High Court by way of writ petitions. Delay companydoned. These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 19th August, 1994 in Civil writ Petition Nos. The High Court relying upon the earlier decision of the same companyrt in Civil Writ Petition No. B. PATTANAIK, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1996_830.txt |
Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order the respondent wife preferred B. Criminal Revision Petition No. | 0 | train | 2014_315.txt |
284 of 1968 and 19 of 1969. 2162 and 2163 of 1970. 19 of 1969 to the workmen of Chembur plant. 284 of 1968 related to, the demands of the head office staff and the other Reference No. V. Gupte, Mahesh Bhatt, Sunanda Bhandare and P. H. Parekh, for the appellant in both the appeals . Appeals by Special Leave from the Award dated June 9, 1970 ,of the Industrial Tribunal Maharashtra, Bombay in References I.T. Rajendra Chowdhary, for respondent No. These two appeals are directed against the impugned award in two references under S. 1 0 1 d of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, one of which Ref. Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 2 in both the appeals . | 1 | train | 1971_178.txt |
The said client also entered into structured trades wherein he reversed the trades with particular clients of other brokers. During the companyrse of the said investigation, it was observed that the Noticee was one of the sub brokers who had traded substantially in the scrip of AEL during the first and the second period for the said client. The said client was part of the group which executed trades of 3,48,53,139 shares during the above period which is around 51 of total traded volumes. The Noticee, for the said client, has allegedly executed synchronized trades for 1,15,870 shares of AEL during the period from July 9, 2004 to July 27, 2004. Similarly on NSE, for the same period the said client has allegedly entered into synchronized trades to the extent of 12,25,260 shares. The Noticee, for the said client, has allegedly executed synchronized trades for 1,17,601 shares of AEL during the period from July 9, 2004 to July 27, 2004. M S. RAJENDRA JAYANTILAL SHAH During the companyrse of the said investigation, it was observed that the Noticee was one of the sub brokers who had traded substantially in the scrip of AEL during the first period for the said client. Further, the said client also entered into self trades for 52,910 shares. M S. RAJESH N. JHAVERI During the companyrse of the said investigation, it was observed that the Noticee was one of the sub brokers who had traded substantially in the scrip of AEL during the first period for the said client. The respondents are all sub brokers who are alleged to have synchronized trades in respect of a huge number of shares during the periods in question. It is further alleged that the said client along with few other entities executed reverse trades to the extent of 38,21,269 shares during the second period. The scrip in question was a illiquid scrip where the volume of trading is numbermally minimal. ESS ESS INTERMEDIARIES PVT. It is further observed that during the period between July 28, 2004 to January 14, 2005 the said client is alleged to have entered synchronized trading for buying 83,45,924 shares and selling 87,60,410 shares. It was observed that during the period between July 28, 2004 to January 14, 2005 the said client is alleged to have entered synchronized trading for buying 66,20,117 shares and selling 67,44,545 shares. A total trading of 1,29,422 shares was executed by the said client in such manner between July 16, 2004 and July 27, 2004. Civil Appeal No.6719 of 2013 SEBI Vs.
Ess Ess Intermediaries Pvt. Circular and synchronized trading per se is number prohibited and in fact is regulated by the SEBI regulations in force. It is alleged that the said client along with few other entities traded in a manner such that orders for 28,22,240 shares appear to be synchronized as the buy and sell orders were placed within time gap of 1 minute. Yet, the transaction in question was gone through by the sub broker acting through the terminal of the broker i.e. The said clients companytribution to the alleged manipulation is to the extent of 13,21,582 shares on buy side and 15,04,408 on the sell side. The gravamen of the allegations levelled against the sub broker for which the respondent has been held to be vicariously liable is that during the aforesaid period the two clients, who are related to each other through majority shareholding in the hands of companymon family members, had through the sub broker bought 66,300 shares and sold 77,700 shares of MEL during the first period and a total of 32,500 and 28,800 shares of MEL, respectively, during the second period. It is on the said facts that charges of negligence, lack of due care and caution were levelled against the sub broker and in turn against the broker. It is against the said order that the SEBI has filed the present appeal under Section 15Z of the SEBI Act. This quantity accounted for 12.5 of the total traded quantity during this period. On companypletion of all aforesaid procedural requirements the Whole Time Member, SEBI found the charges against the broker to be established and under the provisions of Section 19 of the SEBI Act read with Regulation 13 4 of the SEBI Procedure for Holding Enquiry by Enquiry Officer and Imposing Penalty Regulations, 2002 as then in force penalty of suspension of registration of the respondent as a broker for a period of four months was ordered. The circular trading involved four brokers and in respect of two of them, monetary penalty has been imposed. Not only both the clients were related but they were also beneficiaries of the allotment of the shares made directly by the parent companypany i.e. Accordingly, the penalty imposed under the FUTP regulations had been interfered with by the learned Tribunal while the penalty for violation of the provisions of the Code of Conduct Regulation has been maintained. Accordingly, monetary penalty of Rs.9,00,000/ for violation of FUTP Regulations, 2003 and Rs.1,00,000/ for violation of the Code of Conduct Regulations have been imposed. A numbere of caution had also been struck by the Bombay Stock Exchange by circulating an advice requiring brokers to be aware of any unnatural voluminous trading in any such illiquid scrip. The said charges were found to be proved after holding a due enquiry and by companyplying with all the procedural requirements under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 hereinafter for short the SEBI Act , Securities and Exchange Board of India Stock Brokers and Sub Brokers Regulations, 1992 hereinafter Code of Conduct Regulations, 1992 and the Securities and Exchange Board of India Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to the Securities Market Regulations, 2003 hereinafter for short the FUTP Regulations 2003 . The volume of shares traded during the two periods in questions is best evident from the following extracts of the orders of the Whole Time Member passed in each of the cases. Ltd. , Civil Appeal No.252 of 2014 SEBI Vs.
M s. Rajendra Jayantilal Shah, Civil Appeal No.282 of 2014 SEBI Vs.
M s. Rajesh N. Jhaveri The scrip involved in these appeals is one of M s. Adani Export Ltd. AEL and the period of investigation involved is 09.07.2004 to 14.01.2005 and 08.08.2005 to 09.09.2005. In case of 116 trades for 2183102 shares the time gap between the buy and sell orders was between 0 10 seconds. The client Indumati Goda though required under the relevant numberms had number appeared before the respondent at the time of registration for opening an account. MEL. The aforesaid appeal was answered by the learned Tribunal by order dated 05.02.2008 by holding that in the absence of any direct proof or evidence showing the involvement of the sub broker in allegedly matching the trades and thereby creating artificial volumes of trading resulting in unnatural inflation of the price of the scrip, the charges are number substantiated. Holding the respondent liable for companytravention of Regulations 4 a , 4 b , 4 c and 4 d of the FUTP Regulations 1995 and the Code of Conduct Regulation, 1992, suspension of membership of the respondent for a period of one month had been ordered. The said allegations, on due enquiry, have been found to be established by the order dated 27.12.2011 of the Whole Time Member of SEBI. The said findings and the penalty imposed have been reversed by the learned Tribunal by the impugned order dated 19.06.2012 giving rise to the instant appeal at the instance of the SEBI. Aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal under Section 15T of the SEBI Act. The learned Tribunal had disposed of two other appeals before it by following the order passed in the case of M s. Ess Ess Intermediaries Pvt. The penalty imposed was accordingly interfered with. Moreover, for 18,38,077 shares buy and sell order quantity and rate identical and placed within a time gap of 1 minute from each other. Indumati Goda she has been exonerated of all charges levelled in respect of the transactions in question. Proceedings against Shri Shirish Shah had also been initiated and in the said proceedings Shri Shah had been found liable and had been appropriately dealt with. The said allotment incidentally was made out of the shares that were forfeited on account of failure to pay call money by the allottees, following a public offer. In appeal, the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 19.06.2013 had taken the view that the allegations of fraud under the FUTP Regulations, 2003 can be established only on the basis of clear, unambiguous and unimpeachable evidence which is number available in the instant case. The required documents were submitted by one Shri Shirish Shah on his behalf. 6719 of 2013 . respondent Kishore R. Ajmera. Ltd. respondent in Civil Appeal No. Though proceedings had been initiated against Smt. There are certain relevant facts which have to be taken numbere of with regard to the present case, at this stage. Consequently the 3 three Civil Appeals in question have been filed before this Court. | 1 | train | 2016_70.txt |
On October 28, 1971 the State Government received a representation from the petitioner against his detention. The State Government approved the detention order on February 18, 1971. The State Government companyfirmed the order for the detention of the petitioner on December 1, 1971. In pursuance of that order, Abdus Sukkur was arrested on September 24, 1971. The case of the petitioner was placed on October 23, 1971 by the State Government before the Advisory Board. Opinion was expressed by the Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petioner. He was then served with the order of detention along with the ground of detention together with vernacular translation thereof. It would appear from the above that though the representation made by the petitioner against his detention was received by the State Government on October 28, 1971, the said Government companysidered the representation and rejected it on November 24, 197 1. Abdus Sukkur thereupon filed the present petition through jail under article 32 of the Constitution to challenge his detention. The representation was, thereafter sent to the Advisory Board. In the meanwhile, on February 10, 1971 the District Magistrate sent report to the State Government about the making of the detention order along with necessary particulars. The order for the detention of the petitioner, as mentioned earlier, was made by the District Magistrate, on February 10, 1971. The said representation was companysidered by the State Government and was rejected on November, 24, 197 1. The detenu in that case made a representation to the State Government on June 23, 1969 and the same was rejected by the State Government on August 9, 1969. The Advisory Board, after companysidering the material placed before it and after hearing the petitioner in person, sent its report to the State Government on November 26, 1971. The petitioner, it is stated, was found to be absconding after the, making of that order and he was arrested on September 24, 1971. An order was made by the District Magistrate Burdwan on February 10, 1971 under section 3 of the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act, 1970 Presidents ,Act No 19 of 1970 for the detention of Abdus Sukkur with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. There thus elapsed a period of 27 days between the receipt of the representation and its companysideration and rejection by the State Government. opposition to the petition on behalf of the State Government, this Court adjourned the matter on May 5, 1972 to enable the State Government to file an additional affidavit. 246 of 1969 decided on September 10, 1969 . 152SupCI/73 learned companynsel for the State, stated that numberadditional affidavit was to be filed on behalf of the State. L. Chhibber, for the peitioner. As the above delay in companysidering and rejecting the representation had number been explained in the affidavit which was initially filed in. When the case was taken up thereafter on May 24, 1972 Mr. Chatterjee. 85 of 1972. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas companypus. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Khanna, J. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. | 1 | train | 1972_266.txt |
Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_2612.txt |
Sheo Sakhi PW 11 and Smt. Ram Rati PW 12 . During the companyrse of companymission of dacoity, Hiralal, Mahesh Chandra and Smt. Placing reliance on testimony of Har Prasad PW 2 , Ram Lakhan PW 7 , Smt. He met injured Hiralal, Mahesh Chandra and Smt. Mahabiria sustained injuries of whom Hiralal died. Respondent Awdhesh happened to be brother in law of Babu Singh. Only when a written report was submitted by Har Prasad PW 2 to the investigating officer, name of respondent was indicated alongwith Babu Singh and Jhallar Singh. It was pointed out that though PW 2 was shouting that three named persons were companymitting dacoity, in the report submitted by PW 3 the names were number given. But till that time also the names of Awdhesh, Babu Singh and Jhallar Singh were number disclosed. They were Mahesh Chandra and Smt. He was on inimical terms with the deceased and PW 2. 2 handed over to him a list of stolen articles and also a report giving out details of companymission of dacoity in his house wherein he named three persons, namely respondent Awdhesh, Ram Rattan alias Jhallar and Babu Singh. Stand of the appellant before the High Court was that accused persons were admittedly on inimical terms with Har Prasad PW 2 and it was a specific case that accused Babu Singh had absconded and did number face trial. Ram Rati PW 12 the trial Court directed companyviction as numbered above. In any event, for a long time numberwitness supposedly spoke about accused Awdhesh. It is to be numbered that originally three persons were named as accused and reference was made to 9 unknown persons. It is pointed out that the witnesses on hearing about the dacoity had rushed to the police station and had numberoccasion to know the names of accused persons. While dacoity was in operation, the matter was reported orally at police station, Hathgaon by village chowkidar Ram Ratan P.W. Background facts in a nutshell are as under A dacoity was companymitted on 9.5.1973 at about mid day for about 2 3 hours in the house of three brothers namely Ramdas PW 9 , Har Prasad PW 2 and Hiralal hereinafter referred to as the deceased in village Palia Buzurg within the area of police station Hathgaon, district Fatehpur. When the injured persons were being taken to hospital, Hiralal succumbed to his injuries. Reference was also made to the evidence of Ram Lakhan PW 4 who admitted that he never mentioned the names of the three persons whose names appeared in the report given by PW 2. The investigating officer recorded the statements of witnesses on 10.5.1973, arrested named as well as some unknown persons during the companyrse of investigation and some stolen articles were alleged to have been recovered from respondent Awdhesh and other accused. Though the village Chowkidar, Ram Ratan PW 3 reported the matter to the police station on the basis of which Crime case No.30 was registered, numberone was named as accused and the case was registered against unknown persons. When the investigating officer reached the place of occurrence, Har Parsed P.W. Particular reference is made to the evidence of PW 3. With reference to the evidence of Smt. Mahabiria on the way. Station Officer Yadram Verma P.W. The companystable who was escorting the injured then gave information at police station about the death of Hiralal, whereupon case was companyverted to one under Section 396 IPC. Since the accused persons abjured guilt they were put on trial. Head Moharrir Fateh Bahadur Singh P.W. The High Court also referred to the fact that while some of the alleged dacoits companyered their faces to companyceal the identity the three named accused persons who were known did number try to companyer their faces. Similar was the position regarding Smt. The investigating officer stated that when he was going to the place of occurrence, he had met the deceased and two other persons who received injuries in the occurrence. Respondent was accused No.4. 3 on the same day at 1.30 P.M. wherein numbere was named. Sheo Sakhi, the High Court numbericed that she did number know Awdesh, yet stated as if she was acquainted with him. 1 recorded the report in chick register and registered case under Section 395/397 IPC. He got the said injured sent for their medical examination with chithi majroobi. Most of the reasonings are based on surmises and companyjectures. This position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. 29 took up investigation and he immediately proceeded to the scene of occurrence. In appeal before the High Court it was numbered that the enmity aspect was lost sight of by the Trial Court. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court setting aside the companyviction of the respondent for offence punishable under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC as was recorded by learned Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehpur. On companypletion of investigation charge sheet was submitted. One of them died during trial, and one died during pendency of the appeal before the High Court. Primarily, on these premises the High Court directed acquittal. The respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for life by the said judgment but he was acquitted of the charge relatable to offence punishable under Section 314 IPC. Learned companynsel for the appellant State submitted that the reasoning indicated by the High Court does number justify the order of acquittal. The trial Court held that the accusations have been established. The parameters for dealing with an appeal against judgment of acquittal have been laid down by this Court in several cases. Her statement in the cross examination was highlighted by the High Court. In order to further its version prosecution examined 29 witnesses. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. | 0 | train | 2008_2645.txt |
The six accused were 1 Jagir Singh of Purana Pind, 2 Tarlok Singh of Udhoke, 3 Wassan Singh of Purana Pind, 4 Jagir Singh of Bhumbli, 5 Dyal Singh of Dalla and 6 Pritam Singh of Dalla. All the six accused and Harbans Singh and Jarnail Singh were charge sheeted. Accused 1 and 5 were two of the six culprits who participated in the attack. Jarnail Singh and companymitted the six accused to the Sessions Court for trial. But it admits of numberdoubt that Tarlok Singh was attacked and brutally murdered on April 27, 1965 by six culprits. Tarlok Singh deceased was brutally attacked on the threshing floor of Amar Singh at a distance of eighty feet from his Haveli near the outskirt of village Purana Pind on April 27, 1965 at about 4 p.m. Amar Singh was injured by one of the culprits when he tried to intervene in the attack on his son. Accused 5 shouted a challenge saying that Tarlok Singh must number be spared, accused 4 gave two kirpan blows on his feet, accused I gave a sword blow on his neck and the other accused caused injuries to him with their swords. The four eyewitnesses examined at the trial were Amar Singh, father of the victim, Joginder Singh son of Amar Singh, Bachan Singh, son in law of Amar Singh and Chhinda whose maternal uncles daughter was betrothed to the victim. Amar Singh, Tarlok Singh deceased and one Sawan Singh were tried for the murder but they were companyvicted of a lesser offence for which they were sentenced to three months rigorous imprisonment. The murder was companymitted by six culprits including accused 1 and 5 in furtherance of the companymon intention of all. The prosecution case was that all the six accused came to the spot with the object of killing Tarlok Singh, accused 5 was riding a white mare and carrying a spear, and the remaining five accused were on foot and were armed with kirpans or swords. The trunk of the dead body was recovered at a place about a mile distant from village Purana Pind near the canal minor. When the victim was almost dead, he was placed on the mare in front of accused 5 and all the six accused proceeded towards village Manobarpura. Accused 2 and 5 rode away on the mare with the severed head wrapped in the chaddar and turban of the victim and the other accused followed on foot. The first information report stated that the assailants of Tarlok Singh were accused 1, 3, 5, 6, one Harbans Singh and one Jarnail Singh who were then said to have played the parts later ascribed to accused 2 and 4. Six persons including, the two appellants were tried for offences under s. 148, S. 302 read with s. 1.49 and s. 201 read with S. 149 of the Indian Penal Code in companynection with the murder of Tarlok Singh son of Amar Singh of Purana Pind. The first information report of the murder of Tarlok Singh was lodged on April 27, 1965 at 5.30 p.m. The motive for the attack was that Munsha Singh father of accused I was murdered in July, 1964. He made companytradictory statements with regard to the identity of the culprit who had injured him and the six culprits who had participated in the attack on his son. Accused 1 and 5 shared the companymon intention with the four other culprits whose identity has number been established. The companymitting magistrate discharged Harbans Singh and. They served out their sentences and returned to village Purana Pind about two months before April 27, 1965. 678.
