{"catalog":{"description":"This update brings the RegScale CJIS catalog of controls from version 5.9.0 to 5.9.3. The CJIS Security Policy provides Criminal Justice Agencies (CJA) and Noncriminal Justice Agencies (NCJA) with a minimum set of security requirements for access to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division systems and information and to protect and safeguard Criminal Justice Information (CJI). This minimum standard of security requirements ensures continuity of information protection. The essential premise of the CJIS Security Policy is to provide the appropriate controls to protect CJI, from creation through dissemination; whether at rest or in transit.","uuid":"258cd739-add0-450c-9eb8-079303328901","datePublished":"2024-03-04T15:00:00","master":false,"url":"https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cjis_security_policy_v5-9_20200601.pdf/view","abstract":"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Law enforcement needs timely and secure access to services that provide data wherever and whenever for stopping and reducing crime. In response to these needs, the Advisory Policy Board (APB) recommended to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division authorize the expansion of the existing security management structure in 1998. Administered through a shared management philosophy, the CJIS Security Policy contains information security requirements, guidelines, and agreements reflecting the will of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies for protecting the sources, transmission, storage, and generation of Criminal Justice Information (CJI). The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 provides further legal basis for the APB approved management, operational, and technical security requirements mandated to protect CJI and by extension the hardware, software and infrastructure required to enable the services provided by the criminal justice community. The essential premise of the CJIS Security Policy is to provide appropriate controls to protect the full lifecycle of CJI, whether at rest or in transit. The CJIS Security Policy provides guidance for the creation, viewing, modification, transmission, dissemination, storage, and destruction of CJI. This Policy applies to every individual—contractor, private entity, noncriminal justice agency representative, or member of a criminal justice entity—with access to, or who operate in support of, criminal justice services and information. The CJIS Security Policy integrates presidential directives, federal laws, FBI directives and the criminal justice community's APB decisions along with nationally recognized guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The Policy is presented at both strategic and tactical levels and is periodically updated to reflect the security requirements of evolving business models. The Policy features modular sections enabling more frequent updates to address emerging threats and new security measures. The provided security criteria assists agencies with designing and implementing systems to meet a uniform level of risk and security protection while enabling agencies the latitude to institute more stringent security requirements and controls based on their business model and local needs. The CJIS Security Policy strengthens the partnership between the FBI and CJIS Systems Agencies (CSA), including, in those states with separate authorities, the State Identification Bureaus (SIB). Further, as use of criminal history record information for noncriminal justice purposes continues to expand, the CJIS Security Policy becomes increasingly important in guiding the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Council and State Compact Officers in the secure exchange of criminal justice records. The Policy describes the vision and captures the security concepts that set the policies, protections, roles, and responsibilities with minimal impact from changes in technology. The Policy empowers CSAs with the insight and ability to tune their security programs according to their risks, needs, budgets, and resource constraints while remaining compliant with the baseline level of security set forth in this Policy. The CJIS Security Policy provides a secure framework of laws, standards, and elements of published and vetted policies for accomplishing the mission across the broad spectrum of the criminal justice and noncriminal justice communities.","defaultName":"cjis","title":"Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Policy Version 5.9.3","lastRevisionDate":"2024-03-04T15:00:00","regulationDatePublished":"2023-09-14T12:00:00","keywords":" CJIS; FBI; Security Policy; Criminal Justice; Law Enforcement, confidentiality; FISMA; APB, cybersecurity; information security; information system; integrity; personally identifiable information; privacy controls; privacy functions; privacy requirements; Risk Management Framework; security controls; security functions; security requirements; system; system security","securityControls":[{"description":"

Before exchanging CJI, agencies shall put formal agreements in place that specify security controls. The exchange of information may take several forms including electronic mail, instant messages, web services, facsimile, hard copy, and information systems sending, receiving and storing CJI.

Information exchange agreements outline the roles, responsibilities, and data ownership between agencies and any external parties. Information exchange agreements for agencies sharing CJI data that is sent to and/or received from the FBI CJIS shall specify the security controls and conditions described in this document.

Information exchange agreements shall be supported by documentation committing both parties to the terms of information exchange. As described in subsequent sections, different agreements and policies apply, depending on whether the parties involved are CJAs or NCJAs. See Appendix D for examples of Information Exchange Agreements.

There may be instances, on an ad-hoc basis, where CJI is authorized for further dissemination to Authorized Recipients not covered by an information exchange agreement with the releasing agency. In these instances the dissemination of CJI is considered to be secondary dissemination. Law Enforcement and civil agencies shall have a local policy to validate a requestor of CJI as an authorized recipient before disseminating CJI. See Section 5.1.3 for secondary dissemination guidance.

","uuid":"a2ed5197-f842-4c84-856d-6b3b9347a670","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1 Information Exchange","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1"},{"description":"

Procedures for handling and storage of information shall be established to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure, alteration or misuse. Using the requirements in this Policy as a starting point, the procedures shall apply to the handling, processing, storing, and communication of CJI. These procedures apply to the exchange of CJI no matter the form of exchange.

The policies for information handling and protection also apply to using CJI shared with or received from FBI CJIS for noncriminal justice purposes. In general, a noncriminal justice purpose includes the use of criminal history records for purposes authorized by federal or state law other than purposes relating to the administration of criminal justice, including – but not limited to - employment suitability, licensing determinations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national security clearances.

","uuid":"1331c013-586a-4625-9bec-c051936e2003","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1.1 Information Handling","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1.1"},{"description":"

Any CJA receiving access to CJI shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA providing the access. The written agreement shall specify the FBI CJIS systems and services to which the agency will have access, and the FBI CJIS Division policies to which the agency must adhere. These agreements shall include:

  1. Audit.

  2. Dissemination.

  3. Hit confirmation.

  4. Logging.

  5. Quality Assurance (QA).

  6. Screening (Pre-Employment).

  7. Security.

  8. Timeliness.

  9. Training.

  10. Use of the system.

  11. Validation.

","uuid":"37fef026-6cb0-4b04-a3cc-facb1de18324","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1.3 Criminal Justice Agency User Agreements","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1.3"},{"description":"A NCJA (government) designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CJA shall be eligible for access to the CJI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to executive order, statute, regulation, or interagency agreement. The NCJA shall sign and execute a management control agreement (MCA) with the CJA, which stipulates management control of the criminal justice function remains solely with the CJA. The MCA may be a separate document or included with the language of an interagency agreement. An example of an NCJA (government) is a city information technology (IT) department.","uuid":"40b300df-7428-43d6-9a24-652d95802998","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1.4 InterAgency and Management Control Agreements","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1.4"},{"description":"

The CJIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHRI, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentiality of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CJIS Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General may require. Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall acknowledge, via signing of the CJIS Security Addendum Certification page, and abide by all aspects of the CJIS Security Addendum. The CJIS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modifications to the CJIS Security Addendum shall be enacted only by the FBI. 1. Private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CJA shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specifically identifies the agency’s purpose and scope of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the CJA and the private contractor shall incorporate the CJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the FBI, acting for the U.S. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 28 CFR 20.33 (a)(7). 2. Private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions on behalf of a NCJA (government) shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specifically identifies the agency’s purpose and scope of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the NCJA and the private contractor shall incorporate the CJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the FBI, acting for the U.S. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 28 CFR 20.33 (a)(7).The CJIS Security Addendum is a uniform addendum to an agreement between the government agency and a private contractor, approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which specifically authorizes access to CHRI, limits the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensures the security and confidentiality of the information is consistent with existing regulations and the CJIS Security Policy, provides for sanctions, and contains such other provisions as the Attorney General may require.

Private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies. All private contractors who perform criminal justice functions shall acknowledge, via signing of the CJIS Security Addendum Certification page, and abide by all aspects of the CJIS Security Addendum. The CJIS Security Addendum is presented in Appendix H. Modifications to the CJIS Security Addendum shall be enacted only by the FBI.

1. Private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions for a CJA shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specifically identifies the agency’s purpose and scope of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the CJA and the private contractor shall incorporate the CJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the FBI, acting for the U.S. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 28 CFR 20.33 (a)(7).

2. Private contractors designated to perform criminal justice functions on behalf of a NCJA (government) shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted pursuant to an agreement which specifically identifies the agency’s purpose and scope of providing services for the administration of criminal justice. The agreement between the NCJA and the private contractor shall incorporate the CJIS Security Addendum approved by the Director of the FBI, acting for the U.S. Attorney General, as referenced in Title 28 CFR 20.33 (a)(7)

","uuid":"8dc70a26-61f4-4e4f-886c-3d47036e9b4c","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1.5 Private Contractor User Agreements and CJIS Security Addendum","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1.5"},{"description":"

A NCJA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the A NCJA (public) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. A NCJA (public) receiving access to CJI shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA/SIB providing the access. An example of a NCJA (public) is a county school board.

A NCJA (private) designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks, with the full consent of the individual to whom a background check is taking place, for noncriminal justice functions, shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. A NCJA (private) receiving access to CJI shall enter into a signed written agreement with the appropriate signatory authority of the CSA, SIB, or authorized agency providing the access. An example of a NCJA (private) is a local bank.

All NCJAs accessing CJI shall be subject to all pertinent areas of the CJIS Security Policy (see Appendix J for supplemental guidance). Each NCJA that directly accesses FBI CJI shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI’s network through the external network connection or system.

","uuid":"7c624d8b-7dfa-48e4-8755-9c0a310dd004","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1.6 Agency User Agreements","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1.6"},{"description":"

Channelers designated to request civil fingerprint-based background checks or noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCJA (public) or NCJA (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All Channelers accessing CJI shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Security and Management Control Outsourcing Standard. Each Channeler that directly accesses CJI shall also allow the FBI to conduct periodic penetration testing.

Channelers leveraging CJI to perform civil functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.

","uuid":"718ccaf5-9eff-4fb5-8988-24781a6d9f72","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1.7 Outsourcing Standards for Channelers","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1.7"},{"description":"Contractors designated to perform noncriminal justice ancillary functions on behalf of a NCJA (public) or NCJA (private) for noncriminal justice functions shall be eligible for access to CJI. Access shall be permitted when such designation is authorized pursuant to federal law or state statute approved by the U.S. Attorney General. All contractors accessing CJI shall be subject to the terms and conditions described in the Compact Council Outsourcing Standard for Non-Channelers. Contractors leveraging CJI to perform civil functions on behalf of an Authorized Recipient shall meet the same training and certification criteria required by governmental agencies performing a similar function, and shall be subject to the same extent of audit review as are local user agencies.","uuid":"80e79eff-2be2-44be-b4e1-cf9698861245","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1.8 Outsourcing Standards for Non-Channelers","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1.8"},{"description":"As specified in the interagency agreements, MCAs, and contractual agreements with private contractors, the services, reports and records provided by the service provider shall be regularly monitored and reviewed. The CJA, authorized agency, or FBI shall maintain sufficient overall control and visibility into all security aspects to include, but not limited to, identification of vulnerabilities and information security incident reporting/response. The incident reporting/response process used by the service provider shall conform to the incident reporting/response specifications provided in this Policy.","uuid":"275e503f-35e2-4f9f-84f6-f835b797719f","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.2 Monitoring, Review, and Delivery of Services","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.2"},{"description":"Any changes to services provided by a service provider shall be managed by the CJA, authorized agency, or FBI. This includes provision of services, changes to existing services, and new services. Evaluation of the risks to the agency shall be undertaken based on the criticality of the data, system, and the impact of the change.","uuid":"9d6700b5-d3b5-413c-b8c6-b9f2bab18e5c","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.2.1 Managing Changes to Service Providers","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.2.1"},{"description":"If CHRI is released to another authorized agency, and that agency was not part of the releasing agency’s primary information exchange agreement(s), the releasing agency shall log such dissemination.","uuid":"18e9d469-a4ef-4be0-ae24-19e3170fb30d","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.3 Secondary Dissemination","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.3"},{"description":"If CJI does not contain CHRI and is not part of an information exchange agreement then it does not need to be logged. Dissemination shall conform to the local policy validating the requestor of the CJI as an employee and/or contractor of a law enforcement agency or civil agency requiring the CJI to perform their mission or a member of the public receiving CJI via authorized dissemination.","uuid":"312b54b8-9658-444a-85eb-52f6e38b75ae","family":"Policy Area 1 - Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.4 Secondary Dissemination of Non-CHRI CJI","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.4"},{"description":"

The agency’s information system shall generate audit records for deThe agency’s information system shall generate audit records for defined events. These defined events include identifying significant events which need to be audited as relevant to the security of the information system. The agency shall specify which information system components carry out auditing activities. Auditing activity can affect information system performance and this issue must be considered as a separate factor during the acquisition of information systems.

The agency’s information system shall produce, at the application and/or operating system level, audit records containing sufficient information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and the outcomes of the events. The agency shall periodically review and update the list of agency-defined auditable events. In the event an agency does not use an automated system, manual recording of activities shall still take place.

","uuid":"80c78a4f-bd6b-4007-a5a1-e0f8acf2a444","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.1 Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems)","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.1"},{"description":"

The following events shall be logged: 1. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts. 2. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to use: a. access permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource; b. create permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource; c. write permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource; d. delete permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource; e. change permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource. 3. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to change account passwords. 4. Successful and unsuccessful actions by privileged accounts (i.e. root, Oracle, DBA, admin, etc.). 5. Successful and unsuccessful attempts for users to: a. access the audit log file; b. modify the audit log file; c. destroy the audit log file.The following events shall be logged:

1. Successful and unsuccessful system log-on attempts.

2. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to use:

a. access permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource;

b. create permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource;

c. write permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource;

d. delete permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource;

e. change permission on a user account, file, directory or other system resource.

3. Successful and unsuccessful attempts to change account passwords.

4. Successful and unsuccessful actions by privileged accounts (i.e., root, Oracle, DBA, admin, etc.).

5. Successful and unsuccessful attempts for users to:

a. access the audit log file;

b. modify the audit log file;

c. destroy the audit log file.

","uuid":"f701790b-4b16-49c3-9e18-23045eb47148","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.1.1 Events","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.1.1"},{"description":"

The following content shall be included with every audited event: 1. Date and time of the event. 2. The component of the information system (e.g., software component, hardware component) where the event occurred. 3. Type of event. 4. User/subject identity. 5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.The following content shall be included with every audited event:

1. Date and time of the event.

2. The component of the information system (e.g., software component, hardware component) where the event occurred.

3. Type of event.

4. User/subject identity.

5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.

","uuid":"219a8a21-2787-4bc3-b71d-6a9025e5373a","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.1.1.1 Content","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.1.1.1"},{"description":"The agency’s information system shall provide alerts to appropriate agency officials in the event of an audit processing failure. Audit processing failures include, for example: software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded.","uuid":"2ff89dc3-e91e-4ebc-9615-b5504e4d16bd","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.2 Response to Audit Processing Failures","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.2"},{"description":"The responsible management official shall designate an individual or position to review/analyze information system audit records for indications of inappropriate or unusual activity, investigate suspicious activity or suspected violations, to report findings to appropriate officials, and to take necessary actions. Audit review/analysis shall be conducted at a minimum once a week. The frequency of review/analysis should be increased when the volume of an agency’s processing indicates an elevated need for audit review. The agency shall increase the level of audit monitoring and analysis activity within the information system whenever there is an indication of increased risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information.","uuid":"cae22b95-ae2a-4098-ad4e-d8300b411e15","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.3 Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.3"},{"description":"The agency’s information system shall provide time stamps for use in audit record generation. The time stamps shall include the date and time values generated by the internal system clocks in the audit records. The agency shall synchronize internal information system clocks on an annual basis.","uuid":"af490331-32a9-4535-981e-62247e07b4ab","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.4 Time Stamps","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.4"},{"description":"The agency’s information system shall protect audit information and audit tools from modification, deletion and unauthorized access.","uuid":"4f2d0b70-975e-472e-a178-7b81d70bd730","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.5 Protection of Audit Information","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.5"},{"description":"The agency shall retain audit records for at least one (1) year. Once the minimum retention time period has passed, the agency shall continue to retain audit records until it is determined they are no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, for example, retention and availability of audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, subpoena, and law enforcement actions.","uuid":"6b318398-d2d9-4d54-a476-a31806295f05","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.6 Audit Record Retention","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.6"},{"description":"A log shall be maintained for a minimum of one (1) year on all NCIC and III transactions. The III portion of the log shall clearly identify both the operator and the authorized receiving agency. III logs shall also clearly identify the requester and the secondary recipient. The identification on the log shall take the form of a unique identifier that shall remain unique to the individual requester and to the secondary recipient throughout the minimum one year retention period.","uuid":"37ccc19b-c260-44a5-be1c-96fada46fd4c","family":"Policy Area 4 - Auditing and Accountability","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.4.7 Logging NCIC and III Transactions","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.4.7"},{"description":"Planned or unplanned changes to the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of the information system can have significant effects on the overall security of the system. The goal is to allow only qualified and authorized individuals access to information system components for purposes of initiating changes, including upgrades, and modifications. Section 5.5, Access Control, describes agency requirements for control of privileges and restrictions.","uuid":"8aedbfb8-d431-4551-ab84-7a69ff08319c","family":"Policy Area 7 - Configuration Management","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.7.1 Access Restrictions for Changes","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.7.1"},{"description":"The agency shall configure the application, service, or information system to provide only essential capabilities and shall specifically prohibit and/or restrict the use of specified functions, ports, protocols, and/or services.","uuid":"6cb7d7f9-769a-4556-ba62-42e6d76a23d1","family":"Policy Area 7 - Configuration Management","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.7.1.1 Least Functionality","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.7.1.1"},{"description":"

The agency shall ensure that a complete topological drawing depicting the interconnectivity of the agency network, to criminal justice information, systems and services is maintained in a current status. See Appendix C for sample network diagrams. The network topological drawing shall include the following: 1. All communications paths, circuits, and other components used for the interconnection, beginning with the agency-owned system(s) and traversing through all interconnected systems to the agency end-point. 2. The logical location of all components (e.g., firewalls, routers, switches, hubs, servers, encryption devices, and computer workstations). Individual workstations (clients) do not have to be shown; the number of clients is sufficient. 3. “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) markings. 4. The agency name and date (day, month, and year) drawing was created or updated.The agency shall ensure that a complete topological drawing depicting the interconnectivity of the agency network, to criminal justice information, systems and services is maintained in a current status. See Appendix C for sample network diagrams.

The network topological drawing shall include the following:

1. All communications paths, circuits, and other components used for the interconnection, beginning with the agency-owned system(s) and traversing through all interconnected systems to the agency end-point.

2. The logical location of all components (e.g., firewalls, routers, switches, hubs, servers, encryption devices, and computer workstations). Individual workstations (clients) do not have to be shown; the number of clients is sufficient.

3. “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) markings.

4. The agency name and date (day, month, and year) drawing was created or updated.

","uuid":"0c483560-6aa4-4e6e-b7a6-2053e7ef41f6","family":"Policy Area 7 - Configuration Management","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.7.1.2 Network Diagram","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.7.1.2"},{"description":"The system configuration documentation often contains sensitive details (e.g. descriptions of applications, processes, procedures, data structures, authorization processes, data flow, etc.) Agencies shall protect the system documentation from unauthorized access consistent with the provisions described in Section 5.5 Access Control.","uuid":"b461f10c-c323-4ea1-ae22-d9fd25078583","family":"Policy Area 7 - Configuration Management","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.7.2 Security of Configuration Documentation","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.7.2"},{"description":"

A physically secure location is a facility, a criminal justice conveyance, or an area, a room, or a group of rooms within a facility with both the physical and personnel security controls sufficient to protect CJI and associated information systems. The physically secure location is subject to criminal justice agency management control; SIB control; FBI CJIS Security addendum; or a combination thereof.

Sections 5.9.1.1 – 5.9.1.8 describe the physical controls required in order to be considered a physically secure location, while Sections 5.2 and 5.12, respectively, describe the minimum security awareness training and personnel security controls required for unescorted access to a physically secure location. Sections 5.5, 5.6.2.2.1, and 5.10 describe the requirements for technical security controls required to access CJI from within the perimeter of a physically secure location without AA.

","uuid":"8c7c5727-d304-46f5-891a-66475d2753d2","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1 Physically Secure Location","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1"},{"description":"The perimeter of a physically secure location shall be prominently posted and separated from non-secure locations by physical controls. Security perimeters shall be defined, controlled and secured in a manner acceptable to the CSA or SIB.","uuid":"cdd1af23-f119-4c14-8e48-55a842a2da48","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1.1 Security Perimeter","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1.1"},{"description":"The agency shall develop and keep current a list of personnel with authorized access to the physically secure location (except for those areas within the permanent facility officially designated as publicly accessible) or shall issue credentials to authorized personnel.","uuid":"6ef13362-fe28-4fcc-a1a6-815f1d910cd2","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1.2 Physical Access Authorizations","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1.2"},{"description":"The agency shall control all physical access points (except for those areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible) and shall verify individual access authorizations before granting access.","uuid":"dee9d678-f986-4016-8254-893c65cb791e","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1.3 Physical Access Control","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1.3"},{"description":"The agency shall control physical access to information system distribution and transmission lines within the physically secure location.","uuid":"39742b00-d5f1-4d61-aa7f-7d465564f0c8","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1.4 Access Control for Transmission Medium","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1.4"},{"description":"The agency shall control physical access to information system devices that display CJI and shall position information system devices in such a way as to prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing and viewing CJI.","uuid":"46b1fcd7-4aad-4a84-8796-1249b741c76c","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1.5 Access Control for Display Medium","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1.5"},{"description":"The agency shall monitor physical access to the information system to detect and respond to physical security incidents.","uuid":"489e983b-99ba-435e-a104-25b96a5e4309","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1.6 Monitoring Physical Access","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1.6"},{"description":"The agency shall control physical access by authenticating visitors before authorizing escorted access to the physically secure location (except for those areas designated as publicly accessible). The agency shall escort visitors at all times and monitor visitor activity.","uuid":"be40d1a3-0b27-4b3c-b30a-0da16bef1a95","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1.7 Visitor Control","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1.7"},{"description":"The agency shall authorize and control information system-related items entering and exiting the physically secure location.","uuid":"0a4bbc1d-5960-4def-ae60-378f6767ef90","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.1.8 Delivery and Removal","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.1.8"},{"description":"

If an agency cannot meet all of the controls required for establishing a physically secure location, but has an operational need to access or store CJI, the agency shall designate an area, a room, or a storage container, as a controlled area for the purpose of day-to-day CJI access or storage. The agency shall, at a minimum:

1. Limit access to the controlled area during CJI processing times to only those personnel authorized by the agency to access or view CJI.

2. Lock the area, room, or storage container when unattended.

3. Position information system devices and documents containing CJI in such a way as to prevent unauthorized individuals from access and view.

4. Follow the encryption requirements found in Section 5.10.1.2 for electronic storage (i.e., data “at rest”) of CJI.

","uuid":"25d80755-8968-499e-bdda-859f3a585308","family":"Policy Area 9 - Physical Protection","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.9.2 Controlled Area","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.9.2"},{"description":"

The network infrastructure shall control the flow of information between interconnected systems. Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to travel within an information system and between information systems (as opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without explicit regard to subsequent accesses to that information. In other words, controlling how data moves from one place to the next in a secure manner. Examples of controls that are better expressed as flow control than access control (see Section 5.5) are:

1. Prevent CJI from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network.

2. Block outside traffic that claims to be from within the agency.

3. Do not pass any web requests to the public network that are not from the internal web proxy.

Specific examples of flow control enforcement can be found in boundary protection devices (e.g., proxies, gateways, guards, encrypted tunnels, firewalls, and routers) that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict information system services or provide a packet filtering capability.

","uuid":"7baa99ee-827c-4ebc-b35d-3aefbd20990b","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.1 Information Flow Enforcement","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.1"},{"description":"

The agency shall:

1. Control access to networks processing CJI.

2. Monitor and control communications at the external boundary of the information system and at key internal boundaries within the system.

3. Ensure any connections to the Internet, other external networks, or information systems occur through controlled interfaces (e.g., proxies, gateways, routers, firewalls, encrypted tunnels). See Section 5.13.4.3 for guidance on personal firewalls.

4. Employ tools and techniques to monitor network events, detect attacks, and provide identification of unauthorized use.

5. Ensure the operational failure of the boundary protection mechanisms do not result in any unauthorized release of information outside of the information system boundary (i.e., the device “fails closed” vs. “fails open”).

6. Allocate publicly accessible information system components (e.g., public Web servers) to separate sub networks with separate, network interfaces. Publicly accessible information systems residing on a virtual host shall follow the guidance in Section 5.10.3.2 to achieve separation.

","uuid":"ed0ea8ab-681a-4d06-b0f9-ba366a4efb5b","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.1.1 Boundary Protection","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.1.1"},{"description":"Encryption is a form of cryptology that applies a cryptographic operation to provide confidentiality of (sensitive) information. Decryption is the reversing of the cryptographic operation to convert the information back into a plaintext (readable) format. There are two main types of encryption: symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption (also known as public key encryption). Hybrid encryption solutions do exist and use both asymmetric encryption for client/server certificate exchange – session integrity and symmetric encryption for bulk data encryption – data confidentiality.","uuid":"5945a3fc-4eca-4b9c-b9b2-348db3691a0a","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.1.2 Encryption","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.1.2"},{"description":"

When CJI is transmitted outside the boundary of the physically secure location, the data shall be immediately protected via encryption. When encryption is employed, the cryptographic module used shall be FIPS 140-2 certified and use a symmetric cipher key strength of at least 128 bit strength to protect CJI.

NOTE: Subsequent versions of approved cryptographic modules that are under current review for FIPS 140-2 compliancy can be used in the interim until certification is complete.

EXCEPTIONS:

1. See Sections 5.13.1.2.2 and 5.10.2.

2. Encryption shall not be required if the transmission medium meets all of the following requirements:

a. The agency owns, operates, manages, or protects the medium.

b. Medium terminates within physically secure locations at both ends with no interconnections between.

c. Physical access to the medium is controlled by the agency using the requirements in Sections 5.9.1 and 5.12.

d. Protection includes safeguards (e.g., acoustic, electric, electromagnetic, and physical) and if feasible countermeasures (e.g., alarms, notifications) to permit its use for the transmission of unencrypted information through an area of lesser classification or control.

e. With prior approval of the CSO.

Examples:

","uuid":"92f9326e-f3fa-4cbb-9891-f32acc72d064","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.1.2.1 Encryption for CJI in Transit","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.1.2.1"},{"description":"

When CJI is at rest (i.e. stored digitally) outside the boundary of the physically secure location, the data shall be protected via encryption. When encryption is employed, agencies shall either encrypt CJI in accordance with the standard in Section 5.10.1.2.1 above, or use a symmetric cipher that is FIPS 197 certified (AES) and at least 256 bit strength. 1. WWhen CJI is at rest (i.e., stored digitally) outside the boundary of the physically secure location, the data shall be protected via encryption. When encryption is employed, agencies shall either encrypt CJI in accordance with the standard in Section 5.10.1.2.1 above, or use a symmetric cipher that is FIPS 197 certified (AES) and at least 256 bit strength.

1. When agencies implement encryption on CJI at rest, the passphrase used to unlock the cipher shall meet the following requirements:

a. Be at least 10 characters

b. Not be a dictionary word.

c. Include at least one (1) upper case letter, one (1) lower case letter, one (1) number, and one (1) special character.

d. Be changed when previously authorized personnel no longer require access.

2. Multiple files maintained in the same unencrypted folder shall have separate and distinct passphrases. A single passphrase may be used to encrypt an entire folder or disk containing multiple files. All audit requirements found in Section 5.4.1 Auditable Events and Content (Information Systems) shall be applied.

NOTE: Commonly available encryption tools often use a key to unlock the cipher to allow data access; this key is called a passphrase. While similar to a password, a passphrase is not used for user authentication. Additionally, the passphrase contains stringent character requirements making it more secure and thus providing a higher level of confidence that the passphrase will not be compromised.

","uuid":"7836e2d9-8192-435f-8e8a-ac4b9abf03ca","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.1.2.2 Encryption for CJI at Rest","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.1.2.2"},{"description":"

For agencies using public key infrastructure (PKI) technology, the agency shall develop and implement a certificate policy and certification practice statement for the issuance of public key certificates used in the information system. Registration to receive a public key certificate shall:

1. Include authorization by a supervisor or a responsible official.

2. Be accomplished by a secure process that verifies the identity of the certificate holder.

3. Ensure the certificate is issued to the intended party.

","uuid":"2b711d13-3a7e-40be-8dc0-05aa15799d01","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.1.2.3 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Technology","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.1.2.3"},{"description":"

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has been embraced by organizations globally as an addition to, or replacement for, public switched telephone network (PSTN) and private branch exchange (PBX) telephone systems. The immediate benefits are lower costs than traditional telephone services and VoIP can be installed in-line with an organization’s existing Internet Protocol (IP) services. Among VoIP’s risks that have to be considered carefully are: myriad security concerns, cost issues associated with new networking hardware requirements, and overarching quality of service (QoS) factors.

In addition to the security controls described in this document, the following additional controls shall be implemented when an agency deploys VoIP within a network that contains unencrypted CJI:

  1. Establish usage restrictions and implementation guidance for VoIP technologies.

  2. Change the default administrative password on the IP phones and VoIP switches.

  3. Utilize Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) technology to segment VoIP traffic from data traffic.

Appendix G.2 outlines threats, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and NIST best practices for VoIP.

","uuid":"fbfa541c-2617-4e1e-abf0-7aba377fba57","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.1.3 Voice Over Internet Protocol","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.1.3"},{"description":"

Organizations transitioning to a cloud environment are presented unique opportunities and challenges (e.g., purported cost savings and increased efficiencies versus a loss of control over the data). Reviewing the cloud computing white paper (Appendix G.3), the cloud assessment located within the security policy resource center on FBI.gov, NIST Special Publications (800-144, 800-145, and 800-146), as well as the cloud provider’s policies and capabilities will enable organizations to make informed decisions on whether or not the cloud provider can offer service that maintains compliance with the requirements of the CJIS Security Policy.

The storage of CJI, regardless of encryption status, shall only be permitted in cloud environments (e.g., government or third-party/commercial datacenters, etc.) which reside within the physical boundaries of APB-member country (i.e., U.S., U.S. territories, Indian Tribes, and Canada) and legal authority of an APB-member agency (i.e., U.S. – federal/state/territory, Indian Tribe, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)).

Note: This restriction does not apply to exchanges of CJI with foreign government agencies under international exchange agreements (i.e., the Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreements, fugitive extracts, and exchanges made for humanitarian and criminal investigatory purposes in particular circumstances).

Metadata derived from unencrypted CJI shall be protected in the same manner as CJI and shall not be used for any advertising or other commercial purposes by any cloud service provider or other associated entity.

The agency may permit limited use of metadata derived from unencrypted CJI when specifically approved by the agency and its “intended use” is detailed within the service agreement. Such authorized uses of metadata may include, but are not limited to the following: spam and spyware filtering, data loss prevention, spillage reporting, transaction logs (events and content – similar to Section 5.4), data usage/indexing metrics, and diagnostic/syslog data.

","uuid":"1f1cc393-3be3-49ba-8d09-040c13a431c5","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.1.4 Cloud Computing","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.1.4"},{"description":"CJI transmitted via a single or multi-function device over a standard telephone line is exempt from encryption requirements. CJI transmitted external to a physically secure location using a facsimile server, application or service which implements email-like technology, shall meet the encryption requirements for CJI in transit as defined in Section 5.10.","uuid":"d2d9791f-1c5a-40c8-943b-312abfc0b5c5","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.2 Facsimile Transmission of CJI","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.2"},{"description":"As resources grow scarce, agencies are increasing the centralization of applications, services, and system administration. Advanced software now provides the ability to create virtual machines that allows agencies to reduce the amount of hardware needed. Although the concepts of partitioning and virtualization have existed for a while, the need for securing the partitions and virtualized machines has evolved due to the increasing amount of distributed processing and federated information sources now available across the Internet.","uuid":"e228ae8d-8f2e-4ffb-ad44-f2477b073e92","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.3 Partitioning and Virtualization","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.3"},{"description":"

The application, service, or information system shall separate user functionality (including user interface services) from information system management functionality.

