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Harnessed Lightning HOW THE CHINESE MILITARY IS ADOPTING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

iii rtificial intelligence (AI) is progressing at lightning speed. What 10 years ago would have been considered science fictionself-adapting computer algorithms with billions of parametersis now a central focus of military and intelligence services worldwide.  1  Owing in part to AI's fast-paced development, most analyses of its military promise tend to focus more on states' future aspirations than present-day capabilities. This is particularly true for the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), which has routinely made clear its desire to harness AI for military advantage, and which prefers to keep a close hold over its actual, technical capabilities.  2  But as tensions mount between the United States and China, and some experts warn of an impending crisis over Taiwan, it is crucial that U.S. policymakers and defense planners understand the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) AI technologies already available to the Chinese military.  3  This report offers a detailed look at the PLA's adoption of AI by analyzing 343 AI-related equipment contracts, part of a broader sample of more than 66,000 procurement records published by PLA units and stateowned defense enterprises in 2020. The report identifies key AI defense industry suppliers, highlights gaps in U.S. export control policies, and contextualizes the PLA's AI investments within China's broader strategy to compete with the United States. Key findings include: 1. Chinese military leaders are already procuring AI-related systems and equipment to prepare for "intelligentized" warfare, but AI so far represents a small fraction of overall purchasing activity.  4  Executive Summary
 A Center for Security and Emerging Technology iv • Approximately 1.9 percent of public PLA contracts awarded between April 2020 and November 2020 are related to AI or autonomy. • While we can only estimate a floor for Chinese military AI spending, it is likely that the PLA spends more than $1.6 billion each year on AI-related systems and equipment. • The PLA seems most focused on procuring AI for intelligence analysis, predictive maintenance, information warfare, and navigation and target recognition in autonomous vehicles. • Whereas some PLA officers have expressed serious reservations about developing lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), laboratories affiliated with the Chinese military are actively pursuing AI-based target recognition and fire control research, which may be used in LAWS. 2. Chinese leaders view AI as the key to transforming the PLA into a "worldclass," globally competitive military force. PLA advances in AI and autonomy will create new vulnerabilities for the United States and allied forces operating in the Indo-Pacific. • The PLA hopes to use AI to generate asymmetric advantages vis-à-vis the United States, which it regards as a "strong enemy" (强敌), but also a role model for AI development. • PLA units and military laboratories are focused on developing autonomous vehicles and surveillance systems in the undersea domain, where the United States has traditionally had a significant advantage. • The PLA is stepping up investment in information operations and adaptive radar systems to jam and blind U.S. sensor and information networks, which PLA leaders judge to be particularly vulnerable. • To compensate for vulnerabilities in its own networks, the PLA may adopt edge applications of AI (directly proximate to, or embedded within a platform) that can operate semi-or fully autonomously. 3. China's military-civil fusion (军民融合) development strategy is helping the PLA acquire COTS technologies, both from private Chinese technology companies and sources outside of China. • Most of the PLA's AI equipment suppliers are not state-owned defense enterprises, but private Chinese tech companies founded after 2010. Center for Security and Emerging Technology v • Although most suppliers are not state-owned, many have benefited from equipment, personnel, information, or capital provided directly or indirectly by the state. • Of the 273 PLA AI equipment suppliers identified in this study, just 8 percent are named in U.S. export control and sanctions regimes. • Some Chinese suppliers make a business out of sourcing foreign data or components and reselling them to sanctioned Chinese defense companies and PLA units. • Lapses in due diligence and situational awareness may permit the Chinese military and defense industry to access capital and technology originating in the United States and partner nations, including advanced computer chips. Supported by a burgeoning AI defense industry, the Chinese military has made extraordinary progress in procuring AI systems for combat and support functions. Within the next five to 10 years, the PLA will likely continue investing in AI to disrupt U.S. military information systems and erode the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare. Although PLA investment in the technology appears substantial-roughly equivalent to that of the U.S. military-it remains to be seen how exactly AI might alter the balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific. In addition to renewed interest in counter-autonomy research, U.S. and allied efforts to regulate access to semiconductor devices may hinder the utility and availability of AI systems for the Chinese military. Introduction n the early pages of Liu Cixin's science fiction novel Ball Lightning, when asked what, exactly, goes on at System Review Department No. 2, Dr. Lin Yun replies that she develops "new concept weapons" (新概念武器)-fantastical ideas with the potential to change warfare itself. As the mastermind behind the Chinese military's eventually catastrophic "lightning weapons" program, Lin is remembered for her ends-justify-means personality and willingness to develop dangerous weapons in the service of the state.  5  Seventeen years after it was first published in Chinese, Liu's novel has been eclipsed by his more successful series, Remembrance of Earth's Past. A Hugo Award winner, he publicly decries any comparison between his imagined universe and modern geopolitics.  6  But there can be no denying that Liu's fictional depiction of a Chinese People's Liberation Army bent on mastering "lightning weapons" bears striking similarities to its quest for artificial intelligence today. Chinese military leaders expect AI to fundamentally change warfare, and are leaning on the technology to transform the PLA into a "world-class military" by 2050.  7  AI's revolutionary potential and general-purpose application even led Andrew Ng, former chief scientist at the Chinese internet company Baidu, to label it "the new electricity" in 2017.  8  Despite some anxiety within the PLA about developing intelligent or automated weapons systems, concerns about technology misuse seem to take a back seat to the needs of the state.  9  The PLA's rapid embrace of AI raises questions about strategic stability and the future of warfare. While analysts generally agree that AI forms the basis of the PLA's modernization strategy, questions linger about how far it may be willing to go in devel-I oping lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), and which of its new concept weapons will eventually mature into programs of record.  10  By examining 343 AI-related equipment contracts awarded by PLA units and state-owned defense enterprises in 2020, this study offers a detailed view of how the Chinese military is beginning to wield AI-and to what end. The report begins by reviewing the budgetary constraints and modernization goals that have shaped the PLA's transition to "intelligentized" warfare, followed by a discussion of the study's methodology and limitations. It then identifies seven primary application areas for which the Chinese military is awarding AI-related equipment contracts: autonomous vehicles, intelligence analysis, information warfare, logistics, training, command and control, and target recognition. The bulk of the report discusses common trends and significant AI purchases made within each of these fields. A fourth section profiles 273 of the PLA's known AI equipment suppliers, highlighting gaps in U.S. export control policy and prevailing technology transfer risks. Finally, the report discusses how AI fits into the PLA's broader concepts of operations, before concluding with a discussion of the policy tensions that will shape its military competition with the United States. • After being made a priority in the 1980s, mechanization sought to equip PLA units with modern platforms, including electronic warfare systems, as well as motorized, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. Mechanization emphasized fixed boundaries and armor operations, primarily for troops stationed along China's land borders, at the expense of naval and air operations.  15  In 2020, the PLA announced it had "basically achieved" mechanization.  16
 A • Since the 1990s, the PLA's dominant push has been informatization, in which wars are won through information dominance, and the space and cyber domains are the "commanding heights of strategic competition."  17  PLA operational concepts today emphasize the need to win "informatized local wars" by using long-range, precision, smart, and unmanned weapons and equipment.  18  In 2020, the PLA announced its goal to become a "fully mechanized and informatized" force by its centenary, the year 2027.  19  • First mentioned in China's 2015 Defense White Paper, intelligentization represents "a new round of military revolution" characterized by networked, intelligent, and autonomous systems and equipment. It endeavors to build on mechanized and informatized systems, creating "ubiquitous networks" in which "'human-on-human' warfare will be replaced by 'machine-on-human' or 'machine-on-machine warfare.'"  21  In particular, AI forms the basis of the PLA's push toward intelligentization, and tops the list of emerging technologies prioritized in recent Chinese strategy documents and development plans.  22  Although these modernization goals represent "phases" of development, there is significant overlap between them: "While some units of the PLA employ data links, network-centric sensor-to-shooter system-of-systems, and field a variety of UAVs, electronic warfare platforms, and advanced combat capabilities," writes Dean Cheng, "other units are still in the midst of simply shifting from towed artillery to self-propelled guns, improving their main battle tanks and becoming fully motorized."  23  Since 2013, however, the PLA has placed significantly less emphasis on mechanization and informatization, and is starting to phase in intelligentization as a guiding concept, as evidenced in the 2015 and 2019 defense white papers (Figure  1 ).  24  At the same time, numerous reforms to China's military and defense industry have sought to streamline the PLA's promotion of science and technology and acquisition of intelligent equipment. Some of the most significant have included the creation of an Equipment Development Department alongside an entirely new service branch, the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).  25  Renewed emphasis on military-civil fusion (MCF; 军民融合), too, has expanded the PLA's access to private-sector innovation and enabled it to draw on the work of internet giants like Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, and telecom giants like Huawei and ZTE.  26  But even with reforms, contemporary scholars have questioned whether China's historically bloated and inefficient defense industry can sufficiently adapt to the information age.  27   Methodology and Scope 2 rocurement information holds distinct advantages for those looking to understand the Chinese military and its immediate capabilities. First, defense contracts offer strong signals of both intent and capability, as militaries willing to spend limited resources on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions clearly deem them useful. Second, as it does in the United States, the public procurement process shapes China's ability to acquire and harness AI for military advantage.  28  To assess how China is adopting AI, this report analyzes a sample of purchasing information published directly by the Chinese military in 2020. In addition to capabilities identified in procurement contracts, the authors draw on theoretical writings and research papers by PLA officers and defense industry engineers to assess how the PLA may use the AI systems it is purchasing, and how these systems fit into its concepts of operations. CSET's corpus of PLA procurement tenders spans 66,207 records published between March 30 and December 1, 2020. These tender notices run the gamut from technology requirements and requests for proposals (RFPs) to announcements of equipment or software contracts that were awarded to Chinese companies. Different types of procurement information reflect different steps in the PLA's technology acquisition process: • Requirements, inquiries, and bid solicitations signal demand. They reflect the PLA's technological priorities and perceived gaps that research institutions and service branches are trying to fill.  29  • Contract awards signal supply and, ultimately, capability. They represent weapon systems or components the PLA sought to acquire and ostensibly received. In most cases, several companies compete to win a contract through a competitive bidding pro-P cess.  30  More rarely, the PLA selects a single vendor as a contract recipient without considering alternative suppliers ("sole source" procurement). Of the 66,207 tenders in the CSET dataset, 21,086 announce contracts to supply the PLA with equipment, including software and electronic components.  31  Information about many of these purchases is limited. While 49,493 tenders in the dataset are publicly available (公开), the rest are classified as confidential (秘密; 14,024 tenders) or secret (机密; 2,270 tenders).  32
 UNDERSTANDING PROCUREMENT IN THE PLA This study primarily considers contract awards, but also makes use of RFPs and bid solicitations filed by PLA service branches, scientific papers published by research institutions, advertisements from Chinese defense companies, and theoretical articles published in outlets like People's Liberation Army Daily (解放军报). Of the 21,086 contract awards included in the CSET dataset, 18,354 are "public" and include information such as the requesting unit, intended end user, project budget, tendering agency, and contract winner. A full list of variables can be found in Appendix I. Most of these contracts were not awarded by PLA units, but by defense state-owned enterprises including the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), and hundreds of their subsidiaries.  33  Just 3,726 of the 18,354 public equipment contracts in the dataset were awarded by PLA service branches, while the remain-  The 18,354 public contracts in our dataset include all manner of supplies and equipment ranging from toilet seats and ball bearings to completed, off-the-shelf CH-4 Rainbow (彩虹) combat UAVs. We do not claim to have a complete history of the PLA's purchase records for this period of time. However, by examining trends among a sample of public contracts awarded in 2020, this paper aims to illuminate the specific types of AI-related equipment the PLA is purchasing, and to explore their potential application.
