{"catalog":{"description":"

This Handbook serves as the foundation on which Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components are to develop, build, and implement their information security programs; it provides specific techniques and procedures for implementing the requirements of the DHS Information Security Program for Sensitive Systems, and for meeting the Program’s Baseline Security Requirements (BLSR), which are generated by the DHS information security policies published in DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A. Components must address these BLSRs when developing and maintaining information for their security documents.

This Handbook contains a compilation of DHS Component best practices that adhere to DHS Information Technology (IT) security policies and meet requirements contained in various National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publications, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) direction, and Congressional and Executive mandates.

The scope and contents of this handbook will be updated as new capabilities are added to DHS systems, as security standards are upgraded, and as user experiences and needs change.

This handbook addresses only information security and is issued as implementation guidance under the authority of the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) through the Office of the DHS Chief Information Security Officer (CISO).The aspects of information security covered by this Handbook are comprehensive; they pertain to personnel, physical, information, and industrial security; investigations; emergency preparedness; and domestic counterterrorism. Additional information will be published by the proponents of these programs.

","datePublished":"2015-11-15T05:00:00","uuid":"325f9b8c-c184-49d6-b538-bd7621fadfb0","version":"1.0.0","master":false,"url":"https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-4300a-sensitive-systems-handbook","abstract":"The DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook provides specific techniques and procedures for implementing the requirements of the DHS Information Security Program for DHS sensitive systems and systems that process sensitive information for DHS.","defaultName":"dhs-4300a","title":"DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook","lastRevisionDate":"2024-01-26","regulationDatePublished":"2023-12-18","keywords":"DHS, Cyber Security, Sensitive Systems","sourceOscalURL":"","securityControls":[{"id":25508,"description":"

Basic security management principles must be followed in order to ensure the security of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) information resources. These principles are applicable throughout the Department and form the cornerstone of the DHS Information Security Program.

Component Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) and Information Systems Security Managers (ISSM) submit all security reports concerning DHS systems to the Component senior official or designated representative. Component CISOs/ISSMs interpret and manage DHS security policies and procedures to meet Federal, Departmental, and Component requirements. Component CISOs/ISSMs also answer data queries from the DHS CISO and develop and manage information security guidance and procedures unique to Component requirements.

Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) are the primary points of contact for the information systems assigned to them. They develop and maintain Security Plans (SP) and are responsible for overall system security.

Refer to Section 2.0, Roles and Responsibilities for detailed information security requirements.

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Protecting computer systems, networks, and data is essential to effective management of information resources. Programs that have not met the standards and criteria may be denied funding.

Information security is a business driver and any risks found through security testing are ultimately business risks. Information security personnel should be involved to the maximum extent possible in all aspects of the acquisition process, including drafting contracts, and procurement documents. DHS Management Directive (MD) 102-01, “Acquisition Management Directive” and DHS MD 4200.1, “IT Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) and Portfolio Management” provide additional information on these requirements. Consult the DHS CPIC Guide for more information.

Two critical and complementary processes, CPIC and SELC govern information system management. Senior managers must ensure that information security is adequately addressed throughout all phases of systems engineering and investment lifecycles.

Department budgets must address the adequacy and effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices. Security controls must be included in capital planning and procurement actions for both the current budget year and for the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP).

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3.2.1\tCapital Planning and Investment Control Process

DHS investment management is governed by DHS Management Directive 1400, Investment Review Process. The Directive requires that all information systems investments be reviewed by the DHS Enterprise Architecture Board (EAB) at each Key Decision Point (KDP). The security function has a formal role as a specialty reviewer, advising the EAB on whether the project should be allowed to proceed, based on how well security requirements are met at each lifecycle phase.

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Program Authorization (KDP1) – Programs must demonstrate the results of operational analysis and identify requirements. With approval at KDP1, the initiative is:

•\tDesignated as a Level 1 acquisition

•\tDirected to charter a major acquisition Integrated Product Team (IPT)

•\tEntered into the budget process (Typically the Fiscal Year +2 budget)

•\tAuthorized to move to the Concept & Technology Development phase

Alternative Selection (KDP2) – Alternatives are evaluated for feasibility. Programs present their evaluations and basis for assessing relative merits. Promising solutions are defined in terms of:

•\tCost

•\tSchedule

•\tPerformance objectives

•\tInteroperability

•\tSupportability

•\tInfrastructure requirements

•\tOpportunities for tradeoffs

•\tAcquisition strategy

•\tTest and evaluation strategy, including Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E), and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E))

The Program Manager submits an updated Exhibit 300 based on these items; this information is used to monitor initiatives, direct corrective actions, and determine when the investment is ready to proceed to the Production and Deployment Phase.

Project Decision (KDP3) – The preferred alternative is reviewed for feasibility and refined prior to a full production commitment. The Program Manager reviews and updates documents prepared during previous phases, develops proposed exit criteria for the Production and Deployment Phase, and submits an updated Exhibit 300. This information is used to manage risks and determine when the investment is ready to proceed to the next phase. The future year’s program plan must be fully funded. With approval at KDP 3, the investment is authorized to proceed to the Production and Deployment Phase.

Executive Review (KDP4) – Projects are reviewed against their performance and costs goals. Results of this review form the basis for decisions for project enhancement, re-engineering, or retirement.

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Capital Planning and Investment Control Responsibilities

DHS CIO

Ensure that all information systems acquisition documents, including existing contracts, contain appropriate information security requirements and comply with DHS information security policies

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Manage information security resources including oversight and review of security requirements in funding documents

System Owners

Ensure that funding for implementation of information security is included in project life cycle planning

AOs

Ensure that funding for implementation of information security is included in project life cycle planning

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Contractors fill a vital role in support of daily operations and share the responsibility to protect sensitive information.  All personnel must adhere to the same standards.

All contract documents and statements of work incorporate information security requirements.

System Owners and Project Managers must review and include security requirements in solicitation documents prior to the acquisition of information systems or services. Information security must be a key factor in the source selection process and must be weighed against the sensitivity and criticality of the data to be processed. If the solicitation includes purchase of a Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) application or if the system being developed has a COTS element, the security aspects of the COTS product must be considered.

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Responsibilities for contractors and outsourced operations are provided in the following table.

Contractors and Outsourced Operations Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

System Owners/ Project Managers

ISSOs

All information security costs must appear in the initial investment management business case and in subsequent cost benefit analyses throughout the SELC. The system design and functional requirements documents must include computer security requirements.

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The DHS CISO has developed a Department-wide security performance measures and metrics program. Appropriate information is included in this section.

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Performance measures and metrics responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Performance Measures and Metrics Responsibilities

DHS CISO

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

NIST SP 800-55, Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems provides additional guidance on how organizations can, through the use of metrics, identify the adequacy of security controls, policies, and procedures, and describes an approach to assist management in determining where to best focus additional security resources.

A security metrics program includes four interdependent elements:

•\tStrong senior management support

•\tPractical security policies and procedures

•\tQuantifiable performance metrics

•\tResults-oriented metrics analysis

Metrics monitor the success of performance goals and objectives by quantifying the level of compliance of security controls.

Data required for calculating metrics must be easily obtainable, and the process under consideration must be measurable. To be measurable, a repeatable process is required. Only formal processes should be considered for measurement.

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The Continuity Planning for Critical DHS Assets Program is vital to the success of the DHS Information Security Program. The Business Impact Assessment (BIA) is essential in the identification of critical DHS assets. Once critical systems are identified, continuity planning addresses the following two different but complementary elements:

•\tContinuity of Operations (COOP) Planning

•\tContingency Planning (CP)

The COOP planning element requires Components to develop, test, exercise, and maintain comprehensive plans so that essential business functions can be continued. The COOP Plan is business oriented and focuses on sustaining an organization’s essential functions until the primary site can be restored.

The Contingency Planning element is designed to sustain and recover critical information services. Contingency plans focus on sustaining the critical applications and general support systems needed to support essential operations. The thrust of contingency planning is to assure the continuous availability of critical systems; to protect assets and vital records; to mitigate disruptions to operations; to provide maximum safety to personnel; and to achieve a timely and orderly recovery from a disruption to operations.

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3.5.1 Continuity of Operations (COOP) Planning

DHS must have the capability to ensure continuity of essential functions under all circumstances. COOP policies are designed to establish a Department-wide capability to react to emergency events (response); to restore essential business functions (recovery); and to resume normal operations (reconstitution).

COOP Plans focus on sustaining an organization’s essential business functions at an alternate site until the primary site can be restored. This requires that Components develop, test, exercise, and maintain comprehensive plans to ensure that essential business functions can be continued following an emergency. COOP Plans address three essential phases:

• Activation and Relocation (0-12 hours)

• Alternate Facility Operations (12 hours to Termination)

• Reconstitution (Termination to Return to Normal Operations)

General COOP planning responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Continuity of Operations Planning Responsibilities

DHS Continuity Planning Program Director

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Component ISSOs

3.5.1.1 COOP Requirement

Components are required to develop, test, exercise, and maintain COOP Plans. COOP Plans are business oriented and focus on sustaining essential and supporting business functions at an alternate site for up to 30 days.

3.5.1.2 COOP Objectives

COOP is designed to achieve the following objectives:

• Ensure the continuous performance of essential functions and operations during an emergency

• Protect equipment, vital records, and other assets to meet mission needs

• Reduce or mitigate disruptions to operations

• Reduce loss of life

• Minimize damage and losses

• Achieve a timely and orderly recovery from an emergency and resumption of full service to customers

3.5.1.3 COOP Plan Content

To facilitate their usefulness and acceptance, COOP Plans should be concise, and must address the following elements:

• Essential functions (including information systems requirements, vital records and databases, and functional recovery activities)

• Essential personnel

• Alternate operating facilities

• Interoperable communications

• Human capital issues (inclusion of occupant emergency planning)

• Devolution of control (delegations of authority and orders of succession)

• Reconstitution (return to normal operations)

COOPs normally focus on facility level and organization contingency planning. Information systems requirements, considered in terms of their support of essential and supporting office functions, should be documented in the COOP Plan. Although contingency planning is a separate effort, these plans can be included in the COOP Plan as appendixes. Close coordination with support operations is required to ensure availability at the alternate site(s).

3.5.1.4 COOP Test, Training, and Exercise

The most important aspect of successful COOP is personnel training and periodic testing and exercising of the plan. Tests and exercises serve to validate specific aspects of plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities that would be used during an emergency and to identify weaknesses and correct them. Exercises and test results must be documented.

3.5.2 Contingency Planning

Contingency planning is an integral part of the Critical DHS Assets Program and is designed to ensure the availability of critical information systems under all circumstances. Components are required to develop, test, and maintain contingency plans.

Contingency planning is designed to establish a Department-wide capability to react to emergency events (response); to restore essential business functions if a disruption occurs (recovery); and to resume normal operations (reconstitution). Plans focus on sustaining an organization’s critical information services.

Contingency planning responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Contingency Planning Responsibilities

DHS Continuity Planning Program Director

System/Network Administrators

Site Managers/System Owners

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Component ISSOs

3.5.2.1 Contingency Planning Requirement

Requirements for implementation of contingency planning are found in

• NIST SP 800-34, Rev 1, “Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology Systems,” May, 1010

NIST SP 800-34 considers continuity of support planning to be synonymous with contingency planning. Since a contingency plan is required for each major application and general support system, multiple plans may be maintained within the organization’s COOP or Business Continuity Plan.

• Appendix III to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, “Management of Federal Information Resources,” revised, November 30, 2000

Appendix III requires development and maintenance of continuity of support plans.

• NIST SP 800-53, Rev 4, “Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,” April 2013, with updates as of January 15, 2014

• NIST SP 800-53 defines a family of security controls and identifies the level at which these controls should be developed for high, moderate, and low potential impact systems. DHS uses the FIPS 199 designation of the availability security objective (rather than the high water mark) to define the impact level applicable to contingency planning controls.

3.5.2.2 Contingency Plan Development

Contingency planning is designed to achieve the following objectives:

• Ensure the continuous availability of the critical information systems

• Protect assets and vital records needed to support mission needs

• Reduce or mitigate disruptions to operations

• Reduce loss of life

• Minimize damage and losses

• Achieve a timely and orderly recovery from an emergency and the resumption of full service to customers

3.5.2.3 Contingency Plan Format and Content

Contingency plans should be concise. Specific control requirements and levels of effort are determined based on the system’s security categorization. The level of resources is based on the security categorization for the availability security objective.

Contingency plans must address the following elements for the potential level of impact on the system’s availability security objective:

• Disruption impacts and allowable outage times

• Preventive controls and recovery strategies

• Vital records

• Responsible personnel

• Alternate operating facilities

• Devolution of control (delegations of authority and orders of succession)

• Reconstitution (return to normal operations)

3.5.2.4 Contingency Plan Test and Exercise

Testing the contingency plan identifies planning gaps. Tests and exercises serve to validate specific aspects of plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities to be used during an emergency. Both activities improve plan effectiveness and overall Department preparedness.

3.5.2.5 Contingency Plan Training

Training prepares recovery personnel for plan activation and improves plan effectiveness for overall Department preparedness. Appropriate personnel are to be trained in their contingency plan responsibilities according to the system’s potential impact level of the availability security objective.

• High impact for availability – All personnel involved in contingency planning are to be identified and trained in the procedures and logistics of contingency planning and implementation, as well as in their roles and responsibilities in relation to contingencies. This training is to incorporate simulated events. Annual refresher training is to be provided.

• Moderate impact for availability – All system personnel involved in contingency planning are to be trained in the procedures and logistics of contingency planning and implementation, as well as in their roles and responsibilities in relation to contingencies. Annual refresher training is to be provided.

• Low impact for availability – Training is not required.

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SELC methodology provides a structured approach to managing information systems projects. It also allows introduction of information security planning, including budgeting, review, and oversight. The SELC process begins when the Program Authorization decision of the CPIC process occurs.

Figure 2 shows the eight distinct phases in the SELC process.

\"\"

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SELC responsibilities are provided in the following table.

SELC Responsibilities

DHS CIO

DHS CISO

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

System Owners/Project Managers

3.6.1 Planning

The Planning Phase defines the system concept from the user’s perspective and establishes a comprehensive plan for developing the system. Information security activities include the following:

• Preparation of the initial Risk Assessment and Security Plan

• Ensuring that adequate budgetary resources for information security requirements are available

3.6.2 Requirements Definition

During the Requirements Definition Phase, users and technical staff define detailed requirements to ensure that the system will meet user requirements. This results in the establishment of a Functional Baseline. Information security activities include:

• Updating the Risk Assessment and Security Plan

• Reviewing Baseline Security Requirements

• Developing an initial Plan of Action and Milestones

• Developing an initial Security Test and Evaluation Plan

• Reviewing information security budget requirements

• Preparing the initial security inputs to the Training Plan

• Preparing the initial Contingency Plan

3.6.3 Design

The system development then moves to the Design Phase, during which the requirements are transformed into detailed design specifications. During the Design Phase, an Allocated Baseline is established and documented in the System Design Document. Information security activities include the following:

• Updating the Risk Assessment and Security Plan

• Reviewing budget requirements

• Developing Interconnection Security Agreements

• Updating the security information in the Training Plan

• Updating the Contingency Plan

• Preparing the initial Security Authorization Process package

3.6.4 Development

After formal approval of the design, the project enters the Development Phase. During this phase, the development team builds the system according to the design specified during the Design Phase and conducts development testing. The Development Phase represents an iterative process during which the development team builds the system, tests the system build, modifies the system based on any problems identified during Development Testing, and then tests the modified system build. Information security activities include the following:

• Conducting the initial Developmental Security Control Assessment

• Updating the Risk Assessment and Security Plan

• Developing the initial Operational Security Control Assessment

• Reviewing budget requirements

• Updating the Security Authorization Process package

3.6.5 Test

When the developed system is fully functional and has successfully passed Development Testing, the system development project moves into the Test Phase. During this phase, independent testing and evaluation is conducted to ensure that the developed system functions properly, satisfies the requirements (including security requirements) developed in the Requirements Definition Phase, and performs adequately in the host environment. Information security activities include:

• Conducting formal Developmental Security Control Assessment

• Reviewing budget requirements

• Updating the Risk Assessment and Security Plan

• Updating the Security Authorization Process package

3.6.6 Implementation

The system development project enters the Implementation Phase after the system has successfully passed testing and is ready for deployment. The output of this phase is the Product Baseline, which consists of the production system, databases, an updated data dictionary, associated infrastructure, and supporting documentation. During this phase the system is deployed to designated production sites. Information security activities include the following:

• Conducting the Operational Security Control Assessment on upgraded or new systems

• Reviewing adequacy of budget requirements

• Finalizing the security inputs in the Training Plans

• Updating the Risk Assessment and Security Plan

• Finalizing the Security Authorization package

3.6.7 Operations and Maintenance

After the system has been successfully deployed, it enters the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Phase. During this phase, the system becomes operational and any necessary system modifications are identified and documented as “System Change Requests.” These changes must be formally approved before they can be implemented. Information security activities include the following:

• Reviewing Security Authorization Process status and maintaining documentation currency

• Conducting annual user security awareness training and role-based training (e.g., training for ISSOs, Authorizing Officials (AO), network and system administrators, and managers)

• Maintaining adequate budgetary resources

3.6.8 Disposition

Finally, the system is retired from the operational environment during the Disposition Phase. Activities during this phase involve:

• Terminating system operations

• Removing the system from the production environment

• Archiving the system elements, data, and documentation

• Disposing of equipment and media in accordance with security requirements

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Configuration Management (CM) includes management of all hardware and software elements of information systems and networks. CM within DHS consists of a multi-layered structure – policy, procedures, processes, and compliance monitoring. Each Component uses its own appropriate level of configuration management.

CM applies to all systems, subsystems, and components of the DHS infrastructure, and ensures implementation and continuing life-cycle maintenance. CM begins with baselining of requirements documentation and ends with decommissioning of items no longer used for production or support.

The CM discipline applies to hardware, including power systems, software, firmware, documentation, test and support equipment, and spares. A Change Management Process ensures that documentation associated with an approved change to a DHS system is updated to reflect the appropriate baseline, including an analysis of any potential security implications. The initial configuration must be documented in detail and all subsequent changes must be controlled through a complete and robust CM process.

Users report known or suspected implementations of unauthorized IT changes to DHS Enterprise Configuration Management (ICCB.Services@hq.dhs.gov). For more information regarding how unauthorized changes are addressed, refer to the DHS ICCB Unauthorized Change Tracking Process.

Configuration management has security implications in three areas:

As new systems and newly modified systems proceed through the SELC, changes must be documented and tested prior to placing the systems into an operational environment. The objective is to ensure that new vulnerabilities are not introduced during the change process. The same requirements apply to operational systems as they undergo periodic modifications.

In today’s climate, new vulnerabilities quickly present themselves and often the risk of not implementing vendor-supplied patches exceeds the risk of installing an untested patch.

Components must have provisions for reacting quickly as these critical patches are identified and released by the DHS Security Operations Center (SOC). Configuration management policies must include provisions for quickly testing and approving time-sensitive changes that result from newly released vulnerability information.

For more information regarding how unauthorized changes are addressed, refer to the DHS ICCB Unauthorized Change Tracking Process.

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Configuration management responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Configuration Management Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

AOs

Project Managers/ISSOs

Project Team

Users

Component CISOs/ISSMs, in cooperation with network operations leadership, determine when and how quickly late-breaking patches must be expedited through the CM process and installed on DHS systems.

The ISSO and Project Manager work with the appropriate development team (for new development systems) or the O&M Support Team (for fielded systems) to ensure that all proposed changes to the configuration baseline are analyzed and tested to determine their security implications. As new vulnerabilities are identified during the testing process, appropriate security software patches must be developed and installed prior to implementation of the proposed change. Any changes that impact the security posture of the system must be brought to the attention of the Security Control Assessor and the AO.

Proposed configuration changes to operating systems, operating system security features, applications, critical system files, and system devices must be approved through the CM process and documented prior to the change being implemented. If the change is deemed to be significant, the Security Authorization Process documentation must be updated.

The CM process continues throughout the system life cycle.

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Risk management is a process that allows System Owners to balance the operational and economic costs of protective measures to achieve gains in mission capability by protecting the information systems and data that support their organization’s missions.

An effective risk management process is a vital element of a successful Information Security Program. An organization’s risk management process is designed to protect the organization and its ability to perform its mission, not just its information system assets. The process identifies risks and assesses their impacts so that appropriate steps can be taken to reduce them to an acceptable level.

Effective risk management enables an organization to accomplish its mission(s) by:

•\tBetter securing the information systems

•\tEnabling management to make well-informed risk management decisions

•\tAssisting management in authorizing information systems

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3.8.1 Risk Assessment

Risk assessments are used throughout a system’s lifecycle to determine the extent of potential threats and risks. The results are used to identify appropriate security controls to reduce risks to an acceptable level.

There are nine major areas to consider when developing a risk assessment:

• System characterization

• Threat identification

• Vulnerability identification control analysis

• Likelihood determination

• Impact analysis

• Risk determination

• Control recommendations

• Results documentation

3.8.2 Risk Mitigation

Risk mitigation occurs after the risk assessment phase and encompasses the prioritization, evaluation, and implementation of appropriate security controls.

There are seven (7) major activities to be conducted as part of the risk mitigation phase:

• Prioritize actions

• Evaluate recommended control options

• Conduct a cost-benefit analysis

• Select appropriate controls

• Assign implementation responsibility

• Develop an implementation plan

• Implement selected controls

3.8.3 Evaluation and Assessment

Risk management is an ongoing process that will evolve as systems are updated and replaced. New risks can surface and risks previously mitigated can re-surface.

Components must conduct risk assessments whenever significant changes to the system configuration or to the operational or threat environment occur, or every three (3) years, whichever comes first. The risk assessment is a key element of the Security Authorization Process.

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Risk management responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Risk Management Responsibilities

DHS CISO

Security Control Assessor

AOs

System Owners

Project Managers/ISSOs

Risk management is an integral part of the Security Authorization Process and contains three essential elements:

• Risk assessment

• Risk mitigation

• Evaluation and assessment

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DHS periodically assesses the selection of security controls to determine their continued effectiveness in providing an appropriate level of protection.

It is recommended that Components pursue Type Security Authorization for information resources that are under the same direct management control; have the same function or mission objective, operating characteristics, security needs, and that reside in the same general operating environment, or in the case of a distributed system, reside in various locations with similar operating environments.

Type Security Authorization consists of a master security authorization package describing the common controls implemented across sites and site-specific controls and unique requirements that have been implemented at the individual sites.

The DHS “Security Authorization Process Guide” describes detailed processes governing security authorization and system risk assessment.

Detailed information for creating and managing POA&Ms is published in this Handbook’s Attachment H, “Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) Process Guide.”

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) directs that all Federal agencies develop and implement an agency-wide information system security program designed to safeguard information systems, assets, and data. The Department’s Security Authorization Process policy is based on the recommendations set forth in NIST SP 800-37, and OMB Circular A-130.

Security Control Assessment is the comprehensive testing and evaluation of the management, operational, and technical security features of an information system. It addresses software and hardware security safeguards; considers procedural, physical, and personnel security measures; and establishes the extent to which a particular design and implementation meets a specified set of security requirements. It also considers procedural, physical, and personnel security measures employed to enforce information security policy.

Authorization is the official management decision that permits the operation of a system. It includes explicitly accepting the risk to Department operations, assets, or individuals, based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of security controls. The AO accepts security responsibility for the operation of an assessed system and officially grants Authority to Operate (ATO). AOs are to be identified in Information Assurance Compliance System (IACS). The Component CIO serves as the AO for any system where an AO has not been appointed or where a vacancy exists.

A common controls approach (type authorization) may be used for authorizing systems. Attachment D to this Handbook, “Type Authorization,” provides specific guidance. The AO must approve the use of any common controls-based Security Authorization Process.

Components categorize systems in accordance with FIPS 199, “Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems” and apply the appropriate NIST SP 800-53 and NIST 800-161 controls. The IACS automated tool is used to produce Security Authorization Process packages. IACS supports the POA&M process, quarterly reports and annual self-assessments.

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NIST SP 800-37 describes the six Risk Management Framework steps which are listed below:

• Step 1 – Categorize Information System

• Step 2 – Select Security Controls

• Step 3 – Implement Security Controls

• Step 4 – Assess Security Controls

• Step 5 – Authorize Information System

• Step 6 – Monitor Security Controls

The DHS Security Authorization Process Guide provides detailed instructions for creating authorization artifacts, using authorization tools for authorizing systems, and the timeline for creating authorization artifacts, tracking remediation activities, and performing the required self- assessments and generating the required reports.

Required Security Authorization Processes to be completed for sensitive systems are detailed in DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Systems are authorized by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A).

