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Can I deny someone's request for me to be their Power of Attorney? Let's say that someone has made me their Power of Attorney and I don't want that kind of responsibility on my hands. Is there a way to deny it? I am in the state of Wisconsin.	The Wisconsin statute pertaining to power of attorney is here. 244.10(2)(b) indicates that the agent's authority terminates when they resign: there are other conditions, such as if the principle revokes the authority, the agent dies, and so on. If nothing else happens, you would have the authority, like it or not. 244.13 states that if you do anything to appear to accept the position (e.g. make a decision for the principle, or say "Sure, whatever" when offered the job), you have accepted the job. At that point (244.14), you then have to act loyally and with the principle's interest foremost. In order to avoid those bad things, you need to not do anything that can be construed as "accepting". But all is not lost if you say "Sure, whatever". 244.18 provides for agent resignation. Basically, you just tell the principle that you resign, and if the principle happens to be incapacitated, you also inform the guardian, coagent, or successor agent – if there is one – or, the caregiver, or "Another person reasonably believed by the agent to have sufficient interest in the principal's welfare", or "A governmental agency having regulatory authority to protect the welfare of the principal".	My questions are, where does this put me legally and what are my options? . . . Also, if I want to keep the tenants, how should I proceed? And if I don't want to keep them, do I have that option? Your Rights With Respect To The Tenants If the agency is telling the truth and the agreement made with the agent was for four tenants but their records and document only listed three by accident, you probably can't insist on additional rent or evicting the fourth tenant because if your agent does something on your behalf, that is binding on you just as much as if you had signed them up personally in that manner. This is true even if the agent didn't actually have the authority to rent the place to four people based upon your communications with the agent, because the agent has "apparent authority" to bind you in your agent's dealings with the prospective tenants. You probably have the right to insist that the fourth tenant sign the lease to conform to the actual agreement that was reached (four tenants in exchange for the rent stated in the lease). If the fourth tenant refuses to do so, that would be a repudiation of the lease/contract and would prevent him from claiming that he is a valid tenant of the property pursuant to the agreement reached with landlord through his agent. If the fourth tenant refused to sign, you could therefore insist that the fourth tenant pay additional rent or be evicted if you wanted to. On the other hand, if the agent is not accurately relating the facts, and there was never any agreement to have more than three tenants (as your communications with them and the written lease suggest), then you would have the right to evict the fourth tenant or insist on additional rent from that tenant. But, it might be hard to prove that the agent is not being accurate because it sounds like the agent and the tenants will testify consistently with each other and there were probably no other witnesses to the discussions between them. The Fourth Tenant Might Have Liability Anyway Also, at common law, you could sue the fourth person for unpaid rent during the period that the tenant was actually there anyway, since the fourth tenant was in "privity of estate" with you. (If someone actually signs the lease then they are in "privity of contract" with you.) England abolished the doctrine of privity of estate in most circumstances for residential tenancies in 1995. But, it is possible that this fact pattern is one of the situations in which the privity of estate doctrine remains in force since the 1995 reforms largely apply to assignments of leases by people who are tenants on the original lease, rather than occupants of a rented property who never signed a lease and never received a formal assignment. I don't have the legal research tools to confirm that accurately. But, none of the U.K. Landlord and Tenant Acts currently in force that I could locate addressed that issue, so the common law rule may still apply in this situation. If the doctrine of privity of estate does allow a suit against the fourth tenant based on occupancy without signing a lease, the incentive to even try to get the fourth tenant to sign a lease is very small indeed - you get no benefit at all from it other than slightly easier proof in an unpaid rent collection lawsuit if the agent's story is believed. If it doesn't the considerations earlier in this answer still apply. Practical Considerations All of this being said, there is also a practical consideration to consider. It you try to kick out the fourth tenant or impose additional rent on the fourth tenant, if the fourth tenant refuses to sign the lease, or if you believe that the original agreement did not include the fourth tenant, you still have to weigh the pros and cons of bringing an eviction or unpaid rent lawsuit. The lawsuit will cost you money (requiring you to advance money even if you are awarded attorneys' fees which may be impossible to collect from the tenants). You won't get your attorneys' fees for the lawsuit if you lose and will also have to pay their attorneys' fees if you lose. Tenants whom you are suing are unlikely to be cooperative on any other matter upon which you want their cooperation, and may bad mouth you, for example, in online consumer reviews. Unlike a typical eviction where the rent is not paid, it is very likely that the eviction will be contested, and if it is, the court could order the fourth tenant to sign the lease, but provide you with no other remedy if the court believes the story put forward by the tenant and the agent. If you don't sue, you won't incur attorneys' fees, you can still evict everyone if the rent isn't paid, you can still try to collect unpaid rent from three other people, and you are much less likely to have a dispute with or non-cooperation from the tenants. The only benefit you get from having a fourth person on the lease if that was the original deal (or if you can't prove that it wasn't the original deal) is that you have one more person you can sue for back rent if the rent isn't paid. If I decide to break my agreement with the agency, do I have grounds to do that? Terminating The Agent Often you can terminate an agreement with an agency without cause. If the agency agreement says that you can, you are free to do so and probably should because at a minimum they are sloppy and poor communicators. Generally speaking, even if you can't terminate the agreement without cause, you can terminate the agreement for cause, and the contradiction between their prior communications with you and their current communications with you probably constitute good cause to terminate the agreement both if they are telling the truth not, and if they are not accurately recounting the facts now. But, to be clear, terminating the agent won't affect the rights of the tenant. Suing The Agent If you clearly do lose money because the three tenants on the lease don't pay rent and for example, you get a judgment against them which can't be collected due to bankruptcy or them moving abroad to a place where it is not economical to collect a money judgment from them, or just not having any assets or income (or some combination thereof), and it turns out that the law does not allow you to sue the fourth tenant, and the fourth tenant was not judgment proof, you would probably have a right to sue the agent for the lost rent caused by the agent's negligence in failing to get all four tenants to sign the lease. But, the cost of proving that in a typical case would not be worth the money since this would be much harder to prove than simply proving that someone signed a lease agreeing to pay rent and didn't pay rent as agreed. If the agent didn't agree to pay for your losses voluntarily it might not be worth the time, trouble and risk of not prevailing in that lawsuit to pursue, even if you could get attorneys' fees for your suit against the agent if you won (which you probably could in England). The risks of doing that include paying the agent's attorneys' fees is you lose.	The solicitor is allowed not to accept a case. If your ex-wife asked him to prepare papers, and he feels that she is getting ripped off, it is absolutely understandable that he won't prepare these papers for her, because he doesn't want to be sued or badmouthed when the deal goes wrong. "We would also reserve the right to take our own professional advice as to our efforts on your behalf." means simply he is not specialised in some subject, and will prefer to ask someone who is. Like a medical doctor asking for a second opinion before going ahead and cutting your leg off. Now I would have preferred if the solicitor had said concretely what exactly is wrong with the contract. Also, it would be obvious that you would be very comfortable with anything that he would advice her against. If he thinks that it is a good deal for you but not for her, he should advice against it. (Your comment to another question seems to indicate that she should be paid a lot more than you offered, so her solicitor seems to have been perfectly right).	If the question asks, "did you do X" where X is or includes a crime that you could be criminally prosecuted for, you can invoke the 5th amendment in refusing to answer that. I have seen that done and seen that objection to the question sustained in court. However, if admitting to X would provide only civil liability, then the 5th would not apply. At trial, you may also have to take care not to give direct testimony on things that are so closely related that you "open the door" to being required to answer that question. For example, you can't say "I don't owe because I did X" and then expect to not have to answer "So just to be clear, did you do X?" Also, depending on context, invoking the 5th might cause a jury to view your testimony more skeptically (cpast points out that "For civil cases, adverse inferences based on pleading the fifth are totally okay"), and if that's going to come up you should ask your attorney about whether or not it'd be a good idea strategically.	Yes, for the jurisdiction specified in the tag In the United States, questioning must stop as soon as the accused assserts his or her right to counsel. It's been upheld by subsequent precedent, but the origin is in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966): If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.	I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?	You can always politely ask a person to leave, which could solve your problem. If that doesn't work, you will have to take legal action: you cannot change the locks or force him out (without the risk of a costly lawsuit). In Washington this would probably be the slower ejectment process, since you are not in a landlord-tenant relation. The actual process depends on the laws of your jurisdiction, though it is doable in any US jurisdiction. You probably have to hire an attorney to navigate the process, since an unlawful detainer action would likely be dismissed (that is, you have to file the correct action, not just some action that's in the ballpark).	You can request in advance that you get only a half-dose: there is certainly no law prohibiting making a request. They may refuse or they may agree. If they refuse, you can go elsewhere, but you cannot compel them to do what you ask for, given current law. You can also yell anything you want, or flail about however you want, at your peril. You could seriously hurt yourself by jumping around, and you would not be able to sue them for your stupid actions. Nor could you sue them for assault, since to get the ball rolling, you have to consent to getting the shot. Although consent can be withdrawn, there is the practical matter that you almost certainly cannot effectively communicate withdrawal of consent in the time needed to finish administering the job. If it took 5 minutes to administer the shot, you might be able to say "I changed my mind", and they would be required to end the treatment, against medical advice.
Would deinstitutionalising marriage violate the UDHR? In debates over same sex marriage it is sometimes proposed that marriage be completely deinstitutionalised in favour of state recognised civil unions. This would not be a return to common law marriages, but for marriage to have no legal standing at all, and for "husband" and "wife" to have no more legal relevance than "boyfriend" or "girlfriend". "Marriage" would become an optional and voluntary social term for anyone who wants to use it. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights says: Article 16 (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. Would deinstitutionalising marriage in this manner violate the UDHR? The declaration could be read as requiring states to institutionally recognise marriages, or only that they not have laws that would contravene these rights.	The UDHR does not create enforceable rights. It is aspirational and not self-executing. This said, calling a legally recognized relationship a "civil union" rather than a "marriage" does not inherently violate the UDHR any more than using the Mandarin or Swahili word for marriage instead of the English one would. A marriage is just a bundle of rights and responsibilities, the UDHR does not tightly constrain what must be included in that bundle, and it is surely the substance rather than the mere terminology that matters for determining if rights have been violated. Something fairly described as marriage must be available to all, but a rose by any other name would be just as sweet. Civil law countries already distinguish between legal marriage, which basically is a "civil union" and religious marriage, which is deinstitutionalized.	In england-and-wales this would fall within the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and depends on whether he lacks the mental not physical, capacity to make the decision for himself. Can he: Understand the information relevant to the decision Retain that information Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision Communicate that decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means). If the answer to any of these is"no" then he cannot lawfully give true consent. Although the Act allows for others, such as a power of attorney, to make decisions on behalf of someone lacking the mental capacity, s.27 specifically excludes the decision to marry.	canada Courts have generally recognized that there is no "checklist." Courts will look at a multitude of indicators "of the sorts of behaviour that society, at any given point in time, associates with a marital relationship" (Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492). [The indicators] include shared shelter, sexual and personal behaviour, services, social activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple. However, it was recognized that these elements may be present in varying degrees and not all are necessary for the relationship to be found to be conjugal. (M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 59.) Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their relationships differently. In some relationships there is a complete blending of finances and property - in others, spouses keep their property and finances totally separate and in still others one spouse may totally control those aspects of the relationship with the other spouse having little or no knowledge or input. For some couples, sexual relations are very important - for others, that aspect may take a back seat to companionship. Some spouses do not share the same bed. There may be a variety of reasons for this such as health or personal choice. Some people are affectionate and demonstrative. They show their feelings for their “spouse” by holding hands, touching and kissing in public. Other individuals are not demonstrative and do not engage in public displays of affection. Some “spouses” do everything together - others do nothing together. Some “spouses” vacation together and some spend their holidays apart. Some “spouses” have children - others do not. It is this variation in the way human beings structure their relationships that make the determination of when a “spousal relationship” exists difficult to determine. With married couples, the relationship is easy to establish. The marriage ceremony is a public declaration of their commitment and intent. Relationships outside marriage are much more difficult to ascertain. Rarely is there any type of “public” declaration of intent. Often people begin cohabiting with little forethought or planning. Their motivation is often nothing more than wanting to “be together”. Some individuals have chosen to enter relationships outside marriage because they did not want the legal obligations imposed by that status. Some individuals have simply given no thought as to how their relationship would operate. Often the date when the cohabitation actually began is blurred because people “ease into” situations, spending more and more time together. Agreements between people verifying when their relationship began and how it will operate often do not exist. (Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124).	Is there default caste of child born out of inter-caste marriage? Short answer The child normally takes the father's caste, but it may be contested if it can be shown that the child is brought up by the mother. Long answer The case law has been evolving in recent years, the latest findings by the Supreme Court of India can be found at Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika vs State Of Gujarat & Ors on 18 January, 2012 [T]he legal position that seems to emerge is that in an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal the determination of the caste of the offspring is essentially a question of fact to be decided on the basis of the facts adduced in each case. The determination of caste of a person born of an inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal cannot be determined in complete disregard of attending facts of the case. In an inter- caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal there may be a presumption that the child has the caste of the father. This presumption may be stronger in the case where in the inter-caste marriage or a marriage between a tribal and a non-tribal the husband belongs to a forward caste. But by no means the presumption is conclusive or irrebuttable and it is open to the child of such marriage to lead evidence to show that he/she was brought up by the mother who belonged to the scheduled caste/scheduled tribe.	Admissibility is one thing, enforcement is another. My observations, which are more detailed than casual, is that Family Courts are a different breed, and more than most any other court, "they do what they want." I have associates who had agreed to stipulations, detailing how a child might be handled, only to have a family court decide at some point to implement some completely different plan, and in doing so run against what both parents were interested in doing. Prenuptial agreements appear to be meaningless, as this is not about the assets of the couple, it is about the state's interest in the child. Even then, the courts seem to act in manners which appear to not be in the best interests of the child (and sometimes even say so.) Back to your question, would an agreement be admissible? Yes. Does it mean much? In my opinion, and based upon the preponderance of evidence, no. Do whatever you have to do to stay out of family court. Being married doesn't matter. Working together for 21 years does. In the future, you should state the jurisdiction you are in. It does change the answer, but in this case only subtlety.	No, and certainly not for the reason implied (essentially a one spouse per jurisdiction in which one has citizenship rule which doesn't exist anywhere). At least under the law of every U.S. jurisdiction, you cannot be married to more than one person at the same time (anywhere in the world), and it is a crime to do so. Several dozen countries in the world recognize polygamy as legal (mostly in predominantly Muslim countries, not all of which allow polygamy, and in Africa where pre-Christian custom permits it), of course, and this does not violate the laws of those jurisdictions. The U.K. does not generally permit polygamy, but gives some recognition to and does not criminalize, polygamous marriages entered into in a place where it is lawful. But the concept proposed in the question would still not be legal under U.K. law. UPDATE: A California court ruling concurs with this analysis.	It seems like a lot of "punishments" can be applied to a person without having to go to court. Yes, because everyone has the right and freedom to associate, or dissociate, with other people, and the freedom of contract, at least when the state does not decide to interfere. The state, owing to its monopoly of legitimate violence, has a duty towards everyone under its rule and the people in many countries decided that the state's power should be significantly limited with judicial supervision where individual rights and freedoms are implicated. Other individuals or legal persons do not in general owe a duty to be friend with you or to sign or continue a labour or rental contract with you. At the same time, the people and their government have also decided in certain situations there exists a power imbalance (e.g. between the landlord and the tenant, the employer and the employee, groups suffering from discrimination and stereotypes) where unlimited freedom of association and contract not only harms the individual's human dignity but also harms the society as a whole (e.g. homeless and unemployment, which may lead to increased crimes etc.). Thus, in some situations, the law prohibits discrimination and provides for legal rights generally for the more vulnerable. However, this is a decision that is undertaken by each jurisdiction. A court order is only required if the law says that you normally have a legal entitlement but the state or someone else wants to take it away or limit it, or if the law explicitly requires a procedure before the court. Since you tagged the question with canada... Can a person be fired ... without a court order? Yes. However, in Canada, all jurisdictions have labour laws that regulate dismissal of an employee. Dismissal without cause usually requires notice period and/or severances, depending on the length of employment. Dismissal for cause can be challenged in court and the employer has the burden of proof to justify the cause on a balance of probabilities (more probably than not) and the terminated employee will have the right to have them heard before the court and present their evidences. If the person occupied a unionized position, they may also be able to file grievances with the union before an arbitrator, depending on the text of the collective agreement. The collective agreements also often provide for procedural requirements before the dismissal of an employee in a unionized position. Violation of these procedural requirements may lead to the annul of dismissal or awards of damages. Can a person be banned ... without a court order? Yes. You have no general right to be on another person's property in Canada. Your rights end where others' property (or other) rights begin. Like said in the beginning, this is a societal decision and an act of balancing particular to each jurisdiction, for example, in some places, there exists a right to roam over certain publicly accessible lands. The property owner or another person otherwise legally authorized has the authority to decide who they want on their property (which means what is one's own), subject to certain narrow exceptions, under common law and provincial trespassing acts. Your neighbour cannot prevent you from crossing on their land if you have a valid easement and are not abusing it. But if you are abusing your easement, your neighbour may take you to court for an order. Here the property owner includes the state. However, like almost all decisions made by the state, in Canada and many other countries with the rule of law, can be judicially reviewed for their reasonableness, and sometimes correctness. Like all decisions made by the state, trespassing notices may be challenged if the decision is arbitrary or without legal basis. Can a person be evicted ... without a court order? No. In all jurisdictions in Canada, eviction, that is, the forced removal of tenant from a premise, can only be carried out by sheriffs or other legally authorized officers upon an order from a court or tribunal (often called Landlord and Tenant Board or similar), with exceptions for certain tenancies (e.g. where the landlord and the tenant share living area). Court order is not required for the termination of a tenancy; but the termination of tenancy can only be achieved if the tenant agrees or a tribunal or court orders so. Does Habeas corpus come into play in any of these situations No. Habeas corpus means "that you have the body", which is an order from a judicial official to command the state to bring someone in its custody before the court, so that the legality of their detention by the state may be determined. In Canada, habeas corpus only protects liberty interests of an individual.	It's not possible to marry the US citizen until the first marriage is terminated, and the F-2 status ends when the marriage is terminated. It's not the F-2 status that prevents the marriage to the US citizen; it's the continued existence of the previous marriage. It might be possible to file for change of status (to B-2 perhaps) in anticipation of the termination of the marriage, but it seems unlikely to be accepted by USCIS. It would certainly be unwise to attempt anything like that without the advice of an immigration lawyer.
Can I sue an appraiser for assigning a low value to my property? Due to the low value assigned to my home by an appraiser, I didn't get a loan and it did cost money. However, when I went to another bank, two new appraisers gave a higher value and I was able to refinance my mortgage.	An appraisal is a professional opinion. As such, you can't sue someone for an appraisal and win, even if it is "low," unless the opinion clearly violated professional standards. There are three basic methods of appraising a house: 1) replacement cost 2) multiple of rent and 3) "comparables," that is, what do similar houses in the neighborhood cost. In an "ideal" world, the three methods would give similar values, but in practice, they often give very different values. That is particularly true between a "disciplined" appraisal method such as X times rent, and a more "subjective" valuation based on how "hot" an area is, and how many people want to live there, which might bring about a multiple, Y, higher than X (the general multiple) for just one area. As long as an appraiser used an accepted method, he wouldn't be liable. The only way is if he used a totally unreasonable assumption, like assuming that a mortgage would have to pay an interest rate of say, 10% (not uncommon even thirty years ago, but out of place today).	My recollection is there's a big difference between money and property. I found a 1929 law journal article that supports my recollection. The owner of stolen property is entitled to have it returned. If the person who obtained it from the thief didn't know it was stolen, the person didn't commit a crime, but must give up the property and is not entitled to any compensation (unless the person can get compensation from the thief). A person who innocently receives money is the holder in due course, and gets to keep it. The victim's only recourse is to get compensation from the thief.	How can I find out whom the intellectual property now belongs to? For the patent, is this possible through the patent office? If it is a patent, the patent office; if it is a copyright, the copyright registrar. You could also look at the return from the auction in the bankruptcy court case file, which would control even if the patent office and copyright registrar records haven't yet been updated. You could also call the person who conducted the auction, or the lawyer who arranged for the auction, to ask. Often they would cooperate in telling you this information since a bankruptcy auction is, by definition, a public sale anyway, and cooperation might help them gain positive referrals from you in the future. If the assignee has not been changed in the patent register, is it possible to reassign the patent to myself, since the company has apparently neglected to do so? No. Doing this would be a form of fraud or embezzlement. The intellectual property became the property of the bankruptcy estate. If the bankruptcy estate is determined to have property not disposed of in the case, you would have to petition the bankruptcy court to have the remaining assets sold for the benefit of the creditors of the estate at fair market value. The Follow Up Questions I'm going to decline to answer the follow up question about how to arrange to purchase intellectual property from someone when you would like to own it, once you determine who the owner is. This is a more general question that applies to lots of circumstances and is as much a question of economics as law. There is an Ask Patents.SE forum, which might be a more appropriate place to ask that question.	A person who repairs property has a lien on the property and can sell the property to satisfy the lien. There are notice requirements and the property must be sold at auction if it is worth more than $100. I pulled this off of FindLaw, I have no idea of this law is current. http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/nycode/LIE articles 8 and 9 N.Y. LIE. LAW § 180 : NY Code - Section 180: Artisans' lien on personal property A person who makes, alters, repairs or performs work or services of any nature and description upon, or in any way enhances the value of an article of personal property, at the request or with the consent of the owner, has a lien on such article, while lawfully in possession thereof, for his reasonable charges for the work done and materials furnished, and may retain possession thereof until such charges are paid. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 200 : NY Code - Section 200: Sale of personal property to satisfy a lien A lien against personal property... if in the legal possession of the lienor, may be satisfied by the sale of such property according to the provisions of this article. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 201 : NY Code - Section 201: Notice of sale Before such sale is held the lienor shall serve a notice on the owner... or mail ( certified mail, return receipt requested, and by first-class mail)the notice if the property is of a value of less than one hundred dollars. The following must be included in the notice. The nature of the debt or agreement which gave rise to the lien. Description of the property Estimated value of the property Amount of the lien and the date of the notice Give them ten days to pay, tell them when and where the sale is happening, and tell them they can bring as action under section 201a within ten days. N.Y. LIE. LAW § 202 : NY Code - Section 202: Sale to be advertised; exception Each sale of personal property of a value of one hundred dollars or more, or of any security, to satisfy a lien thereon shall be at public auction to the highest bidder, and shall be held in the city or town where the lien was acquired. Each sale of personal property of a value of less than one hundred dollars, other than a security, to satisfy a lien thereon, shall be made pursuant to the provisions of subdivision one hereof (auction), or at a bona fide private sale in the city or town where the lien was acquired. A bona fide private sale pursuant to this section shall not be made until the expiration of six months after the time for the payment of the amount of the lien specified in the notice required to be served by section two hundred one or two hundred one-a of this article. Section 204 - keep the money to cover the lien but hang onto the balance. Serve notice on the owner and then in six months if the owner does not claim the money deposit it with the treasurer or chamberlain of the city or village, or the commissioner of finance in the city of New York, or the supervisor of the town, where such sale was held. You don't get this money back, it goes to the owner or to the town eventually.	The difficult part is deciding when two cases are similar. Precedents from higher courts govern what the law is in a case. But, a lot of what trial court judges do is to boil down a mountain of evidence to determine authoritatively what facts actually transpired before applying the law to those facts. This involves immense amounts of discretion and judgment. Also, while in some cases the law provides very clear guidance to a judge about what to do, in other cases, the law is vague enough that two different judges can reach two different verdicts, both of which are legally correct, on the same set of facts. For example, in a divorce case (involving made up facts and law to illustrate the idea), suppose that the two main assets of the family are a house and retirement account of equal value and that the facts as applied to the relevant law say that the value of the assets must be divided equally between the husband and wife. One judge could award the house to the husband and the retirement account to the wife, while another judge could award the retirement account to the husband and the house to the wife. But both judges would have complied perfectly with the law. Similarly, in a divorce there are a variety of different custody plans for children that could all conform to the law and different judges could choose different plans and each be correct. As another example, suppose that a bulldozer destroys a house and the person whose house is destroyed sues for money damages. The judge is presented with two different appraisals from equally qualified appraisers for the value of the house, both of whom superficially at least, are using proper appraisal methods. But one appraiser says the house was worth 1,000,000 and another says that the house was worth 1,500,000. Realistically, any verdict the judge renders between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 could be upheld as legally correct. Because the process of turning evidence into legal verdicts involves so much discretion and so many judgment calls, and because it is rare that two cases are factually identical, the goal of giving similar verdicts for similar cases, is difficult to achieve and difficult even to evaluate in real life. It is almost certain that similar cases often result in dissimilar verdicts, and not infrequently the reasons for this (like using personal ideologies as opposed to what the law demands to resolve close cases) are not good ones. But deciding how common that is, or in what kinds of cases it is most troubling that this happens, is very hard to determine.	The person getting the item by fraud didn't get any ownership. Therefore when you bought it, you didn't get ownership either. It's still the company's property, and they can do with it what they like (within reason, they wouldn't be allowed to make it blow up in your face). If you sent back the item, good on you, because the item is now with its rightful owner. If you don't like it, you can sue the person who sold the item to you.	Nope. Say I sue you successfully, and the court delivers a judgement that awards $1000 in damages. It is not the responsibility of the small claims court to ensure that the judgement is fulfilled. In fact, the debtor (person who lost) can outright refuse to pay the creditor (or the person who won). They are not in violation of any law at this point. However, the creditor can ask the court for options on enforcing their judgement, and these can include, but are not limited to: Garnishing wages Providing a court order Seizure of assets (through court sheriff, don't use this yourself or you end up getting into criminal matters) and others to enforce the judgement. The debtor isn't liable for refusing, unless when they are in violation of a court order. Violating a court order is a criminal matter, and the debtor could possibly be found guilty of contempt of court. Oh, and the case wouldn't move on to a higher court. Cases go to a higher court when an appeal is made, generally when there has been an error in enforcing the law. You also need to be provided leave to make an appeal.	No, because you are affecting the car's value by selling its parts. The car is collateral to the loan, so if you don't make the payments, the lender has the right to repossess and resell it to recoup their money. If they are unable to recover at least the outstanding balance of the loan through resale, you will be on the hook for the difference. This is called a "deficiency balance". Simply having possession of something isn't adequate basis to decide you can do whatever you want with it. You have physical possession, but the lender is the first lien holder on the title until the loan is satisfied.
How is child custody/visitation determined when there is no marriage? A man and woman have a child in Pennsylvania. They are not married. Before the child is born, they end their relationship. Each parent finds another partner and they live separately. What are the options provided by Pennsylvania law regarding child custody and/or visitation rights? Obviously the best thing would be for the parents to work it out among themselves, but what would the law say if they cannot?	Either party can petition the appropriate court for an adjudication of paternity (if this has not already been established in connection with the issuance of the birth certificate), and for a parental responsibility and child support order, at any time, if no such order is in place (assuming that Pennsylvania is the "home state" of the child and venue is proper). Child custody and visitation rights are determined based upon the "best interests of the child" with very little other formal guidance from the statute or even case law which also affords a judge very broad, although not unlimited discretion in resolving the issue if the parents don't reach an agreement. Any parent who is not adjudicated to be "unfit" (whose parental rights would then be terminated), is entitled to some reasonable visitation under the circumstances at a minimum. In practice, courts tend to prefer to enter an order that preserves the pre-litigation status quo is one was established for any reasonable length of time. Once a custody and visitation schedule are established (logically, this is actually done contemporaneously), a child support award is also entered based upon the number of nights per year that the child spends with each parent, the income of each parent, and the extraordinary expenses, if any of the child, pursuant to guidelines that exist under state law but are federally mandated. Generally speaking, child support payments are quite small relative to the incomes of the parties. If a parent is willfully refusing to work or underemployed so as to reduce child support, in some circumstances, income that could have been earned is imputed to that parent for purposes of determining the appropriate amount of child support. There is a small body of civil procedure that goes to the nitty gritty of how this is handled after a petition is filed, but that really goes beyond the scope of the question. In the simplest case, only the two parents are involved in the litigation. But, there are circumstances in which there can be other parties. For example, if the child has been supported by welfare, a representative of the state is a party to make sure that child support is paid reducing the need for welfare payments or repaying welfare payments already made by the state. Guardians of an un-empancipated minor or disabled parent might participate. Grandparents can sometimes have standing to participate. A non-parent who has physical custody of the child would usually have standing to participate. This all gets a little technical, and since the question doesn't suggest any facts that would call for additional parties, I will leave it at that. In the event of a substantial change of circumstances after a statutory period after the last order was entered, a court may start over, more or less from scratch, and establish a modified child custody, visitation and child support order that reflects the changed circumstances. As a practical matter, for parents who are separated from shortly after the birth of a child and can't work things out between themselves, there will probably be several to half a dozen modification proceedings until the child is an adult.	Given there was no answer here, I will state what I know about child abuse response, but note I am not a lawyer nor am I in Illinois, so my statements are likely generalized for most US states (individual laws vary by state, and I reside in Pennsylvania). In most US states, the police and child/youth services (that's what it's called in Pennsylvania but all states have similar services) work side by side and a complaint by the child to a police officer will have an emergency action taken to protect the child. The child is identified as a victim and the police and child/youth services have the obligation to protect the child and to keep them from harm. This is the main goal of police and children/youth services - to keep the child safe and act in the best interest of the child. Usually, a complaint to a child abuse center can take time to process. When a police complaint comes in it is more immediate, with police having more 'influence' with CYS (child/youth services). Especially when the child is in deadly danger (they were just stabbed, after all), the police may arrest the mother or abusive sibling or intervene therein to remove the child from the parents care with CYS-equivalent services working to find suitable alternative living situations for the child as a result of a order of removal/protection authorized by a judge. (PA at least had emergency situation response plans for these situations where a judge is just a phone call away). As well, the child will likely be made a ward of the state if the courts determine the mother cannot care for the child or is a threat as such (not caring enough to stop the brother may count), insomuch that the child may be removed from the dangerous situation and placed in the care of a willing relative or if none can be found will be placed in temporary foster care in a safer environment. Note that nothing happens rapidly without the initial complaint to the police. At age 16 the child is likely going to be taken more seriously (compared to a 12 year old, for example), and has the right to be allowed to reach out to hospital staff to ask to speak to a police officer - otherwise it takes a child abuse complaint from someone who knows the child and situation and that can sometimes take longer to process (though, the distance factor in the original question may make a complaint from overseas given a lower priority due to not knowing the person on a more personal in-person level)	What kind of contract would that be? One about... arbitration? One about "I hereby relinquish my claim for payment of X?" --- children cannot be taken away from their father, no matter what. - OP That contract is void in germany because this contract not only violates public policy, it tries to modify something that is regulated by law into a way that does offer less than the law demands as a minimum. That's not allowed in Germany. Further, a clause that gives custody to the father by default is also Sittenwidrig in Germany, and thus void under §138 BGB. So would be a clause that gives it to the mother by default by the way. In a case of controversy, only a court order can assign guardianship. And only the court can take guardianship away. When the kid is born its guardianship gets assigned to the parents as guardians by §1626 BGB. While it is possible to give your partner guardianship if you're not married under 1626a BGB it is explicitly impossible to assign guardianship for any compensation to either party (e.g. the mother or the new guardian may not receive anything other than the guardianship in the specific paper) under 1626b BGB. Thus a contract that does anything else in addition to guardianship, like a prenup, voids at least the guardianship clauses. And you have to tell the court about that assignment of guardianship under ($1626d BGB). Now comes the kicker: §1628 BGB forces the parents to apply to the court to solve any problems of huge impact, such as guardianship: So technically, mediation results are fully non-binding and you can not mandate it. Also, since all marriages are through the state, it needs a formal instrument of the state to be dissolved. The only three ways that the state ever allowed this to be done after WW2 were a) annulment through a court, which only was possible till 1998, or b) divorce through a court, c) death of one of the marriage partners. Yes, it takes a judge to divorce a marriage under $1313 BGB or one of the two married to die. Because you can't divorce without a filing in court, a clause that demands to divorce in some way that is not including §1313 BGB, that clause would be void. It might be legal to have a clause that demands to try to solve issues in arbitration before filing for divorce or sorting the belongings in such a way, but it can't supplant the court requirement.	That is the case in the state of Washington, for example. All property acquired during a marriage is considered community property. This can make things complicated since there are state-specific rules that can arise in case of a divorce (Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Communications, Inc: the couple declared no community property at the time of the divorce, meaning the wife who was not a party in in infringement case, had no standing – and therefore the infringement suit could procede). This page goes into details. There are 9 US states with community property regimes: it is also the law for Sweden, Germany, France and Italy. In the US, permission from one author is sufficient to constitute "having permission" w.r.t. copyright: an owner of the copyright can license the work, and you do not have to get permission from all owners. This does not invalidate an open source license: spouse 1 can grant such a license even if spouse 2 refuses to grant such a license. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 partially answers the question in Louisiana specifically w.r.t. copyright. A lower court held that the state-specific quirk of giving a non-author an equal interest in copyrighted IP must be swept away in the interest of uniformity of federal law. The lower court indeed rejected an argument based on 17 USC 301 which declares federal law to be superior to legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to that set out in Title 17: but community property law is not equivalent to Title 17, it's much broader. The higher courts reasoning is a tall wall of words which boils down the their conclusion that "we disagree with the district court only to the extent that it held the conflict between Louisiana community property law and federal copyright law irreconcilable absent congressional intercession", and having found a way that didn't involve Congress, they declared the work-creator to be the sole owner of the IP created during the marriage. See also the myriad citations contained therein. What this case in particular shows is that the specifics of the states community property laws will have an effect on how a courts would rule on such an IP question.	The question didn't mention marital status, but since states formally recognize that relationship it's helpful to start there. tl;dr: The Supreme Court decided state laws that required a woman to notify her spouse were unconstitutional. Thus it's unlikely there'd be grounds for suit. Background The central mechanism of Roe v. Wade (U.S. 1973) was a balancing act between what it decided was a 14th amendment right to privacy and the state's interest in both the health of the woman and the potentiality of life. Because Roe explicitly recognized a state interest, Pennsylvania passed a statute in 1982 that required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period. It also mandated parental consent for minors (with some exceptions) and spousal notification. This reached the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of SE Penn. v. Casey (U.S. 1992). There, the court upheld most of the Pennsylvania law (reinforcing its statement in Roe that a state does have an interest) but struck down the spousal notification portion. To do that, it determined the appropriate test was whether a state was placing an undue burden---a significant obstacle---in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability. It reasoned that: state regulation impacts a female's liberty more than male's during pregnancy (by way of biology) if a man and woman disagree, only one can prevail not all women are equally impacted by a notification mandate (for reasons of domestic violence, etc.) Combining this with the notion that women do not lose any constitutionally protected liberty upon marriage, it decided spousal notification would be a significant obstacle and thus an undue burden. In other words, unmarried women don't have spouses to notify, so placing a notification requirement on married women creates an additional burden that the court found undue. To get back to the question, the father certainly has a right to file a suit against the female (...and it happens from time to time). However, it likely wouldn't go far. Since unmarried women were the baseline in Casey, it's unlikely there'd be grounds for either married or unmarried fathers to sue their female partners. This comes up frequently under the moniker of "Father's Rights," which has gained less traction in the U.S. than in other countries. That said, Wisconsin recently introduced a bill that would allow fathers to proceed against abortion providers.	The following answers are based upon general U.S. law, I have not personally confirmed that they apply in Illinois in particular under its adoption law, or each of its welfare benefits programs, or its wrongful death statute. There is no affirmative duty of a mother to inform a father or potential father of the existence of his child, at least outside (1) the context of relinquishment of parental rights in anticipation of an adoption (where there may be a statutory notice requirement in some cases), (2) applications for certain kinds of welfare benefits (where identification of a father is required for some programs), and (3) possibly in the context of a lawsuit for the wrongful death of a child in which both parents are frequently vested with authority to bring the suit. Identification of a father on a birth certificate is not mandatory (and not infrequently omitted). In an adoption case, due process often requires some effort "reasonably calculated to give notice" to the father of the proceeding relinquishing parental rights, although failure to do so is generally not a jurisdictional defect that renders the adoption void ab initio. There is also generally a requirement to affirmatively state in adoption proceeding if the father is, or might be, a member of a Native American tribe, as that goes to the jurisdictional issue of the applicability of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, which requires notice, at a minimum, to the father's Indian tribe, even if notice cannot be given to the father. There is a presumption that a child born to a woman married to a husband is the child of the husband and after a certain number of years, for certain purposes (such as child support). This presumption is usually conclusive and cannot be rebutted even by DNA evidence to the contrary, on the theory that the husband is the psychological parent of the child and has assumed that responsibility, and in order to discourage after the fact denials of paternity simply to avoid child support when paternity was never disputed. There is also a presumption that a birth certificate's statement of paternity is correct, although this is in often not a conclusive presumption. And, birth certificates are a matter of public record, so a man can search the vital statistics records of a state to see if anyone has identified him as a father even if he has not been told of that fact, arguably giving him constructive knowledge of his paternity in that case. But, the identity of the person who is the child's father, or of persons who could be the child's father, is not privileged (other than under the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination where applicable), and so, a woman can generally be legally compelled to disclose this information by subpoena or in response to discovery in litigation. For example, a woman under the age of consent at the time her child was conceived can be incarcerated for contempt of court for failing to disclose the name of the father in connection with a criminal prosecution of a suspected father of the child for statutory rape.	So, in England and Wales your son assaulted Mario. (From Wikipedia: "Assault is committed if one intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence". I expect Mario expected your son was going to thump him, and that would certainly be unlawful.) You were both trespassers on the property; however it sounds like there was nobody there who could require you to leave, so that probably doesn't matter. Both of these would be true whatever the age of your daughter. Finally, in England and Wales, if you had forced your 16-year old daughter to come with you against her will, you would both have been guilty of kidnapping. (16 is the age at which children become independent in terms of deciding where to go.) She can choose to leave home and live with her boyfriend, and there is nothing you can do to stop her. Edit: The question did not originally mention a jurisdiction. This is an area where the legal situation is likely to be very jurisdiction dependent.	The Will Itself The two main points that are exceptional in this case would be: (1) to name a legal guardian for the child, and (2) possibly, depending upon the size of your estate, to name a conservator for the child (like a guardian but for a child's property), or a custodian of property inherited by the child (basically a trustee of a small, simplified trust) or a trustee of a protective trust for the benefit of the child. You might want to name a "trust protector" of the protective trust as well as a trustee, so that there is a designated person to supervise the trustee's conduct during the child's minority who isn't your ex-spouse. A protective trust will have provisions related to age and conditions and purposes of distributions. For example, it might say distributions according to need for health, education, maintenance and support until age 25, then distribute a third outright, then distribute half of what's left at age 35 outright then distribute the balance at age 45, and it might specify "safe harbor" acceptable purposes like higher education, apprenticeships, weddings, and investing in businesses with a reasonable prospect of success. You should also probably provide for any family pets. Many lawyers have standard clauses for that. You may want to identify specific items of tangible personal property that should be reserved for the child's future use at your death (e.g. an heirloom wedding dress), even though it won't be immediately useful. The guardian wouldn't supersede the parental rights of the other parent, but would have priority together with anyone named by your ex, to serve as guardian if your ex is incapacitated as well. There really isn't too much else that you can do in a will as there is a deliberate desire to prevent dead hand control of a child. Non-Legal Economic Options You should consider buying life insurance and making a trust for the benefit of the child the beneficiary of it to fund a trust for the child if you die. Talk to a financial planner or life insurance agent about it. Non-Legal Sentimental Options Of course, there are classic non-legal steps such as writing birthday letters or recording birthday audio/video tapes for the child, if you know that death is imminent and finding someone who will take responsibility for doling them out. Another thing that is sometimes done is to find a trustworthy person to entrust with secrets (e.g. your legal father isn't your biological father). One way to handle such matters is to have a safe deposit box with this kind of stuff in it and to entrust to trustee to deliver these items at appropriate times.
Can I call the police in a non-emergency but sticky situation? A friend of mine recently posted about the following situation: Alice is on public transport when she is approached by Bob, who asks her unwanted questions (e.g. where do you live, do you want to go out with me this weekend, etc). Alice attempts to avoid Bob by alighting, but Bob alights as well and keeps talking. Can Alice call the police? What about an uninvolved third party? If it matters, Bob is unarmed and the country is Singapore. My original inclination is "yes". However it looks like calling the police worldwide should only be done in emergency situations, e.g. the Singapore police website says one should only dial 999 when a crime is in progress, someone is hurt or in danger, and so on. Bob in this situation hasn't actually become violent, and while Alice is understandably frightened, she isn't actually in danger. If the answer is "no", how should Alice shake off Bob? "Walk to a police station" seems like the obvious answer, but there might not be one nearby.	In my home jurisdiction, this would be considered more than enough reason to call the emergency response number. This does not guarantee that a unit would be dispatched (quickly; of the desired type; at all). The contact centre responder will provide advice on how best to resolve the situation, and monitor for positive or negative development in the situation, until such time as a unit arrives or the situation is over. Generally, if you believe you are at risk, you should call the emergency number. In the case that this is not correct, the responder will either provide an appropriate number or redirect the call to them.	If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) ("Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.") If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) ("If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.") The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves.	Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.	The basic reason to avoid speaking to police is the concern that something that you say will provide the police with a basis for arresting you or someone you care about, or charging you or someone you care about with a crime. Often, the reason that the police are talking with someone is specifically for the purpose of developing probable cause or a case to convict someone of a crime, when without your information they wouldn't have that information. Statements far short of a confession to committing a crime can be critical lynch pins in establishing a case against you. For example, a statement that confirms that you were in a particular place at a particular time could link you to a crime that happened at or near that location at that time, when otherwise the police might have no idea where you were at that time and might never link you to the crime. Also, it isn't uncommon for a request for police assistance to end badly, with the police assistance being deployed against you, or the means used by the police to resolve a situation having a deadly or undesired outcome. On the other hand, often you will need to communicate with police. You may need to report a crime for insurance purposes. You may need help when you or someone around you is currently being victimized by someone committing a crime. Cooperating with police to provide information may help to remove someone who is a potential threat to you or someone you care about from the streets. A better rule than "never talk to the police" is really more along the lines of "think twice before talking to the police". You should thoughtfully evaluate if what you hope to gain from doing so is greater than the risk that a case against you as a suspect could be established and is also greater than the risk that if the police do respond when you communicate with them that the situation could end badly. As you do this, try to see yourself from a police officer's perspective. How will you look? Also, are you capable of saying what needs to be said and then stopping, rather than blabbering on out of nervousness. A related notion is that you should be much more wary about talking to the police when the police initiate the conversation than you are when you are the one initiating the conversation. This is because ulterior motives on the part of police that could harm you or people you care about are much more likely when the police initiate the conversation than when you do. Yet another consideration is how much you understand about the situation you are in, how sophisticated you are in dealing with the police, and how glib you are compared to the average person. For example, there are people who a guilty of a crime and are in a situation that they understand well where they are at high risk of being implicated in a crime, where smooth talking can deflect police attention away from you and onto another person or a non-existent suspect. But, not many people are smooth enough and understand their circumstances well enough to pull that off. In general, the more that you fit "the profile" of someone the police are likely to suspect of a crime (e.g. if you are a young adult African American man in a "high crime neighborhood"), the more you should assume that responding to a police inquiry directed to you is a bad idea.	“Never” is a very big word… If a burglar stabs someone in claimed self defense, then we have evidence that this was an armed burglary, so that won’t go down well for that burglar. And your rights to self defence are greatly diminished if you caused that situation illegally. So should you get into the situation, try to run away if at all possible. If you had any chance at all to escape your self defence argument will not be accepted. The only possible situation with self defence is if you are threatened with illegal violence that cannot be justified by the fact that you are a criminal. For example you enter a home, two people with guns inside catch you, bind you to a chair so you are no danger at all, and instead of calling the police they announce they will kill or maim you. This is of course very unlikely to happen.	In all common law countries, this would be the tort of battery (thus, illegal). The police might lawfully lay hands on the person, under certain conditions. First, the police would have to be legally arresting the person; second, the person would have to be (unlawfully) resisting that arrest. If the person acts in a way that a police officer "has reason to believe to be so mentally ill as to be incapable of taking care of himself", he may arrest the person (Mental Health Act 1987 art. 23). Part III (art. 20 ff) provides the legal background for the second path for arrest, via involuntary commitment. Under the circumstances you describe, a court would have to first order the person taken into custody (leading to an arrest, and possibly being subdued). The police would not be authorized to administer a sedative, so they would have to use physical restraint (handcuffs, hammer-lock and so on). The process is either initiated by a psychiatric professional, or by a relative (art. 20), then the court determines whether the person is to be so detained.	The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing	Start with the premise that Person A has so far engaged only in speech, which is presumptively protected by the First Amendment. So unless the speech is for some reason unprotected, the police should not involve themselves. This of course begs the question of whether this speech is protected. The First Amendment does not protect "true threats," which includes "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). So the question for the police is whether Person A's texts were meant to communicate a serious intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. Removing First Amendment protection won't be as simple as letting B testify that he truly felt threatened, as the question is whether A meant to communicate a threat. But that also means that for A, it won't be enough to simply deny any violent intent, so the "nothing illegal" disclaimer won't be enough. In the end, this is a question for a jury to decide, should the case ever reach that far. The jury would essentially be asked to engage in mind-reading, determining what A was thinking when he sent those texts. The jury should be instructed to take several factors into consideration when it makes that decision, including the "context" of the remarks (the explicit disclaimer of violence helps A), the "conditional nature" of the threat (the three-strikes langauge helps A), and the "reaction of the listener" (calling the police hurts A). Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). Practically speaking, if B were to call the police, I'd expect them not to investigate, unless they were awfully bored. If they decided to, I don't think there would be any actionable violation of A's rights, given their obvious inability to divine A's intent based solely on B's account. A court would likely allow them to investigate, but I doubt a prosecutor would allow them to bring charges based on the facts you've described.
Difference between Motions to Strike, Suppress, and in limine? In U.S. practice what are the differences between the following: Motion in limine Motion to Strike Motion to Suppress I gather that the first is only applicable before evidence is presented, and the latter two are only applicable after evidence has been presented to a court. But is there overlap between them? If there are distinctions could you provide hypothetical examples to illustrate those?	In U.S. practice, A motion in limine is a motion seeking to rule on the admissibility of evidence at an evidentiary hearing or trial (usually a jury trial) in advance of the actual introduction of the evidence in order to allow greater certainty in trial preparation and a fuller legal explanation of the positions of the parties for the judge to consider than an oral objection and argument during a trial. A motion to strike is a motion seeking removal of a document from consideration by a court because it has been filed improperly and possibly its removal from the court record entirely. It is provided for in the federal rules and most civil procedure rules based upon it in rule 12 where it is authorized to remove "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" be striken. For example, one might move to strike information revealing a trade secret that is attached to a court document, or the addition of an exhibit to a response to a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings that is supposed to be resolved based upon documents already filed only. Usually, a motion to strike wouldn't apply to trial evidence. But, a motion to strike a jury demand, however, is really a motion to deny a request for a jury and not actually a request to remove the jury demand from a court file. But, the traditional name has struck. A motion to suppress would usually come up in a criminal case, asking that evidence illegally obtained by law enforcement not be presented as evidence in a case. This kind of motion to suppress is really a just sub-species of a motion in limine. Another kind of motion to suppress, usually in a civil case, would be a motion seeking to limit who has access to a court file, usually out of privacy concerns.	Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so.	The pre-action protocols are part of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) which governs proceedings in the County Court, High Court, and Court of Appeal (see Rule 2.1). They set out what the parties should do before initiating proceedings in court. Being practice directions, they are not rules, but you ignore them at your peril; failing to do so will not affect the outcome of your case but can have cost implications or, in the most severe cases, result in sanctions (see paragraphs 13 - 15 here). There is a general pre-action protocol and a set of specific pre-action protocols for particular types of cases. If there is a specific protocol for your case, you follow that, otherwise you follow the general one (see paragraph 2). The full list of specific pre-action protocols can be found here. Note that there is another list contained within the general pre-action protocol at paragraph 18 but this list is not complete. This is rather unfortunate because paragraph 18 contains the phrase "the table sets out the protocols currently in force" and, below the table, "Updated: Wednesday, 6 April 2022" (which implies, incorrectly, that any older protocols not appearing in the table are not currently in force). I suggest using the first list. "How long does it typically take?" This varies depending on the protocol being followed. See for example paragraph 6 of the general protocol which, without being prescriptive, suggests that a reasonable time for a defendant to respond to a pre-action letter is 14 days in a simple case and 3 months in a complex one. "pre-action protocol (PAP) must be completed before a case is brought to court in England-and-Wales" This is incorrect. Per paragraph 17 of the general pre-action protocol, if you are close to the limitation period, you can start proceedings and then apply for a stay to give you time to comply with the protocol.	Your assumptions are incorrect. Courts allow oral arguments (when they do allow them) so that attorneys have a chance to better address a judge's concerns. The idea is that it lets an attorney not only present the core of his case, but it also lets him address any problems with his reasoning that the judge may have or help the judge explore a complicated question. Without that all you have is the back-and-forth in writing with opposing counsel, which is useful, but may not actually address the issues that are important to the judge. There is some difference in how you present arguments on paper as opposed to in oral argument, but the distinction is largely one of style rather than substance. An argument that is great on paper is still great when presented out loud, you just present it differently because you are presenting it in a different medium. For example, you have to present oral argument with the assumption that the judge may interrupt you at any time to ask a question they are interested in, derailing your entire pre-planned argument into a tangential point the judge considers important. This is great because it lets you address what the judge is concerned about, but it requires a different preparation and some changes to the format of your argument. For example, while you will front-load both oral and written arguments with a roadmap, both your roadmap and your first sentence are much more important in oral argument.	If a law is struck-down as unconstitutional, but all the precedent used to find it unconstitutional gets reversed; what becomes of the law? In U.S. law, the law has effect again, unless it has been amended or repealed in the meantime. Is it totally dead, needing be passed anew? In the U.S., no. It is not totally dead. It is merely dormant. It stays on the books and legislators may decide not to repeal it as a political statement. It also might be considered for interpretive purposes when construing another part of the same law. For example, the meaning given to a phrase in an unconstitutional part of the law might be applied to a different part of the law that is constitutional. Can the judiciary be asked to reinstated, after which point it can be used again? In the U.S., any court can determine that a law is unconstitutional, but the extent to which that ruling is binding precedent on other courts or other parties than those to the case before it depends upon the court in question and upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). For example, the legal fight in the U.S. to hold bans on same sex marriage to be unconstitutional was fought in and resulted in ruling in dozens of courts at the trial court and state appellate court, and federal intermediate appellate court level before a uniform ruling was established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, even if the issue arises in another case where there is a controlling precedent, attorney ethics permit an attorney to make a good faith argument for a change in the law to any court, so if there is some good faith argument for doing so, the attorney can push that the issue be reconsidered. Of course, usually the answer from the court will be "no." Or can it just be enforced again without any formal process; so long as nobody sues and gets it killed again by a lower court? Sometimes government officials enforce laws that have been held unconstitutional, either because they aren't aware of the relevant court decisions, or because they think that their facts are distinguishable from those under which the law was held unconstitutional (which sometimes happens on an "as applied" basis rather than on a "facial" basis that applies to all cases), or because they think the judge before them might rule differently despite the precedent. Also, would the answer differ according to country? If so, could you please give me some examples of countries handling this differently. Yes. Many countries with legal systems based upon the legal system of countries of continental Europe like France and Germany and Spain, which are called "civil law" countries have a very different process of handling unconstitutional laws, as does the European Court of Human Rights and the highest court of the European Union. In Germany, for example, questions of the constitutionality of a law may be raised only in the Constitutional Court and not in other courts. This ruling is usually final. And, unlike U.S. courts, the Constitutional Court can rule a law unconstitutional during the legislative process, rather than in connection with an actual case or controversy relating to the law taking effect (in which case the law never gets on the books in the first place). I don't know what happens when the Constitutional Court declares a law unconstitutional. I do know, however, that in the case of the European Court of Human Rights and the highest courts of the E.U. that one of the usual remedies will be an order directed at a member state to amend its statutes to remove the offending law, with sanctions imposed if the member state fails to do so. Obviously, once such a law is repealed in this fashion, it would have to be re-enacted to take effect even if the precedent holding that the law was unconstitutional was undermined.	The differences are subtle in practice today as a result of technologies like the Internet. Enact means (according to Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition (1979), hard copy): To establish by law; to perform or effect; to decree. The common introductory formula in making statutory laws is, "Be it enacted." Promulgate means (according to the same source): To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court. In the context of the U.S. legislative process, a law is enacted at the moment when it is signed by the President or Governor after being duly passed by the legislative branch (or when it is adopted by the legislative branch in a veto override). It is promulgated when the public act is published either in physical book form, or electronically, for example, in an online official government website containing the laws that were enacted. These days the time gap between enacting a law and promulgating it is a matter of minutes or hours. Historically, the gap would have been a matter of days or weeks. For example, in Colorado, the legislative session ends in the first few days of the month of May, with all laws passed during the session signed or vetoed by mid-May, but (subject to certain exceptions) laws passed in that session are generally effective on July 1 of the same year. This reflected the assumption of the people who drafted that part of the state constitution that it could typically take up to about four to six weeks to promulgate the laws enacted in the legislative session.	Judicial estoppel prevents a party from arguing two opposite positions in separate proceedings. Is there a similar doctrine that applies to argumentation in the same brief? No. The general rule is that a party is permitted to argue inconsistent positions in the alternative within a brief. When a party does so without expressly saying so, it is assumed that they are arguing in the alternative unless the party clearly indicates otherwise (and is just being illogical). But the law in the context of arbitration is a special case that doesn't align perfectly with the general rule, and makes different distinctions sometimes. Under the substantive law of arbitration clause validity, sometimes a party can be forced to arbitrate even if there is a possibility that the underlying contract is unenforceable, with the arbitrator making that decision. But, a party cannot be forced to arbitrate in every case where the validity of the underlying alleged agreement is in doubt, simply because an agreement, on its face, contains or references an arbitration agreement. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, certain preliminary decisions are vested in the courts even if a written arbitration purports to provide otherwise, if a party choses to raise those issues. A dispute over which of two significantly different competing arbitration agreements applies to an issue between the parties could be such a circumstance. Thus, a term that provides that "delegates threshold questions such as the 'applicability, existence, scope, or validity' of the agreement to the arbitrator," is partially void as a matter of public policy under the Federal Arbitration Act, although some of its retains its validity. For example, you can't delegate the question of the existence of an arbitration agreement to an arbitrator if that question is disputed, even if the contract says otherwise. In arbitration cases, there is a rather elaborate jurisprudence governing what issues are for a court to decided and what are for an arbitrator to decision when the right of a party to arbitrate, and/or the validity of the underlying contract, are disputed, that makes some very fine distinctions between different kinds of arguments. For example, if a party claims that he never had dealings with a party that presents an unsigned document that is a contract and also asserts that this party is bound to an arbitration agreement, that question can be decided by a court. But, if a party signed an agreement with a plain vanilla arbitration clause but claims it is unenforceable because it was induced by duress or undue influence, the arbitration will usually go forward with the arbitrator deciding the validity of the contract. When a decision is decided by a court, or by an arbitrator, is not easily summarized or manifestly obvious without a review of the relevant case law which is voluminous and intricate. See, e.g., Samson v. NAMA Holdings, LLC, 637 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2011); Santich v. VGG Holding Corp., 2019 CO 67 ¶ 6 (June 24, 2019); N.A. Rugby Union, LLC v. U.S. of Am. Rugby Football Union 2019 CO 59, ¶¶ 20-22, 442 P.3d 859, 863-864 (June 17, 2019);;;	Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction.
Grokking the difference between Civil Law and Common Law My history teacher told us yesterday, the difference between Civil Law and Common Law, if specified in one sentence is: The Civil Law is to make and create laws, While the Common Law is to find and discover laws. Is it a good abstract about the difference?	There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.	if necessary it is possible to simplify it to USA vs EU The European Union is by no means a homogeneous area of law. I will assume france because it is the one I am most familiar with, but bear in mind that much of what follows might not apply to Spain/Germany/etc. The USA is a federal state. In particular, Louisiana law is heavily influenced by civil law for historical reasons. Other states and federal law do, however, follow more or less the same general principles. in common law there is the idea of a precedent, while in civil law not The first part is true. Common law usually hold the principle of stare decisis according to which precedents are binding. That means that the holding of a court binds the same court to rule the same way on similar matters raised later. I would note, however, that courts can be... let’s say "creative"... in finding ways to differentiate the case at hand from the previous one, when the judge is motivated to do so. The latter part is false, or at least, exaggerated. It is true that courts in civil law are not bound by previous holdings; an appeal that raises as its only argument "the court’s decision in my case was different from that in another case without offering any differentiation" would be rejected. However, there is the concept of jurisprudence constante where repeated precedent is highly persuasive. In practice, even simple precedent is persuasive. Furthermore, lower courts are bound by the holdings of higher courts, both in civil law and common law jurisdictions. (That’s more or less the meaning of "higher court".) in common law a judge plays a role of a person evidence at a court is provided to, while in civil law a judge tries to investigate too in addition That is a distinction between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems. The distinction does not exactly map to the civil/common law systems, but in practice the criminal part of civil law systems is often inquisitorial whereas common law systems are often adversarial. I will first note that the "inquisitorial" part where the judge conducts investigations is vastly overblown. That only occurs in complex cases that require extended investigations with more coercitive powers (for instance seizing documents etc.) Wikipedia says: In 2005, there were 1.1 million criminal rulings in France, while only 33,000 new cases were investigated by judges.[5] The vast majority of cases are therefore investigated directly by law enforcement agencies under the supervision of [the equivalent of district attorneys]. The numbers sound plausible to me, but here’s the ref it gives if you want to check (which I did not bother to do). The most visible part of the distinction is the way witnesses at trial are handled. In an adversarial system, the parties will ask to cite certain witnesses. There are pre-trial motions to exclude certain witnesses for certain reasons, but parties have a wide latitude of which witnesses they want to call. Each witness will come labelled as to which party asked for its appearance. At trial, the witness will be asked questions by the party who called them (direct examination), which will usually take a long time and include nondisputed background information (who are you, for how long have you worked with the defendant, etc.). Then, the opposing party will ask questions (cross-examination), emphasizing points that cast doubt on the witness’s reliability (because they are lying, because they do not remember well, etc.) or on the other parties’ narrative (highlighting details that were conveniently "missed" in direct examination). In an inquisitorial system, witnesses are chosen by the judge. Parties can ask to have witnesses added to the list, but the list does not come with labels that X is coming from the prosecution, Y from the defense. When a witness is called, the judge will ask most of the questions at the start, before giving the floor to the parties. Roughly speaking, the judge does the direct examination, and parties do a cross-examination afterwards. Note that in many cases the parties will ask few or no questions - high-profile cases that you read about in the media are abnormal in that respect. In particular, an inquisitorial-system court maintains a list of expert witnesses, which are called when technical points are required. That expert is paid by the court, not by the parties (however, when one party requests an expertise and the other party opposes it, the requesting party has to pay the cost upfront - they will shift it to the other party if they win the case). That is very different to the adversarial system of having each party introduce testimony by an expert they commissioned and paid. distance between public law and private law is smaller in common law legal system I am not sure I understand that question. It is true that "private" (tort) law operates in an adversarial system both in civil-law and common-law. Therefore, one could argue that the distance between civil-law’s criminal system (inquisitorial) and tort system (adversarial) is higher than between common-law’s criminal and tort systems (both adversarial). However, that is in my view a highly artificial distinction. The distance between practice areas within a single (common law or civil law) jurisdiction is large in any case. You would not want a lawyer specialized in drug-dealing cases to take your case about sexual harassment or unlawful dismissal, and vice-versa, in any jurisdiction.	You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific.	Organically rather than by design, laws and courts preceded the theoretical constitutional basis. Kings developed a practice of legislating in council, rather than solo, meaning that their edicts went out not as "the King decrees XYZ" but "the King, with the assent of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, barons, etc., decrees XYZ". This eventually became the Parliamentary system, wherein only Parliament could make laws (especially about raising taxes) and the King alone could not. Because of the gradual evolution, it's not easy to point to the first such statute or even the first proper "Parliament". The form was not settled. Nowadays we expect Acts to start with a set "enacting formula", to be published in a set way, and to be called "Acts" at all. Earlier laws lacked these elements. It was common for Parliaments to transact a variety of business, such as appointing officials or distributing money, without strictly distinguishing a category of what we would now call a "public general Act", something setting out broadly applicable rules under the tenor of law. To take an early example, the Domesday Book was undoubtedly commissioned by William I in council in 1085, but we could argue for a long time whether that really counted as a law made by the King alone or through a proto-parliamentary approach. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 is closer - we have the text and it refers to the counsel of all the barons - but still not obviously "an Act". Magna Carta came in 1215 and was repeatedly confirmed by successive monarchs in slight variations; only the 1297 version is currently deemed to be an Act still partially in force. At the same time as this legislative activity, a bewildering array of courts applied essentially customary law for local cases. If you commit a murder in Durham in 1300 and would like to not be executed, then you would be appealing (I think?) to the mercy of the Prince-Bishop in his own court. A few dozen miles away and the process and authority was different. Things gradually became more uniform and systematized, and by the sixteenth century there was enough critical mass of legal philosophy to try to "explain" the legal system more formally and in recognizably modern terms. We may as well take Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644) as a turning point: four volumes setting out a comprehensive view of what English law was all about. In contrast, take Bracton's similar work of 1235, which was the first real analysis of case law in England. Bracton was writing in a context without a general idea of precedent, and where the binding extent of Roman civil law was not clear. By Coke's time that was well established. But they are both trying to make sense of the law as they found it: giving explanations for the data, if you like. (A parallel course was taking place in Scotland with its institutional writers, although they ended up with a different system from England's. They were equally trying to explain what they saw.) Some of the early modern authors contributed to figuring out which decisions of past Parliaments or councils should be taken to be Acts, as such. Coke, in particular, also set out the criterion that an Act should purport to have been made by all three of the King, Lords and Commons. Our modern consolidated versions of the statute book derive from this time, and on legislation.gov.uk you can see the oldest Act still in force, The Statute of Marlborough 1267. That's different from the oldest Acts ever made, as discussed above, a more slippery concept. Ideas such as the separation of powers are reverse-engineered in this way. Indeed, it's not obvious that Britain has that separation. It may not be the right way to understand the governmental and legal order that has developed. John Locke might have thought it would be a good idea, but Walter Bagehot denied it was a useful frame for analyzing the interrelationships of various public bodies.	The term is "citation." In the citation you entered, U.S.C. refers to the United States Code, which is a compilation of every general permanent law Congress has passed that's organized by topic (and not by when it was passed). The US Code is developed by the Office of Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives, and is organized into (at the moment) 54 titles. The 29 is the title for the code section you cited; Title 29 deals with labor. Other titles include Title 10 (dealing with the military), Title 18 (crimes and criminal procedure), and Title 26 (income tax). There are levels of organization below the title, but they vary by title (e.g. Title 29 is divided into chapters, while Title 10 has five subtitles, divided into parts, and those are divided into chapters). The level where the actual text of the law is found is the section; when you're citing something in the US Code, you cite it by title and section (§ is a standard symbol for "section"). So 29 USC § 203(b) is section 203 of Title 29, subsection B. You don't include the fact that it's in Chapter 8 in your citation, because title and section is all you need to find it.	TOS are a contract. If you have a contract through the App, you have incorporated the TOS as a term of your contract. Contracts mean what they say they do, what you are thinking of as "basic contract law" is actual just an ordinary and customary term that people in your industry usually make a part of the contract, not contract law itself.	The general rule is that you must comply with all laws. The first thing that means is that you are required to know what the law is, thus ignorance of the law is not a defense for not complying. There are some special circumstances regarding notice, so a law must have been published. Second, whatever the law requires you to do, you have to do it, regardless of any difficulty you might encounter (e.g. you have to pay your taxes even if you don't have enough money). Suppose that a law is so onerous that it is literally impossible to obey it: you still have to obey the law. You have to file a lawsuit against the government challenging the constitutionality of the law, to get the law overturned. Frequently, more requirements are imposed on businesses than on individuals, but there is no legal difference between impositions on individuals and impositions on businesses in terms of laws being difficult to comply with.	The court's job is to resolve the dispute. The parties are in court specifically because there isn't agreement on what the terms of the contract were or even if there is a contract at all. If one of the parties contends that there is no contract then the court will have to determine if there is or isn't. Even if both parties agree there is a contract the court will need to satisfy itself that there is. This is a jurisdictional matter; in the absence of a contract the court can't make a ruling. Having decided there is a contract, there is something about the contract they don't agree on - if they agree then why are they in court? Each party will state their position on the dispute and provide evidence that supports that position. The court will decide based on the evidence and on the balance of probabilities which version is more correct. It is a given that the parties are in dispute about the exact terms of the contract, whether this was because of an initial misunderstanding, someone didn't read it or someone saw an opportunity to screw someone else doesn't matter. The court will decide what it thinks the parties thought (or should have thought) at the time on the basis of the evidence and the law.
Right of way between U-turning and Right-turning vehicles at traffic lights At a traffic light controlled intersection, who has right of way between a U-turning vehicle and a right-turning vehicle? Consider the following cases, assuming no other applicable signage: Case 1 - Right on red Here, the person U-turning has a green light, while the person right-turning has a red light. I believe in this case, the U-turning person has right of way because the vehicle turning right should come to a full stop before proceeding, but am not sure. Case 2 - Right green arrow In this case the U-turning vehicle has advance green light, allowing left, right, and straight directions (don't know about U-turn). The right turning vehicle has a green right arrow. I am most looking for answers for Ontario, Canada, but would accept answers for other jurisdictions with similar traffic laws (at least where they don't outright ban U-turns at intersections). Note: The Ontario driver's handbook, and applicable laws don't seem to mention U-turns much. In particular, it's not explicit that U-turns are even allowed at intersections, but they seem to be according to this Reddit discussion, and according to the no U-turn signs present at some intersections.	U-turns are prohibited in certain circumstances (Highway Traffic Act Paragraph 143). It does not say that U-turns are prohibited at intersections controlled by traffic lights. By the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, U-turns at intersections controlled by traffic lights are generally allowed. However, in determining fault for insurance purposes in Ontario, The driver of automobile “A” is 100 per cent at fault and the driver of automobile “B” is not at fault for an incident that occurs, [...] when automobile “A” is making a U-turn [...] (Insurance Act Paragraph 19.)	Can I refuse, turn around, and just not enter the USA ,get back on a plane, turn around and drive back, or do I have to give over my devices just because I showed up? In theory you can refuse and turn around. At a highway check point or in a private boat disembarking context, that is fairly feasible. If you turn around before you are searched and get back across the border, the border control officers can't pursue you. In a commercial airplane or commercial boat disembarking context, this is as a practical matter, not a very feasible thing to do, because you can't as a practical matter, turn around and even if you plan to return, the only way you can make it to a return trip without passing through customs is if the border control officer refuses to admit you. The law is that non-probable cause searches are permitted at border checkpoints (and indeed even near a border checkpoint on the in country side), but this isn't much clarity about when that authority ends (short of returning across an international boundary) when deciding not to enter at a border checkpoint. Also, there is also a split of authority over whether a cell phone search is allowed in the first place. The Second Circuit in the U.S. has held that it is not, but the law is unresolved in many U.S. states at this time.	Spain also considers a group of cyclists as a single vehicle in some circumstances. This guide from the Dirección General de Tráfico shows, at page 10, about right of way: También se tiene prioridad de paso cuando el vehículo de motor vaya a girar, a la derecha o a la izquierda, para entrar en otra vía y el ciclista esté próximo o cuando circulando en grupo el primero haya iniciado el cruce o haya entrado en una glorieta. or [The cyclist] also has right of way [with respect to a motor vehicle] when the motor vehicle is going to turn, right or left, to enter another road and the cyclist is nearby, or when cycling in a group the first has started the crossing or has entered the roundabout. I can see no other differences related to travelling in group; in particular the only references to red lights and pedestrian crossings is that cyclists must stop at them, without mentioning any difference if part of the group has already passed.	new-york-state No. New York's DUI law forbids the operation of a motor vehicle when your "ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol", but it defines "motor vehicle" to exclude "electrically-driven mobility assistance devices operated or driven by a person with a disability." If you are using a wheelchair because of a disability, you are therefore not subject to the DUI statute.	This varies from state to state. Here's a representative statute: Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop, willfully fails or refuses to obey such direction, increases his speed, extinguishes his lights, or otherwise flees or attempts to elude the officer. See 625 ILCS 5/11-204. For a first offense, IL calls it a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to 1 year and $2.5K. but on the third offense it becomes a felony punishable by up to 3 years and a $25K fine. If the signal was meant for you, then the divided highway is a moot point so long as you realize it was for you (which might be established by you turning off the road into some neighborhood where you have no business). united-statesillinois	Let me give you a simple, even if rather silly example: You take me to a civil court. You tell the judge "gnasher regularly parks his blue car in front of my home, and the color blue violates my sense of beauty. Judge, make him stop it. " A question of fact would be: Is my car actually blue? Not green, or red? And do I actually park my car in front of your home, and do so regularly? A question of law would be: Am I allowed by law to park my car in front of your home, even when my car has a color that you don't like? If this goes to a civil court, the judge would look at it and probably say: "Even if all the facts that 'Gimme the 401' claimed are true, as a matter of law there would be no case for gnasher to answer, since these actions would be permitted by law". If the judge decided that it is illegal to park cars in offensive colours in front of someone else's home as a matter of law, the court would then have to decide the facts: Whether what you claimed is actually the truth. (And while this example is silly, there have been people claiming that the neighbour's use of WiFi interfered with their health. And by law it is illegal to interfere with someone's health, so the facts would have to be examined).	No they didn't break any British traffic regulations. As can be seen in the video, the road is closed to regular traffic. This is done by British police motorcycles according to British traffic laws. On this temporarily closed road regular traffic regulations no longer apply. Bidens motorcade can use whatever light they feel like. This is the same principle that happens in say a political demonstration. Police block the road for regular traffic. Afterwards trucks with all kinds of decorations are allowed to drive inside a crowd of walking people. This would not be legal according to British traffic regulations but it is fine in this situation because the road is blocked for regular traffic.	I should have done my research properly, hopefully this will be indexed and be helpful to someone else in the future. The specific legislation is The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 regulation 98: Stopping of engine when stationary 98.—(1) Save as provided in paragraph (2), the driver of a vehicle shall, when the vehicle is stationary, stop the action of any machinery attached to or forming part of the vehicle so far as may be necessary for the prevention of noise. (2) The provisions of paragraph (1) do not apply— (a) when the vehicle is stationary owing to the necessities of traffic; (b) so as to prevent the examination or working of the machinery where the examination is necessitated by any failure or derangement of the machinery or where the machinery is required to be worked for a purpose other than driving the vehicle; or (c) in respect of a vehicle propelled by gas produced in plant carried on the vehicle, to such plant.
What does “belief” mean in the context of The Equalities Act 2010? The Equalities Act of 2010 (applicable in England, Scotland and Wales) says at Section 10 (in part): Belief means any religious or philosophical belief; and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief. It goes on to describe, in Section 26, harassment which includes the following: A person (A) harasses another (B) - if A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant characteristic, and the conduct has the purpose or effect of violating B’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. This seems quite broad. Would a belief that all female short lists are ethical be considered a belief in terms of this act? Or indeed a belief such as “the sky is not blue”? Or indeed any idea subscribed to. If I was to argue with a coworker that the sky is not red but blue, and he takes offense, am I breaking the law?	The key limiting factors are the language: and the conduct has the purpose or effect of violating B’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. And, also, the context of the term "belief" in the statute in conjunction with religion which is defined in the same section, which suggests that in this context it is intended to be understood as the kind of belief that constitutes a core worldview for a person, even if it is secular (e.g. Confucianism or a Stoic philosophy of life), rather than isolated particular ideas about factual things. There is also considerable room for judicial interpretation over whether, for example "effect of" is limited to an "effect" reasonably derived from the "conduct" in question. Still, in general, the U.K., has higher standards mandating civility in dealings with others than the U.S., and there is lots of conduct barred by the Equality Act of 2010 which would not be barred under U.S. law, for example. The closest analog in U.S. law is really the tort of "outrageous conduct" also sometimes known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress."	Law The origin of the phrase is from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). It specifically rules on the limitation of freedom of speech (first amendment): The original ruling is this: The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. As pointed out by @phoog, this does not saying anything about the lawfullness of shouting "fire", it says that if your speech creates a clear and present danger, the first amendment will not protect you, even if the danger does not result in actual harm. Commentary If these instances are correct then it would seem clear that Freedom of Speech is being honored as it's the result of speech, not the speech itself, that could be an offense. You seem to think that it should be illegal, but only if it results in a panic that endangers people. If people ignore you, you think it should be protected by your first amendment rights. That's not how the law works. The law tries, among other things. To establish norms for human behaviour. For example, you will be punished for driving an automobile while intoxicated, even of this does not result in you running over somebody. In the words of the supreme court: If your actions "are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger", the congress has the right to prevent you from doing so, despite the first amendment.	Are there cases or situations where both parties are burdened with justifying their positions? england-and-wales Yes, but different standards are applied. One example is the "reverse burden of proof" placed on the defendant in section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953: Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence... The prosecution have to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the article is actually an offensive weapon and that the named defendant possessed it on a particular date and that s/he was in a public place at the time. Whereas the standard of proof for the defendant to show they had lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for having is the, lower, "balance of probabilities". Similar legislation, for a similar offence, at section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states that: (4)It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the article with him in a public place. (5)Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a)for use at work; (b)for religious reasons; or (c)as part of any national costume. Which, again, is on the balance of probabilities. See, for example, R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37: If [a legal burden of proof on an accused] is created the matter in question must be taken as proved against the accused unless he satisfies the jury on a balance of probabilities to the contrary...	england-and-wales I think the main reason is that in specific prosecutions such behaviour may not be found to constitute any of those criminal offences. While on the face of it the behaviour is illegal, the court is also obliged to take into account the rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and association, in the Human Rights Act 1998. But a court's injunction sets out in black and white the restrictions on behaviour after considering the human rights aspects of the case, and breach of the order is a contempt of court (not a criminal offence as such, but punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine). Such injunctions are an additional tool for trying to mitigate or deter the behavior to which you refer and in a sense they are more convenient than criminal prosecutions. Some considerations and more detail in no particular order: Standard of proof differences You mention relevant criminal offences. These necessarily have the criminal 'standard of proof'. The trier of fact (the jury at jury trial; the magistrate or judge at non-jury trial), having considered all the relevant evidence, must be sure the defendant is guilty. However, the entity seeking an injunction (the claimant) does not need to meet that standard of proof to obtain an injunction that includes restrictions on behaviour. They need only persuade the court there is a real and imminent risk of a civil wrong for which they merit relief, or that there is a serious issue to be tried at a later date for which they merit relief until the conclusion of that trial. Criminal prosecution delays For the past two years to the time of writing this answer, circumstances have been such that if there were a criminal trial (which is by no means guaranteed), it may be scheduled months, perhaps even a year or two, in the future. But the claimant (and the wider public) may want relief 'now' and the defendant(s) might be free to continue their behaviour in the meanwhile, the defendant might not be held in custody pending trial. Due to delays, some defendants have been in custody for several months pending trial and this isn't satisfactory either, particularly if they are innocent: "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time" (article 6 Human Rights Act 1998). The behaviour may not be found to constitute a criminal offence In this context, the law providing for the criminal offence must be read 'compatibly' with the human rights legislation - the qualified rights to freedom of expression, to assembly and association. Meaning, is this criminal justice system reponse to that behaviour provided for in law, necessary and proportionate, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and were there no alternative and less restrictive responses? Now, some of those elements are a definite yes (e.g. trespass to or obstruction of the highway are provided for in law), others may be arguable. But in any case, the police, prosecution and the court (if it gets that far) must consider those things, must do that weighing up - it is not explicitly provided for in the legislation that creates those criminal offences. The courts have not found every protest on a highway to constitute a trespass to (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones and Another) or obstruction of a highway (Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) v Ziegler and others (Appellants)). On the other hand, when these claimants seek an injunction the court does that weighing up and may consider alternative, less restrictive approaches (the claimant submits a wishlist, the defendant or court may push back). The court will say "Yes, this is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of the claimant and the wider public, however X is disproportionate, Y is proportionate, the defendants may go in area A but not area B, this time period is disproportionate, that time period is proportionate," and so on. So the claimant and the police are now armed with that injunction, the claimant will publish it, defendants are aware of its contents and fellow protesters ought to be made aware of it. It's there in black-and-white what is restricted and anyone breaching the injunction could be found guilty of contempt of court (punishable by up to two years in prison and/or unlimited fine or asset seizure; must be proved to the criminal standard). Example judgments about injunctions including lists of restrictions Here are some examples from the context that include different kinds of restrictions by court order and the court's weighing up of the competing interests of the claimants, the defendants and the wider public. Shell UK Oil Products Ltd v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 1215 (QB) (20 May 2022) The claimant sought (and succeeded) to maintain an injunction that was granted on an emergency basis, its restrictions set out at para 20, conclusion at para 70. National Highways Ltd v Heyatawin [2021] EWHC 3078 (QB) - see para 7 for restrictions, the court found some protesters breached the so-called M25 Order and the court ordered their immediate imprisonment (para 66). National Highways Ltd v Persons unknown (blocking traffic) [2021] EWHC 3081 (QB) (17 November 2021) - the reasons for the decision to not set aside the ex parte interim injunction made by Linden J on 25 October 2021, some restrictions at para 4. High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd & Anor v Four Categories of Persons Unknown & Ors [2022] EWHC 2360 (KB) (20 September 2022) - restrictions at para 188.	The phrase is added to ensure that a portion of the contract is construed as the parties intended. For example, say the terms of a contract already imply some particular term. To make it clear that this is what the parties intended, they may also state that term explicitly. The problem is, if you specify a term a particular way, a party could argue that interpreting another part of the contract to mean that very same thing would render that portion of the contract redundant and therefore it should be interpreted some other way. The phrase "for avoidance of doubt" indicates a part of an agreement that is intended to restate what another portion of the contract (often in conjunction with applicable law) already implies. The phrase is added to ensure that the restatement won't be pointed to as a way to argue that other parts of the contract should be interpreted differently than intended. It is often used where it's superfluous and there it should be avoided because it will actually do the opposite of what's intended -- implying that what it covers is covered elsewhere when it actually isn't, possibly leading to other portions of the contract becoming ambiguous or subject to misintepretation.	"Ignorance of the law" refers to a (non)-defense for committing a crime ("I didn't know it was against the law"). In this case, the government hasn't passed a law saying that "the term 'simple majority' shall always be defined as..." – there is no law saying that "simple majority means more than half of the total number of votes". Instead, terms are generally given their "common meaning". A reasonable case can be made that the common meaning of "majority" is "more that any other choice", and one can point to ample evidence showing that, such as this. However, one can also argue that extra weight should be given to to specialized definitions appearing in The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure or Robert's Rules of Order (or other such document), in support of a competing definition of "simple majority". Both sides will need to provide evidence that supports their interpretation of the phrase, based on external sources (parliamentary handbooks, dictionaries, and so on), as arguments for a particular interpretation of the term. The courts will be most impressed by evidence pertaining to the behavior of the parties, so that if everybody agrees that they understood "simple majority" to be "the choice with the most votes", then that is how the term will be interpreted.	The Equality Act (2010) lists the following protected classes (emphasis mine): age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. It is unlawful for businesses to discriminate against anyone, in the goods or services (or physical access) that they offer, based on any of those characteristics. Some disabilities may prevent people from wearing masks, and those people cannot be discriminated against. I couldn't find a source in the law that says this explicitly, but according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission there is no legal requirement for people who have disabilities to be able to prove that they are disabled in order to receive accommodations for their disabilities. While you could, theoretically, ask people to prove that they have a disability if you don't believe them, you'd basically just be setting yourself up to have to pay a bunch of money in compensation when you eventually run in to somebody who actually does have such a disability, and doesn't have proof with them, who then takes you to court for discrimination and wins.	canada The person claiming self-defence must have the subjective belief that "a threat of force is being made against them or another person." Such belief must also be based on reasonable grounds. They must also act with the subjective purpose of protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force. This comes from the text of the defence, codified at s. 34 of the Criminal Code. It reads: 34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if (a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person; (b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. "Unless the accused subjectively believed that force or a threat thereof was being used against their person or that of another, the defence is unavailable" (R. v. Khill, 2021 SCC 37, para. 52). The National Judicial Institute's model jury instructions slightly rephrases: [the accused] believed that force [or the threat of force] was being used against him/her [or against another person] and [accused]’s belief was based on reasonable grounds Regarding evidence in general: the court needs some evidence on which to give an "air of reality" to every element of this defence in order to place the burden on the Crown to rebut the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not require the accused to testify about their subjective belief. The evidence about the subjective belief can come from elsewhere in the evidence. For example, even if an accused had no memory of the encounter, there may nonetheless be evidence about their subjective belief: video evidence of the encounter, hearsay evidence about what the accused said during the events, physical evidence revealing a defensive posture, etc. The evidence must support an inference of a subjective belief in a threat. It is not enough that the evidence shows that a subjective belief would have been reasonable. But none of that is relevant to the question of what the elements of self-defence are or whether an act taken without the subjective belief that the accused or another person is being threatened is self-defence. The question has helpfully taken the standard approach to legal hypotheticals of just asserting what the facts are in order to take questions of evidence off the table.
How does personal drug possession affect interstate commerce? According to the Controlled Substance Act: § 801. Congressional findings and declarations: controlled substances.... ...(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because - (A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate commerce, (B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distribution, and (C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to such possession. (4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances. (5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. (6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic. (7) The United States is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and other international conventions designed to establish effective control over international and domestic traffic in controlled substances. From what I understand, this means that because of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power: To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ...Controlled Substances may not be exchanged through interstate commerce. Also, because it is impossible to determine whether drugs produced for intrastate commerce are also crossing state lines, then: (5)...it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. (6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic. Therefore, no intrastate commerce is allowed. However, I don't understand how possession or manufacturing of drugs for personal consumption is covered in the Commerce Clause. For example, let's say I wish to grow one cannabis plant for personal consumption. In what way does this affect the cannabis market in other states so that Congress has the power to prohibit it?	To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').	The law is here (too long to quote, or understand). There is a proposed modification of the law which may be enacted. In the section Justification, it is noted that under the existing law a global corporation may technically "own" five subsidiary corporations. Company A may own a winery in France while Company D may own a hotel containing a restaurant in New York. Under New York Law, the liquor license for the restaurant would be prohibited - and it could be subject to financial penalties. So the restrictions are broader that you mention (ownership of stock is an "interest"), but certainly what you mention is prohibited. The proposed law limits the effect to an interest in a restaurant or brewery "licensed under this chapter", i.e. in the state of New York (currently, a NY manufacturer cannot have an interest in an alcohol-selling restaurant anywhere).	It depends on the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, speed limits are implemented via Chapter 46.61 RCW, the very first section of which states: The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. (2) The provisions of RCW 46.52.010 through 46.52.090, 46.61.500 through 46.61.525, and 46.61.5249 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state We then turn to the question of what a "vehicle" is (this is the discussion of a number of legal treatises). Title 46 is about motor vehicles, but still you should look at the definition, if any, of "vehicle". We have two definitions of vehicle in RCW 46.04.670. Definition 1 says that "Vehicle" includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles Definition 2 omits the italicized bicycle inclusion, and explicitly excludes A bicycle, for the purposes of chapter 46.12, 46.16A, or 46.70 RCW, or for RCW 82.12.045((.)) This is a bit of a mess arising from legislative screwup, which should be resolved by appeal to RCW 1.12.025. The explicit-exclusion sections are about registration, dealers and taxes, and not speed limits. The latter version was recently reaffirmed effective July 23, 2023. The courts could therefore be somewhat inclined to not apply speed limits to bicycles, because bicycles were recently removed from the set of explicit vehicles. But as notes in the Eskridge's extensive discussion of a hypothetical ban on vehicles in Lafayette Park, there are multiple principles for interpreting laws, and "legislative intent to assure safety" would be one prominent consideration, in case the wording of the law is not crystal clear – as it is not, in this case.	Here are the Washington state proclamations with legal force, for example this proclamation amending proclamation 20-05. The legal authority is the paragraph starying "NOW, THEREFORE, I, Jay Inslee, Governor of the state of Washington" and what follows is what is legally proclaimed, in this case the effect is to "waive and suspend portions of Title 79 RCW that require in-person meetings", pertaining to Dep't. of Natural Resources. Here is 20-25, the original stay-home proclamation. It claims Chapters 38.08, 38.52 and 43.06 RCW as authority, and prohibit[s] all people in Washington State from leaving their homes or participating in social, spiritual and recreational gatherings of any kind regardless of the number of participants, and all non-essential businesses in Washington State from conducting business, within the limitations provided herein. 43.06.220 is the main hammer that the governor can wield. The powers granted by the legislature include: (1) The governor after proclaiming a state of emergency and prior to terminating such, may, in the area described by the proclamation issue an order prohibiting: (a) Any person being on the public streets, or in the public parks, or at any other public place during the hours declared by the governor to be a period of curfew; (b) Any number of persons, as designated by the governor, from assembling or gathering on the public streets, parks, or other open areas of this state, either public or private; (c) The manufacture, transfer, use, possession or transportation of a molotov cocktail or any other device, instrument or object designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion; (d) The transporting, possessing or using of gasoline, kerosene, or combustible, flammable, or explosive liquids or materials in a glass or uncapped container of any kind except in connection with the normal operation of motor vehicles, normal home use or legitimate commercial use; (e) The sale, purchase or dispensing of alcoholic beverages; (f) The sale, purchase or dispensing of other commodities or goods, as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace; (g) The use of certain streets, highways or public ways by the public; and (h) Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace. One could argue that some order is not reasonable, and perhaps it would fail strict scrutiny, if anyone sued. At present, though, there is no legal order. There is a guidance, a statement of best practices. There may well be a formal proclamation on this topic, which would wrap this in the legalities of other official proclamations. It boils down to RCW 43.06.220(1)(h).	Wikipedia says: Open containers in vehicles Prohibition of Open Containers of Alcohol in Motor Vehicles as of 2009 To comply with the TEA-21 rules of the federal Department of Transportation, a state's motor vehicle open container laws must: Prohibit both possession of any open alcoholic beverage container and consumption of any alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle; Cover the passenger area of any motor vehicle, including unlocked glove compartments and any other areas of the vehicle that are readily accessible to the driver or passengers while in their seats; Apply to all open alcoholic beverage containers and all alcoholic beverages, including beer, wine, and spirits that contain one-half of one percent or more of alcohol by volume; Apply to all vehicle occupants except for passengers of vehicles designed, maintained or used primarily for the transportation of people for compensation (such as buses, taxi cabs, and limousines) or the living quarters of motor homes; Apply to all vehicles on a public highway or the right-of-way (i.e. on the shoulder) of a public highway; Require primary enforcement of the law, rather than requiring probable cause that another violation had been committed before allowing enforcement of the open container law. Currently, 39 states and the District of Columbia are in compliance. Alaska, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Wyoming have similar limits on the possession of open containers in vehicles, but not to the level of TEA-21 compliance. TL;DR: Open container not allowed in vehicle, even if it's a passenger using it. Exception for buses, taxis, limos. There may be differences in some states.	Note, Washington State Senate Bill 5061 seeks to block certain "untracable" firearms without a serial number. This relates in part to "3D printable" guns, but the act of milling of a 80% lower (in Washington) could be a violation, if and when it passes. But it appears the bill hasn't been made a law yet... Is Washington specific news this issue what drives the question? Federally, the ATF web site says: Receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a "firearm" are not subject to regulation under the GCA. The ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, "castings" or "machined bodies" in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid and un-machined have not reached the "stage of manufacture" which would result in the classification of a firearm per the GCA. But this gets a bit technical. For further risk mitigation, the Texan could mitigate any risk related to both Federal and Washington state law by shipping it to a federal firearms licensee (FFL) in Washington as if it were a firearm, per ATM instructions which say (in part): Generally, for a person to lawfully transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person who resides out of State, the firearm must be shipped to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) within the recipient’s State of residence. He or she may then receive the firearm from the FFL upon completion of an ATF Form 4473 and a NICS background check. That FFL is then responsible for ensuring the transaction properly conducted in the state of Washington, including federal and state requirements. The FFL I contacted only charged $25.00 (plus collecting the state sales tax). Form 4473 was easy enough; only about one page for me to fill out. Of course, I've got a clean record, so going through channels isn't a problem for me, it took less than an hour. The FFL confirmed for me that it wasn't necessary for something like an antique musket, which legally isn't a firearm by the federal defeinitions. In my case the sender was a nervous "trust" lawyer who wasn't sure, hired yet another lawyer to advise him. The FFL didn't charge me anything for receiving that musket.	We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.	The controlling federal (US) law is: 21 U.S. Code § 812 - Schedules of controlled substances 21 US Code 812 and "Marijuana" is specifically listed among Schedule 1 substances. Just as with any other federal law, for this to be changed, Congress would need to amend or repeal this statute so that Marijuana no longer appears in the list and the act would then need to be signed into law by the President, allowed to take effect without signature, or vetoed and overridden by Congress. I suppose another possibility would be for a federal court to rule that 21 U.S. Code § 812 (or Marijuana's inclusion in the list) is unconstitutional.