The application, service, or information system shall physically or logically separate user interface services (e.g., public web pages) from information storage and management services (e.g., database management). Separation may be accomplished through the use of one or more of the following:

1. Different computers.

2. Different central processing units.

3. Different instances of the operating system.

4. Different network addresses.

5. Other methods approved by the FBI CJIS ISO.

","uuid":"116f22bd-9b6a-497e-ba34-c1a8895f35e2","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.3.1 Partitioning","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.3.1"},{"description":"

Virtualization refers to a methodology of dividing the resources of a computer (hardware and software) into multiple execution environments. Virtualized environments are authorized for criminal justice and noncriminal justice activities. In addition to the security controls described in this Policy, the following additional controls shall be implemented in a virtual environment:

1. Isolate the host from the virtual machine. In other words, virtual machine users cannot access host files, firmware, etc.

2. Maintain audit logs for all virtual machines and hosts and store the logs outside the hosts’ virtual environment.

3. Virtual Machines that are Internet facing (web servers, portal servers, etc.) shall be physically separate from Virtual Machines (VMs) that process CJI internally or be separated by a virtual firewall.

4. Drivers that serve critical functions shall be stored within the specific VM they service. In other words, do not store these drivers within the hypervisor, or host operating system, for sharing. Each VM is to be treated as an independent system – secured as independently as possible.

The following additional technical security controls shall be applied in virtual environments where CJI is comingled with non-CJI:

1. Encrypt CJI when stored in a virtualized environment where CJI is comingled with non-CJI or segregate and store unencrypted CJI within its own secure VM.

2. Encrypt network traffic within the virtual environment.

The following are additional technical security control best practices and should be implemented wherever feasible:

1. Implement IDS and/or IPS monitoring within the virtual environment.

2. Virtually or physically firewall each VM within the virtual environment to ensure that only allowed protocols will transact.

3. Segregate the administrative duties for the host.

Appendix G-1 provides some reference and additional background information on virtualization.

","uuid":"82493f51-9d80-4a55-94ae-0fbe2e6873d4","family":"Policy Area 10 - Systems and Communications Protection and Information Integrity","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.10.3.2 Virtualization","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.10.3.2"},{"description":"The FBI CJIS Division is authorized to conduct audits, once every three (3) years as a minimum, to assess agency compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies. The CJIS Audit Unit (CAU) shall conduct a triennial audit of each CSA in order to verify compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies. This audit shall include a sample of CJAs and, in coordination with the SIB, the NCJAs. Audits may be conducted on a more frequent basis if the audit reveals that an agency has not complied with applicable statutes, regulations and policies. The FBI CJIS Division shall also have the authority to conduct unannounced security inspections and scheduled audits of Contractor facilities.","uuid":"be4e753e-4b29-47ba-893b-bfb9f7f72934","family":"Policy Area 11 - Formal Audits","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.11.1.1 Triennial Compliance Audits by the FBI CJIS Division","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.11.1.1"},{"description":"The FBI CJIS Division is authorized to conduct security audits of the CSA and SIB networks and systems, once every three (3) years as a minimum, to assess agency compliance with the CJIS Security Policy. This audit shall include a sample of CJAs and NCJAs. Audits may be conducted on a more frequent basis if the audit reveals that an agency has not complied with the CJIS Security Policy.","uuid":"fa99a9c8-012e-4991-92a4-d58a791ecd27","family":"Policy Area 11 - Formal Audits","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.11.1.2 Triennial Security Audits by the FBI CJIS Division","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.11.1.2"},{"description":"

Each CSA shall:

1. At a minimum, triennially audit all CJAs and NCJAs which have direct access to the state system in order to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.

2. In coordination with the SIB, establish a process to periodically audit all NCJAs, with access to CJI, in order to ensure compliance with applicable statutes, regulations and policies.

3. Have the authority to conduct unannounced security inspections and scheduled audits of Contractor facilities.

4. Have the authority, on behalf of another CSA, to conduct a CSP compliance audit of contractor facilities and provide the results to the requesting CSA. If a subsequent CSA requests an audit of the same contractor facility, the CSA may provide the results of the previous audit unless otherwise notified by the requesting CSA that a new audit be performed.

Note: This authority does not apply to the audit requirement outlined in the Security and Management Control Outsourcing Standard for Non-Channeler and Channelers related to outsourcing noncriminal justice administrative functions.

","uuid":"86ef5b30-a5b5-453f-9cdb-860aadb05154","family":"Policy Area 11 - Formal Audits","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.11.2 Audits by the CSA","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.11.2"},{"description":"All agencies having access to CJI shall permit an inspection team to conduct an appropriate inquiry and audit of any alleged security violations. The inspection team shall be appointed by the APB and shall include at least one representative of the CJIS Division. All results of the inquiry and audit shall be reported to the APB with appropriate recommendations.","uuid":"8e72b673-970c-4978-b461-11bd9c0546f3","family":"Policy Area 11 - Formal Audits","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.11.3 Special Security Inquiries and Audits","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.11.3"},{"description":"

The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy Board (APB) established the Compliance Evaluation Subcommittee (CES) to evaluate the results of audits conducted by the CJIS Audit Unit (CAU). The CES makes specific recommendations to the APB concerning compliance with applicable policies and regulations. The most current information regarding the CAU audits that are within the purview of the CES and detailed CES sanctions process procedures are available at CJIS.gov (Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal) CJIS Special Interest Groups CES Section and CJIS Section of FBI.gov.

The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact (Compact) Council at Article VI established the Compact Council (Council). The Compact Council Sanctions Committee is responsible for ensuring the use of the Interstate Identification Index System for noncriminal justice purposes complies with the Compact and with rules, standards, and procedures established by the Compact Council. As such, the Sanctions Committee reviews the results of audits conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of participants in the FBI’s Criminal Justice Services (CJIS) Division programs. The Sanctions Committee reviews the audit results and the participant’s response to determine a course of action necessary to bring the participant into compliance and make recommendations to the Compact Council or the FBI. Additional information on the Compact Council Sanctions process is available on the Compact Council’s web-site.

","uuid":"97beb1a9-7c4d-4304-804e-1bffb89ddc73","family":"Policy Area 11 - Formal Audits","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.11.4 Compliance Subcommittees","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.11.4"},{"description":"

Supplemental Guidance:

It is recommended individual background re-investigations be conducted every five years unless Rap Back is implemented.

","uuid":"21689c17-67c3-492e-9fd7-260d885dc873","family":"Policy Area 12 - Personnel Security","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.12.1 Personnel Screening Requirements for Individuals Requiring Unescorted Access to Unencrypted CJI","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.12.1"},{"description":"Upon termination of personnel by an interface agency, the agency shall immediately terminate access to local agency systems with access to CJI. Furthermore, the interface agency shall provide notification or other action to ensure access to state and other agency systems is terminated. If the employee is an employee of a NCJA or a Contractor, the employer shall notify all Interface Agencies that may be affected by the personnel change.","uuid":"6b0b75f8-e666-457e-895a-5dcc20b11d73","family":"Policy Area 12 - Personnel Security","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.12.2 Personnel Termination","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.12.2"},{"description":"The agency shall review CJI access authorizations when personnel are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the agency and initiate appropriate actions such as closing and establishing accounts and changing system access authorizations.","uuid":"6e3ef64e-637e-42c4-b22c-1bd410bddce2","family":"Policy Area 12 - Personnel Security","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.12.3 Personnel Transfer","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.12.3"},{"description":"The agency shall employ a formal sanctions process for personnel failing to comply with established information security policies and procedures.","uuid":"a5883cad-9df9-49ca-87ed-f07ab61129fa","family":"Policy Area 12 - Personnel Security","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.12.4 Personnel Sanctions","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.12.4"},{"description":"Examples of wireless communication technologies include, but are not limited to: 802.11, cellular, Bluetooth, satellite, microwave, and land mobile radio (LMR). Wireless technologies require at least the minimum security applied to wired technology and, based upon the specific technology or implementation, wireless technologies may require additional security controls as described below.","uuid":"73904ed8-4595-49e8-8440-4753e6880a2c","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.1 Wireless Communications Technologies","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.1"},{"description":"

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) cryptographic algorithms, used by all pre-802.11i protocols, do not meet the requirements for FIPS 140-2 and shall not be used.

Agencies shall implement the following controls for all agency-managed wireless access points with access to an agency’s network that processes unencrypted CJI:

1. Perform validation testing to ensure rogue APs (Access Points) do not exist in the 802.11 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) and to fully understand the wireless network security posture.

2. Maintain a complete inventory of all Access Points (APs) and 802.11 wireless devices.

3. Place APs in secured areas to prevent unauthorized physical access and user manipulation.

4. Test AP range boundaries to determine the precise extent of the wireless coverage and design the AP wireless coverage to limit the coverage area to only what is needed for operational purposes.

5. Enable user authentication and encryption mechanisms for the management interface of the AP.

6. Ensure that all APs have strong administrative passwords and ensure that all passwords are changed in accordance with Section 5.6.2.1.

7. Ensure the reset function on APs is used only when needed and is only invoked by authorized personnel. Restore the APs to the latest security settings, when the reset functions are used, to ensure the factory default settings are not utilized.

8. Change the default service set identifier (SSID) in the APs. Disable the broadcast SSID feature so that the client SSID must match that of the AP. Validate that the SSID character string does not contain any agency identifiable information (division, department, street, etc.) or services.

9. Enable all security features of the wireless product, including the cryptographic authentication, firewall, and other available privacy features.

10. Ensure that encryption key sizes are at least 128-bits and the default shared keys are replaced by unique keys.

11. Ensure that the ad hoc mode has been disabled.

12. Disable all nonessential management protocols on the APs.

13. Ensure all management access and authentication occurs via FIPS compliant secure protocols (e.g., SFTP, HTTPS, SNMP over TLS, etc.). Disable non-FIPS compliant secure access to the management interface.

14. Enable logging (if supported) and review the logs on a recurring basis per local policy. At a minimum, logs shall be reviewed monthly.

15. Insulate, virtually (e.g., virtual local area network (VLAN) and ACLs) or physically (e.g., firewalls), the wireless network from the operational wired infrastructure. Limit access between wireless networks and the wired network to only operational needs.

16. When disposing of access points that will no longer be used by the agency, clear access point configuration to prevent disclosure of network configuration, keys, passwords, etc.

","uuid":"84cafa4c-5231-4cd5-984b-a8a7822fa6a0","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.1.1 802.11 Wireless Protocols","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.1.1"},{"description":"

Cellular telephones, smartphones (i.e. Blackberry, iPhones, etc.), tablets, personal digital assistants (PDA), and “aircards” are examples of cellular handheld devices or devices that are capable of employing cellular technology. Additionally, cellular handheld devices typically include Bluetooth, infrared, and other wireless protocols capable of joining inCellular telephones, smartphones (i.e., Blackberry, iPhones, etc.), tablets, personal digital assistants (PDA), and “aircards” are examples of cellular handheld devices or devices that are capable of employing cellular technology. Additionally, cellular handheld devices typically include Bluetooth, infrared, and other wireless protocols capable of joining infrastructure networks or creating dynamic ad hoc networks.

Threats to cellular handheld devices stem mainly from their size, portability, and available wireless interfaces and associated services. Examples of threats to cellular handheld devices include:

1. Loss, theft, or disposal.

2. Unauthorized access.

3. Malware.

4. Spam.

5. Electronic eavesdropping.

6. Electronic tracking (threat to security of data and safety of the criminal justice professional).

7. Cloning (not as prevalent with later generation cellular technologies).

8. Server-resident data.

","uuid":"6d0f68aa-4f8a-4e41-b2ea-17b3804c0868","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.1.2 Cellular Devices","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.1.2"},{"description":"

Certain internal functions on cellular devices may be modified or compromised by the cellular carrier during international use as the devices are intended to have certain parameters configured by the cellular provider which is considered a “trusted” entity by the device.

When devices are authorized to access CJI outside the U.S., agencies shall perform an inspection to ensure that all controls are in place and functioning properly in accordance with the agency’s policies prior to and after deployment outside of the U.S.

","uuid":"d9cd0aaa-b4e4-431f-80e0-efa45f3dca46","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.1.2.1 Cellular Service Abroad","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.1.2.1"},{"description":"Any cellular device used to transmit CJI via voice is exempt from the encryption and authentication requirements.","uuid":"3f3a083d-2928-474e-b513-f39b206bdc90","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.1.2.2 Voice Transmissions Over Cellular Devices","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.1.2.2"},{"description":"

Bluetooth is an open standard for short-range radio frequency (RF) communication. Bluetooth is used primarily to establish wireless personal area networks (WPAN). Bluetooth technology has been integrated into many types of business and consumer devices, including cell phones, laptops, automobiles, medical devices, printers, keyboards, mice, headsets, and biometric capture devices.

Bluetooth technology and associated devices are susceptible to general wireless networking threats (e.g., denial of service [DoS] attacks, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle [MITM] attacks, message modification, and resource misappropriation) as well as specific Bluetooth-related attacks that target known vulnerabilities in Bluetooth implementations and specifications. Organizational security policy shall be used to dictate the use of Bluetooth and its associated devices based on the agency’s operational and business processes.

","uuid":"fc3d3af6-4f49-4f62-b254-d49399ea3da0","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.1.3 Bluetooth","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.1.3"},{"description":"

Many mobile devices include the capability to function as a Wi-Fi hotspot that allows other devices to connect through the device to the internet over the devices cellular network.

When an agency allows mobile devices that are approved to access or store CJI to function as a Wi-Fi hotspot connecting to the Internet, they shall be configured:

1. Enable encryption on the hotspot

2. Change the hotspot’s default SSID

a. Ensure the hotspot SSID does not identify the device make/model or agency ownership

3. Create a wireless network password (pre-shared key)

4. Enable the hotspot’s port filtering/blocking features if present

5. Only allow connections from agency-controlled devices

Note: Refer to the requirements in Section 5.10.1.2 Encryption for item #1. Refer to the requirements in Section 5.6.2.1.1.1 Basic Password Standards for item #3. Only password attributes #1, #2 and #3 are required.

OR

1. Have a MDM solution to provide the same security as identified in items 1 – 5 above.

","uuid":"d42793b2-5639-4311-b2f4-8272456f4769","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.1.4 Mobile Hotspots","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.1.4"},{"description":"

Mobile Device Management (MDM) facilitates thMobile Device Management (MDM) facilitates the implementation of sound security controls for mobile devices and allows for centralized oversight of configuration control, application usage, and device protection and recovery, if so desired by the agency.

Due to the potential for inconsistent network access or monitoring capability on mobile devices, methods used to monitor and manage the configuration of full-featured operating systems may not function properly on devices with limited-feature operating systems. MDM systems and applications coupled with device specific technical policy can provide a robust method for device configuration management if properly implemented.

Devices that have had any unauthorized changes made to them (including but not limited to being rooted or jailbroken) shall not be used to process, store, or transmit CJI data at any time. User agencies shall implement the following controls when directly accessing CJI from devices running a limited-feature operating system:

1. Ensure that CJI is only transferred between CJI authorized applications and storage areas of the device.

2. MDM with centralized administration configured and implemented to perform at least the following controls:

a. Remote locking of device

b. Remote wiping of device

c. Setting and locking device configuration

d. Detection of “rooted” and “jailbroken” devices

e. Enforcement of folder or disk level encryption

f. Application of mandatory policy settings on the device

g. Detection of unauthorized configurations

h. Detection of unauthorized software or applications

i. Ability to determine the location of agency-controlled devices

j. Prevention of unpatched devices from accessing CJI or CJI systems

k. Automatic device wiping after a specified number of failed access attempts

EXCEPTION: An MDM is not required when receiving CJI from an indirect access information system (i.e., the system provides no capability to conduct transactional activities on state and national repositories, applications or services). However, it is incumbent upon the authorized agency to ensure CJI is delivered to the appropriate requesting agency or individual. The CSO will make the final determination of whether access is considered indirect.

","uuid":"2f75cc2e-b2f7-4a42-9a4a-47613c3a99cf","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.2 Mobile Device Management (MDM)","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.2"},{"description":"

Organizations shall, at a minimum, ensure that wireless devices:

1. Apply available critical patches and upgrades to the operating system as soon as they become available for the device and after necessary testing as described in Section 5.10.4.1.

2. Are configured for local device authentication (see Section 5.13.7.1).

3. Use advanced authentication or CSO approved compensating controls as per Section 5.13.7.2.1.

4. Encrypt all CJI resident on the device.

5. Erase cached information, to include authenticators (see Section 5.6.2.1) in applications, when session is terminated.

6. Employ personal firewalls on full-featured operating system devices or run a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system that facilitates the ability to provide firewall services from the agency level.

7. Employ malicious code protection on full-featured operating system devices or run a MDM system that facilitates the ability to provide anti-malware services from the agency level.

","uuid":"79dbd85f-01ee-4080-8f09-9e36bf9429c8","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.3 Wireless Device Risk Management","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.3"},{"description":"Managing system integrity on limited function mobile operating systems may require methods and technologies significantly different from traditional full-featured operating systems. In many cases, the requirements of Section 5.10 of the CJIS Security Policy cannot be met with a mobile device without the installation of a third party MDM, application, or supporting service infrastructure.","uuid":"04452761-84c6-41b8-8673-86f47187d2c6","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.4 System Integrity","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.4"},{"description":"

BBased on the varying connection methods for mobile devices, an always on connection cannot be guaranteed for patching and updating. Devices without always-on cellular connections may not be reachable for extended periods of time by the MDM or solution either to report status or initiate patching.

Agencies shall monitor mobile devices to ensure their patch and update state is current.

","uuid":"51c19633-be87-444a-9e17-f2492016abf4","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.4.1 Patching/Updates","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.4.1"},{"description":"

Appropriately configured MDM software is capable of checking the installed applications on the device and reporting the software inventory to a central management console in a manner analogous to traditional virus scan detection of unauthorized software and can provide a high degree of confidence that only known software or applications are installed on the device.

Agencies that allow smartphones and tablets to access CJI shall have a process to approve the use of specific software or applications on the devices. Any device natively capable of performing these functions without a MDM solution is acceptable under this section.

","uuid":"d44c7e0b-c3a3-47e1-b50c-16c040ee4230","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.4.2 Malicious Code Protection","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.4.2"},{"description":"

For the purpose of this policy, a personal firewall is an application that controls network traffic to and from a user device, permitting or denying communications based on policy. A personal firewall shall be employed on all mobile devices that have a full-feature operating system (i.e., laptops or tablets with Windows or Linux/Unix operating systems). At a minimum, the personal firewall shall perform the following activities:

1. Manage program access to the Internet.

2. Block unsolicited requests to connect to the user device.

3. Filter incoming traffic by IP address or protocol.

4. Filter incoming traffic by destination ports.

5. Maintain an IP traffic log.

Mobile devices with limited-feature operating systems (i.e., tablets, smartphones) may not support a personal firewall. However, these operating systems have a limited number of system services installed, carefully controlled network access, and to a certain extent, perform functions similar to a personal firewall on a device with a full-feature operating system. Appropriately configured MDM software is capable of controlling which applications are allowed on the device.

","uuid":"b4c1f366-8bfe-41d2-8667-0545deb55ecc","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.4.3 Personal Firewall","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.4.3"},{"description":"

In addition to the requirements in Section 5.3 Incident Response, agencies shall develop additional or enhanced incident reporting and handling procedures to address mobile device operating scenarios. Rapid response to mobile device related incidents can significantly mitigate the risks associated with illicit data access either on the device itself or within online data resources associated with the device through an application or specialized interface.

Special reporting procedures for mobile devices shall apply in any of the following situations:

1. Loss of device control. For example:

a. Device known to be locked, minimal duration of loss

b. Device lock state unknown, minimal duration of loss

c. Device lock state unknown, extended duration of loss

d. Device known to be unlocked, more than momentary duration of loss

2. Total loss of device

3. Device compromise

4. Device loss or compromise outside the United States

","uuid":"25833c86-7045-4483-b780-924045965bed","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.5 Incident Response","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.5"},{"description":"Multiple user accounts are not generally supported on limited-feature mobile operating systems. Access control (Section 5.5 Access Control) shall be accomplished by the application that accesses CJI.","uuid":"3920c7a0-c121-42dd-869e-0f6fb81d5f10","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.6 Access Control","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.6"},{"description":"Due to the technical methods used for identification and authentication on many limited-feature mobile operating systems, achieving compliance may require many different components.","uuid":"85e61771-3ac0-43d9-862c-fbddafbf825e","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.7 Identification and Authentication","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.7"},{"description":"When mobile devices are authorized for use in accessing CJI, local device authentication shall be used to unlock the device for use. The authenticator used shall meet the requirements in section 5.6.2.1 Standard Authenticators.","uuid":"46779dec-db08-49ce-acd7-db3e7d092dbb","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.7.1 Local Device Authentication","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.7.1"},{"description":"When accessing CJI from an authorized mobile device, advanced authentication shall be used by the authorized user unless the access to CJI is indirect as described in Section 5.6.2.2.1. If access is indirect, then AA is not required.","uuid":"eaf2dc33-bf52-468b-9534-e53f82520003","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.7.2 Advanced Authentication","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.7.2"},{"description":"

CSO approved compensating controls to meet the AA requirement on agency-issued smartphones and tablets with limited-feature operating systems are permitted. Compensating controls are temporary control measures that are implemented in lieu of the required AA control measures when an agency cannot meet a requirement due to legitimate technical or business constraints. Before CSOs consider approval of compensating controls, Mobile Device Management (MDM) shall be implemented per Section 5.13.2. The compensating controls shall: 1. Meet the intent of the CJIS Security Policy AA requirement 2. Provide a similar level of protection or security as the original AA requirement 3. Not rely upon the existing requirements for AA as compensating controls 4. Expire upon the CSO approved date or when a compliant AA solution is implemented. Additionally, compensating controls may rely upon other, non-AA, existing requirements as compensating controls and/or be combined with new controls to create compensating controls. The compensating controls for AA are a combination of controls providing acceptable assurance only the authorized user is authenticating and not an impersonator or (in the case of agency-issued device used by multiple users) controls that reduce the risk of exposure if information is accessed by an unauthorized party. The following minimum controls shall be implemented as part of the CSO approved compensating controls: - Possession and registration of an agency issued smartphone or tablet as an indication it is the authorized user - Use of device certificates per Section 5.13.7.3 Device Certificates - Implemented CJIS Security Policy compliant standard authenticator protection on the secure location where CJI is storedCSO approved compensating controls to meet the AA requirement on agency-issued smartphones and tablets with limited-feature operating systems are permitted. Compensating controls are temporary control measures that are implemented in lieu of the required AA control measures when an agency cannot meet a requirement due to legitimate technical or business constraints. Before CSOs consider approval of compensating controls, Mobile Device Management (MDM) shall be implemented per Section 5.13.2. The compensating controls shall:

1. Meet the intent of the CJIS Security Policy AA requirement

2. Provide a similar level of protection or security as the original AA requirement

3. Not rely upon the existing requirements for AA as compensating controls

4. Expire upon the CSO approved date or when a compliant AA solution is implemented.

Additionally, compensating controls may rely upon other, non-AA, existing requirements as compensating controls and/or be combined with new controls to create compensating controls.

The compensating controls for AA are a combination of controls providing acceptable assurance only the authorized user is authenticating and not an impersonator or (in the case of agency-issued device used by multiple users) controls that reduce the risk of exposure if information is accessed by an unauthorized party.

The following minimum controls shall be implemented as part of the CSO approved compensating controls:

- Possession and registration of an agency issued smartphone or tablet as an indication it is the authorized user

- Use of device certificates per Section 5.13.7.3 Device Certificates

- Implemented CJIS Security Policy compliant standard authenticator protection on the secure location where CJI is stored

","uuid":"9b212857-9ed7-4f63-a6e5-cc74ac4ab768","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.7.2.1 Compensating Controls","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.7.2.1"},{"description":"

Device certificates are ofteDevice certificates are often used to uniquely identify mobile devices using part of a public key pair on the device in the form of a public key certificate. While there is value to ensuring the device itself can authenticate to a system supplying CJI, and may provide a critical layer of device identification or authentication in a larger scheme, a device certificate alone placed on the device shall not be considered valid proof that the device is being operated by an authorized user.

When certificates or cryptographic keys used to authenticate a mobile device are used in lieu of compensating controls for advanced authentication, they shall be:

1. Protected against being extracted from the device

2. Configured for remote wipe on demand or self-deletion based on a number of unsuccessful login or access attempts

3. Configured to use a secure authenticator (i.e., password, PIN) to unlock the key for use

","uuid":"dc0d7571-be5b-4fb4-90da-60c258e16940","family":"Policy Area 13 - Mobile Devices","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.13.7.3 Device Certificates","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.13.7.3"},{"description":"

Discussion: Media protection policy and procedures address the controls in the MP family that are implemented within systems and agencies. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of media protection policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the agency level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of agencies. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to media protection policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an agency policy or procedure.

","uuid":"f54e36a0-a675-4235-8488-d0cf6258648a","family":"Media Protection (MP)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.8.MP-1 Policy and Procedures","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.8.MP-1"},{"description":"

Restrict access to digital and non-digital media to authorized individuals.

Discussion: System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state, magnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes paper and microfilm. Denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless the individuals seeking access to such records are authorized healthcare providers is an example of restricting access to non-digital media. Limiting access to the design specifications stored on compact discs in the media library to individuals on the system development team is an example of restricting access to digital media.

","uuid":"acedfe03-8813-4669-8b03-da60a9690448","family":"Media Protection (MP)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.8.MP-2 Media Access ","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.8.MP-2"},{"description":"

a. Physically control and securely store digital and non-digital media within physically secure locations or controlled areas and encrypt CJI on digital media when physical and personnel restrictions are not feasible; and

b. Protect system media types defined in MP-4a until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.

Discussion: System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state, magnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes paper and microfilm. Physically controlling stored media includes conducting inventories, ensuring procedures are in place to allow individuals to check out and return media to the library, and maintaining accountability for stored media. Secure storage includes a locked drawer, desk, or cabinet or a controlled media library. The type of media storage is commensurate with the security category or classification of the information on the media. Controlled areas are spaces that provide physical and procedural controls to meet the requirements established for protecting information and systems. Fewer controls may be needed for media that contains information determined to be in the public domain, publicly releasable, or have limited adverse impacts on agencies, operations, or individuals if accessed by other than authorized personnel. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate protection.

","uuid":"22eca6ba-932e-4cef-b5b0-cd11a752c81e","family":"Media Protection (MP)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.8.MP-4 Media Storage","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.8.MP-4"},{"description":"

Discussion: System media includes digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes flash drives, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external or removable hard disk drives (e.g., solid state and magnetic), compact discs, and digital versatile discs. Non-digital media includes microfilm and paper. Controlled areas are spaces for which agencies provide physical or procedural controls to meet requirements established for protecting information and systems. Controls to protect media during transport include cryptography and locked containers. Cryptographic mechanisms can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending on the mechanisms implemented. Activities associated with media transport include releasing media for transport, ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport processes, and the actual transport. Authorized transport and courier personnel may include individuals external to the agency. Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes restricting transport activities to authorized personnel and tracking and/or obtaining records of transport activities as the media moves through the transportation system to prevent and detect loss, destruction, or tampering. Agencies establish documentation requirements for activities associated with the transport of system media in accordance with agency assessments of risk. Agencies maintain the flexibility to define record-keeping methods for the different types of media transport as part of a system of transport-related records.

","uuid":"09570f92-8e4d-4bcb-9c45-e93c6e614532","family":"Media Protection (MP)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.8.MP-5 Media Transport","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.8.MP-5"},{"description":"

Discussion: Media sanitization applies to all digital and non-digital system media subject to disposal or reuse, whether or not the media is considered removable. Examples include digital media in scanners, copiers, printers, notebook computers, workstations, network components, mobile devices, and non-digital media (e.g., paper and microfilm). The sanitization process removes information from system media such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Sanitization techniques—including clearing, purging, cryptographic erase, de-identification of personally identifiable information, and destruction—prevent the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals when such media is reused or released for disposal. Agencies determine the appropriate sanitization methods, recognizing that destruction is sometimes necessary when other methods cannot be applied to media requiring sanitization.

Agencies use discretion on the employment of approved sanitization techniques and procedures for media that contains information deemed to be in the public domain or publicly releasable or information deemed to have no adverse impact on agencies or individuals if released for reuse or disposal. Sanitization of non-digital media includes destruction, removing a classified appendix from an otherwise unclassified document, or redacting selected sections or words from a document by obscuring the redacted sections or words in a manner equivalent in effectiveness to removing them from the document. NSA standards and policies control the sanitization process for media that contains classified information. NARA policies control the sanitization process for controlled unclassified information.

","uuid":"ed3438bb-f5bd-4812-8802-560ea0c8d35d","family":"Media Protection (MP)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.8.MP-6 Media Sanitization ","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.8.MP-6"},{"description":"

Examples of technical controls: port disabling, access control lists (ACL), security groups, group policy objects (GPO), mobile device management (MDM).

Example of physical control: locked server cage, disconnect CD-ROM drive in PC, remove USB port.

Example of administrative controls: the agency’s electronic media policy defining how flash drives are to be used within the agency rules of behavior.

Discussion: System media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes diskettes, magnetic tapes, flash drives, compact discs, digital versatile discs, and removable hard disk drives. Non-digital media includes paper and microfilm. Media use protections also apply to mobile devices with information storage capabilities. In contrast to MP-2, which restricts user access to media, MP-7 restricts the use of certain types of media on systems, for example, restricting or prohibiting the use of flash drives or external hard disk drives. Agencies use technical and nontechnical controls to restrict the use of system media. Agencies may restrict the use of portable storage devices, for example, by using physical cages on workstations to prohibit access to certain external ports or disabling or removing the ability to insert, read, or write to such devices. Agencies may also limit the use of portable storage devices to only approved devices, including devices provided by the agency, devices provided by other approved agencies, and devices that are not personally owned. Finally, agencies may restrict the use of portable storage devices based on the type of device, such as by prohibiting the use of writeable, portable storage devices and implementing this restriction by disabling or removing the capability to write to such devices. Requiring identifiable owners for storage devices reduces the risk of using such devices by allowing agencies to assign responsibility for addressing known vulnerabilities in the devices.

","uuid":"36b13e02-12e9-49e0-b00f-4a916c500920","family":"Media Protection (MP)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.8.MP-7 Media Use","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.8.MP-7"},{"description":"

1. Organization-level awareness and training policy that:

(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and

(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the awareness and training policy and the associated awareness and training controls;

1. Policy annually and following changes in the information system operating environment, when security incidents occur, or when changes to the CJIS Security Policy are made; and

2. Procedures annually and following changes in the information system operating environment, when security incidents occur, or when changes to the CJIS Security Policy are made.

Discussion: Awareness and training policy and procedures address the controls in the AT family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of awareness and training policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to awareness and training policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

","uuid":"feacd96e-dc96-49fb-b5c1-07758c6876be","family":"Awareness and Training (AT)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.2.AT-1 Policy and Procedures ","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.2.AT-1 "},{"description":"

1. As part of initial training for new users prior to accessing CJI and annually thereafter; and

2. When required by system changes or within 30 days of any security event for individuals involved in the event;

1. Displaying posters

2. Offering supplies inscribed with security and privacy reminders

3. Displaying logon screen messages

4. Generating email advisories or notices from organizational officials

5. Conducting awareness events

Discussion: Organizations provide basic and advanced levels of literacy training to system users, including measures to test the knowledge level of users. Organizations determine the content of literacy training and awareness based on specific organizational requirements, the systems to which personnel have authorized access, and work environments (e.g., telework). The content includes an understanding of the need for security and privacy as well as actions by users to maintain security and personal privacy and to respond to suspected incidents. The content addresses the need for operations security and the handling of personally identifiable information.

Awareness techniques include displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security and privacy reminders, displaying logon screen messages, generating email advisories or notices from organizational officials, and conducting awareness events. Literacy training after the initial training described in AT-2a.1 is conducted at a minimum frequency consistent with applicable laws, directives, regulations, and policies. Subsequent literacy training may be satisfied by one or more short ad hoc sessions and include topical information on recent attack schemes, changes to organizational security and privacy policies, revised security and privacy expectations, or a subset of topics from the initial training. Updating literacy training and awareness content on a regular basis helps to ensure that the content remains relevant. Events that may precipitate an update to literacy training and awareness content include, but are not limited to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.

","uuid":"636386e9-4807-435d-94dc-821ddf4dc57e","family":"Awareness and Training (AT)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.2.AT-2 Literacy Training and Awareness","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.2.AT-2 "},{"description":"

Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.