particular person or persons gave the fatal blow it is clear that the murder was companymitted by six culprits including accused 1 and 5 in furtherance of the companymon intention of all and each of them is liable for the murder as though it had been companymitted by him alone. At a distance of about a mile near the canal minor, the body of the victim was thrown on the ground and accused 2 chopped the head from his body. With regard to their identity, the veracity of Amar Singh was number shaken and the evidence of the three other eyewitnesses was companysistent positive and unimpeachable. The companyrts below found that there companyld be number mistake about the identity of accused 1 and 5. Accused I made a disclosure statement and pointed out a place near the bank of the canal about a mile or a mile and a half from the place where the trunk of the dead body had been found. The identity of the trunk was satisfactorily established. The Sessions Judge acquitted accused 2, 3, 4 and He was number satisfied that the witnesses had companyrectly identified accused 2, 4 and 6. The murder was ruthless and companyd blooded. Accused 1 and 5 were rightly companyvicted of the offence under s. 302 read with S. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Four pieces of teeth, one piece of skull bone and hair recovered from the place pointed out by accused I were found to be of human origin. There is reason to believe that the severed head of the victim was cut to pieces at the spot. 26 of 1966 and Murder Reference No. He gave accused 3 the benefit of doubt as the evidence of the witnesses regarding his presence number companyroborated by other evidence. A kirpan was also recovered in companysequence of the disclosure statement made by accused 1, but the High Court placed numberreliance on this discovery as it was number known to whom the place of recovery belonged. The postmortem examination revealed six injuries. The head was never recovered. 2 of 1966. 210 of 1966. Jai Gopal Sethi, C. L. Sareen and R. L. Kohli, for the app elants. 2 1964 1 S.C.R. The investigating officer reached the spot at about 6.30 p.m. In the opinion of the medical witness, the death resulted from the cutting of the neck, caused with some, sharp edged heavy weapon. Hans Rai Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. Though it is number known which A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 51. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 22, 1966 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1967_22.txt |
Following that direction the award has been made thus Accordingly, the award was announced by the Land Acquisition Collector and the respondent was paid as under Compensation for the land Rs.1750.00 Interest 12 on Rs.1750 from Oct. 1972 to 31.3.87 in the nature of equitable companypensation as per order dated 23.7.1986 of Honble High Court. No.125/86 and the High Court by its order dated July 23, 1986 held that On the amount of companypensation payable to the petitioner in respect of land, interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum shall be paid from the date of the taking over of possession till the date of payment of interim companypensation and of final companypensation, if there is enhancement. of the companypensation from October 19, 1972 to March 1987.
v. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Hyderabad 1995 3 SCC 208, a bench of three Judges to which one of us B.L. Hansaria, J. was a member, dealt with the power of the Court to grant interest on equitable companysideration and held thus It has also been submitted by Shri Madhava Reddy that higher rate of interest may be ordered to do equity between the parties. Notification under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act was published on February 27, 1986 and the Collector passed the award on March 29, 1987. Dissatisfied therewith, the respondent had filed C.W.P. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1995_533.txt |
Exhibit 35 disclosed that the knife was stained with human blood while the clothes of the appellant were stained with blood group A which was the blood group of Balya, the deceased. P.W.2 also stated that P.W.1 Tulsabai opened the door which was latched from inside and she ran outside the house. The appellant, who was sitting on the company outside the house, stated to have went inside the house while P.W.1 was standing at the entrance of the house. Balya went inside the house for washing his hands. P.W.1 he rushed towards her house where he saw the appellant standing outside his house and that the door was closed. Thereafter, the deceased asked W.1 to serve food for him which she did inside the house. The deceased stated to have asked his father, appellant herein, to sleep inside the house and, thereafter, the appellant went inside which was being watched by P.W.1 who was standing near the door of the house. P.W.1, the wife of the appellant, is also the mother of the deceased. Exhibit 36 disclosed that the blood group of the appellant as B group. He admitted that the appellant was holding a knife in his hand and was standing outside the house. Apart from the exclusive presence of the appellant with a weapon in his hand as deposed by P.W.2, the other two persons were the deceased and P.W.1. Then P.W.1 stated to have heard the cries of the deceased to the effect that he was dying and when she asked him, he replied that he was stabbed by the appellant and that she cried for help to which the neighbours gathered who took the deceased in an auto rickshaw to the hospital and that thereafter she lodged the report Exhibit 38. In the cross examination P.W.1 came out with the information that the deceased was under the influence of liquor and that whenever he was under the influence of liquor he used to throw the household articles and also beat himself. As per her version before the Court on the date of the incident she was present along with her husband, when the deceased in the first instance asked the appellant whether he had his dinner and thereafter W.1 served dinner to the deceased inside the house. The admission of P.W.1 that the deceased had drinking habit and that whenever he was under the influence of liquor he used to create a ruckus in the house was a factor which had to be necessarily borne in mind while companysidering the offence alleged and proved against the appellant. After investigation, P.W.3 stated to have arrested the appellant at 1.50 a.m and drew the scene of occurrence in the presence of Panchas under Exhibit 45, seized the clothes of the appellant under seizure memo Exhibit 46, seized the knife under seizure memo Exhibit 47 and also seized two blood stained bed sheets, simple and blood stained soil from the spot in the presence of Panch witnesses under seizure memo Exhibit 48 which were sent for chemical analyzer report. It is stated that on being admitted in the hospital, it was declared that the deceased succumbed to the injuries. The appellant stated to have companye out of the house by shouting to the effect that he had stabbed the deceased and on hearing shouts the appellants brother one Sunil Chandrabhan Bansod arrived at the spot and arranged for an auto rickshaw to take the deceased to Irwin Hospital, Amravati. It is sated that at that point of time she saw the appellant inflicting a stab injury on the deceased on which the deceased raised shouts about the inflicting of the injury by his father and so saying he also fell down. The report of the chemical analyzer was marked as Exhibits 30, 35 and 36. According to P.W.2, a neighbour of the house, on hearing the cries of a lady i.e. The printed First Information Report is Exhibit 39. P.W.2 was declared hostile. According to the companyplainant, on 09.07.2004 between 9.30 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. while her husband, the appellant herein, was sleeping on a wooden company which was in the front companyrt yard of the house, her son Balya the deceased, came from outside and asked the appellant as to whether he had taken his dinner to which the appellant replied in the negative. The brief facts which are required to be stated are that on 10.07.2004 W.1 Tulsabai preferred a companyplaint under Exhibit 38 with P.W.3 PSI Madhav Dhande attached to Police Station Frezarpura, Amravati which came to be registered as Crime No.138/2004. Whatever be the subsequent versions made by P.Ws 1 and 2 before the Court, it came out in evidence that at the time of occurrence there were only three persons, namely, the appellant, P.W.1 and the deceased. According to him, when he asked the appellant as to what happened, the appellant, who was holding a knife in his hand, informed P.W.2 that he gave one blow to his son which made him sleep for ever. To the suggestion put to W.4 that the injury mentioned in postmortem report companyld have been caused by the knife of 19 cm. As per the opinion of P.W.4, the probable cause of death was the injury to the vital organ like liver which caused internal haemorrhage and shock. In the 313 questioning the appellant totally denied the offence alleged against him. in width, the same was denied by him. in length and 4 cm. On framing of the charges for the offence under Section 302 of IPC, the trial was held against the appellant in which four witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench dated 01.12.2011 passed in Criminal Appeal No.84 of 2006. | 1 | train | 2012_836.txt |
Nairn, Mohd. One Manzoor Hussain was admittedly the tenant of a premises located at Aligarh. The widow and the sons and the daughter of Manzoor companytinued to live in the tenanted premises on payment of rent. Nadeem and a daughterNuzhat. When numberice was issued from the Court of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Aligarh, respondent 2 herein, the appellant entered companytest by filing an affidavit to the affect that he has been living with 13 members of his family in the premises and rent was being companylected from him following the death of his father Manzoor Hussain. It is the case of the appellant that being the eldest member of the family he was paying that rent. Azeem the appellant , Mohd. The Prescribed Authority did number accept the companytention of the appellant and held that the house in question must be deemed to have become vacant when Nairn, who was a member of the family, had built a house. The Rent Control Inspector submitted a report on June 22, 1983, that Nairn, appellants brother, had built a house four or five years before in Amir Nisan, a part of the city of Aligarh and, therefore, the tenancy must be deemed to have terminated in view of the provisions companytained in Section 12 of the U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 Act for short . He died in 1969 leaving behind a widow and three sonsMohd. The appellant, who filed a writ application before the Allahabad High Court assailing the revisional order of the District Judge of Aligarh, is in appeal by special leave. The revisional authority placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Appellant carried a revision before the District Judge, respondent 1, which was dismissed. | 1 | train | 1985_116.txt |
No.18 of 2004 before the MRTP Commission to take possession of the allotted plot. He submitted that the order dated 13.09.2007 passed by the MRTP Commission directing handing over possession of the plot to the companyplainant is thus without jurisdiction. For deciding the companytention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the order dated 13.09.2007 of the MRTP Commission was a companysent order, we must look at the order dated 13.09.2007 of the MRTP Commission, which is quoted hereinbelow We have heard the arguments for some time of the parties. By the order dated 13.09.2007, the MRTP Commission also directed the petitioners to furnish a fresh SSI certificate to the respondents and directed that the matter be listed on 01.11.2007 for further directions. Instead of handing over possession of the allotted plot to the petitioners, the respondents filed Review Application No.16 of 2007 on 18.12.2007 and by the impugned order dated 04.03.2009 the MRTP Commission allowed the Review Application and recalled the order dated 13.09.2007 insofar as it directed the respondents to handover possession of the plot to the petitioners. Thus, the companytention of the petitioners that the order dated 13.09.207 of the MRTP Commission was a companysent order is misconceived. The petitioners then filed a companyplaint UTPE No.119 of 2000 before the MRTP Commission and after numberice to the respondents the companyplaint was heard from time to time. Earlier the companyplainant had submitted a provisional SSI certificate which is already expired. The SSI certificate earlier submitted by the companyplainant was provisional and has already expired. On 13.09.2007, the MRTP Commission passed an order directing that the respondent shall handover possession of the allotted plot within next two weeks to the companyplainant and as regards the balance amount, if any due, the respondents shall submit a detailed chart giving the dates on which the subsequent installments were due and the amount payable on each due date. 16 of 2007 was filed beyond 30 days and belatedly, he submitted that under Section 13 2 of the MRTP Act, the MRTP Commission has the power to revoke any order passed by it at any time. The petitioners paid 10 of the companyt of the plot on 23.03.1994. However, physical possession of the plot was number given to the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners had number paid all the dues for the plot. Dwivedi, Chairman Sri D.C. Gupta, Member On a reading of the order of the order dated 13.09.2007, we do number find that the directions in the said order to the respondents to handover the possession of the plot to the petitioners was based on the companysent of the learned Advocates appearing for the respondents and this is what has been held by the MRTP Commission also in the impugned order dated 04.03.2009. These are petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution for leave to appeal against the order dated 04.03.2009 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, New Delhi, for short the MRTP Commission in Review Application No.16 of 2007 and the order dated 05.01.2010 of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, in Review Application No.06 of 2009. In response to the advertisement, the petitioners applied for a plot and on 05.03.1994 a plot of 800 square metres in Site C was allotted. It is number disputed by the petitioners that Review Application No. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed Review Application No.06 of 2009 before the Competition Appellate Tribunal and by the impugned order dated 05.01.2010, the Competition Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Review Application of the petitioners. Respondent shall handover the possession within next two weeks thereafter to the companyplainant. Relying on the decision of this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Ved Prakash Aggarwal 2008 7 SCC 686, he submitted that the MRTP Commission has numberpower to direct handing over possession of the plot to the companyplainant and it is only the Civil Court which companyld while granting a decree of specific enforcement of the companytract direct the defendants to handover possession to the plaintiffs. In reply to the submission on behalf of the petitioners that Review Application No. Complainant number undertakes to furnish the fresh SSI certificate to the respondent positively within one month. The other companytroversy is regarding the formalities namely certificate of SSI Registration and a NOC from Pollution Control Department of the State. A companyy of the order be given dasti to the companyplainant. Therefore, an issuance of that certificate by the companycerned authority will number stand in the way of their issuing a fresh SSI certificate. The parties are at issue regarding the balance amount payable by the companyplainant to the respondent towards balance installments or interest thereon. The General Manager, District Industry Centre, Greater NOIDA is directed to issue the SSI certificate at the earliest after companypliance of the necessary formalities. As regards the balance amount if any due, the respondents shall submit a detailed chart giving the dates at which the subsequent installments were due and amount payable on each due date. It has been pointed out by the learned companynsel for the respondent that the companyplainant should hand over these documents to Mr. Dinesh Jain, Legal Adviser of UPSIDC at Surajpur Office with intimation to the companynsel for the respondent who will ensure that the possession is delivered to the companyplainant within next two weeks. While the companyplaint was pending, petitioners filed I.A. The facts very briefly are that the respondents published an advertisement in the Hindustan Times, New Delhi inviting applications from entrepreneurs for allotment of industrial land in Greater NOIDA on payment of 10 of the companyt of allotted land. He submitted that this Court in Kiran Singh and Others vs. Chaman Paswan and others AIR 1954 SC 340 has held that an order without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged in companylateral proceedings. List on 1st November, 2007 for further directions. Honble J. Sri O.P. K. PATNAIK, J. | 0 | train | 2012_217.txt |
On 9 3 1968, according to Sutar, Balwantsingh him self went to Sutar. On 4 3 1968, the truck met with an accident and Balwantsingh Uttamsingh is said to have sent information of it to S. D. Sutar. He had entrusted Balwant Singh Uttam Singh, the brother of the appellant, with the truck. It is against Balwantsingh Uttamsingh and makes numberallegations against the present appellant. 2200/ p.m. from Balwantsingh Uttamsingh who was running the truck and seemed to be incurring all necessary expenses of it. Thereafter, Balwantsingh Uttamsingh, the driver, avoided meeting the purchaser of the truck and was said to be absconding. It is said that Balwant Singh Uttarnsingh had met S. D. Sutar again on 12 3 1968 and told him that he would turn up again. I do number know whether Balwant Singh left with M Lorry in Dec. 1967. Balwant Singh is my brother but I do number know if the companyplainant had given lorry in his possession in his capacity as a driver. S. D. Sutar stated that he found the truck at Thana Katha where he also found the appellant before us, Karnalsingh Uttamsingh, who had been, apparently, driving the truck. As Shankar Dhondiba Sutar had number paid up the whole amount due for the truck which he had borrowed from the Society, the owner of the truck, as entered in the Insurance papers, was the Society itself. I do number know whether M Lorry No. He had a companytract with Balwant Singh Uttam Singh under which he used to get a net income of Rs. Vazir Singh Gaya Singh, PW 2, the Secretary of the Bombay Ex Servicemen Transport Co. deposed that S. D. Sutar was a shareholder in the Company and proved the terms of his companytract with Balwantsingh. The prosecution evidence in the case was one Shankar Dhondiba Sutar a member of the Ex Servicemen Transport Cooperative Society Ltd., Bombay, had purchased the Truck No. had told me to take the lorry at the Pydhonie Police Stn. Mangal Singh told me that this lorry had met with an accident and that I should invest the amount over repair, and after the amount is recovered from the plying of the lorry, the lorry would be returned to him. I do number know anything about Balwant Singh number meeting the companyplainant thereafter. The First Information Report was lodged on 20 4 1968 at 12.30 p.m. by S. D. Sutar. All that he said was that the truck was seen near Kashali Bridge and the present accused was its driver. 7372 valued at Rs. It is true that Vazir Singh and one P.C. 43,000/ . The appellant before us by special leave was charged as follows by the Presidency Magistrate of Bombay B. P. Saptarshi, Presidency Magistrate 6th Court, Mazaagaon, Bombay, do hereby charge you Karnal Singh S o Uttam Singh as follows That you on or about the 20th day of February, 1968 at Bombay along with one Balwant Singh s o Uttam Singh who has absconded, at 171, Kazi Sayyed Street, being entrusted with certain property to wit M Lorry No. 52,000/ belonging to the companyplainant Shankar Dhondiba Sutar as driver companymitted criminal breach of trust in respect of the said property and aided and abetted to the absconding accused in companymission of the said offence and thereby companymitted an offence punishable under Sec. MRS 7372 after taking a loan of Rs. MRS 7372 was handed over to the companyplainant on sale purchase agreement and that the companyplainant had paid Rs. 50,000/ from the Society out of which he had paid up Rs. Sub Inspector Ramesh Damodar, PW 3, stated that, on 13 5 1968, Vazir Singh, PW 2, and a police companystable brought the truck to Pydhonie Police Station and that it was being driven by the present appellant at that time. And, when the owner asked him to take him to the truck, it is alleged that he did number companyply with this request. 43,000/ towards the instalment. I do number know where is my brother at present. It has been translated as follows Ext.1 Dated 12 3 1968. I was the driver on the said vehicle at that time. I do number know whether the price was fixed at Rs. 50,000/ . 2000/ to Rs. 1354 lf 1 969. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal N4. This amount was paid regularly upto December, 1967. 408 r.w. M. Sikka for the appellant. And I hereby direct that you be tried by me on the said charge. The only question that the appellant was asked by the learned Magistrate under Section 342 Criminal Procedure Code and the appellants reply are What do you wish to say with reference to the evidence given and recorded against you? 133 of 1971. He also made numbercomplaint whatsoever against the present appellant. 114 of the Indian Penal Code and within my companynizance. C. Bhandare and M. N. Shroff for Respondent. This is all the evidence against the appellant. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 15 2 1971 of the Borrrbay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J. K. Gambhir and 5. | 1 | train | 1975_357.txt |
1, Hanumangarh Camp Sangaria dated 8.10.1999 directing to submit herself to medical examination on the question as to whether she is of unsound mind. By an order dated 8.10.1999 the said application was allowed directing the appellant to submit herself to the medical examination. Whether a party to a divorce proceeding can be companypelled to a medical examination is the companye question involved in this appeal. The parties herein were married on 26.6.1991 according to the Hindu rites. He filed an application seeking directions for medical examination of the appellant on 5th May, 1999. 1414/99 dismissing an application filed by the appellant herein questioning an order of the Addl. On or about 3.6.1995, the respondent filed an application for divorce against the appellant under Section 12 1 b and 13 1 iii of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This question arises out of a judgment dated 17.11.1999 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. The appellant objected thereto inter alia on the ground that the Court had numberjurisdiction to pass such directions. Civil Revision Petition No. Aggrieved by the said order, she filed a Revision Petition before the High Court which was dismissed by the impugned judgment. B. Sinha, J. | 0 | train | 2003_156.txt |
3 on seeing the deceased companying on scooter from the opposite side at a high speed had stopped the bus and when the scooter companylided with the bumper of the bus, the bus was in a stationary companydition. 3 herein, who was driving the bus in high speed. When he reached at a place known as Nabahi, an accident took place between the said scooter and bus having registration No. On 31.05.2001, the deceased Upamnyu, who was the only son of the appellants herein, was driving scooter having registration No. HP 28 215 from Mandi side towards Sarkaghat. The appellants claimed that the said accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of respondent No. 441 of 2003 whereby the amount of companypensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mandi for short, the Tribunal in Claim Petition No. The Tribunal vide award dated 01.07.20013, while relying on the testimony of PW 3 Lekh Ram and other evidence placed on record, returned a categorical finding that the said accident has taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus as the bus driver did number blow the horn at the site where there is a curve and, thus, awarded companypensation of Rs.3,17,200/ along with interest. Since the deceased got injured in that accident, he was taken to C.HC. 3 herein, namely, Gian Chand, driver in R.T.C., Region Sakarghat, Mandi, H.P. HP 28 715, which was being driven by respondent No. Sakarghat and thereafter when he was being taken to PGI Chandigarh, he died on his way. The appellants by way of this appeal has impugned the judgment dated 27.03.2006 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in FAO No. It was averred by the appellants that the deceased, who was a student, was also doing agriculture and household work earning Rs.4,000/ per month and they being parents of the deceased were dependant upon him. With these averments, the appellants filed a claim petition under Section 166 of The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for short, the said Act on 21.07.2001 and sought companypensation to the tune of Rs.15 lakhs. Against the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal, the respondents filed an appeal under Section 173 of the said Act before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla, which was registered as FAO No. V.RAMANA,J. The appellants have companye in appeal against this judgment dated 27.03.2006. The respondents companytested the claim of the appellants on the ground that respondent No. | 1 | train | 1947_75.txt |
58 59/71. 437/67 and 520/68 and tax cases number. 58 59 and 880 883 of 1971.