 IDENTIFYING AI AND "INTELLIGENT" EQUIPMENT PURCHASES Several limitations constrain our assessment of the Chinese military's AI-related procurement activity. First, definitions of "AI" are not consistent even within the U.S. defense enterprise. The U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) 2020 AI strategy defines AI as "the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence"-a description that includes "decades-old DoD AI" such as autopilot and signal processing systems, but also modern deep learning techniques.  34  Second, Chinese defense engineers frequently conflate terminology surrounding unmanned and autonomous systems, making it difficult to distinctly analyze the latter. Finally, some project titles are ambiguous and difficult to categorize. The PLA's contract notices offer very little information about each product's technical specifications or envisioned use, though manufacturers sometimes advertise this information.  35  This study therefore adopts a broad definition of AI, including most contracts that describe "intelligent" systems and equipment. Despite these constraints, we identify PLA procurement projects related to AI and autonomy by using keyword searches and an AI assistant, "Elicit."  36  We first searched for contracts with names that included any of 14 broad keywords: algorithm (算法), automatic (自动), autonomous (自主), autonomy (自治), intelligent (智 能), human-machine (人机), unmanned (无人), prediction (预测), artificial intelligence (人工智能), computer vision (计算机视觉), robot (机器人), intelligence (智慧), learning (学习), and the English-language abbreviation "AI." Of the 18,354 public equipment contracts in the dataset, 523 contained one or more of these phrases.  37  However, some of these keywords are excessively broad, and upon closer examination, many of the projects that mention them are not strictly related to AI development. For example, "learning" (学习) returned contracts related to machine learning (机器学习), but also military education. "Automatic" (自动) and "robot" (机 器人) likewise returned contracts about automated manufacturing, machinery, tools, and robotic projects that likely do not feature AI or autonomy. We therefore elimi-nated 180 extraneous "intelligent" equipment contracts, for a total of 343 contracts related to AI and autonomy. These AI-related contracts represent 1.9 percent of PLA-wide public contract awards from April-November 2020. For a full explanation of the coding and labeling process, see Appendix I.
 PRICING CHINESE MILITARY AI DEVELOPMENT Of the 343 AI contract notices in the dataset, 205 (60 percent) listed the monetary value of the contract. Public AI contracts in the dataset were typically awarded through a competitive bidding process, as opposed to sole-source procurement. They ranged in value from $1,300 (RMB 9,000, for an intelligent sound-and-light alarm detection system) to $3 million (RMB 21 million, for an intelligent UAV data access and management platform), with the average contract amounting to $240,000 (RMB 1.7 million). These contracts are noticeably small, even when adjusted for purchasing power parity.  38  It is likely that the PLA's equivalent of major defense acquisition programs are classified or otherwise not captured in this dataset.  39  Approximately 2 percent of all public equipment contracts in the dataset appear related to AI, broadly defined. The PLA's five main service branches-as opposed to theater commands, research institutes, or defense SOEs-award the majority of public AI contracts. As in the United States, these service branches are tasked with procuring equipment used in military operations. Among the PLA Air Force, Ground Force, Navy, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force, approximately one in 20 public equipment contracts appear related to AI. The PLA spends more than 41 percent (approximately $86 billion) of its official $209 billion budget on equipment, and provides no additional information about how that funding is distributed.  40  If public contracts reflect how the PLA prioritizes different emerging technologies, then it is likely the PLA spends more than $1.6 billion each year on AI-enabled systems.  41  However, because it is still an emerging technology, the PLA's true spending on AI likely exceeds this number, as more funding is captured in research and development rather than off-the-shelf technology procurement. Moreover, the most resource-intensive AI projects are likely classified. For these reasons, we can only approximate a floor for Chinese military AI spending. Using a different methodology and set of source documents, past CSET analysis estimated a ceiling for Chinese defense-related AI research at "no more than about 19 billion RMB ($2.7 billion)" in 2018, "and possibly much less."  42  Our analysis supports the conclusion that annual Chinese military spending on AI is in the low billions of U.S. dollars. Comparisons between Chinese and U.S. military spending are inherently complicated, as both countries define AI differently, discuss intelligent and autono-mous systems in different ways, publish different degrees of information about their equipment spending, count that spending differently, and use currencies with different degrees of purchasing power. However, if the PLA does spend between $1.6 billion and $2.7 billion on AI-related technologies each year, then its AI spending is likely on par with that of the U.S. military. Various analyses of DOD budgets for procurement and research indicate that it spent between $800 million and $1.3 billion on AI in 2020, with an additional $1.7 billion to $3.5 billion for unmanned and autonomous systems.  43  rior analysis has highlighted the PLA's plan to use AI in a variety of military applications, including intelligent and autonomous unmanned systems; intelligence analysis; simulation, war-gaming, and training; information warfare; and decision support.  44  Yet there are many ways to taxonomize AI applications for military use. CSET's 2020 study Chinese Perspectives on AI and Future Military Capabilities identified 12 specific AI applications of interest to Chinese military and defense industry researchers, including cybersecurity and intelligent munitions.  45  The DOD's Communities of Interest on autonomy include four AI application areas: machine perception, reasoning, and intelligence; human-machine collaboration; scalable autonomous system teaming; and test, evaluation, validation, and verification.  46  This study builds on prior taxonomies of AI applications, consolidating some fields while adding others. After reviewing the 343 AI-related contracts in our dataset, we arrived at seven discrete application areas for which the PLA is adopting AI:
 AI Purchases by Application The resulting taxonomy is imprecise. Working with limited information, we adopted an iterative labeling process to characterize each contract, which is described in more detail in Appendix I. Contracts that did not clearly fit in any of these seven categories were marked "Other." Despite some labeling uncertainty, this report finds that autonomous vehicles, ISR, predictive maintenance, and information warfare are priorities within the PLA's intelligentization strategy. To a lesser extent, PLA units also appear interested in using AI for simulation, target recognition, and command and control systems. Appendix II includes more detailed information about how each of the PLA's service branches are adopting AI, while the remainder of this section discusses each application in detail.