The DHS Security Authorization Process is governed by the following NIST publications:

• NIST Special Publication 800-30, “Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments”

• NIST Special Publication 800-37, “Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems”

• NIST Special Publication 800-53, Rev. 4 “Recommended Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations”

• NIST Special Publication 800-53A, “Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations, Building Effective Security Assessment Plans”

• NIST Special Publication 800-59, “Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System”

• NIST Special Publication 800-60, Volume I: “Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories,” and Volume II: “Appendixes to Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories”

• NIST SP 800-161, “Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations,” April 2015

• Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS Pub) 199, “Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems”

• FIPS Pub 200, “Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems

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3.9.1 Ongoing Authorization (OA)

The DHS OA Program builds upon an information system’s existing Security Authorization; the purpose of the Ongoing Authorization (OA) Program is continuous evaluation of security controls, based on system-specific information, and timely action in response to changes to information systems and risk posture.

OA enhances the information assurance life cycle process by replacing the periodic three-year assessment cycle with ongoing security assessments that are driven by risk as opposed to time.

The DHS Ongoing Authorization Methodology describes detailed processes governing the OA Program’s requirements and entrance criteria for a Component and for a Component’s systems. The OA Methodology defines the deliverables and templates required for maintaining compliance with OA as well as required and recommended internal procedures. Components are accepted into the OA program by the DHS CISO according to the provisions of DHS Ongoing Authorization Methodology with the concurrence of the Component AO and/or CIO.

Processes and procedures within the OA program are governed by DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.

3.9.1.1 Key Ongoing Authorization Artifacts

3.9.1.1.1 Control Allocation Table (CAT)

The Control Allocation Table (CAT) is a risk-based tailoring of controls that outlines frequency, rigor, and impact of each control. It is updated over time to meet changing risks in response to triggers. Each system’s security team determines how often each control was evaluated based on DHS 4300A guidance, NIST SP 800-53 tailoring guidance, accounting for mission, criticality and other organizational factors. The authoritative and accepted Control Allocation Table will be created and managed in IACS.

3.9.1.1.2 Trigger Accountability Log (TRAL)

The Trigger Accountability Log (TRAL) acts as a running list of all triggers for all systems in OA for each Component. The TRAL allows Components to track and document the number and type of events occurring for a system, provides DHS with visibility into Component activities, and serves as an audit trail.

The appropriate operational and security staff will constantly monitor for trigger events. Triggers can be either routine or non-routine. Routine triggers are events that are normal or scheduled occurrences. They are planned and are known to the operations and security personnel. Non- Routine triggers are events that are out-of-cycle, anomalies, of unknown origin or activity. They are detected through Continuous Monitoring mechanisms (e.g. Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems and Firewalls). These trigger types are explained as follows:

• Routine Triggers

• Non-routine Triggers

3.9.1.2 Component Admission

Components must meet the eligibility requirements and be approved by the Department to implement Ongoing Authorization. The criteria for Component eligibility are described in the subsequent sections.

3.9.1.2.1 Robust Continuous Monitoring

This requirement uses the DHS Scorecard, which is the barometer of Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) in DHS. The metric of the total ISCM score is the basis of this requirement. This average score is derived from the following ISCM Metrics:

• Hardware Asset Management

• Software Asset Management

• Configuration Management

• Vulnerability Management

• Anti–Virus

• Information Security Vulnerability Management (ISVM)

Maintaining an ISCM score of 80% or higher over three (3) consecutive months is indicative of a Component that has a fully functioning Continuous Monitoring initiative. Components interested in OA participation must meet that score.

3.9.1.2.2 Approved Common Controls

The CAT) is a core requirement for systems to be admitted to OA. Components must define Common Controls within the IACS tool, along with expressed approval from the AO in the form of a signed Risk Acceptance letter. This ensures that CATs are filled out accurately and show the inheritance of controls from the Component CISO Program level.

3.9.1.2.3 Designated Ongoing Authorization Manager

The Component Ongoing Authorization Manager (OAM) will serve as the primary non- executive director of their OA Program. The OA Manager directs the Operational Risk Management Board (ORMB) and is the first line of defense for alerted triggers and communications from the Component CISO or the Department. At least one OAM must be designated in writing before a Component can be entered into the DHS OA Program.

Components may opt to assign additional deputy OAM’s at their discretion. Once a package has completed the necessary OA entrance requirements that are defined in official DHS policy documents (e.g., DHS 4300, OA Methodology), submission is then possible into the DHS OA Program.

3.9.1.2.4 Chartered Operational Risk Management Board

A key function of OA is the ORMB, which decides how triggers are handled and how risk is accepted or remediated. Each Component must determine how to operate or construct its ORMB, but it also must ensure ORMBs function as specified in the Ongoing Authorization Methodology and other DHS policies. While their membership and activities may have commonalities, the ORMB is different from the Change Management Board (CMB). The events and activities pertinent to each board are shown in Table 1.

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Members of the CMB may be members of the ORMB.

3.9.1.2.5 System Admission Requirements

Components that have been approved for OA by DHS can nominate Systems to undergo OA. However, nominated Systems are not automatically enrolled in OA. Systems have their own eligibility criteria. The criteria for System eligibility are:

3.9.1.2.5.1 Component Accepted into the Ongoing Authorization Program

Systems that desire to be included in the Ongoing Authorization Program must have the oversight and management of a participating Component in order to process triggers, have a credible ORMB, and must enter all systems and all artifacts into IACS to ensure the system authorization of their individual programs.

3.9.1.2.5.2 Ongoing Authorization System Admission Letter

The Ongoing Authorization System Admission Letter serves as the formal CISO recommendation via the Authorizing Official (AO) of a system regarding its eligibility to begin participation in the DHS Ongoing Authorization (OA) program. This letter does not permit systems to be designated as an official OA system until a full review is performed by the DHS OA Team for suitability and subsequent admission.

3.9.1.2.5.3 Ongoing Authorization Recommendation Letter

The Ongoing Authorization Recommendation Letter serves as the formal CISO recommendation to the AO of a system regarding triggers that get escalated from the ORMB and system eligibility to continue participation in the OA program. This recommendation shall be completed and approved by all relevant parties as requested. DHS provides a template for the OA Recommendation Letter, but Components may develop their own internal communications as it relates to their unique mission and operations.

3.9.1.2.5.4 ATO Expiration Greater than 60 Days of Submission Date

Systems being considered for entrance into OA shall have an ATO within this time frame, unless by waiver of a Component CISO or AO. The logic behind this is that a system with an expiring ATO under the old system may not be up to date with its control assessments and evaluation of its security posture. It is ultimately up to the Components if they wish to accept this risk in writing and allow systems with ATOs of shorter expiration duration to enter OA. Systems that have expired ATOs are not permitted.

3.9.1.2.5.5 ISSO with Collateral Responsibilities that are less than 51%

Systems are required to have ISSOs with less than 51% of collateral duties in order to function within the limits of OA. The intent of this requirement is to ensure that systems have dedicated security professionals that have adequate time to execute the duties required as part of Ongoing Authorization.

3.9.1.2.5.6 ISSO Trained on Ongoing Authorization Processes

ISSOs are required to have completed both Department and Component OA training to ensure that OA policies and procedures are carried out to maintain ongoing awareness of the security posture of DHS. This is in parallel with the current philosophy and requirements that are placed on Privileged Users in the DHS enterprise.

3.9.1.2.5.7 Approved Control Allocation Table (CAT)

Per DHS Ongoing Authorization (OA) entry criteria, each system must have a unique Control Allocation Table (CAT) that traces NIST controls to their proper source(s). The system’s security team will determine how often each control is evaluated based on NIST SP 800-53 tailoring guidance, mission, criticality and other organizational factors. After declaring how the system is to be monitored on an ongoing basis, internal and enterprise processes are used to maintain the system’s security posture. Changes to the CAT may be necessary as events are triggered that affect the system.

To illustrate that all federal and organizational requirements are met, each of the system’s controls are formally documented, numbered, and mapped to their source(s) in a CAT. By identifying controls and design requirements already tested (through inheritance, common controls, or through Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation), the CAT provides insight into those controls NOT adequately assessed by an automated tool or other method. This information is combined with the system’s mission and organizational objectives to determine the review frequency and impact for each control.

3.9.1.3 Information Assurance Compliance Systems (IACS)

Each system that participates in the DHS OA Program must utilize the IACS tool and ensure all information is accurate and up-to-date. During the migration from the Trusted Agent FISMA (TAF) system to IACS, all DHS systems in TAF and their stored artifacts were migrated to IACS. Each system is required to complete the IACS workflow up to the OA tasks. Systems cannot complete the OA portion of the IACS workflow until the previous tasks are completed.

The OA enrollment verification tasks in the IACS workflow are designed to prepare systems for entering and participating in the DHS OA Program. They also provide nonrepudiation for each level of the IACS approval process before the system is presented to the DHS OA Team for evaluation. The steps include filling out a checklist for the basic OA requirements and the subsequent approvals for the requirements which are illustrated in the figure below. These internal Component–based approvals of the requirements checklist, directly relate to the requirements for system entry into the OA Program, will help ensure a smooth evaluation process by the DHS OA Team.

Figure 4: IACS Ongoing Authorization Process Flow

Final approval and consideration of a system for OA remains with the DHS OA Managers. Once approved, a system must build the Control Allocation Table and complete the Ongoing Authorization System Admission Letter. Step-by-step procedures of how OA is implemented in IACS are available in the Appendix I: OA IACS Procedures.

3.9.2 FIPS 199 Categorization and the NIST SP 800-53 Controls

The high watermark requirement is the concept whereby the highest impact level of any of the security objectives (confidentiality, integrity, availability) must be used for a system as a whole.

Within DHS, the high water mark requirement is amplified to reflect the actual security requirements that controls must meet.

Within DHS, those controls required to support the security objectives for an information system are implemented. There is no requirement to implement extra controls beyond this minimum standard, but any program may implement additional or more stringent controls. This policy amplification is a Department-level risk-based decision that is consistent with the FISMA requirement to “cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level.” The tailoring of controls and use of compensating controls is also consistent with providing the safeguards necessary to reduce the risks within a specific operating environment.

This policy amplification is also consistent with the NIST information security guidance which promulgates the “concept of risk-based decisions.” The due diligence required by FIPS 199, “Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems,” requires determination of the exact impact level of each type of information on the system, and on each of the security objectives; this due diligence will lead to well-defined impact levels for confidentiality, integrity, and availability across systems. It is important, when using a risk- based decision, to minimize the security controls and to ensure that all of the information and the risks to that information are clearly defined and documented, so that the AO can make an informed risk-based decision for the system and its information in its specific operational environment.

The “DHS FIPS 199 Workbook” defines impact level categories (high, moderate, low). Each security objective is assigned to one of these categories. Appropriate control implementation is given by the Workbook for each category; for example, a system with low risk availability, high risk integrity, and low risk confidentiality is not required to implement high controls across the board, but rather the controls that revealed by the analysis. In this example, categorization analysis would indicate high level integrity controls and low level controls confidentiality and availability.

For systems involving Personally Identifiable Information (PII), the confidentiality security objective is assigned a minimum impact level of “moderate.” If warranted by a risk-based assessment the confidentiality security objective is elevated to “high.”

All CFO Designated Systems are assigned a minimum impact level of “moderate” for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. If warranted by a risk based assessment, the integrity objective is elevated to “high.”

This Handbook’s Attachment M, “Tailoring the NIST SP 800-53 Security Controls,” lists the NIST SP 800-53 controls by impact level and by security objective, and provides information on the possible tailoring of these controls and the use of compensating controls.

3.9.3 Privacy Assessment

Information systems that collect, use, maintain, or disseminate PII are required to complete privacy compliance documentation. To determine whether a system is a Privacy Sensitive System (see Section 1.4.18), all System Owners must submit a Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA) to the DHS Privacy Office for review. See Section 3.14, “Privacy and Data Security” for additional information.

As part of the Security Authorization Process, the confidentiality security objective for all Privacy Sensitive Systems is assigned an impact level of at least moderate.

3.9.4 E-Authentication

E-Authentication security requirements apply to information systems that allow online transactions. For systems where e-authentication security requirements apply, two additional steps are required:

• Determine the potential impact of authentication errors

• Determine the required assurance level for authentication

The E-Authentication Workbook and instructions are available on the DHS CISO Web page. The DHS Compliance Help Desk (202) 343-2500 can also provide assistance in obtaining these documents.

3.9.5 Risk Assessment

Risk Assessment is the process of identifying risks to system security, determining the probability of occurrence and the resulting impact, and identifying additional safeguards that would mitigate that impact. An initial risk assessment is used to understand the unique system risks and to determine whether or not any controls are required to address specific threats or weaknesses. The initial assessment incorporates system characterization information, security categorization, PTA and PIA, and e-Authentication assessment. The results are used to directly address the controls that will be documented in the Security Plan and implemented in the system.

An initial Risk Assessment is conducted within IACS whenever a Security Authorization Process package is initiated.

The initial assessment is created after security controls are implemented and tested, and is updated and revised whenever corrective actions or changes are applied. The amount of residual risk is identified throughout the process.

DHS follows the overall risk process as described in NIST Special Publication 800-30, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments.”

The Security Authorization Process Guide published by the DHS Office of the Chief Information Security Officer provides detailed information on developing Risk Assessments.

3.9.6 Security Plan (SP)

The SP provides a complete description of an information system, including purposes, functions, system boundaries, architecture, user groups, interconnections, hardware, software, encryption techniques, transmissions, and network configuration. It also provides an overview of the system’s security requirements, describes the controls in place or planned, and delineates the responsibilities and expected behavior of all individuals who access the system. The SP, typically written in conjunction with the Risk Assessment, is refined throughout the authorization process.

3.9.7 Contingency Plan (CP)

A CP documents the management policies and procedures designed to maintain or restore business operations in the event of emergencies, system failures, or disaster. Specific control requirements and level of effort are determined based on the system’s security categorization.

The level of resources for the Contingency Plan is based on the security categorization for the availability security objective:

• For systems with a low impact for availability, the System Owner may determine the CP format and content that is appropriate for the system and its environment. The CP created in IACS is used for tailoring such plans.

• For systems with a moderate impact level for availability, the default CP in IACS is used.

• For systems with a high impact level for availability a rigorous CP is developed. The

DHS-developed high impact CP, “IT Contingency and Disaster Recovery Plan,” is used; it is found in IACS; the template in this Handbook’s Attachment K, “IT Contingency Plan Template” is aligned with it.

The DHS “Security Authorization Process Guide” provides detailed information on developing the Contingency Plan using IACS.

3.9.8 Security Control Assessment Plan

The RTM is generated by IACS as part of the Security Authorization Process package; it is populated with sample test procedures. The procedures will need to be tailored to the particular SP, risks, and system environment, and they will need to be supplemented with detailed technical methods and procedures.

The complete Security Control Assessment Plan includes the primary document and any supporting material. Typically, supporting material includes the documented test procedures contained in the IACS RTM.

The DHS Security Authorization Process Guide provides detailed information on using IACS to develop the Security Control Assessment Plan. Once the Risk Assessment, SP, and Security Control Assessment Plan are completed and approved by the System Owner and agreed to with the Security Control Assessor, Security Control Assessment testing can be conducted as part of the assessment process. Results of the testing are documented in the Security Assessment Report.

3.9.9 Contingency Plan Testing

Contingency Plan testing is the process of simulating an information security event and the subsequent activities undertaken to restore and recover the system.

Contingency Plan testing is required only for systems with a moderate or high impact for the availability security objective; it is optional for systems with a low impact for availability.

Testing requirements are provided in the following sections.

3.9.9.1 Systems with High Impact Availability — Testing Required

High Impact Availability systems require an established alternate site as part of their CPs, and resources for establishing an alternate site must be identified and made available.

Annual CP testing is required; a full-scale test is preferred; in a full-scale test, the triggering incident is simulated, but the detection, containment, and recovery steps is executed in accordance with and by the actual individuals listed in the plan. This test includes coordination with and involvement of alternate site personnel, and has the following objectives:

1. Demonstrate that the system(s) can be brought to operational condition(s) at the designated alternate site by following the procedures and instructions described in the plan.

2. Verify that the CP can be accomplished with resources located away from the site where the incident occurred.

3. Verify that the organizational units responsible for the CP fully understand and are able to execute their responsibilities in a timely manner.

4. Verify that the system(s) can be brought to an operational condition within the allotted recovery time.

5. Verify that system information can be restored to the expected state, so that operations can resume in a synchronized manner.

6. Verify that authorized personnel are able to access information on restored systems and that connectivity can be re-established.

A rigorous tabletop exercise, with a planned follow-on for a full-scale test, may be conducted whenever circumstances preclude a full-scale test. The tabletop exercise is described below in the following section on moderate impact systems.

3.9.9.2 Systems with Moderate Impact for Availability — Testing Required

Moderate Impact Availability systems should have an alternate site identified as part of their CPs, and resources for establishing an alternate site should be identified and made available, a full-scale test of the CP.

Annual CP testing is required and a full-scale test is encouraged, but is not required. A tabletop exercise is acceptable under most circumstances for most moderate impact systems, as determined by the System Owner. In a tabletop exercise, the triggering incident, detection, containment, and recovery are simulated and a walk though is conducted by using a prepared scenario to demonstrate how system recovery would be achieved. Recovery steps are executed in accordance with and by the actual individuals listed in the CP. This test includes coordination with and involvement of the alternate site personnel, demonstrating that:

• Results for each step are being simulated as rigorously as possible.

• There is reference only to only personnel and other resources that will be located away from the site where the incident occurs.

• The exercise requires each organizational unit to explain how they would carry out their responsibilities.

• There is a timeline, with reasonable times for events, used to illustrate that the system could be brought to an operational condition within the allotted system recovery time.

• The exercise illustrates how access to system information by authorized business area personnel would be reestablished.

3.9.9.3 Systems with Low Impact for Availability — Testing Optional

CP testing is optional for systems whose with low impact for availability. At a minimum, the plan is reviewed and evaluated for feasibility every two years or whenever significant changes are made. A memo is developed that indicates that “the system is a FIPS 199 low availability impact system; therefore, the system's CP is not required to be tested” is included as part of the system description in the SP.

3.9.10 Security Assessment Report (SAR)

The SAR summarizes the results of the Security Control Assessment and indicates the system’s level of compliance with the security controls defined in its SP. Residual risks are also documented. Security Control Assessment results are attached to support the findings in the SAR. A SAR is automatically created in IACS.

3.9.11 Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M)

A POA&M is required as part of the authorization package. The POA&M documents any the weaknesses that will be mitigated and the corrective actions that must be taken. The POA&M It details the resources required, milestones, and scheduled completion dates, and assigns actions to individuals. Detailed guidance on the POA&M process is found in Attachment H to this Handbook, “Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) Process Guide.” When reviewing the authorization package, the AO may stipulate that certain POA&M activities be completed within a specific timeframe, or that additional compensating controls be implemented as a condition for authorization.

3.9.12 Authorization to Operate (ATO) Letter

Authorization to Operate (ATO) or Denial of Authorization to Operate letters are generated based on the appropriate AO’s decision after reviewing the authorization package. The package includes the following documents:

• Security Plan (SP)

• Security Assessment Report (SAR)

• Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M)

• Security Control Assessor Transmittal Letter (documents the Security Control Assessor’s recommendation (i.e., ATO or Denial to Operate)

• Any supplemental information requested by the AO or Security Control Assessor (e.g., CP, final Risk Assessment, Configuration Management Plan (CMP), Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Concept of Operations CONOPS)

For operational systems, the AO makes a risk-based decision either to grant full ATO or deny authorization to operate. Authorizations to operate systems may be granted for a maximum of three (3) years. Should Components require a system to operate in a production environment for six (6) months or less an ATO authorization period waiver from the DHS CISO is required.

3.9.13 Interim Authorization to Operate (IATO)

An IATO provides a limited authorization to operate development, testing, or prototype systems under specified terms and conditions and acknowledges greater risk to the organization’s operations and assets. An AO may grant one six-month IATO, and may extend this period for an aditional six monthsThe AO may grant an IATO for development, testing, or prototype systems. IATOs may not be used for production systems under any circumstances. An IATO provides a limited authorization to operate the system under specified terms and conditions and acknowledges greater risk to the organization’s operations and assets. A system operating with

an IATO is undergoing development testing or a prototype system is not considered authorized during the IATO period.

The AO must sign a formal ATO letter subsequent to Key Decision Point 3 of the life cycle development. The DHS Security Authorization Process Guidance for SBU Systems: Users Manual provides detailed information on the authorization phase and on the ATO letter.

The AO must sign a formal ATO letter subsequent to Key Decision Point 3 of the life cycle development. The DHS Security Authorization Process Guide provides detailed information on the authorization phase and on the ATO letter.

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3.9.14 Annual Self-Assessments

Annual assessments are performed during the Continuous Monitoring Phase of the authorization. They provide ongoing oversight and monitoring of the system’s security controls and serve to inform the authorizing official whenever changes occur that may impact the security of the system. During this phase, the system’s status is monitored to ensure that residual risk is kept within the acceptable level, and that any significant changes to the system configuration or operational or threat environment are identified. Components must re-authorize their systems every three (3) years or whenever a major change occurs.

The automated reporting tool IACS addresses the annual self-assessments.

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Assessment and Authorization Responsibilities

DHS CISO

Security Control Assessor

AOs

System Owners

Assessment Responsibilities:

Authorization Responsibilities:

Project Managers/ISSOs

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FISMA requires a thorough annual review of the DHS Information Security Program. This review must include a report on the degree to which security requirements have been implemented, significant deficiencies discovered, remedial actions that have been taken or are in progress to correct deficiencies, and level of compliance with NIST standards. This Handbook’s Attachment E, “FISMA Reporting,” provides detailed information on FISMA reporting.

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3.10.1 Review and Assistance Management and Oversight

Senior management participation is necessary for the successful implementation and management of the Information Security Program. The scope and complexity of the requirements requires active participation and oversight by a senior DHS official with a staff of qualified security professionals. The DHS CISO serves as the senior manager who reviews and approves information security policy, oversees the information security assistance program, and prepares the annual assessment report.

3.10.2 Information Security Assistance

Components must provide on-site assistance to their organizations to the maximum extent practicable, in accordance with the Information Security Review and Assistance Program. Component CISOs/ISSMs coordinate with ISSOs and provide guidance and oversight in identifying deficiencies and prioritizing them based on missions, risk, and funding. The size and geographic dispersion of DHS offices and organizations require close coordination and collaborative planning between the DHS CISO, Component CISOs/ISSMs, and ISSOs. Active support by site personnel and system development teams is imperative for the success of the assistance program.

3.10.3 Information Security Reviews

Information security controls are specified in accordance with FIPS 200 and NIST SP 800-53; NIST SP 800-53A is used for assessment of security control effectiveness and for annual FISMA reporting. System and site ISSOs have primary responsibility for completing the annual review and reporting results to senior management in accordance with the procedures established by the Component CISO/ISSM. The Component CISO/ISSM monitors ISSO performance, provides updates to the IACS database, and interacts with the DHS Compliance and Oversight Program Director.

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Information security review and assistance responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Information Security Review and Assistance Responsibilities

DHS CIO

DHS CISO

DHS Compliance and Oversight Program Director

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

System Owners

Site Managers

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Working groups and other forums representing various functional areas convene on a regular basis.

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3.11.1 CISO Council

The CISO Council is the management team responsible for developing and implementing the DHS Information Security Program. The Council is responsible for implementing a security program that meets DHS mission requirements, and also for reviewing specific topic areas assigned by the DHS CIO or the DHS CISO.

The CISO Council is also responsible for establishing and implementing significant security responsibilities; promoting communications between security programs; implementing information systems security acquisition requirements; and developing security best practices in all enterprise and Component information security programs.

Note: Periodically, the CISO Council may be convened to include Component ISSMs.

3.11.2 DHS Information Security Training Working Group

The DHS Information Security Training Working Group is established to promote collaboration on information security training efforts throughout the Department and to share information on Component-developed training activities, methods, and tools, thereby reducing costs and avoiding duplication of effort. The Information Security Training Working Group is chaired by the DHS Program Director for Information Security Training.

3.11.3 DHS Security Policy Working Group (SPWG)

The DHS Information Security Policy Director chairs or appoints the chair for the SPWG. The DHS Security Policy Working Group is established to promote collaboration involving all Components in the maintenance of DHS information security policy.

3.11.4 DHS Enterprise Services Security Working Group (ESSWG)

The DHS ESSWG is established to ensure the development, review and vetting of proposed security documents for current and proposed enterprise service solutions and service offerings. It also provides recommendations to the CISO Council for review and approval. The Enterprise Services Security Working Group is chaired by the DHS CISO, the DHS Headquarters CISO, and Executive Director of Enterprise Systems Development Office or their delegates.

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Individual accountability is a cornerstone of an effective security policy. Component Heads are responsible for taking corrective actions whenever security incidents or violations occur and for holding personnel accountable for intentional violations. Each Component determines how to best address each individual case.

Information security violations may result in disclosure of sensitive information to unauthorized individuals; unauthorized modification or destruction of data; loss of processing capability; or loss or theft of system resources. Violations also include failure to adhere to DHS policy regarding appropriate use of Departmental computer resources. The DHS SOC initiates necessary investigations and notifies appropriate law enforcement authorities, who pursue the investigation and recommend disciplinary action, if required.