from the judgment and order dated 10 4 1970 of the madras high companyrt in writ petition number. 58 59 of 1971 arise out of a judgment of a division bench of the madras high court dismissing two writ petitions filed against numberices issued by a companymercial tax officer showing institution of sales tax assessment proceedings in respect of certain iron and steel goods for the assessment year 1965 66 in writ petition number 437 of 1967 and for the assessment year 1966 67 in writ petition number 520 of 1968.
moreover this very question was also before the high companyrt in regular revision petitions under the tamil nadu sales tax act hereinafter referred to as the tamil nadu act . so long as iron and steel companytinue to be raw materials they enjoy the exemption. 437 of 1967 and 520 of 1968.
hence six cases were connected and heard together by us. 880 883 of 1971 arise out of four petitions for revision under the provisions of the tamil nadu act for the years 1964 65 and 1965 66 which were allowed by the madras high companyrt 4 setting aside assessment orders by following its judgment and decision mentioned above given on 24 6 1970 on writ petitions number. scrap iron purchased by the respondent was merely re rolled into bars flats and plates. 135 138 of 1970 respectively. p. h. parekh and miss manju jetley for the intervener m s durga steel the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by beg j. the two civil appeals number. ram reddy a. v. rangam and miss a. subhashini for the appellant in c.as. sachin chandra chaudhury and mrs.
s. gopalakrishnan for respondent. gobind das. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. civil appeals number. | 1 | test | 1976_3.txt |
The Consolidation Officer rejected the objection and the respondents filed an appeal. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation agreed with the respondents and allowed the objection. 4, Sheo Narain, a minor, whose father was suffering from a disqualification within the meaning of Clause d of Section 157 1 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act , they were companyered by Section 157 and companysequently the provision of Section 21 1 h were attracted. Consolidation of Holdings Act, companytending that the names of the appellants were wrongly recorded in place of their names as sirdars with respect to the land in question. According to the case of the respondents they were the tenants and the appellants were subtenants under them when the zamindari was abolished in Uttar Pradesh. 3 and 4 filed on objection under Section 9 A of the U.P. On that basis it is claimed that the appellants who were their sub tenants acquired the status of asamis and number that of adhivasis. 3, Ram Narain, was a paralytic patient and respondent No. 3 and 4 were entitled to the benefit arising out of the provisions of Section 21 1 h read with Section 157 was decided against the appellants and the High Court rightly refused to re examine the companytroversy which was set at rest by findings of fact. The appellants denied the allegations and prayed for dismissal of the objection. The appellants after unsuccessfully moving the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. In view of the subsequent amendment in the law the respondents claimed the rights of bhumidhars. An attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the appellants before us to re open the issue but we declined to go into that question which is dependent on evidence. Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. An appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the High Court Rules was also dismissed by a Division Bench by the judgment which is the subject matter of the present civil appeal by special leave. The respondents No. As the respondent No. | 1 | train | 1990_494.txt |
Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant died on 7 5 1999. The proceedings for declaring the appellants as purchaser under Section 32 G were initiated during the lifetime of the landlady, Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant but the mutation Entry No. On 12 5 1975, Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant executed last will and testament in favour of Anant Mahadev Sawant, Respondent 1. Proceedings under Section 32 G for declaring the appellants as purchasers were initiated during the lifetime of the landlady and the same were suspended on 8 1 1964 during the lifetime of the landlady being a widow. Ratnagiri, Maharashtra for fixing the purchase price under Section 32 G of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act . The appellants, aggrieved by the order of the Sub Divisional Officer, filed a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. Aggrieved against the order dated 9 9 2011, Respondent 1 filed an appeal under Section 74 of the 1948 Act before Respondent 3, Sub Divisional Officer, Ratnagiri, Maharashtra. The predecessor of the appellants were tenants prior to 1956 1957 i.e. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by a companymon order dated 20 4 2013 dismissed the revisions and companyfirmed the order of the Sub Divisional Officer. There were other revisions filed by several other tenants who were aggrieved by the order of the Sub Divisional Officer. Respondent 2 held that predecessors of the appellants were tenants prior to 1956 1957. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held that applicants were under legal obligation to give intimation expressing their desire to purchase within time stipulated under Section 32 F, which having number been given, numberright of purchase is available to applicants. The name of Respondent 1 was mutated in the revenue records on 29 2 2000, with regard to which numbernotice was issued to the appellants, hence they were number aware of either the death of Indirabai or mutation in favour of Respondent 1. Aggrieved against the judgment of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, writ petitions were filed by the appellants and several other similarly situated tenants. prior to 1 4 1957. All the writ petitions were dismissed by companymon judgment dated 1 8 2014 Arjun Hari Kamble v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4931 of the High Court, against which judgment, these appeals have been filed. In the year 2008, when the appellants came to know that the landlady has died and in her place, name of Respondent 1 has been mutated, they filed an application on 5 9 2008 before Respondent 2 Additional Tahsildar A.L.T. Respondent 3 held that the appellant ought to have issued numberice under Section 32 F within the time as prescribed and numbernotice having been issued within the time as prescribed, the appellants have lost right of purchase. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was amended by Act 15 of 1957. Respondent 2 allowed the application of the appellants by order dated 9 9 2011. Respondent 2 fixed the purchase price and directed the appellants to deposit the same to enable issue of sale certificate in favour of the appellants. Respondent 3 allowed the appeal vide its order dated 8 1 2013. Respondent 1 filed reply and opposed the said application. | 0 | train | 2019_561.txt |
The appellant filed an application to dismiss the writ petition and direct the respondent to avail himself of the statutory remedy. The matter relates to promotion to the post of Chief Engineer, Level 11 in U.R Jal Nigam. The Division Bench, by the impugned order dated 19 1 1994, held that since the pleadings were companyplete, it was number necessary to relegate the parties to the Tribunal to avail themselves of the statutory remedy and that, therefore, dismissed the application. The respondent, who was also a government servant filed the writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad at Lucknow Bench seeking relief as regards his service grievance and the High Court entertained the writ petition and directed the parties to companyplete their pleadings. Thus, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1994_699.txt |
The respondent along with one Sitaram was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for having allegedly companymitting the murder of one Maharu, on 1.5.1992 at about 6.00 p.m. in village Antapur Shivar. Upon trial, the appellant was companyvicted but Sitaram acquitted. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court vide the judgment impugned in this appeal by special leave. | 0 | train | 2002_1207.txt |
The first respondent refuted his liability to pay the arrears of tax on the ground he had transferred the vehicle to the second respondent as early as on 2.1.Tl. The case pertained to the owner of a goods vehicle who was prosecuted under Section 12 1 a of the Taxation Act for numberpayment of tax for a certain period during which the vehicle was companyered by a certificate of fitness and there was also numberevidence that the vehicle had been put to use on the roads even without a certificate fitness. The Chief Judicial Magistrate accepted the defence of the respondents and held that since the first respondent had sold the vehicle he was number liable to pay the arrears of tax and likewise the second respondent too was number liable to pay the tax because the vehicle did number have a fitness certificate and had been left in a workshop for repairs being carried out. MYH 3797, to the second respondent on 2.1.71 but neither of the respondents reported the transfer of the vehicle to the Regional Transport Offi cer in companypliance with the terms of Sub Section 1 a and Sub Section 1 b of Section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act. A demand numberice was then issued to the second respondent and he too refuted his liability to pay the arrears of tax on the plea that the vehicle was number in a fit companydition and it had been lying in a workshop during the relevant period without repairs being affected for want of spare parts. The first respondent sold his goods vehicle, to wit a 12 ton lorry bearing Registration No. The objective of the State of Karnataka in filing this Appeal by Special Leave is to seek a pronounce ment of this Court on the scope and effect of Section 3 1 of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 number the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act 1957 and number to pursue the prosecutorial action against respondents 1 and 2 for their companytravention of certain provisions of the said Act. This led to a demand numberice being issued to the first respondent to pay the arrears of tax together with penalty. Since both the respondents failed to pay the arrears of tax the Transport Authorities filed a companyplaint against them under Section 3 1 read with Section 12 t a of the Taxa tion Act in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mangalore. In the trial of the case the second respondent sought to prove his defence by examining the owner of a workshop known as Lokmata Garage and filing several defence exhibits. For taking such a view and acquitting the respondents, the learned Magistrate relied on a decision of the Karnataka High Court in State v. Boodi Reddappa. 169 of 1976 B. Datar, Swaraj Kaushal and M.A. From the Judgment and Order dated 26.3.1976 of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Appeal No. Even so, the facts of the criminal case filed against the re spondents and the reasons for their acquittal require men tion for a proper companyprehension of the legal issues involved in the case. R. Nagaraja for the Respondent. 19751 Karnataka Law Journal p. The State preferred an appeal against the acquittal to the High Court but the High Court dismissed the appeal in limine and hence the present appeal by special leave by the State. This position was companyceded by the learned companynsel for the State even at the companymencement of his arguments. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Khan for the Appellants. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN, J. 2 of 1977. | 1 | train | 1987_252.txt |
Jalal and Mohd. The TI Parade was held on 3.4.1998 and the appellant and other accused were companyrectly identified by PW 3. Vishwas Jain PW 3 companyrectly identified the appellant. With reference to the statement of Renu Jain PW 1 and Vishwas Jain PW 3 it was companytended that there was possibility of the appellant having been shown to the companyplainant and his wife. It was stated that the Test Identification Parade in short TI Parade was done after a period of over 7 days. The TI Parade was done on 3.4.1998, the accused was arrested on 27.3.1998 and on 28.3.1998 the accused was produced by the SHO at the residence of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No.6 and prayer was made for police custody remand. It was pointed out that PW 1 had accepted that his wife, PW 1 had number gone for the identification. The evidence of Shri Ratish Kumar Garg PW 12 the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jaipur shows that on 3.4.1998 he was working as Judicial Magistrate and on the direction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur the accused appellant alongwith others were brought for the TI Parade. Babul, Mohd. Appellant Mohd. On 31.3.1998 the SHO again produced the appellant before the Magistrate and on both occasions the Magistrate recorded that the accused was produced Baparda. Thereafter, the accused also tied the mouth, hands and legs of Vishwas Jain PW 3 and his wife Renu PW 1 and then bolted them inside the bathroom and having threatened them at the point of pistal and knife, the accused looted the gold and silver ornaments, companyns and cash. Kalam was arrested on 27.3.1998. Complainant Vishwas managed to companye out of the bathroom through a window and then telephonically informed the police personnel of Police Station, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows In the intervening night of 8 9th May, 1994 when Vishwas PW 3 and his wife Renu Jain PW 1 were sleeping in their house situated in Mauji Colony, Malviya Nagar, Jaipur, five persons entered the house and tied their servant Chaturbhuj who was sleeping in the basement of the house. Co accused Saidulla was also arrested but he absconded during trial and is still absconding. The investigating agency arrested three accused, namely, Mohd. Learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that only on the basis of identification by PW 3 the companyviction should number have been recorded. After arrest, Test Identification Parade was companyducted and after companypletion of investigation, police submitted charge sheet against the appellant. The basic challenge before the High Court was to the possibility of identification. On the application for remand, the Magistrate allowed the police custody till 31.3.1998. Ansari and after companypletion of investigation submitted charge sheet against them for offence under Section 395 IPC. It was also numbered that the said witness was believed in respect of the identification of three other accused persons who had earlier faced trial and had been companyvicted for offence punishable under Section 395 IPC and on appeal their companyviction had been upheld by the High Court. The High Court also companysidered the evidence of PWs 1 and 3 and came to hold that it was crystal clear that PW 3 had ample opportunity to identify the appellant. Vide judgment dated 13.4.1998 the High Court dismissed the appeals of Mohd. At the companyclusion of trial, the leaned trial Judge vide its judgment dated 31.3.1997 held the accused appellant guilty and accordingly companyvicted and sentenced them. Investigation as against the appellant and companyaccused Saidulla was kept pending under Section 173 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code . These three accused challenged their companyviction by filing appeals before the High Court. By the said judgment, the appellant was companyvicted for offence punishable under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short IPC . Challenge in the appeal before the High Court was to the judgment and order dated 10.4.2002 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge Fast Track Class II, Jaipur. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench. The miscreants stayed in their house for about an hour. 489 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP Crl. 4178 of 2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J Leave granted. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/ with default stipulation. Learned companynsel for the respondent State supported the judgment of the trial Court. High Court did number accept the plea. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. | 0 | train | 2008_462.txt |
It is stated that Gajoo and Rampal both did number want to give any land to Taradevi. When they reached near the house of Taradevi, in the light of torches that they were carrying, they saw that Gajoo and Rampal were throttling her in the Aangan companyrtyard of her house and Gajoo was holding Daranti, Ext. PW2 and PW3 were carrying their torches and in the light of the torches they saw that accused Gajoo was armed with a Daranti, Ext. Gajoo, the accused appellant, is the brother in law of deceased Taradevi i.e. Taradevi, the deceased was married to one Gajaram. On the basis of Ext. He reached the place of incident and did Panchayatnama of the companypse of Taradevi. The trial companyrt awarded life imprisonment to the accused Gajoo, as the accused Rampal had died during the pendency of the appeal. Dr. Chopra in his report Ext. On being challenged, both these witnesses were threatened by Gajoo stating that they should go away from there. On their way back both PW2 and PW3 heard moaning sounds when they reached near the house of Taradevi. From this marriage, she had two children namely Rampal and Guddu PW4 . PW1 had lodged the written report vide Ext. Ka 1, the FIR, a Check Report, Ext. Ka 6, he numbericed that there were wounds on the companypse and prepared a Report Ext. The statement of PW4 has to be read companylectively along with the statement of PW1, PW2 and PW3. 2 with which he was hitting the deceased and accused Rampal had held her down, in the Aangan companyrtyard of her house. After the demise of her husband, there were some disputes regarding the division of property between the deceased, on the one hand, and her elder son, Rampal and brother in law, Gajoo on the other. He was also staying separate, though near the house of Taradevi. Blood stained soil, Ext 3 and plain soil samples, Ext 4 were companylected from the spot, and a site plan, Ext. PW5, Gudru has proved recovery of Ext. He partly supported the case of prosecution as he affirmed that there was a dispute with regard to the land between his mother and uncle Gajoo, but stated that he did number know as to who had killed his mother. After performing autopsy on the body of the deceased, vide Ext. As already numbericed, according to them, when they were on their way back from the house of Chetu Ram after taking part in Satyanarain Katha, they heard the cries of deceased, Taradevi. He stated that he too had gone to attend the Katha at the house of Chetu Ram and in the morning, when he returned, he saw his mother dead. After the death of his mother, PW4, Guddu, minor son of the deceased had gone to his uncles house to inform him about his mothers death and thereafter, his uncle lodged the report to the police. Ka 16, was prepared. Ka 11 was prepared. Ka 12 was prepared. PW4 was a minor, when he saw his mother dead in the year 1987. The next morning, information of the incident was given by PW4 to his maternal uncle Bhadu Ram, who was examined as PW1. Dr. U.K. Chopra of Doon Hospital on 3rd July, 1987 prepared the Post Mortem Report, Ext. On the night of 1st July, 1987, a Satyanarayan Katha had been organised by Chetu Ram at his house in the village Kotda Kalyanpur. 2 which was used in the crime and recovery memo, Ext. The elder son Rampal was married and had been living separately with his family though in the same village. The Investigating Officer filed the report before the Court in terms of Section 172 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code, charging the accused appellant Gajoo and Rampal, both under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short IPC . PW2 and PW3 who were examined as eye witnesses have fully supported the case of the prosecution. PW2, Asharam and PW3, Kewalram along with other people were returning back to their homes at midnight. After the unfortunate death of her husband Gajaram, she used to live with her younger son Guddu. Ka 1 at Police Station, Sahaspur at about 10.30 in the morning. According to him, PW4 had number companypletely stated the case of the prosecution, and therefore, the accused was entitled to acquittal. With the motive of grabbing the entire land, PW1 has falsely implicated both the accused. The Daranti and blood stained pyjama which were recovered, were number sent for FSL examination and numberserological report was obtained. A number of residents of the village had gone to attend the Katha. In the cross examination, PW4 has made certain statements which numberdoubt, do number support the case of the prosecution. Upon receiving information, the matter was reported by PW1 to the police in the morning of 2nd July, 1987. In support of his companytention, the learned companynsel for the appellant had laid a lot of emphasis on the statement of PW4. While impugning the judgment under appeal and praying for an order of acquittal, the learned companynsel appearing for the appellant has primarily and with some emphasis companytended that PW2 and PW3, the so called eye witnesses, are number genuine and are related to PW1. Ka 10 also recorded the following findings On internal examination, under injury No. Investigation Officer, PW6, in the witness box narrated the entire case of the prosecution and the investigation companyducted by him. He stated that he had number given the names of the murderers to his uncle. her husbands younger brother. The larynx and trachea were found companygested. When they tried to intervene, they were threatened. Sub Inspector Brahma Singh, PW6 started investigation in the matter. Then he sent the body for post mortem examination to Dehradun. Both lungs were found companygested. His statement was recorded on 22nd January, 1990 i.e. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial companyrt, the accused preferred an appeal before the High Court which came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 7th April, 2008. Swatanter Kumar, J. The dispute was related to the agricultural land. These two witnesses are stated to have neither raised any alarm number disclosed the incident to anyone. They faced trial before the Court of Sessions Judge and were companyvicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC vide judgment dated 2nd July, 1990. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital dated 7th April, 2008 passed in Criminal Appeal No. Their presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful. The High Court companyfirmed both the judgment of companyviction and order of sentence passed by the trial companyrt, giving rise to the present appeal. more than two and a half years after the date of occurrence. One Smt. | 0 | train | 2012_361.txt |
The main companytention of the tenant was that there was numbersub letting or parting with the possession of the shop, that Hira Lal was a relative of the tenant who died some time prior to 1958, that Sri Bhagwan is the son of the tenant, and that the name of the business was given as M s Hira Lal Sri Bhagwan in memory of the deceased relative Hira Lal. He further pleaded that the possession of the shop is with the tenant. A reply statement was filed by the land lord to the effect that though Sri Bhagwan was the natural son of the tenant Duli Chand, he had been given in adoption to Hira Lal, that on such adoption Sri Bhagwan had gone out of the family of the respondent and that it was a clear case of sub letting or parting with the possession of the shop. The tenant is the appellant. The other witness was Upper Division Clerk in the Sales Tax Department and his evidence was that Sri Bhagwan was an assessee of the Department and as per the records in his office the fathers name of Sri Bhagwan was Hira Lal. Road, Delhi, on the ground that the tenant Duli Chand has sublet or parted with the possession of the said shop after 9th day of June, 1952 to M s Hira Lal Sri Bhagwan illegally and without the written companysent of the landlord. The second appeal filed by the tenant to the High Court was dismissed companyfirming the finding of the Rent Control Tribunal that the tenant had parted with possession of the tenanted shop. Ram Panjwani and Vijay Panjwani for the Appellant. Avadh Behari Rohtagi and P.N. The re spondent landlord filed a petition under section 14 1 b of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 hereinafter referred to as the Act for an order of eviction of the appellant tenant for a shop bearing No. 25 A Azadpur, G.T. 1810 of 1982. 361 Old No. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.3.1982 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. 204 of 1980. Some other defences like the Respondent petitioner was number a landlord, that he had numberlocus standi to file the petition for eviction, and that the numberice of termination of tenancy was number valid, were taken in the written statement and they were overruled and do number survive for companysideration in this appeal. Gupta for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAMASWAMI, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 0 | train | 1989_418.txt |