Discussion: Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can include behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction; attempts to gain access to information not required for job performance; unexplained access to financial resources; bullying or harassment of fellow employees; workplace violence; and other serious violations of policies, procedures, directives, regulations, rules, or practices. Literacy training includes how to communicate the concerns of employees and management regarding potential indicators of insider threat through channels established by the organization and in accordance with established policies and procedures. Organizations may consider tailoring insider threat awareness topics to the role. For example, training for managers may be focused on changes in the behavior of team members, while training for employees may be focused on more general observations.

","uuid":"d8d2c5f9-1b0c-457e-9f77-b28a2ae57948","family":"Awareness and Training (AT)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.2.AT-2(2) Literacy Training and Awareness | Insider Threat ","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.2.AT-2(2)"},{"description":"

Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential and actual instances of social engineering and social mining.

Discussion: Social engineering is an attempt to trick an individual into revealing information or taking an action that can be used to breach, compromise, or otherwise adversely impact a system. Social engineering includes phishing, pretexting, impersonation, baiting, quid pro quo, thread-jacking, social media exploitation, and tailgating. Social mining is an attempt to gather information about the organization that may be used to support future attacks.

Literacy training includes information on how to communicate the concerns of employees and management regarding potential and actual instances of social engineering and data mining through organizational channels based on established policies and procedures.

","uuid":"2f9ef459-0158-478a-a24c-c1a90c361d61","family":"Awareness and Training (AT)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.2.AT-2(3) Literacy Training and Awareness | Social Engineering and Mining ","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.2.AT-2(3) "},{"description":"

Provide all personnel when their unescorted logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CJI with initial and annual training in the employment and operation of personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls.

Discussion: Personally identifiable information processing and transparency controls include the organization’s authority to process personally identifiable information and personally identifiable information processing purposes. Role-based training for federal agencies addresses the types of information that may constitute personally identifiable information and the risks, considerations, and obligations associated with its processing. Such training also considers the authority to process personally identifiable information documented in privacy policies and notices, system of records notices, computer matching agreements and notices, privacy impact assessments, [PRIVACT] statements, contracts, information sharing agreements, memoranda of understanding, and/or other documentation.

","uuid":"ba7666f8-e9cf-4a73-bb11-e550cfb28580","family":"Awareness and Training (AT)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.2.AT-3(5) Role-Based Training | Processing Personally Identifiable Information","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.2.AT-3(5)"},{"description":"

a. Document and monitor information security and privacy training activities, including security and privacy awareness training and specific role-based security and privacy training; and

b. Retain individual training records for a minimum of three years.

Discussion: Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual supervisors at the discretion of the organization. The National Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention for federal agencies. Retention of records for three (3) years accounts for a triennial audit cycle.

","uuid":"62fc8068-8b7d-4690-9a53-914638940bd3","family":"Awareness and Training (AT)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.2.AT-4 Training Records","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.2.AT-4"},{"description":"

An FBI authorized originating agency identifier (ORI) shall be used in each transaction on CJIS systems in order to identify the sending agency and to ensure the proper level of access for each transaction. The original identifier between the requesting agency and the CSA/SIB/Channeler shall be the ORI, and other agency identifiers, such as user identification or personal identifier, an access device mnemonic, or the Internet Protocol (IP) address.

Agencies may act as a servicing agency and perform transactions on behalf of authorized agencies requesting the service. Servicing agencies performing inquiry transactions on behalf of another agency may do so using the requesting agency’s ORI. Servicing agencies may also use their own ORI to perform inquiry transactions on behalf of a requesting agency if the means and procedures are in place to provide an audit trail for the current specified retention period. Because the agency performing the transaction may not necessarily be the same as the agency requesting the transaction, the CSA/SIB/Channeler shall ensure that the ORI for each transaction can be traced, via audit trail, to the specific agency which is requesting the transaction.

Audit trails can be used to identify the requesting agency if there is a reason to inquire into the details surrounding why an agency ran an inquiry on a subject. Agencies assigned a limited access ORI shall not use the full access ORI of another agency to conduct an inquiry transaction.

NOTE: This control will be included in AC-3 Access Enforcement when modernized.

","uuid":"3c08bdd2-8caf-4421-a70d-7e9914f09bc4","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-0 Use of Originating Agency Identifiers in Transactions and Information Exchanges","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-0"},{"description":"

a. Develop, document, and disseminate to authorized personnel:

1. Agency/Entity identification and authentication policy that:

(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and

(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and the associated identification and authentication controls;

b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the identification and authentication policy and procedures; and

c. Review and update the current identification and authentication:

1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and

2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.

DISCUSSION: Identification and authentication policy and procedures address the controls in the IA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of identification and authentication policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to identification and authentication policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

","uuid":"06a13de2-59a9-4501-ae36-cc60040c3865","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-1 Policy and Procedures","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-1"},{"description":"

Uniquely identify and authenticate organizational users and associate that unique identification with processes acting on behalf of those users.

DISCUSSION: Organizations can satisfy the identification and authentication requirements by complying with the requirements in [HSPD 12]. Organizational users include employees or individuals who organizations consider to have an equivalent status to employees (e.g., contractors and guest researchers). Unique identification and authentication of users applies to all accesses other than those that are explicitly identified in AC-14 and that occur through the authorized use of group authenticators without individual authentication. Since processes execute on behalf of groups and roles, organizations may require unique identification of individuals in group accounts or for detailed accountability of individual activity.

Organizations employ passwords, physical authenticators, or biometrics to authenticate user identities or, in the case of multi-factor authentication, some combination thereof. Access to organizational systems is defined as either local access or network access. Local access is any access to organizational systems by users or processes acting on behalf of users, where access is obtained through direct connections without the use of networks. Network access is access to organizational systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) where access is obtained through network connections (i.e., nonlocal accesses). Remote access is a type of network access that involves communication through external networks. Internal networks include local area networks and wide area networks.

The use of encrypted virtual private networks for network connections between organization-controlled endpoints and non-organization-controlled endpoints may be treated as internal networks with respect to protecting the confidentiality and integrity of information traversing the network. Identification and authentication requirements for non-organizational users are described in IA-8.

","uuid":"f9931219-f9d5-4b28-bafe-c6fa2634729f","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) ","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-2"},{"description":"

Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts.

DISCUSSION: Multi-factor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The authentication factors are defined as follows: something you know (e.g., a personal identification number [PIN]), something you have (e.g., a physical authenticator such as a cryptographic private key), or something you are (e.g., a biometric). Multi-factor authentication solutions that feature physical authenticators include hardware authenticators that provide time-based or challenge-response outputs and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card or the Department of Defense (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC). In addition to authenticating users at the system level (i.e., at logon), organizations may employ authentication mechanisms at the application level, at their discretion, to provide increased security. Regardless of the type of access (i.e., local, network, remote), privileged accounts are authenticated using multi-factor options appropriate for the level of risk. Organizations can add additional security measures, such as additional or more rigorous authentication mechanisms, for specific types of access.

","uuid":"90bb97b0-9270-49fa-8e6c-72ce917c5299","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-2(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-2(1)"},{"description":"

Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts.

DISCUSSION: Multi-factor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The authentication factors are defined as follows: something you know (e.g., a personal identification number [PIN]), something you have (e.g., a physical authenticator such as a cryptographic private key), or something you are (e.g., a biometric). Multi-factor authentication solutions that feature physical authenticators include hardware authenticators that provide time-based or challenge-response outputs and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card or the DoD Common Access Card. In addition to authenticating users at the system level, organizations may also employ authentication mechanisms at the application level, at their discretion, to provide increased information security. Regardless of the type of access (i.e., local, network, remote), non-privileged accounts are authenticated using multi-factor options appropriate for the level of risk. Organizations can provide additional security measures, such as additional or more rigorous authentication mechanisms, for specific types of access.

","uuid":"e3aaec8e-92b6-4279-8fe6-b938625ae3ac","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-2(2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-2(2)"},{"description":"

testImplement replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for access to privileged and non-privileged accounts.

DISCUSSION: Authentication processes resist replay attacks if it is impractical to achieve successful authentications by replaying previous authentication messages. Replay-resistant techniques include protocols that use nonces or challenges such as time synchronous or cryptographic authenticators

","uuid":"2e72bfc4-f7f4-4f37-8b1c-461701c9d63f","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-2(8) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCESS TO ACCOUNTS — REPLAY RESISTANT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-2(8)"},{"description":"

Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials.

DISCUSSION: Acceptance of Personal Identity Verification (PIV)-compliant credentials applies to organizations implementing logical access control and physical access control systems. PIV-compliant credentials are those credentials issued by federal agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidance documents. The adequacy and reliability of PIV card issuers are authorized using [SP 800-79-2]. Acceptance of PIV-compliant credentials includes derived PIV credentials, the use of which is addressed in [SP 800-166]. The DOD Common Access Card (CAC) is an example of a PIV credential

","uuid":"951e16fd-b349-4cdb-a264-73abddfb2362","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-2(12) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-2(12)"},{"description":"

Uniquely identify and authenticate agency-managed devices before establishing network connections. In the instance of local connection, the device must be approved by the agency and the device must be identified and authenticated prior to connection to an agency asset.

DISCUSSION: Devices that require unique device-to-device identification and authentication are defined by type, device, or a combination of type and device. Organization-defined device types include devices that are not owned by the organization. Systems use shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC], Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification or organizational authentication solutions (e.g., Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol [EAP], RADIUS server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to identify and authenticate devices on local and wide area networks. Organizations determine the required strength of authentication mechanisms based on the security categories of systems and mission or business requirements. Because of the challenges of implementing device authentication on a large scale, organizations can restrict the application of the control to a limited number/type of devices based on mission or business needs.

","uuid":"4a68f347-62f2-41d6-a6f9-8064a78ed450","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-3 DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-3"},{"description":"

Manage system identifiers by:

a. Receiving authorization from organizational personnel with identifier management responsibilities to assign an individual, group, role, service, or device identifier;

b. Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, service, or device;

c. Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, service, or device; and

d. Preventing reuse of identifiers for one (1) year.

DISCUSSION: Common device identifiers include Media Access Control (MAC) addresses, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. The management of individual identifiers is not applicable to shared system accounts. Typically, individual identifiers are the usernames of the system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the account management activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4. Identifier management also addresses individual identifiers not necessarily associated with system accounts. Preventing the reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used individual, group, role, service, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, services, or devices

","uuid":"acf28c37-6588-4006-9033-22eae07f2dd0","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-4 IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-4"},{"description":"

Manage individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as agency or nonagency.

DISCUSSION: Characteristics that identify the status of individuals include contractors, foreign nationals, and non-organizational users. Identifying the status of individuals by these characteristics provides additional information about the people with whom organizational personnel are communicating. For example, it might be useful for a government employee to know that one of the individuals on an email message is a contractor.

","uuid":"2c66a8c1-d0bd-42c3-a7ec-99f0f422f8da","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-4(4) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-4(4)"},{"description":"

Control:
Manage system authenticators by:

a. Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, service, or device receiving the authenticator;

b. Establishing initial authenticator content for any authenticators issued by the organization;

c. Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;

d. Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost or compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;

e. Changing default authenticators prior to first use;

f. Changing or refreshing authenticators annually or when there is evidence of authenticator compromise;

g. Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;

h. Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific controls to protect authenticators; and

i. Changing authenticators for group or role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.

j. AAL2 Specific Requirements3

Control:

All credential service providers (CSPs) authenticating claimants at Authenticator Assurance Level 2 (AAL2) SHALL be assessed on the following criteria:

(1) Authentication SHALL occur by the use of either a multi-factor authenticator or a combination of two single-factor authenticators.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: A multi-factor authenticator requires two factors to execute a single authentication event, such as a cryptographically- secure device with an integrated biometric sensor that is required to activate the device. Nine different authenticator types are recognized, representing something you know (a memorized secret), something you have (a physical authenticator), or combinations of physical authenticators with either memorized secrets or biometric modalities (something you are). Multi-factor (MF) authentication is required at AAL2. MF authentication at AAL2 may be performed using the following AAL2 permitted authenticator types: MF OTP Device, MF Crypto Software, or MF Crypto Device; or a memorized secret used in combination with the following permitted single-factor authenticators: Look-Up Secret, Out-of-Band authenticator, SF OTP Device, SF Crypto Software, or SF Crypto Device.

(2) If the multi-factor authentication process uses a combination of two single-factor authenticators, then it SHALL include a Memorized Secret authenticator and a possession-based authenticator.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Multifactor authentication requires the use of two different authentication factors. See IA-5 j (1) for permitted authenticator types at AAL2.

(3) Cryptographic authenticators used at AAL2 SHALL use approved cryptography.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Cryptography is considered approved if it is specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation. Since verifiers and cryptographic authenticators must use the same algorithms to successfully authenticate, assessment of the verifier also assesses the authenticators that may be used.

(4) At least one authenticator used at AAL2 SHALL be replay resistant.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Replay resistance is a characteristic of most, although not all, physical authenticators. A given output of the authenticator is required to be accepted for only one authentication transaction. For example, the output of a time-based OTP device or an out-of-band device is considered replay resistant if it can only be used for at most one authentication transaction during its validity period. If it can be used for more than one during this period, it is not replay resistant.

(5) Communication between the claimant and verifier SHALL be via an authenticated protected channel.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Communication between claimant or user and verifier or agency is required to be via an encrypted channel that authenticates the verifier to provide confidentiality of the authenticator output and resistance to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. This is typically accomplished using the Transport Level Security (TLS) protocol. Mutual authentication of the communication channel is not required unless that is part of the process of authenticating the claimant. Accordingly, the verifier is only responsible the use of an appropriately secure communications protocol.

(6) Verifiers operated by government agencies at AAL2 SHALL be validated to meet the requirements of FIPS 140 Level 1.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Verifiers operated by or on behalf of government agencies are required to be validated to meet FIPS 140 requirements. The FIPS 140 requirements generally apply to cryptographic modules (both hardware and software).

(7) Authenticators procured by government agencies SHALL be validated to meet the requirements of FIPS 140 Level 1.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The FIPS 140 requirements generally apply to cryptographic modules (both hardware and software). While authenticators are not directly the responsibility of the CSP (particularly in the case of bring- your-own authenticators), the CSP is still responsible for ensuring that a sufficiently strong and FIPS 140 validated authenticator is being used. Binding of CSP-supplied authenticators that are known to meet validation criteria is sufficient.

(8) If a device such as a smartphone is used in the authentication process, then the unlocking of that device (typically done using a PIN or biometric) SHALL NOT be considered one of the authentication factors.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement applies to multi-factor authenticators resident on a smartphone or similar device; single-factor authenticators on such devices would only provide a single (physical) authentication factor. Unlocking of a device such as a smartphone may be done for any number of reasons unrelated to authentication, and such devices are normally in an unlocked state for a period of time thereafter. Human action such as entry of a memorized secret or presentation of a biometric factor needs to be provided that is directly associated with the authentication event. Generally, it is not possible for a verifier to know that the device had been locked or if the unlock process met the requirements for the relevant authenticator type.

(9) If a biometric factor is used in authentication at AAL2, then the performance requirements stated in IA-5 m Biometric Requirements SHALL be met.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Detailed conformance criteria applicable to the use of biometrics are contained in section IA-5 m Biometric Requirements. Since verification of biometric factors is not deterministic due to measurement errors in collection of the biometric information, evaluation of performance, and, most importantly, false accept rate, is important to ensure security of the authentication process.

(10) Reauthentication of the subscriber SHALL be repeated at least once per 12 hours during an extended usage session.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Reauthentication is required to mitigate the risks associated with an authenticated endpoint that has been abandoned by the subscriber or has been misappropriated by an attacker while authenticated. At AAL2, providing a memorized secret or biometric factor is sufficient for reauthentication prior to the expiration time.

(11) Reauthentication of the subscriber SHALL be repeated following any period of inactivity lasting 30 minutes or longer.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Reauthentication is required to mitigate the risks associated with an authenticated endpoint that has been abandoned by the subscriber or has been misappropriated by an attacker while authenticated. At AAL2, providing a memorized secret or biometric factor is sufficient for reauthentication prior to the expiration time.

(12) The CSP SHALL employ appropriately tailored security controls from the moderate baseline of security controls defined in the CJISSECPOL.

The CSP SHALL ensure that the minimum assurance-related controls for moderate-impact systems are satisfied.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: NIST SP 800-53 provides a comprehensive catalog of controls, three security control baselines (low, moderate, and high impact), and guidance for tailoring the appropriate baseline to specific needs and risk environments for federal information systems. These controls are the operational, technical, and management safeguards to maintain the integrity, confidentiality, and security of federal information

systems and are intended to be used in conjunction with the NIST risk management framework outlined in SP 800-37 and SP 800-63-3 section 5 Digital Identity Risk Management. NIST SP 800-53 presents security control baselines determined by the security categorization of the information system (low, moderate or high) from NIST FIPS 199 Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems. For IAL2, the moderate baseline controls (see https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/impact/moderate) may be considered the starting point for the selection, enhancement, and tailoring of the security controls presented. Guidance on tailoring the control baselines to best meet the organization’s risk environment, systems and operations is presented in SP 800- 53 section 3.2. Tailoring Baseline Security Controls.

While SP 800-53 and other NIST Special Publications in the SP-800-XXX series apply to federal agencies for the implementation of the Federal information Security Management Act (FISMA), non-federal entities providing services for federal information services also are subject to FISMA and should similarly use SP 800-53 and associated publications for appropriate controls. Non-federal entities may be subject to and conformant with other applicable controls systems and processes for information system security (e.g., FEDRAMP, ISO/IEC 27001). SP-63A allows the application of equivalent controls from such standards and processes to meet conformance with this criterion.

(13) The CSP SHALL comply with records retention policies in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: It is recommended that CSPs document any specific retention policies they are subject to, in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, or policies, including any National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) records retention schedules that may apply.

The CSP is responsible for the proper handling, protection, and retention or disposal of any sensitive data it collects, even after it ceases to provide identity proofing and enrollment services. A CSP may document its policies and procedures for the management of the data is collects in a data handling plan or other document.

(14) If the CSP opts to retain records in the absence of any mandatory requirements, then the CSP SHALL conduct a risk management process, including assessments of privacy and security risks to determine how long records should be retained and SHALL inform subscribers of that retention policy.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This is a conditional requirement and depends on the basis for CSP records retention. Absent clear jurisdictional requirements, risk management processes, including privacy and security risk assessment, need to be performed for records retention decisions. The records retention duration is required to be derived from a risk-based decision process.

k. Privacy requirements that apply to all CSPs, verifiers, and RPs.3

(1) The CSP SHALL employ appropriately tailored privacy controls from the CJISSECPOL.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement establishes overall privacy posture of the CSP.

(2) If the CSP processes attributes for purposes other than identity proofing, authentication, or attribute assertions (collectively “identity service”), related fraud mitigation, or to comply with law or legal process, then the CSP SHALL implement measures to maintain predictability and manageability commensurate with the associated privacy risk.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Predictability and manageability measures include providing clear notice, obtaining subscriber consent, and enabling selective use or disclosure of attributes. Predictability is meant to build trust and provide accountability and requires full understanding (and disclosure) of how the attribute information will be used. Manageability also builds trust by demonstrating a CSPs ability to control attribute information throughout processing – collection, maintenance, retention.

l. General requirements applicable to AAL2 authentication process.3

(1) CSPs SHALL provide subscriber instructions on how to appropriately protect a physical authenticator against theft or loss.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Instruction should address aspects of protecting the specific type of authenticator being used.

(2) The CSP SHALL provide a mechanism to revoke or suspend the authenticator immediately upon notification from subscriber that loss or theft of the authenticator is suspected.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The CSP needs to have a documented procedure to allow subscribers to report lost or stolen physical authenticators, and to revoke or suspend such authenticators promptly when reported. Subscribers need to be instructed (see GEN-1) the procedure for reporting loss or theft.

(3) If required by the authenticator type descriptions in IA-5(1), then the verifier SHALL implement controls to protect against online guessing attacks.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Throttling or rate limiting is key to resistance against online guessing attacks. This is generally required for memorized secrets or when the authenticator output of a look-up secret, OOB, or OTP authenticator may have less than 64 bits of entropy.

(4) If required by the authenticator type descriptions in IA-5(1) and the description of a given authenticator does not specify otherwise, then the verifier SHALL limit consecutive failed authentication attempts on a single account to no more than 100.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Throttling or rate limiting is key to resistance against online guessing attacks. It is important that it be implemented in a non-abrupt manner as described in the specification so that it is not usable as a denial-of-service mechanism by an attacker. Additional techniques MAY be used to reduce the likelihood that an attacker will lock the legitimate claimant out as a result of rate limiting. These include:

• Requiring the claimant to complete a CAPTCHA before attempting authentication.

• Requiring the claimant to wait following a failed attempt for a period of time that increases as the account approaches its maximum allowance for consecutive failed attempts (e.g., 30 seconds up to an hour).

• Accepting only authentication requests that come from a white list of IP addresses from which the subscriber has been successfully authenticated before. Leveraging other risk-based or adaptive authentication techniques to identify user behavior that falls within, or out of, typical norms. These might, for example, include use of IP address, geolocation, timing of request patterns, or browser metadata.

(5) If signed attestations are used, then they SHALL be signed using a digital signature that provides at least the minimum security strength specified in the latest revision of 112 bits as of the date of this publication.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Attestations are sometimes provided by cryptographic authenticators to securely indicate their capabilities, e.g., that they are hardware-based or that they have characteristics such as two-factor capability. For the attestations to be useful, these signatures need to use algorithms and keys that are sufficiently strong.

(6) If the verifier and CSP are separate entities (as shown by the dotted line in Figure 8 Digital Identity Model), then communications between the verifier and CSP SHALL occur through a mutually-authenticated secure channel (such as a client-authenticated TLS connection).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In cases where the verifier and CSP are separate, it is important that this not create additional security vulnerabilities as compared with an integrated verifier/CSP combination. This requirement ensures that there is not an opportunity to perform eavesdropping or active attacks on the channel between them.

Figure 8 – Digital Identity Model

(7) If the CSP provides the subscriber with a means to report loss, theft, or damage to an authenticator using a backup or alternate authenticator, then that authenticator SHALL be either a memorized secret or a physical authenticator.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: It is important that the loss of control of an authenticator be quickly reported to the CSP. To balance between the need to easily and promptly report this and the risk of a fraudulent report, a backup authenticator, either a memorized secret or physical authenticator, should be usable by the subscriber to make this report. Only a single, single-factor authenticator is required.

(8) If the CSP chooses to verify an address of record (i.e., email, telephone, postal) and suspend authenticator(s) reported to have been compromised, then...The suspension SHALL be reversible if the subscriber successfully authenticates to the CSP using a valid (i.e., not suspended) authenticator and requests reactivation of an authenticator suspended in this manner.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Reversibility of suspension is intended to minimize the impact of inadvertent loss reports from the subscriber and in some cases from an attacker who may be attempting to deny service to the subscriber.

(9) If and when an authenticator expires, it SHALL NOT be usable for authentication.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Expiration is used by some CSPs to limit the security exposure from an authenticator that is lost but the loss has not been detected/reported and revoked.

(10) The CSP SHALL have a documented process to require subscribers to surrender or report the loss of any physical authenticator containing attribute certificates signed by the CSP as soon as practical after expiration or receipt of a renewed authenticator.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The requirement for surrender or destruction of expired authenticators minimizes the possibility that authentication with an expired authenticator will be attempted. PKI-based authenticators that are collected or known to be destroyed also do not need to be included in certificate revocation lists.

(11) CSPs SHALL revoke the binding of authenticators immediately upon notification when an online identity ceases to exist (e.g., subscriber’s death, discovery of a fraudulent subscriber), when requested by the subscriber, or when the CSP determines that the subscriber no longer meets its eligibility requirements.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Prompt revocation ensures that unauthorized parties are not able to use the authenticator to make unauthorized access to the subscriber account. Revocation at subscriber request can affect only a single authenticator; the other classes of revocation generally affect all authenticators associated with the subscriber’s account.

(12) The CSP SHALL have a documented process to require subscribers to surrender or report the loss of any physical authenticator containing certified attributes signed by the CSP within five (5) days after revocation or termination takes place.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement blocks the use of the authenticator’s certified attributes in offline situations between revocation/termination and expiration of the certification. Prompt revocation ensures that unauthorized parties are not able to use the authenticator to make unauthorized access to the subscriber account. Collection or destruction also minimizes the dependence on (and growth of) certificate revocation lists, which are not always 100% effective in accomplishing revocation, particularly in offline situations.

m. Biometric Requirements3

(1) Biometrics SHALL be used only as part of multi-factor authentication with a physical authenticator (something you have).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: For a variety of reasons listed here, a biometric factor is not considered to be an authenticator by itself. The risks associated with biometric factors are largely mitigated by binding the biometric with a specific physical authenticator.

• The biometric False Match Rate (FMR) does not provide confidence in the authentication of the subscriber by itself. In addition, FMR does not account for spoofing attacks.

• Biometric comparison is probabilistic, whereas the other authentication factors are deterministic.

• Biometric template protection schemes provide a method for revoking biometric credentials that is comparable to other authentication factors (e.g., PKI certificates and passwords). However, the availability of such solutions is limited, and standards for testing these methods are under development.

• Biometric characteristics do not constitute secrets. They can be obtained online or by taking a picture of someone with a camera phone (e.g., facial images) with or without their knowledge, lifted from objects someone touches (e.g., latent fingerprints), or captured with high resolution images (e.g., iris patterns). While presentation attack detection (PAD) technologies (e.g., liveness detection) can mitigate the risk of these types of attacks, additional trust in the sensor or biometric processing is required to ensure that PAD is operating in accordance with the needs of the CSP and the subscriber.

(2) An authenticated protected channel between sensor (or an endpoint containing a sensor that resists sensor replacement) and verifier SHALL be established.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement ensures that biometric data that flows across the network to the verifier is protected from disclosure and that an attacker cannot substitute a “skimmer” or other fraudulent replacement for the biometric sensor. If the biometric factor is verified directly on a multi-factor authenticator and the sensor is tightly integrated with it, that local connection does not require an authenticated protected channel.

(3) The sensor or endpoint SHALL be authenticated prior to capturing the biometric sample from the claimant.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement ensures that the biometric data being verified is obtained from the expected sensor rather than from a device that may be spoofing biometric information. This is generally not required when the biometric factor is verified in an endpoint that is tightly integrated with the sensor in a manner that resists sensor replacement.

(4) The biometric system SHALL operate with an FMR [ISO/IEC 2382-37] of 1 in 1000 or better. This FMR SHALL be achieved under conditions of a conformant attack (i.e., zero-effort impostor attempt) as defined in [ISO/IEC 30107-1].

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Since biometric comparison is an approximate match, an operating point threshold is chosen by the verifier that balances false matches and false non-matches. To operate adequately as a verifier, a 1 in 1000 or better false match rate is required.

(5) The biometric system SHALL allow no more than 5 consecutive failed authentication attempts or 10 consecutive failed attempts if PAD demonstrating at least 90% resistance to presentation attacks is implemented.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: With a false accept rate of as much as 1 in 1000 zero-effort attempts, the ability to make a large number of biometric authentication attempts would result in an unacceptably high probability of mis-authentication. This limit is comparable to that provided by several commercial products (mobile devices) currently on the market.

(6) Once the limit on authentication failures has been reached, the biometric authenticator SHALL either:

i. Impose a delay of at least 30 seconds before the next attempt, increasing exponentially with each successive attempt, or

ii. disable the biometric user authentication and offer another factor (e.g., a different biometric modality or a PIN/Passcode if it is not already a required factor) if such an alternative method is already available.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Following a number of consecutive biometric match failures that exceeds the limit in IA-5 m (5), subsequent attempts need to be either aggressively delayed (e.g., 1 minute before the following failed attempt, 2 minutes before the second following attempt) or another authentication or biometric modality associated with the same physical authenticator needs to be used.

(7) The verifier SHALL make a determination of sensor and endpoint performance, integrity, and authenticity.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The verifier needs to have a basis for determining that biometric verification meets the necessary performance requirements. This may be accomplished by authenticating the sensor or endpoint, by a certification by an approved accreditation authority, or by runtime interrogation of a signed attestation.

(8) If biometric comparison is performed centrally, then use of the biometric as an authentication factor SHALL be limited to one or more specific devices that are identified using approved cryptography.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The ability to use a biometric factor on an arbitrary device greatly increases the value of breached biometric data. For this reason, the use of the biometric factor is limited to specific devices for each subscriber. A separate key is required since the main authentication key is only unlocked upon successful comparison of the biometric factor.

(9) If biometric comparison is performed centrally, then a separate key SHALL be used for identifying the device.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Since the main authentication key has not yet been unlocked, a separate key is required for identifying the specific device(s) that the biometric may be used with.

(10) If biometric comparison is performed centrally, then biometric revocation, referred to as biometric template protection in ISO/IEC 24745, SHALL be implemented.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Central databases of biometric templates are an attractive target for attackers. The ability to securely revoke biometric factors is required in response to that threat.

(11) If biometric comparison is performed centrally, all transmission of biometrics SHALL be over the authenticated protected channel.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Because of the replay potential of biometric data, biometric information needs to be distributed in a manner that minimizes the opportunity for attackers to intercept the data either by eavesdropping on MitM attacks.

(12) Biometric samples and any biometric data derived from the biometric sample such as a probe produced through signal processing SHALL be zeroized immediately after any training or research data has been derived

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: If the biometric factor is used for any supplemental purpose, it is important that it not be a mechanism for breach of subscribers’ biometric data.

n. Authenticator binding refers to the establishment of an association between a specific authenticator and a subscriber’s account, enabling the authenticator to be used — possibly in conjunction with other authenticators — to authenticate for that account.3

(1) Authenticators SHALL be bound to subscriber accounts by either issuance by the CSP as part of enrollment or associating a subscriber-provided authenticator that is acceptable to the CSP.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In the past, many physical authenticators were provided by the CSP. More recently, there has been a trend toward BYO authenticators, which can be both cost-effective for CSPs and convenient for the subscriber. This requirement ensures that such BYO authenticators are subject to approval by the CSP, primarily to ensure that they meet security requirements.

(2) Throughout the digital identity lifecycle, CSPs SHALL maintain a record of all authenticators that are or have been associated with each identity.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to authenticate subscribers successfully, the CSP needs to maintain a record of authenticators bound to each subscriber’s account. In addition, a record of authenticators formerly bound to each account needs to be kept for forensic purposes.

(3) The CSP or verifier SHALL maintain the information required for throttling authentication attempts.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to successfully support the throttling of authentication attempts (see requirement IA-5 l (3)), the CSP needs to maintain information on the number of consecutive failed authentication attempts.

(4) The CSP SHALL also verify the type of user-provided authenticator so verifiers can determine compliance with requirements at each AAL.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to determine compliance with AAL-specific requirements, the CSP needs to reliably determine some authenticator characteristics, such as whether the authenticator is hardware-based, whether it is a single-factor or multi-factor authenticator, and performance characteristics of associated biometric sensors. Mechanisms to do this include attestation certificates from the manufacturer and examination of the authenticator (particularly at account issuance). In the absence of this information, the CSP needs to assume that the authenticator is the weakest type that is consistent with the authentication protocol being used.

(5) The record created by the CSP SHALL contain the date and time the authenticator was bound to the account.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: For forensic purposes it is useful to have a record of the period of time each authenticator is bound to the subscriber’s account.

(6) When any new authenticator is bound to a subscriber account, the CSP SHALL ensure that the binding protocol and the protocol for provisioning the associated key(s) are done at AAL2.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: If the process of binding an authenticator is not strong enough, an authenticator that is fraudulently bound to the account could be used by an attacker to gain access to a subscriber’s account. The authentication factor being bound to the account needs to be included in the authentication process for the session in which the authenticator is bound.

(7) Protocols for key provisioning SHALL use authenticated protected channels or be performed in person to protect against MitM attacks.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: For the same reasons that MitM attacks are of concern during authentication, they could occur during provisioning, which could result in the binding of an attacker’s key to the account rather than the subscriber’s key.

(8) Binding of multi-factor authenticators SHALL require multi-factor authentication (or equivalent) at identity proofing.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to prevent a subscriber with only single-factor authentication from up-leveling to multi-factor, binding of a multi-factor authenticator requires that the subscriber be multi-factor authenticated at the time the new authenticator is bound

(9) At enrollment, the CSP SHALL bind at least one, and SHOULD bind at least two, physical (something you have) authenticators to the subscriber’s online identity, in addition to a memorized secret or one or more biometrics.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Executive order 13681 requires the use of multi-factor authentication for the release of personal data. Therefore, it is important that the CSP associate sufficient authentication factors at enrollment to make this possible. While all identifying information is self-asserted at IAL1, preservation of online material or an online reputation makes it undesirable to lose control of an account due to the loss of an authenticator. The second authenticator makes it possible to securely recover from an authenticator loss. For this reason, a CSP SHOULD bind at least two physical authenticators to the subscriber’s credential at IAL1 as well.