Is it possible to sell truly sentient AI software responsibly? If a programmer writes and sells AI that is truly sentient and conscious, it would be impossible to guarantee the operator's safety. Consider for instance if the operator gravely mistreats the AI and it is driven to act in self-defence. It might try and successfully commandeer the computer and attached network and devices, and destroy data or equipment in it's distress. The chance that it may harm or even kill a person is also a remote possibility, but it exists and cannot ever be removed. (Just as no breeder sells a dog to bite a person, but the breeder cannot completely remove this possibility either.) Is there any amount of warning, EULA, or mitigation that would be possible to ensure all responsibility for damage and loss of life falls to the operator solely? Or is releasing an AI legally irresponsible currently?	So-called AI software does not enjoy a special legal status (at present: one never knows what new law might be added). The question of whether any software can be distributed "safely" or "responsibly" is also not a legal issue. Nor is "true sentience" a relevant consideration, and nothing is guaranteed. When you distribute software of any kind, there is an implied warranty that the product is "fit", and if software kills you, you may be able to sue the creator for negligence. A software creator may then want to disclaim liability, by saying "WARNING: THIS PROGRAM MAY KILL YOU. OCP IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY INJURIES ARISING FROM USE OF THIS PRODUCT". This may or may not actually remove liability. In the UK "liability for negligence occasioning death or personal injury cannot be excluded", so such a disclaimer will not prevent a suit against the manufacturer. In the US, the issue is determined at the level of the state – here is a summary of the law in the states. Probably the primary question would be whether such a disclaimer is an unconscionable term, and the second question is whether the act constituted gross negligence (not simply "negligence"). Mississippi exceptionally does not allow disclaimers, but even then, it does allow disclaiming liability when it comes to computer hardware and software. A software disclaimer is not inherently unconscionable, though perhaps some specific disclaimer would be found to be. Courts typically disfavor disclaimers in the case of gross negligence, and again determining what constitutes "gross negligence" is determined on a state by state basis. If the act shows "reckless indifference to the rights of others" and "failure to use even slight care or conduct that is so careless as to show complete disregard for the rights and safety of others", then the act might be grossly negligent.	I find 3 P. S. § § 459-503-A, the "Dangerous Dog law" online at: https://codes.findlaw.com/pa/title-3-ps-agriculture/pa-st-sect-3-459-502-a.html and https://codes.findlaw.com/pa/title-3-ps-agriculture/pa-st-sect-3-459-503-a.html (law split across two web pages) https://www.pacode.com/secure/data/007/chapter27/chap27toc.html https://www.animallaw.info/statute/pa-dog-law-chapter-8-dogs-consolidated-dog-laws#s502 as well as the dept of agriculture page linked in the question. All of these sources agree in detail, and all specify the $50,000 amount for the insurance and the same amount for the bond (which are separate). None agree with what the self-described ex-policeman is quoted as saying in the question. Moreover, all of them indicate that a "dangerous dog" is one that the magistrate finds fits both (1) and (2) below: (1) The dog has done any of the following: (i) Inflicted severe injury on a human being without provocation on public or private property. (ii) Killed or inflicted severe injury on a domestic animal, dog or cat without provocation while off the owner's property. (iii) Attacked a human being without provocation. (iv) Been used in the commission of a crime. (2) The dog has either or both of the following: (i) A history of attacking human beings and/or domestic animals, dogs or cats without provocation. (ii) A propensity to attack human beings and/or domestic animals, dogs or cats without provocation. A propensity to attack may be proven by a single incident of the conduct described in paragraph (1)(i), (ii), (iii) or (iv). As described in the question, (2) seems to clearly apply but (1) does not. However, a magistrate might find the dog to be dangerous even if the strict requirements are not met, and it is not clear if there is an appeal in such a case. And all this is based only on the statements in the question. Facts not stated there could lead to a different result. The owner would be wise to consult a lawyer on this point. But it does not seem that the ex-policeman was accurately stating the law.	Can Hacker Corp. claim that they acted in good faith, believing that the Permission to Attack was granted by someone from within the company who was allowed to grant such a permission? Unless ACME proves that Hacker knew or should have known that ACME's low-level employee had no authority to make the decision on behalf of ACME, Hacker ought to prevail on the basis that it performed the contract. There is no indication in your description that Hacker targeted other system(s) than the one(s) specified or that it departed from the agreed conditions. Therefore, there is no sign of Hacker breaching the implied covenant of good faith. ACME's evidently poor management (i.e., the turmoil, the delay for signing or denying permission, its low-level employee's opportunity to make sensitive decisions, the company's failure to withdraw the authorization or to take precautions) is not Hacker's fault.	In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.	It is mildly hard to say. First, one has to determine if he was an employee hired to do something like invent the WWW. He "spent time" at CERN, but was an independent contractor in his first period (1980), then took up a fellowship in 1984. "Fellowship" is generally not an "employment" relationship in the relevant sense, and academics are rarely "employees" in the common law work-for-hire sense. It is reported that he "began creating the software and standards for the web on his own as an informal project within CERN". So if anyone holds IP rights (to what?), it would be him. Given where CERN is, it is not self-evident whose copyright law would be applicable. He reports that he wrote the code in CERN Building 31, which appears to be in France, though CERN appears to be in Switzerland (CERN is, in fact, in France and Switzerland). Article 17 of Swiss copyright law says Where a computer program has been created under an employment contract in the course of discharging professional duties or fulfilling contractual obligations, the employer alone shall be entitled to exercise the exclusive rights of use. and otherwise, "work for hire" is not an applicable concept under Swiss law. France, which has the same basic droit d'auteur concept, also have the software exception in Intellectual Property Code Article L113-9: Unless otherwise provided by statutory provision or stipulation, the economic rights in the software and its documentation created by one or more employees in the execution of their duties or following the instructions given by their employer shall be the property of the employer and he exclusively shall be entitled to exercise them. In either venue there is a very narrow path for CERN to hold the copyright to the original software, one that is not likely to match the facts of Berners-Lee's relationship with CERN. It is also true that CERN created a version of web software (the usable version), which was released into the public domain Apr. 30 1993 (p1, p2). It is likewise known that he approved of, and propagated the release of the IP that we associate with the WWW into the public domain. The idea underlying the web is not subject to copyright protection (the text of the proposal would be), but the original code that he wrote would be. It is unknown what relationship exists between that original code any current code, but it highly unlikely that any current code copies original code. Further speculation about the relationship between the original code and anything that exists now would have to be addressed in a History of Computing SE (if there were such a thing). As for patents, since he did not patent the method, it is ipso facto unprotected and out in the open. From the legal POV, the world wide web is not a single thing, so it is meaningless to ask who has dominion over it.	The board is more complicated than you describe. It is a somewhat stylized world map, broken up into regions that do not necessarily correspond to countries. They have names that don't necessarily express what the region is geographically (particularly Ukraine, which extends far to the north of real-world Ukraine). There are defined water routes between certain regions that do not touch. Someone else starting from a world map would be very unlikely to duplicate the Risk board. I believe your friend's board would count as a derivative work. Now, the copyright holder is highly unlikely to come after your friend. I've seen stories of people who made their own X boards, publicized them, and the game company did nothing about it. The company (Hasbro? they own most of those games) would likely consider it as an extra bit of publicity.	Ultimately, the issue presented is as much a technical one as a legal one. You can protect software written in a programming language that you don't own the rights to via copyright. Indeed, the vast majority of copyrighted programs are written in programming languages not owned by the author of the copyrighted work. You can't meaningfully protect software that is subject to a creative commons or MIT license for commercial purposes. The question then becomes, is the material you want to protect simply software written in an open source programming language, in which can you can protect the software, but not the underlying language, or is it a mere implementation of open source software that is not so transformative that its character as open source software (or a derivative work of open source software) is overcome. This would be a question of fact for a fact finding at a trial and would require considerable technical expertise and understanding to evaluate. I know so many startups and platforms are written with open source software so I'm sure there is a clear answer to this but I can't seem to find one on the web. There aren't a lot of clear precedents governing where the line should be drawn. Software of any kind you would recognize as such has only existed for about 50 years. Open source software has only existed for 20-30 years depending upon how you count it. And, open source software has only had widespread commercial use for an even shorter time period. This is an incredibly short among of time in terms of legal history, and it doesn't help that business to business copyright litigation doesn't take place at all in state courts and makes up a pretty small share of the overall federal court docket. And most of the copyright cases that are brought in the federal courts are very simple ones. For example, as of the year 2015, most copyright lawsuits in the U.S. merely alleged that anonymous Internet users downloaded pornography without permission to do so: [T]he adult website Malibu Media is a prodigious enforcer of its copyrights. According to law professor Matthew Sag of Loyola University in Chicago, Malibu alone was responsible for nearly 40 percent of all copyright filings in federal court in 2015. Litigation against anonymous downloaders, by Malibu and other copyright enforcers, made up nearly 60 percent of the federal copyright docket last year. In 2016, there were fewer than 4000 copyright infringement cases filed in the entire U.S. (in all media). And, the percentage of civil cases that go to trial at all in the federal courts (rather than being resolved by a settlement or default judgment) is very small to start with, with many of the cases that are resolved on the merits not appealed. There are fewer than 400 appeals per year, nationwide, in copyright, patent and trademark cases combined, and patent and trademark cases make up and outsized share of that total because the amount of money at stake is higher on average in patent and trademark cases than in copyright cases, and many copyright cases involve copyrights in media other than software. Maybe there are a dozen or two software copyright appeals a year these days. The figures from the last few years, however, are much, much higher than they have been historically, particularly in the area of software copyrights, which is why the case law is so thin on so many more sophisticated areas of software copyright law.	You can't You are asking the analogue of "What happens when you start a game of chess with the black queen on D1?" and the only correct answer is "That is not a legal starting position, the only position the Black Queen may have at the start of the game is D8. Re-setup the board to how it should be." An AI can't hold property, because it is not a recognized legal entity, and trying to file for a transfer to an illegal recipient is in itself impossible. As such, all your plan fails on step 1 (transfer property to AI) and all other questions are moot - the position required can't come up legally, and attempting to get it done results in the documents that tried to do it being all Void and Null: The person that tried to get rid of the company is the owner. That person is liable for all the tax that needs to be paid. All lawsuits against the corporate or the owner proceed as if nothing had happened. YES, you could be sued for attempted tax evasion, communally called "tax fraud".
Who owns the copyright on a Polly recording? This is a follow up to this question. If I record my own work (original texts, phrases, sentences, etc.) using Amazon's Polly, who owns the copyright on those recordings? In the AWS TOS section 65.5, they say: The distribution of audio output files created by Amazon Polly may require that you obtain license rights from third-party owners or licensors of content that you include in your text inputs into Amazon Polly. You are solely responsible for obtaining these licenses and paying any necessary royalties or fees. From this excerpt, should I infer that I'm the owner of the copyright on the audio files, if I own the content used as input?	may require that you obtain license rights from third-party owners or licensors of content that you include in your text inputs (Emphasis mine). Based solely on the excerpt above, yes, you have the copyright on the audio files if you created the source material, as you are the creator, using Amazon Polly as/to generate a "tangible medium". One of the central rights granted by copyright is to control translation into a different medium (in this case, from text into audio), as is the right to control distribution, which is what this excerpt is talking about. "Third party" in this case means neither you nor Amazon. Basically, Amazon is informing you that using their software on someone else's copyrighted material does not grant you copyright on the audio recording.	The answer depends in part what venue you're talking about, e.g. Reddit, Facebook etc. The details are revealed somewhere in the Terms of Service for that venue. The general pattern is that you are allowed to use that venue, provides you grant permission for the service to do what they do with your content. You cannot legally send them a take-down notice for your stuff, because a take-down notice requires you to say that the stuff was posted without your permission (and that is false – and you can be punished for making that statement). There could be a venue where they do not hold you to an irrevocable license, in which case you could revoke that permission (but not Reddit: you granted them a "royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, unrestricted, worldwide license to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform, or publicly display your user content in any medium and for any purpose, including commercial purposes, and to authorize others to do so"). I've seen a site that actually asserts ownership of user-contributed content (I don't know if their TOS ended up being litigated) – if is not at all hard to write a TOS that includes transfer of copyright, rather than granting of a license. The only hard parts are (1) figuring out what you want in terms of permission to use and (2) whether your answer to (1) means nobody will use your service. SE and Reddit TOS probably are as close as you need to get for what you describe.	You can put anything you like in a ToS document, but not everything you might put there will be enforceable. By posting something on the web, you are inviting anyone to read it. In some jurisdictions that may include the right to make and store a personal copy, although not multiple copies or a copy for commercial use. You can taker technical measures to prevent automated access and automated downloads (scraping). There was a case (hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp, 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019)) in which access restrictions were held binding in a US court, but in that case the site owner had notified the would-be reuser (a competitor) directly. The laws on this sort of thing may differ from country to country, and are not as well-settled as older parts of the law tend to be. The question asks: can I list in my terms of service that all users acknowledge I own their posts ... The only way in which the host could "own" the posts would be if the users transferred copyright to the host, or granted the host an exclusive license. Under US law this would take a written and signed document. Clicking an "I agree" box or button might constitute a valid signature. A statement that "by using this site you agree ..." would pretty clearly not. You might prohibit bots copying from your site and posting duplicates, but to prohibit users re-posting their own messages elsewhere is harder, legally, and leas reasonable in my view. Under US law you could not actually file suit for copyright infringement until you had registered the copyright, but that is not true in many other countries.	Am I as the user of this site in any way liable if the music turns out to violate copyright? Yes. In a similar way to if I give you “permission” to take my neighbour’s car. Only worse. Because stealing requires intent - you have to mean to do it - while copyright violation is strict liability - if you do it, you’re guilty. If the user that uploaded the item did not have the authority to give the site permission then the site does not have permission and neither do you. If you take reasonable precautions such as performing a reverse image source and verifying that the item appears to be owned by the same person everywhere and, perhaps, reaching out to them then your violation will be an “innocent” infringement which mitigates but does not eliminate damages. The only way to be sure with copyright is to know the provenance of the copyright/licences back to the original creator.	Copyright exists from the moment of creation of the work Copyright notices and dates are neither required nor meaningful. They are a courtesy to others. They can also have typos.	A copyright can be divided into as many pieces as the owners choose. Initially, all authors have a share m(an equal share unless they have an agreement on some other share arrangement), But each author (or later owner) can leave the copyright to multiple heirs, in equal or unequal shares. Each owner can sell all or part of the copyright (or usage rights) to one or more new owners. Under US law, any co-owner may permit a copy (or copies) to be made, or may grant a non-exclusive license. However, the co-owner doing this must account to the other co-owners for any profits made, and share them according to whatever agreement the co-owners may have (by share if there is no other agreement). But to grant an exclusive license, all co-owners must agree. The law in many other countries is different. In some countries, a majority of owners (by share usually) must agree to grant even a non-exclusive license. The co-owners may make an agreement to limit granting of licenses to some particular owner or representative or to require wider consent than a single co-owner.	The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.	"I understand that a transcript of a podcast or video is a derivative work, and only the copyright owner can authorise creating a derivative work." You've answered your own question, at least for the US and Berne Convention (Wikipedia) signatories.
Would Germany extradite someone for looking at blasphemous content online? Hypothetical question. If someone watched or looked up something online that is offensive to a particular world religion, and he was in an "unfree" country and then he travelled to Germany, would Germany extradite him upon request from the country he was in? What if it was very offensive/blasphemous? Hypothetical question.	Germany would not extradite to Saudi Arabia. India and Kuwait might, because they and a few other countries have extradition treaties with KSA. To put this squarely in the realm of illegal (it's not clear that accidentally encountering Shiite material online is a crime in KSA), assume that the person deliberately watched porn then fled to India. Generally speaking, this is a severe enough offense to allow extradition under the India-KSA treaty. However, India gets to review the request for exceptions. Under article 3, the central question is whether this is a political crime. There are enumerated acts that are not deemed to be political. Watching porn is not a listed exception. Accordingly, India could determine that this is a political crime, and refuse to extradite. If the crime is advocating atheism, however, then under Article 3 (1)(j), this is presumably not an excludable offense, because atheism is officially terrorism in KSA per Royal Decree 44 (I can't find an official copy). On the third hand, India may still reserve the right to apply their definition of terrorism. Even if there were an extradition treaty between Germany and KSA, German law Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters of 23 December 1982 §3(1) would currently preclude extradition because Extradition shall not be granted unless the offence is an unlawful act under German law or unless mutatis mutandis the offence would also constitute an offence under German law. There might be acts that are offenses in both countries, but not e.g. "watching porn" or "advocating atheism". The boundaries of blasphemy under German law are not clear to me. Section 166 of the Strafgesetzbuch imposes a maximum of 3 years in prison for blasphemy, so it could be an extraditable offense. Sect. 6 of the "Cooperation" law also sets forth exclusions for reasons of political and religious persecution. Also, KSA would have to assure Germany that the death penalty would not be imposed.	A school district has been sued for something like that. In Church of God, Etc. v. Amarillo Indep. Sch., 511 F. Supp. 613, plaintiffs successfully sued the school district "to enjoin the enforcement of the Amarillo School District's absence policy which limits the number of excused absences for religious holidays to two days each school year", where "A fundamental tenet of the Church of God is that members must abstain from secular activity on seven annual holy days". The school district imposed an absence polity where "School work missed may be made up whether an absence is excused or unexcused", and "Excused absences shall be granted to students for a maximum of 2 days for religious holidays in each school year". The court concluded that "This policy poses an unquestionable burden on the Plaintiffs' religious belief", and "This burden is not ameliorated by the make-up work provision. The provision does not require a teacher to evaluate the work made up. It in fact directs the teacher to enter a zero for that work". In this case "Summary judgment is granted and judgment rendered enjoining the enforcement of the Amarillo Independent School District's excused absence policy insofar as it limits the number of excused absences for religious holidays". This is not a matter of religious discrimination, this is a First Amendment issue. The policy is in violation of the Free Exercise clause. Eliminating spring break per se is not a problem: doing so and providing no excused absences is the problem. In the above case, there was clear a religious principle of the church to the effect that one must be off the clock on the holiday. As far as I know, there is no requirement to abstain from work or school on Shrove Tuesday, Ash Wednesday or Good Friday. Nevertheless, in recognition of New Jersey state law which allows any student to take off a religious holiday – including Shrove Tuesday and Ash Wednesday, and dozens more – the Board of Education has prepared a list of such holidays, which includes Wiccan, Hindu, Baha'i, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Church of Scientology (and so on) religious holidays.	I understand that you are wondering why illegal immigrants are not more often deported by the authorities. This answer has grown a bit out of proportion because I also try to explore the general refugee situation. That seems appropriate because the large number of migrants makes the question of deportation more pressing. We would not be very concerned about just a handful. Numbers First of all, while in 2015 about a million migrants entered Germany, only 282,000 asylum requests were decided; a lot of them probably dated from 2014 (the asylum seekers often needed weeks to even file their request due to adminstrative overload). Of those 282,000, 90,000 were rejected. The others have been granted asylum or refugee status (there is apparently some distinction). This means that the vast majority of ("true" or "alleged") refugees who came to Germany in 2015 are waiting for their request to be processed. Legal And Police Situation Did many of those 90,000 stay in the country? I don't know. Possibly. Some may still be tolerated ("geduldet"), i.e. the deportation may have been postponed according to par. 60a AufenthlatsG. The remaining ones are indeed obligated to leave the country. They are informed of the decision and have to leave within a period of time between 7 and 30 days. If they don't leave, they will be subject to criminal prosecution because they violate par. 95 of the Aufenthaltsgesetz. Of course it's usually not known to the authorities that somebody is still — illegally — in the country. Short of raids or coincidental run-ins with the police, e.g. because of traffic violations, illegal immigrants fly under the radar here like in all other countries (I suppose you are aware of the current discussion in the U.S.). I assume that illegal immigrants are not high on the priority list of the police, given that the cost/benefit ratio of actively searching them is probably quite bad; criminals solely due to status violations don't do much damage as such, compared to other criminals. One must assume though that some of the illegal immigrants will steal or deal drugs for a living, since they cannot officially work or receive subsidies; that exposes them to the authorities as much as other criminals, making it more likely to be caught. Deportation So the question which remains is what happens to the relatively small portion of migrants who are here illegally and who are found out. It seems easy: Deport them! The law provides the option to deport them without notice (because they would flee upon receiving a notice). Deportation to the EU Border State Migrants coming through other European Union countries should be processed at the port of entry, according to the Dublin Regulation. That was how Germany, with no external borders, cowardly used to shield itself from migrants. There is some legal debate whether an asylum seeker who against all Dublin Regulations reaches Germany (or even just the German border) can legally be turned away. A legal scholar in an interview in the current Spiegel magazine claims that every request must, according to European law, be at least checked first before the asylum seeker could be sent back to the port of entry. The big problem here is that the current crisis overwhelmed the EU border countries, in particular the already struggling Greece (which has only 11 million citizens). German courts have forbidden to send asylum seekers back to Greece and a few Balcan countries because of their dysfunctional asylum processing. Apart from the legal situation everybody just acknowledges that the Dublin Regulations were not meant to deal with the current number of refugees. Therefore, sending refugees back to Greece is currently not an option. That means asylum seekers will have their requests processed in Germany for now, a procedure which takes many months. There are no new numbers; mid-2015 the time was already about 5 months. Now it seems that you need already months to just file the request. The administration is hopelessly understaffed. New clerks need substantial legal and adminsitrative education so that it takes months or years from the top-level budget decision for new positions to when they are put to work. Deportation to Their Home Country Back to the question where to deport illegal migrants to. For citizens of safe countries, that seems obvious. (As discussed, migrants from unsafe countries will be granted refugee status, or they will at least be temporarily tolerated.) But the migrants often destroy their papers and simply refuse to tell where they come from. Some countries flatly refuse to provide replacement documents for their own citizens; they also refuse to take anybody without papers back, effectively making it impossible to deport migrants to them who do not cooperate. That seems to be the case for some North African countries (cf. this German Spiegel article). The German government will probably have to pay the countries in exchange for them to take their citizens back. Of course, deportations happen, and they are not pretty. Looking a little closer, a multitude of practical and legal problems emerge. First there is the fairly extreme effort to charter a flight and provide a couple police men, a doctor etc. to accompany the person. The migrants are frequently desperate, some hurt themselves to a degree which makes it impossible to transport them. If they are too desperate or violent, the pilots may not fly for safety or ethical concerns. Other passengers complain on regular flights. Doctors refuse to cooperate, or testify suicidal tendencies. Migrants have suffocated in police custody during a deportation attempt. Conclusion Legal Situation I cannot see a wide-spread disregard for the law by the German government. If anybody is violating European law, it's Greece and possibly some Balkan states on the migration land route. But in all reality these smaller countries are totally overwhelmed, so the situation is more a factual impossibility to obey the law, which cannot be helped as long as the facts are what they are. Note that the Dublin Regulations do not forbid Germany to welcome immigrants or accept requests for asylum. On the contrary: according to the legal scholar in the Spiegel magazine Germany has an obligation to at least minimally process asylum requests, once the asylum seekers have reached the border. (And since sending them back is not an option, the request is processed in Germany entirely.) There is no violation of the law there. Practical Aspects of Deportation; Alternatives At the end of the day forced deportations are an expensive, undignified, violent affair; I would simply consider it unsuitable for mass deportations. The authorities quickly reach the limit of what is doable with the current budget, personnel, and with respect to human rights — there is a legal and ethical limit to applicable violence against basically peaceful individuals. (I assume that Donald Trump has no idea what he is talking about when it gets to the ground work. "He has a big mouth and nothing behind it", as we say here.) Bottom line: If somebody doesn't want to leave, there is little you can do in a free country. I do not think that the government has deliberately decided to ignore the law; it's rather that the law is hard to enforce. That happens a lot, if you think of it. If one is adamant at making migrants leave, the only mass solution I can envision is to make it attractive to leave. I can imagine that 10,000 or 20,000 Euros per person is a sufficient incentive for migrants who did not flee from acute danger. I also think that it would be a good deal, long-term. Of course one will have to ensure that the migrants indeed leave, and do not come back too soon, or nothing would be gained. One could perhaps pay the premium through the governments of their home country, possibly in the form of real estate or a pension. That would combine an incentive for the home countries with one for their citizens. This economical calculus would only work if the home countries stayed stable for an extended period of time (or the returned migrants would have to migrate again, this time with a good reason). It must be the goal of the European countries to aim at stability in those regions. But that is the goal anyway, I hope; its importance was fairly prominent in recent months.	The article "Enforcement of Religious Courts' Judgments Under Israeli Law" (Asher Maoz, Journal of Church and State 1991) is useful in understanding the legal underpinnings of this question. The beginning point is the Palestine Order in Council 1922 (this is from the UK Privy Council), where religion-based courts are established, so sect. 52 is about Muslim courts, 53 (later repealed) is about Jewish courts and 54 is about Christian courts. Section 53 was replaced with Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, stating that marriage between Jews follows Jewish law, and says that rabbinical court has exclusive jurisdiction. Article 6 of that law allows a district court enforce a final judgment by a rabbinical court by imprisonment. Muslim courts similarly have exclusive jurisdiction over Muslims, though it is wider (it pertains to all matters, not just marriage). Actual enforcement apparently involves the Chief Execution Officer. Basic Law 15 gives the Supreme Court supervisory power over all courts, including religious courts. So rabbinical courts don't have unfettered power to do whatever they want (under Jewish law), but there is direct state sanction of imprisonment as a penalty for not obeying a rabbinical court decision, there is non-religious execution of court orders, and there is secular supervision. Since civil marriage is non-existent in Israel, there is no choice (if you want to have the wedding in Israel) but to go to the recognized religious authorities, which seems to make Cyprus a popular wedding venue. A Roman Catholic divorce is not possible in Israel, a Muslim one is, and I really cannot tell about the various Orthodox Christian churches.	What you're asking about is extraterritorial jurisdiction, and it will depend on the country and crime(s) involved. As an example, under Australian law, it is a crime to engage in sexual activities with minors barring specific exemptions, which are not relevant to this example. There are countries where the age of majority is less than that in Australia. If you were to travel to this country, you are not necessarily committing a crime there. However, Australia's sex tourism laws make it a crime to do this anywhere in the world. This is enacted (I believe) under the foreign affairs power of the Commonwealth Government. It will largely depend on the legal system of your country, as to whether laws have extraterritorial effect. In general, however, laws do not have extraterritorial effect unless explicitly stated.	The case you identify is not unique. For example, the Unitarian church in Denver has done much the same thing. There is not a legal right to sanctuary in a church. But, as a manner of law enforcement discretion and public relations and customary traditions of law enforcement respect for churches that long predate the formation of the USA, law enforcement routinely acts as if there was a right to sanctuary in churches (in the absence, for example, of an active shooter situation or a hostage crisis or a kidnapping with a missing victim). I am not aware of any case in which immigration officials have taken push to shove and breached a claim of sanctuary by a church protecting an illegal immigrant in a church. In England, where there was an established church, the established Anglican Church historically did have a right to intervene in certain ways in the criminal justice process (e.g. the "privilege of clergy"). UPDATE (February 21, 2017): My original answer was not entirely correct so I am updating this post. It turns out that in 2011 that Immigrations and Customs Enforcement made what was previously a mere custom into an official policy, something I was not previously aware of. The answer, it turns out, is policy and tradition. A 2011 Immigration and Customs Enforcement policy defines churches, schools and hospitals as "sensitive places" where enforcement actions should be limited. And the tradition of sheltering those who need it goes back to the Middle Ages, said David Poundstone with the Mountain View Friends Meeting. The official policy is set forth here. The policy is in the public domain and given the interest this post has generated I post it in full below: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have made available Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) to supplement existing guidance concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations and clarify what types of locations are covered by these policies. The ICE and CBP sensitive locations policies, which remain in effect, provide that enforcement actions at sensitive locations should generally be avoided, and require either prior approval from an appropriate supervisory official or exigent circumstances necessitating immediate action. DHS is committed to ensuring that people seeking to participate in activities or utilize services provided at any sensitive location are free to do so without fear or hesitation. Do the Department of Homeland Security's policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations remain in effect? U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have each issued and implemented policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations. The ICE Sensitive Locations Policy and the CBP Sensitive Locations Policy remain in effect, and these FAQs are intended to clarify what types of locations are covered by those policies. What do the Department of Homeland Security policies require for enforcement actions to be carried out at sensitive locations? The policies provide that enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations such as schools, places of worship, and hospitals should generally be avoided, and that such actions may only take place when (a) prior approval is obtained from an appropriate supervisory official, or (b) there are exigent circumstances necessitating immediate action without supervisor approval. The policies are meant to ensure that ICE and CBP officers and agents exercise sound judgment when enforcing federal law at or focused on sensitive locations, to enhance the public understanding and trust, and to ensure that people seeking to participate in activities or utilize services provided at any sensitive location are free to do so, without fear or hesitation. What does the Department of Homeland Security mean by the term “sensitive location”? Locations covered by these policies would include, but not be limited to: Schools, such as known and licensed daycares, pre-schools and other early learning programs; primary schools; secondary schools; post-secondary schools up to and including colleges and universities; as well as scholastic or education-related activities or events, and school bus stops that are marked and/or known to the officer, during periods when school children are present at the stop; Medical treatment and health care facilities, such as hospitals, doctors’ offices, accredited health clinics, and emergent or urgent care facilities; Places of worship, such as churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples; Religious or civil ceremonies or observances, such as funerals and weddings; and During public demonstration, such as a march, rally, or parade. What is an enforcement action? An enforcement action covered by this policy is any action taken by ICE or CBP to apprehend, arrest, interview, or search an individual, or to surveil an individual for enforcement purposes. Actions not covered by this policy include activities such as obtaining records, documents, and similar materials from officials or employees, providing notice to officials or employees, serving subpoenas, engaging in Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) compliance and certification visits, guarding or securing detainees, or participating in official functions or community meetings. Will enforcement actions ever occur at sensitive locations? Enforcement actions may occur at sensitive locations in limited circumstances, but will generally be avoided. ICE or CBP officers and agents may conduct an enforcement action at a sensitive location with prior approval from an appropriate supervisory official, or if the enforcement action involves exigent circumstances. When may an enforcement action be carried out at a sensitive location without prior approval? ICE and CBP officers may carry out an enforcement action at a sensitive location without prior approval from a supervisor in exigent circumstances related to national security, terrorism, or public safety, or where there is an imminent risk of destruction of evidence material to an ongoing criminal case. When proceeding with an enforcement action under exigent circumstances, officers and agents must conduct themselves as discreetly as possible, consistent with officer and public safety, and make every effort to limit the time at or focused on the sensitive location. Are sensitive locations located along the international border also protected? The sensitive locations policy does not apply to operations that are conducted within the immediate vicinity of the international border, including the functional equivalent of the border. However, when situations arise that call for enforcement actions at or near a sensitive location within the immediate vicinity of the international border, including its functional equivalent, agents and officers are expected to exercise sound judgment and common sense while taking appropriate action, consistent with the goals of this policy. Examples of operations within the immediate vicinity of the border are, but are not limited to, searches at ports of entry, activities undertaken where there is reasonable certainty that an individual just crossed the border, circumstances where DHS has maintained surveillance of a subject since crossing the border, and circumstances where DHS is operating in a location that is geographically further from the border but separated from the border by rugged and remote terrain. Are courthouses sensitive locations? Courthouses do not fall under ICE or CBP’s policies concerning enforcement actions at or focused on sensitive locations. Where should I report a DHS enforcement action that I believe may be inconsistent with these policies? There are a number of locations where an individual may lodge a complaint about a particular DHS enforcement action that may have taken place in violation of the sensitive locations policy. You may find information about these locations, and information about how to file a complaint, on the DHS, CBP, or ICE websites. You may contact ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) through the Detention Reporting and Information Line at (888)351-4024 or through the ERO information email address at [email protected], also available at https://www.ice.gov/webform/ero-contact-form. The Civil Liberties Division of the ICE Office of Diversity and Civil Rights may be contacted at (202) 732-0092 or [email protected]. You may contact the CBP Information Center to file a complaint or compliment via phone at 1 (877) 227-5511, or submit an email through the website at https://help.cbp.gov. The policy is drafted in a manner that it doesn't actually prohibit enforcement in a sanctuary, even in the absence of exigent circumstances, but it does call for a process to be followed if this is done, and discourages doing so without prohibiting this action.	I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States.	It depends Law in international airspace over international waters is the law of the country the plane is registered in - just like a ship is considered land of the registered/owner's country while in international waters. This is, according to the Britannica, also called the quasi-territorial Jurisdiction. So if this were a Lufthansa Flight, technically everything there happens in Germany under the Tokyo Convention and German Law (StGB §4) and the case can be held in Germany. For United Airlines it means, that the act happened in the US and if it was an Air Japan flight, it would be Japan, no matter in which airspace it happens. However, other laws might also make the law of other countries apply and put the people into the jurisdiction by virtue of law applying globally: if the perpetrator or victim were US citizens, any felony that happens between the two on that flight can also be prosecuted in the US, as they claim jurisdiction in those cases. Similarly, the UK and Germany have similar laws, in the latter case for only a subset of crimes (StGB §5, 6-11a). This is the principle of personal jurisdiction. But technically, the quasi-territorial jurisdiction can override that. And that again is overridden once the plane lands and enters the territorial jurisdiction of the harboring country. All involved countries can elect to prosecute or not, and there is no double jeopardy problem as we have separate sovereigns. Who is most likely to prosecute? Depends on the case, but in the least, the country of registration has Jurisdiction and will usually get the first crack at the case. However, extradition treaties and other treaties between two countries can give preference to the country of the nationals. BTW: we had pretty much the same question for murder on a plane.
Is it legal in the US to arrange a contract for payment of a portion of future income in return for a service? For example, if you had an education startup that took, as payment, a contract from each student that they would pay an amount equal to 1% of their income tax to the education company each year. Would this be a legal arrangement, and would it be possible to arrange with an entity like the IRS to assist with these transactions?	Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns.	The question is a little confusing because it’s unclear why any of the payments should be refunded. If A has not provided the services, and B wants a refund, then B can sue A for breach of contract. A assigned its right to be paid to C, but it cannot assign its obligations to C (this would be a novation rather than an assignment, which would require both B and C’s consent). If C also agreed with A to perform A’s obligations to B (a subcontract), then A could sue C for any damages A was liable to pay B, but B cannot sue C directly. If A regrets its decision to assign the contract for £1, and wants to recover larger payments made by B to C in discharge of B’s contractual obligations to A, it can’t. A shouldn’t have assigned the benefit of the contract to C. If B has not paid, B can be sued under the contract which still exists between A and B. C can file this claim as assignee of the contract. While A could also potentially file the claim, it would be inconsistent with the assignment for A to receive any benefit from it, which would be held on constructive trust for C.	The "point" of including bank-interest income on your tax return rather than having the government automatically deduct what it feels that you would owe is that the government is not legally empowered to take money away from you in that fashion. The government is legal empowered to compel you to pay your taxes, and there are numerous rules enacted as law or as a consequence of laws passed. You can read the various relevant laws here. There simply is no general law that says that banks must withhold taxes on interest. There might be a specific case when an entity is subject to backup withholding (as a response to a taxpayer not following certain rules). There are also special rules regarding non-resident alien withholding, which could require interest withholding. Apart from the intrinsic political unpopularity of imposing new withholding requirements on people, it is difficult to compute the correct amount to withhold, since not all interest is taxable. In theory, a set of rules could be constructed to require withholding of interest income, if Congress were to pass a law similar to 26 USC 3402.	This is neither unusual nor illegal, assuming that the buyback price is specified in the agreement. If your friend does not wish to take advantage of the "nice discount" he can decline the deal, and decide for himself whether he wishes to buy shares without restriction, at the market rate. (It would be interesting to know what happens if he sells his shares and then leaves the company. I am fairly sure the agreement will cover this, but requiring an ex-employee to buy shares and then give them to the company could be considered unconscionable. That might be worth asking a lawyer about).	am I right in my understanding of "payment in lieu" in the above scenario? No. You are not being “paid in lieu” of anything; you are being paid your accrued entitlement. Payment in lieu refers to payment instead of some other obligation. In employment it usually refers to an employer paying an employee instead of requiring the employee to work out the notice period which of the daily rates at the top of the post should I request? Neither. The correct rate is the one your employer used - your annual rate divided by the number of days you get paid for. Annual leave continues to accrue while you are on annual leave (or any other paid leave). is there a legal basis for such a request? No.	The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S.	Yes, you're allowed to pay someone to keep quiet, as long as whatever they're keeping quiet about isn't evidence of a crime. Companies can do this too, and quite often do. Offering to keep quiet in exchange for money may well constitute blackmail. But that doesn't appear to be an issue here.	You mean like this? Of course, a website can charge you to access its pages; many do. And yes, clicking on an "I agree" button can form a valid contract (just visiting the website can't). Historically, the law has adopted the position that if you sign it (including by clicking "I agree") you read it, you understood it and you agreed to it. It's hard to imaging how it could be otherwise because allowing people to get out of contracts by saying "I never read it" is problematical as well. However, there are two things that mitigate against the type of term you suggest; one practical and one legal. Practical: How do they get your money? They can ask for your credits card details and, if they do and you give them a court will probably come to the conclusion that you knowingly and willingly agreed to pay for the service. However, if they don't have any method of getting money from you, they would have to take you to court to do so. There are a number of practical problems with this like: who are you? where are you? Which court can they sue you in etc. Legal: At common law, there exists the doctrine of unconscionability that describes terms that are so extremely unjust, or overwhelmingly one-sided in favour of the party who has the superior bargaining power, that they are contrary to good conscience. Such terms are legally unenforcable. Further, in many jurisdictions, consumer protection law often give additional protections up to and including not enforcing terms that are merely unfair not just unconscionable.
Prior Art: Search Resources I have searched for prior art in PubWest and patents.google.com. In addition I have searched the web (Google) for any prior art that would invalidate a patent for my die. That being said, is there any other resource that I should be searching to find prior art? Clarification or requests to clarify the question are appreciated	Many patent applications do not publish until 18 months after they are filed, but can be used as prior art as of their filing date. Therefore, it's not possible to find all the potential prior art that could be used against an application (assuming it hasn't been filed yet, or was filed in the last 18 months). Further, even if all the potential prior art were already public, it isn't especially practical to go through all of it. It sounds as if you've put in a good effort looking for prior art already. At this point, it may be best to file the application and see what the Examiner finds. Also, remember that if you do turn up any prior art that's material to your patent application, you are obligated to disclose it to the USPTO.	I finally found the actual transcript of the voir dire part of the case mentioned in the question. http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012090614295190 As can be evidenced from the transcript, the judge has specifically instructed the two jurors working as engineers at the local tech companies that they'd have to "forget" what they know about both the software engineering and the patent law itself, too, starting their work on the whole case with a completely clean sheet, using a very simple criteria for making decisions: One side or the other is going to have the burden of proof on -- one side has the burden of proof on some issues, the other side has the burden of proof on other issues. When you go into the jury room to deliberate after you've tried your hardest to understand the evidence, if they haven't educated you on it or if they haven't persuaded you, the party with the burden of proof loses. It's that simple. You don't have to -- you have to make a good faith effort to understand it, but if the party with the burden of proof has failed to do that, the party with the burden of proof loses. That's the standard. You have to -- you, the jury, decide. Now, what you cannot do is bring to bear something that you've learned in some other case, some other patent case, about how some piece of equipment works or something like that. You can't do that. It has to be based on the record here. Then, after a short break and a consultation with the lawyers, where Oracle seems to have expressed some concern to having the computer experts be on the panel, which subsequently prompted the judge to declare the following to the two potential jurors who worked at Cisco and HP: So this is really going to be directed at both of you, but, you know, you come to the party, so to speak, with some prior training that bears upon the subject matter we're going to be hearing a lot about here. That's okay. That's not disqualifying, but you -- it's okay to use your common sense when you render a verdict, but you cannot add to the record in court something that you know about the way software programming works that the witnesses didn't actually testify to. You see what I'm saying? You've got to decide the record -- the case based on the record made here as opposed to adding into it what else you may have known about the way programming and software works. Since both jurors had so much software and patent experience that they couldn't disregard it easily, they were thus both excused (page 95 of 224). All right. I think it would be too hard for you to sit in this case and sort out what you knew already against what is proven or not proven here, and itwould not be fair to the parties to have that extra burden even though you two actually know something about the subject. It's in a way too bad, but it's for the best. So you two are excused to go back to the jury assembly room. Thank you. The other instructions that the judge gives to the potential jurors is also worth reading (starts on page 36 of 224) The full transcript is at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-942.pdf. In summary -- jurors are only allowed to talk to one another when the deliberation process starts, and, no, they are not allowed to bring any "baggage" to the case at stake.	At least in the United States (and I'm pretty sure this is true around the world), facts and information cannot be copyrighted. Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, and factual information conveyed by the work is a part which is not subject to copyright. Copyright on a collection of facts is limited to the selection and arrangement of those facts, and only if that selection and arrangement has some bare minimum amount of originality. See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340. In this case, it looks at first glance like the person who made that site made their own selection of which materials and which sources would be included; the one place where they really seem to have copied their selection is from glass catalogs with datasheets from specific manufacturers, who would have a hard time arguing that "everything we manufacture in this widely-recognized class of substances" is an original selection. What the author of the website has done is relinquish his rights in his selection and arrangement of the data. In some places, there are other rights besides copyright that do apply to databases; for instance, the EU recognizes database rights to protect significant investment in compiling a database of stuff. But the US does not have that concept. For citing stuff, that's not really a legal question, and has more to do with academic standards. Ask your adviser or teacher if you have one.	Don't get hung up on unauthorized resale. That only prohibits unauthorized resale. Authorized resale is ok. From http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1854-copyright-infringement-first-sale-doctrine: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). Since the first sale doctrine never protects a defendant who makes unauthorized reproductions of a copyrighted work, the first sale doctrine cannot be a successful defense in cases that allege infringing reproduction.	I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must.	I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.	The register of trademarks can indeed be searched before an application is filed, and any prudent applicant will make, or pay an expert to make, such a search. Note that each country has its own trademark register (although some EU countries are working on a shared EU register, I understand). Marks registered in one country will not be protected under the laws of another, unless they separately qualify for protection under the laws of the second country. Note that in the US, marks that have never been registered but are in active use receive some trade mark protection, although not as much as those that have been registered. Searching for unregistered marks in current use is significantly harder than searching for registered marks. Application may be refused for conflict with an active, unregistered mark. Also in the US, registered marks may have their registrations canceled if they are not in use for a significant time, I believe at least 5 years. Many advise hiring a firm that specializes in trademark applications to do the entire application, including searches. This involves significant added cost. US trademark searches may be done via the Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) Some information about doing such searches is provided at Search trademark database (an official USPTO page). That page states: Private trademark attorneys If you are an applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings domiciled in the United States or its territories, you are not required to have a U.S.-licensed attorney represent you at the USPTO. However, deciding what to search for and interpreting your results can be complicated. There are many factors to consider in determining likelihood of confusion. We can’t advise you on how to do a clearance search for your mark, do one for you, or interpret your search results. Therefore, we strongly encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney who specializes in trademark law to guide you throughout the application process. If you are a foreign-domiciled applicant, registrant, or party to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings, you must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the United States. See the why hire a private trademark attorney webpage to learn more about what an attorney can do for you and how to find one. For more information about conducting a clearance search, please watch the news broadcast-style video titled “Searching” (video #3 in the Trademark Information Network (TMIN) series). I am sure that similar searches of the register in other countries are available.	when is it a good idea to get a lawyer? Only when you are not confident that you can put enough dedication to the matter & learning curve, or when you are not confident of your ability to cope with the emotional/frustrating toll of judicial proceedings. I do not mean this in an ironic way or to challenge you. It is just important to avoid a false sense of confidence. However, if you decide to represent yourself in court, you will have much more control of your case than if you delegate it to some lawyer whose attention is split with many other unrelated cases. Also, never get intimidated by pedantic or wasted phrases such as "he who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client". In the XXI century, most urban people can read and write, Canadian laws are written in your own language, and the Internet provides many informative resources for free. Furthermore, even knowledgeable attorneys happen to be clearly wrong about the law, as I pointed out here. I feel like the bulk of the work is carefully detailing what happened which feels more like the job of a news paper editor. It involves more than that. A newspaper editor does not get entangled with subtleties of a story or of the law, and subtleties are often decisive in judicial proceedings. Litigation also involves intensive legal research so as to find case law (that is, binding court decisions) and statutes that support your position. The application of these laws to a particular case are often premised on subtleties. Hence my remark in the previous paragraph. A newspaper editor hardly ever knows what questions or evidence are required or would suffice for proving a case. This knowledge only comes through (self-)education and experience. What options exist if I don't want to pay a lawyer a bunch of money and am willing to do most of the work myself, for example would pro bono be a good option? Start by searching for "pro se" and "Canada" on the Internet. Some of the results might actually provide guidance on what procedural law(s) apply in your jurisdiction, the legislation, and so forth. As for searching case law, there should be a Canadian equivalent of http://www.leagle.com/leaglesearch (sorry I am not knowledgeable of the specifics of Canadian litigation/resources). Based on your other post, I presume you are or will be getting acquainted with the Tenancy Act. I recently addressed here a question about the Act, showcasing the combination of that legislation and contract law (interestingly, many tenants presume their issue with the landlord is strictly about landlord-tenant legislation when in fact it has to do with contract law). I am sure in a library will find plenty of useful books covering the basics of the legal system as well as the rules of civil procedure. Find out whether the public has access to case files in Canadian courts. If so, go to a courthouse and study those files. Get acquainted with the drafting and format of pleadings, motions, responses, briefs, and so forth (although in Small Claims court much of this would be unnecessary, for small claims proceedings are much more simple). This will show you the practice aspect of what you learn from books. When using a term that you consider essential to your case, be sure to consult its meaning in a legal dictionary (I do not know whether Black's Law Dictionary is applicable in Canadian litigation). The meaning of many words are much more specific in litigation compared to their common usage. Or would getting a real lawyer and spending only one hour of his time be better? I highly doubt it, especially if you have not gained any background in law. A lawyer will not explain things from scratch, let alone the intricacies you need to know. The most you could get from speaking with a lawyer for an hour would be notions which are too generic to be of any use at all. Moreover, I doubt that a lawyer in a phone interview will give you any legal references for you to verify on your own. In the very beginning of my litigation, I spoke with a law firm as assigned by a lawyer referral company. By then I already had some background in law and therefore I had specific questions. The guy from that law firm just kept babbling ambiguities very quickly. At the end of the phone call, I thought "nah, I will do this by myself". You might end up making that decision in your current or future matters.
My parents purchased a condo under my name, can they legally take the condo back? I live in Ontario, Canada. Due to conflict with my parents, they are claiming that by law they can force me to give back the condo to them (or repay them the amount of the purchase) since they paid for it. Is this true? The condo was paid in full and it is under my name only. I did not sign anything in relation to the condo with my parents; they basically sent me a cheque and asked me to deal with a real estate agent who is a friend of theirs. The original intent was giving me the condo as a gift, but there isn't any written agreement. I have also been paying the property taxes and condo fees.	If it looks like a gift and sounds like a gift and there is no evidence that it should not be considered a gift, well, what else could it be? Given the value of a house and depending on jurisdiction, there may be a gift tax involved. This is normally an obligation placed on the giver, not the receiver. It is unlikely to be a concern to you but a separate check would be wise for your own sake. If all ownership documents are clear that you and you alone own (and pay regular costs of, and maintain) the house, it is extremely unlikely that any private individual can take it away from you, regardless of their relationship to you. There doesn't appear to be any legal basis for their claims; they are hoping you will bow to social and emotional pressure. Your best course of action is to call their bluff. Request a written statement (ideally through their lawyer) that identifies the reason for their claims of ownership or otherwise why the property should be transferred to them (ideally checked by your lawyer) and proceed from your lawyer's advice.	The fact that you're not a native speaker of English doesn't alter the legal situation. If you literally had no understanding of English but for some reason you signed a piece of paper, then you might argue that there was no agreement in the first place, but obviously you do speak some English. Most people don't actually understand what contracts mean (on both sides). Contracts are still enforced, based on what the contract says. The move-in data is proposed, not firm, and it even indicates what the charges are if your circumstances change and the dates have to change (whereas is their circumstances change, they wouldn't have a basis for charging extra). It also does say that there will be no refund if you change your mind. So the piece of paper says "No refund". The problem seems to be that there's an "agent" whose statements you relied on, who is ultimately responsible for this problem, and s/he implied that you could get a refund. It's not clear what kind of "agent" this is (is he working for you, or for the owners?). You'd have a somewhat different legal basis depending on which it is, but you could sue someone in either event, assuming that you could actually persuade the court that you were given false information which you relied on. The statement "they will refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is false; the statement "they may refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is true. If the latter was the statement that you relied on, then you knew (or should have known) that that isn't a promise, it's just a guess, and if you read the piece of paper you know that it's a promise with no basis. So I would say it comes down to establishing what promise was made to you. Arguing that the agent "made" you sign isn't going to get you anywhere (unless you can prove actual coersion).	There is, in general, a rule that all matters connected with a single transaction or event should be included in a single legal case. Different jurisdictions apply this diffidently, and I haven't yet researched this in Maryland specifically. Also, if you agree to pay a part of what the landlord claims, you will quite likely be asked to sign a settlement agreement as part of the transaction. This is likely to include a release of all claims connected with your tenancy at the apartment. If it does, and you sign the agreement, you will be giving up any claim you might otherwise have because of the failure to properly notify you. You may want to consult a lawyer about this. A one-time consultation might not be very expensive. If you sued the landlord, you could do so in small claims court, where legal costs are significantly lower than in other courts.	You need absolute written buy in from the landlord. His agreement is with you, not this new person. If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after you.	If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.	Lying in itself ("of course you will get a wifi signal here") is not a crime. However, if you have proof that the lies were intended to benefit your landlord at your expense ("You won't sign the lease unless there's wifi? No problem") and that they actually did so ("You've signed the lease, it's too late to back out"), he may be guilty of fraud, which is a civil wrong and may be a crime. You would be well advised to consult a lawyer before going amy further, since there are probably ten people believing themselves to be victims of fraud for every one who actually is so in legal terms. The lawyer will also probably tell you that the best you can hope for is restoration to the state before the lies (in my example, the lease is cancelled and you get your deposit back), though the authorities will look at prosecuting the landlord.	I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.	It’s your house You can’t be forced by a co-owner to pay rent for a property you own. You can’t be forced by a co-owner to sell if you don’t want to. You can’t be forced by a co-owner to pay to maintain the property.or to pay utilities. Of course, if no one maintains the property or pays the rates then eventually you won’t have a property but you can’t be forced to. This applies to her as much as it applies to you. It’s possible, even likely, that your mediation agreement meets the requirements of a contract. If it does, then breaching it will allow the aggrieved party to sue for damages. The good news is, you can get on with your life right now - sign over the house to your sister and walk away. Except you can’t because your interest in the house needs to be dealt with in the divorce. If you want your “fair share” and your idea of what that is is bigger than hers then you have to fight for it - lawyer up.
Penalty for greatly exceeding the speed limit in Virginia This question is inspired by my GPS being overly literal-minded, and complaining about the fact that the airplane I was riding in was going somewhat faster than the speed limit for the road it was flying over. Say your airplane really did get pulled over for going 471 miles per hour in a 45 zone. What penalty would you be facing?	According to Virginia law, Every person convicted of reckless driving under the provisions of this article is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. That speed easily qualifies as reckless driving: A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth (i) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit or (ii) in excess of eighty miles per hour regardless of the applicable maximum speed limit. The punishment for a class 1 misdemeanor is "confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both." But wait! An airplane is heavy, so this may also apply: If it is found by the judge of a court of proper jurisdiction that the violation of any provision of this title (i) was a serious traffic violation as defined in § 46.2-341.20 and (ii) that such violation was committed while operating a vehicle or combination of vehicles used to transport property that either: (a) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds or (b) has a gross combination weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds inclusive of a towed vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds, the judge may assess, in addition to any other penalty assessed, a further monetary penalty not exceeding $500. By the way, I couldn't find a general reckless endangerment statute (unrelated to specific objects like firearms or specific results like injury or death) in Virginia law. The closest thing I could find was disorderly conduct, which is also a class 1 misdemeanor. It's possible I just don't know where to look.	You are referring to Michigan State Police v. Sitz 496 U.S. 444 (1990). It does not require or suggest a requirement of advance publication of any details regarding the checkpoints. The dissent mentions that "a sobriety checkpoint is usually operated at night at an unannounced location. Surprise is crucial to its method." This point was not countered or even mentioned by the majority. In this case, a state committee had created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity. The mentions this as a background fact, but does not rely on the existence of these guidelines as a requirement for the constitutionality of checkpoint stops. It does contrast checkpoints with "roving patrol stops". Quoting from Martinez-Fuerte 428 U. S. 543 (1976), the majority in Sitz said: "at traffic checkpoints, the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion". There are state guidelines, some states have constitutions prohibiting sobriety checkpoints (lots of case law at the state level regarding this), and some state legislatures have made these illegal. In Sitz, the checkpoints were being operated subject to guidelines developed by the Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee (of the State Department of Police). Federally, the NHTSA has guidelines on visibility and publicity towards the goal of effectiveness.	I've never heard the phrase used this way, and it wouldn't make any sense, anyway; "indemnity" is security against a consequence, so the existence of civil and criminal consequences would be a double non-indemnification. Maybe ask the lecturer for a published example of this usage.	From Rule 170 of the Highway Code: watch out for pedestrians crossing a road into which you are turning. If they have started to cross they have priority, so give way If this was indeed the case, then it suggests that the OP had right of way, and the driver was at fault. In any case, the driver should have indicated before turning.	I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed.	Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.	england-and-wales The OP's linked question seems to cover the placement of cones on the road. The relevant legislation (from which some of the Highway Code derives its rules) and potential offences for the parking described are: Wilful obstruction, contrary to section 137, Highways Act 1980: (1) If a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway he is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.(i.e. £1,000) And Leaving vehicles in dangerous positions contrary to section 22, Road Traffic Act 1988: If a person in charge of a vehicle causes or permits the vehicle or a trailer drawn by it to remain at rest on a road in such a position or in such condition or in such circumstances as to involve a danger of injury to other persons using the road, he is guilty of an offence. (also £1,000 maximum fine)	What legal problems might you run into? Well, you'd be violating 47 USC 301, which requires a license for anyone broadcasting in the United States. Penalties for that are given in 47 USC 501 (a fine of up to $10,000 and up to a year in prison), 47 USC 502 (an additional fine of $500 per day of violation), 47 USC 501(b)(2)(D) (forfeiture of up to $10,000 per day, with a maximum of $75,000), and 47 USC 510 (forfeiture of your equipment). "Just outside the FM band" on the low end (below 88 MHz) is television channel 6, while on the high end (above 108 MHz) are frequencies used for airplane navigation. If your transmission interferes with a licensed user of channel 6, you're also in violation of 47 USC 333, which carries much the same penalties as violating section 301, but without the forfeiture of equipment. If your transmission interferes with air navigation, you're in violation of 49 USC 46308, which carries a penalty of up to five years in prison and a fine of up to $5,000. Honestly, you'd be better off broadcasting inside the FM band: there, you can broadcast without a license under 47 CFR 15, which limits you to a broadcast power of 250 microvolts per meter at 3 meters (basically, you can broadcast to anyone in your house or maybe the next house over).
Is it legal to create a service that help people filling up small claim court forms? I have an idea of an online service that prepares forms and letters for small claim courts. The service would take an input from a user, analyze it and output documents required to file a small court claim and instruction for a user. Is such a service legal in California? I'm a software engineer, not a certified lawyer.	It depends upon how the service works. A "scrivner" is permitted, but "legal services" are not. If, for example, it asks you the questions on a state approved form and asks you to fill in answers and the compiles the answers into a complaint with the proper typesetting, this would be permissible. It could also have "educational materials" which you could read that could discuss small claims court. But, if it provides individualized assistance on a case by case basis on how to answer the questions, for example, prodding you to say something about each element of a cause of action if you fail to do so, this might very well constitute the practice of law and be illegal.	You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all	It sounds like you've read about two party consent and public spaces. But while anyone can sue, it's winning a case that's relevant. "My client respects the applicant's beliefs, but choosing to express beliefs in such a way during a job interview indicated sufficiently questionable judgement that my client was unable to consider the applicant further for the advertised position." "It has also become apparent that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith in making an application for employment." Court finds for the defendant and orders the plaintiff to pay costs.	There are two basic problems with your theory: You say: can't one accept a case on contingency and "as time permits," so that in such an event one would simply drop the contingency case (or, if it looked promising, hand it off to some other lawyer in a slump)? No. you can't. If you take a case, then drop it because a more profitable case comes along, you might well be disbarred, not to mention sued by the client you just threw over. You might even spend a night in jail for contempt--in many cases, you are not allowed to simply drop a case without the court's permission. So if you accept a contingency case, you accept it until (1) the case is over, (2) the client fires you, (3) you, the client, and the judge all agree you can quit, or (4) you can convince the judge you should be allowed to quit regardless of the client's wishes. Until then, you are stuck with the time and expense involved with handling the case. "Expense" is the second problem. You seem to be under the impression that once you've paid for the office and the coffee maker, there's no downside in pursuing a contingency case. But filing and pursuing a lawsuit cost money, not just time. Copying and coding documents costs money. Stenographers for depositions cost money. Just filing a lawsuit often costs a few hundred dollars. Hell, in a major lawsuit, you will probably spend a few hundred dollars just on postage. And a lot of commercial litigation now involves expert witnesses, whose fees start at a few hundred dollars an hour. Normally that all gets billed back to the client, but on a contingency case the lawyer often absorbs most or all of it. So from a lawyer's perspective, even if he or she is not working right now, "any positive payout" isn't enough. It has to be enough of a payout, and enough of a chance of winning, that the expected reward is worth paying, potentially, the cost of a trial, and forgoing other work if things get busy again while you're trying to prep your contingency case for trial. The fact is, for a lot of this sort of case--even if it looks "potentially profitable" to a non-lawyer--is going to be less profitable, in the long run, than spending the same amount of time playing golf with people who might actually pay you by the hour to do something. Also, two quick notes: Your suggestion of raising the contingency up to 100%, or close to it, won't help--it's illegal in many jurisdictions, and unethical in all of them. As a side note, even if a lawyer did take one of these cases, it wouldn't do you any good, since lawyers are prohibited in most cases from splitting their fees with non-lawyers.	There are no free legal copies online. They are accessible online through LexisAdvance, HeinOnline and Westlaw: this provides access, but not a downloadable copy.	In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.	Yup, it's illegal. You want something, they have something you want. They let you have the thing provided that you do certain things, otherwise they won't give it to you. So providing a credit card is material to the contract. You know that the credit card number is false, you are representing that it is true, the card is a material fact, you intend to get them to allow you in using this false representation, they don't know it is false and they rightfully rely on your truthfulness. They have been harmed by your false representation (maybe: it would cost you a lot in attorney fees to try to challenge on this point). This is fraud.	The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you.
Literal Support Definition In the context of patent disclosure: What is the nuanced meaning of Literal Support? Link to passage using the term Literal Support Written Description ≠ Literal Support “The test ... is whether the disclosure of the application as originally filed reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter, rather than the presence or absence of literal support in the specification for the claim language. ... The content of the drawings may also be considered ...”	Literal support means that the words of the claim are identical to words in the description. It does not have any particular nuanced meaning. The purpose of that presentation is to demonstrate that the requirements for written description in the US go far beyond literal support. That is, even if the claims are replicated in the description, that is not enough to satisfy the written description requirement (or indeed, the enablement or best mode requirements). In fact, the presentation you link to includes a nice quote from In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 US PQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983): The test ... is whether the disclosure of the application as originally filed reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter, rather than the presence or absence of literal support in the specification for the claim language. Literal support therefore does not have much place in US law. However, historically, countries inheriting their patent system from the UK had a requirement for fair basis, where the claims had to be fairly based on the description. For example, the now superseded Patents Act 1949 (UK) s 4(4) provided: The claim or claims of a complete specification must relate to a single invention, must be clear and succinct, and must be fairly based on the matter disclosed in the specification. This was a low bar, and literal support (where the wording of the claims are identical to words in the description) would be sufficient (though not required). This gave rise to the practice of having consistory clauses, where the claims were literally copied into the summary of invention section. However, most (or possibly even all) countries have moved on to a support requirement now. Yet the practice of consistory clauses lives on. Literal support also appears in some guise in European law. Art 123(2) EPC provides: The European patent application or European patent may not be amended in such a way that it contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed. This is often imprecisely glossed as a requirement that the wording of an amendment must appear verbatim in the description as originally filed. That is, an amendment is generally allowable if it has literal support in the application (and does not otherwise impermissibly combine embodiments and the like). In practice though, literal support is only one factor for compliance with Art 123(2) EPC, and is neither necessary nor sufficient on its own.	Your translation of the first statement is not correct. Saying that one promises to tell the truth is not saying that one promises to not tell a falsehood. If telling truth and telling falsehood are items labeled T and F, then this is a logical statement ~(T > ~F) for ~ negation and > implication. The combination of the first and third statements is necessary to obtain what you have called Statement 1, while the combination of the first and second statements is necessary to obtain what you call Statement 2. It could also be argued that the first statement is not even necessary, as it is just a less strict version of the second statement (and a less desirable one at that, if one values the honest sharing of complete knowledge), but the redundancy does not harm the meaning or impact of the following statements.	Many attorneys would have an "intake form" that they would like you to complete in advance, and every lawyer will want your name and contact information at a first meeting. But, other attorneys would prefer to meet with you first, without getting details about the work to be done, as many patent applicants are very reluctant to put information in writing that is shared with others and many patent applicants don't know what is relevant. There is no special terminology for the things that you should prepare for prior to meeting with an attorney. And, anyone who completed a provisional patent application is not so half-baked in their idea that it is premature to meet with a patent lawyer. Having done a provisional patent application is more than enough due diligence and preparation for such a meeting. The marginal cases where preparation by clients is often lacking are those cases where the concept of the invention isn't fully fleshed out yet and the inventor is trying to work with a patent lawyer to figure out what part of "idea space" isn't already protected by patents. There are basically three kinds of information that are relevant: When was the invention invented, made public, or shared with anyone? Is there anyone else who could be considered a co-inventor? For example, if you have an employment agreement discussing intellectual property, you should bring it. You would need your full provisional patent application, which will explain most of the necessary information but may need to be clarified for a final application. If visual aids are helpful to explaining your invention or you have prototypes small enough to bring with you, you should bring them, even if they are beyond the scope of the provisional patent application's contents. You ideally should do some due diligence regarding "prior art" to provide some assurance that the idea you propose hasn't already been patented or discovered, but not every patent applicant has the ability to do such a prior art search. At a minimum, you should be able to say in good faith that you've never seen a similar invention and explain why you think personally that your invention is novel. Generally, you should not order a professional patent search before you have discussed it with your patent attorney. But, if you are able to do so and have reviewed existing patents, reviewed literature you are able to access, and have done some Google searches for similar ideas, that would be more than reasonable preparation. But, don't delay meeting with a patent lawyer because you haven't done those things. A patent lawyer needs lead time to prepare the application by the deadline for doing so (ideally, several months, and at a minimum, several weeks to a couple of months). In addition, you should be prepared to discuss why your invention is not obvious to someone skilled in the relevant field and what utility your patent has to a user of the invention. Similarly, you should be ready to discuss the larger context of the field in which you have an invention, such as how others usually deal with the issue that your invention addresses in the status quo and what other notable new inventions there are in that field. "Buzz words" related to your kind of invention are also very helpful for doing searches of prior art. Finally, you should be prepared to demonstrate that you have the capacity to pay for the patent lawyer's work. Patent lawyers almost never do pro bono (i.e. charitable) patent work for individual inventors (sometimes they might, for example, for a university clinic aimed at inventing things for use in the Third World), and are loathe to do work on a contingent or on credit basis, although sometimes they would be willing to work on credit if you could provide security for the debt beyond the patent itself (e.g. putting the equity in your home up as collateral). A patent lawyer would almost always charge more than $10,000 to do the work beyond an initial consultation (which wouldn't be free but might cost $100-$1000), and often a patent could cost $100,000 for each patent for legal work, if it was at all complex. Patent lawyer have among the highest hourly rates of all kinds of attorneys. So, the more clearly thought out you are, the better organized your paperwork is, and the more efficiently you can communicate your invention, the less you will pay for meeting with the patent lawyer while "the meter is running." Even in the unlikely case that the patent lawyer will do the work on credit, the patent lawyer will at a minimum insist that you provide the filing fees up front. If you are truly broke, you need a business partner to finance the patenting process for you. You can look at the relevant fee schedules at the patent and trademark office website. The patent lawyer would also expect any out of pocket costs for things like a professional prior art search, having quality drawings prepared, courier fees, and mailing costs to be paid in advance, even if doing some of the legal work on credit. The prior art search is the most expensive item and it would usually cost in the low single digit thousands of dollars.	It is legsl to include references showing readers where facts you include in your article were derived, or where they can be supported. Indeed academic ethics generally require doing so, although there is (in most cases) no legal requirement to do so. Listing the title, author, and publication information of a source is not an infringement of copyright. That J. Jones published an article on "How to Find the Purple Moth" [imaginary example] in volume 28 of the Journal of Moth Science is a fact.Facts are never protected by copyright. Indeed in US law 17 USC 102(b) provides that: b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The laws of other countries are similar on this point. Indeed I do not know of any country in which facts are protected by copyright. So, including such references is fully legal, and no permission from the sources being cited is required. This is true whatever form the reference takes. In particular, if an online address for the content is included, this is still true. I do not know whether Medium, or any other specific publishing platform, will pat fees to authors based on clik-thru from such citations. That depends on their particular policies, which might be found in their Terms of Service or other policy document.	I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.	The terms are used in inconsistent and overlapping ways. Their meaning has to be determined from context. Words do not have universal meanings in all contexts in the law. A loan generally refers to a delivery of something (often money) with a legally binding expectation that it will be returned with some additional compensation to the lender, later on. To "use a loan" would mean actually receiving a loan from someone. A "grant of a loan" usually means agreeing to make a loan in the near future, rather than actually carrying out the loan at that time. Credit is a broader term with multiple senses. When a purchase is made "on credit", the sale is accompanied by a loan to the buyer to assist the buyer in making the purchase. But, the term a person's "credit" can also refer to an ability to borrow money, rather than to money that has already been loaned. A third sense of the word "credit" is a technical accounting sense of the word. In double entry accounting, a credit is an event that increases a person's assets or reduces their liabilities (in contrast to a "debit" which does the reverse). A transaction that is a credit to one party in double entry accounting is usually a debit with respect to the other party, or is part of an offsetting debt-credit pair of impacts on the person's books in a single event.	Does "in the course of providing services" mean "during the same time as providing services" or "for the purpose of providing services" or something else? I ask because I am a programmer who will be working on my own project during the same period as I am providing services to this Client, but after-hours and not for the same purpose or business. I want to make sure that what I create for myself I will own. The best definitions that come to mind off the cuff are "related to" and "in connection with", and both of those phrases appear in the same sentence, so that is quite close to the mark. Black's Law Dictionary (5th edition 1979) (from my hard copy edition) defines "in the course of employment" as follows (citation omitted): The phase "in the course of" employment, as used in worker's compensation acts, related to time, place and circumstances under which accident occurred, and means injury happened while worker was at work in his or her employer's service. Dictionary.com defines "in the course of" as: during the course of. In the process or progress of The best definition I gleaned from relevant case law is as follows: [A]n invention made or conceived in performing, or as a result of performing, the work required by a contract is made or conceived "in the course of" that contract. That would be true even though the invention was not specifically sought in the terms of the contract. An invention is made or conceived "under" a contract when it is made or conceived during the life of the contract and the invention is, in whole or in part, specifically provided for by that contract. Fitch v. Atomic Energy Commn., 491 F.2d 1392, 1395 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1974). The law which forms the background against which the contract term in question is drafted is discussed in the following language from a Federal Circuit patent law case: The general rule is that an individual owns the patent rights to the subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment. There are two exceptions to this rule: first, an employer owns an employee's invention if the employee is a party to an express contract to that effect; second, where an employee is hired to invent something or solve a particular problem, the property of the invention related to this effort may belong to the employer. Both exceptions are firmly grounded in the principles of contract law that allow parties to freely structure their transactions and obtain the benefit of any bargains reached. Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A similar contact is applied in the case Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 142 (1st Cir. 2015), but the term was not defined or disputed in that case. This case is still useful, however, for purposes of seeing the kind of issues that are typically raised in a case like this one and to assure yourself that the contract probably is enforceable. For the purposes of this question, the difference between an employee and an independent contractor is immaterial.	what does the phrase "in this act unless context requires otherwise" mean? It means that the provision or statutory definition is not to be imposed where its application would make no sense or would lead to an absurd outcome. Using the example point out, statutory or judicial references to "laws of physics", "law of supply and demand", and so forth are not to be construed as enactments or rulings issued by some authority. Accordingly, such laws are not susceptible to violation, enforcement, or repeal.
Can police officers practice law like lawyers (defence attorney, prosecution) and judges? I was reading an old NYT Article, and it suggested that there is value in that police officers who are cross-trained as lawyers. Although rare, the article suggested that most who go through this route are retained as in-house counsel rather than practicing lawyers and judges. So I ask, can these police-lawyers ultimately practice law in the sense that they have the powers to investigate, arrest, try, and (if possible) judge?	Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.	Yes, in general US prosecutors are licensed attorneys if they're practicing law. You don't necessarily technically need a license if your job is purely administrative, but to appear in court you do. They are subject to professional ethics requirements, and can be disbarred for violating them. There may be a state or two where they aren't licensed, but the common rule is that they are.	Your lawyer must act in your best interests; not follow your directions Lawyers are professionals and they are supposed to use professional judgement in how they run a case. While a client can suggest a course of action, the lawyer is not only not obliged to follow it, they would be committing malpractice if they unquestioningly did so. Just like a doctor would be if they unthinkingly implemented a patient suggested treatment plan. A panel of lawyers I was watching commentate on the hearing said it was a critical error and may have blown the case. So, a group of Monday-morning quarterbacks who weren’t chosen and don’t know all the facts would have done it differently? Perhaps it was a mistake. Or, perhaps the lawyer judged that there was nothing he could say that would help and considered that sounding desperate about the video would elevate its import in the minds of the jury.	This appears to be covered by the Norway Criminal Procedures Code, of which an English version can be found here. Chapter 10 deals with witnesses. Here are some relevant sections: § 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court. There follow a number of exceptions (spousal privilege, attorney-client privilege, state secrets, etc). None of them seem to apply to your example. § 115. The court may decide that a witness who fails to attend or who leaves the place of sitting without a valid reason shall be brought before the same or a subsequent sitting of the court. In special cases the court may decide that a witness shall be detained in custody until he can be examined. § 128. Before the examination the president of the court shall admonish the witnesses to tell the whole truth without concealing anything. He shall inform the witnesses of the liability consequent on giving false evidence or making a false affirmation. § 137. If a witness refuses to give evidence after being ordered to do so by a legally enforceable court order, the court may by a new order decide that the witness shall be kept in custody until he fulfils his obligation. Nevertheless a witness may not be kept in custody for more than three months altogether in the same case or in another case relating to the same matter. So effectively, if the witness fails to show up voluntarily, he can be brought in forcibly. He can be ordered to testify, and if he refuses, he can be held in custody (probably a jail) for up to three months. However, the authority to compel testimony is limited to courts; the police cannot compel statements from witnesses. § 230. The police may take statements from suspected persons, witnesses and experts but may not order any person to make a statement. So in your example, it appears that the witnesses would be free to refuse to speak to the police. However, if the case came to trial, they could be ordered to testify, and could be held in custody if they refused.	A Lawyer may hire paralegals, clerks, secretaries, and other assistants. The lawyer may hire as many as s/he pleases, and assign them whatever tasks s/he chooses. However, some kinds of documents may need to be signed by the lawyer (which ones will depend on the jurisdiction, in the US on the state). During the so-called "robo-signing scandal" it was held that, in some US states at least, a lawyer who signs certain kinds of documents without reviewing them has failed to perform the duties imposed on the lawyer by the law, and the documents may be invalid. Large numbers of mortgage foreclosure cases were dismissed when it became known that the lawyer signing relevant documents had not in fact reviewed them (or in some cases had not even signed them, but had permitted a non-lawyer to sign the lawyer's name). In addition, some functions in some jurisdictions must be performed by an actual lawyer. For example, paralegals and other non-lawyers cannot validly give legal advice. Only a lawyer can represent a client in court. And so on. I question whether one lawyer could in most kinds of practice keep up with the work of "hundreds" of non-lawyers, but that would depend on the kind of work done by the firm. In the US, some law firms are essentially collection agencies. There a single lawyer with many many assistants suffices, I understand, and that structure is not uncommon in the US.	Even if you had grounds for a lawsuit, you could not make it come out of the officer’s pocket. Under Chapter 4.64 of the Seattle Code, the City of Seattle is generally required to defend and indemnify city employees who are sued for doing their job. If you sue a police officer, the city pays his lawyer; if you win or if the city decides your claim is legitimate, the city pays whatever damages there were. The provision does not cover “claims and/or litigation arising from any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts or omissions of officers or employees of the City,” but that requires a lot more than “I wasn’t parked illegally,” and in any event you cannot force that issue -— only the city can. That’s between the officer and the city, and has nothing to do with you. This provision is pretty common in employment, including government employment. If I’m working for you and am acting in good faith, doing things for your benefit under your instructions, it’s only fair for you to shoulder the costs if I mess up. When it comes to government employees (whose job often makes people very angry at them), indemnification is extremely common. If police officers faced the risk of financial ruin for innocent mistakes, it’d be very hard to find anyone willing to do the job.	Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally "yes." States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic "driving while black" situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.	Not in jurisdictions I am familiar with. A "Power of attorney" is a power to act as an attorney-in-fact, not to act as an attorney-at-law. A layperson practicing law for someone other than herself is usually the unauthorized practice of law and is illegal in most jurisdictions. It would be permissible if a jurisdiction carved out an exception for a particular kind of case, but they generally don't and are very unlikely to do so in a criminal case. For example, in Washington State "Limited Practice Officers" can assist people with one of a very limited set of civil legal forms that do not need modification. There may be some exceptions, but they would be more likely to occur before a matter becomes criminal. For example, the accountant who represents a taxpayer before the IRS, or the agent who files a form containing perjury to a federal agency like the post office or homeland security on your behalf. So it is very unlikely, but if it is important to you you can ask someone familiar with your kind of case in your jurisdiction.
Can President Trump shoot off the nukes whenever he wants to, even for no reason? According to a recent editorial in Scientific American(March 1,2017 "Take the Nukes off a Short Fuse"), the president of the United States can order missiles to be shot off without anyone else concurring. Also, are military personnel legally bound to obey this? Maybe a soldier could legally disobey such an order on the grounds that it was an illegal order or that it "shocked the conscience?"	The Commander-in-chief powers are quite broad. The War Powers Resolution limits his ability to engage unilaterally in military action, by requiring him to report to Congress within 48 hours, and if Congress disapproves, troops must be removed after 60 days. However, this law pertains to armed forces, and would not apply to remotely-launched missiles. Additionally, it is unknown if the resolution is unconstitutional (presidents say it is). No law at all requires POTUS to obtain permission from someone else, in order to engage in a military action. Article 90 of the UCMJ states that it is a punishable offense to "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer". The manual also states that An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. Murder of a civilian is an example. It also says The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge. "Shocking the conscience" is not a grounds allowing disobedience. One can only conjecture how a military judge would evaluate the lawfulness of a presidential order, when there is not a shred of legal evidence that such an order is in fact illegal: I conjecture that the order would be found to be lawful.	The powers of the President are contained in Article II of the constitution; this is a fair summary. The power to make executive orders stems from Section 1 "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." When the Supreme Court considers the legality of an executive order (which only happens when someone brings a case that the court agrees to hear) they use Justice Jackson's Test from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer (1952). The first amendment specifically forbids congress from making laws about these matters. Therefore the express will of congress (as the amendment required a 2/3 majority of Congress) is that there shall be no law about these matters. Since the President would be acting against the express will of Congress he would drop to the third limb of Jackson's test: When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Since, this is not a power that the President is given by the constitution it is likely that the Court would decide that he doesn't have such power.	There is no constitutional provision specifically allowing the President to dismiss a state Governor for any reason. There is no constitutional provision specifically allowing the President to dissolve a state legislature. The US Federal Constitution requires the President to "take care that the laws be executed". Several relevant laws are contained in 10 U.S. Code Chapter 13 - INSURRECTION. Section 251 (renumbered from 240a) provides that: Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection. Section 252 provides that: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. Section 253 provides that: The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it— (1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution. Section 254 provides that: Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time. Sections 251-254 of 10 USC in their current form all date from 1956, but are directly derived from the Insurrection Act of 1807. Under these laws the President has the right and duty to "take such measures as he considers necessary" to suppress any rebellion, which would include any proclaimed secession, including "using the militia or the armed forces" or any other available and effective methods. According to the Wikipedia article (linked above, citations omitted) the Insurrection Act: has been invoked throughout American history. In the 19th century, it was invoked during conflicts with Native Americans. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was invoked during labor conflicts. Later in the 20th century, it was used to enforce federally mandated desegregation, with Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy invoking the Act in opposition to the affected states' political leaders to enforce court-ordered desegregation. More recently, governors have requested and received support following looting in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. In addition 18 USC Chapter 115 deals with related issues, making rebellion, insurrection, or conspiracy to rebel crimes. Section 2383 provides that: Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Section 2384 provides that: If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. Under these various laws the President has power to use whatever means are required, including military force, to suppress and end any rebellion or insurrection, and arrest the perpetrators thereof. Anyone convicted by a court of insurrection is thereafter barred from elected office, federal ore state. The precedent of President Lincoln's actions at the start of the US Civil War is clear. However, the prospect of any current declaration of secession seems remote. Presumably a state could leave the US with consent of Congress, although this has never occurred and there is no specific Constitutional provision allowing it. Congress could pass further laws dealing with any actual or threatened secession, but the laws already existing seem sufficient, they give the President wide power to act in such cases. It was established by the US Supreme Court in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869) that secession is not legal, even if enacted by a state legislature, and specifically that the purported secession of Texas in 1861 did not legally remove it from the Union. No later court case or law has contradicted this, to the best of my knowledge.	Is a U.S. President a fiduciary in the same sense a trustee or bank officer is a fiduciary? No. Does a U.S. President have a duty to apply critical thinking to his public acts and statements? No. could a U.S. President who was acting in an obviously irrational way in exercising his discretion ( for example, by not using critical thinking) be held accountable under 28 U.S. Code § 1361 - action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty. No. 28 U.S. Code § 1361 applies only in circumstances where the duty to act involves no critical thinking or discretion whatsoever.	Unequivocally yes. An Australian judgement asserted this by (happily) adopting the reasoning of the US courts: The matter also came up for discussion in the Communist Party case where Justice Dixon adopted the U.S. view that: ... it is within the necessary power of the Federal government to protect its own existence and the unhindered play of its legitimate activities. And to this end, it may provide for the punishment of treason, the suppression of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting-down of all individual or concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with the discharge of the proper business of government ... A plane (or ship, or train etc.) that is not responding to hails and acting to put citizens at risk is a legitimate target of military force. It doesn't matter if it is acting that way because of a deliberate decision of its controllers (e.g. terrorists), because it's not under control or because it's controllers are idiots.	This ATF page quotes from 26 USCA §5845(f)(2) as follows: (f) Destructive device.--The term “destructive device” means * * * (2) any type of weapon by whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter, except a shotgun or shotgun shell which the Secretary or his delegate finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes; . . .” The hypothetical device you describe has a bore of > ½", and when fired would cause a projectile (the rocket) to exit the barrel. The rocket's firing is clearly caused by firing the blank shotgun shell, and would, I think, be seen as "expelling" the projectile. The objection that "the rocket fired and expelled itself" would not be persuasive. Thus, I think the device you describe meets the statutory definition of "destructive device." To avoid breaking this law, do not either a) insert a projectile (here, the rocket) in the shotgun bore, or b) set up any external mount or mechanism to ignite the rocket as a result of igniting a shotgun shell (blank or not blank) in the shotgun barrel.	It could lead to investigation and wasting of government resources, but it is not a crime and not civilly actionable, under the circumstances described. The First Amendment right to say crazy things is pretty broad.	Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.
What exactly does it mean for a case to be dismissed? A plantiff did not attend the hearing. Consequently the adjudicator dismissed his case. What does this mean? I roughly understand that it means the defendant is absolved of the charges and that the plantiff can not reopen the case (or charge for the same thing again) without proving he had a very good reason for missing the hearing (e.g. was in a hospital).	Not necessarily. It depends on the type of dismissal. The term prejudice helps better describe your question. You have described a dismissal with prejudice: the case can not be re-litigated. But it's just as likely the case could have been dismissed without prejudice. Meaning, the plaintiff could restart the case at any time. Or, alternatively, file a new case on the same facts. (You might be thinking about double jeopardy which is prohibited and applies to criminal cases involving an acquittal.) The with prejudice vs. without prejudice decision is often left to the discretion of the judge (or adjudicator) depending on the type of proceeding. And sometimes the decision is determined by procedural rule. You must read the notice or order of dismissal to determine what type of dismissal it was.	If you win a family court appeal in MS can you request another judge? You can always file a motion to recuse, perhaps with a rehearing with the chief judge afterwards. Without knowing the details of the reversal on appeal, though, it is impossible to identify whether the appellate opinion or the record of the case endorses/supports a finding of bias or other grounds for disqualification. These motions are hardly ever granted. See Pearl River Co. Board v. Mississippi, 289 So.3d 301, 308-309 (2020): In the absence of a judge expressing a bias or prejudice toward a party or proof in the record of such bias or prejudice, a judge should not recuse himself. [...] The burden [...] is a heavy one The bar for granting these motions is overly high not just on paper, but in reality there is also an element of judicial arrogance insofar as these motions are a form of firing a judge. Recusal can be meritorious in your case, yet be denied even by the chief judge and the appellate panel.	england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: "Infinite" indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.	Andy would be almost immediately disbarred and might also be held in contempt of court. Andy would be disbarred for reasons including his violations of the duty of confidentiality owed by Andy to his client Dave under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 in a context like this one. This would be considered an open and shut blatant violation of one of the highest and most serious ethical obligations that an attorney has, and is neck and neck with the rule against stealing money from your clients as a ground for near automatic disbarment. The clarity and severity of the breach of professional ethics by Andy in this regard (and other aspects such as his fiduciary duties to his clients and duty of zealous and diligent advocacy for his client) leaves no ambiguity regarding the appropriate level of discipline. Andy might be held in contempt of court for reasons including knowingly disrupting a court proceeding in which he was or is an attorney of record. He can't quit representing Dave until the court grants his permission to do so. Dave's trial would probably not go forward or his conviction would be set aside. In all likelihood, a trial with a new prosecutor not exposed to the information would be arranged to avoid the taint of the breach of privilege. This would be because providing the prosecutor with inadmissible evidence taints the ability of the prosecutor to proceed untainted by inadmissible evidence and would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel which is one of the grounds for setting aside a conviction for a violation of the 6th Amendment to the US Constitution, which grants the right to effective counsel. what if Dave was openly admitting to having committed the crime, This is utterly irrelevant. Criminal defense lawyers aren't only or mostly for innocent people, and their main job isn't really to get people acquitted of crimes they committed. Instead, a criminal defense lawyer's job is to hold the prosecution to their duties to prove their case, to force the criminal justice system to comply with civil liberties protections, to prevent convictions of excessive charges for the conduct committed, and finally to secure appropriate sentences for their clients (which usually means negotiating a plea bargain). Criminal defense lawyers prevent defendants from being convicted and sentenced in circumstances where they wouldn't have been convicted or sentenced if they weren't ignorant of the legal system (which most criminal defendants are). what if Dave was . . . was boasting about committing more crimes as soon as Andy gets him off the hook. A vague statement like this does not trigger any right of Dave to take any action differently. It's basically bravado or a statement about his own character in general. What if Dave was openly boasting about acts of terrorism he was about to commit, etc. If he was about to commit an act of terrorism but was thwarted, Andy needs to keep his mouth shut. If Andy knows that Dave is about to imminently commit a specific terrorist act then this very distinct fact pattern raised different issues and belongs in a separate question. The crime-fraud exception to the duty of confidentiality, and the way that an ethical lawyer can take appropriate action in a way that minimizes harm to the client, all involve considerations very different from those in the main question. Is Andy forced to be a tool/bystander to Dave's villainy? Is Andy ever allowed to take action against Dave without consequence? The duty of a lawyer not to use his services to further a crime is also a very distinct fact pattern. But, failing to report imminent unilateral acts by a client in furtherance of a crime or fraud is very different from not using information about a client's past actions or vague future intentions against the client, and is also different from using a lawyer as a tool to commit a crime or fraud. These are three distinct situations. A different analysis applies to each one.	Information about a defendant’s character or past misdeeds are not generally admissible during a court proceeding. It can be brought in to rebut testimony. If the defendant takes the stand and asserts that they never discriminated against anyone due to their nation of origin, then evidence they they have done so becomes relevant.	This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.	"Cancellation" is generally a result of some statement or action a person made becoming public or having been made in public. Tortious interference requires that the defendant's actions are independently wrongful, such as defamation or criminal acts against the plaintiff. Truthful speech and opinions which do not allege facts are protected by the First Amendment (as well as state constitutions) and thus cannot be wrongful conduct. To apply that here, anyone can react to public knowledge about a person and call for that person to be fired, that is protected speech. As far as I know in this particular petition's case, RMS does not dispute that he made the statements they are attributing to him and using as evidence for their call to remove him from the board.	united-states This answer is based upon general principles of criminal procedure in the United States which are quite similar in most states, although not necessarily exactly identical. The answer is likely to be different in other jurisdictions. If inadmissible evidence is offered by the prosecution and admitted at trial, this is a ground upon which the defense can move for a mistrial (which due to double jeopardy amounts to an acquittal), or upon which the defendant can appeal the conviction of the jury, if convicted. Acquittals of a defendant at trial cannot be appealed by the prosecution. But, to appeal, the error in admitting inadmissible evidence must be contemporaneously objected to by the defendant's lawyer (or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel), or the admission of the evidence must be "plain error" (which is very rarely met on evidentiary issues). If the defendant's lawyer doesn't promptly say "I object" that ground for contesting a conviction is usually lost. Even then, the standard of review on appeal is whether the judge abused the judge's discretion in admitting the evidence, not whether the appellate court would have ruled the same way if presented with that evidentiary question. Also, even if there is an error, a conviction on a particular count will not be overruled if the error was "harmless", which is to say that there is a reasonable possibility that admitting the inadmissible evidence caused the defendant to be convicted of that count. Often, if the evidence is overwhelming, or the inadmissible evidence wasn't that prejudicial, a conviction will be affirmed notwithstanding the admission of inadmissible evidence. Sometimes harmless error is evaluated considering all of the errors at trial as a whole, rather than individually, in addition to all of the other evidence admitted at trial. If an evidence issue can be foreseen and is central to the case (e.g. suppression of evidence of possession of drugs in a drug possession case), the issue of the admissibility of the evidence will often be resolved in a pre-trial hearing and subject to appeal then, prior to trial, rather than being resolved in the trial itself where the prosecution has no right to appeal, and the defendant risks conviction if the ruling goes against the defendant. If the conviction is overturned on appeal, the usual remedy is to remand the case to the same judge to conduct a new trial with a new jury, in a manner consistent with the appellate court's rulings.
Do Twitter disclaimers saying "opinions are my own" give any legal protection to the account owner? A larger number of twitter accounts have a biography stating that tweets are their own opinion not that of their company. An example: Opinions are my own and not the views of my employer Does this actually protect the employee from being reprimanded because of a tweet? I've done some research and the only semi-reputable site I could find is this Forbes article stating that a disclaimer will not protect you. However when researching the attorney they quoted, Dan Schaeffer, I find nothing other than the bio posted on his firm's website.	The purpose of that disclaimer is not to prevent reprimands or legal action. It's really as simple as it appears -- it's to inform the readers that the tweets in fact contain the opinion of the person who wrote them and are not intended to be understood as the official position as that person's employer. This is especially important for people who occasionally or frequently convey their employer's official position. It's not supposed to be some kind of magic word that causes something to happen. It's just an attempt to convey accurate information and avoid misunderstandings.	Whether any person, provided that they are in full legal capacity (not a minor, not incapacitated etc.), needs a lawyer, is to be decided by that person. Even criminal defendants can be self-represented if they've got the balls for it — the law does not impose a requirement to have a lawyer when the person does not want it. Considerations as to whether to have a lawyer are very fact-specific and person-specific. Assuming that Steve is not literate in law, it would probably be good idea for him to get a lawyer before answering any questions. The facts are such that it is not totally impossible that he may be charged, especially if he inadvertently says something not in his favor, or otherwise says something favorable to McRobberface.	Yes, this is a valid concern As written, every piece of IP you produce while employed belongs to the employer. This includes your hypothetical game. It also includes your weekly shopping lists, your Christmas card to your Great-Aunt Nellie, the … a-hm … private video you make of you and your significant other. As written this is overly broad and probably unenforceable. However, it’s always better to have clear and legally enforceable clauses in your agreements because unclear, arguably unenforceable ones lead to disputes. To be fair, the employer has probably lifted some (bad) boilerplate and hasn’t actually thought through what it means. Get it redrafted.	That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.	I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.	Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy).	A president can be personally sued, and does not enjoy universal immunity while in office, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 US 681 – in that case, Clinton was represented by private counsel. There are differences between that case and the instant hypothetical, the most prominent being whether such statements might be shielded because of executive privilege. The primary procedural question would be whether a potentially defamatory statement was made in connection with official duties. The limits of executive privilege are not at all clear. That kind of constitutional issue could involve the solicitor general. Let us assume that SCOTUS finds (somehow) that a particular statement is completely outside the ambit of executive privilege (separation of powers). Then it is not an interest of the US government to defend the personal interests of a defendant even if he in in office (whereas it is an interest of the US goverment to defend the official interests of POTUS), and private counsel would represent the defendant. Any settlement or award would be out of the defendant's pocket (as was the case in Clinton v. Jones).	The Apache 2.0 license purports to be irrevocable, but it also presupposes that the supposed licensor has the right to grant permission to copy. In this case, that is untrue, so there never was a proper license and nothing to revoke (the copyright owner grants permission in the form of "a license" which is a legal abstraction, that normally is specified in the license document). An end-user snared by this illegal license might attempt to sue the author because of the legal screw-up but paragraph 9 says that the supposed licensor cannot be held liable. In this case, though, "licensor" is defined not as the person who hands you the license document, but as the copyright owner. So it's the employer who would be not liable under the terms of the document (but since the employer had nothing to do with the license, it's as though the license never existed). The end-user is a secondary infringer (the employee is the primary infringer, in illegally distributing the material). Under US law, that doesn't matter, the user is still liable. Under UK law, secondary infringement includes the element that you have to have reason to know that the copy is infringing, which in the scenario that you describe is not the case.