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes was companyfined to initial recruitment. Up till that date reservation for Scheduled Castes. 3 belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The first out of every five initial recruitments was reserved for, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes. Thus, if numberScheduled Castes Tribes Backward Classes candidate is promoted against any of the first 10 vacancies the number of vacancies available to such candidates in the following block will betwo. On September 12, 1963, the Government of Punjab passed the following order Subject Reservation for the members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes in promotion cases. In case an out of turn promotion has already been given to a candidate belonging to Scheduled Castes Tribes or Backward Classes against a reserved vacancy and then in the same block it happens to be the turn of a candidate belonging to the said castes classes for promotion, such candidate should number be ignored on the ground that 10 per cent reservation has already been exhausted. However, if Sheduled Castes Tribes candidates are available to fill one out of every ten vacancies, the specific reservation in favour of other Backward Classes should be the, 51st vacancy. It has number been decided that except in the case of All India Services 10 per cent of the higher posts to be filled by promotion should be reserved for the members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes 9 per cent for the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and 1 per cent for the Backward Classes subject to the following companyditions a the persons to be companysidered must possess the minimum necessary qualification and b they should have at least a satisfactory record I of service. Sir, I am directed to refer you to the subject numbered above and to say that at present reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes is applicable to new appointments and number to promotions which are governed by companysideration of merit and seniority alone. So far as Scheduled Castes Tribes are companycerned, the very first vacancy existing on arising after the 12th September, 1963, should retreated as reserved for them and only if numbersuch official is available for promotion against the vacancy reserved for them in the first block of 10 vacancies, a candidate belonging to other Backward Classes may be selected in preference to the remaining officials against one such post only out of one hundred, since the reservation for other Backward Classes may number exceed I per cent. One reserved vacancy should be carried over to the next block of ten vacancies in case it cannot be filled up within any block of ten posts. That clarification reads To illustrate the above point if there is an official of the Scheduled Castes placed at a position say 73rd in a list prepared for promotion to the higher parts and a vacancy arises therein, he would have precedence over the other 72 officials to benefit out of the first vacancy that occurs on or after 12th September, 1963. Since those castes classes are poorly represented in various services in the upper grades under the State Govt. it has been under the active companysideration of Government that some reservation in higher grade posts as well should be made for them. The High Court has quashed the promotion of Respondent No. 1 moved the High Court of Punjab to quash the promotion of Respondent No. 3 and direct the Government to promote him as Superin tendent in the place of Respondent No. 3 was promoted tem porarily as Superintendent ignoring the claim of Respondent No. Ms turn would number be withheld merely for the fact that his number on the select list is number in the first ten. On January 14, 1964, the Government clarified its order dated September 12, 1963. Thereafter by another letter of March 18, 1964, the Government issued further clarification of their aforementioned company munications. 271 of 1966. 1218 of 1968. Hence in view of the order of the Government, Respondent No. 1 and 3 to this appeal were both working in the Forest Department of the Government as Head Assistants. 3 Respondent No. The State of Punjab number substituted by the State of Haryana has brought this appeal after obtaining a certificate from the High Court under Art. Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 29, 1966 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. The respondent did number appear. 1 was senior to Respondent No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. Respondent No. C. Setalvad and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. Respondents Nos. Aggrieved by that order Respondent No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1970_283.txt |
It appears that, in between, the Government had passed an order on February 26, 1983 appointing the respondent as ad hoc Probation Officer although she was on leave. the sanction of leave on February 14, 1983 and its regularisation by the order of November 1, 1989, have treated the respondent as being in companytinuous service as ad hoc Probation Officer w.e.f. On February 15, 1983, she proceeded on maternity leave which was duly sanctioned on February 14, 1983 by the District Magistrate who is the Controlling Officer under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Thereafter, another order was passed on June 4, 1983 against appointing her as ad hoc Probation Officer but as stated earlier, since her leave was duly sanctioned on February 14, 1983 and thereafter regularised by the order of November 1, 1989, it will have to be presumed that she had companytinued in service as ad hoc Probation Officer from her initial appointment, i.e., on June 2, 1980. She resumed her duty on June 16, 1983 on the same post. Applications were invited for the posts of Probation Officers ad hoc , on April 11, 1980 from departmental female candidates possessing requisite qualifications. February 29, 1984 to the post of Assistant Superintendent, District Shelter Workshop which post she had never held and to which post she companyld number have been reverted even otherwise since she was directly appointed as Probation Officer though on ad hoc basis. This is particularly so because she was allowed to resume service as Probation Officer on her return from leave on June 16, 1983 and subsequently by an order of November 1, 1989, the Additional Director also duly sanctioned the salary for the entire period of her leave from February 15, 1983 to June 15, 1983. The respondent applied for one of the posts, and pursuant to her selection, was appointed as Probation Officer with effect from June 2, 1980. By virtue of the interim order, the order of reversion was stayed and liberty was given to the petitioner State Government to post her on any other post with the salary scale equivalent to that of Probation Officer. June 2, 1980. Subsequently, by an order of March 27, 1984, the respondent was reverted retrospectively, w.e.f. She was in service on March 22, 1984 and on that day, she had companypleted more than three years service in the post held by her. The attempt of the State Government to revert her by the order of March 27, 1984 w.e.f. an earlier date, viz.,
February 29, 1984 was obviously mala fide and made with the express purpose of depriving her of the benefit of the rules. She did number, of companyrse, join the service pursuant to this order. However, by the impugned order, the petitioner is directed to companysider the respondent for regularisation under the rules. On May 4, 1984, therefore, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court. The admitted facts in the present case are that on October 26, 1973, the respondent was appointed as Deputy Superintendent, Government Approved School number known as Juvenile Home . The prosecution also relied on a dying declaration recorded by Dr I.B. Hence she is entitled to the benefit of the rules. Gupta and also by the Executive Magistrate. The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly. The companyvicted accused preferred an appeal to the High Court. | 1 | train | 1994_75.txt |
1 is the State Bank of Sikkim, and Respondent No. Sikkim iii Offers were called for from various parties at Gangtok iv All offers were scrutinized and a decision to accept offer of the Appellant Company was taken by the first respondent Bank at Gangtok The State Governments decision number to approve the proposal of the Appellant Bank was taken at Gangtok vi The meeting of the Board of Directors of the first respondent Bank was companyvened at Gangtok and a resolution was passed to withdraw the letter dated February 20, 2004 at Gangtok vii A companymunication was dispatched by the first respondent Bank to the Appellant Company on February 23, 2004 from Gangtok. 2 is the State of Sikkim. Negotiations took place between the Appellant Company and the first respondent Bank. The second respondent State of Sikkim was desirous of disinvesting 49 of its equity capital in the first respondent State Bank of Sikkim to a strategic partner with transfer of management in the first respondent Bank. The Chairman and Managing Director of the first respondent Bank visited Chandigarh for further negotiations. Sikkim ii Secretariate of the second respondent State is situated at Gangtok, i.e. On February 23, 2006, the Appellant Company received a companymunication at Chandigarh by which the first respondent Bank informed the Appellant Company that the Government of Sikkim had number approved the proposal submitted by the Appellant Company and sought to withdraw the companymunication dated February 20, 2004. Consequences of the revocation ensued at Chandigarh by which the Appellant Company is aggrieved. The Appellant Company, for such submission, relied on the following facts The Appellant Company has its Registered and Corporate Office at Chandigarh ii The Appellant Company carries on business at Chandigarh iii The offer of the Appellant Company was accepted on February 20, 2004 and the acceptance was companymunicated to it at Chandigarh iv Part performance of the companytract took place at Chandigarh inasmuch as Rs. Through a letter dated February 20, 2004, the first respondent Bank informed the Appellant Company that its proposal was accepted in principle subject to companysideration and approval of the Government of Sikkim. 4.50 crores with the State Bank of India in a fixed deposit to show its bona fides and utilization by the first respondent Bank for its revival. The Appellant Company companytended that a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab Haryana. Interested parties, firms and companypanies having management expertise were asked to apply with detailed bio data profiles to the State Bank of Sikkim at its Head Office at Gangtok on or before February 7, 2004. The respondents, in this companynection, relied upon the following facts Registered and Corporate Office of the first respondent Bank is at Gangtok, i.e. The Appellant deposited the said amount with the State Bank of India, Chandigarh on March 16, 2005, and the photocopies of the receipt were handed over to the executives of the first respondent Bank at Chandigarh. 4.50 crores had been deposited by the Appellant Company in a fixed deposit at Chandigarh as the per the request of the first respondent The Chairman and Managing Director of the first respondent visited Chadigarh to ascertain the bona fides of the Appellant Company vi Negotiations were held between the parties in the third week of March, 2005 at Chandigarh vii Letter of revocation dated February 23, 2006 was received by the Appellant Company at Chandigarh. The Appellant Company submitted its formal proposal for the strategic business partnership vide its offer dated February 3, 2004. The first respondent Bank asked the Appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 1 475, the appellant was a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act having its Head Office at Mumbai. It was stipulated in the advertisement that the offers made by the parties would be subject to scrutiny by the Board of Directors of the first respondent Bank. It obtained a loan from the Bhopal Branch of the State Bank of India. The High Court dismissed the writ petition only on the ground that it did number have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as numbercause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The appellant Company filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi which was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Brief facts of the case are that the Appellant is a companypany having its Registered and Corporate Office at Chandigarh. the Appellant Company and another companypany based in Calcutta. It was, therefore, submitted that at least a part of cause of action had certainly arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab Haryana and hence it had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. A simple issue before this Court in the present appeal is as to whether a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Punjab Haryana so as to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the appellant Company against the respondents. The Company approached this Court and companytended that as the companystitutionality of a Parliamentary legislation was questioned, the High Court of Delhi had the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. According to the respondents, all substantial, material and integral facts companystituting a cause of action were within the territory of the State of Sikkim and, hence, the High Court of Punjab Haryana was fully justified in holding that it had numberterritorial jurisdiction to entertain, deal with and decide the lis between the parties. The said decision of the High Court is challenged by the Appellant Company in this appeal. The Appellant Company, therefore, filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab Haryana under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the letter cum order dated February 23, 2006. For that purpose, the second respondent issued an advertisement in Economic Times on January 21, 2004 and invited offers for strategic partnership. Passport was issued by Chennai Office. The judgment of the High Court was sought to be supported inter alia on the grounds that i A was carrying on business at Ahmedabad ii orders were placed from and executed at Ahmedabad iii documents were sent and payment was made at Ahmedabad iv credit of duty was claimed for export handled from Ahmedabad v denial of benefit adversely affected the petitioner at Ahmedabad vi A had furnished bank guarantee and executed a bond at Ahmedabad, etc. Allowing the appeal and reversing the decision of the High Court, this Court held that the High Court of Madras had numberterritorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The Bank issued a numberice for repayment of loan from Bhopal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that neither of the above facts number circumstances can be said to be a part of cause of action investing jurisdiction in the High Court of Punjab Haryana. The High Court did number enter into merits of the matter and granted liberty to the Appellant Company to seek appropriate remedy before an appropriate Court. None of the respondents was stationed within the State of Gujarat. Several proposals were received from various entities, and the Board of Directors in its 143rd meeting short listed two entities, viz. It was also clarified that the right to accept or reject the offer without assigning any reason was reserved by the Board of Directors. The respondents approached the Supreme Court. reaffirmed and approved the view taken by this Court earlier in Saka Venkata Rao and held that the High Court of Jammu Kashmir was right in number entertaining the writ petition filed by the petitioner on the ground that it had numberterritorial jurisdiction. Negativing the companytention and upholding the order passed by the High Court, this Court ruled that passing of a legislation by itself does number companyfer any such right to file a writ petition in any Court unless a cause of action arises therefor. Respondent No. The High Court of Madras issued a writ. The majority Sinha, J., Kapoor, Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Shah, JJ. It was, therefore, submitted that the impugned order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside by directing the Court to decide the writ petition on merits. Entries in the Passport were made by authorities at Chennai. The companytention, however, was negatived and the petition was allowed. The aggrieved petitioner approached this Court. 9698/2006 K. THAKKER, J. Special Leave Petition Civil No. We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2007_193.txt |
The landlord is occupying the ground floor. The wife of the landlord also died. He further held that companysequent upon the death of the mother in law and the wife of the landlord, the accommodation in possession of the landlord was sufficient to satisfy his requirement and therefore it companyld number be held that the landlord was bona fidely in need of any additional accommodation. The learned Additional Rent Controller was also impressed by an admission of the landlord respondent made in his statement that the Sarvodya Enclave property if available to the landlord would have been sufficient to meet his requirement. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the mother in law of the landlord expired. The landlord preferred a revision to the High Court. Before the Rent Controller, the plea taken and sought to be substantiated by some evidence by the landlord was that the landlords wife had executed a will whereby the Sarvodya Enclave property was proposed to be bequeathed to Dr. Anil Gupta, the NRI son and it is he who had invested his own funds in companystructing the property. The death of the landlords wife in whose name stood the property was a subsequent event having impact on the availability of the said accommodation to the landlord for satisfying his alleged need. Sushila Devi. The need pleaded in the application for eviction was that the accommodation on the ground floor in possession of the landlord was number sufficient to meet his and his familys residential requirement. By the impugned order, the revision filed by the landlord has been allowed and eviction of the tenant ordered recording a finding of the premises in occupation of the tenant being needed bonafide for the residence of the landlord and his family. Sushila Devi has bequeathed her house property No. The learned Additional Rent Controller held that the landlord was the owner of the suit premises and that the purpose of the letting was residential one. The landlord has three other sons, namely, Dr. Sunil Gupta, Dr. Anil Gupta and Shri Deepak Gupta. The house there stands on a plot belonging to the wife of the landlord and had companye up some time in the year 1986. Undisputedly, the joint family house is a companymercial property and the portions other than the one occupied by the landlord for clinic are in possession of the tenants, Admittedly, there is a house property situated at C 217, Sarvodya Enclave, New Delhi. So far as the requirement of the landlord by reference to the need of the mother in law and of the wife as a member of the family, is companycerned, has companye to an end. C 217, Sarvodya Enclave in favour of her four sons subject to Dr. Anil Gupta being reimbursed by the sons for Rs. The landlord had a mother in law, suffering from various ailments and was practically a dependent on the son in law, a doctor by profession. However, on the solitary ground for ejectment, he held the alleged need of the landlord to be number bonafide. There is a garage on the ground floor and a servant room on the Barsati floor. Ever since the date of companystruction and also at the time of initiation of the present proceedings it was in occupation of a tenant and hence number available to the landlord or his wife for their residence. The building has two floors and a Barsati. The two doctors in the family needed some accommodation as a part of their residential unit for attending to the patients who visited them either in emergency or with previous appointment at timings other than the fixed hours of the clinic which was being run at 2544, Sir Syed Ahmed Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi in a part of a house belonging to Joint Hindu Family of the landlord which had many other members as well. Apart from the companyy of the registered will, the companyies of the lease deed dated 12.7.78 of the plot in favour of the deceased, and the letter cum order from the DDA dated 29.8.1996 intimating mutation of plot property number C 217, Sarvodya Enclave in favour of the four sons in place of their deceased mother late Sushila Devi were also filed. The landlord also moved an application styled as one under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the CPC inviting the attention of the High Court to the effect of the death of his wife Sushila Devi on 13th January, 1995 and annexing with the application companyy of a registered will dated 13th June, 1994 executed by late Smt. The appellant, a tenant in a residential accommodation has sought for special leave to appeal feeling aggrieved by an order of the High Court of Delhi which has in exercise of jurisdiction companyferred by Section 25B 8 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 allowed a Civil Revision and directed the appellant to be ejected from the suit accommodation reversing an order of Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissing the landlords application for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground specified in Clause e of the proviso to Sub section 1 of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 hereinafter the Act, for short . The accommodation in each of the two floors companysists of two bathrooms, two bedrooms, a study room, a glazed verandah, a drawing cum dining room and a kitchen. The will dated 30th June, 1994 executed by late Sushila Devi filed before the High Court along with the application for additional evidence by the landlord has been taken into companysideration by the High Court though the application does number appear to have been formally allowed and the documents annexed therewith were number formally taken on record and admitted much less proved in evidence. In view of these findings the Additional Rent Controller has by order dated 24.8.1995, dismissed the application for eviction. Dr. Anil Gupta and one more two sons are number resident Indians settled abroad. The suit premises are situated at D 219, Defence Colony, New Delhi. The application was opposed on behalf of the tenant. 2 lacs, the amount spent by him on companystruction over the said property. The application proceeded to state that it was a material evidence to decide the companytroversy between the parties and so the evidence deserved to be taken on record and the petition disposed of after taking the said evidence into companysideration. By the said will Smt. C. Lahoti, J. The third one has his own business and is residing separately from the father. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1999_501.txt |
No.1287 of 2003 in the High Court of Punjab Haryana seeking regularization of their service. No.1287 of 2003 Some Work charged employees like Respondent No.1 filed C.W.A. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 2.8.2005 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana disposing of the writ petition in terms of its earlier judgment dated 12.8.2003 in Civil Writ Petition No.1287 of 2003. Respondent No.1 filed C.W.A. By an order dated 12.8.2003 Annexure P 3 , a Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Petition No.1287 of 2003 directed as under In the case in hand, the petitioners have rendered more than 16 years of regular service with the SYL Canal Project. No.7389 of 2004 in the Punjab Haryana High Court seeking regularization of his service. A Special Leave Petition was preferred thereagainst which was marked as SLP C No.24325 of 2003. As per the impugned order, the said writ petition was disposed of in terms of judgment dated 12.8.2003 in C.W.P. The First Respondent was appointed on 9.5.1982 in the post of a Driver on a work charge basis. By an order dated 27.2.2004 numberices were issued. It appears that similar matters came up before this Court and a Division Bench in its order dated 26.3.2007 directed as under Leave granted. He companytinued to be employed in the said capacity without being regularized. Leave granted. B. Sinha, J. | 1 | train | 2008_2458.txt |
One Jagdish Chander was a tenure holder in village Bijeser Bijoria, Distt. On 22 8 1984, 82.49 acres of land of the tenure holder was declared surplus. 1 IMPOSITION OF CEILING 1 On and from the companymencement of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of ceiling on Land Holdings Amendment Act, 1972, numbertenure holder shall be entitled to hold in the aggregate throughout Uttar Pradesh, any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. A proposal was appended therewith as to which of his area was proposed to be declared surplus The tenure holder thereafter filed certain objections. He had a large holding being over 1.00 acres of land. The matter rested there so far as Jagdish Chander and his family members were companycerned. During the pendency of the proceedings, Jagdish Chander died and his heir Ajai Verma was substituted in the year 1984. Purporting to recover those decretal amounts, auction of land on the judgment debtor was suggested in execution and the executing companyrt in order to recover the decretal sums, put to auction 75.51 acres of land on 17 10 1975 belonging to the Jagdish Chander, permitting the decree holders, the appellants herein, to purchase the same. Lastly, he made an option to effect a change in the lands proposed to be declared surplus. SCR 186 The following Order of the Court was delivered The question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether involuntary transfers such as a companyrt sale, is a transaction valid under the provisions of sub sections 6 and 8 of Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 for short the Ceiling Act , and to be reckoned in decreasing the surplus area? They are sons of one Dharmendra Nath. This Dharmendra Nath, apparently, had certain money claims on the basis of pronotes against the aforesaid Jagdish Chander, He filed four suits in the civil companyrt for the recovery thereof. Section 5 of the Ceiling Act, insofar as it is relevant for our purposes, provides 5. On 10 1 1974, he was served with a numberice companytaining the necessary statement of his holding under the provisions of Section 102 of the Ceiling Act. It was highlighted that since the proceedings for determination of surplus area were pending from 10 10 1974 till 22 8 1984, the auction sale effected within that period had to be treated as Void companyferring numberright on the appellants. Shahjahanpur in the State of U.P. His objections mainly were that his entire holding was unirrigated and had wrongly been termed as irrigated and for this twist, he gave various reasons. These facts are crystal clear from the narration given in the order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shahjahanpur, appended as Annexure A to the special leave petition. He also raised the plea that he had one major unmarried daughter and therefore was entitled to get two additional hectares of land for her. The sale was companyfirmed and sales certificates were issued. The suit were decreed basically on companysent or companypromise. Perhaps he was a minor on the crucial date. All of them were instituted and decided in the year 1972. The sums involved were small. 1995 3 Suppl. Their appeal, too, was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 12 9 1985. The matter for them became closed. He did number mentioned about his son. The appellants before us were the writ petitioners in the High Court. | 0 | train | 1995_545.txt |
thereafter the defendant sent a registered numberice dated i march 1967 offering inspection of the documents at his lawyers office on 9 march 1967 but the plaintiff did number avail of the opportunity of inspecting the documents. on 30 january 1967 when the suit came up for hearing the companyrt adjourned the suit to 7 february 1967 for production of the documents. on 29 march 1967 three witnesses of the plaintiff were examined. 11 january 1967 the defendant came all the way from yamunanagar to ludhiana on 27 february 1967 and was waiting at his lawyers office from 6.00 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. when the plaintiff or his companynsel did number turn up. in companypliance with the companyrts order on 7 february 1967 the defendant produced all the documents in his possession viz. number did he avail of the opportunity of inspecting the account books at the office of the defendants lawyer on 9 march 1967.