","references":"","tenantsId":1,"uuid":"656751ce-5475-41e0-9744-3f655365c6fc","family":"Management Policies","subControls":"","weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":false,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"3.12\tInformation Security Policy Violation and Disciplinary Action","relatedControls":"

Information security policy violation and disciplinary action responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Information Security Policy Violation and Disciplinary Action Responsibilities

Users

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FISMA requires that the status of the DHS Information Security Program be reported to the OMB on a recurring basis.

The DHS CISO submits quarterly reports and an annual summary report to OMB. Components update status information on a continual basis using the IACS reporting tool. The status information is collected and compiled for FISMA and other status reports. For additional information, see this Handbook’s Attachment E, “FISMA Reporting,” and Attachment H, “Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) Process Guide.”

Components use IACS when reporting Information Security Program status.

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FISMA reporting responsibilities are provided in the following table.

FISMA Reporting Responsibilities

DHS Chief Privacy Officer

Component CISO/ISSM/ISSO

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The DHS Privacy Office is responsible for privacy compliance across the Department, including assuring that technologies used by the Department sustain and do not erode privacy protections relating to the use of personal and Departmental information. The DHS Chief Privacy Officer has exclusive jurisdiction over the development of policy relating to PII and to privacy-sensitive programs, systems, or initiatives. Questions concerning privacy-related policy should be directed to the Component Privacy Office or Privacy Point of Contact (PPOC). If the Component does not have a Privacy Office or PPOC, then please contact the DHS Privacy Office (privacy@hq.dhs.gov or 202-343-1717) or refer to the DHS Chief Privacy Officer Web page at www.dhs.gov/privacy for additional information.

The privacy controls in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 4, Appendix J, are primarily for use by an organization’s Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer when working with program managers, mission/business owners, information owners/stewards, Chief Information Officers, Chief Information Security Officers, information system developers/integrators, and risk executives to incorporate effective privacy protections and practices (i.e., privacy controls) within organizational programs and information systems and the environments in which they operate. The privacy controls facilitate DHS efforts to comply with privacy requirements affecting those Department-wide and Component programs and systems that collect, use, maintain, share, or dispose of PII or other activities that raise privacy risks.

While the security controls in Appendix F are allocated to the low, moderate, and high baselines in Appendix D, the privacy controls in Appendix J are selected and implemented based on DHS’ privacy requirements and the need to protect the PII of individuals collected and maintained by DHS information systems and programs, in accordance with federal privacy legislation, policies, directives, regulations, guidelines, and best practices.

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3.14.1 Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Various regulations place restrictions on the Government’s collection, use, maintenance, and release of information about individuals. Regulations require agencies to protect PII, which is any information that permits the identity of an individual to be directly or indirectly inferred, including other information that is linked or linkable to that individual regardless of whether the individual is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, visitor to the U.S., or Department employee or contractor.

Sensitive PII (SPII) is PII which if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization, could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual.

Examples of Sensitive PII include Social Security numbers, Alien Registration Numbers (A- number), medical information, and criminal history. The sensitivity of this data requires that stricter handling guidelines be applied. For more information on handling Sensitive PII see: Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information at the Department of Homeland Security.

Consistent with Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPS), PII collected and maintained by DHS should be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete for the purpose for which it is to be used, as specified in public notices. In addition, DHS adheres to data minimization and retention requirements to collect, use, and retain only PII that is relevant and necessary for the purpose for which it was originally collected. Programs will retain PII for only as long as necessary to fulfill the purpose(s) specified in public notices and in accordance with a record retention schedule approved by National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

Additional PII and Sensitive PII-related guidance is included in the following sections of this Handbook:

• Section 3.9, Security Authorization Process, and Security Control Assessments – (For Privacy Sensitive Systems, the confidentiality security objective is assigned an impact level of at least moderate.

• Section 4.8.2, Laptop Computers and Other Mobile Computing Devices – All information stored on any laptop computer or other mobile computing device is to be encrypted using mechanisms that comply with Section 5.5, Encryption, of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.

• Section 5.2.2, Automatic Session Termination – Sessions on workstations and on laptop computers and other mobile computing devices are to be terminated after twenty (20) minutes of inactivity.

• Section 5.3, Auditing – DHS defines computer-readable data extracts as “any Federal record or collection of records containing sensitive PII that is retrieved from a DHS-owned database, through a query, reporting tool, extract generation tool, or other means that is then saved into removable media and/or a separate computer-readable device or application such as another database, a spreadsheet, or a text file.\" (see Attachment S1)

• Section 5.4.1, Remote Access and Dial-in – Remote access of PII must be approved by the AO. Strong authentication via Virtual Private Network (VPN) or equivalent encryption (e.g., https) and two-factor authentication is required. DHS has an immediate goal that remote access should only be allowed with two-factor authentication where one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the computer gaining access. Restrictions are placed on the downloading and remote storage of PII accessed remotely, as noted below in this document.

• Attachment S, “Compliance Framework for Privacy Systems.

The DHS Privacy Office works with Component Privacy Officers, PPOCs, Program Managers, System Owners, and information systems security personnel to ensure that sound privacy practices and controls are integrated into the Department’s operations. The DHS Privacy Office implements three types of documents for managing privacy practices and controls for information systems:

• A PTA provides a high level description of an information system including the information it contains and how it is used. The PTA is used to determine and document whether or not a PIA and/or SORN are required.

• A PIA is a publicly released assessment of the privacy impact of an information system and includes an analysis of the PII that is collected, stored, and shared.

• A System of Records Notice (SORN) describes the categories of records within a system of records and describes the routine uses of the data and how individuals can gain access to records and correct errors.

To promote privacy compliance within the Department, the Privacy Office has published official Department guidance regarding the requirements and content for PTAs, PIAs, and SORNs.

Privacy Compliance Guidance can be found on the DHS Privacy Office website at www.dhs.gov/privacy.

3.14.2 Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA)

The PTA provides a high-level description of the system, including the information it contains and how it is used. PTAs are required whenever a new information system is being developed or an existing system is significantly modified. System Owners and Program Managers are responsible for writing the PTA as part of the SELC process. The Component Privacy Officer or PPOC reviews the PTA and forwards it to the DHS Privacy Office, who determines whether a PIA and/or SORN are required. PTA artifacts expire after three years. DHS MD 047-01 defines the PTA requirements.

PTA responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Privacy Threshold Analyses Responsibilities

DHS Chief Privacy Officer

System Owner

Component Privacy Officer or PPOC

3.14.3 Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA)

A PIA is a publicly released assessment of the privacy impact of an information system and includes an analysis of the PII that is collected, stored, and shared. PIAs are required (as determined by the PTA) whenever a new information system is being developed or an existing system is significantly modified. PIAs are the responsibility of the System Owner and the Program Manager as part of the SELC process. OMB Memorandum M-03-22, DHS MD 047- 01, and the Official DHS Privacy Impact Assessment Guidance discuss the requirements for conducting PIAs at DHS.

PIAs are one tool that DHS uses to convey public notice of information practices and the privacy impact of Department programs and activities. The Department also uses web privacy policies, System of Records Notices, and Privacy Act Statements to provide effective public notice of program privacy practices. PIAs also document how DHS makes individuals active participants in the decision-making process regarding the collection and use of their PII.

PIA responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Privacy Impact Assessment Responsibilities

DHS Chief Privacy Officer

System Owner

Component Privacy Officer or PPOC

3.14.4 System of Record Notice (SORN)

The Privacy Act of 1974 requires a SORN when PII is maintained by a Federal agency in a system of records and the PII is retrieved by a personal identifier. A system of records is “a group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual”1. The SORN describes the categories of records and individuals in the system of record; the routine uses of the data; how individuals can gain access to records pertaining to them and correct errors. The term “system of records” is not synonymous with “information system” and can include paper as well as electronic records. SORNs can be written to cover the records in a single group of records or a single information system or they can be written to cover multiple groups of records or multiple information systems.

Information systems that are considered a system of record may not be designated operational until a SORN has been published in the Federal Register for 30 days. OMB has issued the benchmark references for development of SORNs: Privacy Act Implementation, Guidelines and Responsibilities, July 9, 1975; and Appendix I, “Federal Agency Responsibilities for Maintaining Records About Individuals” to Circular A-130. DHS has published MD 047-01, “Privacy Policy and Compliance,” July 7, 2011; and Official DHS Guidance on System of Records and System of Records Notices. Information systems that are considered a System of Records must keep an accurate accounting of disclosures of information shared outside of the system.

OMB requires each SORN to be reviewed every two years to ensure that it accurately describes the system of records. This process is called the Biennial SORN Review Process. The DHS Privacy Office works with Components to ensure that SORN reviews are conducted every two years following publication in the Federal Register.

3.14.5 Protecting Privacy Sensitive Systems

OMB M-06-16, Protection of Sensitive Agency Information requires that agencies protect PII that is physically removed from Department locations or is accessed remotely. Physical removal includes both removable media and media in mobile devices (e.g., laptop hard drives). Please refer to the following documents for additional information and policies on protecting PII and Sensitive PII at DHS:

• Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information at the Department of Homeland Security:

• This Handbook’s Attachment S, “Compliance Framework for Privacy Sensitive Systems”

• This Handbook’s Attachment S1: “Managing Computer-Readable Extracts Containing Sensitive PII.”

In addition, see Section 5.3 for PII auditing requirements and Section 5.4.1 for remote access requirements.

3.14.6 Privacy Incident Reporting

The DHS Privacy Office is responsible for implementing the Department’s privacy incident response program based on requirements outlined OMB Memorandum M-07-16, “Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information,” May 22, 2007. Through close collaboration, the DHS Chief Privacy Officer, the DHS CIO, the DHS CISO, the DHS SOC, and Components must ensure that all DHS privacy and computer security incidents are identified, reported, and appropriately responded to, in order to mitigate harm to DHS- maintained assets, information, and personnel. Incidents involving (or that may involve) PII are subject to strict reporting standards and timelines.

Incident reporting responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Privacy Incident Reporting Responsibilities

DHS Personnel

Component Privacy Officer or PPOC

Program Manager

Component CISO/ISSM/Component SOC

DHS SOC

3.14.7 E-Authentication

Identity verification or authentication (e-authentication) is needed to ensure that online Government services are secure and that individual privacy is protected. Each DHS system must be evaluated to determine whether e-authentication requirements apply. Only federated identity providers approved through the Federal CIO Council’s Identity, Credentialing, and Access Management’s (ICAM) Trust Framework Provider Adoption Process (TFPAP) should be used. Components should see www.IDmanagement.gov for details regarding the Federal Identity, Credentialing, and Access Management (FICAM) initiative.

E-authentication guidance is provided in the following:

• OMB M-0404, “E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies”

• NIST SP 800-63, “Electronic Authentication Guideline”

3.14.8 Use Limitation and External Information Sharing

Programs may use PII either as specified in public notices, in a manner compatible with those specified purposes, or as otherwise permitted by law. Any PII shared outside the Department must be for a purpose compatible with the purpose for which the PII was collected.

DHS uses PII only for legally authorized purposes and in a manner compatible with uses identified in the Privacy Act or in other public notices. The DHS Chief Privacy Officer and, where appropriate, legal counsel review and approve any proposed external sharing of PII, including with other public, international, or private sector entities, for consistency with uses described in the existing privacy compliance documentation such as PIAs and SORNs or other public notice(s). When a proposed new instance of external sharing of PII is not currently authorized by the Privacy Act or specified in a notice, the Chief Privacy Officer evaluates whether the proposed external sharing is compatible with the purpose(s) specified in the notice. If the proposed sharing is compatible, program owners review, update, and republish their PIAs, SORNs, website privacy policies, and other public notices, if any, to include specific descriptions of the new uses(s) and obtain consent where appropriate and feasible. Information- sharing agreements also include security protections consistent with the sensitivity of the information being shared.

DHS programs that engage in Computer Matching Agreements (CMA) must follow established DHS guidance for ensuring that controls are in place to maintain both the quality and integrity of data shared under CMAs. See DHS MD 262-01 Computer Matching Agreement and The Data Integrity Board.

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DHS Chief Financial Officer (CFO) designated Systems are systems that require additional management accountability to ensure effective internal control exists over financial reporting. The DHS CFO publishes the approved list of CFO Designated Systems annually. This section provides additional requirements for these systems based on Appendix A to OMB Circular A- 123, “Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control.” Controls required to be assessed annually for CFO-designated systems are documented in Attachment R to this Handbook, “Compliance Framework for CFO-Designated Financial Systems.” Attachment R is limited to the controls that must be reviewed annually (and does not contain the requirements of OMB Circular 123). The implementation guidance given in that attachment supplements the security requirements established in DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A and CFO-developed financial system Line of Business requirements.

Note that Section 3.1.5 of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A states: “Wherever there is a conflict between this section and other sections of this Policy Directive regarding requirements for CFO designated systems, this section shall take precedence.”

These additional requirements provide a strengthened assessment process and form the basis for management’s assurance of internal control over financial reporting. The strengthened process requires management to document the design and test the operating effectiveness of controls for CFO-designated Systems. The system owner is responsible for ensuring that all requirements, including security requirements, are implemented on DHS systems. Component CISOs/ISSMs must coordinate with their CFO organization to ensure that these requirements are implemented.

OMB A-123, Appendix A, “Implementation Plans,” defines two types of system controls: Information Technology General Controls (ITGC) and Application Controls. This Handbook accounts for the ITGCs, which address structure, policies, and procedures related to an ‘entity’s’ overall computer operations. ITGCs are not tied to any one business process, but may be related to a number of applications, associated technical infrastructure elements, and information systems management organizations that support Line of Business processes.

The Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM), which provides guidance on how to incorporate robust and secure financial auditing controls, is used to assess ITGCs.

Application controls as defined by OMB Circular A-123 provide controls over input, processing, and output of data associated with individual applications, and are not addressed in this Handbook.

A key control is defined as a control, or a set of controls that address the relevant assertions for a material activity or significant risk. Key controls must be identified in SPs and must be tested as part of every annual Security Control Assessment. System Owners may perform rolling compliance tests that test other (non-key) controls annually and controls that were not tested in previous years.

Documentation and testing artifacts for CFO-designated systems are required to be tracked and captured through the DHS Information Assurance (IA) compliance systems. These artifacts must be delivered within specified timeframes as shown in Table 3. Failure to do so will result in suspension of systems ATOs.

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Social Media hosts are public content sharing websites that allow individual users to upload, view, and share content such as video clips, press releases, opinions, and other information. The DHS Office of Public Affairs (OPA) has published Terms of Service (TOS) and guidelines for posting to these sites. In some cases the Department will develop its own TOS, and in other cases it will endorse those of other Federal agencies such as the General Services Administration (GSA) or Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Due to the high threat of malware, Social Media host sites have been blocked at the Trusted Internet Connection (TIC).

There are a number of security technologies that are especially important to consider when dealing with social media issues. Guidance on the following topics will be found in the indicated sections of this Handbook; the policy to be implemented is found in like-numbered sections of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A:

•\tTrusted Internet Connections (TIC) – Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4

•\tHost Configuration and Hardening – Section 4.8.4

•\tSecurity Operations Center (SOC) and Network Operations Center (NOC) – Section 4.9

•\tTwo-Factor Authentication – Section 1.4.20

•\tDomain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Capabilities – Section 5.4.3

•\tTrust Zones – Section 5.4.3.2

•\tSigned Code – Section 5.4.5

•\tPatching and Anti-Virus – Section 5.6

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The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)2 addresses the privacy of individuals’ health information by establishing a Federal privacy standard for health information and how it can be used and disclosed.

HIPAA prohibits the use or disclosure without the authorization of the individual or as part of an exception contained in HIPAA of Protected Health Information (PHI), electronic or otherwise, for any purpose other than treatment, payment, or health care operations for that individual.

Because of the diverse mission of DHS, it may be necessary for some Components to collect PHI as part of a larger mission requirement (for example detainee processing, disaster relief, etc.).

This section applies to all Components and personnel who collect, process, or store PHI (refer to NIST SP 800-66 for further information).

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Cloud computing technologies allow DHS to address demand for better, faster information services and to save resources, consolidate systems, and improve security. The essential characteristics of cloud computing – on-demand provisioning, resource pooling, elasticity, network access, and measured services – provide the potential for DHS to reduce procurement and operating costs and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of services.

The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is a government-wide program which provides a standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring for cloud products and services. This approach uses a “do once, use many times” framework that will save cost, time, and staff required to conduct redundant agency security assessments. A memorandum establishing FedRAMP, “Security Authorization of Information Systems in Cloud Computing Environments,” was issued by the Federal Chief Information Officer to all agency CIOs on December 8, 2011. The goal of FedRAMP is to provide a cost-effective, risk-based approach for the adoption and use of cloud services.

The purpose of FedRAMP is to:

• Improve the consistency and quality of information security in the cloud

• Ensure trustworthy and re-usable documentation and assessment of security controls

• Provide ongoing assurance and risk assessment of select cloud services

• Enable rapid and cost-effective procurement of information systems/services for Federal agencies

DHS is a key participant in FedRAMP. Other major participants are:

• Federal Agency Customers, who have a requirement for cloud technology that will be deployed into their security environment; the department or agency (D/A) is responsible for ensuring FISMA compliance

• Cloud Service Providers (CSP), who offer the willingness and capability to fulfill the cloud technology requirements of Federal Agency Customers, including security requirements

• The Joint Authorization Board (JAB), comprised of CIOs from DHS, DoD, and GSA, and supported by Technical Representatives (TR) from their CISOs; the JAB reviews the security package submitted by the CSP, performs risk assessment, and grants a Provisional Authorization to Operate (P-ATO). D/As such as DHS can then use the P-ATO in performing their own risk assessments based on their specific security requirements avoiding duplicative assessments in reaching their ATO decision

• Third Party Assessment Organizations (3PAO), who validate and attest to the quality and compliance of the CSP provided security package

• The FedRAMP Program Management Office (PMO), which provides ISSOs and manages the assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring process for JAB reviewed services; maintains a secure repository of security packages authorized by the JAB and by Agencies; is responsible for accreditation of 3PAOs; and provides templates and guidance to support Agencies adoption of cloud computing, including sample language for use in contracts and service-level agreements

• NIST, who provides technical assistance to the third party assessment process, maintains FISMA standards, and establishes technical standards

DHS provides leadership to FedRAMP in Cyber security and operations, monitoring and reporting on security incidents and providing data feeds for continuous monitoring.

In addition to JAB Membership, DHS provides a team of JAB Technical Representatives who provide subject matter expertise to the DHS JAB member and recommend authorization decisions as appropriate. DHS also holds the FedRAMP role for leading Cyber Security Operations and Incident Response. This includes defining adequate, risk-based, cost-effective cyber security; the coordination of cyber security and operations; the development of continuous monitoring standards for on-going cyber security of Federal Information Systems; and develops guidance on agency implementation of the TIC program with cloud services.

Only when applying to FedRAMP for JAB review, CSPs must use a FedRAMP accredited 3PAO to independently validate and verify the security of the cloud service. To become a FedRAMP accredited 3PAO, candidate organizations undergo a rigorous evaluation of their information assurance competencies, experience with FISMA, and experience with testing security controls. 3PAO applicants must also demonstrate technical competence in the security assessment of cloud-based information systems and meet the requirements of ISO/IEC 17020:1998 for independent organizations performing inspections. If a 3PAO does not meet FedRAMP requirements or submits sub-standard work products, they can lose their accreditation.

NIST SP 800-144 states, “Organizations are ultimately accountable for the security and privacy of data held by a cloud provider on their behalf.” All uses of cloud computing by DHS will follow DHS security authorization processes and procedures to include a completed security authorization package and an ATO signed by the appropriate Authorizing Official. Those cloud systems and services which are not exempt from FedRAMP requirements will use the FedRAMP process as required by OMB. Organizations should also review Section 3.14 for applicability in cloud environments if they are dealing with privacy data.

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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) systems face threats from a myriad of sources. The intentional and unintentional actions of system users can potentially harm or disrupt DHS systems and facilities and could result in destruction or modification of the data being processed, denial of service, and unauthorized disclosure of data. It is thus highly important that stringent safeguards be in place to reduce the risk associated with these types of threats.

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4.1.1 Personnel Screening and Position Categorization

Personnel accessing DHS systems are required to have an appropriate security clearance; a favorably adjudicated background investigation commensurate with the defined sensitivity level of the positions they hold; and a valid need to know. The appropriate position sensitivity level is based on such factors as the type and degree of harm the individual can cause through misuse of the system (e.g., disclosure of sensitive information, interruption of critical processing, computer fraud).

Another prudent safeguard is to ensure that individuals who support DHS systems are highly qualified technically and are adequately trained for the position they occupy. This reduces the risk of unintentional actions. While unintentional acts and accidents cannot be eliminated, effective training can help to mitigate the possibility or frequency of such errors.

Sensitivity levels for all Government positions involving the use, development, operation, or maintenance of information systems are required to be designated, and risk levels for each contractor position are required to be determined.

Responsibilities related to personnel issues are provided in the following table.

Position Categorization and Personnel Screening Responsibilities

Component Head

System Owners

Security Managers

4.1.1.1 Background Investigations (BI) for Government Employees

DHS employees undergo the appropriate security investigations to obtain the required clearances. The following is a summary, from least to most comprehensive, of the types of security investigations as given in DHS Instruction 121-01-007, Personnel Suitability and Security Program:

Table 5

4.1.1.2 Background Investigations for Contractor Personnel

The level of risk associated with a contractor position determines the type of investigation required and the preliminary checks required for Entry on Duty (EOD) and for granting of waivers. The security forms and type of investigation required at each risk level for IT positions and for non-IT positions is given in Table 6. The preliminary checks required for EOD and for waivers at each risk level is given in Table 7.

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A waiver only allows the contractor employee to commence work before the required background investigation is completed; it does not substitute for the required investigation.

4.1.2 Rules of Behavior (ROB)

Rules of Behavior (ROB) for access to DHS systems and information resources are a vital part of the DHS Information Security Program. ROB inform users of their responsibilities and holds them accountable for their actions while accessing and using DHS systems, and resources capable of accessing, storing, receiving, or transmitting sensitive information. The DHS ROB applies to DHS employees, contractors, and others working on behalf of DHS.

ROB must be developed for each system, and form the basis for security awareness and training. They must clearly delineate responsibilities and the expected behavior of all individuals. Rules must be in writing; must be made available to each user to read and sign before being granted access to any system; and must state the consequences of inconsistent behavior or noncompliance.

ROB for individual systems may be inherited from organizational rules or site Rules of Behavior (for example, an individual local area network (LAN) GSS Rules of Behavior may be automatically included as part of an organization-wide GSS ROB to which all employees and staff are held accountable).

This Handbook’s Attachment G, “Rules of Behavior,” provides guidance for developing system- specific ROB and guidance for developing general ROB that apply to all DHS systems and devices capable of accessing, storing, receiving, or transmitting sensitive information.

Any person who does not comply with the appropriate set(s) of ROB is subject to penalties and sanctions, including verbal or written warning, removal of system access for a specific period of time, reassignment to other duties, criminal or civil prosecution, or termination, depending on the severity of the violation.

Rules of Behavior that are understood and followed help ensure the security of systems and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive information.

Rules of Behavior responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Rules of Behavior Responsibilities

System Owners

Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO)

Users

4.1.3 Access to Sensitive Information

To protect sensitive information and limit the damage that can result from accident, error, or unauthorized use, the principle of least privilege must be applied.

The principle of least privilege requires that users be granted the most restrictive set of privileges (or lowest clearance) needed for performance of authorized tasks. Users should be able to access only the system resources needed to fulfill their job responsibilities. Application of this principle ensures that access to sensitive information is granted only to those users with a valid need to know.

Access to sensitive information responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Access to Sensitive Information Responsibilities

System Owners

ISSOs/System Administrators

4.1.4 Segregation of Duties and Least Privilege

Segregation of duties is intended to prevent a single individual from being able to disrupt or corrupt a critical security process.

Segregation of duties is necessary for adequate internal control of sensitive systems, because it ensures that no single individual has total control of a system’s security mechanisms, and prevents a single individual from acting alone to subverta critical process or otherwise compromise the system.

Assignment and segregation of system responsibilities must be clearly defined and documented for all DHS systems. Segregation of responsibilities, in addition to appropriate access controls, is intended to ensure that no individual has all necessary authority or information access needed to engage in fraudulent activity without collusion. It is essential that thorough and specific job descriptions be documented for every individual working with DHS systems and sensitive information.

An example of segregation of duties is the segregation of security duties on a network system. One individual would be responsible for backing up the system; another responsible for the physical access controls; and another responsible for the access privileges.

Whenever practical, the positions of security administrator and system administrator should be assigned to different individuals. The same principle should be applied to ISSO and system administrator positions. When it is not possible to have separate system and security administrators, the system administrator is responsible for maintaining the system security configuration, and is subject to periodic audit/configuration review by the ISSO.

If a Component does not have sufficient manpower resources necessary to meet strict segregation of duties requirements, the appropriate Authorizing Official (AO) may authorize exceptions, provided that a shortage of personnel is formally identified as a residual risk and compensating controls have been established.