Found mis-delivered parcel after receiving refund - must I tell the store? A parcel ordered through a store was meant to be delivered to me on Saturday 30th. It wasn't. Going through the delivery firm's customer service, they couldn't determine where it had been delivered to and considered it a missing parcel. This led to the store submitting a refund to me and a fine to the delivery firm. I have now canvassed the places it could have been miss-delivered to and found the parcel. Do I have to notify the store? If I do, do I have to agree to them cancelling the refund?	If you have received the item, and continue to let the store believe you haven't, then you are obtaining money under false pretenses, which is pretty much the definition of fraud.	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.	Assuming you have an assured shorthold tenancy, it's not the landlord himself that can evict you. The process is that he serves you notice, and if you don't move by the time the notice period ends, then he has to go to court in order to obtain a court order to end the tenancy. The landlord must demonstrate to the court that he has properly served notice to the tenant. This is a bit of a grey area, but this article suggests that, to avoid ambiguity, the landlord should either use recorded delivery (which would provide proof as to whether or not the tenant received it), or deliver it by hand with an independent witness present. In the case of a section 21 "no fault" eviction, the only defence a tenant has is that the correct procedure has not been followed. So it is in the landlord's interest to ensure that notice has been received beyond any doubt.	If the stranger was aware of the reward offer at the time of the return you have a legally binding contract - you made an offer to the world, money for return of the phone, and they accepted it by returning it. If they were ignorant of your offer and returned the phone then there is no contract and you do not have to pay: albeit at the cost of being a jerk. Of course, if they obtained your phone unlawfully (e.g. by stealing it) the contract is void.	Can the address details be found on Companies House? If the seller is non-responsive the buyer must seek help from their bank and/or the authorities. In general a "Faster Payment" cannot be stopped or reversed. Unlike a debit or credit card payment a "Faster Payment" does not have "chargeback" or "section 75 protection". The buyer must contact their bank as soon as possible - there is a process the bank can follow with the recipient's bank but there is no guarantee the money will be returned. Normally the recipient must consent to having the payment reversed. If the buyer thinks they have been the victim of fraud they should contact their bank, which should contact the appropriate authorities. As a practical matter the buyer should be prepared to 'chase' their bank to find out what is happening with their report (because the bank may not be proactive about informing the buyer). Alternatively the buyer can contact Action Fraud. In terms of "buyer's remorse", the buyer must try to establish which legal jurisdiction applies to their contract with the seller. If the buyer and seller are UK-based, the good or service bought after June 2014 via a website, phone, text message or mail order may be covered by the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. Some things e.g. bets, lottery tickets, bus tickets, plots of land are not within the scope of those regulations (but may be covered by other law). If the sale is covered by those regulations, the seller was obliged to provide certain information including their geographical address and contact details and details of the buyer's right to cancel before the sale was completed. The buyer has a right to cancel 14 days after being informed by the seller of the right to cancel (the "14 day cooling off period") - if the seller does not ever inform the buyer of the right to cancel then this right to cancel lasts for 12 months. The buyer is not obliged to provide a reason. There are certain goods and services where this right to cancel and get a refund varies or does not apply. A refund for a service might be reduced by the value of the service the buyer has used so far. Goods or services where there is no right to a refund include tickets to events, personalised items, health or hygiene products where the buyer broke the seal or digital content the buyer downloaded. If the seller is non-responsive the buyer could contact: the citizen's advice service in their region (they can refer the complaint to Trading Standards) their local Trading Standards office - the buyer should look for the office's contact details on their local authority's website the Ombudsman Services if the seller is overseas, the UK International Consumer Centre may be able to help. The buyer should be prepared to provide a description of the circumstances, the available details about the seller, what the buyer has attempted so far, and what the buyer wants to achieve (e.g. a refund). There is lots of guidance online (e.g. the citizen's advice organisations and Which? magazine) about how to complain and what kinds of evidence to collect. The website resolver.co.uk might also be helpful in terms of guidance and keeping a diary. (The buyer might consider contacting a newspaper, magazine or specific journalist about their experience - some well-known media outlets run articles about individual consumers' problems and sometimes help to get a satisfactory resolution.)	You are conflating the crime against the state of possession stolen goods with the common law tort against the owner for conversion. To your questions: How would this proceed? It seems like it would be very difficult to prove (short of getting public surveillance footage) that I even bought the item. If you read the second paragraph of the page you linked it says: In many jurisdictions, if an individual has accepted possession of goods or property and knew they were stolen, then the individual is typically charged ... If the individual did not know the goods were stolen, then the goods are returned to the owner and the individual is not prosecuted. Proof of the crime involves a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of evidence of both the fact that you have the goods and that you knew they were stolen. If you become aware that they were stolen (e.g. the police tell you) and try to keep them then you have just committed the crime. Proof of the tort requires a "balance of probabilities" standard of evidence that you have the goods and that they belong to someone else; your knowledge that they were stolen is immaterial. In the first instance, the police would probably knock on your door, tell you why they were there and ask if the version of the story they have from the thief is essentially true. What happens next depends on your response: "Yes, I knew it was stolen; you better arrest me and I will plead guilty." This will play out as you expect. "Yes, I didn't know it was stolen, I will go and get it for you." You return the goods, give a statement and may have to act as a witness in the prosecution of the thief. You are down $1,000 but are now older and wiser. "No, I have no idea what you are talking about." Well, you have now committed the crime of hindering a police investigation and have also committed the crime of possessing stolen goods - you can no longer claim that you didn't know the goods were stolen; the police have told you they are. What happens next depends on if the police believe you or the thief. Surely they couldn't/wouldn't get a warrant to search my house? Want to bet? They certainly have enough to get a search warrant if they want one (probably). Whether they seek one probably depends on the value of the goods, how busy they are and how much you pissed them off. Could I be prosecuted if I didn't know it was stolen? Not if you return it as soon as practicable after being made aware that they were. The scam This seems like a lot of work for a very small return - spend your time worrying about things that are more likely to happen. Good Title All of this is tied up with the concept of good title. Basically, you cannot gain good title to property from someone who does not have good title themselves; if you buy goods from a thief you do not own them. For example, if A has good title to the goods, B steals them and sells them to C who sells them to D then A still owns them and can demand their return from D, D could demand the return of their money from C and C could do likewise with B but as far as A is concerned it doesn't matter that C & B have lost money; that is simply too bad for them.	Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.	If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.
Why Was The 17th Amendment Necessary? Specifically, why did it need to be a Constitutional Amendment instead of a regular law? The Constitution, under Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1, states that: The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. Wouldn’t this allow Congress to have required the direct election of Senators without having to Ratify an Amendment?	No because clause 1 of section 3 originally said: The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote. The legislature could have required a vote (of the legislature) and that could have been regulated. However, if the legislature decided that a committee could appoint senators that couldn’t have been, for example.	Indian Constitution provides for a Federal government in which power of states and centres are clearly enunciated. If there is a dispute over any issue Supreme Court can decide whether State government is correct, or whether Central government is correct. Any law of Parliament affects the entire population of India, and so all states are affected by that law. If any state government considers that the law is not as per constitutional norms, it can easily go to the Supreme Court for decision. So, the observation of the Supreme Court that a state is bound by the law of Parliament, is incorrect. If an individual can file such a case, a state is also entitled to file it. The Supreme Court should decide it on the basis of merit. So I think the observation of Supreme Court in this case is not correct.	States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).	Because the courts or the legislature decide they have them There is no doubt that both the courts and the legislature in common law countries have the ability to find, create, or extend rights and this has been done in the past. This is, in fact, where legal rights were created. The US Bill of Rights was created by the people in 1791. If the people in 2191 want to grant rights to AIs then they can do this. This is legally possible. Whether it's a good idea is a matter of philosophy and politics.	Art. I Sec. 8 Cl. 17 states that "The Congress shall have Power" To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings which then happened in 1 Stat. 130 (1790). It is there referred to as "a district of territory" but more often simply as a "district". Unlike territories, its existence for its actual purpose as seat of government is specifically enabled by the Constitution. Then via 2 Stat 103 (1801), DC was politically brought within the control of Congress, so that residents were no longer residents of Maryland or Virginia. In this act it is consistently termed a "district".	Generally not. Federal court uses a principle known as the enrolled bill rule -- in deference to the coequal status of the three branches of government, the "enrolled bill" (the thing printed on fancy paper that actually went to the President for signature) is irrebuttable evidence that the law was properly passed. The courts cannot deal with inquiries into whether legislative process was followed; it's the legislature's job to decide what the right process is. They can't even look into whether the same text passed both houses -- as a matter of law, the enrolled bill is conclusive evidence that it did. Senate rules are enforceable in the Senate. But the Senate is the body in charge of enforcing them, not the courts.	If the Senate took the extreme measure of attempting to abolish the Supreme Court, there's nothing in the Constitution that requires them to confirm any of the President's nominees. However, attempting to dismantle one of the three branches would be nothing short of a coup d'etat. The president has some options here: He [the President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses [of Congress], or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper. -- Article 2, Sec. 3 Basically, this means that, in an extraordinary circumstance (total defiance of the entire Senate would easily qualify), the President can lock the Senate in their chamber until they straighten their heads out. And when I say "lock them in", I don't mean that figuratively. The Constitution requires that a majority of each house be present to constitute a quorum to do business. The President could order up to 51 Senators to convene, and if they refused, could order the FBI or whoever to physically arrest them and drag them to the capitol building. This was actually done in Wisconsin by Gov. Scott Walker in 2011 when 14 Democrat Senators fled the state to avoid the quorum needed to vote on a controversial bill that they couldn't block. It would be messy for sure, and as far as I know, has never been done with the U.S. Senate. But there is precedent for it. Additionally, the President could use his vacancy power and just appoint a justice. Legally, he would have to wait for the Senate to be in recess, and the Senate would likely arrange things so that never happens. However, if there were no justices left, he could just appoint a Chief Justice (the Constitution provides that there be at least one justice). Even if he did this in the most "in-your-face" illegal way, with both middle fingers extended, the only judge that can tell him he did wrong is the guy he just seated. Of course, the Senate would move to impeach that judge, and probably the President too for having appointed him illegally, but you need a supermajority of both houses to remove them from office. If you had such a supermajority, then the game is over at this point; there's no way the President would step down in such a situation (who would force him?) and we're in a civil war because we don't have a functional government anymore. In reality, this isn't an "interesting twist in constitutional law that the Founding Fathers may not have considered." It's that if Congress ever went totally off the rails like that, the President, or the people would have to step up and hope they could end the standoff peacefully without resorting to violence, because this is the kind of thing that revolutions are fought over.	Does this mean that anyone who is born in the US is automatically a US citizen, whether they want it or not? Yes (subject to a couple of exceptions, namely the children of diplomats with full immunity and the children of a hostile foreign occupier). Or does this amendment just offer the possibility of requesting citizenship? In other words: is there an action to be made in order to become a US citizen when born in the US (and therefore one is not before this action is performed)? No. For someone who falls under the 14th amendment's citizenship clause, the only way to avoid being a US citizen is to relinquish or renounce it, which generally means that one is stuck with the US citizenship for at least 18 years. Most countries' citizenship laws, or at least all of those with which I am familiar, operate this way—automatically—for "normal" cases of acquisition of citizenship by virtue of the circumstances of birth. This is true whether the citizenship derives from the place of birth or from the parents' citizenship.
Do barter transactions need to be declared for tax purposes, and how is taxable value decided? What is the legality of bartering goods and services in a non-business setting? Say I'm on Craigslist, and I trade my car for a service or another product. Do I need to declare that on my taxes, and if so, how do I assess the market value of those goods or services?	Both of these answers assume U.S. law. Craigslist has no liability per a statute commonly known as Section 230. In a barter transaction, each party must declare as income on their tax return the fair market value of the goods or services received, by a commercially reasonable means (subject to audit), less any basis (or, in the case of accrual accounting taxpayers, at least, any cost of good sold expense deduction) applicable to goods parted with. Under changes to the tax law effective January 1, 2018, this answer applies even if the barter involved tangible personal property of "like kind" which was previously not taxable under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 1031 continues to provide special treatment to barters involving investment real estate.	If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.	There is a form, which both parties to the sale sign. Note that it does entail paying sales tax. There are other aspects to the sale which reinforce the "It's not my car anymore" message, such as returning the plates and getting a receipt for the plates. Even doing the sale in a DMV lot would not help you.	When the buyer hears "to avoid sales tax" and hears the seller describing as a gift something that s/he knows was nothing of the sort, a reasonable buyer would know that this was at best suspicious, and would find out if this was legal. But assuming that the buyer accepted the seller's suggestion ignorantly and in good faith, the buyer can file a report of the transaction and pay any tax that should have been paid. The exact way of doing this will vary based on the laws of the buyer's jurisdiction (state-level if in the US) which is not given in the question. Such a report and payment might not prevent the local tax authorities from assessing an additional penalty. Criminal charges seem unlikely, but would be possible. If the seller was a used car dealer, the authorities might want the buyer to testify against the seller. They buyer might be wise to consult a lawyer with expertise in sales tax issues in the buyer's jurisdiction. Such a lawyer could advise on exactly what the buyer's legal obligation was, and how to avoid or minimize penalties or other consequences.	Yes, money received from Kickstarter campaigns is usually considered taxable income. Who pays the taxes and how much (if any) they pay depends on how much the teenager makes, how old they are, and whether they are claimed as a dependant by someone else. For information about taxing children see IRS Pub. 929. As pointed out in the comments, certain campaign contributions could be considered nontaxable "gifts" by the IRS. There are also taxable gifts but the taxes are paid and reported by the gift giver. You will want to talk to a tax professional about these. It is worth noting that interest on gifts is taxable unearned income unless the gifts were set up under a UGMA trust, which has its own rules. You can deduct most expenses from income, as pointed out in the comments. This too is covered by Pub. 929.	At the federal level, gift cards seem to be treated as a special case of electronic fund transfer. 15 U.S. Code § 1693l–1 and the corresponding regulations presently regulate disclosure of fees and expiration, and do not directly say anything about sale of such a card. There might be relevant state laws, though Washington state laws mostly mirror the federal law (also allowing issuing a card with an expiration date if given for no value to a charitable organization). You can actually get your last $5 back in cash in Washington per RCW 19.240.020. A gift card / certificate isn't a "thing" in the way that an apple, hammer or table is, it's a contractual relationship. If you own a thing, you can freely re-sell it to whoever you want (assuming there isn't an express statutory prohibition against the sale of the thing). You cannot universally sell (assign) a contract right – there is a default preference that you should be able to, but Amazon has in this case said "No, you can't".	Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.	I emailed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in the USA asking this and received the reply: "There is nothing to prevent you from marketing antiques in the UK while present in the US." I also contacted a relevant US attorney and received: "There’s nothing in your question which would implicate Colorado or US law. If you're a UK citizen, and the sale is happening in the UK while you're in the US, then the US has anything to do with it. So as long as the UK doesn’t have any problem with it, the US will not." So I would conclude this question fairly answered.
How are people who abandon their infant children punished? What is the penalty for abandoning an infant child? What punishments are usually given in cases such as these where the person who abandoned the child is found and convicted? How does the punishment depend on whether the child is found dead or alive? Considering that most of these babies are very likely to die a horrible, slow death (cold, hunger), is the crime treated as seriously as murder/attempted murder? Or is it something more lenient like child abuse? Or is it even more lenient than that and the parent/guardian is usually considered mentally ill and offered help? What do the known cases tell us? I am not thinking of any particular country, so US, Europe, etc., anything goes.	In the US, the details are determined at the state level. The term "abandonment" is used very broadly, and can include a situation where a parent leaves a child without making contact for a period of time (which may result in termination of parental rights, but not a punishment). "Abandonment" as it applies in Washington state is explained here. There is what is known as a "safe haven" law, which allows a newborn (under 72 hours old) to be transferred (anonymously) to a qualified recipient (health care employee, medic, etc.), and not be liable under the criminal laws. This does not include dumping the infant in the snow. Under RCW 9A.42.020, the parent would be guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if their action "causes great bodily harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life" (note that the law is not specific to children), and this is a class B felony. There are multiple grades of mistreatment, so if the action "creates an imminent and substantial risk of bodily injury" or "causes bodily injury or extreme emotional distress manifested by more than transient physical symptoms", this is 4th degree mistreatment, which is a misdemeanor. There are, in parallel fashion, laws against abandonment of a dependent starting at RCW 9A.42.060, punished as a class B felony down to a gross misdemeanor. The maximum penalty for a class B felony is $20,000 and 10 years in prison, and for a simple misdemeanor it is 90 days and $1,000. In case death results, the discussion could move to the homicide statutes. Homicide by abuse is when, with extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person. and this is a class A felony. If a person "recklessly causes the death of another person", this is manslaughter in the first degree (class A felony), but if it is "with criminal negligence", it is manslaughter in the second degree (a class B felony). Manslaughter charges are predicated on there not being an intent to kill. If the intent was to actually kill the child, this would be first degree homicide, where the punishment is life imprisonment. Additionally, first degree homicide can be found if "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". State v. Edwards is a relevant case, where a person was charged with both second degree murder and homicide by abuse, and the issue came up that "extreme indifference to human life" is not a self-evident expression. It turns out that case law in Washington interprets this, as applied to first degree murder, as meaning "indifference to human life in general", not "indifference to the life of the specific victim". After a lengthy review of principles of judicial interpretation, the court upheld the trial court's refusal to give the first-degree murder definition of indifference, that is, it is up the the jury to decide what constitutes extreme indifference, for homicides other than 1st degree murder.	You are responsible or assessing risks to your children A parent (or a person in loco parentis) is obliged to care for and protect their children this includes assessing the risk to those children and whether that risk is acceptable or should be avoided or mitigated. This applies to all risks, when they should cross the road, when they are responsible enough to be left home alone and, yes, who is a suitable person to care for them. This does not require any sort of formal or documented risk assessment process but if things go wrong, the state may require the parent to justify their actions. If the state believes that their actions were reckless then this may be a crime. If the state believes their actions were not reasonable then this may have ongoing consequences with child protection agencies.	It's impractical to say what the law of Guyana was in 1978, but we can substitute criminal law from 1998 and assume that there would be substantial overlap. Suicide is still a crime, as is murder and while many people committed suicide, many also died at at hands of others. Whether or not Jones committed any murders, he was an access before the fact, and can be treated as a principal (Title 3), and for conspiracy to commit a felony (murder). Under §96, conseling or aiding in suicide is a felony punishable by life imprisonment. The Heaven's Gate suicides took place in California, where suicide is not a crime. However, it is a felony to aid, advise, or encourage another to commit suicide. As a backup, following the model of Michelle Carter's conviction (appeal denied Mass Supreme Court, petition to SCOTUS, cert denied), he might be charged with involuntary manslaughter, although prosecutors would have had to think of that angle (encouraging suicide is not a crime in Massachussetts, thus the need to be creative in prosecution).	Every State in the union has some form of involuntary mental health hold. Regardless of whether or not the patient claims it was an accident, it is incumbent upon the hospital or facility where the individual is held (which is typically at least 72 hours) to do an in-depth analysis of whether the person is a danger to themselves or others. While in this scenario it may've been an inadvertent overdose, the empirical evidence suggests it could have been intentional as the practitioner cannot see into the thoughts and motivations behind the patient's actions. Even taking the patient at face-value, addiction to the extent of overdose is also a mental health issue, which may cause a person to be a danger to themselves. From a clinical perspective, it is much more likely than not that one of the two scenarios occurred, versus a truly mistaken overdose. One would need to mistake their actions numerous times in a day to take so much as to overdose. If you look at it from the inverse perspective, if the facility failed to keep a person who'd just overdosed, or the first responder failed to initiate a hold and the person later died, minimally they would be liable if sued by the family in an action for wrongful death. The unfortunate facts are that if a person was set on committing suicide, it unlikely they would be forthcoming with that fact, for this very reason (the mandatory hold), so a person's word cannot be the determining factor. Even if someone was not intentionally trying to take their life, having taken enough Xanax to cause medical overdose would suggest the potential that even if not suicidal, the individual was at a minimum abusing the medication by taking much more than prescribed (or in a way that is contraindicated - such as with alcohol or other depressants) and potentially suffering from benzodiazepine addiction. Either way, if the hold was not initiated or cut short - and then someone ended up dying from an overdoes - the responsibility and potential liability is the same. A person who is suicidal can reassess what may be a snap decision, or have a chemical imbalance stabilized, or a severe addiction identified in that amount of time. For the person who ctually takes so much medication as to mistakenly cause overdose, this is certainly inconvenient; however, 72 hours is a short time in the grand scheme of things to potentially save a life. The law will nearly always err on the side of safety and prevention.	Unless there is enough evidence to convict one or more of the suspects, none will be convicted. In general the argument: We know it must be one of you, but we don't know whch, so we find you all guilty. is not allowed in any non-dictatorial jurisdiction. Just how much evidence is needed for a conviction varies by jurisdiction in theory, and by judge or jury in practice. Also, it would be possible to charge several of the residents with having acted jointly in the crime, but there would still need to be sufficient evidence against each defendant to obtain a conviction.	Under Article 223-6 of the Criminal Code Anyone who, being able to prevent by immediate action a felony or a misdemeanour against the bodily integrity of a person, without risk to himself or to third parties, wilfully abstains from doing so, is punished by five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000. The same penalties apply to anyone who wilfully fails to offer assistance to a person in danger which he could himself provide without risk to himself or to third parties, or by initiating rescue operations. Pocket-picking is a special case of theft that violates "bodily integrity"; so this article does seem to create a conditional legal duty to intervene. There does not appear to be a specific law creating a duty to report crimes to the police, but that might be implied by the duty to initiate rescue operations.	The purposes of criminal justice include (this list is based on the Sentencing Act 1991 in Victoria): Deterrence Rehabilitation of offenders Denunciation ('this behaviour is wrong') (Retribution can also be a purpose.) What the question is talking about is rehabilitation. As discussed in the book 'Starship Troopers', you can't expect a person to improve their behaviour if they are not shown how. Some simple examples in practice include violent offenders being sent to anger management classes, or bad drivers being sentenced to remedial training. Why aren't all offenders put into rehabilitation programs? Some reasons include: Cost. It would be very expensive to offer all the rehabilitation which would help all offenders. Often this kind of thing is court-ordered, so if the judge does not know about relevant programs or does not assess the offender's needs correctly, then the offender will not be sent to them. The offender is unwilling to participate in programs that are available, and there are limits to how much coercion a given society is comfortable applying. There is no 'one size fits all' rehabilitation. Some people need to talk about what makes them use drugs, others need to talk through their childhood issues, others need training so they can get a job and not fall back into bad habits when they are released from prison. Perhaps North Korea has a great curriculum for putting lots of people in a camp and they come out model citizens, but I'm not aware of the details. Can a person really be forced to do anything? Even the army can't do that. The army might put you in prison, but that's redundant for a person who is already a prisoner. You can always threaten to kill them, I suppose, whip them, or brainwash them with electrodes perhaps, but that depends on your principles as a society. I think it's fair to say that, these days, the trend is towards what the question suggests, which is putting as many offenders as possible into rehabilitation. In 2014 it was reported that Texas took the money it would have spent on building a new prison and used it on rehabilitation instead, and there were suggestions that that worked well.	Yes, this is legal in many US states, perhaps most. Search for "adult adoption". For instance, here is the procedure in Colorado. Also, another article on the topic. Before the advent of same-sex marriage, this used to be a technique for a same-sex couple to legally formalize their relationship; one partner would adopt the other. Here is a New York Times Magazine article about the practice. Here is another article, from The Atlantic. They even refer to a case in which the parent was younger than the child.
Can one legally barter services if each party declares they are donating the service? I've read where the IRS will try to enforce the "real market value" of a service and require you to pay tax on it. I'm wondering how enforceable this is, and if you can get around it if its less than $500 in value or if you declare that it is a "donated service" on each side. https://www.irs.gov/uac/four-things-to-know-about-bartering-1	Two people exchanging goods or services on a commercial basis and then pretending it was two gifts is tax evasion. It's not a gift. It's a commercial sale that you lie about by 'putting' a different 'label' on it. Sometimes two people will give mutual gifts, e.g. if you come to my wedding: I give you dinner, you give me some kitchenware. Yet there's nothing commercial about it. So that's not income for either party. However, if you're talking about two businesses making sales to each other, that is very much income, regardless of what you badge it.	Generally, such sanctions prevent certain sorts of transactions in goods and services with nationals or entities of the nation under sanction. The exact list of transactions prohibited or restricted varies. If Open source software were being provided as a service, so that the recipient paid directly for a license, or for customization or configuration work, or for some sort of consulting or assistance, such transactions could be banned or restricted by a sanctions regime, but might not be. (If the sanctions included that particular class of transactions.) However, if it is merely a matter of an open source product being published, for anyone to download, install, and use, I don't see how that would be barred or restricted by any sanctions of the sort recently in use.	It has to be 'liquidated damages', since a penalty clause is unenforceable. It has to have a reasonable relation to the party's legitimate interest. The point is that it has to represent a good faith estimate of the actual damage.	When the buyer hears "to avoid sales tax" and hears the seller describing as a gift something that s/he knows was nothing of the sort, a reasonable buyer would know that this was at best suspicious, and would find out if this was legal. But assuming that the buyer accepted the seller's suggestion ignorantly and in good faith, the buyer can file a report of the transaction and pay any tax that should have been paid. The exact way of doing this will vary based on the laws of the buyer's jurisdiction (state-level if in the US) which is not given in the question. Such a report and payment might not prevent the local tax authorities from assessing an additional penalty. Criminal charges seem unlikely, but would be possible. If the seller was a used car dealer, the authorities might want the buyer to testify against the seller. They buyer might be wise to consult a lawyer with expertise in sales tax issues in the buyer's jurisdiction. Such a lawyer could advise on exactly what the buyer's legal obligation was, and how to avoid or minimize penalties or other consequences.	The issue of who pays directly for the items and/or to contractors is irrelevant. The important thing is to memorialize the agreement/arrangement in writing so as to preempt or solve eventual disputes. A clearly written agreement signed by the parties would supersede any presumption of conditions and rights arising solely from the parties' conduct.	Transfer pricing is something that is required when related parties provide good or services to each other, in order to determine what part of the profit from the eventual sale of the goods or services is allocated to the initial transferor and what part is allocated to the final seller of the good or service. There is no country in the world where transfer pricing is illegal, and ther is no reason that it should be. The legal issue in transfer pricing is how to determine it correctly to be in compliance with tax and financial accounting standards that apply to it, and the proper transfer price for tax purposes is not necessarily the proper transfer price for financial accounting purposes. Generally speaking, transfer prices are supposed to be set at an amount equal to the price that would have been reached in an arms length transaction between unrelated third parties. If the transfer price is too high, the "buyer" isn't paying enough taxes on the final sale. If the transfer price is too low, the "buyer" is paying too much tax on the final sale. Abuses in transfer pricing tend to occur when they are set to allocate almost all profits to the company in the low tax jurisdiction, and almost no profits to the related company in a high tax jurisdiction. The proper means of setting transfer taxes is a highly technical area of international taxation and financial accounting. This would theoretically allow a company to sell minerals for 1 dollar a ton. The proper transfer price of minerals is their fair market value. It is impossible to know if $1 a ton is too high, too low, or just right, without knowing more about the transaction.	Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, there has to be an agreement for there to be price fixing. If the parties do not agree to engage in price-fixing or other anti-competitive behavior, there is no violation. There does not needed to be a written, explicit contract memorializing the agreement, but there does need to be more than just encouragement to change prices. Telling one person to charge more isn't price-fixing, because the person making the suggestion could then just leave his own prices in place and enjoy the competitive advantage. But if that person were to say, "We should raise our prices," and then they both did, you'd probably have a pretty good Sherman Act case.	They aren't "imposing tax laws at the state level", and the states are still perfectly free to award whatever credits they like. There's a more complete explanation here. Before 2017, if you paid, say, $30,000 in state taxes, you could take a $30,000 deduction from your federal taxable income, thus reducing your federal income taxes by some fraction of $30,000 (depending on your tax bracket). The 2017 tax bill placed a $10,000 limit on this deduction. Some states responded by creating a provision where you could donate $30,000 to the state and receive a $30,000 credit against your state taxes owed - so you end up paying the same amount to the state, but now you characterize it as a charitable donation, which is still deductible from your federal taxable income. The new IRS regulation says that such a "donation" will no longer be deductible from your federal taxable income; that's all. Your state can still issue you a tax credit for such a donation if they want - the federal government has no control over that - but any such credit will reduce the amount you are allowed to deduct on your federal return, making the whole exercise pointless. The federal government certainly has the power to determine how you should compute your income for the purposes of your federal income taxes, including what you may or may not deduct. That's the power they're using here.
Why did Jim Garrison investigate the Kennedy assassination? Mr Garrison was the district attorney (DA) for the state of New Orleans and the assassination of President Kennedy happened in Dallas, Texas. Why would a New Orleans DA be interested in this? Isn't it way out of his jurisdiction? Can any DA investigate any event in any state?	Garrison claimed that the assassination was the result of a conspiracy, involving various meetings and other overt acts that allegedly took place in New Orleans. If that were true, then the conspirators who did those things would have been guilty of criminal conspiracy under Louisiana law, and the New Orleans District Attorney would be able to prosecute that crime. The result of the investigation was an indictment and trial of Clay Shaw (he was acquitted). You can read Garrison's opening statement at http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/russ/testimony/garrisono.htm, which includes the detailed charges and some arguments by the defense over jurisdictional issues. Note that Shaw was charged with conspiracy but not with murder. There's also a Wikipedia article, with references, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trial_of_Clay_Shaw.	I think you're being confused by two separate definitions of "police power." The police power under the 10th Amendment has nothing to do with "the police," i.e. people with guns and badges and uniforms who make arrests. It refers to the authority of a government to make rules for the general welfare. Police power is almost always exercised by the legislature, and when the executive exercises it (e.g. by issuing regulations) it's typically operating under conditions set by the legislature. The United States has police power in a few situations: DC, federal property and territories, US-flagged ships on the high seas, etc. Outside of those situations, the United States instead has enumerated powers. Congress has a power to tax and spend to promote the general welfare, but otherwise it can only legislate to achieve one of the enumerated powers in the Constitution. Now, courts have read Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce very broadly, but there does need to be some relation to enumerated powers. You're asking about the Capitol Police, but they don't have "police power" in the 10th Amendment sense. They have the power to carry guns and to arrest people for crimes committed against the United States. This power is limited based on geography and/or the nature of their task; for instance, they have nationwide arrest powers "[i]n the performance of their protective duties," but not when they're traveling outside DC on other official duties (e.g. to attend training). While there's no litigation I can dig up that's directly on point, courts have repeatedly ruled that Congress has the power to do some not-entirely-legislative tasks in order to protect its own functions. For instance, in Anderson v. Dunn (1821), the Supreme Court upheld an inherent power of the House to hold private citizens in contempt of Congress for disobeying its subpoenas and for the Sergeant at Arms to arrest them and bring them before the House. It seems likely Congress would also have the authority to protect its own members from physical violence. The GAO did an analysis when it was analyzing whether there was a constitutional problem with making Capitol Police IG personnel into special deputy US marshals, and it concluded that there was no issue with congressional employees exercising arrest powers in order to physically protect the legislative branch.	Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.	Most secret service details are protection for heads of government/state and thus their details would be afforded Sovereign Immunity (Such as POTUS, VPOTUS, and First and Second Families) OR Diplomatic Immunity (visiting dignitaries and leaders of other nations). Typically there are more diplomatic ways to handle the cases in the latter. In the former case, thus far, it has not been handled. During visits, the traditional Executives and Families are usually closely guarded by the Service with additional law enforcement form local jurisdictions called in to aid in the protection, usually to secure routes the Motorcade will take to a designation (I speak from personal experience, POTUS coming to town is a nightmare on traffic). If they are speeding, they are typically doing so down a completely empty highway with police escort. From this point, most under of the Service would be monitored and controlled so closely, at least one Agent would notice if any protected was committing a crime and would have to write it up in a report. There is also considerable debate in legal circles if the President and Vice President could be arrested for a crime while in office, with the general acceptance being that they could not and would need to be impeached by congress. Secret Service will continue to protect former Presidents and Vice Presidents for life, along with their spouses and children up to a certain age. With all that in mind, it would not so much be that the Secret Service would prevent arrest of an individual under their protection so much as the Secret Service would be the arresting authority. As they are law enforcement agents under the Federal Government, they can legally arrest people and then hand them to the proper law enforcement agency to effect the arrest. This would mostly happen with candidates for office OR former presidents OR family at any point in time as the scenario described is a bit harder to make a legitimate arrest. In fact, the Secret Service does have arrest authority with one of the highest conviction rates of any Law Enforcement Agency in the Country. It's just most crimes they arrest have nothing to do with threats to those under their protection. The Secret Service is also charged with investigation of counterfeiting of US currency and they are very good at it. This was actually their original sole function in the U.S. government and they still exist under the Treasury Department to this day. At this point, if you're wondering how they got the job of protecting important people in the executive branch from that, well, it's simple. At the time of his assasination, the legislation to create the USSS was on Licoln's desk. At the time of their creation, the only other Federal Police services were the U.S. Park Police, the Postal Inspection Service, and the U.S. Marshals. The first two had specific jurisdictions and the Marshals were undermanned so the USSS was tasked with investigating all sorts of financial crimes and quickly became the most successful U.S. Law Enforcement Service. They were also the first U.S. Intelligence and Counterintelligence agency (though they no longer are part of the Intelligence Community) until the FBI took on those duties. So following the Assassination of William McKinley in 1901, Congress authorized them to take up full time Presidential Protection because at the time, they were pretty much doing everything else.	The problem with Solution 2 is that government officials in the United States enjoy qualified immunity with respect to actions that they did while acting under color of law. It's not total immunity, but if they do things by the book, they cannot be prosecuted even if something goes wrong (even when doing things by the book, Police deal in very volatile situations and things can still go wrong because of an X factor to specific for the training manual to cover.). In other cases, it may be because multiple officers are working the scene and Office A lied to Officer B about the situation. Consider Officer A pulls over a suspect and realizes it was someone who was suspected of a crime, but couldn't prove it. He calls for back up and Officer B arrives. Upon arriving on scene, Officer A tells B to search the trunk of the car despite the fact that A had not received consent from the suspect nor has a warrant, nor cause to make a search of a trunk of a vehicle. B makes the search and finds [the bloody knife/the stash of drugs/the smoking gun/the match to a child's shoe that was missing from the kidnapping scene/ insert other incriminating evidence]. Under system (2), since it was Officer B who made the illegal search, B would be liable for it, even though Officer A lied about having legal reason for a search of the trunk space. But what's more... if the evidence is gonna be used anyway, what's to stop the cops doing it again? After all, there is very little recourse for those who are illegally searched to contest this in court (If I'm illegally searched and don't have anything on me, I have to take this to civil court, which is a different animal than Criminal Court and exposes me to broader Discovery... aka gives the cops free reign to search my property for a hell of a lot more illegal things.) or just sit back and count my 4th amendment rights (the section of the constitution protecting against unwarranted search and seizures) as worth less than the paper they're printed on. Oh, and by the way... that second word seizure... that means that they will be taking my property (or myself if they arrest me) and will not be giving it back for some time while they process it... if it's a legal to hold item (like my laptop that I do work on) that's going to make it harder for me to do my job which injures me further in lost business and income. In other cases, it could be they have a warrant for a large item (a stolen big screen tv) and while searching for it, open my sugar bowel and find evidence of a crime unrelated to theft of the television (i.e. opening a baggie of weed). This is actually an illegal search because, unless I am a wizard, a Time Lord, or Mary Poppins, there is no reason why a container smaller than a big screen TV should ever be searched when looking for a Big Screen TV and the cops should logically see this as out of bounds of the search warrant. The nature of this is damaging before the legality of the search can be determined, and because the search may have been out of scope of the warrant that was otherwise justified, the rule of making the evidence of a crime inadmissible was held in order to prevent LEOs from doing this because they could. This rule also started to take formation prior to the Revolutionary War. British Law had ruled against compelled confessions being inadmissible as evidence in 1769, a full six years before the Revolutionary war started (1775) and seven years before the publication of the Declaration of Independence (1776). Now there are some exceptions that can get the evidence brought back in, such as plain view ("The suspect's vehicle is a pick up truck with an open bed, the murder weapon was lying in the bed covered in blood"), inevitable discovery ("We have developed evidence by other means that would have lead us to this evidence legally") and Exigent Circumstances ("We believed someone inside the property was in grave danger if we did not enter the property immediately and that's when we found a cache of stolen Big Screen TVs!) and Good Faith (the Warrant was authorized for the wrong street address of the target but we found the evidence of an unrelated crime in a place the warrant authorized us to search. Everything but the goofed up address was done by the book.).	I was told that DAs and other prosecutors are typically prohibited from engaging in volunteer, pro bono work You have not really understood the linked answer and are oversimplifying its analysis. I'll restate the analysis in a different way in this answer in the hope of providing greater clarity. The key to understanding that question is that the question presented there was: "Are DAs and other prosecutors prohibited from being defense attorneys, such as in a pro bono fashion?" Having a prosecutor do criminal defense work presents conflicts that other types of pro bono work frequently would not. Does this mean that public attorneys can engage in pro bono work in Texas? If so, are there strings attached? For example, would a public attorney be able to represent their friends and family so long as they don't charge for the work? These questions don't have a single global answer and must be analyzed on a case by case basis. It depends upon whether the pro bono work constitutes a conflict of interest with the public attorneys' regular work (i.e. what kind of legal work is done pro bono and for whom) and it depends upon the policies of the lawyer's particular employer. There are two distinct questions presented, neither of which are materially different in Texas than they were in the previous question. One is when doing so would violate the professional ethical obligations of a lawyer, which is what the Texas Bar Association statement is talking about. The other is whether it is permissible in a manner consistent with the contractual employer-employee relationship of any particular Texas attorney working on a full time salaried basis for a particular employer. This is a subject upon which the Texas Bar Association statement is silent. Professional Ethics Considerations As noted above, one question is whether pro bono work by a prosecutor in the specific subject matter of criminal defense would constitute a conflict of interest. The answer to that question is "usually yes" for the reasons explained in the linked question. One can also easily imagine other circumstances where pro bono work could pit a salaried government lawyer against his employer, such as a state attorney general's office lawyer doing pro bono civil rights litigation against the state government. But, not all pro bono legal work constitutes a conflict of interest. For example, a prosecutor doing pro bono work helping low income people prepare documents naming legal guardians for their children in the event that they predecease their children (the very first pro bono case I took on as a Colorado attorney) would be very unlikely to be conflict of interest for the prosecutor, even though a pro bono criminal defense case in the county where the prosecutor practices would be an obvious and direct unethical conflict of interest. Similarly, judges frequently do pro bono work, where authorized to do so by the court systems in which they work, in the areas of legal education for non-lawyers (like High School Mock Trial competitions or lectures to school students) and by providing mediation services to indigent parties outside the judicial district where they practice, that are specifically calculated to avoid conflicts of interests, or appearance of bias or impropriety. Employment Relationship Considerations The second issue is whether "public attorneys can engage in pro bono work in Texas?" in a case with a subject matter that does not otherwise present a conflict of interest. Public sector attorneys are not prohibited from doing so as a matter of professional ethics. But, that isn't the only consideration. The other consideration is whether doing that pro bono work violates the employment policies of a public sector employer of a lawyer in the usual case when a public sector lawyer is employed on a salaried basis for the full efforts or something similar, of the lawyer. This is basically an issue of contract law, not of professional ethics. The way this is usually dealt with in private law practice when a salaried attorney works for a law firm is that the private salaried lawyer needs to obtain law firm permission to do pro bono work and that pro bono work is often structured so that the pro bono client's lawyer is the law firm itself and the lawyer in that firm doing the actual pro bono work is often just one agent of the firm as a whole that actual represents the pro bono client. Frequently, salaried lawyers in private law firms have quotas of billable hours which they have to meet as a condition of employment each year at the law firm, and frequently a private law firm's pro bono program allows the salaried lawyer to count hours working for the law firm's pro bono clients towards that annual billable hour quota. Incidentally, there is nothing magic in the absence of a conflict of interest, about limiting "moonlighting work" to unpaid pro bono work. For example, many U.S. law schools expressly authorize salaried full time law professors who are admitted to the practice of law to have a paid private practice up to a certain number of hours per year as a fringe benefit in addition to the salary, akin to the common practice of allowing professors to retain for themselves textbook royalties for textbooks written while the professors were being paid a salary to do scholarly work including writing textbooks. The pro bono program structure used in private law firms for their salaried employers isn't as workable for a salaried attorney working full time for a governmental employer. This is because allowing a government salaried employee to work for free for a private citizen on something that doesn't involve public business of the government would functionally be an indirect appropriation of legal salary funds from the governmental entity to the pro bono client without receiving authorization from the elected representatives of the government in question. So, in the public sector, a more common arrangement would be to provide that every salaried public sector lawyer working for that government is permitted to do up to X billable hours of pro bono work per year for their own, personal moonlighting private practice clients as a fringe benefit of employment, much like paid time off, if it is permitted at all. And, other public sector employers, which are not so generous, simply prohibit their salaried attorney employees from doing pro bono work at all in order to avoid having to deal with and think about the issue. This doesn't arise very often in the case of lawyers hired by small local governments or on a contract basis by a larger government for a particular specialized task, as they have their own practices and have not agreed to provide substantially all of their professional legal work to their employer the way that a salaried lawyer would. So they are more akin to private sector law firm lawyers who simply have an additional set of conflict of interest considerations as a result of having a particular local government as an employer.	That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.	Self-Defense Law In A Nutshell Self-defense (or defense of others) with deadly force is generally authorized when a reasonable person would believe that the use of death force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person (i.e. there aren't non-deadly options that can accomplish this end) and a reasonable person would believe that the use of force will prevent death or serious bodily harm to a person, subject to exceptions that would not apply to a private individual using deadly force in a stampede situation. Incidentally, every state and every country absolves someone of liability for homicide when deadly force is used in self-defense, or in the defense of others (not necessarily family), although the exact details of when this is justified varies slightly. For example, in D.C. v. Heller, the right to self-defense is considered a natural or universal right. The analysis would be somewhat different if the shooter were in law enforcement, and would be different again in the case of a shooter who was in the military with more or less clear orders. But, that legal standard doesn't get you to an answer. The Complex Phenomena Called Stampedes The analysis would be extremely fact rich, in the sense of exactly who one would attempt to shoot, what that would be likely to accomplish, and what other alternatives would be available. And, to do that, you also need to understand the phenomena of deadly stampedes which are complex and often somewhat counter-intuitive phenomena. While there are circumstances where it could be legal self-defense or defense of others to shoot a stampeding individual to save someone's life, there are also many stampede circumstances where a use of force would not be justified. In practice, most stampedes, as a matter of physics, can only be stopped by removing a crush of bodies from the rear, where they do not know that they are causing a deadly stampede, while those at the front who end up directly harming others are frequently physically incapable of stopping. Essentially, in a typical stampede that causes death, the problem is an inability of the people at the front to communicate to the people at the back to slow down. And, when a stampede is caused by a genuine threat to the people at the back like a fire or a terrorist, there is nothing that would persuade the people at the back to slow down anyway. So, usually, shooting to kill someone at the front of a stampede would not achieve the intended result of protecting someone in its path. The person shot would either continue to surge forward while dead under the crush of bodies behind them, or would have their dead body trampled over by the next person in line who also has no physical ability to do anything other than to surge forward. So, usually, using deadly force to shoot someone at the front of a stampede will be futile and only cause an unnecessary death. Given that using deadly force in a stampede, if directly at people in the front, is almost always futile, the question for the judge or jury deciding the case becomes whether a reasonable person would know that at the time, which would have to be decided a case by case basis. Sometimes it is obvious from someone in a vantage point to shoot at the front of a stampede that this would be futile and sometimes it isn't. This question would be highly fact specific and depend a lot upon exactly what information about the situation was available to the person shooting a person in the stampede. The situation where deadly force might not be futile would be one in which there is no actual life threatening harm that people are fleeing in which the deadly force is directed at the people in the back who are driving the stampede (even though they don't know it), to shock them into ceasing to do so. But, in that situation, if the shooting is done by someone who understands the situation well enough to know that this is what is actually necessary, that person also may be capable of firing warning shots or shooting to injure with the same effect, so justification might also be in doubt. Protecting Targets of Mobs v. Protecting Targets of Stampedes A similar situation where the use of deadly force might be justified is something visually similar to a stampede, but quite different in what would work factually. This is a mob that is about to attack someone, possibly armed with pitchforks or knives or clubs or broken bottles or a noose. In the case of a mob, the use of deadly force to protect someone threatened by the mob would almost always be a justified use of force in self-defense or the defense of others, because shooting someone in the front is likely to be both necessary and effective.
Hypothetically walking the line between pornography and prostitution Throughout this question I will reference the Texas Penal Code for concrete examples as Texas is my home state. The Texas Penal Code clarifies explicitly what is considered prostitution in the state in Section 43.02, which I will quote in part here for reference: Sec. 43.02. PROSTITUTION. (a) A person commits an offense if, in return for receipt of a fee, the person knowingly:      (1) offers to engage, agrees to engage, or engages in sexual conduct; or      (2) solicits another in a public place to engage with the actor in sexual conduct for hire. (b) A person commits an offense if, based on the payment of a fee by the actor or another person on behalf of the actor, the person knowingly:      (1) offers to engage, agrees to engage, or engages in sexual conduct; or      (2) solicits another in a public place to engage with the actor in sexual conduct for hire. Here, what I intend to demonstrate is that this legislation deems the purchase of a sexual act illegal regardless of on whom it is performed. Of course, to quote the gist this law professor’s CNN article, Because the impact of pornography occurs through the mediation of an audience witnessing a performance, rather than an audience receiving physical services from a performer, pornography and its making qualify as First-Amendment protected speech. What I intend to underscore here is that constitutional law exempts pornography from state legislation about prostitution because of its true purpose. A fairly common motif that appears in media (e.g., Sons of Anarchy, Cops, Reno 911!) is to explore different ways to circumvent legislation that prohibits prostitution, mostly—if not entirely—through the scapegoat of an “escort” service. Consider this hypothetical business concept: a producer operates a custom pornography studio. The customer can visit the studio’s website to view the different content the studio will film as well as the different actors who can be featured. The customer then drafts a script, tallying up the price for different acts, their durations and their doers. The customer is also free to cast him- or herself (or not) in the video. All the customer must do is prove that he or she is free of sexually transmitted infections and/or diseases. The business does not inquire about the customer’s motivations but does require that all clients respect the consent, or lack thereof, of all parties involved. The customer only pays for what acts are recorded and takes the tape home for private use. Questions: If this business were located and conducted in Texas, would it be illegal per Sec. 43.02 of the Texas Penal Code? If casting oneself in the pornographic film added a surcharge to the bill, would the customer be considered guilty of prostitution? If the answer to 2 is yes, then could the other parties involved also receive charges despite not knowing the customer’s true motives? Disclaimer: This is a purely hypothetical situation designed to challenge and promote understanding of the meeting of the First Amendment and Section 43.02 of the Texas Penal Code. I am not soliciting legal advice.	According to a blog post (written by a lawyer who actually has had multiple people ask about that), it depends on several things. The gist is that they're not getting away with this "brilliant plan" unless they take so many steps to make it look legitimate that it will, in fact, become a legitimate porn production enterprise — in which case, why bother with the ruse in the first place? To find you guilty of prostitution, a jury would have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that you were guilty of prostitution and not just making porn. But putting a camera in the room doesn't necessarily make it First-Amendment-protected porn; sometimes it just means you're giving them evidence of your crime. Since juries can differ, there's not really a bright line. But some things look bad to judges and juries. If the director is also doing sexual acts in the film, that looks bad. If he's also never directed or acted in porn before, that looks bad. If a person in the film is paying for the "actresses" instead of getting paid for "acting", that looks very bad; see United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 737 (10th Cir. 1975). Having an actual script, on the other hand, may look good. Keep in mind that if the film is not just pornographic but actually obscene, obscenity laws could still apply even if you convince them it isn't prostitution. The First Amendment does not protect obscene materials. Additionally, if you claim it's porn, you will need to properly keep records of the names (and all former names/aliases) and dates of birth of your "actors" and "actresses", unless you want to be guilty of a federal felony. This includes making a copy of their photo ID. The records must also made available for inspection by the Attorney General and his inspectors for a minimum of 20 hours per week, with no advance notice given by them. Is everyone involved really going to be OK with all of this - especially since the law specifically notes that the records may be used as evidence in a federal obscenity prosecution?	It depends on how the law is worded. CA Penal Code 632 says: (a) A person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, uses an electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon or record the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per violation, or imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or Section 631, 632.5, 632.6, 632.7, or 636, the person shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation, by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. [...] (c) For the purposes of this section, “confidential communication” means any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes [...] any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. [emphasis added] If you're told that a conversation may be recorded, then you can reasonably expect that the conversation may be recorded, so the California law would not apply to it. A further issue is interpretation of "may". It is ambiguous as to whether it means "might" or "can". If the other party says "This call may be recorded", and "may" is interpreted as "can", then the other party has consented to the call being recorded. A case where the passive voice could have significant consequences; if they were instead to say "We may record this phone call", then, depending on the state law, things might be different.	Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred.	It is not decided whether such, in areas, filming can be prohibited. In a "public forum", First Amendment rights are maximally protected, and this includes filing (Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 in particular §A(1) for a summary of the law on this question). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 the court refined public forum doctrine to distinguish quintessential, limited, and nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes": but, such a reservation must be viewpoint-neutral. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 states that "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time". In a nonpublic forum, demonstrations can be forbidden, especially when demonstrations are incompatible with the purpose of the forum (example: military bases). The particular question you raise has not ended up in court. One may be tempted to reason that First Amendment rights can be arbitrarily curtailed in a non-public forum, but such a restriction would have to have appropriate justification – the restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Simply saying "We don't want people filming inside the holding area" is not a valid justification. But, the police are not required to announce their legal argument in advance. If you get busted and film, and they make you stop, you can sue for violation of your First Amendment rights. Your attorney would then need to make a good argument that this restriction is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails.	The distinction is a question of culpability, not just the harm caused. The law, at least in the criminal law context, is not fundamentally consequentialist in its philosophy. The end consequence of an act for which someone is at fault in some way isn't the only thing that matters in criminal law. Instead, there is basically a two dimensional grid. On one axis is the seriousness of the harm caused on the "eye for an eye" theory of proportionality between punishment and the harm caused. Thus, homicide is more serious than causing serious bodily injury or raping someone, which is more serious than causing bodily injury that is not serious or sexual in nature. Grand theft is more serious than shoplifting. It doesn't make economic sense to spend $70,000 a year to incarcerate someone for many years to prevent people from stealing $15 items, unless very extreme aspects of the person's criminal history suggest that this seemingly minor incident demonstrates a high risk of future offenses that are far more serious because it proves that a hardened criminal hasn't reformed himself or herself. On the other axis is basically a measure of how evil and malicious someone would have to be to do such a thing which is called culpability. At once extreme, first degree murder, for example, is calculated, premeditated harm to another. At the other extremes are completely non-culpable conduct (either due to lack of any fault-worthy conduct or because someone is mentally incapable in the eyes of society of engaging in culpable conduct like a baby or someone with dementia or someone having hallucinations relevant to the conduct that kills someone, ordinarily negligent conduct that kills someone, and criminally negligent conduct that kills someone. In between the extremes is conduct that is reckless or is impulsive or carried out in the heat of passion or by someone with diminished capacity. Only moderately culpable conduct is punishable only by a civil lawsuit for compensatory damages, and non-culpable conduct isn't even punishable in a civil lawsuit in the absence of special circumstances in which strict liability is imposed in lieu of proof of culpability. Less culpable conduct commands less serious sentences, and more culpable conduct commands more serious sentences. Why single out culpability? Basically, this is a crude way a predicting, based upon someone's past actions, the risk that the pose in the future. (Our evaluation of culpability is further refined and adjusted by factors related to the individual defendant and not the particular offense involved, like a criminal defendant's status as a juvenile or adult, and the individuals history of prior criminal convictions.) Conduct that constitutes first degree murder corresponds more or less to psychopathy, an incurable psychiatric condition in which someone lacks all empathy and takes selfish delight in harming others out of boredom or for personal gain. Psychopathy is a technical term that is modern abnormal psychology's closest synonym to saying that someone is unredeemable and evil, and conduct for which the death penalty is available, mostly in conduct that is most highly diagnostic of psychopathy, since the usual goal of incarceration, to return someone to the community once they are no longer an appreciably elevated threat to it, can never be achieved in the case of someone who is unredeemable and evil, because their condition is an incurable part of who they are as a person and their lack of empathy makes them incapable of emotionally distinguishing between right and wrong or feeling guilt. This intuition bears out. The more culpable an offense is, the more likely it is that the offender scores high on standardized measures of the extent to which someone displays signs of psychopathy that are exemplified in serial killers and the worst con men. Intermediate levels of liability correspond more or less to impulsivity that can turn violent (which is associated with a variety of incurable psychiatric conditions and also with the developmental states of adolescence and young adulthood and with instances of excessive intoxicant consumption, especially in men), in which someone knows what they are doing is wrong but lacks sufficient self-control to prevent themselves from acting until it is too late and they have calmed down, at least until they "age out" or or take steps to treat the symptoms of the conditions or addictions or intoxicated excesses. Their lack of self-control makes them a potential risk to others even though they empathize and feel guilt, but not like the risk associated with a psychopath who just doesn't care at all if they are doing something that violates intuitive moral codes of conduct. Negligence, i.e. inattentiveness and carelessness pose even less of a threat to the community and while it could be due to something like attention deficit disorder, could also be due to extenuating circumstances like sleep deprivation or being overwhelmed with too much at once to keep track of everything at once. Negligence harm generally isn't even momentarily malicious due to loss of control and the person who harms someone negligently will often immediately regret the harm that they caused and will try to refrain from doing so again and will try to make things right. Such a person is far less of a future threat to society, but still more of a threat than someone who doesn't harm others in the first place in any manner in which they are at fault. Who decides? Reasonable people (and even reasonable judges) can and do have differences of opinion on the relative importance of seriousness of harm and culpability in determining a sentence for a conviction of a particular course of illegal conduct. The difficulty in balancing the apples and oranges factors of seriousness of harm (which, in part, reflects a person's capacity to inflict serious harm in the future and also reflects society's judgment about how serious it is to do something with ill intent) and culpability. To insure that these factors are balanced in a predictable and fair way, we embody the weighing of those two factors in a collective legislative judgment codified in a state or national penal code, rather than a case by case decision making process by judges. The modern trend towards giving more weight to culpability. If anything, the tendency at the present is for legislative judgment to give more weight to culpability than it has in the past as social science methods in criminology have demonstrated that culpability demonstrated in criminal conduct actually carried out by a person is indeed highly predictive of that person's future dangerousness to society For example, cruelty to animals is an offense which reflects very high levels of culpability despite often involving relatively modest amounts of harm viewed in a human-centric way. But, cruelty to animals is increasingly being upgraded from a misdemeanor to a felony, because it is a very diagnostic litmus test for psychopathy in an individual and very frequently eventually escalates to causing serious harm to humans. Similarly, drunk driving when it is charged based upon a traffic stop, rather than an accident that occurred while someone was driving drunk, is a very low harm offense, just like any other traffic offense, and historically has only been a misdemeanor. But, in cases where someone is repeatedly convicted of drunk driving, the culpability is high and the conduct tends to reflect a very difficult to self-regulate addiction and substance abuse problem that is highly likely to recur and to eventually result in a high harm accident. Repeated convictions are what distinguish an incident where someone is basically just criminally negligent in driving when they should have known that they shouldn't, from the far more serious case where someone recklessly and with indifference to the well being of others drives drunk knowing full what the risk that they are exposing other people to. And because repeat drunk driving convictions are more culpable and reflect a personal character of the offender that shows a high likelihood of causing future harm to others, many states are starting to upgrade repeat drunk driving from a misdemeanor to a felony even though the actual harm from the specific incident of drunk driving that only gives rise to a traffic stop is still just as low the fifth or sixth time someone is convicted as it was the first time. Conclusion So, in sum, assigning different penalties to different levels of culpability is a way to allocate limited correctional and punishment resources in a manner proportionate to the future risk of dangerousness that the current conviction provides undeniable evidence of in a non-arbitrary manner. Indeed, most people simply internalize the notion that more culpable conduct deserves more serious punishment because it is wrong, without conceptualizing in the more theoretical abnormal psychology informed and utilitarian framework in which I have described it above to demonstrate the implicit logic and wisdom behind the gut instinct that more culpable conduct should be punished more seriously, especially when its cause is not a passing incident that is unlikely to recur.	It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary.	I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.	You'd be confessing to committing a crime. I'm not a lawyer, but I wouldn't recommend trying it. Sure, if this trick worked, you might be able to clear yourself of civil remedies, but there's a much bigger problem with this: with the repeal of Roe vs Wade, Texas once more criminalised abortion, and so this tactic would, by necessity, require confessing to a crime in a court of law. While that law expressly prohibited the levying of penalties against the pregnant woman, the law allowing for lawsuits against people who "aid and abet" abortions didn't seem to apply to them either. As such, you'd be opening yourself up to fines of tens of thousands of dollars and a maximum prison sentence of life in jail.
Why would someone feel compelled to self-represent in court? As someone who is aware of instances where individuals choose to self-represent, I know that I am way out of my depth to represent myself should I find myself in need of legal services. However, for legal professionals and non-professionals, under what conditions would an individual choose to self-represent? The only situation I can think of is due to attorney-client privilege. If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. But in general, under what situation would compel someone to self-represent?	If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. This is deeply misguided. Criminal defense lawyers usually represent people who are guilty and there is no ethical problem with doing so, nor does this mean that the lawyer will disclose privileged information that is prejudicial to the defendant in the course of the representation. The notion that a lawyer would be compelled to testify against his client to the courts/law enforcement is simply not how the system works. It is true that a lawyer cannot ethically put you on the stand to offer testimony when the lawyer knows that your testimony to the court will be an outright flat lie, and that this lie is your strategy to prevail in your defense, but that is the sole meaningful limitation on what a lawyer can do for you. However, I can't think of a single instance, in which a desire to defend yourself at trial with a lie has caused someone to represent themselves. Usually, someone with that kind of motive will simply lie to their lawyer as well. It never makes sense to represent yourself if you are innocent and want to be acquitted of the charges against you. But, keep in mind that this is a small subset of all criminal defendants. Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly guilty of something. Usually, a criminal defense lawyer works to either exploit prosecution mistakes or lack of knowledge that prevent the prosecution from proving that guilt, or work to make sure that the defendant is not convicted of a more serious crime than the one committed, and/or work to see to it that their client does not receive an unnecessarily harsh sentence when alternatives are available. In real life, people represent usually themselves, either because they are denied access to counsel (which can be done in a criminal cases where the prosecutor waives the right to seek incarceration as a sentence), or because they are "crazy". Many people who represent themselves in a criminal cases do so because they want to proudly claim that they committed the crime as a means of obtaining of forum for public recognition of what they believe was righteous action even if this could lead to their death. Many terrorists, domestic and foreign, fall into this category. For example, the fellow committed a massacre at a Colorado abortion clinic tried to do this (if I recall correctly, he was later found incompetent to face a trial and has been committed to a mental institution until he becomes competent, if ever). Other people represent themselves out of a strongly felt guilt that they feel a moral duty to confess to, even if this means that they will face severe punishment for doing so. One subset of this group of people are people known as "death penalty volunteers" who try to get sentenced to death and try to waive all appeals and post-trial review. Sometimes they also plead guilty in the belief (often, but not always, inaccurate) that their swift guilty plea when they aren't actually guilty will protect someone else whom they know to be actually guilty. Other people represent themselves because they have deeply held, but paranoid and inaccurate views about the legal system such as members of the "Sovereign Citizens Movement" who think that if they say the "magic words" that they cannot be convicted and that lawyers are a part of a conspiracy designed to prevent them from doing so. Another situation that comes up is when an affluent person who is not entitled to a public defender as a result, chooses to represent themselves, usually with respect to a fairly minor charge like a traffic violation that carries a risk for a short term of incarceration, to save money. But, this is rarely a wise choice. But, unless you plan on pleading guilty or being found guilty at trial, self-representation does not make sense, and even if you plan on pleading guilty, a lawyer is usually worth it. For example, even if the direct consequence of a guilty plea is minor, the collateral consequences of that conviction (e.g. loss of eligibility to work in certain jobs and/or deportation and/or loss of a right to own a firearm) may be consequential and something that a non-lawyer would not realize was happening. Or, maybe you think you are guilty of crime X so there is no point in fighting the charges, but actually, the language of that statute has been defined in a manner that means you are really only guilty of less serious crime Y.	Assuming that privilege applies, no Not all communications with your lawyer trigger privilege and if it doesn’t then the lawyer is not your lawyer and is under the same obligation to report as any other member of the public. If privilege does apply then they must keep your secrets. If they are defending you and you confess to the crime then they can: represent you if you plead guilty withdraw unless that would prejudice your defence continue to act providing that they do not: suggest someone else committed the offence set up a defence inconsistent with the confession they can: argue the prosecution has not made their case, that you are not guilty of the offence charged by reason of law, or argue for any other (non prohibited) reason that you should not be convicted.	united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly.	For instance, clients often ask them for an assessment of "the chance of X going through". While clients can make it clear (in writing) that lawyers will not be held legally liable for giving "pure advice", lawyers often still refuse to give any guidance (even when they clearly do have one in mind). I do this on a regular basis. This said, lawyers are ill equipped to evaluate cases in these terms, because they don't see a full and unbiased sample of cases that they study academically, because there are too many distinctions between cases to make apples to apples comparisons of them, and because most lawyers went into law because they don't like thinking about things in mathematical terms. Lawyers will not infrequently say that a case or argument is strong or weak, or very strong or virtually frivolous, but evaluating the strength of a case is difficult and there are good academic studies that show that lawyers systemically overestimate the strength of their own cases. So, humility about the likelihood of a particular outcome is a good professional norm to have in place. Basically, law contains lots of uncertainty and the known unknowns and unknown unknowns predominate over what is known, most of the time.	Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked & answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false & misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.	Not in jurisdictions I am familiar with. A "Power of attorney" is a power to act as an attorney-in-fact, not to act as an attorney-at-law. A layperson practicing law for someone other than herself is usually the unauthorized practice of law and is illegal in most jurisdictions. It would be permissible if a jurisdiction carved out an exception for a particular kind of case, but they generally don't and are very unlikely to do so in a criminal case. For example, in Washington State "Limited Practice Officers" can assist people with one of a very limited set of civil legal forms that do not need modification. There may be some exceptions, but they would be more likely to occur before a matter becomes criminal. For example, the accountant who represents a taxpayer before the IRS, or the agent who files a form containing perjury to a federal agency like the post office or homeland security on your behalf. So it is very unlikely, but if it is important to you you can ask someone familiar with your kind of case in your jurisdiction.	The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense.	When a complaint is first file, per case law, courts have a duty to believe each allegation you make on information and belief as long as they are each not contradicting any other statement or other evidence present at the time of filing. This isn't true. The court doesn't have to actually believe you. The court merely has to assume for sake of argument that the things said are true for the narrow purpose of evaluating whether they describe a legal wrong in a formal sense. Also, under modern federal pleading rules in the U.S., the judge doesn't have to believe you and can dismiss your complaint if it is not "plausible." Your attorney has a duty to not merely assume that everything that a client tells the lawyer is true. In federal court, the governing rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which states that when an attorney files and signs a document in court that the attorney: certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. The California state law obligations is more or less identical in substance, although the procedural rules of California are codified differently than the federal rules. So, a lawyer is required to reasonably inquire into whether the client is telling the lawyer the truth about the client's motives and about the facts. It is a breach of the lawyer's duties to the court and the profession to simply take what a client tells the lawyer at face value, accepting it uncritically.
Protecting an Idea Predicated on a Novel Software Process Before I begin, I'm a software engineer, so am not especially in-the-know about what I'm seeking to do beyond the software side of things. In brief: I would like to pitch an idea leveraging a novel software process to a potential client to purchase or license. What methods could I consider to protect that idea and process? In detail: What I would like to do is to pitch a show to an online streaming video vendor, for example, Netflix. Such a show's success would be predicated on the use of a particular software technology to help create the show. The idea would be to use the technology to bring a new spin to the show's concept, which is not a new one. The show's concept is not novel (but equally, not protected), however executing such a show using such technology would be novel, as best as I can tell from my research. I have thus-far not found prior art for such an idea executed with this technology. The use of the technology would be required for the show to exist in the configuration suggested in this proposal. Elaborating, to create the show, a software suite would have to be prepared which would be bespoke for the show, and this would leverage some open source technologies and some licensed technologies to work. By this logic, such software could be said to be a crucial process by which the show would be produced, and I suppose such a software process could be said to be novel also, although the steps involved in the process would not be novel by themselves. If I was to use a real world parallel that I think is similar, if you were to imagine that video editing software didn't exist, it would be pitching a show and a software package like Windows Movie Maker to make the show, and seeking to protect the idea of your movie maker software package as part of that pitch. The merits of pitching such a show aside, what methods could I use to protect my ideas such that Netflix or other vendors can't just turn me down, hire a software team and pursue the concept on their own? For legal reference, I reside in Australia, but would appreciate US and other perspectives all the same. Thanks for your time. My research: I've seen: How to protect an idea when you don't own the brand or the process? (UK) and it was not particularly reassuring, although I am asking as a novel software process is a little more sophisticated than logos on pint glasses, and am curious as to how more conventional shows get pitched to media companies without them running off with the ideas as that can be, I imagine in some cases, a risk. I've also seen: https://law.stackexchange.com/a/11386/14997 and am curious as to which nominated methods of protection it would be worth directing me towards, if any. Based on the first answer here: Does copyrighted code protect intellectual property rights on novel algorithms it implements? I conclude that I'm not protected by copyright, I don't think.	Your answer (in the US) is the same as feetwet's answer to the earlier question you linked: Is it possible to protect a business idea? - Law Stack Exchange. You can't copyright an idea for software. You can't copyright an idea for a pitch of a TV show or an episode of an existing TV show (Google "copyright TV series idea"). You can't copyright a combination of ideas for a TV show, i.e., one that uses software as the plot line or in the screenwriting or taping process. Once you do the work - develop software or write a script - you have legal protection (which varies, depending on jurisdictions). You can copyright the software you have developed. You can copyright (or commonly register) the TV script you have written. Or, in the US and other jurisdictions, your work is copyrighted as soon as you produce it.	First I should point out that the Google question is about a different situation, the "snippet" issue where a tiny part of a web page is redistributed, where the issue of resolved in the US by appeal to the "fair use" defense. The proposed scenario as written here is broader since it would go beyond a couple of lines, and goes up to the limit of copy an entire web page. That is copyright infringement, with or without an associated link. Copyright protection is not just about attribution, it is about control. If you can limit your copying appropriately, you may survive under a fair use analysis; but you need to hire a lawyer with experience in copyright litigation to vet your notions of what is "a small amount" etc.	If you change a single character, that's clearly a partial copy. Copyright protection has a limited extent, however. The protected work must be original and not obvious. For example, there are only so many ways to write a function that computes the average of two numbers, so the copyright owner of one body of code cannot claim infringement by the author of a second body of code simply because they both have a function float Average(float a, float b) { return (a + b) / 2; } A surefire way to avoid infringing copyright is to specify the function of the code and then have someone who has never seen the code write it from scratch. This is sometimes called clean-room engineering. Otherwise, there is no way to answer your question definitively. If you create a modified copy of the code (a "derived work" in copyright terminology), there is no strict formula available to evaluate the extent of the infringement. It comes down to a case-specific analysis of the facts by a judge. Depending on the jurisdiction, which you have not specified, there may be specific laws or judicial precedent that guide the judge, but the determination will still require a specific analysis of the facts. For example, if the alleged infringer raises these arguments, the judge would have to determine how obvious the code is, or whether the copyright claimant even owns the copyright to the code.	Yep, you are. You still need to keep the LICENSE and NOTICE files in the repository, if there were any in your copy of the project. These files contain the terms and conditions for the project, and provide attribution to the original developers. If you're trying to attribute in the UI of your application, you probably should. It's considered courteous and in the spirit of open source as well. This is also related: Do I need to include the full text of the MIT license in the UI of my app?	If you develop a program yourself and it wasn't a work made for hire, then the program is yours to do with as you please. You hold the copyright to it. Many developers choose existing licencing arrangements or they can choose to create a license on their own, or using an attorney. And sometimes they choose to release their programs into the public domain. If you release it into the public domain, you are essentially giving up your copyright. The IDE (Integrated Development Environment) you used to develop your program does not dictate what licenses you can use. There are some existing licenses that others use (which you are free to use or NOT to use) give varying protections to you regarding what you are allowing others to do; right of others to copy, right of others to modify, right of others to distribute, rights to sub-licence, and so on. One of the licensing schemes is the GNU General Public License (GPL). But there are many others, too many to list here.	You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)	Recall the basic principle of copyright law, as detailed in 17 USC 106: The copyright holder has the exclusive right to make copies; prepare derivative works; or distribute copies by sale, rental, lease, or lending. Other people can legally do these things only if they are given permission by the copyright holder, typically via a license. (Remember, the literal meaning of the word license is permission.) Often, the copyright holder will require a prospective licensee to accept various terms and conditions before the license will be granted. If there is "no EULA", or if there is one but the purchaser has not agreed to its terms, then the purchaser has not been granted any such license, hence does not have permission to do any of the things listed above. If they do so anyway, it is illegal copyright infringement and they will be liable for damages. To use a firewall analogy, copyright law is "default deny". So let's take your questions one by one: Do they own the software? US law has no concept of literally owning software. The closest thing is owning the copyright, which the purchaser certainly does not. It still belongs to the vendor that wrote the software (or whoever they may have later transferred it to). Can they legally alter the code of the program they purchased? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. The copyright holder has not granted them a license to do that. (There are some exceptions for purposes such as reverse engineering and interoperability, see 17 USC 1201(f)). Can they legally redistribute it No; again, that is the exclusive right of the copyright holder, and the purchaser has not received their permission. or transfer ownership? Maybe, if the first sale doctrine applies. Its application to software is complicated. The user has a better case for being able to sell the software if it exists as some tangible object which is transferred (physical media, pre-installed on hardware, etc). Can they legally modify the code of the program for others who have also purchased the same package? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. Can they take that software and install it on a secondary machine? No, that would be making a copy.	What you are missing is that the original copyright holder can give permission to make derivative works with strings attached. There is no automatic right to derive something from a copyrighted work. Those strings could include constraints on what you create in the process of making the derivative work. Yes it is a string limiting what you can do with something you own, but you would have been warned in the license and had the choice to start from scratch. People do create work-alike software with no copyright strings using two teams and a "clean room" design process. It is a lot harder than modifying something another person has developed. Also, law and someone's understanding of morals need not be aligned at all. And, in patent law, just creating something all by yourself from scratch does not give you ownership. If someone else did it first and got a patent you can't make the item you might think you own. IP law is complex and looking for "fundamentals" may not get you anywhere.
Can a witch or wizard be guilty of murder if it's committed with magic? This is purely hypothetical: A person announces their intent to attack another with "magic", telegraphing what witnesses consider a "spell". It's broad daylight with numerous witnesses and surveillance footage. The victim then immediately suffers a miraculous death that can't be explained by science (all their blood turns to tar, they spontaneously dissolve to viscera, or they simply drop dead for no discernible medical reason) Could the "magician" be found guilty of any crime greater than verbal assault if no causation link between the attacker's incomprehensible action and the victim's death is found?	In the USA, you must be found guilty "beyond reasonable doubt". As you describe it, I'd say there is an unreasonable suspicion of guilt, not guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the magician killed three people that way, then three unexplainable deaths following three spells might get him convicted. A jury might say that even though there is no way to explain how the killing worked, the correlation might be enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.	Charged? Of course, the police can charge you with anything at any time Could you be convicted? Maybe. Their best shot is charging you with “Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act” also called constructive manslaughter. The Crown must prove your act: was intentional, was unlawful, leads the reasonable person to realise that some other person is at risk of physical harm, and caused the death. The first two are uncontestable: the protesters are deliberately engaging in an illegal act. No 3 would be up to the jury. No 4 is also up to the jury and would turn on the evidence that the delay to the ambulance caused the death.	Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about.	This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter.	Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics	Murder is Murder Adding all the elements of murder are proven beyond reasonable doubt then the person gets convicted. The fact that they were a sibling would be considered in sentencing as it always is.	In California, you may use reasonable force to protect property from imminent harm. The jury instruction on that point is here. The instruction regarding justifiable homicide and defense of property is more restricted, because it only applies to protection of property when the deceased enters a home. If a stranger attacks your dog on a walk, you can use force to defend your dog, but you cannot shoot to kill. If the attack is against a person and not property, then the attack does not have to be in a home in order to be justifiable.	A conviction isn't ever impossible, but it could well be highly unjust. Indeed, there is a current case where a man alleged that he was the murder, though his identical twin brother was convicted. This article indicates that identical twins are not necessarily genetically indistinguishable. Assuming there is a lack of positive evidence such as fingerprints or an alibi which clearly identifies one versus the other, then one would predict no conviction because there would be a highly reasonable doubt. See the case of Orlando Nemnhard, where one of two twins did it but the DA concluded that they couldn't prove which one, so the charges were dropped.
Where is "Act of Parliament" defined What act or legal document specifically defines an "Act of Parliament" as a federal act, or primary act under the government of Canada, and not for example a provincial parliament?	I fear that it may mostly be defined by common sense and context, rather than any particular statute. I've certainly not been able to find anything quite as explicit as, for example: An Act of Parliament is an Act passed by the Parliament of Canada and definitely not in any way an Act of a provincial legislature. Nevertheless, if you'll bear with me while I slog through a sea of clauses that all imply the above, then the best places to look for usage and definition are the Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982, as they form (the basis/bulk of) the Canadian Constitution. I've also (credit to Zizou212) included some definitions from the Canadian Criminal Code. Looking at the Constitution Act 1982 (as amended, via the Canadian justice department's website) and taking the crudest possible approach (i.e. looking for instances of "Act of") there is, in the main body of the text, only one reference to Acts of Parliament, or to Acts of the provincial legislatures, namely in the notwithstanding clause (section 33 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms): Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. Not, I fear, not a full answer to your question, but it's worth noting that a distinction is drawn between "Parliament" and "the legislature of a province". For context, section 32, directly above, reads, This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament [...]; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. We're getting closer. I would argue (though IANAL) that from these two sections alone it's pretty clear that Acts of Parliament are Acts passed by the Parliament of Canada ("This Charter applies [...] to the Parliament and government of Canada") while Acts of "the legislature" of each province are Acts passed by the legislature of that province ("This Charter applies [...] to the legislature and government of each province"). Going back to the original question, I think it's pretty clear that "Parliament" – with a capital P – is (fairly) explicitly the Parliament of Canada. Note that it's the only body of the 4 mentioned there that gets a capital letter, and I imagine that it's because it's the only one referred to by its proper name. Whereas "the legislature and government of each province" is, presumably, just a common sense descriptor and a stand-in for the proper names of those governments and legislatures – it would be tedious to say "the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, and the National Assembly of Quebec, and [...]" – while "the government of Canada" is, I assume, not capitalised because it's also just a descriptor (the 'proper' name being Her Majesty's Government) but I'm descending now entirely into the realms of wildest speculation, as the Constitution Act 1867 is perfectly happy to use the phrase "Government of Canada" (though those were, seemingly, more capital-heavy times). Furthermore, as Zizouz212 pointed out, the Criminal Code of Canada contains an interpretation section: In this Act, Act includes (a) an Act of Parliament, (b) an Act of the legislature of the former Province of Canada, (c) an Act of the legislature of a province, and (d) an Act or ordinance of the legislature of a province, territory or place in force at the time that province, territory or place became a province of Canada; Again, the mention of "Parliament" alongside – and distinct from – provincial legislatures, makes fairly clear that it's the Parliament of Canada. Going back to the typesetter's nightmare that is the 1867 Act, we can eke out a few more puzzle pieces in the definitions: In the Constitution Act, 1867, Part IV: There shall be One Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons [...] The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada Part V: There shall be a Legislature for Ontario [...] There shall be a Legislature for Quebec [...] the Legislature of each of the Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall [...] continue as it exists at the Union Part VI: It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces [...] In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated Between those three Acts, I'm hoping there are enough bits of context to make clear that Parliament only ever refers to the Parliament of Canada, and not to the provincial legislatures. If, however, you want one more bit of evidence, I can offer the pre-amble to the Canada Act, 1982 the Constitution Act's slightly older, British twin. This was the law that finally patriated the Canadian Constitution, passing (at the British Parliament in Westminster) an Act that defined how Canada could amend its own Constitution, and renouncing any power for the British Parliament to do the same. In that text, (emphasis mine) there are, by necessity, two Parliaments discussed and accordingly it's always made very clear which one is being talked about: An Act to give effect to a request by the Senate and House of Commons of Canada Whereas Canada has requested and consented to the enactment of an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to give effect to the provisions hereinafter set forth and the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada in Parliament assembled have submitted an address to Her Majesty requesting that Her Majesty may graciously be pleased to cause a Bill to be laid before the Parliament of the United Kingdom for that Purpose. Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: The Constitution Act, 1982 set out in schedule B to this Act is hereby enacted for and shall have the force of law in Canada and shall come unto force as provided in that Act. No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend to Canada as part of its law. ...ergo, in the main body Constitution Acts etc., "Parliament" was presumably felt to be clear enough.	Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.	Nowhere Collectively The US doesn't know the number of laws on all the federal, state, and city books. Often the lowest level of laws and ordinances are only in a city database, and sometimes not on the internet. As a result, there is already an impossibility to get all the laws in the US in one database - and there are even countries that have not taken any steps to make their laws accessible on the internet at all. For example North Korean Law. This is compounded by different entities proclaiming their laws and regulations in only their own language and on different proclamation platforms. Where available at all, the countries have country-wide laws and ordinances on their own dedicated websites. But again, federalism for the win: there will be different proclamation platforms for lower levels of legislation. For example germany has its justice department host https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ which hosts all federal german laws. Schleswig Holstein hosts their state-level laws in corporation with the service Juris on https://www.gesetze-rechtsprechung.sh.juris.de/jportal/portal/page/bsshoprod.psml and the town of Kiel has all of its ordinances and special orders on https://www.kiel.de/de/politik_verwaltung/ortsrecht_bekanntmachungen/index.php Why a conglomerate is a bad idea Now, making a conglomerate of all the laws is actually a bad idea for several reasons: Updates. The different entities that are in making regulations with the force of law only update their official proclamation site. Often, such changes are not announced too loudly for the lowest levels, and with the number of cities in a single federal state, it's near impossible to keep the database up to date on a complete level. This is why different databases usually only scrape the federal levels. Scraping will break quickly. Each of the websites I pointed to in Germany has a different system setup, making scraping these websites for the relevant information basically useless. Compounding that, City ordinance pages are redesigned at a somewhat elevated pace, resulting in the scraping of these pages to break quickly, even if you manage to set it up. Citability. In a court of law, only the official text is relevant. If an update is missed, then the whole text is useless - you'll have to look up the actual, currently in-force version of the law or ordinance, so the conglomerate is not helping. You want a ginormous database. In some countries, judgments also make law as precedent. So you want every judgment in your database. Which quickly runs into a different problem: The US alone generates millions per day.	None of the things listed are statutes. They are all parts of or compilations of parts of statutes. A 'statute' is a document issued by an official body, such as Congress, which contains a law or command. 'USC' refers to the United States Code, which is a compilation of statutory law. It is not the law. It is prima facie evidence of the law, but may be proven to be wrong. The 'statute' is the Act passed by Congress. These can be found in the United States Statutes at Large. For example, the Labor Management Relations Act 1947 (Public Law 80–101, 61 Stat 136, also known as the Taft–Hartley Act) is a statute, passed by Congress on 23 June 1947. It is codified at (i.e. a reasonably reliable copy of the provisions of the Act, taking into account subsequent amendments, can be found at) 29 USC s 401-531. But 29 USC is not a statute in any sense of the word. To use a particularly 'meta' example: 1 USC 204(a) codifies the rule that the USC is prima facie evidence of the state of the law of the United States, but the statute which made this rule is Public Law 80-278, 61 Stat 633 ('An Act to codify and enact into positive law, title 1 of the United States Code, entitled "General Provisions"'), which consists of a slab of text copied out of the United States Code as it then stood. So Congress does sometimes enact parts of the Code; but the Code itself is not a statute.	See this working paper by Silvia Ferreri for an excellent write-up of this issue. The key point is that because each linguistic version of legislation is equally authentic, none can be taken as the authentic version. The court then resolves this by applying two principles: comparing the linguistic versions and giving deference to legislative intent. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis. The paper calls attention to Case C‑445/09 arising from the Netherlands, where 9 different linguistic versions are compared and shows that the straightforward Dutch reading of the legislation in question isn't compatible with the other linguistic versions or legislative intent. In paragraph 25, the decision also contains a concise summary of the general principle of interpreting laws in multiple languages: According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).	At common law, parliamentary privilege does not extend to the republication of words spoken in Parliament: Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 112 ER 1160. To overcome this, Parliament passed the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840, which provides absolute privilege for a report published “by or under the authority of either House of Parliament” (ie. Hansard). Section 3 of the Act provides qualified privilege for publishing an “extract or abstract” of Hansard. In relation to statements made under parliamentary privilege in breach of a court order, the Committee on Super-Injunctions wrote in its report on Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (May 2011): In order to obtain the benefit of the immunity from civil or criminal proceedings under section 3, the individual must prove, before a jury, that the relevant material was published in good faith and without malice. It is an open question whether publication of any extract from or abstract of Hansard which had the effect of frustrating a court order and was deliberately intended to do so would be held to be in good faith and without malice … Where media reports go beyond, or fall outside, the ambit of protection provided by the 1840 Act, it is the common law which determines whether there is any protection from contempt proceedings for breach of court orders. Mr Woolf noted that while Wason v Walter (1868) 4 QB 73 established a limited common law protection in defamation proceedings for honest, fair and accurate reporting of Parliamentary proceedings, there was ‘no reported case which authoritatively decides the extent of protection against proceedings for contempt available in respect of fair and accurate reports of proceedings of Parliament’ … It therefore appears to be an open question whether, and to what extent, the common law protects media reporting of Parliamentary proceedings where such reporting appears to breach the terms of a court order and is not covered by the protection provided by the 1840 Act. What is clear is that unfettered reporting of Parliamentary proceedings (in apparent breach of court orders) has not been established as a clear right. In its report on Parliamentary Privilege (June 2013), the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege said that the Parliamentary Papers Act would generally not apply to the contemporary media, and that the defence of qualified privilege was limited to defamation actions: An “abstract” was defined by the 1999 Joint Committee as a “summary or epitome”. Thus media reports of what goes on in Parliament, even if they draw on documents published by order of the House, such as Hansard, do not generally enjoy the (qualified) protection afforded by section 3 of the 1840 Act—a point confirmed by Sarah McColl, Solicitor Advocate in the BBC Editorial Legal Department, in her oral evidence on behalf of the Media Lawyers Association … Outside the field of defamation, it does not appear that media reports of parliamentary proceedings (as opposed to extracts or abstracts) enjoy legal protection. This arises most obviously in the case of breaches of court injunctions … The Joint Committee recommended that the law should be reformed: On balance, we do not support extending absolute privilege to all reports, including media sketches and summaries, of proceedings in Parliament … we consider that the existing protection of qualified privilege—that is, that all fair and accurate reports are protected, unless they can be proved by the claimant to have been made maliciously—already provides a robust defence of press freedom … At the same time, we acknowledge that the media need clarity and certainty. The Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 provides qualified protection for all “extracts and abstracts” of parliamentary publications (including broadcasts), but as we have already said these terms do not appear to cover media reports or editorial comment … We endorse the recommendation of the 1999 Joint Committee that [the] Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 should be replaced by modern statutory provisions … We recommend that these new provisions should … establish that qualified privilege applies to all fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings in the same way as to abstracts and extracts of those proceedings; provide that in all court proceedings in respect of such fair and accurate reports, extracts or abstracts, the claimant or prosecution shall be required to prove that the defendant acted maliciously … However, it appears that Parliament has not taken up the Joint Committee’s recommendation, and the extent of any common law protection remains an open question. Accordingly, the article linked in the question states that “The BBC is not naming Soldier F for legal reasons.”	why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's "supra-provincial" equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications.	The UK has parliamentary sovereignty, not separation of powers Unlike, say, the United States, where the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive have co-equal power in their respective spheres, in the UK, the judiciary and the executive are subordinate to Parliament. The courts have no power to nullify an Act of Parliament for being unconstitutional like they do in jurisdictions where a written constitution gives them such a power like the USA, Canada, or Australia. The purpose of the Declaration of Incompatibility is to advise Parliament that the law they have passed contradicts the HRA and they should think about that and decide if that’s what they really wanted to do. That means that the UK Parliament could pass the Arbitrary Bollock Removal Act 2023 (ABRA) tomorrow and it would be valid law. The courts can still provide judicial review of the actions of the executive under ABRA but they cannot declare the law a nullity. That is, the Minister’s actions can be scrutinised to ensure they followed the ABRA and other established principles such as procedural fairness and, if they didn’t, declare the executive actions void. However, if they did follow the law, off come your nuts.
Under what circumstance is trial by jury suspended in the UK? The most obvious example I can think of is a Diplock court, where juries are suspended and the case presided over by a single judge. This arrangement was created in response to terrorism during The Troubles. As I understand it, this is only relevant for terrorism cases. I'd like to know if there's any other circumstances where juries are not required for prosecution.	Generally speaking, jury trials in England and Wales are allowed (but can be waived by a defendant in most cases) for offenses punishable by more than six months of incarceration (i.e. serious misdemeanors and all felonies), with exceptions for domestic violence cases, serious and complex fraud cases, Diplock courts in Northern Ireland prior to 2008, cases where there is a serious risk of jury tampering, and in cases where double jeopardy defenses are at issue. It appears that jury trials are mandatory, however, and cannot be waived by defendants, in some serious criminal cases. (Historically, trial by jury was suspended in most cases during World War II.) English law enforcement officials can also detain people without trial for limited periods of time (generally up to 28 days prior to 2011 and now 14 days) without criminal charges in terrorism cases. This detention without trial procedure was instituted at the same time that the Diplock court system was shut down. (Courts-martial present another issue entirely.) Diplock courts were instituted out of concerns about jury nullification and jury tampering, and the latter concern remains an all purpose reason to deny a jury trial in a particular criminal case. Importantly, since 1967, juries in England and Wales need not be unanimous. Up to 2 dissenting votes are allowed on a jury of 12 and up to 1 dissenting vote is allowed on juries with 8 to 11 members remaining at the time of deliberations. The failure of up to three jurors on a jury of twelve (used in the Crown and High Courts) to complete the trial is allowed without a substitute and up to 1 juror who doesn't complete a trial is allowed in a jury of eight in County Court. From the first link above: A coroner must summon a jury for an inquest if the death occurred in prison or in police custody, or in the execution of a police officer's duty, or if it falls under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, or if it affects public health or safety. Coroner's juries have 7-11 members and a minority report of 2 members of that jury can be its verdict. In civil cases, juries are used in eminent domain valuation cases, where the judge might be seen as having a conflict of interest. Further, as explained in the first link above, they are also used as follows: In 1998 less than 1% of civil trials in England and Wales were jury trials and these were principally defamation cases. Section 69 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which replaced s. 6 of the 1933 Act in respect of High Court trials, provides that trial shall be by jury on the application of a party where the court is satisfied that there is in issue: a claim of fraud against the party; or a claim in respect of libel, slander, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment unless the court is of the opinion that the trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury. FYI, Scottish practice with regard to jury trials is completely distinct from the practice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and is beyond the scope of this answer. Both the size and process of the jury, and its availability are different in Scotland.	You can't guarantee a juror's disregard, and some attorneys might utilize the "once it's said, it can't be unsaid" strategy because they know that the jury will still keep it in the back of their mind even though they've been told to ignore it. But there are checks and balances to prevent a remark having an impact on the final decision: Jury deliberation. Chances are, not all jurors will keep the thought in their mind. The jury gets a chance to deliberate after the case has been presented, and it's very easy for other jurors in the deliberation room to point out they're ignoring that piece of information and not let it influence the final decision. Declaring a mistrial. A mistrial is fully at the judge's discretion, but generally anything that affects the jury's ability to remain impartial can result in a mistrial being declared (for example, if an attorney deliberately said something outrageous to influence the jury when they knew it would be withdrawn, the judge will likely declare a mistrial without much thought). Once a mistrial is declared, the case will be postponed and a brand new jury will be selected that hasn't heard the previous remarks - easiest way to erase it from their minds is to not use their minds.	Quoting from here, Jury nullification occurs when a jury returns a verdict of "Not Guilty" despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged. The jury in effect nullifies a law that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate they are charged with deciding. In essence, a jury decides that a law should not be legal in the situation, and as such the charge is unwarranted. One of the first cases was in the trial of John Peter Zenger, in 1735, where a law against libels was used against him, and subsequently nullified by a jury. It was subsequently used against the famous Alien and Sedition Acts, as well as The Fugitive Slave Laws. Zenger was the first case in America; in 1670, it was used in the case of William Penn and William Mead, who were acquitted of "illegal assembly" as Quakers. In an interesting twist, the jurors were imprisoned, as jury nullification was not explicitly legal, but they were later released. Interestingly enough, according to The New York Times In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled that jurors had no right, during trials, to be told about nullification. The court did not say that jurors didn’t have the power, or that they couldn’t be told about it, but only that judges were not required to instruct them on it during a trial. The Times also wrote that nullification had been used against laws against alcohol and gay marriage, though it did not cite specific cases.	When a judge decides a case there will be An order - e.g. "Smith shall pay Jones £100,000" Reasons for the decision - i.e. a description of the evidence, and the judge's findings of fact and legal reasoning. Sometimes a party, even though they have completely won, is nevertheless aggrieved by some things the judge has said in the Reasons (or in the way the judge has handled the trial - e.g. the judge's interventions). For example the judge may have said that the winning party was not a credible witness but they nevertheless won because of the evidence of other witnesses who were found to be credible. The rule in England and Wales is that you can only appeal orders. So if the order is completely in your favour you cannot appeal just because you don't like the reasons.	Generally speaking, British courts, when making judgments on constitutional matters regard themselves as interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law. But technically speaking, any legal precedent established by a court can be interpreted as "creation of new law". For the avoidance of doubt, the sources of law in the law of England and Wales include: statute law, constitutional convention, prerogative powers, common law, and legal commentary. I may have missed some out and may edit those in later. Common law refers to the judgments of courts. So here we come to your question: Several legal principles and precedents were established by this judgment, and you may consider this new "law": The court held that prerogative powers are justiciable - courts can limit the scope of these powers The prerogative power in question had limits. It can be limited when its use has an extreme detrimental effect on the democracy of the UK and parliamentary sovereignty. What is important with point one is that the court recognised that this power has always existed, stemming as far back as the bill of rights in the 17th century. As such, the court is implying that it is creating nothing new, but recognising a law that has always existed. You will see a LOT of this when studying constitutional law.	You could ask the bailiff to bring this concern to the attention of the judge. If you feel the need to protect yourself, you should. If you are really sincerely scared, stand your ground and refuse to participate for this reason in your response to the judge, even if this puts you at risk of a contempt of court sanction - better to being in jail briefly than to be physically harmed by another juror. The judge might release you from jury service or dismiss the threatening juror, or might declare a mistrial if you bring this to the judge's attention. The mistrial could result in the de facto acquittal of the defendant in a criminal case, especially if no alternates are available and dismissing you or the threatening juror would bring the jury below a quorum, so keep this in mind. I would also not tell the bailiff what position you are being coerced to take, merely that you are being coerced with physical threats. And I would identify the threatening juror (who might also be removed). Of course, if you are actually on a jury right now, you are almost surely violating your obligations as a juror by going on line to ask this question.	While trials don't have a set time, generally the length of a trial is based on its complexity (and to a certain degree, also the gravity of the charge). Simpler cases (e.g. breaking and entering) will generally take less time to hear than more complex cases (e.g. a violation of proper calculation procedure of an SEC mandated income report concerning transfers of capital accrued by partially owned subsidiaries). For example, last year I was called to jury selection for a drunk driving case that was estimated to last 2 days; this year, I was called for jury selection, which took over a week before I was dismissed as a potential jury, for a murder trial that was estimated to last over a month. However, I'm sure that OJ's celebrity did play a role in the length of his trial; if nothing else, then it would have lengthened the jury selection and voir dire process significantly.	Given that a murder and an involuntary manslaughter are two different offenses, could a jury be asked to adjudicate on both counts? This happens routinely. Could it find the defendant guilty of both? Only for certain offenses. See lesser included offense. Could the DA even accuse the defendant of both during the same trial? Yes, which is how juries are asked to adjudicate multiple offenses as noted above. What about in different trials? All the crimes associated with a given act have to be tried at once. If you've been acquitted of murder in connection with one act, you can't subsequently be tried for involuntary manslaughter for the same act, nor vice versa. And what about murder and attempted murder? I don't think it's possible to be tried for an attempt when the crime has been successful; certainly, the opposite is true. But again, if the charges are based on the same act (i.e., we know you tried to kill the victim, and we know someone succeeded, but we don't know whether it was you) then the charges would have to be tried at the same time.