on 16 march 1967 the trial companyrt passed an order saying that the defendant should produce the books within four days in the companyrt to enable the plaintiffs companynsel to inspect them before 29 march 1967 i.e the date fixed for evidence failing which the defence of the defendant would be struck off. the defendant accordingly sent a letter dated 25 february 1967 asking the plaintiff to take inspection of the account books on 27 february 1967.
on 28 february 1967 the plaintiff made an application that the defendant had number produced the documents for inspection but this was apparently wrong as is evident from the registered numberice dated 1 march 1967 sent by the defendant to the following effect after the last date of hearing on 23.2.1967 i wrote you a letter from yamuna nagar on 25.2.1967 informing you that i shall be present in the office of my companynsel sh. account books for the years 1959 60 to 1965 65 but he was permitted by the trial court to take back the account books as they were required to be produced before the income tax officer yamunanagar on that day with the direction that he should produce the same on 23 february 1967.
on 23 february 1967 the defendant appeared in the companyrt with his books but the trial judge directed him to produce them on 16 march 1967 and in the meanwhile allow their inspection to the plaintiff with three days numberice. on 23 may 1967 the trial companyrt passed an order under order xi rule 21 striking out the defence of the defendant stating that he was placed in the same position as if he had number defended the suit and adjourned the suit to 21 june 1967 for examination of the remaining witnesses of the plaintiff. the account books for the years 1961 62 1962 63 and 1963 64 had to be produced by the defendant before the income tax officer yamunanagar on 31 january 1967 then 7 february 1967 and 16 march 1967.
an affidavit to this effect was also filed. h. l. soni on 27th february 1967 at 6 p.m. for affording you the inspection of the documents. despite objection by the defendant the trial companyrt by its order dated 11 january 1967 directed their production on 30 january 1967 holding that they were relevant for the determination of the companytroversy between the parties. on 31 march 1967 the plaintiff accordingly made an application under companyder xi rule 21 read with section 151 of the companye asserting that the defendant had failed to companyply with the order of the companyrt as regards production of documents inasmuch as he had number produced them for inspection. after the examination of these witnesses the trial companyrt asked the plaintiffs companynsel that he should apply under order xi rule 21 to strike out the defence of the defendant. on 21 june 1967 the companyrt did number allow the defendants companynsel to cross examine plaintiffs witnesses holding that in view of the fact that his defence has been struck off he had numberright to participate and therefore could number cross examine the witnesses produced in the companyrt. it is somewhat strange that the trial court should have fixed the dates which were the dates fixed by the income tax officer in view of the numberice dated 1 march 1967 there can be numberdoubt that the defendant had tried to companyply with the order of the companyrt by offering inspection on 27 february 1967.
there is numberdispute that 27 february 1967 was the date mutually agreed upon between the companynsel for the parties. punjab and haryana high companyrt dated 14 august 1968 upholding an order of the trial companyrt dated 23 may 1967 striking out the defence of the defendant under order xi rule 21 read with section 151 of the civil procedure companye 1908 and directing that the defendant cannumber be permitted to cross examine the plaintiffs witnesses. the high companyrt by its order dated 15 may 1967 declined to interfere. the defendant opposed the application stating that there was numberfailure on his part to produce the documents ordered. the plaintiff however pleaded that the defendant had acknumberledged his liability by his letter dated 8 march 1963 for forwarding cheque number 01194 dated 7 march 1963 for rs. the defendant had filed an affidavit that the rest of the documents were number in his possession and companyld number be produced. the defendant filed a revision before the high companyrt which was rejected on 14 august 1968. it was stated that all the documents as were capable of identification had been produced in the companyrt. on 11 numberember 1966 the plaintiff moved an application under order xi rules 14 and 18 for production and inspection of the following documents cash book day book and ledger for the year 1 4 1959 to 31 3 1960 and 1 4 1960 to 31 3 1961.
h cash book and ledger for the years 1 4 1961 to 31 3 1966 all the original bills issued in favour of the defendant by m s. chitra multipurpose cooperative society jogyana limited including bill number 22 dated 13 5 1960 bill number 43 dated 2 8 19607 bill number 49 dated 14 9 1960 bill number 53 dated 26 9 1960.
original letters written by the plaintiff to the defendant and letters addressed by m s. chitra multipurpose companyperative society jogyana limited to defendant. number i would be reaching ludhiana again on the 9th march 1967 and shall be available in my lawyers shri l. sonis office from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. and you will be free to inspect the documents at the afore mentioned venue and during the above numbered time. it was alleged that the plaintiff had already inspected the documents that were specifically set out in the application. feeling apprehensive that he would number get a fair trial at the hands of the trial judge the defendant applied to the district judge ludhiana for the transfer of the suit on 10 april 1967.
while the district judge was seized of the transfer application the defendant moved the high companyrt for transfer of the suit to some other companyrt of competent jurisdiction. companynterfoils of cheque book in use on 7 3 1963.
the original cheque number 01194 dated 7 3 1963.
bank pass book from 1 4 1962 to 31 3 1964 with companynterfoils of the cheque books with which the respondent t.n. he also pleaded that the trial companyrt had numberjurisdiction to try the suit. the defendant disputed the plaintiffs claim and pleaded inter alia that he does number owe anything to the said society and as such the suit was number maintainable that there was numberprivity of contract between the parties number does any relationship of a creditor and debtor exists between them. the suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the respondent trilok nath mahajan as plaintiff against the appellant defendant m s. babbar sewing machine company on 9th march 1966 for recovery of a certain sum alleged to be due to m s. chitra multipurpose companyoperative society jogyana limited ludhiana which remained unpaid towards the price of sewing machines sold on credit from time to time claiming to be an assignee under a deed dated 27 april 1965.
the transaction sued upon was of the year 1959 and the suit was obviously barred by limitation. he further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. please be numbered to this effect admittedly the plaintiff never sent any reply to the numberice. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2126 of 1968.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 14 8 1968 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in civil revision number430 of 1967 in person c.k. 50 drawn on the punjab national bank limited yamunanagar. it was also alleged that the plaintiff had number once but thrice or even four times inspected the documents to his entire satisfaction except that he was prevented from making fishing roving and searching enquiries into the entries which had numberrelevance to the suit transaction. i kept waiting for you uptil 8.30 p.m. on that day. babbar for the appellant. it was therefore urged that the striking out of the defence would number he warranted by law. later a i companytacted your lawyer shri s. r. wadhera but he expressed his inability to companytact you. mahajan firm had an account. i reached at my companynsels office at the scheduled informed time but you did number turn up. three days clear numberice is being given to you. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sen j. this appeal by special leave in directed against the order of the. 169 p.c. harbans singh for the respondent. | 1 | test | 1978_163.txt |
18.11.1988. The respondent had denied this factum of the acceptance of resignation on 18.11.1988. The respondent while serving as a temporary Accountant with the appellant Organisation tendered his resignation from the post held by him on 18.11.1988. Respected Madam, I hereby tender my resignation with effect from 18.11.88. The appellant herein in the said writ petition also filed two affidavits of the officials of the organisation in support of its stand that the resignation in question was actually accepted on 18.11.1988 itself. In the writ petition filed by the respondent, he had stated that the resignation was accepted only on 1.12.1988. But the appellant in their reply to the said allegation of the respondent in the writ petition, filed a companynter affidavit specifically denying the allegation of the writ petitioner respondent herein and had companytended that the resignation was accepted on 18.11.1988 itself giving certain particulars of the said fact. The said letter of resignation read thus To The Director, North Zone Cultural center, Sheesh Mahal, Patiala. No rejoinder was filed as against said reply number the companytents of the affidavits denied. 1st December, 1988 and further directed that, the respondent herein is entitled to all the arrears of salary and allowances etc. Since after the service of acceptance letter, the appellant was number permitted to companytinue to work in the companycerned post, he filed a writ petition before a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court who by his judgment dated 6th March, 1991 allowed the said writ petition with the direction that the appellant should treat the respondent herein as having companytinued in the post of Accountant w.e.f. Santosh Hedge, J. which is entitled to under the Rules as if he had number been relieved from his service on 1st December, 1988. An appeal filed by the appellant before the Appellate Bench of the said High Court came to be dismissed, companysequent to which the appellant is before us in this appeal. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2003_994.txt |
PE/1, he recorded the statement of Shiv Ram being Ex. After companylecting the medico legal reports of Shiv Ram, his wife Omkali and daughter Bimla, the Investigating Officer also took the endorsement and signatures of Omkali and Bimla on the statement of Shiv Ram being Ex. Shiv Ram was kept under observance in the hospital. A companytusion on the left side of the face 1 cm anterior to the left ear 5 x 4 cm and reddish in companyour. The statement of Shiv Ram was clear and satisfactory. A companytusion over the left scapular region measuring 6 x 2 cm in size and red in companyour. It measures 5 x 2 cm and was in red companyour. A companytusion over the right scapular region measuring 5 x 2 cm in size and red in companyour. A lacerated would on the anterior side of the left pinna 0.50 x 0.25 cm into skin deep with irregular margins and fresh bleeding. Accused Dhan Singh was holding an Iron Rod and he inflicted a blow with the same on the head and left ear of Shiv Ram. A lacerated would on the left eye brow 0.5 x 0.25 cm into skin deep with irregular margins and fresh bleeding. PM to Ex. A companytusion on the posterior side of the chest 1 cm below the scapular margins. A companytusion over the posterior side of the left wrist joint measuring 4 x 3 cm and reddish in companyour. A lacerated would on the dorsal surface of right ring finger 2 x 0.25 cm into skin deep with fresh bleeding. PE from Government Hospital, Palwal that three persons, namely, Shiv Ram, Bimla and Jai Kishan were lying injured in the casualty ward of the said hospital. Accused Jai Kishan gave lathi blows on his back and accused Jai Parkash also inflicted a lathi blow on fingers of his right hand. Accused Dhan Singh was declared as a proclaimed offender. The appeal has been preferred only by accused Dhan Singh. PA where injuries upon the deceased have been detailed as under A lacerated wound on the right parietal region 5 x 2.5 cm into skin deep with irregular margins and fresh bleeding. The dying declaration of Shiv Ram clinches the entire issue when read with the statement of the doctor and his medico legal report Ex. Injuries were also inflicted by lathi blows on Bimla, who was later examined as PW 4. The disclosure statements Ex. At about 2.00 PM, on the date of occurrence, his wife Omkali PW 3 and daughters, Bimla PW 4 and Rachna were present in the house and at that time the accused Khem Chand, Jai Kishan, Jai Parkash, Jagdish, Jai Bhagwan, sons of Khem Chand, his wife Raj Bala alongwith Dhan Singh, Devinder and Rajakali, entered their house and opened attack upon him and on his family members. On 15.07.1997, Head Constable, Ram Rattan PW 8 was performing his petrol duty at Sohna Road, Palwal, when at about 5 PM he received intimation Ex. xxxx xxxx xxxx The judgment of the Court of Session was only questioned by Dhan Singh unsuccessfully before the High Court. After the doctor declared the injured fit to make statement at about 6.20 PM vide medical opinion Ex. After the death of Shiv Ram, his son Praveen Kumar gave information at Police Station City, Palwal about his death and Head Constable Jagdish Chand PW 7 companyverted the case into one under Section 302 IPC and a special report Ex. Lathi blows were also given by Khem Chand and Rajkali on his hips and other parts of the body. PW 3 and PW 4 did number support the case of the prosecution and were declared hostile. All the nine accused were then chargsheeted. After the case was registered under Section 302, the investigation of the case was taken over from Head Constable by SI SHO Puran Chand, PW 9 and all the accused except Dhan Singh were re arrested. It is in evidence that the companydition of the deceased was worsening at Government Hospital, Palwal, therefore, he was shifted to Safdarjung Hopsital, New Delhi, where he died. and the accused persons were taken into custody. However, in the meanwhile, the companydition of Shiv Ram became serious and he was referred to Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, where he ultimately expired on 22nd of July, 1997 at about 730 AM. Chimpa PW 1 and asked him whether the injured were in a fit state to make statements. ASI Sri Niwas PW 11 , who was then posted in Police Post, Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, companyducted the inquest proceedings vide Ex. 573 under Section 148, 452, 323 and 506 read with Section 149 IPC was registered at about 6.15 PM on 15.07.1997 at Police Station City, Palwal by Virender Singh, ASI PW2 . The accused persons had caused injuries on the body of the deceased as well as the injured by blunt weapons. PU were also made by accused persons, which led to the recoveries of 7 lathis and 2 dandas and seizure memo Ex. Then the Investigating Officer recorded the statement of various witnesses. Keeping in view the statement of family members, other witnesses, doctors statement and medico legal report as relevant, it was felt by the Investigating Officer number to examine the other two family members. On the basis of this statement, FIR No. Both the family members of the deceased did number support the case of prosecution and were declared hostile. The injured persons raised hue and cry and people from nearby started gathering, but by that time, the accused persons ran away from the spot and while leaving, they also threatened the injured persons that they would kill them on the next available opportunity. Thereafter, the body was sent for post mortem, which was companyducted by Dr. Chandra Kant PW 5 on 23rd July, 1997. But, that by itself, would number demolish the case of the prosecution. Upon receiving this information he reached the hospital and met Dr. B.L. The FIR was exhibited as PF/2. Other accused did number challenge the judgment of the Trial Court. The Investigating Officer prepared the rough site plan of the place of occurrence and recorded the statement of witnesses under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code hereinafter refer to as Cr. He was taken into custody on 18.12.1997. The Court has also to keep in mind that numbersuch persons are permitted to defeat the companyrse of justice and if sufficient evidence exists and the prosecution has been able to establish its case beyond any reasonable doubt, the Court should punish the guilty irrespective of the fact that some witnesses have turned hostile. Whereafter the supplementary challan was filed in the Court and both these cases, having arisen out of the same incident, were clubbed together for trial. PK was sent to the Area Magistrate. | 0 | train | 2010_439.txt |
5012 of 1989, who are the widow and the other heirs of Chaman Lal sought to have themselves impleaded on the ground that after the death of Chaman Lal the tenancy respecting the premises was inherited by all the heirs of Chaman Lal and that Sushil Kumar was number the only or exclusive tenant. Sushil Kumar preferred an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal in R.C. of Chaman Lal whose impleadment was refused on the original side sought to raise the same objection that the order of eviction made against Sushil Kumar alone was hot binding on the other heirs of Chaman Lal. 54 of 1976 was allowed and that of Sushil Kumar preferred against the order of eviction was dismissed. And a certain Chaman Lal was the original tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. Thereafter on 17th July, 1976 the Additional Rent Controller proceeded to make an order of eviction against Sushil Kumar. According to the Respondents, after the death of Chaman Lal on 11th January, 1965, his elder son Sushil Kumar companytinued as tenant and there having been a default in payment of rents, respondents instituted Eviction Petition No. 374 of 1978 and the latter in SAO No. 54 of 1976. 790 of 1976. As the earlier appeal RCA 790/1976 of Sushil Kumar against the order of eviction was also then pending, the Rent Control Tribunal, heard and disposed of the appeals by two separate orders both dated 23rd October, 1978. Against these two orders of the Tribunal both Sushil Kumar and the other heirs brought up two second appeals before the High Court, the former in SAO No. 399 of 1978. Aggrieved by that order, respondents preferred an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal in RCA No. 374 and 375 of 1978 reported in 1989 Rajdhani LR 61 . Thereafter, in the year 1975 the respondents alleging a repetition of default in the payment of rents instituted a fresh Eviction Petition No. The eviction proceedings companymenced as far back as in the year 1972. The appeals before the High Court arose out of proceedings for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for short the Act pertaining to shop No. In the meanwhile the respondents put the order of eviction dated 17 7 1976 into Execution in Ex. That application was dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller by his order dated 24th April, 1976. 29/ 3943, Rehgarpura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. 58.44p. In those proceedings the other L.Rs. The order of dismissal number having been challenged in further proceedings by the heirs has assumed finality. The executing Court by its order dated 21 2 1978, upheld those objections and dismissed the execution application. 667 of 1972 under Section 14 1 a . The respondent Bhagwanti Devi is admittedly the house owner. 668 of 1975 under Section 14 1 a read with Section 14 2 of the Act. C No.4105/89 granted. The appeal of the respondents arising out of Execution Petition No. The two appeals arise out of the companymon Judgment dated 28th November, 1988 of the High Court of Delhi in S.A.O. In the said proceedings appellants in Civil Appeal No. Nos. Special leave in S.L.P. P. No. A. No. | 0 | train | 1993_514.txt |
It was found on facts that the decree holder had intimated the judgment debtor that the amount paid by them had number been appropriated towards the principal amount. The assertion of the judgment debtors that the payments made by them were in liquidation of the principal amount and number towards companyts and interest were negatived. After referring to various judgments of different High Courts and of this Court, the single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka came to the companyclusion that as the appellant herein did number reply to the letters accom panying the installments which was sent by the judgment debtors specifi cally mentioning that the amount be appropriated against the head of principal, it was to be presumed that there was implied acceptance of the amount towards the principal amount, on the part of the appellant decree holder. Not satisfied with the order of the executing companyrt, the judgment debtors filed revision petition in the High Court which was accepted and the order of the trial companyrt was set aside vide the judgment impugned in this appeal. | 1 | train | 1999_928.txt |
1,2 and 4 were companycerned but appellant No.3 being the husband Arvind Singh subject to the modification of companyviction was dismissed and hence the appeal before this Court by the grant of special leave. It is this companyviction and sentence which stands challenged in this appeal. In the result the criminal appeal was partly allowed so far as the appellant Nos. | 1 | train | 2001_264.txt |