 INTELLIGENT AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES Since it first unveiled the Wing Loong-1 combat UAV in 2009, the PLA has made significant progress in developing intelligent and autonomous systems in the air and maritime domains. Of the 343 AI equipment contracts considered in this study, 35 percent (121) are related to intelligent or autonomous vehicles. Market research firms estimate that military and security services today account for more than 40 percent of the Chinese UAV market, and procurement records confirm that several PLA units and defense SOEs purchase COTS autonomous vehicles through a public purchasing platform called the Drone Network (无人机网).  47  Most of the unmanned and autonomous vehicle contracts in our dataset are for airborne systems. While it is difficult to distinguish between contracts for remotely piloted or truly autonomous aircraft, some PLA units have funded research into autonomous flight, and others have purchased "intelligentized" microwave interference, reconnaissance, and data processing modules, which may be attached to remotely piloted or self-flying aircraft.  48  Myriad Chinese suppliers advertise unmanned or autonomous aerial vehicles for combat or surveillance, including private enterprises, SOEs, and state-run research and design centers. Examples of such systems include the ASN-301-a reverse-engineered copy of the IAI Harpy loitering munition  49  and the GJ-11 "Sharp Sword" combat UAV.  50  The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Shenyang Institute of Automation (SIA) is at the forefront of state-backed autonomous vehicle research.  51  In 2020, it was awarded contracts to supply a "3D intelligent collision avoidance system" for CASC, and "intelligent self-flying machinery" for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF).  52  The Chinese defense industry is also developing coordinated swarms of fixedwing UAVs and rotorcraft.  53  Whereas scholars in the late 2010s speculated about hypothetical swarm applications, the technology has progressed significantly, and some limited swarm applications now appear operational.  54  In 2020, multiple PLA units and CASC institutes awarded contracts for air-launched drone clusters and subsystems used in swarms, including self-organizing UAV communications systems, group node management and control software, AI-based radar coincidence imaging, and collision avoidance sensors.  55  In October 2020, the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) placed a $900,000 order to construct "drone swarm targets."  56  It is not clear from the contract what such a swarm engagement would look like in practice. The Drone Network also advertises COTS software and hardware for use in UAV group operations, such as "SwarmLink"-a network gateway that can support more than three hundred vehicles.  57  Beyond COTS systems, several Chinese universities have conducted swarm-related research, including Beihang University, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and Zhejiang University's Institute of UAV Systems and Control.  58  Notably, multiple lines of research focus on contesting and jamming U.S. military swarm projects such as LOCUST and Gremlins.  59  Although most information about such systems is likely to be classified, some public procurement records also indicate that the PLA is purchasing unmanned and autonomous underwater vehicles (UUVs and AUVs). Five contracts in our dataset were for AUV platforms, and another contract was for an intelligent ship integration system.  60  In the summer of 2020, for example, the PLASSF placed orders for AUVs from Tianhe Defense, a company which seems to be emerging as China's national champion in A/UUVs.  61  Tianhe advertises a "shadowless AUV solution," which it claims is capable of autonomously diving below 200 meters.  62  In addition to contract awards, advertisements from Chinese industry suppliers indicate that they are developing small-and medium-sized, fully autonomous underwater vehiclespossibly for sale abroad. Today, none of the top 10 companies selling AUVs in the international market are Chinese.  63  Yet several COTS AUV models are advertised on the Drone Network, and some PLA units may purchase them for undersea detection and reconnaissance. Examples include the ZF-01 AUV, which can apparently dive to 100 meters with a towed sonar array  64  ; and Kawasaki's SPICE AUV, which comes equipped with a robotic arm for underwater fiber-optic cable and pipeline inspection.  65
 FIGURE 3 AUV Likely Ordered by the Strategic Support Force in 2020 Source: Phoenix New Media and Tianhe Defense.  66  Finally, at least four public contracts in our dataset were related to developing "intelligent satellites" that can autonomously adjust their orbit or engage in rendezvous and proximity operations with other space assets. For example, in August 2020, the PLA Academy of Military Sciences awarded an "intelligent satellite simulation software" contract to Hunan Gaozhi Technology Co., Ltd. (湖南高至科技有 限公司).  67  The company sells high-resolution cameras and intelligent video analysis servers, and holds several patents related to intelligent or automatic servo control in satellite systems.  68  In August 2020, the CASC Shanghai Academy of Space Technology likewise awarded a contract for an "on-orbit satellite data acquisition and prediction subsystem"; while other CASC institutes awarded contracts for intelligent or automatic inclination adjustment, high-precision attitude determination, and small satellite positioning systems.  69  Although nearly all of the vehicle contracts reviewed in this study are described as "intelligent" (智能), the true nature of this intelligence-and the machine learning methods that may or may not be involved in their operation-is unclear. The PLA has long procured unmanned, remotely-piloted vehicles for reconnaissance and strike missions. But in the 2020s, Chinese leaders hope that improvements in autonomous navigation and online, real-time learning will cement unmanned vehicles as the backbone of intelligentized, machine-on-machine warfare.  70
 INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE AI promises to revolutionize military ISR, perhaps more than any other application area. That potential is reflected in the PLA's procurement activity, as nearly one in five AI contracts canvassed in this study  (63)  appear related to ISR. U.S. military and intelligence services recognize the importance of using AI in foreign media and geospatial imagery analysis, and PLA units are adopting AI toward similar ends. According to Liu Linshan, a researcher at the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, "battlefield situational awareness . . . includes not only the results of one's own reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence activities, but also massive amounts of geographic information data, human social and cultural data, and social media data" that can be fused to improve situational awareness at all levels of operation.  71  A significant number of the PLA's AI-based ISR contracts concern remote sensing and geospatial imagery analysis, consistent with U.S. intelligence community assessments of China's space strategy.  72  Throughout 2020, CASC institutes and PLASSF units placed orders for polarized surface detection, imagery analysis, distance measurement, and multisource data fusion systems to be embedded in satellites.  73  In August, for example, the PLASSF awarded a "geospatial information perception and intelligent analysis subsystem" contract to Beijing Uxsino Software Co., Ltd. ("Uxsino," 北京优炫软件股份有限公司).  74  The company produces data processing systems analogous to those made by Oracle in the United States.  75  CASC institutes are also developing microsatellites with edge AI information processing applications. One CASC subsidiary, Shenzhen Aerospace Dongfanghong HIT Satellite Ltd. (深圳航天东方红海特卫星有限公司), advertises a constellation of 80 "intelligent autonomous operation and management" MV-1 microsatellites capable of "full color, multi-spectral, and hyperspectral imaging" at resolutions of 1 to 5 meters.  76  In the maritime domain, the PLA is interested in using AI for underwater inspection and deep-sea sensing. State-run research institutes in this study awarded contracts for intelligent pipeline detection and identification, multisource information processing and scene analysis, and automated coordinate measuring units for underwater vehicles. In July 2020, the PLA Navy (PLAN) awarded an ocean mapping contract to Startest Marine (星天海洋), which offers several products related to undersea surveying and mapping.  77  One of its products, GeoSide1400, is a side-scanning UUV that "uses the backscattered echoes of seabed targets for detection." 78 A video on Startest Marine's website depicts GeoSide1400 being towed by a fishing boat and patrolling the subsurface coastline, an application that could be used to detect U.S. undersea forces in a crisis.  79  The company also advertises services for undersea mapping and hydrological data collection depicted in Figure  4 .  Undersea Sensor Systems Offered by a PLA Contractor Source: Startest Marine.  81  Finally, the PLA is using AI in multisource data fusion for foreign military analysis, including textual analysis of foreign-language documents.  82  In the fall of 2020, the PLAGF awarded two contracts for "foreign military equipment intelligent document data resources"; and in November, an unspecified PLASSF unit ordered a "multilingual intelligent text processing system" from Nanjing Glaucus-Tech Co., Ltd. (Glaucus-Tech; 南京国业科技有限公司). On its website, Glaucus-Tech advertises the "GL-AI Speech Recognition System 001," which can apparently translate foreign languages into Chinese with 80 percent accuracy, at a rate of 20 words every 150 milliseconds.  83  The company's products rely on NVIDIA processors as components, including the Tesla P40 GPU.  84  On balance, Chinese military AI contracts for ISR applications exhibit priorities similar to those stated by the U.S. intelligence community, such as network management, image classification, and transcription of foreign languages.  85  However, in part because of its lack of operational experience, the PLA has struggled to access certain types of data required for some weapons systems, such as radar signature-based target recognition.  86
 PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS As in the United States, the Chinese military is using AI for equipment maintenance and logistics. Of the 343 AI contracts in our dataset, 11 percent  (38)  were related to maintenance, repair, logistics, or sustainment. Newly established PLA contractors have developed AI-based applications for leak detection, fault diagnosis, and "smart warehouses" intended to predict and fill orders for materiel.  87  In March 2020, for example, the Academy of Military Sciences awarded Anwise Global Technology (安怀信科技) a contract for an automated code testing platform.  88  Established in 2016, Anwise is one of China's largest intelligent equipment manufacturers, and primarily services the military aerospace and electronics industries.  89  Its products include AI-based software for soldering fault diagnosis and a virtual prototype library for testing and evaluation of aerospace weaponry.  90  In November 2020, the PLAGF and PLASSF awarded predictive maintenance contracts to Wego (威高), which produces medical devices and fault diagnosis equipment; and Sucheon Technologies (硕橙科技), which focuses on using AI in mechanical noise recognition.  91  Predictive maintenance is also emerging as an edge application for otherwise inaccessible, remotely piloted, or autonomous platforms. In 2020, multiple PLA research institutes fielded orders for automatic test equipment on satellites and underwater vehicles that cannot easily be reached for diagnostic testing and repair.  93  CASC, for example, awarded two $800,000 contracts for ATE systems on unspecified constellations of Earth observation satellites in geosynchronous and low earth orbit. PLA officers predict drastic decreases in equipment and materials stockpile requirements as a result of intelligentized maintenance and logistics systems. "With the development of information technology such as big data and cloud computing," write two PLA logistics officers, "it is not necessary to establish a large-scale resource reserve . . . all materials need only be supplied to the required place at the required time."  94  Consistent with this thinking, CASC and the PLA Ground Force placed orders for intelligent procurement systems for bullets and Internet of Things (IoT) devices throughout 2020.  95
 INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE The U.S. military considers electronic warfare to be a component of information operations, and designates information, data, knowledge, and influence as "information-related capabilities."  96  Approximately 8 percent of public PLA AI contracts in this study  (29)  are related to IO, broadly defined. However, AI stands to affect each of these capabilities in different ways. Some AI projects support the PLA's public opinion warfare (舆论战) and psychological warfare (心理战) strat- Intelligent Maintenance Systems Offered by a PLA Contractor Source: Anwise Global Technology Co., Ltd.  92  egies, whereas others focus on electromagnetic spectrum dominance or defense and intrusion in cyberspace.  97  Public opinion manipulation is a longstanding focus of the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) more broadly.  98  CSET's report Truth, Lies, and Automation found that, with breakthroughs in AI, "humans now have able help in mixing truth and lies in the service of disinformation."  99  Procurement records and research papers indicate that the Chinese military is actively exploring this capability.  100  In November 2020, for example, the PLASSF's Information Engineering University awarded a contract for an "internet public opinion AI clustering system" to Zhengzhou Meicheng Electronic Technology Co. (郑州美诚电子科技有限公司), an electronics wholesaler. It showcases three products related to "online behavior management" that range in price from $6,000 to $56,000.  101  Each is a computer processor produced by Ruijie Networks (锐捷网络), advertised as being able to "intelligently" track source and destination IP addresses, website URL visits, and search history; and perform "real-name online behavior auditing."  102  AI-based sentiment analysis software is also common among PLA units and defense SOEs. KnowleSys (乐思网 络), one of China's largest public opinion management software companies, claims Dalian Naval Academy as a customer.  103  Its products can apparently analyze trends and predict "hotspots" on both Chinese and foreign social media platforms. AI-enabled sentiment analysis systems like these will grow in importance as the CCP continues to expand its overseas information operations.  104  "In the era of artificial intelligence," writes a professor at NUDT, "audience information can be intelligently collected and analyzed by machines, various data about public opinion warfare opponents can also be obtained through network detection and deep data analysis; and public opinion warfare happens in real-time."  105  In addition to psychological operations and social media manipulation, the PLA is purchasing AI-related systems for use in electronic warfare. The PLA Navy Submarine Academy, for example, has awarded several contracts related to adaptive beamforming techniques, using AI to produce a dynamic filter that will cancel the effect of interfering signals.  106  Other PLA units awarded contracts for automatic frequency modulation, microwave jamming, broadband automatic gain control, and multisource signal separation.  107  Chinese experts broadly believe AI will revolutionize electronic warfare by replacing today's passive, adaptive technology with systems defined by more active, cognitive algorithm development.  108  Research papers published in 2020 by PLASSF Units 91404, 63610, and 93175 109 discuss using adaptive, self-correcting systems to conduct operations related to "battlefield situational awareness, electromagnetic target reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, electronic defense, and electromagnetic spectrum management."  110  Cybersecurity and network exploitation are also focal points in the PLA's adoption of AI, and are key elements of information warfare. Prior CSET research has found that "machine learning has the potential to increase both the scale and success rate of spearphishing and social engineering attacks,"  111  and several Chinese universities are cooperating with the PLA to advance related research.  112  Throughout 2020, PLA units and state-owned research institutes in our dataset awarded contracts for intelligent terminal inspection systems; autonomous, self-configuring software; and software control management systems.  113  In November, for example, the PLASSF awarded a contract for an AI-based "cyber threat intelligent sensing and early warning platform" to EverSec (恒安嘉新(北京)科技股份公司). The company serves as a national-level "Cybersecurity Emergency Service Support Unit" (网络 安全应急服务支撑单位) for the Chinese government's National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Center.  114  In this capacity, EverSec's role seems analogous to that of FireEye or CrowdStrike's support for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in the United States.  115  Beyond its adaptive cybersecurity products, the company also advertises services for petabyte-scale data storage and processing, AI-based open source data mining, and internet blocking and censorship protocols.  116  EverSec claims that its products are used in all 31 Chinese provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level municipalities, and evidently PLASSF units also purchase some of these services.  117  The U.S.-based venture capital firm Sequoia Capital is an investor in EverSec.  118