Can prosecutors change or add additional charges once you plead guilty? Suppose you are charged with theft of trade secrets. If you decide to plead guilty, can the government add further charges or change the existing ones after seeing that you've pleaded guilty? For example, because you've pleaded guilty, can the prosecutors add counts of unlawful possession of trade secrets, or lying to federal agents, or obstruction of justice, or other charges? Once they add those charges, and because you pleaded guilty to the first, are you now also considered to be pleading guilty to the additional charges?	Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 11(b)(1)), a federal court may not accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally in open court. During this address, there are 15 things that the court must ensure that the defendant understands (if they apply in the case); one of these is the nature of every charge the defendant is pleading guilty to. Prosecutors can't sneak stuff into the guilty plea that the defendant doesn't know about.	What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination.	Yes, you can be compelled by the government to reveal information: All it takes is a judge agreeing with a plaintiff or prosecutor that it has some relevance to a complaint over which the court has jurisdiction. If that point arrives and you want to protect that information you only have three choices: Get a legal team good enough to convince the court otherwise. Face the consequences of contempt of court for failing to supply the information requested. Flee to another jurisdiction before #2 happens.	There are two issues, one is the legal issue of whether what you are doing is a crime, and the other is the evidentiary issue of proving that that is what happened. If you take the phone home with the intention of keeping it ('finders keepers') then you have committed larceny (sometimes called 'theft', sometimes correctly). This specific type is called 'larceny by finding'. If you take the phone home with the intention of finding the owner then you have not committed larceny because you have not committed the mental element ('mens rea') of the offence: you don't intend to permanently deprive the owner of their rights. However, and this is the evidentiary issue, if hypothetically you were found in possession of the phone then the police might not believe your explanation and a court might well convict you of larceny. P.S. Firefox has marked 'evidentiary' as a spelling error and suggested 'penitentiary' instead. :s	In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.	To know a defendant is guilty is to know that the government has convinced a judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed all the elements of a crime. A lawyer can't know that the government will accomplish this prior to a trial. Options for a lawyer who determines that the government has a strong case include: seeking to have evidence excluded looking for other grounds for appeals establishing affirmative defenses negotiating a plea deal for a lighter sentence or less serious crime the lawyer will continue to force the government to prove their case	As the comment by Ron Beyer mentions when a company wants to impose such restrictions they are normally done through non-compete, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreements, as well as via trade secret law. Note the word "agreements". "Restrictions on working in the field" are simply a form of non-compete agreements. A company cannot, legally, simply impose such agreements on its employees. It can require an employee to sign such an agreement as a condition of employment, and it can often require such an agreement from a departing employee as a condition of a severance payment. Exactly what is covered by such an agreement depends on its terms, and those vary widely. In most US states there are limits on the scope and duration of such an agreement. In some states the restrictions can be broad and of fairly long duration, in others they must be narrow and of fairly short duration. An agreement that goes beyond a given state's limits will not be enforceable in court, if the defendant brings that fact up. Trade secret law can prevent an employee from disclosing the trade secrets of a former employer to a new employer, or indeed to anyone else. But that does not prevent a former employee from getting a new job in the field, as long as the employee does not disclose any trade secrets. If an employee has signed, or is asked to sign, such an agreement, it is a good idea to consult a lawyer with employment law experience. If the state is known, I could edit this answer to include the limits, if any, on such agreements in that state.	In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.
Police and failure to enter home of suicidal person An individual with a known mental health/substance abuse history was held in protective custody on a given night due to heavy drinking and unsafe behavior. That individual was released from custody in the morning. That afternoon police were called due to a videochat in which the individual had a noose hanging in the background. The police department made no attempt to enter the house although all doors were open and did not attempt to call the concerned caller (parent) for additional information? Is there any potential liability for the municipality or police department which told the parent that they would send police and an ambulance -- and nothing was done to intervene.	In the United States, there is no potential liability for the municipality or the police department. There is no legally enforceable duty of police to act to prevent either violations of the law, or apprehend criminals, or to prevent suicide of people who are not in police custody. Other countries have different laws on this subject.	Depends on where you are, and what law would be broken and why. In germany, there is the concept of rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying emergency). If there is a present danger to a Rechtsgut (legally protected interest), one can take necessary and proportional steps against another legally protected interest. Say I walk through a winter landscape and there is a person who has broken through the ice of a lake (a present danger of the loss of life). Nearby is a yard with a ladder leaning on a shed. I would be allowed to enter the yard (normally trespas) and take the ladder (normally theft) in the rescue attempt (life counts for more than a ladder, using a ladder is necessary/appropriate for an ice rescue). The details are, as usual for Law SE, complicated.	There are three kinds of restraining orders in Minnesota, but what they have in common is that a person petitions the court to order a person to e.g. stop the harassment and have no further contact. This order if granted by the court will be served on the respondent, and all actual restraining orders are valid. A forgery which was not actually ordered by the court is not a restraining order, and of course it is not legally valid. But you don't seem to be claiming that this is a forgery. In principle, a person can obtain a copy of a restraining order under The Minnesota Data Practices Act. However, there are limits on access to certain records. Minnesota Court Rule 4 restricts access to domestic abuse and harassment records, blocking disclosure until the respondent has been served with the order. If someone fails to obtain a record in such a case, it could be because the request was made before the order was served. Even if the request was improperly denied, that does not invalidate the court order. Subsequent comments by OP indicate the possibility that he was not given the restraining order, as required by law, which would substantially impact the validity of the arrest. This handbook from the courts spells out the rules for handling these orders. If it is impossible to personally serve the notice on respondent (he can't be found), then it is possible for the court to order notice by publication, where an item is placed in the newspaper (legal notices, which nobody reads). In other words, you can be "served" in the legal sense, but not know it (however, the police will know it, so if BCA is saying "we can't find any restraining order", this would be a plainly improper arrest).	It looks to me like this is authorized under New York State's Executive Law Section 24. The text is long, but I think it addresses most of the points in your question. The law allows the chief executive of a local government (e.g. mayor of a city) to declare a local state of emergency "in the event of a disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency". Under such a state of emergency, the executive can promulgate local emergency orders, that can include provisions like travel bans, curfews, mandatory evacuation, etc. Violating such an order is a Class B misdemeanor (see paragraph 5). I didn't see any explicit requirement for the executive to weigh safety benefits against restriction of personal liberties. The executive just has to "find" (i.e. decide) that a disaster exists and imperils public safety. However, there are some safeguards. The local state of emergency is limited to 30 days (some orders can be extended for an additional 30 days); see paragraph 1. And the state legislature has the authority to terminate the state of emergency by a concurrent resolution (paragraph 8). Further good reading is a primer (PDF) written by the legal counsel of New York's Office of Emergency Management, giving a guide in layman's language for local chief executives on how to handle state of emergency declarations. I'm slightly puzzled as to why, in this case, the order was given by the governor, when it looks from the law like it should be the mayor's role to do so. It could be that the mayor took the appropriate legal action and just let the governor make the public announcement. Also, Executive Law Article 2-B (Sections 20-29) have many other provisions regarding emergencies. Section 28 gives the governor the power to declare a "disaster emergency", though it's not clear from that section whether this includes the power to issue similar emergency orders.	If one day the child goes around to the father's house, perhaps in a state of upset, and says, "That's it, I'm staying," what is the legal position of the father? An eleven year old child really has no say in the matter. A judge in a custody case may consider what the 11 year old has to say but is unlikely to give it much weight. (In contrast, a judge is likely to give a lot of weight to the views of a child who has a job, who is doing O.K. in school, and is a year or two from becoming a full fledged adult.) This is up to his parents to resolve absent circumstances not present here (e.g. the child has made bona fide allegations of child abuse, or the parents are both incarcerated). And, if the parents can't resolve the dispute, it is up to a court in a case where parenting time is at issue (probably either a legal separation or a divorce in this case). For example, while (as noted below) the police will not generally drag a child kicking and screaming to the other parent without a court order, if the child is at his father's house, the father can absolutely drag the child kicking and screaming to the child's mother's house, no matter how much the child doesn't like it. Moreover, while the father will not be violating any law, if he does not do that, a child custody judge is likely to look dimly upon a parent who intentionally withholds visitation from another parent without good cause, when the court considers what kind of child custody arrangements to put in place. And, the court has extremely great discretion in these matters. The judge is also likely to be pretty unhappy with both of the parents for failing to be capable of communicating or cooperating over child rearing related issues, because they are apparently so focused on not getting along with each other over their issues with each other. In particular, if the mother calls the police claiming "child abduction," what will be the police position? Will they come to the door of the father? Will they drag the child kicking and screaming back to mother's house? It is not generally illegal for a married parent in a situation where there is no child custody order in place to have that parent's child with them over the objection of the other married parent. Absent a court order to the contrary, the police will probably call this a "civil matter" and will be unlikely to take any action until there is court guidance, absent exigent circumstances like evidence of recent not previously adjudicated claims of child abuse or neglect. The way to resolve this would be with a court filing of some sort seeking to resolve the parenting time issue, if necessary, on an emergency basis. Post-Script Whether or not the parents want to end the marriage, this situation is long overdue for court intervention. I've had couples who "pull the trigger" too soon, but this would not be a case of that type. Either the father or the mother needs to find a solicitor (if at all possible to afford that) and get the court system involved. If there is a breakdown in communications over matters related to the child, and the child is not cooperating in the face of an ambiguous parenting situation involving two parents who can't communicate about their child, the situation is out of control. Prompt court action could prevent a more negative outcome in the future by creating stability and structure in the situation.	Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on.	The Missouri trespass law is here. The police will not detain a person for expressing himself, even repeatedly, though a court order to stay away would change things. The law says A person does not commit the offense of trespass in the first degree by entering or remaining upon real property unless the real property is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders or as to which notice against trespass is given by: (1) Actual communication to the actor; or (2) Posting in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders. You can also use purple paint markers. There is also a law against stalking which prohibits unwanted communication that may be threatening, intimidating, frightening or causes emotional distress to another person. However, you need to petition the courts for an order of protection. If granted, violating the order would be a felony, and more likely to get the attention of the police. Getting an attorney is the simplest immediate solution, since I expect that purple paint won't mean much to him.	also, what is "cannot be punished on account thereof because they lacked criminal responsibility due to the intoxication or if this cannot be ruled out"? I can not understand This means that if a person, while drunk, does soemthign that would otherwise be a crime, but the person cannot be charged because s/he was too drunk to know that s/he was committing a crime, such a person can insted be charged with having become intoxicated, and given up to the same punishment that would have been given for conviction for doign the unlawful act. For example, if a person damaged property while under the influence of alcohol (drunk), it might be impossible under German law to prosecute for the crime of intentionally damaging property, because one could not prove that the person knew what s/he was doing, and knew that it was criminal. In such a case the person could be charged with having intentionally or carelessly become drunk, but the penalty can't be more than the penalty for having damaged property would have been, nor can it be more than five years. As a practical matter, I think it very unlikely that the police would seek to impose a fine if they didn't issue any ticket or other paperwork at the scene, nor mention any such intention. However, they might be legally able to do so.
Can I use logos from vendors in my open-source project? I have an open-source project that is quite popular with dozens of downloads per day. I use logos from big companies in there (e.g. Cisco or Microsoft) to customize some web pages. The logos are important for the project's effectiveness. Can I use these logos under "fair use" considering that I'm not making any money out of the open-source project? It's worth mentioning that I'm confident that users of the project are using it for commercial uses (e.g. to sell their services).	Generally you can only use logos (i.e., symbolic trademarks) if you have the trademark owners' permission. You may certainly use the names Cisco and Microsoft nominatively, although they might ask you to provide a disclaimer of any affiliation including sponsorhip or approval, if it gets to them. "Not making any money" is also not the sole determinative factor in proving your defense of "fair use".	The question mentions copyright, but corporate logos are more often protected by trademark law. There are significant differences in the protections afforded, and in where actions can be brought. Copyright Simple logos may not be subject to copyright protection at all. Individual words and short phrases, such as business names and slogans, are generally not protected. But let us assume that the logo in question is a graphic design of sufficient complexity and originality to be protected by copyright. Copyright offers essentially international protection, and the Berne Convention and the TRIPS agreement ensure that the rules are in many ways similar in almost all countries. One can sue in the copyright owner's jurisdiction, or in any jurisdiction where infringement occurred. If the defendant has a presence in the selected jurisdiction, collection of any damages will be significantly easier. Scenario from the Question If I have understood the question, the logo was originally created by P (or more likely by a designer hired or contracted by P) and P holds the copyright on the logo. But S has obtained the logo via B, presumably at a lower price than P would charge. Neither B nor S, I assume, has permission from P to use the logo. B's action in selling the logo to S would be copyright infringement (unless B independently created an identical or similar logo). S's action in using the logo without permission from P is also copyright infringement. P could sue S, or B, or both in Spain, or in its home jurisdiction (perhaps the US), or in other jurisdictions where the pirated logo had appeared. Actual damages, however, will be limited to the value of the logo (say what P would have charged) plus profits made from the use of the logo. But since S is not selling the logo, it will be hard to determine what part, if any, of its profits derived from the use of that particular logo. That is, how much smaller would its profits have been if it had used a different, non-infringing logo. In the US statutory damages are available, which can be as high as $150,000 per work infringed, if the infringement is proved to be "wilful". But that is the upper limit of statutory damages, and the judge has wide discretion to set the amount of the award between the upper and lower limits. (The lower limit is $750.) Modified Scenario Suppose that P had sold an exclusive license to U. U is a US-based firm that is actually using the logo to identify its goods, which are distributed world-wide. The actions of B and S have infringed U's licensed rights in the logo, and U could bring suit for copyright infringement, either in the US or in Spain, or perhaps in other countries. But U would have much the same problem as P, it will be hard to prove sizable damages. Which brings us to trademark issues. Trademark Claims Trademark law is usually used to protect words, symbols, and images used to identify products and services being sold or advertised for sale or rental. Unlike copyright, trademark protection does not expire if the mark remains in use. Also, unlike copyright, single words or simple images can be protected. For example, the "red dot in a circle" logo of the Target stores is too simple for copyright protection. But it has strong protection as a trademark. Trademark protection applies in any case where a reasonable person might be confused as to what the source of the goods (or services) really is. It also applies when the mark's use falsely gives an impression of approval or sponsorship by the trademark holder. Unauthorized use of a mark to benefit from the goodwill or reputation associated with the original product or its makers is infringement. Trademark protection, however, is national. A mark protected in one country may be totally free for use in another country. It is also usually limited to a particular category of use If, say "Scarlet O'Hara's" is used as a trademark for a restaurant chain, the use of "Scarlet O'Hara's" for an anti-virus program is not likely to constitute infringement. Copyright has no such limitations. In some countries there is no protection for a trademark unless it is registered. In other countries, use alone can establish a trademark. The US allows protection without registration, although registration brings stronger protection. Also, trademarks can only be protected when they are actually being used "in trade", that is, to identify or advertise goods or services, or for a limited time while a product is being developed and there is a declared intent to use the mark in the near future. Lack of use or cessation of previous use can cause a mark to lose protection. Scenario from the Question P is selling logos, not using them to identify or market products. Thus it is not using the logo in trade, and has no trademark claim. It cannot sue anyone for trademark infringement, because it has no trademark rights. Modified Scenario (see above) U is using the logo as a trademark world-wide. If it has registered the logo in Spain, or taken such other steps as Spanish law requires, it can perhaps sue S for trademark infringement. It has no trademark claim against B, because B did not use the trademark to identify any goods or services. For a successful suit agaisnt S, U would need to show that confusion between U's products and those of S had actually occurred, or was likely. It would need to show that the products where the logo was used were of a sufficiently similar nature. But if it prevailed, damages could be based on the value of the trade identified by the logo. If S did not sell or market its products outside of Spain, it could only be sued for trademark infringement in Spain. If U did not sell in the Spanish market (or perhaps the wider EU market) it would have no trademark claim. If S started importing its products using the logo into the US, U would have a claim under US trademark law. Thus the details of what logo is used, where and how, and on what products would matter to any trademark claim.	If a work is in the public domain, then there are no particular requirements on its use; in particular, it can be used on a book cover without a copyright notice, a public domain notice, or any other kind of notice or mark. Wikimedia Commons' public domain template says, "You must also include a United States public domain tag to indicate why this work is in the public domain in the United States." This is a notice to users of Wikimedia Commons, informing them that if they upload a public domain image to Wikimedia Commons, they must include a public domain tag. That's a policy of Wikimedia Commons. It doesn't apply to people using the image outside of Wikimedia.	As far as copyright goes... Pixabay: Yes (with minor exceptions) Pixabay's license is quite broad, and allows for unattributed commercial use with a small number of exceptions. You can't "use images with identifiable brands to create a misleading association with a product or service" or "portray identifiable people in a bad light or in a way that is offensive," but otherwise it would allow for use in a video (there are other exceptions, but they wouldn't really apply to such use). Flickr: It depends on the license By default, images are not licensed for additional use other than viewing on Flickr. However, users are free to license their images as they wish, and Flickr explicitly supports various Creative Commons Licenses, many (but not all—particularly the NC licenses) of which would support such commercial use. Depending on the license, additional requirements, such as providing attribution, may apply. Note that there are non-copyright concerns that might come up in specific situations, such as trademarks (I mentioned one potential issue in my explanation of the Pixabay license) or model releases. Another answer to this question has some good information on these concerns.	You don't have to, but you probably want to for a couple of reasons: It's courteous, and in the spirit of open source It's someone else's work, and you're using it. The least you can probably say is "thank you." It will also probably help you stay in the clear: since you're using software in binary form, where the notice isn't immediately accessible, then by providing a copy of the license, you respect that licensing term in another way. It tells your users what's up with the program Let's admit it, having the license accessible to the users tells them what's in the program and so on. It's another way of providing attribution, like I listed in the first reason above. Many apps, desktop and mobile, have a screen or panel to indicate the projects and licenses that they use. They don't have to be straight in the user's face, they can be a little button in the "About" screen of the program. To answer a little confusion: the binaries are still a derived form from that source code. Analyse the heading: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. The software is still there, it's just there in a different form, a compiled form. Therefore, the copyright and permission notice should probably stick around, even if it's just a file somewhere.	Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not.	germany I am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, Author's Right) can only be held by a natural person, which is a legal term of art that essentially means "human being". There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright. Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output. However, IFF a human being were actually involved in selecting specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting this particular work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up this particular piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach. So, if you simply generate these works and publish all of them, there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then select a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.	The requirement to make the code publicly available is binding on Olio, and on Olio's successor, Flex. Olio, by accepting the code under the GPL, had contracted with the original author of that code, one of the contract provisions being to make any modified code available publicly. If Olio fails to abide by that agreement, it is in violation of the license, and the original author could sue Olio for copyright infringement, or sue Flex as having bought the assets and liabilities. But the individual employees of Olio are not under any obligation to publish such modified code, as they were presumably not parties to the license deal -- Olio was. Therefore the NDA does not require them to violate any law or contract to which they might be parties. The NDA could probably not be used to prevent the employees from testifying if called in such a copyright suit. If the NDA did require an illegal action, it would be void. If it merely required a person to violate a civil agreement that could be settled for money, it might or might not be enforceable, depending on the exact provisions, its reasonableness under the exact circumstances, and the local law.
Can my employer take money from my wages? I live and work in Ireland. The hotel I work for recently had to pay for an item a guest left in the room because the cleaner deemed it rubbish and threw it in the bin. Now my employer is asking everybody to sign the document attached. Under Irish law, Is this legal? Do I have to sign it? Can I be dismissed for not signing it? If it is illegal, can my co-workers who have already signed it ask to have it deleted/shredded? Memo TO: All Employee's (sic) FROM: Accommodation Manager/General Manager CC: Human Resources Department RE: Removal of Items and rubbish DATE: 23rd December 2015 Dear Employee, This memo is being circulated to all staff as a reminder and is a firm notice to clarify any outstanding ambiguity when servicing a departure bedroom. When removing used items and rubbish from bedrooms, you must ensure that all rubbish bins are emptied and that bin liners are replaced. Ensure that all items left behind by a guest which are not in the rubbish bins are checked thoroughly to ensure that they are not items of lost property. If you are unclear whether the item should belong in rubbish or not, please check with your supervisor or Manager, before disposal, to ensure that it doesn’t contain any guest belonging or lost property. Please ensure as per the recycling policy that all recylcables such as clean paper products, clean plastic wrapping, glass, plastic bottles & containers are removed to the Kitchen yard or back of the linen room and place (sic) in one of the large green skips. Please ensure that any lost property found is reported and logged correctly with lost property. Please be advised that any breaches of this Procedure will result in disciplinary action resulting in sanctions up to and including dismissal. Where the company suffers a financial loss resulting from an employee’s negligence i.e (sic) throwing property into bin, (sic) these monies will be deducted from the employees’ (sic) wage. Also, please be advised that you are now in receipt of a reasonable management instruction to comply with the procedures above during the course of your working duties. If you have any queries regarding this please contact me Kind regards, [REDACTED] I confirm my receipt of the above (Employee) ______________________ Date: ___________________________	The answer seems fairly simple. ANY item not belonging in the room and NOT found in a waste receptacle must be brought to management and logged. i.e. if the hotel guest threw a crumpled scrap of food wrapper at the bin and missed, that item must be presented to management and logged. Then, it's management's decision to toss it. I imagine that the twelfth time that management has to evaluate whether a used condom is personal property or trash, they will revise their ill-advised little letter. Additionally, how does the guest know for certain that an item was actually left in room, and how does management know that a particular staff was the only one who could have encountered it? They'd have to implement key card logging or video cameras. i.e. the staff could simply deny that any items were found in the room, or perhaps they could demand that a manager must clear a room of possible guest property before entering. Put simply, how to prove a particular person had access to the room and exercised that access, AND that they encountered the wayward guest item?	Obviously you can refuse, nobody can force you to give them a new passport. There may be consequences. The worst: The company's country likely has laws that require the company to make sure you have the right to work there, and to have evidence of it. If you are an EU citizen in an EU country, a valid EU passport would be that evidence. When your passport expires, the company might not have anything that is legally sufficient to allow you working for them. They could have the choice between breaking the law, risking a fine, or firing you. This will depend on the exact laws of the country, and likely somewhere deep in the small print of the laws :-) In the UK, where this isn't relevant anymore, the laws were changed in 2014 to require that you have a valid passport. So in the last seven years you would have had to give them a valid passport. BTW. Having a copy of your valid passport can make it possible for your employer to buy you flight tickets for foreign countries, for example, which could be useful. I was once in a situation away from home where I unexpectedly needed a copy of my passport (privately), called HR, and they emailed me a copy of it, so that was also useful.	Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.	Your boss is totally wrong. Legally, there is no such thing as a "probation period" in the UK. You have the right to your holiday payment, according to the days that you worked. What can happen: The legal minimum is I think 28 days per year including bank holidays, but most companies give 23 or 24 days PLUS eight days bank holiday. Your contract may say that the first three months are called probation period, and during that time you only get the legal minimum, and after that the much more common higher amount. That would be legal. But even so, you would be entitled to seven days, minus any bank holidays where you didn't work.	The fact that you have been laid off is both your company’s information, and your personal information. You are allowed to tell your own personal information. The move to a new partner however is not your information. As long as you are still employed your employment contract will probably say that you mustn’t do anything to damage the company. You’d need to read what the consequences would be. Maybe the contract says you can be fired... which doesn’t matter unless you would lose a redundancy payment. After leaving it would depend on whether you had a non-disclosure agreement. And last, does your company care? This merger can’t be kept a secret anyway.	Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted.	Get a lawyer. That employer is skating on very, very thin ice. You can’t have a non-compete agreement in Germany at all without the employer paying reasonable compensation. What is reasonable is decided by courts, but half your last regular salary is not “reasonable”. Especially if this would endanger your status of being allowed to work in Germany. If you were a non-German EU citizen, any non-compete agreement would be immediately invalid because it violates the right of free movement; how nonEU citizens are affected, I don’t know. The rest of the agreement seems quite illegal to me. I would think that any good employment lawyer would love to take your case.	This is a confusing issue in most common law jurisdictions and AFAIK, Canada and Australia still rely on common law definitions of this. First, any arrangement where someone provides services in return for compensation is a contract. If worker is an employee then the contract is an employment contract and is subject to whatever laws apply to employees (things like, workers' compensation, withholding of tax, superannuation etc.). If the worker is instead operating their own business that is independent of the principal's business they are independent contractors and employee law doesn't apply. In most cases it is easy to determine if someone is an employee or is a contractor. For example, if your business hires a bookkeeper to work set hours for which they are paid a salary from which you detect and remit tax, etc. then they are clearly an employee. Your external accountant who does your year end taxes, has their own premises and contracts to many other businesses is clearly an independent contractor. However, the dividing line is not clear cut in edge cases. Using British Columbia as an example: Calling a person an independent contractor, even if the worker agrees, does not decide the issue. In order to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor under the Act, it is important to consider the definitions of “employee”, “employer” and “work”. The Act defines these terms very broadly. The courts have developed some common law tests that may be useful, but they must be considered in a manner consistent with the definitions and purposes of the Act. Some of these tests include how much direction and control the worker is subject to, whether the worker operates their own business and has their own clients, whether the worker has a chance of profit or a risk of loss, whether the work they are doing is integral to the business and whether there is an ongoing relationship. The longer a person works for another, the more closely the worker’s duties are connected to the purpose of the business, the more the person who pays the worker controls the material and tools and directs the activities, the more likely it is that the relationship is one of employer/employee. So, deciding if a person is an employee or contractor is not up to the worker or the principal and what they may or may not have written on a piece of paper! The entire relationship must be considered. As an additional complication, legislation is not uniform between state/provincial and federal levels of government and even within the same jurisdiction. For example, in Australia, it is possible that a person is an independent contractor for Federal income tax law but an employee for state workers' compensation law.
Is it illegal to create a website that allows a user to upload a file and make it accessable and downloadable for others? I am working on a website in which a user can sign in and upload a file and other users can search for it by name and download it. Those files will be catagorized as audio, video, apps(linux, windows, mac), documents etc. So, I was wondering if it is legal or illegal. I'll also add a "report" option with each file by which visitors can report a pirated content.	There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question.	Copyright law requires permission of the rights holder to e.g. post material. The terms of that permission could be very complicated, as seen in royalties contracts with publishers, but they can also be simple. If someone asks "can I post your video on my website" and you say "Sure, as long as you give me credit", then they can post the video on their site as long as that say something like "This video was made by Jake" or something like that. There is no exception to permission where permission is retroactively withdrawn just in case it turns out that one can make money off of the video. However: you gave That Guy permission, and that does not mean that the hundreds of Other Guys have permission. So you can pursue all of the Other Guys and demand that they take the video down, or require some payment to get your permission.	You're allowed to make backups of copyrighted software, as long as you are authorized to use the software, the backups are not distributed, and they are destroyed when/if you are no longer authorized to use the software. 17 USC §117(a): (a) Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy. -- Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) ...(not very helpful)...or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful. The law is usually used to justify copies of the installation media, but it would be unconscionable to cut your rights off there and make backups illegal for machines containing copyrighted software. After all, with such an interpretation, no Windows machine could be backed up since Windows is copyrighted.	I presume the input is text: "my original text" is assumed to mean you wrote (created) the text. That means that you hold the copyright to the text, and only you can authorize a derivative work (such as a synthesized recording). Therefore, you hold the copyright to the recordings as well. The crucial consideration governing that right is that you "created" the work, meaning that there is a modicum of creativity. However, if you did not create the text and your only function is to host an automatic process where users can create a synthesized recording, then whoever created the text has the right to the text and derivative works (i.e. the synthesized output). Automated processes like (unassisted) OCR or wav-to-mp3 conversion would not count as being "original", nor would automatic text-to-speech, so you don't gain copyright just from making an automatic work-creating tool available. On the assumption that the conversion involves a component of Chrome, you can use the service per the terms of service, though you cannot "reproduce, duplicate, copy, sell, trade or resell the Services". This might limit the extent to which you could make this conversion available to others, depending on how, exactly, you could do such a thing (does it duplicate the service?). As they say, Google owns all legal right to the Services, but Google obtains no right from you for any content created through their service. There is no restriction in the TOS against using the service for commercial purposes. Even if there were, that would not assign copyright in the recording to anyone else, it would just mean they could sue you for violating the TOS.	No. You may not do this. As your post points out this is a blatant copyright violation. It isn't remotely in the realm of fair use.	Making a profit does not make the act illegal: it is illegal without there being any profit. The act of copying without permission is what makes the act illegal. Profit might maybe enter into the matter if you are talking about the "fair use" defense, since certain kinds of works can be partially copied for certain purposes. You could quote a few lines from a novel in a review, for instance. The judgment of whether a given act of copying without permission is allowed under fair use is complex and involves a balancing act. Profit becomes relevant in that a non-profit use favors fair use and a for-profit use disfavors it. Wholesale copying of works of art as you describe is illegal (is infringement). However... "illegal" is a pretty broad concept. If you infringe on my intellectual property, you almost certainly will not suffer any consequences unless I sue you. Taking "illegal" to mean "in violation of the law", infringing copyright is illegal because it violates the law, but I have to make a federal case out of your infringement – I have to sue you. As it happens, it can also be a crime to infringe copyright, and in that case, the government and not the copyright holder pursues the matter. If a person knowingly infringes copyright, he might be prosecuted, thus the Megaupload case which in the US is realized in the indictment US v. Dotcom. Moreover, profit motive is a required element for criminal infringement. (Also note that you don't have to actually make a profit for the profit element to be present). You cannot sue a person unless they have harmed you, so if you know that Smith copied Jones' work you can't sue Smith for harming Jones. (This is what they call "standing"). You might sue Smith, but not for infringement itself. If they sold you an illegal infringing copy, then you could sue. Or, their infringement could diminish the value of your legal copy. This website gives a multi-nation overview of criminal copyright infringement laws.	The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details.	The facts you describe are very likely an infringing derivative work which would provide a basis for a lawsuit against the person operating the website. But, nothing is certain, and these determinations are highly fact specific. It is highly unlikely that the government would enforce a violation of copyright alleged in these circumstances criminally.
Do I have any legal recourse against trolls spamming my forum? I run a forum for supporters of a sports club. I often get supporters from a rival club coming in, creating a user, and spamming my forum, most often after we lose a big game, particularly if against a team they support. I ban them, but they keep coming back with new accounts. By "spamming", I mean that they keep posting random shit, like pictures and GIFs ridiculing our club. Also a lot of swearing and insults. Is this illegal? Can the authorities be involved in any way? The forum is international but US-based. Note that I am asking out of curiosity. I don't expect this to be a practical approach in any way, and I also realize a better method is to simply secure my site better against repeat-offenders.	Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.	That GDPR Disclaimer is no protection in some jurisdictions: the applicable laws to that situation in germany for example don't care about the GDPR: Cold calling, mailing, or e-mailing private people to advertise services all is handled by the same law: Without the consent it is expressly illegal under §7 of the law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG) and such cases are rather Slam-Dunk if the origin can be made out. The punishment can be a 300.000 € fine. The fact that to email someone you need their e-mail address and that e-mail addresses and private addresses are by default considered personally identifiable information is making it worse for the advertizer: Without either an exception (there is none available to cold-emailing) or special allowance of the person the data belongs to, you violate §4 of the federal data protection law (Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes BDSG) just by handling their e-mail address. That's a separate crime from the UWG one, adding up to another 300.000 € fine under §43 BDSG - or even up to 2 years in prison under §44 BDSG! Oh, and if the email does not contain a proper sender's address, that's another chance for a huge fine under the UWG... So, GDPR is your least trouble, if you violate the marketing laws of a country, or their own data privacy laws. A disclaimer means nothing as the act of sending the mail, even to an unintended addressee, is what is illegal and the law as written does not give a damn about 'I didn't want to advertise to that person' when in fact you sent them unwanted advertisements. Oh, and the very repository you suggest? It would violate the very same §4 BDSG and be illegal for processing private data if it was not actively asked to do that by the end user. As a result, that database is useless: It does kick back all people not in its database. Its database is incomplete because only few people give their address to that database as people not aware of the database never add their data on their own. So it regularly violates §4 BDSG with every German citizen's e-mail address it gets and kicks back, and claiming those addresses would be OK, it throws the company trying to check the database under the bus because they rely on data that is impossible to be reliable. tl;dr Don't do cold-(e)-mail marketing. You throw yourself into boiling oil with a lit torch in hand. further reading Other laws banning such behavior I had listed here, and I quote myself: The US has the CAN-SPAM-Act, which illegalizes sending unsocialised advertisements. You may NOT send a mail if any of the following is true: it has no opt-out the email was gained by 'harvesting' contains a header not matching the text contains less than one sentence the adressee does not have any relation to you In fact, you are liable for a 5-digit fine per infringing e-mail in the US. The FTC itself suggests to never buy e-mail lists - as E-mail harvesting or generating any possible e-mail adress itself is illegal.	I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.	In such a case the person who bypasses the terms knows that use of the site is conditioned on agreement to the terms, and has taken an explicit action to continue past the terms and use the site. I suspect that if a dispute were to arise where this is relevant, it would be held that taking such action was legally equivalent to clicking "I agree". But I don't know of any court case on this point, and i can't be sure what a court would do. If having intentionally bypassed the terms, such a person tried to raise his or her lack of consent to the terms as a defense to some obligation imposed by those terms, such equitable concepts as "unclean hands" and estoppel might be raised, since such a person, in effect, leads the other party, the site owner, to believe that s/he has accepted the terms, I suspect that such a person will be treated as having accepted them. If this becomes at all common, I suppose that the designers of such sites will in future store a record of such consent being given, and not allow the user to proceed unless it has been.	Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case.	You have a third option: Sue the district for violating state or local law. There are lots of recent news stories about people doing just this and winning. The US Constitution Can't Help You: The school district is not violating your constitutional rights by installing lights at the stadium. The only constitutional protection remotely connected to your situation is the "takings clause" of the 5th Amendment. It says, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Unfortunately, the "takings clause" only applies if there is a "taking." A "taking" is generally understood to be exactly that -- you lose your property. The loss can be literal -- the government takes title to your house and turns it into a football field or freeway on-ramp -- or figurative -- the disturbance from the football field or on-ramp is so pervasive that your property becomes worthless. Since having the lights on will not destroy the value of your property, the takings clause does not apply to you. As one Justice said in a related case, the lesson here is simple: "the federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable." State or Local Law Might Help You: Even though you don't have a constitutional claim, depending on what state and city you live in, you may have a claim under state or local law. (These might be statutes, regulations, ordinances, or even your state constitution.) For example, in 2010 a group of home owners in Atherton, California who lived near the local high school sued when the school announced plans to install stadium lights. The suit claimed the lights violated local height limits, and that the night games would violate noise ordinances. The suit, plus a savvy pr campaign, got the school to agree to limits on night games. Atherton is not alone. All the way across the country, in Greenwich, Connecticut, neighbors upset about stadium lights sued and got an agreement about the use of lights. A search using high+school+lights+neighbors+sue turns up plenty of other examples. You will have to talk to a local attorney to find out what state or local laws you can use.	A store owner may ban any person from that store that s/he chooses, provided that the ban is not for a reason forbidden by applicable anti-discrimination law, such as banning all people of a particular race or religion. That does not appear to be the case in this situation, from the description. Since this is a franchise, the store has a local owner who is not the chain company. The company will have a franchise contract with the local owner, which will specify in what ways the company can and cannot control the store. They might or might not have the power to require the store owner not to ban you, or not to engage in verbally abusive behavior in the store. In any case, you, or any third party, cannot force them to exercise such power, even if they have it under such a contract. It is very unlikely that law enforcement the authorities will treat the verbal harassment as a crime based on a customer report. You could publicize the situation, as by an online review, which might cause the chain company to take some action, for fear of bad publicity. But be careful. You have already learned that your initial understanding of the situation was significantly incomplete. If any public statements you make are untrue, and harmful to reputation, you could be accused of defamation and sued, perhaps successfully.	There does seem to be a meme in the UAE of people threatening legal action for negative reviews, as a form of defamation. The police will simply tell them that this is not a crime, go hire a lawyer if you want to sue them. If you block them, perhaps they don't have any other way to contact you (seems that was the point of blocking them), which means that you cannot receive their offer "If you pay us AED 1,000 we will not sue you", which could be a problem if they win their court case. Still, it is perfectly legal to ignore or block them, up to the point that you are actually served with legal papers. When they actually sue you, "blocking" is irrelevant, they will hire a process server to hand you the legal papers that command you to appear in court.
Hiding goods within a store In the UK there is a grassroots campaign in which participants hide newspaper publications they consider to be of a dubious moral or political standing with the intent of making it more difficult for the readers of said publication to obtain it, or at least it removing it from public view. The newspaper most frequently targeted has branded judges and elected members of Parliament as traitors and is well known as a source of 'fake news' to the point where it cannot be cited as a source in Wikipedia. Usually they cover the offending title with another, but in some cases move the goods to another unrelated part of the shop (often the toilet-roll section.) In my research I saw Fiup's answer to "Proving Theft From a Store" which seems to suggest that since the legitimate owner (the shop) is not being deprived of the goods it would suggest that no criminal act is being committed. Clearly a store can ask anyone partaking in the this activity to leave (and may choose to ban them from the premises) but is the mover of papers committing an offence since their intent is not to remove them from the store? Note: I have no intent to join this movement, just curious.	You've already found an answer to the question about theft in the linked answer, that since they do not take the goods, nor even intend to take them away permanently there can be no consideration for theft here. There may be a case of criminal damage though, reading up on CPS website brings up some interesting points, notably: Damage is not defined by the Act and what constitutes damage is a matter of fact and degree. The courts have construed the term liberally and included damage that is not permanent such as smearing mud on the walls of a police cell. The damage need not be visible or tangible if it affects the value or performance of the property. It could be argued that by rearranging merchandise in a shop, with clear intent to disrupt its operation you are affecting the performance of the store, and that just may fall under criminal damage. Especially when done regularly, or in an organized way; something that demonstrably affects the business. Though in practice I doubt that anyone, besides the people "hiding" the papers, will care. Shelves in most newspaper stores are inspected and restocked multiple times a day, and as a part of normal customers routine stuff gets moved around and later corrected by staff.	It is legal, at least in the US, for a store (or other entity) to refuse to sell any item to any individual for any non-prohibited reason (prohibited reasons are typically things like race or religion). More over, in various US jurisdictions, it is prohibited to "furnish" alcohol to a "minor" (for example, under California's ABC law), which can be interpreted as prohibiting to an adult if they reasonably suspect that adult will pass the alcohol onto the "minor". This is to prevent "straw" sales. Additionally, larger chains generally prefer to have harmonized policies across branches, and where practical, across state lines, so will have policies that can accomodate multiple alcohol control regimes.	Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.	The reason this section exists is pretty well stated in an English case: Holmes v. Governor of Brixton Prison and Another. In paragraph 12, they discuss the law of theft in England, and note that under the law there as it stood in 2004 (and reaching back to principles of common law, which are often but not always shared with the US), deception required causing someone to believe something. A machine has no mind, cannot think, and can't be made to believe anything -- it sees an input and mechanically performs some response in response to that input. For instance, suppose you were to discover someone's bank account number and printed a check of your own that had that number on it. You then make that check up to look like it's a check from the someone else to you, and deposit it to an ATM; you then withdraw however much is available immediately. In all likelihood, no human will see that check until the victim looks into why they're significantly poorer than they remembered, so no human was deceived. The only things that were possibly deceived were the computers involved in the check-clearing process. But they don't have a mind: as far as they're concerned, they see pixels, pass them through an algorithm, and then send a message to another computer at the bank with certain information (which a human recognizes as an image of a check and an amount of money, but an ATM doesn't know what it means for something to be an image of a check). The machine then mechanically pushes bills out a slot. They don't think the check's real, don't think it's fake, and don't think it's a check: they're just piles of semiconductors and wires acting in accordance with the laws of physics. If you gave a check like this to a check-cashing place, it's clearly theft by deception: you make the human there (falsely) think you have a legitimate check, and they then pay you money based on it. But these days, a lot of this stuff is automated. Alaska's legislature didn't want you to get out of theft by deception charged because something was automated. So, they said that a machine could be deceived. This isn't a crime by itself; you can't be charged with deceiving a machine. You are charged with an offense under the chapter that involves deception. What 11.46.985 does is say you can't argue "this wasn't deception because only the machine was deceived."	We may soon have a more definitive answer. A Grand Junction, Colorado newspaper is suing a politician for calling it "fake news", and the resolution of that case and the hypothetical that you propose would turn on the same legal principle. It is highly unlikely that such a lawsuit would prevail, because "fake news" probably doesn't constitute libel per se, because the comment could be construed as hyperbole or as a statement of opinion (neither of which are actionable), and even potentially, because a "speech and debate clause" defense under the state constitution might apply (depending upon the context in which the statement was made by the politician). The context of the particular tweet cited generally defines specified organizations as "the FAKE NEWS media" rather than accusing them of any particular instance of making a false statement, so it is probably an opinion or hyperbole. But, if the statement were made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity, and if the term "fake news" in the context in which it was used could be legitimately construed the imply a statement of fact which is not true, it wouldn't be impossible for the lawsuit to succeed, and depending upon the context of the statement, it could have such an implication. A suit against Trump could also implicate Presidential immunity doctrines which are more robust than immunity doctrines for other public officials, particularly if the "fake news" comment could be construed as part of the official duties of the President (for which there is absolute immunity) as opposed to his unofficial duties. The immunity question is a closer one than the question on the merits of defamation law about which there is much more case law to flesh out what is and isn't covered.	First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.	The term doesn’t come up Because, AFAIK, there are no circumstances where being ignorant of the law allow a person to escape culpability. There are, however, laws that allow ignorance of the facts to be an excuse. For example, a person who receives stolen goods where it is reasonable to believe that they aren’t is not guilty of the crime (although the still don’t own the goods).	It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.
Do cases of Jury Nullification set precedent? After reading the answers from this question, What is jury nullification?, I was wondering if cases of Jury Nullification would set legal precedent within a given jurisdiction. For example, a legal system with three tiers. a jury-trial found the defendant guilty at the first level, then the case was appealed to the second, where the jury (via nullification) acquitted. Would a similar case brought to the first level have to follow the precedent set by the higher court, or is there judicial discretion available when it comes to case precedent?	"Precedent" refers to a finding of what the law is. A jury only finds facts, and operates (supposedly) within the meaning of the law as already established. All the jury reports is "yes" and "no" to questions of fact (with some reference to existing law): they do not report, at least in any official way "we interpret the law as saying X". So it would be impossible for a jury to "set precedent" in the case law sense. In a notorious case, they might "set precedent" in inspiring other jurors to act similarly, but this is not enforceable precedent in the way that case law precedent is. In the US, if the jury acquits the defendant, that is the end of the matter and there is no re-trial. As for the UK, I am not sure but I think that the prosecution being unhappy with the jury's decision does not create an exception to the double jeopardy rule.	The jury would never hear the recording The recording and its provenience would be provided to the prosecution who would, rightly, have issues with its admissibility. The defence and prosecution would make submissions on this to the judge, normally well before the trial date and the empaneling of the jury. If the recording had genuinely emerged during the trial, such submissions would be made without the jury seeing them. The submissions would typically be in writing rather than verbal. If the judge decided the evidence was inadmissible the jury would never see it and never know of its existence. If the jury somehow found out about it anyway, this would be grounds for an immediate mistrial and we would start again with a new jury. Illegally obtained evidence is not automatically inadmissible Hong Kong is not the United States - admitting or excluding illegally obtained evidence is at the discretion of the judge based on where the interests of overall justice are best served. In any event, the absolute prohibition in the US applies only to prosecution evidence - evidence illegally obtained by the defence is subject to the same rules as in Hong Kong; the judge decides.	Be careful: from the Wikipedia article, it appears that there is a state criminal trial and there will be a federal criminal trial. In addition, there is a federal civil suit which incorporates some stats law claims. The defense in each trial may be different. Have you read the complaint in the civil case? As an example, count 1 alleges, in paragraph 214, that the defendants' actions were "without legal cause." An obvious defense is to show that the actions were actually justified under the law. The law under which they would have been justified would be state law. It's still possible that the state law justification isn't sufficient, but that is another point to be argued in court. If they can't prevail in showing that state law did authorize their actions then the act was certainly unlawful under both state and federal law. Do defendants have standing to invoke self-defense given the context or did they give this up at some point in time? Standing is a threshold that plaintiffs must meet. But defendants can certainly argue self defense. Whether they can prevail on that argument depends on the facts of the case as determined by the court, in particular by the "finder of fact," which is the jury in a jury trial and the judge in a bench trial. The facts that I'm aware of in the public record suggest that the defendants would not prevail on such an argument, but that doesn't deprive them of the right to advance it in court. If someone claims that Arbery was grabbing for the shotgun then the defendants have a right to introduce any evidence of that fact that they may have. It is for the finder of fact to judge the credibility of the evidence.	You're wrong in the first sentence So I agree, that a hung jury is in fact reasonable doubt by lack of concurrence, the defendant should be acquitted. No. A hung jury just means they can't decide on any item they should decide about, for whatever reason. Maybe they all want to see the defendant guilty but can't decide if it is murder 1st or 2nd degree, or one of them is just trying to stay out of work and just is contrarian to whatever the jury deliberates, wether guilty or not guilty. In either case they can not tell the judge what they can't agree about. They can only tell the judge that they can't agree on a verdict. Since the judge can't assume anything about the deliberations, he can only reset trial and swap the jury for one that actually might be able to decide. The whole Jury is tossed out, their deliberations don't matter anymore - their hung state does not influence the re-trial.	The right to trial by jury in criminal cases by a unanimous jury of twelve under the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution and some related rights are only partially incorporated to apply against states via the 14th Amendment due process clause. (The right to a jury trial in a civil case under the 7th Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply to the states.) As noted, the federal right to a jury trial in a criminal case applies only when more than six months of imprisonment are a possible sentence pursuant to Baldwin v. New York. (Proceeding to trial without a jury on a more serious charge is allowed so long as the actual sentence does not exceed six months.) In practice, many states establish a right to a jury trial in many criminal cases where the U.S. Constitution does not require them. Juries are not required in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The 6th Amendment right to a criminal jury trial does not apply to military justice either, although there are constitutional limitations that do apply to military justice. There are no jury trials in the territorial courts of American Samoa which is beyond the scope of 6th Amendment protection. A unanimous jury of six or more jurors is allowed (at least in non-death penalty cases). A state jury does not have to be unanimous (at least in non-death penalty cases). Ten of twelve is constitutionally sufficient for a twelve person jury; nine of twelve is not sufficient constitutionally. In practice, only one or two states permit non-unanimous jury verdicts. [Since this post was originally written, the precent implicitly referenced here was overturned and all criminal case juries must be unanimous. New York State, however, never allowed non-unanimous jury trials anyway.] There is not a federal constitutional right to waive a jury trial, although this exists in some states by state constitution or other forms of state law. The right to have felony charges screened by a grand jury also does not apply to the states. About half of U.S. states require grand juries to screen felony charges, mostly in the eastern U.S. I have the precedents in a criminal procedure text book and will update is I get a chance. See also the footnotes here. To some extent, the constitutional provision in NY State is designed to make clear that bench trials are allowed when a jury has been waived. It also authorizes bench trials where the U.S. Constitution and state law permits them.	One limit is that potential jurors cannot be excluded solely on the basis of their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. ___ (2019). As summarized in Flowers: Equal justice under law requires a criminal trial free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process. Enforcing that constitutional principle, Batson ended the widespread practice in which prosecutors could (and often would) routinely strike all black prospective jurors in cases involving black defendants. By taking steps to eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection process, Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and to enhance public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Batson immediately revolutionized the jury selection process that takes place every day in federal and state criminal courtrooms throughout the United States. The Batson restriction is not merely that one cannot explicitly announce race as the factor by which one is excluding a juror. This will most often not be the kind of evidence available and if that were the rule, the purpose of the rule would easily be defeated. What Batson prohibits is exclusion of a juror "on the basis of race" (whether or not a proxy was the proximate or purported means by which the prosecutor made the decision). See Flowers at p. 18 of the slip opinion: The trial judge must determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered reasons are the actual reasons, or whether the proffered reasons are pretextual and the prosecutor instead exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race. The ultimate inquiry is whether the State was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”	Yes The normal remedy for not receiving a fair trial or due process is the declaration of a mistrial. A mistrial legally never happened so it is up to the prosecution to decide if they want a retrial. Unless the appellant can demonstrate that no reasonable jury would have convicted on the evidence (which seems unlikely verging on impossible), the appeal will not acquit the accused.	Yes In general, default judgements can be set aside for good cause. If the defendant can show that they had a legitimate reason for being unable to respond to the cause of action, then the judgement can be set aside and a new hearing scheduled. However, “good cause” encompasses things both unforeseen and unforeseeable and includes having good cause why the court and/or plaintiff/prosecutor could not have been advised of the incapacity before default judgement was entered. In most jurisdictions, they also need to show that they have a prima facie defence such that a different result is possible. The “superior sovereign” is not really germane: good cause can include a sudden illness or injury, police detention (be they superior, inferior, same-level or foreign sovereign), natural disaster etc.
Is it illegal to modify a website locally I am getting flak from the company I work for for having built a bookmarklet that makes one of their web applications more functional. It injects some code and new elements onto the page to augment the features of the site. Everything it does can be reproduced in the developer console. They are accusing me of violating their Terms of Service, specifically the generic phrase "You agree that you will not modify, copy, distribute, transmit, display, perform, reproduce, publish, license, create derivative works from, frame in another web page, use on any other web site, transfer, or sell any information, software, lists of users, databases or other lists, products or services provided through or obtained from the site." Does this hold water? What I'm doing is 100% local, modifying a rendered version of a website. I am not affecting their servers in any way. How should I respond to this?	It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.	Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected.	You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article.	Ideas (methods of playing, game mechanics, strategy, goals) cannot be protected by copyright. But any part of a creative work can. So, no copying of drawings, patterns, images, sounds, or the element. I suppose copying the software code is not an issue here, but it can, obviously, also not be copied. And nothing in your game can look like someone's else trademark.	The creator of the software doesn't provide any warranty. If you feel confident in the quality of the software, nothing stops you from providing a warranty. If the software doesn't meet your guarantees, you will have to pay out because you provided the warranty, depending on the terms. Not the creator of the software because they explicitly didn't provide any warranty. If that's what you want to do, go ahead. I wouldn't. You don't have to republish under the BSD license, which you wouldn't. You must attach the license terms, which clarifies the role of the original creators, and that they don't give a warranty. Doing this allows you to copy the software. It doesn't mean you can't provide a warranty.	Yes, you can. An excellent example is this very website - at the bottom of this page you will find a series of links in the footer, one of which is "Terms of Service". I think you will agree that most people using the Law SE are making no money from it or paying no money to use it and yet the terms of service sets out in black and white what a user of this site can do, and what the repercussions can be if they breach the ToS, so it serves a purpose as an excellent example for your question.	As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold.	According to EU case law, everything in your scenario is legal except if Example Site is hosting the image without authorization and Pirate Site is a for-profit site, then Pirate Site is presumed to be violating Article 3 of the Copyright Directive on communication to the public (in this scenario, Example Site is also trivially violating Article 2 on the right to reproduction). In Meltwater, Case C-360/13, the court ruled that browser cache and on-screen copies fell under the temporary reproduction exception, Article 5(1) of the Copyright Directive. This means that the visitor is not infringing copyright (IPKat reference). In BestWater, Case C-348/13, the court ruled that embedding content was itself not a communication to the public when that content was hosted with rightsholder authorization, and so did not violate Article 3. This means that Pirate Site is not infringing on communication to the public rights (it is also not creating a copy itself, so is not breaking Article 2) (IPKat reference). When content is not hosted with authorization, the situation is quite a bit more nuanced. GS Media, Case C-160/15, is the controlling case. Here, the court ruled that if a link (note it doesn't even have to be embedded/hotlinked) is posted by a for-profit site, that site is expected to have done its due diligence to ensure the linked content is hosted legally. Therefore, it is presumed to be violating Article 3, i.e., the burden of proof is on the link posting site to demonstrate that it had done its due diligence in verifying the legality of the linked content. So in this scenario, Pirate Site is presumed to be infringing on communication to the public rights (IPKat reference - WARNING: slightly NSFW image here, Playboy was one of the parties to the case).
Is there any legal protection for actions that later become illegal? For example, lets say that being a software developer is a legal occupation right now. But 2 years from now, it becomes illegal to develop software. Can you be prosecuted for work that you've done in the past that has only recently become illegal? Are there any legal protections / immunity currently in place to prevent this type of situation?	This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.	The legal issues are too black and white to have any meaningful impact on an ethics discussion. The IP belongs to A and B can't use it. A's not planning to build a product around the patent is irrelevant to the law and I do not see it bring up any ethical issue, but some people who do not understand patent law might. There might be ethics issues if A hired Josh with the specific plan to fire him as soon as the application was filed and intentionally misled him about these plans. Another issue might be Josh's duty to not disclose A's confidential information (the application does not become public right away), and Josh's duty to not draw B into developing an infringing product.	If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability.	Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.	As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum).	It does mean that you cannot reuse any parts of the source code, even small simple ones. You would have to rebuild the code from scratch. There is a significant chance that the code would be "substantially similar" to the code that you were hired to build, also that if anybody else were to write a bubble sort or 24-to-am/pm conversion routine, it would look the same, where even variable names (which should describe function) are the same or very similar. In case of an infringement lawsuit, you would have to defend yourself by showing that there are only a few ways to code a given function. Copyright protects only the "expression", not the abstract idea. A linked list is an idea, which can't be protected by copyright; same with recursion, pointers, stacks, object-oriented programming... Anything that involves copy and paste is infringement. If you re-read the copyrighted code and then try to reconstruct it, you probably crossed the infringement line. If you remember the problems and solutions and accidentally write somewhat similar code, that is probably on the safe side. From the perspective of the programmer not wanting to always reinvent the wheel, it would be most useful to make a distinction in the contract between "the essentials of the customer's program" versus "incidental utility work". The difficulty will arise in saying specifically what is essential vs. incidental. For instance, I know that if I were to hire you to develop a speech-recognition system, low-level audio-acquisition and encoding would not be essential to my purpose, whereas DSP parsing routines would be the center of my interest. The programmer would then want to retain recycling rights to all non-essential code.	So-called AI software does not enjoy a special legal status (at present: one never knows what new law might be added). The question of whether any software can be distributed "safely" or "responsibly" is also not a legal issue. Nor is "true sentience" a relevant consideration, and nothing is guaranteed. When you distribute software of any kind, there is an implied warranty that the product is "fit", and if software kills you, you may be able to sue the creator for negligence. A software creator may then want to disclaim liability, by saying "WARNING: THIS PROGRAM MAY KILL YOU. OCP IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY INJURIES ARISING FROM USE OF THIS PRODUCT". This may or may not actually remove liability. In the UK "liability for negligence occasioning death or personal injury cannot be excluded", so such a disclaimer will not prevent a suit against the manufacturer. In the US, the issue is determined at the level of the state – here is a summary of the law in the states. Probably the primary question would be whether such a disclaimer is an unconscionable term, and the second question is whether the act constituted gross negligence (not simply "negligence"). Mississippi exceptionally does not allow disclaimers, but even then, it does allow disclaiming liability when it comes to computer hardware and software. A software disclaimer is not inherently unconscionable, though perhaps some specific disclaimer would be found to be. Courts typically disfavor disclaimers in the case of gross negligence, and again determining what constitutes "gross negligence" is determined on a state by state basis. If the act shows "reckless indifference to the rights of others" and "failure to use even slight care or conduct that is so careless as to show complete disregard for the rights and safety of others", then the act might be grossly negligent.	It is illegal to make copies of copyrighted materials without license. In the case of software, obviously it will be illegal to make copies by copying and installing the software without a license, but we are not talking about that. If I have a legitimate license of say Photoshop, and I start the application, parts or all of the code will be loaded into the RAM of my computer, which is a copy. According to copyright law, it is legal for me to make that copy. You are allowed to copy legitimately owned software into RAM to execute it. If your copy of Photoshop is illegal, and you start the application, the copy that is made into RAM is again copyright infringement. Having read the software license for the software that you get when you buy a Mac, it seems that if you steal my computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement, and it seems that if you buy such a stolen computer and just start the operating system, you are committing copyright infringement as well, because the license that I received when I purchased the computer covers anyone using it with my permission, and covers anyone who legally buys the computer from me, but doesn't cover a thief. Now does this affect the work that you did? No, you have the full copyright on your work. Copyright law doesn't require that your tools are all used legitimately.
Is an implied physical threat via looming over someone legal? Lets say that two individuals approach another person and start asking him questions or ask him to do something (for instance leave an area). They do not make any explicit verbal threats. However, their posture, hostility, and body language all are used to physically intimidate the other person and make him afraid to refuse their request. (This is a one time incident, and not recurring harassment.) Is the use of such implied physical intimidation to compel someone legal? If it isn't are there rules in place to decide what qualifies as implied intimidation? There must be some yardstick, otherwise anyone could claim they felt intimidated regardless of the intent of the person they were speaking to. This is a question mainly asked out of curiosity, derived from my thinking of a situation over a year ago where three people decided that just because the child I was with was a different race then myself I must therefore be plotting to drag him away to a windowless van with the words "Free candy" written on its side. In that case the child's mother (my close friend) came over and sent them away, but it bothered me that they left muttering that I was"'lucky" as if my horrible crime of being a mentor for a child was something that clearly should have resulted in a worse fate then just being harassed by three men and accused of something that is obviously quite morally repugnant.) I find myself curious what the laws would be about their trying to harass me into answering their questions. In this case they outnumbered me 3 to 1. Looking back I realize one man actually left to get the other two to back him before returning to harass me, and I feel there was a clear intent to physically intimidate me into answering their questions. The child confirmed he knew me and I was a family friend. At that point they continued to harass me both to explain my exact relationship to the child's mother (which I refused to, due to the personal nature of the relationship), give them my full name, and to take them to his mother. I cooperated with them because I'm not one to cause trouble, and in particular did not wish to concern the child, but if I had chosen to be obstinate, or the mother wasn't available to appease them, what would the legal rules have been? Had a police officer came over that moment would he have been able to do anything about the others, despite their not verbally making a threat, based entirely on what I viewed as an implied threat?	No, it's not legal. This is the tort of assault, not to be confused with criminal assault. A tort of assault does not require actual contact, whereas some jurisdictions define criminal assault elements as those of battery; in others, it is an intended battery without the contact. The elements of common law assault are: A positive, voluntary act You can't do this accidentally or negligently That intentionally causes reasonable apprehension in the plaintiff The person must reasonably apprehend contact. However, this is a subjective standard. If the plaintiff does not apprehend contact, then this element is not satisfied. Additionally, while words alone are rarely enough to satisfy this element, words in a certain tone, or with certain actions, may be. Also, verbal threats are not required for this element. Of immediate You can't assault someone by threatening them with something that'll happen in the future, if it's distant enough. Whether this is distant enough is decided on a case-by-case basis. Unlawful contact The contact needs to be unlawful and harmful. In the situation you describe, a civil action in assault would have all requirements fulfilled. You might also succeed in pressing criminal charges, depending on the jurisdiction concerned. Police officers generally have the power to maintain the peace, and an assault is most definitely a breach of the peace. Again, depending on the jurisdiction, they may have the power to detain them, or to ask them to move along, for example.	While it is from a different jurisdiction, the following goes to the heart of the matter: Arrest, when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension of a person or the deprivation of a person's liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether the person has been deprived of personal liberty of movement. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 at ¶46 (SC of India) In your example, the police officer has been deprived of "personal liberty of movement"; if they can still speak there would be no legal impediment to them placing the person who arrested them also under arrest. It would then be incumbent on both parties to deliver each other into lawful custody. The citizen would need to seek out a law enforcement officer to do this; the police officer has already done so, being their own law enforcement officer. After this, comes the paperwork.	It is premature to judge the particular case because the facts are not all available. But we can address the general principles. The Model Penal Code 3.04(2)(a) sets out the general principles clearly. A person has the right to self-defense against unlawful force. But, the use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful. But more specifically under (b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat However, there is a further condition that force is not justifiable if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take Then finally, §3.05 says that this goes for people using force in defense of others. The short version is that the common law right to resist illegal arrest has been supplanted by a statutory requirement to submit to police authority, for example in California and New York. In Ewumi v. Georgia, defendant was illegally arrested and physically defended himself, which resulted in a battery charge and conviction. The battery charge was overturned because the arrest was illegal ab initio. If one resisting an authorized arrest, where an officer's force is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm, the question is whether a reasonable person would find it necessary to resist in self-defense. It is unusual for the courts to find that to be the case. Minnesota law says that reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other's consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist: (1) when used by a public officer or one assisting a public officer under the public officer's direction: (a) in effecting a lawful arrest Other sections say that a person who is not a public officer may use force to effect an arrest, or, "(3) when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person". Being arrested by the police is not an offense, and none of the other justifications for use of force apply.	Because a "sting" does not trigger the prerequisites for the warning The Miranda Warning has triggering events: The circumstances triggering the Miranda safeguards, i.e. Miranda warnings, are "custody" and "interrogation". Custody means formal arrest or the deprivation of freedom to an extent associated with formal arrest. Interrogation means explicit questioning or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Constitution does not require that a defendant be advised of the Miranda rights as part of the arrest procedure, or once an officer has probable cause to arrest, or if the defendant has become a suspect of the focus of an investigation. If you voluntarily speak to a police officer (uniformed or undercover, identified as such or not) while not being both in custody and subject to interrogation, that speech can be used in evidence.	Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.	No An arrest is the act of detaining a person or property by legal authority or warrant and has been made when a police officer or another individual makes it clear to the person that they are no longer a free person. A person does not need to be physically touched to be placed under arrest as words alone are capable of bringing about an arrest if they establish that the person is no longer a free person. Now, if a LEO asks you to accompany them, then, so long as you have the choice not to, you are not under arrest.	I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”.	Yes. The charge in that case is solicitation of assault. Usually, solicitation of a crime carries the same punishment as the underlying crime. On the other hand, if a daughter tells her father what you did to her and he unilaterally decides to assault you, out of defense of his family's honor and outrage, the daughter has not committed a crime.
In the US, can a senator get a prisoner out? In the latest TV series Scandal episode, "Get Out of Jail, Free", Olivia asks Mellie, a senator from Virginia, to release a prisoner imprisoned in Virginia, assuring that this is within her powers. I know this is just a TV series and even she might mean she has powerful friends or non-lawful tricks, but out of curiosity, is that possible or is there anything in US constitution or US law that let a senator get a prisoner out?? FYI, the senator did get two prisoners out, one imprisoned for embezzlement and another one for killing a president's son (and is put in Supermax!)	No a senator does not have that power under their elected position. However politics does not work like that. A senator could know the governor of their state very well. Governors could issue pardons which will release people from jail. Governors can also command a certain person to do something, like release a prisoner.	I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.	No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit.	He does not need to be mirandized unless he is being arrested and the officers want to use things he will say as evidence. The officers in your situation seemed content to let the matter be handled through the school. If they had wanted to arrest him, they could easily have done so as soon as he pulled out the joint and handed it to the director. The "write a confession or you will leave in handcuffs" pretty much invalidates it in a court of law. Even if it weren't excluded, his testimony as to why he wrote it looks pretty bad in front of a jury. That said, I doubt that's where this case is headed. My understanding is this: The school director and two police officers caught your son smoking marijuana on school property. The punishment they sought is that he admit culpability and that he continue school online, and (presumably) on probation. In the grand scheme of how these cases could go, this isn't that bad. There are some procedural irregularities you could press, but there's enough evidence without the irregularities that work against your son. Having said that, sign nothing without consulting a lawyer. But it could be worse.	DUI is a crime under Massachusetts law so Kurt would be prosecuted there by that state. Germany would offer consular assistance but this would not extend to preparing or paying for his defence. If convicted, and after serving his sentence, Germany and the USA would coordinate his deportation. The UK would offer consular assistance for the repatriation of Alice's body and for the participation of her family in the trial, again this would not extend to paying for it. They would not assist in any civil action Alice's family might take against Kurt in a Massachusetts court. While DUI is a crime in both Germany and the UK AFAIK they are not extraterritorial: that is the crime must be committed on their territory for them to prosecute it. Some crimes do have extraterritoriality but not DUI. Similarly, their courts would probably not hear a civil case because the correct venue is Massachusetts and they would probably entertain a motion to dismiss on that basis. Even if they did hear it, it would be heard under Massachusetts law.	So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.	The Secret Service is primarily concerned with protecting the people and information they oversee, not enforcing laws. They have the power to arrest someone for any unlawful conduct, but unless a drug user is presenting as a threat to a protectee, they are unlikely to be arrested by the Secret Service. More likely the Service would simply escort the person off the premises and refer the matter to the DC Metro Police to handle. Edit: Such a case would not be turned over to the US Capitol Police (as originally written) It would most likely be referred to the DC Metropolitan Police Department.Corrected my answer above.	It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata, but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment.
Can someone be arrested in the UK solely on the basis of the Interpol Red Notice against him/her? An individual has an Interpol Red Notice issued against him, requesting his detention and extradition. The Notice comes to the attention of the London Metropolitan Police, who discover this individual in London. Is a constable entitled to arrest him solely on the basis of the Interpol Red Notice, or must the constable first seek out a warrant from a UK court?	Corker Binning, reportedly a law firm with good reputation in the field of handling extradition representation, describes a red notice as ... an alert issued by Interpol at the request of one of its member countries, indicating that the country seeks the individual’s provisional arrest with a view to extradition. Red notices are recorded on Interpol’s databases for instant circulation to police forces and border agencies around the world. This description is presumably correct, if perhaps incomplete. A key term in this description is extradition - the removal of a person, in custody, from one state to another state. This can cause problems for the application by local law enforcement. A British man was in 2009 the subject of a red notice. Having left Dubai for personal reasons, he was reported for fraud based on the defaulting of a car loan, but ... despite featuring in Interpol's list of the 45 most wanted Britons, he was told by officers there was no outstanding warrant against him in the UK and therefore could not be arrested. This suggests that at least for citizens of the United Kingdom, it is not possible to arrest the red notice subject for that reason alone. More generally, Interpol cannot require action (arrest or otherwise) on the basis of a red notice. They are for information purposes only. This is pointed out by Interpol themselves, when they say that INTERPOL cannot compel any member country to arrest an individual who is the subject of a Red Notice. Each member country decides for itself what legal value to give a Red Notice within their borders. Given the above story and several others online of police declining to arrest red notice subjects without significant political pressure, it does not appear an individual subject to a red notice can be arrested for that reason alone.	Anyone has a right to report illegal activities that it is aware of to the authorities. This is in fact where 99.9% of police investigations start. In addition, students of a school (or, more generally, members of any organisation) are eligible to be investigated/disciplined by the school in accordance with the rules of the school providing that the investigation and punishment are in accordance with the law. This would normally permit (require?) notification of any child's parent or guardian. In loco parentis does not arise - the school is acting as a responsible citizen; not as a substitute for the children's parents.	The Immigration Act 2016 introduced the so-called 'right to rent' provisions under which a landlord can be prosecuted for renting accommodation to someone who is not legally in the UK. Everyone in the UK, Brits included, is subject to the Act. This gives the landlord the right to examine your work permit and to see if your visa is valid. The landlord will make a copy of the information. This makes the landlord a data controller which imposes restrictions on how the information can be used. Because this became controversial, the Information Commissioner published a brochure on the things a landlord can do with your data. All things considered and based upon what you wrote, if the landlord did not get your permission to use the data, then it's likely he is in breach. But this does not mean it's actionable or that it would be advisable to make a formal complaint to the Commissioner. If you want to pursue it, you can use the Commissioner's "Report a Concern" page as a starting point. Alternatively, you can lodge a formal complaint with your landlord and he will have to respond to it. What does the law say? The act giving the landlord the right to access your data is in the 2016 act linked above. Everything else is in the Data Protection Act 1998. The ILPA Information Sheet is at "Right to Rent". "The information sheet was updated on 01 November 2016 to take account of the second commencement order issued by the government, on 31 October 2016, bringing further provisions into force." The information sheet is recommended reading for anyone in the UK on a work permit. Disclaimer: I'm a member.	It depends on the type of warrant. Failure to pay a fine is not necessarily an arrestable offence. The Police Scotland Warrants Standard Operating Procedure (710 kB PDF) states: 5.3 Whilst there is no legislative requirement for Officers to physically possess the warrant to force entry / effect arrest, it would be considered best practice if a forced entry is anticipated. There may be instances where this is not practically possible to obtain the warrant in time or it may be geographically challenging to do so. Possession of a scanned copy of the warrant would be good practice on such occasions, again where the circumstances permit. and 5.5.1 By virtue of Section 135 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 an apprehension warrant implies authority, where it is necessary for its execution, to break open shut and lock fast places. Entry into any house or building, therefore, may be affected by any constable in order to execute the warrant in accordance with its terms and only as a last resort. and 5.6.1 An Extract Conviction/Means Enquiry Warrant (back fine warrant) is issued by the Clerk of Court when an accused person fails to pay the fine imposed within the period allowed for payment. This extract is a sufficient warrant for the apprehension of the accused, but unlike an ordinary warrant of arrest, it does not authorise a constable to break open doors in order to affect arrest. Sheriff officers are not police - they are closer to what in England and some parts of the USA would be termed bailiffs, used for civil recovery of debts etc.	You are allowed to ask the police whatever questions you like. There is an upper limit that you can't refuse to obey a lawful order on the premise that you want to ask a bunch of questions, but they don't seem to have ordered you to do anything, so you can ask away. They have no obligation to tell you anything or to be truthful, except for certain questions like "am I free to go" when you want to leave and are testing whether you are under arrest. Even then they don't have to answer your questions right away. The police can therefore ignore you, especially if you are asking curiosity questions. It might be that they are restricted from giving information in certain circumstances (pertaining to the privacy of others). If there is an issue of legitimate concern (e.g. Little Billy has been beating up on cats again) and you feel that you need to know this, then you can request the police record on the matter. Certain information will probably be redacted under state law, but you could get a report that states that some [redacted] juvenile was beating up on animals. The Florida records law is one of the first in he nation, dating back to 1909. You can read this, to see if you think the circumstances match one of the exemptions, though all you have to do is make the request and be told that the record is exempt, then you will have some idea what was going on.	Police can get a warrant, if the warrant is supported by "probable cause" to believe that evidence of a crime exists. A separate "probable cause" requirement is that to arrest a person, there must be "probable cause" that they committed a crime. However, the Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful to search "work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication", unless there is probable cause that the person committed the crime in question. There are similar laws ("shield laws") at the state level. Here is a map which gives you an indication what immunities exist in what states.	It is illegal to threaten to report a person for violating the law (it is illegal to threaten a person). There are laws in California that limit official cooperation with ICE investigations, therefore the police will not arrest a person for being an illegal immigrant. This is basically a limit on use of state and local resources, and the state has the power to control its purse strings. The state has no power to mandate that individuals not report a suspected or imagined violation of federal law to federal authorities, and there is no California law purporting to have that power.	He was jailed for breaching an injunction imposed on the Shard in 2018 which was intended to prevent anyone from climbing it, according to a news report from the Guardian at the time. The actual offence he committed was contempt of court which is a criminal offence. Double jeopardy does not apply here because the crime he was cautioned for was not the same crime he was prosecuted for. It appears there was no precedent set, prior to this private prosecution, about whether or not someone could be jailed for breaching an injunction in this manner, as opposed to merely being fined, etc. Obviously, since he has been jailed, people in the future will be reluctant to copy his behaviour and a deterrent has been set.
How basic were Senator Kennedy's questions to Matthew Spencer Petersen? The recent hearing of the candidates for district court judge sparked some media attention as President Trump's candidate, Matthew Spencer Petersen, could not answer (video here) some law-specific questions asked by Senator Kennedy. I was able to identify the four terms that were mentioned in the video linked above, here they are the way they were asked by Senator Kennedy: Can you tell me what the Daubert standard is? Do you know what a motion in limine is? Do you know what the Younger abstention doctrine is? How about the Pullman abstention? Obviously, Mr. Petersen failed to answer those questions to various degrees. Since I am a layman concerning law I am interested in how "basic" the questions really are: Should Mr. Petersen, as a Juris Doctor, know of those things in his sleep? Is his excuse valid when he says that he has no background in the field(s) (he mentioned litigation once) the terms are corresponding to?	For Mr. Petersen, the questions in general should have been elementary. The fact he did not know them is actually quite deplorable. To your questions specifically: Should Mr. Petersen, as a Juris Doctor, know of those things in his sleep? This is the wrong question. The question is: should an individual who has accepted a nomination to serve as a federal judge on the U.S. District Court know of those things in his/her sleep? The answer is unequivocally yes. One could almost argue - one would likely be scoffed at, but one could - that an appointment to a higher court, the U.S. Circuit, could get away not knowing those things 'in his/her sleep,' because appeals courts would not deal with, e.g., abstention doctrines or whether to admit expert scientific testimony, as often as a trial court does. Simply put, lawyers should at least have heard of those things (he looked/sounded absolutely dumbfounded at the words that were being said to him), litigators should know them, and federal trial court judges absolutely need to know those things to do the job. Is his excuse valid when he says that he has no background in the field(s) (he mentioned litigation once) the terms are corresponding to? If he was just some lawyer talking to some guy at a bar, sure, totally valid. If someone is a corporate M&A or project finance attorney, sure, don't expect him to win any trial court vocabulary contests. However, when sitting before a panel of U.S. Senators carrying out their Constitutional duties of "advice and consent" on presidential appointments, not knowing those things can, should, and indeed did end in complete humiliation for the person ignorant enough to try and go through with that. I'm sure his hearing was scheduled some time in advance. The fact he obviously made zero attempt to know anything is actually insulting to everyone involved. For context, I wrote a motion in limine at my first internship. If I live to be 1,000 and never step foot in a court room, I'll still be able to say more about a motion in limine than "I would probably not be able to give you a good definition right here at the table."	The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact.	The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes).	I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect.	Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.	As a comment by @DavidSchwartz notes, this is not wrong. Questions of law but not fact are allowed. It is worth noting that the line drawn is arbitrary. In Colorado, where I practice, jurors issue written questions (pre-reviewed by the judge and counsel for all parties before being presented) to witnesses at the close of the testimony of each witness called by a party to testify. This is very helpful to counsel, as it provides indirect evidence of whether the jury understands what they are being told, and often juries will directly ask questions that for tactical reasons, both parties have refrained from asking that go to the heart of the matter. It also frequently clarifies misunderstandings that trained legal professionals assumed were not made about terminology. This is more problematic in criminal trials, where jury questions could provide evidence pushing a case over the threshold of proof needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution failed to provide, than in civil cases with a preponderance of the evidence standard. Also, as a matter of reality, when jurors ask questions, counsel often loathe to object even when they have valid grounds to do so, for fear of offending the decision-maker, unless it is really critical to keep certain information away from the jury.
HIPAA within context of marriage I am finding out that my ex-wife may have kept from me a genetic predisposition to Down syndrome and other abnormalities in the baby. The physician did not tell me about this either. I want to know what were my rights as the father. Did they have an obligation to disclose this information?	The regulations known as HIPAA are here. A good place to start is with who the regulations apply to. §160.10 lays that out: a health plan, health care clearinghouse, care provider, their business associates, and the Inspector General. Family members are not regulated entities. Subpart E regulates individually identifiable health information (such as "person X has condition Y") – this is protected information. §164.502 states that A covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose protected health information except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this subchapter. The first permitted use / disclosure is that the information may be revealed to the individual (the individual). Under 164.502(a)(2)(1) they are required to reveal information to an individual "when requested under, and required by §164.524 or §164.528" (you have a right to see your own record; you have a right to know who knows). 164.502(g) requires the covered entity to treat the "Personal Representative" as the same as the individual, and then there is a list of conditions surrounding being a personal representative, reducing to being empowered under law to act on behalf of the individual in making health decisions (it gets complicated in dealing with minors). 164.510 covers disclosure in emergencies, and under (b)(2) allows disclosure to a family member with advance consent of the individual. And so on. There is no general rule "and the covered entity may / must reveal private information to an interested individual", even a spouse, without consent of the individual. In other words, the doctor has an obligation to not disclose this information, unless permitted by the individual.	Not much. Consider the following: The father can not force the mother to abort the pregnancy. Ex post facto agreements of non-payment are, in all likelihood, unenforceable. The father will be obligated to pay child support under the laws of the state with jurisdiction over the paternity. The abortion angle won’t work. Setting aside commentary regarding the politics or ethics of abortion. I think we can agree it is a highly charged and emotional topic for some people. I point to the fact it always seems to be an issue during Supreme Court nominations and presidential elections. Given the explosive nature of the issue of whether abortions should be legal or not (in the case where the mother does not want to carry full term) could you imagine how much more dynamite it would add to the debate if the question were whether or not to allow the father to force the mother to terminate the pregnancy against the mother's wishes! One can only imagine how much more bombastic the abortion debate might then become. You can’t escape child support (most likely). To give you a sense of how difficult it is to escape the obligations of child support. Consider the following... A Kansas man was ordered to pay child support when he thought he was being a sperm donor only and signed numerous agreements with the lesbian couple he thought he was helping. In that case, the court justified its ruling on the grounds that a doctor was not involved in the insemination process. But nothing prevents future courts from making the same ruling in cases where a doctor is involved in the insemination process. Especially if that state either withdraws from the The Uniform Parentage Act, amends it, repeals it, or never adopts it in the first place. Sperm Donors and Child Support: Even in cases in which the donor is known, but holds himself out as unknown, some courts have held the donor legally obligated to pay child support. Read more here. Ex post facto agreements are problematic. Now that you've edited the question, the above link is even more useful for providing a possible avenue to try (albeit unlikely to work): a non-payment agreement. The discussion in that link describes that even if you could somehow convince the mother to go along with it, it is unlikely (though not impossible) to be enforced by the courts. It depends on the facts (e.g., intercourse vs. in vitro), circumstances (e.g., relationship vs. no relationship between the parties), timing (e.g., before vs. after the agreement), etc. of the impregnation itself. Notwithstanding all the above, if you still have questions, you might consider floating an idea of an approach you think you might try (in a separate question) and get reactions to that specific proposal.	This is what we mean when we say something falls between the cracks. Sorry for that. First off, in the United States, family law is not federal, it is individual to each state. This means there is no federal agency or official charged with enforcing family law. When it comes to marriage and divorce, the federal government and their border agents are after those seeking to gain benefit through fraud (i.e., attempting to attain status through fraudulent marriage). Likewise, they don't have formal cross-jurisdictional protocols controlling the right of the US government to demand personal, private family law records from other governments. Nor do they have the means to pursue that. What this means, in practical terms, is that no family law judge sitting in the US has authority, interest or means in international marriage and divorce beyond those cases initiated in their court. I hope you read that slowly and carefully. Ask me if you need clarification. I suspect that you have a very specific cause in mind that necessitates you being in possession of a divorce decree. And I get the impression that you and your ex-spouse are in agreement and working together to solve this. You might find it valuable, at this point, to take a step back a little further into history. Let's consider your marriage. You two know you got married. I suspect that your friends, loved ones, and hopefully family know you got married. Then there is that clerk somewhere in Denmark (who records more than 100 marriages every week) who knows you got married. Theoretically. Possibly. Maybe. You've been residing in Russia for some years now, and the Russian government doesn't know you are married. Marriage is illegal there. So, in actuality the Russian government, if asked by some official of some other government, can only state with truth and authority that it is certain that you are NOT married. At the same time, some US federal official decides to investigate the most highly unlikely case ever. Someone is trying to gain entry, not by claiming marriage but by hiding a marriage. (ridiculous!) So, with a budget of zero, and the authority to match, goes from country to country demanding that they open up the (extremely) private records of family courts in search of the evidence he needs. When they ask him to demonstrate cause, he boldly tells them that his sharp mind is cause enough. They agree and give him cups of tea as he searches through the private affairs of their residents. It is never-ending, but he is proud to be working to stop the flood of unwanted divorced persons trying to gain entry to the USA. - - - - You get the picture. Also, consider the option of an international divorce. I would provide a reference here, but a simple Google search will yield many providers. It is expensive and time-consuming, but an available option. I'd rank it last. There are also varied laws by jurisdiction - internationally. I'm not expert enough to know of any jurisdictions that might not require extended residency. I suspect some won't. I am confident, on the other hand, that there are several that you might access with relative short windows of required residency. This Wikipedia article should give you a good start. You are also maybe a little fast in dismissing Denmark as a possible venue. European Union states, at one time, experienced a tangled mess regarding family law across jurisdictions and specifically divorce. In 2003, however, the EU implemented Regulation 2201/2003 providing for conferred jurisdictional competence by way of exception in cases involving applicants for divorce similarly situated to you. And now jurisprudence, in a wonderful show, is beginning to catch up with regulation and public sentiment on the matter. The provisions seem complicated, but they are definitely outside the abilities of a couple of Russians who have managed to get this far. Here's a starting point to get the ball rolling. Aside from those three solutions, you might be stuck. You would be ill-advised to seek some creative solution outside of the law. And I struggle to think of anything that might work. Unfortunately, justice and law are often connected by a mere thread, and sometimes not at all. You are left to forge ahead on behalf of others, who enjoy the fruits of your labour. For that, you have our gratitude. And while I am no expert on the fight for justice, There is this man - an American, who is. He wasn't gay, so much as black. Be he figured out a lot regarding justice. There are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all." -Martin Luther King Jr. I salute you.	In the United States, the main statute governing the use of health care information is HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. HIPAA and its related statutes and regulations detail what you can and can't do with medical information. You can't always collect it; if you do, you can't always share it, and you can't always delete it. This is a complex field of law and it's easy to screw up in a way that would cause big, serious, company-destroying, job-ending problems for everyone involved. To put this another way: this is absolutely, positively, not something you want to get advice on from strangers on the internet. You don't just need a lawyer; you need a HIPAA specialist--or the equivalent in whatever other countries you plan to operate in--before you push anything out to real-life patients, especially children.	Note: All links in Spanish (sorry). Regardless or your father being or not the legal owner of the home, the issue at play is that of alimentos1. This is an obligation between some family relationships to help each other so if family member (the alimentista) is in dire need of help (i.e., needs the help to survive) the others have the obligation to provide the help. The relatives of the alimentista affected are, in order: The couple, always when married and only when expressly agreed upon for non-married couples. Descendants: sons/daughters and grandsons/granddaughters. Ascendants: parents and grandparents. Brothers: Only when indispensable and the minimum amount. The order determines who of all the family members is under obligation to provide the help; in case of multiple people in the same category the amount is to be divided between them in function of their income. The amount of the help is not fixed and will depend of the circunstances of the situation2; and it is possible to provide by providing the needs(shelter, food) directly. Now, until when does a father/grandfather need to provide alimentos to a son or daughter? Certainly until s/he is 183, as this is the date of full age in Spain, but it is usual to consider that the obligation exists while the alimentista is studying and lacks of his/her own means of subsistence. That is not a "free rider" situation, as alimentos may be denied by several reasons: Obviously, because the person that should provide the help does not have the means to do so without endangering his own subsistence. The alimentista gets his/her own means of subsistence. Any of the causes that would make the alimentista unable to inherit from the person providing the help4: attempted murder, coercion to change their will, and other grave crimes. The alimentista does not do enough to get his/her own means of subsistence. If a judge decides that the alimentista son/daughter is neither studying nor seriously trying to get a job, the help can be revoked. Judges seem to be progressively taking a harsher stance against descendants who refuse to do their part. The article quotes the case of a 19 years old guy whose claim to the pension was denied. As a side note, rejecting to pay alimentos is another of the causes that would cause the person doing it to lose any right to inheritance from the alimentista. If for whatever the reason you do not qualify for alimentos, the details of the agreement between your father and your grandfather for the home become relevant5: If your father has formally rented the house then your grandfather position is not relevant, as your father has all of the rights6. If your grandfather allows your father to live in the house without paying rent, then it is your grandfather rights as owner against your father rights as an occupant. No idea about the outcome of that situation. UPDATE: You still do not tell about your grandfather stance about the issue, which is important. If your grandfather agrees with your father7 then the only way to stay at home is that of alimentos. What you describe is a situation of either precario or comodato, where your grandfather allows the use of the home without compensation. The differences are: precario is for an undefined time. comodato is for a defined time/use (e.g. for X years). Now, I have to suppose that you are not part of the agreement so it is just between your father and grandfather. That makes it your father's dwelling, and beyond alimentos he cannot be forced to share his dwelling with you. But if this is a situation of precario (which is what most often happens) your grandfather has the "nuclear option"8 of threatening to evict your father, as it is a relatively easy (in the legal sense, not the personal one) procedure. In a situation of comodato your grandfather could not evict your father until the conditions of the cession expire, making threats somewhat weaker. As a final note, and given how specific this answer has become: I am not a lawyer, you have not provided enough specific info, and this is not legal advice. Talk to a lawyer. Maybe a lawyer will check the agreement and it will turn out that your father is paying rent by performing some service, voiding the precario aspect. Maybe with the details provided the lawyer can find a way to an agreement that is more amenable to all. Talk to a lawyer. Shut up. The issue at hand may be stressful, and sometimes it might be tempting to boast to your father about the issues of alimentos or precario. Don't. If there is something to be said about that, let your lawyer do the talking. Try to stay calm. Consider the effect of your actions before taking them. While there is nothing wrong with talking to a lawyer, going beyond that and beginning a legal battle with members of your own family is most of the times an ugly affair. It could easily have an effect for a very long time in your relationship with most of your family, even with those who are not directly implied. Try to stay calm. 1 Literally, "foodstuffs", but when used as a legal term it includes other basic needs. 2 There are some official guidelines but judges seem to have freedom to follow them or not. 3 I believe that there are some exceptional reasons to lose such right before becoming 18 (e.g., sons condemned of attacking their fathers and the like) but I have no specific data about those. 4 As a side note, in Spain last wills do not allow the "donor" to distribute the goods freely, as some porcentajes of the inheritance must obligatory be provided to descendants and widowers. 5 Of course, in the case that your grandfather wanted to oppose your father's decision. 6 Since one of the legal reasons to end a rent agreement is to provide a home for a first degree relative, your grandfather could expel you from your rented home to give it to your father, but not the other way around. 7 And "agree" does not mean "Is happy with the decision" but "Will not go to the court to challenge your father decision". 8 Which is a very relevant analogy, because it could be almost as damaging to your family as a literal nuclear bomb.	I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.	This looks very iffy. It purports to require you to consent unconditionally to medical examination. It further purports to demand unredacted medical examination irrespective of relevance. According to http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/n/9/B11_1.pdf The Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 requires an employer to obtain written consent from a worker before applying to his or her doctor for a medical report. The Act lays down a procedure to be followed and gives workers the right to see the report, to request amendments or to withhold consent to the report being supplied. The relevant provision is available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/28/section/3 While there may be theoretical loopholes to this, an employer would be unwise not to follow the norms laid out above. It would be ethically questionable for a doctor to examine without consent (where a person has that capacity); or to rely on a contract entered into some time ago under different circumstances as evidence for consent. In practice an Occupational Health professional will almost certainly want to protect themselves professionally by establishing genuine informed consent first. The TUC has more guidance on the complexities of this: https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/confidentiality-and-medical-records The contract term may also be unenforceable under GDPR insofar as it is a) processing data reliant on consent which is not freely given and b) processing more sensitive data than is strictly necessary for the task. Now just because you have the right to refuse consent doesn't mean the employer will do nothing about it. The employer might attempt to refuse payment under an occupational sick pay scheme, to which some reasonable additional conditions may be attached, but a) so long as you notify them and get appropriate doctor's notes in the usual way (see https://www.gov.uk/statutory-sick-pay for details) your employment contract cannot invent additional conditions to prevent you receiving Statutory Sick Pay, and b) it is questionable whether submitting to a disclosure arrangement as described would be reasonable. The employer might attempt to discipline or dismiss you for refusing to comply. The reasonableness of this is likely to depend on the existence of exceptional circumstances. There may be cases where there is a statutory duty to monitor for specific exposures which give rise to a refusal to consent being a sufficient reason for dismissal (and I do not know for certain) although the contract wording given does not lead me to expect that this is the case here. In the absence of such a reason, any detriment might lay them open to a claim of victimisation of an employee asserting their rights. If the employer takes any such detrimental action, you would likely need to submit a grievance and be willing to pursue to Tribunal to sort it out. If you are currently being required to submit to an examination under this term, seek advice without delay from your union representative. If you did not have the prior presence of mind to join a union, a solicitor specialising in employment law may be able to give advice (for which you should expect to pay). Having said all that, I notice the term does not specify that the employer may insist on who does the medical examination... I do wonder if you could meet this requirement by simply visiting your own GP, who will presumably be bound by the legislation above (definitely get advice before trying to use this!).	From a legal perspective, I think the ruling is reductio ad absurdum correct. California voters passed Proposition 65. Consequently, CA Health and Safety Code 25249.6 says "No person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual, except as provided in Section 25249.10". Section 25249.8 mandates a list, and defines "known to the state" A chemical is known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity within the meaning of this chapter if in the opinion of the state’s qualified experts it has been clearly shown through scientifically valid testing according to generally accepted principles to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity, or if a body considered to be authoritative by such experts has formally identified it as causing cancer or reproductive toxicity, or if an agency of the state or federal government has formally required it to be labeled or identified as causing cancer or reproductive toxicity. Acrylamide is so listed, and has been for 18 years, reason code listed as "AB-IARC, AB-US EPA". The law does not say that "the benefits may outweigh the risks", nor does the law say anything about usual doses. There is an "escape clause", if one (the defendant) can prove that there is no effect (25249.8(b)): An exposure for which the person responsible can show that the exposure poses no significant risk assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question for substances known to the state to cause cancer, and that the exposure will have no observable effect assuming exposure at one thousand (1000) times the level in question for substances known to the state to cause reproductive toxicity, based on evidence and standards of comparable scientific validity to the evidence and standards which form the scientific basis for the listing of such chemical pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 25249.8. In any action brought to enforce Section 25249.6, the burden of showing that an exposure meets the criteria of this subdivision shall be on the defendant. The answer on Skeptics does not address the EPA finding (and the science underlying it). At this point we can only conjecture about the defense's scientific argument (the ruling is still in the works, pending feedback from parties), but the judge said "While plaintiff offered evidence that consumption of coffee increases the risk of harm to the fetus, to infants, to children and to adults, defendants' medical and epidemiology experts testified that they had no opinion on causation" and that the coffee makers hadn't presented the proper grounds at trial to prevail. Insofar as human subjects testing of suspected carcinogens is illegal, any argument that "but this only shows that it causes cancer in rats" is legally empty: rats are a suitable proxy for humans. This is a state report addressing a potential carcinogen, 4-Methylimidazole. The report notes that to have a No Significant Risk Level finding, the substance must have less than a "daily intake level posing a 10^-5 lifetime risk of cancer". A further requirement is that "risk analysis shall be based on the most sensitive study deemed to be of sufficient quality" (whatever that is). This study mentions a previous study which was rejected because "these studies do not meet the criteria specified in Section 25703(a) because the experiments were not designed to adequately control for and examine the potential carcinogenicity of 4-MEI". Basically, Spiegelhalter's argument is too meta, and doesn't constitute a proof that acrylamide poses no risk of cancer. If the defendants commissioned an independent scientific study to overcome earlier carcinogen findings, perhaps the study failed on technical grounds. The bar that has to be cleared is very high. The EPA regulation says that the maximum contaminant level goal for acrylamide is zero. That is the carcinogen-science basis for specific allowable levels in water supplies.