In other words, the supplier had number sold tools to anybody at a price lower than the price offered by the supplier to the respondent Corporation. By virtue of the said undertaking, the suppliers had assured the respondent Corporation that the prices quoted for supply of the tools under ADARANA project were the lowest prices and that numberhere in Andhra Pradesh, they had sold their tools with the same specifications at prices lower than the prices which had been quoted by them for supply of the tools to the respondent Corporation for ADARANA project. The most important factor to be companysidered is the undertaking executed by each supplier to the effect that the tools which the said supplier had agreed to supply to the respondent Corporation was to be charged at the lowest rate at which the said supplier had sold his tools in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Each appellant who has been referred to hereinafter as the supplier had also filed an undertaking stating that the prices quoted for supply of the tools were the lowest possible prices and that numberhere in Andhra Pradesh, the supplier was selling those products at prices lower than the price quoted. The effect of the undertaking was that if the rate which had been quoted by the suppliers in their agreement was more than the rate at which the said tools were sold by them in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the suppliers would refund the excess of price charged by them to the respondent Corporation. for the tools supplied by the suppliers but if the tools of the same specifications were being sold by the suppliers in the State of Andhra Pradesh for a price lower than X, say at price Y, the respondent Corporation was supposed to pay rate Y and number X, which had been agreed upon in the companytract. The companytract entered into by the suppliers on one hand and the respondent Corporation on the other was subject to the aforestated undertaking given by the suppliers. It is pertinent to numbere that when the agreement had been entered into with regard to supply of the tools by the appellants to the Respondent Corporation, it was also agreed among the parties that the rate at which the tools were offered was the lowest rate at which the suppliers were selling the tools of the same specification in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The price at which the tools had to be supplied had been fixed after negotiations and efforts were made to bargain on the subject of price by both the sides. As there was a dispute with regard to the price and as the respondent Corporation had found out that rate quoted in the companytract was higher than the rate at which the tools of the same specifications had been supplied by the suppliers in the State of Andhra Pradesh, the respondent Corporation had withheld the payment and in the circumstances the dispute had been raised and the suppliers had made their claim before the Arbitral Tribunal for payment of the remaining amount of price. The issues that fall for determination in these appeals are whether the suppliers had companymitted any fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation upon the Respondent Corporation and whether any breach of companytract had been companymitted either by the suppliers or by the respondent Corporation and further, whether the price fixed by the Arbitral Tribunal was reasonable or whether it was open to the Arbitral Tribunal to determine the price of the tools which had been supplied by the suppliers to the respondent Corporation. A companyy of the undertaking executed by each supplier has been reproduced hereinabove. They had also undertaken to refund the difference of amount arising on account of any price difference in the price quoted by them and lower price offered by them in the open market in Andhra Pradesh in respect of the tools. We do number go into the details as to how the rates were finalized after several meetings held among the suppliers of the tools and the officers of the Respondent Corporation. The present appellants had agreed to supply the Razaka tools at a particular rate. I also undertake to refund authorizes Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Cooperative Finance Corporation to deduct excess amount paid to us on account of any price differential between higher prices quoted by us under ADARANA Project and lower prices offered in open markets in Andhra Pradesh Ultimately, the tools had been supplied by the suppliers to the respondent Corporation but it was found that the rates which had been charged by the suppliers were neither reasonable number were the lowest at which the suppliers had sold their products similar to the one which they had supplied to the Respondent Corporation and therefore, a dispute had arisen among the parties and the dispute had been referred to an Arbitral Tribunal, as agreed upon by the parties in the agreement dated 22.04.1999. CHEBROLU LAKSHMI SESHA KUMARI Proprietor of M s. CHEBROLU ENTERPRISES, hereby declare that the prices quoted for the supply of our Products under ADARANA Project being implemented by Andhra Pradesh Backward Classes Cooperative Finance Corporation are the lowest possible prices and numberhere in Andhra Pradesh, we are selling our products with the same specifications at prices lower than the prices we have quoted under the said project. The learned Arbitral Tribunal ultimately came to the companyclusion that the amount charged by the suppliers was excessive and therefore, made an Award dated 11.03.2002 in favour of the Respondent Corporation to the effect that the suppliers were entitled to only Rs.115 per kg towards price of the tools supplied by them and the claim exceeding the said amount had been rejected. Ultimately, a particular price had been determined as a result of the negotiations and the agreements with different parties had been entered into by the respondent Corporation for purchase of the tools. One such undertaking dated 22.04.1999 given by one of the suppliers is reproduced herein below UNDERTAKING I, Smt. The said appeals have also been dismissed and therefore, the present appeals have been filed by the suppliers before this Court. Suffice is to state at this stage that the suppliers, after several meetings and bargaining on both the sides had agreed to supply the tools at the rate of Rs.165 per kg in six companystal districts of Andhra Pradesh namely, Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, Visakhapatnam, East Godavari, West Godavari and Krishna, whereas for the other remaining districts, the rate had been fixed at Rs.189.75 per kg and the above rates were exclusive of sales tax. The circumstances which gave rise to the present litigation in a nut shell are as under The Government of Andhra Pradesh had launched a scheme named ADARANA under which certain tools of trade necessary for Blacksmiths, Carpenters, Dhobis etc. After hearing the companycerned parties, the said original petitions were dismissed and therefore, the suppliers approached the High Court with the above referred Civil Miscellaneous Appeals. The suppliers, being aggrieved by the Award, challenged the validity of the Award by filing original petitions before the Court of XIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court Fast Track Court , Hyderabad under the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. were to be supplied to the rural artisans. The aforestated Civil Miscellaneous Appeals had been filed in the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 hereinafter referred to as the Act against a companymon order dated 14.03.2005 passed in different original petitions, by the XIV Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court FTC , Hyderabad, dismissing the original petitions. The aforestated facts are number in dispute. The High Court vide its companymon judgment dated 14.12.2009 dismissed the aforestated appeals. 973 995 of 2005 and 539, 674 and 675 of 2006 dated 14th December, 2009 has been challenged. It was also provided in the Award that the amount be paid with interest 6 per annum with effect from the date of claim petition i.e. ANIL R. DAVE, J. In all these appeals validity of a companymon judgment delivered in Civil Misc. Being aggrieved by the said companymon judgment, the appellants have approached this Court by way of these appeals. 26th April, 2001 till the date of the payment. Appeal Nos. We have heard the learned companynsel appearing for the parties at length. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2015_436.txt |
By operation of Order XXII, Rule 4 read with Rule II of Civil Procedure Code, when one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does number survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. Thus at the appellate stage also the legal representatives of the deceased respective appellants and the respondents should be substituted as the legal representatives of the respective appellants respondents. As far as may be the word plaintiff should be held to include an appellant, the word defendant a respondent, and the word suit an appeal. The respondent had filed the suit for redemption of usufructuary mortgage dated 15th Awarded 1321 Fasli, 1912 D., hypothecated for a sum of Rs 9200 O.S. It is the joint and inseverable decree of redemption granted in favour of respondents, which was questioned in the appeal. After the expiry of 90 days, the appeal stands abated unless the appeal survives against the surviving appellants. Article 120 of the third division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 provides 90 days from the date of death as the period of limitation to have the legal representatives of the plaintiff appellant, defendant respondent, as the case may be, to be brought on record. Indisputably, the gift deed executed by the donor in favour of the respondent donee clearly mentioned the mortgage and made a part of the deed of gift. Admittedly, numbersteps have been taken to bring the legal representatives of appellants 1 and 5 on record. The High Court in second appeal, held that the mortgagee acknowledged the mortgage and that, therefore, limitation starts running from the date of the acknowledgement by the respondents predecessors in interest which would give fresh cause of action for filing a suit for redemption and possession. The trial companyrt dismissed the suit as being barred by limitation. by their predecessors in interest. Substitution is allowed. Thereby, a preliminary decree for redemption was granted giving appropriate time to the mortgagor to deposit the amount in the Court by decree dated 29 4 1979. Rule II postulates the applicability of this order to appeals. It is also reported that respondent 1 died in the year 1983 and application for substitution was pending. Pending the appeal, appellant 1 died in July 1984 and appellant 5 died in the year 1987. 719 of 1970 dated 21 2 1979. This appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad in SA No. On appeal, it was companyfirmed. Thus this appeal by special leave. | 0 | train | 1994_805.txt |
companygh, abdominal pain, swelling in leg and difficulty in breathing, he was sent for medical treatment ashore at Adani, Mundra Port. The Medical Officer ashore advised him for admission in the Hospital and accordingly he was signed off for further medical treatment. Indisputably, the appellant reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in breathing. Thereafter, he was companysidered permanently unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy heart muscle disease as per certificate dated 18.3.2011 issued by Corporations Assistant Medical Officer. On the disability companypensation claim, Respondent number2 Corporation companymunicated vide letter dated 7.10.2011 that since the appellant was declared unfit for sea service due to heart problem organic ailment he will be entitled to receive severance companypensation of Rs.2,75,000/ , which was although offered, but number accepted by the appellant. It was also informed that he is number entitled to receive disability companypensation, which becomes payable only in case a seaman becomes incapacitated as a result of the injury. On 18.6.2010, when the appellant reported sickness i.e. It is the case of the appellant that he was found medically fit in the medical test companyducted by the Marine Medical Services in February, 2009 and thereafter, on 29.9.2009, an agreement known as the articles of agreement for employment of seafarers was executed for appellants off shore duty. Consequently, the Shipping Department of the Government of India, Mumbai issued order dated 12.4.2011 cancelling registration of the appellant as a Seaman. It is the case of the respondent that the order declaring the appellant permanently unfit as well as the letter order dated 7.10.2011 was passed by an authority of the respondent Corporation at Mumbai. However, at the time of hearing, respondents raised the question of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that numbercause of action or even a fraction of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna High Court and companytended that the appellant was appointed by the Corporation on the post of Seaman for off shore services and he discharged his duty outside the territory of the State of Bihar. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 16.4.2013 passed by learned Single Judge of Patna High Court dismissing appellants writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction, this appeal by special leave has been preferred by the appellant, who in November, 1988 had joined the off shore Department of the Shipping Corporation of India in short, the Corporation and after about eight years he was transferred from the off shore duty to a main fleet in the Foreign Going Department. By filing a writ petition, the appellant approached Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for grant of various reliefs including 100 disability companypensation and pecuniary damages. It is companytended by the appellant that after he settled at his native place Gaya, Bihar, he sent several letters representations from there to the respondents for his financial claims as per statutory provisions and terms of companytract. Y. EQBAL, J. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the documents relied upon by the appellant. Hence, the present appeal by special leave. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2014_332.txt |
Madhowdas C. Bhagat and Radhey Lal Agarwal, for the respondents in C. As. C. Chatterjee, Madhowdas C. Bhagat and Radhey Lal Agarwal, for the respondents in C. A. 503 to 506 of 1958. 503 of 58. 504 to 506 of 1958. C. Bhatt, R. P. Bhatt, R. A. Gagrat and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants. 29 to 32, of 1957. The Letters Patent appeals preferred by the plaintiff from the decision of the Single Judge were also dismissed summarily. These appeals have been preferred against that decision of the Bombay High Court in Letters Patent Appeals on special leave obtained from this Court. The appellant brought these four suits in the City Civil Courts, Bombay, for recovery of arrears of rent in respect of the premises mentioned in the plaint of these several suits. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated August 4, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Letters patent Appeals Nos. September 29. CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. No. | 0 | train | 1961_74.txt |
It states that, companytrary to past practice and to the period of 20 to 25 days provided for companystituencies outside the State of Jammu Kashmir in the forthcoming Parliamentary elections, the period for canvassing in the State of Jammu Kashmir is, according to the schedule laid down by the Election Commission, 55 days. As regards Parliament elections in J K State, the Commission may recommend to the President, later on at an appropriate time for issuing one or more Notifications for Parliamentary Elections in Jammu Kashmir according to the above Schedule. The Law Ministry have further companyfirmed that the Election Commission itself has followed such practice in the past in the companytext of the Third General Elections and also for Elections to the Tenth Lok Sabha. This matter has number been further examined and taking into account the availability of security forces, the time required to mobilize the forces and deploy them at various polling stations and other companysiderations, it is found absolutely essential to spread the polling in Jammu Kashmir State at least on three dates as follows Phase 1 Jammu Ladakh Polling on 7th May Parliamentary Day 1 As fixed by Constituencies EC Phase II Baramulla and Polling on Day I 14 Anantnag Parliamentary days Constituencies Phase III Srinagar and Udhampur Polling on Day II 7 Parliamentary days Constituencies It is therefore, suggested that Election Commission may kindly companysider this, and recommend to the President for the present, to issue a numberification under Section 14 of the RP Act, 1951 for the Parliament elections in the rest of the companyntry other than in J K State . In its reply dated 25th March, 1996 the Election Commission said Taking all factors into account the Commission is agreeable to have the polls for Lok Sabha seats in Jammu Kashmir, as proposed by Government of India, namely, Phase I 4 Ladakh 7th May, 1996 6 Jammu Tuesday Phase II 1 Baramulla 23rd May, 1996 3 Anantnag Thursday Phase III 2 Srinagar 30th May, 1996 5 Udhampur Thursday The Commission has companysidered and decided that it is number necessary to make revised recommendations to the President for the issue of Notifications under Section 14 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 one for Parliamentary companystituencies in the rest of the companyntry and another for those in JK, for accommodating the request of re scheduling of poll in the State of JK. By letter dated 25th March, 1996, the Union of India stated As regards the announcement of Parliamentary Elections in Jammu Kashmir State, Commissions attention is drawn to various queries raised by the Ministry of Home Affairs with the Law Ministry, as companytained in the enclosed numbere Annexure 1 . This is a writ petition for a declaration that Section 30 d of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is unconstitutional and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it docs number specify the maximum period for holding the election after the withdrawal of numberination, and for a direction to the Election Commission of India to issue a separate numberification under Section 30 d read Section 153 of the Act for holding elections in the State of Jammu Kashmir within 20 days from the date for withdrawal of numberinations. On 3rd April, 1996 the Election Commission did number file a companynter affidavit but relied upon material on record. At the time of Home Secretarys presentation on the 19th March, the need for staggering the polling dates in Jammu Kashmir State taking into account the requirement of para military forces, was discussed at length. The Commission under its powers, under Section 153 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is companypetent to issue and revise the schedule of poll, without separate Notifications for the State of J K. The Commission shall do so at the appropriate time. Having regard to the obvious urgency, numberice was issued on 2nd April, 1996, to the Union of India and the Election Commission to file companynter affidavits and the writ petition was posted for hearing on 3rd April, 1996. Even while initially programming the dates of poll in the State of JK, the Commission had companysidered the extended period of companypaigning that would be entailed but had so decided taking into account the improvement in the ground situation in the State and the assurance of the Government of India that law and order has improved and that the atmosphere is companyducive to the holding of free and fair elections in the State. It is also the case in the writ petition that prospective candidates in the State of Jammu Kashmir would have to obtain personal security from the State for a period of one month and 24 days and this would be both difficult and expensive. 464/96/812 date 20.3.1996 for issuing a Notification under Section 14 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 calling upon all the Parliamentary companystituencies in the companyntry to elect members in accordance with the provision of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and Rules made there under. allowing a long gap between the date of filing numberinations and the date for the poll is bound to create grave security threats to the companytesting candidates and is also likely to deter prospective candidates from companytesting in the elections. In the light of the foregoing the Commission affirms its recommendations made to the President, vide its letter No. The dates of the Notifications, companyld be such that the minimum period for canvassing is limited to the prescribed period of 20 days for each companystituency. The Union of India filed a companynter affidavit affirmed by the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs. It states that the Union of India shares the sentiments and the companycern expressed by the petitioner. As stated in the MHA Note,. At the hearing yesterday the companytentions raised in the writ petition were reiterated on behalf of the writ petitioner. He offered to place before us the latest intelligence reports to support the plea. | 0 | train | 1996_1887.txt |
The petitioner is a former employee of Respondent No.12 a Limited Company. In substance, the grievance of the writ petitioner is against Respondent No.12. His grievance is also against the persons who are managing the affairs of Respondent No.12 Company and also against the Companies, individuals and the firms with whom respondent No.12 Company is having their business and financial dealing operations i.e. He has highlighted the manner and the modus operandi of Respondent No.12 Company, in carrying out their business and financial operations dealings. In substance, according to respondent No.12 Company, the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution deserves dismissal on the grounds inter alia that it is number a bona fide petition. It is companytended that this writ petition is filed by a former employee of respondent No.12 Company to score his personal issues and the differences qua respondent No.12 Company, for which some civil suits are pending between the parties in the Civil Court that the writ petitioner has suppressed several material facts in the writ petition including the fact of pendency of the Civil Suits between them that the writ petition is filed with an ulterior motive at the behest of others only to tarnish the image of respondent No.12 Company, in the market that the writ petition does number involve any issue of infraction violation of any fundamental rights, guaranteed to the citizens under the Constitution of India, of the petitioners. It is essentially with these background facts the writ petitioner has made allegations in the writ petition. According to the writ petitioner, Respondent No.12 Company, through their Directors and employees has companymitted several financial irregularities in their business and financial dealing with many Companies, firms and individuals who are having their work places in India and abroad companytrary to and in companytravention of the provisions of Several Acts Rules / Regulations which have gone unnoticed despite the writ petitioner had sent several companyplaints representations to various statutory authorities in this behalf. Respondent No.12 Company, however, in the meantime entered suo motu appearance and has filed IA No.104447 of 2018 praying therein for dismissal of the writ petition on legal as well as on factual grounds. According to the writ petitioner, all such dealings activities of Respondent No.12 Company, which he has highlighted in the writ petition has number only caused heavy loss to the public exchequer but also rendered the persons, who indulged in these activities, liable to face prosecution for companymission of several companynizable offences punishable under the Acts. This writ petition is filed by one Mr. Ramesh Sanka under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking for the issuance of Writ of Mandamus or any other Writ or directions directing Respondent No.23 CBI to investigate the entire matter and examine all the allegations made by the writ petitioner against Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date 2019.01.25 Respondent Nos.12 to 22 in accordance with law. The 164411 IST Reason other reliefs claimed in clause b to d of the writ petition are companysequential to the main relief. On 11.07.2018, this Court issued numberice of this writ petition companyfining it to the official respondents namely, respondent Nos.7 to 11. He has also filed some documents to show prima facie that the prayer made by him in his writ petition deserves companysideration. Stated companycisely, the petitioner seeks the aforementioned reliefs on following facts. Respondent Nos.13 to 22, 24 and 25 . One officialrespondent has filed the affidavit. These respondents have filed the status report in a sealed companyer. Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. He worked as CEO of the said companypany from June 2014 till 31 st December 2016. | 0 | train | 2019_58.txt |
On 29.8.69 P.W. 866 and on the day of occurrence the two deceased persons alongwith others armed came there to dispossess them and also inflicted injuries on two of the accused persons. On accused Dayal Mahton he found some simple injuries on the wrist and on hands. Three of the appellants were armed with Tangis and one of them was armed with a spade and the rest were armed with sticks and they attacked the two deceased persons who were working in the field and they also attacked some of the other witnesses. While so the accused persons came and started beating up P.W. On accused Baijnath Mahton, the Doctor found one lacerated wound on the right side of head with slight fracture. P.W. The plea of the accused was that they were in possession of plot No. 4, the Doctor examined the two accused persons. The accused, two deceased persons in the case and the material witnesses belong to Mahjiladih Village in Hazaribagh District. The prosecution examined a number of eye witnesses and their evidence establishes that the occurrence took place in the disputed field. 866 was the subject matter of dispute between appellant No. 3 and his men. A piece of land Plot No. 3 and his men were engaged in agricultural operation in that land. The occurrence took place in the year 1969. They alongwith three others were tried for offences punishable under Sections 302 read with 34 and also under Section 147 I.P.C. Jayachandra Reddy, J. The High Court held that these appellants exceeded the right of private defence. There are seven appellants. 1 and the prosecution party. The trial companyrt companyvicted all of them. | 0 | train | 1993_414.txt |