 SIMULATION AND TRAINING The PLA has long had a problem with training its enlisted service members and officers. A lack of suitable aircraft, friction when conducting joint operations, rigid organizational culture, and seasonal tides in recruitment each affect its force posture and readiness.  119  While improvements in technology can remedy only some of these issues, AI nonetheless stands to save precious time and training costs. Of the 343 PLA contracts considered in this study, 6 percent (22) concerned using AI for simulation and training. Among the PLA officer corps, war-gaming is a well-established tradition, and is growing in importance given China's relative lack of real-world combat experience. It is no surprise that the PLA has awarded contracts for proprietary, AI-based war-gaming software for use in professional military education programs. DataExa (渊亭科技), for example, advertises an AI-based war-gaming simulator called "AlphaWar," inspired by DeepMind's Starcraft-playing AI system, AlphaStar.  120  The PLA's preoccupation with war-gaming grew out of the Information Operations and Command Training Department of NUDT, which created "computer-based, warzone level, intranet-based campaign exercises" throughout the 2000s.  121  According to Chen Hangui, a researcher at the PLA Army Command College, one of the principal uses of AI will be in "war-game systems" to "more effectively test and optimize combat plans." 122 PLA units are also using AI in virtual and augmented reality systems to train fighter pilots and drone operators. In August 2020, for example, Naval Aviation University awarded a contract to eDong AI (翼动智能) for a "human-machine integrated control algorithm model and simulation service."  124  The company primarily designs and builds VR/AR simulation centers, and also advertises stand-alone training software.  125  A similar contract was awarded to AOSSCI (傲势科技), which produces an "X-Matrix" UAV flight simulator for PLA pilots.  126  In June 2021, Chinese media reported that an AI system had defeated a top PLA pilot in a simulated dogfight similar to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Air Combat Evolution program.  127  Public contract awards indicate that AI-based simulation systems are becoming more common within the PLA. While AI for simulation and training promises to save military services time and resources, deep learning systems rely heavily on data, are incapable of learning common sense, and lack interpretability-limitations acknowledged by Chinese defense contractors.  128  Still, even with these limitations, it is likely that advances in AI will continue to supplement or stand in for the PLA's often cited experience gap.
 COMMAND AND CONTROL Chinese military scholars and strategists expect the speed, efficiency, and flexibility afforded by AI to revolutionize battlefield decision-making.  129  Despite the PLA's emphasis on C2, however, public procurement data does not indicate that it is a priority: Just 4 percent (15) of the contracts in our dataset appear related to C2, and most included only limited information alongside nebulous names such as "intelligent control equipment," "smart management systems," and "autonomous mission planning." The few projects for which we could find adequate details seem primarily designed to support human decision-making processes, not replace them outright. It is likely that the PLA's most significant AI-enabled C2 projects are classified, and therefore not included in our dataset. In the following paragraphs, we supplement analysis of public procurement records with outside information, such as defense industry advertisements, to better understand the scope of China's AI-enabled C2 capabilities. Several Chinese enterprises outside of our dataset advertise AI systems capable of automating some elements of command and control-including knowledge mapping, decision support, weapon target assignment, and combat tasking. While we could not use procurement records to confirm that PLA units have purchased each of the systems specified below, each of the following companies publicly claims the Chinese military as a partner or client. Knowledge mapping is a visual representation of information designed to aid decision-making. DataExa, for example, advertises several services for AI-based knowledge mapping and combat decision support, such as encyclopedic information and real-time prediction about the movement of foreign weapons platforms.  130  In July 2020, the company's knowledge mapping software passed licensing review from the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, and DataExa today lists the PLASSF and the Science and Technology Commission of the PLA Central Military Commission among its clients.  131  One of its products, the DataExa-Sati Knowledge Map, provides "information about U.S. aircraft carrier equipment, such as submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and frigates accompanying aircraft carrier strike groups, and infrastructure such as overseas bases, satellite communications, logistics, and support equipment" to the PLA Navy.  132  The company compares itself to the U.S. data management company Palantir Technologies.  133  Decision support systems streamline portions of the military decision-making process by helping identify courses of action for commanders.  134  One of China's most well-known military AI companies, StarSee (摄星智能), specializes in computer vision and decision support software. In 2020, the company won a commendation from China's Central Military Commission for its work on combatting COVID-19. 135 Among other products, StarSee advertises a "Real-time Combat Intelligence Guidance System" designed to "combine the massive parameter model of a knowledge graph and the dynamic information of the battlefield in real-time."  136  StarSee's product is designed to create a common operational picture across different PLA units.  137  By "relying on image, video, and audio language extraction and analysis technology," the company claims to be able to identify foreign weapons platforms, "give various performance parameters of the weapon, and calculate its sustainability, firepower, maneuverability, command and control capabilities, intelligence capabilities, and other threat level parameters."  138  A product demonstration from June 7, 2020, appears to track Chinese aircraft flying near a U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer off the coast of California.  139  Members of the StarSee research team previously worked for Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Microsoft Research Asia. 140 Weapon target assignment software selects an optimal combination of weapons systems to engage one or more targets, assuming different success rates for each.  142  In addition to AI-based predictive maintenance and logistics software, the PLA contractor Anwise Global advertises a "SIMBAT Weapon Effectiveness Evaluation System," which can reportedly use "test data from multiple sources such as simulation, internal and external field tests, and exercises, among others, to evaluate effectiveness throughout the entire life cycle of weapons and equipment."  143  It is not clear whether the PLA has purchased access to SIMBAT specifically, but PLA units have awarded Anwise Global other AI contracts, and the PLA regularly publishes AI-based weapon target assignment research of its own.  144  Combat tasking, whereby a commander selects a course of action and directs a unit to complete some activity, represents one of the final steps in the military decision-making process.  145  Public procurement data indicates that PLA units and defense SOEs have awarded contracts for AI-based command and control software to support unit-level decision-making and combat tasking. One such project, awarded by the China Ship Research and Design Center of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), is for an "intelligent loss management system" to help commanding officers operate with fewer personnel after sustaining casualties. In another case, the PLA Ground Force awarded a contract to 4Paradigm, one of the largest enterprise AI companies in China, for a "battalion and company command decision-making model and human-machine teaming software." 146 4Paradigm advertises a wide array of products and services, including software-defined computing platforms and an "automatic decision-making machine learning platform" called Sage HyperCycle.  147  As of January 2021, the company was cooperating on Very Large Database research with Intel and the National University of Singapore. 148 4Paradigm's angel investor, Sequoia Capital, remains its largest outside shareholder.  149  Taken collectively, these examples illustrate the kinds of public, AI-based decision support applications being developed by the Chinese defense industry. While it is too early to say whether the PLA may attempt to automate other segments of its C2 infrastructure, it is clear that some units have already begun acquiring COTS technologies for combat decision support and contingency operations. China's private AI sector is also starting to mature, with a few specialized companies like Anwise Global, DataExa, and StarSee carving out a niche to support different segments of the PLA's decision-making process.
 AUTOMATED TARGET RECOGNITION Target recognition and fire control are critical components of modern weapons systems, but applying AI to these tasks is a fairly new area of research. Although much of the PLA's research into AI-based automated target recognition is still aspirational, some units are purchasing relevant systems and equipment, and 4 percent (  14 ) of PLA AI contracts in our dataset appear related to ATR. Throughout 2020, PLA units and defense SOEs awarded contracts for feature extraction and recognition algorithms, target recognition algorithms for unmanned vehicles, brain-inspired multi-target fusion, and target detection based on synthetic aperture radar imagery.  150  Most notably, the Chinese military appears to be following in the footsteps of the DOD in developing AI-based ATR software for aerial vehicles.  151  Today, private Chinese companies, including Shandong Hie-Tech Co., Ltd. (山东航创电子科技有限 公司), advertise AI-based ATR systems for use in UAVs. The company won a contract to supply the PLAN with "UAVs and supporting equipment" in June 2020.  152  Research papers from PLA and state-sponsored laboratories also discuss developing AI-based ATR software. For example, the Shenyang Institute of Automation's first target recognition research forum in 2017 focused on using deep learning to recognize targets in still-frame images, and several SIA researchers have conducted research along similar lines.  153  SIA's Robotic Vision Group (机器人视觉组) lists a "UAV airborne visual automated target tracking system" as one of its achievements, but public information about the system is limited.  The PLA also aspires to use AI-based ATR software in undersea vehicles. In 2020, various PLA units awarded ATR contracts to universities and state-run research institutes that were still in the early stages of developing the technology.  156  Notable examples include "USV target recognition algorithm and software development," "deep learning-based, automatic detection of targets at sea," and a contract to construct a "typical marine target database and target recognition module based on deep learning." 157 Multiple PLA units and defense SOEs awarded undersea target recognition contracts to Harbin Engineering University, one of seven universities administered by China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.  158  HEU researchers have developed a series of "Smart Water" (智水) AUVs for underwater ATR and path-planning missions, and are suspected of developing the HSU-001 large UUV first unveiled in China's 2019 National Day military parade.  159  Although AI-enabled ATR research is still in early development, it is maturing rapidly. Recent research papers by PLA units and defense industry engineers have used machine learning algorithms such as Single Shot Detector 300 (SSD300) and "You Only Look Once" (YOLO) to recognize targets with more than 80 percent accuracy.  160  While many of these algorithms are trained to recognize stationary targets in long-distance, overhead images, it remains to be seen whether or how the PLA may adopt AI-based ATR systems for ground-based weapons systems. eyond the Chinese military's intended application of AI, it is important for U.S. policymakers and defense planners to understand the sources of the technology that is being purchased by the PLA. Based on trends in public PLA contracts, we offer three observations about the overall structure and efficiency of China's emerging military AI industry. First, among the contract award notices in our dataset, defense SOEs are both buyers and suppliers of AI-related equipment. Research institutes and subsidiaries belonging to CASC, AVIC, the Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC), and CSIC are included in the PLA's official procurement records (referred to as "PLA contracts"), and each placed orders for AI-related equipment in 2020.  161  Along with other defense SOEs, these companies and their subsidiaries also received contracts to supply AI-related equipment to PLA units and other state-owned research institutions. This two-way transfer of technology could indicate that SOEs are specializing in certain subfields of AI development, rather than crowding out private-sector investment.