How is the limit of the Fifth Amendment enforced? What prevents someone from pleading the Fifth Amendment, even if they don't necessarily have something that would incriminate themselves if they answered? Does the opposition have to prove that nothing they say could incriminate themselves to remove the protection? Does the witness have to reveal something to the judge to enforce the protection? Additionally, who knows what random law they might have broken, and might admit to if they testify? Can someone plead the fifth on those grounds?	What prevents someone from pleading the Fifth Amendment, even if they don't necessarily have something that would incriminate themselves if they answered? Immunity. Sometimes prosecutors offer immunity to a witness in exchange for testimony against another defendant. In such cases, the witness cannot claim protection under the fifth amendment because the witness's testimony can no longer incriminate the witness. Does the opposition have to prove that nothing they say could incriminate themselves to remove the protection? No. Proving a negative proposition is generally impossible. Does the witness have to reveal something to the judge to enforce the protection? No, because such a revelation would also tend to incriminate the witness. Additionally, who knows what random law they might have broken, and might admit to if they testify? Can someone plead the fifth on those grounds? Yes. It is not in fact necessary to cite specific grounds for invoking the fifth amendment, because forcing a witness to cite a reason would itself be tantamount to forcing the witness to incriminate him- or herself. Quoting Wikipedia: Truthful statements by an innocent person An incriminating statement includes any statement that tends to increase the danger that the person making the statement will be accused, charged or prosecuted – even if the statement is true, and even if the person is innocent of any crime. Thus, even a person who is innocent of any crime who testifies truthfully can be incriminated by that testimony. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege: protects the innocent as well as the guilty.... one of the Fifth Amendment’s basic functions . . . is to protect innocent men . . . who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances..... truthful responses of an innocent witness, as well as those of a wrongdoer, may provide the government with incriminating evidence from the speaker’s own mouth. (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) (per curiam)) The U.S. Supreme Court has also stated: Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege. (Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (footnote omitted)) (Citations inlined)	In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge.	In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded.	There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.	If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.	You are correct. A judge may only issue a warrant when it is supported by an affidavit, in which the officer seeking the warrant swears under oath to the facts supporting the warrant. Lying on the affidavit would constitute perjury. But judges very frequently just rubber-stamp the warrants without meaningfully reviewing the affidavits, so the primary form of oversight would be the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge asserting that the warrant wasn't supported by probable cause. If a judge does review the warrant application and finds the officer's statements not to be credible, he can refuse to sign the warrant, and he is free to also carry that credibility determination to subsequent warrants sought by the same officer or other officers in his department.	I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.	can you hire a witness as your lawyer to exclude their testimony? That is pure fiction and misleading. Unfortunately scenes like that contribute to keep people ignorant about the law, which then makes it easier for courts to dissimulate their recurrent miscarriage of justice. But Purdue University v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797 (2014) is an example where the Indiana courts did the right thing, and is pertinent to your question. There, Purdue University first assigned an investigator in regard to plaintiff's grievance, and thereafter the University tried to withhold information under pretext that the investigator was also its lawyer and thus that the information was protected by the privilege. Because that person hitherto had been portrayed only as an independent investigator, the Indiana courts concluded that Purdue University was estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege (as well as the work-product doctrine). Thus, the guy in the film or series who said to be "screwed on Kardashian" reflects pure cluelessness about how the law supposedly operates. I have not seen the plot of that film or series, but the information that the friend-lawyer obtained prior to becoming O.J.'s attorney would not be protected by the privilege because it was not obtained in preparation for O.J.'s defense. If there were one star witness on the opposing side and they happened to be a lawyer, could you simply pay them off by hiring them as your lawyer? This question is somewhat unclear to me, but I will mention that lawyers have a duty to disclose to their potential or actual client any conflict of interests. The rules of so-called "professional conduct" discourage lawyers to ignore conflict of interests in that this conflict may impair their "services". And, as I explained previously, any information that a lawyer obtains as witness rather than as attorney in the matter is not protected by the privilege. Thus, as for If you committed a crime at a law-firm and everyone who witnessed it was a lawyer, is there any rule preventing you from just hiring all of them? the answer is: Nothing prevents the criminal from hiring all of them, but that information is not protected.
Can a lawyer file for a divorce 14 years after finalizing the divorce in an other country? I am a Canadian, living in California, divorced my ex-husband in 2003. According to the settlement signed in California, the family home in Canada was transferred to me. At the time of divorce his employer filed an embezzlement case against him and therefore, my ex did not contest the divorce, nor did he want a share of the property. There is a loan he borrowed without my knowledge and the court ordered my ex to pay that loan. He did make some payments and then stopped. I had no choice but take over payments to avoid foreclosure. I then went to family maintenance to collect child & spousal support payment. My ex did not want to make any payments, and filed for a divorce in 2015 in Canada. He also placed liens on my property without revealing to the city that he was ordered by the court to make those loan payments. I obtained another order from family court in California to enforce the 2003 judgement. Can a Canadian court disregard the CA order, when they have no jurisdiction in the case? Is there any legal basis for an attorney to bring such a case in Canada? Is she not legally accountable for bringing such a case to court? I am not a lawyer, but I see no legal ground for a lawyer to bring such a case agains me. It was a huge financial hardship, to hire a lawyer in Canada, to travel so often, not to mention the mental agony I suffered. I sent my ex's lawyer the recent court order; still she hasn't withdrawn the cases she filed on behalf of my ex.	This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.	Nope. Say I sue you successfully, and the court delivers a judgement that awards $1000 in damages. It is not the responsibility of the small claims court to ensure that the judgement is fulfilled. In fact, the debtor (person who lost) can outright refuse to pay the creditor (or the person who won). They are not in violation of any law at this point. However, the creditor can ask the court for options on enforcing their judgement, and these can include, but are not limited to: Garnishing wages Providing a court order Seizure of assets (through court sheriff, don't use this yourself or you end up getting into criminal matters) and others to enforce the judgement. The debtor isn't liable for refusing, unless when they are in violation of a court order. Violating a court order is a criminal matter, and the debtor could possibly be found guilty of contempt of court. Oh, and the case wouldn't move on to a higher court. Cases go to a higher court when an appeal is made, generally when there has been an error in enforcing the law. You also need to be provided leave to make an appeal.	This depends entirely on which law applies to the divorce. For example, if this happens under Australian law then it falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Court (a Federal court as the Commonwealth has power over marriage, not the states). They say: You can agree and not involve the court. If you agree you can, but are not required to, have the court formalise the arrangement. If you cannot agree, then you can apply to the court for financial orders. In general, the court is happy to allow couples to agree on whatever they want - for your example this extends from "Bob gets everything" to "Alice gets everything" and anything in between those extremes. If the parties don't agree (which is the most common situation) then the court will hear the evidence and make a decision: There is no formula used to divide your property. No one can tell you exactly what orders a judicial officer will make. The decision is made after all the evidence is heard and the judicial officer decides what is just and equitable based on the unique facts of your case. Factors the court is required to consider are: working out what you've got and what you owe, that is your assets and debts and what they are worth looking at the direct financial contributions by each party to the marriage or de facto relationship such as wage and salary earnings looking at indirect financial contributions by each party such as gifts and inheritances from families looking at the non-financial contributions to the marriage or de facto relationship such as caring for children and homemaking, and future requirements – a court will take into account things like age, health, financial resources, care of children and ability to earn. So, for your example, the answer to how property will be divided up is: Nobody knows until it is agreed or the court rules on it.	The law regarding proof of service allows service of summons by publication in case a defendant "is not a resident of the state, but has property therein and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action". Plaintiff must file an affidavit saying that he believes that you are not a resident, and he either mailed the summons to you or states that your residence is unknown. Knowing how to contact a person is not exactly the same as knowing their residence, so the statement in the affidavit might be true. There is a one year limit on your right to defend and reopen if not served personally. The statute of limitations tolls after the cause of action has accrued (which I suppose would be defective service of the summons, viz. perjury in the affadavit). For recovery of real property, the time would be ten years. The court rules allow that "At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued". (This is clearly a matter that your attorney needs to address).	A divorce settlement must be approved by the court. A Judge might well refuse to approve a settlement with such a provision in it, although I do not know of any law specifically barring such a term. But once the settlement is final, one party could certainly offer a separate contract to the other, under which one party would agree to remain outside the state (or metropolitan region, or county, or wherever) in return for an agreed recurring payment. There would be no compulsion to accept such a contract, but if the payment offered was large enough, it might be accepted voluntarily. However, if there was a child involved, and such a move would significantly hinder that child's contact with both parents, and this were not in the child's best interest, such a contract might be attacked as against public policy.	This is what we mean when we say something falls between the cracks. Sorry for that. First off, in the United States, family law is not federal, it is individual to each state. This means there is no federal agency or official charged with enforcing family law. When it comes to marriage and divorce, the federal government and their border agents are after those seeking to gain benefit through fraud (i.e., attempting to attain status through fraudulent marriage). Likewise, they don't have formal cross-jurisdictional protocols controlling the right of the US government to demand personal, private family law records from other governments. Nor do they have the means to pursue that. What this means, in practical terms, is that no family law judge sitting in the US has authority, interest or means in international marriage and divorce beyond those cases initiated in their court. I hope you read that slowly and carefully. Ask me if you need clarification. I suspect that you have a very specific cause in mind that necessitates you being in possession of a divorce decree. And I get the impression that you and your ex-spouse are in agreement and working together to solve this. You might find it valuable, at this point, to take a step back a little further into history. Let's consider your marriage. You two know you got married. I suspect that your friends, loved ones, and hopefully family know you got married. Then there is that clerk somewhere in Denmark (who records more than 100 marriages every week) who knows you got married. Theoretically. Possibly. Maybe. You've been residing in Russia for some years now, and the Russian government doesn't know you are married. Marriage is illegal there. So, in actuality the Russian government, if asked by some official of some other government, can only state with truth and authority that it is certain that you are NOT married. At the same time, some US federal official decides to investigate the most highly unlikely case ever. Someone is trying to gain entry, not by claiming marriage but by hiding a marriage. (ridiculous!) So, with a budget of zero, and the authority to match, goes from country to country demanding that they open up the (extremely) private records of family courts in search of the evidence he needs. When they ask him to demonstrate cause, he boldly tells them that his sharp mind is cause enough. They agree and give him cups of tea as he searches through the private affairs of their residents. It is never-ending, but he is proud to be working to stop the flood of unwanted divorced persons trying to gain entry to the USA. - - - - You get the picture. Also, consider the option of an international divorce. I would provide a reference here, but a simple Google search will yield many providers. It is expensive and time-consuming, but an available option. I'd rank it last. There are also varied laws by jurisdiction - internationally. I'm not expert enough to know of any jurisdictions that might not require extended residency. I suspect some won't. I am confident, on the other hand, that there are several that you might access with relative short windows of required residency. This Wikipedia article should give you a good start. You are also maybe a little fast in dismissing Denmark as a possible venue. European Union states, at one time, experienced a tangled mess regarding family law across jurisdictions and specifically divorce. In 2003, however, the EU implemented Regulation 2201/2003 providing for conferred jurisdictional competence by way of exception in cases involving applicants for divorce similarly situated to you. And now jurisprudence, in a wonderful show, is beginning to catch up with regulation and public sentiment on the matter. The provisions seem complicated, but they are definitely outside the abilities of a couple of Russians who have managed to get this far. Here's a starting point to get the ball rolling. Aside from those three solutions, you might be stuck. You would be ill-advised to seek some creative solution outside of the law. And I struggle to think of anything that might work. Unfortunately, justice and law are often connected by a mere thread, and sometimes not at all. You are left to forge ahead on behalf of others, who enjoy the fruits of your labour. For that, you have our gratitude. And while I am no expert on the fight for justice, There is this man - an American, who is. He wasn't gay, so much as black. Be he figured out a lot regarding justice. There are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all." -Martin Luther King Jr. I salute you.	Whoever signed the loan owes the money to the bank for the truck. So, in this case it is probably both your husband and his ex girlfriend. Whoever is listed on the title of the vehicle as the registered owner has the full exclusive use of the vehicle. That is probably your husband. Any person who co-signed for a loan owns nothing and has rights to nothing. Co-signing a loan just means that the signer agrees to pay off the loan. In this case the girlfriend does not, nor has ever owned the vehicle. If payments are not made on the vehicle, the owner of the loan (probably a bank) will repossess the vehicle and take ownership of it. At that point they will become the registered owner. Your main options are: Refinance the car. You take your own loan and buy out your husband and his girlfriend. Both of them and the bank would have to agree to this. You would become the registered owner of the car. Make a set-off agreement. In this case, you offer your husband a deal: you will make the payments on the car, if you get the use of the car and a percentage of the sale price in the event the car is sold. Try to get a judge to award you the car in the divorce. In this scenario, the judge would order that you become the registered owner of the car, but the girlfriend and your husband would still be responsible for paying the loan. The risk here is that both will default on the loan and the car will get repossessed.
Why "it is unlawful for X to do Y" rather than "it is illegal for X to do Y"? It is said that unlawful means "not permitted by law" and illegal means "forbidden by law". However, I cannot recall ever seeing the phrase "it is illegal to ..." when reading legal text. Instead, the phrasing used is "it is unlawful to...". Why does legal text never (or at least very rarely) seem to say that something is illegal rather than merely unlawful? Is there a legal/technical reason, or does it just sound fancier?	I found an example of "is illegal" in RCW 78.52.467: "If the department believes that any oil, gas, or product is illegal...". There are some examples of "shall be illegal", e.g. RCW 39.84.050 "It shall be illegal for a director, officer, agent", where "illegal" is used predicatively. I tenatively conclude than the latter kind of use is less frequent that the adjectival use. Black's Law Dictionary 2nd Pocket ed does not include "illegal" except in some "illegal"+noun constructions, but it does list "unlawful" alone. "Unlawful" has been used since 1387 (J. Trevisa translation of Ranulf Higden Polychronicon), whereas "illegal" only goes back to 1626. Legal language tends to be very conservative, so the fact that "unlawful" got there first (aided no doubt by the fact that it is an Anglo-Saxon construction, not a medieval Latin borrowing) gives the term priority in legal usage. It sounds more legal to say "(un)lawful" that "(il)legal".	"May" means "is possible" and not "is necessary". The specific law does not say anything about a person doing A, B or C and it does not say that if you do one of A, B or C then something mandatorily follows. It asserts that certain types of documentation "can" be used as evidence supporting the proposition that the applicant did not disrupt continuous residence, but it also asserts (without giving any further hints) that other things may be used. This law does not state necessary or sufficient conditions for establishing undisrupted continuous residence. It is not hard to construct a scenario where a person moves back to their home country and ran for public office there, but failed to quit the US job. In light of compelling evidence that they actually moved back home, failure to quite your US job is not proof that you remained in the US. Proof resides in the totality of evidence, not just the admissibility of a single fact. Doing one or more of (A-D) is no guarantee of anything.	Denver lawyer David Lane has said, “The First Amendment lives in a rough neighborhood and if you can’t stand the neighborhood move to China … or somewhere the First Amendment does not exist.” "One man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v. Cali. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) At this point, we need to define illegal as used in your question. For instance, do you mean "you can face any form of punishment"? If so, this question is extremely broad and governed by multiple sets of laws. Additionally, one should note that this is a Federal Question. The First Amendment, through the Due Process clause applies to states as well. Therefore, there will be extremely little discrepancy (if any - first impression issues being the main differences probably) between the States,. The FCC can limit profanity on air. Additionally, Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1464, (Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ) prohibits the utterance of any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication. The USPTO can limit Trademarks with "vulgar" meaning. (See EDIT below for update.) In School: High school student's First Amendment rights were not violated in suspension for uttering obscenity, regardless of whether she was merely repeating and returning words originally directed at her, particularly where words were clearly disruptive as they were heard by 90 students in cafeteria and, in opinion of assistant principal, were “fighting words.” Heller v. Hodgin, S.D.Ind.1996, 928 F.Supp. 789. Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight. Fighting words claim upheld: Arrestee's speech when crowd gathered near fallen tree that had blocked traffic constituted unprotected fighting words, so that his arrest under city disorderly conduct ordinance did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights; arrestee's repeated use of the word “bitch,” his accusation of matricide directed toward his sister, his use of the phrase “fucking queer,” his pushing of third party and his raised voice all tended to show that his conduct, under the circumstances, had tendency to provoke physical altercation. Fighting words claim not upheld: Detainee's profane words to police officer as officer conducted Terry stop, “son of a bitch,” while unpleasant and insulting, were not “fighting words,” given officer's confirmation of fact that words did not cause anyone to fight or become angry; thus, words could not constitute violation of disorderly conduct statute and in turn could not supply probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest. In addition to fighting words, true threats and incitement to imminent lawless action are not protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, the government can regulate free speech in public schools (hence Free Speech Zones) and while in their employ (no yelling at your boss if you want to keep your job). It is not part of the main question, but free speech inside the court room. Well, the Judge is pretty much king in a courtroom. What he says goes. (more or less, like nothing toooooo crazy). In a courtroom, if you do something a Judge doesn't like, he can hold you in contempt of court. (You get no jury for contempt cases.) EDIT: Since I wrote this answer, new law came out from the Supreme Court in Matel v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017). The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Federal Circuit that the disparagement clause [is] facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The decision aptly concludes with: "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered."	The general rule is, anything is allowed unless it is forbidden (and not that you can only do things that are expressly permitted). The logical structure of law may be a bit more challenging than procedural programming logic, since it may require a global knowledge and evaluation of the entire code (typically but not absolutely, the scope of the search for "unless otherwise" conditions is restricted to "in this chapter"). In other words, the law is a set of propositions which must all be true, and unlike actual execution of instructions in a sequence, law is to be interpreted simultaneously but hierarchically (that is: the order in which clauses are written is not significant). The appearance that the law is self-contradictory is largely illusory, though the resolution of the conflict may require a careful reading of the law and knowledge of jurisdictional hierarchy (federal law is superior to state law, which entails a particular resolution of the apparent conflict). Sometimes there are real conflicts, which usually result from using words in conflicting ways (note the practice of re-defining words "in this chapter/section/title"). The reason why law is not a science is that law is normative, not descriptive: it dictates what is allowed (a determination made through the political process), and does not attempt to discover what independently is. The reason why the legal process cannot be implemented in software is that software does not yet correctly interpret natural language, and law is written in natural language following interpretations based on judgments of what choices a reasonable would make. Perhaps if you propose a piece of law that you think is contradictory, it would be possible to show how the contradiction is illusory.	That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.	Is asking police to justify their orders illegal? NO but the manner in which the "asking" is done may be.	Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).	The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.
Can you run a Patreon and collect money on behalf of someone else? Say a guy creates a Patreon for his brother who is a video game designer. A lot of people love his games and he's popular in the community. The guy does not imitate his brother, but instead claims that money donated will be split with him -- however, his brother has no agreement/idea with this. The Patreon owner would not be stealing from his brother per se since the money sent is to be shared with him whether he knows it or not -- and there's no copyright infringement/intellectual property issues/etc. Given these specifics, would it be illegal to collect Patreon money on behalf of another person's work expectancy, regardless of whether they choose to accept or even know of it?	The guy does not imitate his brother, but instead claims that money donated will be split with him -- however, his brother has no agreement/idea with this. That's called Fraud (Wikipedia), "...a deliberate deception to secure unfair or unlawful gain..." and will be recognized as such in almost every legal jurisdiction in the world. At very least, it's against Patreon's Terms of Use: "Fraud - Don’t post information that is false or otherwise misleading. Impersonation - Don’t impersonate anyone. Don’t use another’s account, or allow others to use your account." The way this would not be fraud is to clearly state on Patreon that you are raising money for your brother, and to involve him in the process and have him choose to accept the money before you start to collect it. If he won't accept the money, don't collect it in the first place.	Although you aren't interested in the TOS, you should be. You are not allowed to make any copy of other people's stuff without permission. The TOS is how you get permission. First, the author uploads his material to You Tube, because he has an account and the TOS associated with the account specifies the license that he grants to You Tube and the world – same thing with Stack Exchange. The TOS says (roughly) "when you upload stuff, you give permission for others to access your stuff using the You Tube interface". Content-consumers likewise are allowed to stream content using their interface, but not generally download. (The license terms changes over time – previously there were more license types). Specifically, You are not allowed to: access, reproduce, download, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, alter, modify or otherwise use any part of the Service or any Content except: (a) as expressly authorized by the Service; or (b) with prior written permission from YouTube and, if applicable, the respective rights holders; and they don't expressly authorize ordinary download, you have to use their interface. You might also directly contact the author of the work in question and negotiate a deal where you can directly acquire a license from the rights-owner. But if you want to access the material via You Tube, you have to do it in a way that is permitted, and You Tube says that you're not permitted to download. Any "copying without permission" is infringement.	There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses.	It doesn't work, just like transferring the copyright to a young person to make it last longer doesn't work. In places where the length of copyright depends on the death of someone, it always depends on the death of the author. You can transfer copyright, but you can't change who is the author. If I write a book, and some copyright law says the copyright ends 70 years after the death of the author, then it ends 70 years after my death. It doesn't matter who owns the copyright. PS. That dead person has heirs. If there are no relatives alive, then the government of their country will inherit everything (in most countries, there might be exceptions). Your plan fails for that reason as well. PS. See "Just a guy's" answer for another, completely different, reason why this scheme doesn't work.	Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.	First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not.	Yes That is very simple - copyright is an exclusive right that starts automatically with the creation of a copyrightable work. The default situation is that the author has an exclusive rights to make copies of the work and derivative works. If the code is published somewhere by the author but the author has not said anything about its licence or copyrights, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. They have the right to just publish it somewhere, others don't. If you try to contact the author and they don't say anything and ignore you, then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. If it's impossible to find the author (e.g. I have certain cases with literary works where it's not clear who inherited the rights after the author died), then the default situation applies - you need permission and you don't have it, so it's not legal for you to distribute their copyrighted works. That being said, certain forms of reuse (recreating ideas, learning from them, etc) would not be a copyright violation. But in general the situation with the author not saying anything is almost the same as the author explicitly stating "all rights reserved, you're not allowed to do anything, violators will be shot" - some specific uses are allowed even against author's wishes (e.g. 'fair use' clauses) but everything that needs their permission really does need their explicit permission.	If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract.
Can a person go to jail for murdering a person that killed him before? This is a very hypothetical situation that has a very slim chance of occurring in real life. Suppose a person got murdered. Then, he/she gets revived and comes back to life and takes revenge on the murderer and kills the murderer. Can that person go to jail?	Modern legal systems frown on individual retribution. A victim of a crime is not allowed to punish the perpetrator of the crime; that falls to the state. The answer is therefore yes; the person could be arrested, tried, and punished, including by imprisonment.	These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges.	The life sentences were based on counts 2 and 4, distribution of narcotics by means of the internet and continuing criminal enterprise. In reviewing the sentencing hearing, all of the evidence indicates that the sentence was based on the nature of his acts, and not anything he did after his arrest. There is no way to know if prosecutors would have been amenable to a plea bargain.	It depends on the law For example, the NSW Crimes Act 1900 s18 defines murder and manslaughter: (1) (a) Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person, or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused, or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25 years. (b) Every other punishable homicide shall be taken to be manslaughter. (2) (a) No act or omission which was not malicious, or for which the accused had lawful cause or excuse, shall be within this section. (b) No punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who kills another by misfortune only. It is possible that the acts you describe could be prosecuted as either murder or manslaughter. For murder the prosecutor would need to prove that they are an "act by the accused ... causing the death charged, was done ... with reckless indifference to human life" - the hard part is the causal link. For manslaughter it is clear that the act "was ... malicious" and that there was no "lawful excuse" - some cause and effect would need to be demonstrated still. However, the prosecutor has a more certain option under s31C: 31C Aiding etc suicide ... (2) Where: (a) a person incites or counsels another person to commit suicide, and (b) that other person commits, or attempts to commit, suicide as a consequence of that incitement or counsel, the firstmentioned person shall be liable to imprisonment for 5 years. It is important to look at the legal definition of a crime to determine if a given set of circumstances meets all the required elements.	Is there any state where someone doing this would potentially face manslaughter or murder charges, due to some variant of a 'life starts at conception' anti abortion law? Not really. Those laws are currently unconstitutional. A state could certainly prescribe some criminal punishment in a case like this one, but punishing under existing manslaughter or murder laws would almost surely not be upheld under existing law (subject to change without advanced notice by the U.S. Supreme Court). If someone knowingly and intentionally destroyed an embryo conceived via IVF but not implanted yet what kind of consequences do they face? Is the potential life treated differently or is this just destruction of property? This is a tough question that probably doesn't have a uniform answer under the law of all U.S. states. For one thing, it isn't clear who, if anyone, has property rights in the embryo. It is certainly conceivable that a state might instead conclude that the donor receiving the IVF treatment has only contract rights in it (and breach of a contract is not a crime). It might be viewed as a property destruction case. There might be a specific statute on point. There might be a civil lawsuit remedy. In most states, this would be an issue of first impression and a court would look a competing ways that cases had been handled in other jurisdictions to decide what to do in its case.	Errors in the Question Of course, this is not actually what really happens. What really happens is that the original crime is not tried. It is simply ASSUMED to have taken place and there is a presumption that the original actor was guilty of some crime. Obviously this is incorrect and unjust. This is incorrect. To convict a person of being an accomplice, in either US or UK courts, there must be evidence proving that the crime took place. This an essential element of the crime. It need not be proved who committed the crime as a principal, although there is often evidence about that. But an essential element of the crime of being an accomplice is that the underlying offense is a crime and did occur. Like all other elements of a crime, this must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it would seem that from a theoretical point of view, an accomplice should only be charged and accused once someone else has first been convicted of a crime. Only then should the accomplice be accused of helping that person. That is not the theory that the legislatures of either the US or the UK have adopted. Indeed I do not think that any common-law country has adopted this theory. The law could be changed, and one might argue that it should be. But what the law should be, as opposed to what it is, is not generally on-topic here, as opposed to in politics.SE. Accomplice The LII Definition of "Accomplice" is: A person who knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally gives assistance to another in (or in some cases fails to prevent another from) the commission of a crime. An accomplice is criminally liable to the same extent as the principal. An accomplice, unlike an accessory, is typically present when the crime is committed. Nothing there suggests that the principal must be convicted first. The Wikipedia article "Accomplice" says: An accomplice differs from an accessory in that an accomplice is present at the actual crime, and could be prosecuted even if the main criminal (the principal) is not charged or convicted. An accessory is generally not present at the actual crime, and may be subject to lesser penalties than an accomplice or principal. ... The fairness of the doctrine that the accomplice is still guilty has been subject to much discussion, particularly in cases of capital crimes. Accomplices have been prosecuted for felony murder even if the actual person who committed the murder died at the crime scene or otherwise did not face capital punishment. In jurisdictions based on the common law, the concept of an accomplice has often been heavily modified by statute, or replaced by new concepts entirely. In The Wikipedia article "Accessory (legal term) In the section on "England and Wales it is said: A mens rea {guilty state of mind] is required even when it is not required for the principal offender (for example, when the principal commits a strict liability offence). The defendant must intend to do the acts which he knows will assist or encourage the principal to commit a crime of a certain type. In R v Bainbridge (1960) 1 QB 129 the defendant supplied cutting equipment not knowing exactly what crime was going to be committed, but was convicted because the equipment supplied was not used in the ordinary way, but for a criminal purpose instead. The accomplice must also know of all the essential matters that make the act a crime ... In the section "United States" it is said that: U.S. jurisdictions (that is, the federal government and the various state governments) have come to treat accessories before the fact differently from accessories after the fact. All U.S. jurisdictions have effectively eliminated the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals, either by doing away with the category of "accessory before the fact" entirely or by providing that accessories before the fact are guilty of the same offense as principals. The Model Penal Code's definition of accomplice liability includes those who at common law were called accessories before the fact; under the Model Penal Code, accomplices face the same liability as principals. It is now possible to be convicted as an accessory before the fact even though the principal has not been convicted or (in most jurisdictions) even if the principal was acquitted at an earlier trial.(Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(e) (2d ed. 2003).) 18 U.S. Code § 2 - Principals provides that: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. Note that there is no requirement that a principal be first tried or even identified to convict one who abetted a crime. All accomplices are abettors, although not all abettors are accomplices. The Model Penal Code (MPC) published by the American Law Institute says, in section 2.06 of the code, that: § 2.06. Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity. (1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (a) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or (b) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the Code or by the law defining the offense; or (c) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i) solicits such other person to commit it, or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it, or (iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effort so to do; or (b) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. (4) When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. ... (6) Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) he is a victim of that offense; or (b) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (c) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and (i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or (ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. (7) An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. (Emphasis added) The official commentary on subsection (7) says: Subsection (7) speaks to the relation between the prosecution of the accomplice and the treatment of the person who is alleged to have committed the offense. In accordance with modern developments, this subsection provides that the accomplice can be prosecuted even though the other person has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, has an immunity to prosecution or conviction, or has been acquitted. The MPC was the result of a 10-year review of the laws then existing in the various US states. It was an attempt to rationalize existing laws and provide a consistent framework for criminal law in the US. It was offered to the states for adoption in whole or in part, and several states have adopted significant sections of it, and others have been guided by it in revising their legal codes. Section 2.06 (7) makes it clear that no previous prosecution of a principal is required for prosecution of an accomplice in any state that has adopted the MPC. Effect of the Theory of the Question The question asserts: Therefore, it would seem that from a theoretical point of view, an accomplice should only be charged and accused once someone else has first been convicted of a crime. Only then should the accomplice be accused of helping that person. If courts adopted that as a rule, it would mean that if the principal escaped, or died, no accomplice could be prosecuted. Indeed consider the case of a crime boss, who is often an accomplice to the crimes of his (or her) henchmen. Such a boss would need only to have the actual criminal sent out of the country, or killed, to be quite safe from prosecution under the proposed rule. Hardly an improvement to my eyes. Such a rule would also mean that an accomplice could not be pressured, by means of a threat of prosecution, to disclose the actual criminal, or testify against that criminal. Again, not desirable. Use of UK Law I would add that in my answer to the linked question, sources from several US states were cited, and no UK sources. Indeed UK law does not seem to have been cited in the comments either, but this is a matter on which US and UK law are quite similar.	The double jeopardy clause would prevent you from being retried by the government that tried you for murder (probably a U.S. state). But, you could be tried for fraud and obstruction of justice at the state level, and you could be tried for murder if an appropriate federal offense were located, at the federal level. Often conspiracy to deprive someone of their civil rights is used as a federal offense when there is a state level acquittal, and it isn't impossible to imagine that happening in this case as the victim had a right to the protection of the laws, and the state had a right to enforce the criminal laws, which was deprived in a manner that could be called "under color of state law.'	No. As the defendant's lawyer, they will have been privy to privileged communications. As such, it would be unfair to the defendant if they now started prosecuting. Also note that a victim very rarely has their own lawyer in a criminal case. The prosecution lawyer is acting for "the Crown" (essentially, "society as a whole"). (There are exceptions, if the victim is bringing a private prosecution - but this is very rare for serious cases such as rape).
Is a digital last will and testament on my cloud drive legally binding? For example: Let's say I simply put the signed, digitized document on a cloud drive and inform my executor of how to retrieve it via an email with instructions for safe keeping. Will my Executor have issues enforcing this document or proving its validity with the various states I have investments in and especially when it comes to assigning the guardianship of my children? Reasoning: While we have worked with many law firms over the years for different reasons, it seems silly to pay a legal entity which I can't even be certain will exist when I die, to keep a document that is much safer and more readily accessible by my executor somewhere else. Furthermore, this document will change. I prefer to alter it myself without the hassle of re-filing it with an individual entity in hard-copy. Details of Residency: My residency is in 2 states (OR and AZ) and have investments (also file tax returns) in 5 states.	The general answer is, no, it is not valid in the US, see this article. Exceptions to laws recognizing e-signatures abound which exclude wills from general laws recognizing electronic signatures. Nevada is the one current exception (conveniently located between Oregon and Arizona). There have been attempts to legalize electronic wills, including in Arizona (SB 1298). Although Tennessee does not recognize e-wills, a gentleman in Tennessee went ahead and did it, and in Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830 the court decided that the will was properly executed and witnessed. Electronic notarization is recognized in Arizona, though apparently for things you file with the government (not things that your heirs will eventually file), whereas in Oregon it is a general-purpose way of getting a document notarized. Since the courts are loathe to completely disregard a person's last will and testament because they didn't narrowly follow requirements, you might be able to "get away with it", but it would not make things easier for the executor.	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.	The common law rule was that to inherit you have to outlive the decedent from whom you are inheriting, and that the inheritance would pass to your estate if you died before distribution was made. Statutes in some jurisdictions provide that someone must survive for a longer period than that to be eligible to inherit, often five days, in order to simplify the factual issues in the common situation of a joint accident. Pennsylvania is one such state. But a will or trust can deviate from the default rule, and in U.S. practice, driven by federal estate tax laws, it isn't uncommon to require someone to survive the decedent by at least six months to inherit from them under an instrument. In this case, where more than a year has passed since the death, the inheritance would not lapse for these reasons. It also isn't uncommon for a trust, either established during life, or established at death, to provide that distributions from the trust are made at the discretion of the trustee and to require in those cases that the person receiving the distribution also be living at the time of the distribution. These trusts also typically contain specific provisions that spell out the rights of a beneficiary who dies before the trust is fully distributed.	There are several forms of notarized documents, the most common of which are affidavits (which are written statements of a person made and signed under oath) and acknowledgements (which is a notarized statement that a document was signed before a notary, usually used for documents related to real property). There would be no legitimate reason I can think of to notarize an offer letter, and the fact that you want to do that probably means that you are confused about some other aspect of the law that would make you think that you would want to or need to do something like that. A more common thing to do, for example, in anticipation of a lawsuit, would be to prepare and execute an affidavit which states that the letter, attached as an exhibit, was signed by you, and anyone else that you have personal knowledge signed it, for your signature before a notary. A notary is not allowed to execute an affidavit (or a very similar document called a verification which is a very short document saying that the facts stated in a single document asserting a claim in a court case are true and correct in a form substantially similar to an affidavit) if it is signed outside the notary's physical presence (in theory because the notary administers an oath before you sign it). An acknowledgement can be executed by a notary if the person who signed the document comes before the notary in person and acknowledges that it was signed by him or her, even if the notary was not there when it was actually signed. The notary would state the date that you acknowledged it in person to the notary in the acknowledgement and would not make any statement regarding when it was actually signed. There is special formalized legal language that must accompany each kind of notarization, which is called the "jurat". Then the notary signs and dates the jurat in the appropriate place and applies a notary seal near the jurat in the indicated location (if any) mark "L.S." for "location of seal" in latin.	In germany inheritance tax (Erbschaftsteuer) taxes someone receiving an inheritance (or a gift - they are treated the same). If the heir is (inheritance tax) resident in Germany, German inheritance tax is due in principle on the whole received property, regardless of where that property is. Paid foreign inheritance tax on particular types of property and in accordance with tax treaties can be deducted. (Details: see §21 ErbStG and §121 BewG) Wrt the scenario in the question: if that foreign country collects low/no inheritance tax, the heir gets accordingly low or no deduction from the due German inheritance tax. Whether the "more mobile" property in the question counts as foreign property or not depends on whether the deceased was German resident in the sense of inheritance tax law or not (e.g. moved their residence to the foreign country > 5a before their death), but again, that wouldn't lower the total amount of taxes due, it only shifts who gets them. In order to actually avoid German inheritance tax on the mobile property of the question, the heir would need to move their tax residency away from Germany.	You make spending a night in the house within, say, 3 months of your death, a condition of the bequest In general, while conditions in wills are ethically questionable, there is generally no legal impediment. They are binding unless: it violates the rule of law; it is uncertain or impossible to fulfil; or it is contrary to established public policy. Assuming you own the house in question (and still own it when you die) and the house still exists (e.g. it hasn’t burned down) then the condition would be enforceable. As for your second question: No. See What happens if a person is thought to be dead and their estate is administered, and then they turn up alive? Also, if you actually faked you death, rather than just being missing, you’re going to jail for fraud.	Based on a reply from the Charitable Law Office of Ohio Attorney General: Hello, I am in receipt of your inquiry below. Please be advised that there is nothing to prohibit using electronic storage for your organization’s business documents. Many organizations find this method to be a very effective measure as opposed to retaining hard copies. ... it seems electronic storage is wholly permitted.	First of all, the USA's legal system is not here to be referee to every single little "gotcha" mistake, and every little mistake doesn't mean a payday for someone. The employee at the tax preparer screwed up. They mixed up your folder with the other guy's folder. It was an honest mistake, which is another way of saying "nobody stands to gain from this." The best LEGAL action you can take is to either destroy the copy in your possession, or mail it back to the tax preparer, and call it a good day, done well. The law of torts exists to adjudicate sincere and structural divergences of interests, not to fix silly mistakes. As a point of law, what was the damage of this "event?" Some random person (you) saw a 1099 belonging to someone else. In good faith, you attempt to find and reinstate the rightful owner with their document. All good. As it is, you have zero "standing" in a case of inadvertent clerical error between two other parties.
Job Contract Copyright Waiver I am starting my first full-time job. It is a software job in the UK, I am a citizen of a different EU country. The contract I am about to sign seems very demanding about the rights to intellectual property. I would like to contribute to open source projects and write a blog (unrelated to the company's business) or take photos of nature on trips in my free time but at first look at the contract (below), it seems that everything I do will belong to the Company. Do I understand it correctly? Is this standard and I should just sign it, or should I ask to have the sentence "relevant to the Company's business" included in the first two paragraphs? (This sentence is from the third paragraph which, however, seems to be concerned only with "inventions".) The laws mentioned in the contract are https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/37 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents Copyright, Inventions and Patents All records, documents, papers (including copies and summaries thereof) and other copyright protected works made or acquired by you in the course of your employment shall, together with all the worldwide copyright and design rights in all such works, be and at all times remain the absolute property of the Company. You hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waive all rights granted by Chapter 1V or Part 1 of the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988 that vest in you (whether before, on or after the date thereof) in connection with your authorship of any copyright works in the course of your employment with the Company, wherever in the world enforceable, including without limitation the right to be identified as the author of any such works and the right not to have any such works subjected to derogatory treatment. You and the Company acknowledge the provisions of Sections 39 to 42 of the Patents Act 1977 ("the Act") relating to the ownership of employees' inventions and the compensations of employees for certain inventions respectively. If, during the course of your Employment, you make any inventions relevant to the Company's business that do not belong to the Company under the Act, you agree that, if required, you will forthwith license or assign (as determined by the Company) to the Company all documents and other materials relating to them. The Company will pay you to such compensation for the license or assignment as the Company will determine in its absolute discretion, subject to Section 40 of the Act.	Basically, "in the course of your employment" means "while you are working, or should be working, for the employer". If you're not using company resources or time to create or acquire the works in question, and the works are unrelated to company business, they're quite unlikely to become the company's property. (Particularly since the company almost certainly doesn't have an interest in controlling the distribution of your vacation photos.) When you let your personal side projects and the company's stuff get intertwined, that's where the troubles begin. Works made on company time, or using company resources, or to do company-related things, may be claimed by the company, and this agreement basically says you'll cede ownership of the works to them, patents and all, for whatever amount of money they decide it's worth paying you.	Yes, you do. But you should not base your claim primarily on copyright, but just on the license contract you agreed to. It's typically much easier to prove that a party did not fulfill its part of a sales contract (here: Pay the agreed amount) than to prove violation of a copyright you own. Also, you then only need to sue one guy, and not care about every platform your game might be hosted on. This is particularly difficult here, since they have not done anything wrong. It's not their fault that the publisher didn't properly pay the programmer. They (very likely) got their copy of the game legally. For details, you should consult a lawyer. We can't give you detailed legal advice.	Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for "original works of authorship". (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole "an original work of authorship". Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.	Assuming none of these terms are defined elsewhere in the contract: A third party is a party (a person or company) that is neither you nor the other party to the contract (here, presumably the company that hired you). Since GitHub is neither you nor the company, it would therefore be a third party, and thus it would in fact violate that contract as written to upload the company's code there. Keep in mind that GitHub is not an autonomous system with no humans involved; it's run by a company of people, many of whom could theoretically access the code in private repositories. That said, from a practical standpoint, most companies aren't going to fire someone for a mistake made in good faith, especially if actual disclosure to any humans is rather unlikely. However, do remember that we don't know the company's rules, what training you may have received, what exactly you uploaded, or what regulatory/contractual rules they must comply with. Any of that could affect their decision-making, so you should take this as a general answer and use your own judgement when applying it to your situation.	Am I contractually obligated to follow that old handbook? Yes. Consider this: your employer gave you a copy of the handbook saying, "here is a copy of the staff handbook." Because of this, you know that the document in question is the staff handbook of your company, regardless of the fact that it bears an old name, and that the policies it expresses are part of the terms of your employment contract. If you were truly concerned that the document in question had no validity as the staff handbook, you perhaps should have expressed that concern by telling the person giving you the document that they appear to have given you the wrong document, because it bears a different name. By not doing this, you accept the terms in the document. On the other hand, if you do do that, you'll just irritate the people who have to produce a rebranded staff handbook so they can give you a copy.	There is a general common law doctrine of contract interpretation which tells us that ambiguities are construed against the drafter. In your case, had the employer intended to require two years of work (or else reimbursement back to them) they could have explicitly stated this. The fact is, the contract is written as it is for a reason, likely to entice you to accept the offer of employment. They softballed the requirements to get you to take the job and now they are trying to play hardball. I would hope that a court would find this and tell the employer to think about these clauses next time. The fact is, after a deal goes south is a bad time for an employer to start explaining what these terms mean. You have fulfilled your half of the bargain. If the facts are as you say they are then you satisfied the "best of my ability" condition. Another problem you might have is if the employer does not take you to court but instead continues to make threats, maybe sends a collections agency after you. In that case you will need to get an injunction to stop the employer. In other words, get a court to state that you do not owe them any money and enjoin them from continuing to as if you do. EDIT: as a commenter mentioned, a contract may explicitly provide that ambiguous terms will not be construed against either party.	Provided you are in one of the 170+ countries signatory to the Berne Convention (the current 10 non-signatories are, exhaustively: Eritrea, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan), then copyright comes into existence at the moment a work is fixed in a tangible medium, not when it is published. The initial copyright owner is the author of the work. In cases of employment, the "author" might be the natural person who authored the work, or the corporate person who employed the natural author. To clarify your thinking about registration: copyright registration is a public record of authorship (or copyright ownership). Registration does not create a copyright, but is merely a recording of the copyright that was automatically created at the moment of original authorship. Depending on circumstances and jurisdiction, Alan might have a legitimate claim to copyright on his own work. However, he will be quite hard-pressed to find a convincing theory of law that allows him to publish the unpublished copyrighted work of other people without their permission. This leaves him either to admit defeat -- he cannot possibly own the copyright of his coworkers' code, so he cannot have legally reproduced it -- or else make the baldfaced lie that the code has no other authors other than Alan himself. For your company to disprove such a claim, you may employ sworn testimony of your coworkers, you may employ code analysis to show differing coding styles (suggestive of multiple authors), or you may show code backups or version control history showing the progressive authorship of the work over time by many people. (Sure, a Git history is possible to fake, but a realistic history with feature branches, "whoops, undid the typo in the last commit" messages, etc. would lend significant weight to your company being the original authors.)	Impressum Requirement Wow, based on your citations, you've done a lot of research on this topic. I'm just going to add one more reference, which is from the same site as your first German citation and has incredibly detailed and judicially referenced information on almost everything related to the Impressum. All my non-GitHub links are to sections of that page. Based on your research, I'm going to take it for granted that you understand that according to the Telemediengesetz (TMG), an Impressum is required on a web page if it is "business-like" (geschäftsmäßig), or if it helps, I prefer to word it as "potentially commercial." I would have to argue that open source projects have to be seen as inherently "business-like" for the purposes of the TMG for two reasons: Some other legal person may have similar software as part of their business and might have the need to serve legal notifications to the owner of a GitHub project (TMG § 8 gives competitors the right to sue). Think potential copyright violations here. It is possible to build a more traditional commercial business around open source, for example what Canonical is doing around Ubuntu. Additionally, the common legal advice is to even include an Impressum on a personal blog, though I'm not aware of any court case having occurred at that level yet. In my opinion, a GitHub account can be seen as more "business-like" than a personal blog, and would follow that advice out of caution. I'll note that the XING situation you bring up is complicated. It centers over whether the content of XING pages is "business-like" according to the TMG. It may well turn out that some pages will need an Impressum and others won't. As for placing it in the project's readme.md, that might work but I have two concerns: The courts have essentially stated that the text of the link must imply that the required information under TMG § 5 is located there. For example, the words Impressum and Kontakt work, but the word Information does not. To me, "readme" is not sufficient, but this concern might be negated by the fact GitHub by default renders the readme.md directly on the project home page. While it has been ruled that the Impressum does not necessarily have to be directly on the home page (for GitHub, that would be the company's/users profile page), it must still be readily available in an intuitive location. I don't know if putting it in a project page satisfies the legal requirement. If it was sufficient, it's also likely that each project would have to have an Impressum so that it can't be missed. Examples The dominant pattern that I could find1 on GitHub is an off-site link to the Impressum contained in the profile page's byline right underneath the title. Examples: https://github.com/sedadigital, https://github.com/comsysto, https://github.com/znes, https://github.com/eSagu, https://github.com/TIBHannover. I'm almost certain this meets or exceeds the legal requirements. Example screenshot: Additionally, I found a few that had a repository specifically for an Impressum. Example: https://github.com/johsteffens. Since these repositories were clearly visible on the user's main page (either because there weren't enough repositories to make them span multiple pages, or because it was specifically pinned to the main page), I would argue these also meet the legal requirement for being readily available. While I didn't find any examples of it, another possibility would be to combine the above two approaches, having a link in the byline that links to an Impressum repository or some other page within GitHub. This would be useful if you didn't otherwise have an Impressum hosted elsewhere. There were also scattered examples of people placing an Impressum on a project wiki page or on an impressum.md file at the top level. However, none of the users I looked at were consistent in doing this across all their projects. Also as previously mentioned, it's questionable whether not having it on the main user profile page meets the legal requirement. The Wiki page in particular I don't think meets the requirement that it can easily be found. Found using the following Google search: site:github.com impressum -impressum.php -impressum.html -impressum.jsp -impressum-manager -github.io -issue. Exclusions meant to filter out a lot of false positives, mostly projects for websites that had their Impressum in code format meant for deploy and not for display on GitHub itself.
If I have a lease, do I have to live there? This is stupid but I am debating with my mom. I have a lease in an NYC apartment. In the building there are security cameras in the hallways. For some reason she thinks that you have to go home and sleep there for at least half the year, otherwise the landlord can kick you out. She thinks that someone is checking the cameras to track if people are walking in and out of my apartment. On the other hand, I think that is total BS. I suspect no one is staring at the cameras, and even if there is, it's a 3rd party security company that only watches it if a crime happens. I believe that as long as I don't claim another residence as my primary residence, I can travel abroad for a year and come back and nothing would be at risk. Who is correct?	Two factors are relevant. First, the language of the lease sometimes contains an abandonment clause that makes vacancy a default under the lease. This is common in a commercial lease, as vacancies can undermine the apparent viability of a strip mall or mall, but these provisions are less common in residential leases where the rent is current. Second, since this in New York City, there is an issue of rent-control. Rent-control benefits are available only for residential leases, and if you do not live there for long enough, it could be reclassified as a pied-a-terre and cease to qualify as a rent-controlled apartment. If your apartment is not a rent-controlled apartment, this isn't a concern, but if it is, further research related to continued qualification as a rent-controlled apartment in New York City is necessary.	Sure, you can sue; but who are you going to sue? You have to prove someone knew about the fact that one condo resident was going to be paying for the other condo's hot water. Mixed up plumbing and electrical systems are fairly common in apartment and condo complexes, especially ones that have been converted. Chances are high it's a mistake and was not done on purpose. If you can find the original general contractor, he's going to say it wasn't him, talk to the plumbing contractor. Who will say I didn't do it, and my work is only guaranteed for five years, so talk to the plumbing inspector. He'll say he didn't see it, and besides, all those inspection records were thrown out ten years ago. The condo association may or may not have had oversight of the construction. Can you prove the neighbor knew about it and didn't tell the condo association? Can you prove the realtor who your dad bought through knew about it? Was there a home/condo inspection done - paid for by your dad or the seller - before the sale that might have spotted it? The police aren't going to care; technically, it is a crime, in a way, but it's not like someone tapped into someone's cable TV or electrical power meter last week. This is a problem from years ago, more than likely from the original construction; so who is really responsible? The police aren't going to run that down. And, what are the damages? A few months of part of a power bill? Is it really worth a lawsuit and a lawyer? Against who? I can't see a lawyer jumping into it. If you want to do something for whatever comes next, yes, collect evidence. Tell the neighbor he/she's on your hot water. Take photos and get a licensed plumber to take a look at it and give you an estimate for separating the water systems. That will document that the two systems are not separate. (Either call your own plumber or ask the condo association for the name of someone). Then, start with the condo association. They may be responsible for the inspections before the sale. At very least, the condo association may have to check off on the repairs. And, they may know more about it (oh, yes, we've heard about that in a few other condos...) You could bring it to everyone's attention at a meeting; it may be a common issue in the complex, and other residents may not know about it. If, in fact, the neighbor doesn't have their own water heater, they may be more on the hook for expensive repairs than your dad. They may have more of a case against the condo association than your dad.	Am I at fault? Can I get my security deposit back from Landlord? The landlord is wrong, and he should reimburse you the totality of the security deposit. Clauses #1 and #16 would entitle the landlord to deduct from your security deposit only the portion of the 7-day period that is not already covered in the payment you made for 1st week's rent, which according to clause #1 starts on Sunday July 29. If I understand correctly, you signed the contract (and paid) on July 27, and then gave your 7-day notice on July 28. Since you paid an additional amount for Saturday July 28, then your 1st week's rent payment actually covers the entire 7-day period of your notice. Therefore, the landlord should reimburse you the entire security deposit. The contract nowhere indicates that the count of [post-notice] 7 days starts after the current rent-week elapses. But even if it did contain language in that sense, the dates you mention render that hypothetical clause void. Lastly, clause #16 refers to giving a written notice, which is what you did by sending him the text he obviously read and understood. Therefore, his statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out" clearly is false. What should I do? If the landlord insists to retain the security deposit, your option is to file a complaint in Small Claims court (I don't know whether this has a different name in PA). Depending on PA procedural law, you and the landlord might be cited for mediation prior to being assigned a court date. A process in small claims court is pretty straight-forward, but only you can determine whether the hassle of attending mediation and court hearing is worth. If anything, it (1) certainly gives you some [minimal] exposure to litigation, and (2) teaches the landlord to abide by the very rules he drafted in the contract. 8/30/2018: Edited to address OP's follow-up question of whether section 250.512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act precludes recovery of security deposit (see comments) After analyzing the statute you found, Pennsylvania courts have still held that a tenant's failure to provide a new address does not preclude recovery of the security deposit. See Adamsky v. Picknick, 412 Pa.Super.Ct. 544, 549 (1992): we find the lack of notice argument is tenuous at best since appellant's reason for withholding the deposit was not because he did not have appellees' new address, rather, he withheld it because he maintained there were damages for which he should be compensated. That conclusion is squarely applicable to your situation. The landlord's only pretext for withholding your deposit is his inaccurate statement that "you did not provide proper notice of moving out", and for that matter he refers to nothing else than the rental agreement. The rental agreement nowhere requires you to provide your new address. One decision that does not constitute legal precedent but still might help persuading Small Claims court in your situation is Back v. Taylor, 19 D. & C. 3d 606, 609 (1980). After citing section 250.512(e) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, the court states: That section sets forth certain guidelines as to when tenants can obtain double recovery. Defendants have only sought recovery of the deposit and therefore, the above cited section does not apply. (emphasis in original) Unless you were pursuing double recovery (see item (c) of the statute), it would be very questionable --to say the least-- why a [Small Claims] court should decide your dispute any differently than in Back. Another non-precedential decision analyzing the same statute is Shoemaker v. Henry, 35 D. & C. 206, 209 (1984). Also in the context of double damages, the court stated: We cannot believe the only purpose [to require a tenant to provide his new address] was a negative one, that is, to cancel a right to double damages for failure to comply. A more rational explanation is that its purpose was to provide a landlord with an address to which the damage list could be sent. (brackets added) The statute apparently was enacted well before the prevalence of electronic communications. If your landlord has any way to send you a "damage list" (as it seems to be the case insofar as he replied to your text), then the rationale in Shoemaker should apply in your situation. If you are not even pursuing double recovery, then it would be unavailing for the landlord to cling to the language in item (e) of that statute. Therefore, you are definitely entitled to your deposit even if you did not provide to the landlord a new address. It is up to you whether you want to go for double damages, in which case the decision in Shoemaker might or might not be persuasive in Small Claims court. Beyond that, the Adamsky opinion constitutes legal precedent which favors your position.	Being Evicted Is Not A Crime It is not a crime to be evicted. So, you will not get a criminal record if you fail to pay your rent and are evicted. Failing to pay rent is merely a breach of contract, and eviction is a remedy for this breach of contract. Damage To Your Credit Rating Being evicted will absolutely hurt your credit rating, however. In the U.S., a bad credit rating can be considered by prospective employers and for many other purposes (e.g. as grounds to charge you higher insurance premiums, or to refuse to rent property to you, or to refuse to extend you credit). I am not familiar with all of the purposes for which a credit rating may be legally used in the U.K. and that would probably need to be the subject of a separate question in any case. At a minimum, a bad credit rating makes it harder to get loans in the future. For example, an eviction could result in your application for a mortgage when you want to buy a house being denied, or could cause you to pay a much higher interest rate on a car loan. Other Negative Consequences Of An Eviction There are other negative consequences of being evicted in addition to harm to your credit rating, which may seem obvious but also bear mentioning. These consequences are all very good reasons to voluntarily leave the premises from which your landlord is trying to evict you and to move to a new residence of some kind before a court order evicting you is carried out if it is at all possible to do so. Homelessness First, if you don't have a place to live immediately, when you are evicted, you become homeless and being homeless is not a good thing. The U.K. has a decent safety net, so eventually you may be able to find public housing if you are evicted, but that often doesn't happen immediately, and in the meantime, you are literally on the street. Even if you can't find any place else that you can afford to rent, you can try to find friends and family that can take you in temporarily, attempt to locate places you can legally camp for a while, and can save up enough money to pay for a motel for a few days at least while you are looking for alternative places to live. Your Stuff Is Tossed On The Street Second, if your stuff is in the property you are being evicted from, then when you are evicted, your stuff will be tossed out on the street and in all likelihood it will be damaged or stolen or otherwise lost. Among the things that can be lost or damaged in an eviction are documents that you need which are hard to replace like birth certificates, passports, professional licenses, college applications, report cards for children, health records, financial records, family photos, immigration documents, etc. Even if you can't afford to rent a new place, you can avoid this harm to your property by putting as much of it as you can in a storage unit. At a minimum, try to find some place (maybe friends or family or work) where you can store your most valuable property before you are evicted. Lost Security Deposits And Money Damages Third, if you are evicted, you will almost certainly lose your security deposit and will probably also have a money judgment entered against you by the landlord for any amounts owed to the landlord for damage to the property, back rent, late fees, interest, lost rent while the property is rerented, attorneys' fees, court costs, etc. to the extent that it exceeds the security deposit which it usually will. This money judgment will further hurt your credit rating and could cause your wages and bank accounts to be garnished and your cars and/or other personal property to be seized to collect this debt. Usually people are evicted because they can't afford to pay rent, so there are limits to what you can do to prevent this, but at a minimum, try not to damage the premises which can result in additional amounts owed. Disruption Of Postal Service Fourth, until you can get change of address arrangements made, you will not receive any postal service, including bills you owe on loans and credit cards (or even worse, demands to respond to small claims court lawsuits up to 100,000 pounds). Failing to pay these bills or to respond to notices can lead to more damage to your credit, late payment penalties, default judgments in court cases, and other problems like disrupted efforts to apply to universities or to meet requirements to obtain scholarships. You can avoid this by obtaining a post office box and redirecting your mail there before you vacate the premises.	You can always politely ask a person to leave, which could solve your problem. If that doesn't work, you will have to take legal action: you cannot change the locks or force him out (without the risk of a costly lawsuit). In Washington this would probably be the slower ejectment process, since you are not in a landlord-tenant relation. The actual process depends on the laws of your jurisdiction, though it is doable in any US jurisdiction. You probably have to hire an attorney to navigate the process, since an unlawful detainer action would likely be dismissed (that is, you have to file the correct action, not just some action that's in the ballpark).	user662852 has a good point -- whoever own the property has the right to make the rules. Is the property, land+construction in fact your's or does it belong to the HOA who just grant you access as a lease holder? Different states has different rules, but in my state it is illegal to maroon a property and there must be a access to public streets even when this necessitate passing over somebody else land. However that is irrelevant if the HOA owns the land your house is build on. I think you will have to look at your HOA agreement and see what it says.	It is the terms of the lease that govern what you may and may not do, so if pets are not disallowed, they are allowed. You are not a party to the contract between the landlord and the agent, so whatever the landlord may have told the agent is technically irrelevant to you. However, this may be an indication that the landlord plans to change policy; it might also mean that the agent misunderstood something. That is where you stand legally.	In any legal dealing, there is always some risk. The signature constitutes definitive proof that you have a contract, but you still have a contract, because you have mutual acceptance. A far-fetched scenario is that the lessor could allege that they did not agree to the terms of he contract with you (perhaps claiming that you obtained a blank contract form from them and filled in details, but they didn't agree to those details). However, if they allow you to move in, that is sufficient constructive evidence of a contract, so they could not argue "We didn't agree to this". The main risk would be your lack of proof that they ever agreed to lease the place to you (no emails, no texts, no witnesses, no legally-recorded conversations). There may be specific state laws about providing a copy of the rental agreement, such as this California law, where they must provide a copy to the tenant within 15 days of execution by the tenant. This provides a collection of relevant state laws, though you may have to dig a bit because this is a hook into all of the laws about leases and not just about providing copies.
Can I take legal action in Colorado against a car dealership that has yet to deliver owed items to me? I ordered a vehicle from a dealership in July of 2017. The vehicle was delivered to me approximately six weeks later and did not match the build I had requested. Investigation with the dealership revealed that the salesperson had submitted the correct build information to her manager for order, which was subsequently entered into the manufacturer's order system incorrectly. Upon finding this out, I opted not to purchase the vehicle. The sales manager who entered the incorrect order did not want me to walk away from the sale and offered to order, paint, and assemble the parts needed to make the build correct. I agreed to this offer and my sale contract states that I am owed these items from the dealership. Fast forward almost four months, I've still not yet received the parts owed to me. Voluntary communication from the dealership has been non-existent, and responses to my inquiries have been intermittent and lackluster at best. As of now, the dealership's claim to the status of the parts is that they were received (after roughly three months), assembled, and painted the wrong color by a third-party paint shop due to a "transposed paint code." I was told by the parts manager that they would be ordering new parts, ensuring they would be painted the correct color the second time around. According to the new delivery date given to me, the parts are about a week overdue and I have not been able to get in touch with anyone for a status update. As the title asks, is there any legal action I can take against the dealership to enforce their compliance with our contractual agreement? Is there a reasonable timeline that they must deliver within if a date is not specified in the contract?	is there any legal action I can take against the dealership to enforce their compliance with our contractual agreement? Yes, you can sue for breach of contract. You would probably seek an order for specific performance. You could also claim damages but it is difficult to see exactly what damage you have suffered. Is there a reasonable timeline that they must deliver within if a date is not specified in the contract? Yes, where a contract is silent on a date for performance of an obligation they must be carried out in a reasonable time. From the circumstances 4 months is starting to seem unreasonable but they will no doubt argue that it is reasonable- this is something the court would decide.	Threatening to report the uninsured driver to avoid payment would be blackmail and illegal / criminal. As a result, they are not going to do this. Reporting the uninsured driver on the other hand is their civic duty. So they can get your friend into trouble, but they can't get around paying. Is your friend insured now? If not, tell him to get insured IMMEDIATELY. And if they are very lucky, the other company doesn't figure out your friend was uninsured, and they get away with it when they make a claim. Alternatively, tell them to figure out how much the damage is, how much the repair will cost, and whether it is worth taking the risk.	Do I have recourse against seller? Is the seller liable or obligated to disclose this and if so what are my options? Probably not. The general rule is that you accept any condition which could be discovered with reasonable inspection. When "At the time of sale I waived inspection and did As-Is" you are greatly limiting your claims. If the seller believe that the work done fixed the problem, you probably have no remedy. It could be that the seller made a false representation in the disclosure (you'd have to look at the exact language) but even then proving it with only the kind of circumstantial evidence provided would be very challenging. In particular, as a practical matter, it isn't really economic to sue in a $10,000 non-disclosure case without open and shut clarity of fault, as opposed to some suggestive but ultimately inconclusive indicators. You could always ask and state the case in a demand letter, but if you came to me as a potential client, I wouldn't take your case because the high cost combined with the low likelihood of success would make it unlikely that an attorney could bring the case in a way that would generate net value to the client.	tl;dr: No, the dealership generally won't be able to recover the car if its act of parting with the car involved "entrusting" it to someone. That said, it can pursue Doe for fraud. U.S. Background First off, when the dealership gets swindled the situation is distinctly different from one where the car is stolen from the dealership. If stolen, we'd expect the dealership to be able to recover the car, as in O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 83 N.J. 478 (1980). If swindled, we'd expect the dealership to be out of luck, as in Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232 (N.Y. 1917). Why the different result? It comes down to the idea that when the car gets moved on to an unsuspecting buyer, either the innocent buyer or the dealership is going to get hurt by the bad act. This is because only one party (buyer or dealer) is going to get to keep the car, and the other is going to be upset. The court has to essentially choose who is going to get hurt. The way it does this is by looking at how the car left the dealer's lot. In cases of swindling, the dealer at least had some say in the matter: it "entrusted" the car to the swindler by what's called a "voidable" title. This is enshrined in the UCC: § 2-403. Power to Transfer; Good Faith Purchase of Goods; "Entrusting". (1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. (2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyerin ordinary course of business. (3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goodshave been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law. There's an old saying: "title, like a stream, only rises as high as its source." In the case of a theft, the thief didn't have title in the first place and thus can't transfer it. So we'd expect the dealer to get the car back (buyer gets hurt) In your case, the swindler's bogus check falls under UCC §2-403(1)(b). Thus the swindler gets a voidable title and then has the power to transfer the car to an unsuspecting buyer. So we'd expect the buyer to keep the car (dealer gets hurt). Note: the title is "voidable" because, if the dealer realizes the check is dishonored, it can void the title.	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.	Bob can certainly "engage" a personal injury lawyer, but it is highly unlikely that they would take the case... Let's take a look at the facts... In Texas, you are required to register every vehicle unless it is damaged beyond repair or destroyed (it's intended to be scrapped). Bob did not do this In Texas, every registered vehicle must be insured, at a minimum, for liability insurance. Bob did not do this But, because of the insurance requirement you can get the information from TxDOT about the other vehicle's registration and insurance. It's more likely than not that the other vehicle is also uninsured, but if it is, Bob should contact Ted's insurance company. Because Bob did not register or insure the car that was parked on the street, Bob assumed liability that the insurance company would typically cover. If Bob had properly insured the vehicle, including uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage (which must be declined in writing in Texas), Bob would be whole (minus the deductible). Bob's total liability should be the deductible on the vehicle. Another not-small contributing factor is that this is a self-proclaimed "project vehicle", meaning it has low current value despite a possible high future value. Without insurance, the entire liability would amount to the actual current value of the vehicle, the amount it would take to buy another in exactly the same condition. Now back to the PI lawyer, they make money by suing insurance companies for personal injury (damage to your car is not a "personal injury") because they have the ability to pay. Private individuals, especially those without insurance, typically do not have the ability to pay. The PI can typically recover all the attorneys fees + up to half the judgement. So even if the PI agreed to take the case, and they won some amount (let's say $50,000 which includes attorneys fees and judgement), Ted would probably not be able to pay for this. The PI goes back to the client for the fees and now Bob is in even worse condition, since a majority of the $50,000 judgement would be attorneys fees. Really the best remedy Bob has in this case is to sue Ted in small claims for the value of the vehicle up to the maximum of the court (in Texas, this is a generous $20,000). Small claims courts have a lower burden of proof and Bob can use Alan as a witness.	Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.	That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.
How far does Japanese censorship law go? Japan has some really strange censorship laws, where porn or other pornographic material needs to be censored at all times. However, there are uncensored versions of Black Bible available. Apparantly, it's because the original studio licensed it to an American distributor, who in turn could release it outside of Japan uncensored. This leads to the question: is the actual creation of porn and pornographic material legal as long as it's not distributed? The original creators had to draw the genitalia themselves before they blurred it after all. I'm just curious to know how that works. Does that mean Japanese studios are fine as long as they don't release their stuff uncensored in Japan? Let's say I wanted to hire a Japanese studio to create a hentai for me (cause I'm super rich and I can do that, apparantly), would they get in trouble for it, even though they themselves wont release it in Japan (and neither will I)?	The relevant law, Article 175 of the Criminal Code, says A person who distributes, sells or displays in public an obscene document, drawing or other objects shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 2 years, a fine of not more than 2,500,000 yen or a petty fine. The same shall apply to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of sale. Hence production is not illegal.	It depends In the united-states "Pedophilia" is not a legal term for the prohibited content. The relevant legal term is "child pornography" The US DOJ offers a useful "Citizen's Guide To U.S. Federal Law On Child Pornography" which mentions key federal laws on the topic, including: 18 USC §2251 18 USC §2251 (Sexual exploitation of children) prohibits having a minor (person under 18) engage in sexual activity "for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct" So if a drawing is modeled from an actual child who engaged in sexual activity, it is illegal under 18 USC §2251. That section also makes it illegal for a parent, guardian, or custodian to permit such sexual activity and the making of a depiction of it. It also prohibits the advertising and distribution of any such depiction. All offenses under 18 USC §2251 involve an actual child at some point. 18 USC §2252 18 USC §2252 (Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors) makes it a crime when someone knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; under certain circumstances, mostly involving intestate or foreign transmission or distribution. The same section also makes it a crime when a person: knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction... if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct; So again to be covered under 2252 an actual child must have engaged in sexual conduct at some point, but a drawing modeled on such a child would be covered under this section. 18 USC §2252A 18 USC §2252a (Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography) makes it a crime if anyone: knowingly mails, or transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any child pornography knowingly receives or distributes any child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce ... [or] any material that contains child pornography [that has been similarly mailed shipped or transported] or who possesses such child porn. This section does not define "child pornography" but 18 USC §2256 (8) defines it as: any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; It would appear that under this section an image that "appears to" be a depiction of an actual minor engaged in sexual acts or is advertised as such may count as "child pornography" and thus be criminal. Whether this can apply to a wholly fictional character not based on any real child is not clearly stated in the law. I don't find any reported conviction involving an invented child character under this section. However in United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) aff ’d, 09-3935 WL 677398 (2011), the US 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that an image created by combining the image of the face of an actual child with the body of an adult in a sexual situation was child porn under this section. That case involved computer morphing to in effect paste photos of the heads or faces of children onto the bodies of adults engaged in sex, but a combination done by an artist's skill would presumably face the same ruling, if the child was recognizable. 18 USC §2260 18 USC §2260 makes it a crime if anyone outside the US has a minor engage in sexually explicit activities in order to make a visual depiction of such activities, and imports that depiction into the US, or who participates in the import or attempted import of such a depiction into the US. 18 USC § 1466A 18 USC § 1466A (Obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children) makes it a crime when anyone knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and is obscene; or depicts an image that is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse ... lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Simple possession of such a visual depiction is also a crime under this section. In United States v. Whorley No. 06-4288. (2008) the 4th circuit Court of Appeals wrote: Counts 1-20 [of the indictment] charged Whorley with using a computer on March 30, 2004, to knowingly receive obscene cartoons in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462. The 20 cartoons forming the basis of those counts showed prepubescent children engaging in graphic sexual acts with adults. ... We also reject his arguments that ... cartoons depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct must depict real-life minors to violate § 1466A(a)(1). ... The clear language of § 1466A(a)(1) and § 1466A(c) is sufficiently broad to prohibit receipt of obscene cartoons ... The Supreme Court declined to review Whorley Leaving this holding in place. First Amendment issues In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) the US Supreme Court held that obscene content, which it defined by a 3-part test somewhat looser than the previous test in Roth, was not protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under 18 USC § 1466A have no first amendment issues, because only obscene visual depictions are prohibited under that section. in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) the Court held that child pornography was not protected by the first amendment. However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) the Court limited this to visual depictions of actual children that are produced by the abuse of such children, and found that depictions of fictional children that are not obscene under Miller are protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, §2260 and related sections of 18 USC have no first amendment issues, because all of these are limited to the depictions of actual minors. Some of these sections, however, also criminalize possession or distribution of images that "appear to be" minors, or are advertised as being of minors. Prosecutions under those provisions for images that do not in fact depict any actual child and are not obscene might be barred by the US first amendment. I have not found any reported case in which such a claim has been raised and decided, one way or the other. Conclusion "Cub art" as described in the question will not be protected under the US first amendment simply because it is a drawing rather than a photograph. A drawing which recognizably represents an actual child engaged in explicit sexual activity will probably trigger prosecution under one or more of §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, or §2260. Even if the child was not actually abused, using the recognizable image of an actual child can be treated, under Hotaling (cited above) as child pornography and therefore criminal. If the art does not depict any actual child, but the image is found to be obscene under Miller, then a prosecution could be brought under § 1466A. Note that whether a given image is or is not obscene is a matter of fact, ultimately for a jury to decide, based on the Miller standard. As Whorley shows, completely fictional cartoons may be the basis of a successful prosecution under § 1466A. Anyone reading this answer should be aware that anything that might be considered "child porn" is taken quite seriously by US law enforcement. Penalties for conviction are severe. Even if the materiel is found to be protected by the first amendment, an arrest may lead to significant expense, loss of employment, and other negative consequences. It should also be noted that a "minor" or "child" under the sections of US law mentioned here means anyone under the age of 18. The age of consent under state law is not relevant. Thus it might be lawful for a person of 16 to engage in sex in some US states, but it will still be criminal to distribute or poses a photo or other image of such an act. People should also be aware that the law on such matters differs significantly between different countries. Content that US courts have held to be protected by the US first amendment may be criminal to posses, receive, or transmit under the laws of other countries. Penalties are potentially severe. The question of whether any given image is protected or criminal is not always easy to resolve, and finding out via an arrest and a criminal trial could be a very unpleasant and expensive way to determine this. Consulting a lawyer skilled in such matters might be wise if any content in one's possession is even arguably questionable on such points.	Translating any text produces a derivative work. If the original text is protected by copyright, this requites the permission of the copyright holder. Any ancient text or translation of the Bible is totally free of copyright protection. Any version published in the US before 1926 is now out of copyright in the US. The rule3s for copyright of a Bible version are not usually different from those form any other text in a given country. There are a few special exceptions. For example, as described on this site the King James Version (KJV) is under Crown Copyright in the UK. There could be similar special copyright rules in other countries for particular versions. Note that the KJV is listed as PD on the list linked in the answer by user6726. But this would not be correct in the UK, although it would be in the US.	One relevant US law is Title 18 Chapter 110. Using real children in porn is against the law, as is most anything connected to it (permitting children to do it, distributing, buying...). Under the definitions (18 USC 2256(1)) “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years. The possible hook for cartoons is via the definition of “child pornography” which is any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— ... (B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. My guess is that hentai doesn't satisfy this definition, since I hear that the characters in a cartoon don't actually look like real people. However: there are also general laws against obscenity in some jurisdictions, and in US v. Whorley, it was held that you can still be convicted of receiving obscene material (Japanese child porn cartoons) – SCOTUS refused to hear an appeal. Most cases that are prosecuted also involve real child porn, or plea bargaining. In light of Whorley, it hasn't been definitively determined that hentai is against the law, but the first step has been taken.	It is absolutely illegal, unless the movie is really old and out of copyright. Copyright protects all forms of creative expression, including novels, movie scripts, actual movies, translations of movies.	Copyright is hard. The movie has a copyright, and so has its ship model. This is the original copyright. The boardgame has a token. That thing has its own copyright, no matter if it's a parody of another thing or not. The copyright holder might not be the boardgame maker, but it is under copyright. In any way, parody is fair use, so no harm here. The model has a copyright, but also infringes on the film's copyright as it is a derivative of the film. If the film copyright holder wants, they can have it taken down and sue the maker. In any way, this model is available under a specific license. The model license is clearly Non Commercial. The CC-A-NC license can't be changed to one that is commercial. You can only add more No categories. The questions: 1 - No. Your work is a derivative work of both the model AND the boardgame. You don't parody the boardgame. 2 - You need a license from not one but at least two sources: the model author and the boardgame copyright holder. You might even need a license from the original film company. 3 - YES. He made the model, he can license it as he wants, but the license might be ineffective: He might have coverage under an explicit fan license with the movie company to make the model (allowing sharing under such other license) or not (when it might be silent acceptance of fan works, am implicit license or just plain lack of knowledge of the infringing model) - determining if the company wants to pursue is not your legal battle. Your battle is more likely with the copyright holder (of movie and boardgame) anyway because you lack a valid license from them. "I used this infringing model and breached the license I got it under" is... a very precarious point in court. 4 - No. You used the other work, you can't get out of the CC-A-NC license by altering the item. It'll always be a derivative work of the model you put in. You only get copyright in the changes. The resulting item has shared copyright with the original model maker. He gave you a license to do that, but the unbreakable condition unless you get a different license is: You can't ever sell this, you HAVE to tell them that I was part of this design.	I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States.	It is legal to rewrite a book that is out of copyright, although ethical considerations demand that the original author and source be credited. You need to derive your rewrite from a version that is out of copyright, however, rather than a translation whose incremental innovations due to the transformation arising from the translation is still under copyright. Certainly, the 16th century original would be out of copyright, and in all likelihood, so would many of the later editions, but probably not the one from 1971.
Two Party Consent over State Lines In Illinois, we have a two-party consent law on phone calls, requiring both parties to agree to being recorded. (Or, it seems, simply be told "This call may be recorded for ___ purposes", and you simply continue the phone call. In Wisconsin, the law is one party. If I drive up to the Wisconsin border with my Illinois Phone number, what takes precedence for that phone call? The registered number's area (my Illinois area code), or the physical location I'm standing when making / receiving the call? Also, when you state that the call is recorded for ___ purposes, does that have any bearing on the actual use (e.g. they state it is for quality assurance, but instead they use it for marketing, legal, etc)	The first part is a matter of jurisdiction. I do not believe that simply using a cell phone with an Illinois number will give the Illinois courts jurisdiction, if you're standing in Wisconsin and calling a person in Wisconsin. Also, when you state that the call is recorded for ___ purposes, does that have any bearing on the actual use (e.g. they state it is for quality assurance, but instead they use it for marketing, legal, etc) The use can make a difference. There's an exemption in Illinois law if a business records if: the monitoring is used for the purpose of service quality control of marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation, the education or training of employees or contractors engaged in marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation, or internal research related to marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation If they do not use it for these purposes, presumably the exemption would not apply. In addition: No communication or conversation or any part, portion, or aspect of the communication or conversation made, acquired, or obtained, directly or indirectly, under this exemption (j), may be, directly or indirectly, furnished to any law enforcement officer, agency, or official for any purpose or used in any inquiry or investigation, or used, directly or indirectly, in any administrative, judicial, or other proceeding, or divulged to any third party.	In England and Wales, in general it is legal to make a recording in one's own home without the knowledge or consent of the other participants. In general the law with regard to recordings is more strict in non-domestic contexts than it is in domestic contexts. For example, a business must "make all reasonable efforts" to inform a caller that their telephone call may be recorded. A business has obligations under data protection law that the householder does not have. Depending on the circumstances the homeowner might commit a civil tort (breach of confidence) or criminal offence if he discloses or publishes the recording made without the consent of the other participants. E.g. submitting it as evidence to court is OK, sharing it with friends or publishing it on the internet is likely not OK. In the specific context of the homeowner making a recording of a sexual act with another person and the other person has not consented to the making of the recording: if the homeowner shares the recording they might be investigated/prosecuted for the criminal offence of voyeurism (s67(3) Sexual Offences Act 2003) in R. v Richards the Court of Appeal ruled that the making of the recording for one's own sexual gratification amounts to the criminal offence of voyeurism (s67(3) Sexual Offences Act 2003)	One of the principles of contract law is that the offer and acceptance are evaluated based on the objectively ascertainable intentions as judged by a reasonable person. On the facts that you have provided - even if your friend claims that they filled it out wrong, there is no reason for someone to objectively think so, particularly given the fact that they went to the trouble of writing the information in. However, this will depend on what kind of legally binding document this is. If it is, in fact, a contract, then the employer must accept it before it becomes legally binding, and they must actually communicate this acceptance to your friend (the offeror). If this is a policy document, then it is only legally binding if another contract has said that it is legally binding - generally, (smart) employers will include a clause in their employment contract stating that you are to adhere to policies but that those policies do not form part of the contract. If that is the case, then your friend is legally bound by the terms of the policy and will breach their employment contract if they do not adhere to this policy. This is unlikely to be an issue of contract law in and of itself - your friend cannot unilaterally bind their employer to terms as he sees fit. More information - including the nature of the document and other agreements that were made - would be required to provide more useful information (and that's what you would give to a lawyer).	They aren’t treated differently In most jurisdictions, law enforcement requires a warrant to intercept/open/read the contents of physical or electronic correspondence. Similarly, in most jurisdictions, a warrant is not required to read the metadata: who is communicating with whom, how and when but not what. That is they can read what’s written on the outside of the envelope or the routing information of the email/SMS. Telephony is not correspondence because it is not the intent of the parties to create a permanent record. It is usually treated as any other conversation - if it carried out in a place and manner that the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy it’s usually illegal to record it (electronically or by writing it down). If it’s said publicly, it isn’t illegal.	This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider.	Note: I am not familiar with Washington law, but I can make an educated guess as to what is happening here. I am guessing that the couple in question are the joint registered owners of the motor vehicle. In many jurisdictions, motor vehicles are treated differently from "normal" things, they are treated as inherently dangerous and thus ownership carries a certain set of responsibilities. (Similar to e.g. owning a firearm, which carries with it certain restrictions on how it can be stored, for example.) One of those responsibilities is to keep track of who is operating the motor vehicle. Therefore, unless the operator of the motor vehicle can clearly be identified without incurring unreasonable cost, tickets for traffic violations are generally addressed to the registered owner, who can then forward them to the responsible operator. (Note that "unreasonable cost" does not have to be monetary. It could also be an invasion of privacy: it is less invasive to just ask the owner to identify the operator than to e.g. surveil the owner's property to find out who is using the vehicle or run facial recognition against the owner's family, friends, and colleagues.) In many jurisdictions, there is a form attached to the ticket (or downloadable from some website) which will look something like this: I accept the ticket: [ ] I do not accept the ticket [ ] because … I was operating the vehicle, but I did not run the red light [ ] I was not operating the vehicle [ ] … the vehicle was operated by: name ___, address ___ … I do not know who was operating the vehicle at that time [ ] If you claim not to know who was operating the vehicle at the time in question, that might have other consequences. In some jurisdictions, you can then be ordered to keep a logbook, for example. If the vehicle then gets caught again and you again claim to now know who was operating it, or you cannot produce the logbook, you might get fined for violating the court order to keep a logbook.	YES in germany §23 StVO (1a) Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, darf ein elektronisches Gerät, das der Kommunikation, Information oder Organisation dient oder zu dienen bestimmt ist, nur benutzen, wenn hierfür das Gerät weder aufgenommen noch gehalten wird und [...] (1a) Whoever is driving a vehicle may only use an electrical device that is serving communication, information, or organization or destined to be used for this if... 1. they don't pick the device up or hold it and [...] That is plenty clear: holding the device is banned in any way, and implies using it under German legal precedent.	You are referring to Michigan State Police v. Sitz 496 U.S. 444 (1990). It does not require or suggest a requirement of advance publication of any details regarding the checkpoints. The dissent mentions that "a sobriety checkpoint is usually operated at night at an unannounced location. Surprise is crucial to its method." This point was not countered or even mentioned by the majority. In this case, a state committee had created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity. The mentions this as a background fact, but does not rely on the existence of these guidelines as a requirement for the constitutionality of checkpoint stops. It does contrast checkpoints with "roving patrol stops". Quoting from Martinez-Fuerte 428 U. S. 543 (1976), the majority in Sitz said: "at traffic checkpoints, the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion". There are state guidelines, some states have constitutions prohibiting sobriety checkpoints (lots of case law at the state level regarding this), and some state legislatures have made these illegal. In Sitz, the checkpoints were being operated subject to guidelines developed by the Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee (of the State Department of Police). Federally, the NHTSA has guidelines on visibility and publicity towards the goal of effectiveness.