Responsibilities related to segregation of duties are provided in the following table.

Segregation of Duties Responsibilities

System Owners

ISSOs

4.1.5 Information Security Awareness, Training, and Education

A key objective of an effective Information Security Program is to ensure that each employee understands his or her role and responsibilities and is adequately trained to perform them. DHS cannot protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its systems and the information they contain without the knowledge and active participation of its employees in the implementation of sound security principles.

All users of Federal information systems are required by 5 CFR part 930, subpart C, as revised, to be exposed to security awareness materials annually or whenever system security changes occur, or when the user’s responsibilities change. Training for new system users must occur before they are allowed access to systems. OMB Circular A-130 Appendix III, “Security of Federal Automated Information Resources,” requires that persons be trained in their responsibilities and in the Rules of Behavior for using GSSs and MA.

Information security training is required to be addressed in the Security Plan for each system. Additionally, Component CISOs/ISSMs3 prepare and submit an annual training plan for information security awareness, training, and education to the DHS Information Systems Security Training Program Director. Plans are required to follow the guidance in the DHS Information Technology Security Awareness, Training and Education Plan template, issued by the DHS Information Systems Security Training Office

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) requires Federal agencies to provide training to the following groups within 60 days of their appointment:

• Executives

• Program and functional managers

• Information resources management

• Security audit personnel

• Information system managers and operations personnel

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-16, “Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A Role and Performance-Based Model,” provides detailed guidelines for developing a robust training program.

4.1.5.1 Initial Awareness

New employees are required to complete an initial information security awareness course and sign appropriate Rules of Behavior as part of their orientation process. Also, Components are required to provide an initial awareness course to newly hired contractor staff or ensure that the contractors provide an equivalent course.

Completion of the appropriate awareness course is mandatory before access is granted to any DHS system or information resources. Records of the training must be maintained to verify compliance. Records must include name and position, the type of training received, and the date and cost of training.

Appropriate media for providing this initial awareness include seminars, presentations, awareness videos, and computer-based training.

4.1.5.2 Refresher Awareness

Components must provide an annual information security awareness refresher course to all users or ensure that contractors provide an equivalent refresher course for their staff. Completion of the refresher course is mandatory. Unless the respective Component CISO issues a waiver, user accounts and access privileges, including access to email, will be disabled for those who have not received annual refresher training. Records of training must be maintained to verify compliance. Records must include name, position, the type of training received, and the date and cost of training.

Appropriate media for providing this initial awareness include seminars, presentations, awareness videos, and computer-based training.

Additional awareness sessions must be conducted whenever there is a significant change in the information security environment or procedures or when an employee enters a new position involving the handling of sensitive information.

4.1.5.3 Ongoing Awareness Activities

Components must reinforce the awareness message throughout the year through the use of posters, newsletters, email messages, trinkets with a security message, and other appropriate communication media.

4.1.5.4 Role-Based Training

DHS personnel, contractors, and others working on behalf of DHS that have significant security responsibilities (e.g., ISSOs, network administrators, system administrators, Authorizing Officials (AO)) must receive annual specialized training specific to their security responsibilities. Specialized security-related training must also be provided to senior managers, System Owners, and Project Managers.

The level of training is required to be commensurate with the individual’s duties and responsibilities. Components must track, by name and position, the type of the training received, and the dates and cost of the training.

Information security awareness, training, and education responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Information Security Awareness, Training, and Education Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

Contracting Officer Representatives (COR)

4.1.6 Separation from Duty

This section addresses the procedures to be followed when an employee, contractor, or other individual working on behalf of DHS terminates employment or transfers to another organization.

In most circumstances, an individual’s departure is amicable; allowing him or her to complete his or her duties and obligations through the last day. When the employee or contractor demonstrates resentment, the site security office should assist in creating a prudent plan of action.

In all cases, Components are required to adhere to the following:

• Revoke all authorizations

• Retrieve hard and soft copy sensitive information

• Retrieve all keys, badges, and other access devices

• Change locks

• Retrieve Government-owned equipment including but not limited to laptops, cell phone, Portable Electronic Devices (PED), and secure ID tokens.

• Conduct exit interview

Responsibilities related to separation from duty are provided in the following table.

Separation from Duty Responsibilities

System Owners/Senior Site Managers

Supervisors

Network/System Administrators

Site Security Officers

Employees, Contractors, or Others Working on Behalf of DHS

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Information systems must be physically and environmentally protected to prevent unauthorized disclosure, denial of service, destruction, or modification. Physical security represents the first line of defense against intruders attempting to gain physical access to systems and must be addressed during each step of the risk management cycle. Cost-effective controls are documented in the Security Plan and are evaluated during the Security Control Assessment.

Residual risks are documented in the Security Authorization Process package and reviewed annually.

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4.2.1 General Physical Access

General physical access controls restrict the entry and exit of personnel from an area, such as an office building, data center, or room where sensitive information is accessed, stored or processed. Such controls protect against threats associated with the physical environment.

Components should review the effectiveness of general physical access controls during business hours and at other times. Control effectiveness depends on the characteristics of the controls, their implementation, and their operation.

General physical access responsibilities are provided in the following table. Specific requirements are given in DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Section 4.2.1.

General Physical Access Responsibilities

Facility Managers

Site Security Officers/ISSOs

Users

4.2.1.1 Physical Controls

Physical controls include barriers, badges, guard or security forces, supporting infrastructure, contingency and emergency support, lighting, facility intrusion detection systems, and surveillance systems. Standards for physical security must be based on an analysis of mission criticality, severity of impact levels, local criminal and intelligence threats, and the value of the equipment and data contained within the facility being protected.

Security personnel must ensure that physical security controls are considered throughout a system’s life cycle and reviewed in conjunction with the annual self-assessments. The following controls should be considered and included in the appropriate Security Plan:

• Controlled access to building (e.g., physical building access, guards)

• Controlled access to computer room(s)

• Locks

• Key control procedures

• Keypads and cipher locks

• ID badges (worn above the waist area)

• Visitor logs

• Biometric devices

• Access control logs (to the building)

• Access control logs (to the computer rooms and facility)

• Motion detectors

• Intrusion detection devices

• Property passes

• Additional controls

Not all of these features will be necessary for every facility. ISSOs and site security officers must determine which security features are warranted.

4.2.1.2 Building Passes

Building passes must be issued and displayed by all individuals at all facilities that store or process sensitive information. Passes should be displayed above the waist and below the neck with the photo side facing out. Each visitor must be issued a temporary building pass which must be turned in upon leaving the facility.

Persons not displaying proper credentials should be challenged. If there is any doubt as to their authorization, they should be escorted from the area and local security personnel should be notified.

Security personnel and supervisors at all management levels must ensure that all staff, contractors, and others working on behalf of DHS are aware of this requirement and periodically reinforce it during staff meetings through email, and by other means. Where practical, challenge procedures should be posted.

4.2.1.3 Property Removal

Removal of items from DHS facilities must be controlled and documented.

4.2.1.4 Loss or Theft of Property

Any missing property, whether lost or stolen, must be reported.

4.2.1.5 Environmental Controls

In addition to the physical security controls discussed above, facility managers and security administrators must also ensure that environmental controls are established, documented, and implemented to provide needed protection in the following areas:

• Fire protection, detection, and suppression

• Water damage risk reduction, detection, and corrective measures, and devices for water hazard prevention

• Electronic power supply protection, to include Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) for multi-use systems and surge protectors for stand-alone systems

• Temperature and humidity recording, monitoring, and alert systems

• Housekeeping protection from dirt and dust

• Combustible cleaning supplies protection (not to be kept in computer areas)

• Appropriate personnel safety features (evacuation routes specified)

• Emergency exit provisions, such as equipping emergency and exit-only doors with hardware that permits immediate egress in the event of an emergency

4.2.1.6 Fire Protection

Fire protection systems should be serviced by professionals on a recurring basis to ensure that the systems stay in proper working order. The following should be considered when developing a fire protection strategy:

• When a centralized fire suppression system is not available, fire extinguishers should be readily available:

• Fire drills must be conducted annually to ensure that all personnel are familiar with their responsibilities.

4.2.1.7 Electronic Power Supply Protection

Electrical power must be filtered through a UPS system for all servers and critical workstations and surge suppressing power strips used to protect all other computer equipment from power surges.

4.2.1.8 Temperature and Humidity Control

When developing a strategy for temperature and humidity control, it is recommended that the environment be kept within the following limits, which are suitable for all classes of IT equipment:

• Temperature: Dry bulb temperature range: 64.4 °F to 80.6 °F

• Humidity: Dew Point 41.9 °F to 60% RH and dew point 59 °F

While many systems will continue to function when temperatures and humidity are beyond this range, the associated risk to data is increased. If operating ranges are established beyond these boundaries, Components should ensure that the range in no case exceeds that specified by the manufacturer of the most sensitive piece of equipment.

Humidity levels below those recommended may result in static; high temperatures may damage sensitive system elements.

Security personnel should obtain a device that will sound an alarm and send out an automatic notification (via telephone, pager, or email) when the operating environment exceeds established boundaries.

4.2.1.9 Housekeeping Considerations

Housekeeping is another important area to monitor.

• Subfloors (where installed) should be cleaned annually.

• If the computer room has carpet it should be of the antistatic variety. This also applies to areas that house workstations.

• Dusting of hardware and vacuuming of work areas should be performed weekly with trash removal performed daily. Dust accumulation inside of monitors and computers is a hazard that can damage computer hardware.

• Cleaning supplies should not be stored inside the computer room.

4.2.1.10 Personnel Safety Features

The facility manager should brief all personnel on emergency procedures including:

• Evacuation procedures

• Location of emergency exits

• Location of emergency equipment such as fire extinguishers and first-aid kits

4.2.1.11 Emergency Exits

Emergency exits should be clearly marked and all personnel should be familiar with established evacuation routes.

4.2.2 Sensitive Facility

Additional environmental and physical controls, based on a risk analysis, should be considered for facilities supporting large-scale operations, such as enterprise servers and telecommunication facilities.

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Storage media that contain sensitive information must be controlled so that the information is protected. Storage media include but are not limited to the following:

•\tMagnetic storage media – Including reel and cassette format magnetic tapes; magnetic disks, including hard disk drives, floppy disks and diskettes, and disk packs; magnetic cards; and magnetic memory devices, including core memory and magnetic bubble memory

•\tOptical storage media – Including optical cartridges, laser disks, compact disks (CD), digital video disks (DVD), Magneto-Optical (MO) disks, holographic devices, and optical tapes

•\tSolid-state storage media – Including Random Access Memory (RAM), Read Only Memory (ROM), Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices, Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) cards, flash cards, smart cards, and Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives (also called flash drives, jump drives, and thumb drives)

•\tHard-copy storage media – Including paper and microforms (e.g., microfilm and microfiche)

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4.3.1 Media Protection

Additional security risks are associated with the portability of removable storage media. Loss, theft, or physical damage to disks and other removable media can compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the data. Proper storage enhances protection against unauthorized disclosure.

All media containing sensitive information must be labeled and kept in a secure location. Backup and archive media must be sent to an off-site location as identified in the appropriate business continuity and contingency plans.

Media protection responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Media Protection Responsibilities

DHS CISO

System Owners

System/Network Administrators

Facility Managers

ISSOs

4.3.2 Media Marking and Transport

DHS processes, stores, and transmits many types of sensitive information. Appropriately labeling the media helps ensure that all recipients of the material are aware that the information requires protection.

Note: If information with different levels of sensitivity is combined, the total package must carry the sensitivity level of the information that has the greatest sensitivity.

The following definitions apply within this section:

• Hardcopy Material – Printed material, including reports, emails, briefings, manuals, guidance, letters, and memoranda

• Label – A piece of information that indicates the sensitivity level of an object and the information it contains. A label may be internal or external as follows:

• Storage Media – Includes but is not limited to magnetic storage media such as hard disk drives and diskettes; optical storage media such as CDs and DVDs; solid-state storage media, including USB drives; and hardcopy materials, including reports, emails, briefings, manuals, guidance, letters, and memoranda.

Terminals, desktop and laptop computers, and other mobile computing devices not authorized to process classified information should be appropriately labeled, especially in environments where both sensitive information and classified information are processed. ”This Medium is Unclassified” labels are available by submitting General Services Administration (GSA) Standard Form (SF) 710.

Media marking responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Media Marking Responsibilities

DHS CISO

System Owners

Project Managers

System Administrators

ISSOs

4.3.3 Media Sanitization and Disposal

Media containing sensitive information must be sanitized prior to reuse or disposition (i.e., disposal or recycling; return of leased media to the owner; return of defective or inoperable media for repair or replacement) in order to protect sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure.

Media sanitization responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Media Sanitization Responsibilities

Site Managers

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

System/Network Administrators

Users

NIST SP 800-88 rev 1, “Guidelines for Media Sanitization,” provides guidelines for the sanitization of numerous types of information storage media, including:

• Magnetic disks (floppy disks; hard drives; USB removable media and drives, flash drives, and memory sticks with hard drives; etc.)

• Magnetic tapes (reel and cassette format magnetic tapes)

• Magnetic cards

• Optical disks (CDs, DVDs)

• Memory

• Hard copy (paper and microforms)

• Networking devices such as routers

• Handheld devices such as cell phones and personal digital assistants (PDA)

• Equipment (copy machines, fax machines)

This Handbook provides information on the sanitization requirements for media containing classified information.

NIST SP 800-88 identifies sanitization options for various storage media. Sanitization options depend on the type of storage medium (e.g., hard drive, CD or DVD, hard copy), intended disposition of the medium (e.g., reuse, disposal), and FIPS 199 categorization for the confidentiality security objective (see Section 3.9.1, FIPS 199).

NIST SP 800-88 defines sanitization as the removal of data from storage media such that there is reasonable assurance the data cannot be easily retrieved and reconstructed. Sanitization methods include clearing, purging, and destruction:

• Clearing is removal of information stored on media in such a way that the information is irretrievable through means such as robust keyboard attacks or the use of data, disk, or file recovery techniques. For magnetic media such as hard drives and diskettes, simple deletion of files is not sufficient for clearing, as the deleted data can be retrieved by various recovery utilities. Overwriting the information with random data, however, will clear the media of information and will help ensure that the information is irretrievable except perhaps by advanced laboratory techniques. Overwriting cannot be used for magnetic media that are damaged or not writeable. In such cases, the media must be physically destroyed.

• Purging is removal of information stored on media in such a way that the information is irretrievable through any means, including advanced laboratory techniques. Executing the firmware Secure Erase command and degaussing are examples of acceptable methods for purging. Degaussers expose the medium to a strong magnetic field, which effectively erases the information (a degausser designed and approved for the type of medium being purged is required). Be aware that degaussing also destroys hard drives, as the firmware that manages the drive is also purged during the degaussing process. Degaussing is effective only on magnetic media such as hard drives, diskettes, and magnetic tapes. It is not effective on optical media such as CDs and DVDs.

• Destruction of media is the ultimate form of sanitization. Physical destruction can be accomplished through disintegration, incineration, pulverizing, shredding, and melting. Destruction of media should be conducted only by trained and authorized personnel. Safety, hazmat, and special disposition needs should be identified and addressed prior to conducting any media destruction.

Sanitization also requires the removal of all labels, markings, and activity logs. Steps for sanitizing of media are as follows:

• Determine the categorization (i.e., low, moderate, or high impact) for the confidentiality security objective

• Determine whether the media will be disposed of or reused (either within or outside of the organization)

• Use Figure 3 to determine the appropriate method of sanitization

• Refer to NIST SP 800-88, Appendix A and Table A-1, for sanitization options for the type of medium to be sanitized

• Validate and document the sanitization of the medium. NIST SP 800-88, Appendix F, provides a sample sanitization validation form

• Sensitive media can be shipped to facilities for clearing, sanitization, or disposal (The National Security Agency (NSA) may accept sensitive media for destruction. For more information and for requirements, contact NSA Classified Material Conversion Customer Service at (301) 688-6672.)

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4.3.4 Production, Input/Output Controls

Sensitive information should be sent through means that limit the potential for unauthorized disclosure regardless of the method of transmission. Since information transmitted over unencrypted electronic links such as telephone lines may be intercepted, custodians of sensitive information should decide whether specific information warrants a higher level of protection, such as that afforded by a secure fax, secure phone, or other encrypted means.

Sensitive information may be sent via the U.S. Postal Service, Army Post Office (APO), commercial messenger, or unclassified registered pouch, provided it is packaged in a way that does not disclose its contents (e.g., double-enveloped).

In data center environments, procedures should be implemented to account for the receipt of input and output media (paper, magnetic, optical, etc.). Rosters of persons authorized to submit or receive input or output should be maintained. Logs documenting transfer of sensitive data via third party services such as mail and courier must be maintained.

Responsibilities related to production, input/output controls are provided in the following table.

Production, Input/Output Control Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Facility Managers

ISSOs

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This section addresses vulnerabilities inherent in voice communications and the operational controls needed to mitigate the associated risks. Voice communication security includes Private Branch Exchange (PBX) systems, telephone usage, and voice mail. If Components choose to encrypt their voice communications, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption per FIPS 140-2 must be used.

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4.4.1 Private Branch Exchange

A PBX is a computer-based switch that acts as a small, in-house telephone exchange for the organization that operates it. Failure to secure a PBX system can result in toll fraud as well as theft of proprietary, personal, and confidential information. Moreover, an attacker could use the call tracking features of an unsecured PBX for traffic analysis to determine possible patterns of response to a planned intrusion. PBX protection is a high priority.

Potential threats to a PBX include:

• Unauthorized access

• Traffic analysis

• Theft of service

• Disclosure of information

• Data modification

• Denial of service

PBXs are sophisticated computer systems that are vulnerable to many of the same threats associated with general purpose operating systems. There are two important ways in which PBX security differs from conventional operating system security:

• External access/control – PBXs typically require remote maintenance by vendors. Local administrators often have the manufacturer remotely install updates, which requires remote maintenance ports and access to the switch by a potentially large pool of outside parties.

• Feature richness – The wide variety of features available on PBXs, particularly administrative features and conference functions, allow for the possibility of unexpected attacks. An attacker may eavesdrop by using features in a manner not intended by its designers. Features may also interact in unpredictable ways, leading to system compromise even if each element of the system conforms to its security requirements and the system operation and administration are correct.

PBX security responsibilities are provided in the following table.

PBX Security Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Site Managers

ISSOs

PBX Administrators

Site Telephone Technical Support

4.4.1.1 Maintenance Vulnerabilities

PBX manufacturers may include features useful on occasions when on-site maintenance personnel cannot resolve problems. For example, the manufacturer could instruct maintenance personnel to configure and connect a modem to the maintenance port, allowing remote access to certain special features in order to resolve problems without sending a representative to the PBX site. Use of such remote connections must be controlled and they must only be made available as needed in response to a particular problem. Use must also be logged, and supervised. These types of features must not be accessible via accounts held privately by the manufacturer. Proper password procedures must be enforced. It is only by exception that passwords may expire in a shorter period (e.g., thirty days) or be single use (e.g., a secure remote access device). All such access and changes to the PBX data and configuration must be logged.

Examples of these special features include:

• Database upload/download utility – Allows the manufacturer to download the database from a system that is malfunctioning and examine it at their location to try to determine the cause of the malfunction

• Database examine/modify utility – Allows the manufacturer to remotely examine and modify a system’s database to repair damage caused by incorrect configuration, design bugs, or tampering

• Software debugger/update utility – Permits the manufacturer to remotely debug a malfunctioning system. It also allows the manufacturer to remotely update systems with bug fixes and software upgrades.

These features are subject to intrusion, and could provide dangerous access to the PBX if misused. To mitigate the associated risks, ISSOs and site managers must:

• Ensure that remote maintenance access is not operational. Whenever possible, some involvement of local personnel in opening remote maintenance ports is required.

• Install two-factor (i.e., two different mechanisms) strong authentication on remote maintenance ports. Smart Card based systems or one-time password tokens, used in addition to conventional login/password functions, make it much more difficult for attackers to breach the system’s security.

• Keep maintenance terminals in a locked restricted area

• Locate the PBX equipment in a locked restricted location that does not indicate what it contains (e.g., do not post a sign saying “PBX room”)

• Turn off maintenance features when not needed

• Verify that non-U.S. Citizens do not perform maintenance

4.4.1.2 Software Loading and Update Tampering

A PBX is particularly vulnerable to software tampering when software is initially loaded and whenever software updates/patches are being applied. The PBX is particularly vulnerable to software tampering. An adversary could intercept a software update sent to a PBX administrator. To mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities, ISSOs and site managers must:

• Make passwords resistant to cracking by automated tools

• Understand that conventional error detection codes such as checksums or Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC) are not sufficient to ensure tamper detection. Strong error detection based on cryptography provides better protection.

• Ensure that PBX boot disks, utilities, logs and records receive more protection than that for typical office software. Strong physical security should be provided, and these items must be appropriately labeled (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.11 this Handbook).

• Shred printouts and sanitize media before discarding

4.4.1.3 User Features

The many features that make PBXs easy to configure and use have led to an expansion of vulnerabilities. These features include:

• Attendant console/override/forwarding/conferencing

• Automatic call distribution (ACD)

• Override (intrude)

• Diagnostics

• Feature interaction

To mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities, ISSOs and site managers must:

• Connect the attendant console to the PBX with a different physical connection than that of the telephone instruments

• Use a line configuration feature if the attendant console connects to the PBX in the same manner as the telephone instruments. Such a feature could require specific line configuration for use with an attendant console. This would prevent the replacement of a telephone instrument with an attendant console to gain access to administrative features.

• Ensure that only essential features are activated

• Log any changes to the configuration (software, database or physical) of the device

• Activate and periodically check any logging facilities provided by the device

• Perform periodic reviews of security facilities, confirming proper configuration and proper correlation of manual logs, device logs and other records

4.4.2 Telephone Communications

Unsecured telephones are not to be used to discuss classified security information. Moreover, care must be exercised in discussing sensitive information. Adequate protection of sensitive information requires awareness of the various risks related to telephone equipment and conversations. Components are required to ensure that users are cognizant of social engineering techniques used to obtain information over the telephone, including passwords and access codes.

Telephone communications responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Telephone Communications Responsibilities

DHS CISO

ISSOs

Users

The following vulnerabilities of unsecured telephone systems can result in unintentional transmission of classified or sensitive information. Commonly accepted best practices dictate that users be made aware of these vulnerabilities and exercise extreme caution when discussing sensitive information on unsecured phones. Unsecured phones are never used to discuss classified information.

• Telephones that are “on-hook” can intercept voice communications by design, by modification, or by attachment of monitoring devices.

• Cordless telephones generate signals that can be monitored.

• Speakerphones can pick up nearby conversations containing sensitive material.

• Telephone answering devices can be accessed to retrieve sensitive information.

• Call forwarding options can be used to redirect sensitive messages.

• Improperly configured or physically unsecured PBXs and computerized telephone systems (CTS) can allow interception of sensitive voice communications.

The risks that these vulnerabilities present justify the policy restricting the use of telephones.

The basic telephony concepts behind these vulnerabilities are beyond the scope of this document. Restricting the use of desktop equipment (e.g., cordless telephones, speakerphones, answering devices, call forwarding options, etc.) in areas where sensitive information will be discussed mitigates some of the risks associated with these vulnerabilities. Following the procedures and guidance in NIST SP 800-24, “PBX Vulnerability Analysis: Finding Holes in Your PBX before Someone Else Does,” will mitigate others. Finally, where telephones must be used to discuss sensitive information, additional guidance can be obtained from the NSA and DOD regarding telephone models that reduce or eliminate the vulnerabilities listed in this section.

4.4.3 Voice Mail

Sensitive information is not to be stored on voice mail systems. Since secure email is available, voice mail should be authorized only by exception for personnel whose responsibilities require it.

Since it is possible to perform traffic analysis or denial of service attacks on telephone systems by abusing voice mail, any user of voice mail should enable password protection for voice mail access. Voice mail passwords should have no fewer than four (4) characters, and no consecutively repeated characters. Passwords should be changed at least every ninety (90) days.

Voice mail responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Voice Mail Responsibilities

ISSOs

PBX Administrators

Telephone Users

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This section addresses vulnerabilities inherent in data communications and the operational controls needed to mitigate the risks associated with those vulnerabilities. Data communications include telecommunications, video teleconferencing, and voice over data network technology.

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4.5.1 Telecommunications Protection Techniques

Extreme caution should be exercised when telecommunications protection techniques are being considered as alternatives to the use of encryption. While such technologies may represent a lower-cost approach, their ability to protect information may not provide an adequate level of protection. During the procurement process, emphasis must be placed on the effectiveness of the tool or approach selected.