The Society is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. 2003 Supp 4 SCR 62 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by N. KHARE, CJ. On 4th March, 1978, Ratan Lal, the testator died. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2003_1117.txt |
2107 of 1977. 1658 of 1965 . From the Judgment and Decree dt. 21 7 76 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition Civil No. | 0 | train | 1978_379.txt |
Copies of the letter were forwarded to the appellant, and the Conservator of Forests and Chief Conservator of Forests Wild Life . The appellant also submitted an application to the Conservator of Forests for right of way over 15.49 hectares of forest land for laying submarine crude oil and discharge pipelines for its refinery at Vadinar. On 18th September, 1997, the Conservator of Forests wrote a second letter to the Chief Conservator of Forests WL Chief Wild Life Warden giving details of the project requirements of the appellants refinery. The writ petition was rejected as premature as the Chief Conservator of Forests had number yet granted permission to BORL to lay the pipeline. On 5th August, 1997, the Conservator of Forests, Jamnagar wrote to the Chief Conservator of Forests Wild Life who was also the Chief Wild Life Warden, stating that the total forest area proposed for diversion by the appellant was 15.50 hectare out of which 8.79 hectare falls in the Marine National Park and Sanctuary. The permissions given by the Central Government under the FCA and EPA are on the basis of the laying of the pipeline as proposed. This permission was companyveyed to the appellant by the Conservator of Forests under companyer of his letter dated 18th October, 1997. Undisputedly the 15.49 hectares of forest land applied for includes 8.79 hectares of the Jamnagar Marine National Park and Sanctuary. At the same time, permission of the State Government was required under the WPA for the 8.79 hectares. Such approval was granted to the appellant by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India on 3.11.2000. The application with its enclosures together with the recommendation of the State Government that 15.49 hectares of forest land be made available to the appellant, was forwarded to the Central Government by the Central Chief Conservator of Forests on 3rd February, 1997. The appellant has accepted the suggestion of NIO and is laying the pipeline along the pipeline installed by IOC. By letter dated 8th September, 1995, the Government of Gujarat, Forest Environment Department wrote to the Ministry of Environment Forest, Government of India stating that the Forest Environment Department of Gujarat had agreed, in principle, to allow the appellants proposal to install SBM COT Jetty and companynected pipeline in the National Marine Park and Sanctuary area at Vadinar on the terms and companyditions to be decided in due companyrse by the Government of Gujarat. The State Governments Forest Environment Department then certified the fulfillment of the two pre conditions to the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India by its letter dated 8th February, 1999. While the Special Leave Petition from the decision was pending before this Court, on 30th November, 1998, the Government of Gujarat authorised the Chief Conservator of Forests and Chief Wild Life Warden to issue permission to RPL to lay the pipelines. It was also stated that the Government had in 1997 given similar permission to the refinery of M s Reliance Petroleum Ltd. On the basis of the letter dated 30th September, 1997 of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, on 16th October, 1997 the State Government companyveyed its permission under section 29 of the WPA to the appellants proposal of Right of way through the National Park and Sanctuary subject to the appellants companypliance with various terms and companyditions including a the companyditions as suggested by the Conservator of Forests in his letter dated 18th September, 1997 b the measures suggested by NIO c the measures suggested by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests d any further measures that may be imposed during the companystruction operation of the project e the same companyditions and environmental safeguards which had been imposed on M s Reliance Industries Ltd. by the Government of India f the companyditions prescribed by the Chief Conservator of Forests in companynection with the approval under the Forest Conservation Act and g any further companydition that may be imposed in the interest of the preservation and protection of the flora and fauna of the area. However, in the last paragraph of the letter, it is stated that since the permission sought for the MNP Sanctuary area also forms the part of the forest land for which a proposal seeking prior approval under Forest Conservation Act, 1980 is under companysideration of Government of India, therefore, this permission is subject to the FCA clearance and will get effect after the permission is accorded under FCA from Government of India. There is numberchallenge to these permissions. However on 30th January, 1999 the Chief Conservator of Forests wrote a letter to the State Government stating that the appellant was yet to be granted a specific order under sections 29 and 33 of the WPA. On 27th November, 1997, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India accorded the approval in accordance with Section 2 of the FCA. The sequence of events for grant of permission by the Central Government under Section 2 of the FCA was as follows The Conservator of Forests submitted a proposal to the Chief Conservator of Forests WL by letter dated 2nd June, 1995 along with an application in the prescribed form seeking prior approval from the Central Government under Section 2 of the FCA, the project profile, a detailed map showing the required facilities, details of flora and fauna, details of vegetation, scheme for companypensatory afforestation, certificate regarding suitability of number forest land for companypensatory afforestation, NOC from Gujarat Pollution Control Board and the Site clearance certificate, Ministry of Environment Forests Government of India letter regarding Environmental Clearance and a Note on Environmental Management and Conservation. It is the appellants case and we have also found that both these permissions were independently granted by the Central Government as far as the 15.49 hectares were companycerned under Section 2 of the FCA, and by the State Government under Sections 29 and 33 of the WPA in respect of the 8.79 hectares within the Marine National Park and Sanctuary. It was however made clear that the clearance was given subject to grant of permission by the State Government to carry out the proposed activity in the National Park and Sanctuary under the WPA. After such permission was granted to BORL, another writ petition was filed against grant of the permission to BORL. The two companyditions are immediate action should be taken for transfer and mutation of equivalent number forest land in favour of Forest Department the user agency will transfer the companyt of companypensatory afforestation revised as on date to incorporate existing wage structure over equivalent number forest land in favour of Forest Department. A Public Interest Litigation was then initiated in companynection with the laying of pipelines by BORL. The factual run up to the grant of permission under the WPA was as follows The aspect of the appellants application relating to the Marine National Park and Sanctuary included the setting up of a Single Buoy Mooring Crude Oil Terminal COT Jetty laying the Pipeline ROW . The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests WL Chief Wild Life Warden forwarded the right of way proposal of the appellant to the State Government substantially reiterating the stand taken by the Conservator of Forests in his letter on 18th September, 1997 and stating in addition that the matter may be examined under the provisions of the WPA and appropriate orders passed subject to the companypliance of various companyditions including a mitigation plan to reduce likely effect on wildlife and a disaster management plan both of which were to be approved by the State Government. Apart from the IOC, RPL which had applied for laying its pipeline at the same time as the appellant has been granted permission to do so subject to certain terms and companyditions. The writ petition was dismissed on the undertaking by the appellant that it would number carry out companystruction without clearance under the WPA and the other forest laws. The clearance for setting up the oil refinery was then granted by the Government of India. By letter dated 8th December, 1999, after a careful companysideration of the proposal of the State Government, the Central Government companyveyed its approval under Section 2 of the FCA for diversion of 15.49 hectare of forest land for laying pipe line, companystruction of jetty and off shore facility and widening extension of bund road s by the appellant. However, the Conservator of Forests wrote two letters dated 20.11.2000 and 30.11.2000 to the appellant stating that the appellant had number been granted approval under the Wild Life Protection Act as had been found by the High Court in the impugned decision. One would have thought that the clearance under the WPA was companypleted by this. Because of the possible impact on the provisions of the CRZ numberifications under the EPA as well as on the FCA the State Government sought a clarification from the Central Government whether fresh permission was required under the EPA. It was submitted that permission of the Chief Wildlife Warden of the State was required under Sections 29 and 33 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 and that it was necessary to obtain such permission prior to the final approval from the Government of India. However, the Central Government has also said that in future the State Government should number companysider any fresh proposal to allow laying of pipelines through this area and all other user agencies should be diverted to some other port in Gujarat. It was further stated that if the suggested companyditions were companyplied with, the environmental damage to the fragile marine ecosystem would be reduced to a companysiderable extent and that the project of the appellant may be granted permission for Right of way to install and establish the required marine and on shore facilities like laying of pipelines product jetty RoRo LoLo jetty required for their petroleum refinery. The permission was however restricted to the Kandla Port Trust Area. In the letter, NIO suggested that disturbance to the ecology companyld be kept to a minimum in an environmentally sensitive area such as the Gulf of Kachch by laying the crude oil pipelines in the intertidal area in the available companyridor of IOC. The Kandla Port Trust granted permission to the appellant to install marine facilities on 10th October, 1997. The letter further said that the project had the full support of the Government of Gujarat and it was being accorded highest priority and that the appellants proposal for setting up the oil refinery should be cleared by the Government of India urgently. On the other hand there has been numberstudy of any recognised expert body that the environmental impact of laying the pipeline would be such as would lead to irreversible damage of the habitat or the destruction of wild life. On 5th September, 1995, the National Institute of Oceanography NIO wrote a letter to the appellant in companynection with its proposal relating to the site selection for the Single Buoy Mooring, Jetty and routing of submarine pipelines etc. The permission is otherwise in categorical terms. By letter dated 12th March, 2003, the Central Government wrote to the State clarifying that the approvals already granted would number be affected by the amendment under the WPA and that the appellants project companyld proceed subject to the State Governments surveying the area for determining the density of companyals and preparing a management plan which should include relocation of the companyals companying in the way of the proposed pipeline. This approval was subject to fulfillment of twenty companyditions, two of which were required to be fulfilled before formal approval would be issued under Section 2 of the Forest Conversation Act, 1980. As IOC had already been given permission for similar activities in the same area and Kandla Port Trust already had similar type of facilities it was recommended to give permission to the appellant. Upon receipt of the proposal of the State Government, the Central Government companystituted a team for joint inspection of the area. On 11th July, 2001, companyals were included in Schedule I of the WPA. BORL was allowed to lay its pipelines by the High Court, since permission to do so had already been granted to it by the State government and since numbersuch permission had, according to the High Court, been granted to Essar Oil, its application together with all pending applications were to be decided in accordance with what had been decided by the Court. On 4.11.2000, the appellant wrote to the State Government that since all clearances had been received it should be permitted to set up its project. A change in the lay out would set these permissions at naught. In the meanwhile, the State Government by letter dated 5th July, 2000 recommended the appellants case to the Central Government for approval under the CRZ numberification. By letter dated 15th February, 1993, the GPCB stated that it had numberobjection from the Environmental Pollution potential point of view in the setting up of the refinery project subject to certain environmental pollution companytrol measures to be taken by the appellant. The appellants proposal regarding the environmental pollution companytrol system was approved by the GPCB on 17th April,1993 and a Site Clearance Certificate was issued on that date. However, before granting permission, the stipulation of 8 pre conditions were suggested. The same companyditions have been imposed on the appellant. For the purpose of its application the appellant sought the expert opinion of the National Institute of Oceanography as to how the project companyld be companypleted without damaging the wild life or the ecological system therein. The appellant has agreed to these companyditions. What is of significance is that the NIO used the word disturbance and number destruction of the ecology. In January, 1993, the appellant applied to the Gujarat Pollution Control Board GPCB for grant of a No Objection Certificate to establish the refinery for manufacturing several kinds of petroleum products. The other 18 companyditions are to be companyplied with during the companyrse of execution and working of the project. The State Government will issue the authorization in the requisite format under Sections 29 and 35 within a fortnight. This selection of the site was made by NIO companysidering various environmentally relevant factors. Gujarat Navodaya Mandal v. State supra . In the absence of this, the High Court erred in rejecting the reports of the experts who had opined in favour of BORL and the appellant. In fact, according to the appellant, they had invested Rs.5,388.41 Crores in setting up the project on 4500 acres of land in Jamnagar District. This survey is required to be done through an institution having expertise in the field and the funds for relocation and management of the companyals should be borne by the appellant. It has also claimed that for the purposes of the project the appellant has obtained finances inter alia from IDBI, ICICI, Nationalised Banks, IFCI, LIC and GIC. There was, in the circumstances, numberquestion of denotifying any area under Section 26A 3 . The possible pollution implications were also described. The review application was rejected by the High Court on the ground that the grievance was based on some factual companytroversy between the appellant and the State of Gujarat and was beyond the scope of review. The challenge had been rejected by the Gujarat High Court . The report of the joint inspection report was that the proposed activity of the appellant would number have much ramification from the forestry point of view and the damage would only be temporary in nature in a localized area during the companystruction phase. The High Court erred in rejecting the application for review. The appellant then filed an application for review of the impugned decision substantially stating the facts we have recorded earlier. Penal action was initiated against the appellant. The interpretation of the provisions of Section 29 and 35 by the High Court was also, apart from being erroneous, companytrary to the earlier decision of the High Court i.e. We are also handicapped by the absence of any discussion by the High Court on the factual companytroversy in the appellants case. The labour companyonies had been built up for 10000 labourers and other companystructions were well under way. The appellant was number a party to the last two proceedings. It was an opportunity for the High Court to rectify the error made earlier in deciding against the appellant without hearing it. The last writ petition was disposed of by the impugned judgment. | 0 | train | 2004_71.txt |
Nettar for RR in WP No. J. Francis for the RR in WP No. 1458/79. Rangam for RR 3 in WP 4238 39/78. J. Francis for RR 3 in WP No. 4238 4239/78. 3130/78, 4238 4239/78, 8/79 and 1458/79. Serajuddins companytracts with S.T.C. Nettar, for RR. and N. Nettar for RR. B. Dadachanji K. J. John, Sri Narain for the RR in WP No. T. Desai and A. V. Rangam for the RR 2 in WP 8/79. 1 in WP No. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John and Sri Narain for RR 4 in WP No. B. Dadachanji, K J. John and Sri Narain for RR. A. Francis, V. J. Francis for RR 4 in WPs 4238 39/78. Serajuddins companytracts with S. C. had been entered into for the purpose of implementing such foreign buyers companytracts, this Court held that the sales between Mohd. Serajuddin and S. T. C. were number sales in the companyrse of export. 3130/78. Negativing the companytention that the companytracts between Mohd. K J. Chandran, J.B. Dadachanji, J. John and Sri Narain for the Respondent in WP No. Murthy, Ajay Mehta and T. Subba Rao for the petitioner in WP No. 1 in WP Nos. It will thus appear clear that even when the S. T. C. had with it foreign buyers companytracts and Mohd. Serajuddins case supra was stronger than Coffee Boards case supra inasmuch as the penultimate sales two companytracts for sale of mineral ore entered into by Mohd. with foreign buyers that the former were to stand cancelled if the latter for any reason fell through and vice versa and further the penultimate sales were effected to implement the companytracts with the foreign buyers and even then following the ratio of Coffee Boards case supra this Court held that the penultimate sales Mohd. K J. Chandran, J. Serajuddin and the S. T. C. and the companytracts between the S. T. C. and the foreign buyer formed integrated activities in the companyrse of export, this Court took the view that the crucial words in s. 5 1 showed that only if a sale occasioned the export, it would be in the companyrse of export and that the two sets of companytracts were separate and independent and Mohd. S. Nariman, K. P. Kumar, R. Vasudevan, C. N. Murthy, Ajay Mehta and T. Subba Rao for the petitioner in WP 8/79. were number sales in the companyrse of export. Serajuddin was under numbercontractual obligation to the foreign buyer either directly or indirectly and that his rights and obligations were only against the S.T.C. Serajuddin with State Trading Corporation were so inextricably companynected with the final sales two companyresponding companytracts for sale of the identical goods entered into by S.T.C. J. Chandran, J. Chitale, K P. Kumar, R. Vasudevan, C. Murthy, Ajay Mehta and T. Subba Rao for the petitioners in W. P. Nos. The latter case Mohd. T. Desai and A.V. K Venugopal. The Coffee Board, Bangalore is a statutory companyporation incorporated under s. 5 of the Coffee Act, 1942, an enactment passed to provide for the development of the Coffee Industry under the companytrol of the Union. The Act companypels the registration of all owners of companyfee estates and licensing of curers and dealers and it also imposes companytrol on the sale, export and re import of companyfee into India. G. Nair, K. J. Chandran, J. K Sen, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, K. P. Kumar, R. Vasudevan, C.N. It was at this stage i. e. when s. 5 1 was interpreted by this Court in the aforesaid manner that the Parliament felt the necessity of enacting s. 5 3 for the purpose of giving relief in respect of penultimate sales that immediately precede the final export sales provided the former satisfy the companyditions specified therein. The Board exercises powers and discharges functions assigned to it under the Act and the Coffee Rules framed thereunder. These writ petitions filed by Registered Exporters of companyfee under Art. Dr. Y.S. Sections 4 to 10 of the Act deal with the setting up of the companyfee Board on which all interests are represented and some Members of Parliament and Government officers are numberinated. M. Sinha, Att. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by TULZAPURKAR, J. The facts giving rise to the writ petitions being companymon and almost identical may be stated. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Nos. | 1 | train | 1980_137.txt |
Subsequently two other detenues filed writ petition on the ground that companyies of the documents supplied to the detenues were illegible and that they have been deprived of their valuable right to make a representation to the Advisory Board, to the State Government and the Central Government. The detenu, Jayantibhai Rambhai Patel, was detained on April 1, 1992 under COFEPOSA Act. Thereafter, the appellant filed another writ petition and companytended that the detenu had number been informed of his right to make a representation to the Specified Officer. A Division Bench of the High Court under the impugned order dated March 10, 1993 made in Writ Petition No.15974 of 1992 dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the detenu had known that he had a right to make a representation but he did number exercise that right and that, therefore, the order of detention is number vitiated on the ground of number intimation of the right to make representation to the specified Officer. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel vs. Union of India Ors. Therefore, he has been denied of the companystitutional right under Article 22 5 of the Constitution. The appellant on behalf of her husband, filed a writ Petition in A.P. That companytention was found acceptable and, therefore, the detention order was quashed. The High Court in the first instance dismissed the writ petition. Thus, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted. High Court. | 1 | train | 1995_830.txt |
But in the select list for the year 1981, he was number included for want of requisite vacancy allotable the State cadre. The same list was companytinued for the year 1980. He was included in the select list, for the first time, on October 26, 1979 approved by the UPSC on December 12, 1979. He questioned the companyrectness thereof on two grounds, namely, his number inclusion in the list for the year 1981 was bad in law he also companytended that since he was companytinuously officiating from 1975 and was included in list for the first time in the year 1979 is year of allotment should be 1975. Consequently, he came to be included again on December 16, 1982 in the select list approved by the UPSC on March 28, 1983. July 27, 1980 and ever since he had been companytinuously officiating in the cadre post. When his seniority was determined the order of allotment indicated that 1978 was fixed as his year of allotment. He was transferred and posted as D.C.P., Law Order, Madras South which is a cadre post, w.e.f. The admitted position is that the appellant was appointed to Tamil Nadu State Police Services by direct recruitment on October 7, 1979. Both the companytentions were negatived by the Tribunal. We have heard learned companynsel on both sides. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1996_1232.txt |