(10) At enrollment, authenticators at AAL2 and IAL2 SHALL be bound to the account.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to support higher identity assurance, correspondingly high authenticator assurance levels are required to ensure the proper use of the identity.

(11) If enrollment and binding are being done remotely and cannot be completed in a single electronic transaction, then the applicant SHALL identify themselves in each new binding transaction by presenting a temporary secret which was either established during a prior transaction, or sent to the applicant’s phone number, email address, or postal address of record.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The issuance or binding of authenticators may occur well after the enrollment process, following adjudication and eligibility determinations. It is necessary to securely associate the applicant that appears for identity proofing with the person appearing for authenticator issuance/binding in order to avoid mis-issuance of authenticators. At this point it is not possible to fully authenticate the applicant, but the use of a temporary secret provides the necessary protection for this one-time transaction.

(12) If enrollment and binding are being done remotely and cannot be completed in a single electronic transaction, then long-term authenticator secrets are delivered to the applicant within a protected session.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Long-term secrets need to be protected against disclosure while they are sent to the applicant. This applies primarily to symmetric keys, such as for OTP authenticators, that are sent to the applicant by the CSP. “Protected session” in this context refers to an authenticated protected.

(13) If enrollment and binding are being done in person and cannot be completed in a single physical encounter, the applicant SHALL identify themselves in person by either using a secret as described in IA-5 n (12) above, or through use of a biometric that was recorded during a prior encounter.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The issuance or binding of authenticators may occur well after the enrollment process, following adjudication and eligibility determinations. It is necessary to securely associate the applicant that appears for identity proofing with the person appearing for authenticator issuance/binding in order to avoid mis-issuance of authenticators. At this point it is not possible to fully authenticate the applicant, but the use of a temporary secret provides the necessary protection for this one-time transaction.

(14) If enrollment and binding are being done in person and cannot be completed in a single physical encounter, temporary secrets SHALL NOT be reused.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The issuance or binding of authenticators may occur well after the enrollment process, following adjudication and eligibility determinations. It is necessary to securely associate the applicant that appears for identity proofing with the person appearing for authenticator issuance/binding in order to avoid mis-issuance of authenticators. A new secret for this purpose is required for each subsequent encounter.

(15) If enrollment and binding are being done in person and cannot be completed in a single physical encounter and the CSP issues long-term authenticator secrets during a physical transaction, they SHALL be loaded locally onto a physical device that is issued in person to the applicant or delivered in a manner that confirms the address of record.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: To avoid misappropriation of long-term authenticator secrets at enrollment, the CSP is required to load the secrets onto authenticators directly, or deliver them to the new subscriber in a manner that confirms the address of record, typically by sending a short-term secret to that address that the new subscriber uses to obtain the long-term secret.

(16) Before adding a new authenticator to a subscriber’s account, the CSP SHALL first require the subscriber to authenticate at AAL2 (or a higher AAL) at which the new authenticator will be used.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to maintain the significance of AALs and prevent attackers from leveraging lower AAL authentication to gain access to higher AAL resources, subscribers binding additional authenticators need to do so at the maximum AAL at which they will be used.

(17) If the subscriber’s account has only one authentication factor bound to it, the CSP SHALL require the subscriber to authenticate at AAL1 in order to bind an additional authenticator of a different authentication factor.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This is a special-case, one-time only exception to IA-5 n 17 to allow a single-factor account not subject to identity proofing (IAL1) to be upgraded to a multi-factor account. This provides a mechanism for such accounts to increase their authentication security.

(18) If a subscriber loses all authenticators of a factor necessary to complete multi-factor authentication and has been identity proofed at IAL2, that subscriber SHALL repeat the identity proofing process described in IA-12.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Repeating the identity proofing process is an onerous requirement when a subscriber is no longer able to complete multi- factor authentication, but it is necessary to avoid the security problems typically present in “account recovery” situations. This is the primary reason that the binding of multiple authenticators is recommended, particularly in the case of physical authenticators. The entire identity proofing process need not be repeated if the CSP has maintained enough records of the evidence presented to repeat the verification phase of identity proofing.

(19) If a subscriber loses all authenticators of a factor necessary to complete multi-factor authentication and has been identity proofed at IAL2 or IAL3, the CSP SHALL require the claimant to authenticate using an authenticator of the remaining factor, if any, to confirm binding to the existing identity.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: While use of an authenticator at a different factor is only a single authentication factor (and therefore only AAL1), authentication in conjunction with the repeated identity proofing process provides assurance that the claimant is who they claim to be.

(20) If the CSP opts to allow binding of a new memorized secret with the use of two physical authenticators, then it requires entry of a confirmation code sent to an address of record.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Loss of a memorized secret is different from the loss of a physical authenticator because it is not mitigated by the binding of multiple authenticators. This alternate method of associating a new memorized secret may be used by CSPs to avoid the need for repeating identity proofing (Refer to IA-12).

(21) If the CSP opts to allow binding of a new memorized secret with the use of two physical authenticators, then the confirmation code SHALL consist of at least 6 random alphanumeric characters generated by an approved random bit generator [SP 800-90Ar1].

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The confirmation code is required to have sufficient entropy and to be generated in a manner that cannot be predicted by an attacker.

(22) If the CSP opts to allow binding of a new memorized secret with the use of two physical authenticators, then the confirmation code SHALL be valid for a maximum of 7 days but MAY be made valid up to 21 days via an exception process to accommodate addresses outside the direct reach of the U.S. Postal Service. Confirmation codes sent by means other than physical mail SHALL be valid for a maximum of 5 minutes.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The confirmation code has a limited lifetime to mitigate the risk of loss or misappropriation in transit.

o. Session Management: The following requirements apply to applications where a session is maintained between the subscriber and relying party to allow multiple interactions without repeating the authentication event each time.3

Once an authentication event has taken place, it is often desirable to allow the subscriber to continue using the application across multiple subsequent interactions without requiring them to repeat the authentication event. This requirement is particularly true for federation scenarios where the authentication event necessarily involves several components and parties coordinating across a network.

(1) Session Binding Requirements: A session occurs between the software that a subscriber is running — such as a browser, application, or operating system (i.e., the session subject) — and the RP or CSP that the subscriber is accessing (i.e., the session host).

a. A session is maintained by a session secret which SHALL be shared between the subscriber’s software and the service being accessed.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This secret binds the two ends of the session, allowing the subscriber to continue using the service over time.

b. The secret SHALL be presented directly by the subscriber’s software or possession of the secret SHALL be proven using a cryptographic mechanism.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The session secret is considered a short-term secret, so direct presentation of a shared secret is permitted, even at AAL2 or AAL3.

c. The secret used for session binding SHALL be generated by the session host in direct response to an authentication event.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The session secret needs to be directly associated with authentication so that it isn’t inadvertently provided to the wrong session.

d. A session SHALL NOT be considered at a higher AAL than the authentication event.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Each session has an associated maximum AAL at which it can be used that is derived from the authentication AAL; this is associated with the session and its secret by the CSP/RP.

e. Secrets used for session binding SHALL be generated by the session host during an interaction, typically immediately following authentication.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: It is the responsibility of the host (RP/CSP/Verifier) to generate session secrets, not the subscriber.

f. Secrets used for session binding SHALL be generated by an approved random bit generator [SP 800-90Ar1].

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The use of a high-quality random bit generator is important to ensure that an attacker cannot guess the session secret.

g. Secrets used for session binding SHALL contain at least 64 bits of entropy.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The use of a high-quality random bit generator is important to ensure that an attacker cannot guess the session secret.

h. Secrets used for session binding SHALL be erased or invalidated by the session subject when the subscriber logs out.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: At a minimum, the CSP/RP needs to ensure that the session secret can no longer to be used following logout. If possible, the secret should be erased on the subscriber endpoint as well.

i. Secrets used for session binding SHALL be sent to and received from the device using an authenticated protected channel.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Session secrets, particularly when directly presented, need to be protected against eavesdropping and MitM attacks. This is typically accomplished using the Transport Level Security (TLS) protocol.

j. Secrets used for session binding SHALL time out and not be accepted after the times specified in IA-5 j (13) as appropriate for the AAL.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement is in support of the reauthentication requirements in AAL2-*, AAL3-*, and REAUTH-*. The proper way to ensure that a session is logged out is to invalidate the session secrets associated with that session. A new session secret will need to be generated and associated with any session that is about to be established from the same endpoint.

k. Secrets used for session binding SHALL NOT be available to insecure communications between the host and subscriber’s endpoint.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: User endpoints such as browsers that support both secure and insecure communications typically have mechanisms to flag information (e.g., cookies) that are only available to secure sessions. These mechanisms are required to be used for session management secrets. See also IA-5 o (7).

l. Authenticated sessions SHALL NOT fall back to an insecure transport, such as from https to http, following authentication.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In some cases, endpoints supporting https provide, primary for legacy purposes, the ability to connect via http as well. If not done properly, this can make the site vulnerable to a “downgrade attack” where a session switches from https to http. This must not happen for authenticated sessions. If session secrets are managed properly, this downgrade interferes with the continuity of the session.

m. URLs or POST content SHALL contain a session identifier that SHALL be verified by the RP to ensure that actions taken outside the session do not affect the protected session.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Unique session identifiers in the URL or POST content are used to ensure that sessions are not vulnerable to cross-site request forgery (CSRF). Note that the session identifier is separate and different from the session secret; under no circumstances should the session secret be included in a URL.

n. Browser cookies SHALL be tagged to be accessible only on secure (HTTPS) sessions.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Browser cookies have an optional “secure” flag to ensure that they are not accidentally transmitted over a non-secure channel. This flag must be set for session secrets.

o. Browser cookies SHALL be accessible to the minimum practical set of hostnames and paths.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Browser cookies have a scope parameter that limits the sites from to which the cookie can be sent; this should be specified as specifically as possible to limit access to the session secret as narrowly as practical.

p. Expiration of browser cookies SHALL NOT be depended upon to enforce session timeouts.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: While browser cookies have an expiration time, enforcement of session timeouts must occur at the RP/CSP and not at the user endpoint. Cookie expiration may, however, be used to limit accumulation of cookies in the browser.

q. The presence of an OAuth access token SHALL NOT be interpreted by the RP as presence of the subscriber, in the absence of other signals.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Access tokens, used in federated identity systems, may be valid after the authentication session has ended and the subscriber has left.

(2) Reauthentication Requirements

a. Continuity of authenticated sessions SHALL be based upon the possession of a session secret issued by the verifier at the time of authentication and optionally refreshed during the session.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This is a reiteration of requirement IA-5 o (1).

b. Session secrets SHALL be non-persistent, i.e., they SHALL NOT be retained across a restart of the associated application or a reboot of the host device.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Session secrets are not to be maintained across a restart of the associated application or a reboot of the host device in order to minimize the likelihood that a misappropriated logged in device can be exploited.

c. Periodic reauthentication of sessions (at least every 12 hours per session) SHALL be performed to confirm the continued presence of the subscriber at an authenticated session.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to protect against a subscriber leaving a logged-in endpoint, timeouts are defined for session inactivity and overall session length. The timer for these timeouts is reset by a reauthentication transaction. Higher AALs have more stringent (shorter) reauthentication timeouts. Following expiration of the session timer, the subscriber is required to start a new session by authenticating.

d. A session SHALL NOT be extended past the guidelines in IA-5 o (2) a – j based on presentation of the session secret alone.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The existence and possession of a session secret does not consider whether the subscriber continued to be in control of the session endpoint. To mitigate this risk, the session secret is only valid for a limited period of time. While the session secret is “something you have”, it is not an authenticator.

e. Prior to session expiration, the reauthentication time limit SHALL be extended by prompting the subscriber for the authentication factor(s) of a memorized secret or biometric.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Before the session times out, the subscriber should be given an opportunity to reauthenticate to extend the session. The subscriber may be prompted when an idle timeout is about to expire, to allow them to cause activity and thereby avoid the need to reauthenticate.

Note: At AAL2, a memorized secret or biometric, and not a physical authenticator, is required because the session secret is something you have, and an additional authentication factor is required to continue the session.

f. If federated authentication is being used, then since the CSP and RP often employ separate session management technologies, there SHALL NOT be any assumption of correlation between these sessions.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: When an RP session expires and the RP requires reauthentication, it is entirely possible that the session at the CSP has not expired and that a new assertion could be generated from this session at the CSP without reauthenticating the user.

g. An RP requiring reauthentication through a federation protocol SHALL — if possible within the protocol — specify the maximum (see IA-5 j (10)) acceptable authentication age to the CSP.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In some applications, RPs may require a “fresh” authentication to meet its authentication risk requirements. By specifying maximum age, the RP can proactively request the CSP to obtain a new authentication to meet that requirement.

h. If federated authentication if being used and an RP has specific authentication age (see IA-5 j [10]) requirements that it has communicated to the CSP, then the CSP SHALL reauthenticate the subscriber if they have not been authenticated within that time period.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: When the RP communicates its authentication freshness requirements to the CSP, the CSP is expected to reauthenticate the subscriber to support a session that meets those requirements.

i. If federated authentication is being used, the CSP SHALL communicate the authentication event time to the RP to allow the RP to decide if the assertion is sufficient for reauthentication and to determine the time for the next reauthentication event.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: When federation authentication is being used, the authentication assertion from the CSP needs to contain the authentication event time to allow the RP to request reauthentication at an appropriate interval if it has specific authentication age requirements.

DISCUSSION: Authenticators include passwords, cryptographic devices, biometrics, certificates, one-time password devices, and ID badges. Device authenticators include certificates and passwords. Initial authenticator content is the actual content of the authenticator (e.g., the initial password). In contrast, the requirements for authenticator content contain specific criteria or characteristics (e.g., minimum password length). Developers may deliver system components with factory default authentication credentials (i.e., passwords) to allow for initial installation and configuration. Default authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a significant risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be implemented via control PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and by controls AC-3, AC-6, and SC-28 for authenticators stored in organizational systems, including passwords stored in hashed or encrypted formats or files containing encrypted or hashed passwords accessible with administrator privileges.

Systems support authenticator management by organization-defined settings and restrictions for various authenticator characteristics (e.g., minimum password length, validation time window for time synchronous one-time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of biometric authentication). Actions can be taken to safeguard individual authenticators, including maintaining possession of authenticators, not sharing authenticators with others, and immediately reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators. Authenticator management includes issuing and revoking authenticators for temporary access when no longer needed.

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(a) Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers:

1. Maintain a list of commonly-used, expected, or compromised passwords and update the list quarterly and when organizational passwords are suspected to have been compromised directly or indirectly;

2. Require immediate selection of a new password upon account recovery;

3. Allow user selection of long passwords and passphrases, including spaces and all printable characters;

4. Employ automated tools to assist the user in selecting strong password authenticators;

5. Enforce the following composition and complexity rules when agencies elect to follow basic password standards:

(a) Not be a proper name.

(b) Not be the same as the Userid.

(c) Expire within a maximum of 90 calendar days.

(d) Not be identical to the previous ten (10) passwords.

(e) Not be displayed when entered.

6. If chosen by the subscriber, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 8 characters in length.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Memorized secret length is the most reliable metric determining strength against online and offline guessing attacks. The objective is primarily to defend against online attacks (with throttling of guesses) and to provide some protection against offline attacks, with the primary defense for such attacks being secure storage of the verifier.

7. If chosen by the CSP or verifier using an approved random number generator, memorized secrets SHALL be at least 6 characters in length.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Memorized secret length is the most reliable metric determining strength against online and offline guessing attacks. The objective is primarily to defend against online attacks (with throttling of guesses) and to provide some protection against offline attacks, with the primary defense for such attacks being secure storage of the verifier.

8. Truncation of the secret SHALL NOT be performed.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Memorized secrets that are longer than expected by the verifier might (but must not) be simply truncated to an acceptable length. This gives a false impression of security to the user if the verifier only checks a subset of the memorized secret.

9. Memorized secret verifiers SHALL NOT permit the subscriber to store a “hint” that is accessible to an unauthenticated claimant.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The availability of memorized secret hints greatly weakens the strength of memorized secret authenticators.

10. Verifiers SHALL NOT prompt subscribers to use specific types of information (e.g., “What was the name of your first pet?”) when choosing memorized secrets.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Prompts for specific information (often called Knowledge-based Authentication or Security Questions) encourage use of the same memorized secrets at multiple sites, which causes a vulnerability to “password stuffing” attacks. This guidance applies to account recovery situations as well as normal authentication.

11. When processing requests to establish and change memorized secrets, verifiers SHALL compare the prospective secrets against a list that contains values known to be commonly used, expected, or compromised.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The maintenance of a list of common memorized secrets that cannot be used by users protects provides protection against online attacks that might otherwise succeed before throttling mechanisms take effect to defend against these attacks. This is an alternative to the use of composition rules (requirements for particular character types, etc.) and can provide more customized protection against common memorized secrets. This list may include, but is not limited to:

• Passwords obtained from previous breach corpuses.

• Dictionary words.

• Repetitive or sequential characters (e.g. ‘aaaaaa’, ‘1234abcd’).

• Context-specific words, such as the name of the service, the username, and derivatives thereof.

12. If a chosen secret is found in the list, the CSP or verifier SHALL advise the subscriber that they need to select a different secret.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The use of common memorized secrets greatly increases the vulnerability of the account to both online (guessing) and offline (cracking) attacks. This is an alternative to the use of composition rules (requirements for particular character types, etc.) and can provide more customized protection against common memorized secrets.

13. If a chosen secret is found in the list, the CSP or verifier SHALL provide the reason for rejection.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: When a subscriber chooses a weak memorized secret, it is likely that they will choose another weak memorized secret that may or may not be on the blocklist. In addition to explaining to the user the reason for the rejection of their selection, it is helpful to provide coaching on better choices. Tools like password-strength meters are often useful in this situation.

14. If a chosen secret is found in the list, the CSP or verifier SHALL require the subscriber to choose a different value.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: When a subscriber chooses a weak memorized secret, the memorized secret change process is not complete until the subscriber has chosen a different value.

15. Verifiers SHALL implement a rate-limiting mechanism that effectively limits failed authentication attempts that can be made on the subscriber’s account to no more than five.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Rate limiting restricts the ability of an attacker to make many online guessing attacks on the memorized secret. Other requirements (e.g., minimum length of memorized secrets) depend on the existence of rate limiting, so effective rate limiting is an essential capability. Ideally, a rate limiting mechanism should restrict the attacker as much as possible without creating an opportunity for a denial-of-service attack against the subscriber.

16. Verifiers SHALL force a change of memorized secret if there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Although requiring routine periodic changes to memorized secrets is not recommended, it is important that verifiers have the capability to prompt memorized secrets on an emergency basis if there is evidence of a possible successful attack.

17. The verifier SHALL use approved encryption when requesting memorized secrets in order to provide resistance to eavesdropping and MitM attacks.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: As defined in Appendix A of the CJIS Security Policy, cryptography is considered approved if it is specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation.

18. The verifier SHALL use an authenticated protected channel when requesting memorized secrets in order to provide resistance to eavesdropping and MitM attacks.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Communication between claimant and verifier is required to be via an encrypted channel that authenticates the verifier to provide confidentiality of the authenticator output and resistance to MitM attacks. This is typically accomplished using the Transport Level Security (TLS) protocol.

19. Verifiers SHALL store memorized secrets in a form that is resistant to offline attacks.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Storage of memorized secret verifiers in a hashed form that is not readily reversed is a key protection against offline attacks. In no case should a verifier store memorized secrets in cleartext form. Criteria IA-5(1)(a)(20) – (22) provide more detail on how this is done.

20. Memorized secrets SHALL be salted and hashed using a suitable one-way key derivation function.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Key derivation functions take a password, a salt, and a cost factor as inputs then generate a password hash. Their purpose is to make each password guessing trial by an attacker who has obtained a password hash file expensive and therefore the cost of a guessing attack high or prohibitive. Use of a key derivation with a salt, preferably with a time- and memory-hard key derivation function, provides the best protection against attackers that are able to obtain a copy of the verifier database.

21. The salt SHALL be at least 32 bits in length and be chosen arbitrarily to minimize salt value collisions among stored hashes.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Salt values need to be large enough to make it impractical for an attacker to precompute hashed verifier values (so called rainbow tables). While rainbow tables are typically quite large, this requirement would increase their size by a factor of about 4.3 billion. If not chosen arbitrarily, the attacker might be able to anticipate the salt values that would be used, which would eliminate much of this advantage.

22. Both the salt value and the resulting hash SHALL be stored for each subscriber using a memorized secret authenticator

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to verify a memorized secret, it needs to be salted and hashed for comparison with the stored verifier (resulting hash). To do this, the salt value needs to be available, and since it is different for each user, needs to be stored with the verifier. It is impractical to verify a memorized secret if this is not done.

23. If an additional iteration of a key derivation function using a salt value known only to the verifier is performed, then this secret salt value SHALL be generated with an approved random bit generator and of sufficient length.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: An additional keyed hashing iteration using a key value that is secret and stored separately from the verifiers provides excellent protection against even attackers (“password crackers”) with substantial computing resources, provided the key is not also compromised. Accordingly, it is important that this salt, which is common to multiple users, be generated in a manner that is not vulnerable to compromise.

24. If an additional iteration of a key derivation function using a salt value known only to the verifier is performed, then this secret salt value SHALL provide at least the minimum-security strength.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: An additional keyed hashing iteration using a key value that is secret and stored separately from the verifiers provides excellent protection against even attackers (“password crackers”) with substantial computing resources, provided the key is not also compromised. Accordingly, it is important that this salt, which is common to multiple users, be of sufficient size to make cryptographic and brute-force attacks impractical.

Currently, the requirement is that the key be at least 112 bits in length.

25. If an additional iteration of a key derivation function using a salt value known only to the verifier is performed, then this secret salt value SHALL be stored separately from the memorized secrets.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: An additional keyed hashing iteration using a key value that is secret and stored separately from the verifiers provides excellent protection against even attackers (“password crackers”) with substantial computing resources, provided the key is not also compromised. Accordingly, it is important that this salt, which is common to multiple users, be stored separately so that it is unlikely to be compromised along with the verifier database. One way to do this is to perform this last hashing iteration on a physically separate processor, since it only requires a value to hash as input and provides the hashed value in response.

DISCUSSION: Password-based authentication applies to passwords regardless of whether they are used in single-factor or multi-factor authentication. Long passwords or passphrases are preferable over shorter passwords. Enforced composition rules provide marginal security benefits while decreasing usability. However, organizations may choose to establish certain rules for password generation (e.g., minimum character length for long passwords) under certain circumstances and can enforce this requirement in IA-5(1)(a)(5). Account recovery can occur, for example, in situations when a password is forgotten. Cryptographically protected passwords include salted one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. The list of commonly used, compromised, or expected passwords includes passwords obtained from previous breach corpuses, dictionary words, and repetitive or sequential characters. The list includes context-specific words, such as the name of the service, username, and derivatives thereof.

(b) Look-Up Secret Authenticators and Verifiers

1. CSPs creating look-up secret authenticators SHALL use an approved random bit generator to generate the list of secrets.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The use of a high-quality random bit generator is important to ensure that an attacker cannot guess the look-up secret

2. Look-up secrets SHALL have at least 20 bits of entropy.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Look-up secrets need to have enough entropy to ensure that brute-force guessing attacks do not succeed

3. If look-up secrets are distributed online, then they SHALL be distributed over a secure channel in accordance with the post-enrollment binding requirements in IA-5 ‘n’ 17 through 25.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Look-up secrets need to be distributed in a manner that minimizes the opportunity for attackers to intercept the secrets either by eavesdropping or MitM attacks.

4. Verifiers of look-up secrets SHALL prompt the claimant for the next secret from their authenticator or for a specific (e.g., numbered) secret.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In most cases claimants will be prompted for the next unused memorized secret in a list but may be challenged to use a specific secret from a list.

5. A given secret from an authenticator SHALL be used successfully only once.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Many threats, such as key logging, are enabled if the look-up secret can be used more than once.

6. If a look-up secret is derived from a grid (bingo) card, then each cell of the grid SHALL be used only once.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Grid (bingo) cards are sometimes used to provide a rudimentary challenge-response authentication involving the claimant. However, an attacker such as a key logger that has persistent access to the endpoint can derive the contents of the grid, and potentially authenticate successfully, if grid entries are reused in subsequent authentication transactions.

Absent the ability to reuse grid squares, grid (bingo) cards will probably no longer be attractive as authenticators.

7. Verifiers SHALL store look-up secrets in a form that is resistant to offline attacks.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Storage of look-up secret verifiers in a hashed form that is not readily reversed is a key protection against offline attacks. In no case should a verifier store look-up secrets in cleartext form.

8. If look-up secrets have at least 112 bits of entropy, then they SHALL be hashed with an approved one-way function

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Use of an approved one-way function effectively protects the look-up secrets from disclosure if the verifier is compromised. Salting of secrets with this amount of entropy is not required because it is not practical to mount brute-force or cryptographic attacks against secrets this large.

9. If look-up secrets have less than 112 bits of entropy, then they SHALL be salted and hashed using a suitable one-way key derivation function.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Key derivation functions take a look-up secret, a salt, and a cost factor as inputs then generate a hash. Their purpose is to make each look-up secret guessing trial by an attacker who has obtained a look- up secret hash file expensive and therefore the cost of a guessing attack high or prohibitive. Use of a key derivation with a salt, preferably with a time- and memory-hard key derivation function, provides the best protection against attackers that are able to obtain a copy of the verifier database.

10. If look-up secrets have less than 112 bits of entropy, then the salt SHALL be at least 32 bits in length and be chosen arbitrarily to minimize salt value collisions among stored hashes.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Salt values need to be large enough to make it impractical for an attacker to precompute hashed verifier values (so called rainbow tables). While rainbow tables are typically quite large, this requirement would increase their size by a factor of about 4.3 billion. If not chosen arbitrarily, the attacker might be

able to anticipate the salt values that would be used, which would eliminate much of this advantage.

11. If look-up secrets have less than 112 bits of entropy, then both the salt value and the resulting hash SHALL be stored for each look-up secret

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to verify a look-up secret, it needs to be salted and hashed for comparison with the stored verifier (resulting hash). To do this, the salt value needs to be available, and since it is different for each secret, needs to be stored with the verifier. It is impractical to verify a look-up secret if this is not done.

12. If look-up secrets that have less than 64 bits of entropy, then the verifier SHALL implement a rate-limiting mechanism that effectively limits the number of failed authentication attempts that can be made on the subscriber’s account.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Rate limiting restricts the ability of an attacker to make many online guessing attacks on the look-up secret. Other requirements (e.g., minimum length of look-up secrets) depend on the existence of rate limiting, so effective rate limiting is an essential capability. Ideally, a rate limiting mechanism should restrict the attacker as much as possible without creating an opportunity for a denial-of-service attack against the subscriber.

13. The verifier SHALL use approved encryption when requesting look-up secrets in order to provide resistance to eavesdropping and MitM attacks.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Cryptography is considered approved if it is specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation.

14. The verifier SHALL use an authenticated protected channel when requesting look-up secrets in order to provide resistance to eavesdropping and MitM attacks.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Communication between claimant and verifier is required to be via an encrypted channel that authenticates the verifier to provide confidentiality of the authenticator output and resistance to MitM attacks. This is typically accomplished using the Transport Level Security (TLS) protocol.

(c) Out-of-Band Authenticators and Verifiers

1. The out-of-band authenticator SHALL establish a separate channel with the verifier in order to retrieve the out-of-band secret or authentication request.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: A channel is considered to be out-of-band with respect to the primary communication channel (even if it terminates on the same device) provided the device does not leak information from one channel to the other without the authorization of the claimant.

2. Communication over the secondary channel SHALL be encrypted unless sent via the public switched telephone network (PSTN).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The secondary channel requires protection to ensure that authentication secrets are not leaked to attackers. Legacy use of the PSTN as an OOB authentication medium is exempt from this requirement, although other requirements apply.

3. Methods that do not prove possession of a specific device, such as voice-over-IP (VoIP) or email, SHALL NOT be used for out-of-band authentication.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Communication with VoIP phone numbers and email do not establish the possession of a specific device, so they are not suitable for use in out-of-band authentication which is used as a physical authenticator (something you have).

4. If PSTN is not being used for out-of-band communication, then the out-of-band authenticator SHALL uniquely authenticate itself by establishing an authenticated protected channel with the verifier.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Communication between out-of-band device and verifier is required to be via an encrypted channel to provide confidentiality of the authenticator output and resistance to MitM attacks. This is typically accomplished using the Transport Level Security (TLS) protocol.

5. If PSTN is not being used for out-of-band communication, then the out-of-band authenticator SHALL communicate with the verifier using approved cryptography.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Cryptography is considered approved if it is specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation.

6. If PSTN is not being used for out-of-band communication, then the key used to authenticate the out-of-band device SHALL be stored in suitably secure storage available to the authenticator application (e.g., keychain storage, TPM, TEE, secure element).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The secret key associated with an out-of- band device or authenticator application is critical to the determination of “something you have” and needs to be well protected.

7. If the PSTN is used for out-of-band authentication and a secret is sent to the out-of-band device via the PSTN, then the out-of-band authenticator SHALL uniquely authenticate itself to a mobile telephone network using a SIM card or equivalent that uniquely identifies the device.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Since the PSTN does not support the establishment of authenticated protected channels, the alternative method of authenticating the device via the PSTN is supported. Note that there are other specific requirements for use of the PSTN that also apply (see IA-5 (1) c (19) through (20)).

8. If the out-of-band authenticator sends an approval message over the secondary communication channel, it SHALL either accept transfer of a secret from the primary channel to be sent to the verifier via the secondary communications channel, or present a secret received via the secondary channel from the verifier and prompt the claimant to verify the consistency of that secret with the primary channel, prior to accepting a yes/no response from the claimant which it sends to the verifier.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Most out-of-band verifiers operate by sending a secret over the secondary channel that the subscriber transfers to the primary channel (e.g., the capability to copy and paste from one app to another). Other methods are possible, however, specifically transferring from primary to secondary and user comparison of secrets sent to both channels (with approval being sent to the verifier over the secondary channel). It is good practice to display descriptive information relating to the authentication on the claimant’s out-of-band device, to provide additional assurance that the transaction being approved by the subscriber is the correct one, and not from an attacker who exploits the subscriber’s approval.

9. The verifier SHALL NOT store the identifying key itself, but SHALL use a verification method (e.g., an approved hash function or proof of possession of the identifying key) to uniquely identify the authenticator.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order for the out-of-band authenticator to be considered “something you have”, it must be securely authenticated as a unique device or instance of a software-based authentication application. This is required to be done through proof of possession of a key by the authenticator, rather than presentation of the key itself. This provides verifier compromise resistance with respect to the authentication key.

10. Depending on the type of out-of-band authenticator, one of the following SHALL take place: transfer of a secret to the primary channel, transfer of a secret to the secondary channel, or verification of secrets by the claimant.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Three different methods of associating the primary and secondary channel sessions are permitted. The intent of these methods is to establish approval for a specific authentication transaction, and to minimize the likelihood that an attacker with knowledge of when the subscriber authenticates can obtain approval for a rogue authentication.

11. If the out-of-band authenticator operates by transferring the secret to the primary channel, then the verifier SHALL transmit a random secret to the out-of-band authenticator and then wait for the secret to be returned on the primary communication channel.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This is the most common form of out-of- band authentication where an authentication secret is transmitted to the out-of-band device and entered by the user for transmission on the primary channel.

12. If the out-of-band authenticator operates by transferring the secret to the secondary channel, then the verifier SHALL display a random authentication secret to the claimant via the primary channel and then wait for the secret to be returned on the secondary channel from the claimant’s out-of- band authenticator.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This is a less typical authentication flow but is also acceptable in that the secret securely associates possession and control of the out-of-band authenticator with the session being authenticated.

13. If the out-of-band authenticator operates by verification of secrets by the claimant, then the verifier SHALL display a random authentication secret to the claimant via the primary channel, send the same secret to the out-of-band authenticator via the secondary channel for presentation to the claimant, and then wait for an approval (or disapproval) message via the secondary channel.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This is a somewhat more user-friendly authentication flow because it does not require the claimant to read and manually enter the authentication secret, but it carries the additional risk that the claimant will approve the authentication without actually comparing the secrets received from the independent channels. Approval is required to be obtained from the out-of-band authenticator rather than the primary channel because that at least establishes control of the authenticator.