Except in low impact cases, establish alternate telecommunications services including necessary agreements to permit the resumption of specified operations for essential missions and business functions within a Component-defined time period when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites

Telecommunications protection responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Telecommunications Protection Responsibilities

Component CISO/ISSMs

System Owners

Although sensitive data may be contained entirely within a protected network, there still exists the possibility that a disgruntled, malicious, or subversive individual may be able to access sensitive data by means of devices or software that capture data traveling across the network. This is often accomplished by sniffing software, which uses low-level driver commands to put a Network Interface Card (NIC) into promiscuous mode. Normally, network interface cards only accept information directed to them and ignore information that does not have their address. A promiscuous NIC collects all information from the network to which it is attached, regardless of the intended address.

Tools for detecting NICs that are in a promiscuous mode are available. The scanning of systems referred to in Section 5.4.8, “Testing and Vulnerability Management,” can detect software programs that are capable of enabling this mode. Scanning tools can also detect software operating in promiscuous mode when it is collecting data from a NIC.

A malicious individual can make information unavailable by rendering the network unusable. This is commonly known as a denial of service (DoS) attack. An individual can initiate a DoS attack by broadcasting large amounts of data, by physically compromising network elements, or by taking advantage of some of the inherent weaknesses of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) handshaking process.

Intrusion detection system tools exist that can detect most types of DoS attacks (see Section 5.4.4, “Firewalls”). Proper configuration of server systems can also mitigate these attacks by altering the default TCP/IP software configuration settings.

Additional vulnerabilities exist with respect to the accuracy of the information transmitted. There is a class of attacks known as “man in the middle.” In these attacks, an individual receives information, alters it, and transmits the altered information to its originally intended recipient in such a manner that the recipient believes that the information was sent directly from the original destination. These attacks can be mitigated through the use of message digests. Message digests calculate a fixed length value from any amount of text. This fixed length value is very difficult to reproduce. Also, encryption and digital signing make the task of altering data difficult or sufficiently time consuming that it is of little use.

NIST SP 800-13, “Telecommunications Security Guidelines for Telecommunications Management Network,” outlines these and other security considerations involving telecommunications. NIST contends that 65 percent of the compromises regarding availability, integrity and privacy/ confidentiality are committed by employees through errors, omissions, and malicious acts.

Establishment by Components of alternate telecommunications services is required by DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Section 4.5.1.

4.5.2 Facsimiles

Facsimile (fax) technology was developed for scanning and transmitting documents. Although fax is traditionally a telephony-based application, the technology has evolved to address the transmission of text or image files.

Fax inherently is not a secure means of communication, and faxes can easily be intercepted and decoded. Fax protocols provide neither authentication nor non-repudiation services, which allows fax traffic to be sent to or received by unintended recipients. The commonly used Group III fax protocol implements support for proprietary and undocumented data exchange using a feature called Nonstandard Facilities (NSF). Fax servers or fax modems attached to networks provide a potential means for network intrusion and penetration.

Several proactive steps must be taken to ensure adherence to DHS fax policy. This policy is designed to prevent unauthorized paths into the protected network, commonly referred to as “backdoors.” For example, “fax polling” features must be disabled. Fax polling allows a remote fax machine to access a fax machine and retrieve any data in memory waiting to be delivered.

Any fax machine used to transmit sensitive information should be placed in a locked room that only trusted individuals are able to access. The fax machine should also be placed in such a fashion that any documents being sent or retrieved are not visible to non-trusted individuals.

Anyone sending sensitive information should verify the recipient’s secure fax number immediately before sending and should ascertain whether or not the intended recipient (or trusted subordinate) will be present to receive the fax as soon as it is sent.

Sensitive information should never be sent to an unattended fax machine. Fax machines should have the “memory” features turned off, so that the information cannot be accessed or retransmitted (possibly to an unauthorized recipient) at a later time.

All documents being transmitted should be appropriately labeled (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.11 of this handbook). The reverse procedure should be used if the individual is receiving. All documents transmitted or received should be immediately removed from the fax machine room and appropriately stored.

Extremely sensitive or classified faxes require more stringent controls, such as transmission over trusted links (as opposed to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)). If such a fax must be sent via the PSTN, use of encryption devices is required.

Because a fax machine is operated in a similar manner to a copying machine, transmission of extremely sensitive or classified data should be followed by using the machine in copier mode to process several copies of a test pattern or some unclassified data to remove the image of the sensitive data from the fax machine’s imaging apparatus.

Facsimile responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Facsimile Responsibilities

CISO

System/Network Administrators

Facility Managers

ISSOs

4.5.3 Video Teleconferencing

Video teleconferencing permits DHS personnel to engage in live exchanges of information without the lost time and high cost of traveling to attend a face-to-face meeting in a distant city. Video teleconferencing offers many beneficial applications, including training and distance learning, data collaboration, large and small meetings, and informational broadcasts.

Two basic mechanisms allow video teleconferencing to take place. The most basic uses professional quality video equipment, which displays remotely on television monitors or similar projection devices. The second uses inexpensive video devices, which are attached to computers and display on computer screens using protocols such as H.323 over IP networks. The transmission medium for both can be within a protected network, across the PSTN or across an internal or external (Internet) network connection.

The first approach allows the equipment to be controlled, operated, and secured by trusted individuals with specific responsibilities for the teleconferencing equipment. Operators can assure that any recording of information is labeled and secured according to its sensitivity (see Section 4.3.2), properly disposed of when no longer useful (see Section 4.3.3), and secured during transmission by use of proper encryption (see Section 5.5.1) or tunneling. They can also confirm that the broadcast information is being sent to the proper location. It is recommended that, to the degree possible, such conferences occur in a point-to-point manner between two sites.

The second approach is not authorized. This technology introduces all of the vulnerabilities associated with sensitive data transmission across an IP network (see Section 4.5.1 of this handbook), as well as the vulnerabilities associated with other devices, which may unwittingly make sensitive data available to unauthorized parties (see Sections 4.4.2 and 4.6.3). The ability of an individual to easily eavesdrop on such communications or record them on media for improper dissemination is an unnecessary risk.

The design of the video teleconferencing system and facility must be approved by the DHS CISO before purchase and installation. Components must develop standard operating procedures for the operations and maintenance of this capability. These procedures must specify that:

• All participants must have the appropriate clearance and need-to-know

• Video conferencing must be disabled when not in use

• Any videotapes created of the teleconference must be appropriately labeled with the highest classification of the information contained on the videotape and secured in accordance with established media controls

Video teleconferencing responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Video Teleconferencing Responsibilities

AOs

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Supervisors

ISSOs/Teleconferencing Operators

Users

4.5.4 Voice over Data Networks

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and similar technologies move voice over digital networks. These technologies use protocols originally designed for data networking. Such technologies include Voice over Frame Relay, Voice over Asynchronous Transfer Mode, and Voice over Digital Subscriber Line (refer to NIST SP 800-58 for further information).

Voice over data networking cannot yet be considered a mature technology. Although various standards are currently being published, there is little assurance that systems that incorporate these capabilities can be adequately protected. Moreover, there are hidden costs associated with their use that make their implementation suspect on technical grounds other than security considerations. These include interoperability issues. Although not prohibited, implementation of these technologies is discouraged.

Prior to implementing voice over data network technology, Components must conduct rigorous risk assessments and security testing and provide Department business justification for their use. Furthermore, any systems that employ this technology must be authorized for use with residual risks clearly identified.

Redundancy can be accomplished by establishing major (trunk) links in a load balancing fashion. This concept involves having multiple pathways that appear to be a single pathway in terms of addressing or routing. If one of the alternate pathways fails, the share of traffic that it was handling is distributed to the other pathways. If there is only one other pathway, the situation is known as fail over. Such a failure should show an indication on the network monitoring tools. Technicians could then be dispatched to repair the failed element and return the link to full operation.

Information integrity is a significant security concern when using voice over data networks. Services provided by commercial entities are not directly controlled by DHS staff. Encryption of any data (including voice) that traverses these links is mandatory. The contractual arrangements with these suppliers must specify that only U.S. Citizens are involved in the maintenance and operation of these links.

Authentication controls and audit logging may be provided by the same technologies that provide these capabilities for digital data traffic. VoIP standards also include specification of a Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP) that also collects audit information.

As with many technologies, there are numerous vendor-specific protocols and numerous standards in development. Many of the security issues related to VoIP are dependent upon vendor selection and architecture design. Rigorous testing and clear business justification should be completed before any AO approves the use of this technology.

Responsibilities related to voice over data networks are provided in the following table.

Voice Over Data Networks Responsibilities

Project Managers

ISSOs

Network/System Administrators

Facility Managers

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Wireless network communications technologies include the following:

•\tWireless systems (e.g., Wireless Local Area Networks [WLAN], Wireless Wide Area Networks [WWAN], Wireless Personal Area Networks [WPAN], peer-to-peer wireless

networks, information systems that leverage commercial wireless services). Wireless systems include the transmission medium, stationary integrated devices, firmware, supporting services, and protocols

•\tWireless mobile devices capable of storing, processing, or transmitting sensitive information (e.g., smart telephones, two-way pagers, handheld radios, cellular telephones, Personal Communications Services [PCS] devices, multifunctional wireless devices, portable audio/video recording devices with wireless capability, scanning devices, messaging devices)

•\tWireless tactical systems, including mission-critical communication systems and devices (e.g., include Land Mobile Radio [LMR] subscriber devices and infrastructure equipment, remote sensors, technical investigative communications systems)

•\tRadio Frequency Identification (RFID)

General guidelines pertaining to all wireless communications technologies are provided in this section. Policies more specific to wireless systems, wireless mobile devices, wireless tactical systems, and RFID are provided in Sections 4.6.1, 4.6.2, 4.6.3, and 4.6.4, respectively.

Components employing encryption on wireless technologies must implement and enforce a key management plan consistent with DHS Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Policy Authority. The key management plan must clearly define the practices, procedures, and techniques used to enforce the key management policy and functional requirements. Representative guidance may be drawn from NIST SP 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management – Part 2: Best Practices for Key Management Organization”.

For wireless technologies classified as general support systems or major applications, the key management plan must be addressed in the SP.

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4.6.1 Wireless Systems

Wireless system policy and procedures are described more completely in Attachment Q1, “Wireless Systems” to This Handbook.

Wireless systems allow mobile devices, wired devices, and other devices to process, store, or transmit sensitive information using Radio Frequency (RF) or infrared (IR) capabilities.

Wireless systems are vulnerable to a number of traditional attacks and to attacks specific to wireless technologies. These attacks fall into the following categories:

• Unauthorized access

• Denial-of-service/jamming/interference

• Signal detection/eavesdropping

• Spoofing/masquerading

• Message modification

Use of appropriate countermeasures will help ensure that wireless systems comply with DHS information security policy.

This Handbook’s Attachment Q1, “Wireless Systems,” provides implementation guidance for developing and implementing security for wireless systems.

Wireless system responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Wireless System Responsibilities

AOs

Component CISOs/ISSMs

System Owners/Project Managers

ISSOs

System/Network Administrators

DHS Managers, Supervisors, and Employees

4.6.2 Wireless Mobile Devices

Wireless mobile devices include any wireless clients capable of storing, processing, or transmitting sensitive information.

Guidance applicable to wireless mobile devices is detailed in this Handbook’s Attachment Q2, “Mobile Devices.”

There is currently no DHS-approved encryption software for wireless mobile devices, although individual Components may be using products that provide adequate protection. As DHS or National Security Agency (NSA) standards are established, they will be discussed in this section of the Handbook.

Personally owned mobile devices are not authorized for processing, transmitting, or storing sensitive or classified information. Personally owned mobile devices may not be connected to sensitive or classified systems or networks.

Government-owned mobile devices may be used in conjunction with Department networks or systems (to include any downloading of data from a user’s workstation to these devices) only if the current Security Authorization Process documentation (available on the Compliance and Technology page on DHS Connect) specifically addresses the inherent risks associated with their use and the AO evaluates and accepts any residual risk. Re-authorization is required if these issues are not addressed in the most current Security Authorization Process documentation.

System Owners and Project Managers must identify and implement as many countermeasures as appropriate to strengthen the security of wireless devices. These countermeasures include the use of passwords, personal firewalls, and antivirus software; the monitoring of malicious activities; the use of modification detection software and of software that will allow the device to dynamically identify and adapt to each wireless mode of operation; the tracking of data and assets; and management protocols. Countermeasures should allow the system administrator to maintain a user and community profile through unit identification and validation, which would in turn allow administrators to remove data, update software, and log and track unauthorized removal where appropriate.

Because of their portability and mobility, mobile devices are also extremely susceptible to theft, physical damage, and loss—all of which could lead to compromise of information.

Components must develop and maintain a property inventory list of all wireless devices authorized for use. This list includes serial numbers and/or seat numbers, user names, use, and location of all mobile devices for accountability purposes. Each DHS-owned mobile device is required to have an asset tag whose number is included in the inventory list. Rules of Behavior for mobile devices must be published and enforced. This Handbook’s Attachment G, Rules of Behavior provides guidance on developing Rules of Behavior, including rules for mobile devices.

This Handbook’s Attachment Q2, “Mobile Devices” provides guidance for developing and implementing wireless security.

Wireless portable electronic device responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Wireless Device Responsibilities

AOs

System Owners/Project Managers

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

System/Network Administrators

DHS Managers, Supervisors, and Employees

4.6.2.1 Cellular Phones

Cellular phones used in areas where sensitive information is discussed have the same inherent vulnerabilities as cordless telephones and speakerphones as discussed in Section 4.4.2 of this handbook. They potentially allow a discussion being held in the same area to be overheard by a third party.

As with traditional telephones, cellular communications can be intercepted. While the interception of conversations over telephones requires insertion of a monitoring device; the interception of cellular communications does not, and information transmitted by cellular phones can be intercepted at reasonably great distances. Cellular phone credentials can be cloned to other phones, allowing the cloned phone to masquerade as the original phone and allow covert monitoring of conversations.

Cellular phone responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Cellular Phone Responsibilities

Managers

Users

4.6.2.2 Pagers

Text messages may be sent via text pagers, from a cellular service provider’s Web page, or from other Web sites that allow users to send text messages. Pagers have the same inherent vulnerabilities as cellular phones with respect to exposure of sensitive information to unauthorized recipients (see Section 4.6.2.1).

Text messages rely on the service provider’s network and are not encrypted. There is thus no assurance of the security of these services. Moreover, text-message devices can be spammed until the user’s mailbox is full.

Pagers must not be used to transmit sensitive or classified information that is explicitly labeled as sensitive or classified, nor should they be used to transmit information on computer or network problems or status. This information could be intercepted and used to identify the configuration and possibly the location of information systems.

A preferred alternative to transmitting text messages is to page an individual with a phone number and require the individual to call that number using a landline (not cellular or mobile) telephone from a location where the conversation could not be overheard by non-trusted persons.

Pager responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Pager Responsibilities

Managers

Users

4.6.2.3 Multifunctional Wireless Devices

Wireless devices have evolved to be multifunctional (cell phones, pagers, and radios can surf the Internet, retrieve email, take and transmit pictures). Most of these functions do not have sufficient security.

Where there is a strong business justification for their use, DHS-owned wireless devices can be equipped to allow synchronization with approved Department owned computers. Data is encrypted or decrypted, as needed, for synchronization with computer-based personal information managers (PIMs) and other programs.

The risk assessment for multifunctional wireless devices must in all cases include an assessment of the risks associated with all functions, including IR, RF, and video. The AO may allow the use of multifunctional wireless devices based on the sensitivity and classification of the data and the associated risks.

Use of peripheral devices must be tightly controlled. Audio and video recording capabilities should be prohibited unless specifically required for an individual’s duties. Unauthorized recording of sensitive conversations or images of sensitive equipment could be used to compromise the security of DHS systems.

Multifunctional wireless device responsibilities are in the following table.

Multifunctional Wireless Device Responsibilities

AOs

Project Managers/System Owners

System/ Network Administrators

ISSOs

4.6.2.4 Bluetooth

DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A allows the use of Bluetooth wireless technology but requires strict controls as specified in Section 4.6.2.4 of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.

4.6.3 Wireless Tactical Systems

Wireless tactical systems include LMR subscriber devices, infrastructure equipment, remote sensors, and technical investigative communications systems. Because they are often deployed under circumstances in which officer safety and mission success are at stake, wireless tactical systems require even greater security measures. To ensure secure tactical communications, Components must implement strong identification, authentication, and encryption protocols designed specifically for each wireless tactical system.

Wireless tactical system policy and procedures are described more completely in Attachment Q3, “Wireless Tactical Systems,” to this Handbook.

Wireless tactical communications systems are also subject to issues such as technology advances, standards, and functional convergence. As the use of wireless tactical communications systems evolves, Components must develop and implement plans for migration to the new technologies. AOs must ensure that these migration plans are consistent with DHS policy and that appropriate waivers have been obtained.

LMR systems are the primary means of wireless communications for several Components. Security and risk management principles must be included in every phase of the LMR system development lifecycle. LMR network communications traffic should include encryption and security controls such as those specified by FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, and FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

LMR subscriber units can periodically update and rekey encryption protocols manually by using a handheld Key Variable Loader (KVL) or automatically via Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) techniques. With OTAR technology, radios can be rekeyed within seconds over the air from a remote location, allowing for easier and more regular rekeying, and resulting in improved security. In addition, the OTAR channel can be used for digital voice transmissions in the encrypted mode for emergency interoperability.

LMR security and policy guidelines and standards defined by Project 25 (P25) should be implemented where appropriate. The primary objectives of the P25 standards are to promote interoperability among digital or analog LMR equipment used by various levels of Government, support backward compatibility with legacy LMRs, enhance spectrum efficiency, and maximize economies of scale. All DHS LMRs must be built on P25-compliant platforms or be capable of interfacing with P25-compliant platforms to ensure that DHS requirements can be satisfied in a timely manner. Waivers to this requirement must be approved by the DHS CISO.

This Handbook’s Attachment Q3, “Wireless Tactical Systems,” provides guidance for developing and implementing wireless tactical system security.

Wireless tactical system responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Wireless Tactical System Responsibilities

AOs

System Owners/Project Managers

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

DHS Managers / Supervisors

Employees

4.6.4 Radio Frequency Identification

RFID enables wireless identification of objects over significant distances. Because of the computing limitations of RFID tags, it often is not feasible to implement many of the security mechanisms such as cryptography and strong authentication that are commonly supported on personal workstations, servers, and network infrastructure devices. RFID security controls can support Departmental and Component privacy objectives, mitigate risks to business processes, and prevent the disclosure of sensitive data.

RFID policy and procedures are described more completely in “Sensitive RFID Systems,” Attachment Q4 to the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.

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Wireless communications responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Wireless Communications Responsibilities

PKI Policy Authority

AOs

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

System/Network Administrators

DHS Managers, Supervisors, and Employees

DHS CISO

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Communication outside of the United States or its territories has different security requirements than domestic communication. The Department of State has published a series of Foreign Affairs Manuals relevant to these requirements.

Wireless communications are highly vulnerable to interception and monitoring. DHS employees overseas must be informed of the risks and the appropriate precautions they should follow when using wireless devices overseas. Use of secure wireless devices overseas must be approved by the DHS CISO.

The following sections of Volume 12 of the U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), found at http://www.state.gov/m/a/dir/regs/fam/12fam/index.htm, contain information relevant to overseas communication:

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Overseas communications responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Overseas Communications Responsibilities

DHS CISO

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Project Managers/System Owners

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

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Equipment security encompasses workstations, laptops, other mobile computing devices, personally owned equipment, and the maintenance of these items. This section addresses the use and maintenance of computer equipment and stresses the importance of individual accountability in protecting these resources.

System administrators and ISSOs must ensure that all users are educated in the proper procedures for logging off and for configuring screen savers. Specific procedures for logging off, locking workstations, and enabling password-protected screensavers are published in Attachment I to this Handbook, “Workstation Logon.”

The following guidelines apply to the protection of workstations used to process or store sensitive information:

•\tWorkstations must be adequately protected from theft.

•\tOnly licensed and approved operating systems and applications may be used on DHS workstations.

•\tAll default vendor or factory-set administrator accounts and passwords must be changed before installation or use.

•\tAll equipment is to be marked with the highest level of classification of information that has ever been processed or stored on the device, if there are any devices authorized for processing National Security information in the vicinity.

•\tEquipment must be housed in facilities authorized to process sensitive information.

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4.8.1 Workstations

All users must be instructed to log off or lock their workstation any time the workstation is left unattended. As an added precaution, users should also use a password-protected screensaver. The screensaver should activate after no more than fifteen (15) minutes of inactivity.

Workstation responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Workstation Responsibilities

Facility Managers

Site Security Staff/ISSOs/Supervisors

System/Network Administrators

Users

4.8.2 Laptop Computers and Other Mobile Computing Devices

DHS relies heavily on laptop computers and other mobile computing devices. The mobility of these devices has increased the productivity of the workforce, but at the same time, mobility has increased the risk of theft and unauthorized data disclosure. It is important to employ additional measures to protect these resources including laptops and other mobile computing devices and the data they store and process.

The increased risk of theft of laptop computers and other mobile computing devices presents both security and cost concerns. Both hardware replacement and restoration of data entail significant cost. The risk of data disclosure is also a major security concern. Care must be taken to guard against theft at all times, and fundamental security principles must be observed with mobile computing devices. For example, the user’s password should never be written down and stored with the device.

Mobile computing devices cannot be connected to DHS networks or systems unless such connections are authorized to the network or system. The security plan must identify the devices that can be used to access the network or system, the purposes for the access, and the security controls to be employed for the connection. Any laptop computers or other mobile computing devices that process sensitive data (whether or not they are connected to a DHS network) must employ virus protection. All removable media must be scanned prior to use to ensure it is free of malware.

Rules of Behavior for mobile computing devices must be published and enforced. This Handbook’s Attachment G, “Rules of Behavior” provides guidance on developing Rules of Behavior.

Mobile computing devices that process sensitive data must employ encryption technology. Encryption policies and procedures are addressed in Section 5.5.1 of this handbook. All information stored on any mobile computing device must be encrypted using technology that complies with Section 5.5, “Encryption,” of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.

Responsibilities related to mobile computing devices are provided in the following table.

Laptop Computer and Other Mobile Computing Device Responsibilities

DHS CISO

Component CISOs/ISSMs

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

Users

4.8.3 Personally Owned Equipment and Software

Users must not use personally owned equipment (e.g., laptop computers, cell phones, and media) or software to process, access, or store sensitive information. Also prohibited are USB flash (thumb) drives, external drives, and diskettes. Exceptions require written approval from the AO and will only be made when the AO deems that the use or connection is essential to the Department’s mission. The AO accepts any risk associated with personally owned equipment and this residual risk must be documented as part of the systems’ Security Authorization Process.

Components are required to conduct semiannual reviews of all equipment and software to ensure that only Government-licensed software and equipment are being used, or that appropriate waivers have been documented.

Policy and guidance pertaining to the protection and disposal of personally owned equipment and software is addressed in Section 4.3 of this handbook. Components are required to ensure that policies are reflected in appropriate Rules of Behavior documents and reinforced during periodic security awareness sessions.

Responsibilities related to personally owned equipment and software are provided in the following table.

Personally Owned Equipment and Software Responsibilities

AOs

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

Users

4.8.4 Hardware and Software

Components must be cognizant of the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks associated with hardware and software installation and maintenance on DHS systems.

The DHS CISO has published secure baseline configuration guides for several operating systems, the Oracle 9i database management system, and CISCO routers, and will provide additional configuration guides as required. These hardening guides provide system and database administrators with a clear, concise set of procedures that ensure a minimum baseline of security in the installation and configuration of the hardware and software.

Baselines were developed using a variety of security guidelines from the NSA, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), NIST and other Federal agencies, and from vendor recommendations. The principle reference used was NIST SP 800-70: “Security Configuration Checklists Program for Information Technology (IT) Products – Guidance for Checklists Users and Developers.”). These baselines represent the minimum configuration requirements; Components are authorized to implement more rigorous configuration guides. If unable to meet the published configuration baselines, a waiver or exception is required.

Hardware and software responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Hardware and Software Responsibilities

DHS CISO

Component CISO/ISSMs

AO

ISSOs

Network/ System Administrators

Facility Managers

System Owners/Project Managers

4.8.5 Personal Use of Government Office Equipment and DHS Systems/Computers

The use of Government-furnished property, including but not limited to office equipment, supplies, computer equipment, software, telecommunications devices, networks, and systems, is for official, authorized purposes only. Some limited personal use is allowed, but only when such use:

• Involves minimal additional expense to the Government

• Is performed on the employee’s non-work time

• Does not reduce productivity or interfere with DHS missions or operations

• Does not violate the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch

In addition, any limited personal use must be appropriate. Examples of inappropriate use include:

• Use of Internet sites resulting in an additional charge to the Government

• Obtaining, viewing, or transmitting sexually explicit material or other material inappropriate to the workplace

• Use for other than official Governmental business that results in significant strain on Department computer systems (e.g., mass mailings or sending or downloading large files such as programs, pictures, video files, or games)

• Any otherwise prohibited activity, such as sending out solicitations or engaging in political activity prohibited by the Hatch Act

A more complete list of inappropriate uses is contained in DHS 4600.1, “Personal Use of Government Office Equipment.”