 Supply and Demand for Intelligent Equipment in the PLA Second, whereas the organizations responsible for buying AI equipment are fairly concentrated, the PLA's AI equipment suppliers are diffuse. Of the 343 public AI contracts in this study, 331 contracts named 273 unique suppliers. Most companies were awarded just one public AI contract, and the single most active private-sector supplier, Langfang Rongxiang Electromechanical Equipment Co., Ltd. (廊坊市荣祥机电设备有限公司), was awarded just four contracts during our period of inquiry. Moreover, China's MCF development strategy is improving the PLA's access to private-sector advances in AI. Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has attempted to integrate the technical achievements of the civilian and military industries to strengthen China's comprehensive national power. In more recent policy documents, the CCP has called for deepening MCF and "encouraging the twoway transfer and transformation of military-civil technology," as evidenced by the  Internet+ Action Plan (2015), innovation-driven development strategy (2016), and New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (2017).  162  CSET research has highlighted the role of new policy levers in achieving this goal, such as government guidance funds, technology brokers, and a formal Chinese AI Industry Alliance-of which 24 (9 percent) of the 273 suppliers in this study are members.  163  It should come as no surprise that a large number of private companies supply the PLA with AI-related equipment, and that some of these companies have benefited from equipment, personnel, information, and capital provided directly or indirectly by the state.
 THE PRIVATIZATION OF INTELLIGENTIZATION A robust military AI industry is emerging in China, spanning Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) research institutes, military factories, universities, private en-TABLE  3  The PLA's Top Suppliers of AI-Related Equipment, April-November 2020 terprises, state-owned enterprises, and their subsidiaries. To categorize each AI equipment supplier in our dataset, we searched for background information on each company's "About Us" web page, vacancies they advertised on job posting websites, and ownership information on Chinese financial service and due diligence platforms. We recorded the date each institution was established and any indication that it may be a subsidiary of a defense SOE or state-owned holding company. If a company publicly claimed to be a subsidiary or appeared to be majority-owned by an SOE, university, or CAS institute, we labeled it as such. Among the 273 unique PLA suppliers identified in this study, we find that private Chinese technology companies-not SOEs or their subsidiaries-are the PLA's most common suppliers of AI-related equipment. Generally speaking, these are recently established, high-technology companies for whom intelligent software or sensors are a dominant focus.  164  The PLA awarded 61 percent of the public AI contracts in our dataset to 166 private enterprises. Of them, two-thirds (108) were founded since 2010, and more than one-third  (63)  were founded since 2015. Most have fewer than 50 employees and registered capital of less than $1 million.  165
 FIGURE 9 Private Companies are the PLA's Primary AI Equipment Suppliers As previously noted, China's MCF strategy is accelerating the PLA's access to, and adoption of, AI. Many of the non-state-owned companies that supply the PLA with AI equipment are supported directly or indirectly by the state, and some self-identify as "military-civil fusion enterprises" (军民融合企业). But even non-stateowned companies tend to jointly develop products with legacy defense SOEs, or base their business model around supplying them with software and equipment. The typical modern, private Chinese military AI company is: • Founded by STEM graduates from elite universities in coastal provinces; • Headquartered in a commercialization enclave or innovation park run by a university or the local CCP Science and Technology Commission; • Engaged with researchers at defense-affiliated universities and research laboratories; and • Sustained by contracts from public security bureaus, PLA units, and major defense SOEs.
 LIMITATIONS OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS U.S. policymakers regularly voice concerns that technology produced in the United States may be exfiltrated and deliberately or inadvertently accelerate Chinese military modernization. The U.S. government has adopted several policies designed to curtail the Chinese defense industry's access to equipment, personnel, information, and capital, especially where AI is concerned.  166  Since 1989, the United States has prohibited arms sales to China, and today the U.S. government presumes denial for license applications of items relevant to national security (NS items) to known military end-users in China.  167  Additional statutes place restrictions on specific companies: • The Entity List (EL) published by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security restricts the ability of U.S. firms to sell or supply technology or intellectual property to specific institutions abroad, including some individuals and institutions based in China.  168  • The Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List (NS-CMIC List) published by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control restricts the ability of U.S. persons to make securities investments or own stock in certain Chinese military companies, pursuant to Executive Order 13959.  169  • The List of Chinese Military Companies (NDAA Sec. 1260H List) published by the Department of Defense is mandated by the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, and exists to inform Americans of companies that may be connected to the Chinese military.  170  Subsequent Executive Orders have extended OFAC investment restrictions to include companies on the Sec. 1260H List.  171  Although tens of thousands of Chinese companies are licensed to supply the PLA with equipment, very few are found on any of these three U.S. export control or sanctions lists. Of the 273 known AI equipment suppliers in our dataset, just 8 percent  (22)   Because most institutions that supply AI-related equipment are new and not subject to end-use controls, the Chinese military is frequently able to access or acquire technology from abroad, including from the United States. Some Chinese suppliers make a business out of sourcing foreign data or components and reselling them to sanctioned Chinese defense companies or PLA units. Beijing Zhongtian Yonghua Technology Development Co., Ltd. (Zhongtian Yonghua; 北京中天永华科技发展有 限公司), for example, is not currently listed in any U.S. sanctions regime. In August 2020, it was awarded a contract to supply intelligent sensor equipment to CASC, which the DOD designates as a Chinese military company.  173  A Chinese online business directory entry for Zhongtian Yonghua says that it is "mainly engaged in the agency and sales of various imported instruments and meters," and specifies that it is primarily a distributor of instrumentation equipment produced by companies in the United States (Agilent, Fluke Corporation, and Testo Inc.) and Japan (Hioki Corporation and Kyoritsu Electrical Instruments Works, Ltd.).  174  Multiple companies engage in similar activity, and some examples are included throughout this report.  175  rocurement data offers a detailed, if incomplete, picture of how the PLA may use AI in future warfare. By comparing trends in purchasing records to long-standing themes observed in theoretical writings, research papers, and news reporting, we conclude that the PLA is interested in using AI to erode the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare and to jam U.S. sensor and communication networks. These aspirations are particularly relevant for U.S. policymakers and defense planners as they respond to mounting Chinese threats to Taiwan and other partners in the Indo-Pacific.  176
 ERODING THE U.S. ADVANTAGE IN UNDERSEA WARFARE The PLA's adoption of AI appears focused in part on overcoming its significant disadvantages in undersea warfare. Ten years ago, the PLAN had "very limited ASW [anti-submarine warfare] capabilities and [appeared] not to be making major investments to improve them"; and more recent assessments have concluded that floating mines and active sonar would likely prove ineffective against U.S. submarine forces operating in or near the Taiwan Strait.  177  To compensate, the PLAN commissioned the construction of an "Underwater Great Wall" (水下长城) acoustic sensor network in 2017, and has since rapidly expanded its diesel submarine force.  178  Today the PLA appears to be making significant investments in AI-enabled systems, such as A/UUVs, A/USVs, and undersea ISR systems, which could challenge U.S. and allied submarine forces in a crisis. In addition to the contract data presented earlier in this report, research published in 2021 by Jiangsu University of Science and Technology claims that "a full spectrum of unmanned submersibles has been initially What the PLA's Buying Habits Say About Its Battle Plans 5 P established in China," listing nearly a dozen AUV and UUV models of varying sizes.  179  Based on contract data and recent technology demonstrations, we assess that over the next five to 10 years, the PLAN will likely continue expanding its network of autonomous surface and undersea vehicles in an attempt to limit U.S. Navy access to the undersea space between the first and second island chains.  180  Public A/UUV contracts in our dataset are primarily for small-and medium-sized vehicles used for ISR, but English-language reporting has also shed light on some of the PLA's larger vessels, which are proliferating in number and growing in capability.  181  Chinese AUVs have also set navigation records for depth and distance. In June 2020, the SIA's Haidou 1 (海斗一号) AUV successfully dove below 10,000 meters in the Mariana Trench; and in November, SIA's Sea-Whale 2000 (海鲸2000) AUV finished a 37-day continuous test, crossing 1,250 miles of the South China Sea.  182  Despite the PLA's apparent progress in testing, however, prior CSET analysis has shown that "the state of the current technology, the complexity of antisubmarine warfare, and the sheer scale and physics-based challenges of undersea sensing and communications all suggest these systems have a long way to go."  183  Given limitations in battery life and the robustness of computer vision systems, it remains to be seen whether the PLA's expanding AUV force will materially change the undersea balance of power.