14. The authentication SHALL be considered invalid if not completed within 10 minutes.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Secrets used in out-of-band authentication are short-term secrets and need to have a definite lifetime. This requirement also relieves the verifier from the responsibility of log-term storage of the secrets.

15. Verifiers SHALL accept a given authentication secret only once during the validity period.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to prevent an attacker who gains access to an authentication secret generated by the subscriber from using it, it is important that the secret only be valid for a single authentication. This requirement only applies when a secret is being transferred between the primary channel and the out-of-band authenticator.

16. The verifier SHALL generate random authentication secrets with at least 20 bits of entropy.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Consistent with other short-term authentication secrets, 20 bits of entropy are required to provide resistance against brute force attacks. 6-digit numeric secrets (19.93 bits of entropy) are sufficiently close to 20 bits to be acceptable.

17. The verifier SHALL generate random authentication secrets using an approved random bit generator.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The use of a high-quality random bit generator is important to ensure that an attacker cannot guess the out-of-band secret. Approved random bit generators are generally included in a FIPS 140-2 certified encryption module.

18. If the authentication secret has less than 64 bits of entropy, the verifier SHALL implement a rate-limiting mechanism that effectively limits the number of failed authentication attempts that can be made on the subscriber’s account as described in IA-5 l (3) through (4).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Rate limiting limits the opportunity for attackers to mount a brute-force attack on the out-of-band verifier. Since the out-of-band secret has a limited lifetime, it is sufficient to limit the number of attempts allowed during the (maximum) 10-minute lifetime of the secret.

19. If out-of-band verification is to be made using the PSTN, then the verifier SHALL verify that the pre-registered telephone number being used is associated with a specific physical device.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Some telephone numbers, such as those that are associated with VoIP services, are not associated with a specific device and can receive calls and text messages without establishing possession and control of a specific device. Such telephone numbers are not suitable for OOB authentication. Services exist to distinguish telephone numbers that are associated with a device from those that aren’t.

20. If out-of-band verification is to be made using the PSTN, then changing the pre-registered telephone number is considered to be the binding of a new authenticator and SHALL only occur as described in IA-5 n (17) through (25).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The binding of a new authenticator requires that the subscriber authenticate at the same or a higher AAL (currently AAL2) than that at which the authenticator will be used, and that a notification be sent to the subscriber. This is required to prevent attackers from changing the phone number of a PSTN-based out-of-band authenticator to one they control.

21. If PSTN is used for out-of-band authentication, then the CSP SHALL offer subscribers at least one alternate authenticator that is not RESTRICTED and can be used to authenticate at the required AAL.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Use of the PSTN for out-of-band authentication involves additional risk, resulting in its being designated as a restricted authenticator. CSPs are required to provide subscribers with a meaningful alternative.

22. If PSTN is used for out-of-band authentication, then the CSP SHALL Provide meaningful notice to subscribers regarding the security risks of the RESTRICTED authenticator and availability of alternative(s) that are not RESTRICTED.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Use of the PSTN for out-of-band authentication involves additional risk, resulting in its being designated as a restricted authenticator. CSPs are required to explain these risks to subscribers and offer more secure alternatives.

Currently, authenticators leveraging the public switched telephone network, including phone- and Short Message Service (SMS)-based one-time passwords (OTPs) are restricted. Other authenticator types may be added as additional threats emerge. Note that, among other requirements, even when using phone- and SMS-based OTPs, the agency also must verify that the OTP is being directed to a phone and not an IP address, such as with VoIP, as these accounts are not typically protected with multi-factor authentication.

23. If PSTN is used for out-of-band authentication, then the CSP SHALL address any additional risk to subscribers in its risk assessment.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Use of the PSTN for out-of-band authentication involves additional risk, resulting in its being designated as a restricted authenticator. These risks need to be documented.

24. If PSTN is used for out-of-band authentication, then the CSP SHALL develop a migration plan for the possibility that the RESTRICTED authenticator is no longer acceptable at some point in the future and include this migration plan in its digital identity acceptance statement.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Use of the PSTN for out-of-band authentication involves additional risk, resulting in its being designated as a restricted authenticator. A plan for eliminating them in the future needs to be documented.

(d) OTP Authenticators and Verifiers

1. The secret key and its algorithm SHALL provide at least the minimum security strength of 112 bits as of the date of this publication.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The secret key used by an OTP authenticator needs to be sufficiently complex to resist online and offline attacks. An attacker may have the ability to observe the authenticator output at some point during its operation; it needs to be impractical for the secret key to be derived from a set of these observations.

2. The nonce SHALL be of sufficient length to ensure that it is unique for each operation of the device over its lifetime.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: If the nonce isn’t long enough, the output of the authenticator will repeat, which represents an easily avoided vulnerability.

3. OTP authenticators — particularly software-based OTP generators —SHALL NOT facilitate the cloning of the secret key onto multiple devices.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Like other physical authenticators, the use of OTP authenticators is premised upon the authenticator secret being present in a single authenticator so that it proves possession of a specific device. Mechanisms that would facilitate cloning the secret onto multiple devices include the ability to enroll more than one device producing the same OTP output and backup mechanisms, especially when software-based authenticators are used. Verifiers are expected to make their best effort at determining that bring-your-own authenticators not issued by them meet this requirement and to have policies not allowing the use of non-compliant authenticators.

4. The authenticator output SHALL have at least 6 decimal digits (approximately 20 bits) of entropy.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Consistent with other short-term authentication secrets, 20 bits of entropy are required to provide resistance against brute force attacks. 6-digit numeric secrets (19.93 bits of entropy) are sufficiently close to 20 bits to be acceptable.

5. If the nonce used to generate the authenticator output is based on a real-time clock, then the nonce SHALL be changed at least once every 2 minutes.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The authenticator output needs to be changed often enough that there is reasonable assurance that it is in the possession of the claimant and that it is not susceptible to OTP-guessing attacks.

6. The OTP value associated with a given nonce SHALL be accepted only once.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: A fundamental premise of a “one-time” authenticator is that it can be used successfully only once during its validity period.

7. The symmetric keys used by authenticators are also present in the verifier and SHALL be strongly protected against compromise.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Verifiers typically contain symmetric keys for all subscribers using OTP authenticators. This makes them a particularly rich target for attackers. While the protection of these keys is implementation- dependent and there is therefore no specific requirement for how the keys are protected, measures to prevent the exfiltration of the keys are needed. An example of such a measure is the storage of keys and generation of authenticator outputs in a separate device accessible only by the verifier.

8. If a single-factor OTP authenticator is being associated with a subscriber account, then the verifier or associated CSP SHALL use approved cryptography to either generate and exchange or to obtain the secrets required to duplicate the authenticator output.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: It is critical that authentication secrets be generated and transferred or negotiated securely. This includes the use of secure random number generators and protocols for transferring or negotiating (e.g., Diffie-Hellman) secret values. Cryptography is considered approved if it is specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation.

9. The verifier SHALL use approved encryption when collecting the OTP.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Cryptography is considered approved if it is specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation.

10. The verifier SHALL use an authenticated protected channel when collecting the OTP.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Communication between claimant and verifier is required to be via an encrypted channel that authenticates the verifier to provide confidentiality of the authenticator output and resistance to MitM attacks. This is typically accomplished using the Transport Level Security (TLS) protocol.

11. If a time-based OTP is used, it SHALL have a defined lifetime (recommended 30 seconds) that is determined by the expected clock drift — in either direction — of the authenticator over its lifetime, plus allowance for network delay and user entry of the OTP.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The clocks on time-based authenticators are subject to drift because of cost and environmental factors such as temperature. Accordingly, verifiers need to accept authenticator outputs before and particularly after the intended validity period to allow use by authenticators that are not in synchronization.

12. Verifiers SHALL accept a given time-based OTP only once during the validity period.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In order to prevent an attacker who gains access to an OTP authenticator output from using it, it is important that the secret only be valid for a single authentication.

13. If the authenticator output has less than 64 bits of entropy, the verifier SHALL implement a rate-limiting mechanism that effectively limits the number of failed authentication attempts that can be made on the subscriber’s account as described in IA-5 l (3) through (4).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: OTPs whose output has less entropy are more vulnerable to online guessing attacks. To mitigate these attacks, rate limiting is required. Online guessing attacks are less of a concern for time-based OTP authenticators because of the limited validity window, but a limit on the number of guesses during a given validity period is effective in resisting automated attacks.

14. If the authenticator is multi-factor, then each use of the authenticator SHALL require the input of the additional factor.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: To ensure that a multi-factor authenticator cannot be stolen and used repeatedly following activation, a separate activation is required for each use of the authenticator. It is preferable for a multi-factor authenticator not to indicate that the wrong memorized secret or biometric were presented, but rather to produce an authenticator output that is invalid, although this is not required. This provides protection against guessing or presentation attacks on the authenticator itself.

15. If the authenticator is multi-factor and a memorized secret is used by the authenticator for activation, then that memorized secret SHALL be a randomly chosen numeric secret at least 6 decimal digits in length or other memorized secret meeting the requirements of IA-5 (1)(a).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The requirement for memorized secrets used as activation factors is the same as that for memorized secrets used as distinct authenticators (see IA-5 (1)(a)).

16. If the authenticator is multi-factor, then use of a memorized secret for activation SHALL be rate limited as specified in IA-5 l (3) through (4).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Rate limiting is required to provide protection against brute-force guessing attacks, particularly if the authenticator gives an indication when an incorrect secret is entered.

17. If the authenticator is multi-factor and is activated by a biometric factor, then that factor SHALL meet the requirements of IA-5 m, including limits on the number of consecutive authentication failures.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: General requirements for biometric activation factors include false accept rate criteria and the number of consecutive authentication failures that are allowed.

18. If the authenticator is multi-factor, then the unencrypted key and activation secret or biometric sample — and any biometric data derived from the biometric sample such as a probe produced through signal processing — SHALL be zeroized immediately after an OTP has been generated.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: It is important that the unencrypted key and associated data be zeroized to minimize the likelihood that it can be misappropriated by an attacker following a successful authentication. Each authentication requires a re-presentation of the activation factor (see IA-5(1)(d)14). Verifiers are expected to make their best effort at determining that bring-your- own authenticators not issued by them meet this requirement and to have policies not allowing the use of non-compliant authenticators.

19. If the authenticator is multi-factor, the verifier or CSP SHALL establish, via the authenticator source, that the authenticator is a multi-factor device.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: From the standpoint of a verifier, a multi- factor OTP authenticator appears the same as a single-factor OTP authenticator. In order to establish that the authenticator meets the multi-factor requirements, the verifier or CSP can issue the authenticator, examine it in some way, or rely on an assertion from the manufacturer.

20. In the absence of a trusted statement that it is a multi-factor device, the verifier SHALL treat the authenticator as single-factor, in accordance with IA-5 (1) (d) (1) through (13).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Authenticators of unknown provenance or that are not known by the CSP or verifier to meet all of the requirements for multi-factor OTP authenticators can be used, but only as single-factor authenticators.

(e) Cryptographic Authenticators and Verifiers (including single- and multi-factor cryptographic authenticators, both hardware- and software-based)

1. If the cryptographic authenticator is software based, the key SHALL be stored in suitably secure storage available to the authenticator application.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Although dependent on the computing device on which the authenticator is operating, authenticator software needs to avail itself of the most secure storage available, considering issues like ability to extract the secret from the device and its potential to be included in backup data. Verifiers are expected to make their best effort at determining that bring-your- own authenticators not issued by them meet this requirement and to have policies not allowing the use of non-compliant authenticators.

2. If the cryptographic authenticator is software based, the key SHALL be strongly protected against unauthorized disclosure by the use of access controls that limit access to the key to only those software components on the device requiring access.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Although dependent on the computing device on which the authenticator is operating, authenticator software needs to store secret keys in a manner that limits access to keys to the maximum extent possible so that they cannot be accessed by other (possibly rogue) applications and/or users. Verifiers are expected to make their best effort at determining that bring-your-own authenticators not issued by them meet this requirement and to have policies not allowing the use of non-compliant authenticators.

3. If the cryptographic authenticator is software based, it SHALL NOT facilitate the cloning of the secret key onto multiple devices.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Like other physical authenticators, the use of cryptographic authenticators is premised upon the authenticator secret being present in a single authenticator so that it proves possession of a specific device. Mechanisms that would facilitate cloning the secret onto multiple devices include the ability to enroll more than one device with the same key and backup mechanisms, especially when software-based authenticators are used. Verifiers are expected to make their best effort at determining that bring-your-own authenticators not issued by them meet this requirement and to have policies not allowing the use of non-compliant authenticators.

4. If the authenticator is single-factor and hardware-based, secret keys unique to the device SHALL NOT be exportable (i.e., cannot be removed from the device).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Cryptographic device authenticators are constructed so as not to allow the secret key to be obtained from the device. These devices are enrolled for authentication using the public cryptographic key, but the private key is never shared. This requirement addresses primarily functionality allowing the key to be exported; FIPS 140 requirements cover the resistance of the device to various forms of attack.

5. If the authenticator is hardware-based, the secret key and its algorithm SHALL provide at least the minimum-security length of 112 bits as of the date of this publication.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The secret key used by a cryptographic authenticator needs to be sufficiently complex to resist online and offline attacks. An attacker may have the ability to observe the authenticator output at some point during its operation; it needs to be impractical for the secret key to be derived from a set of these observations. Since verifiers and cryptographic authenticators must use the same algorithms to successfully authenticate, assessment of the verifier also assesses the authenticators that may be used.

6. If the authenticator is hardware-based, the challenge nonce SHALL be at least 64 bits in length.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement applies to hardware-based cryptographic authenticators. The challenge nonce is required to be large enough that it will not be reused during the lifetime of the authenticator in order to provide replay protection. Since verifiers and cryptographic authenticators must use the same algorithms to successfully authenticate, assessment of the nonce generated by the verifier also assesses the authenticators that may be used.

7. If the authenticator is hardware-based, approved cryptography SHALL be used.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Cryptography is considered approved if it is specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation. Since verifiers and cryptographic authenticators must use the same algorithms to successfully authenticate, assessment of the verifier also assesses the authenticators that may be used.

8. Cryptographic keys stored by the verifier SHALL be protected against modification.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Protection against modification is required for all keys to ensure that an attacker can’t substitute keys they control, which would permit them to authenticate successfully. This protection could be provided by operating system access controls, or through integrity checks of the stored keys with separately stored hashes.

9. If symmetric keys are used, cryptographic keys stored by the verifier SHALL be protected against disclosure.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Protection against disclosure is required for symmetric keys because their disclosure also would permit an attacker to authenticate successfully. This protection could be provided through operating system access controls.

10. The challenge nonce SHALL be at least 64 bits in length.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement applies to verifiers of cryptographic authentication. The challenge nonce is generated by the verifier and used by a cryptographic authenticator to compute the authenticator output. The challenge needs to be sufficiently long that it will not need to repeat during the lifetime of the authenticator, so the authenticator output, if available to an attacker, cannot be replayed.

11. The challenge nonce SHALL either be unique over the authenticator’s lifetime or statistically unique (i.e., generated using an approved random bit generator).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The challenge nonce is generated by the verifier used by a cryptographic authenticator to compute the authenticator output. The nonce cannot repeat during the lifetime of the authenticator, so the authenticator output, if available to an attacker, cannot be replayed. This can be accomplished by either deterministic means (e.g., an algorithm choosing values guaranteed not to repeat) or statistically (random values chosen from a range giving a very low probability that the same nonce will ever be seen twice).

12. The verification operation SHALL use approved cryptography.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Cryptography is considered approved if it is specified or adopted in a FIPS or NIST recommendation. Since verifiers and cryptographic authenticators must use the same algorithms to successfully authenticate, assessment of the verifier also assesses the authenticators that may be used.

13. If a multi-factor cryptographic software authenticator is being used, then each authentication requires the presentation of the activation factor.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The activation factor, either a memorized secret or a biometric, is required to be presented each time an authentication operation is requested by the authenticator to ensure that an activated authenticator cannot be used by an attacker.

14. If the authenticator is multi-factor, then any memorized secret used by the authenticator for activation SHALL be a randomly chosen numeric secret at least 6 decimal digits in length or other memorized secret meeting the requirements of IA-5 (1) (a).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The requirement for memorized secrets used as activation factors is the same as that for memorized secrets used as distinct authenticators (see IA-5(1)a).

15. If the authenticator is multi-factor, then use of a memorized secret for activation SHALL be rate limited as specified in IA-5 l (3) through (4).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Rate limiting is required to provide protection against brute-force guessing attacks, particularly if the authenticator gives an indication when an incorrect secret is entered.

16. If the authenticator is multi-factor and is activated by a biometric factor, then that factor SHALL meet the requirements of IA-5 m, including limits on the number of consecutive authentication failures.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: General requirements for biometric activation factors include false accept rate criteria and the number of consecutive authentication failures that are allowed.

17. If the authenticator is multi-factor, then the unencrypted key and activation secret or biometric sample — and any biometric data derived from the biometric sample such as a probe produced through signal processing — SHALL be zeroized immediately after an authentication transaction has taken place.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: It is important that the unencrypted key and associated data be zeroized to minimize the likelihood that it can be misappropriated by an attacker following a successful authentication. Verifiers are expected to make their best effort at determining that bring-your-own authenticators not issued by them meet this requirement and to have policies not allowing the use of non-compliant authenticators.

","uuid":"ea0c3006-f70c-4aee-9704-b7fbb2ba2236","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-5(1) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTHENTICATOR TYPES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-5(1)"},{"description":"

(a) For public key-based authentication:

1. Enforce authorized access to the corresponding private key; and

2. Map the authenticated identity to the account of the individual or group; and

(b) When public key infrastructure (PKI) is used:

1. Validate certificates by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor, including checking certificate status information; and

2. Implement a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation.

DISCUSSION: Public key cryptography is a valid authentication mechanism for individuals, machines, and devices. For PKI solutions, status information for certification paths includes certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, certificate validation involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common Policy Root trust anchor, which includes certificate policy processing. Implementing a local cache of revocation data to support path discovery and validation also supports system availability in situations where organizations are unable to access revocation information via the network. A local cache of revocation data is also known as a certificate revocation list. This list contains a list of revoked certificates and can be periodically downloaded to ensure certificates can still be checked for revocation when network access is not available or access to the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) server is not available. Without configuring a local cache of revocation data, there is the potential to allow access to users who are no longer authorized (users with revoked certificates).

","uuid":"9a1eee35-9417-43a0-bbb7-d357661fa6d1","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-5(2) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PUBLIC KEY BASED AUTHENTICATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-5(2) "},{"description":"

Protect authenticators commensurate with the security category of the information to which use of the authenticator permits access.

DISCUSSION: For systems that contain multiple security categories of information without reliable physical or logical separation between categories, authenticators used to grant access to the systems are protected commensurate with the highest security category of information on the systems. Security categories of information are determined as part of the security categorization process.

","uuid":"5dbdafa2-ccbc-458d-aea3-b0f41d124b4d","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-5(6) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-5(6)"},{"description":"

Obscure feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation and use by unauthorized individuals.

DISCUSSION: Authentication feedback from systems does not provide information that would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some types of systems, such as desktops or notebooks with relatively large monitors, the threat (referred to as shoulder surfing) may be significant. For other types of systems, such as mobile devices with small displays, the threat may be less significant and is balanced against the increased likelihood of typographic input errors due to small keyboards. Thus, the means for obscuring authentication feedback is selected accordingly. Obscuring authentication feedback includes displaying asterisks when users type passwords into input devices or displaying feedback for a very limited time before obscuring it.

","uuid":"1e535e9f-a708-4acf-867d-e204e3142a6d","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-6 AUTHENTICATION FEEDBACK","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-6"},{"description":"

Implement mechanisms for authentication to a cryptographic module that meet the requirements of applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines for such authentication.

DISCUSSION: Authentication mechanisms may be required within a cryptographic module to authenticate an operator accessing the module and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the requested role and perform services within that role

","uuid":"a65b47f1-e719-4565-b4e4-a0bc31a7075a","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE AUTHENTICATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-7"},{"description":"

Uniquely identify and authenticate non-organizational users or processes acting on behalf of non-organizational users.

DISCUSSION: Non-organizational users include system users other than organizational users explicitly covered by IA-2. Non-organizational users are uniquely identified and authenticated for accesses other than those explicitly identified and documented in AC-14. Identification and authentication of non-organizational users accessing federal systems may be required to protect federal, proprietary, or privacy-related information (with exceptions noted for national security systems). Organizations consider many factors—including security, privacy, scalability, and practicality—when balancing the need to ensure ease of use for access to federal information and systems with the need to protect and adequately mitigate risk

","uuid":"cc7a21e0-2db9-42df-8a66-b14a5bbd8e6a","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-8"},{"description":"

Accept and electronically verify Personal Identity Verification-compliant credentials from other federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial (SLTT) agencies.

DISCUSSION: Acceptance of Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials from other federal or SLTT agencies applies to both logical and physical access control systems. PIV credentials are those credentials issued by federal or SLTT agencies that conform to FIPS Publication 201 and supporting guidelines

","uuid":"7359dbba-eb63-4d45-8125-684f96913811","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-8(1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-8(1)"},{"description":"

(a) Accept only external authenticators that are NIST-compliant; and

(b) Document and maintain a list of accepted external authenticators.

DISCUSSION: Acceptance of only NIST-compliant external authenticators applies to organizational systems that are accessible to the public (e.g., public-facing websites). External authenticators are issued by nonfederal government entities and are compliant with the CJISSECPOL. Approved external authenticators meet or exceed the minimum Federal Government-wide technical, security, privacy, and organizational maturity requirements. Meeting or exceeding Federal requirements allows Federal Government relying parties to trust external authenticators in connection with an authentication transaction at a specified authenticator assurance level.

","uuid":"44cc5b26-97cd-4487-af8a-37cd1a249db2","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-8(2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATORS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-8(2)"},{"description":"

Conform to the following profiles for identity management: Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) or OpenID Connect.

DISCUSSION: Organizations define profiles for identity management based on open identity management standards. To ensure that open identity management standards are viable, robust, reliable, sustainable, and interoperable as documented, the Federal Government assesses and scopes the standards and technology implementations against applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines

","uuid":"ceb907fc-b369-496d-8552-0d96fdcbf2c5","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-8(4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | USE OF DEFINED PROFILES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-8(4)"},{"description":"

Require users to re-authenticate when: roles, authenticators, or credentials change, security categories of systems change, the execution of privileged functions occur, or every 12 hours.

DISCUSSION: In addition to the re-authentication requirements associated with device locks, organizations may require re-authentication of individuals in certain situations, including when roles, authenticators or credentials change, when security categories of systems change, when the execution of privileged functions occurs, after a fixed time period, or periodically

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a. Identity proof users that require accounts for logical access to systems based on appropriate identity assurance level requirements as specified in applicable standards and guidelines;

b. Resolve user identities to a unique individual; and

c. Collect, validate, and verify identity evidence.

DISCUSSION: Identity proofing is the process of collecting, validating, and verifying a user’s identity information for the purposes of establishing credentials for accessing a system. Identity proofing is intended to mitigate threats to the registration of users and the establishment of their accounts. Organizations may be subject to laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies that address the collection of identity evidence. Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel regarding such requirements

","uuid":"da8c6b73-80b0-4c4b-9489-5d33536177c6","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-12 IDENTITY PROOFING","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-12"},{"description":"

Require evidence of individual identification be presented to the registration authority.

DISCUSSION: Identity evidence, such as documentary evidence or a combination of documents and biometrics, reduces the likelihood of individuals using fraudulent identification to establish an identity or at least increases the work factor of potential adversaries. The forms of acceptable evidence are consistent with the risks to the systems, roles, and privileges associated with the user’s account

","uuid":"e62e9a54-c52a-4ed2-825f-417721459a73","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-12(2) IDENTITY PROOFING | IDENTITY EVIDENCE","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-12(2)"},{"description":"

a. Require that the presented identity evidence be validated and verified through agency-defined resolution, validation, and verification methods.

3 This requirement is sanctionable for audit beginning October 1, 2024.

DISCUSSION: Validation and verification of identity evidence increases the assurance that accounts and identifiers are being established for the correct user and authenticators are being bound to that user. Validation refers to the process of confirming that the evidence is genuine and authentic, and the data contained in the evidence is correct, current, and related to an individual. Verification confirms and establishes a linkage between the claimed identity and the actual existence of the user presenting the evidence. Acceptable methods for validating and verifying identity evidence are consistent with the risks to the systems, roles, and privileges associated with the users account.

b. Identity proofing SHALL NOT be performed to determine suitability or entitlement to gain access to services or benefits.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The sole objective of identity proofing is to ensure the applicant is who they claim to be to a stated level of certitude.

c. 1. Collection of PII SHALL be limited to the minimum necessary to resolve to a unique identity in a given context.

2. Collection of PII SHALL be limited to the minimum necessary to validate the existence of the claimed identity and associate the claimed identity with the applicant providing identity evidence for appropriate identity resolution, validation, and verification.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The goal of identity resolution is to uniquely distinguish an individual within a given population or context. Effective identity resolution uses the smallest set of attributes necessary to resolve to a unique individual. It provides the CSP an important starting point in the overall identity proofing process, to include the initial detection of potential fraud, but in no way represents a complete and successful identity proofing transaction.

Collection of PII may include attributes are used to correlate identity evidence to authoritative sources and to provide RPs with attributes used to make authorization decisions. There may be many different sets that suffice as the minimum, so it is recommended that CSPs choose this set to balance privacy and the user’s usability needs, as well as the likely attributes needed in future uses of the digital identity.

Examples of attributes that may be used for minimum identity attribute sets include:

● Name (first, last. middle) with combinations and variations,

● Address (#, Street, City, County, State, Zip code) with combinations and variations,

● Date of birth (DDMMYYYY) with combinations and variations,

● Email address,

● Phone number.

For population sets that are more defined than the general population (e.g., military veterans, Native Americans), these minimum attribute sets may be tailored to that specific community.

Additionally, it is recommended that CSPs document which alternative attributes it will accept in cases where an applicant cannot provide the minimum necessary attributes (e.g., applicant does not have a home address or phone number).

d. The CSP SHALL provide explicit notice to the applicant at the time of collection regarding the purpose for collecting and maintaining a record of the attributes necessary for identity proofing, including whether such attributes are voluntary or mandatory to complete the identity proofing process, and the consequences for not providing the attributes.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Notice of proofing may contain at a minimum:

● Attribute information that is mandatory

● Attribute information that is voluntary

● What will be done with the information collected

● How the information will be protected

● Consequence of not providing mandatory attribute information (e.g., suspension/termination of the identity proofing process).

This notice may be delivered as an online screen (for remote identity proofing), a poster or printed notice at in-person proofing locations, or an oral notice delivered at the time of information collection.

e. If CSPs process attributes for purposes other than identity proofing, authentication, or attribute assertions (collectively “identity service”), related fraud mitigation, or to comply with

law or legal process, then CSPs SHALL implement measures to maintain predictability and manageability commensurate with the privacy risk arising from the additional processing.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Predictability and manageability measures include providing clear notice, obtaining subscriber consent, or enabling selective use or disclosure of attributes.

Predictability is meant to build trust and provide accountability and requires full understanding (and disclosure) of how the attribute information will be used. Manageability also builds trust by demonstrating a CSPs ability to control attribute information throughout processing – collection, maintenance, retention.

f. If the CSP employs consent as part of its measures to maintain predictability and manageability, …then it SHALL NOT make consent for the additional processing a condition of the identity service.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Consent involves collecting and recording an affirmative response from the applicant that they agree to the additional processing of their attributes. In order to make this consent meaningful, it is recommended that CSPs first disclose to its applicants which attributes are being collected and processed and why.

g. The CSP SHALL provide mechanisms for redress of applicant complaints or problems arising from the identity proofing.

These [redress] mechanisms SHALL be easy for applicants to find and use.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The Privacy Act requires federal CSPs that maintain a system of records to follow procedures to enable applicants to access and, if incorrect, amend their records. Any Privacy Act Statement should include a reference to the applicable SORN(s), which provide the applicant with instructions on how to make a request for access or correction. It is recommended that non-federal CSPs have comparable procedures, including contact information for any third parties if they are the source of the information.

It is recommended that CSPs make the availability of any alternative methods for completing the identity proofing and enrollment processes clear to users (e.g., in person at a customer service

center, if available) in the event an applicant is unable to properly complete the initial identity proofing and enrollment process requirements online.

Note: If the ID proofing process is not successful, it is recommended that CSPs inform the applicant of the procedures to address the issue but avoid informing the applicant of the specifics of why the registration failed.

To be effective, the use of a CSP’s redress mechanism results in a timely correction of errors, resolution of the dispute or complaint, and the process should not be overly burdensome or complex.

It is recommended that the CSP document and publish, in a manner which is easy for Applicants to find and use, its mechanisms for redress of Applicant complaints or problems arising from the identity proofing processes.

h. The CSP SHALL assess the [redress] mechanisms for their efficacy in achieving resolution of complaints or problems.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: \"Effective\" in this requirement means that use of the redress mechanism will result in a timely correction of errors, resolution of the dispute or complaint, and the process shall not be overly burdensome or complex.

It is recommended that CSPs maintain a record or log of all cases – including outcomes – where applicants have sought redress for complaints or problems arising from the identity proofing and provide for the periodic review of these records.

i. The identity proofing and enrollment processes SHALL be performed according to an applicable written policy or *practice statement* that specifies the particular steps taken to verify identities.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Having documented procedures is a prerequisite for transparency, accountability, quality control, auditability, and ease of interoperability among

federated communities. The documentation, dissemination, review and update to identity and authentication processes is a core control under IA-1 Identification and Authentication Policy and Procedures.

j. The *practice statement* SHALL include control information detailing how the CSP handles proofing errors that result in an applicant not being successfully enrolled.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: “Proofing errors” in this context refer to circumstances that result in the inability or failure to complete the identity proofing and enrollment processes. Such circumstances may include:

● Applicant abandons the identity proofing and enrollment processes;

● Applicant fails to provide mandatory attribute information;

● Identity evidence of required strength is not provided;

● Identity evidence is rejected following inspection;

● Identity evidence and information do not correlate;

● Information from identity evidence is not validated by issuing or authoritative sources at the required strength;

● Identity evidence verification of binding to the applicant fails; and

● Applicant fails to confirm enrollment code within code validity period.

Depending on the circumstances above, it is recommended that the documentation include the number of retries allowed, proofing alternatives (e.g., in-person if remote fails), or fraud countermeasures when anomalies are detected. Additional controls for handling identity proofing errors include:

● Advising the applicant of identity proofing failure and recourse options; and,

● Recording the errors in enrollment records/audit logs, along with any mitigating actions.

k. The CSP SHALL maintain a record, including audit logs, of all steps taken to verify the identity of the applicant as long as the identity exists in the information system.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Ideally, the CSP’s identity system includes the capability to securely record and log key security-related activities associated with the identity proofing process.

Examples of key steps that may be recorded in enrollment logs include:

● Identity information collected;

● Identity evidence provided;

● Identity evidence validated;

● Identity evidence validation source;

● Identity evidence binding verification method;

● Identity evidence verification result;

● Enrollment code confirmation result;

● enrollment result; and

● Authenticator enrollment binding

l. The CSP SHALL record the types of identity evidence presented in the proofing process.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Ideally, the CSP’s identity system includes the capability to securely record and log specific activities associated with the identity proofing process. For each piece of evidence collected or captured, the record should include:

1. Evidence type;

2. Determined strength;

3. Issuing source; and

4. Method of collection/capture*.

* Methods of collection and capture may include camera, flatbed scanner, bar code scanner.

m. The CSP SHALL conduct a risk management process, including assessments of privacy and security risks to determine:

1. Any steps that it will take to verify the identity of the applicant beyond any mandatory requirements specified herein;

2. The PII, including any biometrics, images, scans, or other copies of the identity

evidence that the CSP will maintain as a record of identity proofing (Note: Specific federal requirements may apply); and

3. The schedule of retention for these records (Note: CSPs may be subject to specific retention policies in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, or policies, including any National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) records retention schedules that may apply).