Inappropriate use is considered a security incident. Depending on its severity, the incident may be deemed a security violation and, as such, be reportable under the DHS SOC provisions of Section 4.9 and of this Handbook’s Attachment F, “Incident Response and Reporting.”

DHS employees, contractors and others working on behalf of DHS are subject to disciplinary action or sanctions for failure to comply with DHS security policy, regardless of whether or not the failure results in criminal prosecution. Information security-related violations are addressed in “Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch.”

Employees can not expect privacy when using Government resources. A banner message indicating this policy is required to be displayed on the login screens of DHS computers. This information must also be included in the Rules of Behavior that users are required to sign annually.

Use of Government resources constitutes implied consent to monitoring and auditing of equipment and systems at all times. Monitoring includes tracking of internal DHS network transactions and external transactions such as Internet access. It also includes auditing of stored data on local and network storage devices as well as removable media. DHS is authorized to access email messages or other documents on Government computer systems as part of an investigation or whenever it has a legitimate reason for doing so.

Contractors are not authorized to use Government office equipment or systems for personal use under any circumstances, unless limited personal use is specifically permitted by their contract. When limited use is authorized, contractors are governed by limited personal use policy.

Responsibilities relating to personal use of Government office equipment and DHS systems are provided in the following table.

Personal Use of Government Office Equipment and DHS Systems Responsibilities

Human Capital Office

DHS CIO/CISO

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Supervisors

ISSOs, Network/System Administrators

Users

Contractors and non-DHS Employee Users

4.8.6 Wireless Settings for Peripheral Equipment

Peripheral equipment (printers, scanners, fax machines) often includes capabilities, intended to allow wireless access to these devices. Although convenient, wireless access comes with additional risks. In general, wireless access is not allowed on DHS networks.

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The DHS Security Operations Center (SOC) is the central coordinating and reporting authority for all Sensitive and National Security computer security incidents throughout the Department. The Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) SOC reports incidents to the DHS SOC through appropriate channels to protect data classification. The HSDN SOC is subordinate to the DHS SOC, acting as the central coordinating and reporting authority for all SECRET computer security incidents throughout the Department.

Attacks against automated systems continue to increase dramatically. As reliance on computer resources has increased, the systems themselves have become more vulnerable to attack, viruses, system failure, and user error. Attacks have been launched against many organizations and have occurred regardless of the sensitivity and criticality of the data being processed.

Incidents can be accidental or malicious, and they can be caused by outside intruders or internal personnel, causing significant disruption of mission critical business processes and computer- supported operations; these incidents can severely disrupt computer-supported operations, compromise the confidentiality of sensitive information; and diminish the integrity of critical data.

The effects of security incidents can range from embarrassment to interruption of service to inability to function, and, potentially, to loss of human life. A significant concern is that hostile individuals or foreign states could severely damage or disrupt critical operations, resulting in harm to the public welfare. DHS maintains a security incident reporting and handling capability to help combat the disruptive short and long-term effects of security incidents.

OMB M-06-19, “Reporting Incidents Involving Personally Identifiable Information and Incorporating the Cost for Security in Agency Information Technology Investments,” requires that agencies report all incidents involving Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) within one hour of discovery of the incident. All incidents involving PII in electronic or physical form are to be reported, and no distinction is to be made between suspected and confirmed incidents.

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4.9.1 Security Incidents and Incident Response and Reporting

The HSDN SOC operates as a separate component, though subordinate to the DHS SOC, in a similar manner to the Component SOCs.

4.9.1.1 DHS SOC Organization

The DHS SOC reports to the DHS CIO; the DHS CIO and DHS CISO provide senior management guidance and direction to the DHS SOC. The DHS SOC provides guidance to Component SOCs.

4.9.1.2 Logging and Monitoring

The DHS SOC maintains visibility into security operations by using logging and monitoring. The DHS SOC logging strategy can be broken into two main elements: real-time Security Incident Management (SIM) logging and monitoring; and archive logging designed for offline processing and later retrieval in the event of a security incident.

Effective DHS security event logging capability requires SOC and element asset integration, requisite event visibility, retention, storage considerations and direction for elements to provide logging events into the DHS SOC toolset and relevant security policy reference.

Department logging guidance is documented in the DHS Logging Strategy in the DHS Security CONOPS.

4.9.1.3 Authority and Management

Security operations oversight and management is inherently a Governmental responsibility, not one that can be outsourced solely to contractors. While a Component SOC may contract for security operation capabilities, the responsibility and ultimate authority must lie with a Government employee. The Governmental authority, commonly assigned as a Federal SOC manager, and one or more Watch Officers, must have the ability to make decisions on behalf of the Government in response to the ever-changing cyber threat landscape. This is not an authority that can be delegated.

The Federal SOC manager and at least one Government Watch Officer must be cleared to Top Secret/Specially Compartmented Information (TS/SCI). Ideally all Watch Officers will be TS/SCI cleared. Such clearance is necessary to receive threat intelligence updates at Top Secret (TS) and above.

Because cyber operations are a continuous activity, Government authority must be continuously available. This is commonly is handled by three or more Watch Officers on an eight hour shift rotation, or by Government authority passed from one SOC to another to cover their watch area during off-hour operations. A DHS Watch Area must never be without Government oversight.

4.9.1.4 Forensics

Forensics is “…the examination of computer systems and the digital information created and stored on such systems to extract and analyze evidence in support of an investigation.”6 Whenever a system compromise occurs, a computer forensic investigation will reveal whether or not the network or system has become a target of criminal action or has been used in the commission a crime. Forensic investigation can protect against future incidents by revealing vectors and methods of intrusion, thus suggesting measures which can be taken to protect against future incidents.

The DHS SOC, in cooperation with involved Components, will conduct forensic examinations as deemed necessary in accordance with the incident response guidelines detailed in “Incident Response,” Attachment F to this Handbook.

In response to an incident requiring computer forensics, the DHS SOC will coordinate support from Components that have appropriate capabilities.

Any investigation that reveals potential criminal activity must be turned over to the appropriate authority. Forensic investigations will normally consist of three tiers, as shown in Table 2, Forensic Investigations Tiers.

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4.9.1.5 Vulnerability Management

Vulnerability management is a combination of detection, assessment, and mitigation of systematic weaknesses. Vulnerabilities may be revealed by a number of sources, including reviews of previous risk assessments; audit reports; vulnerability lists; security advisories; and system security testing (such as automated vulnerability scanning and Security Control Assessment).

The DHS SOC takes a proactive approach to vulnerability management including detecting vulnerabilities through testing, reporting through Information Security Vulnerability Management (ISVM) messages, and conducting Vulnerability Assessments (VA).

A core element of vulnerability management is mitigating the discovered vulnerabilities, based on a risk management strategy. Such a strategy accounts for vulnerability severity, threats, and assets at risk.

Risk calculation allows Components to prioritize remediation actions, in accordance with specific situations and risk management strategies. Remediation actions are captured in each Component’s patch management policy.

4.9.1.6 Information Security Vulnerability Management (ISVM)

The DHS SOC will stay abreast of current system vulnerabilities and provide recommendations to Components through ISVM messages. The DHS SOC will forward advisories from US-CERT, as appropriate, and ensure that each Component is alerted. In cases where the alert, advisory or warning is time-critical, the DHS SOC may also inform each DHS Component CIO and Point of Contact (POC) via telephone. The Component POCs will be asked to reply to the DHS SOC within a specified time period in instances requiring response to external organizations.

ISVM messages to Components can be of three forms:

• Information Security Vulnerability Alert (ISVA)

• Information Security Vulnerability Bulletin (ISVB)

• Technical Advisory (TA)

The kinds of vulnerabilities, messages, and required Component actions are outlined in Table 9.

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Anyone within DHS may be added to the ISVM distribution list. Those wishing to be added must obtain management approval and provide a DHS email address. ISVMs contain sensitive, “For Official Use Only,” information and must not be forwarded to non-DHS email accounts.

Although ISVM messages can be sent to anyone, only Component CISOs/ISSMs or their designated representatives may acknowledge receipt of messages, report compliance with requirements or send notification of granted waivers.

ISVM messages will have the same general format and will contain the following sections, as applicable:

• Message number

• Version

• Related Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) numbers

• Release date

• Subject

• Executive summary

• Requirements

o Acknowledgment (yes/no)

o Acknowledge by date

o Compliance (yes/no)

o Compliance by Date

o Reporting Instructions

• Affected systems

• Details

• References

• Required actions

• Recommended actions

• Contact information

• Revision information

See Appendix 6 to the DHS Security Operations Concept of Operations for the ISVM Message Template.

Correspondence regarding ISVM notices should be sent via email to dhs.soc@dhs.gov.

4.9.2 Law Enforcement Incident Response

The DHS SOC notifies the DHS Chief, Internal Security and Investigations Division, Office of the Chief Security Officer (CISID-OIS) whenever an incident requires law enforcement involvement. Law enforcement coordinates with the DHS SOC, the CISID-OIS, the Component, and other appropriate parties whenever a crime is committed or suspected.

4.9.3 Definitions and Incident Categories

A security event is a notable but unassessed occurrence that may affect a computing or telecommunications system or network. Security events may result from intentional or unintentional actions and may include inappropriate use of DHS information resources. An event can become an incident after it has been assessed. The assessment process may be performed by the DHS Help Desk, a Component SOC, or the DHS SOC, depending upon its nature and the circumstances. Events are investigated individually, but the Help Desk and SOCs also review them globally for patterns and tendencies that could identify system vulnerabilities.

An information security incident is an assessed security event. It may even be a simple, inadvertent situation that can be rectified by employee training. Security incidents include the inappropriate use of DHS computer resources. Examples include:

• Use of Internet sites that result in an additional charge to the Government

• Obtaining, viewing, or transmitting sexually explicit material or other material inappropriate to the workplace, which might be considered to contribute to a hostile work environment for some employees

• Use for other than official Governmental business that results in significant strain on Department computer systems (e.g., mass mailings or sending or downloading large files such as programs, pictures, video files, or games)

• Any otherwise prohibited activity, such as sending out solicitations or engaging in political activity prohibited by the Hatch Act

Sometimes, the security incident is a clear violation of an explicit or implied security policy that applies to a computing or telecommunications system or network. DHS has identified several categories of computer security incident and defined them in Attachment F to this Handbook. Examples include:

• Unauthorized attempts to gain access to information

• Introduction of malicious code or viruses into an information system

• Loss or theft of computer media Categories of incidents include the following:

• Unauthorized Access (Intrusion): Unauthorized access includes all successful unauthorized accesses and suspicious unsuccessful attempts.

• Denial of Service (DoS): DoS attacks include incidents that affect the availability of critical resources such as email servers, Web servers, routers, gateways, or communications infrastructure.

• Malicious Logic: Malicious logic includes active code such as viruses, Trojan horses, worms, and scripts used by crackers/hackers to gain privileges and/or information, capture passwords, or modify audit logs to hide unauthorized activity.

• Misuse: Misuse occurs when a user violates Federal laws or regulations and/or Department policies regarding proper use of computer resources; installs unauthorized or unlicensed software; or accesses resources or privileges that are greater than those assigned.

• PII incident: PII incidents are suspected or confirmed breaches of personally identifiable information in electronic or physical form and are categorized by the manner in which the PII incident occurred (e.g., Alteration/Compromise of Information, Unauthorized Access (Intrusion), Misuse). The DHS SOC Online Reporting System has specific questions that relate to PII incidents, which should be completed in their entirety.

• Probes and Reconnaissance Scans: These include probing or scanning networks for critical services or security weaknesses; this category also includes nuisance scans.

• Classified System Incident: Any incident that involves a system used to process national security information.

• Alteration/Compromise of Information: Any incident that involves the unauthorized altering of information, or any incident that involves the compromise of information.

","weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":false,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"4.9\tDepartment Information Security Operations","relatedControls":"

Security incident response and reporting responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Security Incident Response and Reporting Responsibilities

DHS CIO

DHS CISO

DHS SOC

Component CISO/ISSM

ISSOs

System/LAN Administrators

Users

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Documentation of information systems involves collection of detailed information in areas including functionality, system mission, unique personnel requirements, types of data processed, architecture, system interfaces, system boundaries, hardware and software elements, system and network diagrams, cost of assets, system communications and facilities, and any additional system-specific information. This information represents the foundation of the system’s configuration baseline. All proposed changes to the configuration baseline must be analyzed and tested to determine whether or not they have any security implications. All proposed configuration changes to operating systems must be analyzed, as must operating system security features, applications, critical system files, and system devices. Changes must be approved through a formal Change Control Board (CCB) and must be fully documented before they are implemented. Change control policies must consider and have provisions for quickly testing and approving time-sensitive changes that result from newly available vulnerability information.

The software, firmware, algorithms, data structures, processes, and other design mechanisms that satisfy a set of documented security requirements make up the system’s security baseline.

Security elements of operational systems should be set to their most restrictive mode prior to placing the system into the operational environment.

Adequate records of changes to the configuration or security baseline must be maintained for each system. A historical log of changes for all previous configurations must be maintained. Periodic configuration reviews are conducted in conjunction with periodic risk assessments.

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Documentation responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Documentation Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Project Managers/ISSOs

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Adhering to requirements regarding data backups can significantly reduce the risk that data will be compromised or lost in the event of a disaster or interruption of service. A Backup Operations Plan must be included in the Contingency Plan (CP), as discussed in Section 3.5.2, “Information Technology Contingency Planning.”

Development of a data backup strategy begins early in the system life cycle when the criticality and sensitivity of the system are first considered. The following factors (derived from the Risk Assessment and documented in the CP) drive the data backup strategy:

•\tApplication restoration priorities based on DHS mission criticality

•\tThe maximum downtime permissible before DHS mission requirements are seriously degraded

•\tThe number of data updates that can be lost between a service interruption event and the last data backup

•\tThe number of changes in system configuration settings that can be lost between a service interruption event and the last data backup

•\tInterdependencies with other systems

•\tIdentity of the System Owners

Elements that must be considered as part of the backup operations strategy include:

•\tSpecific needs of the site

•\tPeople: their roles, responsibilities, and skill levels

•\tHardware requirements

•\tCommunications considerations

•\tSupplies required

•\tLocation and availability of an alternate processing site

•\tTransportation requirements

•\tSpace requirements of the recovery site

•\tPower and environmental requirements

•\tBackup documentation requirements

The frequency of backups will depend upon how often the data processed by the system(s) changes and how important the changes are. The risk assessment will drive this element of the backup strategy. Data backups must be stored both on-site and off-site, in secure facilities, in fireproof and waterproof containers.

Data backup and restoration procedures must be tested regularly as an integral part of the overall Contingency Plan. Backup copies are tested to make sure they are actually usable for restoration. More frequent testing may be required, commensurate with the risk and magnitude of loss or harm that could result from disruption of information processing support. Testing helps ensure that each person with data backup responsibilities understands and is able to technically fulfill their backup and recovery duties. Testing of data backup and restoration procedures must be formally documented and records of testing must be retained as part of the system history.

The same principles that govern backup of system data also apply to individual users. Virtually all DHS employees and contractors will frequently possess critical sensitive data residing on hard drives on Government-owned computers or laptops. Hard drive crashes combined with failure to save critical files can result in a negative impact on the DHS mission or, at a minimum, can result in additional costs and lost time to recover or duplicate lost data. Critical data should never be kept on individual hard drives unless a backup copy exists. The backup should preferably be stored on a network drive where frequent backups are made. DHS system administrators do not have the responsibility or the resources to assist users in recovering lost data resulting from hard drive crashes unless the System Owner deems that said data is critical to a DHS mission.

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Information and data backup responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Information and Data Backup Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Security Control Assessors

System Owners

System/Network Administrators

Users

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Advances in technology have resulted in the availability of devices that offer multiple functions. Many devices such as multifunctional desktop computers, copiers, facsimile machines, and Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems may contain sensitive data and may also be connected to data communications networks.

The use of nontraditional information systems elements without appropriate safeguards presents risks to DHS organizations in part because these devices are typically not thought of as information systems.

Wireless devices must be secured as specified in Section 4.6, Wireless Communications. Copiers with the capability to process sensitive documents must be secured in the same manner as facsimile machines (see Section 4.5.2). Sanitization of media included in copiers (or other devices) must be carried out in the manner prescribed in Section 4.3.3, Media Sanitization and Disposal. If the device is a multifunction device, the fax functions must be secured in the same manner as stand-alone fax machines. Printing functions must be secured in accordance with the provisions of Section 4.3.4, Production, Input/Output Controls.

HVAC, fire suppression, and power equipment (including emergency power backup) must be secured in accordance with the requirements specified for PBXs, as described in Section 4.4.1.

If these do not have internal auditing functions, manual audit/access logs are to be maintained by a trusted employee who accompanies any individual who performs maintenance, upgrade or repair on the indicated systems.

The devices discussed in this section that have the capability to process or store sensitive data, whether or not such devices are connected to DHS networks, must be clearly documented in the Security Plan and authorized for that functionality. The risks of using such devices must be identified along with countermeasures employed to mitigate these risks. This information must be included in applicable Rules of Behavior and addressed in awareness training orientation and refresher sessions.

","references":"","tenantsId":1,"uuid":"48c3f896-2512-4b65-998b-d6a73da1fceb","family":"Operational Controls","subControls":"","weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":false,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"4.12\tConverging Technologies","relatedControls":"

Converging Technologies Responsibilities

ISSOs

Network/System Administrators

Facility Managers

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Identification is the process of telling a system the identity of a subject. Usually this is done by entering a name or presenting a token to the system via a Smart Card. The identity of each user must be established prior to authorizing access to the system, and each system user must have his or her own unique User ID. Personal Identification Verification (PIV) credentials, or alternative solutions that provide NIST SP 800-63 Level of Assurance (LOA) 4 of the user’s identity are the primary means of logical authentication for DHS sensitive systems.

NIST SP 800-63 states that a username, password, and single factor one-time password (such as RSA SecurID) is not LOA 4 compliant.

Authentication is the process of proving that a subject is who the subject claims to be. Authentication is a measure used to verify the eligibility of a subject and the ability of that subject to access certain information. There are three methods of authenticating:

•\tSomething you know (e.g., password)

•\tSomething you have (e.g., a Smart Card)

•\tSomething you are (e.g., a biometric such as a fingerprint)

DHS systems must be designed to ensure that each user is authenticated prior to being allowed access. Concurrent logins to the same system or application using the same authentication credentials are not allowed, unless a specific business or operational need is documented and approved by the Authorizing Official (AO).

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5.1.1 Passwords

The least expensive method for authenticating users is a password system in which authentication is performed each time a password is used. More sophisticated authentication techniques, such as Smart Cards and biological recognition systems (e.g., retina scanner, handprint, voice recognition), must be cost-justified through the risk assessment process.

A password is a sequence of characters used for authentication purposes. Passwords are often used to authenticate the identity of a system user and, in some instances, to grant or deny access to private or shared data.

Passwords provide a reasonable degree of authentication and are one of the most common methods used for controlling system access. Passwords are important because they are often the first line of defense against intruders or insiders who may be trying to obtain unauthorized access to a DHS system. To be used effectively, policies requiring strong passwords must be implemented, and users and system administrators must follow DHS password guidelines.

The use of a personal password by more than one individual is prohibited throughout DHS. It is recognized, however, that, in certain circumstances such as the operation of crisis management or operations centers, watch team and other duty personnel may require the use of group User IDs and passwords.

5.1.1.1 Selecting Strong Passwords

DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A makes the use of strong passwords mandatory, and requires ISSOs to determine and enforce measures to ensure that strong passwords are used. Therefore, users must select well-constructed passwords. The following table contains guidelines based on DHS policy and “US Government Configuration Baseline” (USGCB)

http://usgcb.nist.gov/ for strong passwords that should be followed throughout the Department:

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5.1.1.2 Results of Weak Passwords

Hackers have access to a variety of password-cracking tools. Weak passwords may allow internal or external users or hackers to gain unauthorized access to DHS systems.

Brute force attacks involve manual or automated attempts to guess valid passwords. There are numerous password-guessing programs available on the Internet. Most hackers have a “password hit list,” which is a collection of default passwords automatically assigned to various system accounts. For example, the default password for the guest account in most UNIX systems is “guest.”

Many hackers will try to guess passwords using a user’s personal information, such as birth date, name of spouse or children, pets, employee ID number, etc. Hackers will often practice what they call “social engineering,” which involves talking with employees to find out things about the systems in their office, and, more importantly, personal information that will help them guess passwords.

Users tend to choose passwords that are easy to remember such as the name of a family member or pet, a birth date, or a word that may mean something to the user. These types of passwords are the easiest for others to guess.

People are the key to constructing good passwords. Poorly constructed passwords make it easier for a hacker to crack the password. The longer it takes hackers to get a password, the more likely they are to move on to other methods of gaining access to the system.

It should be noted that many computer systems use auditing features that keep a record of actions initiated by the users while on the system. Once a hacker cracks a password and gains access to the system using the appropriate User ID, the system audit logs record that the User ID was used in taking harmful actions on the system. Authentication is the basis for control and accountability of the users on the system.

5.1.1.3 System Administrator Responsibilities

System administrators should follow the DHS password guidelines in the following table to ensure that password settings are in compliance with DHS requirements.

A secure method for distribution of passwords is also necessary. Administrators must verify an individual’s identity prior to communicating account or password information.

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Privileged accounts must be secured by authentication technology stronger than that based only on a User ID and password. All actions taken by remote privileged users must also be logged for auditing purposes and must be encrypted to prevent “playback” attacks. All passwords, algorithms, keys, certificates, codes, or other schemes used for authentication must be stored in a manner that prevents unauthorized access.

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Identification and authentication responsibilities are provided in the following table below.

Identification and Authentication Responsibilities

DHS CISO

Security Control Assessors

System Owners/Project Managers

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

Users

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Access controls restrict access to objects such as files, directories, and devices based upon users’ identities or groups and protect against unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of the data.

Automated systems are vulnerable to the fraudulent or malicious activities of individuals who have the authority or capability to access information not required to perform their job-related duties. Access control policy is designed to reduce the risk of an individual’s engaging in fraudulent or malicious behavior while acting alone. The Principle of Least Privilege states that users should only be able to access the system resources needed to fulfill their job responsibilities. This principle should be considered when granting access.

Principle of Least Privilege: Requires that each user in a system be granted the most restrictive set of privileges (or lowest clearance) needed for performance of authorized tasks. The application of this principle limits the damage that can result from an accident, error, or unauthorized use.

Network and system administrators and ISSOs are responsible for ensuring that access controls are in place and operating as intended. It is especially critical that the authority to add, change, or remove element devices, dial-up connections, and network addresses and protocols, or to remove or alter programs be tightly controlled, with access limited to a select group of authorized personnel.

• Initial User Access

Users who need access to DHS systems and networks must have completed a background investigation prior to being granted access. User access will vary depending on the user’s position. The user’s supervisor or Project Manager must also determine the systems the user needs to access and the levels of access the user requires. The System Owner must approve user access privileges.

• Review of Access Privileges

The data a user needs to access will change over time. Therefore, supervisors have the responsibility to ensure that access control lists are current and up-to-date. This requirement also applies to contractors and other non-DHS personnel with access to any DHS systems.

ISSOs have an oversight responsibility to ensure this is being accomplished. These actions are reviewed as part of the Security Authorization Process process and during annual self- assessments.

Access control policies and procedures are written and stored in an off-site location. They must to be accessible in the event of an emergency. This information also needs to be included in the Contingency Plan.

• Terminated and Departing Employees

System and Local Area Network (LAN) administrators and Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) must ensure that all departing employees have their access privileges terminated immediately. No former employee should have the ability to access system resources after their term of employment has ended. Procedures vary depending on whether the separation is voluntary of involuntary. Termination of access privileges also applies to employees whose job functions have changed such that they no longer require access to the level to which they were previously granted. See Section 4.1.6, Separation from Duty, for additional guidance.

• Secure Remote Access

Hardware security tokens, such as cryptographic smartcards, can be issued to DHS employees and contractors who have a valid need to remotely access DHS systems and data.

Users are responsible for protecting all DHS information to which they have access.

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5.2.1 Automatic Account Lockout

Components must configure each information system to lock a user’s account for a specified period following a specified number of consecutive failed logon attempts. Users must be locked from their account for a period of 20 minutes after three consecutive failed logon attempts. All failed logon attempts must be recorded in an audit log and periodically reviewed.

Automatic account lockout responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Automatic Account Lockout Responsibilities

DHS CISO

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

5.2.2 Automatic Session Termination

The term session refers to a connection between a terminal device (workstation, laptop, mobile device) and a networked application or system. The term does not include a direct connection to a DHS network, as when authenticating from a device that is directly connected to a DHS network.)The term session also refers to accessing an application or system such as a database or networked application through the DHS network. When a session is locked, the user may resume activity by reauthenticating.

Automatic session lockout responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Automatic Session Lockout Responsibilities

DHS CISO

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

5.2.3 Warning Banner

The DHS CISO stipulates that a warning banner statement be displayed on all DHS systems during logon. The most current language can be found on the DHS CISO Web page.