 JAMMING AND BLINDING U.S. INFORMATION SYSTEMS In conjunction with modernizing equipment, the PLA is developing new concepts of operations oriented around systems confrontation and systems destruction warfare, in which "warfare is no longer centered on the annihilation of enemy forces on the battlefield," but "won by the belligerent that can disrupt, paralyze, or destroy the operational capability of the enemy's operational system."  184  For example, an electronic warfare textbook published by NUDT emphasizes that "the U.S. military's combat command, military deployment, and joint operations are extremely dependent on battlefield information network systems," and prescribes that, "once the battlefield communication network is broken . . . the entire battlefield information network system (C4ISR system) will be severely damaged, destroyed, or even paralyzed."  185  Approximately 8 percent of public procurement projects in our dataset  (29)  are related to information and electronic warfare, many of which focus on jamming or blinding enemy sensor networks and using AI for cognitive electronic warfare. Examples of such equipment contracts are outlined in Table  4 . Cyberattacks, data manipulation, and electromagnetic spectrum interference are key components of the PLA's systems confrontation strategy. In 2020, several PLA units and state-backed research institutions awarded contracts for "microwave reconnaissance jamming drones" and "electromagnetic weapon" payloads that can be attached to swarms of small UAVs and flown into enemy airspace.  186  PLA thinkers also emphasize the need to "disrupt or block the enemy's command and decision-making to ensure one's own decision-making advantage," and point to the U.S. Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI; now the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability) as a likely locus of systems confrontation.  187  "In the 'combat cloud' system," write PLA National Defense University professors Zhang Xiaotian and Luo Fengqi, "information and algorithms are key strategic resources, and the opposing parties will inevitably engage in information confrontation and algorithmic warfare in the 'cloud.'" 188  espite the PLA's demonstrable progress in adopting AI, three points of tension will define its continued push toward intelligentization in the 2020s and beyond. These include the vulnerability of C4ISR networks; dependence on foreign computer chips; and disagreements over the development of lethal autonomous weapon systems.
 BREAKING THE COMBAT CLOUD IT STRIVES TO EMULATE The first tension concerns the PLA's plan to exploit U.S. battle networks while developing its own. Having watched and learned from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya, the PLA is investing heavily in its own networked C4ISR systems, many of which feature elements of AI.  189  The PLA's vision for an intelligentized force is based in large part on U.S. military concepts like network-centric warfare, Mosaic Warfare, and the notion of a "combat cloud."  190  In particular, PLA thinkers cite the need to "cloudify" (云化) their combat systems to speed up the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) feedback loop first coined by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd.  191  By emulating U.S. integration of sensor arrays and weapons platforms, the PLA aims to develop "'ubiquitous networks' (泛在网络) that will shorten the distance between perception, judgement, decision-making, and action," and brace itself for the quickened tempo of modern warfare.  192  "As the pace of war accelerates," write PLA science and technology analysts Shi Chunmin and Tan Xueping, "combat time will be calculated in seconds."  193  They go on to note that Link 16, the communications and tactical data transmission system used by the United States, NATO, and coalition forces, allows a delay of just seven milliseconds.  194
 Fundamental Tensions in Chinese Military Modernization But ubiquitously connecting sensors and shooters has created new vulnerabilities for the United States, which PLA leaders recognize and plan to exploit. U.S. defense planners often lament that exquisite ISR and communication systems make for "big, fat, juicy targets,"  195  and worry that in a crisis, adversaries will jam, blind, and hack the networks that bind U.S. assets together.  196  As previously outlined, PLA leaders are forging a new array of operational concepts predicated on "systems confrontation" and "systems destruction," which are specifically designed to take advantage of U.S. vulnerabilities.  197  But it is not clear how the PLA plans to make its own networks resilient to the kinds of exploits it envisions deploying against the United States. One solution may be to develop edge applications of AI that are insulated from the rest of the battle network.  198  Some edge applications-such as predictive maintenance systems for satellites or target recognition systems for autonomous underwater vehicles-can be found among the PLA's public AI contracts.  199
 ENSURING ACCESS TO FOREIGN SEMICONDUCTORS The second tension concerns the supply of advanced computing products at the heart of China's intelligentization strategy. Chinese leaders are acutely aware of the PLA's wholesale dependence on AI chips designed by U.S. companies and produced in Taiwan and South Korea. Although computing hardware was not the original focus of our procurement analysis, further investigation reveals that the PLA has awarded myriad contracts for U.S.-designed computer chips useful for training machine learning systems.  200  One paper by researchers from China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology estimates that "more than 90% of China's high-end chips rely on imports," including "100% of DRAM memory, 99% of CPUs, and 93% of MEMS sensors."  201  The Chinese government has constructed multibillion-dollar guidance funds to promote the country's domestic semiconductor manufacturing industry, but these initiatives are rife with corruption, and it is not yet clear whether they will succeed.  202  In the meantime, U.S. policymakers have crafted a variety of export controls and sanctions designed to limit the Chinese military's access to leading-edge AI chips.  203  Large Chinese corporations such as Huawei have had to cease production of some product lines and have seen large shortfalls in revenue as a result of U.S. sanctions.  204  However, this study finds that few of the PLA's AI equipment suppliersjust 8 percent of the companies in our dataset-face specific barriers to acquiring U.S. equipment, information, and capital. PLA units and defense SOEs continue to procure systems that use leading-edge NVIDIA and Xilinx processors, and sometimes purchase these processors, themselves, through intermediary companies. Moreover, in 2021, U.S. companies have cooperated on AI-related research projects with Chinese businesses that supply the PLA with AI systems and equipment.  205  The PLA's continued access to U.S. and other foreign technology is not guaranteed. The United States and its allies may yet take additional steps to impede Chinese military access to the data, hardware, and personnel required to build an intelligentized force. If such policies were to create a significant shortage in advanced semiconductors, and if China continues to struggle with indigenizing segments of its own chip industry, it would likely slow or impair the PLA's intelligentization strategy. But U.S. experts warn that a decision to effectively cut off Chinese military access to foreign advanced semiconductors could inadvertently fuel China's homegrown chipmaking industry, and should not be taken lightly.  206
 DECIDING THE ROLE OF LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS The third tension concerns the development of LAWS. The Chinese government has famously shown a Janus face to LAWS, publicly calling for a ban on such weapons while privately carving out a legal defense for their development.  207  As in the United States, different factions within the Chinese military and defense industry harbor different attitudes toward LAWS.  208  A 2020 CSET study found that PLA officers and defense industry engineers are worried AI may undermine strategic stability by reducing the capability of Chinese air defenses, increasing the vulnerability of Chinese command and control systems, or degrading the PLA's available time to respond to an attack.  209  Some PLA officers appear legitimately disturbed by LAWS, and caution against a future characterized by smart weapons. In 2021, for example, three PLA researchers responded to reports that a Turkish "Kargu-2" quadcopter had autonomously attacked a human target in Libya, writing that fully-autonomous weapon systems present "not only a lack of moral responsibility, but also a serious challenge to international humanitarian law and international peace and security."  210  This perspective is not uncommon, and PLA officers often voice similar concerns in research papers and think pieces. Others in the PLA are more sanguine about AI's utility on the battlefield, and believe that technology will inevitably increase the operational tempo of war such that, unaided by fully automated systems, humans will be incapable of responding to imminent attack.  211  Liu Peng, a member of China's Cloud Computing Expert Committee and professor at the PLA University of Science and Technology, wrote in 2020 that "at present, most intelligent combat decision-making systems are semi-autonomous systems with humans in the loop," but that the PLA should "introduce learning into the combat decision-making process to achieve mutual error correction, complementarity and efficiency."  212  Defense officials in the United States have advanced similar arguments.  213  Among other issues, the fast pace of technology development, lack of appetite for safety measures, and general lack of trust between the United States and China are giving rise to a security dilemma around AI development.  214  Despite the Chinese government's stated position against LAWS, it is clear that developing AI-based target recognition and fire control systems is an objective of some PLA and government-backed research centers.  215  Computer vision is by far the most active subfield of the PLA's public AI research portfolio, and the share of PLA-sponsored research papers dedicated to "military target recognition" (军事目 标识别) increases each year.  216  By itself, AI-based ATR does not constitute a lethal autonomous weapon system. Yet target recognition remains an integral step in the detect-to-engage sequence, and AI-based ATR is inseparable from "AI weapon" (人工智能武器) concepts described by the Chinese military.  217  In August 2020, The Paper, a well-circulated state-run media outlet, reported that using AI-based ATR to "equip a missile with a 'super-powerful brain' to achieve precision strikes" is the "lifelong pursuit" of NUDT's State Key Laboratory for Automated Target Recognition (自动目标识别国家重点实验室).  218  ATR research published by the Dalian Naval Academy is similarly explicit, noting that "AI and computer vision technology provides new technical support for shipborne missiles to attack all kinds of sea and land targets accurately" and, "in the process of target recognition, using deep learning algorithms is an effective way to improve the accuracy of missiles attacking targets."  219  Ultimately, trends in procurement records, research publications, and media reports indicate that the Chinese military and defense industry are developing AIbased target recognition and fire control systems, which are essential components of LAWS. Although public information about their research is limited, the NUDT State Key Laboratory for Automated Target Recognition and the CAS Shenyang Institute of Automation appear to be key institutions driving LAWS development in China. Combined with the Chinese government's extraordinarily narrow definition of LAWS, this emphasis on AI-enabled ATR research suggests that the PLA may yet develop weapons capable of autonomously detecting and engaging human targets.  220
 Conclusion he share of procurement activity dedicated to AI is one indication that China's military aspirations extend beyond peripheral security concerns. In the 2020s, intelligentization has become the chief focus of Chinese military modernization, with AI-related systems and equipment already accounting for 5 percent of public contracts awarded by the PLA's five main service branches. This report's narrow look at public procurement records confirms that the PLA awarded AI contracts worth at least $49 million from April to November 2020, and that it may spend more than $1.6 billion on AI-related systems and equipment each year. Investing in AI is part of the PLA's longstanding mission to become a "world-class" military that is "equal to, or in some cases superior to, the United States." 221 PLA leaders frequently compare their own capabilities to those of the U.S. military, and public writings from 2021 refer explicitly to degrading and exploiting U.S. information systems. While much of the PLA's focus on systems confrontation and systems destruction appears to still be in early stages of development, a plurality of its equipment contracts are related to information operations and electromagnetic spectrum dominance. Within the next five to 10 years, the Chinese military will likely continue investing in AI to erode the U.S. advantage in undersea warfare; and will seek opportunities to jam, blind, and hack U.S. military information systems. Contrary to conventional wisdom about bloating in the Chinese defense industry, we find that the PLA has made significant progress engaging the private Chinese technology sector to acquire AI systems and intelligent equipment.  222  Most of the PLA's AI equipment suppliers today are not lega-T cy defense SOEs, but small, private companies that specialize in software development, data management, and IoT device design.  223  Some Chinese AI companies in our study self-identify as "military-civil fusion enterprises," and benefit from equipment, personnel, information, or capital provided by the state. Others are private technology companies that have welcomed the PLA as a customer. The PLA's progress toward intelligentization will become increasingly important for the United States in the 2020s as tensions between the two countries continue to rise. In its attempts to harness AI for military advantage, the PLA will face important questions, for example, about decoupling supply chains and developing lethal autonomous weapons. It remains to be seen whether the Chinese military will succeed in becoming a fully intelligentized and world-class military force, but one thing is certain: AI is no longer just an emerging technology. Rather than speculate about its far-future implications, defense planners and policymakers would do well to heed the words of science fiction writer William Gibson: "The future is already here-it's just not evenly distributed."  224  veillance, and Reconnaissance; (3) Predictive Maintenance and Logistics; (4) Information and Electronic Warfare; (5) Simulation and Training; (6) Command and Control; and (7) Automated Target Recognition. Tenders that did not fit in any of these seven categories were marked "Other." Categorizing each contract was necessarily a subjective, iterative process. To make the labels more robust, the authors used the Elicit AI research assistant to check their manual coding.  226  Elicit uses language models to code data. For each contract, Elicit used the manual labels for some of the other contracts as training data, then labeled each "intelligent equipment" contract in the dataset. Initially, Elicit agreed with author coding in 50 percent of cases. After one author reviewed the disagreements, recoded some of the data, and reran Elicit, agreement increased to 62 percent. For remaining disagreements, author judgment superseded that of Elicit. Table  5  lists 10 examples of how the authors coded "intelligent" equipment contracts.   The PLA's five main service branches are most focused on using AI to improve navigation and data management in autonomous vehicles; to improve the speed and scale of intelligence collection and dissemination; and to enhance logistics through predictive maintenance. However, each of the services tend to focus on different applications of AI. For example, relative to other branches, the PLASSF is most interested in purchasing AI technology that can be used in information and electronic warfare, whereas the Ground Force tends to purchase more AI solutions for predictive maintenance and logistics. Each of the PLA's service branches are focused on using AI in intelligent and autonomous vehicles and for predictive maintenance, but ISR and information and electronic warfare are also common applications.