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In accordance with its risk management processes, CSPs should conduct – and document the results of – privacy and security risk assessments. It is recommended that the scope of this assessment includes risks associated with:

● Any steps the CSP takes to verify applicant identities beyond what is required by the CJISSECPOL

● The CSP’s collection, processing, and protection of PII, including any biometrics, images, scans, or other copies of the identity evidence that the CSP will maintain as a record of identity proofing;

● Retention and/or disposal of any records; and

● Adherence to any applicable federal requirements, laws, regulations or policies.

n. All PII collected as part of the enrollment process SHALL be protected to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and attribution of the information source.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Unauthorized disclosure of PII can result in tangible and intangible harms to both the CSP as well as the subjects of the PII. After assessing the risks associated with collecting PII as part of its enrollment process, it is recommended that the CSP employ functional and technical mechanisms that adequately protect the confidentiality, integrity, and attribution of the PII under its control.

Such mechanisms may include:

● Limiting access to PII data;

● Privacy protecting policies;

● The use of encryption for data at rest and during transmission; and

● Integrity protection mechanisms such as hashes and record access logging.

o. \"The entire proofing transaction, including transactions that involve a third party, SHALL occur over authenticated protected channels. \"

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: An encrypted communication channel uses approved cryptography where the connection initiator (client) has authenticated the recipient (server). Authenticated protected channels provide confidentiality and MitM attack protection and are frequently used in the user authentication process. Transport Layer Security* (TLS) is an example of an authenticated protected channel where the certificate presented by the recipient is verified by the initiator. Unless otherwise specified, authenticated protected channels do not require the server to authenticate the client.

Authentication of the server is often accomplished through a certificate chain leading to a trusted root rather than individually with each server.

*TLS version 1.2 or greater is recommended.

p. \"If the CSP uses fraud mitigation measures, then the CSP SHALL conduct a privacy risk assessment for these mitigation measures. \"

Such assessments SHALL include any privacy risk mitigations (e.g., risk acceptance or transfer, limited retention, use limitations, notice) or other technological mitigations (e.g., cryptography), and be documented per requirement IA-12(3) k – m above.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This is a conditional requirement. CSPs may choose to obtain additional confidence in the identity proofing process beyond the requirements for IAL2 through additional fraud mitigation measures. Such measures may include:

● inspecting metadata information, such as by checking geolocation data associated with a mobile device used to send a photo or receive an SMS;

● examining the applicant’s device characteristics;

● evaluating behavioral characteristics, such as typing mannerisms, gait, or voice characteristics; and

● checking against authoritative sources, such as the Death Master File.

Employing one or more of these fraud mitigation techniques may result in the collection of additional PII about an applicant. Additional PII increases the potential impact of the

unauthorized disclosure of this data. As part of the privacy risk assessment on these additional fraud mitigation measures, it is recommended that CSPs consider, at a minimum, the additional data (PII) that is processed, the implications of retaining this additional PII, and ways the associated risks can be minimized without negating the effects of the additional measures.

These additional fraud mitigation measures are not intended to substitute or replace the mandatory requirements. CSPs employing these measures are still responsible for meeting all applicable requirements.

q. In the event a CSP ceases to conduct identity proofing and enrollment processes, then the CSP SHALL be responsible for fully disposing of or destroying any sensitive data including PII, or its protection from unauthorized access for the duration of retention.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This is a conditional requirement for CSPs that cease to perform identity proofing and enrollment functions. The CSP is responsible for the proper handling, protection, and retention or disposal of any sensitive data it collects, even after it ceases to provide identity proofing and enrollment services. A CSP may document its policies and procedures to the management of the data it collects in a data handling plan or other document. Additionally, it is recommended that CSPs document any specific retention policies they are subject to, in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, or policies, including any National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) records retention schedules that may apply.

Specifically, it is recommended that the CSP defines and documents the practices it has in place for fully disposing of or destroying any sensitive data including PII, or its continued protection from unauthorized access for the duration of any period of retention.

r. Regardless of whether the CSP is a federal agency or non- federal entity, the following requirements apply to the federal agency offering or using the proofing service:

1. The agency SHALL consult with their Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) to conduct an analysis determining whether the collection of PII to conduct identity proofing triggers Privacy Act requirements.

2. The agency SHALL publish a System of Records Notice (SORN) to cover such

collection, as applicable.

3. The agency SHALL consult with their SAOP to conduct an analysis determining whether the collection of PII to conduct identity proofing triggers E-Government Act of 2002 requirements.

4. The agency SHALL publish a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) to cover such collection, as applicable.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: This requirement applies to Federal agencies whether providing authentication services directly or through a commercial provider. This requirement directs Agencies to consult with their Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) and conduct an analysis to determine whether the collection of PII to issue or maintain authenticators triggers the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974 or the requirements of the E-Government Act of 2002. Based on this consultation and analysis, the agency may need to publish a System of Records Notice (SORN) and/or a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) to cover such collections, as applicable. While this requirement specifically applies only to federal agencies, CSPs that provide services to federal agencies may be expected to provide information about their identity services in support of an Agency’s privacy analysis and PIA.

s. An enrollment code SHALL be comprised of one of the following:

1 Minimally, a random six character alphanumeric or equivalent entropy. For example, a code generated using an approved random number generator or a serial number for a physical hardware authenticator; OR

2 A machine-readable optical label, such as a QR Code, that contains data of similar or higher entropy as a random six character alphanumeric.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The use of an enrollment code for address confirmation is a requirement for IAL2 remote identity proofing and enrollment. CSPs that perform in-person identity at IAL2 may voluntarily choose to use enrollment codes for such binding, but this is not required. Enrollment codes may also be used for in-person proofing and enrollment processes if an authenticator(s) is not registered to the subscribers’ account at the time of in-person identity proofing and, therefore, the authenticator binding would need to occur at a later time.

Enrollment codes may be used for authenticator binding to subscribers’ accounts in such circumstances.

Enrollment code use for IAL2 remote identity proofing allows the CSP to confirms that the applicant controls a validated address of record. Authenticator binding may not be completed in the same session for in-person identity proofing. Enrollment codes may be used for binding an authenticator to subscribers’ accounts at a later time in such circumstances. The requirements presented in this criterion apply to all enrollment codes that may be used by the CSP for any purpose.

Enrollment code use has the additional requirement for code validity periods. The validity period is determined by the type of address where the enrollment code is sent, as follows:

● 10 days, when sent to a postal address of record within the contiguous United States;

● 30 days, when sent to a postal address of record outside the contiguous United States;

● 10 minutes, when sent to a telephone of record (SMS or voice);

● 24 hours, when sent to an email address of record;

● 7 days if provided directly to the applicant during an in-person proofing session for authenticator binding at IAL2.

These validity periods are presented again in requirement IA-12 (5) g which presents the mandatory requirement for enrollment code confirmation for IAL2 remote identity proofing.

t. Training requirements for personnel validating evidence SHALL be based on the policies, guidelines, or requirements of the CSP or RP.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The training requirement pertains to personnel performing the validation of identity evidence but does not specify training content. The CSP policies, guidelines, or requirements for validating identity evidence for identity proofing would be appropriate for the type of training intended by this requirement. Such content may include:

● the CSP’s policy for types of evidence it collects and validates in order to meet the requirements of designated IALs;

● validation of security features for the types of identity evidence collected;

● detection of evidence alteration, falsification, or forgery for the types of identity evidence collected. Procedures for the validation of identity evidence information with issuing and authoritative sources.

This training may be accomplished through written training material, oral instruction, on-the-job training and mentoring, or other means. CSPs may perform some of the requirements for identity evidence validation through automated services and equipment. Therefore, personnel training would be based on the CSPs policies and procedures for the manual performance of evidence validation.

u. This criterion applies to CSPs that provide identity proofing and enrollment services to minors (under the age of 18):

If the CSP provides identity proofing and enrollment services to minors (under the age of 18), then…the CSP SHALL give special consideration to the legal restrictions of interacting with minors unable to meet the evidence requirements of identity proofing [to ensure compliance with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), and other laws, as applicable]. \"

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In general, minors will not possess the types of evidence required to meet the CSP’s minimum requirements for a given IAL. ICSPs that provide identity services to minors will need to determine and document the special considerations it applies to minors. Such special considerations may include the use of trusted referees and an expanded list of acceptable evidence types to include evidence a minor would likely possess, such as school IDs.

Requirements ‘v’ and ‘w’ apply to the collection of biometric characteristics for in-person (physical or supervised remote) identity proofing and are mandatory at IAL3. These criteria also apply to CSPs that optionally choose to collect biometric characteristics through in-person identity proofing and enrollment at IAL2.

v. The CSP SHALL have the operator view the biometric source (e.g., fingers, face) for presence of non-natural materials and perform such inspections as part of the proofing process.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Applicants may try to defraud the identity proofing process by using fake fingers or by applying non-natural materials - such as latex, silicon, or glue – to their fingers, faces, or other sources of biometrics. It is recommended that identity proofing operators be trained to recognize such practices and to examine all biometric sources used in the identity proofing for the presence of foreign materials.

It is recommended that the CSP documents and applies technologies and procedures which ensure that the proofing operator reviews the biometric source (e.g., fingers, face) for presence of non-natural materials and perform such inspections as part of the proofing process.

Requirements ‘v’ and ‘w’ apply to the collection of biometric characteristics for in-person (physical or supervised remote) identity proofing and are mandatory at IAL3. These criteria also apply to CSPs that collect biometric characteristics through in-person identity-proofing identity proofing and enrollment at IAL2.

w. The CSP SHALL collect biometrics in such a way that ensures that the biometric is collected from the applicant, and not another subject. All biometric performance requirements in IA-5 m (1) through (12) apply.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Applicants may try to defraud the identity proofing process by having another person present themselves for biometric collection. The risk of this happening is increased if the identity proofing process is not completed in a single session and during supervised remote identity proofing processes.

Documenting the technologies and procedures the CSP employs to ensure that biometric samples are taken from the applicant him/herself and not another person facilitates the assessment against this requirement.

x. The CSP SHALL support in-person or remote identity proofing, or both.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: IAL2 allows for remote or in-person identity proofing. IAL2 supports a wide range of acceptable identity proofing techniques in order to increase user adoption, decrease false negatives (legitimate applicants that cannot successfully complete identity proofing), and detect to the best extent possible the presentation of fraudulent identities by a malicious applicant.

Remote proofing presents challenges to achieving the desired outcomes described above that can be overcome through the use specific processes and technologies. Potential processes and controls that CSPs may employ to mitigate risks associated with remote identity proofing at IAL2 include:

1. A remote operator is present during at least part of the identity proofing session and can provide positive confirmation that the requirements for IAL2 identity proofing are met. Employing real-time remote operators provides the capability for the identity proofing process to be completed in a single session and allows the remote operator to direct the applicant for proper presentation and examination of identity evidence and biometrics collection.

2. The CSP employs automated technologies and services (e.g., liveness detection, identity evidence verification and validation, and presentation attack detection, if applicable) which can ensure the requirements for IAL2 identity proofing are met and protect against spoofing attacks. This process also provides the capability for the identity proofing process to be completed in a single session.

3. The CSP employs an off-line operator to evaluate the evidence and images collected during a previous identity proofing process. In this scenario, the identity proofing process requires more than one session with the applicant and is not completed until the operator provides a positive confirmation that all requirements for IAL2 identity proofing are met.

y. The CSP SHALL collect the following from the applicant:

1. One piece of SUPERIOR or STRONG evidence if the evidence’s issuing source, during its identity proofing event, confirmed the claimed identity by collecting two or more forms of SUPERIOR or STRONG evidence and the CSP validates the evidence directly with the issuing source; OR

2. Two pieces of STRONG evidence; OR

3. One piece of STRONG evidence plus two pieces of FAIR evidence

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The goal of identity validation is to collect the most appropriate identity evidence (e.g., a passport or driver’s license) from the applicant and determine its authenticity, validity, and accuracy. Identity validation is made up of three process steps: 1) collecting the appropriate identity evidence, 2) confirming the evidence is genuine and authentic, and 3) confirming the data contained on the identity evidence is valid, current, and related to a real-life subject.

Figure 9 - Notional Strength of Evidence Types of this document presents notional strengths for types of evidence that may be presented for identity proofing purposes. Documenting the types and strengths of evidence the CSP collects for each proofing encounter demonstrates conformance for this requirement. (Also see IA-12 (3) l.)

Examples of methods and how they can be used to capture identity evidence images or extract data for validation include:

● Cameras to capture images of identity evidence for the purposes of evidence validation;

● Document scanner to capture images of identity evidence for the purpose of evidence validation; and

● Bar-code scanner to capture and extract information from standardized barcodes embedded on identity evidence.

High resolution images of at least 300 ppi are necessary for proper evidence examination and validation.
z. The CSP SHALL validate each piece of evidence with a process that can achieve the same strength as the evidence presented (see ‘y’ above). For example, if two forms of STRONG identity evidence are presented, each piece of evidence will be validated at a strength of STRONG.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The goal of identity validation is to collect the most appropriate identity evidence (e.g., a passport, driver’s license) from the applicant and determine its authenticity, validity, and accuracy. Identity validation is made up of three process steps: 1) collect the appropriate identity evidence, 2) confirm the evidence is genuine and authentic, and 3) confirm the data contained on the identity evidence is valid, current, and related to a real-life subject.

Evidence validation for authenticity involves examining the evidence for:

● Confirmation of required information completeness and format for the identity evidence type.

● Detection of evidence tampering or the creation of counterfeit or fraudulent evidence.

● Confirmation of security features. See Figure 10 - Types of Identity Evidence Security Features to this document for types of commonly used security features for identity evidence.

Most of the capabilities to confirm security features on identity evidence are dependent upon physically viewing the evidence directly, tactile feel of the evidence, and viewing the evidence under specialized lighting or through the use of specialized equipment (see Figure 10 - Types of Identity Evidence Security Features). Therefore, the validation of evidence that may be submitted remotely for remote identity proofing methods is particularly challenging. For this reason, CSPs opting to provide remote identity proofing may find it most effective to use automated evidence validation products and services. If automated evidence validation solutions are not used, CSPs may choose to apply similar procedures for IAL2 remote proofing as are required for IAL3 supervised remote proofing. These procedures provide that a trained operator can remotely supervise the evidence collection process, require the applicant to turn or tilt evidence or apply lighting to be able to confirm security features on evidence that is presented for the identity proofing encounter in a recorded video or webcast. Alternatively, a CSP may use an automated interface for the capture of identity evidence images that similarly can direct the applicant to turn, tilt or provide lighting on evidence presented for identity proofing purposes.

aa. The CSP SHALL verify identity evidence as follows:

At a minimum, the applicant’s binding to identity evidence must be verified by a process that is able to achieve a strength of STRONG.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The goal of identity verification is to confirm and establish a linkage between the validated evidence for the claimed identity and the real-life applicant presenting the evidence

bb. For IAL2 remote proofing: The collection of biometric characteristics for physical or biometric comparison of the applicant to the strongest piece of identity evidence provided to support the claimed identity performed remotely SHALL adhere to all requirements as specified in IA-5 m.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: See IA-5 m (1) – (12) for conformance criteria for the implementation and conformance assessment of requirements for the use of biometrics.

cc. Knowledge-based verification (KBV) SHALL NOT be used for in-person (physical or supervised remote) identity verification.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: identity verification is performed against the strongest piece of identity evidence submitted and validated. For IAL2 the strongest piece of evidence will always be either STRONG or SUPERIOR evidence. KBV (sometimes referred to as knowledge-based authentication) is only permitted as a verification method for evidence at the FAIR strength level; therefore, verification of FAIR evidence binding will never be required for IAL2.

dd. The CSP SHALL employ appropriately tailored security controls, to include control enhancements, from the moderate or high baseline of security controls defined in the CJISSECPOL.

The CSP SHALL ensure that the minimum assurance-related controls for moderate-impact systems are satisfied.

ee. Supervised Remote Identity Proofing: Supervised remote identity proofing is intended to provide controls for comparable levels of confidence and security to in-person IAL3 identity proofing for identity proofing processes that are performed remotely. Supervised remote identity proofing is optional for CSPs; that is, if a CSP chooses to use supervised remote identity proofing, then the following requirements, (1) through (8), would apply. It should be noted that the term “supervised remote identity proofing” has specialized meaning and is used only to refer to the specialized equipment and the following control requirements, (1) through (8). In addition to those requirements presented in this document, as well as the applicable identity validation and verification requirements, CSPs that provide supervised remote identity proofing services must demonstrate conformance with the requirements contained in this section. The following requirements for supervised remote proofing apply specifically to IAL3. If the equipment/facilities used for supervised remote proofing are used for IAL2 identity proofing, the following requirements, (1) through (8), for supervised remote proofing do not apply. In this case, the requirements for conventional remote identity proofing are applicable.

1. Supervised remote identity proofing and enrollment transactions SHALL meet the following requirements, in addition to the IAL3 validation and verification requirements specified in IA-12(3)s.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Supervised remote identity proofing involves the use of a CSP-controlled station at a remote location that is connected to a trained operator at a central location. The goal of this arrangement is to permit identity proofing of individuals in remote locations where it is not practical for them to travel to the CSP for in-person identity proofing.

2. The CSP SHALL monitor the entire identity proofing session, from which the applicant SHALL NOT depart — for example, by a continuous high-resolution video transmission of the applicant.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The integrity of supervised remote identity proofing depends upon the applicant being continuously present during the entire session. An applicant who steps away from an in-process session may do so to alter their biometric source or substitute a different person to complete the identity proofing process.

3. The CSP SHALL have a live operator participate remotely with the applicant for the entirety of the identity proofing session.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Having a trained operator supervise and participate in a remote identity proofing session reduces the opportunity for an applicant to defraud the process. As described in Appendix A Terms and Definitions, the operator is a person who has received specific training on enrollment and identity proofing procedures and the detection of potential fraud by an applicant.

4. The CSP SHALL require all actions taken by the applicant during the identity proofing session to be clearly visible to the remote operator.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: The camera(s) a CSP employs to monitor the actions taken by a remote applicant during the identity proofing session should be positioned in such a way that the upper body, hands, and face of the applicant are always visible. Additionally, the components of the remote identity proofing station (including such things as keyboard, fingerprint capture device, signature pad, and scanner, as applicable) should be arranged such that all interactions with these devices is within the field of view.

5. The CSP SHALL require that all digital validation of evidence (e.g., via chip or wireless technologies) be performed by integrated scanners and sensors.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Technologies exist that allow for the digital validation of identity evidence via electronic means (such as RFID to read the data off e-passports and chip readers for smartcards). The scanners and sensors employed to access these features should be integrated into the remote identity proofing stations in order to reduce the likelihood of being tampered with, removed, or replaced. To be integrated means the devices themselves are a component of the workstation (i.e., smartcard readers or fingerprint sensors built into a laptop) or the devices, and their connections, are secured in a protective case or locked box.

6. The CSP SHALL require operators to have undergone a training program to detect potential fraud and to properly perform a supervised remote proofing session.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: A comprehensive training program for supervised remote identity proofing operators may include some or all the following:

● Purpose and objectives of the identity proofing and enrollment process, as employed by the CSP;

● Supervised remote identity proofing process workflow;

● Identity evidence validation processes;

● Threats associated with the identity proofing process and how to detect potential fraud; and

● System and process troubleshooting and problem resolution.

7. The CSP SHALL employ physical tamper detection and resistance features appropriate for the environment in which it is located.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: For example, a kiosk located in a restricted area or one where it is monitored by a trusted individual requires less tamper detection than one that is located in a semi-public area such as a shopping mall concourse.

8. The CSP SHALL ensure that all communications occur over a mutually authenticated protected channel.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Mutually authenticated protected channels employ approved cryptography to encrypt communications between

ff. Trusted Referee: The use of trusted referees is optional for CSPs; that is, if a CSP chooses to use trusted referees for identity proofing and enrollment, then the following requirements, (1) through (3), would apply. The use of trusted referees is intended to assist in the identity proofing and enrollment for populations that are unable to meet IAL2 identity proofing requirements, or otherwise would be challenged to perform identity proofing and enrollment process requirements. Such populations may include, but are not limited to:

• disabled individuals;

• elderly individuals;

• homeless individuals,

• individuals with little or no access to online services or computing devices;

• unbanked and individuals with little or no credit history;

• victims of identity theft;

• children under 18; and

• immigrants.

In addition to those requirements presented in the General section of this document, as well as the applicable IAL requirements, CSPs that use trusted referees in their identity proofing services must demonstrate conformance with the requirements contained in this section.

1. If the CSP uses trusted referees, then…The CSP SHALL establish written policy and procedures as to how a trusted referee is determined and the lifecycle by which the trusted referee retains their status as a valid referee, to include any restrictions, as well as any revocation and suspension requirements.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In instances where an individual cannot meet the identity evidence requirements specified in IA-12 (3) y – ee and IA-12 (5) b - i, the agency may use a trusted referee to assist in identity proofing the applicant. It is intended that CSPs using trusted referees for identity proofing and enrollment will document the procedures and controls in an applicable written policy or *practice statement* as described in IA-12 (3) h.

2. If the CSP uses trusted referees, then…The CSP SHALL proof the trusted referee at the same IAL as the applicant proofing.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Trusted referees, who participate in the identity proofing process on behalf of an applicant need to be identity proofed themselves to the same level as that of the applicant. If CSPs allows the use of Trusted Referees, its documented policies should state this requirement.

3. If the CSP uses trusted referees, then…The CSP SHALL determine the minimum evidence required to bind the relationship between the trusted referee and the applicant.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: In addition to proofing a Trusted Referee to the same (or greater) IAL as that of the applicant, CSPs will need to determine its process for proving a legitimate relationship to the applicant. The CSP should consider and document the types of evidence (i.e., power of attorney) it will accept to “bind” the relationship between Trusted Referee and an applicant. This minimum evidence may vary based on IAL.

","uuid":"e0319bb9-ae33-405e-84d9-6b9ff235724a","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-12(3) IDENTITY PROOFING | IDENTITY EVIDENCE VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-12(3)"},{"description":"

a. Require that a registration code or notice of proofing be delivered through an out-of-band channel to verify the users address (physical or digital) of record.

DISCUSSION: To make it more difficult for adversaries to pose as legitimate users during the identity proofing process, organizations can use out-of-band methods to ensure that the individual associated with an address of record is the same individual that participated in the registration. Confirmation can take the form of a temporary enrollment code or a notice of proofing. The delivery address for these artifacts is obtained from records and not self-asserted by the user. The address can include a physical or digital address. A home address is an example of a physical address. Email addresses and telephone numbers are examples of digital addresses.

b. The CSP SHALL confirm address of record.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Valid records to confirm address are issuing source(s) or authoritative source(s). Ideally, the CSP will confirm an address of record through validation of the address contained on any supplied, valid piece of identity evidence. However, the CSP may confirm address of record by validating information supplied by the applicant that is not contained on any supplied piece of identity evidence. Postal addresses are preferred, however these guidelines support any type of address that can be validated against an issuing or authoritative source, whether physical or digital. Acceptable addresses of record include postal addresses, email addresses, and telephone numbers. The types of addresses of record a CSP accepts will determine, in part, the method it employs to validate them. For instance, postal addresses can be validated by confirming it against a piece of supplied, valid identity evidence. Email addresses may be confirmed by sending an email to the provided address.

c. Valid records to confirm address SHALL be issuing source(s) or authoritative source(s).

Self-asserted address data that has not been confirmed in records SHALL NOT be used for confirmation.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: An address of record is a “validated and verified location (physical or digital) where an individual can receive communications using approved mechanisms.” IAL2 requires confirming an applicant’s address of record. This can be accomplished in two ways: 1) validation of the address contained on a valid piece of identity evidence, or 2) by employing a mechanism such as enrollment codes to validate an address not contained on a supplied piece of identity evidence.

Addresses that are supplied by an applicant, either verbally or on a non-valid piece of identity evidence, are not valid for confirming an applicant’s address of record.

d. Note that IAL2-7 applies only to in-person proofing at IAL2.

If the CSP performs in-person proofing for IAL2 and provides an enrollment code directly to the subscriber for binding to an authenticator at a later time, then the enrollment code…SHALL be valid for a maximum of seven (7) days.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Upon successful completion of the identity proofing process the CSP will typically register one or more authenticators to the subscribers’ account or may optionally choose to bind an authenticator(s) at a later time. If the CSP chooses to use an enrollment code provided directly to the applicant to authenticate for such later binding, the validity period for the enrollment code is a maximum of seven days (see IA-12 (3) s).

Note that conformance criteria IA-12 (5) ‘e’ through ‘i’ apply to remote identity proofing processes at IAL2.

e. For remote identity proofing at IAL2:

The CSP SHALL send an enrollment code to a confirmed address of record for the applicant.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Enrollment codes used for IAL2 remote identity proofing may be sent to any confirmed address of record – postal, mobile phone number for SMS, or email addresses.

f. For remote identity proofing at IAL2:

The applicant SHALL present a valid enrollment code to complete the identity proofing process.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Per IA-12 (5) e above, sending an enrollment code to a confirmed address of record, as captured during the identity proofing process, is required to complete the remote identity proofing process and provides additional confidence in the binding of that address to the applicant.

Valid enrollment codes mean that the correct enrollment code is submitted by the applicant within prescribed validity periods. Enrollment code validity periods depend on the type of address where the code is sent as shown in IA-12 (5) g below.

Information captured in the CSP’s enrollment records or system logs facilitate assessment against this requirement. Ideally, this information would include details about the validity of the enrollment code (date and time applicant entered code; confirmation it was the correct code; and confirmation it was not expired).

g. Note that the following enrollment code validity periods apply to enrollment codes sent to confirmed addresses of record for IAL2 remote in-person proofing only.

Enrollment codes shall have the following maximum validities:

1. 10 days, when sent to a postal address of record within the contiguous United States;

2. 30 days, when sent to a postal address of record outside the contiguous United States;

3. 10 minutes, when sent to a telephone of record (SMS or voice);

4. 24 hours, when sent to an email address of record.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Enrollment codes sent to addresses of record are only valid for a limited amount of time, depending on the type of address of record to which they are sent. Applicants that present enrollment codes that are no longer valid (aka, expired) cannot use this code to complete their identity proofing process.

h. If the enrollment code sent to the confirmed address of record as part of the remote identity proofing process at IAL2 is also intended to be an authentication factor, then…it SHALL be reset upon first use.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: Enrollment codes sent as an authentication factor for address confirmation may only be used once.

i. If the CSP performs remote proofing at IAL2 and optionally sends notification of proofing in addition to sending the required enrollment code, then…The CSP SHALL ensure the enrollment code and notification of proofing are sent to different addresses of record.

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE: For example, if the CSP sends an enrollment code to a phone number validated in records, a proofing notification may be sent to the postal address validated in records or obtained from validated and verified evidence, such as a driver's license

","uuid":"20b3f65b-15c0-40b6-88c4-42c30683d640","family":"Identification and Authentication (IA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.6.IA-12(5) IDENTITY PROOFING | ADDRESS CONFIRMATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.6.IA-12(5)"},{"description":"

a. Replace system components when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer; or

b. Provide the following options for alternative sources for continued support for unsupported components: original manufacturer support, or original contracted vendor support.

Discussion: Support for system components includes software patches, firmware updates, replacement parts, and maintenance contracts. An example of unsupported components includes when vendors no longer provide critical software patches or product updates, which can result in an opportunity for adversaries to exploit weaknesses in the installed components.

Exceptions to replacing unsupported system components include systems that provide critical mission or business capabilities where newer technologies are not available or where the systems are so isolated that installing replacement components is not an option.

Alternative sources for support address the need to provide continued support for system components that are no longer supported by the original manufacturers, developers, or vendors when such components remain essential to organizational mission and business functions. If necessary, organizations can establish in-house support by developing customized patches for critical software components or, alternatively, obtain the services of external providers who provide ongoing support for the designated unsupported components through contractual relationships. Such contractual relationships can include open-source software value-added vendors. The increased risk of using unsupported system components can be mitigated, for example, by prohibiting the connection of such components to public or uncontrolled networks, or implementing other forms of isolation

","uuid":"5017a2e7-5650-4dd1-a9f6-480dd43b37d6","family":"SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION (SA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.14.SA-22 UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.14.SA-22"},{"description":"

a. Develop, document, and disseminate to all organizational personnel with system and information integrity responsibilities and information system owners:

1. Agency-level system and information integrity policy that:

(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and

(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy and the associated system and information integrity controls;

b. Designate organizational personnel with system and information integrity responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the system and information integrity policy and procedures; and

c. Review and update the current system and information integrity:

1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and

2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.

Discussion: System and information integrity policy and procedures address the controls in the SI family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of system and information integrity policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to system and information integrity policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure

","uuid":"36551d37-77db-45d6-94c7-a80c05b49b65","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-1"},{"description":"

a. Identify, report, and correct system flaws;

b. Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation;5

c. Install security-relevant software and firmware updates within the number of days listed after the release of the updates;5

• Critical – 15 days

• High – 30 days

• Medium – 60 days

• Low – 90 days; and

d. Incorporate flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.

Discussion: The need to remediate system flaws applies to all types of software and firmware. Organizations identify systems affected by software flaws, including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this information to designated organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities. Security-relevant updates include patches, service packs, and malicious code signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. By incorporating flaw remediation into configuration management processes, required remediation actions can be tracked and verified.

Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of risk factors, including the security category of the system, the criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw), the organizational risk tolerance, the mission supported by the system, or the threat environment. Some types of flaw remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration and the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations may determine that the testing of software or firmware updates is not necessary or practical, such as when implementing simple malicious code signature updates. In testing decisions, organizations consider whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures

","uuid":"ac7727a0-bfa5-44dc-af39-e13573c78c09","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-2 FLAW REMEDIATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-2"},{"description":"

Determine if system components have applicable security-relevant software and firmware updates installed using vulnerability scanning tools as least quarterly or following any security incidents involving CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.

Discussion: Automated mechanisms can track and determine the status of known flaws for system components

","uuid":"f37ec3e0-c2de-4fa7-b232-c7fca0cb8a96","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-2(2) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-2(2)"},{"description":"

a. Implement signature-based malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code;5

b. Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;

c. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:

1. Perform periodic scans of the system at least daily and real-time scans of files from external sources at network entry and exit points and on all servers and endpoint devices as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and

2. Block or quarantine malicious code, take mitigating action(s), and when necessary, implement incident response procedures; and send alert to system/network administrators and/or organizational personnel with information security responsibilities in response to malicious code detection; and5

d. Address the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the system.5

Discussion: System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote access servers, workstations, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats contained within compressed or hidden files or hidden in files using techniques such as steganography. Malicious code can be inserted into systems in a variety of ways, including by electronic mail, the World Wide Web, and portable storage devices. Malicious code insertions occur through the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code.

Malicious code protection mechanisms include both signature- and nonsignature-based technologies. Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include artificial intelligence techniques that use heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of malicious code and to provide controls against such code for which signatures do not yet exist or for which existing signatures may not be effective. Malicious code for which active signatures do not yet exist or may be ineffective includes polymorphic malicious code (i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). Nonsignature-based mechanisms also include reputation-based technologies. In addition to the above technologies, pervasive configuration management, comprehensive software integrity controls, and anti-exploitation software may be effective in preventing the execution of unauthorized code. Malicious code may be present in commercial off-the-shelf software as well as custom-built software and could include logic bombs, backdoors, and other types of attacks that could affect organizational mission and business functions.

In situations where malicious code cannot be detected by detection methods or technologies, organizations rely on other types of controls, including secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to ensure that software does not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that, in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, the detection of malicious downloads, or the detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files

","uuid":"fefe5f43-49e1-4d75-8913-dd24bc789c73","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-3 Malicious Code protection ","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-3 "},{"description":"

a. Monitor the system to detect:

1. Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives:

a. Intrusion detection and prevention

b. Malicious code protection

c. Vulnerability scanning

d. Audit record monitoring

e. Network monitoring

f. Firewall monitoring;

and

2. Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;

b. Identify unauthorized use of the system through the following techniques and methods: event logging (ref. 5.4 Audit and Accountability);

c. Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices:

1. Strategically within the system to collect organization-determined essential information; and

2. At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization;

d. Analyze detected events and anomalies;

e. Adjust the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation;

f. Obtain legal opinion regarding system monitoring activities; and

g. Provide intrusion detection and prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring, and firewall monitoring software logs to organizational personnel with information security responsibilities weekly.

Discussion: System monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at external interfaces to the system. Internal monitoring includes the observation of events occurring within the system. Organizations monitor systems by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring objectives guide and inform the determination of the events. System monitoring capabilities are achieved through a variety of tools and techniques, including intrusion detection and prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, and network monitoring software.