Please note that the current warning banner was developed specifically for use on DHS workstations. Due to differing function, purpose and situation as well as length requirements, warning banners for other environments, such as routers, switches and public-facing websites, will be developed and included in a future version of the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook.

The use of the warning banner serves as a reminder to all users that the computers they are accessing are Government computers.

Warning banner responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Warning Banner Responsibilities

DHS CISO

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

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Access control responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Access Control Responsibilities

Component Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) and Information Systems Security Managers (ISSM)

Security Control Assessors

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

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Auditing is a fundamental security principle that provides the ability to track the activities of a user who is accessing an automated system. Trails maintained by auditing tools are an effective method of enforcing this principle. Audit trails maintain a record of system, application, and user activity.

With the use of appropriate tools and procedures, auditing can further progress toward several security-related objectives including:

• Individual accountability

• Intrusion detection

• Problem identification

• Capability to reconstruct events

Audit trails can track the identity of each subject attempting to access a system, the time and date of access, and the time of log off. Audit trails can also capture all activities performed during a session and can specifically identify those activities that have the potential to modify, bypass, or negate the system’s security safeguards. The auditing technique used must be able to support after-the-fact investigations of how, when, and why normal operations ceased.

Audit trail records must be maintained online for at least 90 days to allow rapid access to recent information. Audit trails should be preserved for a period of seven years as part of record management for each system to allow audit information to be placed online for analysis with reasonable ease. Preservation of the audit information should be part of contingency and business continuity plans, so that events preceding a disaster or interruption of service can be reconstructed.

To be effective, audit trails must be periodically reviewed and analyzed. The capability to review the information captured by the auditing process is of paramount importance. In many cases, it is only through the review process that incidents of unauthorized access, modification, or destruction are uncovered. Audit trails need to be secured to prevent tampering and they must be backed up regularly.

","references":"","tenantsId":1,"uuid":"08d6803a-82c0-40fb-8de3-9f5c7a219093","family":"Technical Controls","subControls":"","weight":0,"archived":false,"isPublic":false,"enhancements":"","controlType":"Stand-Alone","title":"5.3\tAuditing","relatedControls":"

Auditing responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Auditing Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

System Owners

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

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Network security encompasses remote access, network monitoring, external connections, boundary protection, Internet usage, email security, and vulnerability scanning. This section addresses vulnerabilities inherent in network security and the technical controls needed to mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities.

","references":"","tenantsId":1,"uuid":"911f33ab-4f15-4537-8cf9-e0a97c7d5771","family":"Technical Controls","subControls":"

5.4.1 Remote Access and Dial-In

Remote access technology allows trusted employees to access DHS networks by dialing in via modem or accessing the DHS network via the Internet. This allows mobile employees to stay in touch with the home office while traveling. There are significant security risks, however, associated with remote access and dial-in capabilities. Proper procedures can help mitigate these risks.

Unauthorized access is the biggest risk associated with remote access. Access by untrusted or uncleared persons can violate the Department’s confidentiality, integrity, and availability standards. An unsecured modem or other dial-in facility could provide a backdoor to the entire

DHS network for unauthorized users (inside or outside of the DHS). Malicious individuals can also exploit improperly configured remote control software.

There are commercially available products that can be used in conjunction with other network protection mechanisms to reduce the risks of unauthorized access. These require the use of authentication methods stronger than passwords and user IDs.

Components must develop and implement acquisition procedures to ensure that only approved hardware and software is purchased and operated.

Remote access solutions that do not comply with the requirements of FIPS 140-2 are not authorized.

Remote access and dial-in responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Remote Access and Dial-In Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

Users

5.4.2 Network Security Monitoring

Security monitoring, detection, and analysis are key functions and are critical to maintaining the security of DHS information systems. Network monitoring and analysis is limited to observing network activity for anomalies, malicious activities and threat profiles. Content analysis is not within the scope of network monitoring.

Component SOCs lead the network security monitoring effort. Component CISOs/ISSMs, ISSOs, and system/network administrators respond to and participate in intrusion alerts and SOC-led incident response investigations. They also evaluate the impact of each event on the system and implement any necessary corrections.

Network security monitoring responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Network Security Monitoring Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

DHS and Component SOC

ISSOs/System Administrators

5.4.2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

Intrusion detection is the art of detecting inappropriate, incorrect, or malicious activity. Systems that operate on a host to detect malicious activity on that host are called Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS). Those that operate on a network are referred to as Network Intrusion Detection systems (NIDS). Intrusion detection is viewed as an integral part of a layered security model/defense-in-depth strategy.

Intrusion detection operates on the principle that any attempt to penetrate a system can be detected in real time as opposed to actually stopping the penetration, as is the case with firewalls. This principle is based on the assumption that it is virtually impossible to block every avenue to security breach. A NIDS is designed to identify break-in attempts and stop them, in some cases working in conjunction with firewalls to alter the access control lists to halt an incursion. A HIDS can offer the equivalent of a software firewall installed on the host, stopping or preventing would-be intruders.

Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) are closely related to IDSs. Some IDS technologies currently provide intrusion protection by halting malicious data transmissions and disconnecting communication from the host from which they originate. Others take the additional step of reconfiguring firewalls to permanently block attacking hosts from sending data into the network.

Firewalls are designed to prevent unauthorized entry, but firewalls can fail or be compromised by an intruder. Intrusion detection systems supplement firewalls by alerting the organization that an attack may have occurred or be occurring. Firewalls are also incapable of protecting a network from internal compromise, but an IDS can alert network and system managers of such an attack.

5.4.2.2 Intrusion Detection Methods and Techniques

The most common approaches to intrusion detection are statistical anomaly detection and pattern matching (signature) detection.

Statistical anomaly involves tracking system use and establishing a baseline of what is “normal” and setting an acceptable range of parameters to which the system normally adheres. When the system goes beyond the statistically established ranges, an intrusion may have occurred and an alarm is given.

Pattern matching is simply what its name implies. Patterns of known attacks are part of the IDS database. Attack patterns for denial of service attacks, buffer overflow attacks, and backdoors are well known. These are known as signatures. When these signatures are detected, an alarm is given.

When alarms are given, those monitoring the IDS investigate to determine if an intrusion has in fact occurred and react accordingly. Event correlation systems can compare information from various security devices and reduce the likelihood of unnecessary response to “false positives,” which may arise from an attack signature matching allowed activities. Such systems can also reduce the likelihood that the monitoring staff is distracted from noticing an actual attack by a flurry of alarms raised by relatively innocuous activities.

5.4.2.3 Monitoring

The DHS SOC is responsible for monitoring of DHS systems and networks. Upon receipt of an alarm, operators investigate to determine the validity of the alarm. Once validity is confirmed, the operator notifies the ISSO and/or the system administrator for corrective action. If the problem is deemed critical, senior management is notified and must be involved in determining the appropriate course of action.

5.4.3 Network Connectivity

A system interconnection is the direct connection of two or more information systems for the purpose of sharing data and other information resources by passing data between each other via a direct system-to-system interface without human intervention. Any physical connection that allows other systems to share data (pass thru) also constitutes an interconnection, even if the two systems connected do not share data between them. System interconnections include connections that are permanent in nature, connections that are established by automated scripts at prescribed intervals, and/or connections which utilize web and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) services. System interconnections do not include instances of a user logging on to add or retrieve data, nor users accessing Web-enabled applications through a browser. External connections are defined as system(s) or IP addressable end points that are not under the direct control of DHS, systems that have IP addressing not in the DHS addressing scheme (routable and non-routable), or systems that have an authorizing official who is not a DHS employee.

Use Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) has been mandated by the Office of Management and IPv6, it is recommended that all Components ensure new technology acquisitions are able to send and receive IPv6 traffic, either through internal testing, or validated against a reputable organization, such as the U.S. Government version 6 (USGv6) Profile and Testing Program.

A number of management, operational, and technical controls impact network connectivity. These include identification and authentication controls, audit logging, integrity controls, and periodic reviews of programs and systems to ascertain whether or not changes have occurred that could adversely affect security.

Network connectivity responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Network Connectivity Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

AO

System Owners

Network Administrators

ISSOs

Users

5.4.3.1 Interconnection Security Agreements (ISA)

Proper management of network connections is vital to ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data processed by a system. Interconnections of systems must be established in accordance with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-47 “Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems.”

An Interconnection Security Agreement (ISA) is required whenever the security policies of the interconnected systems are not identical or the systems are not administered by the same entity or AO. The ISA documents the security protections on the interconnected systems to ensure that only acceptable transactions are permitted. Component personnel must review ISAs as part of the annual FISMA self-assessment. ISAs must be reissued every 3 years or whenever significant changes have been made to any of the interconnected systems.

All external connections must be identified and documented in the SP, the risk assessment, and other Security Authorization Process documentation as necessary. The risk associated with these connections must be addressed during the Security Authorization Process.

An ISA should contain the following:

• Purpose – This section should explain the rationale for the interconnection and contain a one- or two-paragraph statement that justifies the need to interconnect the two systems.

• Interconnection Statement of Requirements – This section documents the formal requirement for connecting the two systems. The following items should be addressed in this section:

o The names of the systems being interconnected

o The requirement for the interconnection, including the benefits derived

o The type of connection (Frame Relay, T1, etc.)

o Physical location of connection equipment, including addresses and room numbers

o Primary Points of Contact (POC) for both systems

o The agency name(s) or organization that initiated the requirement.

• System Security Considerations – This section documents the security features in place to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data and the systems being interconnected. This includes such aspects as incident reporting and personnel clearances. Technical representatives from each organization need to discuss the contents of this section and come to a mutual agreement as to which items should be included.

• Topological Drawing – Each ISA must include a topological drawing depicting the end-to- end interconnectivity in a clear and readable manner. The drawing should include:

* All data communications paths (not program system paths), circuits, etc., used for the interconnection beginning with the DHS-owned system(s) and including all interconnected systems to the non-DHS end-point

* The logical location of all elements (mainframe computers, host processors, hubs, firewalls, encryption devices, routers, frame relay devices, secure frame units [SFU], communications service units [CSU], data service units [DSU], and customer personal computers).

• Signatures and Comments – Each ISA must be signed by the AO of each interconnecting system or organization, or by the official designated by the AO to have signatory authority for ISAs. This section acknowledges that the ISA is subject to change, will be reviewed annually, and will be modified as circumstances warrant. This section must include a statement that the ISA may not be unilaterally modified and that any changes must be reviewed and jointly agreed upon by the AOs of the interconnected systems. Others in the organization, however, should have the opportunity to review changes.

Details on completing an ISA, and a template, are contained in DHS 4300A Attachment N, “Preparation of Interconnection Security Agreements.”

5.4.3.2 Trust Zones

Information and services sharing between the DHS Security Operations Center (SOC) and Components occurs through Trust Zones. A Trust Zone consists of a group of people, data systems, and networks subject to a shared security policy or set of rules governing access to data and services. (For example, a Trust Zone may be set up between different network segments that require specific usage policies based on information processed, such as law enforcement information.) The DHS SOC must be aware of Component-security requirements, as defined by Trust Zones, to accurately perform DHS SOC duties.

DHS Trust Zones have the following characteristics:

• The Trust Zone must be set of networked hosts protected from unconstrained access by one or more security perimeter devices

• There must be a basis for placement and configuration of firewalls, Virtual VPNs, and remote access protection devices

• The Trust Zone may consist of a single host, one or more LANs at a site, or a group of networks connected via a network provider or backbone

• OneNet provides a layer of trust by means of sub-netting, firewalls, and other policy enforcement mechanisms

• Network Admission Control permits dynamic assignment of information systems and users to basic Trust Zones. Medium and High assurance models are another mechanism that permits assignment to Trust Zones

5.4.4 Firewalls and Policy Enforcement Points

Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) separate Trust Zones as defined in the DHS Security Architecture. Boundary protection between DHS and external networks is implemented by firewalls at the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) and other approved direct system inter- connections. DHS TICs are provided by OneNet and monitored by the DHS SOC. Component SOCs may protect DHS-internal boundaries across Trust Zones.

Within DHS, boundary protection of information system resources is accomplished by the installation and operation of firewall systems. Firewalls, when used in concert with a variety of additional security controls such as intrusion detection systems, data encryption, personnel background checks, security guards, , and physical security barriers, provide an added level of assurance that unauthorized personnel will be unable to access the Department’s automated systems.

By tracking and controlling data, and deciding whether or not to pass, drop, reject, or encrypt the data, firewalls have proven to be an effective means of securing a network.

Responsibility for deployment and management of firewalls are included in the following table.

Firewall Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs and ADP Support Personnel

Site Managers

SOCs

5.4.4.1 Firewall Basics

A firewall is a system or group of systems that enforce an access control policy between two networks. The actual means by which this is accomplished vary widely. Firewalls can authenticate the source and destination of a given data path provide Network Address Translation (NAT) and Port Address Translation (PAT) and log all traffic passing through them. Logging is either done on the machine on which the firewall software runs on, or is logged to a separate machine for audit and intrusion forensic analysis.

Firewalls are often associated with filtering devices, which screen incoming (and possibly outgoing) data traffic for viruses and malware in the form of mobile code. By offloading these responsibilities to ancillary machines, the firewall can allow higher rates of data transmission.

Mobile (downloadable) code is software that is transmitted from a remote source across a network to a local system and then executed on that local system (e.g., personal computer, wireless mobile device mobile phone, Internet appliance, etc.). Examples include ActiveX controls, Java applets, script run within the browser, and Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) email. Although mobile code is a legitimate method for distributing application software, it is most frequently associated with “malicious mobile code” (e.g., viruses, worms, Trojan horses), that executes without the permission of or any explicit action by the local system’s owner/user.

Firewalls also have two facets with respect to encryption. A frequently used mechanism is the SSHv2 protocol (Secure Shell version 2). This facility can provide for authentication by a digital certificate or two-factor authentication mechanism, and strong encryption. Such a connection should only be allowed from the protected (internal) side of a firewall, so that unauthorized outsiders are unable to affect a change.

Firewalls often have the capability to implement encrypted data communications. Although this approach might be slightly more economical, it is more prudent to have a system that functions as a firewall serve a single purpose. A separate encryption server behind the firewall is afforded the extra protection of being shielded by the firewall. Encryption, moreover, involves use of a substantial amount of computational power, which would slow down the operation of the firewall. Lastly, if the firewall system is compromised, the encryption facility is not automatically compromised at the same time.

NIST SP 800-10, “Keeping Your Site Comfortably Secure: An Introduction to Internet Firewalls,” and NIST SP 800-41, “Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy,” offer guidance with respect to firewalls and the functions they can serve.

5.4.4.2 Firewall Deployment

Firewall systems have been deployed to various DHS sites, and additional systems are scheduled for deployment as part of the continuing effort to provide necessary security safeguards.

Firewalls are not used solely to provide boundary protection from the outside world. In commercial environments, for example, the fiscal processing systems may be protected from the remainder of the network by firewalls. In a similar manner, the Department can use firewalls to segment systems that have various levels of sensitivity, unless they are so classified that connection to the network should be prohibited.

5.4.4.3 Firewall Management

All firewalls for sensitive systems must be under the control of DHS and Component SOCs, who are responsible for providing direction and guidance for firewall settings and rule sets. The actual application of all firewalls is under the DHS SOC.

5.4.5 Internet Security

Section 5.4.5 of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A provides specific DHS technical policy regarding the use and proper configuration of firewalls and the management of dial-up connections and other protocols.

Sound network security practice dictates that all network connections be identified and that the threats and vulnerabilities associated with these connections be analyzed. The guidance provided in Section 5.4.3, Network Connectivity, specifically that with regard to ISAs, and in Attachment N to this Handbook, “Interconnection Security Agreements,” also applies to connections to the Internet and extranets. An extranet is a private network encompassing that portion of an organization’s intranet that it chooses to securely share, via the Internet and the public telecommunication system, with external entities, which may include suppliers, vendors, and customers. An extranet requires security and privacy and may involve firewalls, digital certificates, message encryption, and virtual private networks that can tunnel through the public network.

All external connections, including extranets, must be identified and documented in the Security Plan, the Risk Assessment, and other Security Authorization Process documentation as necessary. The risks associated with these connections must be addressed during the Security Authorization Process. Additionally, external network connections are to be reviewed annually by Component personnel and documented in the annual information security assessment.

Adequate protection requires proper selection and installation of firewalls and other boundary devices, Intrusion Detection Systems, and ancillary encryption or filtering devices. These devices must be assessed and authorized prior to their use on DHS networks. Implementation guidance for firewalls is discussed in Section 5.4.4 of this Handbook, “Firewalls.” Intrusion detection systems are covered in Section 5.4.2; encryption is addressed in Section 5.5.1. The adequacy of all of these must be monitored and reviewed as part of periodic information security assessments.

Firewalls must be configured so as to prohibit any Transport Control Protocol (TCP), UDP service, or other protocol that is not explicitly permitted. Of particular concern is the need to close ports that allow file and printer sharing, whether through Microsoft NetBIOS, Common Internet File Service (CIFS), Network File Services (NFS), or TCP Server Message Block (SMB) protocols. The use of file and printer sharing is associated with numerous vulnerabilities related to everything from enumeration of devices and user accounts to anonymous control of systems without authorization.

Telnet, which is prohibited on DHS systems and networks, is a utility program and protocol that allows one computer to connect to another computer on a network. After providing a username and password to login to the remote computer, a user can enter commands that will be executed as if entered directly from the remote computer. Telnet transfers all information in “clear text” (unencrypted human-readable text), which allows Internet service providers (ISPs) and other users on the Internet, intranet, or LAN to intercept and read the traffic. Telnet use could allow unauthorized users to get user IDs and passwords, capture information or commands that are being sent, and potentially alter the information in the telnet connection. Telnet uses a commonly known port, which makes it easy for someone to “sniff” telnet traffic. The approved solution for this functionality is to use SSH. SSH is an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) protocol that provides encrypted connections and supports authentication with digital certificates and other secure methods of authentication.

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is a means of transferring files from one computer to another. FTP transfers all information in clear text (unencrypted human readable text), which allows Internet Service Providers (ISP) and other users on the Internet, intranet, or LAN to intercept the traffic it creates. This allows unauthorized users to capture information or commands and possibly alter the information in the FTP connection. FTP generally uses a commonly known port, which makes it easy for someone to “sniff” FTP traffic. The approved solution for this security risk is to use the Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) element of SSH. SSH is a FIPS 140-2-approved IETF protocol, which provides encrypted connections and supports authentication with digital certificates and other secure methods of authentication.

Use of the following is expressly prohibited:

• Telnet

• File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

• Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), which can be used to monitor and control systems

• Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) messages

The following have significant risks and must be used only in conjunction with appropriate countermeasures and risk-reduction procedures:

• Cross boundary routing broadcasts

• Domain Name Service (DNS) communications across the boundary (by using split DNS with authentication of zone transfers)

• Mobile code (e.g., ActiveX, JavaScript) that has not been reviewed and digitally signed by an appropriate DHS authority.

Implementation guidance for securing dial-up connections is addressed in Section 5.4.1, Remote Access and Dial-In. Dial-in connections, to the extent they can even be justified, must be strictly controlled.

Internet security responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Internet Security Responsibilities

AO

ISSOs

Network/System Administrators

5.4.6 Email Security

The DHS email gateway Steward provides email monitoring for spam and virus activity at the gateway.

DHS SOC personnel are trained to respond to incidents pertaining to email security and

assist the email gateway Steward as necessary. Components must provide appropriate security for their email systems.

Email is the most commonly used application for exchanging data electronically. The email process is divided into two main elements:

• Mail servers, which deliver, forward, and store mail

• Clients, which interface with the user and allow them to read, compose, send, and store messages

Instant messaging (IM) and “I Seek You” (ICQ) tools provide capabilities similar to email, but are inherently less secure; the technology to secure. IM and ICQ tools possess all of the risks associated with unsecured email, including the capability to install software or malware on a recipient’s system without their knowledge. If IM and ICQ tools are to be used, they should not include or communicate with publicly available IM or ICQ tools provided by several Internet providers. Any such tools employed need to be capable of blocking any format except pure text. This specifically includes blocking executable code, Web links, video or still images, and audio. The use of Instant Messaging and ICQ is not currently authorized for use on sensitive systems and networks.

Second only to Web servers, mail servers are the host on a network that is most often targeted by intruders. Mail servers are targeted because they communicate, to some degree, with untrusted third parties. Additionally, email has been an effective method of passing malicious code (viruses). As a result, mail servers, mail clients, and the network infrastructure that supports them must be protected. Email security issues include:

• Flaws in the email application software have been used as the means of compromising first the server and subsequently the associated network

• Denial of service (DoS) attacks may be directed to the mail server

• Sensitive information on the mail server may be read by unauthorized individuals or changed in an unauthorized manner

• Unencrypted sensitive information transmitted between a mail server and email client could be intercepted

• Information in email messages may be altered at some point between the sender and recipient

• Viruses and other types of malicious code may be distributed throughout an organization via email

• The sending of inappropriate, proprietary, or other sensitive information via email could expose an organization to legal action

Securing a mail server is a two-step process. The first step is to secure the underlying operating system. Many security issues can be avoided if the operating systems are configured appropriately. The second step is to configure the email application. Administrators must configure their servers to apply the organization’s security policy. Securing a mail server includes the following steps:

• Apply patches as they become available after first testing them in a lab environment

• Remove or disable unneeded services and applications

• Configure user authentication

• Scan the operating system with a vulnerability assessment tool

Components must consider encryption technologies to protect their email systems. Most standard mail protocols default to unencrypted user authentication and send email data in the clear. Sending data in the clear allows a hacker to compromise a user’s account and/or intercept emails.

When a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system is properly integrated into the client email facility, it is possible to “hash” a message to determine that it has not been altered or otherwise tampered with. It is also possible to encrypt sensitive data in an email using the employee’s digital certificate encryption key and digitally sign an email using the digital certificate’s signing key. This establishes integrity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation with regard to sensitive information.

The infrastructure that supports the network plays a vital role in the security of the email system. The network infrastructure is the first line of defense between the Internet and a mail server.

Network design alone, however, cannot protect a mail server. The following steps need to be accomplished on a according to a regular schedule:

• Review and analyze log files

• Back up data daily (or in accordance with the Security Plan (SP))

• Protect against malicious code (e.g., viruses, worms, Trojan horses)

• Have a recovery plan in the event of a disaster

• Test and apply patches in a timely manner

• Scan the system for vulnerabilities with a vulnerability-scanning tool

NIST SP 800-45, “Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security,” and NIST SP 800-49, “Federal S/MIME V3 Client Profile,” have valuable information detailing how to secure email. NIST SP 800-45 gives detailed technical guidance for Microsoft Exchange, Linux, and UNIX mail services and contains general guidance on how to secure mail servers.

Note: Due to the significant risk associated with HTML email, DHS is considering following the lead of the Department of Defense (DOD) and moving to text based email.

Email security responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Email Responsibilities

DHS CISO

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Security Control Assessors

AOs

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

5.4.7 Personal Email Accounts

Just as discussing sensitive information on a cell phone in a crowd can expose the information, sending sensitive email to a personal account can expose that information to a large number of unauthorized individuals.

Sending email to a personal account has the following vulnerabilities:

• DHS does not authorize the use of personally owned computers within DHS; they are not likely to have the appropriate encryption software installed, thus information is sent in “clear text”

• The route that the email travels cannot be predicted

• Untrusted persons at ISP sites may read sensitive information

• Email travels over unprotected communication links that can be “sniffed” in transit, exposing messages to being read by unauthorized persons

• Web browsers are often used to access private email accounts and such access is inherently not secure

• Malware (which could exist on the employee’s personal computer) can send copies of existing emails or other text on a victim’s computer to unknown individuals

• Instant Messaging channels are a frequent source of malware and of mechanisms for attacks on personal computers

• So-called “spyware” programs transmit information from personal computers to unknown sites. Some programs (both freeware and commercial) install these programs to harvest marketing information and other information from a user’s computer.

Any unauthorized person who acquires sensitive information in this manner could post it on the Internet, deliver it to a news bureau, or forward it to individuals who could use the information to compromise national security.

Personal email responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Personal Email Responsibilities

DHS CISO

System Owners and Supervisors

System Administrators

ISSOs

Users

5.4.8 Testing and Vulnerability Management

The DHS SOC takes a proactive approach to vulnerability management including detecting vulnerabilities through testing, reporting through Information System Vulnerability Management (ISVM) messages, and conducting Vulnerability Assessments (VA).

Vulnerability management is a combination of detection, assessment, and mitigation of weaknesses within a system. Vulnerabilities may be identified from a number of sources, including reviews of previous risk assessments, audit reports, vulnerability lists, security advisories, and system security testing such as automated vulnerability scanning or security control assessments.

Core elements of vulnerability management include continuous monitoring and mitigating the discovered vulnerabilities, based on a risk management strategy. This strategy accounts for vulnerability severity, threats, and assets at risk.