 PLA Service
 PLA STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE (PLASSF) As the service branch responsible for space, cyber, and information warfare, the PLA Strategic Support Force is the most active in procuring AI-related technologies and applications. Of the PLASSF's 65 public AI-related contracts, most were related to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); information warfare, and autonomous vehicles.    228  The General Staff Department's Survey and Mapping Research Institute in Xi'an (Unit 61540) was another significant purchaser of AI-enabled ISR equipment within the PLASSF, awarding various contracts for intelligentized forecast correction systems, high-precision positioning algorithms, and high-resolution ocean and climate modeling software.  229  The PLASSF envisions using AI for information and electronic warfare, in applications ranging from multilingual natural language processing to public opinion monitoring, cyber threat intelligence, and adaptive radar jamming. For example, the PLASSF's Engineering Information University awarded various contracts for an AI-based "internet public opinion monitoring and clustering system," "intelligent network traffic analysis system," and a "cyber threat intelligence early warning platform" throughout 2020. Previous research suggests that PLASSF Base 311 (Unit 61716) carried out social media manipulation ahead of Taiwan's 2018 local elections.  230  One of the PLASSF's repeat contractors, EverSec, advertises services for petabyte-scale data storage and processing, AI-based open source data mining, and internet blocking and censorship protocols.  231  In addition, multiple PLASSF units have awarded contracts for AI-based fiber optical line protection switches, network amplifiers, and automated frequency modulation systems used in cognitive electronic warfare.  232  The PLASSF is also awarding contracts for autonomous vehicles, both individual platforms for logistics and sustainment and swarms with potential combat applications. Public reporting indicates that the PLASSF has been experimenting with using UAVs to resupply troops from Lhasa, Tibet, for operations near the Line of Actual Control with India.  223  The service's procurement records indicate that it has purchased several UAVs and intelligentized simulation systems from Lyncon Tech (西安羚控电子科技有限公司), a leading provider of Chinese drone swarm technology, specifically for use in or near Lhasa. In June 2020, the PLASSF's Equipment Command and Technology Academy (Unit 63628) awarded a $630,000 contract to AOSSCI Technology for a UAV simulation and training center.
 PLA GROUND FORCE (PLAGF) After the PLASSF, the Ground Force has displayed the most interest in adopting AI, and awarded 58 of the public AI-related contracts in our dataset. Previous studies show that academic AI research sponsored by the PLAGF tends to focus on improving unmanned or robotic systems' ability to navigate difficult terrain, and this priority is also reflected in the service's public procurement records.  234  Of the 58 AI contracts the PLAGF awarded in 2020, the plurality were related to autonomous vehicles, predictive maintenance, and electronic warfare. The PLAGF is most focused on using AI in autonomous aerial and ground vehicles. Valued at $890,000, its single most expensive public AI contract involved developing a UAV swarm, to be fulfilled by CASC Shenzhou Flight Vehicle Co., Ltd. (航天神舟飞行器有限公司). The company holds several patents related to swarm technology and UAV-based applications of the Beidou satellite constellation.  235  Other PLAGF contracts were related to ultra-short-range control link modules and non-line-of-sight transceivers for unmanned and autonomous UAVs. The PLAGF is also leveraging AI for ground vehicles, and in June 2020 awarded a contract to Beijing Laser Bofeng Information Technology Co., Ltd. (北京雷神博峰信息技术有限责任公司), "a major supplier of vehicle-mounted Beidou information terminals and intelligent control systems for petrol vehicles," to develop an autonomous tanker truck.  236  The company specializes in autonomous "IoT vehicles" for logistics and transportation.  237  Predictive maintenance is another clear priority for the PLAGF. Throughout 2020, it awarded contracts for "intelligent supply chain" networks, ammunition shell quality detection software, and equipment failure and maintenance prediction systems. Among these, its most expensive project was a $275,000 contract for a "self-organized network intelligent packaging system" for bullets. The contractor, Chongqing Jialing Special Equipment Co. (重庆嘉陵特种装备有限 公司), is a wholly owned subsidiary of the defense SOE China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO).  238  To a lesser degree, the PLAGF is also leveraging AI for electronic warfare. In September 2020, PLAGF Unit 63871 awarded Xi'an Ruiweishen Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. (西安睿维申电子 科技有限公司) a $160,000 contract to develop a "microwave reconnaissance jamming drone." In 2013, the company had won a national Torch Program award for a high-performance digital signal processing platform.  239  The PLAGF awarded a similar contract to TIYOA Aviation ( 河北天遥航空设备科技有限公司) to develop "electromagnetic weapon" payloads aboard small UAVs. The company specializes in intelligent control systems, video surveillance, and small drone applications.  240  PLA NAVY (PLAN) The Navy is just behind the Ground Force as the PLA's third-most active branch in adopting AI, and awarded 51 of the public AI-related contracts in our dataset. Most contracts were related to autonomous vehicles, ISR, and other applications not neatly captured in our taxonomy. Naval Aviation University (海军航空大学) was the PLAN unit most active in awarding AI contracts, accounting for nearly one third  (15)  of those in our dataset. Valued at $1.3 million, the PLAN's most expensive public AI contract involved retrofitting unmanned aerial vehicles with multi-tasking pods, to be filled by AECC Guizhou Liyang Aviation Power Co., Ltd. (中国航发贵 州黎阳航空动力有限公司). Several other PLAN contracts were related to sea floor mapping and AUV development. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is another major focus of the PLAN's AI procurement. Several contracts mention fusing automatic identification system (AIS) ship positioning data to improve situational awareness for submarine and surface fleets. For example, in June and July 2020, the PLAN Submarine Academy (海军潜艇学院) purchased bulk AIS ship tracking data from Elane Inc. (亿海蓝(北京)数据技术股份公司) and tasked the company with bulk AIS processing.  241  Elane runs shipfinder.com, a global shipping database with "millions of global shipping and related users."  242  The company advertises "real-time monitoring of all satellite AIS ship positions worldwide," updated every five minutes, using a constellation of 108 Orbcomm satellites.  243  Although Orbcomm is a U.S. satellite company, Elane's AIS service is marketed for Chinese users only. Other PLAN units have struck similar contracts to purchase AIS data from Yantai Huadong Electron Technology Co., Ltd. (Huadong Elec-Tech; 烟台华东电 子软件技术有限公司) and the China Transport Telecommunications & Information Center (CTTIC) Information Technology National Engineering Laboratory.  244  The PLAN's other AI contracts involve building libraries of undersea sonar signatures and using deep learning to stitch them together. In July 2020, the PLAN's Naval Aviation University awarded Harbin Engineering University with a contract for an "automatic sea-based target detection" system based on "deep learning image recognition." Several researchers at HEU have pioneered an AI-based "seabed image mosaic system," hold relevant patents, and regularly conduct research on the topic.  245
 PLA AIR FORCE (PLAAF) With just ten public AI contracts, the Air Force appears much less interested in AI procurement, relative to the Ground Force or Navy. Its AI purchases are mostly related to autonomous vehicles, predictive maintenance, and electronic warfare. Most public AI research papers sponsored by the PLAAF are related to autonomous flight, a trend that extends to its procurement records.  246  Several contracts were related to intelligent flight decision control (智能驾驶决策控制), technology primarily developed by Northwestern Polytechnical University and research institutes subordinate to CASC. One of the primary companies involved in supplying autonomous UAVs to the PLAAF is ChunYi UAV (北京淳一航空科技 有限公司), a Beijing-based provider of autonomous aerial and surface-sea vehicles.  247  In September 2020, the PLA Air Force paid to lease and operate some of ChunYi UAV's autonomous aerial vehicles. The company's website specifies that its products are useful for "counterterrorism and aerial dogfight weapons testing and training."  248  Some of the PLAAF's more expensive AI contracts are related to predictive maintenance for communication networks. In April 2020, for example, China Eracom Contracting and Engineering Co., Ltd. (中时讯通信建设有限公司), a fiber-optic cable company, won a contract for an "intelligent operation and maintenance management system." That month, the PLAAF awarded a similar contract to China Iconic Technology Co, Ltd. (中徽建技术有限公司), a twice-removed subsidiary of China Telecom, for an intelligent phone network system. Finally, like the PLAGF, the PLAAF is also interested in using AI for electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum dominance. In October 2020, the PLAAF's Air Defense Early Warning Equipment Department (Unit 93209) awarded China Civil Aviation University a contract for "trusted radar target detection" and "research into the dynamic evolution of the electromagnetic environment," using algorithms to enhance battlefield situational awareness and plot the locations of friendly radar units.