Depending on the security architecture, the distribution and configuration of monitoring devices may impact throughput at key internal and external boundaries as well as at other locations across a network due to the introduction of network throughput latency. If throughput management is needed, such devices are strategically located and deployed as part of an established organization-wide security architecture. Strategic locations for monitoring devices include selected perimeter locations and near key servers and server farms that support critical applications. Monitoring devices are typically employed at the managed interfaces associated with controls SC-7 and AC-17. The information collected is a function of the organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of systems to support such objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. System monitoring is an integral part of organizational continuous monitoring and incident response programs, and output from system monitoring serves as input to those programs. System monitoring requirements, including the need for specific types of system monitoring, may be referenced in other controls

(e.g., AC-2g, AC-17(1), CM-3f, CM-6d, MA-3a, MA-4a, SC-5(3)(b), SC-7a, SC-18b). Adjustments to levels of system monitoring are based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other sources of information. The legality of system monitoring activities is based on applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.

","uuid":"238b3903-7e99-4836-86cd-cc57bcadb1e2","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-4 SYSTEM MONITORING","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-4"},{"description":"

Employ automated tools and mechanisms to support near real-time analysis of events.

Discussion: Automated tools and mechanisms include host-based, network-based, transport-based, or storage-based event monitoring tools and mechanisms or security information and event management (SIEM) technologies that provide real-time analysis of alerts and notifications generated by organizational systems. Automated monitoring techniques can create unintended privacy risks because automated controls may connect to external or otherwise unrelated systems. The matching of records between these systems may create linkages with unintended consequences. Organizations assess and document these risks in their privacy impact assessment and make determinations that are in alignment with their privacy program plan.

","uuid":"1715e925-ccb3-49c4-a8dd-7f7f170dc073","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-4(2) SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS AND MECHANISMS FOR REAL-TIME ANALYSIS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-4(2)"},{"description":"

a. Determine criteria for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions for inbound and outbound communications traffic;

b. Monitor inbound and outbound communications traffic continuously for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions such as: the presence of malicious code or unauthorized use of legitimate code or credentials within organizational systems or propagating among system components, signaling to external systems, and the unauthorized exporting of information.

Discussion: Unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions related to system inbound and outbound communications traffic includes internal traffic that indicates the presence of malicious code or unauthorized use of legitimate code or credentials within organizational systems or propagating among system components, signaling to external systems, and the unauthorized exporting of information. Evidence of malicious code or unauthorized use of legitimate code or credentials is used to identify potentially compromised systems or system components

","uuid":"3aefa9bf-c70f-4f2f-9dbd-d54cc4ffc5ac","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-4(4) SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-4(4)"},{"description":"

Alert organizational personnel with system monitoring responsibilities when the following system-generated indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: inappropriate or unusual activities with security or privacy implications.

Discussion: Alerts may be generated from a variety of sources, including audit records or inputs from malicious code protection mechanisms, intrusion detection or prevention mechanisms, or boundary protection devices such as firewalls, gateways, and routers. Alerts can be automated and may be transmitted telephonically, by electronic mail messages, or by text messaging. Organizational personnel on the alert notification list can include system administrators, mission or business owners, system owners, information owners/stewards, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, system security officers, or privacy officers. In contrast to alerts generated by the system, alerts generated by organizations in SI-4(12) focus on information sources external to the system, such as suspicious activity reports and reports on potential insider threats

","uuid":"44922c44-12bf-47d5-b078-356b9460dfc0","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-4(5) SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-4(5)"},{"description":"

a. Receive system security alerts, advisories, and directives from external source(s) (e.g., CISA, Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center [MS-ISAC], U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team [USCERT], hardware/software providers, federal/state advisories, etc.) on an ongoing basis;

b. Generate internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary;

c. Disseminate security alerts, advisories, and directives to: organizational personnel implementing, operating, maintaining, and using the system; and

d. Implement security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notify the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.

Discussion: The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) generates security alerts and advisories to maintain situational awareness throughout the federal government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance with security directives is essential due to the critical nature of many of these directives and the potential (immediate) adverse effects on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation should the directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include supply chain partners, external mission or business partners, external service providers, and other peer or supporting organizations.

","uuid":"1aaf0bc5-42e5-4f9e-bb08-60f2f1e3fdb4","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-5 SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-5"},{"description":"

a. Employ integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information systems that contain or process CJI; and

b. Take the following actions when unauthorized changes to the software, firmware, and information are detected: notify organizational personnel responsible for software, firmware, and/or information integrity and implement incident response procedures as appropriate.

Discussion: Unauthorized changes to software, firmware, and information can occur due to errors or malicious activity. Software includes operating systems (with key internal components, such as kernels or drivers), middleware, and applications. Firmware interfaces include Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) and Basic Input/Output System (BIOS). Information includes personally identifiable information and metadata that contains security and privacy attributes associated with information. Integrity-checking mechanisms—including parity checks, cyclical redundancy checks, cryptographic hashes, and associated tools—can automatically monitor the integrity of systems and hosted applications

","uuid":"c729dd1e-bcd6-4143-86f0-c170d06da29f","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-7 SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-7"},{"description":"

Perform an integrity check of software, firmware, and information systems that contain or process CJI at agency-defined transitional states or security relevant events at least weekly or in an automated fashion.

Discussion: Security-relevant events include the identification of new threats to which organizational systems are susceptible and the installation of new hardware, software, or firmware. Transitional states include system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort

","uuid":"011170ea-2687-4331-9b2e-24b3d50ef574","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-7(1) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY CHECKS5","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-7(1)"},{"description":"

Incorporate the detection of the following unauthorized changes into the organizational incident response capability: unauthorized changes to established configuration setting or the unauthorized elevation of system privileges.

Discussion: Integrating detection and response helps to ensure that detected events are tracked, monitored, corrected, and available for historical purposes. Maintaining historical records is important for being able to identify and discern adversary actions over an extended time period and for possible legal actions. Security-relevant changes include unauthorized changes to established configuration settings or the unauthorized elevation of system privileges.

","uuid":"893bbe62-8aa9-427d-bd28-d4125a9326bc","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-7(7) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-7(7) "},{"description":"

a. Employ spam protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and act on unsolicited messages; and

b. Update spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.

Discussion: System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote-access servers, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Spam can be transported by different means, including email, email attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection mechanisms include signature definitions

","uuid":"bb049f7a-7588-4e08-8a2b-34433f3866c7","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-8 SPAM PROTECTION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-8"},{"description":"

Automatically update spam protection mechanisms at least daily.

Discussion: Using automated mechanisms to update spam protection mechanisms helps to ensure that updates occur on a regular basis and provide the latest content and protection capabilities.

","uuid":"0a778ec5-fe13-4375-91b4-9e19e1f57fb6","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-8(2) SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-8(2)"},{"description":"

Check the validity of the following information inputs: all inputs to web/application servers, database servers, and any system or application input that might receive or process CJI.

Discussion: Checking the valid syntax and semantics of system inputs—including character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values—verifies that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. For example, if the organization specifies that numerical values between 1-100 are the only acceptable inputs for a field in a given application, inputs of “387,” “abc,” or “%K%” are invalid inputs and are not accepted as input to the system. Valid inputs are likely to vary from field to field within a software application. Applications typically follow well-defined protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attacker-supplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to be interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component that receives the corrupted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret the data incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing them to interpreters prevents the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation ensures accurate and correct inputs and prevents attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks

","uuid":"4396302e-c112-418b-9060-781c1da0be48","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-10 INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-10"},{"description":"

a. Generate error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited; and

b. Reveal error messages only to organizational personnel with information security responsibilities.

Discussion: Organizations consider the structure and content of error messages. The extent to which systems can handle error conditions is guided and informed by organizational policy and operational requirements. Exploitable information includes stack traces and implementation details; erroneous logon attempts with passwords mistakenly entered as the username; mission or business information that can be derived from, if not stated explicitly by, the information recorded; and personally identifiable information, such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers. Error messages may also provide a covert channel for transmitting information

","uuid":"1df4e3d2-f0d6-4ab3-ab46-980dacc9ad3e","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-11 ERROR HANDLING","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-11"},{"description":"

Manage and retain information within the system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines and operational requirements.

Discussion: Information management and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond system disposal. Information to be retained may also include policies, procedures, plans, reports, data output from control implementation, and other types of administrative information. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provides federal policy and guidance on records retention and schedules. If organizations have a records management office, consider coordinating with records management personnel. Records produced from the output of implemented controls that may require management and retention include, but are not limited to: All XX-1, AC-6(9), AT-4, AU-12, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-9, CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-6, CM-8, CM-9, CM-12, CP-2, IR-6, IR-8, MA-2, MA-4, PE-2, PE-8, PE-16, PE-17, PL-2, PL-4, PL-8, PS-2, PS-6, PS-7, RA-2, RA-3, RA-5, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-10, SI-4, SR-2, SR-8.

(1) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS

Limit personally identifiable information being processed in the information life cycle to the minimum PII necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is collected (see Section 4.3).

Discussion: Limiting the use of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle when the information is not needed for operational purposes helps to reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system. The information life cycle includes information creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposition. Risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, and policies can provide useful inputs to determining which elements of personally identifiable information may create risk.

(2) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | MINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH

Use the following techniques to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for research, testing, or training: data obfuscation, randomization, anonymization, or use of synthetic data.

Discussion: Organizations can minimize the risk to an individual’s privacy by employing techniques such as de-identification or synthetic data. Limiting the use of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle when the information is not needed for research, testing, or training helps reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system. Risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, and policies can provide useful inputs to determining the techniques to use and when to use them.

(3) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | INFORMATION DISPOSAL

Use the following techniques to dispose of, destroy, or erase information following the retention period: as defined in MP-6.

Discussion: Organizations can minimize both security and privacy risks by disposing of information when it is no longer needed. The disposal or destruction of information applies to originals as well as copies and archived records, including system logs that may contain personally identifiable information.

","uuid":"4b77638b-9e8f-41ef-b90a-595d9db22bce","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-12 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-12"},{"description":"

Implement the following controls to protect the system memory from unauthorized code execution: data execution prevention and address space layout randomization.

Discussion: Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in nonexecutable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Controls employed to protect memory include data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention controls can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware enforcement providing the greater strength of mechanism

","uuid":"dcf1b522-f30c-4a83-ad51-c8b04e8af7bc","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-16 MEMORY PROTECTION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-16"},{"description":"

a. Develop, document, and disseminate to all personnel when their unescorted logical or physical access to any information system results in the ability, right, or privilege to view, modify, or make use of unencrypted CJI:

1. Agency-level incident response policy that:

(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and

(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and the associated incident response controls;

b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the incident response policy and procedures; and

c. Review and update the current incident response: 3

1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and

2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.

Discussion: Incident response policy and procedures address the controls in the IR family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of incident response policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to incident response policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

","uuid":"3a99a388-fc2a-493f-9457-c0c12eaece93","family":"Incident Response (IR)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3.IR-1 Policy and Procedures","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-1 "},{"description":"

a. Provide incident response training to system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:

1. Prior to assuming an incident response role or responsibility or acquiring system access;

2. When required by system changes; and

3. Annually thereafter; and

b. Review and update incident response training content annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI. 3

Discussion: Incident response training is associated with the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level of detail are included in such training. For example, users may only need to know who to call or how to recognize an incident; system administrators may require additional training on how to handle incidents; and incident responders may receive more specific training on forensics, data collection techniques, reporting, system recovery, and system restoration. Incident response training includes user training in identifying and reporting suspicious activities from external and internal sources. Incident response training for users may be provided as part of AT-2 or AT-3.

Events that may precipitate an update to incident response training content include, but are not limited to, incident response plan testing or response to an actual incident (lessons learned), assessment or audit findings, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines

","uuid":"f430d87f-5c38-4aa3-b8ec-7b5e70598afa","family":"Incident Response (IR)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3.IR-2 Incident Response Training","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-2"},{"description":"

Test the effectiveness of the incident response capability for the system annually using the following tests: tabletop or walk-through exercises; simulations; or other agency-appropriate tests.

Discussion: Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine their effectiveness and identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident response testing includes the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises, and simulations (parallel or full interrupt). Incident response testing can include a determination of the effects on organizational operations and assets and individuals due to incident response. The use of qualitative and quantitative data aids in determining the effectiveness of incident response processes.

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a. Implement an incident handling capability for incidents that is consistent with the incident response plan and includes preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery;

b. Coordinate incident handling activities with contingency planning activities;

c. Incorporate lessons learned from ongoing incident handling activities into incident response procedures, training, and testing, and implement the resulting changes accordingly; and

d. Ensure the rigor, intensity, scope, and results of incident handling activities are comparable and predictable across the organization.

Discussion: Organizations recognize that incident response capabilities are dependent on the capabilities of organizational systems and the mission and business processes being supported by those systems. Organizations consider incident response as part of the definition, design, and development of mission and business processes and systems. Incident-related information can be obtained from a variety of sources, including audit monitoring, physical access monitoring, and network monitoring; user or administrator reports; and reported supply chain events. An effective incident handling capability includes coordination among many organizational entities (e.g., mission or business owners, system owners, authorizing officials, human resources offices, physical security offices, personnel security offices, legal departments, risk executive [function], operations personnel, procurement offices). Suspected security incidents include the receipt of suspicious email communications that can contain malicious code. Suspected supply chain incidents include the insertion of counterfeit hardware or malicious code into organizational systems or system components. For federal agencies, an incident that involves personally identifiable information is considered a breach. A breach results in unauthorized disclosure, the loss of control, unauthorized acquisition, compromise, or a similar occurrence where a person other than an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable information or an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses such information for other than authorized purposes.

(1) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES

Support the incident handling process using automated mechanisms (e.g., online incident management systems and tools that support the collection of live response data, full network packet capture, and forensic analysis.

Discussion: Automated mechanisms that support incident handling processes include online incident management systems and tools that support the collection of live response data, full network packet capture, and forensic analysis. Incident handling could be inherited from an upstream agency or could be part of a state-level process

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Track and document incidents.

Discussion: Documenting incidents includes maintaining records about each incident, the status of the incident, and other pertinent information necessary for forensics as well as evaluating incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information can be obtained from a variety of sources, including network monitoring, incident reports, incident response teams, user complaints, supply chain partners, audit monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user and administrator reports. IR-4 provides information on the types of incidents that are appropriate for monitoring

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a. Require personnel to report suspected incidents to the organizational incident response capability immediately but not to exceed one (1) hour after discovery; and

b. Report incident information to organizational personnel with incident handling responsibilities, and if confirmed, notify the CSO, SIB Chief, or Interface Agency Official.

Discussion: The types of incidents reported, the content and timeliness of the reports, and the designated reporting authorities reflect applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Incident information can inform risk assessments, control effectiveness assessments, security requirements for acquisitions, and selection criteria for technology products

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Provide an incident response support resource, integral to the organizational incident response capability, that offers advice and assistance to users of the system for the handling and reporting of incidents.

Discussion: Incident response support resources provided by organizations include help desks, assistance groups, automated ticketing systems to open and track incident response tickets, and access to forensics services or consumer redress services, when required

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a. Develop an incident response plan that:

1. Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response capability;

2. Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;

3. Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall organization;

4. Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, and functions;

5. Defines reportable incidents;

6. Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization;

7. Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature an incident response capability;

8. Addresses the sharing of incident information;

9. Is reviewed and approved by the organization’s/agency’s executive leadership annually; and

10. Explicitly designates responsibility for incident response to organizational personnel with incident reporting responsibilities and CSO or CJIS WAN Official.

b. Distribute copies of the incident response plan to organizational personnel with incident handling responsibilities;

c. Update the incident response plan to address system and organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;

d. Communicate incident response plan changes to organizational personnel with incident handling responsibilities; and

e. Protect the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

Discussion: It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated approach to incident response. Organizational mission and business functions determine the structure of incident response capabilities. As part of the incident response capabilities, organizations consider the coordination and sharing of information with external organizations, including external service providers and other organizations involved in the supply chain. For incidents involving personally identifiable information (i.e., breaches), include a process to determine whether notice to oversight organizations or affected individuals is appropriate and provide that notice accordingly.

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a. Develop, document, and disseminate to: organizational personnel with access control responsibilities

1. Agency-level access control policy that:

(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and

(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and the associated access controls;

b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the access control policy and procedures; and

c. Review and update the current access control:

1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and

2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.

Discussion: Access control policy and procedures address the controls in the AC family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of access control policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to access control policy and procedures include assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure.

","uuid":"ae559a09-e34c-4f1f-ad6a-6b5a756033f8","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-1 Policy and Procedures","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-1"},{"description":"

a. Define and document the types of accounts allowed and specifically prohibited for use within the system;

b. Assign account managers;

c. Require conditions for group and role membership;

d. Specify:

1. Authorized users of the system;

2. Group and role membership; and

3. Access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and attributes listed for each account; 3

Attribute Name

Email Address Text

Employer Name

Federation Id

Given Name

Identity Provider Id

Sur Name

Telephone Number

Identity Provider Id

Unique Subject Id

Counter Terrorism Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator

Criminal History Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator

Criminal Intelligence Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator

Criminal Investigative Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator

Display Name

Government Data Self Search Home Privilege Indicator

Local Id

NCIC Certification Indicator

N-DEx Privilege Indicator

PCII Certification Indicator

28 CFR Certification Indicator

Employer ORI

Employer Organization General Category Code

Employer State Code

Public Safety Officer Indicator

Sworn Law Enforcement Officer Indicator

Authenticator Assurance Level

Federation Assurance Level

Identity Assurance Level

Intelligence Analyst Indicator

e. Require approvals by organizational personnel with account management responsibilities for requests to create accounts;

f. Create, enable, modify, disable, and remove accounts in accordance with agency policy;

g. Monitor the use of accounts;

h. Notify account managers and system/network administrators within: 3

1. One day when accounts are no longer required;

2. One day when users are terminated or transferred; and

3. One day when system usage or need-to-know changes for an individual;

i. Authorize access to the system based on:

1. A valid access authorization;

2. Intended system usage; and

3. Attributes as listed in AC-2(d)(3); 3

j. Review accounts for compliance with account management requirements at least annually;

k. Establish and implement a process for changing shared or group account authenticators (if deployed) when individuals are removed from the group; and

l. Align account management processes with personnel termination and transfer processes.

Discussion: Examples of system account types include individual, shared, group, system, guest, anonymous, emergency, developer, temporary, and service. Identification of authorized system users and the specification of access privileges reflect the requirements in other controls in the security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on system accounts receive additional scrutiny by organizational personnel responsible for approving such accounts and privileged access, including system owner, mission or business owner, senior agency information security officer, or senior agency official for privacy. Types of accounts that organizations may wish to prohibit due to increased risk include shared, group, emergency, anonymous, temporary, and guest accounts. Where access involves personally identifiable information, security programs collaborate with the senior agency official for privacy to establish the specific conditions for group and role membership; specify authorized users, group and role membership, and access authorizations for each account; and create, adjust, or remove system accounts in accordance with organizational policies. Policies can include such information as account expiration dates or other factors that trigger the disabling of accounts. Organizations may choose to define access privileges or other attributes by account, type of account, or a combination of the two. Examples of other attributes required for authorizing access include restrictions on time of day, day of week, and point of origin. In defining other system account attributes, organizations consider system-related requirements and mission/business requirements. Failure to consider these factors could affect system availability.

Temporary and emergency accounts are intended for short-term use. Organizations establish temporary accounts as part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts without the demand for immediacy in account activation. Organizations establish emergency accounts in response to crisis situations and with the need for rapid account activation. Therefore, emergency account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts, including local logon accounts used for special tasks or when network resources are unavailable (may also be known as accounts of last resort). Such accounts remain available and are not subject to automatic disabling or removal dates. Conditions for disabling or deactivating accounts include when shared/group, emergency, or temporary accounts are no longer required and when individuals are transferred or terminated. Changing shared/group authenticators when members leave the group is intended to ensure that former group members do not retain access to the shared or group account. Some types of system accounts may require specialized training

","uuid":"d723b397-6a04-4244-8fe8-d5c84ad14f63","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-2 ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-2"},{"description":"

Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.

Discussion: Access control policies control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (i.e., devices, files, records, domains) in organizational systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the system level and recognizing that systems can host many applications and services in support of mission and business functions, access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security and privacy. In contrast to logical access controls that are implemented within the system, physical access controls are addressed by the controls in the Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) family

","uuid":"7058d371-1f50-4157-9497-71f86dcc48da","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-3 ACCESS ENFORCEMENT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-3"},{"description":"

Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between connected systems by preventing CJI from being transmitted unencrypted across the public network, blocking outside traffic that claims to be from within the agency, and not passing any web requests to the public network that are not from the agency-controlled or internal boundary protection devices (e.g., proxies, gateways, firewalls, or routers).

Discussion: Information flow control regulates where information can travel within a system and between systems (in contrast to who is allowed to access the information) and without regard to subsequent accesses to that information. Flow control restrictions include blocking external traffic that claims to be from within the organization, keeping export-controlled information from being transmitted in the clear to the Internet, restricting web requests that are not from the internal web proxy server, and limiting information transfers between organizations based on data structures and content. Transferring information between organizations may require an agreement specifying how the information flow is enforced (see CA-3). Transferring information between systems in different security or privacy domains with different security or privacy policies introduces the risk that such transfers violate one or more domain security or privacy policies. In such situations, information owners/stewards provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points between connected systems. Organizations consider mandating specific architectural solutions to enforce specific security and privacy policies. Enforcement includes prohibiting information transfers between connected systems (i.e., allowing access only), verifying write permissions before accepting information from another security or privacy domain or connected system, employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way information flows, and implementing trustworthy regrading mechanisms to reassign security or privacy attributes and labels.

Organizations commonly employ information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms to control the flow of information between designated sources and destinations within systems and between connected systems. Flow control is based on the characteristics of the information and/or the information path. Enforcement occurs, for example, in boundary protection devices that employ rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict system services, provide a packet-filtering capability based on header information, or provide a message-filtering capability based on message content. Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering and/or inspection mechanisms (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information flow enforcement. Control enhancements 3 through 32 primarily address cross- domain solution needs that focus on more advanced filtering techniques, in-depth analysis, and stronger flow enforcement mechanisms implemented in cross-domain products, such as high- assurance guards. Such capabilities are generally not available in commercial off-the-shelf products. Information flow enforcement also applies to control plane traffic (e.g., routing and DNS).

","uuid":"a27ca728-1e61-4e9d-8c1a-4787c45ff6dd","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-4 INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-4"},{"description":"

a. Identify and document separation of duties based on specific duties, operations, or information systems, as necessary, to mitigate risk to CJI; and

b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.

Discussion: Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes dividing mission or business functions and support functions among different individuals or roles, conducting system support functions with different individuals, and ensuring that security personnel who administer access control functions do not also administer audit functions.

Because separation of duty violations can span systems and application domains, organizations consider the entirety of systems and system components when developing policy on separation of duties. Separation of duties is enforced through the account management activities in AC-2, access control mechanisms in AC-3, and identity management activities in IA-2, IA-4, and IA-12.

","uuid":"2be8a16f-7e6f-476e-92c8-cd1e35255233","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-5 SEPARATION OF DUTIES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-5"},{"description":"

Employ the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks.

Discussion: Organizations employ least privilege for specific duties and systems. The principle of least privilege is also applied to system processes, ensuring that the processes have access to systems and operate at privilege levels no higher than necessary to accomplish organizational missions or business functions. Organizations consider the creation of additional processes, roles, and accounts as necessary to achieve least privilege. Organizations apply least privilege to the development, implementation, and operation of organizational systems.

","uuid":"94b06c4c-1203-4eae-a932-b56c56bb5a4c","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-6 LEAST PRIVILEGE","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-6"},{"description":"

a. Enforce a limit of five (5) consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a 15-minute time period; and3

b. Automatically lock the account or node until released by an administrator when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.

Discussion: The need to limit unsuccessful logon attempts and take subsequent action when the maximum number of attempts is exceeded applies regardless of whether the logon occurs via a local or network connection. Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic lockouts initiated by systems are usually temporary and automatically release after a predetermined, organization-defined time period. If a delay algorithm is selected, organizations may employ different algorithms for different components of the system based on the capabilities of those components. Responses to unsuccessful logon attempts may be implemented at the operating system and the application levels. Organization-defined actions that may be taken when the number of allowed consecutive invalid logon attempts is exceeded include prompting the user to answer a secret question in addition to the username and password, invoking a lockdown mode with limited user capabilities (instead of full lockout), allowing users to only logon from specified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, requiring a CAPTCHA to prevent automated attacks, or applying user profiles such as location, time of day, IP address, device, or Media Access Control (MAC) address. If automatic system lockout or execution of a delay algorithm is not implemented in support of the availability objective, organizations consider a combination of other actions to help prevent brute force attacks. In addition to the above, organizations can prompt users to respond to a secret question before the number of allowed unsuccessful logon attempts is exceeded. Automatically unlocking an account after a specified period of time is generally not permitted. However, exceptions may be required based on operational mission or need.

","uuid":"59e0a004-9de6-4b8e-954c-7a9a5cadcef3","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-7 UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-7"},{"description":"

a. Display a system use notification message to users before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines and state that:

1. Users are accessing a restricted information system;

2. System usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;

3. Unauthorized use of the system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties; and

4. Use of the system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;

b. Retain the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the system; and

c. For publicly accessible systems:

1. Display system use information consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines, before granting further access to the publicly accessible system;

2. Display references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with privacy accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and

3. Include a description of the authorized uses of the system.

Discussion: System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners displayed before individuals log in to systems. System use notifications are used only for access via logon interfaces with human users. Notifications are not required when human interfaces do not exist. Based on an assessment of risk, organizations consider whether or not a secondary system use notification is needed to access applications or other system resources after the initial network logon. Organizations consider system use notification messages or banners displayed in multiple languages based on organizational needs and the demographics of system users. Organizations consult with the privacy office for input regarding privacy messaging and the Office of the General Counsel or organizational equivalent for legal review and approval of warning banner content

","uuid":"64a3076a-04a0-426d-8563-55813097d5c5","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-8 SYSTEM USE NOTIFICATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-8"},{"description":"

a. Prevent further access to the system by initiating a device lock after a maximum of 30 minutes of inactivity and requiring the user to initiate a device lock before leaving the system unattended.

NOTE: In the interest of safety, devices that are: (1) part of a criminal justice conveyance; or (2) used to perform dispatch functions and located within a physically secure location; or

(3) terminals designated solely for the purpose of receiving alert notifications (i.e., receive only terminals or ROT) used within physically secure location facilities that remain staffed when in operation, are exempt from this requirement.

b. Retain the device lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.

Discussion: Device locks are temporary actions taken to prevent logical access to organizational systems when users stop work and move away from the immediate vicinity of those systems but do not want to log out because of the temporary nature of their absences. Device locks can be implemented at the operating system level or at the application level. A proximity lock may be used to initiate the device lock (e.g., via a Bluetooth-enabled device or dongle). User-initiated device locking is behavior or policy-based and, as such, requires users to take physical action to initiate the device lock. Device locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of systems, such as when organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays.

","uuid":"439c4cb4-196e-435b-bd3f-cdd6e74b3ac2","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-11 DEVICE LOCK","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-11"},{"description":"

Automatically terminate a user session after a user has been logged out.

Discussion: Session termination addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions (in contrast to SC-10, which addresses the termination of network connections associated with communications sessions [i.e., network disconnect]). A logical session (for local, network, and remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses an organizational system. Such user sessions can be terminated without terminating network sessions. Session termination ends all processes associated with a user’s logical session except for those processes that are specifically created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. Conditions or trigger events that require automatic termination of the session include organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, or time-of-day restrictions on system use.

","uuid":"4d2d28d1-dc32-4fe6-9bc7-428283954f2e","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-12 SESSION TERMINATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-12"},{"description":"

a. Identify any specific user actions that can be performed on the system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational mission and business functions; and

b. Document and provide supporting rationale in the security plan for the system, user actions not requiring identification or authentication.

Discussion: Specific user actions may be permitted without identification or authentication if organizations determine that identification and authentication are not required for the specified user actions. Organizations may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication, including when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when facsimiles are received. Organizations identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may, under certain circumstances, allow identification or authentication mechanisms to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch that commands bypass of the logon functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored use. Permitting actions without identification or authentication does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have already occurred and are not repeated but rather to situations where identification and authentication have not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on organizational systems without identification and authentication, and therefore, the value for the assignment operation can be “none.”

","uuid":"5268667e-4ea7-4ed5-96dc-28a06a0ad9fa","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-14 PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-14"},{"description":"

a. Establish and document usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; and

b. Authorize each type of remote access to the system prior to allowing such connections.

Discussion: Remote access is access to organizational systems (or processes acting on behalf of users) that communicate through external networks such as the Internet. Types of remote access include dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations use encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity for remote connections. The use of encrypted VPNs provides sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat such connections as internal networks if the cryptographic mechanisms used are implemented in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN does not enhance the availability of remote connections. VPNs with encrypted tunnels can also affect the ability to adequately monitor network communications traffic for malicious code. Remote access controls apply to systems other than public web servers or systems designed for public access. Authorization of each remote access type addresses authorization prior to allowing remote access without specifying the specific formats for such authorization. While organizations may use information exchange and system connection security agreements to manage remote access connections to other systems, such agreements are addressed as part of CA-3. Enforcing access restrictions for remote access is addressed via AC-3.

","uuid":"f867b6cf-f3ac-4f96-acde-7633a2d7b1bd","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-17 REMOTE ACCESS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-17 "},{"description":"

a. Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices, to include when such devices are outside of controlled areas; and

b. Authorize the connection of mobile devices to organizational systems.

Discussion: A mobile device is a computing device that has a small form factor such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; is designed to operate without a physical connection; possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and includes a self-contained power source. Mobile device functionality may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the device to capture information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local data with remote locations. Examples include smart phones and tablets. Mobile devices are typically associated with a single individual. The processing, storage, and transmission capability of the mobile device may be comparable to or merely a subset of notebook/desktop systems, depending on the nature and intended purpose of the device. Protection and control of mobile devices is behavior or policy-based and requires users to take physical action to protect and control such devices when outside of controlled areas. Controlled areas are spaces for which organizations provide physical or procedural controls to meet the requirements established for protecting information and systems. Due to the large variety of mobile devices with different characteristics and capabilities, organizational restrictions may vary for the different classes or types of such devices. Usage restrictions and specific implementation guidance for mobile devices include configuration management, device identification and authentication, implementation of mandatory protective software, scanning devices for malicious code, updating virus protection software, scanning for critical software updates and patches, conducting primary operating system (and possibly other resident software) integrity checks, and disabling unnecessary hardware.

Usage restrictions and authorization to connect may vary among organizational systems. For example, the organization may authorize the connection of mobile devices to its network and impose a set of usage restrictions, while a system owner may withhold authorization for mobile device connection to specific applications or impose additional usage restrictions before allowing mobile device connections to a system. Adequate security for mobile devices goes beyond the requirements specified in AC-19. Many safeguards for mobile devices are reflected in other controls. AC-20 addresses mobile devices that are not organization-controlled.

","uuid":"aa6601ec-caae-44b6-9f4f-f7fc073391e2","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-19 ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-19"},{"description":"

a. Establish agency-level policies governing the use of external systems consistent with the trust relationships established with other organizations owning, operating, and/or maintaining external systems, allowing authorized individuals to:

1. Access the system from external systems; and

2. Process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information using external systems; or

b. Prohibit the use of personally-owned information systems including mobile devices (i.e., bring your own device [BYOD]) and publicly accessible systems for accessing, processing, storing, or transmitting CJI. 3

Discussion: External systems are systems that are used by but not part of organizational systems, and for which the organization has no direct control over the implementation of required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness. External systems include personally-owned systems, components, or devices; privately owned computing and communications devices in commercial or public facilities; systems owned or controlled by nonfederal organizations; systems managed by contractors; and federal information systems that are not owned by, operated by, or under the direct supervision or authority of the organization. External systems also include systems owned or operated by other components within the same organization and systems within the organization with different authorization boundaries. Organizations have the option to prohibit the use of any type of external system or prohibit the use of specified types of external systems, (e.g., prohibit the use of any external system that is not organizationally owned or prohibit the use of personally-owned systems).

For some external systems (i.e., systems operated by other organizations), the trust relationships that have been established between those organizations and the originating organization may be such that no explicit terms and conditions are required. Systems within these organizations may not be considered external. These situations occur when, for example, there are pre-existing information exchange agreements (either implicit or explicit) established between organizations or components or when such agreements are specified by applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, or standards. Authorized individuals include organizational personnel, contractors, or other individuals with authorized access to organizational systems and over which organizations have the authority to impose specific rules of behavior regarding system access. Restrictions that organizations impose on authorized individuals need not be uniform, as the restrictions may vary depending on trust relationships between organizations.