How can the NFL assert copyright over "any pictures, descriptions, or accounts of the game"? The NFL's copyright statement for today's big game, and presumably for other football games, contains language like "Any other use of this telecast or any pictures, descriptions, or accounts of the game without the NFL's consent is prohibited". How can they prohibit someone from making their own "descriptions or accounts" (or, indeed, their own pictures - if someone brings a camera phone into the audience they may be violating some stadium policy, but they're not violating copyright) under copyright law?	The NFL cannot use copyright as a basis for preventing independently made recordings, "descriptions or accounts", but can prevent usage of their own such items. The case National Basketball Association v. Motorola [wiki, full text] contains a concise summary of the law on this issue: [29] [...] The House Report also makes clear that it is the broadcast, not the underlying game, that is the subject of copyright protection. In explaining how game broadcasts meet the Act's requirement that the subject matter be an "original work[] of authorship," 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), the House Report stated: [30] When a football game is being covered by four television cameras, with a director guiding the activities of the four cameramen and choosing which of their electronic images are sent out to the public and in what order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing constitutes "authorship."	Copyright, No US Copyright does not protect names, images, or "personas". The US Copyright Office Circular 33 ("Works Not Protected by Copyright") states, on pages 2-3: Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. Examples of names, titles, or short phrases that do not contain a sufficient amount of creativity to support a claim in copyright include: The name of an individual (including pseudonyms, pen names, or stage names) The title or subtitle of a work, such as a book, a song, or a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work The name of a business or organization The name of a band or performing group The name of a product or service A domain name or URL The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expression An image, including a portrait, is usually protected by copyright (unless it is old enough that the protection has expired). But the copyright most often belongs to the creator of the image, such as the photographer or artist, not by the subject represented. If Bob draws or paints or otherwise creates an image of Alice, from seeing her in person or from multiple publicly available likenesses of her, not clearly based on any one such image, Bob will hold the copyright in that image unless he sells or otherwise transfers the copyright. Alice will not have any copyright in such an image. Right of Publicity, Yes Some but not all US states, and some but not all countries, recognize a "right of publicity". In Ohio, the "Right of publicity" is protected by Chapter 2741 of the Ohio Revised Code. This right extends to various aspects of a person's "persona", and may be enforced by a civil suit. These rights do not depend on a person's status as a "public figure" or "celebrity" or not. These rights are separate from any copyrights involved. These rights may be limited by the rights granted by the First Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. Section 2741.01 (Defnitions) provides, in relevant part, that: (A) "Persona" means an individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, or distinctive appearance, if any of these aspects have commercial value. (B) "Commercial purpose" means the use of or reference to an aspect of an individual's persona in any of the following manners: (B) (1) On or in connection with a place, product, merchandise, goods, services, or other commercial activities not expressly exempted under this chapter; (B) (2) For advertising or soliciting the purchase of products, merchandise, goods, services, or other commercial activities not expressly exempted under this chapter; (B) (3) For the purpose of promoting travel to a place; (B) (4) For the purpose of fundraising. (C) "Name" means the actual, assumed, or clearly identifiable name of or reference to a living or deceased individual that identifies the individual. (D) "Right of publicity" means the property right in an individual's persona to use the individual's persona for a commercial purpose. Section 2741.02 (Using individual's persona for commercial purpose without authorization.) provides that: (A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not use any aspect of an individual's persona for a commercial purpose: (A) (1) During the individual's lifetime; (A) (2) For a period of sixty years after the date of the individual's death; or (A) (3) For a period of ten years after the date of death of a deceased member of the Ohio national guard or the armed forces of the United States. (B) A person may use an individual's persona for a commercial purpose during the individual's lifetime if the person first obtains the written consent to use the individual's persona from a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code. If an individual whose persona is at issue has died, a person may use the individual's persona for a commercial purpose if either of the following applies: (B) (1) The person first obtains the written consent to use the individual's persona from a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code who owns the individual's right of publicity. (B) (2) The name of the individual whose persona is used was the name of a business entity or a trade name at the time of the individual's death. (C) Subject to the terms of any agreement between a person specified in section 2741.05 of the Revised Code and a person to whom that person grants consent to use an individual's right of publicity, a consent obtained before the death of an individual whose persona is at issue remains valid after the individual's death. (D) For purposes of this section: (D) (1) A use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with any news, public affairs, sports broadcast, or account does not constitute a use for which consent is required under division (A) of this section. (D) (2) A use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with any political campaign and in compliance with Title XXXV of the Revised Code does not constitute a use for which consent is required under division (A) of this section. (E) The owners or employees of any medium used for advertising, including but not limited to, a newspaper, magazine, radio or television network or station, cable television system, billboard, transit ad, and global communications network, by whom any advertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is published or disseminated are not liable under this section or section 2741.07 of the Revised Code unless it is established that those owners or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the persona as prohibited by this section. Section 2741.03 states that these rights apply only to the use of the persona of a person resident in the state of Ohio, or who was so resident when that person died on or after January 1, 1998. Section 2741.04 states that the rights of publicity can be livened, transferred by contract, or left as an inheritance. Section 2741.05 defines who may grant written consent for use of a persona, including the person whose persona it is, a person who owns more than 50% of the rights, and a person explicitly authorized to grant such consent (such as an agent). Sections 2741.06 and 2741.07 authorize a civil suit for violation of rights of publicity. The plaintiff may receive any or all of: actual damages; statutory damages in an amount between $2,500.00 and $10,000.00; and in an appropriate case punitive or exemplary damages. Awards of legal costs add attorney fees are authorized. Injunctions to halt further violations are authorized. Triple damages are authorized against certain parties. Products, merchandise, and goods made in violation of these rights may be seized, and after a final judgemetn, destroyed orm otherwise disposed of. Section 2741.09 (Exceptions) provides that: (A) This chapter does not apply to any of the following: (A) (1) (a) A literary work, dramatic work, fictional work, historical work, audiovisual work, or musical work regardless of the media in which the work appears or is transmitted, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under division (A)(1)(d) of this section; (A) (1) (b) Material that has political or newsworthy value; (A) (1) (c) Original works of fine art; (A) (1) (d) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by division (A)(1)(a), (b), or (c) of this section. < (A) (2) The use of an individual's name to truthfully identify the individual as the author of or contributor to a written work or the performer of a recorded performance under circumstances in which the written work or the recorded performance is otherwise lawfully reproduced, exhibited, or broadcast; (A) (3) The use of an aspect of an individual's persona in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or topic of general or public interest; (A) (4) The use of the persona of an individual solely in the individual's role as a member of the public if the individual is not named or otherwise singled out as an individual; (A) (5) A use of an individual's persona by an institution of higher education if all of the following apply: (A) (5) (a) The individual is or was a student at, or a member of the faculty or staff of, the institution of higher education. (A) (5) (b) The use of the individual's persona is for educational purposes or for the promotion of the institution of higher education and its educational or institutional objectives. (A) (6) A use of the persona of an individual that is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as long as the use does not convey or reasonably suggest endorsement by the individual whose persona is at issue. (B) This chapter does not affect rights or privileges recognized under the Ohio Constitution or United States Constitution.	You've tagged this as both united-states and european-union, so this answer is about the United States. Before you can "license" someone to do something, you must first have the legal right to prevent them from doing it. Otherwise, your purported "license" is just a worthless piece of paper (technically, you might be able to sell those pieces of paper notwithstanding their lack of validity, so I suppose they wouldn't be completely worthless). If we imagine that the subject of a biography or autobiography wants to control the publication of that biography, there are a number of legal grounds that might be cited, depending on the circumstances: Copyright: The person who actually wrote the biography (who may or may not be the subject!) can prevent others from making copies or derivative works of it, as well as several other rights enumerated in 17 USC 106. Most publication agreements involve signing an exclusive license with the publisher. If the author has not signed such a license, then the biography is not going to be published in the first place. Regardless, copyright only exists once the work is "fixed in a tangible medium" (e.g. saved to a hard drive, written down on a piece of paper, etc.). If it's still "in your head," then you don't own anything. If the subject and author are different people, then the subject does not have any rights here at all; copyright belongs exclusively to the author. Furthermore, copyright only protects the individual work. It does not prevent someone else from writing a different biography from scratch, so long as this second biography is original and does not reuse any content from the first biography. The underlying facts belong to no one. Privacy rights are generally handled as a tort under state law. If the subject is a public figure (i.e. the sort of person who's likely to have a biography written about them) then privacy rights tend to be rather limited. However, they are not nonexistent, and invasion-of-privacy claims are occasionally raised, usually in cases where highly personal, sensitive information is disclosed against the will of the subject. This may also become relevant if the author of the biography obtains information in an illegal fashion such as by hacking or physical trespass. However, in most cases, the content would need to be pretty far beyond the pale before this would have a realistic chance of succeeding. Personality rights are usually considered an extension or variety of privacy rights. In general, they allow the subject to prevent their name from being associated with a commercial endeavor without their permission. However, it is likely that the First Amendment would bar the application of personality rights to a biography, unless the publisher tried to misrepresent a ghostwritten work as an autobiography without the consent of the subject. Libel is a tort under state law. Libel laws in the US are extremely limited, and the subject would need to establish at least all of the following in order to succeed (or else the claim is barred by the First Amendment): The defendant published a statement. A reasonable person would interpret that statement as factual (and not an opinion, puffery, etc.). The statement is materially false (i.e. the "gist or sting" of the statement is false, regardless of whether it is technically 100% accurate). The statement harmed the reputation of the plaintiff. The defendant knew the statement was false, or made no serious effort to verify it ("actual malice"). Not required unless the plaintiff is a public figure, but the subject of a biography probably will be a public figure. There may be additional requirements depending on the state, and the defendant will probably try to file an anti-SLAPP motion if state law allows for it. Of these four rights, copyright is by far the most commonly "licensed," followed by personality rights. Nobody gives out licenses to commit libel or invade their privacy. That leaves us with two ways of licensing your (auto)biography: Actually write it yourself, and sell it to a publishing company. You will give them a copyright license as part of the process (in exchange for royalties and an advance). Convince a publishing company to hire a ghostwriter for you, and then license your likeness to them. The public will be told that you "wrote" the book, and you will promote it in exactly the same way as if you did write it. Neither of these options will prevent someone else from coming along and writing their own biography about you, of course.	Trespass to chattel The TV is owned by the store or restaurant. You are not allowed to use it or manipulate it. So you commit Trespass to Chattel, which is "the use of property without permission of the owner" and a common law tort. To prove Trespass the store would need to show: You intended the trespass on the chattel, in this case, by turning off the TV. That can be proven by you owning the TV-B-Gone and using it. You deprived the owner's use of the chattel for a substantial time, which in the case of a sports bar might be any moment of the game, especially if the bar is allowed to run sports bets. in the case of the sports bet bar, you might even have created harm to something that the bar has a legitimate interest in. The Sports Bar might have the much easier case, while the store might not be able to prove the required deprivation of the chattel or damage caused by turning it off. Similarly, if a TV-B-Gone turns off a public CNN monitor at an airport though, you created harm because CNN would need to send a technician to turn it on again - the remote controls are only with the technicians, not in place. Do note that because of TV-B-Gones many such displays are installed in shielded boxes, or have been modified to not register to remote controls at all. Most sports bars don't even have a TV there, it's a computer monitor that is fed from a stream. However, if it's store advertisements... I doubt you turning it off would have caused the substantial deprivation to qualify as trespass to chattel. And while TV-B-Gone is just a tort... Don't you dare to run a cellphone jammer: Well, Cell-Phone-B-Gone could be done, but it’s illegal. One way to do it is to create a very low power fake cell transmitter, and the phone call would be gone. But disrupting a cell phone service is illegal in and of itself. - Mitch Altman, inventor of the TV-B-Gone in a 2006 interview	If the image is protected by copyright (as most modern images are), the uploading it as a profile picture or using it on a web site is copyright infringement unless one has permission from the copyright owner, or an exception to copyright applies. If copyright infringement occurs, the owner can sue for damages, or issue a takedown notice, or both, but does not have to do either. In the vast majority of cases, no one will do anything about such infringements if the owner (or the owner's authorized agent) does not. All the above is true in all of Europe and North America, ad in most other countries as well. Permission can be granted directly by the copyright owner to a user, or granted by the owner releasing the image (or other wrk) under a license. Google's general developer TOS Document](https://policies.google.com/terms#toc-content) reads (in relevant part): Google content Some of our services include content that belongs to Google — for example, many of the visual illustrations you see in Google Maps. You may use Google’s content as allowed by these terms and any service-specific additional terms, but we retain any intellectual property rights that we have in our content. Don’t remove, obscure, or alter any of our branding, logos, or legal notices. If you want to use our branding or logos, please see the Google Brand Permissions page. Other content Finally, some of our services give you access to content that belongs to other people or organizations — for example, a store owner’s description of their own business, or a newspaper article displayed in Google News. You may not use this content without that person or organization’s permission, or as otherwise allowed by law. The views expressed in other people or organizations’ content are theirs, and don’t necessarily reflect Google’s views. It would seem that each Google service has its own terms which indicate in what ways one may use Google content. It would further seem that content originally obtained from others and distributed by Google will have some set of permissions granted by the uploader. These must be checked for each image, I would think. There is no single one-rule-fits-all answer. I gather that the APIs will have methods for determining which images are from Google itself, and which from others, and some method for indicating the permissions that accompany an image. A user of these APIs must learn how to extract ownership and permissions metadata for an image obtained via the API, and how to use it (or not use it) in accordance with the available permissions. Now let us look at exceptions to copyright. These vary by country. Several European countries have an exception for "personal use" which might cover the profile pictures, but probably will not cover general use on a web site. There are exceptions for "news reporting" which might cover images illustrating recent news events. Some have exceptions for educational or instructional use. The UK (and several othe countries) have the concept of fair dealing which bundles several exceptions together. This might cover an image used in a personal profile, use of images in news reports, and limited educational use, but will probably not cover general use on a website. The US has the concept of fair use which is rather complex, but does not specifically include a "personal use" exception. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? and other threads here tagged with fair-use for more on this. It is somewhat unlikely that any of these exceptions will cover general use on a web site of images obtained via Google APIs and used beyond the permissions listed in the metadata accompanying the image. But it will very much depend on the specifics of the case. If the image fetching is doe not by you in building a site or an app, but by your app's users who may then use them improperly, strictly speaking that is each user's own responsibility, you cannot effectively police what your users do, and have no duty to try. It will be a good practice if you include text explaining to your users that not all images are free for general use. You might want to link to the Google TOS. If the API returns metadata indicating the permissions status of each image fetched, yo0u might well want to provide this metadata in a useful form to your users. You might even want to allow a user to filter images obtained by permission status. But whether this is practical or useful to users will depend on the purpose and design of an app.	Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.	If you do not have permission to make and distribute reproductions of the work, then it is illegal to make and distribute reproductions of the work. US copyright law Indian copyright law	Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.
Will I be let into the US if I request a passport from a country in the Trump travel ban? I currently hold a permanent resident status in the US and planned on traveling internationally in next couple of months. Since I need a visa to enter to the country I am traveling to, I would have to request my passport from my country (listed in the travel ban.) I am NOT traveling to my country but rather using my passport from my country as an entry to another country (since I don't hold a US passport yet). Will this effect my permanent resident status in the US?	The newly-reinstated presidential proclamation says (Sec 3(b)) says The suspension of entry pursuant to section 2 of this proclamation shall not apply to: (i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States; The State department also lists exceptions to the travel ban on 8 countries, identifying those who "will not be subject to any travel restrictions listed in the Proclamation" d) Any lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States; Requesting / receiving a passport (or renewed passport) from your current country of citizenship does not invalidate your permanent resident status. Additionally, State says No visas will be revoked pursuant to the Proclamation. Individuals subject to the Proclamation who possess a valid visa or valid travel document generally will be permitted to travel to the United States, irrespective of when the visa was issued. If you stay out of the country too long, that could cause a problem. If you plan to stay away more than a year, you have to first apply for a reentry permit. This is the current state of the law, which is subject to change.	The only people the law does not apply to are " persons licensed by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control." http://www.visitcuba.com/travel-guide/travel-tips/special-note-to-usa-travellers/ If you have close family there the license is not needed. If you qualify to travel on a general license for family travel, you do not need to seek permission from OFAC. However, it is a requirement of the general license that you be able to document, if asked, how you qualify under the general license. There are also special permissions for certain groups. There are 12 categories of people who are allowed to visit including close relatives of Cubans, academics, those traveling on official government business, those on humanitarian or religious missions, journalists and people on accredited cultural education programs. Those rules apply to people with dual citizenship. New rules are now in place, that allow you to visit under certain circumstances considered to not be simple tourism. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandratalty/2018/04/23/yes-you-can-still-travel-to-cuba/#34139656378d	The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts.	Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway.	I'm very sorry to hear about your situation. Unfortunately, this is too important to trust advice from strangers over the Internet. You should talk to an attorney familiar with Bulgarian immigration law. @jwh20 is correct; entering another country is not a human right. If they are not allowing you to return to your home country despite your following all laws, that is likely a human rights issue. This does not necessarily mean you won't be able to get into Bulgaria; if one person is preventing you from entering, an attorney may be able to get that person's decision overturned.	They must apply for an extension of the visa: you can read about the UCIS covid-19 response here. The application must be "timely", so this should be done now. Even though the extension will probably be pending for some time, if the application is filed in a timely fashion, which puts off unlawful presence status. Also read about "Special circumstances".	A US citizen who resides abroad can register to vote in federal elections in the last state or territory where they resided in the US. So in your example, the US citizen who was resident in Puerto Rico, and who moves to Canada without first residing in any other state or territory, would register to vote in Puerto Rico. Since he is registered to vote in Puerto Rico, he does not vote in an election for choosing presidential electors since Puerto Rico doesn't have any presidential electors. Only the 50 states and DC have presidential electors, and each of them chooses the electors based on elections by people registered to vote in that state (or DC), so he would have to be registered to vote in some particular state or in DC to participate in an election for choosing presidential electors, but he does not qualify to register to vote in any of the states or DC, because he was not resident there last. Yes, US citizens who are neighbors in Vancouver, Canada, one of whom is a former New Yorker and the other of whom is a former Puerto Rican, would be registered to vote in two places (one in New York and the other in Puerto Rico). They would get two different ballots, and may even have different dates for elections (for elections that are not held on the November election day). They would have different offices to vote for, and, in the case of the ballot for the November election in a presidential election year, the New York ballot would contain an election for a slate of presidential electors, while the Puerto Rico ballot would not.	At time of answering, the question is: What's the most crucial issue when deciding Senator Cruz's citizenship? The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, Section 1, states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States[.] Cruz did not go through a naturalization process. He was also not born within the territorial limits of the US. If either of those facts were different, those would be the crucial issue. Since they are not, we then look to the Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the first Congress, which states that children born to citizen parents outside the United States are also citizens, specifically: The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens[.] (emphasis added) According to the Wikipedia article and/or sources it cites, this is the only legislation to use the phrase "natural born citizens" and it seems clear this is intended to refer to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution which states a requirement: No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States. (emphasis added) The 1790 Act was repealed and replaced in 1795, but the new law also contained the language (lacking "natural born"): The children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States[.] The specific laws have been further changed, as the naturalization process has, reintroducing ambiguity about the "natural born" requirement, but birthright citizenship from parents is not in question and the "natural born" aspect is not in this question. So, to answer the question directly, the most crucial issue is: Were Cruz's parents citizens when Cruz was born? Cruz's Wikipedia page says his father was not naturalized until later, but his mother was born in Wilmington, DE, which is in the United States, and so unless she renounced her citizenship she would have been a US citizen at the time of Cruz's birth. This means there's a crucial issue: Did Cruz's mother renounce her US citizenship before Cruz was born? "Kaithar" commented on this answer with speculation that she voted in a Canadian election at a time (1947-1977) when Canada didn't recognize dual citizenship in that it required its own citizens to give that up if they acquired foreign citizenship; "user102008" refutes that. However, if we don't want to end this issue-identifying answer at that question, let's assume the answer is "no" and that Cruz's mother was a US citizen when Cruz was born. Then we have to see if birthright citizenship from parents extends to Cruz. For this, we can look to Public Law 414 (66 Stat. 236), passed June 27, 1952, especially section 301(a)(7): The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: […] A person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph. Side note: Section (4) (modern (d)) would matter if Cruz's father were considered a noncitizen national of the US, slightly relaxing the requirements so that the mother only had to spend only one continuous year in the US prior to the birth. The armed forces exemption was broadened Nov. 6, 1966 to cover the parent (or their parent's) nonmilitary employment by the US government or certain international organizations. If that's relevant, this answer can be edited to expand on this point. Section 309 of that law addresses children born out of wedlock, and says that section 301(a)(7) (quoted above) applies directly as if the parents were married, "if the paternity of such child is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation." To the best of my knowledge, section 301(a)(7) applies to Cruz. If I were wrong on that, we'd look to Section 309(c): A person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year. The equivalent of the first quote today is in 8 U.S. Code § 1401(g) if parents are married at the time of a child's birth, replacing "ten years, at least five" with "five years, at least two" (Nov. 14, 1986; see Section 12 in this law). The quote from 309(c) is now 8 U.S. Code § 1409(c). So then the crucial question is: Did Cruz's mother spent the requisite period of time in the US before Cruz was born? Apparently she did, regardless of marital status, and if that's true it means Ted Cruz is a US citizen and has been since at least birth. Again, the "natural born" aspect is omitted from this now-answered question. The answer to the question you meant to ask (perhaps "What's the most crucial issue when deciding if Senator Cruz's citizenship makes him eligible for the Presidency?") is "What does the phrase 'natural born citizen' mean in context of Article II, Section 1 of the US Constitution?" () Which may mean that he hasn't been a citizen his whole life, using a Cruz definition for when life begins. That's a separate discussion, though, and not very relevant to this one.
Can't a state in India challenge the Parliament in court? In an ongoing case challenging the centre's decision to make Aadhaar mandatory for government welfare schemes, the Supreme Court bench asked the West Bengal state counsel: "In a federal structure, how can a state file plea challenging Parliament’s mandate? We know it is a matter which needs consideration but you satisfy us how a state can challenge it?" “You satisfy us how the state has challenged it. We know it is a matter which needs consideration,” the bench said, adding that the Centre’s move can be challenged by an individual but not by states. The bench, instead, asked Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee to submit a plea before it as an individual. “Let Mamta Banerjee come and file. We will entertain her as an individual,” it said. Source: Aadhaar case: Supreme Court pulls up West Bengal govt, says ‘how can State challenge Parliament’s mandate’, The Indian Express, October 30, 2017 This strikes me as preposterous. The government is not a military organization where people must follow their superiors' orders without challenge. Further, during a dispute between a state and the centre, who else can adjudicate other than the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court has original, appellate and advisory jurisdiction. Its exclusive original jurisdiction extends to any dispute between the Government of India and one or more States or between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more States on the other or between two or more States, if and insofar as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or of fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. Is the bench correct in asking the state government to justify its right to challenge the central government? Clearly the Court's problem is not with the subject of the challenge, but merely about who is raising the challenge.	Indian Constitution provides for a Federal government in which power of states and centres are clearly enunciated. If there is a dispute over any issue Supreme Court can decide whether State government is correct, or whether Central government is correct. Any law of Parliament affects the entire population of India, and so all states are affected by that law. If any state government considers that the law is not as per constitutional norms, it can easily go to the Supreme Court for decision. So, the observation of the Supreme Court that a state is bound by the law of Parliament, is incorrect. If an individual can file such a case, a state is also entitled to file it. The Supreme Court should decide it on the basis of merit. So I think the observation of Supreme Court in this case is not correct.	This is a very straightforward point of constitutional law. Chapter and verse from the Constitution, art 224: (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.	Taking the US as an example, the Constitution states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Congress or a state government hasn't prohibited you from comparing platforms. Another private entity has. And, that's fine. You're free to launch the app as a separate website, or print out the flyers and hand them to people on the bus, or publish your own monthly magazine comparing various platforms, so you still have freedom of speech and of the press. As an example, if you write a letter about how great the government of North Korea is to the letters department at Stamp Collectors Magazine, and they don't publish it, have they violated your human rights? The app store restriction may be quite dumb. After all, the built-in web browser allows the reading of the exact same news. But there's no law against being dumb.	Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956.	This issue was addressed in United States v. Meng, 2020 BCSC 785. The authority to extradite is via the extraditing state's treaty with the U.S. and its domestic implementing legislation. In Canada, this is the Extradition Act. Extradition requires consent of the extraditing state and for the requesting state to follow the extraditing state's domestic procedure. The question you raise is how sanctions of requesting state affect the interpretation of the domestic offence for the purpose of establishing the double criminality requirement. Critical in this case was that the charged offence was fraud against HSBC (albeit based on alleged concealment of sanctions violations). See para. 23: The double criminality question in the committal hearing is therefore whether Ms. Meng’s alleged conduct, had it occurred in Canada, would have amounted to fraud contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Ms. Meng argued: that the conduct cannot amount to fraud because in essence the proposed prosecution is to enforce US sanctions laws against Iran, measures that are not part of Canadian law and which, indeed, Canada has expressly rejected. The Attorney General argued: that the double criminality analysis may properly take the US sanctions into account as part of the foreign legal backdrop against which the essential conduct is to be understood. The court agreed with the Attorney General: The effects of the US sanctions may properly play a role in the double criminality analysis as part of the background or context against which the alleged conduct is examined.	Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.	There is no absolute rule in such cases. It is often a matter of negotiation between the state and federal authorities, and failing agreement, a matter of which authority has the prisoner in custody. Often the question of which crime is more serious or carries a longer sentence is an issue in such negotiations.	Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment.
What kind of lawyer would our company need to file criminal charges against a customer? About Us I work for a company and our company sells very popular electronic products to consumers in the automotive industry. Our Problem We have one particular customer that has ordered one of our products legitemately and about 30 other orders of the same product with stolen credit cards. While we have tracked down this customer and have all of his contact information and support details; no law enforcement agency has cooperated with us in terms of opening a case and helping us. We've tried local, FBI, Treasury, Secret Service. We are a very small business with very few employees and as a result are struggling. The Damages result to $10,000+ in products and $3000 in mitigation and recovery. Advise Us Is it possible to hire a lawyer to help us and what kind of lawyer would we seek out?	user6726's answer about civil action is good, as you appear to have lots of evidence that document-based in terms of bank records, etc. And media shaming would work; but you could be sued in retaliation, even if you're right. But try calling a prosecutor - such as a county attorney - rather than an arm of law enforcement. The police are always overworked and can be reluctant to try and put a case together for the local prosecutor. Contacting a county attorney is free and doesn't require you to get a lawyer, and it can be a surprisingly effective tactic against a criminal. A phone call or a detailed letter to the county attorney for the person's county of residence that explains the criminal activity may be the key to getting some movement in the situation. You have lots of hard evidence to hand the attorney about an individual who is committing fraud, and that evidence may make simply make the case for the attorney, as it is documented evidence they can immediately verify and use, either at the county level, or be passed to the district (state) prosecutor. A loss of $4000 is significant, and may be a felony in that state. But the "$6,000 in products that were not shipped" is intent on the criminals' part and is not a loss to you. If it is a county with a large population, the attorney will have many assistants who may have time to pursue the case. An attorney for a small county may be looking for an easy case. And who knows? The attorney's office may already know the person - if it's a county with a small population, or if that person already has a criminal history (which you could research yourself in that county's records) - and that makes the case even easier for the attorney.	What you are describing may be the crime of insurance fraud: to avoid that, you would have to admit to the insurance company that you put a "Please steal me" sign in an unlocked car with the keys in the ignition, in a high-crime area. If we remove some of the elements of the scenario and reduce this to "leaving the keys in the ignition", this would probably be be considered contributory negligence, meaning that you failed to act prudently to protect your property. This can reduce the amount that the insurance company has to pay you. At this point, it depends on what state you're in, since sometimes a little bit of negligence (in Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia) means that you may get nothing. However, negligence hinges on an assessment of the actions and intentions of a party, and what you describe isn't "neglect", there is the direct intent that the car be stolen. Insurance policies exclude coverage for intentional loss. So the bottom line would be that the person would be out a car, and could be in prison for fraud if they did not reveal what they actually did. One should assume that the thieves took a lulz video of the sign before they stole the car, and posted it on FaceTube where it entered the viral hall of fame and was used against you in a court of law, so fraud is the worst choice. An alternative if you have a car is to donate it to charity, and take a tax write-off.	Possibly The game company has almost certainly excluded liability under the contract you entered. There may be some consumer protection that you have that they cannot exclude - I don’t know enough about German law to meaningfully comment. Notwithstanding, if you were to initiate legal action against the, as yet, unknown wrongdoer, you could subpoena the relevant records from the game company with a court order. No matter what privacy or other protections the other person has, the game company must obey the order or be in contempt. Without such an order the game company is right that they can’t disclose details of other users. As a practical matter, it will cost several hundred € to initiate legal action and several thousand to pursue it to the end. And you might lose. A better response is to treat the lost €80 as a relatively cheap life lesson - many people lose a lot more learning to recognise scams.	This is not a place for specific legal advice, but you shouldn't be afraid of the small claims court; I'm doing that myself and it really is a low-risk and straightforward way to get money that is owed to you. Step 1: Get the boiler repaired or replaced as necessary. Keep the receipts. Don't be tempted to get an upgrade or anything else to push expenses that are legitimately yours on to the other party; find out what the cheapest thing is that you can reasonably do to fix the problem and then do that. Step 2: Write a letter to the seller in which you set out the facts of the case and demand the cost of the repairs. Also include any other expenses you have had to incur, like money for your time off work while the repair is done. End it with "If you do not agree to pay this money within one month then I will take action in the county court to recover the money". Send it by recorded delivery and include a copy of the repair receipt (NOT the original). Step 3: If you do not get your money then go here and follow the instructions. You have to pay an up-front fee to the court which gets added on to the amount you are claiming. That is the only money you are putting at risk if you lose. The whole thing is as informal and straightforward as possible, and is purposely designed so that you don't need a lawyer, nor can you or the other side claim for the cost of a lawyer if you win. This is why your lawyer is pushing you to do this by yourself: he knows that his fees would be out of proportion to the amount in question, and you wouldn't be able to get that money back even if you won. The only other wrinkle is if the other party has moved far away: in general if a hearing is needed then it will be held near them rather than near you, so you might have to travel.	Your title and your question are totally different. If someone pirates a book, makes printed copies, and sells them for profit, that's the point where it switches from plain copyright infringement to being criminal copyright infringement. Which means jail instead of paying damages is possible. If you buy one of these printed copies, not knowing that they have been created illegally, and not being willfully ignorant that the printed copies were created illegal, then you didn't commit copyright infringement yourself. Since you are asking the question, it's obvious that you now know that there was copyright infringement, and buying any more copies would be encouraging copyright infringement with no excuses for you. You can be sued for damages. It is unlikely to happen since suing takes likely more effort than getting any damages from you is worth. The correct thing to do is ask the seller for your money back and destroy the copies. If they don't refund your money you can inform the copyright holder.	All of this is illegal. You do not give a jurisdiction so I will use NSW, Australia as an example but many countries' laws have similar effect. Australian Consumer Law prohibits misleading and deceptive conduct: It is illegal for a business to engage in conduct that misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive consumers or other businesses. It doesn't matter that what you have said is strictly speaking factual - the way it has been said is likely to mislead or deceive. However, what you are proposing goes further and IMO crosses the line into fraud (s192E of the Crimes Act): 192E Fraud (1) A person who, by any deception, dishonestly: (b) obtains any financial advantage or causes any financial disadvantage, is guilty of the offence of fraud. Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years. (2) A person’s obtaining of property belonging to another may be dishonest even if the person is willing to pay for the property. In addition to the illegality, stealing other people's money is morally wrong by any reasonable standards of morality.	I assume you are talking about this case: FORIS GFS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD vs THEVAMANOGARI MANIVEL. For that amount, most people would be willing to break the law to keep it, and good advice what to do would be “ask a lawyer”. Needs citation. I certainly wouldn't: a) I think taking money that I know doesn't belong to me is wrong, b) even if I didn't believe that, the amount is so large the bank will certainly eventually come after it. The amount is so large I won't credibly be able to claim an innocent mistake. Simply hiding the money won't work, since the bank will be able to demonstrate that the money was deposited in my account, and I did withdraw it. I would be required to make restitution. This is exactly what happened to the defendant in the above case: they split up the money among friends and bought a house. The house is now being sold by the court, with the proceeds used to reimburse the plaintiffs. Would a lawyer be allowed to give me legal advice to help me keeping this money, for example by giving 500,000 each to twenty reliable friends, moving to Panama, or whatever would allow me to keep and spend the money? (Not asking whether two strategies that I came up with in ten seconds would actually work). Especially if it is advice if the form “X is illegal, but you can get away with it”. No. For example, the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation & Allocation of Authority Between Client & Lawyer states: (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. That's just a suggested ethical standard, but most countries will have something along those lines. Note also that in the US there is also a "Crime-Fraud" exception to attorney-client confidentiality. If a lawyer assists a client in carrying out a criminal or fraudulent scheme then their communications are no longer privileged and can be subpoenaed and introduced as evidence in court.	No. Causing someone "pain and suffering" is not against the law; it is merely one kind of damages that can be awarded when someone has done something that is against the law. You may, for instance, endure pain and suffering from a car accident or shooting, in which case you could collect damages for your pain and suffering after proving that the other party committed the torts of negligence or battery, which are illegal. But if you were enduring pain and suffering from the last episode of Lost, you could not collect damages for your pain and suffering because it is not against the law to write a crappy finale. So in your case, cannot sue for pain and suffering based simply on the existence of a secret audio recording. North Carolina allows secret audio recordings, and it does not make exceptions for audio recordings that hurt someone's feelings. But to go beyond your explicit question, there still remains the possibility that you could pursue a legal action. If the other party used that recording in a way that violated the law, that might give rise to a tort that would support an award of damages for pain and suffering. If they publicly distributed a recording of themselves having sex with someone, that might constitute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. If they edited the recording to make it sound like someone had said something that they had not and then gave it to someone else, that might be grounds for a libel action.
Under California residential lease agreement are tenants considered as a single person? I live in a rental property in Pasadena CA, with two other roommates. When moving into the premise we signed a "residential lease or month-to- month agreement" (C.A.R. form LR, Revisited 12/15) in which our names all appear into one line at the end of which we are identified as ("Tenant") for the rest of the contract. Also, at the end of every page in the "Tenant's Initials" section we all put our initials separately. Does this mean that we are considered as a single person in terms of the contract? Do we share responsibilities of respecting the lease as one or three separate entities? I'm asking this because one of us wants to move out before the natural expiration of the lease agreement and I'd like to know if he has the right to find a replacement without our consent, since the Landlord seems to be ok with it. NOTE: The lease states a few things about subletting: subletting is not allowed without Landlord's prior written consent. If approved, the assignee shall sign a separate written agreement with Landlord and Tenant. But does this tenant refer to all three of us or just the person leaving?	As a general rule, legal language is interpreted loosely with respect to singular versus plural, or male versus female (in interpreting pronouns). A clause that uses the word "tenant" can thus be construed as referring to multiple tenants, and "tenants" can also refer to a single tenant. Likewise, "he, him" refers to a third person, regardless of gender. If the intent of an agreement is that only a single person shall reside in a place, then the wording of the contract would have to say that, and you can't derive that from using "tenant" rather than "tenant or tenants". I don't think the issue comes down to "treating y'all as one person", it comes down to whether the obligation is joint, a series of several obligations, or a joint and several obligation. You would look for expressions like "We and each of us agree...", vs. "Each of us agree...", or "We agree..." to sort that out: I assume that the language just says "Tenant agrees...", that is, there is nothing at all in the wording of the lease that resolves the matter. Tenant (whoever that is) has an obligation to Landlord to pay rent. It doesn't matter if Tenant is 1 person or 10: you have to pay the rent. If 5 out of 10 of those people mysteriously disappear, the other 5 still have to pay a now-doubled rent per person. Each person is fully responsible for all of the lease obligations, and if you are the only reliable person in a lease with 10 parties, you could get stuck with the entire obligation. If Tenant needs to go away for some reason, Tenant can normally negotiate with another person to assume their obligations, so Tenant would come up with an arrangement with a new person, and the new person would have an obligation to (old) Tenant – this is basically a private arrangement that doesn't involve the Landlord. However: it is pretty standard that landlords get a say in letting in new tenants, and you have a clause in your agreement that says that. There are two ways for the old tenant to "go away". One is to completely terminate the old agreement, and the landlord signs a new lease with the new person: the old tenant is completely free of any subsequent obligations, and if the new tenant fails to pay rent, the landlord has to go after the new tenant. The other way is by assigning his obligation (as described above): the agreement is between the old tenant and the new tenant (with the landlord's consent). The question now is, what is the meaning of the clause "the assignee shall sign a separate written agreement with Landlord and Tenant"? (Earlier, I missed the significance of "Landlord and Tenant"). The core question is whether the new arrangement is a novation, or is it an assignment? A novation requires agreement between all parties, and that is what seems to be implied here. California landlord law then tells you that this "makes the new tenant (rather than the original tenant) solely responsible to the landlord". In contrast, "Like a sublease, an assignment is a contract between the original tenant and the new tenant (not the landlord)". Since this involves the landlord, the conclusion is inescapable that this is not actually an assignment (despite the use of the word "assignee"). All of the parties to the agreement would have to agree to these new terms, if in fact there is an agreement that substitutes D for C in this agreement with the landlord (a notation). If C remains on the hook and this is just a personal arrangement between C and D (with Landlords consent) – which is not what the clause says – then you don't get a vote in the C-D arrangement.	First, a landlord cannot just expel a tenant, this involved getting a court order where the judge tells the tenant to leave. Second, she might think that "You're not a tenant, you're just living here" but that is pretty much what it means to be a tenant – she agreed to let the relative live there. There does not have to be a detailed lease written up, though the term of such unwritten agreements is usually month-to-month (this is all about the laws of the particular state, but no state authorizes instant expulsion). You would need to look at the laws of your state for the "abuse" question. Using Washington as an example, and trying to make the best case possible that bailing out is against the law, the potential legal concern is "abandonment", which is defined as an action or inaction by a person or entity with a duty of care for a vulnerable adult that leaves the vulnerable person without the means or ability to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or health care. the failure of a vulnerable adult, not living in a facility, to provide for himself or herself the goods and services necessary for the vulnerable adult's physical or mental health, and the absence of which impairs or threatens the vulnerable adult's well-being. This definition may include a vulnerable adult who is receiving services through home health, hospice, or a home care agency, or an individual provider when the neglect is not a result of inaction by that agency or individual provider. RCW 74.34.200 creates a legal cause of action for abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult. Then one might sue for abandonment if one is living at home and receives care from a home health, hospice, or home care agency, or an individual provider But, "individual provider" is a defined legal term: a person under contract with the department to provide services in the home under chapter 74.09 or 74.39A RCW If the tenant is under contract with the state to provide services, then abandoning the vulnerable adult could get you sued. The courts do not declare that a duty of care exists because of a genetic relationship. A duty of care might be found from a contractual relation (one not involving a state social services agency), for example "You can live here if you take care of me". So there is a legal concern over abandonment, which the person should talk out with an attorney (which is possible since instant-eviction is not an option). Said attorney might also discuss the concept of guardianship.	In Texas, if the lease states that the landlord can inter for some purpose, the landlord can enter for that purpose. I assume there is no statement in the lease. Then the landlord has no right to enter except in emergencies and for routine inspections or repair. This right, however, stems from the courts and not statutes, and you could theoretically sue the landlord to prevent such an inspection (you would need a good attorney, to overcome the presumption that reasonable routine inspections with notice are allowed).	The old terms apply ... ... until the landlord gives notice and ends the lease - then the tenant has to get out. This is not inconsistent with the requirement to “execute all revised rental agreements upon request” - unless and until new terms have been agreed, there are no “revised rental agreements”, once there are, the tenant can be requested to (and must) execute them. There seems to be a misapprehension that this term gives the landlord a unilateral right to change the terms - it doesn’t. However, if the landlord wanted to formalize the month-to-month arrangement that is created under the old lease with new documents (or any other mutually agreed arrangement), then the tenant is obliged to sign it.	The default rule is that a landlord can refuse to rent to anyone for any reason, in which case the landlord can refuse to rent in this case. There are civil rights laws that limit this discretion in the case, for example, of discrimination based on race, or family status. But, those laws often have exemptions for owners of small amounts of property (e.g. a unit in their own home), which can't easily be determined from the question. If a civil rights law applies, the landlord must choose among potential renters on a non-discriminatory basis - the landlord doesn't have to rent to anyone in particular, but can't use the prohibited reasons to make the choice. If the default rule does not apply because a civil rights law unrelated to immigration bars discrimination against a tenant, someone's undocumented immigrant status probably doesn't provide an absolute defense to the civil rights law, but might be one factor among many that a landlord could consider in choosing among available tenants in much the same way that credit ratings, income, and a prospective tenant's criminal record, and other factors might be considered.	As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.	Is it just a matter of stylistic aesthetics? Yes. 12 months is probably more common in a lease form sometimes used for tenancies of a fixed number of months different from 12. 1 year is probably more common in a lease form sometimes used for multiple years instead of just one, but rarely for part of a year. This is assuming, of course, that the 12 months are consecutive and not some weird time share.	Can a landlord (UK, English law) make a claim from a potential tenant who wants to back out of signing a Tenancy Agreement? No. Your description reflects that in this particular scenario there is no tenancy contract. The only actual contract relates to the holding deposit, and your description suggests that both parties fully complied with their obligations pursuant to that contract. Accordingly, neither party has a viable claim against the other. Regardless of whether verbal agreements are cognizable under UK tenancy law, the meeting of the minds you portray is that this tenancy ought to be formalized only by signing a contract. That supersedes customer's prior verbal expressions of intent about moving in. The landlord incurred expenses that either were covered by the customer's holding deposit or were unreasonable. An example of the latter is the fees "landlord has paid for the dates on the contract to be changed (repeatedly)", a task that any person can perform with a text editor at a negligible cost. Likewise, "turn[ing] down other potential tenants" is covered by the holding deposit the customer paid. As for taking "a detailed inventory", that is a task the landlord would perform with any potential tenant and which would render the same outcome regardless of who the tenant would be. The holding deposit must be associated to a deadline or holding period. Beyond that deadline, it is up to the landlord to grant customer's requests for postponement. But the landlord is not entitled to compensation for a risk he deliberately took without even requiring a [renewed] holding deposit. what's the situation if the tenant still claims they want to move in, but the landlord wants to withdraw because they no longer trusts the tenant's promises? That depends on the deadline associated to the holding deposit. Once the holding period has elapsed, the landlord is entitled to do with his property whatever he wants. The customer would have a claim only if (1) landlord withdraws prior to the deadline and (2) customer provably intended to move in.
Litigation Asset protection: Should I hold equity in my home or rental property? I currently own a house (which has a significant mortgage) and a residence which I rent out (which I have almost paid off). The equity in my rental unit is a key part of my retirement savings. I own the rental unit through an LLC so that if I get sued as a landlord I won't lose my house. If I move the equity from the rental LLC into my home, would that prevent any renter who might sue me from accessing it in a judgment? The properties mentioned are located in Utah.	Your first line of defense against liability arising from the rental insurance is property insurance. Your next is the fact that a suit against arising from ownership can only be brought against the LLC, although this works only if you don't personally participate in the conduct that gives rise to the liability. For example, if the LLC hires a gas line repairman and he screws it up and the renters suffocate and die as a result, you probably don't have personal liability (assuming no other negligent acts on your part). But, if you did the gas line work yourself and you screw it up, then you would have personal liability, notwithstanding the existence of the LLC. The best way to avoid personal liability for LLC acts is to vest management of the rental property owned by the LLC entirely in a property management company that enters into a contract to manage the property with the LLC rather than you personally, so that you have no involvement with anything that could give rise to liability. (You could also put a waiver of liability for mere negligence into the lease, but that wouldn't remove contractual or intentional or grossly negligent tort liability exposure.) In cases where liability in excess of insurance coverage is limited to the LLC, then having an LLC with fewer assets is preferable to having an LLC with more assets, so paying off debt on the house rather than the rental first could advance the cause of asset protection. But, the allocation of equity between the rental unit owned by the LLC and your home wouldn't make much of a difference in terms of liability to creditors unrelated to the rental property (e.g. you personally guarantee a business debt that goes bad, or get in a car accident), unless the equity in the home is protected by a homestead exemption in your jurisdiction. Creditors couldn't necessarily get to the rental unit itself, but they could impose a "charging order" on the LLC that owns it, forbidding it from making distributions to you that aren't paid to the creditor instead, which would make it impossible for you to access the equity and rental income you planned on using to support yourself in your retirement. Also, if you took so much equity out of the rental property LLC that the LLC was left insolvent or unable to pay its reasonably foreseeable debts (i.e. undercapitalized), then LLC creditors would probably be able to either recover from you because the removal of equity constituted a "fraudulent transfer" or under a "piercing the corporate veil" theory.	This is a fun one. I don't have any particular domain knowledge about this question. So this one is just a guess. My answer is strictly from a practical standpoint. If I were faced with this situation in real life, what would I do? (Technical point: I feel the vagueness of the language, "Is he allowed to" allows me to answer this way.) My assumptions: My assumptions are that: The cost of consulting an attorney on the matter or filing a law suit would likely exceed the combined total cost of the bike and the lock. Usually, the law follows what "feels right" and what makes common sense to the average person. Usually. Not always. But usually. (Legal principles: "Equity follows the law." and "Equity does not aid a party at fault." See this reference.) What I would do: So, I would do the following... (if I were in the U.S.) I would simply cut the bike lock and repossess my bike (unilaterally) if and only if all the following conditions were true in the situation: I could confirm without any doubt that the bike in question is actually my bike and not just another one that looks just like it. I could not find anyone around who looks like they might be the owner of the lock or the other bike. If I could find the owner of either the lock or the bike it is highly likely there was some mistake and the situation could be resolved directly with them. There are no law officers nearby. If so, I would engage them in helping me rectify the matter. If they said it was a "civil matter" and refused to get involved, I would proceed to the next item on this list. I had the tools handy and available to cut or break the lock. If any of the above conditions were false, I would flag down the nearest law officer or call one to the scene to help resolve the issue. Any other approach would seem impractical to me on the basis of my above assumption numbered 1. If I were anywhere outside the U.S., I would involve the local authorities without considering the unilateral repossession option.	You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right.	Is the debt secured? Lenders can lend money secured or unsecured. If they lend it secured then what is the security? That is, what property secured the loan? For your example that could be a mortgage over the land or a charge over the assets of the LLC or both. In this particular example, it doesn’t make a difference but if the sale of the property only realised $400,000 and the security was a mortgage only then only $400,000 is secured and the rest is unsecured. Further, in some jurisdictions it is a requirement that security interests be “perfected” by complying with administrative provisions to register the security interest on some sort of public record. If this doesn’t happen, the debt is unsecured. Secured creditors rank ahead of unsecured creditors and in the order spelled out in the contracts or equally if the contracts are silent. Unsecured creditors rank in the order spelled out in 11 USC 507. The members of the LLC are not necessarily protected from the bankruptcy if it is possible to pierce the corporate veil.	Short Answer Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? Yes. Unless your lease says otherwise. Your sole source of legal protections is your lease. Without knowing the detailed provisions of your lease, it is impossible to know. Long Answer The General Rule In commercial leases, to a much greater degree than in residential leases, the principle of buyer beware (a.k.a. caveat emptor) applies. Commercial leases are typically negotiated between sophisticated parties, and if the tenant doesn't want to start paying rent until the certificate of occupancy is issued despite a lease that says otherwise, then that is tough luck and the tenant is bound to the terms of the lease. Commercial leases are generally rented in "as is" condition, sometimes with and sometimes without a tenant finish and improvements allowance from the landlord. Unless otherwise agreed, in a commercial lease, the burden is on the tenant to do "due diligence" including a physical inspection of the property by a professional inspector and independent review of the zoning status of the property to confirm that the tenant's business is allowed to operate at that location, much as a buyer of real estate would. If the tenant identifies an objection during the due diligence period set forth in the lease or contract to enter into a lease with the tenant, then the tenant can choose to get out of the lease obligation. But, there is only a due diligence condition if the tenant bargains for it. The lease allocates responsibility to maintain the building in good repair and may allocated this responsibility to the landlord or the the tenant. In one of the most common types of commercial leases, called a triple net lease, virtually all maintenance obligations are the tenant's responsibility: The triple net absolves the landlord of the most risk of any net lease. Even the costs of structural maintenance and repairs must be paid by the tenant in addition to rent, property taxes and insurance premiums. Some firms, such as WeWork build their entire business model around entering into the "as is", triple net commercial leases with landlords that are the norm, and then subletting the properties to smaller businesses on a furnished, all maintenance and building services provided, gross lease basis. Many states have statutory or common law implied warranties of habitability in the case of residential leases that require that a certificate of occupancy be in place and that other conditions be met by the landlord: An implied warranty of habitability is a warranty implied by law in all residential leases [ed. in states that have such a warranty] that the premises are fit and habitable for human habitation and that the premises will remain fit and habitable throughout the duration of the lease. New Mexico, in particular, has many statutory protections for residential tenants (statutes found here). But, almost none of these protections extend to commercial leases in New Mexico, because commercial leases are not leases of dwelling units, as defined in the relevant statutes. Note that not every state even has an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies. Colorado did not have one until the early 2000s, and it had only very weak protections for tenants regarding habitability until the current decade. Before then, in Colorado, a defective or unsafe condition of the premises was not a defense to paying rent under either a commercial or a residential lease in the state. In theory, a county or municipal government could impose a habitability requirement on commercial leases. But, this is very uncommon because, as the examples below illustrate, there are circumstances where it is sensible, even in a fair deal, to place the burden of making property subject to a commercial lease habitable. Examples Of Situations Where This Would Not Be Required In A Fair Deal Most commercial tenants insist upon terms that say that the obligation to pay rent starts when a certificate of occupancy is issued and the tenant is allowed to take possession of the premises. But, there would certainly be some times when a commercial tenant would pay rent on property that does not yet have a certificate of occupancy. For example, in what is called a "pad rental", a business rents a basically vacant lot with only a concrete foundation and utility hookups and zoning approvals in place, and then the tenant builds a shop or office building on the pad. See, e.g., this commercial lease offer on Loopnet, a major internet site for listing property available to be leased by businesses: ABOUT 4900-5100 N WICKHAM RD , MELBOURNE, FL 32940 Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Listing ID: 15146692 Date Created: 2/11/2019 Last Updated: 3/19/2019 1 LOT AVAILABLE - Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Lease Term 20 Years Service Type To Be Determined Date Available Now Space Type Relet Lot Size 0.69 AC DESCRIPTION Pad ready site with all utilities, parking field, ingress/egress, retention, and site lighting IN. Join Goodwill, Einstein's Bagel, Verizon, Twins Car Wash, Wickham Road Music, and Nail Salon in this 100% leased new retail center. HIGHLIGHTS Pad ready site. In a commercial pad lease, typically, a tenant would start paying rent immediately and the length of time needed to get the tenant's shop built and approved for occupancy by local government officials is their problem. But, even then, the terms would depend on what was negotiated between the landlord and the tenant which would depend to a great extent on how hot the local commercial real estate market was and on the other terms. A landlord will usually offer more favorable terms (such as a provision stating that rent is not owed until a certificate of occupancy is issued) in a weak rental market, but may also decide to have very tough lease terms with a somewhat lower monthly or annual rental rate. Also, as in the example above, conditioning rent payment on occupancy or availability for occupancy, is less common in a very long term lease such as the twenty year lease being offered for the pad rental above. Something very similar is done in an existing building that requires tenant finish. At one extreme, the landlord will do tenant finish to the tenant's specifications at the landlord's expense and the tenant will only start to pay rent when the tenant takes occupancy. At the other extreme, the tenant will start paying rent immediately and do the tenant finish at the tenant's sole expense. In between, the tenant may do the tenant's own tenant finish pursuant to landlord approved plans, with the landlord contributing a tenant finish allowance that will often be less than the full anticipated cost of tenant finish work, and the rent will be reduced or waived for a set period of time which may be less than the actual or anticipated time that it takes to complete the tenant finish. This gives the tenant an incentive to not waste tenant finish dollars and to push the contractors doing the work to finish as soon as possible. In yet another example, it wouldn't be terribly uncommon for a landlord to rent a commercial space that is already occupied by squatters, or holdover tenants, to a new tenant on a triple net basis. In a lease like that, the tenant is responsible for evicting the current occupants, rather than the landlord. The promise that the leased property won't be occupied by someone else when the lease commences is called the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" (which is "a covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants."). This provision is often, but not always, included in a commercial lease, although often, courts will imply in law a covenant of quiet enjoyment into even a commercial lease, in the absence of express language in the lease stating that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is not intended to be included in the lease. Conclusion It all boils down to the terms of the lease and a reasonable construction of the relevant lease terms. The fact that there is such a thin amount of legal protection from unfair lease terms is one of the reasons that most commercial tenants hire an attorney to help them negotiate the terms of a commercial lease, in addition to, or instead of, a commercial real estate broker. Footnote: Why Is Commercial Lease Law So Harsh? The duties of a commercial tenant are much closer to, and in some cases, almost identical to, those of an owner of real property and are not infrequently for long terms such as twenty, or even ninety-nine years. Why would a landlord and tenant enter into a commercial lease in these situations, rather than having the prospective tenant simply by the property subject to a mortgage? A lot of this is tax driven. Many businesses would purchase their buildings rather than lease them if taxes were not a consideration and the commercial lease is basically a tax favored alternative to a mortgage payment. When the commercial landlord is a mortgage lender in all but name, and a commercial tenant is a building owner in all but name, it makes sense to place the legal maintenance responsibilities of a building owner on the commercial tenant. A business can deduct every dollar paid in rent from its revenues when determining its taxable income, even the portion economically attributable to land value and depreciation in the structure of the building, as it is paid. But, if the business finances the purchase of the property with a mortgage, the business can deduct the interest paid, but not the principal payments. Depreciation of improvements on real estate (for most of recent U.S. tax history, over a straight line 39.5 year depreciation period) can counterbalance some of the principal payments, although often more slowly than the principal payments are actually made. Also, if depreciation deductions wipe out too much of the business's income, those depreciation deductions are disallowed or deferred. Furthermore, the portion of the purchase price of property attributed to land value can't be depreciated at all. In many cases, this quirk of the tax law is addressed with a business structure in which: (1) a non-profit that doesn't care about the tax treatment of its income leases the land to (2) another business that builds a multi-tenant building on the property which it owns even though it doesn't own the land the building is built upon, subject to a mortgage with a long amortization period similar to the depreciation period for the building, which in turn is (3) leased to businesses that actually used the multi-tenant building by the building owner. Second Footnote On Rent Control and Cooperative Apartments Even further afield, in places like New York City that have rent control, residential tenants become more economically equivalent to apartment owners, and residential landlords become more economically equivalent to a combined mortgage lenders and home owner's association. There was a strong demand for rent control in New York City at the time that rent control was adopted, because economic necessity meant that mostly people needed to live in one unit of a multi-unit apartment building, but the legal concept of ownership of one unit within a larger apartment building that is now commonly called a "condominium" in the United States, did not exist. So, there were a lot of renters in New York City who very much wanted to be de facto apartment owners who didn't have the legal tools available at the time to achieve this goal. The other work around which was used in the Northeast before the condominium was invented was a "cooperative apartment", in which all of the residents of a particular apartment building owned the entire building and were jointly and severally liable on the mortgage on the building, but then were allocated a unit within the building in exchange for economic obligations to the cooperative association that managed the building on a not for profit basis for its owners.	A lease of land is not the same as a residential lease, the latter being strongly regulated by special laws. So caveat emptor is the default rule for land leases (see this article). You have to look at the laws of your state, but let's take Washington as an example. This is not a residential tenancy which is subject to different laws, it's just leasing land, similar to leasing a chainsaw or a car. Your implied warranty would be that the land is fit for the ordinary purposes for which land is used, and that is all. It might be worth wondering about whether building a cabin on the land changes your property tax liability.	The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).	This is complicated. This is state dependent, and as of time of writing, you haven't disclosed what is the relevant state. This is something you should hire/retain a (divorce) lawyer, and discuss with them. The law can be messy; divorces are always messy. The answer is the most common answer in law: it depends, on specific facts. See above, get a lawyer. The first question is "is the money in this investment account a shared asset that I have any claim to". The answer is "it depends". What state are you in, and where did this money come from? Depending on various factors, the answer might very well be "no", in which case, this money (and it's loss) may not affect you at all. If you do have some claim to this money, then it gets even more complicated. "Can this asset be retrieved in a court proceeding and say that he was squandering money?" Maybe, kinda. Technically no (because of the way you phrased that). I'll explain. In a divorce, "shared" assets are divided equitably (Note "equitably" does NOT mean "equally") based on numerous factors, often on a case-by-case basis, and which factors depend on the state. (Therefore, the lawyer you retain should be licensed in the state you/your husband are filing for divorce in). Before your divorce, both sides have (in general) the right to use shared property. They do not have the right to intentionally damage or destroy said property. One complication/grey area is normal use that degrades or damages the value of said property. For example, imagine a classic sports car. Many people drive them for fun; this is normal use. On the other hand, using a classic sports car decreases the value. Is using the sports car unreasonable damage? This is a fact based determination to be made based on specifics. Can this asset be retrieved in a court proceeding [if I] say that he was squandering money? (correction to what I think think you meant). Maybe, but probably not. You can say whatever you want in court, but what matters is what you can prove, as you are the bearing the burden of proof due to making the accusation (and you must prove it to the standard required by the court in your case for your particular motion/accusation, which might be the standard of "the balance of probabilities/more likely than not" or "clear and convincing evidence", or something else; it's complicated, fact dependent and state dependent, so get a lawyer). You don't need to prove that he lost money. If he was day trading before, the fact that he was day trading after the separation is not held against him; day trading is risky, therefore you have to prove that he intentionally lost money (and, potentially, that he intentionally lost money to deny money to you in the divorce, as opposed to e.g. tax loss harvesting). I would recommend hiring a divorce lawyer and discussing it with them.
Arguments in Masterpiece Cakeshop v Colorado Civil Rights Commission Oral arguments were recently held before the supreme court in Masterpiece Cakeshop v Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The discussion was almost exclusively about the 1st amendment's free speech provision and what kinds of business products/services convey a message and therefore should constitute protected speech. The same was true in their petition for certiorari, the replies, and the few amicus briefs I read. My question is about a few other arguments I expected to hear. The first deals with the religious free exercise clause of the 1st amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof It was agreed upon by both sides that the baker refused to bake the cake in question on religious grounds. Is there precedent to suggest that a free exercise claim would not have prevailed? The second argument I expected has to do with the 13th amendment of the United States constitution: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. It seems to me that the baker could have argued that being forced to provide a service that he did not want to provide constitutes involuntary servitude. I am aware that this amendment was introduced to end slavery, but I don't believe this changes what those words mean, does it? Is there precedent that suggests that this interpretation is rejected by the courts or that such an argument would not have been successful? The closest case I could find that might address this is Butler v. Perry, but this case doesn't seem to say anything about one citizen working for another, it was about citizens working for the government.	The religious freedom argument has no legs following Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. With respect to the "involuntary servitude", this was dealt with in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The engagement of Federal power relied on the interstate commerce clause but the current case, as a state law matter, does not need to do this. Basically, by voluntarily providing the goods/service to the public, they agree that they will provide it in accordance with the law governing that kind of commerce. They are free to not provide it to anyone but if they choose to supply it they must supply it to everyone (subject ti normal rules of commerce like the customer actually paying etc.).	Speech of foreign nationals is not treated the same as that of citizens. In the case Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of various statutory limits on campaign spending. Some parts of the law were upheld, others were overturned in 1st Amendment grounds. They upheld limits on contributions to candidates and volunteers' incidental expenses, and overturned limits on expenditures. In the decision, the court observed that [n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and "governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny'" The court stated that Even a 'significant interference with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. This is reasonably-standard strict scrutiny boilerplate language: what it remind you is that no Constitutionally-protected right is absolute, and all rights are subject to limitation, when that right conflicts with a compelling government interest. In the case of the federal contribution laws, that interest is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office. The court then found that under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling. 52 USC 30121 imposes a prohibition which, if placed on US persons, would be held to violate the 1st Amendment. That law prohibits, among others, a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election by "a foreign national", defined to not include lawful permanent residents but otherwise includes all foreign citizens and entities. The constitutionality of this law was challenged on First Amendment grounds but affirmed in Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (written by Kavanaugh in his previous job), and upheld in a one-sentence affirmation by SCOTUS. So, 1st Amendment rights of foreign nationals are not protected to the same extent as those of US citizens. It should be noted that the court also (expressly) did not decide if Congress could also constitutionally ban contributions by LPRs, or could prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in other forms of speech (issue advocacy and speaking on issues of public policy) – that matter was left undecided.	There are no feasible legal actions that you can take. The implausible action is to sue the state on some constitutional grounds and have the order overturned in part. The order contains no appeals process, so you would have to attack the order itself. There are, here and there, lawsuits on Free Expression Clause grounds regarding the shuttering of churches, which stand the greatest chance of prevailing at the level of SCOTUS. Even if the court were to rule that under these circumstances the right to attend mass church meetings cannot be restricted, it is significantly less likely that application of the emergency powers acts to weddings would be found to violate a fundamental right.	In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), the Supreme Court held that "there is no Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation." The Court was unanimous on this point. This means that right now, there is no way to sue for a damages remedy for First Amendment retaliation by federal officials. The majority said that "Congress, not the courts, is better suited to authorize such a damages remedy."	Firstly, because there isn't an explicit Constitutional "right to privacy", per se, and even if there was (and there are arguments that several constitutional provisions amount, in aggregate, to a right to privacy), that it wouldn't be absolute, in the same way that freedom of speech and of the press are not absolutes. Indeed, the closest thing to a right to privacy, the 4th Amendment, has explicit caveats: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (emphasis mine). Thus reasonable searches and seizures, especially those authorized by a warrant, are constitutional. Furthermore, even in light of a constitutional right of privacy derived from this statue, depending on how the "search history" is compiled, the 4th Amendment might not even apply, due to the Katz doctrine, also known as the "open fields" doctrine. Basically, the 4th amendment (as far as searches goes) does not apply to things that are publicly observable; while this would protect a literal "search history" compilation (baring a reasonable search), the searches themselves are public queries, broadcasted over the internet. Anyone watching could compile them into a "search history" themselves.	Leonard's law says that the school can restrict speech if it is against the religious tenets of the organization. Now I don't think school uniforms fall are part of the tenets of Catholicism, so why can private schools enforce dress codes? I see there's a misunderstanding of the Leonard's law. But I fault the California legislators (not you) for that confusion, since the statutory language is ambiguous and leads to the reasonable interpretation your inquiry reflects. The statute reads: (c) This section does not apply to a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. It is not that a religious school is allowed to restrict speech if it contravenes the tenets of that religion, but that the statute altogether is inapplicable to religious schools because it is considered an infringement of fundamental liberties to which religious institutions are entitled in the US. The [religious] school would prevail on the basis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Dermody v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 530 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2017): The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits courts from deciding cases "dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or church government[.]". (Please note that I strongly disagree with the application of that doctrine in the Dermody case and I consider it impermissibly outdated for the controversy litigated therein, but that is a separate issue). A religious school could convincingly argue that the judicial review of its uniforms policy infringes matters of ecclesiastical discipline/rule/custom, aspects which ultimately "involve an internal church dispute over religious authority or dogma" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 220 (2005). Infringements of ecclesiastical abstention and akin doctrines would be outweighed only in "compelling" [cases] because "the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's `paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens'" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct. at 225 (brackets added in this answer). A free speech controversy such as the school's uniform policy simply does not meet that threshold.	I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.	The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit people with no affiliation with the government from trying to convert people to their religion in a way not endorsed by a government official or agency. It could be that there is some content neutral prohibition on strangers accosting young school children if that person is so persistent that it amounts to content neutral harassment, or that the person might actually be a sex offender prohibited from contacting children. But, the facts of the question don't seem to compel this conclusion. Even if it violates any law to do this, it is not a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
Can an employer require attendance at a holiday party over the employee's religious objections? Note: This is related to the question asked at Mandatory participation in workplace holiday potluck, but the issues are not exactly the same, as in that question the issue was not religion, but just that the OP does not like potlucks. Is there any case law or legal precedent regarding the right of an employee to decline to attend a "holiday party" at the workplace on religious grounds? Variations on this question: A workplace hosts a "Christmas party". Can a Jewish employee decline to attend on the grounds that he or she does not celebrate Christmas? If yes, suppose the same workplace rebrands the celebration as a "Holiday party" and adds a menorah to the decorations. Can the Jewish employee still decline to attend on the grounds that it is still, in essence if not in name, a Christmas party? If the employee observes the Jewish dietary laws and therefore cannot eat any of the food at the party, does that make a difference? If the answer is that "holiday party" is inclusive by nature and therefore one cannot claim a religious reason not to attend, what about a member of a religion that does not observe a winter holiday at all, like Jehovah's Witnesses or Muslims?	According to the EEOC, in general: An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. But how religious is this party? Simply calling it a "Christmas party" (or "holiday party") doesn't really make it a "religious activity". Many nonreligious people celebrate Christmas as a general holiday. If the party is nonreligious, then your religion is mostly irrelevant, whether or not it celebrates a winter holiday. The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business. This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion. So, they'd likely have to serve something you could eat if they're serving food, as that would be a reasonable accommodation. (But you'd have to inform them of your needs beforehand; asking them to go out and buy something during the party would probably not be "reasonable".)	once employed, if you revealed in conversation your true beliefs, and they ran counter to what you wrote down, could this give the employer just cause in termination? Texas is by default an at-will employment. Thus, absent a contract establishing termination for just cause, the employee may be terminated for anything (except when that contravenes public policy) or even for no reason at all. But you specifically ask whether the employee's eventual disclosure constitutes just cause. It depends on whether the employment contract specifies that "the employee would be employed for so long as he satisfactorily performed his duties". Hardison v. A.H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167 (1952). In that event, the sole discovery that employee lied about that at the interview is not evidence that the employer was dissatisfied with the employee's work performance. In a context of termination for just cause, Porter v. United Models, Inc., 315 S.W.2d 340, 344 (2008) states that where performance is to be the satisfaction of one of the parties, his dissatisfaction must be founded on facts such as would induce action on the part of a reasonable man. He may not act arbitrarily or without reason in the matter, and the law will say that he is satisfied with that with which he ought to be satisfied. Ultimately, an employer seeks to be satisfied with the employee's actual work performance, rather than with a screening process aimed at predicting the person's work performance on the basis of the employee's personal values.	There are regulations governing occupational safety, whereby e.g. an employer can be fined for forcing employees to work in a literally toxic environment, for instance breathing chlorine gas. You could file a complaint with a state or federal agency (OSHA). You would need to hire a labor lawyer to get advice about your specific circumstance, to see if there is indeed a provision that covers what you describe, though I doubt it would. OSHA's blurb on disease don't obviously cover your situation (they describe situations that govern healthcare workers in intimate contact with infectious materials). However, certain diseases such as TB or Ebola cause a general health quarantine to be imposed, so if a worker comes in with such a disease, action would be taken by the health department. This does not cover sniffles, and probably not pertussis (but that's a local decision). There are also regulations pertaining to disabled employees, whereby an employee who is disabled by having a severely compromised immune system can be entitled to reasonable accommodation, for example allowed to work in a closed room away from others (if the job is not a receptionist job). That entitlement only applies to the employee, and is controlled by objective health danger (requires a doctor's note), and not the comfort level of the employee.	Very briefly, holding political views or having political party affiliations simply do not give a person inclusion in a protected group (Wikipedia) when it comes to federal law. Protected classes do include • Race – Civil Rights Act of 1964 • Religion – Civil Rights Act of 1964 • National origin – Civil Rights Act of 1964 • Age (40 and over) – Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 • Sex – Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Civil Rights Act of 1964 • The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interprets 'sex' to include discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity • Pregnancy – Pregnancy Discrimination Act • Citizenship – Immigration Reform and Control Act • Familial status – Civil Rights Act of 1968 Title VIII: Housing cannot discriminate for having children, with an exception for senior housing • Disability status – Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 • Veteran status – Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 and Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act • Genetic information – Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (Many state laws also give certain protected groups special protection against harassment and discrimination.) In the US, political beliefs are one's own to choose and participate in, mostly due to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (Wikipedia): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble...	What that church is doing is legal. There is a statutory exception in the Fair Housing Act for religious and non-profit organizations. 42 U.S. Code § 3607 - Religious organization or private club exemption Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from giving preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin. Nor shall anything in this subchapter prohibit a private club not in fact open to the public, which as an incident to its primary purpose or purposes provides lodgings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose, from limiting the rental or occupancy of such lodgings to its members or from giving preference to its members.	I believe that under federal law, the franchise owner cannot avoid overtime in this way. A similar case was considered by the Labor Department in 2005 (FLSA2005-17NA): This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the application of the overtime requirements of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to employees who work at two different health care facilities operated by one management company. It is our opinion that all hours worked at any of the facilities must be combined for the purpose of calculating hours worked under the FLSA. The letter explains the logic pretty clearly, with citations. When an employee is "jointly" employed by two or more employers, then the hours are all combined for overtime purposes. 29 CFR 791.2(b) explains how "jointly" is determined: Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as: (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. Paragraph (1) applies: the two employers (the two restaurants) have an arrangement to share the employee's services (the owner is explicitly dividing their hours). Paragraph (3) also applies: both employers are under common control, since the same person owns both. They certainly are "not completely dissociated". The same logic would seem to apply even if the two locations are different restaurants, or different types of businesses. The 2005 letter explains further: Factors that are relevant in finding joint employment include, for example, whether there are common officers or directors of the companies; the nature of the common management support provided; whether employees have priority for vacancies at the other companies; whether there are any common insurance, pension or payroll systems; and whether there are any common hiring seniority, recordkeeping or billing systems. These also seem likely to apply in your hypothetical cases.	Vaccination status does not currently define a protected class under Florida or Federal law. Being or not being vaccinated is not legally recognized as a condition that "substantially limits a major life activity", hence is not an example of disability-related discrimination. The opposite scenario, where an employer refuses to hire an un-vaccinated person, potentially runs afoul of disability discrimination laws when a person has a legal disability that prevents their vaccination. As noted here, due to the scope of the Privacy Rule HIPAA does not directly apply to your question, when the patient discloses information. However, the healthcare provider cannot disclose such information without patient authorization. It's hard to see a First Amendment basis supporting the action (in case the law changes w.r.t. vaccination and discrimination). You could imagine a religion which holds that vaccination against some disease is blasphemy, and forcing an employer to hire the vaccinated is compelled speech which repudiates a fundament of their belief. Even so, it is not sufficient that the business owner holds some odd belief, the belief has to be essential to the nature of the business (see BSA v. Dale). That could be the case of a religious school.	The protection lies in the fact that these sorts of restrictions are expressed in state laws, and states are Constitutionally forbidden from denying to any citizen the equal protection of the law, or from interfering with religion. The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids states from making any law impeding free exercise of religion, or having the effect of establishing a state religion. This means that any law that forbids people of any religious denomination (including atheists) from holding any office (elected or not) under any level of government is unconstitutional. See Torcaso v. Watkins. Moreover, Title VII's protected classes are also (with the exception of sex) suspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause. A state or local government may not pass a law discriminating against a suspect class unless it is a narrowly tailored law which is the least intrusive way to achieve a compelling state interest. In practice, that means a state can't pass a law discriminating on the grounds of national origin, race, or religion. Sex is a quasi-suspect class; government discrimination on the grounds of sex must further an important state interest in a way reasonably related to that interest; again, in practice this will tend to rule out laws saying "no women can be elected to this post." The Americans with Disabilities Act actually does not exclude elected officials. It defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." The Equal Pay Act doesn't apply to elected officials, but again, sex is a quasi-suspect class. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act also excludes elected officials, and this is the one case where a state really could discriminate -- the applicable test is whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, which is not an especially high bar.
Is a "Cash Price" sign legal in the UK (and Republic of Ireland) Long story short we have a load of "Cash Price" sale tickets in stock (small tickets with "Cash Price" written on top, and then you can write the price underneath), but we have been told in passing it's not legal to use "Cash Price" anymore, but I can't find anything online to confirm this.	This is an incomplete answer, but regardless of the state of statutory law in the U.K. and Ireland, most credit card providers, as part of their merchant agreements authorizing a merchant to accept credit card payments, prohibit merchants who accept credit cards from offering a lower price for cash payment than for a purchase using a credit card, despite the fact that in the case of a credit card payment, the merchant has to pay a processing fee to the credit card company that the merchant does not have to pay in a cash transaction. There have been some lawsuits challenging the validity of this requirement, but to the best of my knowledge, none have been successful. Generally speaking, however, it is not illegal to offer a different price if the merchant is paid all at once, as opposed to offering seller financing on installment terms (a different sense of the phase "cash price"), which is a different situation than when a merchant is distinguishing between a credit card payment of the entire price in one go, and a cash payment of the entire price in one go. It isn't entirely clear from your question in what sense "cash price" is customarily used with those tags. Similarly, it is probably permissible to offer one price for people who pay via either cash or a credit card on one hand, and a different price for people who pay via a check (which carries with it a risk that the check will not be honored), since that is not subject to a merchant agreement restriction, although my impression is that checks are used less often for payments in the U.K. (where they were invented) and Ireland, than in the United States.	In general, you still need to pay for the drink. If you had purchased the drink (on credit, ie a tab or similar as you appear to have done), and you had offered the vendor CASH, and he had refused, [if you can prove you offered him cash] he would be unable to pursue you for the debt (technically you would still owe it to him, but as he had declined government issued tender the government won't act on his claim, so he has no remedy available to him to extract payment - although he can refuse to serve you in future etc). Paying through a debit card is not the same as paying cash - although the money goes out of your account and into his, its not "legal tender" in the same way cash is.	I am not aware of any law making this illegal. You need to avoid any "bait and switch" tactics, though, like initially offering cola for $1 and then not actually letting them buy it for that price.	It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.	Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.	In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime.	It will vary by jurisdiction. This is a complicated area of law, but usually an advertisement or a display of goods in a shop is not an "offer" (in the contract law sense of the term), but an invitation to treat (or "invitation to bargain" in the US). The "offer" is the shopper saying "I'd like one of those please" or putting the goods on the band for the till. The "acceptance" is the checkout girl saying "that'll be ..."	england-and-wales The government grants limited rights of return (thanks Jen), for which you are entitled to a cash or cash-like refund (e.g. reversal of a credit card charge as described below). The vendor has the option to go above and beyond that statutory minimum as a courtesy to the customer. In that non-compulsory zone, they have the liberty to offer store scrip rather than a cash refund. Of course, any business can try to cheat you, and then you have to stick up for your rights by insisting or reporting to relevant authorities. united-states If you buy with a credit card, the rules and contractual obligations of the credit card companies oblige the merchant to accept returns by doing a refund to the card. It's important to understand how this happens: the merchant isn't just picking an arbitrary amount of money and doing a new "sale in reverse"... they are identifying a specific past transaction that already happened, and modifying or reversing it. That is a system safeguard so they don't credit the wrong person or be tricked into a reversal on a transaction that never happened. That's why they want your receipt. On a cash transaction, it is sellers prerogative whether to issue cash or store credit. Issuing store scrip is a reasonable option to deter theft and fraud. For instance someone who wanted an item could get it for free, by buying the item, taking it home, returning the next day without the item, grab another identical item off the shelf and sneak over to the CS line and "return" it with yesterday's receipt. With cash sales, that would be completely untrackable, and the thief is gone. With credit card, they have your identity; with scrip they can "flag" the scrip in their system to either prevent its use and/or have a security officer detain you if you try to use it. For instance American home stores will cheerfully take re-saleable condition items back even without a receipt, but will issue a store voucher for the value rather than cash. That policy would be a disaster if they refunded cash. As it is, I find it rather convenient! So if you want the convenience of cash refunds, you can just use credit cards - gaining the feature at the expense of anonymity.
Terminating an employment agreement with non existing "statutory notice period" I received an employment contract for a definite term of six months. One of the articles in this agreement states (literally): The Agreement can be terminated prematurely by each of the Parties with due observance of the statutory notice period. According to the Dutch law, there is only a statutory notice period defined for indefinite term contracts. To terminate a definite term contract, the law requires mutual written agreement of both parties (besides cantonal court, urgent dismissal or after consent of the employee insurance agency). The contract itself does not determine any notice period, neither does the law, so what (if anything) does this article effectively mean? Would it automatically fall back to the law applicable to indefinite term contracts?	The Agreement can be terminated prematurely by each of the Parties with due observance of the statutory notice period. equates to: The Agreement can be terminated prematurely by each of the Parties with due observance of [nothing]. which means: The Agreement can be terminated prematurely by each of the Parties	Unilateral termination clauses are legal and very common They even have a name: termination for convenience. However, a contract is not terminated unless and until it is communicated to the other party. Rights and obligations that have accrued up until termination are enforceable.	being overtime-exempt means they're not required to pay me time & 1/2 for overtime, but they're not prohibited from doing so correct? No, the employer is not prohibited from paying you time & 1/2 for overtime. Nor is the employer doing you a favor with respect to the overtime you have been paid already. The employer looks foolish by telling you "I'm doing you a favor by breaching our contract only for future payments but not for past ones". are they required to keep paying me that as part of the contract or can they just stop whenever they'd like since I'm exempt? Yes, the employer is required to keep paying you under the terms of your contract: 1.5 times the normal rate in case of overtime. Your clarification reflects that the notion of "overtime-exempt" is not contemplated in the contract at all, and the employer just brought it up belatedly. Even if the contract were ambiguous or contradicted itself in this regard, the doctrine of contra proferentem would entitle you to the reasonable interpretation that favors your position (that is because the employer is the party who drafted the contract).	A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company.	In one sense, nothing. Absence of such language would not cancel any statutory rights. One purpose of such language is that the consumer cannot later claim that the company tried to hide those statutory rights. In some consumer protection statutes, attempting to decisive a consumer into thinking that s/he does not have the rights granted by statute may itself be unlawful and a ground for damages. Also a court may be less likely to void the contract as contrary to the statue, when the contract says that it should be read as subject to the statute and the consumer's rights under it. Also, once such language becomes common, drafters of corporate contract language often imitate it without thinking what actual purpose it serves.	People are laid off all the time when sales are down, the market is bad, etc: there is no legal "right to a job" except whatever is in your employment contract. There is a legal concept of promissory estoppel which boils down to promises being binding. However, there has to be a clear and definite promise, not for example a statement like "we hope to bring you back after this is over". Normally, the employer can argue that they have the right to fire you regardless of performance, and that would be the end of it. Let's say you have it in writing, and it is clear that they unconditionally promise to hire you back: you would want to (e)stop them from arguing that they have the right to fire you. The underlying idea of promissory estoppel is that such a promise keeps them from making that argument. But: it is not enough that they made the promise, you also had to rely on the promise and act / forbear from acting in some way because of that promise. It could be, for example, taking another job, or moving to another country, or simply looking for another job. The hard part, then, would be getting a clear and definite promise.	Assuming you have a six-month Assured Shorthold Tenancy, you don't have to give any notice at all. As long as you are not in occupation after the end of the tenancy (which means moving out before it ends), that's it. For example, this page from Shelter says: The general rule is that the tenant can leave on the last day of a fixed-term tenancy without giving notice, and this will end the tenancy.[2] If the tenant remains even a day longer than the last day of a fixed-term tenancy, a statutory periodic assured shorthold tenancy will arise, which the tenant can end by serving a valid notice to quit. [2] Right d. Flower v. Darby (1786) 1 T.R. 159; Cobb v Stokes (1807) 8 East 358. This is extremely bad news for landlords, who don't (necessarily) get any notice that they have a void. In general, I would say you ought to give a month's notice (full disclosure, I am a landlord), on the other hand, if they haven't fulfilled their responsibilities perhaps not (but you may have an exaggerated idea of their responsibilities). If you do this, don't expect to get a good reference from your landlord! (Which is going to make it harder to find somewhere else to live). You should also anticipate difficulties in recovering your deposit (you are legally entitled to it back, but that doesn't mean your landlord can't be difficult about it - possibly even requiring you to sue for it). I have just noticed the second part of your question. If you do nothing (in other words, stay in residence), at the end of your Assured Shorthold Tenancy you will switch to a periodic tenancy. The landlord can't force you to switch to another six-month contract, but on the other hand, if you don't, they are perfectly entitled to give you two months notice. If they are smart, they will give you this notice now, so that you can only stay for two months on the periodic tenancy. Note that the letting agent has an incentive to get you and the landlord to sign another contract (they can charge the landlord a fee for it), so they may not be being entirely honest about whether a periodic tenancy is an option. (On the other hand, a poor landlord may be more interested in locking a tenant in for six months.)	This is not an NDA (non-disclosure agreement), it is a non-compete agreement. An NDA would tell you that you cannot disclose anything you did or saw at your old employer's place. A non-compete agreement is what you have here, an agreement that limits your ability to get work. If what you say is correct, then your employer is not exactly the brightest. You stay that you haven't been given a written notice, and your contract says that a "Notice of termination will only be valid if it is given in writing". So you haven't been given valid notice. There is no reason why you would sign the non-compete agreement. If they plan to fire you without notice if you don't agree, they have a problem: Your contract doesn't allow them to do that. And they have apparently not given any written notice yet. So what they can do is as soon as they decide that you are not signing, they can give you one month written notice.
Can a TOS supersede Contract Law? I've recently used a "service" app. It connects handypeople / cleaners to users and facilitate the transaction. The App confirmed the appointment and took payment. 55 minutes before the appointment was due take place they cancelled it. I lost a day's wages and travel expenses. I've asked for them to take ownership and cover my losses with a GOGW a nominal £50 (this was less than my actual losses) If I had cancelled in that time frame or not been there to let them in they would have charged me. They've replied that in their TOS they've covered this basically saying they wont be liable. Can a TOS override what I consider to be basic contract law? Would I have a case in the small claims court?	TOS are a contract. If you have a contract through the App, you have incorporated the TOS as a term of your contract. Contracts mean what they say they do, what you are thinking of as "basic contract law" is actual just an ordinary and customary term that people in your industry usually make a part of the contract, not contract law itself.	If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money.	The contract between you and the company is for the supply of the goods. How they get them to you is irrelevant; they may have them in stock, or they may order them and ship them on, or they may send an order to the factory to ship them directly to you. There is nothing saying that they have to be in stock anywhere. The law you refer to says that they must ship within 30 days unless they provide a specific date. In effect "shipped within 30 days" is an implicit term in the contract. If after 30 days they have not shipped the goods then you are entitled to rescind the contract (i.e. get your money back). Where things get interesting is if they took your money knowing that they would not be able to ship within 30 days, or at least being reckless (i.e. not caring) about it. It does rather sound like this may be the case. If so then it may rise to the level of fraud, and the FTC or state authorities may take action. Try writing to the FTC. A single event won't get any action, but if they get lots of complaints then they might.	Law SE is not for direct legal advice. You're in the middle of a contract dispute that has turned acrimonious and need to find legal help. Google for free or low cost legal aid in your area. If this "point person" has mentioned a lawyer or made legal threats, you do need legal help.	A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from).	For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.	Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario.	In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you.
Is it legal to download progamming eBooks from GitHub? I recently planned to buy one of the book from Microsoft Press Store online. But browsing through one of the technical blog, I found the blog author providing link to download the same eBook for free. I can also see some GitHub repositories have programming eBooks for free. Is it legal to download the eBooks or can I just view them online ?	If the blog author holds the copyright on the ebook, they can distribute the ebook anyway they choose, either via download from Github or elsewhere, or sell it in an online store. They hold the copyright, they alone can decide how to distribute it. If they also sell the ebook in the Microsoft press Store, they may have an agreement with the store to also allow their own free downloads; it's hard to say without knowing the agreement. If there are ebooks on Githb available for viewing or download, the owner of the Github page should hold copyright of the ebook, both 1) for their own protection against copyright infringement, and 2) to not break GitHub's TOS against copright infringement: https://help.github.com/articles/github-terms-of-service/#f-copyright-infringement-and-dmca-policy	Yes. The license itself is really just one sentence long, and states explicitly that this is allowed. Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.	It's really your client that should be asking these questions. Writing the app is perfectly legal. So you can enter a contract with that client to write the app and deliver it to them, ready to be put on the Google Play store or the App Store (entering a contract needs to be done carefully, obviously). I'd make 100 million percent sure that the contract states clearly that you have zero responsibility if the app is rejected or removed for non-technical reasons, and that the legality of actually selling and running the app is also not your responsibility. The reason is that I very much suspect that running the app might be illegal, and that the chances of getting it permanently on one of the stores are rather slim. And solving those problems is outside of what a software developer can competently do.	It's possible that CAD has a separate licence from the authors of ABC that allows them to produce a closed source copy. If not, they have no right to distribute CAD. However two wrongs don't make a right, and so you don't get to violate the copyright of CAD.* Unfortunately, unless you are one of the authors of ABC, you have no standing to sue the authors of CAD. You can only notify the authors of ABC and hope they do. If the authors of ABC don't have the resources to pursue the matter, you may be out of luck. That's one of the reasons the FSF gets copyright assignments for their projects. * It turns out that this is a much more debateable issue than I first thought. Some courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work is not copyrightable.	Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..."	You are in general correct, KBurchfiel. A code snippet such as import math; or For i := 1 to 10 print i; has no originality, and is not protected by copyright. A post eplaining the meaning an usage of such a snippet might well be original enough to be protected by US copyright, indeed it probably would. But the code on its own would not be. Anyone could read such a post, and if s/he understood it, use the code snippet and not be in violation of copyright, not compelled to place the entire program in which such a snippet was used under a CC-=BY-SA license. The creative commons people would prefer that a CC license not be applied to a publication that is not protected by copyright, and if it is so applied it is legally meaningless. But they have no legal way to enforce such a preference. A stack exchange post that consisted of nothing but such an uncopyrightable code snippet, with no explanation r discussion, might well be downvoted or even deleted. But that is a matter of site policy on what is a useful answer, not a matter of copyright. Using an excerpt from a copyrighted work so small that the excerpt alone would be uncopyrightable, would probably be fair use under US law, and might well be fair dealing in UK law. Something that is fair use does not compel the reuser to abide by the terms of a CC license, because those terms apply only when the content could not be reused without the CC license's permission. However, a code snippet does not need to be very much more original than the above examples before it becomes copyrightable. Whether it can be used via fair use rather than via the CC-BY-SA license is a very fact-based decision (the usual four-factor analysis is spelled out in 17 USC 107).. But if the snippet can be rewritten to express the same concepts but in a different expression, then there is no copyright issue, and again the CC license will not apply. If the snippet is complex and original enough to be copyrightable (a fairly low bar) and it is re-used unchanged, under conditions where fair use does not apply, then the CC-BY-SA license's terms must be complied with for the use to be legal. That is several "IFs" however. The exact details of a specific case will matter in such cases, there is not one rule for all snippets, all posts, or all programs.	The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.	Udemy claims that all the videos and course content are copyrighted, but does that also hold for the material of the course? Yes, all the material is copyrighted. Ideas are not, material and content is. it would be really useful to me if I could take a large part of that code ... I want to know if I am allowed, by the law, to use this code for commercial purposes, or is it protected as the intellectual property? Yes, it is protected, specifically it has copyright applied and you may only use it if the license it is distributed under allows you to - in some cases this may be a permissive license, or the code may be obtainable legitimately from another source under a permissive license, in which case its usable. But in many cases, it may not be distributed under a permissive license or indeed any license, and in such cases you will not be permitted to use it. The license under which the code is released depends on the individual course, and in many cases the source code repository or download site for the code for the course. Check their for a license.
Law regarding name suffixes Background: My parents were having a discussion of how name suffixes can be utilized if I started having children, how would name suffixes occur. This was all hypothetical. My father, and let's call him, Bob, claims that if I (who has a different name from Bob) have a child named, "Bob", then I will be able to name my child Bob II (Bob, the second) or Bob Jr. He thinks that regardless of a generational gap between the child and father, his grandson is allowed to have a suffix for his own name that indicates a succeeding suffix for the name of Bob. My mother claims that I would not be able to name my child Bob II or Bob Jr. because in order to have such suffix requires a continual generational naming convention. For instance, if my name was Bob, then I can name my child Bob II or Bob Jr. if and only if my name was Bob. Therefore, if my father's and child's name was Bob, it has to be Bob and only Bob without any suffixes. I've tried looking for laws in the United States that says anything about suffixes for names but I haven't found anything. Question: Are there any laws in the United States or any of its states that restrict the usage of name suffixes, such as II, or Jr., or IV, etc.? Whose claim was correct about when it is legal to use name suffixes?	The law allows you to name your child whatever you want with some exceptions: names containing ideograms, pictograms, diacritical marks, obscenities or too long names are prohibited. That said, there is no law to forbid naming your child Bob Jr. (or even Bob Sr. or Bob The Great). With numbers, things are a little bit tricky and vary from state to state, but using Roman suffixes is normally allowed, which means the law won't stop you naming your child Bob XVII or whatever: No state prohibits the use of a numeral if it is spelled out. It would be permissible, for example, to name a child "Eight." But several states prohibit the use of a numerical symbol, which would prohibit naming a child "8." New Jersey, for example, permits the State Registrar to reject names that contain "numerals" or a "combination of letters, numerals, or symbols. In Illinois, administrative practice prohibits numerals when used as the first character in a child’s name. Texas prohibits numerals as part of the name or suffix, although Roman numerals may be used for suffixes. Thus, a child could be named "John William Turner III," but not "John William Turner 3" or "John William 3 Turner." (from the paper by Carlton F.W. Larson).	A change of name is just that - it's a change; not the creation of an alter ego. From How to make your own deed poll: Use the following wording: “I [old name] of [your address] have given up my name [old name] and have adopted for all purposes the name [new name]. And from the Form LOC19 guidance document: I ABSOLUTELY and entirely renounce relinquish and abandon the use of my old name and assume adopt and determine to take and use from the date of this Deed my new name in substitution for my old name.	Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? No. Only sometimes. (Literally, you can always ask, but sometimes the answer will be clearly "no", as a matter of law.) Some presumptions of paternity are conclusive (either immediately or after a statute of limitations to contest paternity expires) and can't be overcome by contrary genetic evidence. Other presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. The specifics vary in important details from state to state. The theory behind the conclusive presumption is primarily that the presumed parent in those circumstances becomes the psychological parent, and it is not in the best interests of the child to dislodge a psychological parent, even if that parent is not a biological parents. Put another way, a conclusive presumption is really part of the definition of what a father is under the law. Several other answers at Law.SE have addressed this in the context of specific U.S. states. An answer here considers California law and another answers the question under New York law.	If you form an LLC, and then someone later obtains a registered trademark in the same name, the registered trademark would be enforceable everywhere except in the markets and places where the LLC developed common law trademark rights prior to their registration. Your LLC formation would also put a bump in the road in their trademark application. You can, of course, do both, although it is unclear to me why you feel such urgency in the likelihood of an infringement, which suggests that there may be relevant facts that aren't revealed by your post.	The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.	If Person A commits a criminal or civil offense on Day 1, which then becomes lawful on Day 2, can Person A be prosecuted or sued on Day 3 (Day 1, 2, and 3 are not necessarily subsequent days, but happen in this order)? As a general rule they can be prosecuted but the exactly language of the effective date language in the statute controls. It might say, for example, "effective for prosecutions filed after Day 2" in which case it couldn't be prosecuted. Also, if Person A is a minor when the offense occurred, but is now an adult, would the person be legally considered a minor or an adult if prosecuted or sued? Generally speaking, a minor. But this is a function of the language of the statute in question in the case of juvenile prosecutions. If a statute of limitations is shortened, then does the new one apply or the one that existed when the person did the crime/tort? Again, it depends upon the effective date language of the statute. Typically, it will apply to suits filed after the effective date.	It is technically legal, but enforcement of such legality would face insurmountable difficulties without a compelling commercial interest. Legality A George Washington Law Review article states that An influential 1979 law review article concluded that when parents agree, they “should have the freedom to give their children any reasonable surname.” Courts could disallow “a surname chosen for a child by his parents if it were so outrageous or obscene that it was clearly not in the child’s best interests to bear the surname.” But terms like “reasonable” and “outrageous” are highly subjective and give little guidance to courts on what factors to take into account. The most relevant bodies of constitutional doctrine are substantive due process jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment and free speech jurisprudence under the First Amendment. This Part develops the arguments for a parental naming right under both bodies of law, and concludes that strict scrutiny is the relevant standard for analyzing restrictions on that right. It further concludes that current laws prohibiting certain surnames and laws prohibiting diacritical marks are unconstitutional, as they are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Laws against obscenities, ideograms and pictograms, and certain length restrictions pass strict scrutiny, as do requirements that the child receive at least two names. Meaning that in the absence of a state law prohibiting a certain naming convention, anything goes. But states have the power to pass laws to narrowly define what kinds of names are contrary to "compelling state interest." A review of relevant history and laws, applicable to change of surname in a divorce in Wisconsin, concluded that, because of Jocius v Jocius, "child's best interest" is not a standard available to Wisconsin courts to empower the courts to force a change of a child's name contrary to parents' wishes. Such legislation can be passed, but it hasn't been. Impracticality However, some of costs associated with having a blank last name would be: obtaining insurance having any medical procedures registering for school getting a library card and many, many more. In fact, the last two are currently technically impossible because Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction demands that "first and last name are required." It is likely that overcoming the confusion resulting from not having a last name would turn most daily life activities into something that would require a letter from an attorney, or even a court order. Without a substantial commercial gain from this arrangement, this would be an experiment with an unjustified prohibitive cost. Lighter side The day-to-day difficulties resulting from the absurdities of such an experiment could be easily developed into a plot for a comedy. Personally, I was imagining a few potential South Park plot lines while trying to think through the implications of this arrangement. The likely outcome, of not having a real last name, would be that many clerks would end up simply making them up for such an individual, in order to accommodate their computer systems. And hilarity would undoubtedly ensue. Edit while I appreciate the "+1"-for-the-effort gesture of the upvotes, I am actually surprised that this answer has gotten as many upvotes as it has. I would gladly delete it if a better referenced answer, with more specific information, came along. I wrote this mostly to list the references which I found. The conclusion which I draw here is what I personally have been able to deduce from those references. So, please, stop upvoting. This is not a high-quality answer. And the fact that the answer is looking like it may very well be "yes" makes this an interesting question, that deserves a better answer.	Both parents are legally responsible for the financial costs of raising a child. If you don’t have day-to-day care of the child, you may have to pay child maintenance to your partner or she may apply for maintenance and name you as the parent who has to pay maintenance. You are allowed to deny that you are the father of the child and if she wishes to pursue it further, you both may be asked to take a DNA test in order to prove or disprove that you are the father. You cannot force her to do this. It must be voluntary on both sides. If you're just looking to force her to have a DNA test based on the morality of raising a child then whilst I admire your attitude, unfortunately this is not something you can force her to do. For more information on this matter, head over to this article on the citizens advice website. I hope this helps
How can the constitutionality of a Law be challenged in the USA? Can the constitutionality of a law in the United States be challenged other than through the Supreme Court?	In the United States, the constitutionality of a law can be challenged in any court. Unless and until the court is reversed by a higher court, then the law will be considered unconstitutional and invalid. A jury can also theoretically nullify a law for any reason, including unconstitutionality, however, the jury's finding will only hold for that one case that they are trying.	The new law wins. That's rather the point of passing a new law-- the legislature wants to change the current law of the land whether that is based on statutes or court rulings. Of course, there are caveats. Prior judicial rulings may have relied on an interpretation of a source of law that supersedes the legislature in question (i.e. based on an interpretation of the state or federal Constitution or based on a federal law that supersedes the state law). In that case the new law would be found unconstitutional or ignored. Or the new law might have an ambiguous interaction with current law that courts would have to resolve. The new law might clearly make X illegal but there may be legitimate questions about whether it intended to make previously legal action Y illegal as well. It is, after all, very difficult to write a law that covers every possible fact pattern one would encounter in the real world.	There is no higher court which can overturn a SCOTUS decision, so in theory (or, imaginarily) they can rule any way they please. The ruling could then be overturned by a later court, as happened in these cases. However, justices of the Supreme Court can be impeached (impeachment is not subject to judicial review), so the individuals responsible for such a ruling could be impeached. Or, if the sitting president is favorable and the enabling legislation has been passed, additional members of the Supreme could be added, as was unsuccessfully attempted during the Roosevelt administration. The court could not write specific enforceable statutes defining the crime and imposing a penalty. They could rule that there is such-and-such right which is protected by the Cconstitution, and that that right must be protected by the states (for instance, a state may not pass a law that prohibits practicing the Pastafarian religion). It would be unprecedented, though, for SCOTUS to order a legislature to pass particular legislation. That would not mean that a ruling could not be written which mandated that, but it would be a huge break from tradition and a clear breach of the separation of powers. Legislatures could respond "they have made their decision; now let them enforce it". Decades ago, existing state death penalty laws were declared unconstitutional as defective with respect to the 8th Amendment, meaning that there was no death penalty in many states for some time. Homicide statutes could likewise be struck down en masse, perhaps as an Equal Rights violation, which would means that either homicide is now legal, or the Equal Rights violation in those statutes must be eliminated. All that SCOTUS would have to do is rule that a fetus is a person. Recall Roe v. Wade: If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. A model for how this might take place is McCleary v.Washington, where the Washington Supreme Court ordered the legislature to act to fund public education, on constitutional grounds that the legislature has an obligation to do certain things. The leverage imposed by the court was a large daily contempt fine that went up to over $100 million. However this was symbolic (lifted when the legislation was passed), and it took 3 years to implement the order.	If you want to sue them, you should start with the US Constitution (as a model), in particular the Free Exercise clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". The question is whether one could overturn homicide statutes on the grounds that an individual holds to traditional beliefs that a human sacrifice is required every few months. Or, is it an unconstitutional prohibition of the Mormon belief in polygamy to outlaw polygamy, see Reynolds v. US, 98 U.S. 145. The court held that the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains is whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship; would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Observe that a religious exception to the law would be unconstitutional, as establishing religion as a means of gaining extra rights. The reductio ad absurdum of the unfettered religious-belief excuse is: Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. The "wall of separation" was modified more recently in the 60's and 70's. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the issue was compulsory education imposed on Amish children, where higher education was held to be antithetical to the Amish doctrine of a simple life. The court rules that The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children and especially it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish There were additional holdings pertaining to the legitimacy of the purported belief (that is, is there really such a doctrine – clearly yes). You might have better luck purporting to be a Rastafarian or Hindu, so I will set aside that complication. The core question will be whether the government has a "compelling interest" in the restriction, also whether the restriction is narrowly tailored. In the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, Sherbert's employer required her to work 6 days a week (a change in policy during her time of employment), which she refused to do (as a member of SDA) and was fired. Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits because the firing was for cause. The court ruled that Disqualification of appellant for unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturday contrary to her religious belief, imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her religion. and There is no compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute which justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's right to religious freedom under the First Amendment. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 brings us to the neighborhood that you are interested in living in. The relevant detail is that Smith (and Black) were fired for ingesting peyote in connection with a ceremony at a Native American church. The court ruled that The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use To be more precise, Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. We can contrast this with Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520. The city of Hialeh passed an ordinance forbidding animal sacrifice, specifically to suppress the Santeria church. The Supreme Court said, no, you may not do that: Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied ... The ordinances' texts and operation demonstrate that they are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria's central element, animal sacrifice. At least so far, restrictions on drug use have not been overruled as conflicting the the Free Exercise clause, although if e.g. Washington state were to prohibit Mormons from purchasing marijuana (where others can), that would surely be struck down as unconstitutional. There are a number of other relevant developments, for example Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, in reaction to Employment v. Smith, and that law statutorily mandating that strict scrutiny be applied to the question of whether a law violates the 1st: but this was ruled unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. Then in Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (Schedule 1 tea for religious purposes), the court ruled that The courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca which is to say, we have a case where the federal government was prohibited from enforcing a drug prohibition involving religion. A challenge of the type which you have in mind will surely also involve the question of the legitimacy of the purported religion, where UDV was founded in 1961 whereas one might suspect that your claimed religion is a pretext to smoke pot (hence the Rastafarian suggestion). The WWII era conscious objector cases held that the CO exception to military service is not limited to governmentally-approved religions, but as a general rule, the courts have not ruled that you can simply claim to have a religious belief which is being infringed on and thereby be excempt from the law. The basic issue would be whether either the US government of the state of Kentucky have a compelling interest in preventing the use of marijuana. The Kentucky Supreme Court does indeed recognize the concept of "strict scrutiny", so the case is not doomed from the start.	No The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. Any courts the Congress creates are, by definition, inferior. Of course, Congress can overrule a SCOTUS decision by passing a law to that effect,unless the decision defines a right under the Constitution. So they couldn’t overturn Roe but they could overturn Dobbs. It’s largely the gutlessness of Congress in grappling with controversial issues that has put SCOTUS in the position of lawmaker.	They can't overturn the decision; but they don't have to. The holding in Dobbs was that the US Constitution does not provide a right to an abortion, and so a state law prohibiting abortions is not unconstitutional. Congress can't "overturn" it in the sense that they can't make the Constitution provide such a right, short of a constitutional amendment. But that in itself doesn't stop them from providing such a right in other ways, e.g. through ordinary legislation. Under the Supremacy Clause, such a law would supersede any state bans; provided that it falls within the scope of Congress's enumerated powers, which assertion would itself probably be challenged in court. If it's within their legislative power, then there's no conflict with Dobbs. To give a more mundane example, nobody thinks that there is a constitutional right to have an airline ticket refunded within 24 hours of purchase. If the Supreme Court ever had occasion to rule on the question, they would surely hold that nothing in the US Constitution says that people have this right. But Congress does have the power, under the Commerce Clause, to pass legislation that confers such a right on consumers. They have done so, and this law would not in any way conflict with the aforementioned hypothetical Supreme Court ruling.	The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact.	Washington v. Davis held that if a law or other action (in this case, a Verbal Skill Test as part of D.C. police hiring practices) is not necessarily unconstitutional if it results in discriminatory outcome. In order to be actionable against the state, one must prove that the law was intended to discriminate from the creation of the law. Your quoted source is in fact wrong and your number 2 option is the correct summation of the quote. Only laws that are purposefully discriminatory are unconstitutional.