The DHS ISVM Program, managed through the SOC, provides Component CISOs/ISSMs and operational support personnel (e.g., ISSOs, System Administrators) with bulletins, alerts, and technical advisories related to emerging vulnerabilities and threats. The ISVM is modeled on the Department of Defense Information Assurance Vulnerability Assessment (IAVA) program but generally does not prescribe mitigation options nor centrally manage software patching. The following ISVM tools are available to support the Component CISO/ISSM:

• DHS Top 20 Critical Vulnerabilities List

• DHS Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) – Red Team for Components without internal capabilities and for independent verification as necessary

• DHS Vulnerability Assessment Request Form (see Appendix O2 of DHS 4300A Attachment O to this handbook)

• Negotiated pricing for VA tools (pending)

The DHS Vulnerability Management Program is described in “Vulnerability Management,” Attachment O to this Handbook. Testing and vulnerability assessments can be accomplished by a combination of scanning and manual techniques. Plans call for DHS to field an automated Security Authorization Process tool with a built-in vulnerability assessment capability. In addition, Plans of Action & Milestones (POA&M) will be prepared and used in conducting periodic vulnerability testing and assessments of information security controls and techniques.

Testing and vulnerability assessment responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Testing and Vulnerability Assessment Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs and Information System Support Personnel

5.4.8.1 Vulnerability Scanning

Vulnerability scanning is the process of identifying known vulnerabilities of information systems operating on a network in order to determine if a system can be compromised. Vulnerability scanning often employs software that contains databases of known flaws, and tests systems for the occurrence of these flaws.

Vulnerability scanning typically refers to system audits on internal networks that are not connected to the Internet, as well as to systems that are visible on the Internet. The purpose of vulnerability scanning is to identify weaknesses in a system (or in system security procedures, hardware design, internal controls, etc.) that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access or to affect the systems’ availability or data integrity.

Staff members performing this type of testing must be cleared to the levels commensurate with that of the system being tested.

5.4.8.2 Expanded Vulnerability Scanning

The type of security testing performed by general-purpose vulnerability scanning tools may uncover weaknesses in the underlying elements of systems that host DHS intranet or Internet web sites. A special class of scanning tools explores weaknesses in elements of web systems for vulnerabilities related to the content and functionality of such systems. Examples of such vulnerabilities include the ability of unauthorized persons to examine or alter files, to establish cross-site scripting (which redirects users of a web site to another web site), or to directly access a database from which the website draws data that it displays. A similar class of database vulnerability tools exists for databases. These tools have the capability of exploring inherent and design-induced weaknesses. Common vulnerabilities include default passwords that have not been removed, authentication bypass errors, and the ability to alter data without authentication.

Thorough vulnerability scanning expands upon the “canned” tools to include manual testing of potentially vulnerable systems and network elements. For example, firewalls may provide barriers to standard discovery techniques. Specialized scanning tools, however, can use normally open ports (e.g., 80 for (HTTP)) and configurable timing parameters to discover internal systems in such a manner that neither a firewall nor a (NIDS can detect the scan. Such vulnerability assessments should also include both “war dialing” to find unauthorized dial-in modems, and “war driving” to detect unauthorized or misconfigured wireless network equipment.

5.4.8.3 Gap Analysis

Gap analysis determines the variance between requirements current capabilities. It requires that the testers have access to internal information such as security policy and procedure documents and specific networks or systems that should be assessed. Internal staff or, preferably, third parties can perform gap analyses.

5.4.8.4 Penetration Testing

Third-party personnel who have no knowledge of the security policies or the internal structure of the network typically perform penetration tests. Penetration testing assesses weaknesses of a computer facility or network to attack by amateur or professional “hackers.” A thorough penetration test will include social engineering, dumpster diving, identification of networks through public sources (e.g., WhoIs and RwhoIs searches of the Regional Internet Registries) as well as manual techniques for finding weak points in an organization’s perimeter. Once internal systems have been identified, a search of the NIST Internet Categorization of Attacks Toolkit (ICAT) database can provide a laundry list of possible vulnerabilities in the hardware, operating systems, middleware, or applications discovered.

5.4.8.5 Scope of Vulnerability Assessments

All equipment attached to the DHS information system infrastructure is subject to security vulnerability scanning. In today’s changing environment, vulnerable and/or unprotected systems can easily be overlooked. Systems that are not properly managed can become potential threats to the health of the DHS infrastructure.

Proactive security scanning allows for a meaningful assessment of system security against known risks, provides a roadmap of effective countermeasures for improving security, leads to faster detection of vulnerabilities, and reduces damage to breached systems. Proactive scanning can also identify authorized and unauthorized devices on the internal network, such as unauthorized wireless access points, modems or high-speed links installed by employees for their personal convenience.

Any system identified in conjunction with a security incident is subject to a comprehensive security scan. Random network scans will not be advertised, but the DHS SOC will be informed prior to conducting any scans.

Network and host scans are to be conducted by authorized DHS personnel using pre-designated scanning machines in order to be easily recognizable as benign activity in system log files.

Because vulnerability scanning can be resource intensive, routine scanning is to be done during periods of low network activity when feasible.

5.4.9 Peer-to-Peer Technology

Peer-to-peer technology refers to applications that allow individual PCs to act as servers to other individual PCs. This technology was made popular by music file-swapping services (e.g., Napster, Kazza, etc.). Peer-to-peer technology allows users to share files with each other through a network of computers that use the same peer-to-peer client. Each computer has the ability to act as a both a server, by hosting files for others to download, and a client by searching other computers for files the client wants to access.

This technology introduces a significant risk to Government data and exposes Government agencies to legal liability for copyright infringement. Use of this technology can also decrease productivity and use large amounts of bandwidth.

Peer-to-peer applications circumvent most enterprise security systems. This provides malicious users easy access, allowing them to install malware, identify IP addresses or user names, launch denial of service attacks, gain control of network resources, or access sensitive information.

Many peer-to-peer programs do not allow users to control how much of their disk space is accessible, potentially allowing unauthorized persons access to files that the user has no intention of sharing.

In addition to security concerns, the use of peer-to-peer technology for its most commonly used functions (i.e., sharing music, images, and video) exposes both the individual and DHS to criminal prosecution for copyright violations.

For these reasons, peer-to-peer software is not authorized on DHS computers or on any computer or system that might be connected to the DHS network. Use of peer-to-peer software is considered an unauthorized use of Government resources and constitutes a reportable security incident and may result in sanctions against violators.

[For additional information on inappropriate use of DHS resources, see Section 3.12, “Information Technology Security Policy Violation and Disciplinary Action;” Section 4.8.3, “Personally Owned Equipment and Software;” Section 4.8.5, “Personal Use of Government Office Equipment and Department of Homeland Security Information Technology Systems/Computers;” and Section 4.9, “Security Incidents and Incident Response and Reporting.”]

Peer-to-peer responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Peer-to-Peer Technology Responsibilities

DHS CIO, CISO

Component CISOs/ISSMs

Supervisors

ISSOs, Network/System Administrators

Users

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Cryptography is a branch of mathematics that deals with the transformation of data. Cryptographic transformation converts ordinary text (plaintext) into coded form (ciphertext) by encryption; and ciphertext into plaintext by decryption.

This science relies on two basic components, namely an algorithm, for example Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and a key. The algorithm is the mathematical function used for encryption or decryption, and the key is the parameter used in the transformation.

The two basic types of cryptography are: secret key systems (also called symmetric key systems) and public key systems (also called asymmetric key systems).

In secret key systems, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption; that is, all parties participating in the communication share a single key that must be securely distributed and protected.

In public key systems, each user is assigned his own pair of uniquely related keys: a private key known only to the key pair’s owner, and a public key that can be made publically available. Unlike secret key systems, the only keys that need to be shared are the public keys.

The two keys are mathematically related, but the private key cannot be determined from the public key and the public key cannot be determined from the private key.

Encryption using a public key system works as follows:

1. The originator encrypts the communication for each intended recipient using each recipient’s public key. A unique cyphertext is created for each intended recipient; the encryption is done by the PKI system and is transparent to the user.)

2. The encrypted message is sent to each recipient.

3. Each intended recipient uses his unique private key to decrypt the communication. This is done by the system and is transparent to the user.

Refer to NIST SP 800-21, “Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government,” for more in-depth information on cryptography.

Digital signatures are implemented through a public key system. A digital signature is an electronic analogue of a written signature. Like a written signature, it can be used to (digitally) sign messages, but has added advantages. Advantages include:

• Proving that the originator signed the message

• Determining whether or not the message was altered after it was signed

• Remotely authenticating a user’s identity for access control

• Signatures may be generated for stored data and applications so that the integrity of the data and applications may be verified at any later time.

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5.5.1 Encryption

Encryption is the process of changing plaintext into ciphertext for the purpose of security or privacy.

Encryption responsibilities are provided in the following table

Encryption Responsibilities

DHS CISO

AOs

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

5.5.2 Public Key Infrastructure

A PKI is an architected set of systems and services that provide a foundation for enabling the use of public key cryptography. This is necessary in order to implement strong security services and to allow the use of digital signatures.

The principal components of a PKI are the public key certificates, Registration Authorities (RA), Certification Authorities (CA), directory, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL), and a governing Certificate Policy (CP).

Specific requirements for PKIs which must be met are detailed in DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.

PKI responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Public Key Infrastructure Responsibilities

DHS CISO

DHS Office of Security

DHS PKI Operational Authority

Component CISOs/ISSMs

AOs

ISSOs

Network/System Administrators

5.5.3 Public Key/Private Key

A public key certificate is used to obtain subscribers’ public keys in a trusted manner. Once a certificate is obtained, the public key can be used:

• To encrypt data for that subscriber so that only that subscriber can decrypt it

• To verify that digitally signed data was signed by that subscriber, thereby authenticating the identity of the signing subscriber, and the integrity of the signed data

A public key/private key pair validated in accordance with Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-1 is generated in a hardware or software cryptographic module as part of the PKI registration process and is under the control of the subscriber. The private signing key remains under the sole possession of the subscriber; it is escrowed by the CA and may be securely recovered if it is lost or corrupted. This practice allows previously encrypted data to be decrypted by the subscriber.

Public key/private key responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Public Key/Private Key Responsibilities

DHS CISO

DHS PKI Operational Authority

DHS Office of Security

Component CISOs/ISSMs

ISSOs

Human Subscribers

Sponsors

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There are a number of programs that are classified as malicious code, or “malware.” These programs are referred to as viruses, logic bombs, worms, Trojan horses, and other names. This section covers types of malware.

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5.6.1 Types of Malware

Various types of malware are defined in the following table:

Virus – A virus is a self-replicating malicious program segment that attaches itself to legitimate application programs, operating system commands, or other executable system elements and spreads from one system to another. Another definition for virus is: a program or piece of code that is loaded onto a computer without the user’s knowledge and runs against the user’s wishes. As it spreads, it is said to be infecting the system.

Worms – Worms are malicious programs that copy themselves from system to system, rather than infiltrating legitimate files. For example, a mass-mailing email worm is a worm that sends copies of itself via email. A network worm makes copies of itself throughout a network or through file shares. Worms often contain Trojan horse or “backdoor” programs.

Logic Bombs – A logic bomb can be defined as dormant code, the activation of which is triggered by a predetermined time or event. For example, a logic bomb might start erasing data files when the system clock reaches a certain date or when an application has been loaded X number of times.

Trojan Horses – A Trojan horse is a computer program that is apparently or actually useful but performs another function covertly. A Trojan horse generally provides remote access to an unauthorized person. A Trojan horse can be used to modify databases, write checks, send email, or destroy files. It could be imbedded by a programmer or downloaded from the Internet.

Web Bugs – A web bug is executable code included in an image (as small as one pixel) that can disrupt the operation of a system or acquire and transmit information from a system without the s knowledge of users who merely visit a malicious or compromised (bugged) web site.

Backdoor – A backdoor is a method of bypassing a system’s security controls. The backdoor may take the form of an installed program or could be a modification to an existing program or hardware device.

5.6.2 How Malware Affects Systems

Malware poses a significant threat to DHS systems therefore, it is essential that all systems employ preventive measures commensurate with the level of risk identified in the risk analysis. What makes malware unique is that it can spread from program to program and from system to system without direct human intervention.

Systems that can be accessed by DHS-approved browser configurations should be categorized (trusted, untrusted, etc.). Users must not deploy Web browsers “out of the box,” since the security policies implemented in such tools tend to reflect vendor interests that do not coincide with DHS interests.

5.6.3 Procedures When Malware Is Detected On a System

If malware is detected, the LAN/system administrator is responsible for taking appropriate actions, including:

• Running disinfectors available with antivirus software

• Scanning backups for malware prior to restoring system applications and data files

• Checking for re-infection from media overlooked during the eradication process

• Using incident reporting procedures described in Section 4.9 to notify the ISSO of the security incident.

• Once the malicious code has been eradicated, the system administrator determines the extent of the damage and restores the cleaned programs and files to the disinfected system.

Occurrence of malicious code constitutes a security incident that must be reported; reporting procedures are described in Section 4.9, “Security Incidents and Incident Response and Reporting.”

Virus protection responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Malware Protection Responsibilities

Component CISOs/ISSMs

System Owners

System/Network Administrators

ISSOs

Users

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Information Assurance (IA) involves protecting and defending information and information systems by ensuring their confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and nonrepudiation. Information assurance is achieved through the use of IA and IA-enabled products.

The National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) is a collaborative effort by NIST and the NSA designed to meet the security testing, evaluation, and assessment needs of both information system producers and consumers. NIAP combines the extensive security experience of both agencies to promote the development of technically sound security requirements for information system products and appropriate metrics for evaluating those products and systems.

The NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) for information security is a partnership between the public and private sectors, to evaluate information system product conformance to international standards. The scheme is designed to help consumers select products that meet their security requirements while helping the manufacturers of those products gain acceptance in the global marketplace.

Compliance with the DHS 4300A Policy Directive, coupled with the requirement that products have been appropriately validated by designated Federal authorities and by CCEVS, will reduce costs and remove the burden of maintaining and providing interoperability between numerous software systems custom written by various contractors.

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Product assurance responsibilities are provided in the following table.

Product Assurance Responsibilities

Component CISO/ISSMs

Security Control Assessors

System Administrators/ISSOs

Project Managers

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Both the public and private sectors generally recognize that much of the trustworthiness challenge facing commercial Information and Communications Technology (ICT), including hardware, software, and services, stems from decisions made by suppliers. Weaknesses exist in commercial ICT product development and in the underlying business systems that produce them, but more importantly, acquirers are accepting risks that result from these weaknesses on behalf of the end user without providing the information needed to assess the risk themselves. These supply chain weaknesses, and the costs of not reducing the consequent risks, become the burden of the end user.

Components assign an impact level (high, moderate, low) to each security objective (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) for each DHS information system, applying NIST SP 800-161 controls tailored specifically to the security objective at the determined impact level.

NIST SP 800-161security controls are implemented by use of the FIPS Pub 200, “Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems” methodology, based on the FIPS 199 impact level established for each separate security objective (confidentiality, integrity, availability).

Supply chain risk mitigation activities can take place at any time during a system’s lifecycle, but the opportunity to influence the trustworthiness of the system’s commercial ICT products and services is greatest during acquisition and in preparation for milestone reviews. At these times, supplier business risks and rewards are greatest. Even procurements associated with operational support and system retirement offer an opportunity to mitigate supply chain risk. A strategy to manage supply chain risks must include the following actions:

1)\tDevelopment and implementation of supply chain risk management strategies at the enterprise, component, division, department, and operational level of each system.

2)\tEducation and training of DHS staff and contractors about supply chain risks, and about each person’s role in managing that risk.

3)\tEnforcement of good DHS supply chain hygiene, and extension of this enforcement to suppliers by establishing contractual requirements and audit mechanisms to enforce those requirements.

Future policy revisions will integrate these actions into existing and new requirements, particularly with regard to accountability for identification and mitigation of supply chain risk. Opportunities for SCRM education and training, as well as for broad awareness of supply chain hygiene, will be the manifest response to the implementation of this strategy.

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5.8.1 Business Impact

DHS depends on numerous external supply chains for its ICT needs. Many of these supply chains are independent of one another, and come with their own risks. It is often no longer enough for acquisitions staff to perform due diligence at the beginning of an acquisition.

Effective Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) requires the analysis of a Business Impact Assessment (BIA) to determine if the supply chain risks represent unacceptable business or mission impact and to propose cost effective counter-measures.

A BIA is most effective at the point in the system acquisition and development lifecycle at which enough is known about the operating environment and interconnections, major components and services, and the allocation of government and contractor responsibilities to determine the likelihood of harm to the enterprise.

All DHS organizations that acquire, develop, and operate sensitive systems require a SCRM Plan. There are three tiers of SCRM governance, two of which require SCRM plans:

• Tier 1: Governance as DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, defining the SCRM policy for the DHS enterprise;

• Tier 2: SCRM plans that consist of a Component’s specific guidance to mission and business owners who may supplement this component guidance as to the recommended controls and countermeasures;

• Tier 3: SCRM plans at the level of individual systems or programs, such plans either standing alone, or incorporated into the system’s security plan.

These three SCRM governance tiers are shown in Figure 5.8-1.

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5.8.2.1 SCRM Plan Framework

SCRM plans should cover the full lifecycle of systems and programs, addressing acquisition, development, operations, sustainment, and termination or disposal. Plans should include, as attachments, relevant agreements provided by system integrators, suppliers, and external service providers as part of the contracting process. Such agreements, which can also be referred to as supplier SCRM Plans, may describe details of risk management activities performed on behalf of the end user by supply chain participants.

These agreements are typically reflected in plans submitted as a contractual deliverable and included in Tier 3 SCRM plans, but may also be included in Tier 2 SCRM Plans for acquisitions that span multiple systems. Review and update SCRM Plans on a schedule that coincides with lifecycle milestones or control gate reviews and significant contracting activities.

Figure 5.8-2 shows graphically how a Tier 3 SCRM plan may evolve over its lifecycle.

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5.8.2.2 SCRM Plan Sections

Structure of an SCRM Plan should have nine (9) numbered sections as given below.

1. Introduction

Describe the purpose of the SCRM Plan. Tier 2 Plans may need to be derived, in whole or in part, from existing policies or other guidance. Tier 3 Plans may be closely tied to or integrated with Security Plans (SP) but may also be retained as “stand-alone” documents in the case of, for example, legacy systems with no expected changes to existing documents. These systems still require SCRM plans to ensure that supplies, replacement parts, support contracts, etc. comply with DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.

For all tiers, provide a general statement that conveys the intent of the organizational leadership to adhere to the Plan, enforce its controls, and ensure it remains current.

2. Purpose and Scope

Include: The name of the Department, Agency, or Component for which this Plan applies. For Tier 2:

• State a unique identifier given to the mission or business. This may be the name of an acquisition program, an IT acquisition (e.g., one listed in an applicable OMB Exhibit 300), or any other designator that describes the scope of the SCRM Plan at Tier 2.

• Provide a brief explanation of what this mission or business encompasses, including a high level summary of systems within the scope of the Plan.

• List all Tier 3 SCRM Plans and/or System Security Plans that are within the scope of the Tier 2 Plan.

For Tier 3, if creating a separate SCRM Plan, include a unique identifier and name given to the system. (For consideration: List all essential supporting systems and interfaces (such as network infrastructure) and their relevant SCRM data from their SCRM plans if such a plan exists. This provides the opportunity for the Component or Agency to find missing, overlapping, and redundant controls. At minimum, most if not all supporting systems will require replacements, supplies, and upgrades.)

3. Authority

Include: Authorities and references to relevant DHS and Component documents, such as policies, strategic plan(s), acquisition guidelines, processes, procedures, etc. Policies may include SCRM policy, security policy, acquisition policy, and any other policy applicable to the context of this SCRM Plan.

For Tier 2, include the applicable Tier 1 SCRM Plan title.

For Tier 3, include the applicable Tier 1 and Tier 2 SCRM Plan titles.

4. Audience

For all three tiers, include all Components that should be active participants or interested parties in this plan, and that should be using it to influence their activities. These may include legal, acquisition, IT security, supply chain and logistics, human resources, finance, etc.; specific individual roles such as CISOs, procurement personnel, program managers, etc., as appropriate.

5. Roles and Responsibilities

For all three tiers, identify by position those responsible for the Plan and identify the key contributors to SCRM.

a. Responsibility for the Plan

State the role and name of the individual or group responsible for the Plan.

• For Tier 2, an example may be Chief Information Officer (CIO), mission or business function manager, or Program Manager

• For Tier 3, this is the System Owner and, if integrated into the Security Plan, the Authorizing Official.

Include the name, title, organizational affiliation, address, email address, and phone number of each person.

b. Key Contributors

Identify key contributors to the Plan.

• For Tier 2, an example may be Acquisition/Contracting, Operations Manager, System Architect

• For Tier 3, an example may be Systems Engineer, Security Engineer, and Developer/Maintenance Engineer.

Include the name, title, organizational affiliation, address, email address, and phone number of each person.

6. SCRM Controls

List applicable (per tier) SCRM controls resulting from the Evaluation of Alternatives. Description of each control should include the following:

• Title and description

• How the SCRM control is being implemented, or planned to be implemented

• Applicable scoping guidance

• Tailoring decisions with justifications

For Tier 2, reference the applicable Tier 1 SCRM Plan that provides common controls.

For Tier 3, reference the applicable Tier 2 SCRM Plan that provides common controls.

7. Using and Revising SCRM Plan

SCRM Plans are living documents that must be updated and communicated to all appropriate individuals - government staff, contractors, and suppliers.

a. Communicating SCRM Plan

Describe processes by which this SCRM Plan will be communicated to other Tiers to ensure supply chain interdependencies are addressed. Examples include:

• Posting on appropriate portal(s)

• Communicating via email

• Briefing appropriate individuals including those responsible for addressing deficiencies

• Including information contained in the SCRM Plan in applicable training and outreach materials.

b. Revision and Improvement

Tiers 1 and 2 SCRM Plans should be reviewed, at a minimum, on an annual basis since changes to laws, policies, standards, guidelines, and controls are dynamic and evolving. At a minimum, review and update Tier 3 SCRM plans at lifecycle milestones, gate reviews, and significant contracting activities, and verify compliance with upper tier plans as appropriate.

State the required frequency for SCRM Plan reviews to consider updates. Define criteria that would trigger SCRM Plan revisions. These may include:

• Change of authorities that apply to the plan

• Change of policies that apply to the plan

• Significant SCRM events

• Introduction of new technologies

• SCRM plan shortcomings

• For Tiers 2 and 3, change in the governing SCRM plan for the Tiers above

• Change of scope

• Other Component -specific criteria

SCRM Plan owners can use an SCRM Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) to assess the impact of the changes and guide SCRM Plan revisions and to ensure that the updated Plan does not leave a gap in coverage from the previous version. Describe SCRM POA&M process and resolution steps.

c. Implementing and Assessing Effectiveness of SCRM Plan

Components should use their SCRM Plans during budgeting and planning processes, particularly with respect to acquisition and procurement activities. Operations staff who procure replacement parts and ancillary services and who may not be aware of the potential supply chain risks associated with such procurements must also adhere to applicable SCRM plans. Each tier’s SCRM Plan should describe SCRM monitoring and enforcement activities (including auditing, if appropriate) applicable to the scope of each specific Plan.

If appropriate, SCRM Plan owners may decide to use qualitative or quantitative measures to support implementation of the Plan and to assess effectiveness of this implementation. If such measures are used, they should be stated in the Plan.

Supplier-provided plans associated with Tier 3 systems should be included if such plans are part of contractual agreements.

Describe general details about the use of the SCRM Plan, such as when to initiate collaboration with engineering and contracting activities, the condition under which an SCRM Plan audit is performed, and permissible steps to enforce the conditions of the SCRM Plan.

8. Use of SCRM Plans during Contingencies and Emergencies

This paragraph is optional. Components should decide whether to use it depending on mission criticality, applicable threats, and other factors.

In the event of contingency or emergency operations, the Component may need to bypass normal acquisition processes in the interest of mission continuity. Contracting activities that are not vetted using approved SCRM Plan processes introduce unknown risk to the enterprise.

When appropriate at Tier 1, 2, or 3, describe abbreviated acquisition procedures to be followed during contingencies and emergencies, such as the contact information for SCRM subject matter experts, who can provide advice in the absence of a formal tasking and approval.

For Tier 1, describe Component procedures and waiver processes.

For Tier 2, describe mission and business procedures and waiver processes in addition to those included in Tier 1.

For Tier 3, describe system-specific procedures and waiver processes in addition to those required by Tiers 1 and 2.

9. Attachments

For Tier 2, attach or provide links to applicable Tier 3 plans.

For Tier 3, attach or provide links to applicable plans for essential supporting systems.

For Tier 3, attach applicable contractual agreements or SCRM plans provided by contractors or suppliers.

No prescriptive set of mitigations can be provided; rather, it is necessary for each DHS organization to consider the range of countermeasures that could be selected. Table 10 provides some general recommendations. It is up to individual Components to establish their appropriate supply chain risk reduction strategies and to determine the best ways to implement them.

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