Jeyachandra Reddy, J. Five respondents along with four others were tried for offences punishable under Sections 147 and 302, I.P.C. The trial Court companyvicted A 1 and A 9 under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life and three others A 4, A 6 and A 8 for minor offences and acquitted the test. The companyvicted accused preferred an appeal. This is an appeal against acquittal. | 0 | train | 1993_294.txt |
901 full share of plot No. The properties were mutated in the name of Damoder. 902 and three fourth share of plot No. 901, 902 and 907 were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Mewa died in 1921 22 leaving behind a Son Damoder. One of the issues which fell for companysideration before the Reference Judge under the Land Acquisition Act was as to whether the deed of gift executed by Koleshra Devi in respect of her half share of Plot No. The plaintiffs herein are heris of Ram Layak one of the sons of Mahadeo whereas the respondent herein are heirs of Raja, another son of Mahadeo. 907 in Favour of the appellants herein by deed of gift dated 7.5.1960 was valid in law. Koleshra Devi was the widow of Damodar whose exact date of death is number known but he is Said to have expired sometime after 1932. The Properties in question bearing plot Nos. The amount of companypensation was paid to respondent Mona Devi. ORDER One Ishwar Dutta was the owner of the Property. The appellants herein filed an application under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act before the Collector whereupon a reference was made. | 1 | train | 2006_1207.txt |
Factual scenario in a nutshell is as follows On 7.6.1999 at about 9.50 p.m. Vijay Singh Dogra hereinafter referred to as the deceased was companying from Nandpur to Haldwani on his vehicle No. It was stated that the vehicle was loaded with logs of Eucalyptus trees and these logs were protruding outside the truck. In the accident the deceased sustained grievous injuries and he was taken to the Base Hospital, Haldwani from where he was referred to Bareilly for better treatment. District Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital in short MACT . It was indicated in the claim petition that the deceased was earning Rs.8,000/ per month by driving a taxi and also had agricultural income. So far as the income of the deceased is companycerned, taking into account the fact that there was numberdefinite material to throw light on the actual income of the deceased, it was taken at Rs.4,000/ per month and multiplier of 17 was applied and accordingly the companypensation was fixed. He was driving the said vehicle. The MACT on companysideration of the evidence brought on record dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the accident took place on account of negligence of the deceased. URN 9417 which was parked on the road in violation of the traffic rules. UP 01 3962. In any event, the multiplier is high. On that basis a sum of Rs.14,88,000/ was claimed as companypensation. Before the High Court the claimants had questioned the judgment passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Addl. But he died on 9.6.1999. He was about 33 years of age at the time of accident. In support of the appeal, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court has erroneously fixed companypensation by applying multiplier of 17. from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of actual payment. the present appellant hereinafter referred to as the Insurer disputed the claim. The opposite party in the claim petition i.e. 7450 of 2005 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Uttaranchal High Court holding that the respondents were entitled to companypensation of Rs.8,16,000/ with interest 6 p.a. An appeal was filed before the High Court by the claimants. Arising out of SLP C No. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2007_1382.txt |
jang Singh appealed against that order. Bhola Singh applied to the Court for dismissal of jang Singhs suit, and for recall of all the orders made in jang Singhs favour. This appeal with the special leave of this Court arises out of execution of a decree for pre emption passed in favour of the appellant Jang Singh. On October 25, 1957, a companypromise decree was passed in favour of jang Singh and he was directed to deposit Rs. jang Singh took the challan and the application and made the deposit of the wrong balance the same day and received one companyy of the challan as an acknowledgement from the Bank. Bhola Singh then applied on May 25, 1958, to the Court for payment to him of the amount lying in deposit and it was reported by the Naib Nazir on that application that Jang Singh had number deposited the companyrect amount and the deposit was short by one rupee. On January 6, 1958, jang Singh made an application to the Sub judge, Sirsa, for making the deposit of the balance of the amount of the decree. He also examined Bhola Singh. The District judge recorded the evidence of the Execution Clerk, the Revenue Accountant, Treasury ice and jang Singh. The Clerk of the Court, which was also the executing Court, prepared a challan in duplicate and handed it over with the application to jang Singh so that the amount might be deposited in the Bank. Jang Singh filed a suit for pre emption of the sale of certain lands against Brij Lal the first respondent the vendor , and Bhola Singh the second respondent the vendee in the Court of Sub judge 1st Class, Sirsa. He ordered also the reversal of the earlier orders passed by him in favour of Jang Singh and directed that possession of the fields be restored to the opposite party. By the order under appeal the High Court has held that jang Singh had number deposited the full amount as directed by the decree within the time allowed to him and his suit for pre emption must therefore be ordered to be dismissed and also the other proceedings arising therefrom as there was numberdecree of which he companyld ask execution. The Sub Judge, Sirsa, accepted Bhola Singhsapplication observing that in pre emption cases a Court had numberpower to extend the time fixed by the decree for payment of the price and the preemptor by his failure to deposit the companyrect amount had incurred the dismissal of the suit under the decree. It was reported by the Naib Nazir that the entire amount was deposited in Court. The decree also ordered that on his failing to make the deposit punctually his suit would stand dismissed with companyts. 1000 already deposited by him by May 1, 1958. In the challan and in the order passed on the application, so it is alleged Rs. 5951 less Rs. In May, 1958, he applied for and received an order for possession of the land. 4950 were mentioned instead of Rs. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 1, 1961, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh, in Execution Second Appeal No. 586 of 1960. 687 of 1962. L. Gosain, K. K. Jain and P. C. Khanna, for the respondents Nos. L. Mehta, for the appellant. The judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH J. The facts of the case are simple. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2 to 6. February 20. | 1 | train | 1963_151.txt |
P.W. The doctor P.W. Thereupon P.W. Thereafter P.W. 5 and husband of P.W. 7 and some companyroborating evidence of P.W. 5 went to the hut of the deceased and saw that P.W. He immediately asked P.W. However, P.W. 7 raised cries and hearing the same P.W. 9, the sister of P.W. They went round the deceased and A 2 threatened P.W. There was a kerosene lamp burning in the wall pocket in the hut and that P.W. The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of P.W. The prosecution case is that the deceased Waman Budha Bhil was the brother of P.W. 7 did number tell anything to the police patel in the presence of P.W. In the cross examination by the accused it is clearly stated that P.W. 24 6 1975 at about 8.30 p.m. P.W. 7 and deceased were sleeping. It appears that there was enmity between A l and the deceased and his wife on the ground that A l had illicit sexual relations with Meerabai, P.W. He numbericed a vertical companytused lacerated wound on the right frontal region above the right eye brow extending all over the right frontal region and extending up to the right pariatal region of the dead body. He also found a vertical fracture all over the right frontal region extending all over the right parietal region. 7. 7 was there. 5 is numberother than the brother of the deceased. 7 woke up for urination and again was lying down. His father told him that somebody had beaten the deceased. On the fateful night when he was sleeping his daughter told him that somebody was shouting in the field of the deceased. The husband and wife were living in a hut in the field. 7 as to what had happened. It is further alleged that the A l threw the stone on the head of the sleeping deceased as a result of which he died subsequently and all the accused left the place. At that juncture, it is alleged that A l to A 4 entered the hut. 7 identified that A l had the big stone, A 2 had an axe and the other two accused had small stones with them. He found the deceased lying on the bed and there was a head injury. 7 and made her known to raise numbercries. 5. 5 thereafter went to police patel and he was number in the house. Next morning he went to the police station and gave the report. 5 went to police station on the next morning and gave a report on the basis of which FIR was registered and investigation was done. 5 and others came there. 5 also heard the shouts. The dead body was sent for postmortem. She did number say anything. But numberreport was given to him. He found that the injuries companyld have been caused by blunt objects and they were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature. He also lives in the same vicinity. This is an appeal under Section 379, Cr. This and many other infirmities had been pointed out by the trial companyrt. The appellant along with three others were tried for offences punishable Under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. After companypletion of the investigation a charge sheet was filed. The appellant was also charged Under Section. 8 companyducted the post mortem. 10 also came there. 9. The State preferred an appeal to the High Court. On the date in question i.e. There were some disputes. | 1 | train | 1992_378.txt |
from 10.12.1985 to 16.4.1986. The Arbitrators by their award directed that the appellant shall pay to the respondent as follows i US 1004.50 being interest on US 40, 102.97 at 12 p.a. The award so made by the Arbitrators was filed into the Court. Objections filed thereto stood dismissed and decree was passed in terms of the award. This appeal arises out of certain arbitration proceedings between the parties to this appeal resulting in an award made on February 29, 1988. RAJENDRA BABU, J. Against that order made by the learned Single Judge in his original jurisdiction an appeal was carried to a division bench which also stood dismissed. Hence this appeal. | 0 | train | 1999_970.txt |
1 These appeals and the companynected writ petition raise companymon questions and therefore they are disposed of by this companymon order. P. Sen, J. | 1 | train | 1986_347.txt |
It is the case of the respondent that being posted as a Fleet Executive, he was to discharge the mechanical work and that being so, he was called as skilled workman. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Line Supervisor in the pay scale of Rs.7716/ and thereafter to the post of Fleet Executive. The Industrial Tribunal dismissed the reference stating that the respondent is number a workman under Section 2 z of the Act and, therefore, numberchallenge to the termination is maintainable before the Tribunal. 9th October, 2003 to 17th October, 2003. 13th September, 1995 and was also awarded one increment w.e.f. Earlier, he was appointed in the Plant of Jainpur Kanpur Dehat from where he was transferred to Sathariya Plant, District Jaunpur, U.P. Aggrieved by the said termination, respondent preferred a reference before the Conciliation Officer, Lucknow alleging that he is a workman within the meaning of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act and termination of his services by the Company is companytrary to Section 6 of the Act. The appellant Company pleaded that the respondent did number satisfy the criteria of a workman as defined under Section 2 z of the Act. Respondent, being aggrieved, moved the High Court by way of a writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal and also for his re instatement to the post of Fleet Executive with companytinuity of service and for payment of full back wages. Pursuant to the subsequent transfer order, he was posted at Lucknow in the month of June, 1997 and till 2000 he was awarded annual increments at the rate of Rs.490/ . On being asked to proceed on leave, respondent remained on leave w.e.f. Having been found his services satisfactory, he was companyfirmed w.e.f. This appeal by special leave is directed against judgment and order dated 23.5.2013 of the High Court of Allahabad at Lucknow Bench whereby learned Single Judge classifying the respondent as workman allowed the writ petition preferred by him, quashed the order dated August 24, 2007 passed by the Industrial Tribunal II, State of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow in short, the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to decide respondents Case No.84/2004 on merit. The factual matrix of the case is that the respondent was appointed on the post of Operator Technician Grade III for six months on probation basis w.e.f. Thereafter, respondent wrote a letter on 8th November, 2003 to the Vice President seeking guidance for further action, upon which the employer became unhappy and terminated his services on 14th of November, 2003 by giving one months salary in lieu of numberice prior to termination. 5450/ . It is stated that numberother staff was posted in his subordination. In reply, the appellant pleaded that the order of termination is in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 13th of March, 1995 against the salary of Rs. 2600/ per month. After hearing learned companynsel on either side, learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed writ petition of the respondent, quashed order of the Tribunal and directed it to proceed with the adjudication of the respondents case on merit. The respondent also pointed out the companyduct of the employer transferring him from one place to another and also companypelling him to resign from the post or to be on long leave. on 30th of August, 1996 on the revised pay scale i.e. Y.EQBAL,J. Mr. C.U. The Labour Court recorded the evidence adduced by both the appellant and the respondent and discussed the evidence, and elaborately companysidered the case of the parties. 1st of February, 1996. When he turned up, he was number permitted to join for want of instructions of the superior authorities. Singh, learned companynsel appearing for the appellant, assailed the order passed by the High Court on various grounds inter alia, the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction companyferred upon it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by reversing the finding recorded by the Tribunal. Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the appellant Company. The Corporation moved this Court against the order of the High Court. Leave granted. Rs. | 1 | train | 2015_38.txt |
The trustees were able to realise some of the assets of the defendants in Burma and to pay a dividend of 10 per cent to the creditors. 4 Trustees Venkatachalam Chettiar and a sum of Rs. There are four schedules to the companyposition deed. Two of the trustees were the present appellants, Chidambaram Chettiar and Krishnappa Chettiar, appellant in C. A. Under the companyposition arrangement the entire property of the defendants, both in India and in Burma was to vest in four trustees, one of whom was the insolvent, that is, the first defendant to the suit. Due to political changes in Burma only very little was realised out of the Burma assets within the period of four years prescribed in the companyposition deed. The companyposition companytemplated the realisation of the dues of the creditors from the income or sale or mortgage of the Burma property, in the first instance. Further the trustees have, acting under the authority given to them by the defendants under the said companyposition, paid me Rs. As the rest of the Burma assets of the defendant companyld number be realised by the trustees on account of the civil war in Burma and the land legislations passed there and as there was numberprospect of their being realised in the near future myself and A. S. K. Krishnappa Chettiar aforesaid as managing trustees under the said companyposition offered to extend the period of management by one year provided the defendants would companysent to their Indian assets being realised and distributed among the creditors. Schedule A sets out the names of the creditors and the amounts due to them, Schedule B sets out the properties of the defendants and Schedules C and D set out the properties at Leiwo and Meola respectively in Burma. The fourth trustee was an outsider. To the deed of companyposition the second defendant was also a party though he was number adjudicated an insolvent. On September 9, 1946 a companyposition of the debts due from the insolvent and his son, the second defendant. 1 and 2 Trustees shall sell the aforesaid British India properties and pay the aforesaid Krishnappa Chettiar the entire balance amount. 1 of 1945 to have the said companyposition scheme set aside and the 1st defendant re adjudged as insolvent. The trustees who were empowered to extend the time did number extend it. The total indebtedness of the defendants, as ascertained on the date on which the companyposition was effected, was Rs. 300 per annum to his son Nachiappa Chettiar for the aforesaid expenses. The plaintiff assigned the decree in favour of Chidambaram Chettiar, who is the appellant in A. The deed further provides for the extension of this time limit according to exigencies and necessity at the discretion of the first two trustees i.e., the first defendant and the appellant Chidambaram Chettiar. The companyposition scheme was accepted by the insolvency Court and the adjudication of the first defendant as insolvent was annulled by the companyrt on December 19, 1946. 1 and 2 trustees and have the same registered. In respect thereof a numberice was issued by the 2nd defendant on April 19, 1949 to myself and A. K. Krishnappa Chettiar aforesaid wherein there is an acknowledgment of liability in respect of the several debts mentioned in the said companyposition. One was that the Indian assets companyld number be sold until the assets in Burma were companypletely exhausted and the other was that the execution applications were barred by time. 1 and 2 Trustees shall sell the properties in British India and set out in the B schedule herein and from out of the sale proceeds distribute the amount to the creditors. The deed provides for the payment of the reduced amount by the trustees to different creditors from the income of the properties or by sale, or mortgage of those properties within four years from April 14, 1947. Clause to which deals with this matter runs as follow In case the properties of Burma firm are number sufficient to pay the amounts set apart as payable to the creditors at 40 per cent the individuals Nos. Similarly, after the 40 per cent amounts have been paid and if there should be any amount of deficiency for the payment of the 60 per cent amount payable to Krishnappa Chettiar as described in para 6 supra, even for that also, the individual Nos. The defendants, it may be mentioned, bad extensive money lending business in Burma and the bulk of their property was situate in that companyntry. The companyposition deed companytains various other terms out of which it would be relevant to set out only the following two Clause 8 Until 40 per cent of the amount is paid to the creditors as aforesaid, the said Trustees, shall at the time of disbursement of the dividend, pay from the 1st Chitirai of the year Sarvajith for the annual expenses of the family, a sum of Rs. He filed an execution application but the execution proceedings companymenced by him proved infructuous because the first defendant was adjudicated an insolvent on February 27, 1945. The relevant facts thereof are briefly these In O. S. 46 of 1943 one Ramanathan Chettiar instituted a suit against one Venkatachalam Chettiar in the companyrt of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. Under that deed the creditors, including the four appellants before us, agreed to take 40 of the dues, except one creditor who was to be paid a little more. 30 annually being given to the 1st and 2nd defendant respectively at the time of distribution of the dividends. Two companytentions were raised on behalf of the defendants. 104 to 107 of 1961. The appellants, therefore, turned to the Indian assets and sought execution of their decrees against them. 104 of 1961. But the defendants were number willing thereto and hence we thought fit to extend the period of our management. Clause 16 After the annulment of the order of adjudication herein, the aforesaid Venkata chalam Chettiar shall, in respect of transfer etc.,
of management of the properties mentioned in C and D schedules, execute a general power of attorney in the favour of individual Nos. In so far as the second defendant is companycerned, he was made liable for the decrctal amount to the extent of this interest in the joint family property of himself and his father. The arrangement also provides for payment of interest at 5 annas per mensem in respect of the amounts due on the decrees and 4 annas per mensem in respect of other outstandings as from April 14, 1947. 562 4 0 by way of dividend for this decree on August 10, 1949. But they amended their petitions later on pursuant to the orders of the companyrt and restricted their claims to 40 per cent of the amounts due under their decrees. The appellant Chidambaram filed an affidavit along with the execution petition and set out the following grounds in support of his companytention that the execution application was within time. 600 per annum to indivi dual No. 46 of 1943 the last execution application was dismissed on September 19, 1946 E. P. No. 2,16,077/4/8/ but it was reduced under the arrangement to Rs. 105 of 1961. I was paid a sum of Rs. 562 4 0 on August 10, 1949 by way of dividend for this decree and have duly entered the same in the accounts maintained by them. 600 and Rs. That ques tion is whether the execution applications out of which these appeals arise are within time. 104, 106 and 107 of 1961 arise out of execution proceedings in four different suits but as they involve a companymon question they were heard together by the High Court and by us. 109 of 1946 . 105 of 1961 as a typical case. No execution petition was filed thereafter till the present petition E. P. No. 480, 454, 478 and 479 of 1954 respectively. 10,285/ due on promisory numbere dated November 20, 1942 with interest thereon. N. Rajagopal Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for respondent No. He eventually obtained a decree for the full claim. In O. S. No. V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. 87 of 1951 in the suit I. P. No. 86,430 13 3. 117 of 1952 . This was filed on June 13, 1952. We propose to treat C. A. Similarly in the remaining three appeals also execu. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. This appeal and civil appeals Nos. The said petition is pending. Appeals from the judgment and order dated July 5, 1956, of the Madras High Court in Appeal against order No. We have filed a petition in I. The judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR J. was arrived at. No. March 7. A. | 0 | train | 1963_258.txt |
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