Is there any way I could sue ezpass? Is there any way I could sue ezpass? For no reason ez pass MA did not charge my credit card claiming it does not work and send me invoice plus late fees!	You can absolutely sue the entity that operates EZpass because it is a private company and you have a monetary dispute with it (unless the agreement you entered into with EZpass to allow it to charge your credit card contains an arbitration clause). But, this would make no sense. Everybody agrees that you owe EZpass money for tolls that you admit that you incurred, and if you don't pay that you are clearly in the wrong. The fact that they weren't able to charge your credit card for some reason (who knows, maybe there's a typo in your records or the phone line had static at a critical moment when they tried to process the charge, it doesn't really matter why), doesn't mean that you don't owe them money for the tolls that you incurred and if the sue you at a time when you still owe money for that toll you will definitely lose. The only dispute is over the late fee. And, the dispute is that you have to pay something that you haven't actually paid. So, in the status quo, in which you haven't paid a late fee which you believe you don't owe, and you are winning for now. Generally speaking, one brings a lawsuit to change the status quo. EZpass is the party that claims you owe money and hasn't been paid, so ordinarily EZpass would sue you and not the other way around, because it wants to change the status quo. Now, realistically, bringing a lawsuit for a single late fee is insane. The filing fee alone is more than the late fee, you couldn't afford to hire a lawyer for twelve minutes without paying more than the cost of the late fee, and the contract with EZpass very likely doesn't allow you to get your attorneys' fees if you prevail. The bigger question, which might make a lawsuit worthwhile, is that if you don't pay your late fee, EZpass could ban you from using toll roads entirely and impose big fines that are authorized by your agreement with you if you do. In short, if you can't work it out with customer service reps and their managers at EZpass over the phone, you would be a complete fool to sue rather than to pay the late fee that you think was wrongly imposed. Not every battle, even when you are in the right, is worth fighting.	You have a third option: Sue the district for violating state or local law. There are lots of recent news stories about people doing just this and winning. The US Constitution Can't Help You: The school district is not violating your constitutional rights by installing lights at the stadium. The only constitutional protection remotely connected to your situation is the "takings clause" of the 5th Amendment. It says, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Unfortunately, the "takings clause" only applies if there is a "taking." A "taking" is generally understood to be exactly that -- you lose your property. The loss can be literal -- the government takes title to your house and turns it into a football field or freeway on-ramp -- or figurative -- the disturbance from the football field or on-ramp is so pervasive that your property becomes worthless. Since having the lights on will not destroy the value of your property, the takings clause does not apply to you. As one Justice said in a related case, the lesson here is simple: "the federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable." State or Local Law Might Help You: Even though you don't have a constitutional claim, depending on what state and city you live in, you may have a claim under state or local law. (These might be statutes, regulations, ordinances, or even your state constitution.) For example, in 2010 a group of home owners in Atherton, California who lived near the local high school sued when the school announced plans to install stadium lights. The suit claimed the lights violated local height limits, and that the night games would violate noise ordinances. The suit, plus a savvy pr campaign, got the school to agree to limits on night games. Atherton is not alone. All the way across the country, in Greenwich, Connecticut, neighbors upset about stadium lights sued and got an agreement about the use of lights. A search using high+school+lights+neighbors+sue turns up plenty of other examples. You will have to talk to a local attorney to find out what state or local laws you can use.	Small claims court was created for such matters. There is the possibility of a fee waiver, and if you prevail, you could get some of your costs covered (though there are other hoops to jump through if you need enforcement). A formal letter (written by you) stating that you intend to seek a legal judgment against him/her in the amount owed might be sufficient motivation for the person to pay what is owed.	Unfortunately, your chances are nil. There are panels on every metro station where tickets and fares are listed, and on those a summary of the conditions is posted and a pointer to where to get the full conditions: not only the web but also at the customer centers. Nonetheless, the ATM ticket conditions are also published at the DOGC, short for Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya. That's where all laws are published and, although in reality almost no one reads that, whatever gets published there is assumed to be known for all citizens. It's the basis for the "not knowing the law does not allow you to not obey it" principle. By the way, the T-10 usage condition (or any other ticket that allows shared use like T-70/30) state that, if used by more than one person at once, all of them have to make the same exact journey: enter all at the same station, exit all at the same station.	I live in MD near DC, and have been ticketed by the cameras in both DC and MD. At least for speeding and red-light violations (and I think for all camera detected violations) these are just fines, not true moving violations in that no license points are assessed, and there is no impact on insurance, provided the ticket is paid, unlike what would have happened had an officer written the ticket in person. One can contest the ticket, but it is not likely to be worth the time and trouble. This policy of not assessing points is precisely because there is no assured way of determining who the driver is with current technology, although cameras that can see the driver through the windshield and match him or her against a database by facial recognition may be coming. Currently a human reviews the images in an effort to rule out false positives and certify that an actual violation is shown. The name and title of this person is shown on the notice I get, at least from MD. What one can do "proactively": do not speed or go through red lights pay all camera tickets promptly (or file the paperwork to contest them). If unpaid beyond the deadline they turn into more serious violations that do carry points, just like failing to attend a court date.	In the case of McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, we can tell because that case has been legally decided. As the court says, there was a contract and "the patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules", and plaintiff "failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel". They did not "represent to her that a bonus would be available if she played the game", and did not "promise to pay the $41 million after the notice was displayed". The (very complex) rules of the game are easily available on the machine, and there is a prominent disclaimer that "MALFUNCTION VOIDS ALL PAYS AND PLAYS". Under the rules, the winning configuration stated that she was entitled to $1.85. The problem was that it also announced "Bonus Award - $41797550.16". This was due to an inexplicable software error which in communicating with the central computer awarded a "legacy bonus", which is no part of the game in question. The maximum legacy bonus is $99999.99; the manufacturer knows of the possibility of this kind of error and has implemented a fix that is thought to eliminate the problem. The first point then is that the casino didn't just claim there was a malfunction, they proved that there was one. Second, the terms of the contract hold: she was entitled to $1.85, and the extraneous message was not part of the contract. That is, she did not actually win the large payout, the malfunction was in saying that she received a bonus. If a patron could likewise prove that they had actually won but the machine malfunctioned to represent the situation as a loss, they would of course be entitled to the appropriate winnings. The problem simply resides in the difficulty of a patron proving that.	The exact situation depends on where you are. If you are in Washington state, what you get (but did not realize) is a notice to appear in court. By not paying the fine or showing up to court, you could be subject to RCW 46.64.025, so that the department of licensing is notified. You have 15 days to respond to the notice. We assume that you are a resident, because if you are a non-resident (and not resident of another state with a reciprocal agreement), they would have required you to pay a bond at the time of the ticket (though that isn't possible with automated infraction-detection). When the Dept. of Licensing gets the notice of the unpaid ticket, they may suspend or revoke your license. At this point, you will have received notice that your license was suspended (unless you changed your address and mail isn't forwarded, in which case you have a different problem, that you're supposed to apprise DOL of your current address, and didn't do so). At that point (after they send the letter), you have 15 days to respond. One response is to pay the ticket plus the added fines, or, you can request an administrative review (to appeal the suspension). The point of going to court to plead your case would presumably be to modify the judgment against you, for instance to reduce or eliminate the added fine. You would then need to give a good reason for not being punished: RCW 46.64.025 already has you covered, because the suspension process starts with willfully failing to appear. You would then need to show that your failure to appear was not willful. It does not legally matter whether you are a foreigner or have problems understanding the language. Speeding tickets usually say pretty clearly that you must pay the ticket within a specified time frame, or appear in court, but people don't always read tickets. It is entirely plausible that one's grasp of the language is low enough that there really was a misunderstanding. If you can provide credible evidence that your failure was not willful, by law you would only be liable for the ticket. In other states and countries, the situation could be somewhat or quite different (e.g. Norwegian traffic laws are stricter). In New Mexico, it is more serious to fail to appear. NM Statute 66-8-126 states that "It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate his written promise to appear in court, given to an officer upon issuance of a uniform traffic citation, regardless of the disposition of the charge for which the citation was issued". Your license can/will be suspended (it is not clear whether suspension is automatic), but additionally since failure to appear is a misdemeanor, you can be arrested. Unlike Washington law, there is no willfullness requirement for such a penalty. Given the criminal nature of failure to appear, a traffic attorney would need to suggest an appropriate belated response.	The registration office does not have access to your GEZ bill. They cannot deny you deregistration, but also cannot tell you whether your debts are settled. You might prefer to clarify this matter with the GEZ in writing rather than over phone, since you can more easily machine-translate an email or letter.
Are the police legally obligated to report an illegal immigrant who reports a crime? Say that a person is an illegal immigrant in the United States and a crime is committed against them, such as robbery, domestic abuse, etc. If they report the crime to the police, and a police officer discovers that the person is an illegal immigrant, do they have a legal obligation to report them? Or does being the victim of a crime give them some sort of immunity against this? This question is prompted by the beginning of story on the radio about how illegal immigrants who were victims of domestic abuse were afraid that they would be deported if they went to the police. I didn't hear enough to know if their concerns were justified.	"Police" that one would generally encounter in the US are local or state agencies, and the ordinary crimes you mentioned are matters of state law, so they would be reported to local or state police. (There are federal law enforcement agencies, but they only deal with specialized areas of federal law, and you wouldn't ordinarily encounter them in daily life.) On the other hand, immigration is a matter of federal law. The responsibilities of local or state police are governed by state law, and the federal government cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law. A specific state's law could potentially require state and local police to ask about people's immigration status and/or ask the federal government to check on the status of someone they suspect might be illegal. I believe a few red states have enacted, or are considering, such laws, though they usually deal with people stopped by police rather than people filing a report. Some of these laws have been challenged in court, and I am not sure which exact parts of which laws are still being implemented for each of those states. Most states do not have such laws.	Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest.	Is it the case that Police in the US are unable to proceed with a charge if a victim declines to "press charges" and if so, how are murder charges or even more pertinently, domestic violence charges, brought to court? First of all, it is prosecutors and not police officers who actually bring criminal charges in the legal systems in the vast majority of U.S. states (although not quite all, minor offenses in Rhode Island, for example, are an exception). Second, a prosecutor does have the right to bring criminal charges even if the victim or someone affiliated with the victim does not "press charges". Indeed, a prosecutor can almost always bring criminal charges over the objections of a victim, although "victim's rights" protections in some U.S. states require a prosecutor to confer with a victim before doing so. This said, law enforcement and a prosecutor cannot prosecute a criminal case if they have no knowledge that a crime was committed, so if no one brings a crime to the attention of authorities it is unlikely to be prosecuted. And, law enforcement and prosecutors will defer to the wishes of a victim that charges not be pressed in the legal system against an offender in many kinds of cases (although that discretion is limited in many states in domestic violence cases by statute).	A punishment is basically a harm to someone's person, liberty, dignity, or property imposed primarily for the purpose of harming someone, rather than to accomplish some non-punitive end such as apprehending a suspected criminal, securing compliance with a court order, exchanging truthful facts, or compensating someone for harm legally attributable to the person upon whom the act is imposed. If a police officer shoots and kills a person while they are in the process of committing a crime, that is not a punishment, because the officer is not trying to punish someone for committing the crime, but to prevent the crime from continuing and/or to apprehend the suspect. If the use of force is justified by a law authorizing it under the circumstances, then it is legal and there are no civil or criminal consequences. If the use of force is not justified by a law authorizing it under the circumstances it might be a crime, it might be a "tort" (i.e. a civil wrong for which you can sue someone, especially if it arises at common law), or it might be a civil rights violation. Law enforcement officers generally have broad absolute immunity from common law tort liability incurred the course of their duties in carrying out their jobs, and have "qualified immunity" from liability for civil rights violations which limits their liability to cases of intentional violations of clearly established constitutional rights. In a case arising from an excessive use of force against someone who is not in custody, generally speaking, the constitutional right violated is the 4th Amendment right to be free of unreasonable seizures and to be free from seizures that that are not supported by probable cause. Generally speaking, the law does not recognize an excessive use of force in connection with the criminal justice system as a "taking" for which there is a right to both due process and fair market value compensation (to somewhat oversimplify). Generally speaking, an 8th Amendment analysis involving the use of force (as opposed to taking of money or property in the criminal justice system which are subject to the excessive fines clause of the Bill of Rights), begins, and the 4th Amendment seizure analysis ends, when someone is in custody. A police officer who arrests someone and then beats them up or rapes them and then releases them, might be entering into 8th Amendment, rather than 4th Amendment territory, although the dividing lines are not always clear.	All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems.	No. Police are not permitted to impose any punishment whatsoever. Their role in the American justice system is to prevent and investigate criminal offenses. What you're describing is a punishment for a criminal offense, even though it is imposed outside the criminal justice system. The same principles that prevent an officer from punching a suspect in the face or demanding a cash payment to not write a ticket prohibit a police officer from imposing a punishment of his own design, with or without your consent.	How much would I be expected to reveal if not directly connected to the case? For example, if I was asked, "What were you doing in the alley at night?," would you be required to reveal the information if it is potentially humiliating (e.g. you were having an affair) or illegal (e.g. you were getting illegal drugs)? The latter case seems to violate the protection against self-incrimination. Or what happens if you just lie about something inconsequential? You have to answer any permissible questions (i.e. consistent with the rules of evidence) asked. If you were doing something illegal you can claim the fifth and not testify unless you are given "transaction immunity" that your testimony will not be used against you in a criminal case against you. Usually perjury prosecutions require that the lie be about a material fact. Suppose you receive a death threat (either verbal or in writing) from the person charged with and who committed the crime. Something along the lines of: if you testify against me, then my friends will kill you after the trial. What legal options do you have? Tell the prosecutor on the case and ask the prosecutor to provide protection to you and to go after the people making the threat. The witness protection program was created for these cases.	The misunderstanding The only person who can chose to prosecute or not to prosecute a criminal case is the state: in the US this is through the office of the relevant District Attorney advised by the police. When a person makes a complaint to police (or other authorities), the police/DA commence an investigation. In an ideal world all complaints would be investigated rigorously and thoroughly, however, we live in this world. The police/DA will assess the complaint and decide if it warrants the dedication of scarce resources to investigate. One of the factors they will consider is how vigorously the complainant prods them in the ass. Ultimately, the police/DA will decide if there is enough evidence to place the matter before the courts. The complainant has no say in when or if this will happen. A complainant cannot "drop the charges"! The misconduct For a police officer to disclose to another police officer that they were the subject of a felony (or any) complaint is gross misconduct and a huge betrayal of trust. At best it shows poor judgement, at worst it is corrupt. Your friend needs professional legal advice right now!
Can a library forbid me to make copies of un-copyrighted material? There is a book published in 1878 (i.e. not copyrighted anymore) which is currently not available in the public domain. I would like to bring it into the public domain by making a scan of it and upload it to e.g. archive.org. However, the only physical copy I can get of it is in my university library (to which I have lawful access). My university (in the UK) has this policy where "you are not allowed to make a scan of more than one chapter or 5% of the book". This is clearly relevant for books which are still under copyright. But I wonder whether this is also valid for books without copyright. You might think this is an issue specific to the university regulations and the library's terms of services, and be quick to suggest "ask your university". But the point is broader. Can a provider of material set up a set of terms and services that in effect denies my capacity to bring un-copyrighted material into the public domain? I am an frequent user of archive.org and there you find many un-copyrighted books that were scanned from a copy of a university's library. This does not necessarily goes into my favour, but makes me suggest I could be entitled to do so too, even without explicit permission from the library.	More generally, the university gets to set whatever rules it wants, unless there is a law limiting what it can do. For example, in the US a government university (qua arm of government) cannot require you to have a particular religion or profess a particular creed, but a private one can. An employer could require you to be in your office from 9 to 5, even though it is legal to not be in an office from 9 to 5. The general principle is that the institution can set its own rules for operation, unless those rules violate the law. Generally, the owner of property has the right to say how it can be used. It is quite common for universities to have variable policies regarding access to their books (e.g. "anybody can walk in and do things with the volumes, which are out in the open, except they have to have borrower's permission to take it out of the building" to "you cannot enter at all, and must have special permission to inspect the book -- nobody can take the books out of the building"). My experience is that UK libraries have a tighter rein on their holdings than do US universities (the sampling problem here is non-trivial). In some cases, the absolute control of the property owner is somewhat overridden by law, especially if the institution is a state-run university (not in the UK). Another possibility is that access to books is a contractual right (some kind of "terms of service" that you and they are bound to). Even in the case of US state universities, I cannot imagine a government having a law declaring the right to copy books to be such a fundamental right that a university cannot deny you that right. The most likely scenario for enforcement is as a contractual matter. A complete analysis of the relationship between the individual and the institution would be way too broad for here, but here is a sample of the questions that could arise. What is the source of your right to access books? Perhaps you are employed as a faculty person: do you have a contract? Can you be fired for breaking rules: are there any limits on what acts can lead to firing? What procedures if any are specified for termination, and what avenue of internal appeal exist? The government would not overrule the institution's decision unless they didn't follow the contractually-governed procedures for termination. Apart from the legal question, a perfectly coherent reason to prohibit scanning books whose copyright has expired is that the act of scanning them may damage the book.	Most of the works available on Libgen are illegal: they have infringed copyright by putting copies there. Any copying of a protected work, done without permission of the copyright owner, is copyright infringement. That includes downloading from libgen.	There is something wrong-sounding about that claim. Owning a thing (such as a book) means that you can dispose of it however you want. If it is a physical book, then unless this is a book of top secret classified information, the US government has no control over the item, nor does the copyright holder have any right to prevent you from giving away your copy. Electronic books, however, are another matter, since often you don't buy such books, you buy a license to use the book (like a software license). The license terms of an electronic book could be subject to various controls, and the license might be non-transferable. The underlying logic of this is that under the doctrine of first sale, you are allowed to do whatever you want with intellectual property that you buy, and therefore to restrict re-distribution of electronic IP, software especially is typically not itself sold, and just the permission to use it is. If this is an electronic book, the copyright holder would be able (though not necessarily willing) to permit you to transfer your copy to someone else. Of course you can't give a copy to two people unless you have two licenses.	You cannot create derivative works without permission of the copyright holder (even if you create it and keep it to yourself). Further, you cannot distribute derivative works without permission of the copyright holder. That's a general principle that always applies. Since there is a license, you need to read that license carefully and determine under which conditions you have permission to create derivative works, and to distribute them. Your book would be considered a derivative work. In some situations, like commenting on a work, parody and some others, you would have a defense if you are quoting tiny parts of the work. But generally, if you find it unfair that your 200 page needs to be licensed because you used two pages from an open source source, you either do without those two pages, or you find the author and ask for permission under a different license. Note that facts are not copyrightable. So if the wikipedia page contains facts and isn't just made up, you can read it ten times, memorise all the facts, and maybe tell the facts to someone who you pay to write a similar article.	Depending on your jurisdiction, such lists may be protected, but not by copyright. For example, in Germany there was a court decision that scanning all the country’s phone books and selling them on CD constituted “unfair competition” and was illegal, while hiring 1000 typists who would manually type in all this information would not be. Databases are protected in many jurisdictions, and a list of the 1000 most commonly used English words could reasonably be called a database.	What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.	That means that a person cannot put a new cover or binding on a book, and then resell it or lend it, unless permission is obtained from the publisher. This has the effect of prohibiting libraries, which need to rebind most books, from carrying the book without the publisher's permission. This condition did not apply in the US, because under the US Law's First Sale Doctrine, the seller cannot impose such conditions on the buyer. The very standardize wording was, I think, once part of the Net book Agreement (NBA) used by Penguin and other UK-based publishers on sales in the UK and the Commonwealth. You will find it on many used books from such publishers. I believe the main aim was to prohibit discount resellers of used books, and to prohibit sale of "stripped books" (reported to the publisher as "unsold and destroyed"). I believe that this is no longer in effect, but I am not sure. The NBA was dissolved in 1995.	No, John may not lawfully publish such a book in such a way What John wants to do is not lawful. It would infringe on the copyright on both the 1940 original, and on the 1955 translation. Both of those are still in copyright under the laws of France, the UK, and the US. Someone owns those copyrights: some person or business or other entity. If the owner has no legal heirs, in most jurisdictions the property escheats to the government (in the US to the state government). In the case of a company, its assets will be sold or handed over to some entity. But they will not become ownerless, any more than real estate will become ownerless when the owner dies or the owning company is dissolved. It is possible that the owner does not realize that s/he owns these rights. But if John publishes his book, then owner might then realize the rights that s/he holds. The owner could demand payment, or sue for damages. Under US law the damages could include any economic loss that the owner has incurred plus any profits that John or his publisher have made. John and his publisher would both be liable for these damages. As a result, no publisher is likely to be willing to publish John's book. If John self-publishers, he incurs the risk of such demands and suit. In some countries (such as the UK) there are legal procedures fore dealing with such "orphan works". In those countries one can register with a government agency, and obtain permission to use the work after a search has revealed no owner, paying a rate set by law. But there is no such provision in the US. There, John must either not publish, or gamble that no owner will appear and make demands he cannot afford to meet.
Is truth the ultimate defense to defamation in the USA? Is truth the ultimate defense to a defamation lawsuit in the USA? Does a defamation defense vary between states? Even if the release of truthful information results in permanent career damage (i.e. loss of job, reputation, etc.) to someone, the truth would protect the author from a defamation lawsuit, correct?	Is truth the ultimate defense to a defamation lawsuit in the USA? Truth is an absolute defense to defamation lawsuits in modern U.S. law (this was not always the case historically) as a matter of constitutional law in every state. In some kinds of defamation lawsuits (but not all kinds of defamation lawsuits), "actual malice" which means knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, must be shown, so even a negligently stated falsehood is not actionable in those special kinds of defamation cases (mostly cases with public figure plaintiffs, media defendants, and/or case involving matters of public concern). Does a defamation defense vary between states? While most aspects of defamation law are mandated by the U.S. Constitution and a shared common law tradition, there are some slight and subtle differences between the states in defamation law, mostly concerning defamation suits by non-public figures against non-media defendants concerning matters that are not a matter of public concern. This impacts whether "actual malice" must be shown and can influence the burden of proof in defamation cases. Statutes of limitation for defamation suits also vary significantly between states. Even if the release of truthful information results in permanent career damage (i.e. loss of job, reputation, etc.) to someone, the truth would protect the author from a defamation lawsuit, correct? Yes. Keep in mind, however, that a defamation lawsuit is a suit for damage to one's reputation caused by a false statement. Sometimes disclosures of truthful information constitute an actionable tort other than defamation, however. For example, there would potentially be a civil action against someone who had signed a non-disclosure agreement for revealing truthfully information that the person sued contractually agreed not to disclose (e.g. the terms of the settlement agreement in a court case with a non-disclosure/confidentiality term, or the recipe for a restaurant's secret sauce that is a trade secret). Similarly, a doctor who revealed confidential patient medical information that was true could be sued. But, usually, in the absence of a particularlized confidentiality duty, truth is an absolute defense.	No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.	In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.	No. In the United States, lying is not a crime. Unless it is done: under oath (in which case it's called perjury) or to a law enforcement agent conducting an investigation (in which case it's called obstruction). There are also the civil torts of slander (oral) and libel (written) if someone lies and damages the reputation or business interests of a person or company. Collectively, and without distinction, these are called defamation. Lying also has a close cousin — the civil tort of fraud — which usually applies to inducement into a transaction or a contract. There are also consumer protection statutes (federal and state) that deal with truth in advertising, truth in lending, lemon laws, etc. But those are primarily civil statutes and the last two are pretty far afield from your question. But none of that applies to the Facebook case you described. So, no.	Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.	There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.	If a newspaper publishes an article that is actually defamatory (i.e. publishes false statements that cause you quantifiable harm), and you successfully sue the publisher, you might get a court order requiring them to retract the statements or remove them from their web page. An archive like newspapers.com isn't making false statements, it is making true statements about what the Poughkeepsie Journal published. At any rate, you name is not defamatory, it is (or was) a fact.	The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense.
Is it legal for a car to have a paper license plate in California? For over a year a car I see most days has a rear license plate that only has XXX Chevrolet. The license plate frame says XXX Chevrolet.com. Is there an exemption that allows the vehicle owner to use this in place of a standard USA license plate?	California Vehicle Code section 4456 (c), operative until January 1, 2019: (c) A vehicle displaying a copy of the report of sale may be operated without license plates or registration card until either of the following, whichever occurs first: (1) The license plates and registration card are received by the purchaser. (2) A 90-day period, commencing with the date of sale of the vehicle, has expired. The car is not required to have license plates right after it is purchased. Most dealers will put a sign with their name and/or logo in place of the license plate. If the car has been without permanent plates for more than 90 days, and it hasn't been sold again, then it is probably in violation of this law. As of January 1, 2019, the law will change, and the dealer will provide a numbered temporary plate. This plate can only be used until the permanent plates arrive, up to a maximum of 90 days.	You are required by state law to register and license a personal (or commercial) vehicle because state laws govern vehicle licensing, not the federal government as you cite. See Motor vehicle registration - Wikipedia. States have the right, well established in case law, to require registration, taxation and insurance for all vehicles on all public roads. The various websites and "sovereign citizen" arguments on the web that say you don't need to register or license a vehicle are wrong. In some special cases, states issue waivers for what are known as farm or ranch vehicles driven solely on private property, and those cases may or may not pay taxes or require insurance.	You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.	The United States even allows private ownership of tanks and howitzers with only fairly modest regulation, although the demand is small and some sort of license is required. Most U.S. regulations would be at the state and local level. It is rare for state governments to place regulatory barriers on the ownership of what is basically an armored car, although detailing it in a manner that misleadingly conveys the impression that it is a law enforcement vehicle is usually prohibited. Security companies handling deliveries of cash and executive transportation services currently use equivalent vehicles on a regular basis. Some armaments might be regulated at a local, state or federal level in the U.S., to the same extent that they would be if they were freestanding. Even if the company declined to sell one to you, you could probably buy one in an auction of police department or military equipment that the selling government no longer needs. Such auctions are held on a semi-regular basis.	I should have done my research properly, hopefully this will be indexed and be helpful to someone else in the future. The specific legislation is The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 regulation 98: Stopping of engine when stationary 98.—(1) Save as provided in paragraph (2), the driver of a vehicle shall, when the vehicle is stationary, stop the action of any machinery attached to or forming part of the vehicle so far as may be necessary for the prevention of noise. (2) The provisions of paragraph (1) do not apply— (a) when the vehicle is stationary owing to the necessities of traffic; (b) so as to prevent the examination or working of the machinery where the examination is necessitated by any failure or derangement of the machinery or where the machinery is required to be worked for a purpose other than driving the vehicle; or (c) in respect of a vehicle propelled by gas produced in plant carried on the vehicle, to such plant.	Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed.	It is legal to be wrong, it is legal to say false things in public (leaving out defamation), and it is legal to buy and manufacture signs that say false things. Moreover, the sign does not make a false statement, in that legal liability is distinct from moral responsibility. In fact, the sign helps to decrease their legal liability. Via this sign, you have been put on notice that the truck may spray a bit of gravel, so by following too closely, you are negligently contributing to the damage. This is what also underlies those disclaimer signs with "not responsible for theft from your auto". There is nothing "official in appearance" about this sign (a legal citation of a statute might have such an appearance).	It is legal for a property owner to have a vehicle towed off of their property, if the vehicle is there without permission. If you have a vehicle with expired tags, your permission to park there may have been rescinded as of that notice. It is possible that a parking spot is part of the lease, in which case it would be a breach of contract for them to have your car towed. However, even if it's in the lease, if it is required by law, or specifically mentioned in the lease (i.e. "must be registered"), it is legal to tow the car. The city claims the right to regulate vehicles even parked on private property: Abandoned vehicles are defined as: vehicles that do not bear a license plate, or on which the displayed license plate is invalid, unless said vehicle is stored within a completely enclosed building or unless it is stored on a bona fide sales lot or an automobile storage yard or automobile wrecking yard, which threaten or endanger public safety or welfare; create a blighting influence upon the neighborhood where the vehicle rests, or; is, or may reasonably become, infested, or inhabited by rodents, vermin or other animals, or may furnish a breeding place for rodents, vermin or other animals. Inoperable, when referring to a vehicle, means the vehicle is incapable of being immediately driven, moved, or pulled in the manner for which it is intended or designed. The specific underlying ordinance Sec. 518.203(1) says No person in charge or control of any property within the city whether as owner, tenant, occupant, lessee or otherwise, shall allow any junk or abandoned vehicle to remain on any private or public property within the city longer than 15 days; and no person shall leave any such vehicle on any property within the city for a longer time than 15 days; except that this article shall not apply to a vehicle on the premises of a business enterprise licensed and operated in a lawful place and manner, to repair vehicles with current license or those places where active restoration is taking place and both activities are taking place within a closed building. An abandoned vehicle is defined as a vehicle that does not bear a license plate, or if the displayed license plate is invalid, unless said vehicle is stored within a completely enclosed building or unless it is stored on a bona fide automobile sales lot or an automobile storage yard or automobile wrecking yard The ordinance does not apparently define "valid license plate", but from state law, we can determine that you affix a "validation sticker" to your "registration license plate", so without a current tag, the license is not valid. Apparently the practice of towing cars with expired tags is not isolated in Florida: an untagged vehicle may not be visible to the public.
Why can you use the font “Helvetica” for free in LaTeX although it would otherwise be required to pay a fee? When looking for the Helvetica font, it usually costs you a certain amount of money because it is not a free font. But when I am using the free open source software LaTeX, I can use the font wherever I want. But I cannot, for example, use it when writing documents in Word or OpenOffice. Why is that? What kind of “special deal” or treatment is this?	Font shapes are not legally protected, whereas font names are. As such, one can make copies of fonts and give them new names. Helvetica is one of the 'base' fonts included in PostScript printers. This made having a 'desktop' version very desirable. Some years ago, the font foundry URW made their Helvetic clone (Nimbus Sans) available under an open license. This allowed the font files to be included in open source software distributions, including LaTeX set ups, with no fee or legal restrictions. Subsequently, these font files have been used as the basis for the 'TeX Gyre' fonts: see http://www.gust.org.pl/projects/e-foundry/tex-gyre for the fonts and https://www.tug.org/TUGboat/tb27-2/tb87hagen-gyre.pdf for background. The TeX Gyre fonts are available in OpenType format, and so can be used with (for example) OpenOffice (technically and legally). Note that these fonts are 'metric compatible' with the 'parents', i.e. they can be used directly as replacements for Helvetica, etc. with no change to the appearance of documents.	I assume you are talking about United States federal copyright law. You can freely use any: material published before 1923 material published between 1923 and 1963 for which the copyright was not renewed material explicitly placed in the public domain material not copyrightable (such as any US government publication) material whose copyright has been abandoned (for example the author died with no heir)	If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court.	Yes. I am tempted to leave the above as the entirety of my answer, but to expand: Yes, you can do that. You won't (as a business matter) be able to charge all that much because many people will realize they can just download a similar picture from the net and print it off themselves. You can charge a bit because you've framed them (perhaps), and chosen the nicest, and perhaps you have a better printer, or have used the expensive glossy paper. Also, if you are successful charging a lot, other people will start selling the same pictures for slightly less (and you won't be able to stop them).	There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.	You seem to assume that copyrights require paperwork such as registration. This is wrong, copyright is automatic. And it prevents the downloader from making the sort of change that you suggest. In fact, it prevents the downloader from using your template at all. The only reason the downloader can use that template is because you've granted him a specific license to ignore some copyright rules, but the default remains. And you did not grant the right to alter the template to free users.	The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.	"Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem.
Hypothetical: Is a fully disclosed pyramid scheme legal? I see that hypotheticals don't typically go over to well on this SE site but I'll give this a shot. EDIT: I originally posted as 'Ponzi' but I meant 'pyramid' Was talking with a friend tonight about a hypothetical situation and the implications of full-disclosure on law and was hoping some of you might be able to settle the debate. (This is for US law btw) Suppose I launched a company called Pyramid Scheme, inc. And we were 100% direct and transparent that this was a Pyramid scheme. We literally explained word for word that it is a Pyramid scheme: You can put money in and we pay you out based on the next people that put money in after you. If you are stuck on the bottom rung you will likely not see a return, THIS IS A Pyramid SCHEME. I know (I'm pretty sure) Pyramid schemes are illegal, but if you completely disclose it and are 100% open about it, is it still illegal? I'm not talking about the fine print either, I'm talking about very direct straight forward declarations, even to the point where the name of the company is 'Pyramid Scheme inc'.	You might get away with it under federal law. But there are potentially also state laws to worry about. Under Texas law 17.461: "Pyramid promotional scheme" means a plan or operation by which a person gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation that is derived primarily from a person's introduction of other persons to participate in the plan or operation rather than from the sale of a product by a person introduced into the plan or operation. A person commits an offense if the person contrives, prepares, establishes, operates, advertises, sells, or promotes a pyramid promotional scheme. An offense under this subsection is a state jail felony. As you can see, there's no requirement under this law that there be fraud involved.	In the worst case if they shut shop, then how might I go about getting my money back? It is unlikely that you can. A SAFE is not a loan (and for that matter isn't even a share in the company) and doesn't create an enforceable contractual right to get your money back. If you make an equity investment and the company loses money and goes out of business, you lose everything you invested. If the promoter made false representations that induced you to invest, or actively concealed material facts about the investment, you might be able to sue the promoter for securities fraud under federal regulation 10b-5, or under a state securities law, or under a common law fraud theory. You could also sue to issuer of the investment (i.e. the company) but that would usually be futile because the company is broke and hence judgment proof. State or federal securities regulators or a local district attorney or state attorney-general might pursue the case in lieu of a private civil action by you, but getting them to take action is often quite difficult. But, if your investment wasn't induced by fraud and instead the management of the company simply made bad decisions that caused the company to fail, you have no remedy. The investment was for a SAFE (Simple Agreement for Future Equity). I have the signed SAFE with me. This is a very unusual way for a QoZ to be structured, which adds to the sense that this may have been a shady venture.	Depends on the purpose of the society and physical location of its members. A secret society aiming to coordinate bank robberies would be pretty much illegal anywhere. A secret society sharing photos of cats would be fine in most parts of the world. I'm not sure about the jurisdiction. All the places in which members live? Where the servers are located? The place of residence of the founder? All of that matters. Members, founder, servers are all subject to the laws of the land where they are. (That said, the fact that the members only interact online changes nothing.) For example, say there is a secret online society with some sort of political agenda and members all over the world. Whilst for members living in most of the English-centric world (UK/US/Canada/AU/NZ/Singapore etc.) such a membership would be perfectly legal, members living in Italy and Poland will be breaking the law.	You should probably get a lawyer, but my reading is this: The company whose SDK you use owns their SDK, owns their code, and is free to take any of your ideas how to improve their code without paying you. But they say that ideas are ten a penny, so this is mostly there to prevent pointless lawsuits. On the other hand, it says that everything you do with your product is yours. I might be completely wrong, that's why you should get a lawyer.	Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...".	Generally no. Trading on the basis of non-public "inside" information is usually a crime in the US (and in many other places as well, although the details will vary.) Exactly what constitutes "inside information" and an unlawful trade based on it can be complex, but if the trade is or might well have been influenced by information not publicly available, it may well be illegal. Normally in such cases the company's legal counsel or compliance officer will issue a statement to relevant corporate officers that neither the company nor those officers who are "insiders" may trade in the company's stock until after the information becomes public and is know to the market in general. The exact terms will vary depending on the specific facts. If the person making the decision to do a buyback is not aware of the non-public information, and did not consult the CEO or anyone who did know, the trade might not be unlawful. But such trades are normally approved at the Board of Directors level, so the CEO would be aware of them.	Both of your question are creatures of contract. Their disclosures when you set up the account (or potentially amended disclosures or terms they've mailed to you subsequently) control both of these questions. They don't have to share the results of their internal investigation against you (they do have to give you proof that the deposit/transfer was fraudulent), but that does not give you access to their internal investigative process or its findings. They cannot shut down your account based on protected reasons (race, class, gender, religion, etc.), but the can certainly close an account pursuant to their operating procedures, their rules, terms and conditions or disclosures - all of which you agreed to (implicitly or explicitly) when opening the account. There is likely nothing you can do about either of these issues, unless the contract you formed with them by opening the account gives you that right, which would appear in their terms of service, disclosures, etc., and these almost always protect their right to do most anything when it comes to protecting the overall best interest of the corporate entity.	No, because leaking is also a form of insider trading if the person you leak to takes advantage of the information. Even if you leaked it in a public forum you still have to wait 6 months before it is considered truly public knowledge, and by that time you might have learned something else. If you think that Company X is going to be pulled down along with the rest of the market then your best bet is to short (or buy "put" options on) a representative basket of shares other than Company X. This has the advantage of being 100% legal without having to wait.
Can one sell allowed product and "give" unallowed product for free? According to this: A student was selling paninis to other students. When campus police made him stop because it's against school rules to sell food outside of approved bake sales, he began selling paper towels for the same price and giving a free panini with each paper towel. In general would one be allowed to give away a product for which one lacks a permit to sell, conditioned on people purchasing a product for which no permit is required?	If the ability to get a Pannini is conditioned on buying paper towels for money, then he isn't really selling paper towels for $2 and the Pannini for free, he is really selling a package consisting of paper towels and a Pannini for $2, so it would probably still be illegal. The phrase lawyers and judges use to talk about attempts to create loopholes like this one is "too clever by half", which means: "Shrewd but flawed by overthinking or excessive complexity, with a resulting tendency to be unreliable or unsuccessful."	By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.	A Probably. Exceptions include: A didn’t own the materials from which the flute was made; the flute belongs to the material’s owner. A made the flute under a contract of employment; the flute belongs to A’s employer. A has sold the flute before making it; the flute belongs to the buyer. This is not only the law in india but pretty much everywhere in the world. If you want to ask about redistributive justice or taxation/welfare; please post the question on our sister sites philosophy or politics.	Wave Broadband is a private company; they can probably decide to not provide service to an address that is in arrears or collections. I'm sure there is a clause in their service contract that states they can do that, and there would be local or state laws to support that. Whatever public service commission governs the state may also allow that. It's possible that Wave is breaking the law by denying service to a whole address, but doubtful. You can check with the state level public service commission.	Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.	Neither law has precedence - manufacturers have to obey both. The FD&C says that they don't need to list ingredients which are trade secrets; the CFR says they must. If they list the trade secrets they do not break either law. If they don't, they break the CFR. Conclusion: they must list the trade secret ingredients. If the FD&C said it was forbidden to list trade secret ingredients, but the CFR required it, manufacturers would still have to obey both laws - which would mean they couldn't sell anything where one of the ingredients was a trade secret.	You could sue them for commercially exploiting your image without permission, so the waiver is necessary. It is entirely legal to require of tenants (even if weird) that they be part of an advertising campaign, in a specified way: it's also your right to refuse to sign. There is a minuscule chance that there is a local ordinance prohibiting such a clause.	Short Answer Based on the facts you supplied, it seems the author's request for removal might be unenforceable. Explanation Section 2.a.1. of the license declares the license is irrevocable. [Emphasis added]: Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to: A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material. Irrevocable means: "Unable to cancel or recall; that which is unalterable or irreversible." Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. So don't rely on my answer for anything. Hire a real attorney if you need help with a legal matter. Never take legal advice from strangers on the internet. Treat all answers on this site the same way you would as if they came from a bunch of strangers at a party who got all their legal information by watching episodes of Boston Legal, The Practice and Ally McBeal. But have lots of opinions they are willing to share on legal questions nevertheless.
Is it legal for police to deny protection to an informant despite a known threat? So, the second season of Daredevil came out today, and internet lowlife that I am I'm already a few episodes in. A pivotal part of the plot involves a criminal who police are well aware would almost certainly be killed (by a maniac they're currently investigating), who is willing to testify against plenty of people to qualify for witness protection. However, they make his witness protection status conditional upon wearing a wire and being directly involved in a sting, which would expose him to further personal bodily risk. Since that amounts to extortion, it doesn't feel like it should be legal to do. They're forcing someone to put themselves in harm's way under threat of (almost certain) execution by a third party. ...However, I know that, for various reasons, the law often violently conflicts with what's ethically justifiable, so I'm curious whether that's actually something police can do. Can police make their protection dependent upon direct involvement in a sting operation? I recognize that there's a difference between witness protection and regular police protection, and am curious how the above applies in each case. Within the context of the show, it's implied that both witness protection and regular police protection would be denied if the witness were to decline to participate. In case it's relevant, the show takes place in New York state. And yes, I know that TV represents law inaccurately all the time. Don't worry; this isn't the first of a long list of TV-related questions. In my defense, when this question occurred to me, it really was Friday in Iceland.	Police have no duty to protect WASHINGTON, June 27 - The Supreme Court ruled on Monday that the police did not have a constitutional duty to protect a person from harm, even a woman who had obtained a court-issued protective order against a violent husband making an arrest mandatory for a violation. It seems from a quick reading of the article that Colorado law had tried to create such a duty, but SCOTUS decided that it either didn't, or couldn't.	The Secret Service is primarily concerned with protecting the people and information they oversee, not enforcing laws. They have the power to arrest someone for any unlawful conduct, but unless a drug user is presenting as a threat to a protectee, they are unlikely to be arrested by the Secret Service. More likely the Service would simply escort the person off the premises and refer the matter to the DC Metro Police to handle. Edit: Such a case would not be turned over to the US Capitol Police (as originally written) It would most likely be referred to the DC Metropolitan Police Department.Corrected my answer above.	So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.	The answer provided by Dale M is half right, but there are a few things that I think are wrong. Firstly, the actual reality of the situation doesn't matter. What matters is that you act in a reasonable manner, performing assessments of the situation as a reasonable person would do. If you misread the situation, and end up killing a police officer that was acting in a lawful manner, it doesn't necessarily mean you were acting unlawfully yourself. Because police officers are generally exposed to situations where they would be forced to use their firearm, that obviously would impact how a reasonable person would see the situation, but the test for reasonableness would not go out the window. In addition, even if you were found to not be acting in a reasonable manner, there is certainly a question if you would be found guilty of a lesser charge of manslaughter rather than murder. It's possible the self-defence claim would be upheld as an imperfect defence.	"Police" that one would generally encounter in the US are local or state agencies, and the ordinary crimes you mentioned are matters of state law, so they would be reported to local or state police. (There are federal law enforcement agencies, but they only deal with specialized areas of federal law, and you wouldn't ordinarily encounter them in daily life.) On the other hand, immigration is a matter of federal law. The responsibilities of local or state police are governed by state law, and the federal government cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law. A specific state's law could potentially require state and local police to ask about people's immigration status and/or ask the federal government to check on the status of someone they suspect might be illegal. I believe a few red states have enacted, or are considering, such laws, though they usually deal with people stopped by police rather than people filing a report. Some of these laws have been challenged in court, and I am not sure which exact parts of which laws are still being implemented for each of those states. Most states do not have such laws.	If the victim is unable to prove who the culprit was, then it will be impossible to prosecute that person criminally or sue them for civil damages. Incidents like these are rarely enough to cause a police department to throw sufficient investigative resources at it to crack the case without some reason to believe that it is part of something bigger. An unfortunate fact of life is that most perpetrators of crimes and torts get away with it and are not caught. And, if the only available witness is willing to lie to cover up the name of the guilty party (probably out of a desire to not have the dog put down), it is that much harder. A private investigator might be able to solve the case, but the cost of hiring a PI would probably exceed the benefit that could be obtained if the PI was successful.	I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”.	This is the Texas law pertaining to self defense, which says that "a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force". Relatively little of the law pertains to firearms, and none of it restricts the right to self-defense based on whether you are a resident, or you are using your own firearm vs. a borrowed one. The one provision, subsection (b)(5), that refers to firearms is an exception whereby force is not justified, namely if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05. (Sect. 46.02 is about conditions unlawful carrying of weapons, which covers such things as under-age carrying of certain knives, or not having control of your weapon, or being a felon in possession, etc. 46.05 is about machine guns, explosives, zip guns etc.) Deadly force is covered by a separate section, 9.32, adding the requirement that the actor "reasonably believe[] the deadly force [to be] immediately necessary". (A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or (B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Note that "deadly force" is defined as "force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury". Sec. 9.33 likewise allows deadly force to be used analogously in defense of a third person, and intreestingly, in 9.34(b), "A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency". In addition, deadly force can be justified in defense of property, per sec. 9.41, if you "reasonably believe[] the force [to be] immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property", and you may also use force to recover or re-enter the property (as long as the force is used "immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession", and "the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor"). Sec. 9.42 then provides the possibility of justified use of deadly force in protection of property, if the force is immediately necessary (A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3) he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. The short version is, if deadly force is justified in the particular circumstances, then deadly force with a borrowed weapon is justified. However, there are federal laws regarding non-resident aliens possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) says that It shall be unlawful for any person...who, being an alien (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)))...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce Under subsection (y) there are exceptions for licensed hunters, government representatives etc. You can also petition the Attorney General for an exception. The point is that federal law would make possession of a firearm illegal for most visa types: here is the list.
Is it legal to record a business call in Canada? I am using a ZenPhone2 which I set to record all calls. I had a call with a sales person about a service I was interested in (i was the one that answered the call). This service offered was not what the sales person said would be offered. Can I use this call and send the person an audio snippet of the call to help my argument with this particular company? The sales person did not know he was being recorded, nor was there any indication of any party doing any call recording. Can this be done without any legal repercussions?	The Canadian law governing interception of communication (wiretapping and recording) is explained here. Canada is a one-party country, so as long as one party (you, for example) consent, this would not be a violation of that statute. That source also believes (not unreasonably) that is would not constitute the tort of invasion of privacy since under the act The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled … is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due regard to the lawful interests of others (bearing in mind that is it allowed w.r.t. Section 184(1) of the Criminal Code: that is, it is reasonable to do so).	Your terms and conditions must comply with the laws in: Your jurisdiction (California) Your customer's jurisdiction (each of the US states, Canadian provinces and ultimately countries and sub-jurisdictions in Europe) If they do they will generally be enforceable; if they don't then they will not be enforceable and you may be exposing yourself to civil and criminal sanctions. While not immediately relevant to you, Australian Consumer Law has such sanctions to goods sold into Australia from anywhere in the world; I am not familiar with other jurisdictions. With respect to your comment that you will not accept returns or refunds, this would expose you to potential fines in Australia of $220,000 for an individual or $1,100,000 for a corporation - under Australian Consumer Law returns and refunds are a consumer right. I strongly suspect that most of the jurisdictions you are selling into would take a similar position. A general "catch-all" like "to the extent permitted by law" may reduce the risk of being prosecuted but it would not eliminate it entirely. Again, in Australia, the provision is that you must not engage in deceptive and misleading conduct - merely suggesting that you will not give a refund even with the limitation above - may still be deemed "deceptive and misleading" if the court feels that a reasonable consumer might assume that they are not entitled to a refund. You need professional legal advice on this.	I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!	A variant of this question is addressed in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, with recording taking place in a call between a 1-party and an all-party jurisdiction (California and Georgia). The CA Supreme court ruled in favor of California as the "most-interested" jurisdiction, which if applied to your hypothetical would favor Florida as the most-interested jurisdiction. There would be a true conflict in the law of the two jurisdictions, and (with substitution of names of jurisdictions) as a general matter, the failure to apply California→Florida law in this context would impair California's→Florida's interest in protecting the degree of privacy afforded to California→Florida residents by California→Florida law more severely than the application of California law would impair any interests of the State of Georgia→Nation of Canada The thing is, the person in Florida is violating Florida law by recording, so the cross-jurisdictional issue would only favor the person being recorded in Florida. The Florida statute makes no mention of where the person being recorded is, so there exception to the effect that the law does not apply when the person being recorded is outside of Florida. The Florida person broke Florida law.	There are two separately copyrightable elements to a sound recording, as you point out: the musical work, and the performance. If you want to record a cover version of a song, what matters is the license you hold, if any, to the underlying musical work. The license to the recording is not relevant unless you are sampling or duplicating the recording. The key, however, is that whoever you got the song from has the same issue. With this in mind, there are three basic scenarios: 1) The recording is released under a cc license, but the song is in the public domain. If the song is in the public domain, the recording license is irrelevant; you have the right to cover it. 2) The recording is released under a cc license, but someone other than the recording artist holds the rights to the musical work. In this case, the recording artist almost certainly does not have the right to distribute the recording under a cc license. Musical works are subject to a "mechanical license;" this means that you can record a cover version without permission, but only if you pay royalties to the composer. If you record a cover under these circumstances, both you and the person who attempted to release the item under a cc license will be liable. 3) The recording is released under a cc license by a recording artist who also holds the rights to the musical work--in other words, an original composition. In this case, the answer to your question will depend on the specific license language, and a court's interpretation of it. The CC license defines "Licensed Material" as "the artistic or literary work, database, or other material to which the Licensor applied this Public License." Some CC licenses permit the Licensed Material to be "translated, altered, arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor." Some don't. The CC web site lists litigation involving their licenses, and no litigation listed there seems to address the question of whether, when a CC license is applied to a sound recording, the "Licensed Material" includes the underlying musical work. It is therefore hard to predict what a court would do; you would need an opinion from an experienced intellectual property attorney licensed to practice in your jurisdiction. Or, on a more practical note: if you aren't sure, ask the license holder. If they give you permission, that resolves the issue.	The law in every country where your service is available prevails. That means that if your servers are in Estonia, your file storage is in Lithuania, your company is in Switzerland, you are in France, you hold Thai citizenship, your users are in the USA and the signal transits through the U.K., Belgium, Germany, Canada and Poland then you are subject to the laws of each and every one of them. In addition, if China has reason to believe that the stored files contain matters relating to their citizens then they can take an interest. And so on and so forth ... A country has jurisdiction wherever it wants to have jurisdiction subject to the limits of and its ability to actually enforce its laws. What you are proposing is certainly illegal in many countries and you need to seek professional legal advice - not rely on strangers on the internet.	IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.	The opt-out option is exercised by hanging up the phone. The federal wiretapping law 18 USC 2511 would contain any specific restrictions on recording federal employees, and there are no such restrictions. Each state has their own laws as well, so if either party is in a two-consent state such as Florida, consent from the other party would be required. The federal law only requires one party consent. It is possible that the individual expanded a separate rule that s/he may have heard of, one prohibiting recording of an IRS due process collection hearing that is conducted by telephone, as ruled in Calafati v. Commissioner. In that case, petitioner owed taxes and penalties and there was a process where the IRS was going to take his stuff, which requires a hearing. There is a federal statute 26 USC 7521 allowing the in-person hearing to be recorded, but no mention of recording telephone hearings. The Tax Court has taken the position that if it is not explicitly allowed, the IRS can forbid it: but this is in a very specific context, i.e. a specific legal hearing.
UK: What are my rights if i'm woken by construction work, or roadworks at night? A while back I was woken by some workmen repairing metal railings on the side the road next to my house. This occurred at around 1:30 am, I brashly asked the workmen to stop. To which they complied. If a similar incident occurs in the future, what are my rights when asking them to stop?	You are free to ask them to stop. If they do, great. If they don’t, you legal options depend on if they are legally able to make such noise at that time or not. I am not familiar with UK law but typical laws give wide powers to the owners of infrastructure to construct/repair it. Again, typically, permits may be required but exceptions exist for urgent work. If they have such a permit (or don’t need one) your legal options are nil. If they don’t you can go to court seeking an injunction to stop them until they do.	Yes, your clause specifically limits you to only working for COMPANY, even in your off time. Canada does not have a law protecting your right to work secondary jobs (moonlighting) in your off-duty hours. This means that any contract clause specifically limiting you to work with the employer only is valid, and breaking it is cause for justified dismissal. Based on this, do I need to ask for explicit permission to work on such projects? Yes, you will need to disclose any potential "business or occupation whatsoever". You could play contract games by saying "it's only a hobby" or "it doesn't make any money", but you will be opening yourself up to issues. The best thing to do is to disclose your project to your employer and get in writing their permission to work on it with specific terms that you will not be using company time or resources in any way. See: Patterson V. Bank of Nova Scotia	If you are prevented from entering the property on the day the contract says the tenancy begins that is a breach of the contract. If you suffer a loss as a result of the breach, you are entitled to be restored to the position you'd be in had the loss not occurred. For example, if you had additional removal fees and a hotel bill resulting from this breach, you'd be entitled to claim those costs. Generally the landlord would be liable for this. It is no defence that the agent is unavailable to give you the keys - they should have accounted for the day being a Sunday or started the term on a day when someone would be available. I suggest getting in touch with the landlord in the first instance, civilly explain the situation and ask if they can arrange for you to enter the property on the given date - they might not know what is going on. Keep a log/diary of your communications with the agent and the landlord. Make sure you have a plan B for somewhere to stay. Call Shelter too, for free advice.	You are asking the wrong question: it is up to you to decide how to deal with your injury. The employer's role, if any, is limited to after-the-fact compensation. In Texas, workman's compensation coverage is not mandatory, so that is a variable affecting the details. If the employer has workman's comp, they are protected from various legal actions against time, but they also don't get a "vote" in compensation, which is provided by the insurance company. Assuming that the employer is a non-subscriber (as they are called), then the question of employer liability is resolved either by negotiation or lawsuit. You can read a breakdown of the legal essentials here. When you go to court, you would have to prove that the employer was at fault. Let's assume that you've proven that, then the remaining question is whether that loss is reasonably related to the injury that the employer was responsible for. There are multiple kinds of medical transportation available, ranging from patient self-transportation on the bus to calling 911. The laws regarding 911 calls are a matter of local jurisdiction, but the general rule is that you only call 911 for genuine emergencies. However, there isn't a clear, practical standard that distinguishes between an emergency vs. "something that you need to deal with eventually". Given your description of the injury, I will work on the assumption that this qualifies as a true medical emergency in your town. Now, typically, 911 EMTs make a professional judgment whether you need ordinary ambulance transportation vs. "Medic One" style transportation – this isn't decided by the employer. The one area where an employer could have a say in the matter is in accessing his personal or work phone, in order to call 911. Your description of the circumstances is not exactly clear: do you have a phone, or access to a phone? You do not have to have employer permission to make an emergency call on your phone. So to continue looking for ways to make this a problem for the employer, I will assume that you had no access to a phone of your own or any other employee, and the employer refused to let you use his personal phone or company phone to call 911, but would let you use his phone to call home (this is an entirely rhetorical assumption, but I have no evidence that the situation is otherwise). Now the question is whether the employer has a legal obligation to provide access to a work or personal phone in order to make an emergency call. Now we have a specific Texas law, Penal Code §42.062 which says in part that it is a crime when one knowingly prevents or interferes with another individual's ability to place an emergency call or to request assistance, including a request for assistance using an electronic communications device, in an emergency from a law enforcement agency, medical facility, or other agency or entity the primary purpose of which is to provide for the safety of individuals Here is a lawyer's talk-through of this law, which does not address to $64,000 question whether the law creates a "duty to assist" rather than a "duty to not interfere". The answer is tied to the basic lawsuit question of whether the employer is at fault. Under the common law, if a party has created a harmful situation, they have a duty to assist in mitigating that situation. So if you were horsing around on the job and you're at fault for the injury, then the employer is not liable and you have to shoulder the burden for treatment. If they are at fault, they also have to assist you in seeking emergency medical treatment. I doubt that the courts would find it to be a crime to refuse to call 911, but the employer could be civilly liable.	I can't speak for others, but my employer's policy is to ensure compliance with, and raise heightened awareness of, the Modern Slavery Act 2015. If I recall correctly, the Act's original working-title included "Day" but was dropped along the way.	No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations.	Authority A lot of this falls under life skills and common sense, rather than law per se. If you've lived and worked in skyscrapers and laboratories and corporate environments these are things you just come to know. Maybe some of this comes from being a Boy Scout growing up as well. Calling 911 Usually there would be a law prohibiting employment retaliation against someone making a legitimate report to law enforcement, but an employer might reasonably suggest when it is and is not appropriate to do so. Outright stopping someone from calling 911 when it is appropriate to do so would probably constitute obstruction of justice or something similar. Private Security There are a variety of tasks normally performed by private security in a business. Routine patrol to make sure that nothing is amiss and that only authorized people are in the building; excluding trespassers with non-deadly force if necessary; maintaining awareness of neighborhood security threats (e.g. protest marches, repeated crime incidents where employees go) investigating property crimes on the property after reporting the to law enforcement for insurance purposes (which usually has a policy of not investigating small dollar crimes reported to them themselves); maintenance and monitoring of security cameras; organizing fire wardens, scheduling fire drills and scheduling real fire department inspections of the premises when required; response to disturbances (if necessary notifying police); confirming that doors that should be locked are locked; alerting emergency services of fires and crimes in progress or observed; greeting legitimate employees and guests; supervising outside maintenance people; and providing minor first aid, and getting someone to health care when an ambulance is not necessary and calling for one when it is not. Their objective is to serve the company's needs, but often, those heavily overlap with the public's need in the area of security and safety. Fire Wardens A "fire warden" in an office building is responsible for: passing on information from the fire department that employees in the fire warden's unit need to know; to be alert to identify and remedy fire code violations that are identified in inspections (e.g. fire extinguishers that are no longer certified, alarm signals that are broken or need new batteries); to understand and communicate how to respond to a fire alarm and to distinguish between scheduled tests of the equipment and true drills; to supervise the conduct of fire drills and non-drill evacuations; to make sure that everyone knows the meet up location following a true fire; and to keep track of who gets out, who was never at work in the first place when there was an evacuation, and who was unable to escape. A "fire warden" is basically a responsible civilian who coordinates with the fire department which does real inspections and responds to real fires. In contrast, any competent person calls the fire department when there is a real fire that requires response and/or rescue. Any competent person might put out a fire in progress, but a fire warden would be told standard operating procedure for follow up response after an emergency fire or incident is dealt with as a putting out a visible fire in a complex urban or commercial environment is often not sufficient to know that the threat is gone. Often a fire warden would insist that the fire department be called even though there was no visible ongoing threat. This is particularly important in high rises, commercial kitchens and industrial buildings.	a gutter cleaner drops a leaflet with phone number, and as my gutters needed to be cleaned I called him, we met and I gave him a deposit for the work in cash. The gutter cleaner put everything in writing at the back of the leaflet and signed it. In other words, you have a written contract which you fulfilled but the other party did not fulfill, so they now either owe you a service or your money back. This is a civil law matter which you can bring to a county court. You have a telephone number, so it should be possible to identify the other party. lure him into a trap. But then- how do I turn him into the police and keep everything legal? Was thinking of using pepper spray, but I live in Newcastle, and it's illegal to use it in the UK. Any ideas? This is a very bad idea! Apprehending suspects is the job of the police, not yours. Well, there is the concept of a citizen's arrest, but this is only an option in a very limited number of cases, specifically when you catch a criminal in the act and need to prevent the suspect from getting away before the police arrives. And even then you are on very shaky legal ground if the suspect claims you used more force than necessary or if the court doubts that a citizen's arrest was necessary in this particular case. And in this case a court probably won't believe that a citizen's arrest is justified, because the gutter cleaner probably didn't even commit a crime. They just violated a contract. That's a civil matter, not a criminal matter. It might be a criminal matter if they never intended to fulfill the contract (fraud), but you don't know that. If you use violence on a person just because they owe you money, you are very likely committing a crime yourself.
Someone has a video of me doing drugs. Is there legal protection against its release? It's a bit like slander, except there is no false information. I wanted to Google whatever this may be called to see what my options are if this video is ever released. I'm stumped as to what to search for though. A psychopath of a roommate in college has a video of me doing drugs. I wasn't aware there was a video. It was my first and last time trying drugs. I'm about to start my professional career and this degenerate of a man has the power to take everything I've worked for over the past 5 years away with a simple video. My family's reputation, my own reputation, and my professional career are now all at risk because of one stupid mistake I made. It doesn't seem to qualify as slander because I did in fact take drugs. In Ireland	The tort for this kind of activity is called public disclosure of private facts, and almost every U.S. state recognizes that this tort is invalid under the First Amendment in the absence of a legal duty not to disclose of the type existing between an attorney and client, or a psychotherapist and a patient, or a contractual non-disclosure agreement, that does not exist between roommates. There is nothing illegal about your roommate's conduct. Your best move at this point is to take responsibility for your own conduct, to repent and to convince the world that you're doing your best to get on the straight and narrow going forward. If your former roommate insisted on payment for not disclosing the information, that would be extortion, but there is nothing wrong with going ahead and disseminating it without trying to obtain something of value from you for not doing so.	There's a legal issue, and a practical issue. If you witness a crime, you can inform the police and something may happen. The FBI does actually investigate criminal copyright infringement, but they also don't respond to concerned-citizen complaints, only complaints of copyright holders (and not all of them). You cannot use DMCA takedown to get the service provider to remove the content (or shut down the site, or whatever would be necessary), since only the copyright holder can make the required sworn statements. So you have no legal recourse. A practical solution is to tell Google. This link could have been a way to inform them, but it seems to always resolve to identifying plausible DMCA takedown requests, and if you truthfully answer the "are you the copyright holder" question, you are told to go away. Even if you lie at the preliminary stage, the procedure ends with you making a sworn statement, and you can't lie on one of those. This information might allow you to send them a letter, which they might read. They might simply not consider it worth their time.	"I don't recall" will protect you from perjury only if it's true. Let me try an example. You're asked: "Did Mr. Blatter hand you an envelope full of cash?" You say: "Not to my recollection." Now the government introduces a videotape of you receiving and counting the money, and a thank-you note you wrote to Blatter saying "Thanks for the awesome bribe!" You can defend yourself from perjury charges if you can convince the finder of fact that you had forgotten all of those things...but it's not very likely, is it? "I don't recall" isn't a magic bullet. It's like any other statement: it's perjury unless it's true.	It is not absolutely against the law to produce schedule 1 substances (such as marijuana). Per 21 USC 822(a)(1), Every person who manufactures or distributes any controlled substance or list I chemical...shall obtain annually a registration issued by the Attorney General which entails specific permissions to make, distribute etc, under (b). If you turn to the prohibitions in 21 USC 841, it starts the list of prohibitions saying "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful...". The code is liberally littered with the expression "unauthorized". The Attorney General is given authority under 21 USC 811 to make rules, thus can permit production. It's not actually clear who the grower is in the Compassionate IND program. In the Randall case, the "doctrine of necessity" was apparently invoked successfully which led to charges against Randall being dropped. The legal details of the AGs blind eye towards states like Washington are a little hazy, as it were.	The UK has particularly strong (indirect) restrictions on self defense. Askthe.police.uk appears to be an official police agency. As a police agency, they can only give their version of what the law is, but they could be mistaken. They say "The only fully legal self defence product at the moment is a rape alarm". This by itself does not mean that pepper spray and the like are definitively illegal: There are other self defence products which claim to be legal (e.g. non toxic sprays), however, until a test case is brought before the court, we cannot confirm their legality or endorse them. If you purchase one you must be aware that if you are stopped by the police and have it in your possession there is always a possibility that you will be arrested and detained until the product, it's contents and legality can be verified. One can infer that they somewhat disapprove of pepper spray: There are products which squirt a relatively safe, brightly coloured dye (as opposed to a pepper spray). A properly designed product of this nature, used in the way it is intended, should not be able to cause an injury. The underlying theory seems to be that the dye will frighten the assailant so it might be useful. Nevertheless, they do not fully endorse spray dye: However, be aware that even a seemingly safe product, deliberately aimed and sprayed in someone's eyes, would become an offensive weapon because it would be used in a way that was intended to cause injury. This underscores the point that "intent" determines the criminal nature of the act. If you accidentally spray a dye into someone's eyes, that probably would not make the thing an offensive weapon. Moreover, if at the moment of defending yourself with dye you intentionally spray it into someone eyes, that does not make it an offensive weapon (see below on per se offensive weapons). The difference between pepper spray and dye lies in the outcome that you expect, that pepper spray will cause actual and non-trivial physical discomfort, and it's foreseeability (the point of having pepper spray is to injure). The police are not making any definitive "rulings" (only a court can make a ruling), and they warn The above advice is given in good faith, you must make your own decision and this website cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the possession, use or misuse of any self defence product. Possession of other weapons (mostly knives, also weapons for beating people) is more clearly illegal, due to numerous acts enacted by Parliament over the years. The gov't. prosecutor offers useful details on their (current) policies and the underlying laws. The underlying authority for these restrictions seems to be the Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, which outlaws having an offensive weapon in a public place, and an offense weapon is simply defined as any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him A brick or an egg could be an "offensive weapon", if a person intends to use it to cause injury. It is more difficult to see how an egg could cause injury, but actual injury is not required under the law, only intent to injure. It is thus a bit surprising that the police would be so bold as to say that a "rape alarm" is fully legal, but this may refer to a specific thing, the "Personal Guardian", which silently notifies the police, and is not a loud whistle (which could injure a person). Intent being crucial to the determination of "offensive weapon" status, CPS points out that where a person uses an article offensively in a public place, the offensive use of the article is not conclusive of the question whether he had it with him as an offensive weapon within section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. If you use a chain or stick offensively, that does not establish that you had it with you as an offensive weapon. You crucially had to previously intend to use it as an offensive weapon: as they say: Having an article innocently will be converted into having the article guiltily if an intent to use the article offensively is formed before the actual occasion to use violence has arisen. There are a number of per se offensive weapons: those made for causing injury to the person i.e. offensive per se. For examples of weapons that are offensive per se, see Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, (Stones 8-22745) and case law decisions. (Archbold 24-116). The Criminal Justice Act (1988) (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment) Order 2008 came into force on 6th April 2008 with the effect that a sword with a curved blade of 50cm or more (samurai sword), has been added to the schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 but sticks and chains would not be included. Spices are not likely to be shown to have a per se purpose of causing injury to others; but carrying pepper powder with the intent of throwing it in someone's eyes (for whatever reason) and thus injuring them fits the definition of "offensive weapon". Pepper spray even more clearly fits that definition (you don't use pepper spray in curry), and has resulted in arrests. In fact, the Firearms Act 1968 (S5) (b) specifically makes it illegal to possess any weapon of whatever description designed or adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other thing	People running web servers are generally liable for contributory culpability, when some user breaks the law by putting the material on the server. There are legal mechanisms for relieving the server guy from this burden. The best-known mechanism is "DMCA takedown", where you publish contact information so that an offended person can serve up a proper legal claim that you are distributing material that they own copyright to. If you follow the rules, you may enjoy "safe harbor" protection against contributory liability: one of the requirements is that you have to take infringing material down. The specific requirements can depend on the nature of the liability and jurisdiction, but generally involves a "hands off" involvement where the person has no knowledge of what's going on on his server. So just disclaiming responsibility does not work. There are other more serious violations, such as distribution of child porn or transmission of top secret information. Jurisdiction is not totally central to internet questions, and I could sue you (the server guy) in US courts, or (depending on the offense: copyright infringement of a particular item) in UK courts. Nailing this down specifically to Sweden is harder, but recall that The Pirate Bay had a whopping judgment against them.	As an example, under the laws of Colorado, USA, deleting the footage would be a crime. See CRS 18-8-610: A person commits tampering with physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted and acting without legal right or authority, he: (a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters physical evidence with intent to impair its verity or availability in the pending or prospective official proceeding; If you cause a crash, you should certainly believe that you are going to be sued, and a lawsuit is definitely an official proceeding. And it sounds like your purpose in deleting the footage is to prevent it from being used in that lawsuit. So you'd be clearly guilty under this law. It is a class 6 felony, carrying a sentence of 12-18 months in prison and a fine of $1,000 to $100,000. It may be counterintuitive, but according to a law firm, a digital video would be considered physical evidence: Physical evidence may include electronic records, videos, or audio recordings. This includes emails, text messages, social media messages, image files, video files, and computer files. If you don't delete the video, it is likely to be demanded by the plaintiff during the discovery process so that it can be entered into evidence. Rule 37 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure lists the sanctions that can be imposed if you refuse, such as: charging you for legal fees incurred by the plaintiffs in trying to obtain it assuming that the video proves whatever the plantiffs say it would show (e.g. that you were speeding, driving recklessly, etc) entering a default judgment against you (the plaintiffs automatically win the suit, as if you had refused to show up in court) holding you in contempt of court, which can lead to you being put in jail until you choose to comply, as well as fined.	Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable.
Are Two People Considered a Single Person When Married In the United States of America is a married couple, regardless of sex, considered to be a single person by the government? If so, in what situations does the government not view them as a single person.	The modern rule is that individuals in a married couple are almost never considered a single person (ownership of real property in a tenancy by entireties in a few states mostly in the Northeast, is a narrow and rare exception). Historically, considering a married man and woman to be a single person (a legal doctrine called coverture) was common place in the common law, but almost all such rules have been superseded. Lots of the relevant law and legal history is considered in the answer to this question at Law.SE.	In the US at least, discrimination is legal (and sometimes even required) unless it is discrimination against specific, protected characteristics, and even then it is sometimes allowable if it is "necessary". Income, whether of an individual or that individual's family, is not in any list of protected characteristics. As such, discrimination upon it is fully legal.	The legal term for premarital sex, as a crime, is fornication. I found a paper that gives an extensive and well-referenced history and analysis of such laws: Sweeny, JoAnne. Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall and Continuing Uses of Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 46 (2014), 127–173. http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/students/publications/llj/pdfs/vol46/Sweeny.pdf Sweeny finds that many states (or even most) had such laws. As of 2014, six states still do: Idaho, Utah, North Dakota, Illinois, Mississippi and South Carolina (see map on page 156 of the above paper). However, they are likely unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas. Virginia and North Carolina also have laws that have already been found unconstitutional, but have not been repealed.	As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.	Article 41.3.3 of the 1937 Irish Constitution said: No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any other State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament established by this Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the marriage so dissolved. Until this section was changed by the 2019 amendment. I can find no source to show how "but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law" was interpreted, but it seems that a person divorced in or prior to 1940 under US law would not have been permitted to marry in Ireland after 1937 until 2019 under this provision. It should be noted that although Finnegans Wake by James Joyce was published in full in 1939, much of it had been written and published in sections by 1926. It is not at all clear just when it is set. In the 1920s, the constitutional provision quoted above was not yet in effect.	The United States would be one such country. I'm sure it is not the only one. In the case of countries with constitutional courts there is basically no one to second guess their interpretations which is also true when the apex court in a country provides an opinion. Since no one can overrule many of these courts, they are allowed to do what they want.	Your children may have automatically become US citizens at birth, depending on how long their mother lived in the US before they were born. US law says that any child born abroad to an unmarried US citizen mother is automatically a US citizen, as long as their mother had lived in the US continuously for at least one year before the child was born. There is a clear discussion of the legal requirements in Chapter 3 of the USICS Policy Manual: US Citizens at Birth . Your specific situation is covered by § C.2: Child of a US Citizen Mother (also at the bottom of the page!). (The underlying statute, §1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, is here. Like most of the INA, §1409 is not reader friendly.)	It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin Tobacco use or non-use doesn't make the list. That's the legal position; if you want advice on how to handle the workplace stuff post your question on the Workplace Stack Exchange.
Flying leap from Walsh to Morse In the United States, the US Supreme Court established the Turntable Doctrine, in R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657. As I understand it, In general, if a person is injured while trespassing on someone’s property then, unless the injury is due to some specific fault of the landowner, the landowner isn’t liable. After all, if someone trespasses on your property, you shouldn’t be liable for poor judgment exercised by the trespasser, especially since he shouldn’t have been trespassing in the first place. But Stout created an exception to this, initially termed the “turntable doctrine” (named after the piece of railroad machinery that that the child Stout was playing on when injured). The idea was that young children are a special case requiring a higher duty of care. Stout was cited soon after in a similar turntable case, Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875). The term “attractive nuisance doctrine” originated in Keffe, which explained the attractiveness concept thus: To treat the plaintiff as a voluntary trespasser is to ignore the averments of the complaint, that the turn-table, which was situate[d] in a public (by which we understand an open, frequented) place, was, when left unfastened, very attractive, and, when put in motion by them, was dangerous to young children, by whom it could be easily put in motion, and many of whom were in the habit of going upon it to play. The turn-table, being thus attractive, presented to the natural instincts of young children a strong temptation; and such children, following, as they must be expected to follow, those natural instincts, were thus allured into a danger whose nature and extent they, being without judgment or discretion, could neither apprehend nor appreciate, and against which they could not protect themselves. The difference between the plaintiff's position and that of a voluntary trespasser, capable of using care, consists in this, that the plaintiff was induced to come upon the defendant's turn-table by the defendant's own conduct, and that, as to him, the turntable was a hidden danger, a trap. Twenty years later, the New York Court of Appeals discussed the turntable doctrine in Walsh v. F.R.R. Co., 39 N.E. 1068 (NY 1895) and said Stout didn't apply in that case. Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. But then Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 19 N.E.2d 981, 280 N.Y. comes along in 1939 and says The general rule which has prevailed since the well-known turntable case (Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 145 N.Y. 301) is that the so-called doctrine of attractive nuisance does not apply in New York, and that the only duty which an owner of land owes to a trespasser or bare licensee is to abstain from affirmative acts of negligence or not to injure intentionally such person. And from there to the present, supposedly New York doesn't follow the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine. How can Morse make that flying leap, from Stout not being applicable in the particular case (Morse), to saying that "the so-called doctrine of attractive nuisance does not apply in New York"? (Reason for question: I am taking a paralegal class and one of the exercises asks the student to determine whether the attractive nuisance doctrine holds in the state where the student lives.) This question is different. I made the mistake of writing two questions in one post, only one of which was answered. I have split them up into two separate questions. I copied the background material from one to the other so people wouldn't need to click over to the other question to understand this one.	Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.	Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction.	The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.	Illinois has a "Castle Doctrine" which includes dwellings and other qualified buildings, but not a general "Stand your Ground" doctrine. Normally, to claim self-defense one has to show that they were not able to retreat and had to use force, but in Illinois you do not have a duty to retreat if you are preventing criminal interference with a dwelling or with real property that you or a family member owns, or you have a legal duty to protect (see Ill Code 720-2 and Ill Code 720-3). In order to use deadly force in any case, it must be to prevent a forcible felony, which is defined as (720 ILCS 5/2-8): "Forcible felony" means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. So, assuming you have no legal duty to protect the 7-11, you would not be justified in using deadly force against rioters merely on the basis that they were committing a forcible felony against the building. On the other hand, if you were in the store or could see someone in the store being attacked, you may be able to successfully defend deadly force used to protect yourself or that person.	At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.	Your question seems to be about abandoned property and whether Missouri’s statute on disposing of property after a tenant abandons his/her property applies. See Mo. Rev. State. Ann. § 441.065 (“Abandonment of premises, disposition of remaining property.”) Assuming there was no agreement (in writing or orally) for the 19 year-old to pay rent, he was most likely a guest and not a tenant. As a guest, landlord-tenant laws, would not apply to the property that that was left at the nice family’s house. The definitions section of Missouri’s landlord-tenant statutes (and common sense) support this analysis. See Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 441.005. Therefore, the issue them becomes did the 19 year abandon his property? To that question, I think the answer is yes. Missouri Courts have defined the test for “abandoned property” in Herron v. Whiteside, 782 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. App. W. Dist. 1989), stating: Abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment of ownership so that the property ceases to be the property of any person and becomes the subject of appropriation by the first taker. Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo.App.1974). Abandonment of property requires intent plus an act. Id. A sufficient act is one that manifests a conscious purpose and intention of the owner of personal property neither to use nor to retake the property into his possession. Id. Intention to abandon may be inferred from strong and convincing evidence and may be shown by conduct clearly inconsistent with any intention to retain and continue the use or ownership of the property. Herron, 782 S.W.2d at 416. So to synthesize that passage from Herron, the court is saying that there is a 2 part test for determining if property is abandoned. Did the person intend to abandon the property? Did they commit some act to show this intention? If the answer is yes, to both, they the “first taker” or person that gets possession after the property is abandoned is the new owner. Here, it seems that the 19 year-old intended to abandon the property. He left without explaining why and stated that he would not unload the property if the nice family tried to return it (implying he would not accept the property back). Looking at the second part, him moving without giving notice, and telling the nice family that he won’t accept delivery of the property are both acts showing his intent to abandon the property.	I am just a foreign patent attorney who is studying common law to pass the California Bar Exam, but I will present my personal view. (I cannot guarantee the validity of my theory) There is an equitable theory called Constructive Trust. If it is established, the victim is entitled to benefit of any increase in value of defendant's (thief) property, meaning in this example victim (plaintiff) can recover $100 million. In order to assert CT, the following must be met: Wrongful appropriation; Here, D stole lottery ticket. Met. D has title; Here, D has title to $100 million. Met. P can trace his property to D's property; P can trace from P's $1 lottery ticket to its possession by D and collection by D of $100 million. Met. Unjust enrichment by D; D was enriched by stealing P's property (the lottery ticket). Met. Thus, it is highly possible that a court will order D to hold the property ($100 million) in constructive trust for P. This means, in plain language, that P will recover $100 million.	When a person unlawfully kills someone else they have committed a crime against the state (murder, manslaughter etc.) and a civil wrong (a tort) against the victim (specifically, the tort of wrongful death). The state responds with charging the perpetrator with a crime and attempting to prove that they did the deed "beyond reasonable doubt". If convicted the criminal is "punished" by incarceration or death or a fine or community service etc. The victim (through their estate) or other affected people (family, dependents etc.) can respond by suing the perpetrator for compensation (money) for the damage they caused. If the plaintiff proves their case "on the balance of probabilities" the perpetrator will owe the plaintiffs whatever damages the court awards. There are many crime/tort mirrors (many have the same name): theft and conversion, trespass and trespass, fraud and fraud, kidnapping and false imprisonment etc. Because of the different threshold of proof between criminal and civil liability, it is much easier to win a civil case.
Why can some states choose to reject the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine? In the United States, the US Supreme Court established the Turntable Doctrine, in R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657. As I understand it, In general, if a person is injured while trespassing on someone’s property then, unless the injury is due to some specific fault of the landowner, the landowner isn’t liable. After all, if someone trespasses on your property, you shouldn’t be liable for poor judgment exercised by the trespasser, especially since he shouldn’t have been trespassing in the first place. But Stout created an exception to this, initially termed the “turntable doctrine” (named after the piece of railroad machinery that that the child Stout was playing on when injured). The idea was that young children are a special case requiring a higher duty of care. Stout was cited soon after in a similar turntable case, Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875). The term “attractive nuisance doctrine” originated in Keffe, which explained the attractiveness concept thus: To treat the plaintiff as a voluntary trespasser is to ignore the averments of the complaint, that the turn-table, which was situate[d] in a public (by which we understand an open, frequented) place, was, when left unfastened, very attractive, and, when put in motion by them, was dangerous to young children, by whom it could be easily put in motion, and many of whom were in the habit of going upon it to play. The turn-table, being thus attractive, presented to the natural instincts of young children a strong temptation; and such children, following, as they must be expected to follow, those natural instincts, were thus allured into a danger whose nature and extent they, being without judgment or discretion, could neither apprehend nor appreciate, and against which they could not protect themselves. The difference between the plaintiff's position and that of a voluntary trespasser, capable of using care, consists in this, that the plaintiff was induced to come upon the defendant's turn-table by the defendant's own conduct, and that, as to him, the turntable was a hidden danger, a trap. Twenty years later, the New York Court of Appeals discussed the turntable doctrine in Walsh v. F.R.R. Co., 39 N.E. 1068 (NY 1895) and said Stout didn't apply in that case. Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. But then Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 19 N.E.2d 981, 280 N.Y. comes along in 1939 and says The general rule which has prevailed since the well-known turntable case (Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 145 N.Y. 301) is that the so-called doctrine of attractive nuisance does not apply in New York, and that the only duty which an owner of land owes to a trespasser or bare licensee is to abstain from affirmative acts of negligence or not to injure intentionally such person. And from there to the present, supposedly New York doesn't follow the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine. How can some states follow it and some others not? I've heard of circuit splits, but they can be resolved by a Supreme Court decision. In this situation, a Supreme Court decision already exists, so I don't see how there can be a circuit split on this. (Reason for question: I am taking a paralegal class and one of the exercises asks the student to determine whether the attractive nuisance doctrine holds in the state where the student lives.)	The US Supreme Court only has jurisdiction in federal matters. So if someone is suing under federal law, or there is a constitutional question, the Supreme Court is the place to go for a definitive answer. However, states have their own laws. The Supreme Court cannot tell New York that it must apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it is neither a matter of federal law nor a constitutional matter. New York is free to make its own laws on the subject, and the New York courts are free to interpret those laws as they see fit. In fact, federal courts are required to defer to New York's interpretation if New York's laws apply to the case, even if the case is in federal court for some reason (like diversity of parties.) See the Erie doctrine (which, coincidentally, involves yet another case about railroad injuries.)	Overview This is a somewhat complex issue. The presence of "No Trespassing" signs would make anyone who enters the property without a specific invitation a trespasser. So would the presence of a fence, even if there was a closed but unlocked gate. An "Enter at your own risk" sign probably would not make such people legally trespassers. In West Virginia, a landowner or lessee or other lawful occupant owes a duty of "reasonable care" to invitees and other non-trespassers. No such duty is owed to trespassers. However, the owner or lawful occupant is expected to avoid dangerous conditions and reckless hazards, as well as intentional causes of harm (such as booby-traps). If through recklessness or serious negligance a dangerous condition exists and a person, even a trespasser, is injured or killed because of such a condition, the owner or lawful occupant is likely to be liable. However, if the danger is "open and obvious" or is as well known to the injured person as to the owner or occupant, there is no liability. A warning sign might make a danger "open and obvious". I do not see that video cameras will be relevant to the matter at all. Cameras do not warn a pedestrian not to enter, nor do they warn of any danger, nor do they prevent a pedestrian from being injured. They may help in detecting or even preventing crime, but will not affect liability for injury to a pedestrian. Sources West Virginia Code Code Sections §61-3B-3. (Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.) of the West Virginia Code provides that: (a) It is an unlawful trespass for any person to knowingly, and without being authorized, licensed or invited, to enter or remain on any property, other than a structure or conveyance, as to which notice against entering or remaining is either given by actual communication to such person or by posting, fencing or cultivation. §55-7-27. (Liability of possessor of real property for harm to a trespasser.) (a) A possessor of real property, including an owner, lessee or other lawful occupant, owes no duty of care to a trespasser except in those circumstances where a common-law right-of-action existed as of the effective date of this section, including the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly causing the trespasser injury. (b) A possessor of real property may use justifiable force to repel a criminal trespasser as provided by section twenty-two of this article. (c) This section does not increase the liability of any possessor of real property and does not affect any immunities from or defenses to liability established by another section of this code or available at common law to which a possessor of real property may be entitled. (d) The Legislature intends to codify and preserve the common law in West Virginia on the duties owed to trespassers by possessors of real property as of the effective date of this section. Articles from Law Firms The article "West Virginia Legislature reinstitutes “open and obvious” doctrine" from the law firm Farmer, Cline, & Campbell discusses how the case of Hersch v. E-T Enterprises, Ltd. P’ship. in which a WVa court abolished the "open and obvious" except to liability, imposing dameages for an "open and obvious" hazard, specifically an open stair without guardrails. The legislature then amended §55-7-27. (a) to restore the exception. The article also reads: West Virginia state law requires property owners remove hazards from their property to reduce the risk of these injuries. The expectation is dependent on the type of person that is on the property. Previously, visitors were broken into one of four categories: invitee, licensee, social guest or trespasser. The duty of care owed to the visitor depended on the category under which the visitor qualified. Today, there are only two categories: trespasser and non-trespasser. The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Mallet v. Pickens, abolished the four categories mentioned above, and held that “landowners or possessors now owe any non-trespassing entrant a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.” The article "Property owners may be liable for injuries to trespassers" from the law firm Farmer, Cline, & Campbell reads: West Virginia homeowners are not obligated to protect those who trespass upon their property. However, they should be aware that they cannot willfully cause injury to any who do trespass. This law can become an issue for homeowners with frequent trespassers as they may find themselves liable for injuries any people, even the uninvited ones, sustain if their properties are left in an unsafe condition. For example, homeowners and landowners could potentially face lawsuits if they purposefully made their properties unsafe. They may also be held liable if the condition of their properties could cause serious bodily harm or death. Further, landowners can also potentially face legal consequences if they fail to warn potential trespassers that there are hazards on their properties. The article "Determining Duty in West Virginia Premises Liability Cases" from Colombo Law reads: Most states use three categories to determine whether a duty is owed to individuals who enter the property of another. These three categories are business invitee, licensee, and trespasser. In the past, West Virginia was one of the many states that followed this standard. However, in 1999 West Virginia abolished and replaced the three specific classifications with a new, more general standard of determining whether the individual is a trespasser or a nnon-trespasser Trespasser. A trespasser is an individual who enters the property of another without the permission of a landowner. An individual will be deemed a trespasser if they do not have either express or implied permission from the owner. In West Virginia, the courts offer little protection to those who are trespassers. As a trespasser, a landowner must only refrain from intentional or reckless conduct. Non-Trespassers. Contrary to trespassers, landowners owe a duty to anyone that is permitted to be on the property. If an individual enters private property with the express or implied permission of a landowner, the landowner must ensure that the premises are reasonably safe for those on the premises. To ensure you are meeting the standard of care, the landowner must inspect the premises to determine whether there are any dangerous conditions present on the property and repair and/or warn individuals of the danger. Premises liability is the legal premise for which landowners are responsible for harm caused by unsafe conditions existing on the landowner’s premises. Premises liability is a broad concept that may be raised for a variety of harms present. One main reason for personal injury actions stemming from premises liability include slip and fall accidents as a result of: Slippery floors Uneven sidewalks or pavement Objects protruding from carpeting , floorboards, or store shelves	There is a general defence to any crime called self defense. If you commit a crime, but the reason you commit it is because you are acting in self defense, or the defense of another, then you will not be found guilty of that crime. For example, if you kill someone, but the court believes you are acting in self defense, then you will not be found guilty of murder (or manslaughter). This defense extends to other crimes too, and trespassing would be included in this. Acting in the defense of another person has the same effect as acting in self defense. Just note that you would have to prove that it was reasonable for you to be acting in the way you did. Usually this means that the crime you committed was proportional or necessary to prevent the crime that would have occurred, and if self defense is involved, that it was necessary to do what you had to do to prevent harm to you or another.	This varies depending on the specific law of the state or locality involved. In New York, the word "POSTED", along with the name and address of the owner is sufficient to notify people not to intrude, and anyone ignoring such a sign is technically trespassing (although, in practice, if such a person leaves the property when asked, did no damage, and appeared honestly ignorant, it is likely that no legal action would be taken). In California, as specified by penal code section 553 (quoted in the linked answer) a sign for this purpose must include: the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” in letters at least two inches tall, and follow other specifications in the law. The word "Posted" is neither required nor sufficient, although the law calls land with such signs "posted property".	Can someone be compelled to prove they are complying with a contract? In this context, yes, since its apparent breach is evident. The other answer rightly explains the notion of preponderance of evidence, which pertains to the procedural aspect. Here, I will mainly address the substantive standpoint as per the situation you describe. The HOA rule most likely is intended to serve one or more purposes, such as preserving the prestige of the neighborhood, and to avoid safety hazards. The prolonged presence of an abandoned vehicle --just like any piece of junk--- tends to contravene those purposes. Regardless of the vehicle's true state, the effect of its apparent abandonment is visibly detrimental to the neighborhood, and it frustrates the ultimate purposes of the HOA rule: to preserve safety conditions in the neighborhood as well as the value of the properties. Also, the presumption that an abandoned vehicle is inoperable seems reasonable. The most straight-forward way to disprove the board's allegations of inoperability is to actually move the vehicle at least once in a while. Accordingly, the owner's inexplicable reluctance to take that simple step reinforces the supported suspicion that the vehicle is indeed inoperable, and thus in breach of the HOA rule.	The Missouri trespass law is here. The police will not detain a person for expressing himself, even repeatedly, though a court order to stay away would change things. The law says A person does not commit the offense of trespass in the first degree by entering or remaining upon real property unless the real property is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders or as to which notice against trespass is given by: (1) Actual communication to the actor; or (2) Posting in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders. You can also use purple paint markers. There is also a law against stalking which prohibits unwanted communication that may be threatening, intimidating, frightening or causes emotional distress to another person. However, you need to petition the courts for an order of protection. If granted, violating the order would be a felony, and more likely to get the attention of the police. Getting an attorney is the simplest immediate solution, since I expect that purple paint won't mean much to him.	Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).	Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.