Therefore, organizations may choose to impose different security restrictions on contractors than on state, local, or tribal governments.

External systems used to access public interfaces to organizational systems are outside the scope of AC-20. Organizations establish specific terms and conditions for the use of external systems in accordance with organizational security policies and procedures. At a minimum, terms and conditions address the specific types of applications that can be accessed on organizational systems from external systems and the highest security category of information that can be processed, stored, or transmitted on external systems. If the terms and conditions with the owners of the external systems cannot be established, organizations may impose restrictions on organizational personnel using those external systems.

","uuid":"bcd6a49c-735f-451c-9b2f-13c060687289","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-20 USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-20"},{"description":"

a. Enable authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to a sharing partner match the information’s access and use restrictions as defined in an executed information exchange agreement; and

b. Employ attribute-based access control (see AC-2(d)(3)) or manual processes as defined in information exchange agreements to assist users in making information sharing and collaboration decisions.

Discussion: Information sharing applies to information that may be restricted in some manner based on some formal or administrative determination. Examples of such information include, contract-sensitive information, classified information related to special access programs or compartments, privileged information, proprietary information, and personally identifiable information. Security and privacy risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, and policies can provide useful inputs to these determinations. Depending on the circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, or organizational level. Information may be defined by content, type, security category, or special access program or compartment. Access restrictions may include non-disclosure agreements (NDA). Information flow techniques and security attributes may be used to provide automated assistance to users making sharing and collaboration decisions

","uuid":"860f8154-6815-4a82-b99c-2bad73a0d65e","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-21 INFORMATION SHARING","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-21"},{"description":"

a. Designate individuals authorized to make information publicly accessible;

b. Train authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain nonpublic information;

c. Review the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and

d. Review the content on the publicly accessible system for nonpublic information quarterly and remove such information, if discovered.

Discussion: In accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines, the public is not authorized to have access to nonpublic information, including information protected under the [PRIVACT] and proprietary information. Publicly accessible content addresses systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible to the public, typically without identification or authentication. Posting information on non- organizational systems (e.g., non-organizational public websites, forums, and social media) is covered by organizational policy. While organizations may have individuals who are responsible for developing and implementing policies about the information that can be made publicly accessible, publicly accessible content addresses the management of the individuals who make such information publicly accessible

","uuid":"e2294cbe-5b0e-4397-9268-595a6656910e","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-22 PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE CONTENT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-22"},{"description":"

a. Develop, document, and disseminate to organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities:

1. Agency-level maintenance policy that:

(a) Addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and

(b) Is consistent with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines; and

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the maintenance policy and the associated maintenance controls;

b. Designate an individual with security responsibilities to manage the development, documentation, and dissemination of the maintenance policy and procedures; and

c. Review and update the current maintenance:

1. Policy annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI; and

2. Procedures annually and following any security incidents involving unauthorized access to CJI or systems used to process, store, or transmit CJI.

Discussion: Maintenance policy and procedures address the controls in the MA family that are implemented within systems and organizations. The risk management strategy is an important factor in establishing such policies and procedures. Policies and procedures contribute to security and privacy assurance. Therefore, it is important that security and privacy programs collaborate on the development of maintenance policy and procedures. Security and privacy program policies and procedures at the organization level are preferable, in general, and may obviate the need for mission- or system-specific policies and procedures. The policy can be included as part of the general security and privacy policy or be represented by multiple policies that reflect the complex nature of organizations. Procedures can be established for security and privacy programs, for mission or business processes, and for systems, if needed. Procedures describe how the policies or controls are implemented and can be directed at the individual or role that is the object of the procedure. Procedures can be documented in system security and privacy plans or in one or more separate documents. Events that may precipitate an update to maintenance policy and procedures assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. Simply restating controls does not constitute an organizational policy or procedure

","uuid":"35f7c16a-3dd6-43e7-abca-3491e0969add","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES3","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-1"},{"description":"

a. Schedule, document, and review records of maintenance, repair, and replacement on system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements;

b. Approve and monitor all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and whether the system or system components are serviced on site or removed to another location;

c. Require that organizational personnel with information security and privacy responsibilities explicitly approve the removal of the system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, or replacement;

d. Sanitize equipment to remove information from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance, repair, replacement, or destruction;

e. Check all potentially impacted controls to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following maintenance, repair, or replacement actions; and

f. Include the following information in organizational maintenance records:

1. Component name

2. Component serial number

3. Date/time of maintenance

4. Maintenance performed

5. Name(s) of entity performing maintenance including escort if required.

Discussion: Controlling system maintenance addresses the information security aspects of the system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to system components conducted by local or nonlocal entities. Maintenance includes peripherals such as scanners, copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes the date and time of maintenance, a description of the maintenance performed, names of the individuals or group performing the maintenance, name of the escort, and system components or equipment that are removed or replaced. Organizations consider supply chain-related risks associated with replacement components for systems

","uuid":"12d8394f-9a46-4850-a4a0-cc114519af74","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-2 CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-2"},{"description":"

a. Approve, control, and monitor the use of system maintenance tools; and

b. Review previously approved system maintenance tools prior to each use.

Discussion: Approving, controlling, monitoring, and reviewing maintenance tools address security-related issues associated with maintenance tools that are not within system authorization boundaries and are used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational systems. Organizations have flexibility in determining roles for the approval of maintenance tools and how that approval is documented. A periodic review of maintenance tools facilitates the withdrawal of approval for outdated, unsupported, irrelevant, or no-longer- used tools. Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items and may be pre-installed, brought in with maintenance personnel on media, cloud-based, or downloaded from a website. Such tools can be vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally or unintentionally, into a facility and subsequently into systems. Maintenance tools can include hardware and software diagnostic test equipment and packet sniffers. The hardware and software components that support maintenance and are a part of the system (including the software implementing utilities such as “ping,” “ls,” “ipconfig,” or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch) are not addressed by maintenance tools.

(1) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS3

Inspect the maintenance tools used by maintenance personnel for improper or unauthorized modifications.

Discussion: Maintenance tools can be directly brought into a facility by maintenance personnel or downloaded from a vendor’s website. If, upon inspection of the maintenance tools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper manner or the tools contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident handling.

(2) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA3

Check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in the system.

Discussion: If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance, diagnostic, and test programs, organizations determine that the media contains malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures.

(3) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL3

Prevent the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by:

a. Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment;

b. Sanitizing or destroying the equipment;

c. Retaining the equipment within the facility; or

d. Obtaining an exemption from organizational personnel with system maintenance responsibilities explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.

Discussion: Organizational information includes all information owned by organizations and any information provided to organizations for which the organizations serve as information stewards.

","uuid":"51c984c5-b338-4dea-bbd1-e537988e71df","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-3 MAINTENANCE TOOLS ","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-3 "},{"description":"

a. Approve and monitor nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities;

b. Allow the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and documented in the security plan for the system;

c. Employ strong authentication in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions;

d. Maintain records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and

e. Terminate session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.

Discussion: Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are conducted by individuals who communicate through either an external or internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are carried out by individuals who are physically present at the system location and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used to establish nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network access requirements in IA-2. Strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multi-factor authentication. Strong authenticators include PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric. Enforcing requirements in MA-4 is accomplished, in part, by other controls

","uuid":"b6d19f79-ff39-42e9-851f-11931ad22329","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-4 NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-4"},{"description":"

a. Establish a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintain a list of authorized maintenance organizations or personnel;

b. Verify that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the system possess the required access authorizations; and

c. Designate organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess the required access authorizations.

Discussion: Maintenance personnel refers to individuals who perform hardware or software maintenance on organizational systems, while PE-2 addresses physical access for individuals whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the systems. Technical competence of supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on the systems, while having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near the systems. Individuals not previously identified as authorized maintenance personnel—such as information technology manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants—may require privileged access to organizational systems, such as when they are required to conduct maintenance activities with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of risk, organizations may issue temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials may be for one-time use or for very limited time periods

","uuid":"2fbaac2a-c067-4ad5-aa1c-018d49de962a","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-5 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-5"},{"description":"

Obtain maintenance support and/or spare parts for critical system components that process, store, and transmit CJI within agency-defined recovery time and recovery point objectives of failure.

Discussion: Organizations specify the system components that result in increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation when the functionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational actions to obtain maintenance support include having appropriate contracts in place

","uuid":"2d191da0-d819-44d2-a31b-48f2e2dc0c06","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-6 TIMELY MAINTENANCE","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-6"},{"description":"

Each CSA head or SIB Chief shall execute a signed written user agreement with the FBI CJIS Division stating their willingness to demonstrate conformity with this Policy before accessing and participating in CJIS records information programs. This agreement shall include the standards and sanctions governing utilization of CJIS systems. As coordinated through the particular CSA or SIB Chief, each Interface Agency shall also allow the FBI to periodically test the ability to penetrate the FBI’s network through the external network connection or system. All user agreements with the FBI CJIS Division shall be coordinated with the CSA head.

","uuid":"6e2d2c20-6d35-42ee-9772-e4c2cb7513bd","family":"Policy Area 1: Information Exchange Agreements","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.1.1.2 State and Federal Agency User Agreements","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.1.1.2"},{"description":"

a. Provide role-based security and privacy training to personnel with the following roles and responsibilities:

• All individuals with unescorted access to a physically secure location;

• General User: A user, but not a process, who is authorized to use an information system;

• Privileged User: A user that is authorized (and, therefore, trusted) to perform security-relevant functions that general users are not authorized to perform;

• Organizational Personnel with Security Responsibilities: Personnel with the responsibility to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CJI and the implementation of technology in a manner compliant with the CJISSECPOL.

1. Before authorizing access to the system, information, or performing assigned duties, and annually thereafter; and

2. When required by system changes.

b. Update role-based training content annually and following audits of the CSA and local agencies; changes in the information system operating environment; security incidents; or when changes are made to the CJIS Security Policy;

c. Incorporate lessons learned from internal or external security incidents or breaches into role-based training;

d. Incorporate the minimum following topics into the appropriate role-based training content:

1. All individuals with unescorted access to a physically secure location

a. Access, Use and Dissemination of Criminal History Record Information (CHRI), NCIC Restricted Files Information, and NCIC Non-Restricted Files Information Penalties

b. Reporting Security Events

c. Incident Response Training

d. System Use Notification

e. Physical Access Authorizations

f. Physical Access Control

g. Monitoring Physical Access

h. Visitor Control

i. Personnel Sanctions

2. General User: A user, but not a process, who is authorized to use an information system. In addition to AT-3 (d) (1) above, include the following topics:

a. Criminal Justice Information

b. Proper Access, Use, and Dissemination of NCIC Non-Restricted Files Information

c. Personally Identifiable Information

d. Information Handling

e. Media Storage

f. Media Access

g. Audit Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting

h. Access Enforcement

i. Least Privilege

j. System Access Control

k. Access Control Criteria

l. System Use Notification

m. Session Lock

n. Personally Owned Information Systems

o. Password

p. Access Control for Display Medium

q. Encryption

r. Malicious Code Protection

s. Spam and Spyware Protection

t. Cellular Devices

u. Mobile Device Management

v. Wireless Device Risk Mitigations

w. Wireless Device Malicious Code Protection

x. Literacy Training and Awareness/Social Engineering and Mining

y. Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)

z. Media Protection

3. Privileged User: A user that is authorized (and, therefore, trusted) to perform security-relevant functions that general users are not authorized to perform. In addition to AT-3 (d) (1) and (2) above, include the following topics:

a. Access Control

b. System and Communications Protection and Information Integrity

c. Patch Management

d. Data backup and storage—centralized or decentralized approach

e. Most recent changes to the CJIS Security Policy

4. Organizational Personnel with Security Responsibilities: Personnel with the responsibility to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of CJI and the implementation of technology in a manner compliant with the CJISSECPOL. In addition to AT-3 (d) (1), (2), and (3) above, include the following topics:

a. Local Agency Security Officer Role

b. Authorized Recipient Security Officer Role2

c. Additional state/local/tribal/territorial or federal agency roles and responsibilities

d. Summary of audit findings from previous state audits of local agencies

e. Findings from the last FBI CJIS Division audit

Discussion: Organizations determine the content of training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals as well as the security and privacy requirements of organizations and the systems to which personnel have authorized access, including technical training specifically tailored for assigned duties. Roles that may require role-based training include senior leaders or management officials (e.g., head of agency/chief executive officer, chief information officer, senior accountable official for risk management, senior agency information security officer, senior agency official for privacy), system owners; authorizing officials; system security officers; privacy officers; acquisition and procurement officials; enterprise architects; systems engineers; software developers; systems security engineers; privacy engineers; system, network, and database administrators; auditors; personnel conducting configuration management activities; personnel performing verification and validation activities; personnel with access to system-level software; control assessors; personnel with contingency planning and incident response duties; personnel with privacy management responsibilities; and personnel with access to personally identifiable information.

Comprehensive role-based training addresses management, operational, and technical roles and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technical controls. Role-based training also includes policies, procedures, tools, methods, and artifacts for the security and privacy roles defined. Organizations provide the training necessary for individuals to fulfill their responsibilities related to operations and supply chain risk management within the context of organizational security and privacy programs. Role-based training also applies to contractors who provide services to federal agencies. Types of training include web-based and computer-based training, classroom-style training, and hands-on training (including micro-training). Updating role-based training on a regular basis helps to ensure that the content remains relevant and effective. Events that may precipitate an update to role-based training content include, but are not limited to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines.

","uuid":"f758fc42-dc20-4ec7-85c3-95e89c092599","family":"Awareness and Training (AT)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.2.AT-3","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.2.AT-3"},{"description":"

Provide incident response training on how to identify and respond to a breach, including the organization’s process for reporting a breach.

Discussion: For federal agencies, an incident that involves personally identifiable information is considered a breach. A breach results in the loss of control, compromise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, or a similar occurrence where a person other than an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses personally identifiable information or an authorized user accesses or potentially accesses such information for other than authorized purposes. The incident response training emphasizes the obligation of individuals to report both confirmed and suspected breaches involving information in any medium or form, including paper, oral, and electronic. Incident response training includes tabletop exercises that simulate a breach.

","uuid":"0405a9a6-ee28-42dc-bc3d-3ca8977fdb7e","family":"Incident Response (IR)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3.IR-2(3) Incident Response Training | Breach","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-2(3)"},{"description":"

Coordinate incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.

Discussion: Organizational plans related to incident response testing include business continuity plans, disaster recovery plans, continuity of operations plans, contingency plans, crisis communications plans, critical infrastructure plans, and occupant emergency plans.

","uuid":"0786bc32-16b1-4aa6-bfd9-fe09f3c0cd17","family":"Incident Response (IR)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3.IR-3(2) Incident Response Testing | Coordination With Related Plans","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-3(2)"},{"description":"

Support the incident handling process using automated mechanisms (e.g., online incident management systems and tools that support the collection of live response data, full network packet capture, and forensic analysis.

Discussion: Automated mechanisms that support incident handling processes include online incident management systems and tools that support the collection of live response data, full network packet capture, and forensic analysis. Incident handling could be inherited from an upstream agency or could be part of a state-level process.

","uuid":"b6c569eb-a3d6-4253-8bb9-cd6d82a434ec","family":"Incident Response (IR)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"","title":"5.3.IR-4(1) Incident Handling | Automated Incident Handling Processes","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-4(1)"},{"description":"

Report incidents using automated mechanisms.

Discussion: The recipients of incident reports are specified in IR-6b. Automated reporting mechanisms include email, posting on websites (with automatic updates), and automated incident response tools and programs

","uuid":"cc5c6017-3b86-49b9-bb76-646e3dbf1c2f","family":"Incident Reporting (IR)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3.IR-6(1) Incident Reporting | Automated Reporting","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-6(1)"},{"description":"

Provide incident information to the provider of the product or service and other organizations involved in the supply chain or supply chain governance for systems or system components related to the incident.

Discussion: Organizations involved in supply chain activities include product developers, system integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, and resellers. Entities that provide supply chain governance include the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC). Supply chain incidents include compromises or breaches that involve information technology products, system components, development processes or personnel, distribution processes, or warehousing facilities. Organizations determine the appropriate information to share and consider the value gained from informing external organizations about supply chain incidents, including the ability to improve processes or to identify the root cause of an incident

","uuid":"bb85f9ac-44de-4cb2-81a3-58b13cc37a2d","family":"Incident Reporting | Supply Chain Coordination","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3.IR-6(3) Incident Reporting | Supply Chain Coordination","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-6(3)"},{"description":"

Increase the availability of incident response information and support using automated mechanisms described in the discussion.

Discussion: Automated mechanisms can provide a push or pull capability for users to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals may have access to a website to query the assistance capability, or the assistance capability can proactively send incident response information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of increasing understanding of current response capabilities and support.

If the automated mechanisms include external assistance that will give unescorted physical or logical access to CJI, it is imperative to ensure that the appropriate controls/procedures (CJIS Security Addendum/Outsourcing Standard) are in place. Examples would include Cyber Incident Response Vendors (IT Security/Law Firms).

","uuid":"7f4c7a18-5196-4120-a6d7-69ddc81a097a","family":"Incident Response (IR)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3.IR-7(1) Incident Response Assistance | Automation Support for Availability of Information and Support","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-7(1)"},{"description":"

Include the following in the Incident Response Plan for breaches involving personally identifiable information:

a. A process to determine if notice to individuals or other organizations, including oversight organizations, is needed;

b. An assessment process to determine the extent of the harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to affected individuals and any mechanisms to mitigate such harms; and

c. Identification of applicable privacy requirements.

Discussion: Organizations may be required by law, regulation, or policy to follow specific procedures relating to breaches, including notice to individuals, affected organizations, and oversight bodies; standards of harm; and mitigation or other specific requirements

","uuid":"dd7cf086-b6e8-48f1-ae1a-f1d52fe9f965","family":"Incident Response (IR)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3.IR-8(1) Incident Response Plan | Breaches","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.3.IR-8(1)"},{"description":"

Support the management of system accounts using automated mechanisms including email, phone, and text notifications.

Discussion: Automated system account management includes using automated mechanisms to create, enable, modify, disable, and remove accounts; notify account managers when an account is created, enabled, modified, disabled, or removed, or when users are terminated or transferred; monitor system account usage; and report atypical system account usage.

Automated mechanisms can include internal system functions and email, telephonic, and text messaging notifications.

","uuid":"90fa99ce-4261-4f08-94c3-e0755dada3a5","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-2(1) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-2(1)"},{"description":"

Automatically remove temporary and emergency accounts within 72 hours.

Discussion: Management of temporary and emergency accounts includes the removal or disabling of such accounts automatically after a predefined time period rather than at the convenience of the system administrator. Automatic removal or disabling of accounts provides a more consistent implementation

","uuid":"deada71c-faa2-4257-a1e3-bf2a6f9b08ab","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-2(2) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED TEMPORARY AND EMERGENCY ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-2(2)"},{"description":"

Disable accounts within one (1) week when the accounts:

(a) Have expired;

(b) Are no longer associated with a user or individual;

(c) Are in violation of organizational policy; or

(d) Have been inactive for 90 calendar days.

Discussion: Disabling expired, inactive, or otherwise anomalous accounts supports the concepts of least privilege and least functionality which reduce the attack surface of the system.

","uuid":"e7a53da6-84be-4d2d-87fa-543226c4f1c9","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-2(3) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-2(3)"},{"description":"

Automatically audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions.

Discussion: Account management audit records are defined in accordance with AU-2 and reviewed, analyzed, and reported in accordance with AU-6.

","uuid":"b3f32cfd-0254-4b3f-b4b0-3d5cfa9f5b31","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-2(4) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-2(4) "},{"description":"

Require that users log out when a work period has been completed.

Discussion: Inactivity logout is behavior- or policy-based and requires users to take physical action to log out when they are expecting inactivity longer than the defined period. Automatic enforcement of inactivity logout is addressed by AC-11.

","uuid":"1021a293-9796-483a-b97a-d3e57d1fe38c","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-2(5)ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-2(5)"},{"description":"

Disable accounts of individuals within 30 minutes of discovery of direct threats to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of CJI.

Discussion: Users who pose a significant security and/or privacy risk include individuals for whom reliable evidence indicates either the intention to use authorized access to systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Such harm includes adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation. Close coordination among system administrators, legal staff, human resource managers, and authorizing officials is essential when disabling system accounts for high-risk individuals.

","uuid":"9729aa9b-1cc0-44e5-ab2f-12822a26ed2e","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-2(13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-2(13)"},{"description":"

Provide automated or manual processes to enable individuals to have access to elements of their personally identifiable information.

Discussion: Individual access affords individuals the ability to review personally identifiable information about them held within organizational records, regardless of format. Access helps individuals to develop an understanding about how their personally identifiable information is being processed. It can also help individuals ensure that their data is accurate. Access mechanisms can include request forms and application interfaces. For federal agencies, [PRIVACT] processes can be located in systems of record notices and on agency websites. Access to certain types of records may not be appropriate (e.g., for federal agencies, law enforcement records within a system of records may be exempt from disclosure under the [PRIVACT]) or may require certain levels of authentication assurance.

Organizational personnel consult with the senior agency official for privacy and legal counsel to determine appropriate mechanisms and access rights or limitations

","uuid":"9b70a33a-0603-43fd-865a-a146c33c5790","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-3(14) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | INDIVIDUAL ACCESS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-3(14)"},{"description":"

Authorize access for personnel including security administrators, system and network administrators, and other privileged users with access to system control, monitoring, or administration functions (e.g., system administrators, information security personnel, maintainers, system programmers, etc.) to:

(a) Established system accounts, configured access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), set events to be audited, set intrusion detection parameters, and other security functions; and

(b) Security-relevant information in hardware, software, and firmware.

Discussion: Security functions include establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), configuring settings for events to be audited, and establishing intrusion detection parameters. Security-relevant information includes filtering rules for routers or firewalls, configuration parameters for security services, cryptographic key management information, and access control lists. Authorized personnel include security administrators, system administrators, system security officers, system programmers, and other privileged users

","uuid":"9a828126-8c2b-4f8f-88f5-0b6890dcf26c","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-6(1) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-6(1)"},{"description":"

Require that users of system accounts (or roles) with access to privileged security functions or security-relevant information (e.g., audit logs), use non-privileged accounts or roles, when accessing non-security functions.

Discussion: Requiring the use of non-privileged accounts when accessing non-security functions limits exposure when operating from within privileged accounts or roles. The inclusion of roles addresses situations where organizations implement access control policies, such as role-based access control, and where a change of role provides the same degree of assurance in the change of access authorizations for the user and the processes acting on behalf of the user as would be provided by a change between a privileged and non- privileged account

","uuid":"211a65ea-d042-4b83-9c31-b5e1aaed0969","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-6(2) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-6(2)"},{"description":"

Restrict privileged accounts on the system to privileged users.

Discussion: Privileged accounts, including super user accounts, are typically described as system administrator for various types of commercial off-the-shelf operating systems. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles prevents day-to-day users from accessing privileged information or privileged functions. Organizations may differentiate in the application of restricting privileged accounts between allowed privileges for local accounts and for domain accounts provided that they retain the ability to control system configurations for key parameters and as otherwise necessary to sufficiently mitigate risk.

","uuid":"cbbe2b8e-ddcf-42f5-8713-a2ea2828e0f8","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-6(5) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-6(5)"},{"description":"

a. Review annually the privileges assigned to non-privileged and privileged users to validate the need for such privileges; and

b. Reassign or remove privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission and business needs.

Discussion: The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over time to reflect changes in organizational mission and business functions, environments of operation, technologies, or threats. A periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to determine if the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be revalidated, organizations take appropriate corrective actions

","uuid":"ff219e6a-3323-434f-a4f4-74b3ab739707","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-6(7) LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGES","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-6(7)"},{"description":"

Log the execution of privileged functions.

Discussion: The misuse of privileged functions, either intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts, is a serious and ongoing concern and can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Logging and analyzing the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and, in doing so, help mitigate the risk from insider threats and the advanced persistent threat.

","uuid":"3010c437-5faf-417f-a249-28fb20534a97","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-6(9) LEAST PRIVILEGE | LOG USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-6(9)"},{"description":"

Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions.

Discussion: Privileged functions include disabling, circumventing, or altering implemented security or privacy controls, establishing system accounts, performing system integrity checks, and administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users are individuals who do not possess appropriate authorizations. Privileged functions that require protection from non-privileged users include circumventing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms. Preventing non- privileged users from executing privileged functions is enforced by AC-3.

","uuid":"20e28af7-45e1-40f3-af66-33f365fccf8e","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-6(10) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROM EXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-6(10)"},{"description":"

Conceal, via the device lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.

Discussion: The pattern-hiding display can include static or dynamic images, such as patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery life indicator, or a blank screen with the caveat that controlled unclassified information is not displayed.

","uuid":"e0d0a173-e1f6-4cff-b704-57c211638716","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-11(1) DEVICE LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-11(1)"},{"description":"

Employ automated mechanisms to monitor and control remote access methods.

Discussion: Monitoring and control of remote access methods allows organizations to detect attacks and help ensure compliance with remote access policies by auditing the connection activities of remote users on a variety of system components, including servers, notebook computers, workstations, smart phones, and tablets. Audit logging for remote access is enforced by AU-2. Audit events are defined in AU-2a.

","uuid":"922de2ff-e01b-409d-b483-6a8483b135ed","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-17(1) REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING AND CONTROL","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-17(1)"},{"description":"

Implement cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions.

Discussion: Virtual private networks can be used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is an example of a cryptographic protocol that provides end-to-end communications security over networks and is used for Internet communications and online transactions

","uuid":"87ecaa8d-f891-4958-950c-7db5221bccf6","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-17(2) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-17(2)"},{"description":"

Route remote accesses through authorized and managed network access control points.

Discussion: Organizations consider the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative requirements for external network connections since limiting the number of access control points for remote access reduces attack surfaces.

","uuid":"af6fa682-265a-4c64-b381-3c37710724d4","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-17(3) REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-17(3)"},{"description":"

a. Authorize the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access only in a format that provides assessable evidence and for the following needs: compelling operational needs; and

b. Document the rationale for remote access in the security plan for the system.

Discussion: Remote access to systems represents a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. As such, restricting the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access reduces the exposure of the organization and the susceptibility to threats by adversaries to the remote access capability.

","uuid":"b0719de2-0e4c-4230-a9d8-a7d81c83bfe7","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-17(4) REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS AND ACCESS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-17(4)"},{"description":"

a. Establish configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of wireless access; and

b. Authorize each type of wireless access to the system prior to allowing such connections.

Discussion: Wireless technologies include microwave, packet radio (ultra-high frequency or very high frequency), 802.11x, and Bluetooth. Wireless networks use authentication protocols that provide authenticator protection and mutual authentication

","uuid":"57b3ed79-5998-4fec-b1b9-8a654f0d90f4","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-18 WIRELESS ACCESS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-18"},{"description":"

Protect wireless access to the system using authentication of authorized users and agency-controlled devices, and encryption.

Discussion: Wireless networking capabilities represent a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. To protect systems with wireless access points, strong authentication of users and devices along with strong encryption can reduce susceptibility to threats by adversaries involving wireless technologies

","uuid":"41021358-8a86-4925-b39b-3d353948e7fc","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-18(1) WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-18(1)"},{"description":"

Disable, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities embedded within system components prior to issuance and deployment.

Discussion: Wireless networking capabilities that are embedded within system components represent a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. Disabling wireless capabilities when not needed for essential organizational missions or functions can reduce susceptibility to threats by adversaries involving wireless technologies

","uuid":"6d841d9f-b541-4bd8-8a5f-63bc3803c518","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-18(3) WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKING","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-18(3)"},{"description":"

Employ full-device encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on full- and limited-feature operating system mobile devices authorized to process, store, or transmit CJI.

Discussion: Container-based encryption provides a more fine-grained approach to data and information encryption on mobile devices, including encrypting selected data structures such as files, records, or fields.

","uuid":"c1af00a4-0755-4524-bdee-049353c9f6c6","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.19(5) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DEVICE OR CONTAINER-BASED ENCRYPTION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.19(5)"},{"description":"

Permit authorized individuals to use an external system to access the system or to process, store, or transmit organization-controlled information only after:

a. Verification of the implementation of controls on the external system as specified in the organization’s security and privacy policies and security and privacy plans; or

b. Retention of approved system connection or processing agreements with the organizational entity hosting the external system.

Discussion: Limiting authorized use recognizes circumstances where individuals using external systems may need to access organizational systems. Organizations need assurance that the external systems contain the necessary controls so as not to compromise, damage, or otherwise harm organizational systems. Verification that the required controls have been implemented can be achieved by external, independent assessments, attestations, or other means, depending on the confidence level required by organizations

","uuid":"1870f19a-0d97-4eb6-9519-8d28ede10c37","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-20(1) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USE","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-20(1)"},{"description":"

Restrict the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external systems.

Discussion: Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external systems include restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices may be used

","uuid":"f7fe69d8-c924-410d-adfe-601f75707cfa","family":"Access Control (AC)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.5.AC-20(2) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES — RESTRICTED USE","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.5.AC-20(2)"},{"description":"

Manage and retain information within the system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidelines and operational requirements.

Discussion: Information management and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond system disposal. Information to be retained may also include policies, procedures, plans, reports, data output from control implementation, and other types of administrative information. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provides federal policy and guidance on records retention and schedules. If organizations have a records management office, consider coordinating with records management personnel. Records produced from the output of implemented controls that may require management and retention include, but are not limited to: All XX-1, AC-6(9), AT-4, AU-12, CA-2, CA-3, CA-5, CA-6, CA-7, CA-9, CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-6, CM-8, CM-9, CM-12, CP-2, IR-6, IR-8, MA-2, MA-4, PE-2, PE-8, PE-16, PE-17, PL-2, PL-4, PL-8, PS-2, PS-6, PS-7, RA-2, RA-3, RA-5, SA-4, SA-5, SA-8, SA-10, SI-4, SR-2, SR-8.

","uuid":"23c67de2-a0a5-461e-90ac-50fda12559f2","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-12(1) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-12(1)"},{"description":"

Use the following techniques to minimize the use of personally identifiable information for research, testing, or training: data obfuscation, randomization, anonymization, or use of synthetic data.

Discussion: Organizations can minimize the risk to an individual’s privacy by employing techniques such as de-identification or synthetic data. Limiting the use of personally identifiable information throughout the information life cycle when the information is not needed for research, testing, or training helps reduce the level of privacy risk created by a system. Risk assessments as well as applicable laws, regulations, and policies can provide useful inputs to determining the techniques to use and when to use them.

","uuid":"35fd01ee-b286-4d45-841a-af067309f9df","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-12(2) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | MINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-12(2)"},{"description":"

Use the following techniques to dispose of, destroy, or erase information following the retention period: as defined in MP-6.

Discussion: Organizations can minimize both security and privacy risks by disposing of information when it is no longer needed. The disposal or destruction of information applies to originals as well as copies and archived records, including system logs that may contain personally identifiable information.

","uuid":"128b2c9d-3411-4a0e-80b9-f29ee40159bd","family":"System and Information Integrity (SI)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.15.SI-12(3)","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.15.SI-12(3)"},{"description":"

Inspect the maintenance tools used by maintenance personnel for improper or unauthorized modifications.

Discussion: Maintenance tools can be directly brought into a facility by maintenance personnel or downloaded from a vendor’s website. If, upon inspection of the maintenance tools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper manner or the tools contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident handling.

","uuid":"0d947651-7eeb-4259-b3ad-e0b499793a5e","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-3(1) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-3(1)"},{"description":"

Check media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in the system.

Discussion: If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance, diagnostic, and test programs, organizations determine that the media contains malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures.

","uuid":"7b41ec6a-e2e0-4cf1-8236-191aa23e43cd","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-3(2) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-3(2)"},{"description":"

Prevent the removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by:

Discussion: Organizational information includes all information owned by organizations and any information provided to organizations for which the organizations serve as information stewards.

","uuid":"b04701d6-5519-475c-8d4b-a6161d708d53","family":"Maintenance (MA)","parameters":[],"subControls":"","tests":[],"weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":true,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.16.MA-3(3) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL","ccis":[],"assessmentPlan":"","objectives":[],"practiceLevel":"","mappings":"","controlId":"5.16.MA-3(3)"}]}}