 PLA ROCKET FORCE (PLARF) The Rocket Force is the least active service branch with respect to public AI procurement, awarding just four contracts from April to November 2020. The PLARF contracts included using AI to forecast maintenance and support resource consumption; as well as to develop intelligent robotics; a "smart communications warehouse"; and an autonomous, tethered UAV platform. The PLARF awarded its largest AI contract to China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC) for an autonomous, tethered UAV platform, to be supplied to the 613 Brigade in Shangrao City.  249  Tethered drones are particularly useful for emergency response and communication, as an autonomous UAV can be towed alongside a ground vehicle or watercraft without the need for constant supervision or recharging. 250 CETC's 54th Research Institute produces lines of fourand six-rotor tethered UAVs,  251  while the 7th and 23rd Research Institutes hold patents on UAV mooring cables.  252  Other Chinese companies have developed tethered UAVs for emergency communications, such as the DG-X10 and DG-M20.  253   FIGURE 1 Equipment Modernization Phases Mentioned in China's Defense White Papers
 1 . 1 Intelligent and Autonomous Vehicles 2. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 3. Predictive Maintenance and Logistics 4. Information and Electronic Warfare 5. Simulation and Training 6. Command and Control (C2) 7. Automated Target Recognition
 FIGURE FIGURE 2
 80
 FIGURE 4 4 FIGURE 4
 FIGURE 5 5 FIGURE 5
 FIGURE 6 " 6 FIGURE 6 "War Game in Taiwan Strait 2019" Using CMO
 FIGURE 7 Real 7 FIGURE 7Real-Time Combat Intelligence System Offered by a PLA Contractor
 154 154
 FIGURE 8 AI 8 FIGURE 8 AI-Based UAV Target Lock Software Advertised by a PLA Contractor
 FIGURE 9 Private 9 FIGURE 9    Private Companies are the PLA's Primary AI Equipment Suppliers
 FIGURE 11 Number 11 FIGURE 11    Number of AI Equipment Contracts Awarded by PLA Service Branches, April-November 2020

 TABLE 1 Types 1 of Procurement Information Published by the PLA, April-November 2020 Source: CSET corpus of PLA procurement activity.
 TABLE 1 1 Types of Procurement Information Published by the PLA, April-November 2020 contracts were awarded by defense SOEs; theater commands; and research institutes and academic institutions under the control of the Central Military Commission, including the Academy of Military Sciences and the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT). Announcement Type ANNOUNCEMENT TYPE Public ( PUBLIC ( ) ) Confidential ( CONFIDENTIAL ( ) ) Secret ( SECRET ( ) Total ) TOTAL Award (Bid) 15,028 1,855 356 17,239 Award (Sole Source) 3,545 272 30 3,847 Bid Solicitation 7,508 2,767 416 10,691 Inquiry 12,268 659 4 12,931 Requirement 2,705 2,509 406 5,620 Modification or Annulment 2,143 600 102 2,845 Other 6,716 5,362 956 13,034 Total 49,913 14,024 2,270 66,207
 TABLE 2 The 2 PLA's Top Buyers of AI-Related Equipment, April-November 2020
 TABLE 2 The 2 PLA's Top Buyers of AI-Related Equipment, April-November 2020 Institution INSTITUTION Institution (Chinese) INSTITUTION (CHINESE) No. of Contracts NO. OF CONTRACTS China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) Strategic Support Force Ground Force Navy Academy of Military Sciences Air Force Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC) Overall Design Institute of Hubei Aerospace Technology Research Academy (CASIC 9th Overall Design Department) Rocket Force China Ship Research and Design Center National Defense University People's Armed Police Source: CSET corpus of PLA purchasing activity (343 contracts specify purchasing units). Note: Values for state-owned enterprises such as CASC and AECC include multiple subsidiaries.
 TABLE 3 The 3 PLA's Top Suppliers of AI-Related Equipment, April-November 2020 Institution Source: CSET corpus of PLA purchasing activity (331 contracts specify suppliers).
 face specific limitations set by the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Treasury, or Defense. At times, lapses in due diligence and situational awareness may permit the Chinese military and defense industry to access U.S. technology and capital. 172   FIGURE 10 FIGURE 10 Portion of Known PLA AI Equipment Suppliers Named Portion of Known PLA AI Equipment Suppliers Named in U.S. Export in U.S. Export Control or Sanctions Lists Control or Sanctions Lists Entity List (BIS) 91% NS-CMIC List (OFAC) 83.5% NDAA Sec. 1260 List (DOD) Informatization (信息化) Intelligentization (智能化) 91.2% NOT LISTED PARENT IS LISTED LISTED Source: CSET corpus of PLA procurement activity (273 known AI equipment suppliers).
 TABLE 4 Select 4 AI-Related Electronic Warfare Contracts Awarded by PLA Units in 2020 Translated Project Name MUCD Probable Affiliation within the PLA Autonomous and controllable transformation of software configuration Unit 63796 PLASSF Xichang Space Launch Center management system Optical fiber line automatic switching protection devices and optical Unit 66389 PLASSF (Central Theater Command) amplifier equipment Information and Communications Brigade Power amplifier and smart pressurizer Unit 63751 PLASSF Base 26 Tracking and Communications Office Enclosed space automatic frequency modulation device Unit 63672 PLASSF Northwest Academy of Nuclear Research Research on key test technology for microwave reconnaissance jamming Unit 63871 Huayin Conventional Munitions Test and UAV Training Base Environmental noise intelligent collection terminal Unit 63811 PLASSF Wenchang Space Launch Center Algorithm demonstration software for cooperative sensing of radar Unit 93209 PLAAF Research Academy targets; credible detection and dynamic evolution of electromagnetic environment
 TABLE 4 4 Select AI-Related Electronic Warfare Contracts Awarded by PLA Units in 2020 TRANSLATED PROJECT NAME MUCD PROBABLE AFFILIATION WITHIN THE PLA Source: CSET corpus of PLA procurement activity (seven EW contracts awarded by identifiable PLA units).
 TABLE 5 5 Examples of Coded "Intelligent" Equipment Contracts Tender Name (Chinese) Tender Name (English) Counts as AI? Application(s) "XX design and artificial intelligence typical application Yes Other scenarios demand analysis of key general use technologies" sole source announcement "Research on military applications of AI technology for Yes Autonomous Vehicles rockets -intelligent robotics technology in rocket (Munitions) military XX class engineering applied research project" outsourcing Two service-type pooled and packaged procurement Yes Autonomous Vehicles projects on "research on effect field reconstruction (Munitions) technology," and "research on projectile penetration depth algorithms based on the principles of seismic wave imaging" "Intelligent co-processor accelerator card processing Yes Other and Shenwei [CPU and operating system] platform testing" tender announcement Announcement of bid evaluation results for the "study Yes Predictive of key technology for an aerospace equipment Maintenance and intelligent inspection system" Logistics "Cruise missile and UAV simulation system Yes Simulation and development" outsourcing procurement bid Training announcement Announcement of the winner of the Project 1903 UAV Yes Autonomous Vehicles platform subsystems competitive negotiation (Air) procurement tender Announcement of the winning bid for 2020-6356 low- No N/A emission gas turbine prediction methods research and validation Procurement of Workshop 23: semi-automated blasting No N/A equipment Announcement of finalists for the 500kV diode No N/A experimental research platform automated subsystems project tender
 TABLE 5 5 Examples of Coded "Intelligent" Equipment Contracts TENDER NAME (CHINESE) TENDER NAME (ENGLISH) COUNTS AS AI? APPLICATION(S)
 TABLE 6 Number 6 of Equipment Contracts Awarded by PLA Service Branches, April-November 2020
 TABLE 6 Number 6 of Equipment Contracts Awarded by PLA Service Branches, April-November 2020 PLA SERVICE BRANCH TOTAL NUMBER OF EQUIPMENT CONTRACTS NUMBER OF AI-RELATED EQUIPMENT CONTRACTS PORTION OF PUBLIC CONTRACTS RELATED TO AI Source: CSET corpus of PLA procurement activity.
 Source: CSET corpus of PLA procurement activity (188 contracts awarded by service branches). ment distribution measurement system" from Xi'an Kuaizhou Measurement and Control Technol- ogy Co., Ltd. (西安快舟测控技术有限公司), an application particularly useful in battle damage assessment. FIGURE 11 FIGURE 11 Number of AI Equipment Contracts Awarded by Number of AI Equipment Contracts Awarded by PLA Service Branches, April-November 2020 PLA Service Branches, April-November 2020 Strategic Strategic Support Force Support Force Ground Force Ground Force Navy Navy Air Force Rocket Force Autonomous Vehicles NUMBER OF AI EQUIPMENT CONTRACTS Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Predictive Maintenance 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Information and Electronic Warfare Simulation and Training Target Recognition Command and Control Other Public procurement records indicate that the PLASSF is focused on using AI for intelligence and data fusion, especially for applications such as weather monitoring, earth imagery, and battle damage assessment. One of its most expensive public contracts in 2020, valued at $1.1 mil-lion, was for an automatic high-altitude image detection system provided by Nanjing Britronics Machinery Co., Ltd. (南京大桥机器有限公司). The company produces more than 60 types of weather radar and satellite imaging equipment, including an "intelligent high-altitude image detection system" capable of measuring meteorological phenomena between 36 and 200 NUMBER OF AI EQUIPMENT CONTRACTS Rocket Force Autonomous Vehicles Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Predictive Maintenance 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Information and Electronic Warfare Simulation and Training Target Recognition Command and Control kilometers above ground. Air Force Other 227  In July 2020, PLASSF Unit 63672 also bought a UAV-borne "frag-