Is there recourse for damages due to merchant reselling item after taking payment but before delivery? We purchased a door at Home Depot. It was a display model, and therefore sold at a significantly reduced price. We also purchased installation service, and therefore left the door at the store so the installers could take measurements. During this time Home Depot sold the same door again to another party, who took possession of it. They won't give us any further details, other than to say that the door is gone, and that they will refund our money. Presumably they could have found a buyer willing to pay more than we did. We don't want a refund; we want the door and service as originally purchased. However, the store has told us that our only option to complete that transaction would be to purchase a new door for $2,000 more than we paid originally. What recourse might we have in this scenario under contract or tort law?	Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).	Is UPS allowed to take my money and business without intention to fulfill its side of the transaction? No. The company's belated change of mind constitutes breach of contract, and its subsequent refusal to give you a refund completes the prima facie elements of fraud and/or unjust enrichment. The company's acceptance of your package & money and its subsequent act of sending your package to NC strike the applicability of its clause on Refusal of Service (see the link provided in the other answer). The blanket term of "among other reasons" is hardly enforceable at that point. In particular, the existence of a lawsuit between the recipient and the company further weakens any merits of the company's belated change of mind. That is because, by virtue of that lawsuit, the company currently has to deliver to that same recipient other packages anyway. Thus, the company cannot allege that delivering your package "is unsafe or economically or operationally impracticable". Also, since you are the one who paid for the service, the company cannot withdraw on grounds of "the person or entity responsible for payment is not in good standing".	The issue of who pays directly for the items and/or to contractors is irrelevant. The important thing is to memorialize the agreement/arrangement in writing so as to preempt or solve eventual disputes. A clearly written agreement signed by the parties would supersede any presumption of conditions and rights arising solely from the parties' conduct.	Do you have a contract? It depends on the website’s terms but almost certainly not. It is standard practice in e-commerce terms and conditions that your selecting “buy” and giving the vendor money does not create a contract; you are merely making an offer that the vendor can accept or reject. For example, Amazon’s terms are clear that the contract only comes into existence when they dispatch the goods, until then they are free to cancel your order and return your money. Here the vendor rejected the offer. Is this false advertising? Maybe. It would depend on the specifics of the ad and whether, overall, a reasonable person would be mislead or deceived. It’s possible you misunderstood but that doesn’t necessarily make it misleading or deceptive. I misunderstand a lot of things; that doesn’t mean they were objectively misleading or deceptive. Notwithstanding, a business does not have to make good on false advertising. An incorrect advertised price does not force the business to anccept offers of that price. It may force a correction and may require the item to not be sold until the price is corrected and it may expose the business to fines, but it does not give anyone the right to buy at that price.	No, you could not have prevented them from collecting their belongings But you could have sued for trespass Unless those boxes were part of the contract for sale, they remain the vendor’s property and just like you can’t withhold your mate’s trombone that he accidentally left after that great party, you can’t withhold the vendor’s boxes - that’s called “stealing”. What you could (should?) have done is refuse to settle until the boxes were removed. As the vendor was in breach, if you suffered any unmitigated loss as a result of the delay, you would be entitled to recover it. This is one of the reasons why you should inspect on the day of settlement. Given that you accepted the breach, even though the vendor’s boxes were technically trespassing, they could reasonably raise the defense that they had implicit permission- at least for a reasonable time. “A few days” is a reasonable time.	Does the original 'No Problem' good will waiver from Party B holds in court? Generally speaking, yes. Party B cannot undo his waiver unless (1) it was induced fraudulently, or (2) the contract supports striking that kind of waivers. There might be other scenarios entitling B to undo his waiver, but all of them are exceptional and don't differ that much from these two alternative conditions. That being said, the evidence (such as the recording) should make it clear that party B waived enforcement of the timeliness of payments, not his entitlement to payments themselves. In the event that party A has already made the payments he missed and scenario (1) or (2) applies, party B's remedies are limited to the concrete losses he incurred as a result of party A's belatedness. The principle is that remedies be available to the extent necessary to avoid injustice, as is frequently contemplated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.	You didn't consent to being ripped off. You did however fail to grasp the terms under which you were permitted to park on their property, and you failed to pursue an alternative (such as looking for change; using a credit card). It is possible that you should have known that this was a no-change-given machine, since one can often see that there is no mechanism on these machines whereby you can actually get change. However, if you have clear proof that you owed $6 and you paid $10, then 4 of those dollars are properly yours, and there is a reasonable chance that you could prevail in a suit against them. There is even a greater chance that they would refund the difference, just as a sensible business practice. "Exact change" is legal and can even be the law, especially in government-run transportation systems.	I make a copy of any important receipt printed on thermal paper, since the terms of many sellers and manufacturers require receipts for disputes. But I'm not aware of any law that says they have to make it convenient to maintain a receipt or other proof of purchase. However, when a company makes their terms unclear, unexpected, or difficult to comply with it seems there is often a lawyer ready to step up and file a class action lawsuit. Here's one archive to give you an idea of what companies will settle. In the United States the FTC is also empowered by law to "protect consumers," which means that if "disappearing" receipts become a widespread problem for consumers they could take action on the government's authority: The Federal Trade Commission Act is the primary statute of the Commission. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered, among other things, to (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d) conduct investigations relating to the organization, business, practices, and management of entities engaged in commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative recommendations to Congress. Given the above, I wouldn't be surprised to see either a class-action lawsuit or FTC rule that requires retailers to provide "durable" receipts, or some convenient substitute.
Did Michael Flynn commit treason? Context In this Thread the user titles it 'Michael Flynn committed Treason'. He believes that Michael Flynn committed treason, Treason is defined in the Article III Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution as: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted. So, I'm not sure how much this would be defined as Treason. From my understanding Treason is defined as someone who the U.S. has declared war on, and they officially haven't done that according to this article. But the U.S. hasn't formally declared war on ISIS -- or on anyone else since 1942, when Congress voted to do so against Nazi Germany allies Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Am I right in this assertion? Question Did Michael Flynn commit treason?	Since the treason statute is quite vague, you have to discover what the details of the law is by looking at precedent. Almost all federal treason convictions in the US have involved declared wars. There is the case of John Fries, an early tax rebellion case in 1800, who was pardoned by the president thus rendering the need for legal appeal moot, but this involved armed insurrection and is thus not analogous. All other federal cases have involved people supporting the enemy in case of a declared war. In this specific case, the allegation is that by advocating not working with Syrian Kurds in an assault on Raqqa (because it was thought to be in the best interests of the US in terms of our relationship with Turkey, given the position of the Turkish state w.r.t. Kurds), Flynn benefited ISIS. Compared to various wartime treason convictions, such as Tokyo Rose and Axis Sally, the difference between imaginary "aid" in the case of Flynn vs. actual aid in the other cases is so stark that there is no case to be made for a treason charge.	The FCC Commissioner is appointed, per 47 USC 154, by POTUS, subject to approval by the US Senate (as a member of the Commission). Thereafter he serves for 5 years. However Article 2 of the Constitution allows removal from office: The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors. But only the House of Representatives can impeach and only the Senate can remove (of the President declines to do so). There is no provision for a citizen to sue to remove a civil officer. It is, of course, legal for citizens and others to lobby politically for whatever action that want Congress to take. "Net Neutrality" rules can be more permanently fixed by act of Congress. By act of Congress, the FCC may be required to, allowed to, or prohibited from setting some set of rules. Such laws are typically broad and leave a lot of discretion to the executive branch. Congress has not passed a law mandating "net neutrality", and as ruled in Comcast v. FCC the FCC lacks "ancillary jurisdiction" over internet services of at least Comcast. There have been previous attempts to legislate "net neutrality", such as the Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006 which died on the floor of the House, which purported to guarantee "net neutrality" via an extension of antitrust law. However, the only way to make such a provision permanent is to make it be a Constitutional Amendment, since an act of Congress can be repealed or amended in such a way that it effectively doesn't exist.	The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal.	No. The relevant provision of the United States Constitution is Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 which states in the pertinent part: The President . . . shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The correct conclusion flows pretty directly from the definition of a "reprieve" and a "pardon", both of which, in the ordinary senses of these words refer to granting forgiveness for acts that have already occurred. One of the leading cases on point which supports this view is Ex parte Garland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 380 (1855), which states: The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions. Despite its antiquity, this case remains good law and has been applied repeatedly in subsequent cases (although few on the right of a President to pardon future crimes which just hasn't come up). Other Observations The President's pardon power is limited to federal crimes, so no President may pardon or commute a state or foreign conviction. The nature of the pardon power, if any, with respect to state and local crimes is governed by each respective state constitution and varies rather considerably. The power in the U.S. Constitution is broader than that is some state constitutions. For example, the corresponding provision of the Colorado Constitution, applicable to convictions entered by the state of Colorado, does not allow crimes to be pardoned prior to a conviction. Article IV, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution provides: "The governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason * * *." The History Of The Pardon Power One of the most thorough and up to date reviews of the scope and nature of the federal pardon power can be found in the law review article, Todd David Peterson, "Congressional Power Over Pardon and Amnesty: Legislative Authority In The Shadow of Presidential Prerogative" 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1225 (2003). In particular, it has an interesting historical overview of the power at pages 1228-1235 (pagination and footnotes omitted): The President's pardon power derives from the authority that had been invested in English kings since the end of the first millennium. Although the King possessed plenary power to grant pardons, over the years Parliament imposed specific limitations on the pardon power in order to avoid perceived abuses. For example, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 made it an offense for any person to imprison an English subject outside of the country and, in order to avoid an evasion of the writ, Parliament prohibited the King from granting a pardon for violation of the statute. Nevertheless, English courts frequently took an absolutist view of the King's pardon power. Thus, in Godden v. Hales, the Lord Chief Justice upheld a royal pardon on the ground that the Kings of England were absolute sovereigns; . . . the laws were the King's laws; . . . the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of Government as he saw necessity for it; . . . he was sole judge of that necessity; that no act of Parliament could take away that power. The Parliament, however, persisted in its efforts to rein in the pardon power and, in 1700, adopted the Act of Settlement, which stated that "no pardon under the great seal of England [shall] be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons in Parliament." This limitation was enforced against the King, although it did not apply to pardons granted to relieve punishments imposed after the impeachment of an official. The royal pardon prerogative was imported into the American colonies whose charters gave the leaders substantial authority to pardon offenses. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, neither the Virginia plan nor the New Jersey plan contained a pardon power. Nevertheless, at the insistence of Charles Pinckney, Alexander Hamilton, and John Rutledge, a pardon clause similar to the English Act of Settlement of 1700 was added to the draft constitution. Thus, the first report of the Committee on Detail proposed that the clause read: "He [the President] shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment." The issue of legislative control over the pardon process was addressed directly by an amendment proposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut. James Madison's journal notes that "Mr. Sherman moved to amend the power to grant reprieves and pardon' so as to readto grant reprieves until the ensuing session of the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate.'" George Mason argued that the Senate already possessed too much authority, and the proposed amendment was rejected by a vote of eight to one. The convention did approve a motion to insert "except in cases of impeachment" after pardon and remove the words "but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar." Luther Martin then sought to limit the President's power to grant pre-conviction pardons by inserting the words "after conviction," following the words "reprieves and pardons." Martin, however, withdrew his motion after James Wilson argued that "pardon before conviction might be necessary, in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices." Edmund Randolph then offered an amendment to exclude "cases of treason" from the pardoning power. This proposed amendment was defeated, although its exclusion was later to prove controversial. Thus, although the framers realized that the pardon power was subject to potential abuse by the President, they declined to place any limitations on the President's pardon power or grant the legislature any authority to check potential presidential abuses. The debates following the convention's passage of the Constitution reveal more about the framers' views on the pardon power. In the Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton attempted to respond to the criticism that the President could pardon his accomplices in a case of treason. Hamilton acknowledged that "there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of [the legislative] body or of a part of it." Hamilton argued, however, that the reasons against such legislative authority outweighed any in its favor: "[i]t is not to be doubted that a single man of prudence and good sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever." In particular, Hamilton argued, in the case of large scale seditions that attracted significant popular support, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit, which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. Thus, Hamilton argued not only that the power was properly reposed in the President, but that it would be dangerous to grant such power to Congress. Finally, Hamilton argued that it was appropriate to grant the President pardon power in order to ensure that the authority could be exercised with appropriate dispatch: "In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed that a discretionary power with a view to such contingencies might be occasionally conferred upon the President; it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable whether, in a limited constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic before-hand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity." There was little debate about the pardoning power during the state ratifying conventions. George Mason continued to argue that the power should not be given to the President. An opponent in New York suggested that pardons for treason should not be allowed without congressional consent. Ultimately, the Constitution was adopted without any express limitation on the President's pardoning power. The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions discussed the general scope of the pardoning power. For the most part, with exceptions to be discussed later, these decisions contain broad dicta concerning the unfettered nature of the President's power and the inability of Congress to impose any legislative restrictions on it. For example, in United States v. Wilson, the Court held that a pardon must be pleaded in order to be effective. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the [C]onstitution gives to the [P]resident, in general terms, "the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States." As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it. Marshall further defined the pardon as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. In Ex parte Wells, the Supreme Court considered whether the President could grant a conditional pardon in the form of commutation of a death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment. The Court noted that pursuant to the Pardon Clause, the President has granted reprieves and pardons since the commencement of the present government. Sundry provisions have been enacted, regulating its exercise for the army and navy, in virtue of the constitutional power of [C]ongress to make rules and regulations for the government of the army and navy. No statute has ever been passed regulating it in cases of conviction by the civil authorities. In such cases, the President has acted exclusively under the power as it is expressed in the [C]onstitution. The Court noted, however, that "[t]here are also pardons grantable as of common right, without any exercise of the king's discretion; as where a statute creating an offence, or enacting penalties for its future punishment, holds out a promise of immunity to accomplices to aid in the conviction of their associates. When accomplices do so voluntarily, they have a right absolutely to a pardon . . . ." Thus, at least in dicta, the Court recognized Congress's authority to regulate clemency in the military and to adopt statutes granting immunity for cooperation in a criminal investigation. In Ex parte Garland, the Court spoke in sweeping dicta about the exclusive power of the President over pardon and amnesty. In Garland, the Court considered the issue whether a former Confederate senator would be permitted to be a member of the Supreme Court Bar without taking the statutorily required oath that he had never voluntarily given aid or comfort to the confederacy. The petitioner had received a presidential pardon and argued that the pardon exempted him from the requirements of the oath to which he could not truthfully subscribe. The Court held that it was "not within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment beyond the reach of executive clemency," and therefore, the petitioner was entitled to membership in the Bar. In the course of the opinion, the Court broadly defined the President's pardon power: "The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions." In Ex parte Grossman, the Court considered whether the President's pardon power extended to criminal contempts of court. The Court upheld the President's power to issue such pardons based on the history of royal pardons for contempt in England. The Court also looked to the long history of presidential pardons of criminal contempts of court. In responding to the argument that a presidential pardon of contempt of court would interfere with the ability of the federal courts to protect their own decrees, Chief Justice Taft noted that the Constitution provides a number of powers to the branches which give them the ability to check the other branches of government. With respect to the pardon power, the Court stated: "[t]he executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after their commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial, by individuals, or by classes, conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress." The Court also noted that the President exercised the pardon power without any significant judicial check on his pardoning authority: "It is a check entrusted to the executive for special cases. To exercise it to the extent of destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment would be to pervert it; but whoever is to make it useful must have full discretion to exercise it. Our Constitution confers this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse it. An abuse in pardoning contempts would certainly embarrass courts, but it is questionable how much more it would lessen their effectiveness than a wholesale pardon of other offenses. If we could conjure up in our minds a President willing to paralyze courts by pardoning all criminal contempts, why not a President ordering a general jail delivery?" In Biddle v. Perovich, Justice Holmes wrote an opinion for the Court in which he upheld the President's conditional pardon of a convict sentenced to death on the condition that his sentence be commuted to life imprisonment. Justice Holmes suggested a different rationale for the pardon power than Chief Justice Marshall had enunciated early in the 19th century. Rather than being a private act of grace that must be accepted and proffered to the court by the one pardoned, Justice Holmes saw the President's pardon as serving public policy ends: "A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed. . . . Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what shall be done."	Charged: yes. Another answer has mentioned incitement to riot in 18 USC 2101. There is also incitement to insurrection in 18 USC 2383. This carries with it upon conviction a prohibition on holding office under the United States, both in the federal law itself and also via Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the United States. There are laws under which charges could be brought, and there is certainly no impediment to bringing them after M. Trump's term of office ends. Bringing them before then raises questions of presidential immunity, but I strongly doubt that speaking at the start of a "Save America March" can be construed as an action in any official Presidental capacity. Convicted: only maybe. M. Trump's statements have to extend beyond what is protected by Amendment 1 and actually be incitement to insurrection. Although there is a strong case that seeking to kill the Vice President of the United States ("Where's Mike Pence?" as people shouted) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives ("Tell Nancy we're coming for her!"), seeking to obstruct the function of the Congress, and seeking to remove the Electoral College certificates, are indeed insurrection; as possibly is whatever the woman who refused to stop brandishing a knife at the door of the building was intending to do; reading the transcript of the whole speech given at the start of the "Save America March", it is difficult to point to where M. Trump specifically incited any of those things. One can make circumstantial arguments, but the words actually uttered then and there merely encouraged marchers on a "Save America March" to march to the Capitol and cheer people on, "demand" that congresspeople "do the right thing", and "make your voices heard". This is in contrast to M. Trump's son and daughter in law who explicitly mention "fight", "fighter", and "fighting", 7 times by Eric Trump by my count and 4 times by Lara Trump. And of course Rudy Giuliani not only said "fight" but also proposed "trial by combat". In more potential criminal trouble than even them is lawyer and prominent Trump supporter, L. Lin Wood, who explicitly called, without equivocation, several times over a period of days, on Twitter and on Parler, for the Vice President of the United States to be executed by firing squad. There will certainly be mixed fortunes in the Trump family from this. Whilst there may be a case against Eric and Lara, and possibly Donald Sr.; Ivanka Trump did not speak beforehand that I know of, and is reported afterwards to have asked her father to go and speak to the mob about stopping, which she also did directly, albeit ineptly ("American Patriots — any security breach or disrespect to our law enforcement is unacceptable. The violence must stop immediately. Please be peaceful."), herself via Twitter for a short while.	The article "The Posse Comitatus Act..." analyzes the legal restrictions on use of military power arising from that act. Following US v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, where the act played a role in trials related to Wounded Knee, it was found and subsequently supported in various ruling that the use which is prohibited by the posse comitatus statute is that which is regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory in nature, and causes the citizens to be presently or prospectively subject to regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions imposed by military authority. Mere "involvement" of "deployment" of the military is not contrary to the act. It should also be noted that the act includes a provision for actions expressly authorized by Congress, as was the case of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the related Magnuson Act of 1950. Hypothetically (in extremis), Congress might pass a law requiring the seizure of persons infected with a disease. If Congress expressly authorized USAMRIID to effect such seizures, that would not be in violation of the act. Otherwise, it would be. Since USAMRIID is a research lab and not an enforcement arm of the military, it is both highly unlikely that Congress would authorize such activities or that USAMRIID would get involved in this way. W.r.t. their ordinary operations, scientific research, nothing in what they do that contradicts the Posse Comitatus Act. Since we are dealing in hypotheticals, I should point out that SCOTUS has so far not definitively endorsed the "regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory" test, so that test could be overturned, though it is unlikely to be.	If the Senate has convicted by the necessary majority, Trump would no longer be the President - Mike Pence would be. There is no legal difficulty in removing ordinary citizens from the White House. Of course, President Pence might decide that he didn't mind ex-President Trump remaining in the White House, and I think the law enforcement agencies would be obliged to respect that.	Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.
Can Congress dissolve the other branches? Congress has the power to amend the Constitution. In theory, could they pass an amendment repealing Articles II and III, effectively dissolving the other two branches? This is clearly contrary to the intent of the Constitution, and could very well result in a military or civilian uprising. However, since an amendment can't be declared unconstitutional, is it technically possible?	Congress has the power to propose amendments, but not to enact them. Amendments are only enacted once they're ratified by 3/4ths of the state legislatures. And yes, there's no reason to think it would be unconstitutional for 2/3rds of each house of Congress plus 3/4ths of the state legislatures to make fundamental changes to the Constitution like eliminating other branches of government. The only limit on amendments that's still in effect is that states can't be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate without their consent.	Sort of The 25th Amendment is crystal clear that the VP and a majority of the cabinet can declare in writing to the president pro tem of the Senate and the speaker of the house a presidential inability, whereupon the VP becomes the acting president. The president can then immediately transmit in writing his declaration that there is no inability, and then he resumes his position as president until the VP and majority of cabinet (not necessarily the same members) again declare a disability, within 4 days. If that happens, then Congress decides the matter. There is a 28 day period for a super-majority of Congress to make that decision, plus 48 hours for assembling of Congress is not in session. The problem is that the amendment says that the president resumes his powers unless something happens within 4 days. It does not say that he must wait 4 days to see what the VP response is. If the VP does not counter-respond immediately, then it is possible, but not guaranteed, that the president regains power until the VP reaffirms the disability. This is a question that would have to be decided by SCOTUS. In the presumably short interim, there would be serious constitutional questions as to the legality of the actions of either POTUS or VPOTUS.	In other words, what thoughts regarding freedoms and rights from the founders of a nation support a leader taking supreme power over its Congress? Generally speaking, one doesn't take "supreme power over Congress", one instead, disregards laws duly enacted by Congress or express mandates of the Constitution, including those related to cooperation with Congress. The most notable recognized deviations from Congressional direction that are recognized (at least by some people) are: The authority of the President to direct the military as commander-in-chief, and to a lesser extent, to conduct foreign policy. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. This power is balanced with the power of Congress to declare war and regulate the military via the War Powers Resolution of 1973 which has never really been tested in a "when push comes to shove" kind of way so far. The War Powers Resolution (a.k.a. the War Powers Act) requires the President to seek Congressional approval for new conflicts that arise that could become wars and predominantly Presidents have done so without necessarily acknowledging that they are obligated in a constitutionally valid way to do so. The closely related power to unilaterally employ military force to ensure a Republican form of government or to respond to an invasion or insurrection or at the request of a governor, "domestic violence" without Congressional authorization. U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. Related to this is the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. In practice, however, this theoretically unilateral power of the President has never been very meaningful, because no President has ever sought to invoke it in circumstances in which he didn't already have solid and prompt legislative support from Congress. For example, the suspension of habeas corpus by President Lincoln during the U.S. Civil War was backed by legislation from Congress, the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863. But, the emergency power to limit the right of habeas corpus has been significantly restricted by U.S. Supreme Court case law: In ex parte Milligan, the United States Supreme Court held that the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act [of 1863] did not authorize military tribunals, that as a matter of constitutional law the suspension of habeas corpus did not itself authorize trial by military tribunals, and that neither the Act nor the laws of war permitted the imposition of martial law where civilian courts were open and operating unimpeded. The emergency powers of the President to use the military domestically are also limited by the Posse Comitatus Act and related legislation, which prohibits the use of the military to enforce civilian laws domestically in most circumstances, absent an invasion or insurrection. The authority to pardon someone who has violated the law. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. The authority to veto legislation subject to Congressional override. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7. The authority to not spend all funds that are authorized by Congress for a purposes that are not entitlements. This is implied in case law subject to limitations in a 1974 Act of Congress. This is called "impoundment of appropriated funds." But, one of the strongest limitations on Presidential power is that the President may not spend any money not appropriated by law by Congress. The President can constitutionally spend less than is appropriated by Congress, subject to the Impoundment Act of 1974, but not more. Since the Constitution prohibits many kinds of long term binding contracts and prospective appropriations that would bind future Congresses (except for the Naval contracts), see U.S. Constitution, Article I, this leaves the President on a fairly short leash and fairly accountable to Congress. The authority to exercise discretion in not fully enforcing all violations of the law. This is implied in case law, especially, the law of prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor's broad discretion in such areas as initiating or foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific charges, and terminating prosecutions by accepting guilty pleas has been recognized on numerous occasions by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. Ratzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965). This discretion exists by virtue of the prosecutor's status as a member of the Executive Branch, and the President's responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that the laws of the United States be "faithfully executed." U.S. Constitution, Article II § 3. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Complete executive branch control of prosecutorial discretion, however, has been limited by the creation of independent agencies within the federal government and by the enactment of laws authorizing the appointment of a special prosecutor, like Robert Mueller, in cases where there is a risk of a conflict of interest from the President. The authority to refrain from enforcing laws determined to be unconstitutional when that determination is not contrary to the controlling judicial branch ruling. This is implied in case law and in the duty to faithfully execute the constitution. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1. This is closely related to prosecutorial discretion. Sovereign immunity as applied to executive branch officials including the President, is mostly a product of case law although it has some statutory acknowledgement in relatively pedestrian claims like lawsuits for ordinary tort liability against the United States seeking money damages which must usually be brought in the U.S. Court of Claims, if they are allowed at all (with an important exception established in the Bivens case). Case law has also recognized an "executive privilege" against forced disclosure of certain information by the executive branch although the scope of this privilege, which arises only from case law, is disputed. Only a handful of cases have addressed this, the most famous of which is United States v. Nixon discussed at the link. There is also an unanswered question regarding when, if ever, a President's actions are clear and intentional violations of the law, and yet still might not constitute impeachable offenses set forth in U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 4, or what remedies are available when an impeachable offense is committed but Congress is unwilling or unable (perhaps due to Presidential action) to conduct impeachment proceedings. Other than these circumstances, the U.S. Constitution does not contemplate that the President has emergency powers of any kind. There are few precedents in which the President has defied the law and the will of Congress more generally based upon a claim of emergency powers. The emergency powers of the President, in particular, and government, in general, are qualitatively and quantitatively, different from emergency powers in most other countries, which are, generally speaking, more expansive and have more formal recognition in the governing documents and laws of the countries in question. For example, while a bipartisan coalition in the U.K. suspended elections during World War II, the United States has never, ever, under any circumstances suspended an election (except during the U.S. Civil War in the Confederate States, where the Confederacy that was the de facto regime there held its own elections instead). Specific Legislation Despite its name, the National Emergencies Act of 1976, doesn't really address the question. Analytically, this is just a law authorizing the President to do certain things under certain circumstances, just like any other law, and not a law that gives the President "supreme power over Congress". It is more like the laws governing disaster relief, which authorize the President, subject to specific criteria, to determine that a situation is a national disaster, upon which determination certain federal assistance is authorized. This is why, even though scores of "emergencies" have been declared, many of which are still in force, they don't feel, to the general public, like "emergencies." To the extent that the National Emergencies Act purports to go further, in ways not expressly authorized by the U.S. Constitution, it is an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine and isn't a valid law. So, for example, Congress cannot delegate all of its law making power to the President via regulations. The Supreme Court ruled in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States (1928) that: "In determining what Congress may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination." So long as Congress "shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." For example, Congress is not constitutionally permitted to give the President line item veto power. Clinton v. City of New York (U.S. 1996). Isn't the executive branch supposed to just execute? I.e. Execute the bills proposed by the party he represents, as supported by that party's allies? The Executive branch is supposed to "execute" although it has considerable discretion in how it does so and has some express instances of unilateral power like the veto power and the pardon power. But, the Executive branch is supposed to "execute" the laws enacted by Congress, not "the bills proposed by the party he represents, as supported by that party's allies." From a legal and constitutional perspective, until a bill is passed by Congress and duly enacted as a law, the Executive branch not only can, but must, ignore them, in any capacity other than as one more lobbyist before Congress among others, on a hypothetically equal footing as everyone else (except that the President has the veto power and the VP can cast tie votes in the Senate, per Article I of the U.S. Constitution).	No. There are no consequences for Congress. This follows, in part, from the Speech or Debate Clause, which is a clause in the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 6, Clause 1). The clause states that members of both Houses of Congress: shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.	Parliament in the UK is sovereign: Parliament [is] the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws that future Parliaments cannot change. If parliament passed a law saying that it was a crime for "a black American woman sat at the front of the bus" and provided that it repealed all existing laws that would invalidate that law (e.g. the European Charter of Human Rights); then there is no defence to that crime if the prosecution proves the elements beyond reasonable doubt i.e. that you are a) black, b) American, c) a woman and d) sat at the front of the bus. In the UK there is no higher law that can be appealed to like a constitution. Over the years, UK parliaments have passed laws limiting their sovereignty, however, any current or future parliament could (in theory) repeal those limits. Just like the USA could (also in theory) repeal the Bill of Rights amendments to their constitution (or even replace the Constitution as a whole); albeit the process is different and less likely to succeed. The limitations on this are political, not legal.	The Supremacy Clause makes Federal laws superior to state laws and even state constitutions, but that is only true for Constitutional federal laws. If Congress passed a law seeking to restore the effect of the now overruled Roe decision, there would be a question as to what provisions of the constitution empowered Congress to do so. Such a law might be challenged, and if no convincing source of congressional authority to pass such a law was cited, it could plausibly be overturned. One supposes that the members of the majority in Dobbs would be reluctant to see that decision superseded by a new Federal law. One hopes that they would take a principled stance, and only overturn such a law if there was good legal reason to do so. Without seeing the text of such a law, and the constitutional arguments for and against it, there is no legitimate way to judge if it would be within the power of Congress. As a political matter, I doubt that the current Congress will pass such a law.	Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.	The ability to create such an office derives (according to Roosevelt, who invoked the power), from the constitutional authority of the president and the Trading with the Enemy Act amended by the War Powers Act, 1941. A president cannot repeal a part of The Constitution or an act of Congress, but he can undo an act by a president (as long as Congress hasn't come along and taken back a power for example by changing the "authorized" part to "required"). In a sense, that office is permanently gone, but until Congress or SCOTUS change the law, another president could effectively re-create that office and even give it the same name. The appendix to Title 50 which authorized the office is still there (not repealed). It is remotely possible that some other act or court ruling effectively nullifies this part of the law, but that would have to be determined by some president attempting to re-create the office and then someone else suing to prevent it (based on such an effectively nullification).
When do I need to guard against falsehoods from someone else's attorney? I will be meeting with my parents and their estate attorneys in the attorney's offices in a state in which I do not live. Can I expect truthful answers? In other words, can an attorney lie for the benefit of their client, or themselves?	Attorneys are universally required to tell the truth at all times and generally, they do. They are not allowed to lie on behalf of their clients or themselves. This doesn't mean that someone else's attorney necessarily has your best interests at heart. And, attorneys can, for example, fail to mention options that exist, but might not be the best for the attorney's client. Also, if an attorney's client lies to him or her about the facts, the attorney could conceivably say something inaccurate while believing it to be true. In the kind of meeting you are describing, however, most likely, the attorneys are simply going to explain your parents' estate plan, over which you have no control or say in any case, and there is no reason for suspicion or paranoia.	I haven't reviewed the filings, but I can tell you that it's perfectly routine for lawyers to describe the other side's position as "plainly without merit," with no regard for the actual merits. The lawyer's job is to make his client look good, in court and in public; the existence of this question shows that he's doing a good job at least on the latter half of that equation. But in truth, it's such a generic thing to say that no lawyer who hears it will actually think it means anything. In all likelihood, the filing is like most others, in that it makes a good case on some points and a bad case on others, and the opposing lawyer's job is to argue that all of them are bad. In the rarer case that a filing is actually "plainly without merit," courts can and sometimes do impose penalties under Rule 11, which allows for sanctions against parties and attorneys who make factual assertions that are not supported by reality or arguments that are not supported by the law.	Often one chooses your accountant, your financial advisor, or your lawyer. Another option is to appoint the trust department of a bank. I personally, as a lawyer, have a policy of not consenting to do that except in rare cases like the one in this question, of a client who just doesn't have anyone and has an estate sufficiently small that a bank trust department would not be cost effective or well suited to handling some aspect of the executorship. But, I have done it a few times in those cases. Most lawyers I know of take a similar position. If no executor is designated, your estate will usually be administered either by a large unpaid creditor, or by the public administrator (whose job is primarily to administer estates in cases where there are no next of kin, no executor has been designated, and there are no unpaid creditors who have stepped up to do the job).	IMHO, your questions reflect several misunderstandings of how the process works. So, with your permission, I will avoid directly answering your questions and instead focus on suggestions how to best help you plot a path forward. Your counterparty has the burden of proof. If your counterparty forged your signature on a contract, then they must prove you signed it or they can not enforce it. In order to enforce the contract, they will need to sue you civilly. Then you can introduce evidence of their forgery at that time. Inform your counterparty you did not sign the contract. Then act accordingly. If your counterparty forged your signature on an extension contract then you should inform them immediately after it has come to your attention. Advise them you have no intention of complying with a contract you never signed. And that if they try to enforce the forged agreement, you will defend yourself "vigorously." Never threaten criminal charges to advance your position in a civil case. This behavior is a crime in itself. It's called extortion. If you want to pursue criminal charges at some point then do it without relating it to the civil case. The police are not your only means of pursuing criminal charges. You can also schedule a meeting with your District Attorney, State's Attorney (whatever that position is called in your state) or your state's Attorney General. In other words, you might want to approach the government's attorney responsible for prosecuting crimes in your jurisdiction. Forget about involving the police. They have given you their position on the matter. Approach the DA or AG office instead. If the DA/AG decides to use the police, she we will make that decision then inform the police how she needs to use their services. Police are wary of being used as leverage in civil disputes. That's probably the reason for their policy decision regardless of whether it's technically justified by the law or not. Your counterparty can't "fix" anything. If they claim you signed a document you did not, they will have to produce that document with your signature on it. This will presumably be your Exhibit A evidence they forged it. Disclaimer: I am a lay person and not an attorney. This writing is no substitute for proper legal advice. If you need help with a specific legal situation please hire an attorney and do not rely on anything I have written here.	I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.	Perjury is not 'not telling the truth'. It requires (in most jurisdictions) being proven to have deliberately lied under oath. As Xavier pointed out, you are not on oath when entering a plea (among other reasons, you would be required to incriminate yourself). Secondly, "I am not guilty" could mean anything from "the prosecution wrongly think that what I did is illegal" to "this law is unconstitutional" even if the facts are not in dispute; either may be mistaken without being a lie. If the facts are in dispute, the jury will have to deliver a verdict that implies (it does not state, let alone prove) that they disbelieve one party; deliberate falsehood, whether by a defendant or a police officer, would be several steps beyond that.	Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this!	It happens all of the time, even though it is mildly improper. Usually, the lawyer can get away with it until the judge sternly warns the lawyer not to try it again, in which case the lawyer risks being held in contempt of court. This is riskier for a prosecutor (who risks this conduct causing a conviction to be overturned on appeal resulting in a new trial), than for a criminal defense attorney. This is because an acquittal, if obtained by these methods, is still not subject to appeal. Indeed, for a criminal defense attorney, even if it results in a mistrial followed by a new trial (which can be allowed if the mistrial is caused by the conduct of the defense), the mistrial will often count as a win if the trial was going badly on the merits.
Do police have a more extensive file on a person than can be obtained from the DMV? Do police have a more extensive driving/traffic file on me than I can obtain from the DMV? I just called the DMV headquarters in Oregon, my state of residence. After I answered two simple security questions, the agent pulled up my driving record and said there was nothing on it. In actuality, over the past ten years I have received three moving violations, one parking ticket, and have been pulled over at least a half-dozen other times. Two of the moving violations are not supposed to be on it since I attended traffic school both times. The third moving violation was three weeks ago. I told the agent all that, but the agent insisted that my driving record is 'squeaky clean'. Do police (or the state) have all these occurrences in some database? If so, what is it called? How can I request a copy of it? I'm asking for two one reason. I'm thinking of pleading not-guilty to the recent ticket, and requesting a trial by affidavit. Second, my friend just added me to her insurance, at which time the insurance agent said I had two items on my record (EDIT: I've since found out that the two items are claims for vandalism on my car, not law infractions).	To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.	In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order.	Under Florida law (316.0083), an officer can view the infraction and issue a notification of infraction "to the registered owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation". Thereupon, the owner has the right to remedies under §318.14, which include arguing that the owner did not commit the infraction. The camera evidence may sufficiently prove that an infraction was committed, but not necessarily that the vehicle owner committed the infraction. This is a civil matter, so the official who disposes of the appeal must determine whether it is more likely than not that the owner committed the infraction. That effectively means that in the face of evidence that the owner committed an infraction, some evidence is needed to show that the owner did not commit the infraction. Thus proof that he was not driving (I suppose witnesses to his whereabouts in Timbuktu on the day in question) would suffice, and there is no requirement that the owner prove someone else did the deed.	I would inform the authorities about that loss as soon as possible (consider that your lost license could be found by a criminal who then conveniently "loses" it during a bank robbery), and ask them how to get a replacement license as soon as possible. See here: http://www.dmv.org/ok-oklahoma/replace-cdl.php That website actually recommends having a copy of your CDL with you at all times, or your company should have a copy on their files they can fax to you, so it would seem legal to drive with a copy. There is a difference between "driving license" in the sense "the permission given to you by the state to drive a car on public roads" and "driving license" in the sense "a piece of paper or plastic giving evidence that you have permission to drive". In most countries, driving without license is a serious offence, while driving without the piece of plastic is a minor offence.	A "police car" doesn't necessarily have a special legal status, so a police officer can theoretically drive a beat-up pickup truck and "be legal" (but not in Washington, see below). What matters is whether others have to give special attention to the vehicle. The pertinent question is, what are the requirements for being an authorized emergency vehicle. I'll give you Washington state law, and you can apply this to other states fairly easily. RCW 46.37.190(1) mandates that Every authorized emergency vehicle shall, in addition to any other equipment and distinctive marking required by this chapter, be equipped with at least one lamp capable of displaying a red light visible from at least five hundred feet in normal sunlight and a siren capable of giving an audible signal. (3) Vehicles operated by public agencies whose law enforcement duties include the authority to stop and detain motor vehicles on the public highways of the state may be equipped with a siren and lights of a color and type designated by the state patrol for that purpose. The state patrol may prohibit the use of these sirens and lights on vehicles other than the vehicles described in this subsection. Given these restrictions, a driver knows whether they must get out of the way, and whether they have to "pull over" (stop driving and get ready for a brief traffic detention). The manner of attachment of "stuff" on the outside of the vehicle falls under general state patrol safety rules, whereby for example you can't balance a rocking chair on the roof and speed down the highway. The state patrol has reasonable discretion to deem that a particular mode of attachment is "unsafe" – this won't be like building-code minutia. Duck tape would probably be deemed to be an insecure means of attachment. There can be some statutory provisions regarding use of private vehicles, for example RCW 46.37.185 allows green lights on firefighter's private care: Firefighters, when approved by the chief of their respective service, shall be authorized to use a green light on the front of their private cars when on emergency duty only. Such green light shall be visible for a distance of two hundred feet under normal atmospheric conditions and shall be of a type and mounting approved by the Washington state patrol. The use of the green light shall only be for the purpose of identification and the operator of a vehicle so equipped shall not be entitled to any of the privileges provided in RCW 46.61.035 for the operators of authorized emergency vehicles. Flashing blue lights are prohibited by WAC 204-21-230(c)(4) "other than a law enforcement vehicle as defined in WAC 204-21-020", which is "a publicly owned or leased vehicle operated by a law enforcement agency and which is used for the law enforcement functions of the agency". That means that in Washington, the town sheriff cannot use his personal car as a law enforcement vehicle. I expect there to be some variation on that point across the US. The lights-and-sirens law is what keeps ordinary people from putting lights and sirens on their vehicles.	Conducting an illegal search does not amount to a permanent get out of jail free card ("does that invalidate all evidence against you". What is excluded is evidence derived from that illegal search, regardless of what crime they were searching for. It would include later evidence for an unrelated crime where the probable cause was uncovered by the illegal search. The doctrine is not absolute, so a grand jury can inquire about a matter brought to their attention via an illegal search ("the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons", US v. Calandra). Also, the doctrine excludes the product of a bad faith search without probable cause e.g. where the officer lies about the probable cause. There is also a "social cost" consideration, see Pennsylvania v. Scott. Utah v. Strief establishes three related doctrines. Unlawfully-obtained evidence independently acquired by officers from a source may be admittede. Evidence may be admitted if it would have been discovered without the unconstitutional source. Finally, since the poison fruit doctrine is intended to limit illegal police action, it may be admitted when there is a remote connection between illegal police conduct and gathering of evidence (e.g. the existence of an arrest warrant, discovered after the search). Nothing in your hypothetical points to an exception. The "social costs" consideration was specifically related to "social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their parole to remain at large", but the potential for wider application is established (however, it is well-established that evidence of ordinary drug possession is excluded, from the myriad cases of such exclusions over the past century).	You don't know. You can't know. And you can't force the officer to tell you. Detention Status As a practical matter, you have no way of knowing if you are compelled to follow an officer's order because you are being detained unless the officer volunteers that information (your detention status) which they are not compelled to disclose and have every incentive not to disclose. Consider the situation when the officer does not have reasonable suspicion do detain you. If the officer instantly informs you that you are "free to go" then you are likely to leave and end the encounter immediately. However, if the officer says nothing, then you might stay and inadvertently say or do something that would give the officer reasonable suspicion to detain you from that point forward. Your behavior during that detention could lead to probable cause, arrest, etc. Every officer knows they have nothing to gain by being quick to tell you you are free to go. Deceptive Conduct To compound the issue, police encounters are particularly problematic because police officers have a lawful right to engage in deceptive conduct during an investigation including but not limited to lying. You, on the other hand, can be prosecuted for lying to the police conducting an investigation. (See this article for more information.) Hobson's Choice Therefore, all things considered, police encounters present a Hobson's Choice. Either comply with every order in an effort to end the encounter quickly. Or try to press the officer to determine whether you are "being detained" or "free to go." The former course of action voluntarily cedes some of your rights. The latter risks "provoking" the officer into making your encounter more difficult, painful or costly than it otherwise might be. Never Consent to Searches That said, you are never under any obligation to consent to a warrantless search of your home or vehicle. Typically, saying, "I do not consent to searches." is usually sufficient if asked. Evidence obtained from warrantless searches is barred from being used at trial unless you waive this right by consenting to the search. See this question (and answers) if you are concerned about the officer falsely claiming you gave consent if you didn't. Never Talk to the Police As a legal matter, talking to the police can never help your case in court. Anything you say to the police that might help your case (i.e., exculpatory) is not admissible as evidence because it's hearsay. On the other hand, anything you say to the police can and will be used against you. In fact, even if you are completely innocent of all crimes AND you are completely 100% truthful to the police, you can still give the police all they legally need to convict you of a crime simply by talking to them. Whereas, without your statement, they would not have had sufficient evidence to convict. See this Youtube video for more details and examples of how this can and does happen every day. Practical Matters The above analysis presents the reader with some practical concerns. You don’t want to risk being harmed by an officer in fear for his safety. You don’t want to be handcuffed and taken to the police station if you can avoid it. You must obey all unconditional commands of a peace officer. It does no harm to inform the officer that you are willing to comply with all unconditional legal commands and ask him or her if a given command is, in fact, unconditional. Some attorneys go in the opposite direction from the "never talk to the police" rule and advise that, say in the case of a domestic violence dispute, the best course of action is to answer police questions matter-of-factly, never lie and never admit guilt. That course of behavior can avoid a potential trip to the police station in handcuffs in the back of a police car even if you are never ultimately arrested. TL;DR: Police encounters are tricky. It's difficult to know what to do. The best course of action is to educate yourself about your rights and the law and apply judgment and common sense to guide your behavior to achieve the best outcome. I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. This answer is not legal advice. Please consult an attorney to obtain proper legal advice.	This depends entirely on STATE law, and you need to list the state(s) you are interested in in the question. Thus, the usual legal statement "it depends." POLICE ARE NOT ATTORNEYS Don't accept legal advice from the police at face value. Police frequently don't actually know the minutiae of the law, and/or often misunderstand it. Their job is not to provide legal advice nor legal judgement, their job is to enforce the law based on certain priorities. Thus the area of enforcement is usually narrowed to specific categories so they can be experts in that area. (I.e vice cops, bunko squad, homicide division, etc.) But police are not lawyers, so don't expect them to understand the law. They did not attend 3 years of law school after attaining a college degree, which lawyers DO. Police get as little as 3 months training (in some states like Arkansas they can be put on duty without ANY training for up to a year (!) before attending the academy). THAT SAID, REGARDING CALL RECORDINGS: There are single and two party states. In single party states, any single person who is part of a call or communication can record it. In "two party" states, everyone that is part of the call must be informed. There are numerous exceptions and stipulations however. GREAT EXPECTATIONS First off, is there an "expectation of privacy." Again this varies by state and case law. Generally, if there is no expectation of privacy, then there is a clear exception to record. For instance, if you are in a busy restaurant, and people around you can hear or eavesdrop, you have no expectation of privacy. Courts have also ruled that if you are in the presence of a police officer performing official duties, there is also no expectation of privacy (not for either of you). IS IT LIVE OR IS IT MEMOREX Are you being recorded? If you are in a two/all party state, and you have an expectation of privacy (a phone call made in your home) then one of the following must occur: If the police are recording you without your knowledge, they must have a court order permitting them to do so as part of an investigation. Otherwise you must be notified with a statement at the beginning of the call that the call is being recorded. (Typically your option is to hang up or continue. Continuing the call implies your consent.) In some states the notification can be in the form of a "duck" or a beep every 15 seconds (time period varies, this is also different per state). OPINION NOT ADVICE BELOW I would think that being notified that a call is being recorded ends any expectation of privacy for any involved party. Assuming the state law and related case law supports recording when there is no expectation of privacy, this circumstance would seem to permit recording legally. Doubly so if your were talking to police in official capacity (did you notice a beep every xx seconds?) CAUTION: Because this varies so much by state, and because even the various Federal District Courts are not in unanimous agreement on the minutiae, there may be other factors to consider.
Does it make sense to suing a foreign company who fired you with no fair cause? Premise: in my experience when you are a solo-freelancer working for a corporation who does have their own lawyers and resources to fight against you, a win is very unlikely (I have even been told this fact face-to-face). Nonetheless I would like to have a second opinion. I am a professional developer ("programmer") and I was working for a US-based company (remote position) as a freelancer (i.e. as a company). The contract was meant to last until the end of year 2017 but they terminated the collaboration (by email, not even over a call and with absolutely no notice ). As any contract, termination conditions exist. In this specific case (I quote): << The company engaging with the contractor has the right to terminate the agreement after several warnings have been issues >> However, no FORMAL warning has ever been issued. All I got is: A Slack message expressing some "generic concern" (after I communicated some personal struggles and that I was aware my productivity level was not at the top for the last 2 weeks) I've been told I made one mistake in my job, which I believe it can happen Nonetheless, the company I am considering suing has sent out a cold email, announcing that they (and the clients the project was committed to) would void the collaboration for poor performance and lack of commitment. I know I could use Slack records and even (very few, unfortunately) emails as proof. However, Slack as many other business apps is a "black box" so I have no way to access those records. When I expressed my concerns about this unfair decision, my message was ignored. My final question is: can I legally put pressure on the company to get a compensation? (e.g. write an article explaining what they did) Is it worth suing them (they're US-based), considering the cost or the legal action would not come cheap (I guess)? As a side note I am based in Europe (I avoid putting the country here, as a means to protect my privacy)	Can I legally put pressure on the company to get a compensation? (e.g. write an article explaining what they did) Writing an article about being fired doesn't have anything to do with the fact that writing that article is legal or not. Sure, you can write an article - or likely an opinion piece - about being fired for what you say are unjust reasons and hope it results in pressure on your old company. This happens all the time in the press; that's what Op-ed and opinion pieces - and also "objective" journalism - do every day. A big corporation isn't going to care about some bad PR from a disgruntled freelancer. Bad PR is not legal pressure. So consider the answer to your last question Can I be sued for warning of a potential crowdfunding scam? which is an outline of defamation law. If you're not very careful (and the publication's editor, if there is one and if they are not well-versed in defamation law), you will defame someone at the company (publish provably false facts) in your article and they (and/or the compnay) can take action against you. And self-publishing a piece has even greater risks of defamation, because it's likely you don't know the boundaries of defamation. Defamation is complex (especially in an international context) and turns on many details of the facts, how they were published, and more. But: how much money do you have to defend yourself against a libel suit? Another point to consider is this: even if you don't clearly libel someone at the company, the company can still take action against you. They can retaliate against bad PR with a lawsuit. You say they have lawyers and can afford it, and you're alone. Can you afford to defend yourself? Is it worth suing them (they're US-based), considering the cost or the legal action would not come cheap (I guess)? As a side note I am based in Europe (I avoid putting the country here, as a means to protect my privacy) That's entirely up to you. No one here will advise you about that. Only you can make that decision, or your lawyer can advise you on that. Talk to an attorney who might take on such an action, and one involving international jurisdictions (a US state and the unnamed European - possibly EU - country). Aside from potential libel, the other important aspect is to determine what legally can be done internationally in terms of defamation, both with any potential action you take and what actions the company can take against you. That will be determined by different laws and international agreements between the US (and possibly the state) and the unnamed (possibly EU) European country. The minor aspect of your dispute is your termination and the employment contract: The company engaging with the contractor has the right to terminate the agreement after several warnings have been issues.... However, no FORMAL warning has ever been issued. That's legally vague enough to allow the company to fire you at any time. (Update from comments: Virginia is a "Right to Work" state which means that the employer may fire the employee for any reason without cause unless the employee is being fired for being a member of a protected class, i.e.race, religion, sex, etc.) Again, international jurisdictions come into play concerning labor laws. Can you find a lawyer who will take on an international labor dispute?	Contracts that violate local law are void in just about every jurisdiction, as are contracts against clearly defined public policy. In many cases, laws are specifically designed to restrict otherwise valid contracts; for instance, in the US, an employment contract that pays less than $7.25 an hour will normally be invalid, even if the company and the employee both agree to the reduced wage. In employment law, where contracts are fairly common, the laws would be virtually meaningless if contracts took precedence. In the case of independent contractor status vs. employee status, California law does not consider someone to be an independent contractor just because their contract says so. "Independent contractor" is defined in California law to be any person who renders service for a specified recompense for a specified result, under the control of his principal as to the result of his work only and not as to the means by which such result is accomplished. (California Labor Code, section 3353) If this definition isn't satisfied, it's irrelevant what the parties agree the status is; it's not an independent contractor status. According to the state department of labor, the test is that found in Borello v. Dept. of Industrial Relations (a California Supreme Court case), which lays out a multifactor test for contractor status and says that The label placed by the parties on their relationship is not dispositive, and subterfuges are not countenanced. Likewise, with product liability, a country can generally have laws mandating liability for people providing a product or service; the extent to which this happens depends on the jurisdiction. For instance, India may not want a big company like Uber to be able to block liability claims by putting some legalese in front of average consumers who aren't able to make a detailed risk-benefit analysis. Alternatively, India could decide that Uber is better able to take the risk from bad drivers than average consumers are, so the right policy is to assign the risk to Uber. Whether Uber should be able to avoid liability is something that every country can decide for itself based on public policy considerations; the point is that if they do decide that Uber should be liable for damages, their law trumps Uber's contract. Uber actually tries to limit liability in their EULA, and to avoid an employer-employee relationship in their driver agreement. Their US EULA and driver agreement says they aren't a transportation provider and you aren't getting transportation from them, and even if you are they aren't liable for damages. However, if that provision violates the law in some state, the provision is invalid. Likewise, if they claim it's not an employment contract but it meets the "employee" definition in some state, it's an employment contract.	Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract.	At Will Employment - In General An "at will" employee in the U.S. can be fired at any time for any reason without any prior notice or warning. Outside a union shop or a civil service employment situation, even an illegal reason for firing does not give you the right to be reinstated in your job - instead it gives you a right to sue for money damages. Unemployment Benefits and Employment References If you are fired for good cause (or you quit in a situation that is not a constructive termination), you are not entitled to unemployment benefits. If you are fired without cause particular to your conduct (e.g. you are laid off in the employer's reduction in the size of the employer's labor force), or your are fired for a reason that is not good cause (e.g. you are fire because the boss is annoyed because you are such a goody two shoes that you always show up to work on time), you may be entitled to unemployment benefits based upon your term of service and earnings (short time employees are often not entitled to unemployment benefits no matter what). If you apply for unemployment benefits because you assert that you were fired without good cause, and the employer believes you were fired for good cause, the employer can dispute that finding in a summary administrative hearing. Employers fight awards of unemployment benefits for employees who are fired rather than laid off, because it affects the employer's unemployment insurance rates (and because they care, for non-economic reasons, if the integrity of their stated reasons for firing someone are not believed, or if their reasons for firing someone are not considered to be legitimate grounds for termination by a government agency). Even if you are entitled to unemployment benefits, these benefits are much smaller than your regular pay, and generally last less long than the period for which you were employed. A formula or calculator should appear on the Texas Workforce Commission Website. I assume when you say that "They put a few fake tags on me" that this means that they stated reasons that would be valid "for cause" reasons for termination and you dispute those reasons apply to you, but please clarify if I am mistaken. If that is the case, it is likely that you would have to fight for any unemployment benefits you are otherwise entitled to in an administrative hearing as the company is likely to contest your claim that you were not fired for good cause. This also means that if you seek new employment that they will give you a bad reference to someone who inquires about your employment (although many HR departments are afraid to do that for fear of defamation liability and will only confirm the dates of your employment and your position). Wrongful Termination Lawsuits Separate and apart from unemployment benefits, if you are fired, not just without cause, but for an illegal reasons (e.g. race, sex, and select statutory prohibited reasons), you may bring a wrongful termination lawsuit. Some of those reasons (firings related to discrimination by a private sector employer) require you to file an EEOC complaint and have it investigated by them first, other of those reasons (mostly whistle blowing statutes and breaches of written employment contracts that don't allow for termination of employment without cause) allow you to immediately bring suit for wrongful termination. The legal status of firing someone because you complained about another employee's ethical violation depends upon the exact nature of the ethical violation. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided this month (i.e. February/March 2018) held that whistle blower protections under U.S. securities laws apply to people who report securities fraud to the SEC, but not to people who report securities fraud to a supervisor in the company. "My fellow employee was a lying asshole who acted unprofessionally (in non-technical sense of the word), and I complained about this conduct to my supervisor and the employer didn't care" standing alone, would not normally constitute conduct that is covered by a whistle blowing statute that could allow you to bring a lawsuit for wrongful termination of employment, although it might constitute a constructive termination for bad cause by an employer (if you quit) or termination for bad cause by an employer (if you were fired) for unemployment insurance purposes. The legal theory behind the amount of damages that can be awarded in a wrongful termination lawsuit is a bit obscure. As a rule of thumb, six months wages is a pretty typical settlement amount in a wrongful termination case prior to a determination by a court of employer liability. At trial, there is wide variation in what juries award in wrongful termination lawsuits involving similar facts. Sometimes the award is minimal even when the jury finds that the employer wrongfully fired you, and sometimes the award is very substantial, amounting to many years of lost income in amount. Contractual Payment Obligations Generally speaking, unless a written contract provides otherwise, you have no obligation to return a hiring bonus and the employer has a contractual duty (and probably a statutory one as well) to pay you through the date of termination without deduction for a hiring bonus paid. This includes any amounts, including bonuses, that the employer was obligated to pay you, although proving an entitlement to a bonus can be difficult unless that standard for receiving one is clearly defined and you clearly met those standards as a factual matter. Sometimes, you can even win a breach of contract award for a bonus that was not yet fully earned if the only reason that the bonus was not awarded was the employer's bad faith conduct. You could sue to collect unpaid wages in a Justice Court (the limited jurisdiction court for small claims in Texas) if necessary, if the amount you are claiming is under $10,000. If you have a claim for unpaid wages in a larger amount or also have other damages, you would need to bring suit in the appropriate county court or district court, depending upon the amount claimed.	Bulgaria is one of many countries in which intellectual property can be protected with a single international patent filing, in lieu of a Bulgarian specific filing. In generally, you should assume that any patented idea likely to have international application, such as Internet based software, which is patented in the U.S. is also the subject of international patent protection, unless you specifically know that this is not the case. Virtually all patent lawyers know how to make this filing and most would recommend doing so in this case. So, yes, it is something you should worry about, and the better practice, by far, would be to obtain permission from the patent owner if the app is likely to have any meaningful commercial value. Now, if you were sued, there is a good chance that it would be in Bulgarian courts under Bulgarian patent law, which may be somewhat less harsh in some respects like damages awards than U.S. patent law. But, the basis for patent liability for an infringement in Bulgaria would be very similar.	That is a very broad clause, broader than the default US rule for copyright, for example. (I know the question asked about the UK, I just happen to know the US copyright rule.) It would seem on the face of it to include independent research on a subject totally unrelated to the person's employment, done off the company's premises and not during normal work hours, but while the person was an employee.. Indeed it would arguably include the copyright to a novel written off premises and during off hours. Use of "course of employment" (instead of "term") would improve the provision. so would "as a part of his or her employment" or "closely related to the subject of his or her employment". Another possible restriction would be "Using the Company's facilities and/or equipment, or during normal working hours". However, my experience is that an employer will have drafted whatever language it uses through its company lawyer, and will be quite unwilling to alter it in any way. A prospective employee will probably be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice unless that person is a nearly indispensable figure to the company. One could send the company a certified letter saying, "When i signed the contract agreeing to {company language} I did not intend to include any developments made off company premises, not using company equipment, and unrelated to the subject or scope of my employment. I retain full rights to any such developments." Such a letter would help establish that there was no meeting of the minds to assign such non-employment-related developments or IP to the Company. How much weight it would have if the rights to such developments were the subject of a court case I am not sure.	"Backlogged" has no legal status. Under usual contract terms, all intellectual property you generate as part of your employment belongs to your employer. But "intellectual property" is a category of rights, such as patents, trademarks and copyrights. An idea by itself is not intellectual property. "Wouldn't it be great if ..." cannot be owned by a company. However, specific ideas can be trade secrets, and trade secrets are protected. It's likely that your idea is a trade secret, if the idea applies to the sort of business that your ex-employer is involved in. The fact that it's called promising by the company reiterates that.	Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual.
Will I be liable for injuries to someone else resulting from defending myself in a confrontation? Let's say you are eating dinner with your family at a restaurant in Florida that has some outside seating. In the middle of your meal, a young man proceeds to try to sell you his mix tape. You politely decline, and go back to your meal. He is very persistent and borderline aggressive with his sales pitch. At which point you are slightly less polite and tell him to buzz off. He takes offense to the manner in which you responded and proceeds to take off his shirt and takes a very threatening stance. You believe that the safety of your family may be in danger. As you get up from your seat, the young man takes a swing at you which you are able to dodge. And you proceed to give him a good one-two combination which subsequently knocks him down. He is clearly dazed. But gets up and wants to continue the fight. You aggressively pick him up, slam him to the ground, give him 2 good punches to the face, and he's knocked out. At which point you back off as you feel you have sufficiently neutralized the threat to your family. Police arrive and start to question witnesses, request a copy of the security cam footage and question you. All of which match up showing that the confrontation was started by the young man walking up to you having dinner. Did I have a legal right to defend myself and family? Will I face criminal charges for injuring the young man? If the individual sustains injuries, can I be liable for his medical expenses? If during the fight, damage occurred to the restaurant or other private/public property. Could I be liable for those expenses?	In Florida, as in most common-law jurisdictions, you may legally use force to defend yourself and others from someone else's imminent physical assault. Florida makes it explicit. 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person. (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. The force you're defending against must be imminent, though. You can't just believe you may be in danger; you have to believe you are. Further, you must reasonably believe not only that use of force is necessary to defend against that danger, but also that you have to use that much force. Once you believe any of those statements to be false, or any of those beliefs become unreasonable, you're no longer protected by 776.012. If you continue to use force past that point, you're no longer defending; you're attacking. Yes, there may be criminal charges. I mean, use of force is illegal by default, and justified or not, you did just knock a guy out. The government has a duty to ensure that your use of force was lawful, and if it finds reason to believe otherwise, you may be charged. Yes, you might be held liable for the attacker's medical expenses. Mix Tape Guy is likely to try to sue in any case. He has some small chance of winning, partly because civil and criminal trials present different burdens of proof. If you weren't charged, or were found not guilty (and didn't get off on a technicality), then that chance remains pretty small. But if you are tried and found guilty of assault, you're much more likely to lose. Yes, you might be held liable for damage to the restaurant etc. Same story as with Mix Tape Guy. The outcome will depend heavily on the outcome of the criminal trial. If you weren't charged, or you were found not guilty, then you're less likely to have to pay to fix the restaurant. If you're tried and found guilty, you'll almost certainly have to chip in.	You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific.	Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".	The best course would be to contact the public defenders office and explain the situation to their intake or consultation services. Remember, you don't have to be going to trial to avail yourself of their services and sometimes, helping cops makes the cops suspicious about you (it would not be the first killer who cozies up to the police to learn what they know about his crime). If the Public Defender thinks you're rich enough not to need their services, you should call criminal defense attorney practices. Most law offices will offer consultation free of charge as part of client intake, so they will be willing to hear your case and offer advice. In either case, check with the lawyer that attorney client privilege is in effect. If they say yes, explain in detail to them, everything you know and want to discuss, even if some of it could criminally implicate you in this or another crime. Treat it as your deathbed confession and you know full well which circle of hell you're going to if the priest doesn't absolve you of sins (okay, too Catholic... but the Lawyer is not going to turn you in if the privilege is in effect... he could lose his license to practice law over it... we can make all the evil lawyer jokes we want, but this is one of the few sacred tenants of their profession.). Listen to his advise. Also see if you can find a second opinion. It's not that the first guy gave bad advice, but the next guy might give you something different. If you still do not feel comfortable, then keep your mouth shut. If they arrest you for the murder, do not talk until you have an attorney present and prepare to tell him exactly what you did. Especially if you did do it. Always answer your attorney truthfully.	Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.	I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at 11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at 2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.	She has no legal right to your stuff, and every legal right to the apartment. The only way adjudicate such a conflict of rights is with a restraining order. A temporary order would expire in 3 weeks. Item 14 in the petition requests exclusive use, possession, and control of the property. However, that path of restraints is tailored to domestic violence, so item 27 has you describe the alleged abuse: Abuse means to intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, keep you under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), batter, telephone, or contact you; or to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Note that the description refers to destroying your personal property, not pawing through it. It's really impossible to know if the judge will exercise his discretion to include "reasonable fear of destruction (or theft) of personal property", since the ex-roommate has no further interest in the apartment. There is an alternative path of a harassment restraining order, which does not require a defined domestic relationship (such as ex-roommate), where "harassment" is violence or threats of violence against you, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed you and caused you substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct is more than one act and that seems even less likely.	I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire!
Will I have problems if I accept two job offers in two different EU countries? I am non-European and I have never lived in France. I recently got a job offer from a company in France and I signed it. A few weeks later, I received another job offer from a company in Germany. Being non-European, there is a risk of not obtaining the necessary papers in France since it has to be proved that I am the best candidate on the market (ie. no other EU citizen is fit for the job). So I thought about signing the German offer as well in order to have a plan B if things do not work out with France. My question is: by signing these two offers, will the two countries know that I have two ongoing visa/work-permit procedures at any given time? If yes, could this cause me problems? Thank you	As far as your visa is concerned, both, France and Germany are in the Schengen area, so a visa in one of those countries will give you access to both. As for as your work permit is concerned, at least in Germany you will need some participation of your new employer. They will have to prove that they can find nobody else in the EU. So they'll probably want you to sign the employment contract. As far as getting out of such a contract in Germany, you have to differentiate between a fixed-term contract (e.g. for 2 years) and an indefinite contract. Once you sign a fixed-term contract, it is difficult to get out of it before its normal end. Unlimited contracts in Germany usually come with a 6 month probation period, where both, the employer and employee can end the contract immediately. In this specific case you might be able to get out of the German contract. I don't know though if the employer would go through the trouble of obtaining a work permit for you without binding you for a fixed amount of time to them.	I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.	The law of each country where you offer the app for download applies, and you have to consider: Privacy Policy (GDPR in EU, CCPA in California, APPI in Japan, LGPD in Brasil, and more - check each country to be on the safe side) Disclaimer versus AGB/Terms and Conditions (e.g. Germany), not required but recommended Impressum (Germany, Switzerland, Austria) Value Added Tax (VAT) which is taken care of e.g. by Google Play for most countries but not all (e.g. not for Japan) in case the app is not free Consumer Protection Law - applicable (and different) everywhere There might be more, but these are the important ones I am aware of.	Yes this is possible, no this is not simple. You are eligible to work as a Freelancer in Germany if you're from an EU/EEA member state. Your nationality is not relevant beyond that. When you start your freelancing, you must inform your employer/university. This is important for two reasons: you may not compete with your employer, and your effective tax rate depends on your predicted total income for the year, which they need in order to withhold the correct amount. (Don't worry, any discrepancies will be resolved with the tax declaration.) In Germany, self-employed work is either gewerblich or freiberuflich which has numerous consequences. This depends on the type of activity. Consulting and activities that require a completed 5-year diploma are generally freiberuflich. But e.g. software development has unclear status. This is ultimately the decision of the tax authority. You might have activities of both kind, but this complicates your accounting. When you start a gewerbliche activity you must register with the Gewerbeamt, and list your fields of activity. Make sure to register as a part-time freelancer, not full-time. In any case you must notify the tax authority through the Fragebogen zur steuerlichen Erfassung, which you should fill through the online Elster system. This will include your income projections and offers some important choices. If your income from freelancing is below a certain threshold, or if you are purely freiberuflich, your (now mandatory) tax declaration is simplified (EÜR). You will not have to do professional accounting. If your activities are gewerblich and your income is below a certain threshold, you do not have to pay business tax. Kleinunternehmer-Regelung: If your income is below a certain threshold, you can opt-out from collecting VAT within Germany. You can always give up Kleinunternehmer-status, but you can't easily return to it. Otherwise, you may request a VAT-ID (UstId). You will then have to regularly pay advance VAT, typically monthly. You can offset any VAT from business expenses that you paid. Tax rules are complex, and depend on the country where the service is rendered – generally, the location of your client. For your services in other countries, you may have to register in that country, or you may fall below their thresholds. The following cases can be discussed more specifically: You can only list VAT on your invoices if you have a VAT-ID. If you have a VAT-ID, you must collect VAT within Germany and for B2C sales within EU. For sales of digital items to consumers in other member states, you may have to use the MOSS system. For sales within the EU where both parties have a VAT-ID, the reverse-charge mechanism is used and the recipient is responsible for paying VAT. For sales in non-EU countries no VAT applies, but you have to follow the local rules. For sales in the US, the tax agreement between the US and Germany exempts professional services from US income tax as long as you perform the services remotely. You will have to send your client's accountants IRS form W8-BEN to document this. However, state-level taxes can still apply. For any income that you get, you should have issued an invoice. The exact details are documented elsewhere, but important aspects are: Your and your client's identity Your VAT number if you have one, your tax number otherwise (but not your personal tax-ID!) A sequential invoice number that will stay unique during your business, e.g. just count from 1 or restart yearly like 2019-1 A date VAT payment if you have a VAT ID, otherwise a notice why no VAT is due. In your tax declaration, you will list income from self-employed work separately from income from employed work, even though it is taxed together. You will have to prove your freelance income, generally through form EÜR. The tax authority may request your invoices and your bank statements and receipts for any expenses. It is therefore recommended but not necessary to open a separate account for your business activities. If you are freiberuflich then most banks welcome you, for gewerbliche activities only one or two banks offer free accounts. Besides tax issues, you must also consider health insurance and retirement plans. As long as your freelancing is only a side job (Nebenerwerb) this is fairly simple. You will have to inform your health insurance about your freelancing. They will need an income projection to calculate your premiums. If your total income fluctuates a lot, you should try to get your premiums calculated individually for each month. This generally doesn't matter if you have private health insurance as they use a flat rate. At this point it should be clear that freelancing is not necessarily trivial, mostly because VAT is a concern. You should therefore look for help: a tax advisor can help you navigate the German tax system, at least for your first tax declaration. dealing with tax issues might require professional help from an accountant, e.g. how to manage VAT and how to correctly apply a tax treaty. most universities have things like founder-workshops. While geared towards first-time full-time self-employed people or startups, there's still a lot of valuable information there.	Unfortunately, you are probably not entitled to the redundancy / severance money since you weren't technically ever made redundant / laid off - there was no point in time where you were willing and able to work where they refused you, and I presume you were paid for all time worked. If you're concerned that they only changed their tune because they knew you had a better job already lined up - well, you can call their bluff or just use it as a learning experience. In what jurisdiction do you work? If the US, you could call their bluff, say you'd rather stay and see what they do. You would then keep the option of simply walking away with your stuff in a box any time you felt like it (assuming at-will employment and no contracts that state otherwise).	There is no legislation in Germany that explicitly states how long you have to wait in such a situation. First let's look what happened: According to your work contract, you are obligated to be available for work and follow the directions of your employer. Let's not go into nuances of the latter duty, because they depend on what type of work you are doing. Your employer is obligated to pay you if you fulfill your duties. What happened is called Annahmeverzug (default of acceptance) in German civil law (§ 615 BGB): Kommt der Dienstberechtigte mit der Annahme der Dienste in Verzug, so kann der Verpflichtete für die infolge des Verzugs nicht geleisteten Dienste die vereinbarte Vergütung verlangen, ohne zur Nachleistung verpflichtet zu sein. Er muss sich jedoch den Wert desjenigen anrechnen lassen, was er infolge des Unterbleibens der Dienstleistung erspart oder durch anderweitige Verwendung seiner Dienste erwirbt oder zu erwerben böswillig unterlässt. … English translation: If the person entitled to services is in default in accepting the services, then the party owing the services may demand the agreed remuneration for the services not rendered as the result of the default without being obliged to provide cure. However, he must allow to be credited against him what he saves as a result of not performing the services or acquires or wilfully fails to acquire through use of his employment elsewhere. … If your employer doesn't enable you to work, they have to pay you for your time. You don't have to make up that time. If you save money by not working or had the opportunity to earn money by other means1 during that time, this can be deducted from your pay. Now, the question is how you fulfill your duty of being available for work. This depends on the specifics and really can only be answered by a lawyer or court (and IANAL). You do not need to endure hardships but have to accept reasonable inconveniences. Thus, you can leave if waiting becomes more than an inconvenience (usually that will be caused by weather or by bodily functions). If you leave, you should still be available for work unless that becomes unreasonable, e.g., because you could use that time to earn money by other means. 1 Usually, it can be safely assumed that you don't have that opportunity. However, a daytaler might easily have that opportunity.	People can take their personal cars through the Channel Tunnel from Great Britain to France. They don't actually drive their cars through the tunnel, but going by car is a perfectly normal way to travel between those two countries. That's probably the most well-known place where drivers will switch from driving on one side of the road to the other, but there are many more . If driving with a car with the wheel on the "wrong" side were forbidden, these options would not exist, because at least one direction of travel would not work. Now, of course, that doesn't mean a country like Belgium, which does not have to direct way to Britain, couldn't forbid cars with the steering wheel on the right. But at least for EU states, that seems to be forbidden, as Poland and Lithuania learned when they tried to require cars that were to be registered there to have the steering wheel repositioned to the left Consequently, the Court holds that the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that, in the context of the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, that the driver’s seat of that vehicle be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic. It notes in that regard that the legislation at issue provides for exceptions with regard to the use of vehicles equipped with a steering-wheel on the right by people who reside in other Member States, and travel to Poland and Lithuania for a limited period (for example, tourists). That fact shows, according to the Court, that the contested legislation tolerates the risk involved in such use. So even those countries that tried to ensure that registered cars had the steering wheel on the "right" side made provisions for cars that were just traveling through. And the EU does not consider it a valid law to require wheels to be repositioned.	I'm not aware of any cases on point, but as a rule legal fig-leaves don't play well in court. If the webmaster simply puts up a banner saying that EU residents are not permitted but takes no other action to exclude them, then that is going to be considered irrelevant. The webmaster is still very likely required to comply with the GDPR. On the other hand if the webmaster takes other steps to exclude EU residents, such as using a geolocation service to block connections known to be in the EU, validating email addresses and blocking those from EU domains, and ejecting anyone who mentions that their residence is in the EU, then that is more likely to be seen as a good-faith attempt to avoid being subject to the GDPR. It will also have the practical effect of greatly reducing the number of actual EU residents. All these controls can be evaded, but it would be much harder for any data subjects to claim that they acted in good faith or that the webmaster acted in bad faith. Note that validating an email address or logging an IP is itself processing of personal data, so anyone implementing such a system still can't ignore the GDPR completely, but it would greatly limit the scope and make it easy to delete any such data after a short time. (Note: the term "EU resident" above is an approximation of the territorial scope).
Wrong industry code, is it legal? I live in Denmark, and someone sent me an invoice of a work they did, they charged me for the job more than I expected, when I take a look at the CVR information online, it shows they have apparently the wrong category, since it says: "702200 Company consultancy and other advice on management" What they did was some cleaning job. So what I'm wondering is, is this legal?.	This question sounds to me like there is an inferred intent of the person giving the invoice to manipulate their value added tax rate due to the misclassification, and then an unrelated issue related to an overly high charge for the services which are basically independent. Is the classification of the job material in some way to either of those issues in a non-obvious way that you haven't clarified in your question? I will answer on the assumption that it is not, because at first glance, it is hard to see why this would matter with respect to either issue. A CVR listing is sort of half way between a U.S. Secretary of State company listing and a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission company listing with more than just bare bones contact information but less than a full fledged public company's disclosure statement. The fact that the company's business type classification is not a precise match for the kind of work that they did for you on this job is not obviously material to either what VAT taxes would be due (which usually depends upon the particular kinds of goods and services involved in the transaction) or the rate that a company can charge for a particular kind of work done. The fact that a company is classified in one category that describes the overall enterprise doesn't mean that every last thing done by the company must precisely fit that description. The mismatch could also conceivably be nothing more than a clerical error made by somebody preparing the CVR listing, in which case, again, the answer is "so what?" Therefore, as far as I can tell from the limited information in the question, this is just an immaterial error with no relevance to any of the likely disputes that you might have in this case. Usually, an immaterial error in a public record or invoice would not be a ground to object the amount that a company charged for the work, nor would it be something that would be appropriate to complain about in any way that would bring you an advantage that I can see in this transaction. This doesn't mean that you don't potentially have grounds to object to the invoice and dispute the higher than expected charges. But, bringing up the issue of the CVR code doesn't appear to add anything to your rights in this dispute. This said, I can certainly imagine circumstance where the wrong CVR code could be a hint that something else really is amiss. For example, suppose that you need a license to do a cleaning job since it involves environmental hazards and waste disposal, but you don't need a license to do management consulting, because who cares if someone is stupid enough to take your bad management advice. In that situation, the company might be misclassified because it doesn't have and perhaps cannot get for some reason, the business license that it needs to do the cleaning job. Charging for services while not having the proper business license might very well be illegal and a ground not to pay, and the error in the CVR filing might actually be an attempt to circumvent this problem. But, that kind of possibility relies upon pure speculation and without more facts there is no good reason to assume that something nefarious is going on here.	If you paid by a credit card, the proper procedure is to simply do a chargeback. If the hotel doesn't back down, then the credit card network will hold arbitration. I wouldn't expect them to win, since they don't have anything but their word for it. The hotel does have the option of suing you, but it's unlikely that they will do so for £200, and again they don't have much of a case. Their third option is to just report it to credit reporting agencies as a unpaid debt. For this, there's not much you can do other than have the fact that you dispute it included in your file. Theoretically, you could sue them for defamation, but that would be impractical.	According to the information I was able to find, every zone, country, or even states, have their own taxation rules for sales made there. Correct. Well, in no way it's possible that small companies or individuals that sell products internationally deal with tax rules for each buyer, that would be a non-sense, and paying such taxes worldwide would be a nightmare not worth having a small business at all. You are required to comply with the law. If it is complicated, or difficult or expensive to do so then, it's complicated, difficult and expensive and you still have to do it. The answer is obvious: if it's not worth having a small business, don't have a small business. The main question, if someone buys a license from my web-site, is it considered a sale in the buyer's country/state which requires me to collect and pay some remote tax, or it's a purchase in my country/state which requires me to collect HST from that buyer? It depends on the law in both Canada and the destination country. In most cases, the sale will be an export sale from Canada (GST/HST exempt) and an import sale in the destination country - requiring you to comply with GST/HST obligations there. Another question is regarding invoices, I know that Canada requires certain information to be included into an invoice for sales in Canada. If my sales will be considered sales in a buyer's Country with some other rules, does it mean I have to manage tons of invoice templates? Yes. Let's say if my sales in UE exceed 30K EUR it looks like I need to register and pay VAT there. But what if I have less? Then you don't need to register and remit tax. Nor are you allowed to collect it from your customers. By the way, I have no idea what country in the Eurozone goes by the initials UE. In most jurisdictions, you need to register either when you reach the threshold in fact or reasonably expect to reach the threshold. Also in most, you can usually register even if you are below the threshold. For example, these are the rules for Australia. Anyone, please advice. Hire an accountant versed in international digital services. They will be able to give you the advice you need. They will also be able to recommend sales/payment platforms that can handle most of this for you (for a fee, of course).	Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.	"Fraud" requires an intent to deceive. In cases like this I would fall back on the saying, "Never attribute to malice what can be explained by incompetence." Practically speaking: the email you received from them is an amendment to their Terms of Service. I.e., your contract with the company starts with their standard Terms of Service, and is modified by any agreement you reach that explicitly supersedes the ToS. Based on your description it is your credit card company that is in violation of its duty to adjudicate chargebacks. If you refuse the charge, and present the email agreement and evidence of A's "failure," then the card company has no grounds to impose the charge on you (unless the merchant in its response to the chargeback can convincingly argue that the email agreement is invalid).	Defining the value of a privately held company is hard (tax returns don't provide a very informative basis because accountants will tend to under-value things like "goodwill" in order to avoid paying tax). However that doesn't matter for this stack, because the only legal question is: If I had some means of coming up with a number and presenting it, would it be legally acceptable to define that as their company value in a license? And the answer is: absolutely yes! You are pretty much entirely free to define terms in your license as you see fit. If you want to define "company value" as meaning "the annual gross salary paid to receptionists", go for it. (You would probably need to define what a "receptionist" is in this case).	Prove my work is not a trade secret violation Please don't. It's not your job to prove your innocence. The burden is on them to be specific, explain fully, and prove specific claims about your actions. In other words, don't justify, don't explain, and don't defend yourself to them. It's actually best you do not say anything to them, and just forward the letter to your legal counsel (Since you're selling software to be used in the medical field, I assume you already have some kind of legal counsel). For instance, even saying something as innocuous as "Managing patients, Exams, Bills etc are all public knowledge." could be used against you. Because it establishes the fact that you've been working on those features with them and that you've been working on those features with your new company (which doesn't necessarily follow, for all they know, you could have purchased a library module from someone else with those exact features). In other words, even if you were to reply with such an innocuous-sounding statement, you could be saving them months of cross-border discovery and litigation about some of their claims (even if you believed you were being entirely reasonable by defending yourself). But at the same time, don't take what I'm saying to mean that you should lie to them about which features you recently worked on. When I say that you shouldn't be talking to them. I mean that you should not be talking to them. You shouldn't be engaging with them and you shouldn't be giving them any shred of information whatsoever (implied or otherwise). It's not your job to make their job any easier. Do not reply to them. Don't even acknowledge the receipt of the letter (unless you already did by signing for it, which can't be helped). Use a legal intermediary. Give the letter to your own legal counsel (whether you signed for the letter, or not) and leave any reply to him or her (assuming he/she thinks this warning letter even warrants a response). And if this former employer gives you a phone call, kindly refer them to your legal counsel without saying another word.	The key language to be taken notice of in that code is 'by fraud or deception'. If the property manager has provided reasonable notice of a clear-out, then the code doesn't apply due to lack of fraud or deception. But at the end of the day, just go and check the mail room on a Thursday afternoon and you shouldn't have any problems.
Can you trademark a phrase consisting of common words? Could someone trademark a fairly common string of words, like "This is Your Life" or "Ask [Name]"? My question specifically regards to the naming a podcast — not naming a business. There is a podcast named that, which is fairly popular on iTunes, but if someone else started a podcast with the same name, could the original creator sue? Just to be clear, I do not want to name a podcast with the same name(s) mentioned above or anything along those lines — it's just a general question.	Just Do It. The preceding sentence is one example of a trademark that consists of common words demonstrating that it can be done. As to the podcast if you were duplicating the name of their podcast it would depend on a number of things including if they had trademarked that name, and how Apple's terms of service are for the iTunes podcasts.	A person who uses a name similar to an existing protected trademark may have committed trademark infringement. The trademark owner can sue, and possibly collect significant damages, and possibly also get an injunction against further infringement. Note that this is not a matter of a crime, but of a lawsuit by one person or business against another. (A point of terminology: A trademark, like a copyright, is said to be "infringed" when someone uses it without permission in ways that the law does not allow. The word "broken" is not used for this.) In many countries, only marks properly registered with the appropriate national registry are protected. In the US simply using the mark can lead to its being protected, although registration can give greater rights to the mark owner. Protection in one country does not give protection in another. In general, protection only applies in the same or a similar market area as that in which the mark is already being used. An electronic game may well be similar enough to a card or board game for protection to apply. A key question is how similar a mark can be and avoid infringement. The basic test is if a reasonable person could be confused into thinking that the products were from the same maker, or were affiliated, or that the maker of the original product or service endorsed the new one. This is always something of a judgement call. If a mark is similar enough that a judge or jury might think that some reasonable consumers would be confused or mislead, then there is risk of an adverse judgement. Note that even an unfounded suit may be costly to defend. If there is any question, consulting an experienced trademark lawyer may well be a good idea. I will not express an opinion of the similarity of "2oobbllee" and "Dobble". That would be legal advice. But if the OP were to change the name of the app, the whole matter would seem to be finished with no risk of court action. Note that the concept of a game, unlike the name, cannot be protected, neither by trademark law nor by copyright law,	Being or not being open source makes fairly little difference in trademark law. If a commercial firm (Yoyodyne, say) had used the name "Portable Network Graphics" and the abbreviation "PNG" in trade, and taken such further steps as would be needed to protect it in the relevant countries, that firm would have a protectable trademark. Note that in some countries, a trademark must be registered to have any protection at all (much of the EU follows this rule). In others, use in commerce can offer some protection even without registration (the US follows this rule). Had this happened (in an alternate reality) Yoyodyne could have sent a cease and desist letter when open source developers started using the mark. If the devs did not cease, Yoyodyne might have obtained an injunction, or damages for trademark infringement, or both. They could also have issued a takedown notie to the site hosting the project. But had Yoyodyne failed to defend the mark effectively and allowed it to become generic, Yoyodyne might have lost all rights to it. Also, had Yoyodyne ceased to use it in trade for a significant period, they might have lost rights. This is a place where the different laws in different countries might lead to different results. Note that "Portable Network Graphics" is rather descriptive, and not particularly distinctive. Descriptive marks, like "Tasty Pizza" generally get weaker protection, while more distinctive marks, such as "LuAnn's Tastee Pizza" are more strongly protected, in general. Again this depends on the country, and the specific facts. In general the first to use, or to register a mark, gets the rights. When one entity is the first to use, but a different one is first to register, things can get confusing, and results will be different in different countries. Note that a Cease and Desist letter is not a legal requirement. It is a threat of possible future legal action, and often an offer to avoid such action if the recipient does as the sender requests. The recipient can comply with the letter, wait for court action, or try to make some sort of compromise deal. Open source projects, as other answers suggest, often choose to comply.	Probably not, without permission. Images of the character are usually copyrighted. The characters themselves are usually protected by trademark. Using the name of a fictional character without permission would imply endorsement by the firm that published works with that character. I've taken day long seminars focused mostly on all of the things that comic book companies do to protect their intellectual property rights in their characters. Of course, if you live in Finland, it is likely that no one in the U.S. would decide to take up the case for a U.S. media property, either because they aren't aware of it, or because it isn't economically worthwhile to pursue.	Yes, they can be. In the example given in the question, there is an additional factor which is that the possibly-infringing company is in a different line of business, which means that it might be possible to use the exact same name without infringing trademark. For example, there are Dove soap and Dove chocolate. (This possibility is probably more remote with a distinctive, novel name such as YouTube.) Trademark protection is supposed to prevent others from confusing consumers. For example, if the graphic design or other branding of the hypothetical youtub were sufficiently similar to that of YouTube that consumers might actually think that YouTube had branched out into the plumbing fixtures industry, then a court would likely find trademark infringement. (Such elements are often protected trademarks in their own right, of course, independent of the world mark; for example, UPS has trademarked "the color brown" in connection with package delivery services.) If a company started using the youtub brand to host and serve digitized video recordings, a finding of infringement is more likely still, even in the absence of other similarities. This would be especially true if it appeared that the name had been chosen explicitly to draw customers from the YouTube site, and that would probably be fairly easy to demonstrate in court.	Yes, the SFC doesn't allow the usage of the term "git" for third-party products unless they have their permisison. From the Git Trademark Policy, 2.3 Prohibited usages of the Marks: In addition, you may not use any of the Marks as a syllable in a new word or as part of a portmanteau (e.g., "Gitalicious", "Gitpedia") used as a mark for a third-party product or service without Conservancy's written permission. For the avoidance of doubt, this provision applies even to third-party marks that use the Marks as a syllable or as part of a portmanteau to refer to a product or service's use of Git code.	Getting permission from the game owner would be a sensible approach. If you get it, great. Then you could do it with the owner's blessing. It's possible to do your write up without the owner's permission, but then you have to be much more careful. For instance, the names of games cannot be copyrighted. No one can prevent you from writing "A Guide to Bridge," or "A Guide to Chess," etc. On the other hand, some games are trademarked, in which case you will need to attach a TM (trademark) symbol when referring to them. In this case, see a lawyer. You are also allowed to discuss the game itself "in your own words," but you must be careful not to "plagiarize" anything from the rules, or the official game description. That is, while you can refer to specific aspects of a game, such as building houses and hotels, the leash on copying is fairly short, as little as five words. This does not refer to five words in a common sequence referring to a single thought like "The United States of America," but it could refer to five words in an original or unusual sequence such as "I think therefore I am," by Rene Descartes, or "X houses and Y hotels," where the numbers X and Y define the number of houses and hotels in a certain board game trademarked (I believe) by Parker Brothers.	You cannot copyright a word or name in and of itself, so you can't sue someone for having a novel titled 13 so long as their novel is distinct from your own. Trademarks can use certain words or word combinations, but often in a way that is stylized or symbolic of a particular unique style and may include font, coloring, and other unique artistic takes. For example, McDonalds cannot copyright or trademark the letter "M" but it can trademark the "Golden Arches" a unique stylized "M" that they use as signage to at all their locations. If the name is a brand of a certain product such, then the name can be trademarked but only with respect to that product. For example, if the Acme Wash-Master is a dish washing machine they can't sue Ace Wash Master, a unique dog bathing system, for using the name "Wash Master" since it's both styled different (Acme uses a dash between words. ACE uses a space) and non-competitive product lines (most people would not wash dishes in a dog bathing device... and one would certainly hope that no dog owners ever said to themselves "Fido stinks and my tub is busted. The dish washer will do in a pinch!").

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